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Accomplishing Tibetan identity: The constitution of a national consciousness

Klieger, Paul Christiaan, Ph.D.
University of Hawaii, 1989

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ACCOMPLISHING TIBETAN IDENTITY: THE CONSTITUTION OF A
NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN ANTHROPOLOGY
MAY 1989

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work was for himself an act of Tibetan patriotism. For whatever insight this work may have in the everyday experiences of Tibetans trying to be Tibetan, it has been made possible by Karma-la. As such, this work is dedicated to him.

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a study of individual and collective accomplishment of national identity among Tibetan refugees based at their political center of Dharamsala, India, and extending in recent years back to their homeland. Incorporated in this study is an analysis of various historical periods in the development of the Tibetan governmental apparatus which has traditionally defined the State of Tibet as separate from China. It is suggested that modern praxis is consistent with these historical precedents. The conceptual framework utilized is based on the structure-as-process approach of Sahlins, Jean Comaroff, Ian Hodder, and structural historians who view change and continuity as aspects of the same phenomenon. Important events, such as the 1959 Lhasa Uprising which was immediately responsible for the diaspora, are interpreted on the basis of long-term structural change in Tibetan society. Data for this study were collected primarily through informal interviewing, participant observation, and archival research. Field sites include Dharamsala, Kathmandu, and various locations in Tibet itself.

A long-term patron/client relationship, the sbyin-bdag dyad between secular and clerical elements in traditional Tibetan society, provides an apparent continuity of practice
among actors in exile. Its apparent continuation provides ideological support for a resilient Tibetan identity in exile. While the sbyin-bdag dyad is envisioned to have merely reproduced itself at various periods in Tibetan history up to the present, it has itself been the primary agent for change in society. This is especially evident in the recent diaspora. In accommodating western agency as a new form of patronage, some of the differential relationships between traditional clerical and secular elements have changed. Among these are increasing secularization, western-style nationalism and centralization to the decrease of traditional monastic franchise. An idea of a western-style, sovereign, independent State of Tibet has gradually developed out of these changing relationships.
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NOTES ON TRANSLITERATIONS

Numerous attempts over the years have tried to present a transliteration of Tibetan into Roman script that can satisfy conflicting requirements. Due to silent consonant clusterings, literal transliteration from Tibetan spellings in no way approximates pronunciation. On the other hand, if phonetic spellings are approximated, the native reader or Tibetan scholar would have no way of ascertaining which homonym was referred to. Full spellings, where appropriate, are given according to the Wylie system (1959) which seems to be accepted by many native scholars and by many western Tibetologists. The names of informants, widely-known place names and Tibetan terms are transcribed according to the form which they usually appear in popular western literature which often is close to actual pronunciation. I have also largely dispensed with the English affectation of capitalization of many proper nouns in transliteration, which would seem inconsistent with Tibetan practice as well as being graphically unwieldy.

Secondly, Chinese transliteration into the modern pin-yin of the People's Republic seems out of character with some secondary western historical sources that I utilize. Since the majority of western scholars dealing with Tibet have chosen to continue using the standard Wade-Giles convention, I have adopted it with pin-yin following in
parentheses where appropriate. (Tibetan refugee historians often utilize Wade-Giles as well [as in Taiwan]).

Sanskrit terms are transliterated according to modern conventions.
"The very enterprise of social science, as it determines fact, takes on political meaning... All social scientists, by the fact of their existence, are involved in the struggle between enlightenment and obscurantism. In such a world as ours, to practice social science is, first of all, to practice the politics of truth." (Mills 1973:11)

In reporting the truth, the researcher becomes the benefactor of the group he or she studies, and the ethnography itself often becomes a statement of advocacy. Reporting the truth as we see it, while protecting the anonymity of the people we study, is the primary responsibility of anthropology (American Anthropological Association 1970:14-16). My work is an ethnography of a resistance movement (see Nash 1976), thus I have been burdened by a certain amount of ethical dissonance between ideology and practical matters. This is a position comparable to many Tibetan refugees who have chosen to live and work in a host environment, yet remain "Tibetan" until such time that their country is liberated.

The question of the political status of Tibet has been an active cause for debate in the world community at least since the final decline of the Manchu Ch'ing dynasty in China. It is still unresolved, especially from the refugee point of view.

I was first introduced to Tibetan culture as an undergraduate by Dr. Frank Bessac at the University of Montana.
Bessac was one of the very few foreign adventurers who visited Tibet prior to the communist occupation in 1951, and among the last. He later went on to be trained as an anthropologist, and obtained his PhD at Wisconsin. Despite the fact that Tibet had become completely closed to foreign visitors, let alone to modern researchers, I decided at that time to try to develop a course of action in my academic career that would allow me to continue my "quixotic" interest in Tibetan studies. The history of western studies of the area indicates a regular cycle of opening and closing of Tibet. I had hoped to be prepared when Tibet again opened.

In Hawaii I was introduced to two Tibetan lamas who had established active Buddhist dharma centers in the Islands. I began a private study of Tibetan Buddhism and language under the Nechung (Gnas-chung) Rinpoche, abbot of the State Oracle institution of the former (and now exiled) Tibetan government. For the first time I learned of the thousands of refugees who had resettled in South Asia in the wake of the Chinese occupation, and of their efforts to conserve Tibetan institutions and cultural identity. And while I had previously been aware of the Dalai Lama's exile in northern India, I was quite surprised at the apparent magnitude of the religious establishment that had been built around the "god-king's" representatives in the West.
After having made a few contacts at the University of Hawaii and with other native Tibetan scholars, I headed off to Dharamsala in northern India, in 1978, for preliminary work on the culture of Tibetan refugees. Expecting to find the Tibetans in a sad state of resignation towards some inevitable assimilation into Hindu society, I was dumfounded at what I saw. Outwardly, at least, the Tibetan refugees acted in a manner which to me (based on my readings) seemed entirely traditional, and not the least bit "refugee." The clothing, their buildings, language usage and mannerisms, down to the possession of innumerable Lhasa apso dogs, were entirely what one would expect if one dreamed of a small village in the Tibet of, say, the 1940s. I was to learn much later that much of display is more likely due to very successful "impression management" on the part of the Tibetan refugees. I, a foreigner, had certain expectations of what Tibetans should look like and act, and they did not disappoint me. At the time, the oppositions between the Tibetans and neighboring Indians seemed real enough—yet I later began to question whether they were "traditional" oppositions.

Tibetan nationalism and separate identity had strengthened by the time of my fieldwork in 1986-1987. By the mid-1980s, Tibet itself was open to tourists, researchers, and visiting refugees. The "Tibetan Question" has again surfaced in the consciousness of the West. It
seems clear that the status of the state of Tibet and the Tibetan people is a process of negotiation between native actors and those on the outside who express an interest in the region.

We have some credibility to call the Tibetan exiles a "culture" if simply by the fact that they tell us so. But to large extent, perhaps, the Tibetans have either accepted our notion of culture or have developed one of their own which neatly separates themselves from their neighbors. What is the nature of this formulation? And perhaps more importantly, is the process by which the Tibetans have formulated the boundaries of "Tibetanness" consistent throughout their history or at least considered such these days? If so, we may have the basis of a "persistent" people. Is the Tibetan identity system in diaspora consistent with perceived traditional patterns? Native Tibetan history and its claims to statehood is mythologized, according to some Chinese and western scholars. But these accounts are Tibetan nevertheless. Whatever claims they may have to genuine tradition and continuing institutions in exile, a boundary continues to be drawn between those within and those without. This study attempts to understand these processes.
The tiger's stripes are on the outside.
Man's stripes are on the inside.
--Tibetan Proverb

Jigme's Assertion

Jigme Dhondup may in some aspects be the prototypical new generation Tibetan refugee. Jigme is in his mid-twenties, born and raised in the large Tibetan diaspora community of Kathmandu, Nepal. He has completed his secondary education, one which emphasized fluency in English. Like many Tibetan refugees in South Asia, his material standard of living is generally better than most Nepali or Indians. He likes popular western music, and is a fan of Rambo and Chuck Norris movies.

I first met Jigme in Lhasa at one of the new hotels built for foreign tourists. He had been hired as an interpreter by a western physician, a "trekkers' doctor," who worked out of Kathmandu. One could hardly refer to Jigme as a seasoned tour guide, for this too was his first trip to Tibet. With his camera, western clothes, mannerisms, and idiomatic English, he stood in marked contrast to local Tibetans. While apparently he was perceived as an "authentic" Tibetan back home in Kathmandu,
enough so as to be hired by westerners as a guide to Tibet, here he was treated by westerners and locals alike as just another foreign tourist. When Jigme spoke to locals in flawless Tibetan, however, their response was to gape in perplexed amazement.

For Jigme, trying to be Tibetan in his homeland was disheartening. Many times in front of the main Lhasa cathedral, the Jokhang, Jigme was often besieged by local Tibetan girls— the "walking souvenir stands," selling their spurious Tibetan jewelry to westerners. Apparently Jigme similarly qualified as a potential customer. Jigme, in his embarrassment, told me that many of these local Tibetans thought he was Japanese.

On one occasion inside the Jokhang, the sanctum sanctorum of Tibetan Buddhism, Jigme sat alone in despondency and frustration as the endless queues of homespun-clad Tibetan pilgrims filed past the ancient statue of Jo-bo Rinpoche, the Lodestone of the temple. He obviously did not feel a part of this community, and preferred to stay near the company of his western charges.

After a few days of these unsettling encounters, Jigme had an idea: We headed off to the Barkhor, the central bazaar of Lhasa. We walked past stalls of gaudy "Tibetan" carpets from Nepal, brightly colored plastic combs and mirrors from China, finally stopping at a vendor selling souvenir Tibetan jackets to tourists. Jigme tried on a
cheaply made black cotton jacket, with its bright blue polyester lining trim—clearly a poor imitation of the traditional wool homespun jackets with silk brocade typical of the style still worn by men in the Tsang province. Eventually in the stacks of readymade, Jigme found a jacket which fit. Donning it in front of the mystified saleslady, Jigme proudly proclaimed, and without the slightest conceit of sarcasm, "Now I am a Tibetan!"

We walked back to the tourist hotel, passing many French, American, Danish, and Italian men and even ladies clad in the same black jackets with polyester trim. Jigme showed a studied indifference. A few days later Jigme returned to Kathmandu, having demonstrated for himself, at least, an idea of what it means to be Tibetan. In a sense, he was a Tibetan tacitly play-acting at being "Tibetan" by wearing souvenir garb. He succeed in meeting not the local Tibetan expectations, but the expectations of western tourist ideas of "authentic" material culture, one which would qualify more appropriately, however, back home in Kathmandu. Jigme's presentation of self was conditioned by outsiders in an active process of negotiation. Jigme's assertion is representative of a general pattern of individual and group praxis which defines Tibetan identity.

Meaning is never absolute, but negotiable among actors. I suggest that much of Tibetan refugee culture is based on an active articulation of the idea of "what it means to be
Tibetan" between refugee actors and the expectations of
their western benefactors. Refugee culture, then, is not a
"maintenance" response as much as it is an inventive one.

