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THE BATTLE OF LEBANON: A STUDY OF REVOLUTIONARY
DEVELOPMENT

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THE BATTLE OF LEBANON: A STUDY OF
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is an analysis of the political development and the events leading to the Battle of Lebanon, April 13, 1975. The analysis provides an alternative to mainstream literature, utilizing the concept of class within a political economy framework. There is also a critique of the literature on Lebanon and a critique of the popular "Moslem versus Christian" theory advocated by mainstream theorists.

Class formations and transformation, the material basis of confessionalism, the impact of colonialism, economic development and under-development, as well as dependency relationships between Lebanon and the dominant capitalist countries are central to the analysis. Ethnicity and religion are also placed in a materialist context to better understand primordial ties, class formations and the different alliances that arose between different sectors of Lebanese society.

The dissertation is primarily a study of revolutionary development. There is an examination of the contending forces and the economic and political underpinnings which gave rise to them. Also shown is the continuity of revolutionary development of the LNM prior to and during the battle, positions the LNM assumed in combating pro-system forces and effecting reforms, and the effect of the Syrian invasion on revolutionary development. The lack of revolutionary ideology to guide the LNM, the loose coalition that characterized it, and the errors in strategic political and military analysis and tactics are brought into focus.

Proposed within the dissertation is a paradigm capable of analyzing social and political development more coherently, relying on a concept applied in Marx's Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, the notion of the State and the theoretical framework developed in Poulantzas' Political Power and Social Classes. Since the theoretical framework relies heavily upon Poulantzas, major criticism of his work is also considered. This dissertation is a practical attempt to apply the theoretical framework in a systematic way, incorporating dependency theory and Marxist analysis. In conjunction with this analysis, two concepts developed through the application of this theoretical framework are advanced. One pertains to "a state without cohesion" and the other concept is in relation to "class sectors" as distinguished from "class fractions".

Primary sources on Lebanon's political economy were obtained from the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development in Kuwait, and from economic studies available in Lebanon and Iraq. Other information was obtained from interviews conducted with LNM leadership as well as leadership in the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party. Certain officials in the PLO and Fateh were also interviewed, along with many other interviews and meetings held with people who witnessed major events in the Battle of Lebanon and/or who were party members or sympathizers of the Progressive Socialist Party, Ba'ath, PFLP, Fateh, the Lebanese Kata'eb Party (LKP) and others. Documents, speeches, party organs, statements and other literature from these various groups were also utilized.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The events of April 13, 1975 signaled the beginning of a drawn-out armed conflict, the "Battle of Lebanon", between two irreconcilable social forces. Extremist pro-confessional forces, intent on maintaining a political system that guaranteed their political and economic interests, took the offensive as anti-confessional forces gained momentum in their demands for economic and political reforms.

At that time, various shades of pro-system forces with articulated political and economic interests did not opt for the armed solution; rather, they tried to reconcile the situation. Their deliberate vacillation during the battle allowed them to remain viable political instruments in any situation. However, the growing role of the "left coalition" during the battle gradually relegated these forces to the sidelines of the conflict, exposing the true nature of their vested interests.

Pro-system forces hoped to maintain confessionalism--a system of government whereby various religious sects of a polity are proportionally represented according to the population of each sect. However, this ossified, and parochial systems could not accommodate the ever more volatile and popular demands stemming from the "left". Extremist forces committed to system maintenance eventually were

transformed into agents of "system explosion",* the natural consequence being the "Battle of Lebanon".

This conflagration was perhaps the most devastating political outcome in Lebanon in history. To understand the nature of Lebanese politics, the dialectical interplay of the historical moments should be brought into focus. Such a study is necessary for comprehending the complexities of Lebanon's political development.

If one is to assume that confessionalism is incapable of accomodating the persistent new "left" forces emerging in Lebanon, the following questions must be addressed:

1. What is the "left" alternative to confessionalism?
2. How can this model be effected?
3. What forces can implement this change?

One is immediately faced with the problem of understanding the nature of the contending forces and the underpinnings of the political and economic context that gave rise to them. Against this background, one can test the claims, assumptions and activities of the anti-confessional forces and pro-confessional forces to determine whether their activities were consistent with their goals.

A search for an alternative political system also makes it necessary to study revolutionary development in Lebanon. On one level, the "left coalition" and its "minimum program" provided such

* The term "system explosion" is introduced to depict the sudden fragmentation of the state machinery as a result of antagonisms within a political system that had outgrown mechanisms of system maintenance.

an alternative.** Also in examining revolutionary development and the various obstacles that it faced which often seemed insurmountable, certain conditions must be met that would enable the "left" to carry out the necessary tasks which are prerequisites of revolutionary change.

In my second chapter, I discuss class formations in Lebanon and Lebanon's development from its early beginnings to independence. We see how classes arose in this historical context and why they arose. Utilizing political economy, I show the political development of Lebanon and the emergence of definite classes and relation--the peasant-landlord relationship, the peasant's relationship to the clergy, etc.--and why they had these sort of relationships. I also talk about the major revolts that occurred in Lebanon's history, the impact of colonialism, and how certain changes occurred from a feudal mode of production to a capitalis mode of production. Class formations and transformations are all intricately tied in with the economic mechanism generating society. We can see how ideology, politics and most of all, economics, are important in determining class interests.

The third chapter is specifically about the economy of Lebanon from Independence (1943) to 1975 (the year of the Battle). In this chapter I show how there is a dependency relationship between Lebanon

** The minimum program consists of social, economic and political reforms of the Lebanese system. Significantly, it calls for the abolishment of confessionalism. The program is "minimum" in that it does not call for a socialist revolution and because it remains within the confines of liberal democracy. See G. Shukri, Urs Ed-Dam Fi Lubnan (Beirut: Dar-et-Taliya, 1976), 134-135.

and the dominant capitalist countries. I also show how Lebanon's economy is subjugated to the requirements of the international capitalist market. I have illustrated, as far as quantitative data permit, what it means to have uneven development socially, in the economic sectors and the regions.

Chapter four is a discussion of the literature on Lebanon. The overwhelming majority of the literature on Lebanon is within the mainstream tradition of political science, utilizing the so-called "American political science paradigm". Of these mainstream theorists, Hudson is the most authoritative and the most consistent with his use of the paradigm, his shortcomings being the shortcomings of the paradigm.* My position is that the mainstream political science paradigm is inadequate and incapable of revealing the true nature of political and socioeconomic realities. I show that classes and class analysis are crucial to understanding Lebanese society and the fundamental problems that arose. By putting ethnicity and religion in a materialist context, one can see that mainstream theorists are bankrupt in explaining class formations, primordial ties, and alliances that arose between different sectors of Lebanese

* At one point in his "Precarious Republic Revisited" article, Hudson seemed to be at a crossroads. In this article Hudson talks about the failure of mainstream literature in analyzing and predicting events in Lebanon. This insight, however, only appeared at a time (during the Battle of Lebanon) when the roof had caved in on him and he could not but admit to this theoretical error. Regretfully, in his book, Arab Politics, which followed publication of the "Precarious Republic Revisited" article, he unequivocally reverted back to the major tenets of structural functionalism, reneging on much of his criticism of the mainstream theorists and opting, with a vengeance, for restitution in the tradition of Apter, Pye and Verba.

society. Proponents of the "Moslem vs. Christian" theory do not fully address economic categories, are apologists of the status quo, and proved themselves incapable of analyzing the tide of events which came as a "surprise" rather than as a calculated, highly probable event.

Within the Christian and Arab Nationalist literature, which is far superior to the mainstream literature, I have shown certain incongruencies. This illustrates the need for a paradigm that is capable of analyzing political development more coherently. I also show that Arab Nationalist literature agrees with the main tenets of dependency theory; however, its concept of dependency was not developed in a systematic way. Dependency theory was never applied to Lebanon for a number of reasons, primarily because dependency theory was a product of the 60's, gaining prominence in the 70's. To date, there is no such work about Lebanon that in a systematic way is either based on dependency theory and/or Marxist analysis.

In terms of theory building, one would have to rely on concrete historical data. Theory must correspond to social reality as well as to the historical development of social reality. In chapters two and three, class formation and the historical development of Lebanon's political economy are discussed. Chapter four critiques the literature on Lebanon, the mainstream paradigm, Arab Nationalist and Christian literature. Chapter five points out the need for a type of literature that can analyze Lebanon's social and political development in a comprehensive and dialectical fashion. In chapter five I argue for a Marxist theoretical framework.

The Marxian framework does not come out of thin air. In

chapters two and three I present the material basis for my paradigm and show that beneath the surface of political tactics and maneuvering there are classes operating on the political, ideological and economic levels. These classes interact with the mode of production and each other to condition, modify or change the existing societal structure. There is continual interaction and transformation on all levels of society.

Within chapter five I argue for certain concepts that I will be using in my analysis. I am relying on basic tenets applied in Marx's Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, since this work is considered by many Marxists as the first profound application of dialectics to the analysis of a specific event (the French coup of December, 1851). The notion of the state is central to revolutionary Marxism; therefore, the theoretical framework developed in Poulantzas' Political Power and Social Classes is central to my analysis. Since I am relying heavily on Poulantzas, I also consider the major criticisms of his work (Bridges; Johnson). I show that Poulantzas is neither "ahistorical" nor "undialectical", but proceeds instead from historical materialism. Such characterizations as "structure ossification", "ahistoricity" and "undialectical" are without merit. In those instances, a critique of structuralism a la Althusser may be apropos, although I feel Poulantzas' model eclipses such criticism.

Since Poulantzas' conception of "classes" is also brought into question (Johnson), I have taken time to clarify his understanding of classes as "pertinent effects of the structure." I would like to point out that in the framework developed in Political Power and Social Classes, Poulantzas also speaks of classes as "a

structure in a certain place (a field)" and utilizes "class" as a structure in the field of social relations.

One can criticize structuralism per se as being "ahistorical" or "undialectical", but that does not mean that one cannot use a certain framework that may be "structuralist". This chapter does not accept the theoretical framework as a recipe. One can utilize a structuralist framework and still remain historical and dialectical if it is applied as such. This dissertation is an attempt to develop and apply such a Marxist framework while incorporating dependency theory as a developed theory of Imperialism. In chapter six I attempt to show the possibilities of such a framework.

In Chapter six I discuss Lebanon's political development from Independence to the eve of the battle (1943-1975). Utilizing the framework discussed in the previous chapter, relations of forces at various conjunctures are examined. I also discuss the social formation, how it is related to the state, what kind of forces are in the state, what kind of alliances were made within and without the state, and why these alliances occurred. The study of politics on the level of the state shows how the internal contradictions in Lebanon propelled the revolutionary movement. This also shows how the revolutionary development interacted with factors external to the polity.

The Battle of Lebanon would remain a puzzle if one did not understand Lebanon's political and economic development. Chapter six is a study of revolutionary development, and illustrates how Marxist theory can be applied to better understand underlying reasons of events which cannot be deciphered without looking at the

relations of forces within the context of the historical development of politics and economics.

In chapters seven, eight and nine, I discuss the Battle of Lebanon, showing that there is a continuity with the revolutionary development of the LNM prior to and during the Battle. In chapter seven the Battle is examined to show the positions the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) took in combating the pro-system forces. Data are provided that shed light upon the weaknesses and strengths of the LNM.

In chapter eight it is shown that the LNM moved from a position of effecting reform in the system by diplomatic and political means, to a position that convinced it that it must defeat the right-wing forces militarily to be able to transform the nature of the Lebanese state and to effect economic and political reforms.

In chapter nine I discuss the Syrian invasion, and the way it prevented the LNM from attaining its goals.

In my "Discussion and Conclusion" (chapter ten), I apply the theoretical framework to show how it is possible to analyze Lebanon's economic and political development within a Marxian framework. I also show that it can be used in understanding the alliances that occurred in the Battle and the development of the LNM. The inability of the LNM to effect its program is discussed to point out a possible method of affecting change. Also in chapter ten, a contribution to the development of the theory is advanced.

Primary sources on Lebanon's political economy were secured from the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development in Kuwait and from economic studies available in Lebanon and Iraq. While in the Middle

East in 1978, many meetings and interviews were conducted with people who were directly or indirectly involved with the Battle of Lebanon. I was able to secure an extended interview with the First Chairman of the Central Political Council of the LNM, Dr. Rafi'i, who also was the leader of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party in Lebanon, and who is currently in the National leadership of the Party in the Arab World. Another extended interview was conducted with a top PLO official who also is a member of Fateh. Another interview was conducted with two top officials of Fateh--the Revolutionary Council, an off-shoot of Fateh. An intermedial level PFLP leader was also interviewed. Many other interviews or meetings were conducted with people who witnessed major events in the Battle of Lebanon, and with party members and sympathizers of the Progressive Socialist Party, Ba'ath, PFLP, Fateh, the Lebanese Kata'eb Party (LKP), and others. I was also able to study literature of these various groups (documents, speeches, party organs and statements).

CHAPTER TWO

POLITICAL HISTORY

In the fourth decade of the seventh century A.D., Muslim Arabs conquered Syria (Lebanon, Palestine and modern Syria). In order to repel Byzantine attacks, Muslim tribes settled on the conquered areas. The displaced Christians, who were mostly Maronite, took refuge in the northern part of Mount Lebanon.¹

During the Crusades, Mardites were brought from the Amanus and Taurus mountains to protect coastal towns from Muslim Arab attacks. At the end of the Crusade period Muslim Arabs forced these Mardites to relocate in the Mountain where they intermingled with the Maronites.

Under the influence of the Crusaders, Maronite relations with Rome began to take form in the twelfth century. Rome's influence also touched upon Maronite doctrines. Earlier Maronite belief about Christ having two natures, one divine and the other human with one divine will, gave way to Catholic belief. It was not until 1439, however, that partial union with Rome was achieved at the Council of Florence. Full union was effected only in 1736 at the Synod of Al-Luwzayah.²

Trade with Italian city-states and Catholic missionaries in the Mountain further reinforced relations of the Maronite Mountain with the West. During the seventeenth century, the Maronites referred to the area around the Cedars as Mount Lebanon. Not until the eighteenth century did the name also refer to areas further south which bordered Jabal (mount) Ash-Shuf where Arabs of the Druze religion lived since

the Crusade period.³

Druze religion is an offshoot of Islam. It originated in Egypt during the reign of Fatimid caliph Hakim (r. 996-1021). Not meeting with much success in Egypt, Muhammad Ad-Darazi, founder of the Druze religion, took refuge in Jabal Ash-Shuf after Hakim's assassination. In the Jabal, the Druze began to convert other Muslim tribes to their belief. Families who had played important roles in Lebanon's history, like the Tannukhs, the Arslans, the Ma'ans and the Jumblats were among the converts.⁴

In this setting, a feudal system began to emerge in the Maronite and Druze areas. In 1516 when Ottoman Selim I defeated the Mamluks in Syria, Feudalism was firmly established in the Mountain. Selim I named the Ma'an Fakhr-Ed-Din I "Sultan of the Mountain". His grandson Fakhr-Ed-Din II (r. 1586-1635) is regarded as the father of modern Lebanon. He was able to unite the northern Mountain with Jabal Ash-Shuf in the "Emirate of Mount Lebanon". During his reign the Ottomans did not interfere much in the internal affairs of the Mountain, as they regarded it as a "tax farm".⁵

The decline of the Ma'ans prompted the Hamadeh Shi'ite tribe to annex the northern areas of the Emirate to their Hirmil region.⁶ In 1759, however, the Maronite peasants rebelled against the Hamadeh's and asked the Shihabis to rule them. At this time the Shihabis (converts to Christianity from Islam) ruled the Emirate. Bashir Shihab I was elected governor in 1697 by the council of Emirs (land lords) after the last of the Ma'ans died childless.⁷ In keeping with their predecessors' policies, the Shihabis encouraged Maronite peasants to migrate south to Kisrwan and Ash-Shuf. This migration resulted in the permanent

push of the Shi'ites out of Mount Lebanon. Furthermore, exclusive Druze areas witnessed a sustained and steady Maronite peasant migration as they were badly needed to till the lands of landlords who were seeking to increase their revenues.⁸

In the Emirate, social stratification consisted of two main socio-economic groups, lord and peasant. Peasants were also subdivided into landowners and tenants. In this feudal system, social relations were somewhat secular. Harik informs us that in the Iqta' (feudal) system "the party groupings, again, cut across religious lines."⁹ Although the Druze landlords were more influential than their Maronite counterparts, "Nevertheless, it is clear that religious affiliation was not a factor in shaping the politics of the Imarah (Emirate) before the end of the eighteenth century."¹⁰

Druze landlords were more powerful than their Maronite counterparts due to two main reasons: (1) the strong social organization of their society, and what seems obvious, (2) the Druze were historically the pillars of the Emirate while the Maronites were integrated relatively recently. While northern Maronite lords were not much better off than their peasants, influential Druze lords exercised their political and economic power in areas outside their villages.¹¹

In vying for power over the Emirate, Bashir II (a Maronite) depended upon Druze lords to fight other Shihabi contenders. Bashir II also encouraged the complete integration of the Maronites into the Emirate as they were needed as laborers and scribes. For these reasons Maronites were treated on an equal basis with Druze and Muslims. They were allowed by own land and to participate in the politics of the Emirate.

The political office of mudabbir (manager and advisor to the emir) was an extremely sensitive position. Earlier Shihabi rulers had Maronite mudabbirs to counter the power of Druze lords. Maronite mudabbirs would curtail the power of the Druze lords and render more power to other Maronite families.¹² When Bashir II became ruler, he rewarded his Druze supporters by appointing one of them as the mudabbir. This was an opportune moment for the Druze lords to check the power of the Maronite lords and regain the power which they had lost earlier. Although the office of mudabbir "...made political conflict inevitable between the Maronite and Druze Manasib [lords] who were the main custodians of power in the system,"¹³ the feudal system still remained secular, and political conflict among lords also cut across religious lines.

Up until the middle part of the eighteenth century, landlords and peasants were the main social forces in the feudal system. Development of the Emirate brought about another highly organized social force whose role was to become decisive in eighteenth and nineteenth century Lebanon.

The church's traditional organization and poverty were not conducive to making it an independent and powerful social force on the political scene. However, reform in the church and the integration of the Maronite areas into the Emirate were favorable conditions for the growth of its prestige and power in society. Church reorganization brought formal hierarchy to and limited bribery in seeking religious positions. It also regulated and made church functions more efficient. These steps were aided by the education of the clergy at the Maronite college which Pope Gregory XIII opened in Rome in 1584. Integration of Maronite areas into the Emirate had put the Maronites on an equal

footing with the rest of the population in the secular system.

At first, the reorganized church remained poor and completely dependent upon the upper class "for general support, for seats where they could carry on their religious work, and for the establishment and maintenance of new monasteries. In return for these benefits, the notable clans exercised influence over the church and secured most of the top offices for members of their families."¹⁴ Thus we see a symbiotic relationship between church and nobility and in many cases, the church was an institution through which the nobility could exercise influence over the peasants.

When the Khazins (Maronite lords of Kisrwan) were encouraging Maronite peasants to immigrate to their fiefdom, they used the church to do so. They supplied the church with protection and influenced its policies by transferring much of their lands into mortmain. Non-Christian lords did not interfere with the church, but on various occasions donated land in the south for the building of monasteries. This was one means of attracting the much-needed peasants to the south of the Mountain. Through this policy, lords increased their revenues through taxes that the church had to pay. Furthermore, Christian donor families regarded mortmains as investments and exercised property rights over them by having bishops elected from these families. A member of these clans once wrote to the Pope: "The Monasteries are ours founded by our fathers and grandfathers, and we will admit to them whomever we want to admit...We remain obedient to the Holy See in all matters religious."¹⁵

A significant development gave much political and economic power to the clergy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Around 1700

the Order of Monks started as an autonomous organization in the church. The order was formally under the bishop, but each monastery was in fact run by its abbot. Monks were recruited from peasants and they lived a communal and ascetic life. Since they did not need much to live on, they were capable of working the land and saving money to acquire more land. Seeing how efficient these monks were, lords began donating more non-productive land to them. With so much land to cultivate, monks encouraged Maronite peasants to congregate around and work for them. "For these reasons many of the muqati'jus (feudal lords) preferred to see monks serving their subjects rather than the village secular priest, for the secular priest, as an individual working by himself, was not the productive force the organization of the monks was."¹⁶ In this way the Order of Monks became "one of the largest propertied sectors of Lebanese society."¹⁷ These corporate bodies became wholly integrated into the system which they served very well.

As the Order of Monks became wealthier, a power struggle developed between them and the lords toward the end of the eighteenth century. Earlier, monks payed taxes to lords who took their share and passed the rest on to the ruler of the Emirate. By the nineteenth century they began to pay their taxes directly to the ruler, who was also interested in curtailing lords' power.¹⁸

The church also began to encourage the opporessed peasants to revolt against their lords and feudal privileges. Because of the social and economic functions that the church exercised in society through daily contacts with the people, it was capable of wielding more influence among the people than the lords did. Both clergy and peasant interests converged against the feudal system. The clergy were capable

of leading the opposition due to their organization, education and the communal alternative to the feudal system which they demonstrated.

During Bashir II's rule (1788-1840) commitments to Westernization and his war efforts demanded an ever-increasing budget which he sought to bolster by levying more taxes on the peasantry. The peasantry came out openly against Bashir in the 'ammiyah (commoners) revolt of 1820.¹⁹ Bishop Istfan who had earlier disagreements with Bashir concerning the latter's religious practices, participated with other clergy in the revolt. Class alliances shifted during the revolt. Bashir had to rely upon the Jumblat family to fight the 'ammiyah while other Druze and some Shi'ite lords sided with the 'ammiyah. The revolt also attracted two Shihabi emirs who wanted Bashir deposed. Maronite lords either fought the revolt or stayed neutral, as did some of the Druze.

The 'ammiyah and the alliances concocted around it were powerful enough to depose Bashir II, who fled the Emirate to Huran in Syria. The revolt was significant in various ways. (1) It was organized in village communes with each village electing a representative to a general council. This was something unheard of in the feudal system. (2) Commoners and clergy exercised leadership roles. (3) Church ideology overlapped with peasant communal ideas and was effective in challenging the feudal system.

The new relationship that the peasants voiced and acted upon sought to transcend the patron-client one. To this effort Maronite districts of Matn, Batrun, Jibbat Bsharri, Kisrwan and Jubail all took part in the revolt. Harik contends: "The class consciousness [of the peasants] is also evident from the fact that peasants participated in the uprising against the wishes of their muqati'jis [landlords],

particularly the Khazins and the Abillama's who stood with the Druze manasib and signed their compact."²⁰

The two Shihabi emirs lost the 'ammiyah support when they tried to levy taxes upon the peasantry to meet their financial obligations to the Ottomans. Meanwhile, Bashir II had arranged with the Ottoman ruler to return to the Mountain where he immediately began to reconcile the Druze lords. Once this was done, he sent his son to collect taxes. Peasants protested and gathered in a place called Lihfid. Bashir negotiated with the 'ammiyah and agreed to their demands of equal treatment with the Druze lords in tax matters. Certain political demands, however, were not acceptable to Bashir, who still had most of his support base among Druze lords loyal to the Ottomans. The demand that the emir ruling over them should not be appointed by the Ottoman ruler and should be one of them (a reference to Bashir's wavering religious affiliation, "Christian by baptism, Moslem by matrimony, Druze through convenience rather than conviction..."²¹) precipitated fighting in Lihfid, Kisrwan, Jibbat Bsharri and other places. The outcome of the fighting was devastating to the 'ammiyah and to the nobility that supported it.

Most of the Druze lords became supporters of the Jumblat family, which aided Bashir in the battles against the 'ammiyah in 1821. When Bashir had to flee to Egypt because of a quarrel with the Ottoman ruler, the Jumblatis became extremely powerful. On his return from exile Bashir felt very uncomfortable about this rising new power in the Emirate.

From 1822 until 1825 Bashir worked to consolidate his position. To this end he searched for new allies. He found in the church and the masses it influenced a most useful ally in suppressing Druze

competition. The most powerful Druze and Maronite families were completely subdued in the battle of Mukhtarah. The effects of this battle were far-reaching. Although the feudal system remained a viable institution, it nevertheless underwent fundamental structural changes. The church entered the political scene as a challenger to the lords, thus curtailing much of their previous power. A symbiotic relationship between the emir and the patriarch emerged and the latter was encouraged to settle differences among the Maronite lords. At times the patriarch was capable of intervening with the emir on behalf of Druze lords, an activity that the emir discouraged. "Thus the patriarch became a man of much political influence, but not a holder of political office."²²

What the church could not achieve through the 'ammiyah, it had been able to come closer to through its alliance with Bashir II. As a powerful institution, the church eventually wanted to become the dominant, if not exclusive power in the polity of Mount Lebanon. To this end it encouraged in various ways (through writing, its influence in the 'ammiyah, its daily contact with the peasants, etc.), the breakdown of social relations between the Druze and the Maronites and tried to give it a sectarian flavor. The goal of a Christian Emirate dominated by a church enjoying mass support attracted the weak Maronite lords to an alliance with the church against Druze lords.²³

The attempt to achieve this goal coincided with Egypt's intention of conquering Syria. The weakening Ottoman power through this conquest facilitated the church's goal and prompted it to ally with Egypt and Bashir against the Druze lords and the Ottomans. Druze lords were anti-Egypt due, in part, to the alliance of Bashir Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt

who had subdued them earlier.

From 1825 until the Egyptian invasion in 1851, the Maronite church gained more political and economic power, often at the expense of Druze lords, especially the Jumblats. In aiding the invasion, Bashir relied on an army composed mainly of Maronite peasantry. The church organization was also extremely effective in mobilizing men for Bashir. Bashir and his son utilized sectarian sentiments in inciting the Maronite peasants to fight Druze lords.²⁴

Despite the fact that Egyptian tax policies were unpopular among the peasantry and despite the clergy having a hard time explaining reasons behind a Maronite alliance with Egypt, the clergy did not want to relinquish this alliance. They did not want the tax question to become a hurdle in the way of an exclusive, church-dominated Maronite Mount Lebanon which they thought the Egyptian connection would help secure. This, however, remained an unrealized dream. After Egypt's rule was firmly established in Syria, Ibrahim Pasha became lukewarm toward Bashir II and began contemplating radical changes for the Mountain. The clergy did not appreciate what they regarded as an encroachment on their privileges and immediately asked the French Consul in Beirut to intervene and prevent such an occurrence.²⁵

In essence, the clergy sought to keep all forces balanced in their bid for a Christian Emirate. The people, however, were unable to carry the tax burden and contend with corvee and the fear of conscription into the Egyptian army. Although the clergy and the Maronite lords were not pleased with the situation, they were unable to take action in favor of the people against Bashir and Ibrahim Pasha. Druze peasants were also unable to act single-handedly against Ibrahim Pasha in

Lebanon since they were leaderless. Their lords were still outside the Mountain after their revolt was crushed by Bashir and Ibrahim Pasha.

Divergence of interest between clergy and peasant prompted the alliance of Druze and Maronite peasants who led the revolt of May of 1840 against the Egyptians. The revolt was similar to the 'ammiyah revolt of 1820 in its organization and goals. The leadership was made of the commoners while the lords who joined with the revolt were among the followers.²⁶

Needless to say, the revolt upset the plans of the clergy, who tried in vain to pacify it. The peasants petitioned the patriarch with their grievances but to no avail. In July, however, the church reversed its position in favor of the revolt. This move coincided with the mid-July Treaty of London which committed the European powers to oust Ibrahim Pasha from Syria.²⁷

The revolt called for governmental reorganization, less taxation, an end to corvee in the iron mines of Al-Matn and to the privileges of Druze lords since "Lebanon is not the property of the Druze, it is ours...".²⁸ The first stage of the revolt failed when in July of 1840 Bashir and Ibrahim Pasha defeated the commoners. In September of that year, however, British, Ottoman and Austrian troops landed at Juniah and encouraged the Maronites to revolt. This time the peasants succeeded in overthrowing the Egyptian yoke. The Ottomans appeased the Maronites by exempting them from taxation for a period of three years and agreed to reorganize the Mountain since, like the peasants, they were interested in curtailing emir influence through centralizing the political machine. To this end, the Ottomans in agreement with the European powers appointed Bashir Qasim Shihab (Bashir III) ruler of the

Mountain. The success of the revolt had the European powers recognize the patriarch as the representative of his people, and began to deal with him accordingly.

The unforsaken goal of a Christian Emirate led the clergy to solidify their alliance with Bashir III who also needed a support base among the population. The returning Druze lords, however, saw in the whole affair an encroachment on their rights to fiefdom, especially after the Ottomans were in favor of reorganization.²⁹ The Ottoman goal was to bring the Mountain under their hegemony. This necessitated limiting the lords' power.

To avoid any premature eruption of hostilities, the church found it propitious, at times, to mediate between the Druze lords and the emir Bashir. The latter's untactfulness in dealing with these lords had completely alienated them and eventually led to the October hostilities of 1841.³⁰ The result was frustrating for the clergy. While they wholeheartedly sided with Bashir III and sent him troops made up of commoners and lords, the army could not act due to internal bickering and lack of a unified leadership. While the clergy and commoners were out to destroy the feudal system, Maronite lords were in contradiction with their position. On the one hand they could not completely break away from the peasants; however the demise of the feudal system was definitely not to their advantage. Ultimately they sided with their Druze counterparts against the peasants. The attempt of the church to unite Maronite lords and peasants failed the test of class interests and struggle.

In 1842 the Ottomans replaced Bashir III with an Ottoman ruler. Displeased with this alternative, the European powers intervened and

called for a new arrangement within which they could exert more influence in Lebanon. In 1843 the two-governorate system was initiated. It comprised a northern governorate which was predominantly Maronite and a southern governorate with Druze lords but mostly Christian peasantry.

The 1845 clashes between Druze and Maronites brought about a situation in the southern governorate that stripped Druze lords of most of their powers over their Maronite subjects. The inclusion of intermediaries between those subjects and their lords further eroded the feudal system in the Mountain and contributed to the rise of sectarian sensitivities. As the church expressed it: it was easier for Christians to die than consent to live under Druze rule.³¹ However, the church's goal of a Maronite Emirate failed and in the course of a few years led to another round of open-class warfare that assumed-- thanks to European and church roles--the semblance of religious warfare. Prior to dealing with these events, perhaps it would be useful to look at society up until the forties of the last century.

Great economic and social changes occurred in the decade of Egyptian rule. This new opening to the West had a far-reaching impact upon the social formation of nineteenth-century Lebanon. Earlier, the formation underwent change primarily because of internal dynamics. With this new influence tension propelling change within the system was exacerbated further.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Beirut had no more than 5,000 residents, and was fairly important for trade in the eastern coast of the Mediterranean. Subsistence economy was prevalent in the

Mountain and the household loom complemented farming. Concerning social relations in that period, Hitti informs us that "Christians, Druze and Shi'ites continued to live together in harmony and peace."³² Further, "Neighbourliness, if not 'familyness' characterized business transactions as they did social relations."³³ Speaking of social relations and customs Volney "...was struck by the similarity between Druze and Maronites in the mode of life, system of government, language, customs and manners. Members of both communities live amicably side by side. Druze at times accompany Maronites to churches, make use of the holy water and, if pressed by missionaries, suffer themselves to be baptized."³⁴ A few years earlier, abbot Mariti observed in 1760 that Druze "behave with great friendship to Christians and respect their religion. They pray indifferently in the Greek churches and the Turkish mosques."³⁵

Despite church and foreign power attempts to promote segregation and sectarian conflict, this spirit remained intact during the 'ammiyah revolts of 1820 and 1840. As Hitti contends, the 'ammiyah "starting from a wide base, with the thesis that all sons of the Arabic tongue constituted one nation toward the realization of which they all should strive, the nascent pan-Arab movement was soon confronted with specific local problems resulting in its fragmentation."³⁶ These problems have already been discussed.

Improved means of transportation and increased cultural contact with the West through missionaries had brought furniture from Paris and textiles from the mills of Manchester along with other European commodities to the local market. Local cottage industry and village handicraft could not compete with European goods. Consequently dyeing,

weaving and other manufacturing began to disappear. By 1841 European goods had almost completely replaced them. This dealt "severe blows to the textile industry of Aleppo and Damascus."³⁷

Outsiders began to invest in village lands and villagers were hired as part-time laborers to work the land, planting mulberry trees to grow the silk worm. The silk industry helped to incorporate the villages into the world capitalist market economy. "These changes in the rural areas had adverse impact upon the number and proportion of agricultural workers."³⁸ Unable to find jobs in the village, landless peasants migrated to urban centers in search of better work opportunities. Education and the expanding trade in Beirut and other cities also contributed to the rapid development and expansion of the urban population. Seri culture was among the few local economic activities that prospered due to European contact. Not until WW I was it adversely affected.

The development of division of labor and the impact of the West on Lebanon resulted in the emergence of new classes. Because Druze lords fled the Mountain during the 1820's and 1830's, they were unable to actively participate in the new social and economic relations that were forming. Consequently, Maronite peasantry were capable of increasing their wealth in part at the expense of Druze lords. "Peasants of Druze lords in the 1820's were by the end of the 1830's their moneylenders...Druze middle and lower classes were almost entirely rural and were affected mainly by being drawn into a closer dependence on the foreign market while gaining rather less than their Christian and Muslim counterparts from the ferment of the economy in Beirut."³⁹

In the 1840's control of the economy--at least those factors of

production geared to modern industry such as modern oil presses and steam reeling factories--were in the hands of foreign capitalist investors.⁴⁰ By the late 1800's Beirut had a population of 120,000. The type of businessman who emerged was geared to serving the international capitalist market by acting as a middleman. Gradually these business types accumulated economic and social power and, along with lawyers, doctors and educators, formed a new class that began to share power with the upper class of landowners and clergy. Another class in the Lebanese social formation was the producing class: tillers and manual workers.

Having considered the main social and economic changes during the first half of the nineteenth century, we now can take a look at the events that led to a change in the form of government of the Mountain.

When Bashir Ahmad Abillama' became governor of the north, he posed as champion of the Catholics. With the blessings of France and Austria, he began creating sectarian conflict between Catholics and Orthodox Christians. Recognizing that Bashir Ahmad was supported by her rivals, England gave its support to his opponent, Bashir Assaf, who also enjoyed the support of the Maronite aristocracy. Three years later (1857) rebellion broke out in Kisrwan against the feudal lords. Clashes between the rebels and lords prompted Bashir Ahmad to take action against both parties. This in turn spurred the two sides to separately organize against the governor. The lords wanted to replace him while the peasants wanted to get rid of both lord and governor oppression.⁴¹

The peasants invited the lords to a meeting to present them with their grievances. The Khazins, lords of Kisrwan, refused to consider any of the grievances. Instead they began threatening the peasants, antagonizing them even more. Seeing that the affair was leading to violence, the originally-elected peasant chief Salih Sfayr resigned and the peasants elected instead Tanius Shahin. By January, 1859, the revolt was in full swing and enjoying the backing of the French, the church and the Ottomans.⁴² Local revolts erupted against the Khazins in their fiefdoms where they were beaten up and evicted. The Khazins had failed to get support from the Druze lords in organizing against the revolt.

To prevent any anti-feudal action in the south, Druze 'uqqal (religious men) resorted to sectarian propaganda to keep Druze commoners away from the revolt and to effect an alliance between Druze lords and commoners against Maronite peasants in the south. 'Uqqal reminded Druze peasants of earlier sectarian conflict and in general tried to conceal the class nature of the conflict. This, however, did not prevent many Druze communities from revolting against their lords. The scattered and spontaneous revolts were doomed to failure and the Maronite peasants were left to fend for themselves in the south. From the Summer of 1859 through April of 1860, Maronite peasants tried to organize themselves in anticipation of hostilities.⁴³

When massacres of Christians began in April of 1860, Druze lords were already in touch with Ottoman governors and garrison commanders who aided them in this conflagration. Scores of villages were burned to the ground in Al-Matn and Ash-Shuf districts, and in a few days the whole of the south was a theatre of conflict.⁴⁴ What was

significant in this conflict was that the peasant state in the north did not come to the aid of villagers in the south. Some reasons advanced for this behavior point out the precarious position of the northern state and the constant threat it faced from the feudalists. Added to this were threats and promises peasant leaders in the north received from the Ottomans and the big powers.

The British, it seems, had a hand in much of what took place in April. The attack on the town of Zahlah, for instance, "was planned by Colonel Churchill...".⁴⁵ The various powers as well were stirring sectarian conflict through support they gave to competing factions. The British supported the Druze, the French the Maronites, and the Russians the Greek Orthodox. Although the conflict seemed to be motivated by sectarian allegiance, the underlying reasons were competition over which powers (local and/or foreign) were to control the political and economic destiny of the Mountain and the area in general.⁴⁶

Within a few days, the massacre had cost over 11,000 lives. At this point British, French and other powers agreed to send 12,000 troops to bring an end to the conflict that spread to Damascus as well. Seven thousand troops landed from France. They arrived to find that Fuad Pasha, the Ottoman, was in complete control of the situation. He had already clamped down on those directly responsible for the massacres.⁴⁷

In the Autumn of 1860, an international commission met to negotiate an agreement for the political reorganization of Lebanon. The commission members represented Britain, France, Russia, Austria and Prussia and was presided over by Fuad Pasha. Eight months after its first meeting on October 5, 1860, the commission reached an

agreement: "The Re'glement Organique", comprising seventeen articles. The June 9, 1861 accord established the Mutassarriyya system of government that united Lebanon under an Ottoman ruler and abolished feudalism in the Mountain.⁴⁸

Under the new administration, Lebanon was divided into six (later seven) districts. The Mutassarif (governor) was appointed by the Sultan subject to the approval of the big powers. He was always a non-Lebanese Christian and an Ottoman subject aided by a council of twelve. The council was made up of four Maronites, three Druze, two Greek Orthodox and one each for Shi'i, Sunni (both Moslem sects) and Greek Catholics.⁴⁹

Each district was run by a governor aide assisted by a council of three to six representatives of the various sects. Deir el Kamar, a Christian town, was the seat of the government. To appease the now-weak nobility, the governors appointed them to the central council. The peasants pushed for more equitable representation in state institutions and for ownership of agricultural land. Maronite peasants, however, left the Mountain as land became too scarce and expensive for them to own.

Although a stable Mount Lebanon was conducive to French political and economic interests, this did not prevent France from attempting to gain a better position in the Mountain vis-a-vis the other powers.⁵⁰ To this end France encouraged Usuf Karam to rebel against Daoud Pasha, the first governor, who was not popular with the Maronites. Earlier, Karam was promised the governorship by the big powers and this probably was one reason he did not move to aid the southern peasants in 1860. Now France began calling him a national hero who was seeking more

political independence for Lebanon. This French move failed when Karam was banished.⁵¹ For the next 53 years the region was stable. But instead of political representation being based on class lines, the Mutassarifiyya legitimized sectarian representation and big power intervention in Lebanon.

France did not forsake its attempts to improve its position in Lebanon. Paul Nujaym, Jesuit Father Henri Lammans and others were proponents of Lebanese nationalism that favored France. Writing from Paris, the Lebanese Nujaym was agitating for territorial expansion of Lebanon, an expansion that one suspects could have been beneficial to French expansionism. Nujaym writes:

The statutes of 1861 and 1864 have mutilated Lebanon and robbed it of some of its most fertile districts. Most of all, they have deprived it of its great port of Beirut ...Lebanese commerce, very active and flourishing, has no opening to the sea, as the Porte does not permit the creation of a port on the Lebanese coast...It is necessary that the guaranteeing Powers should intervene to defend the autonomy and accomplish the necessary reforms. But the most serious and most urgent problem of all is the extension of the Lebanese frontiers...The live forces of the Lebanese nation must be made use of in Syria itself, rather than be dispersed in all parts of the world...⁵²

A Lebanese nation, however, dominated by Christians and in congruence with French interests was not particularly inviting for the Druze. A dominant trend, however, was the liberal one that called for Pan-Arabism and Syrian unity. Its main proponents were Christian, mostly Maronite literary figures, and leaders of the Arab Renaissance movement in politics and literature. Al-Bustani, Al-Yaziji, Sarruf and Faris Nimr were among these literary pillars.⁵³

In October, 1915, the Mutassarrifiyya period ended. Due to the First World War, Lebanon was subjected to various economic and social dislocations. The newly-formed commercial classes in the coastal area were awaiting deliverance. The Maronite sector of the bourgeoisie was hoping for French intervention while the other sectors were hoping for Arab independence.

The Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 between France and Britain divided the Arab east between them. Britain was to have Iraq, Jordan and Palestine, and France was to have Syria and Lebanon.⁵⁴ The terms of the agreement, however, ran counter to the hopes of the Sharif Hussein of Mecca and were partly in conflict with what the British had promised him in return for his help against the Ottomans in World War I.

To exercise more influence on the local political movements, France helped to create the Central Syrian Committee in Paris in 1917, which called for a Syrian state extending over much of Natural Syria, under French Mandate.⁵⁵ On October 1, 1918, the Ottoman Ismail Bey handed over power to Umar Bey Da'uaq in Beirut. Umar proclaimed the Arab Government which was supported by Faisal, now King of Syria. Shukri Pasha Al-Ayyubi, a representative of Faisal, arrived from Damascus at the head of a small force to legitimize the government. Shukri reactivated the Central Mutassarrifiyya Council as a branch of the Arab Government in Syria and he raised the flag in Ba'abda, the seat of the Council.⁵⁶

The proclamation of Faisal as King of Syria and the call of the Arab Nationalists in 1918 for the unification of Lebanon and Syria prompted the French to change their tactics. To arrest such unfavorable developments France had to support the Maronite clergy with their

separatist tendencies: they demanded the creation of a "Greater Lebanon" (the Mountain and other parts of Syria) under French Mandate. Consequently two Maronite delegations headed by the clergy went to Paris in 1919 and 1920, respectively, to present their demand for "Greater Lebanon". However, these new developments forced France to relinquish its dream of a Syrian state as espoused by the Central Syrian Committee.⁵⁷

French designs for the area had conflicted with the principle of self-determination called for by the League of Nations. The King-Crane fact-finding commission had recommended a united Palestine-Syria with autonomy to the Mountain and all to be under Faisal with the mandate given to either the U.S.A. or Britain. The commission believed Arab-French hostilities could not be prevented unless the French were to restrict their mandate to the Mountain.⁵⁸

After his trip to Europe in early 1919, Faisal relinquished his claim to Lebanon due to French diplomatic pressure on him and Britain. Instead he accepted a separate Mountain under France.⁵⁹ Hearing of Faisal's new position, other Arab nationalists reacted by convening a National Congress that proclaimed the independence of all Syria. The French arrested Lebanese who took part in the Congress. With French approval, "representatives" of the Christian sects met in Ba'bda (near Beirut) and proclaimed Lebanon independent of Syria.⁶⁰

Disregarding the King-Crane findings, the Supreme Allied Council approved the French Mandate for Syria and Lebanon on April 25, 1920. On July 10, the Central Council resolved by majority vote to proclaim Lebanon independent of France and to cooperate with Syria. To put an end to nationalist tendencies, France decided to occupy Syria. The

Arab defeat in the Battle of Maisaloun (July 24, 1920) sealed the fate of Syria.⁶¹ On September 1, 1920, France proclaimed "Greater Lebanon" independent of Syria. The majority of the population in the annexed areas to the Mountain were non-Maronites and mostly Muslim. "Greater Lebanon" was established against their will.⁶² With this expansion the Maronites were reduced to thirty percent of the population.

In the Summer of 1925, the Druze revolt in Syria had spread to the annexed areas to Lebanon.⁶³ Though the Druze were opposing French attempts to weaken their power, their revolt had a national character: it called for unity of all Syria, giving it home rule, and for the withdrawal of all French troops. The revolt, however, was defeated in 1927. During the revolt the French had drafted a Lebanese Constitution, and on May 24, 1926, the Lebanese Republic was proclaimed with Charles Dabbas as president.⁶⁴

In July of 1928, the Syrian Constituent Assembly met and drafted a constitution reaffirming the unity and independence of Syria. The French, however, dissolved the Assembly in May of 1930 and redrafted a new Syrian constitution.⁶⁵

Having secured the fragmentation of Syria, the Mandate changed its tactics toward the Arab nationalists in Lebanon. It amended the constitution in 1927 and 1929 to guarantee proportional representation for all the sects and regions of Lebanon. It further guaranteed equitable sectarian representation in public employment. These efforts resulted in the acceptance of the state by the elite of the various sects.

The Maronite elite, however, were split on the issue of independence from France. Emile Edde', an isolationist, called for French protection of a Christian Lebanon. El-Khoury, on the other

hand, realized that without appeasing the Muslims he could not become president of an independent Lebanon.⁶⁶ The Muslims on their part realized that if the issue remained a separate Lebanon versus a unified one with Syria, the French would stay in both Syria and Lebanon. Added to these reasons were the benefits that the rising bourgeoisie in the big cities would reap from a non-restricted trade if political power were in its own hands.

To thwart any anti-French feelings and activities, France aided Edde' to be elected president in 1937. He tried to appease some Muslim notables but to no avail. The independent movement was strong and could not be redirected. In World War II, de Gaulle promised Lebanon and Syria their independence. With the defeat of the Vichy forces in the Middle East de Gaulle reneged on his promise. Instead he wanted to revert to the 1936 Franco-Lebanese Treaty by which France was given certain concessions.⁶⁷

To out-manuever the isolationists, Maronite and Muslim notables joined forces within the Chamber of Deputies and elected El-Khoury President of the Republic on September 21, 1943. To strengthen the Muslim and Christian elite understanding the National Pact was drawn:

First, the Christians gave up the idea of an isolated Lebanon and accepted an independent and sovereign Lebanon within the Arab world. The Muslims in return, gave up the idea of giving back to Syria the territories which had been annexed to Lebanon; and also the aim of uniting Lebanon with the Arab world...

Secondly, the Christians gave up the idea of foreign protection, either by way of occupation, military outposts or the concluding of treaties with the Western powers...In return, the Muslims agreed to stop working to make Lebanon submit to Syrian or Arab influence.

Thirdly, the number of seats in Parliament was to be distributed in such a way as to ensure a majority to the

Christians. Also, the President of the Republic was always to be a Christian while the Premier in the Government was always to be a Muslim...⁶⁸

It is important to note that this pact was a non-formal understanding among elite and was not a part of the Constitution. The unity of the elite against the French was possible because the pact guaranteed proportional representation (based on the 1932 census) of all the sects of Lebanon. The five Muslim to six Christian ratio was, however, suggested by the British minister.

What was essentially happening in Lebanon was a power struggle between the Muslim and Christian elite on the one hand, and the French on the other. The latter arrested El-Khoury and appointed Edde' Head of State. The incident touched off mass demonstrations in most parts of Lebanon in support of El-Khoury. Anglo-American pressure was instrumental in forcing the French to reinstate El-Khoury on November 22, 1943. This was followed by the pull-out of foreign troops from Syria and Lebanon on April and December of 1946, respectively.⁶⁹

Between the two World Wars, great economic and social changes occurred in Syria and Lebanon. These changes were a continuation on a larger and more direct scale of the opening to the West that took place in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The division of Syria created obstacles to the free flow of goods and encouraged competition among its seaports; it was a move that weakened the region economically, especially because it discouraged local industry from developing, which in turn severely limited exports.⁷⁰ It was no coincidence, therefore, that the balance of trade was consistently in deficit or that the sources of wealth remained in

agriculture, stock breeding, commercial services and small-scale industry.⁷¹

To alleviate the effects of political fragmentation and to keep them within manageable proportions, the French opted for the use of a single currency, a commercial code and a unified customs system. In the thirties one third of trade with Syria and Lebanon was transit trade. Silk, fruits, carpets and so on were shipped out, and machinery, vehicles and cotton goods were flowing in. At the same time cottage industries were giving way to more modern production techniques. One can trace the foundations of Lebanon's industry after independence to the innovations occurring between 1928-1940, oftentimes with foreign capital. In that period old workshops were modernized, other factories were built to produce commodities new to the area, or to increase production of existing items on the market.⁷²

The Mandate had also contributed to the development of financial institutions in the area. In 1936 there existed three French banks, one Italian and one Egypto-Syrian aside from Banque de Syrie. These banks helped finance many projects for irrigation, power, roads, etc.⁷³ During WW II these institutions were capable of giving out loans to avert severe famines and unemployment, both of which still occurred locally and intermittently. Army expenditure also helped compensate for loss of exports.

The war also gave opportunities for local industry to progress and for agriculture to experiment with new methods of increasing production. The shortage of petroleum products spurred the authorities to construct a refinery at Tripoli (north of Lebanon). All these developments during the war contributed to local accumulation of

capital which toward the end of the war was looking for investment opportunities which war controls had prevented.⁷⁴

It was those war capitalists and the still-powerful landed aristocracy who joined forces to oust the French. Industrial capitalists and a proletariat were at an embryonic stage and the latter, along with the peasants, were living in abject poverty.⁷⁵

It was necessary after the war to return to free enterprise to meet the demand for imported goods which were limited during the war.⁷⁶ Accumulated capital, seeking quick return on investment with low risk, saw these goals could be realized through commercial activity. An opportunity for industrialization was not possible because of the tradition of commercial activity that the intervening few years of the war were unable to change. Also, the objective of the new commercial class coincided on the international level with that of United States policy of freedom of trade and competition.⁷⁷

Although the rising commercial class did not challenge the powerful landed aristocracy, opting to enter into an alliance in its drive for independence, it knew that the structures supporting the aristocracy were weakening. Specifically, land no longer remained the only source of wealth and "landowners lost their function of tax collection."⁷⁸ Furthermore, the new international situation favored the commercial bourgeoisie class. An independent Lebanon, therefore, would help the commercial class improve its position vis-a-vis the aristocracy.

To be sure of mass support, the competing elite posed as representatives of various religious sects rather than of the respective competing classes. What helped them in doing so was that class

conflict had a tendency to take the form of religious strife due to various reasons, primarily to foreign intervention and the role of the clergy in the political development of the Mountain.

CONCLUSION

The history of Mount Lebanon has been an integral part of the historical development of Syria. From the ninth century, when the Maronites were established in the north of the Mountain, Mountain society evolved through an intricate interaction between them and the Druze living in the south. Through integration these exclusive communities were capable of establishing a secular feudal order that matured and prospered within the Emirate of Mount Lebanon.

The feudal mode of production, with its attendant political and social institutions further encouraged the integration of the two communities. The needs of the system for more agricultural land and production to increase landlord revenues had greatly helped with this integration. It also helped create new social forces that became competing and independent on the political scene. This explains, in great part, the role given by the lords to the Order of Monks in production and consequently, their important influence among the peasantry compared with that of the individual village priest. Furthermore, monk organizations were efficient production units with little conspicuous consumption.

An organized social force such as the clergy, sharing with the peasants animosity toward the feudal system, made a formidable force which the ruling emir used to consolidate his position against feudal

lords. In its effort to become a dominant or an exclusive force in the Emirate, the church had to unite with the emir and rely upon religion to separate Druze and Maronite peasants from each other. Druze landlords resorted to the same tactics to counter church designs. To a large extent and despite its influence on the peasants, the church was unsuccessful in turning the class conflict into a religious one. As Hourani contends:

It is true that for generations Lebanon was torn by internal strife, but it was the strife of factions and families. It was only for a short time during the nineteenth century that it took the form of a religious war, and even then the fundamental causes were social and political rather than religious.⁷⁹

In the bid for its Emirate, the church had to betray much of the peasant concerns, as was the case during the 1840 revolt.⁸⁰ What the church wanted to achieve ran counter to the historical development of the Mountain. Instead, it helped in achieving the massacres of 1860 which later led to the Mutassarrifiyya system.

Beginning with the Egyptian conquest, Western impact upon society in Syria and Lebanon was formidable and far-reaching. The impact was decisive in new class formations. Social, political and economic upheavals occurred that spelled the end of feudalism as a political institution. The new classes that were formed came increasingly to share power with the landlord class, which remained the most powerful until independence.

As the commercial class (comprador bourgeoisie) gained in economic power, the feudal mode of production increasingly became less

dominant because land as a source of wealth had lost its exclusive position.

French colonialism hastened the integration of Lebanon into the world capitalist system. It strengthened and encouraged the development of the comprador through the division of Syria to render the area economically weak and dependent upon foreign trade and commercial services.

Lebanon's independence had set the stage for the comprador to gain more economic power for itself and to satisfy the needs of the international capitalist market.

FOOTNOTES

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23. Ibid., p. 241.
24. Ibid., pp. 235-238.
25. Ibid., pp. 242-244.
26. Hitti, op. cit., p. 245.
27. Harik, op. cit., p. 246.
28. Ibid., p. 249.
29. Ibid., p. 253.
30. Ibid., p. 261.
31. Ibid., p. 271.
32. Hitti, op. cit., p. 407.
33. Ibid., p. 471.
34. Ibid., p.. 407-408.
35. Ibid., p. 408.
36. Ibid., p. 478.
37. William R. Polk, The Opening of South Lebanon, 1788-1840 (Mass: Harvard University Press, 1963), 215.
38. Hitti, op. cit., p. 471.
39. Polk, op. cit., p. 174.
40. Ibid., p. 216.
41. Salibi, op. cit., p. 82.
42. Ibid., p. 84.
43. Ibid., p. 87.
44. Hitti, op. cit., p. 437.
45. Ibid., p. 438.
46. Salibi, op. cit., p. 87: "Though the whole conflict was strongly sectarian in 1860, it continued to have the dimensions of class division." Harik, op. cit., p. 276.
47. Hitti, op. cit., p. 439.

48. Ibid., p. 441. See also Salibi, op. cit., p. 109.
49. Salibi, op. cit., p. 110.
50. M. Emerit, "The Syrian Crisis and French Economic Expansion of 1860," Arab Studies (March, 1972), 11-13, 19. (Arabic Source)
51. Salibi, op. cit., p. 112-113.
52. Ibid., pp. 118-119.
53. Ibid., p. 154.
54. Ibid., p. 159-160.
55. Ibid.
56. Stephen H. Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 66.
57. Ibid., p. 88.
58. Ibid., pp. 89-92.
59. Ibid., p. 87.
60. Ibid., p. 99.
61. Ibid., p. 103.
62. Ibid., pp. 89-92.
63. Salibi, op. cit., p. 169.
64. Ibid., p. 170.
65. Longrigg, op. cit., pp. 182, 187.
66. Salibi, op. cit., pp. 172-173.
67. Ibid., pp. 184-188.
68. George Dib, from his introduction to his own translation of "Selections from Riadh Solh's speech in the Lebanese Assembly, October 7, 1943," Middle East Forum (Beirut, January, 1959), 6.
69. Longrigg, op. cit., pp. 353-355.
70. A. H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), 89.
71. Longrigg, op. cit., p. 271.

72. Ibid., pp. 271, 274.
73. Ibid., p. 271.
74. Ibid., p. 339.
75. Hourani, op. cit., pp. 90-93.
76. Longrigg, loc. cit.
77. Ibid.
78. Hourani, op. cit., p. 92.
79. Ibid., p. 130.