This study is an investigation of the nature and the
process of accomplishment by which exiled Tibetans
demonstrate their uniqueness to their host society and other
benefactors—a practice which to many refugees seems
consistent with past experiences in the homeland. At times,
as in Jigme's case, statements of cultural identity by
refugees may seem to outsiders to be studied, superficial,
or even contrived. But it is of primary concern for Tibetan
refugees to try to maintain that oppositional process. The
motivation to maintain a strong notion of "Tibetanness" has,
in fact, become the primary business of the Tibetan refugee
leadership. Although the context in which refugees
accomplish their corporate identity has changed in exile,
and some of the representations of this identity show
innovation, the oppositional process in which Tibetan
cultural identity is constructed has remained quite
constant throughout a long period in Tibetan history. In
short, it is this oppositional process which has kept the
Tibetans Tibetan. It is not necessarily dependent upon a
continuation of the content of "traditional" cultural
expression. This is evident in the diaspora communities in
South Asia through the action of their day-to-day
activities.
To be as succinct as possible, this is a story about historical and modern Tibetans' rhetoric and action along the theme of national sovereignty. It is an ethnography and a history of a small group of people who conceivably have tried to "maintain" a tradition that some have considered the last existing example of an "archaic civilization" in the modern world. I suggest, however, that the telling of the Tibetan story involves some thing other than the terms "maintenance" and "tradition" would accord. Change and continuity are mutually dependent concepts—not polarities along a continuum (Sahlins 1981). Being Tibetan is a continual process of interpretation and negotiation of meaning between historical preconceptions and practical circumstances.

The Problem

Almost without exception, western historians and Tibetologists tend to introduce their work on Tibet by contrastive statements. The romance of the forbidden kingdom of snow, the Shangri-la of mysticism and pristine isolation is developed, then counterbalanced with accounts of shocking descriptions of Tibet's sudden cultural destruction in the wake of the occupation by the People's Liberation Army in the 1950s (see Avedon 1986; Harrer 1954). Such style makes colorful copy. Other writers, sensing perhaps this overly idealized view of the Tibetan situation,
have prided themselves on being able to present similar material in a detached, objectional, rationalistic manner. Often, however, these prosaic interpretations are either simply devoid of life or consider "reality" to be realized from a kind of Hegelian synthesis of the Tibetan viewpoint together with the Chinese (see Grunfeld 1987).

My point is that there are many styles of interpretation, many Tibets. The Han Chinese have a certain recognizable style of perceiving the Tibetan people, the West another, and the government-in-exile of the Tibetan refugees who fled their homeland after 1959 presents its own interpretation. Perhaps none of these viewpoints have any greater or lesser claims to the ultimate Truth, and my own interpretation of Tibetan culture hardly attempts such.

What Tibet is and who the Tibetans are is an interpretive process, one which presumably affects the Tibetans themselves more than those on the outside. This process of determining, maintaining, and adjusting the parameters of cultural identity has become a consciously articulated and demonstrated activity for Tibetan refugees living in South Asia, as indeed it is for many groups of displaced people. What was tacitly maintained through experience with the mundane business of existence in old Tibet has been brought into sharp consciousness by the experience of involuntary emigration. The processes by which, specifically, a national identity is achieved in an
exiled Tibetan community, in suggested continuity with the past, and how that model has influenced modern Tibetans in their homeland, are the main topics of this study.

Tibetan refugees tend to refer to the "maintenance" of Tibetan identity in exile. While the goal of maintenance is to preserve the status quo ante bellum, it is of itself anything but a static phenomenon. Identity is a constant process of the interpretation of present circumstances and the accommodation of these experiences upon a perception of tradition. In the process of attempting to reproduce the structure of traditional Tibetan culture, a "maintenance" procedure, innovations have occurred. This is due to inherent variability in the interpretation of "tradition" (see Handler and Linnekin 1984; Linnekin 1983). In time, many of these innovations become embedded in categories of traditional expression and are no longer considered novel. They become tacitly subsumed within "tradition," while actual change has occurred. One could say that today's traditions are based on yesterday's innovations.

What is being maintained in the refugee communities is not so much the traditional culture of pre-occupation Tibet, but a view of that tradition as it has interacted with the western and South Asian benefactors that have financially maintained the refugee communities for 29 years. This reinterpreted tradition is presently the corpus of information that is utilized to construct the notion of
Tibetanness in exile. One of the major innovations that has occurred in the attempted structural reproduction of traditional Tibetan culture in exile is the emergence of a shared concept of national consciousness increasingly modeled on western patterns of sovereignty. On this basis, Tibetan refugees have proclaimed their right of independence for Tibet. It is an attempt to retroactively ascribe de jure independence to an area which had de facto independence from 1913 to 1950.

The western concept of a modern nation-state had not been realized "sufficiently" in pre-occupation Tibet to allow for recognized de jure independence by the Great Powers of the West. Tibetan nationalism in its present form is an innovative construct not based entirely on events of the 1959 Tibetan Uprising, but from the destruction of the imperial Chinese polity in 1911. The Tibetan concept of State in the early 20th century reflects political and ideological innovations developed in the 17th century. Those invented traditions were rearrangements of even older symbols of nationality. These constructions of nationality seem to be based, however, on the reinterpretations of a long-enduring social structure--a dyadic patron/client relationship. This dyad helps define the native concept of the Tibetan state in the modern day as well as in various periods in the past. It also helps position the role of the individual in regards to the collective.
I will attempt to show in this work that modern Tibetan national identity is constructed upon a redefined notion of the ideal patron/client relationship in apparent continuity with past interpretations of this dyad. Tibet as a client state to a powerful patron has historically defined the Tibetan polity, and this concept is similarly utilized to define the position of Tibetan diaspora society in regards to various western agents of support.

The ideology of the patron/client dyad has its origins in early Indian Buddhism where it was conceived as an ideal pattern of mutual responsibility between lay benefactors (or the State) on one hand, and the monks (or established Church) on the other. Over time and through the establishment of the Tibetan theocracy (a synthesis of Church and State), the State assumed client status among various Mongol, Chinese, and Manchu agencies of patronage. By a modern transformation, refugees have replaced Central Asian agencies of patronage with western ones, and by this process, a new interpretation of the ideal Tibet has been created among Tibetans: Tibet as a western-style independent country, but one which needs support from the outside world. Reconstituted patron/client relationships provide apparent consistency to an idea of the State which is expressed in the modern diaspora.

This research includes a study of a particular community of Tibetan refugees which is the political core
of the diaspora generated by the tumult of the 1959 occupation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China. Approximately 100,000 Tibetans, or about 5% of the total population of the region, have been involved in this emigration. This exile population now inhabits a wide band of the southern Himalayas, stretching from Ladakh in the far northwest of India, through Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan to Assam in eastern India, with much smaller populations abroad in Switzerland, the U.K., the United States, and other western countries (Fig.1).

The main focus of this research is not concentrated upon a "typical" refugee community of the diaspora, but rather its heart--Dharamsala in the state of Himachal Pradesh in northern India. Here is the residence of the exiled Dalai Lama and his government-in-exile. Their institutions attempt to provide the foundation upon which Tibetan national identity is articulated throughout the diaspora and to the outside world. Similarly, Tibetan documents and histories are drawn from the center--the traditional Tibetan government and the modern government-in-exile.

One goal of this research is to demonstrate that Tibetan refugee culture is a product of certain long-durational structures interacting with the flow of contemporary events. Between interacting forces of conservatism and innovation, I sense that Tibetan cultural
Fig. 1. Tibetan Refugee Settlements in South Asia

(Information Office of H.H. Dalai Lama 1981)
systems, both in the past and in the present refugee situation, have been constructed around patron/client dyads reflecting the general ideology of gifting to religious personages. The practice of the Tibetans and non-Tibetans supporting monastic institutions is an important aspect of "traditional" and refugee life, as it is in other Buddhist regions.

The Tibetan term mchod-yon ("object of veneration/benefactor"²) is a specific type of religious patronage (usually translated "patron/priest" in the West) which defines the relationship between politically powerful religious leaders in Tibet and their Mongol and Manchu patrons. I suggest in my work that these sorts of relationships help define the ideal of the Tibetan state in regard to the world among modern Tibetan refugees. The ideal helps provide a perceived consistency to their definition of themselves as a people, as well as to their presentation of "self" to the outside world.

Religious patronage of Buddhism by secular agency has its probable origins in Ashokan India, at a time when Buddhism was becoming an important political force. Similar sorts patron/client relationships can be seen in the structure of the Buddhists states of the T'ang dynasty of China and in modern Thailand and Burma. Buddhism was introduced to Tibet in the 7th century A.D., failed and was re-introduced. The particular mchod-yon set of role
relationships was invented in the 13th century as a means of political control over Tibet by the Mongols through lama vice-regents. It appears to have been later idealized by the developing Tibetan theocracy, drawing upon various images and themes in Buddhism regarding the optimum relationships between the saṅgha (Skt. gloss: "the Buddhist clergy") and the laity. As such, the high priest was considered inherently superior to his lay patrons by the clerical establishment, even when such a patron was the Emperor of China. The specific, historical mchod-yon ended with the Chinese revolution in 1911, yet it appears that Tibetan leaders have continued to attempt to re-establish such patronage with outside powers ever since.

I suggest that religious patronage of politically-based monasteries since the 13th century remains at the core of Tibetan national identity into the diaspora. The mchod-yon dyad may be an example of a long-durational structure, but it too has undergone certain transformations over time. In turn, these re-orientations may have changed other aspects of Tibetan culture. But the process by which modern Tibetans seem to identify themselves with this social arrangement, whatever form it has taken, seems to be a key to the understanding of their relative persistence of a people through time and through such events as the changes in 20th century China. As such, it appears to be a factor
in the demonstrated non-assimilative tendencies of modern refugee life in South Asia.

As the mchod-yon is illustrative of the relationship between the Tibetan state and its Asian patrons, the more general term shyin-bdag or patron of religion (Skt. dānapati) seems to be evident at all levels of Tibetan society, from the relationship between an individual and his lama, to the perception of the Tibetan State vis-à-vis the outside world. While the actors have changed, innovations have occurred, and even the structure itself has been modified over time, the ascription "Tibetan" to this process seems to have had a certain consistency. I suggest that this dyad and its transformations can serve as tools for understanding both Tibetan history and the present refugee situation, and may help to explain why they are refugees in the first place.

**General Overview**

I present a theoretical model in Chapter 2, which may accommodate change and continuity within the praxis of a developing Tibetan national identity.

Chapter 3 provides a methodological approach to these questions, examining some of the particular problems that one encounters working with Tibetan refugees. I also introduce Dharamsala as the center of an international diaspora.
In Chapter 4, I present examples of refugee historians' interpretations of the establishment of the mchod-yon dyad between high lamas and powerful Mongols in the 13th century. This is contrasted with official PRC history of the same period. I also offer an analogy between mchod-yon and its closest equivalent in western history—the relationship between the Papacy and the Empire. In addition, primary material from official Tibetan histories of the past are also presented. These were provided me by researchers at the Tibetan government-in-exile's Library of Tibetan Works and Archives. I had asked the archivist to find references to the mchod-yon from official documents and from native historians, which one could presume are accepted as credible by the Tibetan government. An additional requirement was that these documents should not be widely known in the West. This was done merely to add to the body of data of western Tibetology. The selection of these materials by Tibetan governmental agents for presentation to a western scholar is itself a demonstration of the accomplishment of Tibetan national identity.

Chapter 5 examines the native presentation of the mchod-yon during the rise of the Dalai Lama institution during the Ch'ing dynasty of China. By these selections, the historical samples provided in Chapters 4 and 5 suggest the "presentation of historical self" according to Tibetan refugees. It is essentially an interpretation of history.
according to present circumstances. It is representative of the ideals of the Tibetan state according to Tibetan refugees, as this material has been selected by them.

Chapter 6 notes the apparent continuity of the political ideology of the sbyin-bdag dyad from the demise of the Manchu empire to the present-day refugee community. I present an analysis of the changing status of the Dalai Lama and his government-in-exile. In attempting to reproduce the traditional sbyin-bdag dyad during this period, certain structural changes occurred. This appears to be evident with the trend towards secularization of the State and enfranchisement of the laity.

I discuss the establishment of patronage dyads between modern Tibetan refugees and various western agents in subsequent chapters. Chapter 7 examines the propitiation of exiled lamas by religious benefactors in the West. The novel experience of direct foreign aid and individual sponsorship of the Tibetan laity is discussed in Chapter 8. Entrepreneurial responses to tourism in the Himalayan regions is considered by many Tibetans to be indicative of western patronage. This is examined in South Asian refugee communities (Chapter 9), as well as in Tibet proper (Chapter 10). Chapter 11 examines the individual demonstration of Tibetan patriotism through exchanges between returning Tibetan refugees, local Tibetans, and western tourists in Tibet. I also frame the nationalistic uprisings of Tibetans
in their homeland in late 1987 within the context of the long-term accomplishment of Tibetan national identity.

**Shangri-la and other Approaches to Tibetan Studies**

"Tibetology" was originally a product of the British academic system and its cousins, wherein "areas" were the focal points and all scientific, artistic, and social disciplines relevant to a particular area were examined. It is no surprise that the history of the original impact of western Tibetology roughly corresponds to the presence of the British in the Himalayan region in the mid-19th to the early 20th centuries. Furthermore, as Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, and other Himalayan states closed themselves off to Europeans, the course of Tibetan studies shifted from research based on first-hand observation to that based on archival and museum collections of Tibetan literature and artifacts. It is not surprising, as Bharati (1978) has commented, that many of the "great masters" of Tibetan studies in the first half of the 20th century could not speak a word of the native language. By the late 1940s, much of Tibetan studies requiring access to "live Tibetans" had become a distinctly "armchair" endeavor. Alternately, some anthropologists reconstructed Tibetan history and traditional culture from the recollections of exiled informants (e.g. Ekvall 1964).

Tibetan historical and comparative philological studies, requiring documents and artifacts instead of
"people" fared much better through this period, as the expert works of Hoffman (1976), Snellgrove and Richardson (1968), Stein (1972 [1962]), as well as various Russian, Japanese, and Hungarian scholars demonstrate.

Nepal began to open to European visitors and researchers in the early 1950s following the overthrow of the Rana dynasty of prime ministers and commencement of the direct rule of the Crown. Bhutan began admitting foreigners in the 1960s. India, with a sizable portion of the Tibetan refugee diaspora, has been at times open to their study by foreign researchers. And within the last few years, even the Tibet Autonomous Region in China has been accessible to western social scientists. It has been possible for foreign scholars to initiate work, albeit under varying degrees of restrictiveness, for at least a half a generation. The results of this work are presently being disseminated with increasing frequency, displacing the period of "armchair" Tibetan study.

At least five approaches to modern Tibetan studies can be seen developing in the West. First is the popularized (and no doubt high profitable) travelogue style of books, articles, and films. This phenomenon appears to have been a result of a build-up of western public fascination in the Himalayan region, enhanced by generations of foreign inaccessibility to Tibet. Predictably, coffee-table format books abound, often replete with stimulating photographs and
proportionally distorted text. The combination of closed borders and a dramatic, colorful culture produced a mystique of an other-worldly region. The perpetuation of "intrigue" has been readily accomplished by these publications. Editorial review boards, either overly impressed by the beauty of the photographs alone, or handicapped by the lack of genuine understanding, have tended to publish anything and everything presented on the subject—whether distorted or not.

This approach, which often evokes images of Tibet as "Shangri-la" (from Hilton's 1933 Lost Horizon) certainly has not been overlooked by more authoritative authors. Harrer refers to this under the general category of the western "lure of Tibet" (1985:28). Notably, some of my Tibetan informants have called these overly romantic accounts "Rampa-ism," after the chicanery of a certain son of an English plumber (Lobsang Rampa) who wrote best-selling pieces of fiction about Tibet in the 1950s and 1960s and claimed them to be factual (see Rampa 1956).

As a casual experiment on the impact of Shangri-la on non-fiction Tibetan studies, I did a quick survey of the book titles on the shelves in the Tibetan section of my campus library. The following nouns and adjectives were noted: "forbidden, lost, magic, mystery, secret, mysticism, fantasies, hidden, question, wonderlijk, wunderland." Shangri-la connotes these images of Tibetan culture, and
ascribes authority to interpret and translate the occulted Tibet to practically anyone who can demonstrate that he or she was there. Ethnographic authority, too, is often "guaranteed" by the researcher's ability to "reveal" the mysteries of the East (Said 1978).

It is ironic that the popularity of this "distorted" view (as if I have any claims to reality in my study) of Tibetan refugee culture as a survival from an ossified past has actually resulted in an economic stimulation and socio-cultural change in these South Asian communities. Refugees have responded to the western interest in them by presenting a version of themselves at every opportunity—a version, however, which has been negotiated between the western preconceptions of Tibetans and the Tibetans' expectations of westerners.

Ironically, the self-image of the persistence of Tibetan refugees as carriers of a viable culture with a strong sense of identity is antithetical to the dour prophecies of the Shangri-la school. The romantic notions of Tibet as a delicate, archaic civilization fit well within Boasian acculturation mechanisms. Change, brought about by western contact, is inevitable and ultimately destructive. However, Tibetan refugee culture is not necessarily subject to the sorts of imminent dissolution that some of these writers, influenced no doubt by old anthropological ideas, have suggested. Nor have Tibetans
themselves merely reproduced traditional patterns as far as possible, tossing out those arrangements that do not "fit" the new circumstances (see Corlin 1975).

The Tibetan refugees themselves have responded to the presence of overly sentimental western interpretations of their culture. My informants have suggested that it is beneficial in helping to attract world attention to themselves and their nationalistic goals. Have then the nature of Tibetan culture and the identities that people obtain from it changed in response to the preconceptions of the West? Are the Tibetans responding to an ideal model of "Tibetan tradition" imported from the world of romantic western anticipation? In a pejorative sense, Tibetan refugee culture may have become a caricature of itself by this influence, but it is considered by native actors as being Tibetan nevertheless.

The second category of modern western Tibetan studies is the approach of classical scholars in history and comparative philology who are the students of Snellgrove, Hoffman, Stein, and others. This field appears to be growing (Beckwith, personal communication).

The third thrust of western Tibetan studies, Tibetan religious systems, has been accelerated by the spread of Tibetan Buddhism to the West by exiled lamas. Western scholars Evans-Wentz (e.g. 1935; 1957), Snellgrove (e.g. 1957; 1959), and Tucci (e.g. 1932) had of course published
before the diaspora. Since the exodus however, scores of Tibetan clerics have been re-established in the West in their role as religious teachers, ensconcing themselves initially, as with Zen, ISKCON, and other eastern-based philosophies, within the ideology of the 1960s western counter-culture. The establishment of Tibetan Buddhist study centers and temples in the U.S., Canada, Europe, the U.K., and Australia, the ordination of western monks and nuns, and the financial power of support that these centers supply to mother communities in South Asia are testimony to this trend's development.³

Tibetan studies generated through the auspices of western Tibetan Buddhist centers have focused on publications of lamas and their students on popular Buddhist themes. Collections of religious drawings, translations of Buddhist sūtras and tantras, hagiographies, poems, and philosophical discourses are characteristic of the work of this religiously inspired group.

A fourth approach to Tibetan studies is evident in western comparative religion, perhaps typified by the students of Stein, Tucci, Snellgrove, etc. Again, the substantial interest in Tibetan Buddhism in the western academic world has had a beneficial secondary effect on the Tibetan ethnogenic movement by providing exposure to the Tibetan refugees and their formulation of national identity. Comparative religion departments have, in turn, benefited
from the resources of Tibetan lamas. The spirited works of Hopkins and his students and colleagues (e.g. Hopkins and Napper 1983) have been exemplary.

Finally, various anthropological analyses of the maintenance of Tibetan cultural identity in exile have been offered since the mid-1960s. Corlin (1975) studied culture change among Tibetan refugees in rural Nepal, as has Chhetri (personal communication). Palakshappa's (1978) rather broad study of Mundgod Tibetans (North Karnataka State in India) was based on fieldwork in 1966-1967. Pulman (1983) has subsequently studied the Karnataka Tibetans. Native Tibetan scholar Ugen Gombo (1985) focused on economic adaptation of Tibetans living in Kathmandu. Paljor Tsarong has investigated monastic economies in northern India (personal communication). Aziz (1978) examined the political economy of Tibetan indigenes in northern Nepal. Goldstein (1985; 1978) has published on the agro-business system in South Indian refugee settlements. Tibetan refugees have also been studied in the U.S. by Messerschmidt (1976) and in Switzerland (Ott-Marti 1976). Devoe (1983), Nowak (1984), Calkowski (personnal communication), and Gold (1984) are among the first anthropologists to have studied Tibetan refugees, specifically, in northern India.

Both Nowak and Gold emphasize certain symbolic metaphors which define and perpetuate Tibetan identity in northern India. Nowak concentrates on the system of
Tibetan education as the "prime mover" for continued Tibetan cultural identity. Gold contends that participation in popular annual festivals such as the month-long New Year's celebration has been a major focal point in the process of Tibetan ethnic identification. Devoe has examined traditional reciprocity networks as an economic factor which maintains refugee culture.

I suggest the model devised by Sahlins (1981; 1985), Braudel (1980), and others could be applied to the Tibetan situation. It may be able to provide a certain diachronic consistency to various factors which seem to be at the heart of modern Tibetan national identity.

Such factors include the ideological justification of the attempted re-establishment of traditional institutions and their apparently successful operation, the innovations involved in their attempted reproduction, and the continuing, yet altered relationship between the two segments of the Tibetan world, the laity and the clergy. The patron/client dyad seems to be such a configuration that is well-suited to a structural history approach. The dyad is older than other important Tibetan concepts, such as the Dalai Lama institution and rule by incarnation. In fact, many modern Tibetans trace it back to early Buddhism in India.

Buddhism is a dominant element in Tibetan culture, and its primary relationship to the practical world of living
humans is through the ideology and praxis of the sbyin-bdag dyad. The interaction of this relatively conservative structure with the forces of potential change in the refugee context may be an appropriate stage for understanding "what being Tibetan" is all about.
Notes

1. This figure is controversial. Both the estimate of the number of refugees and the population of Tibet varies from source to source. The government-in-exile of the Dalai Lama figures lie at the upper extreme in both variables, the PRC lies at the lower extreme. The refugee figure mentioned is from the Dalai Lama's sources (Information Office 1981), and the population of Tibet from Prince Peter of Greece and Denmark (1979) (in Grunfeld 1987:219). The rationale for choosing these figure is that the Dalai Lama is the logical choice to have accurate statistics on the diaspora population. Prince Peter's estimate is close to the mean figure of various other estimates.

2. This is a contraction of mchod-gnas dang yon-bdag "the object to which veneration is shown and the dispenser of gifts." The term yon-dbäg and sbyin-dbäg have different historical usages (Jäschke 1965 [1881]:516). However, sbyin-dbäg seems to be used exclusively these days among Tibetan refugees to refer both to patrons of religious institutions and supporters of lay Tibetans. This "fusing of horizons" is an important change in refugee society—one which perhaps reflects the novel circumstance of the laity's present access to foreign support which traditionally was the prerogative of the clergy in the mchod-yon and other sbyin-dbäg relationships.