80. Peasant revolts sought to undermine feudalism. Since most peasants were Maronites, there was much overlap between class and sect affiliation. Identification of peasants as Maronites, however, played in the hands of the church which sought to play up the religious factor to use the anti-feudal sentiment of the peasants for its own goals: to have hegemony over the Mountain. The initial progressive nature of religious affiliation soon dissipated and sectarianism became a reactionary phenomenon. This was especially true under colonialism, which heavily influenced Lebanon's political development by leaving its imprint on Lebanon after independence. It is important to note that sectarianism had been conditioned by social forces that utilized and developed it for their own class interests. In his discussion of ethnicity in Africa, Wallerstein argues similarly. He also seeks to understand ethnicity within the context of the international capitalist system. This leads him to argue that ethnic and national liberation struggles are forms of class struggle. See, for example, I. Wallerstein, "Social Conflict in Post-Independent Black Africa: The Concept of Race and Status Group Reconsidered," in I. Wallerstein, ed., The Capitalist World Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979). See also I. Wallerstein, "Class and Class Conflict in Contemporary Africa," and "Class Formation in the Capitalist World Economy," ibid. Perhaps the most devastating critique of those who talk of ethnicity and not class struggle (in any of its forms) is that they dismiss the international capitalist market and simply remain in the confines of the state or region under consideration.

CHAPTER THREE

POLITICAL ECONOMY

The struggle for independence and the class make-up of the political alliances that carried it through were largely influenced by and the product of the historical development of Syria and Lebanon. Of significance was the creation and development of new economic sectors and class formations.

El-Khoury, the first president, was tied to powerful local banking interests. M. Chiha (considered one of the "fathers" of Lebanese independence) was a powerful banker and the brother-in-law of El-Khoury. Pharoan, an important financier, had sided with the "fathers" of independence.¹ The Kata'eb (Phalanges) party, representing Maronite interests opting for independence, joined forces with El-Khoury, El-Solh (Sunni Muslim) and other elite to bring about the confessional Lebanese independent state.

Confessionalism--a system of government whereby various religious sects of a polity . . . proportionally represented according to the population of each sect--organized relationships among the ruling elite and the classes it represented by invoking sectarian representation in a effort to conceal class conflict. Through the new arrangement, the ruling elite was able to guarantee itself mass following based upon sect and/or za'im (patron/client) relationships.

The balance that confessionalism and the National Pact had represented was not expected to last long. Writing in the 1940's,

Hourani contended "A state so deeply divided both in structure and in ideas as the Lebanese republic and without any unifying national spirit could not continue to exist, at least in its present form, unless there were some external power controlling it closely and intervening continually in its affairs."² Hourani was mainly referring to the national spirit and to political structures and ideas. On another level, however, one could legitimately talk about economic structures and activities that significantly contribute to class formations and greatly influence the political class struggle in its methods and ultimate goals.

The dynamic of the economic structure obtaining in Lebanon at independence was (as mentioned in the previous chapter) supportive of the relatively new classes formed in Lebanon, and not of the archaic landed aristocracy. With the dynamic of the economy favoring certain sectors over others, economic dislocations were to be expected to spill over to the political arena and threaten the once-intact static balance of forces. To be sure, political crises occurred in the first fifteen years of independence, two of which severely upset the balance of forces.³

To gain a fuller understanding of these crises, a discussion of the development of the economy is warranted at this point. Although Lebanon gained independence in 1943, it was not until the end of 1946 that all the functions of state were gradually handed over to the national government by the departing French. For this reason, an attempt will be made here to discuss the economy as of 1945. First, however, let us recapitulate development of the economy during WW II.

Agriculture was the main sector of the economy at independence.

The war years brought to Lebanon a relative growth of industry and runaway inflation (the wholesale price index in Beirut rose to a peak of 1,203 in January of 1945, taking 1939 as the base year). Allied expenditures of 800 million L.L. brought about an expansion of the volume of money from a low of 38.4 million in 1939 to a high of 410 million in September of 1945.⁴

Economic structures set up by the French (customs union, single currency, banks, etc.) favored the rising comprador bourgeoisie in Lebanon and were detrimental to the Syrian national bourgeoisie. As an example, although the customs union alleviated some of the economic disadvantages of the division of Syria, it was beneficial to colonial interests and the local agents of colonial capital. To protect the Syrian market (Lebanon's most important one), the Syrian bourgeoisie severed the union in 1950.⁵

Due to these colonial economic set-ups, international capital was capable of further penetrating, weakening and disintegrating the local economy. Transit trade was facilitated by the capacity of Beirut's port in handling large-size ships and the development of refrigerated and non-refrigerated storage areas at the port. The improvement of land transportation and the opening of Beirut International Airport in 1950 added to the importance of transit trade and tourism. The 1948 dumping of exchange controls which facilitated the buying and selling of currencies for Lebanon and the area in general contributed greatly to the development of Lebanon as an international financial and gold trade center.⁶

To have a feel for the position of the various economic sectors and subsectors, and their dynamic over the first few years after

independence, here are some figures:

Table 1. Lebanon: Net National Income by Industry^a
1948 to 1950
(Millions of Lebanese Pounds)

Sector	1948	1949	1950
Agriculture	168.5	158.8	176.0
Construction	34.8	31.9	41.7
Industry ^b	133.4	135.5	137.3
Services ^c	91.4	93.1	100.5
Transport & Communications	33.5	35.3	37.7
Real Estate ^d	90.0	93.4	96.0
Government ^e	63.1	64.6	71.8
Other ^f	---	---	339.0
TOTAL	---	---	1,000.0 ^g

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- a All estimates are at factor cost, except agricultural income, which is at market price.
b Including price utilities, mining and quarrying.
c Including certain services and professional workers and agencies. Excluding government and domestic services.
d Net rent of residential buildings only.
e Including municipalities.
f Trade, finance and income received from foreign countries.
g Provisional estimate.

Source: Albert Y. Badre, "National Income of Lebanon," Monographs 1 to 7 (Beirut: 1951 to 1954, mimeographed).

It is clear from the table that the shares of "services", "transport and communication" and "real estate" of the national income increased. Also, if one bears in mind that much of the industry was geared to exports and much of the construction was for office space, hotels, clubs and so on, the disparity between services and agriculture (whose average share of NNI remained almost unchanged

over the three-year period) becomes clearer even at this early stage of Lebanon's independence. Furthermore, the thesis that the economic structures do support certain social forces even at the elite level (e.g. comprador) more than they do others (e.g. the landed aristocracy) is borne out by the NNI table.

About half the work force in Lebanon is engaged in agriculture.⁷ This figure would have been higher were it not for the large-scale migration from the village to the town and to other countries. Per capita income in agriculture, even at this early stage, was lower than in other sectors. Increasing agricultural acreage as a possible way of boosting income was not readily feasible. This effort needed unavailable capital and large-scale irrigation projects, which take years to finish.

In the early fifties, efforts were made to increase the production of fruits and vegetables, the net value of which was 50 and 10 percent in 1948 and 1949, respectively. These and a few other industrial crops (olives, tobacco, silk, onions, potatoes) provided export surplus. Increased production of fruits and vegetables required heavy capital outlay, which came mostly from commercial profits and income gained in the services area. Needed irrigation projects were publicly financed.⁸

Although in Lebanon soils, topography and rainfall distribution offer a variety of climatic conditions to allow tropical, sub-tropical and temperate zone crops, we see that most of agriculture is geared toward those crops needed for export at the expense of the needs of the local market. Because of this, Lebanon has been a net importer of livestock, cereals and grains.⁹ Other reasons advanced for this export phenomenon were that the prevalence of small-scale ownership

and the mountainous nature of the land did not encourage large-scale mechanization (except in the plains) but favored crops requiring little land (which happened to be export crops!).¹⁰

In 1953, land distribution in Lebanon was estimated as follows: 10% of the land was in holdings of 100 hectares and over; 15-20% was in holdings of 10-100 hectares. The total number of large and medium holders was 6,000. The rest of the land was held by 133,000 owners, most of whom owned less than 2 hectares. There were a few landless laborers, most of whom rented land from large land owners.¹¹ Cultivated land per capita of agricultural population was 0.4 hectare, less than 20% of which was irrigated.¹² Because of this land-holding profile, much of the necessary agricultural products were not profitable to plant. For example, in 1948 and 1949 cereals accounted for 20 and 12% of the gross value of agricultural production. In 1953 Lebanon was a deficit country in agricultural products. The only items that were in surplus were fruits, vegetables and "industrial crops".¹³

Table 1 shows that industry did not fare much better than agriculture vis-a-vis the services sector. The ascendancy of Lebanese industry in the immediate post-war period was mainly due to the initial scarcity of imported goods. Accordingly, productive capacity doubled between 1946 and 1952. The end of the Korean War had brought more foreign competition to the local market. Furthermore, the severance of the customs union with Syria and the shortage of raw materials contributed to greatly offset the gains initially won by Lebanese industry. Two things remained favorable to industry: one was the protective tariffs, the other was the low level of industrial wages due to the high rate of unemployment in the country.

The following figures will give a better picture of the early pattern of development achieved by Lebanese industry: oil refineries had increased their output from 100,000 tons in 1940 to 545,000 tons in 1953. Power output had increased from 57 million kilowatt-hours in 1945 to 164 million in 1953. Construction maintained a 7 to 10% level of GNP. Its share of gross investment was over 50%, and consumed a large proportion of small savings. Production of building materials also expanded in these years. Food processing had a higher value of output and more capital employed than the other industries. This industry operated well below capacity and, except sugar, provided a small surplus for export. The textile industry provided one-sixth of domestic consumption although woolen cloth production remained well below its consumption levels and productive capacity.¹⁴ Table 2 shows the status of the various industries in 1950.

Table 2 clearly shows that the most important industries are food processing, textiles and non-metallic minerals. Despite the conditions favoring Lebanese industry then, much of it was operating below capacity and was not satisfying the wants and desires of the local market. What aggravated the situation further was the fact that these favorable conditions disappeared in the course of a few years. The severance of the customs union, for example, hurt some industries--especially cotton yarn, tanning, chemicals and beer--which sold large proportions of their output in the Syrian market. The already-small local market began to face stiff competition from foreign goods, which increased after 1953. Overseas markets for Lebanese products proved, at best, to be precarious.

The scarcity of raw materials in the country was a major factor

Table 2. Lebanon: Industrial Establishments, Employees^a, Capital, Cost of Materials and Output, 1950^a

Product or Industry	Number of Establishments	Number of Employees	Capital ^b	Investment Per Employee	Gross Output ^b	Net Output ^b
Food Processing	455	5,404	24.9	4607	61.7	30.1
Beverages	123	1,292	10.7	8282	12.2	5.6
Textiles	60	5,040	32.6	6468	39.5	17.7
Wearing Apparel	15	1,036	3.3	3185	2.3	1.2
Wood and Cork	48	241	1.4	5809	3.8	1.6
Furniture	95	1,211	4.6	3799	10.3	6.2
Paper	9	91	0.5	5495	0.9	0.5
Printing	100	855	8.6	10058	5.8	2.7
Leather	64	737	4.6	6242	14.2	6.2
Rubber	6	447	1.0	2237	2.1	1.4
Chemicals	64	1,104	5.9	5344	16.4	7.9
Non-Metallic Minerals	156	2,768	35.5	12825	21.5	13.5
Metal Products	30	639	2.6	4069	11.1	6.5
Machinery	27	590	3.2	5424	3.6	1.9
Electrical Appliances	4	217	1.6	7373	1.9	0.8
Concessions and Public Utilities	---	---	---	---	38.8	13.9
Other	29	367	6.5	17711	2.7	1.8
TOTAL =	1,285 ^c	22,039 ^c	147.4 ^c	6688	248.8	119.7

a Excluding handicrafts; net output of handicrafts in 1950 was LL 17.6 million.

b Millions of Lebanese pounds (LL).

c Excluding concessions and public utilities.

Source: Albert Y. Badre and Asad Y. Nasr, "National Income in Lebanon," Monograph No. 3, "Income Arising in the Industrial Sector" (Beirut, May 1953, mimeographed).

that had favored certain industries over others. In 1950 the three most important industries mentioned above accounted for 60% of the labor employed in all industry, 62% of the capital invested and 58% of the value of gross net output.¹⁵

The following table shows the small size of Lebanese industrial firms, a further indicator of industry's weakness.

Table 3. Lebanon: Number of Industrial Firms
in Terms of Size of Capital Invested, 1950

Number of Firms	Capital Investment (LL)
25	1 million or over
29	$\frac{1}{2}$ - 1 million
45	$\frac{1}{4}$ - $\frac{1}{2}$ million
381	10,000 - 25,000
249	5,000 - 10,000

Source: Ministry of National Economy, Bulletin
Statistique Trimestriel, October, 1951.

It is important to bear in mind that these economic structural problems were the direct result of the political fragmentation of the Arab East during recent colonial times. These political and economic structures clearly favor (in their fragmentation) certain types of economic development patterns and reinforce the dominance of a certain social class on the political scene. This dominance, in turn, reinforces the economic dominant position of this social class.

Political clout of the dominant class has been reflected in liberal trade policies and reluctant protection of local industry.¹⁶ Any protection granted local industry primarily had in mind those

industries whose owners mustered enough political power to legislate or decree protection for big industries. Be that as it may, protective measures had offset some of the effects of the onslaught of foreign competition. Furthermore, bilateral or inter-Arab trade agreements had somewhat offset the fragmentation of the market.

What was more, the government had extended tax credits to industrial establishments with a capital of over one million LL. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank provided scarce industrial credit which went to industrialists with political clout. In 1953, an industrial institute was established with U.S. aid; it carried out production and marketing studies for prospective enterprises. The institute also assisted existing enterprises to modernize and optimize production factors utilization.

Another assistance which the government extended to industry was the reduction it effected in the cost of electricity. When the electric company refused to expand its plant, the government intervened and took over company administration and reduced costs to consumers by 22%. In 1954 the government bought out the company and expanded output through publicly-financed new projects.

Despite governmental assistance to agriculture and industry, agriculture, the chief economic sector at independence, quickly lost its position to the services sector within a period not exceeding four years.¹⁷ Furthermore, Table 4 shows the trade picture from 1950 to 1954.

Table 4. Lebanon: Foreign Trade and Transit Trade,
1950 to 1954
(Millions of Lebanese Pounds)

Item	1950 ^a	1951	1952	1953	1954 ^b
<u>Foreign Trade</u>					
Special Imports	183.6	298.4	308.5	314.3	262.3
Special Exports	51.9	89.7	77.4	87.5	57.5
Re-Exports	1.9	1.6	3.9	3.0	1.8
Import Surplus	129.3	207.1	227.2	223.8	203.0
<u>Transit Trade</u>					
Re-Exports	1.5	6.6	15.6	9.2	8.0
Merchandise Transit	222.2	323.1	327.6	304.8	259.9
Petroleum	111.1	459.1	471.2	472.8	349.3
TOTAL	334.8	778.8	814.6	786.8	617.2
<u>Trade in Gold</u>					
<u>Special Trade</u>					
Imports	61.2	22.4	38.6	47.7	52.4
Exports	15.2	8.0	--	0.2	9.1
Transit Trade	177.3	354.6	239.9	285.3	147.3

a 14 March to 31 December

b Nine months

Source: Ministry of National Economy, Bulletin
Statistique Trimestriel.

Table 4 shows that Lebanon was a net importer in these years and was heavily dependent upon transit trade. For the sake of illustration, notice that the "other" category for 1950 in Table 1 made up over one-third of NNI.

The main markets for Lebanese exports by order of importance were: Syria, Saudi Arabia, France, Egypt, and the U.S.A. Imports were chiefly brought from Syria, followed by the U.S.A., the U.K., France and the Netherlands.

A brief discussion of the major economic sectors is warranted here to appreciate Lebanon's heavy and precarious dependence upon the

international capitalist market and upon political events in the region.

The opening of Beirut International Airport was a boost to transit trade, tourism and the services industry in general. Transit trade was also facilitated by the abolishment, in 1954, of port dues on goods in transit and through transit agreements that were reached mainly with Syria, Iraq and Jordan.¹⁸ Income from transit in 1951 and 1952 was estimated at 36.9 and 46.8 million LL. respectively. If gold in transit profits were added to these figures, the amounts would have to become 113.1 and 95.4 million LL. in 1951 and 1952, respectively. To encourage the gold trade, the government permitted (in 1949) gold to be kept in transit in the country up to two months, after which it could be shipped to a country other than that to which it was originally destined. The following are figures of gold passed in transit (in tons): 1950 - 44; 1951 - 89; 1952 - 67; 1953 - 73; and 1954 (first six months) - 30.¹⁹

Along with the liberal gold policy, Lebanon had relaxed controls over the foreign exchange market operations; these were later abolished on May 17, 1952.²⁰ Although businesses were not affected by the official exchange rate which was reserved for governmental transactions, the Exchange Stabilization Fund (established 1949) attempted to prevent the appreciation of the Lebanese pound vis-a-vis the dollar. These attempts were not systematic, however, and were small in volume compared to the great volume of exchange operations taking place in the Beirut market. Consequently, this move could not very well protect Lebanon's competitive position.²¹

As mentioned earlier, tourism was another service that received a boost after independence. Capital investment in hotels was 145 million LL. in 1952 (not including restaurants, cafes, etc.). In the same year

there were 585 hotels with 14,350 beds (253 hotels with 4,960 beds in Beirut).²² The following table presents an indicator of tourist development.

Table 5. Lebanon: Tourist Arrivals - 1949 to 1953

Year	Number of Tourists
1949	60,000
1950	67,000
1951	127,000
1952	216,000
1953	285,000

Source: Michel Touma, "Al huria al Khamisa," Muhadarat al Nudwa (Beirut: 1953).

The table shows that the number of tourists had increased by more than 400% in less than five years. Most of these were summer tourists from Arab countries.

The following table shows visitor expenditures for two years.

Table 6. Lebanon: Breakdown of Visitor Expenditure by Category: 1951 and 1952 (Millions of Lebanese Pounds)

Category	1951	1952
Summer Tourists	12.2	10.8
Other Tourists	17.8	30.2
Transit Visitors	1.6	2.1
Foreign Students and Patients	5.3	6.0

Source: Edward Fei and Paul J. Klat, The Balance of Payments of Lebanon, 1951 and 1952 (Beirut, 1954).

A source of governmental income was payments by Iraqi Petroleum (IPC) and Trans-Arabian Pipe Line (Tapline) companies. These payments amounted to 5.5 million LL., and the Tapline had local expenditures of 17.6 million LL. while IPC's expenditures totalled around 10 million LL. yearly.

Lebanon had been dependent upon capital movements which showed a positive balance in Table 7. Although information is scarce on this item, it is commonly assumed that due to political conditions in the neighboring Arab countries, capital flew in from Syria, Palestine and Egypt. Furthermore, capital from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia was either invested in real estate or deposited in Lebanese banks. Concomitant with this development, and as a complement, the banking system developed considerably. Consequently the number of banks increased from 7 to 21 in 1954. Although "national" banks increased in number, their role remained a minor one in the financial structure of the country.²³ In 1939, bank deposits were 27.5 million; in 1945 they increased to 227.1 million; in 1949 they declined to 180.6 million and increased to 392.2 million LL. in 1954. The increase in deposits was mainly due to foreign capital seeking greater security and/or investing in short-term commercial and financial transactions, especially gold and transit. In addition, many foreign firms had located their Middle East headquarters in Beirut.²⁴

A cursory look at the government budget would show the importance of the services' contribution to the budget:

Table 7. Lebanon: Principal Items in Government Budgets:
1939 and 1948 to 1954
(Millions of Lebanese Pounds)

Item	1939	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953 ^a	1954 ^a
<u>Revenue:</u>								
Direct Tax on								
Income/Wealth	1.20	9.73	12.93	12.89	14.46	17.27	15.20	---
Tax on Land and								
Animals		1.28	1.09	1.09	1.01	0.63	0.65	---
Registration Duties		6.41	7.00	7.66	8.77	10.48	10.48	---
Customs Duties	4.35	23.38	26.09	20.51	33.53	36.77	34.30	38.75
Other Indirect								
Tax		29.09	32.77	33.97	37.60	42.57	37.58	---
Other Receipts	1.65	6.77	7.24	7.09	9.73	17.04	14.47	---
TOTAL	7.20	78.66	87.12	83.21	105.10	124.76	112.68	123.40
<u>Expenditures:</u>								
Education	0.05	5.69	6.77	7.86	9.56	9.96	13.55	15.51
Health	0.28	3.73	4.82	4.82	4.56	4.66	5.81	6.27
Defense	---	13.31	17.32	14.56	17.08	17.42	19.06	20.92
Public Works	1.14	17.70	17.56	20.33	17.95	14.77	15.82	19.06
Other Expendit.	4.45	29.64	36.93	36.93	40.90	41.70	58.60	61.64
TOTAL	6.73	70.07	83.40	84.52	90.05	88.51	112.84	123.40
BALANCE	0.83	8.50	8.59	-1.31	15.05	36.25	-0.16	---

a Estimates.

Source: United Nations Bureau of Economic Affairs, Fiscal Branch.

The above table shows that the greatest share of revenue came from customs duties and taxes on consumption. Although direct taxes had risen appreciably over the year, they still remained a minor part of revenue.

Expenditures for education had increased from 1.8% in 1946 to 12.6% in 1954 of total expenditures. Defense expenditures in 1954 were double that of 1946, but their share fell from 21.7% to 17%, respectively. Expenditures for public works also increased in the same period but their

share fell from 19.8% in 1946 to 15.4% in 1954. The development projects were mainly irrigation works, power, roads and communications. Ordinary budget funds for infrastructure projects totaled 173 million LL., 113 million of which was spent on roads, ports, buildings and other works. Of the 113 million spent between 1944 and 1953, 43 million were spent on roads.

State intervention was felt on another level as well. In 1955 an Industrial, Agricultural and Real Estate Bank was established with two million LL. of state funds and 3 million of private funds. Also, under a Point Four General Agreement in 1951, a program agreement was signed in 1952 by which the U.S.A. assisted in agricultural, forestry, irrigation, industrial and other projects. To assist new business, the government passed a law in June of 1954 exempting new enterprises from income tax for a period of six years.

The previous discussion of Lebanon's economy during the first decade of independence clearly shows the uneven development of the various economic sectors and sub-sectors. It also shows that Lebanon's "prosperity" depended a great deal upon Middle East business: oil, transit, customs duties, capital movements and so on. It also depended upon the vicissitudes of international economic trends to a great extent.

Uneven development was also present among the geographic regions of the country. The share of each region of the services, industrial and agricultural sectors had clearly been uneven. The services sector, for instance, was concentrated in Beirut and Mount Lebanon. The same was true of the industrial sector, as the following table shows.

Table 8. Lebanon: Geographic Distribution of Industrial Activity

Region	Value Added	Sales	Workers	Wages
<u>1954</u>				
Beirut	38	38	43	45
Mount Lebanon	32	30	36	32
North Lebanon	22	23	14	17
Biqa'	2	2	3	2
South Lebanon	5	7	3	4
<u>1964</u>				
Beirut	25.4	25.5	29.8	27.4
Mount Lebanon	52.3	35.7	50.4	50.8
North Lebanon	14.6	18.0	14.0	16.4
Biqa'	3.2	3.2	3.5	2.3
South Lebanon	4.5	6.6	2.0	3.1

Source: A. Atallah and S. Khalat, The Lebanese Industrial Sector: Its Growth and Development. A Study for the Ministry of National Economy, Bureau of Industrial Development (Beirut, 1969).

The area of Mount Lebanon, where most of this region's industry is located, actually comprises greater Beirut. Seventy percent of industrial activity (measured by value added) was concentrated in greater Beirut in 1954. This figured jumped to 77.7% ten years later.²⁵

Table 9. Lebanon: Share of Various Industries of Industrial Establishments over Different Periods (In Percent)

Period	Food, Shoes and Clothing	Non-Metal Mining	Mining and Engineering	Chemical	Other
1918	75	5	2	1	13
1919-1928	68	13	7	1	11
1929-1939	50	17	16	2	15
1940-1945	47	25	11	3	15
1946-1950	45	28	9	4	14
1951-1955	46	28	9	2	15
1954	54	21	8	2	15
1964	44	29	7	3	27

Source: A. Atallah and S. Khalat (Beirut, 1969).

Structural changes that occurred within the Lebanese industry are depicted in Table 9. The average number of new industrial establishments between 1918 and 1964 was 40. The period 1945 to 1955 witnessed the creation of above-average number of establishments whereas the opposite was true in the period 1954 to 1964.

It is regrettable that statistics on value added, number of workers, sales value, and so on, are lacking for the periods under consideration.²⁶ However, the industrial establishment ratio in each industrial sub-sector remains a very good indicator of structural change. It is obvious from the above table that Lebanon lacks heavy industry and that most of its industry is concentrated in food, shoes, clothing and non-metal mining. Although some changes occurred, these were not enough to be counted as structural.

The geographic distribution of industrial establishments is as follows.

Table 10. Lebanon: Share of Industrial Establishments in the Various Regions: 1954 and 1964 (In Percent)

Year	Beirut and Mount Lebanon	North	Beka'a	South
1954	78	12	5	5
1964	83.3	10.1	3.5	3.1

Source: A. Atallah and S. Khalat (Beirut, 1969).

It could be argued that many economic benefits to the country accrue because of concentration. This may be true if such efforts were planned and related to other sectors of the economy by either complementing or reinforcing other activities in the rest of the

economic sectors and geographic region. Undoubtedly, such "elegant" theories on concentration do not hold in the case of Lebanon. Whatever the theoretical advantages of concentration are, they must have "evaporated" due to high production costs brought about by wage increases and high land and plant values and rent brought about in great part by concentration itself. Perhaps the worst problems of concentration are depicted by differentiation in income levels among individuals and groups inhabiting different geographic regions. Furthermore, migration to industrial areas brings about higher transportation and housing costs.²⁷

The record of the industrial sector was not encouraging and, as the various tables show, it lags structurally behind the services. This was also reflected in the yearly growth in production (3.75%).²⁸ Individual industries had registered negative growth; for example, food and textiles. Other industries had registered high growth, for example; paper, wood, printing and publishing. In general, industries that are more related to the services grew more rapidly.

The structure of the economy did not encourage the entry of people into the industrial work force. The average growth of employment was 1.84% between 1954 and 1964.²⁹ Food and textiles had in fact laid off many workers and employment growth was -1.33% and -1.84% respectively in the same period. Workers' productivity was 1.7% but it was mostly due to a declining rate of employment compared to the rate of production in most industries.³⁰

Whatever indicator one uses to talk about industrial development and/or the industry's share of the GNP, each clearly points out the secondary nature of industry in the Lebanese economy. The study that

this discussion is based upon puts the yearly average growth of capital (1954 to 1964) at 4.55%. The study concludes that "this rate is considered insignificant and not encouraging to make the industrial sector increase its share of the GNP."³¹

Data on capital-to-production ratios for the different industries show that the higher the ratio, the lower the rate of industrial growth, especially if the production volume is limited.³² This is true in the case of Lebanon, whose industrial market was small and who needed the regional Middle East market and other outlets, especially if industry were to grow at all. For industry to grow, it would have to compete with foreign goods domestically, regionally and internationally. Needless to say, this was a difficult proposition for small industries that were threatened by big competition. Competition probably had been the major reason for low capital-to-production ratios compared to other industrial countries.³³

To guarantee the domestic market for its products, Lebanese industry would have had to resort to protectionism. This could not have been done effectively because of the economy's bias toward the services sector. To keep a strong regional market, Lebanon would have had to control the political process in the region so it could prevent legislation in neighboring countries from encouraging their respective local industry. This absurd condition for protecting the regional market only demonstrates the constraints within which Lebanese industry had been operating. The best thing Lebanese industry was able to do was go for bilateral agreements with separate Arab countries. These agreements, however, had been dependent upon the vagaries of the international capitalist market and the political (in)stability of the

region as a whole.

All these problems--market size, political instability, the strong services industry and the fact that the political process was dominated by mercantilist interests--argue that Lebanon's industry would remain weak. In fact, industry's share of GNP up until 1974 remained almost the same.³⁴ The share of industrial salaries and wages grew at the expense of capital's share. That is, it was a zero sum game reflecting no growth. In 1954, the share of wages and salaries was 31% while capital's share was 69%. In 1964, the share of salaries and wages went up by 7% to 38% while capital's share went down by the same amount (7%) to 62%.³⁵

At the same time the average worker's real income increased from 1,409 LL. in 1954 to 1,842 LL. in 1964 (based on 1954 prices); this comprised a 2.66% increase measured against workers' productivity of 1.7% per year.³⁶ It is obvious that even this modest increase in the wage rate was inflationary due to the economic structure that Lebanon had been locked into even before independence.³⁷

It would be somewhat misleading while discussing Lebanese industry not to bring forward data on value added. If one realizes that the value added had declined between 1954 and 1964, one would begin to ask more questions about Lebanon's economy.³⁸ Such questions would deal with the mercantilist nature of the country's industry. It becomes clear that industry played a "middle-man" role for foreign industry. Semi-finished goods were brought in, their manufacture was completed, then they were re-exported to the regional market. This meant that Lebanon did not initiate raw materials, technology, expertise and so on. While this practice was an "ingenious" way of "making a buck" it

left Lebanon exposed to the unpleasant winds of international political and economic crises.

Between 1957 and 1965, about one-third of Lebanon's imports were for industrial needs. These imports registered a 12% yearly growth rate. Industrial imports were distributed as follows: capital goods - 15%; intermediate goods - 61%; raw material - 24%. The following data would corroborate the above discussion.

Table 11. Lebanon: Rate of Value Added for Various Industries (Percent)

Year	Food Products	Alcoholic Beverages	Tobacco	Textiles	Shoes and Clothing	Wood and Cork
1954	30	61	79	39	43	50
1964	21	51	56	40	44	32

Year	Furniture	Paper	Printing and Publishing	Leather	Rubber	Chemicals
1954	42	36	55	23	43	35
1964	46	33	60	25	40	36

Year	Petroleum	Metallic Products	Machinery	Transport Equipment	Appliances & Equipment	Other
1954	18	28	28	35	50	35
1964	18	21	51	30	50	41

Source: A. Atallah and S. Khalat (Beirut, 1969).

Value added for all industry had dropped from 38% in 1954 to 36% in 1964. Although some industries had shown an increase in value added, most were modest, except for machinery. Be that as it may, the basic problem remains: industry is weak, it is geared for export, it is mainly a consumer-goods industry, and it is a "middle-man" industry.

The following table gives data on imported industrial goods.

Table 12. Lebanon: Value of Imported Industrial Goods Between 1957 to 1965 with Rates of Each (Value in Millions of Lebanese Pounds)

Year	Industrial Capital Goods		Intermediate Industrial Goods		Raw Materials		Total		Total Imports
	value	%	value	%	value	%	value	%	
1957	25	5	102	19	45	8	172	32	542
1958	28	6	80	17	30	6	138	32	461
1959	24	4	98	18	41	8	138	30	555
1960	26	4	125	19	41	6	192	29	669
1961	33	5	124	17	43	6	221	28	725
1962	24	3	135	17	64	8	205	29	779
1963	30	4	150	18	59	7	329	29	837
1964	54	4	228	19	81	7	363	29	927
1965	66	5	256	19	86	6	308	30	1481

Source: A. Atallah and S. Khalat (Beirut, 1969).

Exported industrial products comprised 15.5% of Lebanese exports in 1957. The figure went up to 23.3% in 1965. In 1961 the value of these exports was 18.5 million LL.; it increased to 129 million LL. in 1968.³⁹ The Arab market was the natural market for Lebanese exports in general.

Between 1967 and 1970 a balance-of-trade surplus existed only with the Arab countries. Lebanon's largest balance-of-trade deficit was with the capitalist countries; this deficit has been increasing.⁴⁰ The table does not show that the largest deficit existed with the EEC countries, followed by the U.S.A. In the early seventies Lebanon experienced a trade surplus with the Eastern bloc nations while it maintained a deficit with the Western capitalist countries.⁴¹

Eight-four percent of Lebanon's industrial exports in 1967 went to Arab countries.⁴² The structure of industrial exports is depicted by the following figures (1967): metallic products - 13.5%; food

products - 16%; chemicals - 10%; and non-metallic mining products - 10%. These comprise the main industrial exports.⁴³

The discussion on the industry shows that uneven development exists among regions as it does among the economic sectors. The discussion shows that the regions' share of industry is uneven, and that the position of the industrial sector vis-a-vis the services sector is precarious. The following table shows that no change had really occurred since the early 1950's in the share of each economic sector and sub-sector of the GNP.

Table 13. Lebanon: Share of Economic Sectors of GNP

Sector	1957 (%)	1964 (%)	1965 (%)
Agriculture	15.8	11.46	15
Industry	12.6	14.70	12
Construction	2.7	5.43	5
Trade	31.2	32.30	26
Finance	6.1	3.00	8
Transportation	5.3	6.80	7
Housing	9.3	7.74	10
Services	9.8	8.40	8
Administration	7.2	7.50	9
Other	--	2.50	--
TOTAL	100.	100.	100

Source: Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development:
Report on the Lebanese Economy and its
Developmental Projects (June, 1967).

The table clearly shows the existence of a chronic tilt toward the services sector and especially trade (for comparison see Table 1). To continue our discussion, the following are figures on the labor force.

Table 14. Lebanon: Distribution of Labor Force
on the Various Economic Sectors in 1967
(In Thousands)

Sector	Number	%
Agriculture	300	49
Industry	60	9.75
Construction	20	3.25
Trade and Finance	153	24.5
Transport and Communication	30	4.9
Administration	17	2.7
Armed Forces	10	1.6
Unemployed	20	3.25

Source: Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development,
(June, 1967).

No wonder then, that as early as 1959 the income distribution profile was as follows.

Table 15. Lebanon: Income Distribution

Category	Percent of Population	Level of Family Income (LL.)
Destitute	9	1,200 or less (\$0-400)
Poor	40	12,00-2,500 (\$400-830)
Average	30	2,500-5,000 (\$830-1,660)
Well Off	14	5,000-15,000 (\$1,660-5,000)
Rich	4	15,000 or more (\$5,000+)

Source: Income Distribution Table, 1959 IRFED
(Beirut, 1960-1961).

This poignant portrayal of the miserable economic plight of the masses depicted by the above table becomes compounded when one realizes that the share of each region of the various sectors has been uneven. What this means is that some regions have been more depressed than others in terms of wealth and income distribution, and share the minimum amount of public services. These are facts that cannot be ignored

by any study of Lebanon's economic development.⁴⁴ A readily-available example may be helpful in this regard. Because agriculture is geared to export and because fruits are the most important, one sees that Mount Lebanon is more affluent than the other regions. Although there are no statistics available on the geographic distribution of agricultural workers, it is well known in Lebanon that most of these workers are in the depressed areas of Lebanon. This leaves most of the income from agriculture to fewer people in the Mountain. What corroborates this observation is the pattern of land ownership in the Mountain: small land holdings. This leaves most of the large land holdings owned by zu'ama in the plains which exist mostly in the depressed areas.

The lack of statistics and other relevant information such as provided by national income accounting frustrates research of the economy even up to the last 1960's. In 1967, for instance, only an elementary attempt at national income accounting existed. Its results remained tentative and that data did not have internal consistency.⁴⁵ The available statistics, however, show that not only did agriculture and industry lag behind the services, but they were tied to export trade to a great extent. And in agriculture, Lebanon has been a deficit country in all products except fruits, as the following table shows.

Table 16. Lebanon: Production, Import and Export
of Agricultural Products in 1964
(In Millions of Lebanese Pounds)

Products	Production	Imports	Exports	Deficit/Surplus
Cereals	21.1	77.7	1.4	-76.3
Fruits	177	14.3	46.9	32.6
Industrial	34	51.3	13.9	-37.2
Vegetables/Flowers	64.4	21.9	16.1	- 5.8
Forestry Products	0.5	6.3	0.2	- 6.1
TOTAL	297.1	171.5	78.5	-93

Source: Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development
(June, 1967).

The following table shows that cereal production declined or remained almost the same in the years 1956 to 1966. The same was true of areas planted. The highest yield per hectare was achieved in 1962 while the lowest was in 1965. The average was just below one ton per hectare during the period in question. What we see is that an important agricultural product was allowed to stagnate at a time when there was a need for cereals to satisfy local demand, as depicted by Table 17. This situation was obviously beneficial to trade. The following table gives these figures.

Table 17. Lebanon: Cereal Production 1956 to 1966

	Production (1000 tons)	Area Planted (1000 hectares)	Yield/hectare (tons)
1956	102.8	102.5	1
1957	115.5	106.	1.08
1958	84	98.5	.85
1959	107.4	104.2	1.03
1960	66.3	91.5	.72
1961	94.6	89.1	1.06
1962	104.6	90.3	1.15
1963	82.9	71.8	1.03
1964	100	91.7	1.09
1965	78.9	96.2	.82
1966	92.9	88.4	1.05

Source: Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development
(June, 1967).

Cultivable land area had not really changed from the 1950's to the 1960's. In 1967, for instance, it was estimated at between 256,000 and 310,000 hectares. Land tenure remained almost the same: prevalence of weak small holdings, 44% of which were owner exploited, 55% owner- and farmer-exploited, while agricultural laborers worked for a few big land owners.⁴⁶ IRFED distinguished between the following:⁴⁷

1. Fruits and vineyard lands: large investments, some of which belong to traders and capitalists.
2. Most of the countryside population have lands in non-irrigated areas. Small units are prevalent, with low technical and living standards. The main source of migration to the city came from this group.
3. Very small investments in irrigated areas.

Agriculture had always suffered from distinct problems which had been detrimental to its development. To begin, fruits and vegetables

(export products) depend heavily upon export market conditions, which have often been insecure. Income generated from export trade was not enough to pay for imports of agricultural products, especially cereals. Although the Lebanese government had spent 25 million LL. in 1961 to 1965, and 123 million LL. in 1965 to 1969 on irrigation projects, "no doubt this amount is modest compared to what the Lebanese countryside needs in investment."⁴⁸ Once an area became irrigated, however, land values increased some four- to five-fold. Capital went to buy land for speculation. Because speculation did not need expertise in farming, speculators could not use the land effeciently during the waiting period between buying and selling. This practice had put a heavy burden on the already non-competitive agricultural products vis-a-vis foreign ones.

Also in the late 1960's, financial aid was still ineffective in rendering the small landowner capable, over short- or long-range periods, to service their debts and pay the principal while realizing some profits (interest rate were 6 to 10 percent per month!). To try to meet their financial obligations, small landowners had to cut down on costs, which affected their work methods and resulted in low productivity and soil deterioration. Unable to meet their obligations, they were forced to go deeper into debt or sell the land, a practice that did not help productivity at all. Because of these practices, out-migration became a problem. In 1967, 80% of those who solely depended upon the land as a source of income were over fifty years of age. Furthermore, the standard of living declined and cooperatives became weaker. In 1959 there were 150 cooperatives, while in 1967 the number dropped to 27. Also, the laws pertaining to ownership were not

conducive for cooperative formation or for efficient land utilization. Technical assistance was also denied those who did not seek out immediate financial loans. In this way, technical assistance and loans became structurally legislated for rich peasants and for agricultural business.⁴⁹

Whatever "development" was carried out in agriculture and industry did not change the picture of uneven development of the economy and did not change its structure from that obtaining in the 1940's and 1950's.

While a strict comparative analysis is almost impossible between the economy of the aforementioned decades and of the 1960's (due to non-comparable statistical data of the different periods and other inconsistencies of the data pertaining to the same period),⁵⁰ it can be shown that the state of the economy in the two periods indicates that Lebanon had done little to alleviate the effects of uneven development of its economic sectors and geographic regions.

To corroborate the picture drawn earlier of the economy in the 1950's and to complement the discussion on industry and agriculture in the 1960's, we now turn to a discussion of the principal items in the balance of payments for the years 1961 to 1965 (wherever possible comparison will be made with the 1951-1952 period, which gave a picture of the balance of payments in the 1950's in general).

Commodity trade had three distinguishing features: (1) a big deficit; (2) a relatively great number of products [imports and exports] although fruits and vegetables were the major items; and

(3) exports were mainly with the Arab countries while imports were mainly from Europe. This was the same picture presented for this item on the balance of payments in the 1950's. Non-monetary gold sustained a deficit of 7 million LL.⁵¹ In the early 1950's this item registered a small surplus: 0.9 million in 1951 but -11.5 million in 1952. This represented, at least in theory, domestic consumption or savings of this item.⁵²

The yearly growth of income from tourism had been estimated at 14% in the period under question. Income had risen from 147 million LL. to 248 million, and tourism increased from 331,600 in 1962 to 601,500 in 1965.⁵³ The largest percent were Arabs (40%) followed by 20% Western Europeans, and 15% Australians and North Americans.

Transport and insurance did not indicate reinsurance (local companies insuring in foreign ones). This sub-category is included in the "other" category. Various studies of the Lebanese economy point out the poor commercial fleet of Lebanon. These studies further point out the need to find the reasons behind such a phenomenon. It was clear, however, that Lebanon did not have the capital to build a commercial fleet which was capable of competing with the world fleets.⁵⁴ As long as Lebanon keeps depending upon the services sector to cover its balance of payments deficit, it could never build a commercial fleet of its own.

Investment income was in surplus of approximately 70 million LL., about one-third of which came from real estate investments (buildings).⁵⁵

Governmental operations included the U.N. and foreign embassies and consulates expenditures in Lebanon.

Other services included transit income, foreign exchange income,

financial, commercial and investment services, expenditures of foreign companies, and so on. This "other" category was very substantial and came close (on the credit side) to the comparable item of commodity trade.

The significant feature of Lebanon's foreign trade for the period in question was represented by the deficit in the goods and services account. As shown here, in the period 1961 to 1965, the deficit was as follows: 240, 190, 129, 219, 259, and 349 million LL., respectively. The moving three-year average from 1953 to 1965 depicted a spiralling deficit: 90, 110, 135, 168, 196, 235, 246, 281, 267, 230, 200, 199, 272. Although the average fell from 281 in 1960 to 267, etc. in 1961 to 1964, we see that it rose again in 1965. The trend is clear: the deficit was rising and it remained a significant feature of the goods and services account.⁵⁶

The deficit was covered by the following items on the balance of payments: remittances and donations which had been a precarious and unpredictable item.

Long-Term Private Capital: The major sub-item is foreign investment and real estate, which in 1962 amounted to 90 million LL. and in 1963 to 86 million LL.; 54.2 and 52.2 million LL. for the respective years reflects real estate (other than buildings) investment. Not all of foreign investments are reflected in this category.⁵⁷ As an example, foreign investments of 17 and 18 million LL. for 1964 and 1965, respectively, were invested in trade at 35%, industry at 25% and finance at 13%. The Kuwait Fund Study reports that this item is expected to diminish because "Lebanon does not offer an encouraging financial market for long-term investment."⁵⁸

Short-Term Private Capital: This item is the critical point in the structure of the external accounts for the period under consideration. The deficit in the balance of payments was covered by this item. But a deficit in current transactions cannot be considered covered by short-term capital due to the precarious nature of this item. With this in mind, the following depicts a significant feature of the balance of payments.

Table 18. Lebanon: Balance of Payments Deficit,
1961 to 1965
(Millions of Lebanese Pounds)

Category	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Current Deficit	-119.8	-31.7	-110.4	-130.3	-228.4
Long-Term Capital	44	52.4	50.1	63.1	74.3
Long-Term Public Capital	18.3	11	7.2	20.5	4.8
TOTAL	-57.5	+31.7	-53.1	-46.7	-143.3

Source: Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development
(June, 1967).

It was unrealistic to imagine that this deficit could be covered by increasing the country's exports of goods and services. This move was impossible without a structural change in the Lebanese economy which, needless to say, was not forthcoming: the mercantilists were in dominant control of the political process and state power. Instead of this dramatic change, Lebanon had been relying upon financial transactions as indicated by the increase in the number of local and foreign banks.

Table 19.
Lebanon: Banks Development in Selected Years

	1945	1954	1959	1963	1965	1966
Number of Banks	7	21	29	70	80	99

Source: Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (June, 1967); and F. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1961), 5.

Most of these banks were owned or controlled by foreign interests, mainly European but also U.S.: Chase Manhattan (1950), First National City Bank (1955) and Bank of America (1956).⁵⁹

In 1966, 82 banks were headquartered in Beirut. All banks had 232 branches. However, most of these banks were small. Less than ten "local" banks were considered important in 1965. The following table lists them.

Table 20.
Lebanon: Top "Local" Banks
(In Millions of Lebanese Pounds)

Bank	Capital	Reserve	Other Income
Intra	60	10.5	766
Beirut-Riadh	25	1.3	68.5
Leb. and the M.E.	15	1.4	147.7
Alahli	10	4.2	152
Leb. Union	10	2.2	26.6
Development	8	0.11	34.6
Commerce	5	1.9	157.5
Belgian Lebanese	5	2.7	62
Leb. and Overseas	5	1.4	60.2

Source: Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (June, 1967).

The next table shows the aggregate financial structure of the commercial banks.

Table 21. Lebanon: Commercial Banks,
1964, 1965, 1966
(In Millions of Lebanese Pounds)

Item	1964	1965	1966
Reserves	100	108	188
Foreign Capital	1460	1848	1584
Claims on Private Sector	<u>1945</u>	<u>2310</u>	<u>2336</u>
	3505	4266	4108
Demand Deposits	890	962	894
Term Deposits in Foreign Currency	1271	1705	1891
Foreign Commitments	1023	1156	820
Other Items	<u>322</u>	<u>443</u>	<u>503</u>
	3506	4266	4108

Source: Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development
(June, 1967).

Despite the abundance of "local" banks, most of the deposits were in the Lebanese branches of foreign banks, twenty branches of which had in the summer of 1965 about 75% of local deposits and 85% of deposits of non-residents.⁶⁰ Added to the problem of foreign financial control or perhaps as a result of it, financial markets were virtually non-existent to attract long-term deposits to balance short-term deposits. In this respect one could talk of a chronic structural weakness in the Lebanese banking system--a weakness in the strongest economic sector of Lebanon!

In 1955 the Industrial, Agricultural and Real Estate Bank was founded in an attempt to alleviate some of the effects of the structural weakness of the economy. By the late 1950's and early 1960's, however, it was clear that this institution was incapable of achieving its goals. This was witnessed by the fact that the authorities, in recognition of the problem, had proposed in 1962 to establish a bank for industrial development with the participation of the International Finance

Corporation.⁶¹

One policy which, in the opinion of the Kuwait Fund Study, had contributed greatly to uneven development was the fiscal policy of the state. A surplus in the budget existed from 1943 to 1962. This was a conservative policy which was a hurdle to the rate of growth of GNP. The study implies that government intervention was needed to alleviate uneven development in the economic sectors. Although a slight deficit obtained each year after 1962, government policy remained conservative. In 1964, for instance, government spending was only 16% of the national income. This policy financed yearly expenditures by ordinary income and financed developmental projects through new income or loans.⁶²

Lebanon, it seemed, had been caught in a general contradiction: on the one hand its economic policy contributed greatly to uneven development; on the other hand Lebanon had to have this policy to protect its domestic monetary position and try to avoid whatever threatened the monetary value and the purchasing power of the Lebanese pound. However, these fiscal and monetary policies were conscious decisions by the state. Given the fact that Lebanon's foreign exchange market had been free from all restrictions since May of 1952, and since short-term capital had been an important part in covering the balance of payments deficit, the state had to have a conservative policy. The alternative would have been an inflationary fiscal policy under conditions of lack of state control over foreign transactions which would--sooner or later--have driven away the much-needed short-term foreign capital from Lebanon.

But this was not all in terms of the general contradiction. Despite this conscious conservative fiscal policy, Lebanon did not escape the economic problems brought about by total monetary integration

into the capitalist market. What fiscal policy tried to avoid, Lebanon began to experience (recession and inflation) by 1965-1966. Like most countries' economies that have been caught in the grip of capital, Lebanon's characteristic features had become inflation and recession.

On the eve of the Battle of Lebanon, these economic ills contributed greatly to the conflagration.

So far we have argued that the period 1943 to 1965⁶³ had been one that plunged Lebanon deeper into uneven development and had created heavy dependence upon external political and economic forces. We have also argued that the political set-up had reinforced the services sector at the expense of other sectors, and that the structural set-up of the economy had in turn reinforced the political set-up.

The period beginning in 1964-1965 was not much better. The late sixties experienced a slow economic growth and nothing of significance had happened up until 1972 in terms of development projects.⁶⁴ Due to internal and external disturbances and because Lebanon depended heavily upon the services sector, long-term private capital inflows decreased rapidly. The Intra Bank crisis of 1966, the 1967 war and the 1969 army clashes with the Palestinian guerillas had all contributed to slow growth.⁶⁵

Agriculture kept showing an increasing deficit while having a 20% share of exports. Local production covered 70% of domestic consumption. The share of agriculture in the GDP moved down from 20% in 1950 to 10% in 1968, and 9% in 1973. The services increased from 63% to 70% in the same respective years. The share of manufacturing of GDP increased from 14% to 17% in 1974. Export-oriented manufacturing lead to this growth.⁶⁶ At the same time the labor force was distributed as follows.

Table 22. Lebanon: Distribution of Labor Force
Among the Economic Sectors, 1974
(In Percent)

Labor Force	Economic Sector	GDP
50	Agriculture	9
20	Industry	17
30	Services	74

Source: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

The table is a glaring portrayal of the inequities of income distribution due to the economic structure. What the table does not show, however, is the breakdown of who gets what and how much in each sub-sector of the services. For example, the category of white-collar workers includes managers and clerks, two categories that do not have equal wages and benefits. In fact, the effects of the inequities are more devastating than the above table seems to suggest.

The IBRD reported, "Concerned with growing imbalances between sectors and income groups, the government decided in 1970 to go forward with five irrigation schemes that could...may start in 1975."⁶⁷ 1975 was the year the war began.

The Intra Bank collapse of 1966 had discouraged foreign capital from investing in Lebanon (mostly in Beirut). An important part of this capital was invested in real estate. Construction funds became more difficult to come by: "Present [1969] political uncertainties are not, however, likely to be favorable to fast growth in this sector."⁶⁸

The reliance of Lebanon on the services sector had devastating effects on the economy due to the political and economic disturbances of the 1966-1970 period. Although exports had picked up fast in 1967,

mainly due to the closing of the Suez Canal (a temporary thing and not a healthy factor upon which to build economic policy), it was clear that the situation was not conducive to the political and economic development of the country. A few had benefited at the expense of the rest of the population and even at the expense of some of the elite in the agricultural sector. The economic "recovery" of 1968 witnessed a fast rise in imports which, despite a 14% export growth, had widened the trade deficit by 150 million LL. This was offset by growth in tourism and other receipts, however. Again we see that the services had kept the balance of payments in surplus. That is to say that this sector was shoring up the precarious economy. This practice did not prevent the impoverishment of the population, especially those in agriculture (50% of the labor force) who did not share in the benefits derived from the services.

The 1970's also reconfirmed the precariousness of the whole situation. To fully appreciate the precarious position of Lebanon economically and politically, we will have to begin with the agricultural sector, then go to industry and finally to the services. Before presenting any statistics on the various sectors, the following is a profile of Lebanon's population at the beginning of the decade.

Table 23. Lebanon: Population, Education Enrollment,
Labor Force and Employment, 1970
(In Thousands)

Designation	Beirut	Beirut Suburban	Other Towns	Rural Areas	Total Lebanon
Population	474.9	464.1	339.0	848.3	2,126.3
Education Enrollment	160.7	154.7	126.4	272.5	714.3
% of Population	33.8	33.3	37.3	32.1	33.6
Manpower	275.7	242.1	173.4	420.8	1,112.0
% of Population	58.1	52.2	51.2	49.6	52.3
Labor Force	142.0	123.7	77.9	212.4	556.1
% of Manpower	51.5	51.1	44.9	50.5	50.0
Employment	136.6	118.9	75.5	207.4	538.4
Rate of Unemployment	3.8	3.9	3.1	2.4	3.2

Source: Ministry of Planning; Central Statistical Office:
Employment Survey, November, 1970.

The first thing to notice about the above figures is that the population lived mostly in the big cities and towns. This means that most jobs existed in non-rural areas. This is confirmed by the figures on manpower, labor force and employment. Employment figures, and especially the rate of unemployment, are relatively low. This is so because these figures do not take into consideration under-employment or hidden unemployment and also because it has been difficult to collect employment statistics in Lebanon. Nevertheless, one can see the gap between "manpower" and "labor force" statistics. This is so for two major reasons: (1) many had given up looking for jobs; and (2) many worked outside Lebanon. Also conveniently excluded are the Syrian laborers (a backbone of the economy) and the Palestinian population of Lebanon, who contributed much to the economy.

To go a step further and show uneven development in terms of employment, the following are interesting statistics about the labor force. They basically show that the structure of the economy on the

eve of the Battle of Lebanon had been the same since independence.

Table 24. Lebanon: Employment by Sector, 1970^a
(In Thousands)

Sector	Beirut	Beirut Suburban	Other Towns	Rural Areas	Total Lebanon
Agriculture ^a	0.6	1.6	5.5	94.1	101.8
Industry	23.4	33.4	16.1	22.6	95.5
Power and Water	1.1	1.1	0.9	2.5	5.6
Construction ^a	6.0	8.5	5.3	15.3	35.5
Commerce and Hotels	34.4	24.3	14.9	18.0	91.6
Transport & Communication	11.0	11.0	5.9	10.3	38.2
Finance & Services to Enterprises	10.2	4.4	1.8	2.0	18.4
Other Services ^a	49.5	34.1	24.8	41.4	149.8
Not Allocated	0.4	0.5	0.3	1.2	2.4
Total Employment	<u>136.6</u>	<u>118.9</u>	<u>75.5</u>	<u>207.4</u>	<u>538.4</u>
Unemployed	5.4	4.8	2.4	5.0	17.7
Total Labor Force	<u>142.0</u>	<u>123.7</u>	<u>77.9</u>	<u>212.4</u>	<u>556.1</u>

Source: Ministry of Planning: Central Statistical Office:
Employment Survey, November, 1970.

a Excludes temporary, seasonal labor and Palestinians
in camps.

GDP figures further show uneven development in the economy on the eve of the battle; it is clear from Table 25 that agriculture was the least important sector, especially when a sub-sector of the services (namely transport and communication) was two-thirds as large as agriculture in 1972 and almost equal to it in 1971. As a percent of GDP in 1971, agriculture was 8.6 and transport was 8.1.

The International Monetary Fund Study of January 21, 1975 entitled "Lebanon--Recent Economic Developments" corroborates the picture of the Lebanese economy presented in Table 25. Although agricultural exports increased in absolute terms in the 1970's, their relative share in total exports had declined from one-third in the late

Table 25. Lebanon: Gross Domestic Product by Origin
1966-1973
(In Millions of Current Lebanese Pounds)

Origin	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973 ^a
Agriculture, Livestock & Fisheries	442	426	436	432	445	466	631 ^b	675
Energy & Water	88	93	99	104	113	118	129	140
Industry & Handicrafts	512	492	552	610	661	750	884	1,038
Construction	231	196	194	216	218	239	290	300
Transport & Communication	310	329	380	383	401	438	478	513
Housing	284	300	335	385	430	495	558	610
Financial Services & Insurance	141	149	164	146	165	197	235	285
Other Services	357	337	397	461	482	522	676	791
Trade	1,183	1,160	1,359	1,435	1,527	1,723	2,007	2,241
Government	<u>319</u>	<u>337</u>	<u>357</u>	<u>393</u>	<u>424</u>	<u>451</u>	<u>477</u>	<u>507</u>
GDP at Market Price	3,867	3,820	4,273	4,565	4,866	5,399	6,365 ^b	7,100
Less: Indirect Taxes Less Subsidies	<u>300</u>	<u>267</u>	<u>303</u>	<u>342</u>	<u>345</u>	<u>412</u>	<u>489^b</u>	<u>562</u>
GDP at Factor Cost	3,567	3,553	3,970	4,223	4,521	4,987	5,876	6,538

(As Percent of Total)

Agriculture	11.4	11.2	10.2	9.5	9.1	8.6	9.9 ^b	9.5
Power, Industry	15.5	15.3	15.3	15.7	15.9	16.1	15.9	16.6
Construction	6.0	5.1	4.5	4.7	4.5	4.4	4.6	4.2
Transport & Communication	8.0	8.6	8.9	8.4	8.2	8.1	7.5	7.2
Services & Trade	50.8	51.0	52.8	53.1	53.6	54.4	54.6	55.3
Government	<u>8.3</u>	<u>8.8</u>	<u>8.3</u>	<u>8.6</u>	<u>8.7</u>	<u>8.4</u>	<u>7.5</u>	<u>7.2</u>
GDP at Market Prices	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

a Estimates.

b In 1972 the statistical base of agriculture was revised, adding about 150 million LL. to the production figures.