Also note that the order of the dyad in English usage is reversed in Tibetan: i.e. mchod-yon as "priest/patron." I suggest that this reflects the ideological superiority of the religious client in Tibet, in contrast to western assumptions (Mauss 1967 [1925]) of the inferiority of the client. This provides a very significant difference in the interpretation of Tibetan history vis-à-vis some modern Chinese writers.

3. No study to date has been able to specify the amount or relative percentage of support which is generated by western dharma centers in support of parent monasteries in South Asia. The accounts of monastic revenues are strictly kept secret from the laity, either western or Tibetan—perhaps following the twin themes of esoteric license and economic franchise common to traditional privileges of priestly rule. But one may get a rough idea of the growth of this system by noting over time the development, building, and furnishing of certain monasteries in South Asia corresponding to the success of their outposts in the West.
CHAPTER II
A THEORETICAL DESIGN

Continuous Change, Perpetual Identity

An important event occurred in Tibet just after I had returned from fieldwork and began writing this dissertation. A popular, nationalistic uprising was generated in Lhasa in September, 1987 which resulted in numerous arrests and killings of local Tibetans, the detainment of visiting Tibetan refugees, and the deportation of western journalists and tourists. It was among the most significant events in the 29 years of Tibetan diaspora.

Writing about this particular event in the "time of the chronicle and the journalist" (Braudel 1980:27f) gave me added insight that event history is often merely the immediate expression of structures which themselves have much longer time-frames and cohesiveness through the history of a particular people. The relationship between the flow of such apparently isolated events and the deeper structures of the "long-duration" (Sahlins 1981) in regard to "Tibetanness" is the subject of this inquiry. It is my main postulate that there is a deep structure forming the foundation of a system that has served to define the Tibetan people in the past as well as the present. Such a structure links the Tibetan refugees to their past, and is capable of accommodating innovations, generating and regenerating
symbols by which people identify, and subsequently creating oppositions between themselves and others.

However, this structure, expressed in the ideology of patron/client dyadic relationships in Tibetan society, does not merely reproduce itself in history. In the refugee context, while Tibetans have apparently tried to merely substitute the patronage of the past with western agency, some of the basic relationships within their own social structure have changed as well. Western patronage has effected a structural change in refugee society. This inquiry therefore, is directed not at the static maintenance of Tibetan tradition in exile, but rather the creation of a Tibetan culture. Furthermore, this diaspora culture is perhaps no more artificial than the creation of Tibet in other periods of history. What is important is that modern Tibetans view contemporary events as being consistent with a perceived past. This apparent continuity makes the experience of being Tibetan valid despite innovation.

In inventing their culture, Tibetan refugees appear to utilize the same basic process by which Tibetan culture has been invented in the past. This process provides continuity in how they define themselves and others, whereas the content of their cultural expressions has changed markedly. In the refugee experience, this identity process has manifested itself as a claim to independence and full nation status for their homeland. This new definition of
nation has been recently imported into the homeland itself.

In building an analytical framework for understanding the articulation between contemporary Tibetan experience and the long-term structural history of these people, it is first important to examine the idea that all cultures are invented. Subsequently, I suggest that a structure-as-process model developed by Sahlins (1981; 1985), Braudel (1980), and others is especially applicable to the Tibetan situation. Thirdly, I suggest that Spicer's work on persistent identity systems can be helpful in accommodating the process of culture change with the accomplishment of identity.

The Invention of Culture

Roy Wagner has proposed that ethnography is the product of the anthropologist's "invention of culture":

Anthropology is the study of man 'as if' there were culture. It is brought into being by the invention of culture, both in the general sense, as a concept, and in the specific sense, through the invention of particular cultures. Since anthropology exists through the idea of culture, this has become its overall idiom, a way of talking about, understanding, and dealing with things, and it is incidental to ask whether cultures exist. They exist through the fact of their being invented, and through the effectiveness of this invention (1975: 10).

The fieldworker's immediate distanciation from his own culture and the attempted socialization within the host community places him in an unique position. While most other members of the host community learn social competence tacitly, the anthropologist's enculturation takes place in
an acutely conscious mode. Over-indulgence in one's self-consciousness in the attempt to be competent in a strange setting is familiar as culture shock. Moreover, even the subjects of his study will often feel the necessity of objectifying their patterns of behavior and beliefs in order to present them to the stranger in their midst (Handler and Linnekin 1984). As the anthropologist invents a culture for his people, they invent culture for him as well (Wagner 1975: 11). This process seems particularly true among Tibetan refugees, whose very existence as a separate, "national" culture has been attacked by some outside elements, and thus have great motivation to articulate a "good" image of themselves to sympathetic outsiders--outsiders which are not only a significant component of their economic and political systems, but who help define the Tibetan existence itself.

The responses of informants and the writings of anthropologists, although motivated by a quest for "reality," are symbolic constructions:

The study or representation of another culture is no more a mere 'description' of the subject matter than a painting 'describes' the thing it depicts. In both cases there is a symbolization, one that is connected with the anthropologist's or artist's intention to represent the subject in the first place (Wagner 1975:11).

The point that the anthropologist creates a view of culture on the basis of both his or her present circumstances (in the field) and his or her past (socialization
within the culture and profession) is not a unique perspective for the anthropologist—everyone must do it in order to be a competent member of his or her own society. The anthropologist's position within an alien context, however, brings what is usually a tacit process (or at least an inarticulate one—Asad 1986:161) within immediate consciousness among his informants as well. What was never questioned in the host society (by adults, at least) becomes a subject of questioning for both the anthropologist and the informant.

I suggest that many Tibetan refugees, faced with the real possibility of the disappearance of their separate identity, have become their own social scientists. The continuation of diaspora society and the accomplishment of individual Tibetan identity is based on a conscious questioning of the nature of traditional Tibetan society. Tibetan exiles are distanced spatially and temporally from the source of an "unbroken" cultural milieu as represented in their pre-1959 homeland. As such, they must decide, under conditions of limited resources, what of their old culture is important, irreplaceable, and vital for a proposed continuation of a conceptual "Tibetan culture." Certain institutions must conceivably be maintained, others discarded. Subsequently, children need to be socialized into this abstracted vision of traditional culture and made to identify with it as an important essence of their being.
The Tibetan exile government, educators, monastic lineage heads and other diaspora leaders are charged with the responsibility of providing such a model. One high government official whom I worked with was particularly interested in my research on Tibetan identity. Any "scientific" insight that could demonstrate a core of Tibetan identity was welcomed, as it might be utilized in applied programs of mass education for the Tibetan exiles. Saklani's statistic-based sociological work on Tibetan refugees (1984), for example, was well-received. One informant was favorably impressed with her survey data which "proved" that the Tibetans maintain strong institutional loyalty and identity. This scientific assurance of their viability was also noted in Dawa Norbu's enthusiastic review of Saklani's book in the Delhi-based Tibetan Review (1986).

The everyday Tibetans that I worked with, as well, seemed openly concerned in assuring that their behavior would be considered appropriately "Tibetan" to their own society and (significantly from my perspective) to outsiders whom they knew were writing about them. Refugee mothers were concerned about their sons travelling to Tibet. It was anxiously hoped that their offspring would present to both local Tibetans and western tourists a good impression of themselves as "real" Tibetans—Tibetans, who by going into exile with the Dalai Lama, demonstrated their unbroken allegiance with the traditional Tibetan culture of
pre-occupational Tibet.

The presence of westerners in the refugee communities (and now in Tibet) has had a significant impact on how Tibetans conceptualize themselves. Tibetan refugees read the western ethnographies and histories about themselves. In this sense, traditional meaning is actively negotiated, repeatedly, between the observer and the observed. According to Asad,

"In modern and modernizing societies, inscribed records have a greater power to shape, to reform, selves and institutions than folk memories do. They even construct folk memories (1986:163)."

In Dharamsala, Tibetans were fond of viewing the BBC-produced video, "Tibet--the Lost Mystery," a compilation of newsreel footage of pre-1950 Tibet with extensive commentary by major western pro-independence figures such as Sir Hugh Richardson and Heinrick Harrer. Older Tibetans would bring their children; adolescents would come on their own volition. For several weeks the video played to packed houses. To most Tibetans that I talked to, attention seemed to be directed to the content of the portrayal of traditional Tibetan culture, not to the context of the interpretation of said culture by outsiders. It was westerners in the audience who occasionally complained that the interpretation presented in the video did not match their own.

The process, then, by which I am attempting to provide a model of Tibetan diaspora culture is structurally similar
to the process by which Tibetan refugees themselves attempt to provide a framework for a contemporary exile circumstance that has a perceived continuing association with traditional Tibetan life. Both are consciously derived symbolic constructions. And both cannot fail to possess, however minimal or constructed through the most meticulous methodology and adherence to "fact," a note of contrivance.

The existence of over a thousand years of written, native history suggests that this process of negotiation is not novel. Both diaspora and "traditional" cultures have been invented. Tibetan refugees have constructed a culture that attempts to present itself as traditional--yet a major component of that expression demonstrates a mechanism of incorporation of sympathetic westerners. This tendency towards accommodation of outsiders is made to seem to be consistent with past practices regarding Mongol and Manchu supporters. Modern refugee life is characterized by a type of active, proselytizing nationalism which may seem to be a major innovation in diaspora society. Yet it may be simply a reinterpretation of Tibetan nationality according to western parlance. I suggest that in attempting to reproduce some major aspects of the traditional social system in exile and under western agency, certain basic components of that system have reoriented themselves.

Structure as Process

The inherent weakness in the structural/semiotic
paradigm, one which does not allow it to smoothly handle
time, is that the structure itself has to be made to disappear
in order to allow for change. Here, structure is of a
completely different conceptual order than time or process.
As such, structure has the capability only of reproducing
itself endlessly through time. If "structure" is
confronted with an event in which reproduction cannot be
achieved, it must break down, throwing actors into liminal
states while a new order is constructed. Cultures, thereby,
are often seen as "delicate" phenomena, at great risk to the
forces of potential acculturation and disappearance such as
culture contact or modernization. As Hodder points out,
"systems [maybe considered] so basic in nature that culture
and individuals are powerless to direct them" (1986:7).
This is a distinct trend towards determinism, aggravated
especially if the system is considered adaptational.

This theme has dominated both the popular and academic
literature in studies of the recent Tibetan diaspora, as
well as being expressed in the political policies of such
host nations as India, Nepal, and Bhutan regarding Tibetan
refugees. Assimilation of the Tibetans at home is in fact a
recurring expectation of PRC strategists. Much attention
has been paid in the West to those who have been among the
"last" to portray Tibetan society before it "disappears"
from the world, and political careers in China have fallen
of those who were perhaps too optimistic in their assessment
of timely Tibetan sinification.

The main problem, of course, is that the Tibetans do not seem to be assimilating. In both Tibet and South Asia, they are changing, yet not at the expense of continuing an idea of their separateness as a people. In fact, the oppositional process seems to have strengthened in direct proportion to those attempted forces of assimilation generated by the "outside." The fact of their non-disappearance remains a vexing political problem for the region. One has to attempt to incorporate the history of the Tibetan people within any such operation that seeks to understand their continuing existence as a refugee group.

The idea that history and anthropology are intrinsically linked is not an old idea (see Maitland 1936). However:

it has assumed its periodic prominence in anthropology only at a late stage in the development of the several paradigms that have governed anthropological investigation (McCracken 1983:4).