Source: Ministry of Planning; Central Statistical Office.

1960's to 18% in 1973.⁶⁹ Lebanon in the 1970's remained a net exporter of fruits, vegetables and poultry products and a net importer of cereals, dairy products, livestock and animal feed. The average annual growth rate of agricultural exports in the period 1970-1973 was 13%, while the rate of imports was 9%. In 1973 the export growth rate slowed down to 5%.⁷⁰

Lebanon's agricultural policy was to encourage diversified agriculture and to improve farmers' income. However, the semi-public Agricultural, Industrial and Real Estate Credit Bank (BCAIF) had strict lending policies that precluded lending to farmers with less than 5 hectares of land. Moreover, the bank's loans to agriculture were very limited. Since commercial banks extended credit mostly to large farmers, small farmers were forced to rely on the exorbitant interest rates of private moneylenders. To alleviate the problem the government extended credit to the National Union for Cooperative Credit (UNCC).⁷¹

Agricultural production was further supported by tariffs and import licensing and price supports were extended for tobacco, cereals and sugar. The ensemble of agricultural policies was designed to benefit big farmers while they did little to small farmers to keep them satisfied.

Industrial activity in the 1970's remained geared to light industries such as textiles and food processing.⁷² The Arab market was a benefit to industry which was geared toward export. Industrial exports increased from 87 million LL. in 1967 to 800 million LL. in the first nine months of 1974.⁷³

Of 6,500 industrial establishments in 1971, about 140 employed 50 or more workers. These "large" firms accounted for over 30% of value

added. Industry's share of GDP was about 16% in the 1970's. Between 1970 to 1973 industrial exports grew to an average annual rate of 29%. Over 80% of industrial exports went to the Arab market.⁷³

To a great extent, industry financed its own expansion through retained earnings. Commercial banks which preferred to extend short-term credit to commercial transactions had, in 1973, extended only 16% of their loans to industry. BCAIF had a limited capability to finance industry. In 1973 the government-controlled National Bank for the Development of Industry and Tourism was established. It increased the available medium- and long-term credit to industry.⁷⁴

In the 1970's the government felt compelled to intervene directly in economic development. To encourage industry, the government gave tax holidays for six years to firms that had an annual wage bill of 200,000 LL. and an investment exceeding one million LL. The tax holiday was extended to ten years for industrial establishments outside Beirut.

In the 1970's the services sector was still the most important. This was indicated by the receipts categories of the general budget, which showed that the services were the main contributors. Indirect taxes of which "customs duties" was the major item were the largest in the budget from 1969 to 1975.⁷⁵

In 1973 tourism accounted for 8% of GDP. Tourist receipts also accounted for 16% of receipts from goods and services. A major services sub-sector, banking, consisted of the Bank of Lebanon, 74 commercial banks and 4 medium- and long-term credit institutions. The IMF study contends:

Commercial banking in Lebanon is characterized by the large number of heterogeneity of banks and by the degree of foreign ownership. Over half of the commercial banks are foreign controlled and these banks account for about three-quarters of total deposits. In terms of deposits, the largest Lebanese-controlled bank ranked eighth at the end of 1973...The number of foreign banks has risen significantly in the last two years as a result of the purchases by foreigners of small Lebanese banks. These acquisitions have been motivated by the desire to establish a market presence and thus, hopefully, benefit from the large volume of petrodollars expected to flow through Beirut.⁷⁶

Table 25 sums up the story of development of Lebanon under a system which is widely recognized as the epitome of free enterprise. One could present additional data on investment, agricultural production and on industry. However, they really are superfluous at this point and could only corroborate the pattern of the sectors depicted in Table 25. They also would show that in industry as well as in agriculture, those conditions oriented toward export trade took priority over others. At this point it is much better to sum up the effects of economic development in Lebanon.

In 1975 the IBRD contended: "One of Lebanon's main development problems continues to be the slow rate of execution of public investment programs. The growing imbalances between the private sector and public facilities may not only slow down economic growth, but is likely to undermine the delicate political balances on which the system has been established."⁷⁷ This is a development problem that, at a more basic level, is the result of an anarchic and chaotic economic policy that could not have been otherwise, given the control over the economy by international economic forces operating in the world market.

In IBRD contention is significant in another respect, because it points to the interconnection of politics and economics; namely, how chaotic economic planning can undermine "the delicate political balances...". The IBRD suggests, however, that Lebanon could have solved the problems it faced in 1974 by increasing government spending and by planning to cope with the growth of the private sector. Consequently, it suggests borrowing from international finance through international organizations for that purpose.⁷⁸

The IBRD did not mention uneven development, inequities of income and wealth distribution as problems in Lebanon's development. In fact, it contends: "However, in view of Lebanon's unique position in the Arab World, the rising level of income and consumption in the Middle East and the dynamics of the Lebanese private sector, medium term prospects for the economy are good."⁷⁹ The IBRD was basing its judgement upon aggregate figures, and its problematic is not the welfare of Lebanon but the opening of the country further to international finance: "Lebanon remains credit-worthy for borrowing substantial amounts on conventional terms."⁸⁰ However, the IBRD report contradicts its recommendation of borrowing for public investment when it contends: "However, government investments have declined in real terms since 1969, and their share of GDP went down from 3.8 percent to 2.7 percent in 1973, as compared to almost 19 percent for private investment. The low level of public investment may have helped to avoid overheating of the economy and more in particular the construction sector."⁸¹

Clearly, according to the IBRD, Lebanon was caught in a double bind: on one hand the slow rate of execution of public investments was not conducive to growth; on the other hand higher rates would have

overheated the economy (more inflation that would have had serious political repercussions).

Furthermore, the "relatively low foreign debt" that the IBRD refers to (\$56 million) which "is negligible compared to the size of export earnings and foreign reserves"⁸² is not relatively low at all if the IBRD recognizes that Lebanon has unstable foreign investments and economy.

The picture is completed when one considers capital movements and foreign reserves. Because of bank secrecy laws, knowledge of these flows is conveniently limited. In 1973, net capital inflows--which had quadrupled since 1969--reached 725 million LL. The Lebanese banking system exported capital so that net deposits abroad grew from 1,179 million LL. at the end of 1970 to 2,105 million LL. in August of 1974. Large parts of capital inflow went into construction and real estate speculation; most of the 1.5 billion LL. of foreign deposits in Lebanon were short-term.⁸³ In the 1970's, as it was earlier, this was the critical point in the structure of foreign investment in Lebanon, a point that rendered the economy shakier than it might have appeared at first sight.

In 1973 and 1974, the government was trying to appease the population with some reforms in an attempt to keep uneven development within "comfortable" limits to the system. We now know that these efforts were taken up at an extremely late stage of the game. As the foreign investment picture presented here shows, the myriad problems of the economy were not alleviated by it. Rather, the structure of foreign investment was a major factor in further disrupting the economy which, along with other domestic, regional and international factors,

had opened up the Battle of Lebanon in early 1975.

CONCLUSION

Since independence, Lebanon's economy displayed a bias toward the services sector, which developed at the expense of agriculture. Capitalist relations penetrated agriculture as commercial profits and income gains in the services sector were invested in the production of fruits and vegetables. These two agricultural products were in surplus and geared toward export. Other agricultural products were in deficit since independence. These developments in agriculture favored the comprador bourgeoisie which had a vested interest in keeping Lebanon a deficit country in agriculture.

During the first several years after independence, industry also had a small share of the net national income. Since the early 1950's food processing and textiles showed a marked development compared to other industries, such as chemical.

Uneven development also manifest itself within each of the economic sectors. This is indicated in agriculture, for example, where growing of fruits and vegetables was preferred to cereals and other agricultural products. Lebanon's regions also developed unevenly because industry concentrated mainly in Beirut and its vicinities. Foreign and transit trade, banking and other services were also concentrated in Beirut. This type of development primarily favored Christian and especially Maronite areas in the Mountain and Beirut. For the most part, the rest of the country was neglected.

In its public policies, the Lebanese state favored the development

of the services sector. This was evidenced by the liberal trade policies and by state expenditures on such projects as the construction of Beirut's airport. The state also encouraged banking through the Bank Secrecy Law, which mainly facilitated foreign capital to invest in real estate (mainly in the Mountain and Beirut) or short-term deposits. The extent to which the state assisted industry and agriculture was beneficial mainly to those people who already had political clout and/or those industries and agricultural products that were geared toward export.

The lack of consistent statistics for the thirty-year period before the Battle makes it difficult to perform comparative analysis for the whole period. The following table, however, adapted from Tables 13, 22 and 25, provides a good picture of Lebanon's economic development.

Table 26. Lebanon: Distribution of the Labor Force Among the Economic Sectors and its Share of the GDP^a by Sector (In percent)

Labor Force	Sector	1957	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973 ^b
50	Agriculture	15.8	11.64	15	11.4	11.2	10.2	9.5	9.1	8.6	9.9	9.5
30	Industry ^c	15.3	20.13	17	21.5	20.4	19.8	20.4	20.4	20.5	20.6	20.8
30	Services ^d	68.9	68.1	68	67.1	68.4	70.0	70.1	70.5	70.9	69.5	69.7

a Percent of GNP is used for 1957, 1964 and 1965.

b Estimates.

c Industry includes power and construction.

d Services include transport and communication, trade, finance and government.

The above table shows a steady decline in agriculture's share of the GDP over the years. This declining share was distributed among fifty percent of the labor force.

Industry (which included power and construction) had a steady

share of the GDP, especially in the 1970's. This share was distributed among twenty percent of the labor force. The statistics are somewhat distorted because power is a state sector and its employees are state employees who could be included under services.

The services sector's share of the GDP was distributed among thirty percent of the labor force. The services share of the GDP was more or less steady during the 1970's.

Inequities in income distribution was also reflected among the populations of the various regions. This is evidenced, for example, if one looks at Lebanon's pattern of land holdings, which is mainly characterized by small land holdings in the Mountain and large land holdings (owned by zu'ama) in the under-developed areas. Middle and rich farmers mainly concentrated in the Mountain and were tied to export trade of fruits. Because tourism also favored the Mountain, one sees that its population was much better off than that of the rest of Lebanon. Most of the population in the other areas of Lebanon were either agricultural laborers or poor peasants subsisting on the land. One finds that the "destitute" and the "poor" (Table 15) lived in these areas and in the slums of Beirut.

This conclusion is also corroborated by the statistics given in Table 24, where the majority (94.1%) of those employed in agriculture reside in rural areas, which mostly are located in the Bika', the South and the North.

Table 24 also shows that those employed in industry resided mostly in Beirut and its suburbs. The same occurred in terms of employment in "commerce and hotels" and "finance and services to enterprises".

Finally, this kind of uneven development among the economic

sectors, the regions and the populations provided the Maronite right wing with a mass base mainly in the Mountain and Beirut. The mass base of the progressive parties was mainly in the Biqa', the South, the North, parts of Beirut and some parts of the Mountain.

FOOTNOTES

1. K. S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon (New York: Praeger, 1965), 167, 178, 171.
2. A. H. Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World (London: Oxford University Press, 1947).
3. In 1949, 1952 and the civil war of 1958.
4. H. Bassat, "The Lebanese Economy: Problems and Solutions." Arab Studies (March, 1972), 39.
5. See chapter two.
6. International Monetary Fund, First Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions (Washington, D.C., 1959), p. 129.
7. H. Bassat, op. cit., p. 43.
8. See pp. 71-73.
9. Lebanese delegation to the Fourth Regional Conference of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Beirut, September 13-16, 1954. "Le developpement de l'alimentation et de l'agriculture au Liban." (Mimeographed)
10. See note 11.
11. "Proceedings of the Agricultural Credit Conference" (Beirut, October 12-14, 1953).
12. Ministry of Agriculture, 1950.
13. See note 9.
14. Ministry of National Economy, Bulletin Statistique Trimestriel, Beirut, for oil and textiles, Le Commerce du Levant (July 3, 1954); for construction, A. Badre and A. Altounian, "National Income of Lebanon," Monograph 2, "Income Arising in the Construction Sector," (Beirut, November, 1951).
15. A. Badre, op. cit. See also Table 3.
16. R. Himadeh, The Fiscal System of Lebanon (Unpublished M.A. thesis, A.U.B., Beirut, 1953).
17. See Table 1.

18. Baron Maxime de Dumast, "Le Transit, Vocation du Liban," Les Conférences du Cenacle (Beirut, 1953).
19. Le Commerce du Levant (February 9, 1952).
20. International Monetary Fund, Fourth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions (Washington, D.C., 1953), 221.
21. International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C., 195?).
22. M. Touma, "Al Hurriss Al Khamisa," Muhadarat Alnudwa (Beirut, 1953).
23. Le Commerce due Levant (July 7, 1954).
24. F. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1961), 5.
25. A. Atallah and S. Khat, The Lebanese Industrial Sector: Its Growth and Problems, Ministry of National Economy, Bureau of Industrial Development (Beirut, August, 1969), 20.
26. Ibid., p. 10.
27. Ibid., p. 22.
28. Ibid., p. 32.
29. Ibid., p. 36.
30. Ibid., p. 34.
31. Ibid., p. 2 (my translation).
32. Ibid., p. 48.
33. Ibid.
34. International Monetary Fund, Lebanon--Recent Economic Developments, SM/75/18 (January 21, 1975). The report indicates an increase of industry's share of GDP from 13% to almost 15% between 1969-1973; this is a growth rate of 14% (pp. 2, 7). This, however, does not indicate a structural change in the economy.
35. A. Atallah, op. cit., p. 51.
36. Ibid., p. 54.
37. Ibid., p. 56.
38. Ibid., p. 63; see also Table 11.

39. Ibid., p. 73.
40. H. Bassat, "The Lebanese Economy: Problems and Solutions," Arab Studies (Beirut, March, 1972), 45.
41. I. Dik, A Survey of the Economic Potential for Industrialization of Lebanon (Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Utah, 1975), 110.
42. A. Atallah, op. cit., p. 73.
43. Ibid.
44. See Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, Report on the Lebanese Economy and its Development Projects (June, 1969); see also A. Atallah, op. cit.
45. Kuwait Fund, op. cit., pp. 5, 11.
46. Ibid., p. 19.
47. IRFED, vol. II, chapter 4.
48. Kuwait Fund, op. cit., p. 24.
49. Ibid., pp. 24-26.
50. Invariably every study on Lebanon's economy points out the lack of comparable and consistent statistics over the range of thirty years. See Kuwait Fund, op. cit., A. Attalah, op. cit., IMF reports and Sayigh, The Economics of the Arab World: Development Since 1945 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978).
51. Kuwait Fund, op. cit., p. 55.
52. Edward Fei and Paul J. Klat, The Balance of Payments in Lebanon, 1951 and 1952 (Beirut, 1954).
53. Kuwait Fund, op. cit., p. 55.
54. Ibid., p. 56.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., p. 58.
57. Ibid., p. 59.
58. Ibid.
59. Qubain, op. cit.
60. Kuwait Fund, op. cit., p. 62.

61. Ibid., p. 68.

62. Ibid., p. 73-74.

63. Sayigh, op. cit., divides the period as such: pre-1950; 1950-1958; 1958-1964. He does this on the basis of the comparable statistics available. In 1958 the statistical base had changed from the previous periods. This does not change the fact, however, that in these sub-periods uneven development had been developing.

64. IBRD (May 20, 1975).

65. IBRD (September 11, 1970), pp. 1, 2.

66. Ibid., summary ii, p. i.

67. IBRD (May 20, 1975), pp. iii, viii.

68. Ibid., p. 3.

69. IMF (January 21, 1975), p. 5.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., p. 6.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid., p. 9.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. IBRD (May 20, 1975), p. ii.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid., p. iii.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid., p. 2.

82. Ibid., p. 8.

83. Ibid.

CHAPTER FOUR

CRITIQUE OF THE LITERATURE

Literature on Lebanon's political development is primarily within the framework of the conventional model of capitalist development. Writers have defended the system as "rational," "modern," effective and stable. Rational because it rests upon an agreement among elites that gives groups within plural society equitable shares in the political process based upon a confessional arrangement. Modern because basically it is "democratic" and follows the capitalist model: elections, political parties, bureaucracy, consumption orientation and the services dominate the economy.

Because this system is rational and modern, it features one of the main prerequisites for economic "take off"--stability. Consequently, it is effective in delivering what it purports to delivery: "freedom," high rates of economic growth, higher standards of living, a growing middle class, more efficient bureaucracy and an increasing citizen input into the political process.

Disruptions, inequities and other such problems are contained within the conventional model as birth pangs of "modern society," external forces or vicissitudes of the international capitalist market. As such, the system should not be held responsible.

This general theme prevails in the writings of conventional literature. One may find some statements of concern here and there, however there is general consensus as to the acceptance of status quo.

Among these writers one also finds variations of the characterization of Lebanon. Some call it "plural,"¹ others "mosaic,"² and still others "precarious."³ Whatever the designation, the motivation of the conventional model is to maintain stability, improve upon it and defend it ideologically.

Variations of characterization are important and to this extent shall be dealt with here. While dealing with the conventional body of literature, major themes of the capitalist model of development will become apparent. To continue with and render the critique of the literature complete, a critique of the capitalist model is in order. Needless to say, this model has been subjected to heavy critique from many a quarter.⁵ Here, this critique will be formulated in general by drawing heavily upon the pertinent counter literature.

Two other bodies of literature that disagree with mainstream writers on Lebanon will also be dealt with: Arab nationalist and Christian literature. Significantly, much of the Arab nationalist literature agrees with the major themes of Dependency.

Important and indispensable assumptions in the critique of the conventional model are arguments put forward in chapters two and three. These chapters discuss the material basis of Lebanese society in an historical context. Such arguments render the conventional model inconsistent. The critique would illuminate these inconsistencies and the schizophrenia displayed in the three decades of its practice.

This chapter is an attempt to display the need to develop a theoretical framework that is consonant with the material basis of Lebanon discussed in chapters two and three. Such a theoretical framework, however, is the task relegated to chapter five.

Lebanese Conventional Literature

The Lebanese civil war of 1958 spurred a number of writers to focus upon the "causes" of this war and/or to suggest ways to modernize Lebanon as a preventive measure against future crises. The more basic questions dealing with the political and economic arrangement behind the creation of the confessional polity or the 1958 crisis were circumvented or dismissed.⁶

Writers such as Salibi and Khalaf emphasize the religious cleavages in Lebanon, assuming they constitute the main contradiction in Lebanese society. Most of these writers consider the class nature of the polity to be superficial at best. They assess the political system as "basically sound"; but for a few adjustments its rationality could be maintained.⁷

The second major war in 1975 brought into question not only the literature of the interwar years (1958-1975), but also the inadequacy of the thesis that looks at Lebanon's politics as a contention between Christians and Muslims.⁸ The several political and economic crises of these interwar years prompted a number of studies that delved into reasons behind instability and suggested ways of restabilizing the system. However, none of the studies of which I am aware addressed the basic tenet of the system or the development model upon which it is based.

To most writers within conventional literature, primordial ties are not conducive to modernization. However Lebanon is capable of developing, because it possesses other factors that favor modernization (education, democracy, etc.).¹⁰ Writing within this tradition and noting "the forces making for dissolution,"¹¹ Hourani describes

Lebanon's political development in a hopeful tone. He characterizes Lebanon as having "a frail sense of common citizenship" and other permanent institutions, some of which are liberal, but all being important in nation building, especially the presidency, which stands "above communities, clans and families" and is "the final guarantee both of the unity and of the Christian character of Lebanon."¹²

With the exception of Shihab's presidency (1958-1964), all presidents had relied upon families, clans, and so on. Even Shihab had to rely on some equivalent as a power base--army intelligence and other political bosses with primordial ties. However, because Shihab tried to bypass most of the traditional zu'ama (bosses), a formidable anti-Shihab alliance arose which later was successful in ridding the president of his influence.¹³

On a more basic level, Shihab's term and his "modernization" attempts, as witnessed by institutional development, were an aberration. Even if one stays within the confines of the conventional paradigm, it is not difficult to see that the "Christian character of Lebanon" is hardly a secular modernizing achievement given the literature on modernization.¹⁴

The National Pact, despite claims of its rationality,¹⁵ cannot be seen as a modernizing formula. It is a formula that consecrated primordial ties and more basically preyed upon and encouraged the development of primordial religious feelings.¹⁶ This is hardly a development that corroborates the conventional paradigm. Hourani, writing at the end of Shihab's term, should have been aware of these developments.

In a vein that at face value appears to be in opposition to Hourani's characterization of nation building, Khalaf concedes that

Lebanon hardly possesses any of the instruments of a civil polity. He is of the opinion that political modernization does not necessarily mean secular and ideological commitments as opposed to primordial alliance. The break need not be final. He informs us that "The viability of the political system will not appear so curious if one understands the nature of social and political change in Lebanon." Further, the central theme that he wishes to discuss is that "primordial ties and loyalties are not, as often assumed, impediments to national solidarity and political unity." At once we see that Khalaf's concern is with nation building and "to account for persistence of primordial ties in the political life of Lebanon."¹⁷ The approach he takes in treating the question is cultural, is "How to assimilate traditional culture into the culture of a rational and secular society without destroying both."¹⁸ He repeats after Halpern that "modernization involves the ability to absorb and generate change, not the repudiation of traditional values."¹⁹

His theme leads to a discussion of the zu'ama institution and its role in interest articulation and aggregation, a point which, he maintains, corroborates the rationality of the National Pact and religion in Lebanese politics.²⁰ He pushes a point shared by Salibi, Entelis and others, that the Pact and religion gave stability and democracy to the polity and that the zu'ama institution was instrumental in maintaining its political continuity.

Khalaf also contends that the goods enjoyed and generated by the system are due to confessionalism. "The consecration of confessional loyalties through the National Pact is a realistic and effective formula."²¹ However, unable to shove Lebanon's crisis aside, he claims

that the ills the system experiences are those of the bureaucracy and not confessionalism. Essentially, in his analysis there is no problem with confessionalism or primordial ties. One can still build and modernize further with them.²²

It seems that in Khalaf's analysis, the polity can be modern without being civil. Since modernity is rational, the Pact is rational and carries the polity into a realm of modernity. This rationality of the Pact appears to be the cloth within which all elements of primordialism reside. However, like Pandora's box, once uncovered the polity cannot be contained along the path of nation building designed by such mainstream literature.

To blame the problem on one element of modernity, namely, bureaucracy, is inconsistent with any variation of the paradigm with which one may choose to work. If one maintains that the bureaucracy is to blame because it still had influence of a primordial nature and friction originating from the zu'ama institution (in the case of Lebanon both exist),²³ then it follows that these primordial ties and influences are at the least hurdles to bureaucracy, and by implication, to modernity. It then follows that either the Modern or the zu'ama institution is not rational.

On another level, to separate the influences of the Pact from those of bureaucracy is irrational, since the Pact is extended in practice within bureaucracy.²⁴ Whatever administrative arrangement a polity has, there is by necessity the function of management and administration. However, to solve the problems that arise within the structures of the polity one would have to understand its political, economic and social nuances, as well as the bureaucratic implementation

one resolves to utilize. Khalaf and others choose to ignore the other more basic questions. Herein lies the weakness of Khalaf and some of his colleagues.

Working with the same paradigm, Edward Shils' discussion on Lebanon differs only in its consistency with the literature on modernization. As such, his fundamental problem is, "Why did this polity, which most of the time works quite smoothly, break down?"²⁵ He also contends as Khalaf does that "Lebanon is not a civil society." While Khalaf does not see primordial ties as "impediments to national solidarity and political unity,"²⁶ Shils points to the lack of civility as "the first and most general factor."²⁷ Shils contends that:

Because of the deeply rooted communalism of Lebanese society, it is not an integrated civil society in the modern sense of the term. It lacks the attachment to the national society as a whole, that sense of identity, the consensus that should embrace much of the population on issues that touch seriously upon the interests of the communities that make it up.²⁸

Inferred here is that national solidarity is difficult without civility. The incivility of the zu'ama is one of the important factors which impedes national identity and a consensus. According to Shils, one may also infer that the political system is irrational.

Shils also brings the National Pact itself into question:

The working constitution of the country is made rigid by the National Pact, which prevents the Chamber of Deputies from being a form of real competition of ideas, and prevents the elections from being a real competition of parties. The party system is to a large extent a modern facade to the system of communities which lies behind it. The National Pact

limits efficiency in the civil service by making communal membership a major criterion for recruitment. The government of the day is prevented from doing much at a time in the century when governments which are not "dynamic" are thought everywhere to be unworthy of continued existence.²⁹

As Shils observes, whatever consensus there is, it is based on the narrow confines of an ossified, irrational National Pact. Each group of political actors wants its "legitimate" share of political power so it can articulate and integrate its economic and social demands into the system. At the same time, however, Shils contends that "Lebanon is a country which must be kept still politically in order to prevent communal self-centeredness and mutual distrust from turning into active and angry contention."³⁰

Shils also maintains that "despite this fundamental flaw, Lebanon has many advantages"³¹ which could make it civil given certain conditions. He identifies the "productive economy" as one of these advantages: "...not only does the economy produce wealth but it works without the 'dynamic' intervention of government." Furthermore, "The government of Lebanon, by not claiming to accomplish a great deal, does not foster a revolution of rising expectations...what the citizens of Lebanon want of the Lebanese government for the most part is a fair share of the jobs and intervention that will protect their interests."³²

Shils thinks of the "inactive" government as a problem but an advantage. This "inactive" government is a hope for civility, rather than ideology being a replacement of receding primordialism. One suspects that this inconsistency stems from the separation of politics from economics in Shils' paradigm. Be that as it may, the

revolution of rising expectations need not be fostered by the government. Advertising which promotes capitalist consumption models is another avenue through which this "revolution" comes marching in.

Shils sees that classes cut across communal lines, especially in Beirut. He correctly perceives that class consciousness will grow further because "Economic prosperity under conditions of a liberal economic policy will heighten economic inequality. Urbanization will draw people away from their acquiescence to the inequality which was made tolerable in the patron/client relationship of the zu'ama."³³

With rising inequality, a scramble on the political machine is to be expected. Citizens expect government intervention to protect their interests. For the government to intervene in the economy to benefit the masses, a change in the political system must occur, one that has a basis other than that of elite communal politics. However, because Shils' ideological commitment is to civility, he, like other mainstream writers, promotes liberal institutions to meet such challenges. It is therefore a blessing that "class conflict is inhibited at a period (1963) when the institutions for coping with class conflict through negotiations and compromise are still extremely feeble."³⁴ Shils sees the need to develop liberal institutions to attenuate class conflict. These institutions become all the more necessary since a corollary of class consciousness is the waning power of the zu'ama. However, he also views changes in the system, though inevitable, as a disintegrating factor. Any problem with the economy "would have similar consequences."³⁵

Shils asks another basic question: "What are the chances of civility to triumph over ideology in the competition to fill the void

left by the recession of primordality and belief?"³⁵

If one assumes, as Shils does, that primordialism is receding and civility is difficult to obtain within such a pluralistic society as Lebanon, then according to this logic, ideology will replace primordialism. But this ideology is not necessarily free from, and an alternative to, primordial ties. The primordial and confessional nature of some ideological parties is quite apparent³⁶ as the Kataib-Maronites, the Najjadah-Muslims. It seems that Shils is asking the wrong question. He assumes that primordialism is waning in Lebanon and then reflects upon the prospect of civility in assuming this void. Further, he opposes confessionalism to ideology and civility when both civility and confessionalism are in fact ideological.

Despite the static balance of Lebanese politics ("Lebanon is a country that must be kept still politically"), Shils is of the opinion that if liberal institutions can be secured, prospects of Lebanese civility are good. According to Shils, however, that development of civility depends upon continued Lebanese prosperity, a stable Middle East and "the passage of time".³⁸

Much like the other writers discussed so far, Shils' problematic is essentially nation building. But because he is more consistent with his paradigm (than Khalaf, for instance), he confronts the questions that are hurdles to civility. Inconsistencies apparent in his analysis of Lebanon are largely those of the paradigm. Primordialism, Lebanism, Arabism and their relationship to class consciousness and conflict cannot be fathomed without appreciating the links between confessionalism and free enterprise. For Shils to hold civility as a prospect in the face of insurmountable material problems, and to be unwilling to

consider another development route as a solution that is more consonant with what material conditions exist in Lebanon's political development, is an ideological commitment of the first degree.

Despite serious flaws in Shils' analysis, it remains quite informative in comparison to other writers, Salibi for instance, who describes "Westernization" in Asia and Africa as:

...an urban phenomenon, setting towns apart from rural areas and emphasizing within each town the distinction between the rich upper class and the working folk. Hence in Westernizing societies, cultural incongruity is naturally coupled with increased social tension. The traditional culture, when it is relegated to slums and depressed villages, rapidly loses its original vitality and becomes a leading cause of national sensitivity.³⁹

Lacking a sense of history, Salibi, the historian, goes on to blame the victims for what is really the legacy of colonialism in Asia and Africa:

The West which they generally admire, in challenging them to meet its standards, often appears to them as a threat. Paradoxically, these Westernizing people while seeking to understand the causes of their own cultural inertia, are usually obsessed by a false pride which inhibits them from accepting unfaltering realities and compels them to resort to devious reasoning. They are hence prone to lay the blame for their most serious problems on outside forces...They are also inclined to stress, as a reason for their social and cultural failings, their comparative lack of national power, a condition which is actually the outcome rather than the cause of their backwardness. It is probably because of their insistent association of progress with power that newly independent Asian and African nations have tended to hold their armies in high esteem...military dictatorships have easily superseded constitutional governments in most Afro-Asian countries.⁴⁰

According to Salibi, among the Afro-Asian countries that have developed in the manner described above are the Muslim Arab states in the Middle East. However, "Lebanon presents a striking contrast to the general pattern of Westernization in the Arab Middle East. Because of the influence of its Christian population, this country stands apart from its surroundings, displaying those marked Western tendencies by which it is chiefly distinguished."⁴¹

Salibi goes on to identify the existence of two cultures in Lebanon, two societies, one Christian and modern, the other Muslim and traditional. The Christian society is "socially and culturally homogeneous" and not prone to conflict as is the lot of the Muslim society. Further, because the Christian intellectuals do not form a distinct class, they are links at every level between the different parts of their society and so "they promote a unity of purpose among all classes."⁴² Not so with the Muslims:

In Beirut, as in other towns, a number of Muslim families maintain traditions of urban refinement which are often beyond the capacity and experience of peasant-descended Christians. This refinement, however, does not penetrate to the level of the masses. The ordinary Muslim quarters in Beirut, Sidon or Tripoli resemble their counterparts elsewhere in the Middle East...In Muslim Lebanon, as in most other Middle Eastern or Afro-Asian societies, a wide gap separates the rich from the poor. Westernization follows class lines and emphasizes social differences, national sensitivity influences political thinking and behavior.⁴³

As a general rebuttal to Salibi's ideas, it seems he is unconscious of many effects of colonialism upon the Afro-Asian countries--expropriation and exploitation of human and natural resources, dependency, under-development, etc. Colonialism also creates a following among a

privileged sector of the population that perpetuates the colony's link to the colonial power in various ways after independence.⁴⁴

Assuming political power from the colonialist was a step to deprive colonial powers from legislating the exploitation of that country's resources, many colonial countries failed to develop precisely because they adopted the Western (i.e. capitalist) model of development. The tensions created along class lines in Afro-Asian countries, which Salibi speaks of, are part and parcel of the capitalist model and are hardly due to cultural inertia or backwardness. Tensions between town and country, associating progress with power, and modernization using the military are more than merely the "outcome" of the "Western" model of modernization (South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines).

Lebanon's case, which Salibi opposes to the general development that occurred in Africa and Asia, is also questionable. By Salibi's admission, Lebanon experienced primordial and sectarian conflict on a similar scale to other Afro-Asian countries. Many of these countries were able to find working formulas of conflict resolution until such times that conflagrations occurred, as for example, Cyprus and Nigeria. Lebanon experienced, before Salibi's writing, a coup in 1961, a civil war in 1958, a serious crisis in 1952, and a coup in 1949. However, according to our historian, Lebanon is stable and unique because of its "Christian" character. What accounts for its instability is its "Muslim" society. There are, however, Christians in other Afro-Asian countries. Ethiopia is a strategically located country with a rich history, predominantly Christian, but extremely under-developed.

To simply relegate all "backward" elements in Lebanon to the "traditional Muslims" is no substitute for hard analysis of politics

and economics. Class formation, the impact of the colonial power upon the development of new classes and the economy, are subjects worthy of attention. There is one economy of Lebanon and Lebanese society. The political system reinforces the economy, which in turn creates uneven development among the country's regions and population. This in turn reinforces the political set-up and its attendant zu'ama institution. Explaining "backwardness" by concocting an inherent evil in the aboriginal culture is superficial, subjective, and skirts the underlying reasons that prevented Lebanon from even development. It is obvious in Lebanon's case that the ruling elite of all sects, but predominantly Maronite, perpetuates the status quo and controls the state.

On another level, as Shils and others have noted, classes do cut across religious lines.⁴⁵ Besides, Christians in Lebanon are not a monolithic community, as Salibi leads us to believe. Maronites, Catholics, Greek Orthodox and Protestants are among some of the Christian sects in Lebanon. In many Christian villages one sees various political affiliations: Arab Nationalists, Syrian Nationalists, Communists and Kataib (Phalangists). These affiliations are reflections of various ideological and class positions. This observation does not support Salibi's opinion of the Christian intellectuals.

The confessional nature of the state does not allow the honest analyst to categorize the Christians as liberals and the Muslims as traditionals. Confessionalism, though it may possess certain liberal symbols, is not really so because it is replete with primordial ties that infiltrate liberal symbols. It behooves Salibi to remember that the 1949 coup was attempted by the Syrian Nationalists, whose leader was a Christian; that the 1952 crisis was instigated by the Christian

president, which later prompted Christians and Muslims to force the president to resign; and that the 1958 civil war was also initiated to uphold the Pact which was being violated by the Christian president.⁴⁶ After that war Shihab, the new president, instituted social, economic and political reforms, keeping the confessional system intact and mitigating the radicalization of the masses. As Salibi very well knows, those parts of the country which are predominantly Christian could not have won social achievements they enjoy without the ruling Christian elite dominating the political process, and using it to support the economic sectors that favored their areas at the expense of the rest of Lebanon.⁴⁷ Salibi's analysis extols the inequities of uneven development and legitimizes the confessional political process. The history of Lebanon, before and after Salibi's analysis, belies his observations on the nature of the confessional polity.

A more sober discussion on modernization which falls within the conventional paradigm is given by Salem. He separates political liberty from equality: "Lebanon faces the dilemma of trying to preserve political liberty and a pluralistic society while at the same time mobilizing its resources to benefit the disadvantaged and the poor."⁴⁸ Implicit in this statement is a notion that political liberty comes at the expense of social equality.

Salem is of the opinion that Lebanon had been able to develop politically to "ensure continuing modernization" with little strain and without resorting to a radical ideology. Furthermore, "Lebanon's relative success shows that there are various routes to modernization, and that gradualism with political stability may be preferable to a radical but unstable regime."⁴⁹ Whatever instability faces Lebanon, we are

told, is the result of exogenous factors such as the Palestinian commandoes or a "major political crisis in the Middle East."⁵⁰ However, primordial loyalties usually come to the fore as reactions to external factors in times of crisis: "Confessional loyalties were clearly discernible in the cabinet crisis of 1969, which arose as a result of the operation of Palestinian commandoes against Israel from within Lebanese frontiers."⁵¹

In "devising" a method for Lebanon's modernization, one has to remember that the country is in the Middle Eastern context. Lebanon cannot be discussed in isolation, blaming failure of modernization on factors exogenous to the polity. These factors are not exclusively foreign since Lebanon itself was carved out of Syria. Many potential factors of instability are to be sought in the economic system backed by confessionalism, which further advances power and authority relationships based on primordial patron/client relationships. Such a political system will hamper modernization whose literature, Salem contends, "focuses on rationalism, democracy, viable institutions, economic expansion, rising standards of living, and planned development of national resources."⁵² The focus of modernization literature does not appreciate the "dilemma" that Lebanon faces. For one thing, both "viable institutions" and "rising standards of living" are in the focus of modernization. If, however, this is a practical problem of modernization, then it is likely that the literature is that which is confronted with both a theoretical and practical crisis.

On another level, the modernization focus does not differentiate between "modernization" and "development". If the two are different, as suggested by Enloe,⁵³ then Salem's thesis would be problematic since,

as chapter three demonstrates, Lebanon before the civil war was underdeveloped. In this regard, Lebanon was no exception to Afro-Asian countries that opted to develop within the capitalist paradigm. The recent history of Lebanon before the battle shows political and economic crises were numerous: 1952, 1958, 1961, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1973, etc. These crises cannot really be blamed on "externals". How "external" are the Palestinians who have been living in and contributing heavily to Lebanon's society and economy since 1948? How "external" were Arab monies invested in Lebanon which were in part responsible for the country's "success" story?

Salem's study of Lebanon also falls within the general category of elite politics. This is evident in his description of the various elite "clubs"⁵⁴ and the stakes they have in the system, the bureaucracy and the give-and-take of "politics as usual" that the zu'ama indulge in.⁵⁵ Zu'ama are interested in reform of the bureaucracy, the planning apparatus and other social and economic reforms to the extent of their self interest. It is a documented fact that the late president Shihab faced an uphill battle with the "zaim club" when he tried to implement social and economic reforms. Although some zu'ama were for reform, they were not in the majority, each with his own reasons. Reforms conceded by the "clubs" were either brought about by public pressure or used to defuse explosive situations (the crisis following the 1958 civil war). As Salem correctly observes, reforms "...can be tolerated to a certain extent, but cannot be permitted to encroach on the prerogative of zaims. Major reforms may be tolerated as relief measures in times of crisis but cannot be tolerated by certain members of the clubs if in conflict with the members' immediate interests."⁵⁶

In regard to planning, Salem contends "The Lebanese government has adopted development planning, as it has adopted bureaucratic reforms, mostly in answer to demands and forces largely outside the strictly formal structure of government and bureaucracy."⁵⁷ A review of the plans and their critique points out that such plans are indicative and trail behind the private sector. They could not be implemented except for infrastructure government expenditures which usually occur without a plan.⁵⁸

What has been shown in chapter three to be a major source of Lebanon's problem is described by Salem as its strong point. In a tone reminiscent of Issawi's argument,⁵⁹ Salem contends:

(Lebanon's) free market, the diversity of its product, and its various invisible incomes (private capital inflows, transportation and tourism) have been a source of strength and stability to the economy, providing Lebanon with a higher standard of living than most countries in the Middle East region, and continued economic progress in spite of recurrent political crises.⁶⁰

Yet Salem also concedes that "under laissez faire, many were deprived of acceptable employment and education and health opportunities."⁶¹ He further admits that, in part, the 1958 war was between the "haves" and "have-nots".⁶² According to Salem's logic, one can say that Lebanon's economy (before the battle) was doing fine, but its people were not.

Despite all the shortcomings that Salem finds in the system, he still contends that:

The multiplicity of sects, of foci of economic and political power, and of long-held autonomies in the confessions have led to the establishment of a political formula which ensures consensus that moves slowly and that limits the arena of political action.⁶³

Instead of seeing the confessional system as a limiting factor in Lebanon's development, he concludes, "So far, at least, Lebanon seems to have found a formula whereby it can perpetuate itself peacefully and entertain modernization ideals in a unique manner."⁶⁴ This he observed at a time of much political unrest in Lebanon (1973)--of strikes, inflation and political tensions--which later culminated in the 1973 major clashes between the Palestinian commandoes and the right-wing army. Two years later, after more political and economic tensions, the battle of Lebanon erupted.

Another mainstream writer of significance is J.P. Entelis. His problematic remains the survival of the state through the most important pro-system party, the Lebanese Kata'ib (LKP). He, as the others, assumes "Lebanism" a pluralistic society and elite politics, as essential for conflict resolution.⁶⁵ A rational confessional arrangement has no place for dogmatic politics which try to assimilate Lebanon through Arab nationalist ideology, or politics that seek an alternative system. He informs us that:

(Lebanon's) experience has demonstrated that an accomodative attitude toward parochial interests can actually accelerate national integration, enhance the legitimacy of the political system, and maximize the possibility of peaceful adjustment of social conflicts. Moreover, the adaptive elements of Lebanon's modernization process have helped to cope with internal tensions and discontinuities resulting from rapid social change.⁶⁶

Here he relies on the work of Khalaf and Harik, among others.⁶⁷ As is obvious from the above Entelis analysis, "rapid social change" and not the model of development utilized (laissez-faire grafted onto a confessional polity) is responsible for "tensions and discontinuities." Furthermore, the confessional system is positive in this regard because it helps Lebanon to "cope" with development.

As the history of Lebanon has shown, the long-awaited society Entelis speaks of failed to materialize. Instead of helping Lebanon to "cope", the country's "modernizing" structures legitimized unequal relationships in politics and economics among the population and regions.

Entelis defines his problematic as "modernization", etc., and dismisses challenges to the system from anti-system parties and groups as ideology or demagogy. He then proceeds "objectively" to examine system maintenance and system development ("challenge"). The LKP, we are told, is the "genuinely democratically-inspired and modern political (organization which seeks) an evolutionary form of social integration based upon the legitimate recognition of confessional interests."⁶⁸

Entelis, as the other writers reviewed thus far, chooses well-defined categories (Christian - Muslim) that have the force of tradition. In choosing other categories, one would have to first challenge the previous ones and what is more, one would lose the grip one previously had on the problematic of one's choice. The problematic itself would then become suspect and would have to be challenged. Furthermore, questioning the traditional language of the "modern" leads to an examination of reasons behind the creation of such categories and to an analysis of material conditions that were responsible for the prevalence of such categories in the literature.

If, as is shown in chapters two and three, development means more than just modernization and involves the universe of political economy of the polity, then it is obvious that political development involves more than system maintenance. It certainly involves more than stability, pro-system parties, and zu'ama or other "relevant" institutions; "relevant" to what, and to whom?

Entelis, like Salem, finds many flaws in the Lebanese modernization effort. However, it is not the fault of the system; on the contrary, "confessionalism is the Lebanese response to this democratic problem in a plural society."⁷⁰

Entelis informs us that "In many ways confessional pluralism resembles Lijphart's model of consociational democracy..."⁷¹ Lijphart's conflict-resolution model displays the following features: (1) distinct lines of cleavage between subcultures; (2) a multiple balance of power among the subcultures; (3) popular attitudes favorable to government by grand coalition; (4) external threat; (5) moderate nationalism; and (6) a relatively low total load on the system.⁷²

This "list of conditions favorable for consociational democracy is tentative, and is meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive."⁷³ There are prerequisites to this type of democracy: (1) ability to recognize the dangers inherent in a fragmented system; (2) commitment to system maintenance; (3) ability to transcend subcultural cleavages at the elite level; and (4) the ability to forge appropriate solutions for the demands of the subcultures.⁷⁴

Lijphart's study includes Austria, Belgium, Lebanon, the Netherlands and Switzerland.⁷⁵ However, the history of Lebanon is quite different from that of the other countries. For instance, the

Netherlands was until recent history a colonial country. The other countries mentioned are fairly industrialized and have been more or less stable since WW II. If one takes Lebanon's history within the same period, it would not be difficult to recognize that not all of these conditions were present at one and the same time. For example, one can safely assume that condition five was never present. Besides, in Lebanon there are people who espouse Arab nationalism and others whose allegiance is to "Lebanism". In terms of the prerequisites, it turns out that the elite were not wholeheartedly committed to system maintenance. The model is built on the assumption that instability could be dealt with through a rational elite and an invisible state. This model is also static, and does not take into consideration Lebanon as a part of the Middle East region, but simply as a democracy facing an external threat.

Lijphart's type of democracy may be viewed as a kind of vertically-integrated system which Harik defines as: "the creation and promotion of political mechanisms connecting a community directly with the national government such that each community which is conscious of its ethnic distinctiveness may see in the national government a place for itself, recognition of its political and other rights, and responsiveness on the part of the government to the community's needs."⁷⁶ This definition contains all the prerequisites of the consociational democracy.

Harik seeks to rationalize Lebanon's confessional system when he states that "modernization, particularly the revolution in mass communications, has (sic) aroused and stimulated ethnic consciousness... it is maintained that social engineering may be the main, if not

inevitable course for the new states of the Middle East to take in their search for national integration. Recognition of the legitimacy of ethnic identification and organization within the confines of the state is the main tenet of integrative social engineering."⁷⁷ Furthermore, integration should be vertical since its emphasis "is on adjustment of community life to the central government, making demands on the political system and at the same time accepting constraints essential for the system's endurance and viability."⁷⁸ This, it may be argued, was the "rational" set-up that the Pact had brought to Lebanese politics.

He informs us that the traditional "mosaic pattern" has been disrupted by modernization, which stimulated ethnic consciousness and conflicts. "Class consciousness has also been stimulated, especially in countries like Lebanon, Turkey and Egypt, but hardly anywhere else. Even in these countries very little is known about the subject to warrant a separate discussion here. Social solidarity on a class basis has not yet become a political force."⁷⁹

Harik is of the opinion that Lebanon was a successful example of vertical integration. One charge "is that conflict in Lebanese politics is endemic, and the answer to this is simple: a degree of conflict in any social system is healthy and a sign of vigor, not weakness... It is true, however, that in Lebanon conflicts sometimes reached an unhealthy degree and it has on a number of occasions caused bloodshed."⁸⁰

In lieu of recognizing class formations, which cannot be denied, Harik only alludes to class consciousness and dismisses it in favor of vertical integration. Suppose modernization has disrupted the mosaic

pattern of society in Lebanon and new classes have been formed; what impedes class consciousness in Lebanese society? A laissez-faire economy has put many strains on the system. Confessional politics legitimized the static and unequal political relationships. Confessional politics insured that impediments were put in the way of political and economic development. In fact, it insured the polity's disintegration.

To recognize the social reality of the class nature of Lebanese society is essential to understanding Lebanon's political development. This does not lead, however, to a "refusal to recognize the legitimacy of ethnic (or confessional) reality..."⁸¹ On the other hand, a refusal to recognize the class nature of Lebanon is a refusal to recognize the dominant economic dimension in any discussion of Lebanese confessional politics and/or the development and class position of the various confessions and groups within these confessions.

The fact that classes cut across religious lines should not be treated lightly. The fact that there are class differences within the confessions should lead one to question the simplistic treatment of Lebanese politics along these lines. Furthermore, such a treatment as Harik's deals predominantly with elite politics, largely neglecting non-elite politics as practiced by anti-system parties and groups. That these are part of the social reality of Lebanon and represent large numbers of people is beyond any question. As such, they should be treated for the sake of comprehensive analysis. Not surprisingly, Harik concludes "the Lebanese case proves to be moderately successful in terms of integration. The main reasons for its success, as we have tried to show, are a recognition of the legitimacy of the ethnic

principle of identification and its role within the state; ...

Intercommunal relations can be developed and improved when the initiative remains within the communities."⁸² Here, Harik agrees with Entelis that confessionalism is Lebanon's answer to the democratic problem. That this answer is no solution to Lebanon's development has been shown in the various crises that Lebanon has experienced.

In a somewhat different treatment of Lebanon than that of Entelis, Barakat distinguishes between pluralistic and mosaic in a heterogeneous society. He places these two concepts on opposite ends of a continuum with Lebanon falling somewhere in between.⁸³ He further posits that this type of distinction could be used to study other societies as well (Ireland, Canada, etc.), Lebanon being unique in that it has two contending religious communities which are roughly equal in number and strength. It may be added that this "mosaic" is different than the one which Harik discussed.

Barakat is of the opinion that the most dominant cleavage in Lebanese society is religious. He further observes that the relationship between the two communities has passed through two stages: (1) open conflict; and (2) a period of accommodation crowned by the Pact.⁸⁴

The evidence of a mosaic society, he contends, is: (1) a lack of consensus on fundamentals; (2) a lack of extensive and open dialogue; (3) private loyalties and interests dominating public loyalties and interests; (4) geographical concentrations of different religious communities; (5) non-separation of religion from the state and the legitimization of confessionalism; (6) the absence of a unified educational system; and (7) the existence of different reference groups. Due to these cleavages, the consensus is that essential to a

pluralistic society is lacking in the case of Lebanon.⁸⁵ Unlike Khalaf and Harik, Barakat reaches the conclusion that unless it can modernize, Lebanon will have a stormy future.⁸⁶

Despite this conclusion, Barakat's treatment shares with the rest of the conventional literature the assumption that the Christian-Muslim dichotomy is at the heart of the problem of Lebanese society. What Barakat does not provide is an analysis of the material conditions responsible for the development of the system to its contemporary stage.

Khuri is one analyst who attempts such a discussion. In a discussion of class mobility and the lack of class consciousness, he finds that each community is internally stratified into graded classes. In addition, classes cut across religious lines.⁸⁷ To Khuri, class is a social position rather than a concept based on income or other classifications. Income would make sense, he informs us, as one of the bases of class, if put in the context of a social position. Based on this definition, he identifies three major classes: (1) elites with politico-military power; (2) 'Ayan [merchants, etc.]; and (3) commoners [stratified as to job].⁸⁸ The main drives for class mobility and change were economic growth (which started with silk becoming a cash crop in the nineteenth century which, in turn, enhanced trade and created wage labor in silk factories), education, and emigration. All three induced economic and social differentiation. Emigration began to break coalitions of families, and new families rose to power. Emigration also reduced class conflict.⁸⁹

Khuri's discussion of class puts the zu'ama institution in its proper perspective: an institution of compromise that attenuates the class struggle and is sustained by a structural management. To

begin, the political set-up is such that access to jobs (private and public) is to a large extent controlled by the za'im. Because of the way electoral laws were set up, rural migrants to cities were forced to exercise their political rights in the village of their origin. A migrant worker sought identification in that village because often he had some property and family there. This contributed greatly to continuity of traditional ties which, needless to say, are mainly due to economic status and security. These are major reasons for the lack of class conflict. Two other reasons which he points out are that the clubs are sectarian and that "ideological" parties are prohibited by law. The lack of class conflict impedes class consciousness and hinders political organization along class lines and the rise of classes as conscious political forces.⁹⁰

The above analysis recognizes the class nature of the polity and seeks an interpretation of it through a study of the material conditions obtaining. To this extent, his analysis is distinguished from Salibi's, Issawi's, Khalaf's and Harik's understanding of the Lebanese polity. What the analyst did not consider, however, are the conditions under which class conflict arise. To the extent that such conflict arose in Lebanon's recent history, this criticism is legitimate. Furthermore, this criticism is important because it is essential to consider ways by which class conflict could condition "the changing class structure in Lebanon."⁹¹

Hudson, who is one of the most important students of Arab politics, contends that in Lebanon:

Democratic institutions have brought about and maintained stability in an unfavorable political environment. The Lebanese case suggests that formal institutions, although neglected in behavioral political science, deserve new attention as causal agents in the process of political modernization. At the same time, it raises the question of whether such institutions can supply enough systematic flexibility to meet the social mobilization demands of a rapidly changing society.⁹²

As a pluralist body politic, Lebanon needed:

...a political system based upon the balance of power ...In turn, the balance of power has required institutions that promote democratic values...Lebanon's representative institutions are an essential condition of its stability, not a lucky by-product.⁹³

Although Hudson shares with Entelis, Salem and others the problematic of stability and modernization of new states (Lebanon in this instance), his keen insight into the problem allows him to reach conclusions which are at variance with Salibi's visualization of "traditional Muslims versus modernizing Christians." Hudson recognizes that the "system is democratic only in a limited sense."⁹⁴ And modernization presents a problem of additional social demands to a weak government apparatus. Meeting these demands and becoming responsive to the people "will threaten the existing democratic values that are a product of the balance of power among autonomous traditional groups."⁹⁵ One can already infer, from what has transpired, that modernization and development are not conducive to that political system. The system is based on a static balance of power which is irrational since it cannot cope with political and economic development.

Hudson assumes that the basic question to investigate is the

effect of social mobilization on the Lebanese body politic. He does not analyze the underlying reasons for instability. Instead, he sets out to study "the environment of the Lebanese political system."⁹⁶

This formulation of the problem confines Hudson, as it does other writers, to the study of elite politics. This also allows most writers to relegate to the realm of "ideology" and demagogic pan-Arab feelings and political practice among the Lebanese. It further allows these writers to dismiss such practices as unworthy of serious consideration by social scientists investigating political science questions such as modernization and nation building. Hudson studies "the connection between traditional pluralism, the balance of power, democratic values and stability."⁹⁷ While relegating the weakness of the system to "elements beyond its control,"⁹⁸ he poses:

...the most interesting and perplexing question about Lebanese politics: considering all the factors weighing against it--a divided citizenry, low national feeling, the pressure of Arab politics, the strains of modernization--how can it perform so successfully?⁹⁹

Instead of being seen as "interesting and perplexing," this state of affairs should have been seen as an indicator of rapidly developing and deepening problems of the confessional polity. Despite "the regularity of institutionalized instability," the problems created by social mobilization such as the regional and "structural unevenness" and "the growing politicization" of the Lebanese, Hudson isolates "two important characteristics that mitigate to some extent (the system's) weaknesses" and give it "a certain capacity for muddling through": (1) increasing institutional strength; and (2) a degree of

democratic procedure.¹⁰⁰

He sets out to discuss the modernization that occurred in the office of the presidency and the Chamber of Deputies. He points out some of the reforms that took place under Shihab (social security program, administrative reform and the creation of the social development office) and the changes in Lebanon's foreign policy (closer Arab solidarity). These discussions allow him to conclude:

The events of the last decade suggest that while sectarians at the popular level show no signs of disappearing, the political system can to some extent transcend the confessional, corporate society.¹⁰¹

And in opposition to Entelis' later thesis about the LKP:

For Lebanon more than most states, survival today requires political responsiveness to broadly populist demands, and this fact is recognized by Lebanese politicians. Lebanon does not need a party system to make these realities apparent and a determinant in policy-making. Indeed, the vulnerability of the system increases its responsiveness.

This is not to say, however, that Lebanon will overcome the persistent challenges of modernization in the long run. Institution growth and democratic procedures are palliatives, not cures...(but Lebanon's dilemma remains): too little democracy may lead to social disorder and revolution; too much may bring down upon the state the wrath of the traditional leaders.¹⁰¹

Unlike Entelis' claim, Hudson does not see confessionalism as Lebanon's answer to the democratic problem. And unlike Salem's later claim, evolutionary modernization does not have good prospects according to Hudson.

Although Hudson is at variance with important conclusions of

mainstream writers on Lebanon, his commitment to "their" model prevents him from considering revolutionary change as a solution to Lebanon's development. Given his problematic, he tends to think of such change, though indirectly, as a danger to democracy and institution building.¹⁰³ Although he puts his finger on Lebanon's perennial dilemma, his model does not allow him to cross the threshold.

It took a civil war to bring an analyst of Hudson's caliber to criticize the major treatments of Lebanese polity. It is, I believe, an indictment of the conventional literature from one working within it. In what I feel is also an honest self criticism to some extent, Hudson contends:

The civil war in Lebanon makes it imperative to reassess the conventional pluralist interpretations of Lebanese politics, in particular those of the "optimistic" school of Lebanese specialists and those of the consociational theorists.¹⁰⁴

Further, "It needs no further demonstration that the optimistic pluralist analyses of Lebanese politics, including the consociational model, were inadequate."¹⁰⁵ It may be mentioned in passing that Hourani was at a loss in understanding the reasons for the 1975 conflagration. Furthermore, writers such as Salibi and Stoakes, writing on the war, continue to use the Christian/Muslim categories.

Having come to grips with the problems that were instrumental in disintegrating the Lebanese body politic, ironically, Hudson attempts to save the paradigm from the ravages of the war and return to it the authority it once had. His Arab Politics may be seen as an attempt in that direction. In it he returns to the major themes of the

conventional paradigm.¹⁰⁶ Since, as has been apparent through this chapter, mainstream writers on Lebanon operate within the same paradigm, it is appropriate at this point to critique it. This paradigm has been critiqued generally and particularly in the non-mainstream literature; however, it will be sufficient here to enunciate a critique of its major points.

Conventional political development theory includes structural-functionalism (Almond, Powell, Verba, Coleman, etc.), the social process school (Deutsch, Lerner, etc.), and the institutionalists (Huntington, Binder). While these traditions differ on what they emphasize as the road to development and nation building, they share commonalities that can best be inferred from the centrality of "order", "crisis management" and "social mobilization".

Underlying these commonalities are the assumptions of liberal theory that proceed from the individual in an ahistorical fashion. No wonder then that central to Apter's Politics of Modernization is the secular-libertarian model with its system of choices.¹⁰⁷

Modernization brings about a liberal society. Apter's concern becomes: how to modernize a under-developed polity? According to Apter, the answer is through a modernizing elite that can maintain order and help people "cope" with modernization lest they "slip back".¹⁰⁸ To Huntington, for example, the question become: how to maintain order? The answer: by building state institutions that can control dissent within the polity and insure elite power maintenance. With Huntington, the liberal model transforms to a stability model (essentially repressive state institutions). D. O'Brient points out

that this shift in emphasis with Huntington and other counter-insurgency political scientists such as Pye, is in tune with the requirements of U.S. foreign (and domestic?) policy.¹⁰⁹

The basic function of the model is to explain and devise ways by which societies could develop from traditional to modern. The theoretical constructs utilized by the structural-functionalist school are the Parsonian pattern-variables: Universalism-particularism; achievement-ascription; specificity-diffuseness.¹¹⁰ Furthermore, Easton's input-output model is utilized to view the political system as a linear structure of independent parts.¹¹¹ This type of system model serves as a common denominator of all polities. Comparisons can then proceed uninterrupted between the U.S., for instance, and some Pacific atoll. Recommendations for nation building can then be advanced to modernize the atoll while preventing "volcanic eruption".

The Modern, with its high degree of structural differentiation, its secular political culture and autonomy of its subsystems within the system, is the end to which all polities must aspire. The benchmark of the Modern, needless to say, is the developed capitalist West, ahistorically imposed upon the "Third World" in the best tradition of liberal theory.

The presumed linear motion of societies along the traditional/modern continuum allows the general conventional model to regard development as a cumulative process which may be achieved through piecemeal reform.¹¹² Under this model, development/under-development is perceived by the presence or absence of characteristics of developed societies: political parties, bureaucracies, legislators, and so on. What is inferred from this visualization is that the analysis of

development is largely an internal affair of each developing area taken separately.¹¹³ The ahistoricity of the model is obvious: it employs capitalist categories in its discussion of development since it rests upon the assumption that modernization of the developing areas will follow that of the capitalist West.¹¹⁴ The issue of the relationship of colonial West to the colonies is simply avoided.

The cumulative notion of development serves also as an underlying assumption to the concept of "stability" which is central to this model. To Apter and Huntington for instance, political institutions give stability to the polity. Political parties are engines of modernization while they maintain order in the system. The structural-functionalist school perceives change that does not disrupt the system as the only desirable and legitimate one.

Other fundamental theoretical constructs of this model are built upon the cumulative notion of development. Almond contends that the political system is a system of societal interaction within a political structure where order is maintained through integration and adaptation. As Almond and Verba put it: "The relationship between political culture and political structure becomes one of the most significant researchable aspects of the problem of political stability and change."¹¹⁵ Further "[b]y 'structure' we mean the observable activities which make up the political system" and "the unit which makes up all social systems, including political systems, are roles...We refer to particular sets of roles which are related to one another as structures."¹¹⁶ "The propensities on this psychological dimension of the political system is the political culture."¹¹⁷

The model stresses the study of political socialization and

recruitment, interest articulation and aggregation.¹¹⁸ Of no consequence to the model is whether these functions mean anything to development within the context of an alternative model of politics that seeks to identify and explain underlying structures that give rise to observed political behavior in the area under study. Furthermore, the model presumes objectivity (it is an empiricist model) so it does not address the perennial question that the normativists, the dependency and Marxist writers ask: Development for whom? In this way it attempts to depoliticize development for its own political ends. The bypass mechanism through which this question is left unanswered is represented by the concept of "pluralism".¹¹⁹

Recognizing this difficulty with the model, Huntington suggested substituting "change" for "development".¹²⁰ This supposedly neutral term still raises the question: Change for whom? Pluralism would not be able to save the day for conventional theory. Concrete class contradictions in society cannot be explained away by the use of metaphysical categories that obscure the ideological foundations of the model and the political culture it originated in.

The model adopts the notion of upward mobility whereby the class structure of society is perceived to be flexible. Class interests become fluid concepts from which analysis cannot gain "scientific" knowledge.¹²¹ Since contradictions persist in society, the model invokes "law and order" to protect the system from the vicissitudes of the social and economic factors that are exogenous to the model. In opposition to historic development, this notion of politics regards the national liberation movements and anti-system parties as anti-political. It is no fault of the system (we are led to believe)

if people revolt. The political system and its political culture cannot tolerate "irrational" and non-political responses to political questions.

The value biases of the model are further demonstrated by its ahistorically-perceived notion of the dual character of the traditional and the modern in the economic sphere. The traditional sector may become modern if certain influences trickle down from the latter sector to the former. The trickle-down effect may be achieved through linkages between the sectors. What this model overlooks is that modernizing one sector of the economy would deprive the other sectors of scarce human and natural resources and capital. As a rule, the model is stigmatized by uneven development of society and its economy. However, the model tries to explain away these disparities between the sectors by blaming them on the "traditional".

Left Liberal Arab Nationalist Literature

By definition, Arab Nationalists are anti-system. Whereas pro-system theoreticians rationalize confessionalism and "Lebanese Nationalism", Arab Nationalists attack the system on precisely these points. Maksoud, a representative of this brand of critic, criticizes the Lebanese National Pact as irrational and as an informal understanding between elites. Talking about Lebanon's "democracy by default" Maksoud contends, "In a way, this form of democracy confirms the faulty basis on which the Lebanese body politic rests. Under such conditions a premium is placed on the political attachment to the religious group, and the capacity to serve its interest become the criterion for political relevance."¹²² Further, "The Mithaq (Pact)

brought about a fraternity among confessional politicians who now jockeyed for power through making and breaking a series of unprincipled alliances." And "[d]emocracy then becomes the free interplay of these groups within the framework of the regulatory machinery for their coexistence."¹²³

Maksoud challenges "Lebanese Nationalism" as a concept and argues for "Arab Nationalism" as the "solution" to Lebanon's problems. To him, confessionalism is dysfunctional, reactionary (it operates against the aspirations of the Arab masses and their anti-imperialist goals) and elite-oriented.¹²⁴

Shukri, another left liberal Arab Nationalist, attacks the National Pact, confessionalism and Lebanon's dependency upon the West. To Shukri, the system led to uneven development, created tensions among the population and encouraged primordial sentiments to the detriment of civil society:

Tribalism remained socially and morally (in society) without the economic base being agriculture and herding. The various circles (confessions) opened up on each other narrowly to organize the economic wheel, the dependence upon the services and consumption. These openings did not permit, during the thirty years, the free interaction among the various circles in such a way that religious cleavages melted down into a unified civil society.¹²⁵

Despite the fact that he is anti-imperialist and cognizant of the class nature of the polity, Shukri calls for the replacement of confessionalism by a liberal political system. The route to development, he contends, is one that is based on national industry and economic activity at the expense of the comprador elite.¹²⁶

Shukri's rationalization of this "solution" is that under such a political and economic arrangement, class interests would be recognized for what they are. They would not be distorted or "covered" by primordial conflict. He sees confessionalism as incompatible with the economic base of society: confessionalism is primordial, the economic base is modern; consequently tension arises.¹²⁷

While it is debatable that under a liberal system class interests would be recognized for what they are, his central argument is that the national bourgeoisie road to development can be reinforced within the context of the civic culture.¹²⁸

The excellent critique he offers of most of the ideas espoused by the conventional literature on Lebanon demonstrates that Shukri is a consistent left liberal who offers no apologies for an archaic system. On the contrary, his liberal "solution" is not adulterated by "integration", "adaptation" or "system maintenance". Despite these facts, however, Shukri's "solution" remains anachronistic. While he is cognizant of the power of the world market, he seems to think that one can break out of this encirclement by relying on the national bourgeoisie.

Shukri's model of development has been tried or at least approximated (without the civic culture) in Nasser's Egypt, Nkrumah's Ghana and Sukarno's Indonesia. This model has failed miserably under the pressures of the world market and internal conflict between the various sectors of the bourgeoisie.

In conclusion, Shukri remains incapable of comprehending the dynamics of capitalism in the age of the multi-national corporation (MNC). Furthermore, his model for change fails to see the

contradictions inherent in the civil society he espouses. This model, supposing it could be established, would lead to another variant of these failure cases. At this stage of history, the liberal solution, though it may be anti-imperialist, is ineffectual.

Christian Literature

Since January of 1974, when the first issue of A'faaq (Horizons) appeared in Lebanon, Christian critiques of confessionalism assumed a radical tone. Theoretical articles, in which institutionalized Christianity was subject to critical analysis, called for the subsumption of Christian society under the civic culture. A'faaq rejected tyranny and exploitation and declared that any solution that precludes part of the people is a solution against Man and Christ. Man (all of Man and all men) and Christ are one. If social, economic and political structures are exploiting Man, they must be changed. This change cannot be effected unless Christ is freed from Christianity and the institutional church. Man must declare his commitment to: (1) knowledge; (2) a position [declare one's position on an issue]; (3) a cause; (4) individual action; and (5) communal action [revolutionary party]. These commitments are strategic and tactical, reformist and radical at the same time. If one's analysis pointed out the need for radical change, it would be a crime if one worked for partial solutions and reform.¹²⁹

Christian literature contends that in the final analysis, Christ is total and permanent revolution against Man's alienation. And Christianity neither justifies exploitation nor socialism. Neither was Christ the first socialist nor was Christianity the first

communism. Although Christ was not the first socialist, He is socialism in our time and perhaps would be communism in the future.¹³⁰

Undoubtedly, this radical Christian literature is subversive to confessionalism and the economic structure of the Lebanese polity. However, this critique remains in the philosophic realm and nebulous. It does not provide a substantive direct critique of the Lebanese polity. It does not show the manner in which the Lebanese are being exploited. And although it mentions that Christ is socialism in our time, it fails to show what socialism means to the Lebanese masses in practical terms or how to achieve it. These tasks are simply relegated to all political parties that presumably work against "Man's alienation". But how? And what is meant by "alienation" in this context? These questions are left unanswered in the Christian literature reviewed here.

Perhaps the reason for this weakness lies in the philosophic realm that gave rise to this critique. Instead of proceeding from the material conditions of life (in the Marxist sense) in its critique, this literature remained abstract. "Total and permanent revolution against the alienation of Man" is a nice slogan, but does not mean much if not given substance.

In general, considering the Lebanese situation at the time, this Christian critique remains valuable. Not only did it politicize religion and draw the rug from under the Church, it radicalized religion. However, on its own, it falls short of a desired strategy for revolution.

CONCLUSION

The literature on Lebanon reviewed here falls into three categories: conventional; left liberal Arab Nationalist; and Christian. Conventional literature for the most part is apologetic of Lebanon's development. As events have shown, it was incapable of comprehending the dynamics of Lebanese society or the antagonistic nature of the contradictions which the political system has bred.

The Arab Nationalist critique fails to comprehend the dynamics of the international commodity market in its relationship to the internal class structure and conflict of society. The power of this market exerts its influence on the polity to render the comprador sector of the elite power over the nationalist sector (Egypt, Indonesia and Ghana are examples).

The Christian literature is not clear on many fundamental points of its analysis. Most importantly, perhaps, it does not provide a substantive model of development. It fails to show concretely how revolutionary change may be effected.

FOOTNOTES

1. J. P. Entelis.
2. H. Barakat.
3. M. Hudson.
4. Qubain; Issawi; Salibi; Meo; and Harik are examples of these writers.
5. Mainly Dependency writers; Marxist and non-Marxist; Frank; Dos Santos; Bodenheimer, among others, put structural functionalism, the social process school and the institutionalists on the defensive. It must be said in passing that the latest attempt by Packenham (1978) to defend the mainstream model by attacking Dependency is anachronistic in terms of the historical development of Development theories.
6. See note 4.
7. See L. Binder, "Political Change in Lebanon," in L. Binder, ed., Politics in Lebanon (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966). E. Salem, Modernization Without Revolution: Lebanon's Experience (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973).
8. See Hudson's critique referred to in pp. 125-130 of this chapter.
9. Hudson, who comes the closest to such a critique, elects to remain within the mainstream paradigm a la Deutsch; see. pp. 125-130 of this chapter.
10. E. Shils, "The Prospect for Lebanese Civility," in L. Binder, op. cit.
11. A. Hourani, "Lebanon: The Development of a Political Society," p. 29 in L. Binder, op. cit.
12. Ibid.
13. A. Hottinger, "Zu'ama in Historical Perspective," p. 100, op. cit. P. Rondot writes, "Shihabism therefore risks being no more than an exceptional episode, at the end of which the problems of the Lebanese Executive will reappear in their previous and, so to speak, classic form"; in L. Bender, op. cit. Rondot was right.
14. One has only to recall Parsons pattern variables and the Liberal theory that gave rise to structural functionalism; see the critique of the conventional development model in this chapter.

15. See H. Saab, "The Rationalist School in Lebanese Politics," in L. Binder, op. cit.
16. See, for instance, C. Maksoud and G. Shukri, refer to pp. 134-137 of this chapter.
17. S. Khalaf, "Primordial Ties and Politics in Lebanon," Middle East Studies, IV, 244-245.
18. Ibid.
19. M. Halpern, "Toward Further Modernization of the Study of the New Nations," World Politics, XVII, 158-181.
20. S. Khalaf, op. cit., p. 260.
21. Ibid., p. 262.
22. Ibid., p. 265.
23. E. Shils, op. cit., p. 4, in L. Binder, op. cit.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., p. 2.
26. S. Khalaf, op. cit., p. 245.
27. E. Shils, op. cit.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 4.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., p. 5.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., p. 3.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., p. 10.
36. Ibid., p. 3.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., p. 11.
39. K. Salibi, "The Personality of Lebanon in Relation to the Modern World," pp. 263-264, in L. Binder, op. cit.

40. Ibid., p. 264.
41. Ibid., p. 265.
42. Ibid., p. 266.
43. Ibid., p. 267.
44. Dependency argues for "disengagement" (Stauffer) from the capitalist West if countries are serious about getting out of underdevelopment. See A. G. Frank.
45. See F. Khuri, "The Changing Class Structure in Lebanon," The Middle East Journal, XXIII, 29-43.
46. P. Rondot, op. cit., p. 138, in L. Binder, op. cit.
47. Tourism, fruits, banking and transit trade all favor Mount Lebanon and Beirut.
48. E. Salem, op. cit., p. 2.
49. Ibid., p. 4.
50. Ibid., p. 145.
51. Ibid., p. 27.
52. Ibid., p. 3.
53. C. Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), p. 9.
54. E. Salem, op. cit., pp. 62-74.
55. L. Binder, in L. Binder, op. cit., p. 285.
56. E. Salem, op. cit., pp. 194-105, 110-111.
57. Ibid., p. 107.
58. Ibid., pp. 126-137. See also "The Lebanese 'Six Year Development Plan 1972-1977', An Evaluation," Occasion Paper no. 2, United States Economic and Social Office in Beirut (UNESOB, March, 1973).
59. C. Issawi, "Economic Development and Political Liberalism in Lebanon," in L. Binder, op. cit., p. 69.
60. E. Salem, op. cit., pp. 40-41.
61. Ibid., p. 109.
62. Ibid., p. 110.

63. Ibid., p. 51.
64. Ibid., p. 137.
65. J. P. Entelis, op. cit., pp. 1-3.
66. Ibid., p. 8.
67. Ibid., pp. 5-8.
68. Ibid., p. 7. F. Stoakes agrees with Entelis on the LKP; see "Lebanese Kata'eb Party as a Builder, Surrogate and Defender of the State," Middle East Studies, XII (October, 1975), 215-216.
69. J. P. Entelis, op. cit., p. 5.
70. Ibid., p. 6.
71. Ibid., p. 2.
72. A. Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," Comparative Political Studies, I (April, 1968), 25-30. Also by the same author, "Consociational Democracy," World Politics, XXI (January, 1969), 207-225.
73. A. Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," Comparative Political Studies, I (April, 1968), 25.
74. I. Harik, "The Ethnic Revolution and Political Integration in the Middle East," International Journal of Middle East Studies, III (1972), 304.
75. A. Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic System," Comparative Political Studies, (April, 1968), 25.
76. I. Harik, "The Ethnic Revolution and Political Integration in the Middle East," International Journal of Middle East Studies, III (1973), 304.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid., p. 308.
80. Ibid., p. 321.
81. Ibid., p. 320.
82. Ibid., p. 323.
83. H. Bakarar, "Social and Political Integration in Lebanon: A Case of Social Mosaic," Middle East Journal, XXVII, 301-318.

84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. P. Khuri, op. cit., p. 29.
88. Ibid., p. 30.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. Title of Khuri's article. Khuri's interpretation of class is an inadequate one. See chapter five for an alternative non-phenomenological interpretation based on Marxist theory.
92. M. Hudson, "Democracy and Social Mobilization in Lebanese Politics," Comparative Politics, (January, 1969), 245.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid., pp. 245-246.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid., p. 248.
99. Ibid., pp. 248-249.
100. Ibid., pp. 252-259.
101. Ibid., p. 261.
102. Ibid., p. 262.
103. Ibid., p. 263.
104. M. Hudson, "The Precarious Republic Revisited: Reflections on the Collapse of Pluralist Politics in Lebanon." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association of Arab-American University Graduates, New York, October 2, 1976, p. 5.
105. Ibid., p. 11.
106. M. Hudson, Arab Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).
107. D. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 6-11, 26-36.

108. Ibid., p. 47.
109. D. O'Brien, "Modernization, Order and the Erosion of a Democratic Ideal: American Political Science 1960-1970," Journal of Development Studies, VIII (July, 1972), 351-378.
110. Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glenco: Free Press, 1951), 198-200.
111. D. Easton, "Introduction: The Current Meaning of Behaviorism in Political Science," The Limits of Behavioralism in Political Science (American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, October, 1962).
112. G. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in G. Almond and J. Coleman, eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 7, 11.
113. D. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).
114. Ibid.
115. G. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965).
116. G. Almond and C. Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), 21.
117. Ibid., p. 23.
118. G. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in G. Almond and J. Coleman, eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 12.
119. S. Bodenheimer, "The Ideology of Developmentalism: American Political Science's Paradigm--Surrogate for Latin American Studies," Berkeley Journal of Sociology, p. 107-110.
120. M. Kesselman, "Order or Movement? The Literature of Political Development as Ideology," World Politics, 141.
121. G. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in G. Almond and J. Coleman, eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 12.
122. C. Maksoud, "Lebanon and Arab Nationalism," in L. Binder, op. cit., p. 240.
123. Ibid., pp. 240-241.
124. Theme of C. Maksoud's article in L. Binder, op. cit.

125. G. Shukri, Urs Ed-Dam Fi Lubnan (Beirut: Dar-et-Taliya, 1976) 71 [my translation]; 69-78, 156.
126. Ibid., pp. 189-191.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid.
129. Arab Issues (September, 1974). [Arabic Source].
130. "Introduction," A'faaq (January, 1974).

CHAPTER FIVE

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The deadly verdict against the conventional literature in all its variety was the "Battle of Lebanon". It is my opinion that a new type of literature that can address basic unanswered questions is badly needed.

Unlike the conventional literature, alternative literature on Lebanon is scarce.¹ It includes Arab Nationalist and Christian writing which has already been reviewed and critiqued. Much of the Arab Nationalist critique of the Lebanese polity agrees with the main features of dependency theory.² However, the theory has not been formally applied to Lebanon, primarily because most writers on Lebanon utilize a conventional framework. As a body of literature, dependency theory came to prominence in the late 1960's. A theoretic radical critique of the system was mainly the product of the 1970's (MERIP, Monthly Review, and some literature in Arabic). At this point it is perhaps appropriate to discuss the main features of dependency theory.

Dependency theory was the intellectual response of a number of Latin American neo-Marxist and non-Marxist writers to the conditions of Latin American under-development.³ The theory conceptualizes dependency as an historic condition that arose as a consequence of world capitalist expansion into undeveloped areas. The penetration of capitalism into these areas produced the "traditional" socioeconomic,

political and cultural institutions as much as it did the seemingly "modern" sector. Development - under-development is the result of the same historical process.⁴

Capitalism was able to develop at a rapid rate by subjugating and exploiting the people and appropriating the riches of other areas such as the Americas. What transpired historically was an international economic system whose main features were a highly-developed capitalist commodity market, and an international division of labor.⁵

The "structure of dependence"⁶ (Dos Santos) is characterized by a "whole chain of constellation and satellites [which] relates all parts of the system [to each other]."⁷ (Frank) In this structure there is a dependency relationship between metropole and satellite nations and the structure is duplicated internally (dependency relationship between town and country). Cities in satellite nations are tools for appropriating capital from their own satellites and channelling most of it to the metropole nations.⁸ Whatever development there is in the satellite nations primarily serves the requirements of the metropole nations and the international capitalist market. The logical conclusion was satellite economies geared toward export trade. Export economies are neither "self generating" nor "self perpetuating."⁹ (Frank)

Dos Santos identifies three phases of dependence (not mutually exclusive of course, but according to which type of dependence is dominant):¹⁰

- a. Colonial: Monopoly of the colonial market by the mother country.
- b. Financial-Industrial: Domination of big capital

in the satellite nations in the extractive industries and agriculture.

- c. Post-War Period: Domination based on MNC's. Investment in industries geared to the internal market. This is technological industrial dependence.

The internal structures of dependence were conditioned by these historic forms of dependence. Furthermore, these forms act as a constraint under which the dependent country will have to operate nationally and internationally, the natural conclusion being the "development of under-development."¹¹ (Frank)

The "unequal and combined" relations produced by this dependence limit the development of the domestic market and the "technical and cultural capacity, as well as the moral and physical health of the people."¹²

What is advocated to get rid of this dependence relationship is structural change by breaking out of the metropole/satellite constraints. Internally it calls for getting rid of the local elite that serves as a linkage between the domestic and the international market. This is the first step towards dismantling the structure: severing ties with the international capitalist market.¹³

It is important at this juncture to discuss the theoretical framework that will be used to analyze the battle.

The theory I am suggesting is a Marxist analysis. It agrees with dependency theory in its general conclusions, but goes beyond the latter to examine the internal political and economic forces in a holistic manner within any particular social formation. Marxist

literature on Lebanon shares with the rest of the alternatives their radical perspective on confessionalism.¹⁴ However, it transcends the philosophical realm and rejects the liberal "solution" to Lebanon's development. Furthermore, Marxism provides a model for understanding the effects of the dialectical relationship of internal and external factors upon the Lebanese polity. Relying on the Marxist framework, one can identify the underlying assumptions that the Lebanese state is based upon, the contradictions among its geographic regions and within its population.

Marxist class analysis does not neglect, dismiss nor circumvent contradictions of a primordial nature among the population. On the contrary, it puts these contradictions in their accurate perspective by shedding light on their underlying causes. As such, class analysis is not a surrogate model for "diffusion theory"; instead, it uses "class" as an analytic concept within a political economy framework to uncover underlying structures that give rise to certain events within a polity. Of significance, perhaps, is Faris' article which serves as a demonstration of the use of the Marxist concept of "class" to arrive at historically-consistent conclusions pertaining to the Lebanese conflagration. In his analysis of the stages of the battle, Faris shows how internal and external alliances were formed, based on the interests of classes and sectors (fractions) of classes. Shifting alliances were the result of changing class interests (for example, Syria vis-a-vis the Lebanese progressive movement).¹⁵

As another illustration, the interests of the Muslim fraction of the elite at one point indicated their alliance with the progressive movement. With Syria's intervention, however, the Muslim elite

shifted and became willing to cooperate with the LKP (Phalangists) to prop up the system and leave the progressive movement out in the cold.¹⁶

Without the "class" concept, these shifting alliances might remain enigmatic or at best might be interpreted as "conflicts" between Christians and Muslims. Without the political economy framework, one would not be able to discover the underlying causes of tension. The superficial notion of "modern Christians" versus "traditional Muslims" (K. Salibi) is a sorry substitute.¹⁷ This notion dismisses the Lebanese progressive movement with its substantial Christian elements and its many Christian leaders at all levels.¹⁸

Marxist analysis has yet to be applied in a thorough study of the "Battle of Lebanon" and its contingent revolutionary development. My dissertation is an attempt to develop and apply a Marxist framework for this purpose, while incorporating dependency theory as a developed theory of imperialism. At this juncture I would like to present the Marxist framework that will be used here.

The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, by Karl Marx, is considered by many Marxists as the first profound application of dialectics to the analysis of a specific event: the French coup of December, 1851.

To show the significance of the coup for political practice and the political scene at the time, Marx treats the whole social formation (politics, ideology, economics, classes, class alliances, "Bonapartism", etc.) and not just an aspect of it, for example, the economic.

The underlying assumptions of Marx's theory as applied to the French coup are treated critically in The German Ideology. The

realization by Marx of the "real premises...(which) cannot be stated here"¹⁹ (i.e. men) constitute the substantive point of departure from which Marx was able to state: "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness."²⁰ Earlier in The German Ideology, Marx states: "...the transformation of history into world history is not a mere 'self consciousness', the world spirit..., but a completely material (emphasis added), empirically verifiable act, an act for which every individual furnishes proof as he comes and goes, eats, drinks, and clothes himself."²¹ The "material conditions" that Marx recognizes are not only the economic, but those that constitute the social formation existing at any given time.

Central to Marxism is the notion of the "state": Theory and practice are directed against it. The aim of Marxism is to smash the state and establish "proletarian power" to carry out the socialist transformation of the social formation.²²

A "mode of production" is an abstraction (ideal/typical) from the social formation (real/concrete), and as such the abstraction serves as an analytical concept.²³ A mode of production (for example, the capitalist mode of production [CMP]), consists of many "elements" (the economic, the political, the ideological, etc.). These "elements" influence each other in various ways through their interaction.

However, Marx stresses that "the first premise of all human existence and hence of all history: men must be able to live in order to be able 'to make history'...[and] The production of new needs is the historical first act."²⁴ A tentative conclusion may be drawn: the "economic", by virtue of "real premises" (men) existing in nature,

holds a primary position among the "elements". (The division of labor, population growth, etc., presuppose human interaction and human interaction, in turn, presupposes them.) In this sense, and only in this sense, can we conceptualize the "economic" as a "level" of the mode of production.

The "political" is that "element" which has the function of giving the mode of production its "cohesion", i.e., its function is to keep "order". In a social formation consisting of classes, the organization of the "political" takes the form of the state which may be designated as the juridico/political or simply the political.²⁵

By virtue of its function, the political is not on the same plane as the "economic", and thus we can conceptualize it as constituting another level.²⁶ The "elements" of a mode of production, therefore, are the levels which constitute a mode of production and the economic is dominant in the last instance. This "last instance" never materializes; i.e., the economic in its pure form is non-existent, nor is the political (the state is relatively autonomous). However, these categories are abstract concepts drawn out from the "real/concrete" (the social formation), therefore they are "ideal/typical" but concrete concepts at the level of abstraction.²⁷

We can look at these levels as constitutive of regional theories (for example the political, economic, etc.). The mode of production, however, may be studied as a definite theory. Hence the slave, feudal and capitalist modes of production may be studied each in its own right. Furthermore, the mode of production delimits the regional theories. We can, therefore, study the economic and the political of a specific mode of production.²⁸ The study of the CMP, for instance,

which presupposes the regional theories, is the object of historical materialism (the general theory) whose "problematic" is the social formation (see, for example, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte as a case study).

A question arises: Where in the structure of the CMP, for instance, do classes fit? Or are classes levels of the structure? As producers, men interact with one another and express themselves. The division of labor grows more complex, from one based upon the sexes to one based upon the mental/manual dichotomy. Men enter, therefore, into a complex of relations with each other which are expressed economically, politically and ideologically. The effect of these relations divides men into classes. Hence, in a social formation, we can conceive of these classes as the effects, expression, or product of the structure or its levels. The relationships of men to each other are determined, set, or formed "as he [man] comes and goes, eat, drinks, and clothes himself."²⁹ Furthermore, "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past."³⁰ The existing structure and its levels are the major material conditions in which men find themselves and from there they begin to make history by interacting with the structure.³¹

The economist interpretation of classes is a reductionist one: it attributes to one level of a mode of production, namely the economic, the "legitimacy" of ordaining men into classes. The exclusion of the other levels from this determination betrays the mechanistic world outlook of the economist interpretation.

Two more points will be made in relation to classes:

1. The class struggle; and
2. The object (goal, objective) of the class struggle.

The dominant class in the CMP, for instance, exercises its dominance through the state. The state is a "power center" to maintain the cohesion of the CMP. Because of the separation of the political from the economic in the CMP, the state appears as the state of the people; it does not serve the interests of any particular class. The state, however, through its laws, delimits the object of the class struggle: it defines private property and protects it. Therefore, the struggle becomes limited to one that seeks more representation in government for one group or another. By the same token the workers' struggle becomes limited on the economic level to wage increases and so on. All of this becomes confined within the framework of the status quo. And the effect of this delimiting becomes the legitimation of the capitalist state, the dominant class and, consequently, the CMP.

Since classes are the effects of the structure, they reflect themselves in the state; the field of their reflection is the class struggle. In this sense, therefore, the class struggle is political.³²

A class can exist as an effect of the structure while not playing any role to speak of in the political. To the extent that workers, for instance, support the Democrats or Republicans or belong to a trade union, they would be engaging in "class practices;" i.e., they exert pressure on the political to the extent that their interests are recognized and met by these parties or the trade union leaders. To the extent that slaves, serfs or workers revolt, picket or demonstrate,

to that extent would they influence, threaten or become a "nuisance" to the state and the mode of production. In this sense, therefore, they would be engaging in "class practices". So long as the workers, for instance, do not appear on the political scene as an independent political force with a workers' party organization, they would not have a role to speak of. The existence of a party and other workers organizations influenced by the party is at the heart of revolutionary Marxism.³³

The organization of the workers into a political social force and their realization that the state is a "power center" of the dominant class, has as its objective the smashing of the capitalist state. The state is replaced by another "power center" ("proletarian dictatorship"). The state as a "problematic" (and there is no harm in stressing the point) is central to revolutionary Marxism.³⁴

At this point, before going any further with the discussion of concepts to be used in this framework, we need to consider some of the salient critiques leveled against the theory. Our concern is with the Marxist critics only as they are the ones who could inform and perhaps improve upon this framework. Since this framework relies heavily upon discussions in Poulantzas' writings, we shall deal with that critique of Poulantzas that bears directly upon the framework as it is dealt with here. Furthermore, the object is not to "defend" or "attack" Poulantzas; rather, it is to take into consideration legitimate critiques that could render our framework more useful for analysis. Two representative critiques are those of Amy Bridges and Dale Johnson.³⁵

The Marxist theory of the state has sparked much discussion among

Marxists. Already there exist three major categories that identify the various Marxist writers on the subject: the "instrumentalists", the "Hegelian-Marxists" and the "structuralists".³⁶ What is more to the point, however, when dealing directly with the structural determination of the CMP, is the critique leveled at Poulantzas' main thesis as presented in Political Power and Social Classes. Amy Bridges brings forth serious charges. While one may be sympathetic to her concerns over Poulantzas' theory of the state, the charge that the latter's treatment of the state, social relations and ideology is anti-materialist is not too convincing. She claims:

The paradox of the capitalist state, and consequently of this theory of the capitalist state, is that it is structured with an absence of class, while capitalist society is in fact, class society. Specifically, the paradox of the capitalist state takes the form, in Poulantzas' work, of an articulation of the autonomy of the state to the detriment of an explanation of why its 'objective' function is to maintain class domination. Consequently, the theory of the state in Political Power and Social Classes needs to be 'connected' to class society.³⁷

While it may be true that there is no systematic explanation in the work cited above of the reasons to maintain class domination, there are various places in the work where this is implied or stated. It is even implied in a passage in Bridges' work where she explains Poulantzas' theory: "The hegemonic fraction is able to do this [dominate other fractions in the state] because its place of exploitation within the process of production enables it, through the state, to constitute its interests as a political interest."³⁸ Furthermore, this "shortcoming" is hardly due to the separation between class society and the state. The categories developed by Poulantzas in connection with

the state are class concepts: "hegemonic class", "class alliances", etc., which we shall consider later on.³⁹

The second charge is that the theory of the state is ahistorical.⁴⁰ In fact, this charge follows from Poulantzas' alleged anti-materialism. Bridges contends "the state's relation to the hegemonic class [and here she begins quoting Poulantzas] 'in no way derives from a direct dependence of the state machine on this class...On the contrary, it goes hand in hand with a relative autonomy from the latter...'"⁴¹ She maintains "that the state is immediately dependent on the economy, and that this need is expressed in the state's relation to the bourgeoisie, in historically specific ways. This does not mean that the state does not have 'autonomy', but it does mean that the autonomy is 'relative'."⁴² One is hard put to find what is the point of contention between her and Poulantzas on this issue. According to Poulantzas, the state is relatively autonomous. As to what she means by the "immediate" dependence of the state on the economy, she leaves us uninformed. One could guess that this means that the economic is the determining level, in the last instance, of the CMP and by application of its other levels. If, however, she means that the economic directly determines the political (the state), this would show a mechanicalism in Bridges which she ostensibly rejects, since she talks about relative autonomy. The immediate dependence expressed in the state's relations to the bourgeoisie in historically specific ways is not at odds with Poulantzas' thesis.⁴³ It is important to note that one could develop the political as Marx had developed the economic in Capital. This does not mean, however, that Capital has no implied political relations. The fact that the method is political economy implies the presence of political

relations in Capital. Because the economic is relatively autonomous from the political, it is the dominant problematic in the text. By the same token, in Poulantzas, the political is relatively autonomous from the economic but the political is the main problematic in the text.⁴⁴

Another important point is that class determination is predicated upon the various levels of the structure, a determination that ensures the interconnectedness of the state with the economic. Also the political (the state) is a level of the structure. And because the political class struggle is the motive force of history,⁴⁵ this guarantees that the structure of the CMP is transformed by praxis which historically determines the structure. The inclusion of the political as a level of the structure renders the charge of "ahistorical" false.

At this point let us consider another critic of Poulantzas. "While analytically rigorous," the structuralist framework, as Dale Johnson sees it, "...is seriously deficient in terms of historical grounding and dialectical conception."⁴⁶ In Poulantzas:

...one is left with the impression that social formations do not contain people, only "agents" who carry out the structurally given out obligations of functionally defined social positions. This moves Poulantzas' work in the direction of dehumanized and static theory. Poulantzas' conceptualization of the relations of production yields an ahistorical focus on the continuation of these relations through the reproduction of social classes.⁴⁷

Since, according to Johnson, the major problem with structuralism is its functionalism and its preoccupation with "system maintenance" (reproduction of classes), he contends:

Classes are not simply "pertinent effects" of regional structures (Poulantzas), they are also structural elements of society, they are dynamic forces. Social struggles when viewed dialectically, shape the direction of the movement of the very processes that determine classes and constantly transform society through different developmental stages and historical phases within stages.⁴⁸

While structuralism as such, whether it is Marxian or not, may be heavily critiqued as formalistic (R. Appelbaum),⁴⁹ this does not mean that one cannot utilize a structural framework while remaining within the material conception of history. Poulantzas contends that social formations are "historically determined"⁵⁰ and that the number of classes in a social formation are "strictly related to (a) the modes of production in this formation and (b) the concrete forms taken on by their combination." It is explicit in Poulantzas as well that classes only exist in the class struggle and, following Marx, the class struggle is political.⁵¹

Furthermore, to Poulantzas, classes

...denote social relations, social ensembles; but they are the concepts of them (ensembles), in the same way as the concepts of capital, of wage labor and of surplus value constitute concepts of structures of relations of production.

More exactly, social class is a concept which shows the effect of the ensemble of social structures, of the matrix of a mode of production or of a social formation on the agents which constitute its supports: this concept reveals the effects of the global structure in the field of social relations...

However, ...social classes...constitute, as a structural effect, a structure in the particular frame of reference of social relations. This frame of reference is itself structured insofar as it is circumscribed by the limits set by structures, limits which are reflected as effects of the ensemble of one field on the other.⁵²

One could see that the objection raised by Johnson is answered satisfactorily by showing the relationship of the field of the structure comprising the social formation with the field of social relations where classes as structures are situated. Bearing in mind that the class struggle is political and its goal is state power, the dialectical relationship between the structure and classes in terms of transforming the structure is not neglected or compromised.

In terms of history, Poulantzas contends, "It is clear that the characterization of 'pertinent effects' and of their novelty relative to the typical form of the levels always depends on the concrete historical situation."⁵³ In dealing with an analysis of the political forces at the conjuncture* one is dealing with an analysis of the political class struggle.

One may take issue with Poulantzas' "agents" since this categorization renders nebulous the active part played by class members in transforming the structure. It remains legitimate, however, to analyze the reproduction of social classes in a capitalist formation that is not in a revolutionary situation. One could take matters a step further and show the way in which the alignment of classes in a conjuncture intervene to modify or arrest the development of the reproduction of social classes in a social formation. A Marxist framework that is sensitive to history and dialectics, yet willing to use categories such as those developed by Poulantzas, is capable of handling such an analysis.

Before we consider any further critique of the framework, it is

* See Poulantzas, note 56.

appropriate to develop those salient concepts that will be used in the discussion of the Battle of Lebanon. These theoretical concepts relate to the political and the political class struggle.

For any class or a fraction of a class to become a social force and not simply engage in economic class practices (the place of a class in production and/or its struggle for higher wages within the confines of the capitalist system), it must be organized and represented by its class party. As a "social force"⁵⁴ the class becomes engaged in political class practices with the political (the state) as its objective.

The "common interests" (Marx) of the capitalist class are met by the capitalist state due to the latter's cohesion function on the levels of the capitalist structure. The state ensures the reproduction of the capitalist social relations of production, ideology and, by implication, classes. The state as a "power center"⁵⁵ of the bourgeoisie becomes crucial in terms of understanding the object of political class practices or simply political practices. This understanding has to do with the concept of the "conjuncture" (Lenin) which is, "the starting point from which it is possible in a concrete situation to decipher the unity of the structure and to act upon it in order to transform it."⁵⁶ Furthermore, the "conjuncture" is "[t]he object of political practice."⁵⁷ But the unity of the structure or the formation is "deciphered" in the state.⁵⁸ To assess the unity or the possibility of rupture of this unity is to examine the relations of forces in the field of political (i.e. in the political class struggle).

The unity/rupture determination is one of the essential

elements that comprise the determination/non-determination of the revolutionary situation. Lenin characterizes the revolutionary situation by crisis, meaning that the dominant class is unable to maintain cohesion in the formation, and the revolutionary class (or classes) has the capability of assuming state power.⁵⁹

To "decipher" the unity/rupture of the structure within a political economy framework we need to use pertinent categories to the understanding of the relations of forces in and out of the organization of the political (the state), yet which are in the field of the political (i.e. in the political class struggle).

The dominant class or fraction of a class appears in its relation to the state "as the representative of the general interest of the body politic, i.e., the people/nation which is based on the effect of isolation on the economic."⁶⁰ In this sense the dominant class is said to have "hegemony" (Gramsci) over the social formation. The concept of "hegemony" could be used in a stricter sense as well to indicate the relationships of the dominant classes constituted in a "power bloc" in the state. Specifically, the hegemonic class or fraction of a class is the one that can lead the "power block" in its political class practices. Poulantzas contends, "The hegemonic class is the one which concentrates in itself, at the political level, the double function of representing the general interests of the people nation and of maintaining a specific dominance among the dominant classes and fraction."⁶¹ It is important to note, however, that:

The phenomenon of the power bloc cannot be thought of by means of the notion of fusion: this is because the power bloc does not constitute an expressive totality of equivalent elements, but a complex contradictory unity in dominance. This is how the concept of hegemony can be applied to one class or fraction within the power bloc.⁶²

The "power bloc" needs to be distinguished from another important concept: "alliances". This concept differs from "power bloc" in that classes which are not in the power center may enter into an alliance with a class in that center. However, the alliances are made between two or more classes or class fractions that exist as political social forces, i.e. classes with their independent political organization.⁶³ Incidentally, any class that is not present as a social force in the conjuncture will have its class practices, by necessity, characterized as activities in support of another class or classes. The peasantry during the French revolution, for instance, was a "supporting class"⁶⁴ of the bourgeoisie.

One more point needs to be considered before we deal with an important critique of Poulantzas that pertains to the framework discussed here. A distinction is made here between a class "place" as an effect of the structure and a class "position" (stand) in the "conjuncture". A class "position" may change depending upon the requirements of the concrete class struggle and that class' perception of its particular interests. That class, however, would still occupy the same class place in the social formation as a capitalist class, working class, or petty bourgeois.⁶⁵

Andor Skotnes is an important critic of Poulantzas. Although he agrees with the latter's general framework, he nevertheless

contends that:

Poulantzas has not developed the concepts of class practice/struggle/position far enough for these concepts to function as reliable guides in concrete analysis.⁶⁶

Because, if:

...determined class practices are equated with class struggle, and class positions are also class struggle, how do you tell one class struggle from another? Or to put it differently, which class practices are determined practices and which correspond to class positions in the conjuncture?⁶⁷

This "terminological difficulty"⁶⁸ raised by Skotnes is extremely crucial and one would have to recognize this "difficulty". However, Skotnes raises these problems in relation to a specific analysis in Poulantzas' Classes in Contemporary Capitalism and that is the determination of "the new petty bourgeoisie".⁶⁹ One could concur with Skotnes that for that kind of determination, the concepts that he takes issue with need to be developed further. This, however, is not a problem that concerns us here. In the first place, we will be dealing with a dependent social formation that by necessity displays different material conditions in terms of the "pertinent effects" of the structure; in the second place, as far as the concepts will be used here they are adequately differentiated, as we shall attempt to show.

If classes can exist only in the class struggle and if classes are the effects of the structure, then the structure and its levels are "not separate from the class struggle."⁷⁰ Furthermore, to reiterate a point made earlier, class practices are mainly political, economic or

ideological. Political class practices are distinguished from the economic, for instance, because to indulge in them, a class has to have its interests articulated at the level of the political and it can only do that if it is organized as a social force in a political party. Political class practices are synonymous with the political class struggle and it is distinguished from the economic class struggle (fighting for wage increases, etc.) which does not necessarily require the class to be a political social force to carry out such a struggle.⁷¹ A political social force, however, which is engaged in economic struggle would be capable of raising the political consciousness of its class members to the level of the political, and in this sense, the object of its activities would be the state. This object is absent when a class merely engages in economic class struggle.

To the extent that these concepts will be used here, the above discussion perhaps will satisfy Skotnes' critique.

We have adopted a Marxian theoretic framework within which certain concepts have been developed to facilitate analysis. These concepts rely on the basic concept of class, which is determined by political, economic and ideological levels of a structure of a mode of production.

In this determination, class is a structure in the field of social relations. And it interacts with the levels of the structure of the CMP, for instance, to reproduce, modify or transform the structure itself depending upon the relations of forces in the conjuncture.

Through this treatment, the discussion took into consideration the salient critiques that bear directly, and at times heavily, upon the framework developed here. The discussion has attempted, to the extent

feasible, to show that the framework is not unconcerned about the charges of being ahistorical or undialectical. Instead, the framework is not only sensitive to history and dialectics, but rather proceeds from them, as the discussion of The German Ideology points out. In point of fact, the framework developed here proceeds from Marx's dialectical and historical writings, passing through and relying upon Poulantzas' work, especially his Political Power and Social Classes. This work lends itself to an analysis of specific events such as the Battle of Lebanon.

The relationship of forces at any moment could be grasped through the concepts developed above. These concepts are a further indication that dialectics is not compromised for the sake of an "ossified" structure that, in the first place, is not present in this framework.

A further indication that the framework shares the concerns of the critics is that this work treats classes as they historically arose in Lebanon through the interaction with the structures of the modes of production obtaining in Lebanon, in historically determined ways. This is a realization that concurs with a basic tenet of the framework, which in turn concurs with the basic Marxian position: classes exist only in the class struggle and the class struggle is political.

One final point that needs to be made has to do with Lebanon being a dependent social formation in the age of imperialism. In any discussion of Lebanon, as Lebanon's politics and economy show, one will have to deal with the international capitalist market and/or the politically and economically dominant colonial and imperialist powers. This Marxian framework may be developed to examine the relationship of the internal and external factors and their impact upon the

development of any polity under study from a political economy perspective. This task may be achieved through an analysis of what imperialism is.⁷² Dependency theory, however, which mainly looks at the external factors, may be utilized here because it takes as its point of departure the expansion of capitalism and its impact upon other areas. In this way, dependency may be considered as a theory that is consistent with the historical materialist view which Marxian theory rests upon.

To appreciate the "organic" link between the theoretic framework developed here and dependency theory, Bodenheimer's concept of the "infrastructure of dependency" is enlightening. She maintains that it is an "over-simplification" to say that the "international system causes under-development directly", and further adds:

The international system shapes development in Latin America by means of certain institutions, social classes and processes (e.g., industrialization, urbanization). These aspects of Latin society become part of the infrastructure of dependency when they function or occur in response to the needs or interests of the dominant powers in the international system rather than national needs or interests. It is through the infrastructure of dependency that the international system becomes operative within Latin America, and that the legacy of Latin America's integration into that system is transmitted and perpetuated domestically, thereby limiting the possibilities for development...

...Another fundamental dimension of dependency has been the creation and/or reinforcement of clientele social classes, classes which have a vested interest in the existing structure of the international system. In return for carrying out certain functions on behalf of foreign interests, these classes enjoy a privileged and increasingly dominant and hegemonic position within their own societies, based largely on economic, political or military support from abroad. The alliances and conflicts of clientele classes and other domestic classes are shaped largely by their previous and present alliances with foreign interests. The existence of these elites within Latin America, whose interests correspond to those of the dominant classes in the dominant society, is a sine qua non for the perpetuation of Latin dependency.⁷³

Although Bodenheimer is speaking of Latin America, her conceptualization applies to Lebanon, as pointed out in chapters two and three, and in the criticism of "Arab Nationalists".

FOOTNOTES

1. More recent literature includes: MERIP, Monthly Review, XLIV (June, 1976); Race and Class, II (Autumn, 1976).
2. See for example Shukri's analysis.
3. Frank; Dos Santos; Furtado, and Cardoso are some of the dependency writers.
4. A. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967).
5. S. Bodenheimer, "The Ideology of Developmentalism: American Political Science's Paradigm--Surrogate for Latin American Studies," Berkeley Journal of Sociology (1970), p. 124.
6. T. Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," American Economic Review, II (May, 1970), 231-236.
7. A. Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution? (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), 6.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 7.
10. Dos Santos, op. cit., Section 2.
11. A. Frank, op. cit., Chapter 1.
12. Dos Santos, op. cit.
13. A. Frank, op. cit., p. 17; Dos Santos, op. cit., "Conclusion."
14. F. Faris, "The Civil War in Lebanon," Race and Class, XVIII (Autumn, 1976), 173-184.
15. See note 1.
16. See note 14.
17. K. Salibi, "The Personality of Lebanon in Relation to the Modern World." In L. Binder, ed., Politics in Lebanon (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966).
18. G. Hawi; F. Trabulsi, communist party boss and Communist Action Organization, respectively, are Christians. Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party and Arab Socialist Action Party include Christians on the top level of leadership. These and other organizations comprise the Lebanese National Movement (LNM).

19. Karl Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology, in L. Easton and K. Guddart, Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society (New York: Doubleday, 1967).

20. K. Marx, "Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy," in Marx and Engels Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1970), 182.

21. The German Ideology, p. 429.

22. See for example Lenin, The State and Revolution; Marx, The Civil War in France.

23. N. Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (Thetford, Norfolk; Lowe and Brydone, Great Britain, 1975), 12.

24. The German Ideology, pp. 419-420.

25. Poulantzas, op. cit., p. 37.

26. It must be stressed that these levels are not heirarchical in the strict sense of the word due to "dislocation" of the levels or the uneven development of a social formation.

27. Poulantzas, op cit, p. 14, fn. 3.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., p. 67. The German Ideology, p. 410.

30. K. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in Marx and Engels Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1970), 97.

31. Poulantzas, op. cit., pp. 115, 201.

32. Poulantzas, following Marx and Lenin, differentiates between the political class struggle (the one directed at the state) and the economic class struggle (trade union work, etc.). See, for example, Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto; Marx, The Civil War in France; Lenin, Once Again on the Trade Unions; Lenin, What is to be Done? For a critique of the Historicist (Hegelian) concept of class struggle, see Poulantzas, op. cit., pp. 37-44.

33. For "class practices", see Poulantzas, ibid., p. 85. The First International led by Marx and Engels was an attempt to provide an independent working class movement. Lenin repeatedly stresses the importance of a party so that the workers become not only involved with class practices in general, as noted above, but also as a political force that has its place on the political scene; see Lenin, On Organization.

34. Lenin, The State and Revolution, on the concepts of "smashing" the state and "withering away" of the state. Lenin, it may be added, is consistent with Marx and Engels on the problematic of the state; see, for example, Engels' preface to Marx's The Civil War in France.

35. Other critics include R. Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic Books, 1969); Bamat and A. Skotnes, whose critique of Poulantzas will be discussed later on.

36. These categories are associated with the work of the Kapitalistate group, especially in the San Francisco collective. See also Gold, Lo and Wright, "Recent Developments in the Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State," Monthly Review (November, 1975).

37. Amy Bridges, "Nicos Poulantzas and the Marxist Theory of the State," Politics and Society (Winter, 1974), 171.

38. Ibid., p. 167.

39. See pp. 162-165 in this chapter.

40. Bridges, op. cit., p. 172.

41. Ibid., pp. 171-172.

42. Ibid., p. 172.

43. See fn. 39.

44. Poulantzas also discussed this point in relation to Marx's Capital, Political Power and Social Classes, p. 55. He also points out the relation of the state (even its liberal form) to the economy. This point runs counter to Bridges' critique of the separation of the political from the economic in Poulantzas. See also Poulantzas, op. cit., pp. 53-56.

45. Poulantzas, ibid., p. 40.

46. D. Johnson, "Strategic Implication of Recent Social Class Theory," Insurgent Sociologist I (Winter, 1978), 41.

47. Ibid., p. 42.

48. Ibid.

49. R. Appelbaum, "Born-Again Functionalism?" A Reconsideration of Althusser's Structuralism," Insurgent Sociologists, I (Summer, 1979).

50. As an example of the usage of Poulantzas' framework, see his The Crisis of the Dictatorships (London: NLB, 1976). Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (Thetford, Norfolk; Lowe and Brydone, Great Britain, 1975), 70.

51. Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (Thetford, Norfolk; Lowe and Brydone, Great Britain, 1975), 37, 77, 73-77.
52. Ibid., pp. 67-68.
53. Ibid., p. 81.
54. Ibid., p. 78.
55. The state as a "power center" is in opposition to the notion of the state perceived as an instrument of the bourgeoisie. See Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," New Left Review, LVIII (1969), 67-78.
56. Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (Thetford, Norfolk; Lowe and Brydone, Great Britain, 1975), 41.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., p. 49.
59. Lenin, On Organization.
60. Poulantzas, op. cit., p. 140.
61. Ibid., p. 141.
62. Ibid., p. 237.
63. Ibid., p. 241.
64. Ibid., p. 240.
65. Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (London: NLB, 1975), 14-15.
66. A. Skotnes, "Structural Determination of the Proletariat and the Petty Bourgeoisie: A Critique of Nicos Poulantzas," Insurgent Sociologist, op. cit., pp. 34-54.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid., p. 35.
70. Ibid., p. 37.
71. Lenin, What IS To Be Done?
72. Lenin, Imperialism: Highest Stage of Capitalism.
73. S. Bodenheimer, op. cit., pp. 126-127.

CHAPTER SIX

RELATIONS OF FORCES: A CONJUNCTURAL ANALYSIS

Two general periods of economic development may be identified in Lebanon's history between political independence and the Battle of Lebanon. The first period stretches from 1945-1965 and the second from 1966-1975.¹ Each period maybe subdivided to coincide more or less with different regimes. This coincidence was not accidental. It was rather a reflection of the form that the organic link between politics and economics assumed in Lebanon, and of shifting class alliances among the various class fractions and classes in the power blocs (landlords, high finance and so on).

In the first period three regimes may be identified: (1) El-Khoury [1943-1952]; (2) Shamun [1952-1958]; and (3) Shihab [1958-1964]. The first regime was overthrown through mass action in the form of pressure from class fractions and classes that were not dominant in the power bloc, with other classes acting as supporting classes (workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie). The second regime fought a civil war against opposition that perceived Shamun to be working to undermine its political and economic interests. The Shihab regime allowed more space for the Shamun opposition to develop strength. For the first time in Lebanon's history some kinds of political and economic reforms were attempted, thus strengthening the position of the progressive² forces within the opposition on the mass level.

The second period includes two regimes: (1) Hilu [1964-1970];

and (2) Franjiyeh [1970-1975]. Most of the first regime fell within the second period. It saw economic dislocations and political upheavals that anticipated the 1975 battle. This sub-period, along with Franjiyeh's, is particularly important to study to be able to determine the relations of forces at the conjuncture on the eve of the battle.

It was stated earlier that the political and economic structures in Lebanon developed to such an extent that they became conducive to the ascendancy of the comprador bourgeoisie at the expense of the other classes in the social formation.³ The political economy of Lebanon shows as well that the services sector was dominant and that even the industrial and agricultural sectors were mainly geared toward exports.

The class alliances and the supporting classes of the power bloc during the fight for and at the dawn of independence reflected the hegemony of landlords supported mainly by Christian (non-Maronite) high finance groupings. However, given the dynamics of the general environment, this set-up was temporary. El-Khoury's ouster and Shamun's subsequent election were the result of other classes and fractions of classes vying for more political power in an attempt to legitimize and advance their economic interests. It is important to discuss the way in which this shift occurred. To do so one needs to identify, by way of introduction, the various forces in the power bloc and the supporting classes during El-Khoury's regime.