History can be used to discredit an increasingly problematic paradigm. By noting a particular paradigm's inability to incorporate history into its analytic schemes, "history" becomes a rubric for destroying that prevailing paradigm. "History" (as time, process, or change) has however, continued to remain on the periphery of anthropology rather than being at its core (Braudel 1980).

Structural and symbolic studies have recently attempted to formulate a model that can account for variation in time,
with promise that the particular analytic strengths of this paradigm will not suffer in its own "transformation." Wallace's *Rochdale* (1978) is one attempt that moves away from the idea that event is a "social action or ritual that transforms the token of one cultural type into the token of another, allowing structure to reproduce itself in the process" to one where the structure itself is accomplished by change (McCracken 1983:8). Geertz's *Negara* (1980) and Turner's *Social Dramas and Ritual Metaphors* (1974) have similar ambitions.

Sahlins' *Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities* (1981) and *Islands of History* (1985) and related works by Comaroff (1985) and Hodder (1986) are fairly elegant attempts to place the dimension of time well within a structuralist order of analysis. This particular model seems to be an appropriate framework for dealing with some of the problems encountered in the study of Tibetan refugees.

Sahlins himself has undergone a certain structural "transformation" since his *Culture and Practical Reason* (1976). Then it was thought that culture could accommodate event, in classically structural fashion, by reproducing the old set of relations in a new historical guise (McCracken:8). Sahlins subsequently went on to suggest, however, that there had been an essential flaw in the Saussurian linguistic logic with which the structural/
the disengagement of structure from history had seemed requisite, inasmuch as language could be systematically analyzed as if it was autonomous, referentially arbitrary and a collective phenomenon (Sahlins 1983:3).

Structural analysis, therefore, seemed to exclude individual action and practice. Time and order were antithetical phenomena, as sound shifts were treated by Saussure as independent "events." According to Sahlins:

[this was] the fatal argument that was to be picked up by a structural anthropology: from the perspective of a system of signs, the changes to which it submits will appear fortuitous. The only system consists in the way these historical materials are interrelated at any given time or sake of the language (1983:4).

A linguistic system was thereby sui generis, as a social system would be considered "adaptational." Structure could do no more than simply attempt to reproduce itself by some sort of unknowable, robotic motivation for stability. Simply put, the structural/symbolic model in anthropology can no more deal with social change than the Saussurian system can deal with linguistic change over time. Perhaps, then, order and process are not independent variables, but aspects of the same phenomenon.

In constructing his new approach to the problem, Sahlins has been influenced by the work of Silverstein (1976) on the polysemic nature of signs (McCracken 1983:11). There is a diversity of meaning inherent in signs, a "reservoir of historical potential waiting as it were its
own pragmatic clues" (Sahlins 1981:25). Although apparently fixed at any given point of time, cultural categories (as relationships between signs) are always "meaningfully negotiable." Structures, even if somehow "motivated" to reproduce themselves exactly in discourse or in action, never succeed. Changes, however small, continually affect the system through action. In time this entropic "reproduction" may become apparent as categorical change.

This differs from the idea of a stable structure which can accommodate innovation only to a point. The model suggested by Sahlins can accommodate change in regards to the "relations of meaning" as well. Structures themselves can transform, rearranging entire categories of meaning in the process. It is a continuous process, not dependent upon outside event, but rather on the everyday practice of human life (Bourdieu 1977).

One of the enduring problems with static structural analyses is that it cannot explain the past and suggest where "structures" originated. Time as an axis of interpretation has been problematic in anthropology in various paradigms, not limited to structural/semiotic studies. In most analyses, history is usually broken up in rather disjoint segments, with "event" punctuating these segments. According to Hodder (1986), in the old culture-historical school, events such as invasions or culture contact were considered discontinuities within a
particular historical sequence. In Marxist interpretations, change is inevitable because of structural contradictions which precipitate crisis events. The structural/semiotic approach often compartmentalized time into units heralded by states of social liminality or typified by revitalization, millenarian, or cargo cult movements (Hodder 1986:80). 

History has not often been considered a continuous process. Change can occur gradually and continually. An event such as the 1959 Tibetan uprising and subsequent diaspora, while no doubt momentous for those that have lived through it, begins to take on different referents as it is embedded in the continuous flow of history.

Many of the basic ideas that history is something more than a sequence of "events" and actions of important individuals arose from the structural historians of the Annales school in French historiography and Weber's work on the relationship between the Protestant work ethic and the rise of capitalism (Weber 1976 [1904-05]). The Annales logic, perhaps typified by the work of Braudel in *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (1972 [1949]), seeks to find conservative structures, patterns of the *longue durée* that have provided a certain consistency of meaning throughout long periods of time. Such works characteristically look at the values and behavior of everyday life and "common" actors, as opposed to history of important individuals. The specific
historiographic techniques of the Annales school are similar to that used in ethnohistory—namely, the utilization of personal journals and diaries, business ledgers, and other such records which demonstrate the patterns of day-to-day life, or at least the chronicler's view of those apparent patterns.

Norbert Elias' *History of Manners* (1982 [1934]), for example, traces the development of certain "core values," such as the idea of individualism and propriety in western civilization through the development of table manners in the West. There apparently is a wealth of data from the Middle ages and the Renaissance, generated by the personal reflections of writers of various periods in the West who were fond of noting the social gaffes of their contemporaries. The custom of eating from the common plate or soup tureen, the sharing of utensils and table linen, gradually changed to the modern practice of using individual portions, knives, forks, and napkins. This mirrors the shift from egalitarian values to the notion of private property and individual decorum now prominent in the West, a development that occurred over several centuries.

A similar work by Elias, *Power and Civility* (1982 [1939]), examines the gradual development of the modern nation-states of France and Germany, and the differences and political problems with each, through their differing concepts of descent and inheritance. Following the break-up
of the Carolingian empire, France slowly developed into a unified, centralized state under a single dynastic ruler. Germany, on the other hand, remained decentralized until very recently. One of the basic differences, according to Elias, was that the principle of primogeniture was not as well established in Germany as it was in France. Land, titles, and property in France were usually passed on only to elder sons, which over time, allowed for an accumulation of land, titles, and capital among fewer and fewer families. These centripetal forces continued, ultimately bestowing upon the senior-most individual, the king, most of the resources of the emerging nation. On the other hand, the Germanic pattern of inheritance endowed all sons equal shares in the family property. Family wealth, as a result, would become compartmentalized with each succeeding generation. Land, and the power to control it, was increasingly parcelled out in smaller and smaller allotments. The centrifugal forces generated by the usual pattern of inheritance ultimately prevented the formation of a centralized state. Germany, prior to the late 19th century, was little more than a decentralized assortment of numerous petty principalities. Germany eventually became unified, but only through the forceful possession of the demesne of regional princelings and eventual abandonment of the principle of resource control through heredity.

A similar development can been seen in the history of
Tibet--the forces of pan-Tibetan national identity in exile are often in opposition to decentralizing, sectarian tendencies inherent in re-established religious organizations (see Goldstein 1971).

Characteristic of the work of Braudel, Elias, Le Roy Ladurie (Mountaillou 1979), and other structural historians is that social change is not dependent upon event. Events, rather, are symptomatic expressions of changes which occur at much more gradual rates. The event of the Tibetan diaspora is an expression of a type of nationalism which has a much longer history of development. Structures themselves are flexible--history does not just repeat itself and structures do not merely reproduce. There can be gradual structural change over time.

Max Weber, of course, dealt with long term change in investigating the relationship between the protestant work ethic and the growth of capitalism (1976 [1920]). Weber does not argue for an idealist "prime-mover" as counterpoint to historical materialism, but rather suggests "that a historically specific set of ideas influences the way people organize their society and economy" (Hodder 1986:82). Ideas do not develop on their own, nor are ideas divorced from or directed solely by the needs of the economy or society. However, the spirit of capitalism evolved not from a religiously sanctioned quest for economic success, but rather from Calvinist asceticism.
The purely theological Protestant notions of individual diligence and salvation through works were transformed by society into a quest for economic success through the fruits of one's own labor. Society, through its everyday practice, had transformed what had been a religious idea into a social and economic ideal. "Practice" seems to have had consequences that were unintended or even unwished by the original Protestant theologians. I argue that secularization and westernization are the consequences of accommodation of various western agencies into pre-existent patron/client categories of the Tibetan religious system.

Theory and practice, the idea and the material, form a dialectic in Weber's work. He notes that social action, as purposeful behavior, may have unintended consequences and contradictions (Hodder 1986:83). In addition, over the long-term, ideas and values seem to play an equal, if not dominant role over material considerations:

...over the long-term...the social and economic conditions are themselves seen to be generated within sets of cultural meanings (Hodder 1986:83).

This is precisely what Sahlins has attempted to demonstrate in his study of Hawaii during the time of European contact (1981), and what I suggest for Tibetan society.

For Sahlins, signs and categories have a polysemic nature—the relationship between them ("structure") has a logical instability (McCracken 1983:11). Different meanings may be ascribed to pre-existing relationships, and in this
process, the entire system may be restructured. Change can arise not necessarily from conflict or dominance, but rather when traditional strategies,

which assume traditional patterns of relations (e.g. between chiefs and commoners, or between men and women), are deployed in relation to novel phenomena (Ortner 1984:155).

In *Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities*, Sahlins examines the "novel phenomenon" of culture contact in Hawaii with the arrival of Captain Cook, and as such demonstrates the relationship between structure, "habitus" (Bourdieu 1977) and practice (1981). In Sahlins' example, the concept of *mana* as unseen power, and *kapu* as the day-to-day relationship with this power, are notions which give meaning to action (habitus). But because of the polysemic nature of such concepts, no actor can ever predict the outcome of any particular event or meeting wherein the concept is enacted in practice. Change may occur.

In the Hawaiian situation, the preconceptions of Cook's party came into conflict with that of the Hawaiian in the interpretation of the "event." *Mana* was ascribed to Cook by the Hawaiians, as the event of his arrival fit within the pattern of the returning fertility god Lono. According to the myth, Lono was to rule for a period until he was overthrown by local chiefs whose *mana* originated from a different deity. When Cook did not leave at the appointed time, he was killed as part of the process. The unintended consequences of this action were to transfer Lono's *mana* as
represented by Cook, to all things British. In time, the nobility affected British styles and material goods as an signification of their continuing distinction between themselves and the commons, rather than continuing the system of kapu. This ultimately had the effect of changing the relationship between these two social categories.

According to Sahlins:

The complex of exchanges that developed between Hawaiians and Europeans [subsequent to this event] ...brought the former into uncharacteristic conditions of internal conflict and contradiction. Their differential connections with Europeans thereby endowed their own relationships to each other with novel functional content. This is structural transformation. The values acquired in practice return to structure as new relationships between its categories (1981:50).

Power became more commonly accessible through foreign commerce and trade, rather than the exclusive domain of the traditional mana of the chiefs.

Here we have an example of intended, yet failed structural reproduction. In attempting to accommodate the novel circumstances of culture contact, some basic categories of meaning were changed in the process—in this case the traditional relationship between nobility and commoners. This had wide-ranging social and economic implications for Hawaiian culture.

Sahlins' model of change through practice is appealing, yet it is not without certain problems. The overriding mechanism for culture change is still the old notion of attempted structural reproduction—the system "striving" for
stability. The agency of individual practice, similarly, is seen as an unconscious attempt to maintain the status quo. After all, change occurs in the Sahlins model by unintended consequences of action. In all probability, one should consider both the relative degree of "openness" of any given system (Ortner 1984:156), the interest factor in individual practice, and the degree of "consciousness" involved in such action.