Initially the main figures in El-Khoury's regime were the following: Riad El-Solh, Henri Pharaon, Sabri Hamadeh, Majeed Arslan, Ahmad Al-Asa'ad and Abdul-Hamid Karami.⁴ Each of these main figures was dominant in his region and/or his class. Solh, the Sunni Prime

Minister, had his power base in the South of Lebanon among the urban and semi-urban Sunni petty bourgeoisie.⁵ The Sunni zu'ama of Beirut saw in him a powerful rival who had undercut their political power in the confessional system (if he were a Prime Minister, the post would be unavailable to Salam or some other Beirut za'im).

Ahmad Al-Asa'ad (a Shi'ite) was the most powerful landlord in the South of Lebanon. He, in fact, controlled the South and wielded more political power than anyone else in the regime. Pharaon, the wealthy Greek Catholic, provided the regime with a power base in Beirut and the Biqa' region. And along with Habib Abu-Chahla (Greek Orthodox), Phillippe Taqla and Michel Chiha (both Greek Catholic), Pharaon provided the regime with support of the trade and financial groupings of Beirut.⁶

In the Biqa' region Pharaon secured the backing of the undisputed Shi'ite landlord Sabri Hamadeh. Furthermore, the financial circles were responsive to the regime to such an extent that Pharaon acted as the coordinator of a grand coalition that also included Karami (the Sunni za'im of Tripoli in the North) and Arslan (the powerful Druze lord in the Ash-Shuf area of Mount Lebanon).⁷

The power bloc that emerged from this grand coalition displayed the landlord class as hegemonic. This bloc was capable of giving polity cohesion and relative stability during the first several years of the regime and in this way the bloc served the common interests of the dominant classes in the Lebanese social formation.

While the regime was capable of regenerating itself in two elections which took place in 1947 and 1951, there were already signs of change almost immediately after independence. These signs came mainly from two quarters: a power struggle within the power bloc and

among different fractions within the various dominant classes which were reflected in the 1947 and 1951 elections. The struggle within the power bloc originated mainly from the tension between the regime's need to broaden the grand coalition in each area by appealing to more zu'ama families and the intra-conflicts among these various families. In the North, for example, the most powerful urban za'im, Karami, was alienated from the regime by El-Khoury when the latter sought alliances with the former's rivals, the Muqaddam, Al-Ali, Abboud and Jisr (all Sunni), and Franjiyeh (Maronite) families. These policies prompted Karami to leave the power bloc in 1947.⁸

In the South, Al-Asa'ad was opposed by lesser zu'ama families: the Osseirans and Khalils. In the Biqa', Hamadeh threatened to withdraw support for the regime unless the Greek Catholic za'im, Joseph Skaf of the Biqa', were allowed to run in the 1947 elections as a candidate from the South.⁹ The stiffest resistance to the regime, however, came from the Maronite Patriarch and Emile Edde' of the National Bloc (NB). This resistance in Mount Lebanon grew in intensity after the 1947 elections, when two of El-Khoury's Constitutional Bloc (CB) candidates, Jumblat and Shamun, accused the regime of corruption. As early as 1946 Jumblat was a critic of the regime and was pushing for reforms. This led El-Khoury to give him the ministerial portfolios of National Economy and Agriculture in 1946.¹⁰ After the elections Jumblat began to think seriously of replacing the regime with another one that was more responsive to his reforms.

In Beirut the regime won over the opposition by allying with Abdallah El-Yafi, Sami El-Solh and Hussein El-Oueini (all Sunni). Despite the opposition, the power bloc was capable of dominating the

election results. This was made possible through the "grand list" system whereby the country was divided into five electoral districts (South, North, Biqa', Akkar, Mount Lebanon). In this way the most powerful in each class was able to dominate the entire region during election.¹¹ Al-Asa'ad, for instance, was able to spread his power over the South by striking an alliance with zu'ama who belonged to other confessions. All ran in one "grand list" and Al-Asa'ad was guaranteed votes of other confessions while he reciprocated by guaranteeing "his votes" to the other zu'ama. In most cases this practice eliminated all opposition in the region from entering the parliament.

As a result of the 1947 elections which excluded many urban and feudal zu'ama and which alienated people such as Jumblat, the opposition to the regime increased. The regime, however, was strong in parliament where it introduced and passed a constitutional amendment which allowed El-Khoury to renew his presidential term in 1949.¹²

To further insure the regime's victory in the 1951 elections, El-Khoury rearranged the electoral districts and increased the parliamentary seats from 55 to 77. These tactics split the votes of his opposition and, although some of the opposition won in the elections, he was guaranteed a strong majority.¹³

Those of the opposition who lost in the elections were extremely strong competitors of the pro-regime candidates. This was evidenced by the lower vote rates which the winners acquired in the 1951 elections as opposed to the previous one.¹⁴ Despite El-Khoury's opposition to him, Pierre Edde', Emile's son, was elected in the Metn district of Mount Lebanon. The Socialist National Front, whose declared aims were to reform the government, was also able to win five seats of a total

of nine in the Shuf district of Mount Lebanon. Jumblat, the head of the SNF, was elected along the Camille Shamun, Emile Bustani, Ghassan Tueini and Anwar Khatib.¹⁵

The only party that was anti-system and which scored votes in the elections was the communist party, under whose name the candidate Mustafa Ariss ran and lost.¹⁶

This discussion indicates that in Lebanon the political scene was dominated by pro-system classes whose various fractions were in competition with each other to become members of the power bloc. Beyond this the rising bourgeoisie and especially its Maronite sector¹⁷ wanted a greater share of political power to enhance its economic and social interests and to become the hegemonic class fraction within the power bloc.

This power struggle within the power bloc corresponded to and reflected the development of the Lebanese economy. As argued in chapter three, agriculture (the main sector of the economy during independence) rapidly lost ground to other sectors, especially the services. Capital outlay to increase production of fruits and vegetables came from "commercial profits and income gained in the services sector." This development showed that the comprador bourgeoisie were penetrating agriculture and developing those crops which were most profitable for export. By and large, fruits and vegetables were grown in the Mountain and along the coastal area south of Beirut.¹⁸

Other problems compounded the regime's troubles and weakened it in the face of growing opposition. Palestinian refugees entered Lebanon in 1948 at a time when the war boom was all but over. Added to that, the regime was destabilized by the 1949 attempted coup by the Syrian Nationalist Party (SNP) and by the severance of the Custom Union by

the protectionist Syrian bourgeoisie in 1950. Furthermore, the assassination of Riad El-Solh, the Prime Minister, weakened the regime's support among the Sunni zu'ama.¹⁹

The deteriorating economic situation (high unemployment, increases in the wholesale price index and cost of living index) of 1952 guaranteed the needed mass support for the opposition. The regime was overwhelmed by demonstrations, rallies and strikes which were called by the SNF.²⁰ The regime retaliated by closing down the opposition's newspapers. This prompted more strikes by the opposition, who were aided by Sami El-Solh's resignation as Prime Minister. What had aggravated the situation for the regime was that the army remained neutral. All these developments rendered the regime inoperable.

The elite political actors who formed the opposition were, as mentioned earlier, organized in the SNF which was a parliamentary grouping that included the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) headed by Jumlat, the NB, the National Call Party and other deputies such as Franjiyeh and Shamun. Workers and peasants were organized as supporting classes for the elite opposition by the Popular Front, which included organizations such as the National Organization, the National Congress and Al-Hay'at al-Wataniya. It also included the Lebanese Kata'eb Party (LKP) and the Najjadah party.²¹

This broad-based alliance compelled the regime to hand over power to General Shihab on September 19, 1952. On September 23 the parliament elected Shamun (of the SNF) President.²² Two days before his election Shamun signed a pledge which was witnessed by SNF leaders to respect the Constitution, the National Pact and to reform the administration.²³

One significant aspect of the El-Khoury episode was that despite

a majority in parliament (66 out of 77 deputies) his regime was viewed as illegitimate in the eyes of the masses and the other pro-system (but anti-regime) forces. These pro-system elites had to resort to extra-systemic methods to achieve their political goals. This shows that the system had no mechanisms set to integrate the demands of even the pro-system forces. More importantly, however, the absence of these mechanisms was not an oversight on the part of the dominant classes. The nature of the system (confessional- and zu'ama-oriented) plus the country's small size and its extremely limited resources militated against the system's responsiveness to the needs of all these competing classes within the outside the power bloc.

On another level, a cursory look at the composition of the opposition would show that most of its component were urban-based (businessmen, lawyers and merchants) or they came from Mount Lebanon and were mainly represented by the NB, the LKP and the PSP. The NB, the LKP and Shamun wanted a bigger share of Lebanon's economic development and/or hegemony over the power bloc.

From the outset, Shamun began to solidify his regime's control over the polity. Within the context of confessionalism he began to curb landlord power and his opponents in general. A look at the 1953 elections would indicate this. In Beirut and Mount Lebanon the NB candidates won over the CB ones. In the North the regime's opponents were re-elected by slim margins. Rashid Karami was also re-elected in Tripoli as was Hamid Franjiyeh of Zghart. In the South, Al-Asa'ad and his son Kamel were re-elected but the family's power was weakened. For the first time the Osseiran and Khalil families won parliamentary seats. While these were landlords, they supported the regime against Al-Asa'ad.

Another important development during the Shamun regime was that the SNF began to falter when the President refused Jumblat's proposals for land reform and nationalization of Business. Two members of the SNF, Tueini and Bustani, were not interested beyond improving their position within the regime. Shamun wanted to have Jumblat defeated in the 1953 elections. He was unable to secure this goal; however, he was able to curb Jumblat's power somewhat when Khatib, the PSP candidate, lost to Bustani.²⁴

While the 1953 elections were a reflection of intra-class struggle among the dominant classes, they also reflected the efforts of the comprador bourgeoisie (especially its Maronite sector) to consolidate its power at the expense of other dominant classes in the social formation. Within the confines of confessionalism, however, alliances had to be sought between this sector of the bourgeoisie and non-dominant fractions of other classes (e.g. the Osseirans and among the landlords).

Other developments helped fuel the tensions among the dominant classes. The confessional arrangement and the National Pact provided the parameters for the rules of the game in Lebanese politics. What this meant in practice was that the various dominant classes had to compete with each other for hegemony in the power bloc, or dominance in the social formation that would allow them to enter into the power bloc. At the same time the confessional arrangement safeguarded the common interests of these dominant classes. Given the general dynamic of economic development in Lebanon which favored the services sector, however, it was tempting to certain bourgeois fractions to dishonor this arrangement. In an attempt to strengthen their political power and break up the power of the landlords and other bourgeois fractions,

the comprador had no other option but to pursue this policy.

The moves on the part of the regime that took advantage of the international situation to effect its policy were not without great risk. Shamun was met with disabling resistance from an opposition that was riding high on a wave of mass protest against the regime. Shamun manipulated the 1957 elections in an attempt to unseat his opponents and help elect his supporters to parliament.²⁵ In the North and Biqa' his major opponents could not be unseated. Karami, Hamid Franjiyeh and Hamadeh won. The regime's supporter, Charles Malik, however, won in the Koura district in the North. In Beirut, Shamun's opponents Salam and Yaffi lost to Sami El-Solh's list. Jumblat also lost in the Ash-Shuf district. The pro-regime deputies were distributed as follows: Beirut: 10 of 11; Mount Lebanon: 18 of 20; Biqa': 6 of 10; South: 6 of 11; and North: 8 of 14.²⁶

Despite the fact that these results were an improvement upon the 1953 elections for Shamun, they did not reflect the regime's popularity. It was only a numbers game that allowed the regime to consider amending the Constitution and to pass certain legislation favorable to it. In point of fact, that was precisely what the opposition accused Shamun of doing.

These domestic events were not isolated from others in the region. The Egyptian coup of July, 1952 came at a time when the cold war was on the ascendance. The coup was also a response to the corrupt Egyptian regime. It also signified a triumph for the ideology of "Arab Nationalism".²⁷

The Egyptian and the Syrian Arab Nationalist regimes were both committed to fighting imperialism in the region. The Egyptians, for

instance, were negotiating British withdrawal from the Suez Canal zone. In addition, the United States policies were in direct conflict with the aspirations of the nationalist regimes and the Arab masses in general. The masses rallied to Nasser's call to Arab nationalism and unity. Against this rising tide stood Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. When in 1955 the Baghdad Pact was formed, Iraq, Iran and Turkey were its principals in the area. Their interests coincided to a large degree with those of U.S. Middle Eastern policies.²⁸

Under the guise of serving Arabism, Shamun began to strengthen his ties with Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. He also made moves that were interpreted by the Arab nationalists as attempts to join the Baghdad Pact. In that same year he invited the Turkish President to Lebanon. This move raised havoc in Lebanon, Syria and Egypt. The intensity of the public uproar forced Shamun to declare that he had no intention of joining the Pact.²⁹

What further aggravated the situation was Shamun's stance during the 1956 Suez war. He did not sever relations with the aggressors, Britain and France, in solidarity with the Arab world, nor did he recall his ambassador from London as a sign of protest. To do that was to invite major economic dislocations that would have compromised the comprador bourgeoisie interests and threatened that class fraction vis-a-vis other dominant classes and class fractions in Lebanon. In other words, the interests of this bourgeoisie fraction were not congruent with those of the Arab masses in and outside of Lebanon.

Middle Eastern imperialist policies appeared to be in trouble in the face of this mass resurgence of anti-imperialism. To contain these developments, Eisenhower, the U.S. President, announced his

doctrine by which the region would be "protected" from the amorphous "threat" of communism. On January 5, 1957, he asked Congress to approve the following:³⁰

1. Cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence;
2. Undertake in the same region programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desired such aid; and
3. Employ the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of nations in the area requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism.

On March 16, 1957, Shamun accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine. This was a move that brought about further uproar against him from the Arab nationalists. Other elite from the dominant classes saw a clear violation of the National Pact being committed by the President, who was working to curtail their power. On April 1, 1957, twenty Lebanese political leaders from the United National Front (UNF) submitted a memorandum to Shamun demanding the following:³¹

1. The next Chamber should consist of eighty-eight members, not sixty-six as the President was reported to want;
2. The present cabinet should resign in favor of a "neutral" cabinet to supervise the forthcoming parliamentary elections (due in June);
3. The immediate cancelling of the state of emergency and of press censorship, both imposed in November, 1956, during the Suez crisis;

4. The present cabinet should not enter into agreement with any foreign power until the election of a new Chamber.

The memorandum also warned that if Shamun did not comply, the twenty political leaders would "feel compelled to take practical steps as dictated by the interests of the country."

On May 3, 1957, the government lifted the emergency regulations and press censorship in preparations for "free" elections. The election plank of the UNF essentially called for social and political reforms and was anti-imperialist. The elections took place on June 9, 1957, after the cabinet was forced to resign under popular pressure. The election returns, however, were a victory for Shamun. He was able to secure more than two-thirds of the seats for his protoges. The opposition accused the regime of rigging the election.³²

The election returns widened the gap between the Lebanese regime and the Arab nationalist regimes of Syria and Egypt. When union between the latter two countries was declared on February 1, 1958, delegations from the UNF went to Syria to congratulate the officials there on this momentous occasion. Furthermore, popular celebrations were held in all Lebanese cities. Anti-Arab nationalists in Lebanon, now that they had a majority in the parliament, began agitation among the Maronites to create a mass base which would support Shamun's re-election.

To broaden its support among the masses, the opposition relied upon Arab Nationalism as an ideology, social reforms and traditional support.³³ It is important to note that traditional support alone was incapable of winning over Shamun. It was for this reason that

traditional forces allied themselves with Arab nationalist forces in the area. To those who had social democratic and/or Arab nationalist tendencies, Shamun's defeat was seen as a way of strengthening their position on social reform and pan-Arabism. To the feudal lords and other zu'ama, the UNF was a tool by which they were able to defend their interests and blame all the social ills that their districts suffered from, at least for a while, on Shamun.

The opposition was multi-confessional. The UNF also included political parties that had both Christian and Muslim members. The communist party, the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party and the Arab Nationalist Movement were cases in point. The opposition also included the Third Force, which was the organization of the liberal bourgeoisie that saw Shamun violating the democratic process and the National Pact. This coalition was also multi-confessional. It included the Maronite Patriarch and other Christian and Muslim businessmen and financiers.³⁴ Two important leaders of the Third Force were Henri Pharaon and Charles Hilu.

Shamun could not count on widespread backing except for the support of the SNP, the LKP and a few traditional leaders such as Sami El-Solh, the Prime Minister, Kazem Khalil (Shi'ite), Fawzi Al-Hoss and Kahtan Hamadeh (Druze). This alliance, needless to say, was anti-Arab Nationalist, anti-reform and openly for alliances with the United States. The only significant force which remained "neutral" was the Lebanese army. This was so for two main reasons: (1) General Shihab, the Army Commander, was a Maronite who was sympathetic to the opposition; and (2) Shihab was afraid that the army might have split along sectarian lines had he decided to get involved.

When the civil war started on May 8, 1958, it was clear that the issues were not religious. In fact, the crowning touch of the war was the assassination of an anti-Shamun Maronite journalist, Nasseeb El-Matni.

Lebanon's political economy provides much evidence to support the argument that one of the basic problems of the country has been its uneven development. The comprador fraction of the bourgeoisie, which had been represented heavily in the state, supported the development of the services sector and mainly opposed that of industry and agriculture. This kind of political and economic development resulted in a cost-of-living index increase of 75 points between 1955 and 1957. This increase struck where it hurt most--at the poor and the middle class.³⁵

Another illustration of some of the effects of uneven development that reveals its intensity even at this early stage in the life of the polity, was the Doxiadis Associates' study of 1957 which estimated that 3% of the work force (14,000) earned \$3300 annually while 51% earned \$500 or less.³⁶ Furthermore, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization study of 1959 indicated that per capita income was \$147 among low-income groups while the national average was \$327. While this study was conducted several months after the civil war, it could be viewed as an indicator of the situation on the eve of the war. IRFED's study of 1960-1961 may also be taken as an indicator of uneven development and the plight of the masses in general. Among other things, IRFED reported the following: the agricultural work force (50% of Lebanon's total) accounted for 15.8% of the GNP. The ratio of percentage of national product and percentage of work force in agriculture was 0.324. The financial sector work force amounted to 0.44% of

Lebanon's total and accounted for 6% of the GNP (a ratio of 13,623 as opposed to 0.324 for agriculture).³⁷ Another indicator of the class nature of the conflict was the fact that the areas which were held by pro-Shamun forces during the conflict were the most affluent, while the opposition were, for the most part, in control of severely underdeveloped areas of the country.³⁸ Chapter three clearly shows that the development of the economic sector clearly benefited Beirut and the Mountain.³⁹

The conjuncture on the eve of the civil war was shaped by the events that have been discussed so far. The relations of forces obtaining in the conjuncture, in turn, conditioned the outcome of that war. It is perhaps appropriate at this point to examine a bit further these forces before discussing foreign intervention.

It was clear that those who allied themselves with Shamun were class fractions that benefited from the regime at the expense of other fractions in their respective classes. The alliance of the SNP with Shamun was prompted by their enmity toward the United Arab Republic (UAR--Syria's union with Egypt). The LKP, despite its secondary differences with Shamun, allied itself with the regime compelled by overriding factors. It perceived the anti-Shamun movement as one against Maronite interests and hegemony over the power bloc.⁴⁰ Just before the war Jmayyil, LKP Chief, toured Mexico and the U.S. to drum up support for the regime among the Lebanese emigres (mostly Maronite) and to secure a guarantee from the U.S. for the "protection" of Lebanon (i.e. protection of Maronite and U.S. interests in the region). The LKP's support of the Eisenhower Doctrine must be seen in this light.⁴¹

The financial interests which were in the Third Force such as Pharaon, Abu-Chahla and Taqqla actually attacked the LKP for its support of Shamun.⁴² The perceptions and the actual stances of the two fractions of the financial bourgeoisie indicated that the character of the conflict was not along confessional lines, as is strongly suggested by many writers such as Entelis and Salibi. In the first place, the two fractions were, for the most part, Christian. In the second place, the two fractions' perceptions were shaped by their material conditions of life. In Shamun's case he felt the need to transcend the National Pact. This meant no alliances could be sought with foreign powers, and that Lebanon's "neutrality" must be maintained.

As was mentioned earlier, Shamun's bourgeois fraction allied itself with the SNP, the LKP and other feudal zu'ama. Of these the LKP is perhaps the most significant political force because of its class make-up. The mass base of this party was mostly in the Mount Lebanon area, specifically in Al-Matn and Kisrwan. It was mainly comprised of small and rich peasants and petty bourgeoisie who enjoyed a higher standard of living than their respective counterparts in other areas of Lebanon. As was suggested earlier, this was one of the main reasons the party supported the Shamun regime and could not get over its sectarianism. It is clear that the party had deeply-rooted confessional characteristics. These characteristics have been a main component of the LKP's ideological pool, which rationalized its stance on the 6:5 ratio in Lebanon's political representation. Equally important, these characteristics render the class basis of the conflict nebulous. For the most part, Maronite areas were developed and non-Maronite areas were not. The development of under-development

assumes to a large extent a confessional facade.

While the pro-regime alliance took the form described above, the alliance of the opposition was prompted by many factors which were alluded to earlier. The alliance was possible for the following reasons: (1) zu'ama such as Rashid Karami, Sa'eb Salam and Yafi were against the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine because they violated the National Pact which would have upset the balance among the dominant classes; (2) they were also against Shamun's attempt to change the Constitution because that would have undercut their power in the system; and (3) the masses were anti-Baghdad Pact; they also felt that Shamun wanted to ally Lebanon with Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia to enhance the U.S. position in the area and open up the country further to Western interests. This was diametrically opposed to the interests of the great majority of the Arab masses. Those interests expressed themselves in Arab unity and independent political and economic development.

Zu'ama and mass interests converged. However, the traditional zu'ama were capable of leading the struggle against imperialism because the political parties which then existed were incapable of articulating the masses' interests in a comprehensive political and economic program. The lack of leadership on the part of these parties was for the following reasons: (1) Among the Arab nationalist masses, Nasserism as an ideology was supreme. Among other things Nasserism did not believe in political parties. It only believed in the masses with a leader at their head.⁴³ Within this environment, pan-Arab organizations such as the Ba'ath Party or the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) could not hope to mobilize the already politicized masses. Furthermore, these parties

were operating mainly in the cities, largely because of their class composition, which was petty bourgeoisie.⁴⁴ (2) The communist party had an unpopular position on Arab Unity.⁴⁵ As a pro-Moscow party, it interpreted Arab politics in much the same way as Moscow did. It saw quite correctly that the main contradiction then was between the nationalist forces in the area and the imperialist alliances that existed then. The party had no choice but to trail after Nasser. (3) Nasser's alliance with the Lebanese opposition *zu'ama* gave them more credibility with the Lebanese masses. The nationalist parties had no choice but to follow Nasser's wishes. (4) The masses did not see any qualitative difference between the nationalist parties and Nasserism. In point of fact, Nasserism, with its political and economic clout, appealed more to them than did the parties. It further was capable of articulating their interests (anti-Baghdad Pact and Arab unity) much better than the parties were capable of doing.

The basis for U.S. intervention had been secured by the Eisenhower Doctrine. Prior to that Lebanon was receiving U.S. aid through an agreement signed in 1954 (the Point Four). Six days after the civil war started the U.S. airlifted arms to Lebanon. Robert McLintock, the U.S. Ambassador, declared: "We are determined to help this government to maintain internal security."⁴⁶ Meanwhile, American amphibious forces were being doubled in the area. On May 17, the U.S. declared its intention to send tanks to the Lebanese government and on the 18th it was considering sending U.S. troops to Lebanon.

Shamun accused the UAR of stirring trouble in Lebanon. Given what had transpired already, the accusation could be seen as a justification

for turning to the U.S. for help. While the insurgents were receiving arms and probably men and money from across the border, the fact that Shamun's domestic and foreign policies had precipitated the crisis could not be dismissed or argued against rationally.

In a violent coup on July 14, 1958, the Iraqi monarchy was deposed. The imperialist pact automatically collapsed. The new Baghdad regime boosted the nationalist forces in the area. On the next day U.S. marines landed in Lebanon and British commandos landed in Jordan.⁴⁷ Clearly, this massive intervention was to contain the revolutionary situation in the area. Immediately the U.S. started assessing the damages to its position and attempted to salvage as much of its prestige and interests as possible. To do this, Eisenhower sent his special emissary, Robert Murphy, to Lebanon to negotiate a settlement. Domestically the Third Force was the most equipped to compromise a solution. The effect was that Shamun was not re-elected, the National Pact remained intact, and socio-economic reforms were agreed upon in principle to accommodate some demands of the masses.⁴⁸

The "no victor-no vanquished" settlement appeared to benefit the anti-Shamun forces.⁴⁹ The LKP, however, seized this opportunity to enhance its position in the system. Consequently, it called for a general strike in its areas. Kidnappings and killings along religious lines were common occurrences which were initiated by the LKP members.⁵⁰ These calculated moves were designed to limit any significant shifts in the polity toward sweeping reforms.⁵¹ What appeared to be a personality clash on representation in the new government of Rashid Karami was in fact a clash over the share of each bourgeois fraction in the new cabinet. The crisis that the LKP precipitated lasted for 22 days, a period

characterized by the party as the "22 journées glorieuses".⁵² The crisis was ended on October 14, 1958 when Karami as Prime Minister formed a cabinet that included three other members: Oweini (Sunni), Jmayyil (LKP) and Edde' (NB). With the crisis over the U.S. marines left Lebanon during the same month. The newly-elected President, General Fuad Shihab, the Maronite Army Commander, had the blessings of all parties concerned in the conflict.

Shihab's election reflected the need for some reforms if the confessional system were expected to function without any major dislocations. One of the reforms the new regime called for was expenditures on an irrigation and land reclamation project to alleviate some of the consequences of uneven development. The project was initially conceived to allow Southern farmers to own a few acres of land. Other reforms had to do with universal and free education, health insurance, the social security code, and administrative reforms. All of these were demands put out by the progressive forces in the country over a span of several years. These forces, however, were not part of the system; as such they were unable to share in the implementation of these programs. They were forced to operate through zu'ama such as Jumblat and Karami.

The LKP, a conservative force, was also for these reforms. It espoused them, however, for sectarian reasons. Hudson contends:⁵³

To counter demands from non-Christian socialists for significant income-redistribution policies, Pierre Gemayel has suggested that, because Christians pay about 80 per cent of the taxes (his figure), they are theoretically entitled to 80 per cent of the services. Although the Kataeb

does not advocate strict adherence to such an allocation, Gemayel's statement is a reminder of how the party views social progress. Within this framework there is nevertheless unquestionably a realization that the stability of the Lebanese entity depends increasingly on "social justice" as well as a "free economic system".

To effect any of these reforms meant an impingement upon traditional zu'ama power. It also meant the creation of a new mechanism to replace the power to the extent it was to be curtailed. In a polity such as Lebanon's, power:

...is monopolized by an establishment of clerics, semifeudal political bosses, bankers, businessmen and lawyers. The members of the establishment come from fewer than fifty prominent families. The establishment derives its influence partly from these traditional affiliations and partly from economic success, and Lebanese politics today is still essentially the competition among its members to advance their various parochial interests--sectarian prerogatives, commercial privileges, and pork-barrel benefits.⁵⁴

As Shihab himself had found out, curtailing zu'ama power was an extremely difficult task. While attempting to do so, Shihab had to rely on some of them. This inherent constraint in the confessional system cannot be shaken away without dispensing with the system itself.

For the first time in Lebanon's political development there was not much congruence between the dominant classes (and the zu'ama institution) in the social formation and the power bloc. Despite the fact that in the 1960 parliamentary elections (with its seats increased to 99) more contending zu'ama were elected, this did not lead to an increase in their representation in the power bloc. Nor did it reflect

as readily as it usually did in the past elections the composition of the power bloc. This was because the location of decision making had shifted within the state itself. Technocrats and the army were responsible for important state decisions while the parliament was left to its internal bickering. A semblance of regime tolerance was maintained toward the traditional political game.⁵⁵

Realizing these moves on the part of the regime, various traditional zu'ama, both Christian and Muslim, began to oppose the regime. Its major rivals which represented the dominant class fractions in the various regions were Al-Asa'ad, Shamun, Salam, Edde' and the Maronite Patriarch. All of these figures (except Al-Asa'ad) came into a semi-formal coalition against the regime.

The major pro-regime forces were Jumblat and his PSP, Karami and the LKP. Other progressive figures who won in the 1960 and/or 1964 parliamentary elections were also pro-regime. These included deputies such as Ma'rouf Sa'd of the Southern city of Sidon, who played a major role in the 1958 civil war. For the first time in Lebanon, non-traditional leaders such as the Arab nationalist Ali Bazzi (who had been an interior minister before the 1960 elections) were able to win in the parliamentary elections.

The hegemonic fraction in the power bloc this time was a curious animal--the technocracy and the army--both of which represented a Lebanonist "modernizing" trend. They were for reforming the state institutions and effecting other social reforms.

What helped this trend develop was the relative calm of regional politics in the first three years of the regime. This calm was briefly interrupted by an attempted coup in December of 1961 against Shihab and

by the earlier coup in Syria against its unity with Egypt in the UAR.⁵⁶ These events, however, did not result in serious dislocations. Furthermore, the anti-imperialist trend in the area continued as exemplified by the coup in Syria against the anti-Nasser coup of September, 1961. This Ba'athist coup of March, 1963 came at the heels of another Ba'athist coup in Iraq which took place in February of the same year.

The significance of these Arab events to Lebanon lay in the fact that Shihab did not have to make any serious decisions on the Arab level. He was able to keep Lebanon on a neutral course and on friendly terms with its Arab nationalist neighbors. He was able to spend most of the regime's energies dealing with the domestic situation. As mentioned earlier, the hegemonic fraction in the new power bloc allied itself with other progressive political figures and some traditional zu'ama who were more inclined toward reforms than the majority of the zu'ama. In the absence of strong independent political organizations that were capable of representing the peasants and workers, these classes remained supporting classes of the reformist figures in the power bloc. The position of the classes vis-a-vis the reformists was rational. It was also reinforced by the ability of the zu'ama to be brokers between the masses and the state. The legitimacy of the zu'ama roles was also assisted by the ideological conviction of the lower classes, reinforced by concrete everyday events, that as Muslims or non-Christians they were discriminated against by the state. They saw in these zu'ama the capability of ameliorating that discrimination.

The anti-system political parties were incapable of doing much for the masses other than provide them with Arab nationalist slogans. As was the case in the civil war, however, these slogans were easily

adopted by self-seeking zu'ama in the opposition. The Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) and the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party (ABSP), despite their more coherent and consistent philosophies, were also unable for the most part to represent the interests of the workers, peasants and the petty bourgeoisie. In the case of the LCP this was so because the party had a negative position on Arab Nationalism and, at any rate, supported Nasser's anti-imperialist policies. The LCP found itself allied with traditional pro-Nasser or pro-reform zu'ama. With regard to the ABSP, it was rather difficult for it to represent the majority of the Arab nationalist masses in Lebanon who already had given their allegiance to Nasser. For one thing, he had been at odds with the ABSP since the 1958 union of Syria and Egypt.

Despite these drawbacks in terms of workers' and peasants' political organizations, the spontaneous mass movement that carried the brunt of the fighting in 1958 was politicized as never before. In addition, Jumblat and his PSP became strong advocates of Arab nationalism. As a member of the power bloc, Jumblat was able to articulate the interests of the progressive movement in the state. In this sense, this may be regarded as a step forward for the mass movement. For one thing, it had more freedom of movement in and out of the state machinery. This did not change the fact, however, that the classes which comprised the mass movement remained supporting classes. The aforementioned gains along with Sa'd's election in Sidon and the strong showing in the 1960 parliamentary elections of ABSP's candidate Ra'fi'i in Tripoli indicated that important changes had occurred on the political scene.

The relative calm of the Shihab regime began to wither away during

Hilu's presidential term. In many respects the Hilu regime was supposed to be a continuation of Shihab's. Political, social and economic reforms were to be carried out as specified under the Shihab regime. More importantly, the role of the army in policy decisions remained intact. It was clear, in fact, that Elias Sarkis, a Shihabist, wielded great power as the head of the presidential bureau.

Hilu's regime provided a convincing argument that not even Shihabist policies were capable of ameliorating Lebanon's inherent problems. These problems were structural, which reforms were unable to resolve. Furthermore, these reforms interfered with the confessional arrangements in the polity and were not easy to implement at a time of relative calm in the Middle East. When major dislocations, such as the 1967 war began to occur in the region, these innocuous reforms became unacceptable to the traditional and sectarian forces in the country.⁵⁷

The Hilu period was witness to an economic crisis and to more uneven development of the country. The economic crisis was mainly characterized by a steep recession that reached its peak with the Intra Bank collapse. The structural reasons that led to the collapse of one of the main pillars of the economy in October of 1966 were a tight money market and political animosity between rival banking groups who shared interests with differing foreign financial groupings.⁵⁸ Saudi Arabia was also pressuring Lebanon to modify what it interpreted as a pro-Nasser stand. Saudi and other Arab oil money was quickly withdrawn from Intra Bank, thus precipitating the crisis.

The Bank of Lebanon did not come to the aid of Intra. This probably was a conscious effort on the part of the state to undermine

the bank on behalf of rival banking groups that were represented in the new power bloc (Taqla, Pharaon and others were old friends of Hilu and were members of the Third Force).

Despite attempts that were made to ameliorate uneven development in the Shihab and Hilu periods, the services sector developed at a much faster rate than the others. Lebanon also remained a deficit country in all agricultural products except fruits, which were geared toward export (in 1964 vegetables, which were earlier in surplus, reached a deficit).

As shown in chapter three, land tenure in the Shihab period remained the same as before: affluent landowners mainly were in the Mountain and engaged in fruit growing.*

Concomitant with the development of this economic crisis, the Israeli decision to divert the waters of the Jordan River (whose source sprang in Lebanon with tributaries in Syria and Jordan) brought about a major political crisis to the polity. Lebanon once more was put before the mirror revealing schizophrenic character: without the Arab world Lebanon was unable to survive economically. The dominant classes were able to maintain a relatively high standard of living among the middle class because of the profitable economic arrangement with the Arab world. While over half of Lebanon's population identified with the Arab world on various levels, the dominant classes did not feel obligated to share in the problems that affected the area. Specifically,

* For a discussion of economic development during the period 1958-1970 (which covers both the Shihab and Hilu regimes) see chapter three, pp. 71-81. The declining share of agriculture in the GNP and the increasing shares of the services and manufacturing is shown on p. 81.

the crisis manifest itself by the unwillingness of Lebanon to assume its responsibilities as a part of the Arab League, of which it is a member, to defend the common interests of the Arabs vis-a-vis Israel in protecting the waters of the Jordan River.

Lebanon offered the traditional answer: it wished to remain "neutral" in the dispute lest Israel attack. When the Arabs offered Egyptian and Syrian troops to defend the Southern borders, Lebanon emphatically rejected the offer on the grounds that such Arab military presence would compromise Lebanon's sovereignty.⁵⁹

On the ideological level the crisis manifest itself between "Lebanonism" and "Arabism". These two categories assumed clear religious overtones in the presentation of the question by the main representatives of the Maronite bourgeoisie and the church.⁶⁰ Although the crisis began to take shape in 1962, it was the first Arab Summit meeting of October, 1964, that marked the qualitative shift in the crisis.⁶¹ While none of the Summit participants was willing to face Israel militarily, each felt obliged to respond to the collective Arab crisis as an attempt to pacify, at least for a while, the Arab masses. To this effort two steps were taken: (1) a unified Arab command of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan was set up; and (2) the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed with a pro-Saudi Palestinian at its helm (Ahmad Shukairi).⁶²

Lebanon reluctantly agreed to the above arrangement, which also stipulated that no Arab troops were to enter Lebanon without the request of Lebanese authorities. Furthermore, Palestinians in Lebanon who wanted to seek military training were to go to PLO bases in other Arab countries and had no right to return to Lebanon.

Aside from the PLO--which the Palestinians perceived (quite correctly) as ineffective in the fight against Israel--the first military operation inside Israel was conducted by a new organization. The Fateh issued its first communique, describing the 12/31/64 operation in Israeli territory. The event captured the imagination of the Arab masses and signaled a qualitative shift in the response of the Palestinians to their plight.

This event, however, was a cause for concern to the Lebanese state. Lebanon was presented with almost impossible task of keeping the Palestinians in the country away from the influence of the Fateh organization. The Shihabist Deuxieme Bureau (military intelligence) kept the Palestinian refugee camps under close surveillance and especially terrorized Palestinian youth.⁶⁴

The opposition to Shihabism was aided by the death of Jalal Ka'wash, a Palestinian guerilla fighter, under torture by the Deuxieme Bureau. The anti-Shihabists, those who genuinely supported the guerilla movement and those who did not, seized upon this opportunity to attack the power base of Shihabism. The Bureau survived these attacks, however, and kept its grip on Lebanese politics and the Palestinian refugee camps.⁶⁵

Not until the Arab defeat on June 5, 1967, did politics in Lebanon and the Arab world in general take a sharp turn toward the development of a revolutionary mass movement. The humiliating defeat was an unequivocal proof that all the Arab regimes, including Nasser's Egypt and Ba'athist Syria, were unreliable in the face of Israeli power. This perception by the Arab masses was in one sense liberating. The conclusion--that they must take a direct role in politics--was

extremely clear to them. To the Palestinians, who were by-and-large Nasser followers, the vehicle for direct participation was already present: the guerilla movement almost overnight was catapulted to prominence. The Fateh, the PFLP and the Sa'iqqa were the major guerilla organizations to whom the Arab masses lent allegiance and legitimacy.⁶⁶

Soon after, the innocuous PLO with its helpless chairman Shukairi was taken over by the guerilla movement, which comprised the core of what came to be known as the Palestinian Resistance Movement. Arafat, the Fateh chief, was elected PLO chairman in 1968.

The turning point for the guerilla movement came in March, 1968, when at least 6,000 Israeli troops supported by helicopters and tanks attacked the village of Al-Karamah, situated on the east bank of the Jordan River. The roughly 400 guerilla there, along with the villagers, took to mobile warfare in a battle that lasted about thirty hours.⁶⁷ In the last few hours of the battle a nearby Jordanian army artillery unit, defying orders from headquarters, entered the battle. The unit's role was decisive in turning away a defeated Israeli invasion force. The fact that the guerillas, despite heavy losses, were capable of successfully handling a much superior force was cogent proof that a people's war was the method best suited for the liberation of the occupied territories. The battle was also significant in that it gave more power to the Resistance, which was able to spread its legitimate control over all areas of the Arab world where Palestinians resided.⁶⁸

Lebanon, with about 300,000 Palestinians and a history of popular support to the Palestinian cause, was a logical place for political

activities by the Resistance. The Palestinians were living proof of the organic link between Lebanon and the Arab world. They contributed heavily to Lebanon's economic development (cheap skilled labor, remittances from abroad and Intra Bank) yet, for the most part, they did not share in its gains. Their lot was comparable to that of the majority of the Lebanese population who lived in the extremely under-developed areas of the country. The Palestinian Resistance was already an ally of the Lebanese deprived classes. The alliance developed at a rapid rate under pressure of regional and international developments.⁶⁹

At this point it is perhaps appropriate to discuss the response of the right-wing forces to this developing mass movement in Lebanon.

If "Lebanism" was not easy to create in times of relative stability (Shihab's regime), it was impossible during periods of upheaval as witnessed in the Arab world since 1967. Shihabism during the Hilu regime was increasingly working itself into a double bind. On the one hand it wanted to accommodate the Pan-Arab forces within the limits the system allowed; on the other hand the system itself was incapable of handling the legitimate demands forced upon it by regional and domestic developments.

Another trend of the pro-system forces emerged which articulated its interests in terms of extreme "Lebanonism". It rejected any compromise with demands which Shihabism was willing to accommodate somewhat. This extreme "Lebanonism" manifest itself in "Maroniteism", the representatives of which were Shamun and his Party of Free Nationalists (PFN), Edde' with his NB and Jmayyil with his LKP. These forces formed the Tripartite Alliance or the Hilf.⁷⁰

Despite what authors such as Entelis claim, the LKP cannot be regarded as qualitatively different from the others in the Hilf, whom Entelis quite correctly perceives as reactionary, sectarian and dogmatist in terms of a "Christian Lebanon".⁷¹ As Hudson contends, "As long as 'Lebanon first' continues to be interpreted by Muslims as 'Christian first'...the Kataeb [LKP] will not become an integrating national party."⁷² One would have to refer to Jmayyil's conception of reforms in Lebanon and his famous "80% argument". Furthermore, Entelis himself concedes "[t]he fact that it [the LKP] decided to join the LNP [PFN] and NB indicated that the systematic pressures had exceeded its capacities to control or direct them."⁷³ But the Shihabists were espousing "Lebanon first" as well. If the LKP were different from the PFN and the NB, it had the option to ally with the Shihabists as it did during the Shihabi regime. That the LKP did not was a telling criticism that it was not amenable to an alliance with a trend that was coming under attack from all quarters. The LKP had to become a part of the Hilf; otherwise it would have lost much of its mass base among the Maronites to the other Hilf parties.⁷⁴

More important perhaps is the fact that the LKP philosophy was not much different from that of Shamun or Edde'. In an article published in L'Orient on July 11, 1967, "the Hilf called for the continuation of all forms of relations with the West since 'the Western world has the same faith as we do, in one God, in a parliamentary democratic system, in the rights of man, his liberty and dignity, as well as in economic liberalism'."⁷⁵ This quote actually reflects one of the major contents of the ideological category "Lebanon first". Viewed in an historic context this category becomes a defense of capitalist interests in general

and Maronite capitalist interests in particular. The Hilf became a mechanism by which "Maroniteism" reared its head in an attempt to become the hegemonic force within a new power bloc in the state. In point of fact, the Hilf was a formidable force that eventually helped unseat Shihabism and elect a president who was to become a major ally to the PFN and LKP during the Battle of Lebanon.

As mentioned earlier, the power bloc and its hegemonic fraction during the Hilu regime were not representative of the political forces on the political scene. To begin, the hegemonic fraction was under constant challenge from some new forces in the power bloc. Furthermore, Shihabism as a phenomenon was incapable of resolving Lebanon's inherent problems. As such, it had to attack the nascent Lebanese National Movement (LNM) which, in turn, had to protect itself from Shihabism.

The Israeli commando raid on Beirut's international airport on December 28, 1968 brought about the resignation of the Yafi cabinet, which was accused by the people of incompetence.⁷⁶ Karami was able to form a new cabinet on January 15, 1969, and pledged to meet the demands of the masses which were expressed during the strikes and demonstrations that took place all over Lebanon. These demands were for: (1) military conscription; (2) fortification and defense of border villages; and (3) coordination of Lebanon's foreign policy with the rest of the Arab world through the Arab League and Arab Summit conferences.

Shamun boycotted the cabinet since it did not include him but included two Hilf leaders, Jmayyil and Edde'. The latter two along with two other allies resigned their cabinet posts in support of Shamun. As a response to this challenge, Karami simply appointed four other

people to the vacant cabinet posts. The Hilf responded with a strike on January 30, 1969. Jmayyil declared, "the street would be more effective than the Chamber."⁷⁷ The main objective of the strike was "not the toppling of the present government but the restoration of democratic principles...the secondary aim of this campaign is to make the extremists understand that the Lebanese cannot and will not kneel down to their demands..."; according to Jmayyil the strike was to counter the "communist peril".⁷⁸

At any rate, the strike was a fiasco: the Karami cabinet "received parliamentary confirmation (60-30-8 absent)." Nevertheless, the Hilf declared that the strike "confirmed the opposition of a large majority of Lebanese to demagogic tendencies."⁷⁹ What the strike confirmed, however, was the fragility of the confessional arrangement and the weakness of the Hilf vis-a-vis the nascent LNM, the Resistance and some of the Muslim elite that chose to ally itself with the LNM against the exclusivist Maronite parties.

The Shihabists naturally came against the Hilf in the parliament by giving confirmation to the Karami cabinet. The Hilf's defeat was a victory not only to the Shihabists but also to the LNM. To arrest any further development of LNM power the LKP opened dialogue with the sectarian Muslims such as the Najjadah and the National Committee (Al-Hay'at al-Watiniya, an organization of Muslim businessmen who wanted more representation within the confines of confessionalism and "Lebanonism"). These two groups did not have any mass following to speak of. The masses were gravitating toward the LNM and its main figure, Jumblat (who since independence had identified with social and political reform). The motive of the LKP was obvious: it wanted to present itself as a

party concerned about national unity, which was supposedly being undermined by the LNM. Needless to say, the LKP's conception of national unity was that it comprised two poles, Muslim and Christian, which remained non-antagonistic. This conception, of course, dodged the issue of dealing with the main adversary, the LNM.

The LKP tactics also reflected that while the party was challenging the regime it did not want to challenge the confessional system. These tactics were designed to enhance the Hilf and the LKP positions in the system; however, they backfired. This was evident when Jmayyil stated clearly the Hilf's position that "the only solution to the crisis is the cabinet's resignation; no other alternative is possible."⁸⁰ When it was incapable of doing so, however, the Hilf retracted its position and held a conference in Brummana (near Beirut) on March 7, 8 and 9, 1969. There is stated that "it was not longer a question of participation in the government, but one of political program."⁸¹

Entelis is correct when he states that "[t]he objective was to arouse national consciousness against what the Hilf perceived as a developing socialist-revolutionary trend among Muslim forces in Lebanon."⁸² Except, of course, that this national consciousness was "Lebanonism" and the socialist-revolutionary forces were not Muslim but of various religious backgrounds. The fact that people like Entelis chose to categorize the conflict as Christian-versus-Muslim attests to the weakness of their analyses and their inability to understand politics in Lebanon beyond superficial manifestations.

In its description of the problems in Lebanon, the Hilf's conference never mentioned that Lebanon's economic development had

anything to do with the crisis at hand. Instead, the Hilf simply pointed out that then-current political problems were due to:

(1) disequilibrium in the delegation of constitutional powers; (2) paralysis of democratic institutions; (4) administrative corruption; (5) exploitation of government for personal ends; and (6) oligarchical rule.⁸³

But these were the symptoms of underlying reasons, about which the Hilf kept silent. It was clear that the Hilf was agitating against any reform the LNM wanted to achieve in the system. Furthermore, the Hilf wanted to impose its way upon the regime in an effort to become the hegemonic force in a new power bloc. Such a position, it hoped, would enable it to deal with the LNM from a position of strength to try to nip it in the bud.

The Burmmana Conference was a strategic undertaking in this effort. Other representatives of the dominant classes, however, declared that the conference "purposely exaggerated the communist threat." Furthermore, the Muslim sector of the dominant bourgeois class stated that the conference resolutions were a "denunciation of the Mithaq [National Pact] by its call for foreign protection" and that the Palestinian cause should be supported.⁸⁴

In response to these developments the Hilf threatened to resort to extra-legal means. This of course prompted President Hilu to remind the Hilf to "respect the rules of the game."⁸⁵ The Hilf tactics prompted Jumblat to declare that "the Alliance [Hilf] aimed at instigating some sects in the country, strengthening the confessional schism, and causing internal divisions."⁸⁶ The Hilf was incapable of confronting the LNM head-on. In fact, its strategy called for agitation to create

conditions of polarization that would in turn rationalize its sectarian stance and its defense of the system against those who called for its reform.

The inconsistencies of the Hilf's position were, in fact, designed tactics to bring about a dangerous polarization to the polity. It sought to strengthen its position among the Maronites through conducting sectarian political ploys of "Arabism" and "communism". Having succeeded in elevating this sectarian conflict to the level it desired, the Hilf opted to end the crisis without achieving any of the aims it initially sought.

Another major reason for the Hilf's decision to end the crisis was the fact that the Lebanese presidential elections were less than two years away. The Hilf zu'ama were each eyeing the presidency. The Hilf enhanced its position within the Maronite community, and also struck an alliance with the Central Bloc (founded in 1969) which included Salam, Al-Asa'ad and Suleiman Franjiyeh.⁸⁷

As mentioned earlier, the Palestinian Resistance in Lebanon was perceived as a threat to the Lebanonists, especially by the Maronites. Not only did the Resistance provide a model for the oppressed Lebanese to follow, it was their only natural ally in the face of the state. These long-neglected masses, especially in the South, were of the opinion that the state was at least supposed to protect their villages from Israeli raids and give support to the Resistance in its struggle against the Zionists.

The state and its army, however, saw things differently. They proceeded to prepare to end the threat. The army sought to assert its role through a series of clashes with the Resistance forces between May

and October of 1969. The polarization of Lebanon assumed dangerous proportions. Many of the Muslim elite, such as the Prime Minister Karami, had no choice but side with the Resistance. This was so mainly because the power base of such zu'ama rested upon people who were also pro-Resistance. The Prime Minister had to come up with a compromise solution which he found in the concept of "coordination". The concept referred to coordination of activities against Israel between the army and the Resistance.

"Coordination" found its official expression in the Cairo Agreement which was signed on November 3, 1969, by Arafat and the Lebanese Army Chief Bustani. The agreement in effect was a concession that legalized the presence of the Resistance on Lebanese soil, but constrained its activities somewhat in terms spelled out in the actual agreement.⁸⁸

The Hilf was supportive of the President's and army's position against the Resistance. The Hilf, however, did not dare to go public against the Resistance. At first it tried to drive a wedge in the popular support of the Resistance by blaming communists and Ba'athists in the Resistance for the troubles Lebanon then faced, and praising Fateh and Palestine. The Hilf declared it was not against the Palestinian revolution, it only did not want any guerilla bases in the country. Furthermore, the Hilf was of the opinion that "coordination" was not a workable concept, and as such, was unacceptable to the Hilf.⁸⁹

The Hilf, however, had to agree unwillingly to the Cairo Agreement. The popular pressure and the pressure of radical and conservative Arab states alike convinced Shamun and other Hilf zu'ama of the futility of their position at that time. The LKP and Shamun were not ready to clash militarily with the Resistance; Edde', who dissented at first,

was convinced by the Maronite Patriarch to agree to Shamun's and Jmayyil's position.

In essence, the Resistance was getting deeply rooted among the masses and the LNM (formed in 1969) was in full support of the Resistance. The Hilf was unable to undo what had transpired historically in terms of this revolutionary development. Such a development was not only a threat to the Maronite bourgeoisie but also to the Muslim sector of the bourgeoisie. However, because the latter group relied primarily upon a mass base supportive of the Resistance, it had to become a moderating force between the Hilf and Resistance while paying lip service to the Resistance and the LNM.

This moderating force had the main function of attempting to keep the system intact at a time of grave dangers to confessionalism. With the rise of the LNM, this moderating function assumed greater importance. These moderating forces were able to represent officially the Lebanese masses which did not subscribe to the Hilf's position. In a major way this sector of the bourgeoisie prevented the development of the revolutionary situation to the point of rupture. Events, however, kept pushing the social formation toward rupture; this meant that the moderating elements were losing grip on the masses who were not satisfied with partial response to the crisis of the country. They gravitated to the LNM because it was capable of articulating their interests.

The Hilf so far was mainly dealing with the Resistance and blaming it for the troubles of the polity. The LNM, in turn, accused the Hilf of using the Resistance as a scapegoat because it did not want to deal with the problems of Lebanese development and under-development.

Following its earlier tactic of escalation, the Hilf (and

specifically the LKP) opted to clash with the Resistance. On March 25, 1970, it instigated clashes with the Resistance which lasted until March 29. The Kahala incident soon spread to Beirut, where guerillas from the Resistance clashed with LKP militia in refugee camps and in major parts of the city proper. What started as an attack at a guerilla funeral procession threatened to become a full-fledged war capable of encompassing all of Lebanon.⁹⁰ However, that was to come later when other requirements of the regional and international level were ripe for the "great event". Internally, Lebanon was sitting on a powder keg; the various political forces were primarily engaged in fine tuning of their political and military power while waiting for the right cue to achieve rupture in the system.

Clashes stopped on March 31 after mediation by the Libyan foreign minister. The March attack on the Resistance had another important cause. The LKP was eyeing the Presidency in the August 1970 elections. The party wanted to project itself as the group capable of dealing with the guerilla movement. In fact, many Muslim members of the bourgeoisie did not protest the LKP's clashes with the Resistance because they saw in the Palestinians a destabilizing force which worked against their capitalist interests. These clashes rendered Jmayyil more favorable as a presidential candidate to most bourgeois sectors and fractions than either Edde' or Shamun. It looked as if the competition were going to be Jmayyil versus a Shihabist candidate. With the prevalent anti-Shihabist trend in the country, Jmayyil had a very good chance indeed of being elected.

Two major problems, however, militated against the prospect of Jmayyil for President. The first was the association of the LKP with

Maronite bourgeois interests. This meant that the party, if it assumed the presidency, would have had to work for this bourgeois sector to the detriment of most of the other bourgeois sectors and fractions. The second was that, as early as 1969, another Maronite personality had been working with the presidency in mind. Suleiman Franjiyeh entered into an alliance (the Central Bloc) with Salam and Al-Asa'ad. Franjiyeh became more favorable than Jmayyil to the majority of the anti-Shihabist bourgeois fractions. Franjiyeh too had a tough stand on the Resistance, and yet was acceptable to some groups within the LNM such as Jumblat's.⁹¹

When the elections were finally held it was between Sarkis, a Shihabist, and Franjiyeh. On August 17, 1970, the latter was elected by the parliament by a majority of one.⁹² The election results were good news to the Arab conservative regimes who began to be more wary of the Resistance, and who welcomed a tough president capable of dealing with this issue. The U.S. also was pleased by the Shihabist defeat because of the Shihabist traditional closeness to France and Nasser.⁹³

The defeat of the Resistance in Jordan in what came to be known as "Black September" put more stress on the Lebanese system. Lebanon was about the only place in the Arab world contiguous to Israel where the Resistance had the power to move freely and where it enjoyed a common tradition of struggle with the Lebanese masses, especially in the South. For this reason the Resistance increased its activities in Lebanon after Black September.

Franjiyeh was determined to play tough with the Resistance. This

was evident during his first month in office when he refused entry into Lebanon of a plane-load of Palestinian guerillas from the Arab Liberation Front (ALF--Iraqi sponsored). This act consolidated his position with the anti-Resistance political forces in and outside Lebanon. He also did not damage his reputation with the pro-Resistance forces because he was abiding by the letter of the Cairo Agreement. The Agreement had no stipulation allowing guerillas to arrive in Lebanon by air.⁹⁴

The three Central Bloc (CB) allies were now the President, the Prime Minister (Salam) and the Speaker of Parliament (Al-Asa'ad). In the parliament Tony Franjiyeh, the president's son, organized a new pro-regime alliance, the New Central Bloc (NCB).⁹⁵

The major function of Salam's "youth cabinet" was the dismantling of the Shihabist institutions in the army and the bureaucracy. The Cabinet, however, was unable to accomplish any reforms because of stiff resistance from the dominant classes.⁹⁶ The failure of this maverick cabinet prompted Salam's resignation. He then formed another cabinet made of traditional politicians selected from within the newly-elected 1972 parliament.⁹⁷

The regime began to be accused of nepotism, corruption and alliances with special interests (businessmen and traditional politicians). These accusations became more acute as inflation and unemployment began to climb. The president's son and close associates were accused of rigging prices of pharmaceuticals and other commodities and services. These and similar accusations coming from all levels of society indicated growing dissatisfaction among the masses.

Two events in the 1972 parliamentary elections indicated the

development of the mass movement. The first was the victory of Dr. Rafi'i, the Ba'ath Party candidate from Tripoli, the second the victory of Najah Wakim, the Arab nationalist from Beirut. Both candidates ran against pro-Shihabists. These events showed the lack of confidence of two major urban concentrations in the traditional leaders, and the willingness of the population to elect those who could be more responsive to their needs.

Salibi claims Wakim's victory "appeared as a spontaneous expression of the political and social frustrations and anxieties of the Sunnite Muslim masses, whose sentiments were pan-Arab rather than radical, and who continued to regard the figure of the late President Nasser of Egypt as a symbol of their cause."⁹⁸ This contention, however, is misleading. The separation between "pan-Arab" and "radical"--whatever Salibi means by this second term--is a false one. If by "radical" he means anti-imperialist, surely "pan-Arabism" had a history of this at least since the 1950's. If on the other hand by "radical" he means comprehensive social reforms and major restructuring of the economy and politics, then indeed "pan-Arabism" qualified on this score decades ago: Nasser's mottos were "Freedom, Socialism, Unity". The Lebanese masses who gave their allegiance to Nasser were at the same time "radical" in terms of Lebanese politics. Their objective was to restructure the Lebanese polity and do away with confessionalism. And that certainly was not simply "pan-Arab".

The formation of the LNM in 1969 brought together a large coalition of anti-confessional parties which included Arab nationalists and Marxists.⁹⁹ These parties and organizations formulated a common program.¹⁰⁰

A civil war was fought in an attempt to implement this program. To separate "radical" and "pan-Arab" in the context of Lebanon in the period under question is to display one's misunderstanding of the Lebanese situation. Furthermore, if one were to accept such a separation of categories, one would be hard put to categorize, for example, the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party. Is the ABSP "pan-Arab" or socialist--"radical"? One last point: It is abundantly clear, although Salibi and others completely ignore it, that "pan-Arabism" or Arab nationalism and socialism cannot be identified with the Muslim masses or with Islam.¹⁰¹ This is so despite the fact that the majority of the Lebanese masses are Muslim. The motive force behind events in Lebanon has been the method by which the dominant classes elected to run the country, and the responses these methods engendered from the masses. The interaction between these two forces basically defined a whole historic epoch.

The LNM's ability to articulate the plight of the masses posed a threat to the powers that be as well as to the religious establishments of the various sects. The Shi'ite landlord class (Al-Asa'ad's, etc.) in the South, for example, was already losing its grip on the predominantly Shi'ite masses in the region. The communist party, the ABSP (Ba'ath) and others were gaining more popularity, especially in the border villages where the parties' cadre were defending the villages from Israeli raids.¹⁰²

In an attempt to counter this development, the Shi'ite religious establishment in the person of its Imam Musa As-Sadr began to take a different position from the Shi'ite landlord class. It stood to reason that As-Sadr had to have a progressive position vis-a-vis the Shi'ite masses if he were to remain influential among them. At a time of mass

impoverishment, continual Israeli raids, and strong allegiance by the Shi'ite masses to the Palestinian cause, the force of religion alone would have been unable to satisfy the needs of the population. As-Sadr, therefore, had to support what the LNM already articulated and what the masses believed should take place on the political and economic levels: specifically, sweeping reforms in the administration and the economy, arming the people on the border villages and unconditional support of official Lebanon to the Resistance.

As-Sadr, however, differed from the LNM in one major respect: he articulated the above changes in the social order along confessional lines; i.e., he wanted more participation for the Shi'ite sect in the affairs of the confessional state. Further, As-Sadr's demand for the defense of the border villages "placed ahead of the radical parties which were active in South Lebanon, and were eager to reap political advantage from the situation which had come to prevail there."¹⁰³ Salibi suggests that As-Sadr knew that the Lebanese state could not agree to such a demand. The strike and other political activities that the Imam engaged in catapulted him to the head of a Shi'ite movement (Movement of the Deprived) which he "saved" from the influence of the LNM.¹⁰⁴

The power bloc displayed a formidable alliance: Franjiyeh, Salam, Al-Asa'ad, Shamun, the LKP, the NBC and other individual deputies. The hegemonic fraction was the comprador bourgeoisie. The anti-regime opposition included the remnants of the Shihabist deputies led by Karami and Edde' with his NB. Other opposition to the regime came from outside the parliament. The most influential were Tueini and As-Sadr.

While Jumblat and his PSP were anti-Salam, until 1972 he had no major quarrels with the President personally.

The increasing strength of the Resistance and the increased frequency of Israeli raids further intensified the situation in Lebanon. The scandal over the purchase of Crotale surface-to-air missiles for the defense of Lebanese territory confirmed to the masses that the Lebanese state was not at all serious about enhancing its defense capabilities. On April 10, 1973, Israeli commandos struck in the midst of Beirut. Their major targets were three top Fateh officials (Adwan, Najjar and Nasser) who were assassinated in their Beirut apartments.¹⁰⁵ Demonstrations to protest the Israeli actions and the lax security measures by the state, especially when the commandos left unscathed, brought down the cabinet. Before his resignation as Prime Minister Salam asked for the dismissal of Army Chief Ghanem. This demand was refused by the President.¹⁰⁶

Franjiyeh called upon Amin El-Hafiz, a pro-Shihabist, to form a new cabinet. This was a clever move on the part of the President to appease the pro-Resistance opposition, who accepted someone sympathetic to the Resistance. Furthermore, there was no one of the traditional zu'ama willing or able to form a cabinet under the circumstances. A new face to the Premiership was the only choice.

The frequency of crises increased after April, 1973. As soon as El-Hafiz became Prime Minister, a group of five PDFLP guerillas was arrested near the U.S. Embassy. The guerilla organization abducted three Lebanese soldiers in an attempt to secure the release of the guerillas. This led to clashes with the Lebanese armed forces, who

first time. On May 18 the clashes ended with both sides--the Resistance and the Army--pledging to observe the Cairo Agreement. After much pressure from anti-regime forces, El-Hafiz finally resigned in June, 1973.¹⁰⁷ A major consideration in that pressuring was that the Muslim dominant class sectors in the social formation and in the power bloc wanted a stronger representation within the bloc. They sought that in the strengthening of the office of Prime Minister. In the interim, however, they wanted to be represented by a stronger prime minister than El-Hafiz. The President asked the Sunni Taqui-Ed-Din-El-Solh to form a cabinet.¹⁰⁸ In fact, the traditional zu'ama did not want the premiership to slip out of their hands or to go to a pro-Shihabist. El-Solh's cabinet satisfied their interests for the time being.

On another level, El-Solh's cabinet was a token move to satisfy most of the opposition. It included a progressive figure, Ali-Khalil, who was mandated to study the ways by which administrative reforms were to be carried out. The rest of the cabinet, which included the president's son, were traditional zu'ama or businessmen not interested in reforms.

While El-Solh's cabinet was capable of mending fences with Syria and the Resistance, its economic and local political problems soared.¹⁰⁹ In addition, the continual Israeli raids and the political and economic demands of the masses expressed in demonstrations and strikes drove the country deeper into crisis. The Muslim sector of the bourgeoisie seized upon this rising wave of popular demands to improve its position within the state machinery. This bourgeoisie called for more participation by Muslims on all state levels. These demands, as suggested earlier, also had the function of undercutting the LNM's anti-confessional stand,

thereby trying to maintain the confessional system.

While the dominant classes were bickering among themselves over their respective shares within confessionalism, the October, 1973 war elevated the entire struggle to another plane. To begin, Lebanon put its fuel supply and radar at the service of the Syrian armed forces. In addition Lebanon once more faced a bitter choice on the Arab level: either side with the advocates of a final settlement with the Israelis (which in effect meant accepting the U.S.-sponsored U.N. Security Council Resolution 338) or with those against the settlement (primarily Libya and Iraq).

The two components of the unrest within Lebanon at the end of 1973 were the domestic political and economic problems, and the larger regional issue.¹¹⁰ These two components were inseparable: those Lebanese social forces that fought against the Kissinger Middle East policies were the same forces that fought to amend the Lebanese labor law. The regional component also became one of the link-pins between the Resistance and the Lebanese masses. A major strata of the population (high school and university students) fought for social and political reforms and were also in support of the Resistance and against Kissinger-sponsored Middle East policies.¹¹¹

The November, 1973 Arab Summit meeting recognized that the PLO was the sole legal representative of the Palestinians. It further agreed that no peace would be negotiated with Israel unless the PLO were a direct party in it. The next Arab Summit of October, 1974 further strengthened the PLO's position when Hussein of Jordan was prevailed upon to relinquish his claims to the West Bank in favor of the PLO.¹¹²

As early as 1970 the right-wing parties and organizations such as

the LKP, PFN, Franjiyeh's militia and other lesser ones were arming themselves. By 1974 they were armed to the teeth. The PLO's strength and prestige now allowed LNM groups to arm themselves under the PLO umbrella (the state was the umbrella for the right wing). Most of the LNM groups, however, neglected to arm themselves as independent organizations. They simply relied upon the PLO "in case of fire".¹¹³ As we shall have occasion to see in later chapters, this policy was detrimental to the independent development of the Lebanese revolutionary forces and affected independent political and military decision making by the LNM.

The targeting of the Resistance by the right-wing groups was no accident. The LKP especially resorted to time-honored tactics of divide and conquer. It again tried to drive a wedge between the LNM and the Resistance and divide the latter into what it called "honorable guerilla action" and non-honorable.¹¹⁴ This was reminiscent of Hussein's ploy to divide the Resistance in Jordan. This time, however, the majority of the masses did not accept this distinction.

In 1974 the right wing and the state also sought to escalate hostilities through major armed clashes with the Resistance and the LNM. The most important clashes were: the July 29-30 clashes between the LKP and the Resistance; the August 21 Sidon incident where a policeman shot and killed a guerilla; and September 22 clashes between the LKP in Tarshish in the high Matn in Mount Lebanon.¹¹⁵ The trend was obvious. The LKP and the state were for a settlement that would do away with the Resistance. This had the added function of weakening the LNM and thus safeguarding the system.

When in late September, 1974, the LKP announced that it sought to

join mainstream Arab politics noone was impressed, not even the traditional Muslim bourgeoisie. Mainstream Arab politics meant the acceptance of the U.S.-sponsored policies for the region. This LKP decision came at the heels of an Arab tour by Jmayyil to Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.¹¹⁶ With this policy the LKP pitted itself against the Resistance (especially the Rejection Front¹¹⁷ that was formed at the end of 1973), the LNM and most of the Muslim Sunni and Shi'ite traditional zu'ama. The LKP became the strongest representative of Maronite bourgeois interests and as such remained allied with the PFN, Franjiyeh and the Maronite Order of Monks.

After about fourteen months in office Taqi-Ed-Din-El-Solh resigned the premiership in the face of a quickly-deteriorating situation. Franjiyeh asked Rashid El-Solh, a strong ally of Jumblat, to form a cabinet. The new cabinet included 18 members, with strong representation of Jumblat's PSP, the LKP and Shamun's PFN. The cabinet appointments allowed the President to weaken the traditional zu'ama since Rashid El-Solh was not a traditional zaim and certainly was new to the premiership. At the same time these appointments means that the LNM had a strong voice in the power bloc. Yet this power bloc was a curious one. The major adversaries in the social formation were represented. For the first time in the history of Lebanon an anti-system coalition, the LNM, was heavily represented in the cabinet. For the most part, however, the LNM did not comprise dominant class fractions in the social formation. Even Jumblat, who could be thought of as a traditional zaim, was a radical reformer who worked against confessionalism. However, he was capable of using his traditional support and position

for the benefit of bringing about a new social order. He in fact had distributed all of his land holdings and was only left with a house and a few acres of land. The power bloc was formed as a last resort to avoid systemic rupture and maintain unity and cohesion in the system.

This state of affairs was, however, a delay tactic. All parties in this curious power bloc in the cabinet and the parliament were aware that such an unnatural situation within the power bloc (i.e., the power bloc cannot maintain cohesion) could not last forever. It was obvious that all were jockeying for position; one group had to give in. In fact, the LKP--and the Hilf before it--was working to come to a point that would enable them to settle accounts with the LNM and the Resistance once and for all.

A settlement of the Arab-Israeli question was seen on the horizon. Franjiyeh was dispatched by the Arab Summit of 1974 to represent its participants at the U.N. and to urge the General Assembly to resolve the Palestinian question in a just manner. It seemed the only major opposition to the settlement were the Resistance and the LNM. The latter was seen by the pro-settlement Arab regimes as a potentially destabilizing force for the entire region. An armed LNM allied to the Resistance provided a potential model to be followed in the rest of the Arab world.

In January of 1975 Karami, Salam and Edde' formed what came to be known as the Tripartite Alliance (Tahaluf). The Tahaluf spelled trouble to the regime. Edde' attacked Franjiyeh, the LKP and Shamun, charging them with corruption. The Tahaluf also blamed the chaos in Lebanon on the regime. It also began to enhance its position in preparation for

the 1976 presidential elections.

On February 28, 1975, fishermen in Sidon demonstrated against the licensing of the Protein Company which allowed it to monopolize the fishing industry. The company was financed with Kuwaiti money and its chairman of the board was no other than the "anti-Arab" Shamun. The army clashed with the demonstrators, shot and critically wounded Ma'ruf Sa'd, the city deputy who was at the head of the demonstration.¹¹⁸ The traditional Sunni zu'ama seized upon this opportunity to call for El-Solh's resignation and for dismissal of the army chief. They further called for the reorganization of the army command to reflect equitable representation of Muslims and Christians. Jumblat supported these demands, which were opposed by Shamun and Jmayyil. Jumblat, however, backed El-Solh to remain as Prime Minister in the face of traditional zu'ama opposition. The LNM backed Jumblat on this point.

The death of Sa'd on March 6, 1975 made the reorganization of the army command a more pressing need.¹¹⁹ The Maronite right wing did not want to compromise at all. Having decided upon a shooting war with the progressive forces in Lebanon, it did not make sense to them to surrender to the opposition a major arm of the state--their state. The support given to the Maronite position from other Arab and foreign quarters strengthened their position and made them intransigent on the issue of the army command. Had they not decided on a shooting war they could have reached a compromise settlement with the Muslim bourgeoisie which could have strengthened their position vis-a-vis the LNM.

The conditions were ripe on all levels to bring about the apocalypse. Two major forces were already polarized: the LNM on the one hand and the Maronite right wing on the other. The other pro-system

forces were at various points between the two major contenders.

FOOTNOTES

1. H. Bassatt, "The Lebanese Economy--Problems and Solutions," Arab Studies (March, 1972), 39-40.
2. In general, "progressive" forces are those which are anti-confessional.
3. Comprador is that fraction of the bourgeoisie that is tied directly or indirectly to foreign finance and industry. Bankers and agents of foreign products, such as cars, are comprador.
4. M. C. Hudson, The Precarious Republic (New York: Random House, 1968), 149.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 150.
7. Ibid., p. 149.
8. Ibid., p. 151.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 150.
11. Abdo Baaklini, Legislative and Political Development: Lebanon 1842-1972 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1976) 145-147. See also Hudson, ibid., p. 163, fn 18.
12. F. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (The Middle East Institute, 1961), 22.
13. Hudson, op. cit., pp. 151-153.
14. Ibid., pp. 152-153.
15. Ibid., p. 153.
16. Ibid.
17. As used here, a class fraction cuts across religions lines; a class actor denotes members of a class who also belong to the same confession. The sector may include members of a class who belong to that class' different fractions.
18. See Chapter Three, pp. 45-49. Also pp. 54-59 for a discussion of the development of the services sector that favored the comprador

bourgeoisie in foreign and transit trade, banking and real estate that attracted foreign investments. These developments resulted in a coalition that included Jumblat (the reformer) and Shamun and Edde' (Maronite comprador) against the dominant landlord class fraction and the Khoury regime in general.

19. El-Solh was assassinated in Amman, Jordan, in 1951 by SNP members in retaliation for the execution of the SNP founder by Lebanese authorities.

20. Qubain, op. cit., p. 23.

21. Ibid., p. 22.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., p. 24.

24. Hudson, op. cit., p. 155.

25. Ibid., p. 156.

26. Ibid., pp. 152-153.

27. That the 1952 coup was a milestone in Arab politics is unquestionable. Nasserism emerged as the leading ideology in the Arab world. See, for instance, R. W. Baker, Egypt's Uncertain Revolution under Nasser and Sadat (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1978).

28. See, for instance, Qubain, op. cit., pp. 39-47.

29. Ibid., p. 37.

30. Leila Meo, Lebanon: Improbable Nation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), 102-103.

31. Qubain, op. cit., p. 49.

32. Ibid., p. 57.

33. Hudson, op. cit., p. 114.

34. Qubain, op. cit., p. 50.

35. Hudson, op. cit., p. 64.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., pp. 110-111.

39. See chapter three, pp. 59-62.

40. These Maronite interests were tied to the development of the services sector, especially foreign and transit trade, banking, real estate and tourism. This development accelerated under Shamun, who took advantage of the economic structures that already favored the comprador bourgeoisie.

41. J. P. Entelis, Pluralism and Party Transformation in Lebanon: Al-Kata'ib, 1936-1970 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), 175-176.

42. Ibid., p. 176.

43. The Arab Socialist Union in the United Arab Republic (UAR) was an arm of the state which at best was a quasi-party. At any rate, the ASU did not exist outside of the UAR where the pro-Nasser masses could gravitate towards it.

44. Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon and Tyre were the largest concentrations of the mass bases for the communist party, ABSP and the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM). Their bases were comprised mainly of students, professionals and small shopkeepers.

45. M. Suleiman, Political Parties in Lebanon (New York: Cornell University Press, 1967), 85-91.

46. Qubain, op. cit., p. 113.

47. Hudson, op. cit., p. 110.

48. Ibid., p. 155.

49. Ibid., p. 160.

50. Ibid., p. 145.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., p. 126.

55. Ibid., p. 161.

56. Baker, op. cit., p. 57.

57. See, for instance, E. Salam, Modernization Without Revolution: Lebanon's Experience (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973).

58. Hudson, op. cit., p. 95.

59. K. Salibi, Cross Roads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976 (New York: Caravan Books, 1976), 24.

60. Entelis, op. cit., pp. 159-173.

61. Salibi, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

62. Ibid., p. 26, pp. 24-25.

63. Ibid., p. 25.

64. Ibid., pp. 27-28.

65. Ibid., p. 28.

66. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is a Marxist-Leninist guerilla group with a large mass following. The PDFLP (D for democratic) and the PFLP-General Command are off-shoots of the main group with little or no mass base. The Sa'iqa is a Syrian-financed and controlled Palestinian guerilla group.

67. The battle of Al-Karameh was a turning point in the history of the Palestinian revolutionary movement. Yearly celebrations are held on its occasion.

68. This explains the reasons behind the upsurge in popularity of the Resistance in Jordan, Lebanon and elsewhere in the Arab world.

69. Most Palestinians in Lebanon lived in refugee camps all over the country. Three of these camps were overrun by the right-wing forces and the Syrians.

70. Entelis, op. cit., pp. 161-162.

71. Ibid., p. 162.

72. Ibid., p. 146.

73. Ibid., p. 162.

74. This is reminiscent of the LKP's stance in defense of Maronite bourgeois interests. The party's base is in Maronite Metn and Kisrwan districts of Mount Lebanon.

75. Entelis, op. cit., p. 162.

76. Salibi, op. cit., p. 39.

77. Entelis, op. cit., p. 168.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid., p. 169.
81. Ibid., p. 170.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid., p. 171.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Salibi, op. cit., p. 49.
88. Ibid., pp. 42-43.
89. Ibid., p. 44.
90. Entelis, op. cit., p. 209, fn 1.
91. Salibi, op. cit., p. 50-51.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid., p. 51.
94. Ibid., p. 55.
95. Ibid., p. 56.
96. Ibid., pp. 56-57.
97. Ibid., p. 61.
98. Ibid., p. 62.
99. INM, PSP, CP and OCA were major components of the LNM.
100. See chapter 7 for discussion.

101. The ideology of the ABSP (an Arab Nationalist party) clearly distinguishes and separates between Islam and Arab nationalism. See, for instance, M. Aflaq, Fee Sabeel Al-Ba'ath. It is significant to note that Aflaq, the founder-leader of the party, is a Christian. The party has many Christian cadre in all levels of leadership. Other nationalist parties, such as the ANM, have similar stances on the Islam question. Before the ANM's transformation into Marxist-Leninist groups all over the Arab world, George Habash (Christian), the PFLP leader, was its chairman.

102. K. Kahlil, "South Lebanon Between the State and Revolution," Arab Studies (February, 1975), 32.

103. Salibi, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

104. Shi'ite merchants and businessmen were the chief supporters of As-Sadr and were heavily represented on the Shi'ite Religious Council, which was controlled by the Imam.

105. Salibi, op. cit., p. 66.

106. Ibid., p. 67.

107. Ibid., p. 70.

108. Ibid., p. 71.

109. Ibid., p. 72.

110. For a discussion of the economic situation in the last several years before the Battle see chapter three, pp. 81-226. This situation was one of the major causes for the heightening of class conflict. Under Hilu and Franjiyeh problems of under-development were compounded by regional problems. It is important to note that the LNM mass base was mainly in the under-developed areas of the Biqa', the South and the North. The LNM had also a base in the slums of Beirut where migrants from the South resided. Traditional Muslim areas of Beirut also provided Arab nationalist components of the LNM (especially the INM) with a mass base. The ABSP was particularly strong in Tripoli. In the deep South and in the slum areas of Beirut, the Marxist components of the LNM were especially strong.

111. H. Barakat, Lebanon in Strife: Students Preludes to the Civil War (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977), 165-167.

112. Salibi, op. cit., p. 76.

113. Interview with PFLP official: January 2, 1979 (Kuwait).

114. Salibi, op. cit., p. 82.

115. Ibid., p. 80.

116. Ibid., p. 81.

117. Those Palestinian organizations that rejected the U.S. "solutions" to the Palestinian problem organized themselves in the Rejection Front. The PFLP and the ALF were its chief components.

118. Salibi, op. cit., p. 93.

119. Ibid., p. 95.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SYSTEMIC RUPTURE: THE RIGHT-WING OFFENSIVE

Many changes occurred on the political scene in the Lebanese social formation between 1943 and 1975. During this period anti-system parties were becoming more successful in their challenges of politics. In their efforts to transform the system these political parties were also utilizing the traditional political process. Since the state was a power center of the dominant classes, any erosion of their power was regarded as a threat to their state machinery. Actually, this meant that those classes which stood to lose from such threats, real or perceived, were compelled to oppose the LNM in a significant way. Given the actual Lebanese situation in early 1975, that significant way was nothing short of a well thought out, full-scale military offensive to successfully thwart this nascent progressive movement (the LNM) dead in its tracks.

The calculations for such an offensive were well thought out, coordinated and acted upon by the various components of the right-wing Maronite alliance. By 1975 the alliance had completed its preparations domestically, regionally and internationally. This was evident from the quality of arms with which the alliance equipped itself, as well as from the tour which its leader, Jmayyil, took to reactionary Arab countries. It was no secret that the alliance was supportive of the U.S.-sponsored Middle East settlement in the region. Nor was it a secret that the LNM and the Resistance were enemies to both this unholy

alliance and the pro-settlement regional and international forces.

With these formidable forces aligned against the loose LNM coalition and the fragmented Resistance, it seemed as if the alliance would have been capable of a swift victory. At the propitious moment, pro-system forces were transformed into agents of "system explosion".

This chapter discusses the development of the right-wing offensive, attempting to provide a framework for evaluating the responses of the LNM and the Resistance to this challenge. Strengths and weaknesses of the LNM will be assessed. This discussion will also consider the material conditions that led to the development of the LNM during the offensive and to its incorrect strategies in handling this offensive.

On April 13, 1975, LKP members ambushed a busload of Palestinians and murdered everyone on board. The massacre took place in the suburb of Ayn-al-Rummaneh where Jmayyil, the LKP boss, was attending the consecration of a Maronite church.¹

Having heard of the massacre, Palestinian units of the Resistance engaged the enemy all over Beirut and its suburbs. The result of the first three days of fighting was complete military supremacy of the Resistance.

The massacre triggered Arafat's call for the diplomatic intervention of other Arab countries to resolve the deteriorating relations between Lebanon and the Palestinians. On the night of April 13, the LNM met and decided to call for the expulsion of the LKP ministers from the cabinet and the banning of the LKP.² Due to the intervention of the Secretary General of the Arab League, Mahmud Riad, a cease-fire was arranged on April 16. The next day, however, sniper fire emanating

from LKP areas paralyzed economic activity in the city.³ It appeared that a concerted effort was being made to stop Beirut dead.

The Palestinian position on the bus event was clear. The Resistance wanted the LKP to hand in the seven members accused of the crimes. The Resistance also aided the security forces in eliminating the snipers, thus proving its willingness to search for a peaceful solution to the conflict.⁴ Jmayyil handed in two of the accused to the government. He responded to the Resistance's demand of delivering the others by saying that the judicial investigation must cover the whole event and not merely the bus episode. He went on to accuse Israel of creating the tense climate on April 13 which led to the bus episode.⁵ Previous clashes between the LKP and the resistance, and the LKP's general position on the Palestinian presence in Lebanon made it difficult for the LKP to convince others that it was innocent. The party's history and its conduct during the battle, as we shall see later on, point out fundamental reasons that brought about the bus episode.

As early as 1974, the LKP engaged the resistance in fire fights to create conditions where the state could conspire with the LKP and other right-wing militia in an all-out war with the Resistance. In April, 1975, the right-wing engaged the Resistance with the understanding that if the latter were defeated, the LNM would be easier to deal with. Another reason for these clashes was the correct reading by the right wing that the Resistance was divided over the issue of the Palestinian (mini) state. While the mini-state figured prominently in the designs of the Fateh (the major component of the PLO) and other lesser commando groupings, it was anathema to the Rejection Front.⁶ The right-wing calculation was that the PLO, and especially its leadership, would

moderate the conflict in such a way that would ultimately weaken the Rejectionists' position. In this way, the settlement forces could become supreme and the right wing would be able to re-establish its control over the Lebanese polity.

It also appeared that the right wing recognized that, although Syria was against the U.S.-sponsored settlement in the Middle East, it nevertheless was in favor of a settlement that would include its concerns. Furthermore, the PLO was aligned with Syria against this U.S.-sponsored settlement.

Three specific and distinct stands on the settlement issue became evident. The right wing identified with the U.S.-sponsored plan. The PLO and the Syrians were for a plan that would include them.⁷ The Rejection Front was against all plans that came up with partial solutions to the Palestinian issue, which it considered to be the crux of the Middle East dilemma.

The proponents of the first stand hoped that the elimination of the Rejectionists and the taming of the PLO through financial and military pressure would convince the PLO to join the Middle East settlement plan, especially if the result were perceived by the PLO to be some kind of state. These well-thought-out calculations did not reflect an extremely important consideration, which was basic to the success of any strategy: the conflict had to be fought out on Lebanese soil. What this meant in practice was that despite the PLO's favorable position on the mini-state, that position remained officially undeclared because of its unpopularity among the Palestinians, especially those in Lebanon and the occupied territories.⁸ The LNM and its mass base were solidly behind the Resistance. They also rejected, on the

Lebanese level, any separation within the Resistance. The popular slogan regarding Palestine among the Lebanese masses that comprised the LNM's spontaneous base was: "total liberation, a democratic state."

Any in-fighting among the Resistance groups under conditions of a right-wing offensive would have been condemned by the Lebanese spontaneous mass movement. Certainly it would have been condemned by the completely-mobilized Palestinian masses in the refugee camps.⁹

While certain elements in the Palestinian leadership were willing to come out against the Rejectionists, they were unable to do so openly. Instead, they opted for a "neutral" position: "What occurs in Lebanon is an internal affair, we do not want to be party to the conflict."¹⁰ A complement to this ideological expression was that "the enemy wants to divert our attention from the main goal [the liberation of Palestine]. It wants to drive us to a side battle."¹¹

While Fateh's (and the PLO's) neutral stance was dominant, there was much differentiation within its ranks that actually forced the leadership to enter battle at various times. April 13 was a case in point. Palestinian units spontaneously went on the offensive without waiting for orders from the high command. Arafat, the PLO chairman, was caught by surprise at the reaction of his own commando units.¹² He called upon the Arab governments to intervene in the matter.

The cease-fire of April 16 did not last long. The right wing engaged the Resistance once more. And once more the Resistance's retaliation was spontaneous and again its military supremacy was unquestionable. The situation began to go out of control on the political level as well. In one sense, the state as a power center began

to experience certain contortions. The LNM was in a strong political position, heavily represented in the cabinet, and with major anti-regime elements within the parliament aligned with the anti-system LNM against the extreme right wing. It proceeded to exploit this position by creating a systemic political and constitutional crisis in the hope that the LKP and its allies would, in the words of ex-president Hilu, "respect the rules of the game." The ideological underpinnings of such a tactic will be considered later on. But first consider the tactic.

The roots of the tactic were the actual decisions of the LNM to isolate the LKP from Arab politics and the state. This was a realization on the part of the LNM that if the LKP were pressured by the Arabs it would reconsider its options in dealing with its opponents. Once the first cease-fire crumbled, it was also necessary to practically isolate the LKP, the major right-wing actor, from Lebanese politics.

El-Solh's address to the parliament on May 15 was the form which the tactic took. The significance of this address was not that it accused the LKP and the Army Command of complicity and conspiracy, which it did, but that the Prime Minister enunciated a plan of action to resolve the problem through effecting reforms in the political system. In effect, the address articulated the same points that the LNM was raising: (1) reform of the election laws; (2) guarantee an even distribution of authority among the various offices [the Presidency, the Premiership, the Parliament Speaker]; (3) support the Palestinian question and defend Lebanon against Israel; (4) amend the Army Law, make the army answerable to the political authorities and

keep it separate from internal politics; (5) reform the naturalization law to alleviate the misery of those that this law segregated against; (6) progressive reform of the income tax structure to raise monies to finance social services and social and economic projects needed to carry out essential social and economic reforms.¹³

Fundamentally, in this address the Prime Minister announced his resignation. The social formation was now faced with a crisis on two levels: the first the extant conflagration, the second the incapacity of the system to deal with this, especially after the constitutional crisis that followed the resignation of the Premier.

The reform plan was extremely popular; not even the conventional Muslim establishment was against it. In point of fact, the plan proposed many areas of reform that were in concurrence with the Muslim establishment. Consequently, none of the Muslim politicians was willing or able to form a new cabinet should the President ask him to do so. Their first condition to the formation of a cabinet was an agreement by the President to institute reforms as articulated by El-Solh.

It soon appeared that the President had no recourse but to settle with the LNM and the conventional Muslim establishment. At that time this was the only rational way to resolve the constitutional crisis precipitated by El-Solh's resignation.

Given the military power of the LKP and the other right-wing parties, the state was in no position to maintain cohesion of the social formation when these right-wing political actors no longer had hegemony in the cabinet or the parliament. More importantly perhaps, the President, who occupied the most authoritative state position,

shared many of the views of the other right-wing parties. These major views had to do with the Palestinian issue and social and political reforms, especially those pertaining to the offices of the Presidency and the Premier. Further, the right wing was pressuring since April 20 to have the army intervene in the conflict. All these factors militated against any "traditional" solution to the crisis. Accordingly, the President opted for a non-conventional and potentially dangerous solution when he appointed a military cabinet headed by Brigadier Rifa'i.¹⁴

The formation of the military cabinet came against a background of events that included an LNM rally whose slogan was "no cabinet except that of the patriotic demands."¹⁵ It also came three days after the second round of fighting which started off in Dikwani (north of Beirut). When the cabinet was formed on May 23, the LNM declared a general strike with the objective of bringing the downfall of the military cabinet. May 24 followed with an Islamic conference that demanded that Rifa'i resign.¹⁶

The first Syrian initiative to mediate took place on May 24 when Khaddam, the Syrian Foreign Minister, and Defense Vice Minister General Jamil, arrived in Beirut. The military cabinet resigned on May 26 and the Syrians convinced Franjiyeh to ask Karami, the Tripartite candidate for the Premiership, to form a cabinet. Karami accepted the offer on May 28. However, both he and the LNM were adamant in their refusal to include the LKP in the new cabinet.¹⁷ Syria was instrumental in convincing the LKP to accept for formation of a cabinet without it being represented. The LNM also blocked all LKP efforts to include itself in the cabinet. The LNM then called for a

new National Pact to reflect the various changes and developments that had occurred in Lebanon in the last thirty years.¹⁸ The LNM also wanted to prevent any military officer from assuming the posts of Defense Minister or Interior Minister. Furthermore, it intended to bar the LKP from any future cabinet in an attempt to implement its decision to isolate the LKP from Lebanese politics. This last position did not sit well with the Muslim establishment, which wanted to leave its options open in regards to the LKP. When on June 1, 1975, Jumblat stated that this establishment had agreed with him on the last position, Salam, As-Sadr and others were quick to deny it.¹⁹

The crisis went on unabated with the LKP and Sadat of Egypt drawing closer together as a counterweight to Karami and his Syrian backers. On June 13, Arafat and Shamun met in an effort to facilitate the formation of the cabinet.²⁰

On June 15, Israel attacked the south (Arkoub and Nabatiyeh). These attacks coincided with isolated LKP attacks in Beirut which attempted to resume the fighting on a large scale to abort the formation of a cabinet that precluded LKP participation. The problem was compounded when the Syrian mediation efforts failed to reach a solution by June 17. The situation prompted Jumblat to meet with Asad in Damascus in an attempt to revitalize efforts to isolate the LKP from mainstream Lebanese and Arab politics.

The failure of the Syrian effort was a victory for the LKP, which further threatened to "Cypriotize" Lebanon--partition the country and internationalize the crisis through United Nations intervention--if it were not included in the cabinet. In an attempt to bring about a peaceful solution to the constitutional crisis, Arafat met with the

Lebanese President on June 24, four days after this LKP threat. The LKP, however, with the Israeli card in its favor, banked on a military solution to guarantee its participation in the cabinet and to sabotage the Palestinian role. To this end the LKP entered hostilities on June 24, attacking Chiyyah from its stronghold of Ayn-al-Rummaneh. This attack signified the beginning of the third round of fighting.²¹ The armed forces entered battle on the LKP side by helping to shell the LNM area of Chiyyah. The LKP followed these attacks by a visit to the President in an attempt to influence him in terms of the formation of the cabinet.

This LKP offensive forced As-Sadr to take action in opposition to it, in an attempt on his part to convince the predominantly Shi'ite area that not only the LNM but also the traditional Muslim establishment came to their defense. As-Sadr went into seclusion in the Amliyyah mosque and vowed not to come out until the LKP stopped its attacks on the Chiyyah area.²² On June 29, two days after As-Sadr's seclusion in another Shi'ite area, Karantina, where Marxist LNM and PFLP forces were powerful, decimated a right-wing offensive.²³

One day before the cabinet formation, Jumblat left for Egypt to consult with Sadat on the Lebanese situation. This visit was part of a series of meetings that Jumblat conducted with Franjiyeh, Asad, Khaddam, Kazem Khalil (the Vice-President of the PFN) and the Muslim establishment. The visit was also part of a tour that included Rumania. Despite the fact that some LNM fighters entered battle in support of the Resistance and to defend LNM areas, the LNM was still committed to a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Significantly, the Jumblat forces held back, as did most of the other LNM fighters.²⁴

On July 1, 1975, Karami formed his cabinet. He also assumed the post of Defense Minister. Shamun, the PFN chief, took the post of Interior Minister. The other members were: Osseiran, Taqla, Arslan and Tueini. One of the cabinet's first acts was to register 55 complaints against Israel with the U.N.

On the same day the cabinet was formed, the conflagration spread to the Biqa' region, and As-Sadr ended his seclusion to seek an end to the fighting in the Shi'ite town of Qa' in the Biqa'. On July 7, hostilities spread to the North when Tripoli and Zgharta entered into fierce fighting.

The entire month of July was also witness to intense Israeli raids. Several air strikes occurred on Palestinian camps all over Lebanon between July 7-13. Other raids took place on July 19 and 23. These were accompanied by intermittent explosions, kidnappings and killings, mainly in Beirut.²⁵

The LKP offensive on Karatina signaled a shift in the LKP portrayal of the Lebanese problem. Because of its insistence on entering the cabinet, its propaganda and fighting arm attacked those forces that were behind the decision to isolate it. These attacks were facilitated by the Israeli aids which occupied most of the Resistance forces, especially when these raids were targeted against all Palestinian camps in Lebanon.

The hostilities in the Biqa' and in the North were contained. Destabilization was mainly due to these Israeli raids. Cease-fire violations, however, were serious enough to threaten the peace. In fact, Jumblat predicted, as early as July 6, a new round of fighting.²⁶

With regards to the cabinet formation, it must be said at the outset that the non-participation of the LKP was at least a propaganda victory for Jumblat and the LNM. Matters, however, went deeper than that. The LNM was not represented and the LNM slogan regarding "the cabinet of patriotic demands" was not fulfilled. Furthermore, the right wing, despite the lack of the LKP participation in the cabinet, still emerged with a supreme position in the state. It had the Presidency, the Army Command, the Ministry of Interior and at least one other cabinet post (Arslan's). The rest of the cabinet posts were not overly sympathetic to the LNM. The Muslim establishment was very well represented by Karami.²⁷

The right wing was so powerful in the state that on July 15, the army ordered a curfew in the South, bypassing the Prime Minister. The right wing, through its state machinery, further exercised power by conducting mass arrests of LNM members in LNM areas. The following day, July 18, the LNM warned the state of the serious consequences the arrests might have. The LNM threatened to call for a general strike if its members were not released.²⁸

These tactics made it abundantly clear that the right wing was not interested in a peaceful solution to the crisis. Nor was it interested in effecting constitutional reform inimical to its interests. The fight to get the best deal in the cabinet was merely to enhance its position and its ability to "legally" utilize the armed forces and other state institutions to its benefit. This enhanced position would allow the right wing to utilize methods otherwise inaccessible in its dealings with international efforts to stabilize the situation in the country.

Under the circumstances, the only rational course open to the LNM at this time was a political resolution to the crisis. The LNM was militarily weak and its ally, the Resistance, though militarily strong, had opted for a diplomatic solution which was in concord with the Syrian policy initiatives for Lebanon. Furthermore, there was much conflict between major fractions of the Muslim establishment, the LKP and the PFN. This made the LNM feel that it could win the Muslim establishment to its side. The LNM also felt that in the long run, it could prevail upon the Muslim establishment through mass action to agree to the LNM's brand of reform. This was plausible, at least in theory, since the Muslim establishment relied on a mass base that was increasingly shifting to the LNM. In addition, other pro-system Maronites and Christians were anti-LKP. It was auspicious for the LNM to ally with these forces to isolate and weaken the most formidable right-wing force.

Arab politics also favored a solution where Karami became Prime Minister and where some reforms took place.²⁹ In point of fact, the result of all Jumblat's Arab politicking may be summed up in one sentence: "Lebanon needs a president who carries the thought of Shihab."³⁰ One is reminded that Karami was a Shihabist and also for some reforms of the political system. The fundamental reason, however, for the LNM's position, revolved around the specific makeup of the coalition. Diverse ideological commitments and rivalries made it extremely difficult for all LNM member groups to agree to the same policies. This explains in large part the passive resistance of the LNM during the first several months on the military front.

Since their first initiative in Lebanon, Syrian concern was to seek stability and keep away (or at least restrict) other Arab rivals (Iraq and Egypt, primarily) from intervention. To this end Syria convinced the Saudi Arabian government that with its special relationship to Lebanon, Syria could bring about a solution in Lebanon congruent with Arab politics, which sought a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli question.³¹

That Syria had a special relationship with Lebanon was beyond question. In more recent times and before the April 13 bus massacre, a summit meeting was held between Asad and Franjiyeh on January 7, 1975, at Shtura. A joint communique was issued that assured Lebanon of the readiness of Syria to support it militarily. The two countries also agreed to have political and military coordination between them. Syria followed this by a call on March 24 to all the Arab countries to join in a unified military command. Meanwhile, talks were underway between the PLO, the Syrians and the Lebanese government concerning the Syrian proposal of a joint Syrian-Palestinian leadership.³²

Syria's position in Lebanon was extremely strong. Indeed, Karami's appointment to form a cabinet was a triumph for Syria's policies. Stabilization occurred and reforms were guaranteed some success under Karami. The Israeli raids, however, had the potential for derailing the Syrian and Arab efforts to reach a comprehensive settlement for the Middle East congruent with Syria's interests. To counter the effects of these Israeli raids and to oppose Kissinger's step-by-step peace plans, Syria and Jordan formed a unified political-military committee on June 6, 1973.³³

Seeing that Arab politics was not in its favor, the LKP reverted back to tactics of rapprochement. The entire month of July and most of August saw diplomatic efforts by all the parties to the conflict to enhance their respective positions vis-a-vis each other. Israeli raids continued, which had the potential of sabotaging the Arab drive for a comprehensive settlement and enhancing the right-wing position, if only for the simple reason that such raids diverted Palestinian forces away from right-wing troops.

These right-wing tactics were not new. The LKP had earlier resorted to them when the need arose. As early as January 1, 1975, the LKP chief attacked the political and military work of the Resistance. This was contrary to his earlier divide-and-conquer tactic of "honorable" versus "dishonorable" Palestinian guerillas. A second verbal attack on the Resistance followed shortly while a third one came on February 20, 1975. These attacks, it seems, were part of the LKP strategy that eventually led to the April bus episode.

On April 23, 1975, the LKP was supported by the Permanent Conference of the Maronite Order of Monks, which warned of "the loss of the Lebanese character"³⁴ due to subversive ideologies. These ideologies, of course, meant Arab Nationalism and Communism.

When the LNM decided to isolate the LKP, the Maronite League attacked the decision on April 28. The LNM was successful, however, in isolating the LKP from the cabinet. The LKP accused the "extreme" left of working to subvert the system. However, El-Solh's resignation speech, in which he accused the LKP of sabotage, isolated the LKP even further.

The Resistance repeatedly declared its concern for Lebanese

sovereignty and the unity of the Lebanese, and in reciprocation, El-Solh, the Premier, emphasized Lebanon's concern for the Resistance on April 29, 1975. Franjiyeh also expressed his feelings about the Resistance's position on Lebanon and declared that there was no problem between the Lebanese authorities and the Resistance.³⁵

Having realized that it was isolated, the LKP softened its stance and began to talk of national unity. This was also a reaction to the LNM's call on July 13, 1975 to abolish confessionalism and reform the electoral law. The following day Al-Asa'ad called for the need for a new National Pact. These developments prompted Jmayyil, the accomplished anti-leftist, to declare that he distinguished between a "positive Lebanese left" and a "subversive international left".³⁶ On July 17, however, Jmayyil attacked the Resistance and those who dragged it into the fight to impose socialism on Lebanon.³⁷

The talk about national unity was crucial to the LKP and the right wing in general. They intended to counter the LNM's proposals and split the Muslim establishment and other pro-system forces that supported certain reforms proposed by the LNM. When the Assembly of Catholic Bishops called for national unity on July 22, Jumblat, who had recently arrived from a trip to North Africa, renewed the LNM's call to abolish confessionalism and develop the system. The Mufti (the Muslim religious leader), however, welcomed the bishops' statement. To counter the LNM's call for reform, the Maronite Monks called for a "comprehensive and conscious cultural revolution."³⁸ This incomprehensible statement was followed by the commencement of Muslim-Christian dialogue on July 31, at the suggestion of the President of the Maronite League.³⁹

The month of August witnessed increased Israeli attacks. Tyre was hit from land, sea and air on August 5. Two southern villages were hit on August 7, and still another, Yarine, was hit on August 11. These attacks came on the heels of Karami's visit to Damascus where Syria reaffirmed its commitment to the defense of Lebanon.⁴⁰

On August 13, the LNM discussed the final draft proposal it intended to present to the state dealing with the reform the the political system. The LNM's position was corroborated when, on the fifteenth, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch, Elias the Fourth, attacked the LKP, confessional privileges and the National Pact. On the same day the Nasserist member of the parliament, Wakim, called for the direct election of the President by the people and reform of the political system.⁴¹

Assessing that the situation was not favorable to it, the LKP called for "dialogue", the support of the Resistance and the respect of sovereignty and the Lebanese-Palestinian accords. The LKP "rejects the attempt to lure the party towards any conspiracy and calls upon the state to realize equality and be just to the deprived and that [the LKP] supports the struggle of the Palestinian people...".⁴²

On August 18, Jumblat announced the LNM's program for political reform. It called for a new Arab, patriotic and democratic Lebanon where confessionalism was abolished and basic human rights were protected. It also called for a new electoral law where Lebanon became one electoral district and every 10,000 citizen-voters were represented by one member of parliament. Other points in the program dealt with the rights of the President and other executive offices. They also specified a Supreme Defense Council and a Council of the Armed Forces

to limit the authorities of the Army Commander. The program also dealt with the separation of powers between the three branches of government and with administrative reforms.⁴³

While these events were taking place, Israel attacked Tyre on August 16, and in the Arkoub region, Maroun-el-Raass, Sidon, and other areas of the South on August 19. Other attacks followed the next day on Biqa' and the town of Sirghaya on the Lebanese-Syrian borders.⁴⁴ Meanwhile, Sadat of Egypt attacked the Resistance on August 21. As he put it, he feared for "the Resistance's future in Lebanon, if its positions remained contrary to the general Arab position."⁴⁵ He further suggested the transfer of the PLO headquarters from Beirut to Cairo. On that day Kissinger arrived in the Middle East. Talks between Israel and Egypt were held on the following day. On August 24 rallies were held in Beirut and other areas of Lebanon to protest the partial Sinai agreements. On August 27, Israel called for an end to the Resistance's activities in Lebanon.⁴⁶

On August 23, the LKP sent a memorandum to Franjiyeh and to the Maronite Patriarch calling for the secularization of the state as a basis for the abolition of confessionalism. The LKP sought to accomplish two major goals with the sending of the memorandum: the first was to project itself to the Lebanese that it too was for secularization; the second was to counter the LNM reform program, which specified that the first step towards complete secularization was reform of the electoral law to do away with confessional representation in parliament. The first step would also abolish confessionalism from the army, the civil service and the local government, while leaving the offices of

President and Premier to be reformed in a second stage. It appeared that the LKP was more radical than the LNM because it was for total secularization of the state all in one step. The choice as far as the LKP was concerned was either its suggestion would be followed or no secularization could occur in Lebanon.⁴⁷

Meanwhile, Israeli land and air attacks and shelling occurred on August 25, followed by other attacks on August 28 on the town of Bourgholiyyah. Tyre was also shelled on August 29, and Kfarshouba was attacked on August 31.⁴⁸

The fourth round of fighting began on August 28 because of the deteriorating situation in the Biqa'. Suddenly the right wing began to talk about the partition of Lebanon.⁴⁹ In opposition to partition, Edde', the prominent Maronite leader declared: "A Christian Lebanon will be a second Israel."⁵⁰ Edde' had opted for a unified Lebanon with some reforms that would not drastically change the political system. He and the Maronite Patriarch were considered to be "doves" whereas the Maronite "hawks" were Jmayyil, Ak1, Shamun and Kassiss (the Maronite Order of Monks).

The events that followed the formation of the Karami cabinet and which culminated in the outbreak of violence on a large scale on August 28 proved that a political solution was neither desirable nor practical for 'the Maronite right wing. This right wing was not prepared to share Lebanon with other reform-oriented groups. It seemed that the LNM was cognizant of this fact, yet it kept pursuing a political solution. Aside from the reasons that were given earlier as an explanation of the LNM position, fundamental reasons will be discussed in some detail.

It must be stated at once that the LNM was formed as a coalition in reaction to the right-wing attacks on the revolutionary movement in 1969. The LNM comprised diverse ideological groups with allegiances to various countries and/or classes. The major categories within the LNM were: (1) the pro-Syrian groups; (2) the independent Lebanese group; and (3) the pro-Iraq groups. The Ba'ath Party Organization (BPO), the Union of Working Peoples' Forces (UWPF--one of four Nasserist organizations), and As-Sadr's Movement of the Deprived (MD) belonged to the first category. The PSP (Jumblat's), the major SNP group (Ra'd's), the Communist Party (CP), the Organization of Communist Action (OCA), the Arab Socialist Action Party (ASAP), the Independent Nasserist Movement (INM) and two other Nasserist movements belonged to the second category. The third category was the Arab Ba'ath socialist Party (ABSP).

Each of the categories displays ideological variations within it. This kind of categorization is valid, however, for the following reasons. (1) Groups in the first category remained allies throughout the war. They consistently supported Syria and at one point split from the LNM to form their own front. (2) The second set of groups was not under the direct or indirect influence of any country. They took positions on issues guided by their own analyses which at times coincided with Syria's strategy and at times did not. More importantly, however, unlike the groups of the first category they were the authors of the LNM "minimum program".⁵¹ (3) The ABSP is not included in the second category only to reflect the fact that it was heavily supported by Iraq, where the all-Arab National Command of the party has its headquarters. Major strategies and directives emanated from the Command.

The ABSP, however, had policy positions close to the PSP and the CP. Some of its leaders were also special envoys of the LNM to Europe and other places. The party was also among the authors of the "minimum program". (4) Finally, a categorization by ideology which is abstracted from the concrete conditions of Lebanon would: (a) lump all the Nasserist organizations together disregarding their different positions vis-a-vis Syria to the detriment of the analysis; (b) include the ABSP and BPO together, disregarding the glaring animosities between the two wings of the Ba'ath; (c) not know how to categorize the PSP and the SSNP--the first is strictly Lebanese but pro-Arab while the other is Syrian Nationalist with Marxist undertones; and (d) have to include the CP, OCA and ASAP together as Marxist-Leninists rather than as independent Lebanese parties in the sense that the term was used above. The difficulty with this categorization is that these Marxist-Leninist parties have different positions on Arab nationalism and Arab politics in general.⁵²

The presence of pro-Syrian components within the LNM certainly influenced the course of action that the LNM took, especially in relation to participation (or lack of it) in the Karami cabinet. Since the various LNM components did not fully prepare themselves militarily for the battle, the LNM had to rely upon Syria for supplies. This weakness precluded any serious thinking about an all-out offensive against the right wing.

The CP and the OCA, although they were for reform in Lebanon along the lines spelled out in the "minimum program", shared the same views as the Syrians and the Resistance on the Middle East settlement. An offensive against the right wing at that time would have upset Syria's

calculations for a settlement opposed to Kissinger's step-by-step negotiations. A quick and peaceful solution, they reasoned, must be sought for Lebanon while efforts were to be made to effect peaceful change in Lebanon. Diplomacy and Arab pressure, they felt, were enough to convince the right wing to reconsider its methods. The capacity of the right wing and Israel to sabotage any attempt to reach a peaceful solution was apparently overlooked by this analysis.⁵³

The PSP also looked for a peaceful solution on the grounds that the majority of the political forces and people in Lebanon were in favor of reform and in support of a pro-Palestinian policy. The main strategy to reach such a solution was to apply maximum pressure on the right wing to give up its military options. As with the CP and the OCA, the PSP did not realize that the right wing reached the point of no return and that any pressure against the Maronite right wing would be eased by Israeli military action and by the inconsistencies of Arab politics, which the right wing was skilled in exploiting.

The fourth round of fighting proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that the LNM, if it were to implement its reforms, must smash the right wing militarily. The "fear" of Israeli raids or intervention if a military solution were pursued was the for the most part unjustified. Lebanon was already experiencing almost daily attacks on its southern borders and heavy Israeli incursions deep into its territory. Because of these attacks, Jumblat had in fact called for the shelling of Israeli settlements as a retaliation for the destruction of Lebanese villages by Israel.⁵⁴

The few parties within the LNM that called for a tougher military

stance against the right wing were over-ruled in practice. All the parties, save the pro-Syrian groups, were in agreement on the nature of the Lebanese system and its conservative establishment. What separated them, however, was the manner of effecting change.⁵⁵ Indeed, these months were the reflections of the actual ideologies (labels aside) of the parties and organizations that comprised the LNM.

The fourth round of fighting continued in September. On the first of the month, major clashes occurred in Zahlah. In addition to continued fighting in Zahlah on September 2, fighting erupted in Tripoli and Zgharta in the North, and it intensified on September 4. On September 9, Beirut exploded and by then the fighting raged all over Lebanon. Concurrently, Israel conducted air strikes against Hsbaya on September 2 and against Tyre on the following day. Israel also attempted a naval landing at Sidon on the following day.⁵⁶

Meanwhile, the right wing pressured Karami to use the army in the conflict, and in fact, he called upon the army to intervene on September 3. Jumblat, who had already called the day before for the resignation of the cabinet because it was unable to keep the peace, intensified his attacks against the state for its use of the army. To appease the LNM, the President dismissed Army Commander Ghanem on September 10, and appointed Hanna Sa'id in his place.⁵⁷

On September 15, Jumblat announced that without reform it was impossible to bring an end to the fighting. This announcement was countered by the Maronite League, which declared that the source of the problem was an Israeli creation.⁵⁸ The League was implying that if it were not for the Palestinians in Lebanon, there would have been no fighting and thus, reforms unneeded.

The September fighting resulted in the complete destruction of Beirut's commercial district and its city center. In an attempt to prevent any further damage, the cabinet formed a reconciliation committee. The PLO, which since September 9 had announced that it did not wish to be involved in the fighting, was instrumental in the reconciliation efforts. Arafat met on September 19 with the traditional leaders Yafi, Salam, Karami and Mufti to discuss reconciliation.⁵⁹ The next day Jmayyil threatened to internationalize the crisis. To further complicate matters, the LKP set up a clandestine radio station to propagandize its cause.

The LNM's pressure against the state and Arafat's efforts with the traditional leaders bore fruit. On September 24 the combatants agreed to discuss their differences in the newly-formed National Dialogue Committee (NDC).⁶⁰ The following day the NDC met in the presidential palace where Khaddam, the Syrian Foreign Minister, attended the conclusion of its meeting. The NDC met nine times altogether; its last meeting was held on November 14, 1975. On October 13, 1975, the NDC decided to form three subcommittees for political, economic and social reforms, respectively. The most important of these was the political reform committee, which altogether had six meetings; the first was held on October 16 and the last on November 14, 1975.⁶¹

The NDC consisted of twenty members, most of whom represented the various fractions of the dominant classes in Lebanon: Yafi, Salam, Edde', Taqla, Jumblat, Jmayyil, Shamun, Tueini, Al-Asa'ad, Arslan, Osseiran, Rabbat, Khalaf and Qansu.⁶² The last two plus Jumblat were the LNM representatives. The representation was along confessional lines, which was protested by the LNM. However, the LNM agreed to

enter the committee after registering its reservation pertaining to the committee's makeup. The LNM's main concern at that time was to begin dialogue to effect change.⁶³

The first meeting was typical of the rest of the meetings in all committees and subcommittees, and it set the tone for the rest of the meetings. Two major trends were evident in the NDC. Jumblat and the traditional leaders (Muslim and Christian) save for the LKP and PFN representtives (Jmayyil and Shamun, respectively) were for constitutional changes and other reforms. The LKP and PFN were for no reform whatsoever. In the first meeting Jumblat presented the "minimum program" of the LNM while Salam and Yafi advanced the need for constitutional change to reflect the demographic changes that had occurred in Lebanon over the three decades. Yafi and Salam were referring to the Muslims being the majority in the country.⁶⁴ Jmayyil would not hear of any change:

The present Lebanese framework is one that safeguards our national unity and it is the successful framework.

Further,

With regards to amending the constitution we in the LKP are against this discussion, and if there is insistence upon it I will allow myself not to attend the meetings...