These reservations seem especially relevant in the applicability of the model to Tibetan refugee culture. Following Spicer's work on persistent peoples (1971; 1977), it appears to me that Tibetan refugees conform to what is defined as an "intentional" enclave. This intentionality manifests a degree of self-reflexivity, a consciousness of action. Tibetan leaders have planned curricula and cultural "programs." Tibetan parents worry about teaching their children to be Tibetan. Intentionality is marked among diaspora Tibetans. One must give credit to those intentions that have had the desired result—otherwise "culture" merely arises from haphazard chance and without the agency of human thought and negotiation. According to Ortner:

...to say that society and history are products of human action is true, but only in a certain ironic sense. They are rarely the products the actors themselves set out to make (1984:157).

In the Tibetan context, however, it is entirely possible that some products created in the diaspora situation are exactly that which they wished for.
A second reservation in regards to the Sahlins model of practice is the dominance of ideology. Weber, for example, was careful to show that ideological dominance over socio-economic systems was not consistent throughout the rise of capitalism in the West. Ideology was not the sole "prime mover" over time. At the very least, ideology was co-equal with other factors of potential change. In the sense that Sahlins appears to give primacy to ideology, the model at times seems to be vulnerable to deterministic labeling. Critics of historical or cultural materialism could utilize the same arguments upon Sahlins' model of practice--other cultural variables must not be overlooked.

In the Tibetan refugee context, the socio-economic forces brought about by their removal from Tibet and settlement in India and Nepal are certainly as important as their ideology. The feudal order of monastic land-holding, for example, is entirely absent in refugee life. This has certainly caused substantial changes in any labeling of "traditional" culture to the present situation. However, I am arguing that certain aspects of the ideology provided at least a coequal force for the changes that had to be made for their survival at a subsistence level. This ideology continues to be a force for change, reorienting not only the socio-economic system but the way components of that systems have traditionally maintained certain oppositions.

As Ortner suggests, a successful practice model must be
able to accommodate action between polarities. On one hand, action in the Parsonian model was seen as system-driven reproduction of roles and rules. On the other, such as in symbolic interactionism and transactionalism, the system itself is viewed as relatively unordered reservoir for individual practice. Modern practice models, such as the one proposed by Sahlins, seem to posit their analyses between these two extremes:

that society is a system, that the system is powerfully constraining, and yet that the system can be made and unmade through human action and interaction (Ortner 1984:159).

The Practice Model and Tibetan Refugees

One criticism that Ortner levels at Sahlins' practice model is that there are limits to the flexibility that mature actors have in dealing with "events" or even everyday experiences (1984:156). The system might be more constraining than it might appear if applied to but a single historical event (such as the arrival of Cook in Hawaii). A more adequate approach, therefore, might be to expand the time-frame of analysis. Gradual, long-term structural reorientation of systems is not only possible in culture (as demonstrated by Weber), but desirable from the point of analysis. This seems especially appropriate in historical sequences of multiple events and gradual change.

Such a situation seems apparent in the history of the Tibetan people and their gradual development of an ideology
of modern nationalism out of what had been an ideology of patron/client relations. Tibetans were "refugees-in-the-making" long before the event which activated their physical exodus in 1959 and long before the occupation of their country by the Chinese in 1950. The long-term conflict between the Tibetans and Chinese can been seen as a differential misunderstanding of the traditional patron/client framework that had defined the relationship between the two polities. The expectations of behavior of one party by the other were disappointed at several points in their interaction, particularly over the last hundred years. While Sahlins provides us with one "structure of conjuncture" between the habitus of the British and Hawaiians in the arrival of Cook, the Tibetan situation appears to have several. The developing polity of Tibet has had to deal with numerous invasions by Mongol, Manchu, British, Kuomingtang and Communist Chinese forces. It is not sufficient to merely look upon the events of 1959 as "first contact" with outsiders. "Traditional" Tibetan culture has been remolded continuously through arbitration with these agents.

I suggest that the Tibetan preconceptions of the Chinese as well as other "outsiders" has been remarkably consistent throughout history. Tibet has been subject to numerous invasions over its history, and each time the ideology system has had the capacity to create a certain set
of oppositional patterns—in effect keeping the Tibetans Tibetan. Such patterns seem to be in existence among the present refugees in South Asia as well. Tibetans have simply used this construct for varying circumstances over time. The ideology of patron/client relationships is not merely reproducing itself, substituting one category of people for another. Rather, each time there has been intended reproduction, people's differential assessment of meaning tends to change the outcome. In action, other aspects of culture may change, often unintentionally.

Following Hodder,

the ideational does not cause, or obstruct, or become reduced to the effect of, practical action; rather it is seen as the medium for action (1986:88).

Tibetan refugees' relationship to traditional components of their social order have changed in diaspora, although they have attempted to reproduce them. What is presented as consistent, despite an apparent structural transformation, is the label "Tibetan." This is evident in their own history, in their invention of culture, and their persistence as a people according to their own definitions.

**Ethnicity, Identity, and Persistence**

The acceptance by our culture of the "reality" of the anthropologist's ethnography, as well as such notions as culture areas and racial types, and because "no infallible method has ever been discovered for 'grading' different
cultures into their natural types" (Wagner 1975:2), we tend to assume that every culture is equivalent to every other one. This cultural relativity also burdens us with a realization that whenever we name a certain group of people with certain behaviors, that process demarcates the phenomenon into a "culture" for our own typological convenience. That culture has a reality that the particular actors themselves might not agree with.

This sort of over dependence upon nomenclature and cultural typologies that has left us at times with "marginal" peoples, evident particularly with the Tibetans under the Shangri-la model. While some would argue that there are no marginal peoples, just ambiguous anthropologists, others have suggested that the assumed boundaries between cultures themselves can be used by the actors for their own ends.

Attention to these sorts of problems in general were eloquently brought to anthropology by Edmund Leach's study of the Kachin/Shan in northern Burma (1954), and expanded upon by Barth (1969) and in the "Who are the Lue" series of articles by Moerman (1965; 1968). People can and do cross cultural and ethnic boundaries. Identity for some groups of people is something other than the label that outsiders contrive to place upon them. With other groups, such as in the phenomenon of "persistent peoples" discussed by Spicer (1971), such externally ascribed labels may indeed be a
major component in the construction of native identity.\textsuperscript{1} Tibetan refugees have responded to the expectations of their western patrons in constructing their national identity.

Much of the recent literature on Tibetan refugees, both within anthropology and without, is concerned with the phenomenon of "maintenance" of tradition in exile. Comparisons are often made between the present Tibetan society in southern Asia and the period immediately preceding the Chinese occupation in the 1950s (e.g. Grunfeld 1987; Corlin 1985; Ugen Gombo 1985). Here the logic of change and continuity as bipolar elements becomes especially problematic. What particular historic periods or sequences of events are representative of "traditional" Tibetan life? Is the "Golden Age" of the Tibetan empire in the 8th century (when the T'ang dynasty of China had to submit to Tibetan dictates (Beckwith 1980) more traditional than, say, the period from the first Chinese revolution to the occupation in the 1950s that saw a great degree of western-inspired innovation?

Such lapses arise from an over-dependence on a notion of "culture" that is a neatly-bounded, pristine unit—-one which is often assumed to be vulnerable, to the point of destruction, by any outside influence, most particularly by late-20th century modernization. Tibet's geographical isolation has frequently, and unfortunately, been confused with a notion of cultural isolation. The result has been
the pervasive "Shangri-la" image of a culture that time and the world have forgotten. (The ultimate conceit is that since we did not know about Tibet, it certainly cannot exist in the modern age.)

Much of the literature about Tibetan refugees shows a people admirably trying to hold on to a way of life that is, however, anachronistic and therefore doomed in the modern world. It is my proposition that it is the notion of "Tibetaness" that has allowed the people to survive the vicissitudes of a changing world—in the past as well as the present. The "cultural stuff" is often secondary. Tibetan refugee culture is an ersatz tradition, as ultimately are all traditions. Calling themselves or their cultural products "Tibetan" is a profession of identity, one which is subject to negotiation between the native actor and the outsiders.

The subjective approach to ethnicity in anthropology is characterized perhaps most clearly by the early work of Leach and subsequently by Moerman (1965; 1974). Barth (1969) has taken a functional/ecological approach towards subjective self-ascription of ethnicity. Notions of "ethnicity" are constructed by the individual, often primarily on the basis of notions of group origins and background, but maintained for purposes of economic or "ecological" adaptation of the individual to his environment. The boundary between ethnic groups is the
"reality" of the system, and personnel can cross it. According to Leach, the ascription of Kachin or Shan identity varies according to the context of individual practice, choice, and optimization for self-interest. The boundary persists, yet individuals may traverse it, ascribing to themselves or being ascribed different ethnic identities in the process.

Indian sociologists studying Tibetan refugees in their country have often taken objective ethnicity and assimilation themes as major theoretical constructs (e.g. Gurumurthy 1979; 1980; Saklani 1985; Palakshappa 1978). They fit nicely within the ideals of the post-colonial Indian state (i.e. eventually these pluralistic minorities will assimilate into an "All India" national consciousness). However, assimilation quickly becomes moot when the stated goals of the refugee government and the Tibetan people consistently, and consciously, express nationalistic goals of their own. The process of enclavement rather than the lack of assimilation would seem to be the more logical choice of theoretical design regarding the Tibetan identity process. Showing how Tibetans themselves envision their circumstances and construct their oppositions in a pluralistic society would seem more fruitful than proving the null hypothesis on their lack of assimilation.

For many Tibetan refugees, the concept of ethnicity and its inherent ambiguity affords certain distinct and
practical advantages. Their use of the concept is reminiscent of the Kachin/Shan studied by Leach and the Lue of Moermann, and it is quite applicable to the everyday practice of identity utilized by Tibetan exiles in South Asia. Identity is negotiable:

One of my multilingual informants who was returning to Tibet used the classificatory systems of "others" for practical advantage. In India he could be a "Tibetan refugee," using the special status accorded to these followers of the Dalai Lama, or just an "Indian" in the context of that pluralistic country. In Nepal, he could become just one of the numerous, indigenous Bhotia minorities (which includes Sherpa, Tamangs, the Lama people, etc.), but a Nepali nevertheless. This was convenient for travel and trade. In China, if it were expeditious to manifest an image of local identity for jobs, substantial discounts on transportation, housing, or in the bazaar, he would. On the other hand, he could easily "pass" as a Japanese national whenever it was advantageous to be a foreigner. This behavior was quite common among traveling refugees, but in all cases, Tibetans professed and demonstrated "Tibetaness" in contexts where they were appreciated as such.

The notion that the boundaries of ethnic groups tend to persist regardless of the circumstances (to a point) has its roots in the historical-idealistic paradigm which encompasses
both emic, subjective approaches and cultural relativity. Work along the line of cultural or ethnic persistence, such as Spicer's work among the Yaquis of the North American desert (e.g. 1971), and Castile and Kushner's edited volume, *Persistent Peoples* (1981), look at the conservative nature of some identification systems. Characteristic of this viewpoint is a "powerfully constraining" vision of society and its capacity to maintain oppositional categories, an idea which is reminiscent of Durkheim. Yet they depart from the earlier relativists in that, 1) some cultures do not face imminent dissolution in the face of potential culture change, 2) not all cultures are "equal"—some are tougher than others and contain certain elements which not only define their being but provides for their continuation, 3) cultural change is not necessarily destructive to group identity, but often essential for its continuation. In addition, such writers depart from a very general notion that "ethnic identity" is primarily the concern of the individual/society dyad (see De Vos 1975). Castile suggests that there are four basic nexus by which persistent peoples are popularly thought to identify with: 1) a belief in a unique racial beginning, 2) a concept of a homeland, 3) a history of a distinctive language, and 4) thoughts of an unchanging culture (1981:xvi-xviii). Some native Tibetan scholars themselves have tended to use these popular criteria in their attempts to show the distinctions between
themselves and their neighbors (most especially the Chinese) (see Shakabpa 1984).