My basic observation is that the Lebanese Muslim holds on to the present Lebanese framework [confessionalism?], as for other thoughts [on changing the political system] they are imported either from some Arab system or inspired by Israeli conspiracies.

As for social justice, it cannot be through slogans. And we created in Lebanon which has no petroleum, a national economy that guarantees for the citizen the highest levels. And it might require development, but not change.⁶⁵

A study of Lebanon's politics and economics clearly shows the above statements to be pure rhetoric. More importantly, perhaps, is that these statements reflect what could generally be termed the political thought of the Maronite right wing.⁶⁶ And certainly it would be rational to assume that the LKP was not interested in dialogue to bring about reform. In point of fact, each time that the NDC or its political reform subcommittee raised the question of reform, Jmayyil took exception to it and instead raised the issue of law and order as a requirement that must be met before any dialogue could take place.⁶⁷ In essence, that meant that the LKP was against any peaceful solution and did not want any compromise. From the outset the right wing, which was cornered into accepting participation in the NDC, was probing for ways in which to undermine the NDC. On September 30 a massacre was committed in an LKP stronghold against Palestinian Christians living in Ayn-el-Rummaneh. The crime sabotaged the NDC's third meeting.⁶⁸

On October 8, fighting erupted all over Lebanon and Karami threatened to resign if the fighting did not stop. The following day the Permanent Conference of the Order of Monks issued a statement rejecting the efforts of the NDC. Franjiyeh was also against the NDC, especially when it was dealing with constitutional amendments to limit his powers as President, and when some of its members (Salam and Edde') were calling for his resignation.⁶⁹

The LKP began to agitate for the Arabization of the crisis.⁷⁰ The party was aware that the NDC was heavily influenced by the Syrian position which concurred to varying degrees with those of the LNM and the pro-system forces that were in opposition to the Maronite right wing. The LKP hoped that the direct involvement of other Arab

countries would counterbalance Syria's influence in such a way that the LKP would be able to legitimize its efforts against the LNM. Furthermore, the party, in dealing a heavy blow to the LNM and the Resistance would have weakened the anti-settlement forces in the region. This line of thinking, of which the LKP's opponents were aware, prompted them to reject and work against Arabization. Qansu of the BPO announced that "no Arab country has the right to intervene in Lebanon except Syria."⁷¹

The right wing continued its efforts to sabotage the NDC. On October 14, the Maronite League and the Maronite Order of Monks issued a joint memorandum which they delivered to Franjiyeh, rejecting any dialogue before Lebanon could regain its sovereignty (this referred to the Resistance's presence in Lebanon).⁷² This statement was in support of Jmayyil's position in the NDC. The communique included another important feature: it called for the internationalization of the crisis. On October 16, Jmayyil came out in full support of the communique. This was significant in that it showed that the Maronite right-wing components were in agreement on the NDC and on internationalization. It appeared that Jmayyil agreed to internationalization after his version of Arabization failed when the Conference of Arab Foreign Ministers failed to reach any decision on Lebanon in its meeting of October 15.⁷³

A fifth round of fighting began on October 19 which paved the way for the LKP to withdraw from the NDC. In an attempt to block internationalization, Jumblat met with Asad and they both stated that Syria and the LNM had been successful in preventing the partition of Lebanon, and both were against the internationalization of the crisis. Two days

on October 23, Karami attacked the President and Shamun, and insisted that the army must not get involved in the fighting. Karami was supported by the Lebanese Islamic summit meeting in Aramoun. The presence of Arafat and Jumblat in that meeting, which took place on October 25, showed that the Maronite right wing was alone in its demand to involve the army in the fighting.⁷⁴

In Beirut, a new front was opened when the battle of the hotels started on the day of the Aramoun summit. During the next two days fierce fighting raged all over Lebanon with reports that the army, acting on orders from Shamun, was assisting the right-wing forces. The LKP and the other right-wing forces, however, were defeated on all fronts, especially in Beirut.⁷⁵

Karami went into seclusion on the Sarail (the Cabinet's headquarters) where he formed a security committee in an attempt to stop the fighting. The next day, October 29, Karami arranged a cease-fire which held in Beirut and other areas except in Zahlah. Apparently, the right wing agreed to the cease-fire because, among other things, it meant that the LNM would pull out from positions it captured in the fighting.⁷⁶

By November 4, available Lebanese security forces reports indicated that the LKP violated the cease-fire on various occasions.⁷⁷ On the same day the complicity of the Army Command with the right wing became clear when a huge ship loaded with arms docked at the Acqua-Marina in Junieh, the right-wing makeshift capital. The ship was unloading arms in plain view of the army. Furthermore, the ship could not have entered port without the army having been aware of it.⁷⁸

On November 12, the political reform subcommittee agreed to

abolish confessionalism from the civil service, the judiciary, and the armed forces. In addition, confessionalism was to be abolished from the electoral laws. It was further agreed that reference should not be made to the higher offices (the Presidency, the Premiership, the House Speaker) since the constitution did not include statements that indicated the confessions of the people who could fill these offices.⁷⁹ In fact, only the National Pact specified that the President must be Maronite and the Premier Sunni Muslim.

Edmond Rizk, who was substituting for Jmayyil, was in agreement with these points, proposed in an extended meeting that included representatives of all the parties to the conflict. The sixth meeting of this subcommittee, which took place on November 14, confirmed the agreements reached in the previous meeting. The meeting, however, was not attended by the LKP representative while two other members, Rabbat and Salam, sent word that they were unable to attend. The meeting was also attended by other NDC members.⁸⁰

The following day the extended meeting to discuss the agreements which were reached in the fifth meeting of the Political Reform subcommittee of November 12, was held. Jmayyil and Shamun, who were present there, opposed the recommendations of the subcommittee.⁸¹

The ninth meeting of the NDC, held on November 24, was dominated by Jmayyil and Karami: Salam used it to accuse the Interior Minister, Shamun, and the President, of being responsible for the continued crisis. Both of these people, he argued, had private armies at their disposal which were fighting with the Maronite right wing. The meeting ended with a major squabble as to the responsibility of the President for the continued crisis. This too was the end of the NDC period.⁸²

The demise of the NDC was related to concentrated international efforts to end the crisis. As was mentioned earlier, the right wing had opted for internationalization while the LNM and Syria were trying to combat these actions.⁸³ On November 12, the Greek Orthodox representatives clarified to the Papal Envoy, who arrived in Beirut three days earlier, the need for change in the political system, for dialogue and the need to support the PLO.⁸⁴ This was followed by a U.S. announcement opposing partition. Couve de-Murville, the French Envoy, also came out against partition while Edde', on November 20, attacked right-wing schemes that were designed to partition the country.⁸⁵ Edde' was followed by Jumblat, on November 25, who attacked the President and Shamun and asked for their resignation.⁸⁶ The following day U.N. Secretary General Waldheim arrived in Beirut, where he declared that the solution was in the hands of the Lebanese, who must avoid any foreign intervention.⁸⁷ The right-wing plan began to crumble when Couve de-Murville supported Syria's efforts in Lebanon and suggested that some reforms were needed in the political system. The following day, November 28, Shamun presented Couve de-Murville with a partition plan while Karami began to prepare a plan for reform to bring about stability.⁸⁸ The LNM agreed to Karami's proposals but warned that the plan should not be at the expense of diluting the essence of the crisis.⁸⁹

A part of the plan called for expanding the cabinet. On November 30, the President did expand it. The LNM regarded this move as an effort to dilute the essence of the crisis by making it seem as if it were a squabble over the number of cabinet seats. For this reason the LNM demanded that reform should precede the cabinet expansion. The

Sunni Muslim summit meeting on November 5 at Karami's residence advised him to work for reform before enlarging the cabinet.⁹⁰

An important development began to take form within the LNM during this period. Differentiation began to occur between the pro-Syrian component and the rest of the components of the LNM regarding the method of dealing with the attempts at internationalization. Jumblat was of the opinion that the rest of the Arabs must aid in pressuring the right wing and other countries to relinquish attempts to internationalize the conflict. Furthermore, Jumblat attacked Karami when the former arrived from an Arab tour on December 4, for not consulting with him before deciding upon enlarging the cabinet. When the LNM rejected expanding the cabinet, Qansu of the pro-Syrian BPO lauded Karami's cabinet decision.⁹¹ It appeared that the Syrians wanted to assure the LKP that a solution to its liking could be achieved without resorting to international efforts. It also seemed that this was a clever move by Syria, which could convince the LKP of cooperating with it especially when the foreign envoys were against partition and foreign intervention.⁹²

The LKP was quick to pick up on Syria's intentions which became clear when Asad extended an invitation to Jmayyil to visit Damascus on December 6. In Damascus Jmayyil announced that the cooperation of Syria and Lebanon was a "safety valve" to the two countries.⁹³ Meanwhile, Asad informed Yafi (who was visiting Damascus) that Jmayyil gave guarantees to Syria that the LKP was in favor of the expansion of the cabinet. The expansion of the cabinet signaled the beginning of cooperation between Franjiyeh and Karami, who were at odds with each other up until late November. The LKP gave Asad assurances that

it would work in support of the Karami-Franjiyeh cooperation.⁹⁴

The Syrian decision to invite the LKP was an affront to the LNM, who had been working to isolate the party from Arab politics. The LNM took exception to this move, especially when the LKP was involved on December 6 in what came to be known as Black Saturday. That day LKP party members killed 70 innocent civilians and kidnapped 300 others from various LKP checkpoints in Beirut. On December 7 the LNM demanded that the state must put the LKP on trial for these atrocities.⁹⁵

The period of December 8-13 witnessed heavy fighting all over Lebanon and the LKP was retreating in the face of LNM attacks on all major fronts, especially in the hotel areas. On December 10 Franjiyeh accused "the left and Zionism" for what had been happening in Lebanon. This accusation drew heavy fire from the LNM and other pro-system leaders who accused Franjiyeh of demagoguery.⁹⁶ The LKP shelled residential quarters in LNM-held areas on December 11 to ease pressure on its fighters in Beirut.⁹⁷ The LNM, however, kept its offensive going until a cease-fire was negotiated and took hold on December 14.

To further counter LKP efforts to sabotage the LNM's efforts to reach a settlement through peaceful means, Jumblat visited Damascus on two occasions in an attempt to convince Asad not to cooperate with the LKP. Jumblat also tried to convince Asad of the need to reform the political system along the lines specified by the LNM.⁹⁸

Back in Lebanon, Jumblat accused the President of violating the Constitution by siding with the right-wing forces. Jumblat also demanded the President's resignation. On December 19 General Ash-Shihabi, the Syrian Envoy, met with Franjiyeh, Shamun, Jmayyil, Karami, Salam, Yafi, As-Sadr and Arafat in an attempt to reconcile the conventional

zu'ama with each other. The PLO's position was reflected by Arafat's meeting with these conventional zu'ama and it was echoed the following day in Kuwait by another PLO top official, Abu Iad, who announced:

"The Resistance needs no victory nor defeat in Lebanon. We respect our committment towards the government...We will prevent partition."⁹⁹

This position was in congruence with Syria's position on Lebanon.

On December 20, the Governor of Northern Lebanon, a PSP member, was assassinated. The incident touched off a fight between Karami and Franjiyeh in which the former accused the latter's militia of engineering the assassination. The next day Karami left for Damascus to consult with Asad. The Maronite Order of Monks came out in support of the President against Karami and declared that there was a "Sunni" danger to Lebanon, and further accused the Palestinians of fomenting trouble. Furthermore, the Order announced that the best solution was to go back to the old Lebanon (Mount Lebanon). The Order also expressed these desires to de-Murville when it declared to him that independence was a joke and that the only solution was the state of Mount Lebanon.¹⁰⁰

Jmayyil followed the Order by rejecting Arabism and threatening to work for partition if a "no victor/no vanquished" solution were not found. He further accused "international communism" of creating trouble.¹⁰¹ These right-wing moves came on the heels of a statement by Edde' from Washington, D.C. on December 20, in which he accused Zionism of having a plan to create confessional states in the region. Edde' followed these statements by accusing the U.S. on December 27 of being behind plans to partition Lebanon.¹⁰² In Jumblat's opinion, however, the right wing wanted to dilute the patriotic demands for reform

by threatening to bring about partition if a "no victor/no vanquished" solution were not adopted.¹⁰³

Having failed to achieve its goals so far, the right wing resorted to the old tactic of Arabizing the crisis. It hoped once more that Arabs would be able to help it defeat the LNM and the Resistance, which Syria wanted only to contain. The Order of Monks called for a federated state. Saudi Arabia took a position against partition and Arabization of the conflict and declared that any Arabization would have to be through Syria's efforts.¹⁰⁴ Meanwhile, Edde' warned of another round of fighting in the making which would enhance the right-wing position in any future negotiations. He was referring to the right-wing plan to attack and occupy LNM areas that would give the former the geography of partition.

Indeed, the right-wing offensive began on January 4, 1976, with sniper fire and kidnappings in Beirut and a concentrated attack by the LKP and PFN troops on Tal-ez-Za'tar.¹⁰⁵ Fearful of a serious attempt at partition by the right wing, Syria's Foreign Minister Khaddam announced that "Lebanon was a part of Syria and we will get it back in any partition attempt; either it will remain unified or goes back to Syria."¹⁰⁶ This statement prompted Jmayyil and Shamun to attack Khaddam.

Meanwhile, on January 7, Jumblat left for Saudi Arabia and upon his return declared that the Saudis were against partition. On that day the fighting spread all over Beirut, the North, Biqa' and to parts of the Mountain. On January 9, Shamun ordered the army to fight the LNM, especially in the Biqa'. All the Lebanese except the Maronite

right wing protested the measures that called upon the army to openly take sides in the conflict. The LKP, however, demanded more involvement by the army against the LNM.¹⁰⁷

Israel issued several statements in January in which it warned that it could not remain on the sidelines and watch "Muslim power" grow or any outsider intervene in Lebanon. On January 10, Rabin of Israel issued a similar warning which was designed to counter Khaddam's announcement on the annexation of Lebanon to Syria.¹⁰⁸ On the same day Sadat of Egypt supported Shamun against Syria on the issue of annexation.

Khaddam accused Shamun of cooperating with Israel to bring about partition. He further claimed that Shamun had presented Syria with a partition plan which Syria rejected.¹⁰⁹ On January 11, the LKP surrounded the Palestinian camp of Dbayye. This move was part of the escalation that the right wing was seeking. The camp was the smallest one in Lebanon and was in the midst of LKP territory 15 miles north of Beirut. Any partition plan would have had to call for its surrender.

In an effort to ease the pressure on the camp which was militarily indefensible, the Combined Forces (the LNM and the Resistance now under one command) attacked on many fronts in Beirut and the South primarily, and were able to advance against LKP and other right-wing positions. The Resistance clearly saw that the right wing was working to partition the country. Since partition was against the Resistance's policies, it went with full force to try to put an end to it. The Combined Forces reoccupied the hotel areas from which the LNM had withdrawn under the stipulations of the last cease-fire, and occupied the strategic Beirut bridge linking Beirut with Mount Lebanon. The Combined

Forces also occupied some Beirut suburbs which were under LKP control where pockets of Palestinian and pro-LNM population existed, such as Tal-ez-Za-tar and Naba'h.¹¹⁰

The Combined Forces also surrounded Damour in the South and occupied Mishrif, Na'meh and other areas along the coast south of Beirut. The offensive appeared to blunt the right-wing offensive.¹¹¹ However, the lonely Dbayye camp fell on January 14 to LKP and PFN fighters who were aided by the Army.¹¹² This right-wing victory came one day after its summit which issued a statement that the struggle was with the Palestinians. On January 15 the LKP and PFN attacked Karantina, another LNM area in the midst of right-wing territory of Beirut, which was a threat to the LKP-held port of Beirut and other strategic LKP facilities. As with Dbayye, Karantina had to be occupied to effect partition.

Jumblat warned that the LKP would commit atrocities against the population if it were allowed by capture Karantina. Arafat met with Arab ambassadors in Beirut while the Lebanese Islamic summit meeting in Aramoun warned that the army might split if the Army Command aided the LKP in Karantina.¹¹³

The LKP shrouded its offensive with a diplomatic smokescreen when it called, on January 16, for an Arab "initiative" to solve the crisis. On the next day the Arab ambassadors met with Karami and Franjiyeh and informed them that the Arabs supported the Syrian initiative.¹¹⁴ The LKP's efforts to Arabize the crisis failed. The failure prompted the LKP to take the issue to the U.N. On January 18 the LKP and PFN troops entered Karantina after fierce fighting. The Karantina residents were evicted in buses and were sent to the West

side of Beirut. The result of the Karatina takeover had given the right wing the geography of partition.¹¹⁵

On January 19 the fighting intensified all over Lebanon, and a division of the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) stationed in Syria crossed the border into Lebanon from the Biqa' and the North with heavy equipment.¹¹⁶ Without any previous official consultation with Jumblat or the LNM, the Resistance's leadership gave orders to the Combined Forces to overrun all right-wing areas south of Beirut.¹¹⁷ The offensive was led by Abu Moosa, the Fateh commander in the South. On January 20 all the right-wing positions fell, including Damour and Sa'diyyaat, where Shamun fled from his palace by army helicopter.

On the same day Shamun called for the internationalization of the crisis. Jumblat replied that internationalization would not work because the international community would support the LNM.¹¹⁸ On that day too, the right wing held talks that sought the unification of its military forces which included the LKP, PFN, Cedar Guards and At-Tanzeem, among others.¹¹⁹

Around the middle of January, many army units that despised the complicity of the Army Command with the right wing began to withdraw from the army to form the Lebanese Arab Army (LAA) under the command of lieutenant Ahmad Khateeb.¹²⁰ This development, plus the victories of the Combined Forces, convinced the right wing to lay low and negotiate with its opponents. The Syrians, who gave their blessings to the Combined Forces offensive in the South, renewed their initiative of January 16 that was halted by the right-wing offensive. The right wing (now that it had tried almost everything to block the Syrian

initiative) tried to win what it could diplomatically, hoping that having the geography of partition in its hands would enhance its bargaining position.

On January 22, the LKP, the PFN and LNM agreed to the Syrian solution: the President would remain a Maronite; the Prime Minister would be elected by the Parliament instead of being chosen by the President, subject to parliamentary vote of confidence in the cabinet; and the parliamentary seats would be distributed equally between the Christians and Muslims. A cease-fire was agreed upon, supervised by a military committee made up of Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian military officers.¹²¹

On January 24, despite some cease-fire violations, Jumblat announced that the war was over.¹²² Two days later he called for Franjiyeh's resignation. The Syrian role, however, was not appreciated by Israel which was concerned about Lebanon becoming a confrontation state. The U.S. had a different view of Syria's role. It acknowledged the "positive role that the Syrian government play[ed] in Lebanon."¹²³ On January 31, the Maronite summit welcomed the Syrian initiative and announced that the Maronites had formed what they termed the Front of Freedom and Man.¹²⁴ The Resistance as well expressed its belief that the war was over.

It appeared that Syria's efforts were successful in defeating partition and in keeping the political system virtually unchanged. The pro-Syrian forces within the Resistance and the LNM launched a campaign of terror against the dissident voices to its solution. On January 31 these forces attacked the Beirut and Al-Muharrer newspapers and killed many of the workers and writers.¹²⁵

On that day Salam rejected the Syrian proposal of keeping the Presidency to the Maronites and instead advanced what he had proposed a few days earlier: a Presidential Council of six which would represent the Confessions.¹²⁶ Meanwhile Jumblat accused the LKP and PFN of preparing for another round of fighting in the Spring. All these events were indications that many problems remained in the way of a solution as was envisioned by Syria. Nevertheless, the Syrians were adamant in their efforts to stabilize the country.

FOOTNOTES

1. K. S. Salibi, Cross Roads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976 (Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan Books, 1976), 97.
2. An-Nahar, April 14, 1975.
3. Salibi, op cit., p. 99.
4. Ibid., p. 101.
5. An-Nahar, op. cit.
6. The name Rejection Front denotes the "rejection" of anything short of the total liberation of Palestine.
7. Salibi, op. cit., pp. 88, 122.
8. Officially, the PLO calls for a secular democratic state to be established in all of Palestine.
9. The Sa'iqa, for instance, was quickly condemned by the masses for its clashes with other Resistance groups.
10. Message from Fateh to the Lebanese People (A Fateh Publication, October 26, 1969), 8.
11. Ibid.
12. Salibi, op cit., pp. 98-99.
13. An-Nahar, May 16, 1975.
14. An-Nahar, May 24, 1975.
15. At-Tariq (January-August, 1976), p. 325.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 326.
18. Ibid.
19. Lebanon's War (Beirut: Dar-Al-Masseerah, 1977), 219.
20. At-Tariq, op. cit.:
21. Ibid.
22. An-Nahar, June 29, 1975.

23. At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 327.
24. Up until June, 1975, the fighting was between the Resistance and the right wing. See, for example, M. Deeb, The Lebanese Civil War (New York: Praeger, 1980), 1.
25. At-Tariq, op. cit., pp. 327-328.
26. Lebanon's War., op. cit., p. 220.
27. Karami was a member of the Tahaluf which included Salam. He is also a traditional za'im.
28. The Two Year War (Beirut: Dar-An-Hanar), p. X.
29. The Syrian diplomatic initiative, for instance, convinced Franjiyeh to ask Karami to form a cabinet.
30. Lebanons War, op., cit., p. 220.
31. M. Bannerman, "Saudi Arabia," in P. Haley and L. Snider, eds., Lebanon in Crisis (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1979), 122-126.
32. The Two Year War, op. cit., p. IX.
33. Lebanon's War, op. cit.
34. Ibid., p. 217.
35. Ibid., p. 218.
36. Ibid., p. 220.
37. Ibid.
38. The Two Year War, op. cit., p. X.
39. Lebanon's War., p. 221.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.; At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 328.
43. At-Tariq, op. cit.
46. Ibid.
47. Lebanon's War, op. cit.
48. Ibid., p. 222.

49. At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 329.
50. Lebanon's War, op. cit.
51. The pro-Syrian groups were in support of "reform" that would have consecrated confessionalism.
52. Samih Farsoun and W. Carroll, "The Civil War in Lebanon: Sect, Class and Imperialism," Monthly Review (June, 1976), 24.
53. The entire history of the battle is proof of this observation.
54. Lebanon's War, op. cit., p. 221.
55. The ASAP called for the need to defeat the right wing militarily.
56. Lebanon's War, op. cit., p. 222.
57. At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 329.
58. Lebanon's War, op. cit.
59. Ibid.
60. At-Tariq, op. cit.
61. Minutes of the NDC meetings, in At-Tariq, op. cit.
62. Ibid.
63. LNM statement on the political situation, 9/24/1975.
64. Minutes of NDC first meeting in At-Tariq, op. cit.
65. Ibid., pp. 101-102.
66. For an excellent treatment of right-wing ideology, see, for example, F. Abdallah and K. Hani, "Fascist Features in the Economic Thought of the Lebanese Bourgeoisie," in At-Tariq, op. cit., pp. 45-67.
67. Minutes of NDC first meeting in At-Tariq, op. cit.
68. At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 330.
69. Lebanon's War, op. cit., p. 222.
70. Ibid., p. 223.
71. Ibid.
72. The Two Year War, op. cit., p. XI.

73. At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 330.
74. Lebanon's War, op. cit., p. 224.
75. At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 331.
76. Lebanon's War, op. cit., p. 224.
77. At-Tariq, op. cit.
78. The Two Year War, op. cit.
79. Minutes of NDC meeting in At-Tariq, op. cit.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Lebanon's War, op. cit., pp. 224-225.
84. At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 332.
85. Lebanon's War, op. cit., p. 224.
86. Ibid., p. 225.
87. At-Tariq, op. cit.
88. Lebanon's War, op. cit.
89. Ibid.
90. At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 333.
91. Lebanon's War, op. cit.
92. At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 332.
93. An-Nahar, July 12, 1975.
94. Lebanon's War, op. cit., p. 226.
95. At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 333.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. The Two Year War, op. cit., p. XII.

100. At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 334.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. Lebanon's War, op. cit., p. 227.
105. At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 335.
106. Lebanon's War, op. cit., p. 176.
107. Ibid., p. 228.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
112. An-Nahar, January 15, 1976; interview with Dbay camp residents.
113. At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 336.
114. Lebanon's War, op. cit.
115. After the fall of Maslakh the right-wing forces were able to connect their Beirut areas with the Mountain by way of the coastal road.
116. Lebanon's War, op. cit.
117. Jumlat, This Is My Will (Al-Watan Al-Arabi, June, 1978).
118. Lebanon's War, op. cit.
119. Ibid.
120. At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 337.
121. Lebanon's War, op. cit., p. 229.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid., p. 230.
124. At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 337.
125. Ibid.
126. Lebanon's War, op. cit., pp. 229-230.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE LNM FIGHT FOR HEGEMONY: THE MOUNTAIN OFFENSIVE

By mid-January, 1976, it was clear that the army, the bureaucracy, the parliament, the judiciary and the cabinet were unable to function and keep cohesion in the polity. This was especially the case when the President and some cabinet ministers, such as Shamun, were parties in the conflict and had their own private militias. The Syrian-backed southern offensive of January 20 had convinced the right wing to accept the latest Syrian peace initiative. The pro-system forces allied to the LNM were convinced that this time the Syrian initiative would bear fruit. And there was reason to believe that. The right wing, it seemed, had exhausted all efforts which had previously allowed them to break away from Syrian peace initiatives. These pro-system forces had hoped that the efforts would enhance their position in the political system within the context of an "improved" confessional arrangement.

The LNM, however, had reason to believe that the right wing was preparing for a new round of fighting to isolate those forces within the LNM which would not opt for a confessional solution and to strengthen its position in negotiating with its rival pro-system forces. The LNM had no choice but to accept the Syrian initiative, however, because of the pressure the Resistance had applied on it and because some groups within the LNM wanted to resolve the crisis through Syria's intervention.¹ The condition for the LNM's acceptance of the Syrian initiative was that negotiations must proceed along the lines of the

"minimum program".

The failure of the Syrian initiative which bypassed the LNM and its program, however, had left the latter no choice but to stage an offensive, which was soon joined by the Resistance against the right wing. The LNM recognized, although belatedly, that the only way to succeed in implementing its program was to defeat the right wing militarily. This decision was in itself a development in the LNM's perception of methods of effecting political change. This new outlook came, however, after bitter lessons grasped while dealing with their adversaries in 1975.

This chapter focuses on two significant events. The first is the Constitutional Document that attempted to consecrate confessionalism. The second is the offensive itself, which generated a major split between the LNM and the Resistance on one hand, and the Syrians on the other.

On February 1, 1976, the Front of Freedom and Man (FFM) lauded the Syrian effort while Jmayyil, one of its members, attacked Jumblat and the left. The LKP chief also expressed the need for a new round of fighting against the left.² The Syrian initiative gained momentum when on February 7 Franjiyeh went on a visit to Syria. The immediate result of the visit was a joint communique that guaranteed the implementation of the Cairo Agreement in letter and spirit. It also laid the basis for the unity of Lebanon and agreed to the need for political reform in the Lebanese system. The next day the communique was welcomed in most of the Arab capitals and by all sides in the country.³

During this period kidnappings occurred in right wing areas and

Israel attacked the South on February 2. These incidents threatened the cease-fire which was being supervised by Lebanese and Palestinian army units. Meanwhile, Edde' attacked Israel and accused it of fomenting trouble in the country. He also accused Franjiyeh of being responsible for what had taken place in the country so far. He further announced his belief that Lebanon was Arab and democratic, and that his party stood against the fighting and partition and was for social democracy, justice and the secularization of the state.⁴

The FFM announced that it was for keeping the Presidency with the Maronites and failing that, would demand complete secularization of the system.⁵ In this fashion the FFM hoped to side-step the LNM's gradual plan to implement secularization and at the same time drive a wedge between the latter and the pro-system forces allied to it.

The Franjiyeh visit to Syria made possible what came to be known as the Constitutional Document (CD). The Document was the result of hard negotiations and comprised 17 points, the most significant feature of which was the consecration of confessionalism. On that score it stated that the President would be Maronite, the Prime Minister Sunni and the House Speaker a Shi'ite. While this was agreed to in the National Pact, it was not part of the Constitution.⁶ The CD also stated that the parliamentary seats would be equally divided between Christians and Muslims. Furthermore, electoral law would be amended taking these changes into consideration. Other points called for the realization of "social justice"; the decentralization of the civil service; the strengthening of the army; the creation of a planning and development council; the amending of the naturalization law; the specifying of the President's responsibilities; the election of the Premier

by the parliament; de-confessionalizing the civil service except the top posts which would be equally divided between Christians and Muslims; the creation of a special court whose function would be to look into the constitutionality of the laws and decrees emanating from the executive. These were the major points of the CD.⁷

The Document was proclaimed by Syria as the most important event in Lebanon since the National Pact.⁸ The LKP attacked the CD, which it regarded as consecrating confessionalism.⁹ Salam and Yafi also attacked it for the same reason.¹⁰ The INM, a component of the LNM, also attacked the CD. The LNM accepted eight out of the seventeen points. The points it rejected were those that consecrated confessionalism or those that it regarded as mere patchwork. The LNM, however, did not reject the CD as a basis upon which reform could begin to be implemented.¹¹

Eight days after the LKP attacked the CD, the party held an emergency meeting (February 23) during which it confirmed its belief in what it termed "the Lebanese framework", the secularization of the state, and announced its support of the CD and the Syrian initiative.¹²

On the same day Jumblat also held a press conference in which he reiterated the LNM's position on the CD. He further elaborated that the discussion of the CD should make clear that the "minimum program" was the one needed to be implemented in full. He also mentioned that the LNM had already convinced the masses that there was no way out of implementing the program: "This is the reality that Franjiyeh and Karami must face and it must be faced by the Arab governments including our Syrian friends; the battle of the barracks and their capture [by the LAA] indicates that a new wind of revolution has blown

in Lebanon."¹³ Jumblat further announced that the LNM must be heavily represented in the new cabinet.

The disintegration of the army interfered with the Syrian efforts to reach a solution, as the LAA had enhanced the position of the LNM. The appointment of a new Army Commander on March 2 did not do anything to stop "the battle of the barracks". By the end of March the LAA had total control of the barracks in the South, the Biq'a, the Mountain, most of the North and Beirut. About 75% of the army joined or became affiliated with the LAA.¹⁴ These events were a crushing defeat for the state whose last vestige as a state had crumbled. The right wing, which had depended upon the army in its attempt to stop the development of the revolutionary process, grew more dependent upon the Syrian initiative to reach a solution to the crisis. A few army units that were already assisting the right wing openly declared their position. The few barracks that did not join the LAA and did not cooperate with the right wing were confined to Beirut and its environs. The officers who belonged to these barracks wanted to reunite the army. They were in favor of announcing a general amnesty to all those who had defected and of changing the army law in such a way that could answer the needs of the defectors. Sa'id, the Army Commander, was also in favor of such a move. Franjiyeh and Shamun, however, would not hear of such things; in fact, Franjiyeh asked Karami to agree to take action against the Army Command.¹⁵

The right wing unanimously supported Franjiyeh and Shamun on the army question. The general feeling in Lebanon, however, was that Franjiyeh became an obstacle to any peaceful solution of any question. Calls for his resignation were sounded from every quarter. The

Syrians sent a delegation to try to moderate between Franjiyeh and his opponents but he refused to compromise on the issue.

On March 11 Brigadier Aziz-el-Ahdab of the Beirut garrison staged a "coup" which was supported by the Army Command. He announced that the President must resign since the army was now in charge. The "coup" was dubbed the "television coup" since, in fact, the Beirut garrison had no power to implement its demands. When Ahdab went to the television station to announce the "coup" he was accompanied by body guards from the Resistance.¹⁶

There is reason to believe that the "coup" was supported by the Syrians, who were interested in reuniting the army in an effort to weaken the LNM. At any rate, Saudi Arabia expressed its support of Ahdab by sending him congratulations on the occasion of the Islamic Feast.¹⁷

In a clever move to counter any possible right-wing tactics, Khateeb, the LAA Commander, agreed to coordinate with Adhab to begin negotiations to reunite the army. This showed that the LAA was attempting to find a peaceful solution to the army question. The LKP did not take a position on the Ahdab move until two days after its initiation. Lesser right-wing groups, however, came to Adhab's support from the beginning.¹⁸

On March 14, 66 members of parliament signed a petition asking Franjiyeh to resign, but the President rejected it on grounds that it was not constitutional. Al-Asa'ad, Speaker of Parliament, came out in support of Ahdab and indirectly called upon the President to "sacrifice" and resign so that the army could be reunited.¹⁹

On March 15 a contingent of the LAA was advancing toward Beirut

from the South to bolster its defenses. The pro-Syrian Palestinian Sa'iqa blocked the contingent's way and prevented it from advancing beyond Khalde', a few miles away from Beirut.²⁰ The incident was significant because it confirmed Syria's fear that Franjiyeh's opponents might want to oust him by force. This became clearer when Qansu of the BPO declared that the difference between his pro-Syrian organization and the others was on the method to be used to oust Franjiyeh. Qansu further stated that military force would lead to partition.²¹

Concomitant with these developments the situation in Beirut began to deteriorate, and by March 18 Beirut and the Mountain areas witnessed heavy fighting. Due to these developments the "coup" lost its significance. The new front that the LKP opened up in the Mountains was an indication that the party was not interested in reuniting the army or in resolving any questions if not on their terms. Initially the LKP was capable of surrounding isolated LNM areas in the Mountain.²²

In response to the LKP challenge the LNM opened up the fighting in Beirut on a full scale and by March 23 had established full control of the hotel area and Starco.²³ In the Mountain, the following areas witnessed some of the fiercest fighting: Aley, Kahala, Dhour Shwere and Beit Merry. The LNM announced that no cease-fire would be accepted unless the LKP lifted its seige from the LNM Mountain areas and the right wing accepted the "minimum program".²⁴

These LNM victories were contrary to Syria's designs for Lebanon. Consequently, it unleashed the Sa'iqa on the Palestinian Rejectionists who were actively supporting the LNM's operations in Beirut and other areas. Syria also began to attack the LNM verbally from Damascus and Beirut. The LNM was accused of working for the partition of Lebanon.²⁵

Unheeded, the LNM kept on pushing with its offensive. The Syrian position was in fact supportive of the right wing, at a time when LNM Mountain areas were under seige.

Initially the Resistance (except for the Rejection Front) was not involved in the fighting; however, many considerations were pressuring it to fight. The Palestinian masses expected the Resistance to fight alongside its LNM ally. Equally important was the fact that since late January the Syrians had been working hard to secure dominance over the Resistance. This did not sit well with the Fateh leadership, much less with the Rejection Front.

On March 25 the LAA, in support of the Combined Forces (LNM-Resistance) were advancing toward the Presidential Palace which was being shelled. The heavy shelling led the President to flee to the port of Junieh, a right-wing stronghold. His flight was facilitated by the Sa'iqqa who stood in the way of the advancing LAA and Combined Forces (CF).²⁶ The President's flight was looked at by Shamun with disdain. Junieh panicked because of the threat of LAA heavy guns.

The incident led Syria to take a stronger stance against the LNM and the Resistance. Syria continued its verbal attacks on Jumblat: "We want to end political and economic feudalism in Lebanon, but we look for Lebanon's interest...and not that of one person [Jumblat]."²⁷

Syria had to halt its attacks temporarily since the Combined Forces were able to turn the tide of fighting in the Mountain against the right wing. Ayntoura, Mtein and other Mountain areas were liberated between March 26-27. On March 27 Jumblat went to Damascus to convince Asad not to interfere with the LNM's offensive. He also asked Asad to look the other way for two weeks, by which time Jumblat was

confident the Combined Forces would bring total defeat to the right wing and would force it to sit down and negotiate.²⁸ On the same day Jmayyil threatened to internationalize the crisis and Franjiyeh contacted Asad by phone in an attempt to counter Jumblat's visit with Asad.

The following day fighting in Beirut and the Mountain raged. And out of frustration against the advancing Combined Forces, the right wing shelled the residential quarters in LNM-held areas.²⁹ For the third time since the beginning of the war Beirut's port was on fire.

Back in Beirut, Jumblat announced "Asad's understanding of the LNM's position."³⁰ On March 31, however, the BPO attacked Jumblat verbally and accused him of being a U.S. agent and a traitor. Syria also threatened Jumblat by stating that it would stop allowing arms shipments to reach the LNM through its territories. The Resistance was also putting pressure on the LNM to stop the offensive.³¹

Lebanon's thirty-fourth cease-fire was granted by the LNM, who with the Resistance and the LAA enjoyed a superior military position to the right wing. The cease-fire was to last for ten days so that a new President could be elected to replace Franjiyeh, who was called upon to resign unconditionally and immediately. Furthermore, the LNM demanded that political reform proceed along the lines of its program, and that in implementing the cease-fire the LNM troops were not going to pull out from their advanced positions.³²

Concentrated diplomatic contacts began to be conducted by Dean Brown, who had arrived in Beirut on March 31. On April 1 Brown met with Franjiyeh, Shamun and Jmayyil, then with the Maronite Patriarch, Al-Asa'ad and Karami. Al-Asa'ad, who reflected the Syrian position,

contacted Waldheim and informed him of his rejection of the internationalization efforts. Hussein, the King of Jordan, announced that day (April 1) his support for Syria's intervention in Lebanon since it prevented "the attempt of the extremist Muslims to change the Lebanese system."³³ All these moves were designed to portray to Brown the amount of support Syria's role in Lebanon enjoyed in the area and in Lebanon as well.

Despite the cease-fire of April 2, the Combined Forces liberated Ayntoura for the second time while fierce fighting raged in Aley, Mtein-Bolonia, Beirut and its environs, and in the North of Lebanon.³⁴ On this day too, Brown continued his talks with the Lebanese leaders. He met with As-Sadr, Salam and Jumblat separately.

The Brown mission was looked upon with suspicion by Syria, especially when the LKP and the Cedar Guards were agitating for internationalization of the crisis.³⁵ The Syrians did not want to take chances with any probable effort to shunt them aside in Lebanon. They resisted any effort which they perceived would weaken their position regarding a general settlement of the Middle East conflict. What the Syrians wanted to prove was the fact that they were the only force in the area capable of restoring peace to Lebanon and that they were an indispensable force which must be included in Middle East negotiations.

The BPO and other pro-Syrian forces in Lebanon came out against the Brown mission. A tug-of-war ensued between the Syrians and the U.S. with respect to diplomatic and military initiatives in Lebanon. To moderate the situation somewhat, Kissinger reiterated the U.S. position on Lebanon: the U.S. opposed any foreign military intervention in Lebanon. Kissinger described Syria's role as one that kept extremists

in line.³⁶

The pro-Syrian Sa'iqa and Kamal Shatilla's Nasserist organization levelled scathing attacks on Jumblat for his talks with Brown and for his call to Arabize the crisis. The pro-Syrian groups correctly perceived these moves as an attempt by Jumblat to limit the Syrian role in Lebanon. Meanwhile, Qansu and Amin of the BPO left for Syria to consult with their bosses.³⁷

As a rebuttal to these attacks, Jumblat announced that the LNM would maintain Syria's friendship. He followed this announcement by another on the following day (April 2) which stated that his party, the PSP, was not working to defeat the Syrian initiative.

The LKP, meanwhile, welcomed the Syrian initiative and called for a deterrent military force composed of Arab and foreign troops. Such a force, the LKP reasoned, would contain the LNM and force it to withdraw from its advanced positions. The BPO and the Sa'iqa, however, redirected attention to the fact that the cease-fire was declared to begin the initiative to elect a new President.³⁸ They further warned that any breach of the April 2 cease-fire would not be tolerated by them.

The following day was witness to further talks between Brown and Edde', the Mufti (the Sunni religious leader), Elias Sarkis and the French ambassador. The Mufti informed Brown that no solution was possible unless confessionalism were abolished.³⁹ On April 4, Jumblat attacked Syria's military presence in Lebanon in the form of the Sa'iqa and other Lebanese organization. The PLO came out in support of the LNM on this issue by warning that its alliance with the LNM was strategic and that it was ready to strike without mercy against any attempts

(by the pro-Syrian groups) to dissolve this organic linkage.⁴⁰ These statements were also designed to influence Brown's efforts and to relay to him indirectly that the Resistance was a major force with which he must meet if his mission were to be fruitful (earlier Brown had refused to meet with the Resistance because the U.S. did not recognize the PLO).⁴¹

Brown continued to meet with Lebanese leaders. This time he had talks with Jmayyil, Franjiyeh, Shamun and Malek, all of whom were in the FFM. The pro-Syrian organizations intensified their attacks on the Brown mission. They also attacked Jumblat for his lack of cooperation with the Syrian initiative and for his "ingratitude" for Syria's aid to him and the LNM since 1975. They also blamed Jumblat for not restraining the LNM in the face of cease-fire violations by the right wing.⁴²

On April 6 the Resistance attacked the Brown mission and at the same time interceded to end the propaganda war between Syria and Jumblat. The LNM welcomed the Resistance's initiative for a number of reasons. To begin, the LNM did not want a final break with Syria, at least not before a new President was elected.⁴³

On April 8 France expressed support of the Syrian initiative in Lebanon and declared opposition to the U.S. efforts in the country.⁴⁴ Jumblat met with Brown another time to impress upon him the need to reform the political system. At the same time another LNM leader, Qlailat (of the INM) called for the adoption of the LNM program as a basis for a solution. The LNM followed these moves by its call to amend Article 73 of the Constitution to allow the parliament to elect a new President before August. The LNM also expressed its commitment to seek a political solution within the 10-day cease-fire period it had

already granted on April 2.⁴⁵

Matters heated up between the Sa'iqqa and the Rejection Front, however. The two groups clashed near Beirut's international airport. Furthermore, the Combined Forces were advancing in the North toward Franjiyeh's town of Zgharta. To avert any break between Syria and the LNM as a result of these military moves in the North, the Resistance called for a meeting between the Syrians and Jumblat. On the same day (April 9) the Resistance attacked the Brown mission once more while Jumblat issued a statement about the existence of an international conspiracy being concocted against the Resistance and the LNM. He then called for an Arab League meeting to discuss ways by which this conspiracy could be averted.⁴⁶

To check LNM advances and to apply maximum pressure on it, Syrian units entered Lebanese territory from the East. Popular displeasure in the Biqa' against the Syrian troops was extreme and this move was followed by warnings from the LNM and the Resistance to Syria against the use of its troops in Lebanon.

Meanwhile the French Envoy met with Shamun, Jmayyil and the Maronite Patriarch to talk about possible Presidential candidates. He then met with Al-Asa'ad, Karami and Arafat.

On April 10, President Ford announced that the U.S. was trying to prevent Syria from controlling Lebanon. Brown followed his boss' announcement by suggesting the creation of a local deterrent force which would include American advisors.⁴⁷ After meeting with the French Envoy the PLO chief, Arafat, accused the U.S. of conspiring against the Resistance, the LNM and Syria.⁴⁸

The LNM, who had also met with the French Envoy, took a different

stance than that taken by Arafat. It condemned all forms of intervention and reiterated its adherence to Lebanon's sovereignty and unity. Jumblat, who was speaking as usual for the LNM, expressed the need to Arabize the crisis. He further claimed that some Arab countries did not want confessionalism to be abolished, as that would detonate the situation.⁴⁹

The timing of the Syrian small-scale military intervention was one day before the parliament met to amend Article 73 of the Constitution. Once amended, the Syrians wanted to have enough military strength present to influence the election of a new President. On April 11 the LNM again warned Syria of the dangers of its military adventure in Lebanon. To pressure for a speedy election of the President before Syria's pressure became insurmountable, the LNM announced that it ceased to cooperate with foreign envoys until the election of a new President.⁵⁰ The LNM also called upon the Arab countries and foreign powers to intervene to stop the Syrian military intervention. The situation was further complicated by a series of Israeli attacks on Lebanese towns and Palestinian refugee camps during the month of April. Israel followed these attacks by a threat of military intervention in Lebanon.⁵¹

Despite the fact that the LKP had been violating the cease-fire by shelling residential quarters in the LNM-held areas and by committing massacres in its own areas, Syria was opposed to the LNM retaliation on the military fronts. The LKP took advantage of this Syrian policy and attacked Beit Shabab in the Mountain and occupied it. The PFN also besieged the village of Byaout. These and similar attacks were accompanied by statements from Jmayyil praising Asad and Syria's socialism.⁵²

The LKP continued to improve its military situation in the Mountain and by April 14 occupied another LNM area, Dhour Shwere.⁵²

The general situation in April prompted Edde' to renew his warning of the existence of an Israeli plan in cooperation with the right wing to partition the country.⁵⁴ The French Envoy called for a French military intervention to guarantee the election of a new President and to help stabilize the country.⁵⁵ To counter these French moves and to provide legitimacy for the Syrian limited military intervention, Karami announced there was a need for the Syrian military presence as a force interested in maintaining order.⁵⁶ In an indirect way Israel approved of the Syrian move when it announced that there was a "red line" beyond which it would not tolerate Syrian activities.⁵⁷ It is anybody's guess where this line was or whether it simply was a physical boundary.

On his arrival in Beirut from Damascus on April 15, the French Envoy announced his approval of Syria's role in Lebanon. On the next day he ended his mission to the Middle East. This was in fact a triumph for Syria's efforts. The Resistance was quick to appreciate that fact: it decided to further mend fences with Syria. On the same day the French Envoy left the Middle East, Arafat left for Syria where he reached an agreement with the Syrians. The agreement included the following points: an end the fighting, re-establish the military committee to supervise the cease-fire, oppose partition, oppose Arabization, oppose U.S. efforts, oppose internationalization and support the Syrian initiative. The next day the LNM welcomed the Damascus agreement as an interim one until a new President was elected. The only force apparent against the agreement was the Rejection Front.⁵⁸

On April 19 the right wing severely attacked the agreement and the Resistance. The National Front, which was established by the pro-Syrian Lebanese organizations, warned the right wing against escalating the fighting. The LKP efforts to internationalize the crisis finally crumbled when Brown declared that the solution must be a Lebanese one.⁵⁹ On April 23 Brown left for London to meet with Kissinger.

The LNM military position, despite some losses in the Mountain, was still strong. Up until this point in the war the LNM had not set up local administrations in its areas. There were only popular committees in many of the LNM areas to take care of security, food distribution, housing and medical supplies. But these committees were not coordinated and operated haphazardly.⁶⁰ To establish a firmer control on what happened in its areas and to mobilize the masses and take care of their needs in an efficient manner, the LNM announced it was establishing a local authority. This was also a move to try to deny the local traditional zu'ama from any mass base they might have still enjoyed. The traditional leaders were quick to react negatively to such measures and were aided by the National Front, which attacked these measures as contributors to Lebanon's partition.⁶¹

On April 26 two main contenders for the Presidency emerged: Edde' was the LNM choice; Elias Sarkis was supported by Syria, Karami and the right wing. To the Syrians Edde' was unacceptable because of his close ties with the LNM and because of his consistent attacks against any foreign intervention, including Syria's. Sarkis was more to Syria's liking because he lacked a mass base and an army. Consequently, he would have to rely upon Syria for support. In this fashion Syria could manipulate him the way it wanted.

The LNM announced that its participation in the election of the President depended upon the candidates' acceptance of its program. It argued that this was a realistic demand since the LNM represented 75% of the Lebanese and controlled 80% of Lebanon.⁶²

On May 6 the LNM refused to recognize the convening of the parliament to elect the new President because it charged that Syria was using political and military pressure on members of parliament to vote for Sarkis. On May 9, Sarkis was elected through Syrian intimidation and threats on members of parliament. Furthermore, Edde' was unable to reach the area where the meeting was held because his security was not guaranteed by the authorities.⁶³

Syrian troops shelled Palestinian camps where demonstrations were taking place to protest Syria's intervention in the Presidential elections. Similar demonstrations were also held in the South.⁶⁴ The LNM rejected the election results, but was incapable of acting upon them. On the other hand, the U.S. welcomed these election results. Brown, who had been back in Lebanon since May 1, held a press conference on May 11 in which he declared the impossibility for any group to win militarily. And as a signal to Israel, he declared that Lebanon would not become a confrontation state. He also urged reconciliation among the warring parties so reform could take place.⁶⁵

While an LKP delegation was visiting Syria on May 5, they were simultaneously intensifying their attacks against the LNM in the Mountain. Apparently the Syrians, who claimed neutrality, did not do much to discourage the LKP from violating the cease-fire. Between May 9 and 10 the LKP met with crushing defeats in Ayntoura, which it was trying to recapture. To ease the LKP pressure on Ayntoura the LNM

opened another Mountain front in Oyoum-es-Seimaan. Unable to sustain LNM attacks, the LKP called upon Syria to intervene militarily in Lebanon.⁶⁶

Syria announced it was against any group which sought to continue the fighting. The LNM understood this to mean: do nothing against LKP attacks. On May 14 Jumblat, Khateeb (of the LAA) and Habash (of the PFLP) denounced Syria's intervention and announced their belief that Syria intervened militarily to prevent the LNM from a clear-cut victory against the right wing as the only possible way to bring an end to the war.⁶⁷

The deteriorating military position of the LKP spurred it to shell residential quarters in LNM areas. And in an attempt to stall for time Basheer Jmayyil (the son of the LKP chief) made some reconciliatory remarks to the LNM by calling for a Lebanese agreement on the "common denominator".⁶⁸ This nebulous statement was not taken seriously by the LNM. The LNM, however, announced it was for a coalition which would include itself, the Resistance and Syria, but that it was against Syria's heavy-handed behavior in Lebanon. Furthermore, despite its initial rejection of Sarkis' election it demonstrated its willingness to cooperate with the President-elect by holding a meeting with him on May 19, with Arafat and Abu-Iad of the Resistance attending.⁶⁹

The LNM and the Resistance also rejected a renewed French proposal to send French army troops to Lebanon. On the same day (May 23), As-Sadr, who had visited Syria the week before, attacked the LNM and its program. He also attacked secularization specifically. Being a member of the National Front, it was safe to assume he was reflecting Syria's position on reform.⁷⁰

The right wing resorted to assassination attempts and cold-blooded killings in an effort to create the conditions for an open confrontation between the Syrians and the LNM. On May 25, the LKP-PFN assassination plot against Edde' failed. The day before the LKP attacked Jubail, the coastal town north of Beirut and Edde's stronghold, and killed thirty Edde' supporters.⁷¹ Perhaps one of the most cold-blooded murders was committed against Jumblat's sister, who was killed in her home located in Furn-esh-Shubback in the right-wing held part of Beirut. The following day, Basheer Jmayyil announced that the LKP had captured three of her assassins.⁷²

The last few days in May witnessed escalation of fighting all over Lebanon. The result was more crushing defeats for the right wing in the face of the advancing Combined Forces. The right wing responded by renewing its shelling of residential quarters in LNM-held parts of Beirut.⁷³

In the North Colonel Mi'mary, who was affiliated with the LAA, was accused by Abu-Iad, the Resistance chief, of shelling Christian villages in an effort to create sectarian conflict as a prelude to a possible Syrian military intervention. In essence, Abu-Iad was accusing the pro-Syrian organization in Lebanon of creating the conditions for Syria to be looked upon as the savior.⁷⁴

These right-wing and Syrian tactics bore fruit in the last phase of the Battle of Lebanon. But there were still many duels between unequals yet to be fought. Politically, however, the Mountain offensive was all but over.

CONCLUSION

The LNM Mountain offensive came as a result of specific events that left no choice for the LNM but to fight. The Syrians attempted to consecrate confessionalism through the agreement they reached with Franjiyeh that culminated in the Constitutional Document. The LKP also beseiged LNM Mountain areas, a move which indicated that the Maronite right wing was not in favor of reaching an accord with the LNM. Furthermore, LKP attacks eroded the extremely weak Ahdab's "coup" which attempted to reunite the armed forces and pressure Franjiyeh to resign.

The Mountain offensive brought about rapid victories for the LNM. Because of Syria's and the Resistance's pressure, however, the LNM had to settle for a cease-fire. Fearful that the increasing Syrian role could severely limit its options, the LNM called for Arab and foreign diplomatic intervention to counter it. As it turned out, however, French diplomatic efforts supported Syria's role in Lebanon and were a major factor in countering the initial U.S. diplomatic effort.

Sarkis' election to the Presidency indicated Syria's dominant role in Lebanon. The right wing was quick to adjust itself to this, as it tended to support Syria's diplomatic and military initiatives against the LNM. Both Syria and the right wing intended to blunt the Mountain offensive and defeat the LNM militarily.

The limited military Syrian intervention on the eve of Sarkis' election was an indication that the Mountain offensive was politically all but over. The LNM was still strong militarily, however the stage was already set to deal with it on this level also.

FOOTNOTES

1. These were the pro-Syrian groups. See, for example, M. Deeb, The Lebanese Civil War (New York: Praeger, 1980), 106.
2. At-Tariq (January-August, 1976), 337.
3. Lebanon's War (Beirut: Dar-Al-Masseerah, 1977), 231.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. See chapter 2, p. 33-34.
7. Franjiyeh's message to the Lebanese people and the text of the CD, February 24, 1976.
8. Lebanon's War, op. cit.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., p. 232.
12. Ibid.
13. Jumblat at a press conference on March 8, 1976.
14. The only barracks that did not join were certain ones around Beirut.
15. M. Deeb, op. cit., p. 89.
16. John Cooley, "The Palestinians," in P. Haley and L. Snider, eds., Lebanon in Crisis (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1979), 40.
17. Lebanon's War, op. cit., p. 234.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., p. 235.

23. At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 339.
24. Ibid.
25. Lebanon's War, op. cit.
26. At-Tariq, op. cit.
27. Ibid.
28. Jumlat, This Is My Will (Al-Watan Al-Arabi, June, 1978).
29. At-Tariq, op. cit.
30. Ibid.
31. M. Deeb, op. cit., p. 110.
32. Lebanon's War, op. cit., p. 236.
33. At-Tariq, op. cit.,
35. Ibid., p. 237.
36. Ibid., p. 236.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 340.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Lebanon's War, op. cit., p. 237.
43. M. Deeb, op. cit.
44. Lebanon's War, op. cit.
45. At-Tariq, op. cit.
46. Ibid.
47. Lebanon's War, op. cit.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.

51. Ibid., p. 238.
52. Ibid.
53. At-Tariq, op. cit.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid., p. 239.
56. Ibid., p. 238.
57. Ibid.
58. Interviews with Rejection Front members, August 15, 1978.
59. Lebanon's War, op. cit., p. 239.
60. The popular committees also took care of defense. The Resistance used to arm them. The situation was so chaotic, however, that it prevented coordination with other popular committees or with the LNM top leadership.
61. At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 341.
62. Ibid.
63. Lebanon's War, op. cit.
64. At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 342.
65. Lebanon's War, op. cit.
66. Ibid.
67. At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 343.
68. Lebanon's War, op. cit., p. 240.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 344.
72. Lebanon's War, op. cit.
73. At-Tariq, op. cit.
74. Ibid.

CHAPTER NINE

CONFESSIONALISM WITHOUT COHESION: THE SYRIAN INVASION

Until this point in the Battle of Lebanon, the Combined Forces had been fighting Israel, the right wing and occasionally, the pro-Syrian forces. Despite these formidable enemies the revolutionary movement was able to frustrate the grand design for its annihilation and/or the de jure partition of Lebanon. Furthermore, the revolutionary movement was capable of mounting an offensive that almost succeeded in bringing about a new form of state where the LNM could have been hegemonic in the power bloc. All that was frustrated, however, because of the Syrian role in Lebanon. The revolutionary movement had yet to contend with another military machine with which it was not equipped to deal either militarily or psychologically. On previous occasions the LNM and the Resistance had been reluctant to enter battle with proxy Syrian troops who entered Lebanon in the form of PLA and Sa'iqā. Given a choice between fighting with or acquiescing to the Syrians, the LNM tried to steer a middle course, hoping to bring diplomatic pressure (Arab and international) to bear upon the Syrians and so loosen their grip.

The June 1, 1976 full-scale Syrian invasion, however, changed the situation dramatically. It became a matter of survival of the revolutionary movement, which had no choice but to fight the invading forces. That was a clear-cut choice, especially when the Combined Forces were fighting the right wing and Israel concurrently at the

time of the invasion. Syria's invasion rolled back the gains of the Mountain offensive. This was regarded as a service being rendered to the enemy. No component of the LNM or the Resistance could have collaborated with the Syrians now, and hope to keep its legitimacy within the mass movement.

This chapter deals with the way in which the invasion was capable of containing the revolutionary movement by preventing it from achieving a clear-cut victory. It also deals with the roles which the external forces played in attempting to restore confessionalism. The new confessional state, however, lacked the main feature of the state: cohesion. And that certainly was a curious outcome in Lebanon's political development.

The right wing supported the invasion since Syrian troops entered into fierce fighting with the Combined Forces. Internationally, the U.S. and France were, to varying degrees and for different reasons, in support of the Syrian invasion. The U.S. saw that Syria was attempting to contain the Resistance and the LNM. An Israeli invasion of the same magnitude would have brought about a confrontation between Syria and Israel, derailing the step-by-step Middle East negotiation. Furthermore, such an invasion would have isolated the right wing from the Arabs and contributed to revolutionary development in Lebanon and perhaps in Syria. It appeared that Syria's and the U.S.'s objectives of containing revolutionary development coincided. This containment was a prerequisite to the imposition of a Middle East settlement. France too was not in favor of radical change in Lebanon.

Certainly, the National Front and the Sa'iqa were in full support

of the invasion, as was Colonel M'imary in the North. Al-Asa'ad was also affiliated with the National Front as were some lesser traditional zu'ama.

The invasion was devastating to the LNM, which was already weakened when major forces split it to form the pro-Syrian front. It was apparent as well that if the LNM were to have a fighting chance at all against Syria the Resistance had to ally with it all the way. The Resistance, however, was not a monolith. The Fateh, the Rejection Front and the Sa'iqa each had varying views and goals. Although the Fateh and the Rejectionists supported the LNM militarily against the Syrians, there were military and other reasons having to do with their views on the Middle East settlement which precluded the Fateh from pursuing this option on a long-run basis.

The precarious situation of the LNM prompted it to intensify its diplomatic and political activities. Jumblat called upon the Arab masses to support the steadfastness of the Resistance and the LNM; he also called for a general strike in Lebanon to protest the invasion. On the same day (June 1) the LNM handed the Soviet ambassador to Lebanon a memorandum explaining its position on the Syrian action.¹

On June 2, Jumblat met with Sarkis in the presence of the Fateh chief, Abu Iad. The meeting was followed by a statement from Jumblat that he and Sarkis were agreed to end the fighting and begin negotiating with the right wing. To make good his statement, Jumblat followed it by a meeting with Basheer Jmayyil in the presence of Abu Hassan, the PLO security chief who had arranged the meeting.² With those meetings Jumblat sought to show that there was no need for a Syrian military intervention in Lebanon.

Meanwhile, the Sa'iqā clashed with the Resistance in Beirut, and Syrian forces reinforced themselves in Akkar, Biqā' and the North. On June 6 the Combined Forces, in retaliation against the NF and Sa'iqā forces, occupied the offices of all the pro-Syrian Lebanese and Palestinian parties and organizations and arrested many of their leaders.⁴ The next several days witnessed major clashes between the Syrians and the Combined Forces in the Mountain and Sidon. In Sidon the Syrian attack was repelled; in the Mountain the Syrian forces were capable of advancing toward Sofar.⁵

The LNM's and the Resistance's diplomatic initiatives were fruitful in bringing about a meeting of the Arab Foreign Ministers on June 9. The meeting decided to: (1) send a symbolic Arab force to replace the Syrians; (2) call for a cease-fire; (3) form a committee to represent the Arab League in Beirut; (4) call for national reconciliation under Sarkis; and (5) support the Palestinian revolution.⁶

These decisions did not sit well with Franjiyeh or any other right wing component. On June 11, the Lebanese Front called for the withdrawal of Lebanon from "the League of the Muslim Arabs".⁷ On that same day the military committee formed by the Arab League arrived in Beirut and was followed by Sudanese, Libyan and Algerian troops to begin implementing the League's decisions.

These efforts led to the withdrawal of some Syrian units from Beirut on June 12. In the Mountain, however, the Syrians besieged the Combined Forces in the north of Al-Matn and shelled the Arkoub in the South, and Ayntoura and Sinneen in the Mountain. The next day the Mountain battles raged in Farayya-Oyoun-es-Seeman, Aynsiha-Falougha and Aynzhalta-Ayndara. In addition, the shelling of the LNM and

Resistance areas in Beirut and Sidon ensued and the Syrians entered Arkoub and defeated the Resistance there.⁸ The Syrians quickly declared they were ready to withdraw from these areas, provided the Lebanese authorities agreed to have Arab troops take their positions. Since Franjiyeh was against the Arab League's decisions, he was not about to agree to that.⁹ This also showed that the Syrians were not serious about withdrawing.

On June 14, Jumblat informed the Arab ambassadors to Lebanon that the immediate goal of the LNM was to make Lebanon democratic without changing the economic or social character of the country.¹⁰ The intensified diplomatic initiatives led to meetings between Arab envoys, especially Libyan, with the LKP and the Syrians to explain to them the need for the implementation of the League's decisions. Seeing the ascendancy of the League's position, with right wing quickly reversed its position toward the League's policies. Jmayyil talked of the need to comply with the Cairo Agreement while the Lebanese Front welcomed the League's decisions.¹¹

The military fronts were just as busy as the diplomatic. The Syrian invasion prompted defections of many units of the PLA, which was under Syrian control, to the Combined Forces.¹² These developments, however, did not stop the deterioration of the Combined Forces' military situation. They were being shelled in the Mountain and Sidon by the Syrians and were repelling right-wing attacks in Beirut and its suburbs and also in Akkar in the North.¹³

On June 21 battles raged in the commercial areas of Beirut and in the Mountain. More significantly, however, a right-wing/Syrian offensive began on Tal-ez-Za'tar and Jisr-el-Basha. The north and northeast

of Beirut, Nab'ah, Dikwani, Sin-el-Feel and Mansouriyeh also came under attack.¹⁴

The Syrian invasion was corroborated by Asad's visit to France, which started on June 17 and culminated in a communique on June 19. Syria and France were agreed in terms of Lebanon and the Middle East settlement. Asad's Rumanian visit further strengthened his position on the Middle East in general.¹⁵

The Resistance spent every effort--diplomatic and military--to try to stop the takeover of Tal-ez-Za'tar, to no avail. The seige could have been lifted by the right wing had the Syrians wished it. All they needed to do was move their troops which were blocking Resistance troops from reaching the camp. The Syrians and the right wing, however, were intent on decimating the Resistance in Tal-ez-Za'tar, especially since the camp was an important mass base for the PFLP, which was the major component of the Rejection Front.¹⁶

Militarily, the Combined Forces fared no better in July than in June. Tal-ez-Za'tar remained under seige, and fierce fighting raged on its fronts. In the beginning, however, the Combined Forces were capable of inflicting heavy losses upon the attackers despite Syrian buffer troops.¹⁷ This was a clear indication that the will of the Combined Forces to fight was capable of surmounting almost any barrier. In addition, despite Syrian and Israeli blockages on LNM areas, food and military supplies were reaching the fighters.¹⁸

Saudi and Sudanese units that arrived on July 1 took positions in Beirut and Sidon. They were equipped with tanks and troop carriers. They were helpless, however, in supervising the cease-fire.¹⁹ Military fronts in Beirut and the Mountain erupted and the Combined Forces were

capable of advancing against right-wing positions there. The cease-fire, Lebanon's fifty-first, which was announced on July 2, crumbled the same day. Fighting again erupted on Tal-ez-Za'tar fronts.²⁰

On July 4, Bakradoni of the LKP was in Syria for talks with Asad. Jalloud, the Libyan envoy, was also in Damascus trying to reconcile Asad with the LNM and the Resistance. On that day also, the Arab League committee held a meeting with the Resistance and the Syrian Foreign Minister.²¹ All these efforts failed, however, and fighting raged on all fronts. By July 5 Tal-ez-Za'tar had repelled the forty-seventh major right-wing offensive. July 8 marked the nineteenth day of the camp's seige and by that time the camp had repelled fifty attempts to penetrate its defenses.²²

In the North, the coastal town of Shekka was recaptured by the right wing. The northern right-wing offensive was generally successful because Syrian troops blocked roads to prevent men and supplies from reaching the Combined Forces.²³ The shelling that the Syrian army engaged in against Tripoli in the North and Zahrani in the South compelled Jumblat to threaten Syria with a peoples' war. He also renewed the call for the establishment of local administration in LNM areas.²⁴

Syrian troops met with stiff resistance in the North, the South and the Biqa'. After a devastating defeat of Syrian tanks near Sidon, Syria withdrew from the area on July 13. In the Biqa' Syria was able to enter Baalbek while in the Mountain its troops cut Aley from Al-Matn.²⁵

Anticipating the Syrian preponderance in Lebanon, some members of the parliament joined in a National United Front that was based on three principles of unity: the rejection of partition, the end of intervention, and the implementation of the Cairo Agreement. These

efforts were made by the LNM in a futile attempt to counter Syria's actions diplomatically.²⁶ Meanwhile, coordination between Syria and the right wing ensued when, on July 11, a high level delegation went to Syria for talks. The delegation was comprised of Basheer Jmayyil, Bakradoni, Danny Shamun, Lucein Dahdah and Joseph Mughabghab.²⁷

On July 13 a second Arab Foreign Ministers' meeting was held. It called for a cease-fire and dialogue between the Resistance and Syria. The Ministers also agreed to beef up the Arab Security Forces.²⁸

Concurrently, Tal-ez-Za'tar continued to repel penetration attempts amidst talks of a Palestinian delegation to be sent to Damascus to patch up Syrian-Palestinian differences. On July 18 an LKP delegation went to Damascus for talks while the LNM intensified diplomatic contacts with some Arab governments that could pressure Syria to moderate its position toward the LNM.²⁹

On July 19, a tripartite conference of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Sudan was held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Among other things, the conference discussed Lebanon and decided to recommend a cease-fire, the implementation of the Arab League decisions and a roundtable of reconciliation talks.³⁰ On that day Arafat also confirmed that the Resistance had decided to send a delegation to Damascus.

On July 21 the Palestinian delegation went to Damascus. The talks resulted in a Syrian-Palestinian agreement on July 26, 1976.³¹ Both sides agreed upon the following: (1) to have the Constitutional Document of February 14, 1976 serve as a basis for national dialogue; (2) Lebanon's right to demand the Resistance not to intervene in its affairs and that relations between the two parties must be governed by the Cairo agreement; (3) the right of the Resistance to operate from

all Arab fronts including Lebanon's; (4) the acceptance of a cease-fire in all of Lebanon by all the parties to the conflict; and (5) the creation of a tripartite committee headed by the Arab League to supervise the cease-fire.³²

In addition, the Damascus Agreement included many secret points, chief among them: (1) the separation of Lebanese demands from those of the Resistance's; (2) the Resistance must not demand withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon; (3) the cessation of propaganda war between the two sides of the Agreement; (4) continual consultation with Syria, which must approve all steps to be taken by the Resistance; (5) the determination of Palestinian concentration centers before sending them to the future Palestinian state; (6) the returning of Sa'iqa offices to that organization in Beirut; and (7) a new cabinet to be formed in Syria with Khlaifawi as Prime Minister.³³

The Agreement was rejected by Shamun and Jmayyil.³⁴ The Rejection Front also attacked it as an intervention in Palestinian affairs and claimed it bypassed the LNM completely.³⁵ In point of fact, the Agreement was a triumph for the Syrian side. It appeared that the Palestinians agreed to it because it allowed them to operate (at least theoretically) from all Arab fronts. Also, the main concern of the Palestinians at that moment was to lift the siege from Tal-ez-Za'tar and bring stability to Lebanon. As long as they were allowed to operate from Lebanon, they were willing to abide by the Cairo Agreement of 1969.

Despite the Damascus Agreement, however, Tal-ez-Za'tar and Nab'ah battles did not stop. Furthermore, Syria kept on shelling the South and the Mountain and did not lift its blockade of Tripoli.³⁶

Meanwhile, the LNM began to organize the areas under its control

so as to enable it to administer daily activities concerning food, health care, water, electricity and security. Previously, each component of the LNM was performing these matters separately. The LNM wanted to centralize these activities.³⁷ The Central Political Council was formed to take care of these matters and also to coordinate in a more efficient way the activities of the various LNM components. Jumblat was the Council President and Rafi'i was elected First Vice President and Ra'd, Qlailat and Hawi, Vice Presidents. Ibrahim was elected Executive Secretary. Bureau chiefs for all districts and functions were also elected.³⁸ Under pressure the LNM was forced to seek a more efficient and effective organization. This, however, was at least one year too late. Such a move had been needed from the beginning of the conflict to channel the efforts of the mobilized masses according to a general plan. But such a move was still welcome, as it signified the LNM was insistent upon the implementation of its program, and was gearing its efforts in that direction.

The first several days of August witnessed intensified right-wing military activities in which the main objective was to clear all areas north of Beirut from the LNM and the Resistance. For this reason the battle raged in Tal-ez-Za'tar, and other LNM areas were shelled. The Mountain fronts were especially important to the right wing, which sought to isolate Western Beirut from its sources of supply in Ash-Shuf. On August 4 the right wing announced it had conquered Nab'ah.³⁹ This LNM defeat made it more difficult for Tal-ez-Za'tar to resist. The attackers were amassing more troops for a major assault on the camp. Meanwhile, the LNM announced that it had no other option but to fight. Habash, of the Rejection Front, corroborated the LNM position by

announcing there would be no concessions, only resistance, and that the liberated areas were to remain as such.⁴⁰

The Resistance intensified its diplomatic efforts on the Arab and Lebanese levels in an attempt to prevent the camp from falling. It expressed its willingness to abide by the Cairo Agreement and called upon Syria to begin the implementation of the Damascus Agreement.⁴¹ The Syrians, however, were unwilling to do so. They first wanted to weaken the Combined Forces and pressure them to withdraw from the Mountain. The Syrians and the right were adamant to bring about the fall of the camp. The camp threatened the security of the right-wing areas in Beirut and the lines of communications of Eastern Beirut with the Mountain. In this way, the camp was frustrating the efforts to join East Beirut with the Mountain. In addition, the fall of the camp would relieve 10,000 troops for Mountain operations.

On August 12, 1976, Tal-ez-Za'tar fell after 52 days of daily shellings and repeated assaults. Its 2,500 defenders were almost annihilated in house-to-house fighting after the camp's defenses were penetrated. The remaining 12,000 camp residents were evicted and it was subsequently bulldozed.⁴²

Soon after the fall of the camp the right wing began preparing for the Mountain battles. Tank battles also raged in Beirut. The victorious right wing renewed its call for partition. Jmayyil, for instance, called for "decentralization" and for what he termed "unity in multiplicity".⁴³ The LNM reacted by calling upon the Arab League to protect Lebanon's unity. Jumblat followed this call by declaring that the LNM was not ready to negotiate with its adversaries who wanted partition.

To arrest this deteriorating situation, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were pressuring to have an Arab Summit meeting to take action against the partition. Sudan supported the efforts to hold such a meeting.⁴⁴

On August 16 the right wing began to fight in Ayntoura. The Resistance announced it would continue to fight and not compromise on relinquishing its positions in the Mountain. This announcement was in defiance of the Syrians, who were pressuring the Resistance to pull out from the Mountain. Three days later the right wing announced its intent to fight until it "liberated" all of Lebanon.⁴⁵ Meanwhile, Jmayyil announced he was for dialogue between Christians and Muslims.⁴⁶ These announcements were in fact designed to counter the diplomatic efforts of the LKP's adversaries, who were pressing for an Arab summit. Another attempt to derail the movement towards an Arab summit came about when Franjiyeh instructed the Lebanese ambassador to the U.N. to enter a complaint against "the tampering of the PLO with Lebanese sovereignty".⁴⁷ This request was interpreted as an attempt to internationalize the conflict.

The Commander (Saudi) of the Arab Security Forces in Lebanon met with Jumblat and Salam in an attempt to reach a cease-fire agreement. One of its provisions was to secure an LNM withdrawal from the Mountain.⁴⁸ Jumblat rejected the proposal since no cease-fire had ever held during the conflict. The LNM regarded the proposal as a way to surrender grounds to the Syrians and the right wing.

On August 21, Jumblat pressed for the convening of an Arab Summit. Saudi Arabia suggested the meeting be held in Riyadh, the Saudi capital.⁴⁹ Meanwhile, the LKP announced that diplomatic solutions had failed in Lebanon and that there was no other way but to

fight.⁵⁰ In effect, the LKP was repeating what the right wing had said earlier in its attempt to put hurdles in the way of the Arab summit. This right-wing position was congruent with Dean Brown's statement in Washington, D.C., on August 22. He was of the opinion that the armed conflict was going to be a long one and that "cantonization"--partition--was the solution which would prevent Lebanon from turning left.⁵¹ Partition was "creeping" in on Lebanon. In his capacity as Education Minister, Shamun signed an order that allowed the opening of branches for all colleges of the Lebanese University in Eastern Beirut.⁵² This move further solidified partition.

By August 24, it was apparent that the right-wing Mountain operations were unsuccessful. The right wing redirected the fighting to Beirut and shelled Western Beirut. These moves were accompanied by renewed attempts toward rapprochement with the Muslim traditional zu'ama in an attempt to isolate the LNM from any further negotiations on the Lebanese or Arab level. This was crucial to the right wing since the Saudis were criticizing Jumblat's position and had called for a Palestinian-LKP reconciliation.⁵³ This meant that the Saudis regarded the conflict as one between the Palestinians and the Lebanese. This portrayal of the conflict was in the interest of the LKP, which wanted to leave nebulous the internal contradictions that were brought about by the Lebanese system.

The Arab Security Forces Commander was still attempting to effect a cease-fire that stipulated the withdrawal of the LNM from the Mountain and the implementation of the Cairo Agreement. The LNM again rejected the cease-fire proposal. The Resistance argued that one of the parties to the Cairo Agreement was nonexistent (the Lebanese state).

The Resistance, however, expressed its willingness to abide by the Agreement and pull out from the Mountain as soon as a Lebanese state became a viable entity.⁵⁴

Meanwhile the fighting was raging on all fronts. To deal with this situation the Arab League asked for an emergency meeting of the Arab Foreign Ministers. The meeting was set for September 4.⁵⁵

On August 31, President-Elect Sarkis met with Asad in Damascus where Syria reaffirmed to him its support for his Presidency. During the last several days of August, Israel was claiming that a military and political vacuum existed in the South of Lebanon. On the last day of the month it intervened militarily in the Southern town of Aynebel and announced that Israel was not allowing a reconciliation in Lebanon to occur behind its back. On September 1, Israel "offered" to "protect" the Southern Christian villages and began to amass troops in Aynebel. Israel also declared it was not going to allow the Resistance to return to the South.⁵⁶

Jmayyil demanded the cancellation of the Cairo Agreement and called upon the Arab League to resolve the conflict. On September 5, however, he accepted an invitation to visit Damascus and then attacked the Arab League's initiative to resolve the crisis.⁵⁷ The Arab initiative began the previous day when the Arab Foreign Ministers met to determine the time and place of the Arab Summit meeting. On the same day of the Ministers' meeting, fighting escalated in Lebanon. The Saudi commander accused the right wing of escalating the fighting.

On September 5 the Arab League announced the time and place of the summit meeting: it was to be held in Cairo some time during the third week of October. Furthermore, the League established a

committee composed of some Arab Foreign Ministers to try to calm the situation in Lebanon before the convening of the Arab Summit.⁵⁸

On September 8, Shamun visited Damascus following a visit by the LKP delegation three days earlier. Shamun met with Asad and Khaddam, the Foreign Minister, and declared that Syrian troops were to remain in Lebanon as long as the Lebanese authorities were willing to accept them.⁵⁹

Jumblat countered these right-wing moves by declaring the LNM was not so pressed as to negotiate with anyone. He also said that Sarkis could help resolve the conflict if he were able to transcend narrow interests.⁶⁰ What Jumblat meant was that Sarkis must not side with the Maronites, be amenable to Syria's position on Lebanon, or agree to measures that consecrated confessionalism.

On September 11 the Resistance and the Syrians met in Shtoura in an effort to iron out their differences. On that day Arafat reiterated the Resistance's position regarding its withdrawal from the Mountain. Jumblat also called for the abolition of confessionalism and the adoption of the LNM reform program. He also attacked the traditional zu'ama for their reluctance to move toward the LNM position.⁶¹

In point of fact, these zu'ama had been intensifying diplomatic contacts to bring about a solution to the conflict since Sarkis had assumed the Presidency. On September 15 Salam met with Asad in Damascus. Egypt was also instrumental in that regard. Sadat of Egypt met on September 14 with Karami, As-Sadr and an LKP delegation separately. Taking advantage of their visit Karami and Bashhir Jmayyil met in the Cairo Hilton on September 15, where they discussed matters relating to Sarkis and stability. The Mufti also met with Asad in Damascus

before leaving for Egypt.⁶²

These meetings indicated that these traditional zu'ama were trying to bring an end to a conflict that would preclude the LNM and its program. In a meeting at Shtoura between Sarkis and Arafat on September 17, Sarkis demanded the Resistance's withdrawal from the Mountain. Sarkis' position was congruent with Franjiyeh's and Shamun's who had earlier announced that no negotiations were possible before the Combined Forces withdrew from the Mountain. The Resistance and the LNM in turn announced their unwillingness to withdraw from the Mountain before a solution to the conflict was found.⁶³

A second tripartite meeting was held in Shtoura on September 19. The meeting reached a deadlock on the question of pullout from the Mountain. The stalemate remained even after Sarkis assumed the Presidency on September 23.⁶⁴ The LNM was hoping that the Arab Summit would curtail Syria's influence somewhat. The Resistance, meanwhile, confirmed that diplomatic contacts were underway to convene a mini Arab Summit prior to the October 18 full Summit.⁶⁵

Unwilling to take chances with these Summits, Syria decided to have the Arabs face a fait accompli in Lebanon. In an offensive that lasted four days against LNM Mountain positions, Syria entered most of the LNM-held areas.⁶⁶ The LKP also fought the LNM in the Mountain and announced that it was going to continue the fight even if the Syrians were to stop. Sarkis and other traditional zu'ama had prior knowledge of the offensive. Salam was one of these people.⁶⁷

On September 29, the second day of the Syrian offensive, Egypt called for a mini Summit meeting to be held within forty-eight hours. On the first day of the offensive Jumblat was already in Cairo to press

for Arabization of the conflict. He later left for Saudi Arabia and Baghdad and returned to Cairo, where he consulted with Sadat on the mini Summit.⁶⁸

On October 1 the Lebanese army under Army Commander Sa'id was deployed in Aley against the LNM. The right wing also shelled Western Beirut and the Palestinian refugee camps. Meanwhile, an LKP delegation went to Damascus for talks with Asad.⁶⁹

In Cairo Jumblat called, on October 3, for a mini Summit meeting. He then left for Paris where he called upon France to intervene diplomatically to end the fighting.⁷⁰ On October 4, Qansu (of the BPO) announced that Syria was continuing its military solution and that it stood against any initiative that was not supportive of its plans.⁷¹

Despite the end of the four-day Syrian offensive, fighting raged in Beirut and the right wing kept shelling Western Beirut. The Mountain fronts were busy occasionally. The LNM kept pressing for a French initiative. These moves led Qansu to attack the LNM, the Resistance and the LAA.⁷²

After Paris, Jumblat visited Algeria and Libya on October 7, where he asked the two countries for material help. This prompted a Libyan delegation to leave immediately for Syria. Many events came in the way of these efforts. On October 8, the LNM criticized the Resistance for having met with representatives of Sarkis. The LNM was of the opinion that such meetings were counter-productive and detracted from the Arab and French initiatives. On that day also, Israel aided the right wing in shelling an LNM area in the South. The following day Israel and the right wing escalated the fighting in the South. And by October 10, the Combined Forces were under attack in the South, the Mountain and

Beirut.⁷³

The LKP renewed its threats of "liberating" all Lebanese territory. Syria helped by its attempt to discredit Jumblat among the Druze. Syria propped up certain Druze leaders to fight against Jumblat in coordination with the LKP. While the battles were raging all over Lebanon, an LKP delegation visited Syria on October 13 accompanied by Danny Shamun (Shamun's son) and the Druze Faisal Arslan. Later that day they were followed by Basheer Jmayyil.⁷⁴ On the previous day the right wing had opened a new front east of Sidon: Room-Jizzine. Street fighting raged there for five days.

These tactics were intended to derail the Arabization effort. On October 15, however, Saudi Arabia called for a mini Summit to be attended by Sadat, Asad, Sarkis, Arafat, King Khaled, and Prince Sabbah of Kuwait. The date was set for October 17 in Riyadh.⁷⁵

The mini Summit was held on schedule. It decided upon a ceasefire, the creation of an Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) under Sarkis' command, and a committee of four to guarantee the implementation of the Cairo Agreement within ninety days. The Riyadh mini Summit also called for dialogue among all the Lebanese warring parties. The Arab Summit meeting date was also postponed until October 25.⁷⁶

The right wing, however, with Israel's help, kept fighting in the South. The attempt was to defeat the Riyadh Agreement--and Israel was intent on not allowing the Resistance to return to the South. The right wing also wanted to crush the Resistance and the LNM.⁷⁷

Jmayyil suggested that the ADF should have international supervision. Shamun, however, refused to allow the ADF to enter the right-wing areas once it started its mission in Lebanon.⁷⁸

On October 25 the Cairo Arab Summit meeting rubber-stamped the Riyadh Agreement. Six countries agreed to participate in the ADF: Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Yemen, Libya, the Arab Emirates and Syria. The ADF was to have 30,000 troops, over two-thirds of which were to be Syrian.⁷⁹ In effect, the ADF became a cover for the Syrian invasion.

On October 27, Palestinian reinforcements from Syria moved to the South while others left the Mountain and Jizzine to bolster forces in the South.⁸⁰ At this time the Syrians had to strengthen the Resistance to help bring about a Middle East settlement in which Syria would be included.

Despite its rejection of the ADF entering its areas, the right wing accepted lest the war tide turn against it. After much delay the ADF entered (1) many areas [on November 8] including Junieh, the right-wing capital north of Beirut, and Khaldeh, south of Beirut; (2) [on November 9] the right-wing Mountain areas of Kahala, Bekfayya and Aynsa'adeh; (3) [on November 15] Beirut [eastern and western areas]; and (4) [November 20] Sidon and Tripoli. The ADF had control of all major areas in Lebanon except the South.⁸¹

On December 8 Sarkis asked Dr. Hoss, an economist, to form a cabinet of technocrats so that reconstruction could begin. The cabinet included the following Ministers: Bizri, Raphael, Doumit, Salam, Sheito, Boutross and Rizk.⁸²

After the Cairo Summit, Lebanon re-emerged with a confessional system and state as before. Lebanon, however, came out maimed and divided. No longer does one hear of the name Beirut without adding to it "Eastern" or "Western". There are right-wing areas and LNM areas. A "Christian" Lebanon exists in the South along the Israeli borders.

Confessionalism, thanks to Arab reactionaries and imperialism, has been maintained. This confessional state, however, lost its major feature: cohesion. Without cohesion such a state reigns only with the direct support of external forces.

Most significantly perhaps is the fact that the LNM was contained. The LNM, however, still enjoys the allegiance of the majority of the Lebanese. It had also matured under fire, the most importantly, it never relinquished its guns.

CONCLUSION

The June 1, 1976 Syrian invasion was instrumental in the containment of revolutionary development in Lebanon. Internally, the invasion was supported by the National Front and other zu'ama who were affiliated with it, and also by the Maronite right wing.

The Syrian invasion allowed the right wing to attack Palestinian and LNM areas. Tal-ez-Za'tar and Mountain positions came under heavy attack by both the Syrians and the right wing. The Syrians also tried to drive a wedge between the Resistance and the LNM through the Palestinian-Syrian agreement of July 26, 1976. However, the agreement was not implemented since the Syrians refused to pressure the right wing to lift the seige of Tal-ez-Za'tar or to move their buffer troops from the way of the Combined Forces relief columns.

The Syrian invasion was not inimical in the least to immediate interests of the U.S. and Israel. Both countries were interested in the defeat of the LNM and the Resistance, which Syria was more than willing to accomplish. The fall of Tal-ez-Za'tar, and Israeli

intervention in the South pointed out the immediate common interests among Israel, Syria and the Maronite right wing.

The evidence of complicity among these forces was overwhelming. Furthermore, this complicity allowed the LNM no choice but to develop organizationally to be able to meet the reactionary onslaught. To this end the Central Political Council was formed. The formation of the Council, however, was too late to be effective. Arab diplomatic moves were already underway to bring about an end to the conflict.

The Riyadh mini Summit meeting and the Arab Summit meeting in Cairo resulted in the containment of the LNM and the assistance, and provided professionalism with a lease on life. This lease on life, however, lacked the major feature of cohesion.

FOOTNOTES

1. Lebanon's War (Beirut: Dar-Al-Masseerah, 1977), 241.
2. Ibid.
3. At-Tariq (January-August, 1976), 347.
4. Ibid., Lebanon's War, op. cit., p. 242.
5. At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 345.
6. Lebanon's War, op. cit.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Interview with Fateh, The Revolutionary Council, September 9, 1978.
13. At-Tariq, op. cit.
14. Lebanon's War, op. cit., p. 244.
15. Ibid., p. 243-244.
16. Interview with Rejection Front members, August 15, 1978.
17. At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 348.
18. Interview with Rejection Front Members, op. cit.
19. At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 245.
20. Lebanon's War, op. cit., p. 245.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., p. 246.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 247.

25. Ibid., p. 246.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 247.
30. Ibid.
31. H. Hassan, Lebanon from Ayn-El-Rummaneh till Riadh (Baghdad: Thawra Publication), 81.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., pp. 81-82.
34. Lebanon's War, op. cit., p. 249.
35. Ibid.
36. At-Tariq, op. cit., p. 351.
37. Lebanon's War, op. cit., p. 247.
38. Ibid., p. 249.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., p. 250.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., p. 251.
50. The Two-Year War (Beirut: Dar-An-Nahar), XV.

51. Lebanon's War, op. cit.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. The Two-Year War, op. cit., p. XVI.
56. Lebanon's War, op. cit., p. 252.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. The Two-Year War, op. cit.
60. Ibid.
61. Lebanon's War, op. cit., p. 254.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., p. 255.
67. Ibid.
68. The Two-Year War, op. cit.
69. Lebanon's War, op. cit., p. 256.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid., p. 257.
74. Ibid., p. 258.
75. Ibid.
76. The Two-Year War, op. cit.
77. This is evident from many statements by right-wing leaders.

78. Lebanon's War, op. cit., p. 258.
79. There were already 20,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon.
80. Lebanon's War, op. cit.
81. The South was below the "red line" which Israel had warned the Syrians not to cross.
82. Lebanon's War, op. cit., p. 263.

CHAPTER TEN

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

At the dawn of independence the landlord class and the comprador fraction of the bourgeoisie were dominant in the Lebanese social formation. Their state displayed a power bloc in which high finance was hegemonic. The landlord class, however, was extremely powerful and without it the power bloc could not have been possible. The Lebanese state displayed another important feature that was characteristic of its historic development. This feature, confessionalism, was the form of state that was capable of resolving intra-power bloc conflict and conflict among the class fractions of the dominant classes in the social formation. Confessionalism, then, was that form of state that attended to the "common interests" of the dominant classes and provided polity cohesion.

This form of state arose because of the particular historic development of Mount Lebanon that was inseparable from that of the rest of the region. Feudalism had been firmly established in the Mountain since the early sixteenth century. The majority of the peasantry were Maronites who suffered under the multi-confessional feudal lords. These peasants came to rely upon the Maronite monks in their conflicts with the feudal lords. The Maronite monks represented a powerful institution that increasingly came into conflict with the feudal mode of production. As such, this institution was able to articulate the aspirations of the peasantry. The revolts that occurred further united

that institution with the peasants. Most significant in this regard were the massacres of Maronite peasants at the hands of Druze lords or their co-religionists. Despite the class nature of the conflict, these sectarian activities made it appear as if the conflict were between the Druze on one hand and the Maronites on the other.

Meanwhile, power politics were instrumental in bringing about and taking advantage of this sectarianism. The various powers, in their efforts to prey upon the Ottoman empire, became "protectors" of the different confessions. The Maronites, because of the developing relationship with France, began to establish themselves in commercial activities in the coastal towns. Most Maronites, however, remained in the Mountain and worked their own lands or, employing cottage industries, made silk for export. This was especially true in the Mutassarrifiyya period, when political arrangements reflected the growing influence of foreign powers in Lebanon.

Most importantly, perhaps, was the fact that the Mutassarrifiyya was a confessional arrangement where zu'ama of the various sectors formed a central political council whose function it was to aid the governor in the affairs of state. By having proportional representation of each sect on the council the "protector" of the most numerous sect guaranteed itself more influence than did the other "protectors". Furthermore, the class nature of society became nebulous with this arrangement. Zu'ama who had much in common with each other posed as representatives not of their own interests but the interests of their confessions. Peasants were divided along confessional lines. These divisions were supported by a whole tradition of sectarian conflict.

The coming of the allies in WW I to the Middle East further

developed the commercial class and financial fractions of the bourgeois class fractions through the creation of Greater Lebanon, in which the dominance of the Maronite bourgeoisie in turn strengthened the colonial grip on the polity.

The conflict among the dominant classes centered around the struggle for independence. Some class fractions of these classes sided with the French while others opted for independence. The victory of the independence forces was a result of specific class alignments which established the first regime, El-Khoury's.

The peasantry, workers and petty bourgeoisie functioned as supporting classes for the bourgeoisie in the fight for independence. This was so because these classes were already divided along confessional lines with allegiance to their respective zu'ama. These divisions also precluded the organization of political parties independent of the bourgeoisie or the landlords.

The period between independence and the Battle of Lebanon witnessed increased uneven development of the economic sectors and the geographic regions. The attendant consequences were disparities of income and wealth among the population. Economic development in Lebanon favored Beirut and Mount Lebanon. In Beirut the Maronites were already in prominent positions in economic and political activities. In the Mountain they comprised the overwhelming majority of the population, especially in the North.

The primacy of the services sector of the economy was a result of the strong linkages that colonialists had established between Lebanon and the international capitalist market. The "infrastructure of

dependence" was created for the most part by these colonialists. Tourism, trade and finance helped build the Mountain areas into summer and winter resorts and Beirut into a bustling center for Middle East business activity. The rest of the geographic regions were, for the most part, left undeveloped or became under-developed. In these areas the overwhelming majority of the population were Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims.

The confessional system allowed the dominant classes in the social formation to practice policies inimical to the country's social and economic development. Through economic and other types of legislation the dominant classes, and especially the hegemonic bourgeois class fraction in the power bloc, exacerbated Lebanon's economic ills. Inflation and recession worsened as the country was opened more to international finance.

Confessionalism prevented a serious challenge by components of the power bloc to the hegemonic comprador bourgeoisie that was mostly Maronite. The comprador increasingly sought to improve its position (politically and economically) at the expense of the rest of the power bloc components. A tenuous situation emerged that on a few occasions threatened the existence of the confessional arrangement. In fact, on two occasions the consequences of the intra-power-bloc conflict were two civil wars. This was proof that the political system was incapable of accommodating the varied interests of the dominant classes, let alone the interests of the population.

Imperialist interests and those of the comprador were congruent but diametrically opposed to those of the majority of the Lebanese.

Ideologically and politically, these two interests expressed themselves in "Lebanonism" and in "Arab Nationalism", respectively. The first major conflict between these two ideologies reached its peak in the 1958 civil war. Certain power bloc and other zu'ama rode a wave of Arab nationalism in an attempt to topple the Shamun regime and thus enhance their position in or enter a newly-formed power bloc. The interests of these zu'ama were congruent with those of the majority of the masses. However, the masses were not organized in political parties independent of these zu'ama, nor were they capable of articulating their interests on the level of the "political". Consequently, they were engaged in political practices such as supporting classes of the non-Maronite bourgeoisie or other zu'ama not in the power bloc.

The hegemonic class fraction, which was predominantly Maronite, and its allies relied on those fractions of the lower classes which belonged to their confessions and/or those who entered into a zaim-client relationship with their respective zu'ama. In the case of the majority of the Maronites, for instance, these kinds of relationships were possible due to the relatively higher incomes these people enjoyed compared with the fractions of the lower classes of other confessions or of those who lived in the other regions.

The demise of the Shamun regime dealt a heavy blow to the comprador bourgeoisie and to imperialism in the region. Confessionalism, however, remained intact mainly because of U.S. intervention and because the zu'ama were not serious about changing the confessional system. The political system was powerful enough to prevent any actual change in the mode of production. While economic planning was

attempted under Shihab and some reforms implemented, these reforms did not challenge the existing economic structures.

Furthermore, the modernizing trend that Shihab represented failed to defeat the zu'ama institution. In fact, in his attempt to weaken this institution Shihab was forced to rely on some zu'ama. His attempts to shift the decision-making process in the state in order to bypass the zu'ama backfired. He left the presidency without implementing most of the reforms he had planned.

The supposedly Shihabist regime of President Hilu did not accomplish much reform either. Despite the fact that industry was given more importance under Shihab and Hilu, most of this industry was geared to export. As such it primarily benefited foreign trade, a major component of the services sector. This was especially the case since most raw materials were being imported or the value added was to imported semi-finished goods that were in turn exported. At any rate, when the Hilu regime was finally over the country was experiencing major economic dislocations.

During these times the Palestinians in Lebanon were contributing to Lebanon's economic development without receiving much. In addition, the dynamics of the political situation in the Middle East further contributed to the intensification of the internal contradictions of the polity. In general, the major contradictions were ideologized in "Lebanonism" versus "Arab Nationalism". The conflict intensified after the Palestinians became an organized armed force that enjoyed the support of the majority of the Lebanese masses.

The alliance that developed between the Palestinians and the

Lebanese masses came about because both perceived the state as the enemy. The state was responsible for creating the conditions that led to their poverty and migration to the cities. The state was also incapable of protecting their border villages from Israeli raids. These perceptions contributed to the worsening political situation.

The period after 1967 witnessed increased politicization of the masses. Anti-system political parties were on the ascendency as more people retracted their allegiance from the zu'ama. This was an important step in revolutionary development. It signified the beginning of a shift in the class practices of the spontaneous mass movement; the masses were not content with their role as supporting classes and were, in fact, looking toward developing more independent political class practices in the field of the political (the class struggle). Certainly the armed presence of the Palestinian Resistance contributed greatly to revolutionary development in Lebanon. That presence also provided the "organic" link between the Lebanese masses and those in the rest of the Arab world. Such a presence was contradictory to the interests of the dominant classes in the social formation. And it certainly was in conflict with "Lebanonism".

Inevitably, given the political economy of Lebanon, "Lebanonism" was transformed into "Maroniteism". This was evident on the level of the "political" when major defenders of confessionalism were the LKP, the PFN and the NB. These Maronite parties were firm believers in "free enterprise" and were supported by the Maronite middle class and working class fractions. These parties, however, represented the Maronite bourgeoisie. Shamun was a comprador capitalist and Edde' a banker. The LKP represented Maronite industrialists and commercial

and tourism interests.

The Maronite Order of Monks, Franjiyeh and lesser Maronite fractions also added fervor to "Maroniteism" and thus rendered it less palatable to the rest of the Lebanese. Non-Maronite Christians and Muslims in and out of the power bloc recognized that "Maroniteism" was even contradictory to the National Pact and, consequently, to confessionalism. This was one reason for the lack of support for the Hilf among non-Maronites. The Maronite Shihabist also were not supportive of the Hilf. Although the Shihabists were "Lebanonists", they were also "Modernists", and as such primordial themes such as "Maroniteism" were, to say the least, displeasurable to them. Under Shihabism, Muslim "modernizers" such as Karami could find "Lebanonism" appealing. Shihabism also had a friendly relationship to the Arab nationalist regimes.

However, this "Lebanonist" trend was an aberration in the polity's development. It was partially viable in times of relative calm in the region, but as was said earlier, it came into conflict with the entrenched confessional zu'ama institution. More importantly, Shihabism was unable to develop a mass base that would have enabled it to become an alternative to "Maroniteism". Given the political situation of the region, the masses were beyond "Lebanonism" in any of its forms. "Lebanonism", to borrow a phrase from Marx, was "the religion of the bourgeoisie."

The LNM was the organized expression of the nascent mass movement. It developed as a reaction to the onslaught of the right wing, which was against the anti-system and socialist parties on one hand and the

Resistance on the other. Basically, the LNM was a loose coalition of the progressive parties whose members came from all the religious sects. These parties were generally trying to institute reforms by utilizing the political process. In this fashion they were able to mobilize the already-politicized masses to fight against confessionalism and demand its overthrow. In this conflict the LNM was capable of allying with the already-alienated Muslim establishment, which was also seeking major changes in confessionalism. This, however, was an uneasy alliance since the bourgeois and landlord Muslim establishment were not in favor of the total overthrow of the system. It was still hopeful of reaching an understanding with the Maronite right wing to bring about a new form of confessionalism. It appeared that this hope rested on the Muslim establishment's conviction that the Maronites would prefer to reach an agreement with it, rather than jeopardize confessionalism.

The LNM also included zu'ama such as Jumblat. He, however, was anti-system and relied upon a confessional base, the Druze, to articulate his political philosophy. His party, the PSP, which also included a minority of Christians (including Maronites) and Muslims, was anti-imperialist, pan-Arab, anti-confessional, democratic, and stood for social and economic reforms. Jumblat was one of the factors which enabled the LNM to utilize the political process in pressing its reforms on the system.

The negative aspect of this feature was the fact that the LNM did not, for the most part, find it important to pursue other courses of action against the right wing. The Maronite right wing was arming itself to the teeth while the LNM was content with the fact that its

strategic ally, the Resistance, was militarily strong. The LNM also relied heavily upon the assumption that it was politically strong enough to push for gradual change in the system. It seemed that the LNM opted for reforming state institutions such as the army, not realizing that although the Resistance was militarily strong, it was crucial for the LNM to keep an independent political line. Without military strength, its political line could be compromised.

The downfall of the military government was a defeat for the right wing and testimony that the LNM and its allies were powerful enough to challenge the president's prerogative. The LNM, however, did not pursue its demand for a cabinet where it would have been heavily represented. This was so for various reasons, primarily because it did not want to break up the Syrian initiative which was instrumental in forming a new cabinet. Furthermore, the LNM remained convinced that a peaceful solution could be found to the conflict.

The Karami cabinet and the NDC provided proof that the right wing was not in the least interested in pursuing a peaceful resolution to the conflict. As it turned out, the right wing was preparing for an offensive to secure the geography of the partition. To stop this option the LNM applied diplomatic and political pressure on the right wing. These kinds of efforts were incapable of realizing their objective. The LNM, although it anticipated such an offensive, was incapable of mounting a preemptive offensive to link West Beirut with Karantina, Nab'ah and Tal-ez-Za'tar.

The LNM was still unwilling to break away from Syria and was militarily weak. The traditional nationalist anti-imperialist role of Syria, and especially its role in the 1973 war, obfuscated the nature

of the Asad regime from most of the political parties that comprised the LNM. Only the ABSP consistently warned the LNM of the Syrian role. However, the LNM was reluctant to heed these warnings because it was cognizant of the animosity that the two wings of the Ba'ath harbored for each other. The feeling within the LNM was that these warnings were motivated by this animosity.¹

Another reason for not breaking with Syria was purely logistical. Most of the arms for the LNM were coming through Syria. The LNM was incapable and found it unnecessary to develop another source of supplies. On various occasions, in fact, the pro-Syrian BPO was selective in delivering arms to the various LNM components that bought the merchandise.²

Before the Battle of Lebanon, a frontal attack on the state would have been undesirable and perhaps counter-productive. The LNM was improving its position through "peaceful" means. But because the LNM knew very well that the organs of state power were frequently used against it, it should have prepared for other eventualities. This failure to prepare adequately for armed conflict was perhaps the major error the LNM had committed prior to the Battle of Lebanon.³

In analyzing Lebanon's politics, the literature on political development either employs the "Christian" and "Muslim" categories or regards the conflict as being partly sectarian, partly class and partly cultural. This eclectic approach does not shed light on the underlying reasons for this sectarianism nor on the way it conditioned the class struggle, which manifest itself in a particular form. In its study of politics and history, this approach is unable to fully transcend

appearances.

Confessionalism had its material reasons, which may be discerned through an analysis of the development of the political economy of the Lebanese social formation. Sectarian conflict was the special form that the class struggle partly assumed, but was not the cause for conflict. Sectarian conflict is not an analytic category that can be employed in the analysis of Lebanon's politics nor of the battle.

Despite the great strides that the LNM had achieved on the level of the "political", the Maronite right wing was in firm control of the state machinery, especially the presidency and the army. The right wing opened up the battle with the aim of smashing the LNM and the Resistance through the use of the most formidable organ of the state--the army--which had already been used against the Resistance and the unarmed demonstrations of students and workers, even before the Sidon February 1975 incidents. The latter and the subsequent bus incidents, however, indicated that the right wing was intent on recouping the other organs of the state from LNM influence. The coexistence of the LNM, the LKP, the PFN and other pro-system forces in the same cabinet was certainly a temporary arrangement that portended rough times ahead for Lebanon.

The class alliances that were struck between the LNM and the Muslim sector of the bourgeoisie and other bourgeois fractions were necessitated by the opposition of all these forces to the method the right wing chose to settle accounts with its adversaries. Some comprador bourgeoisie, such as Edde', were against upsetting the confessional arrangement and were looking ahead with the presidency in mind. Other bourgeois fractions were willing to settle for some reforms provided

the confessional arrangement were not challenged. The Muslim sector of the bourgeoisie was, for the most part, in favor of increasing its political power by having more say in the running of the state machinery.

Since the right wing was opposed to all of these reforms, these forces had no choice but to ally with the anti-confessional LNM. The Muslim establishment also opted for this alliance in an effort to keep its legitimacy among the masses who were increasingly shifting their support toward the LNM.

The LNM provided the masses with the opportunity to be represented in the field of the political. This was possible because the LNM included "working class" parties such as the CP, the ASAP and the OCA. More importantly, the "minimum program" articulated the aspirations and needs of the masses at a particular stage of revolutionary development. The program was also capable of connecting the short- and long-term goals of the revolutionary movement.⁴

The Resistance was also unwilling to render massive support to the LNM in such an offensive even if the LNM had opted for it. The Resistance was pursuing a course of action that the Palestinian leadership thought was most appropriate for the achievement of its goals under the circumstances. On various occasions these goals were not congruent with those of the LNM.

The LNM offensive that cleared all right-wing positions south of Beirut was possible because of heavy Palestinian and Syrian commitment to it. The Sa'iqqa and the PLO participated in it. This offensive showed that in many instances the LNM political leadership was bypassed by the Syrians and the PLO in decisions of great importance such as the

offensive.⁵

The lack of a guiding revolutionary ideology in the LNM was perhaps a major reason for the reluctance of the LNM to prepare itself militarily prior to the battle. The lack of such an ideology, however, was because of certain reasons which may be sought in the way the revolutionary movement developed. Initially, the LNM began forming (in 1969) as a reaction to right-wing attacks on both the Resistance and the Lebanese anti-confessional forces. More important perhaps is the fact that the Lebanese social formation displayed a sizeable peasant population with small land lots. This population still believed in private property. The recently-formed agricultural laborers were still caught up in the za'im/client relationship. Furthermore, the new migrants to the city did not have a tradition of factory work. Most industrial establishments were small (less than 20 people). And most of these workers had menial jobs which were unsteady, or not in industry. Also, many of them still had ties in the countryside where they either had small land lots or other family members.

The country's small size is also crucial in explaining the persistence of these ties. For one thing, it was easy to communicate between the city and village. All of the above factors may be added to the fact that the country had a sizeable petty bourgeois class in the cities whose members either worked in their own shops as artisans or retailers of goods. In addition, because the country relied heavily upon the services sector, many of the low-level white-collar workers were captive to the bourgeois ideology.⁶

For these reasons the ideology of the LNM was reformist, petty bourgeois and reconciliationist. The make-up of the mass movement

reflected the presence of these classes in the social formation.

The contradictions within the polity and the way these interacted with the external factors, however, propelled the LNM forward and forced it to assume more "radical" methods in its fight against the right wing. An LNM with a radical petty bourgeois ideology was further forced to differentiate itself from the pro-Syrian forces. This was an important milestone for revolutionary development. Another step followed when the LNM decided to go it alone on a military offensive.

The LNM Mountain offensive was significant for the following reasons: (1) the decision was purely an LNM one and the Resistance had to oblige; (2) the LNM realized it had to become hegemonic in the social formation and a new state if it were going to effect its program; (3) the Syrian role in Lebanon was called into question and exposed to the masses; and (4) the capability of the LNM and the Resistance to defeat the right wing militarily relegated all pro-system *zu'ama* to the sidelines of the battle.

The June 1, 1976 Syrian invasion was disastrous to the LNM. For one thing, the ultimate decision was to acknowledge the presence of Syrian troops as occupiers who were able to contain the LNM and the Resistance. Once the Syrians were in Lebanon, the majority of the Muslim sector of the bourgeoisie chose to cooperate with Syria rather than with the LNM. Additionally, many groups within the LNM opted for cooperation with Syria to bring stability to Lebanon. This alliance was also spurred by the opening of a new front by Israel and the right wing in the South. The main point, however, was that this cooperation was not an alliance between peers but between a victorious occupation army and a contained LNM.

Because the LNM did not opt for a military solution until a late stage in the battle, it was careful not to allow its adversaries to accuse it of working for partition (an accusation later leveled against it by Asad). For this reason it failed to centralize and take charge of administering the areas under its military control. As with the NDC, the reluctance of setting up a central political council allowed many of the traditional leaders who lost legitimacy among the population to stay on the loose and pretend to exercise more power than they in fact had. As with the NDC, the non-existence of a political council allowed these zu'ama to pretend to represent the masses and contact other Arab and foreign states to work out a solution that could keep confession-alism intact.

Jumblat himself regretted the fact that this central political council was not established earlier. However, he advanced policies such as implementing land reform in the LNM-liberated areas that other groups within the LNM rejected.⁷ For these reasons the spontaneous mass movement lost a great opportunity to mature and propel the LNM further along the road of revolutionary development.

Local administrations that did exist in LNM areas were set up spontaneously and haphazardly. They lacked coordination with each other. Because of these reasons the populations in many of these areas were subjected to the whims of profiteers. Instead of individual efforts being directed in a more efficient manner to support the LNM, it went toward securing the next loaf of bread. The spontaneous mass movement that gave almost everything in support of the LNM was not given the opportunity consolidate its gains by organizing itself.

It was for all these reasons that the Central Political Council

was finally established under the pressures of the Syrian invasion. The LNM hastened to establish it because they realized there was a probability of a protracted war against the Syrians and other adversaries. As it turned out however, the LNM opted for a solution of the conflict through political means. Jumblat, who in March of 1977 was assassinated (by whom?), had second thoughts about that method. He wondered whether a protracted war against the Syrians and the other adversaries should have been started.⁸

It may be easy to say what should or should not have been done a few years later. However, these regrets and second thoughts came from the leader of the LNM, who gave his life for the cause in which he believed. Whatever the case may be, the fact is that the LNM remains the force which is best equipped to carry out the revolutionary process in Lebanon. It also remains the only organized force to which the masses give allegiance. More important, perhaps, is the fact that the LNM has been strengthening itself on all levels. Militarily, politically and diplomatically it is increasingly becoming more independent of its allies in its political line. The Battle of Lebanon provided the revolutionary movement with extremely important lessons, but the price was steep. The LNM has long way to go yet to free itself of petty bourgeois radicalism lest it pay a steeper price in the future. To meet the requirements of the mass movement and revolutionary development the LNM must reflect on the lessons of the battle and become guided by revolutionary Marxism.

The situation created after the Cairo Summit of 1976 presented a confessional state guaranteed by the ADF. This state, however, lacks

the main feature of the state: cohesion. This occurrence was possible since the social formation is a highly penetrated one. This high penetration is for the following major reasons:

1. Lebanon is a dependent country. Consequently foreign powers can exercise much influence on its politics, as was demonstrated by the 1958 U.S. military intervention and by the Brown mission during the battle.
2. Lebanon was carved out of Syria. As such the two countries have a special relationship which allowed Syria to exert much influence on Lebanese politics, especially during the battle.
3. The country's size is small, and it lacks natural resources that could equip it to steer a different political course if it so desired. Any attempt to change the system or even modify it would run the risk of being smashed by internal forces aided by external ones.

The curious situation of a state without cohesion provides Marxism with the opportunity of examining whether this phenomenon exists or could exist in other dependent social formations, and if so, under what conditions it might be possible. Be that as it may, a further study of this phenomenon could be started in Lebanon to gauge the impact of this state of affairs on the development of the revolutionary movement. Marxian theory may be enriched from such an effort.

Another point that relates to the theoretical framework is the following: Poulantzas spoke of class fractions--for instance, the comprador bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie are two fractions of the same class. In terms of Lebanon, the category "class fraction"

certainly applies; however, I found the need to speak of the "Maronite sector of the bourgeoisie" or the "Muslim sector of the bourgeoisie". The distinction is crucial in that the new category "sector" refers to more than one fraction of the same class where the Muslims or the Maronites of each fraction come together to form the "sector" of the class to defend its common interests as Maronites or Muslims. This distinction between "class sector" and "class fraction" seems, at least in the case of Lebanon, to spring from the historic development of politics and economics where the various confessions were differentiated so that it became necessary to take this differentiation into account. The new category "class sector" allows us to understand better power-bloc politics and class alliances between power-bloc fractions and others of the same class in the social formation.

The category "class sector", however, does not take precedence over the category "class fraction". In Lebanon, allegiance to the "class fraction" was primary. As an example, Edde', who is from the Maronite sector of the bourgeoisie had common interests with its other elements such as Shamun and Jmayyil: all wanted to keep the Maronite sector of the bourgeoisie hegemonic in the power bloc. Edde', however, was compelled to take issue with the LKP on the Battle. His emphasis was on Lebanon's unity, which led him to accept the need for some reform. This was contrary to Shamun's and Jmayyil's interests, which emphasized primarily their hegemony over the power bloc, a position that actually led them to opt for armed conflict.

FOOTNOTES

1. Interview with Dr. Rafi'i, September 9, 1978, Baghdad, Iraq.
2. Jumlat, This Is My Will (Al-Watan Al-Arabi, June, 1978), 109, 123, 148.
3. According to Jumlat, the Resistance did not really want to see the LNM militarily independent. This LNM weakness limited its options during the battle, ibid.
4. By improving itself militarily and organizationally (short-run goals), the LNM would be in a better position to effects its program by pursuing state power (long-run goal).
5. Jumlat, op. cit.
6. This refers to the belief in private property and conspicuous consumption.
7. Jumlat, op. cit., pp. 124, 145-146.
8. Ibid., p. 155.

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