None of these criteria are fool-proof: the long-enduring Gypsies have no concept of homeland (Adams 1981), original languages may disappear entirely, and cultures change. The most problematic popular concept is race. Again, even some Tibetans have attempted to utilize race as a defining feature for their people, going so far as to utilize material from obsolete physical anthropology racial classifications:

Physical anthropologists, such as Turner, Morant, Risley, and Buxton, hold that the Tibetan [sic] are a different race. According to the findings of these authorities, Tibetans belong to a tall dolichocephalic race of considerable antiquity called Proto-Nordics—tall, long headed—big boned, and quite distinctive from the Han (Office of Tibet, NY n.d.).

Similar oppositional rhetoric confuses race and culture for political considerations:

Such a classification [with the Mongoloid race] seems plausible since Tibetans have had a close relationship with the Mongols for centuries (Shakabpa 1984:5-6).

The Chinese also have used old concepts of race for attempting to prove the racial affinity of the Tibetans to the Han (and set within the context of having less cultural affinity to the Indians, a Tibetan claim):

...as is stated in anthropological literature, the human remains of the Neolithic age found in Tibet belong to the Mongolian race and are free from such physical features of the Indians of the Aryan race as prominent noses and deep-set eyes (Wang and Suo 1984: 11-12).
"Race" is not necessarily a defining feature or necessary condition for a continuing identity process. As we will later see, commonly shared notions of racial affiliation are not a matter of high priority among Tibetans (or Chinese, either). Castile points out that the defining characteristic of a persistent people is a continuity of common identity. Spicer has suggested:

The persistence or stability of a people lies in the consistency of the successive interpretations with one another. If together they make up a single interrelated set of meaning through many generations then the phenomenon of the enduring people emerges (1980:356).

Characteristic of long-enduring peoples is a successful operation of a set of symbolic oppositions with a certain amount of conservatism through time, and a group's continual identification with these symbols. Membership may vary, innovations and other aspects of the culture may change (including physical relocation)—but "the thing which survives and must survive is the identity system itself" (Castile 1981:xxi). The key to the study of a long-enduring people is to find those symbolic operations which have some sort of continuity with the people's perception of the past. The linkage may be genuine or spurious, and even the symbols themselves may change. But there must be a continuity of identification with the structural process by which these symbols are constructed or maintained. I suggest that modern Tibetan national identity is constructed upon a redefined notion of the ideal patron/client relationship in
apparent continuity with past interpretations of this dyad. Tibet as a client state to a powerful patron has historically defined the Tibetan polity, and this concept is similarly utilized to define the position of Tibetan diaspora society in regards to various western agents of support. Identity is therefore "genuinely" continuous with the past.
1. It is perhaps interesting to note that these "forced" classificatory systems are certainly not limited to the West. While western traditions have always had difficulty in placing the Manchu people within certain schemes, both the Chinese Republicans and the succeeding communists have had no problem. Although whatever separate culture that had been the Manchu had long vanished from China before the 1911 revolution, both KMT and PRC policies have proclaimed the Manchu as one of the "Five Great Nationalities" of China—this despite the fact that there are no longer any Manchus. Similarly, China has ascribed equal status as a national, autonomous minority to the Tibetans, who do exist yet largely do not wish such association.

2. Castile feels that the overriding tendency in both anthropology and sociology has been to analyze "persistent persons, not persistent peoples," and as such, the focus should shift from the individual to the group (1981:xvi).
CHAPTER III
WORKING WITH TIBETANS

Diaspora Migration

Synchronically, Tibetans live not only in Tibet but within an international diaspora, in communities exhibiting various states of social integration. Diachronically, Tibet has had over a thousand years of recorded history, a history which shows, contrary to the fancy of some romantics, a dynamic culture full of social paradoxes and culture change. The modern generation of refugees is not only literate, but most often bi- or even trilingual. Tibet's religious system could be described as one of the most complex in the world, and thus it does not lend itself easily to various reductionistic attempts at classification. And for such a small number of people, the refugees have had considerable world attention drawn to their goals and ideas, and have acted in response to this western interest. They face not only the "preservation" of their culture within their host countries in South Asia, but must continue to express their view to the larger western world in the development of Tibetan nationalism. This nationalism seems to require the operation of a rhetorical polemic between their claims for Tibetan independence and those of China.

What further encumbers any thoughts of simplicity in the study of Tibetan refugees is that they have recently
become quite restless, and following certain prosperity over the last twenty-eight years in exile, can afford to travel to seek out better opportunities, for pilgrimage, to discover their "roots" or just to travel for pleasure. While I might be tempted to say that they are reverting to their old nomadic ways, a more parsimonious suggestion would be that many refugees who have become itinerant tradesmen in the South Asia diaspora fit within the common traditional pattern of the pilgrim/trader of old Tibet.

In any case, it is quite impossible to profess a complete knowledge of such a complex and dynamic society. And as the modern generation of refugees begins to move, and to return to Tibet, it has been important to abandon some of my thoughts of producing a "classic" synchronic ethnography of a people isolated in time and space. As such, this study has two aspects: 1) a static element which is represented in the Tibetan government-in-exile's attempts to "maintain" Tibetan culture and to define Tibetan identity in regards to the larger world and its own perceived history, and 2) a dynamic element, which is the personal interpretation of this growing national identity, for example, in the refugees' process of repatriation in Tibet itself. These aspects are components of the same dynamic: the history of Tibet is seen in the daily practice of Tibetans trying to be themselves.
To my knowledge, this is the first "migrational" ethnography on Tibetan refugees, in that I have traveled with my informants spatially along their extended familial, religious and economic networks, crossing two international frontiers in the process of returning to Tibet. Whether this study is representational of refugee or traditional Tibetan culture as a whole is not the issue as much as it is a study of how some refugees and native historians conceive their ideas of nation and their place within it.

The Dharamsala Setting

Dharamsala, the seat of the Dalai Lama, is actually composed of numerous settlements built along a chain of foothills of the Dhaulagar range of the Himalayas (Fig. 2). Dharamsala proper, the Indian town lies at the base of these hills and is the administrative capital of the district of Kangra in the Himachal State. Several hundred meters above Dharamsala is Gangchen Kyishong, the Central Tibetan Secretariat, the site of the Tibetan archives, several ministries and the National Assembly of the Tibetan government-in-exile. Several hundred meters higher is the main refugee settlement and commercial center of McLeod Ganj (Fig. 3). On adjacent hills are the palace of the Dalai Lama, the Central Cathedral and the Dalai Lama's private monastery, the Tibetan Children's Village, and other monastic and secular establishments.
Fig. 2. Map of Dharamsala Region, India
Fig. 2. Map of Dharamsala Region, India
Fig. 3. Map of McLeod Ganj (Dharamsala)
Fig. 3. Map of McLeod Ganj (Dharamsala)
According to figures provided by the Information Office of the government-in-exile (1976), the Dharamsala region had 3,591 Tibetan residents. Of this population, 1,200 were students and teachers, 212 worked in the handicraft industry, 147 were monks or nuns, 1,772 were civil servants or businessmen, 60 were retired, and 200 were housewives. I regret that I was unable to collect more recent demographic data. The population, however, did not seem to be noticeably larger nine years after my first visit (in 1978). In addition, the population had become transicent, thus hopes for a representative sample were effectively dashed.

In 1986-87, I lived near the center of McLeod Ganj in a rented room which had once been a popular hotel. Proximity to everyday activities of the majority of Tibetans in the area was assured. More importantly, perhaps, to other living arrangements was that I had a certain amount of privacy in which I could spend my evenings writing up the day's notes. In Tibetan, as in Chinese, there is no term for privacy, which suggests that unless you are in religious retreat, there is little value placed upon the state of being apart from society.¹

Most meals, however, were taken in local restaurants, chai shops, and the local disco/tavern. This afforded me the opportunity to meet new Tibetan acquaintances, learn (and share) the gossip of the day, plus note any newcomers to the village—either Tibetan or tourist. It was also a
rather comfortable arrangement for note-taking between inevitable lags in conversation.

Through trial and error I became rather scrupulous in the attempt to be as unobtrusive as possible in participating in Tibetan life. For example, I learned early on that the standard tape recorder was inappropriate for data collection. Westernized young Tibetans are far too sophisticated to view such a device as a technological wonder. Rather, it often represented an invitation for listening and dancing to disco music. Someone would always find a tape or ask me to put on one of mine (which they knew I had--I was considered a source of all kinds of western "cargo"). However small, any social gathering was a Tibetan invitation to party, and I could hardly refuse their requests for music. In order for conversations not to become dominated by Michael Jackson and Madonna, I had to rely on rather old-fashioned techniques of notebook and pencil, and developing a good memory.

I spent much of the days visiting friends, talking with shopkeepers and craftsmen, visiting monasteries, paying calls on Tibetan officials, going to the video house or disco with my friends, plus periodically attending religious/governmental functions. I had the advantage of being remembered by some of my friends from my initial visit in 1978. As a result, when I returned to McLeod Ganj I
could begin work immediately without much of the culture shock or "honeymoon" experiences common to many initial fieldwork periods.

The study of sociocultural change and continuity requires historical data, especially as I have suggested the importance of the conservative sbyin-bdag dyad for Tibetan cultural expression through time. Fortunately, there is no lack of material on the history of Tibet. Russians, the British, Chinese, Indians, Americans, Japanese, and the Tibetans themselves have all contributed to the world's stock of literature on the history of this region. The Library of Tibetan Works and Archives in Gangchen Kyishong in Dharamsala has one of the greatest collections of native and foreign Tibetan history to be found anywhere.

After morning meetings with Tibetans up at McLeod Ganj, I would usually spend several hours each day in the Archives. Lunch breaks provided an additional opportunity to meet with governmental staff at Gangchen Kyishong, the Central Tibetan Secretariat. Late afternoons and evenings were usually spent with Tibetan informants back at McLeod Ganj. Other data-collecting techniques included mapping and photography, plus occasionally recording native songs.

I discovered in the 1986-87 session that much of the population in Dharamsala had become quite transient. Relative prosperity and the traditional Tibetan delight of travel, the opening of Tibet, the seasonality of western and
Tibetan tourism/pilgrimage, and the availability of jobs for English speakers in the cities in India and Nepal have combined in a manner that did not favor a sessile population. Quite literally, a sample completed on one day might be completely unrepresentational of the community the next.

Fieldwork in Tibet

The restlessness of the Dharamsala community, I soon realized, was indicative of a very recent development of great significance to the Tibetan diaspora. From 1979 to mid-1987, the People's Republic of China has allowed Tibetan refugees to return to Tibet for periods up to one year. Traveling on overseas Chinese visas, refugees were under no obligation to remain in occupied Tibet and could return at will. Similarly, PRC Tibetans were allowed to visit refugee settlements in South Asia. It was now possible for Tibetans on both sides to renew family ties that had been broken since 1959. In addition, Tibetan refugees could visit Tibet for pilgrimage purposes and seek employment opportunities generated by the developing tourist industry there. For the generation of refugees born abroad, a visit to Tibet was primarily a type of identity-affirming behavior which had not been previously available in exile.

As I realized that the refugee population had become transient, my study moved away from being the ethnography of a settled village. As I kept losing my informants in Dharamsala, I soon had no trouble of being convinced to go
with some of them to Tibet. The opening of Tibet was not only an extraordinary event in Tibetan refugee history, but afforded me an opportunity to participate in these sorts of identity-affirming activities of young Tibetans.

As the winter weather cleared, I decided to be part of the spring wave of refugees returning to Tibet. Although I was not always with the same individuals on the long, overland trip to Lhasa (approx. 1770 km from Dharamsala), I had been asked by the families of two young Tibetan men (in their mid-twenties) to watch over their sons in sbyin-bdag fashion on their quest. My foreignness to the Chinese was considered an asset for the security of the Tibetan refugees in my company. A certain degree of financial security for the Tibetans was anticipated by this sbyin-bdag ascription as well.

I went ahead to Kathmandu to await my friends, and lived with a family of Khampa Tibetan refugees at the Tibetan settlement of Bodhanath. Here I met other refugees who were similarly planning a return to Tibet, and I was able to do a bit of comparative observation while waiting. My two Dharamsala charges arrived, and, unlike explorers of old, we left for the Tibetan border by taxi in April of 1987. At the border town of Khasa (Zhang-mu) we organized a mini bus, and filled it with other returning refugees and western tourists for the trip to Lhasa. I served as a broker between the tourists and our Tibetan driver.
Although Chinese officials would occasionally attempt to segregate westerners from Tibetans and Chinese *en route*, I generally found that the Tibetans insisted that I stay with them, and I found this not only possible, but preferable. Once in Tibet, I met many other refugees from all over South Asia. Eventually, my social network expanded to include local Tibetans as well. My credibility, even extending to local Tibetans, was assured by my adoption by Tibetan friends. I was considered *nang-pa*, "one of us."\(^3\) Within my cohort I never felt that I was treated any differently than would be a fellow Tibetan. Older local Tibetans often considered me a pilgrim, and I had access to many temples that foreign tourists could not see (here, my background in Buddhist iconography helped considerably). And while being a part of the family had great benefits for my research perspectives, it nevertheless involved occasional squabbles and disagreements common to any closely-linked group. Once accepted in this manner, Tibetans no longer treated me with the type of courtesy accorded "honored guests."

It was through these sorts of experiences that I began to feel that Tibetan identity is strongly predicated upon performance rather than ascription. One can become *nang-pa* by action. It was not applied just to the anthropologist in their midst, but as I discuss in detail in later chapters,
to any outsider whose actions are perceived as consistent with the role of sbyin-bdag.

Language Usage

Lhasa-dialect Tibetan has practically become universal in Dharamsala and in most refugee communities (Ugen Gompo 1985). Occasionally, non-refugee Tibetans would be visiting Dharamsala, such as the Khampas from eastern Tibet or the Ladhaki from far northern India. At such times, the relative linguistic homogeneity of the Dharamsala refugees would seem markedly prominent. The dominance of Lhasa dialect in refugee life is a product of their educational system, and is indicative of a gradual elimination of regionalisms among the Tibetan refugee populace as a whole. In a sense, nationalism rather than regionalism is now a major nexus of identity. This sort of homogenization is common among refugee groups (Talai 1986).

One of my informants, of Amdo-wa heritage and raised in Dharamsala speaking Lhasa dialect, began to affect a Khampa accent as soon as we crossed into Tibet, which to me seemed an affectation of a "macho" identity of the notorious Khampa tribesmen (see Peissel 1972) that in Dharamsala had been suppressed.

But I discovered that the lingua franca among the younger generation of refugees in Dharamsala and other communities is something altogether different than standard Lhasa Tibetan. Refugee education is trilingual: the first
language is Lhasa Tibetan, the second is English, and the third is the respective language of the host area. In Dharamsala, the third language of importance is Hindi, in Kathmandu it is Nepali, and in east India it is often Bengali. My assistant, who was born in Darjeeling near Bengal, spoke Hindi, Bengali, Nepali, English, and Lhasa Tibetan.

Ugen Gompo's (1985:16) study of Kathmandu refugees noted that a spontaneous and common practice among younger Tibetans, especially when all present know English, is to use English or a combination of English and Tibetan in everyday discourse. This is exactly the same situation in Dharamsala. Although initially I felt this behavior was due to my presence, I later learned that this was routinely practiced. Often Tibetan and English words would be combined even within the same sentence. According to Gumperz (1982), this type of discourse is common among bilingual groups. "Code switching" is defined

"as the juxtaposition within the same speech exchange of passages of speech belonging to two different grammatical systems or subsystems." (Gumperz 1982:59)

Significantly, code switching is not necessarily associated with marginality within the larger social system, but usually simply characteristic of the bilingual qualifications of the actors. Young Tibetans would invariably use pure Tibetan in formal situations or in the company of non-English speaking Tibetans, and would
code-switch otherwise. This phenomenon is also common in situations where there is a generational difference in bilingual competence (Gumperz 1982:68).

In Dharamsala code-switching, Tibetans would occasionally add a Hindi or Nepali word, if it conveyed a more precise meaning than either English or Tibetan. My own acquisition of Tibetan was facilitated no doubt by this type of discourse. On the overland trip, my informants told me that they would speak pure Tibetan after crossing the border. It seems as if this was designed to show solidarity with local Tibetans and was probably characteristic of their "identity-affirming" behavior in general. However, after a few days of pure Tibetan, many of my informants reverted to code-switching. All was not rosy between returning refugee youth and local Tibetans. Reversion to code-switching with English may have been a device by refugees to maintain some sort of opposition between themselves and local, non-English speaking Tibetans.

In Dharamsala, some Tibetans that I did not know would talk about me in pure Tibetan within my presence, but as my language competence increased and they became aware of it (often with a certain embarrassment on their part), they would simply switch to gossiping about someone else. Some of my informants would switch to Hindi or Nepali, which I have no knowledge of, in order to keep their conversation private. My informants and I would often speak pure Tibetan
for confidentiality around westerners in Tibet, or switch to English around the Chinese. The languages spoken by many Tibetan refugees allows a great deal of flexibility. Moreover, it seems apparent that the selected use of various languages serves to define the degree of inclusiveness or exclusiveness of groups or sub-groups, which as I hope to demonstrate, are always subject to negotiation.

The Significance of History

In order to understand the praxis of everyday life, it is important to understand how Tibetans themselves view their own history, and how "outsiders" have interpreted Tibetan history as well. It is on the basis of those preconditions that individual action is meaningful. I suggest that the sbyin-bdag dyad is a long-term structure which at various periods has provided a core on which Tibetan identity has been renewed. Therefore history and ideology is at the center of this study, rather than as a background or introduction to an ethnography. Tibetan, Chinese, and western historical documents differ in the interpretation of mchod-yon, for example.

Tibetan historical interpretation differs even among modern native writers. Tsepon Shakabpa, a former minister, perhaps provides the standard "official history" according to the Tibetan government-in-exile (1984). K. Dhondup views (1984) are more "independent." Similarly, Richardson (1962), a British agent in Tibet prior to 1950, seems to
follow the paradigm of official Tibetan history. In addition, he has a certain credibility based on personal experience. Others, such as Hoffman (197-) and Stein (1972), whose interpretations of Tibetan history have largely been derived from comparative study of historical documents and philology, aspire to be more "objective."

What follows are examples of refugee-based Tibetan history, as well as older official native histories. A polemic exists between these and "official" Chinese history of Tibet. In a sense, the dialectic between Tibetan and Chinese historical accounts of mchod-yon and the broader category of sbyin-bdag is the heart of the "Tibetan Question." Tibetans are living in a diaspora because their differential interpretation of state level mchod-yon suggests that Tibet was, and should be an independent nation. This is in opposition to official Chinese history. Illustrating the ideology of this dyad as represented in primary and secondary native historical documents, and demonstrating how these notions are articulated in a wider sense in everyday life among the Tibetans can provide a certain feeling of continuity between "traditional" Tibet and the diaspora situation. There is an apparent continuity between ways in which past Tibetans have presented themselves and modern historical accounts and everyday action. We will see that the only item that is actually continuous in the patron/client dyad is the idea of the dyad
itself. Its contents, as the relationships between categories of patron and client, as well as the identities of the actors, have changed throughout the span of Tibetan history. Native history and modern practice presumes an unbroken continuity. Upon this thread, modern Tibetan national identity is built.
Notes

1. The closest equivalents to "privacy" in Tibetan are gsang-ba, which means to hide one's self in a secret place, as in meditative retreat, and dben-pa, which means lonely. The former compares with Chinese yin ju (隐居), a concealed dwelling.

2. Dharamsala, as the home of the Dalai Lama, has become a pilgrimage site for western Buddhists and Tibetans from all over the diaspora, and even from Tibet itself.

3. The Tibetan term nang-pa more often is translated "a Buddhist." It is commonly used as a term of inclusiveness by native speakers, and reflects perhaps the close association between the practice of Tibetan Buddhism and the ethnic category of "Tibetan." Related to this usage are nang-po, "bosom-friend," and nang-mi "members of a household."
The monastic village of Sakya (Sa-sKya), so named because of the distinctive blue-grey native rocks in the region, is presently a tiny community just northeast of the Ting-ri plain in southern Tibet. Much of the fortress, small temples, and the pilgrim circuit have been destroyed during this period of Chinese occupation. What does remain is impressive—the main temple of Sakya, a giant monolith of maroon and blue-grey, perhaps a city block square, seems to fluoresce in the clear sunlight at 4200m. From my observations, at least, Sakya Gompa (T. dgon-pa, "monastery") contains perhaps the finest intact collection of statuary and offering-pieces to be found anywhere in Tibet. The walls, wood carvings and frescoes, in addition, possess that unmistakable patina of antiquity in stark contrast to the preponderance of restoration work found at other important historical sites (such as the Potala, Norbulinka, and the great monasteries of Lhasa). It seems reasonable to question why this monastery survived largely untouched through the tumult of the 1959 Uprising and Cultural Revolution, standing apart, as it were from the destruction of most important historical centers in Tibet.
It may simply be that Sakya Gompa is as important to the Chinese version of Sino-Tibetan relations as it is to the Tibetan. It is at this monastery, in the 13th century, that the mchod-yon dyad first was applied at the national level between the client state of Tibet and its patron, the Mongol Empire. This establishment was to be considered by Tibetans a few centuries later and into the present a foundation for a centralized, independent state, one which nevertheless maintained a spiritual relationship with its benefactor. It was a time in which Tibet began to re-emerge as a powerful state, recalling the days of the Tibetan empire in the 7th-9th centuries (see Beckwith 1980).

To modern Chinese, however, this development heralded the initial entry of Tibet as an integral part of China. For Tibetans, the Mongol Khans who eventually conquered China under the Yüan dynasty had granted the Sakya patriarch of Tibet all secular and ecclesiastical authority. In return, the patriarch would serve as Imperial Preceptor for the Mongol Empire. To the modern Chinese, this had been but a demonstration of the submission of Tibet to the Mongols, corresponding to western ideas of separation of church and state, the assumption of inferiority to the recipient in a patron/client relationship, and the submission of religious ideology to secular concerns. Tibet became a part of China in the 13th century, by an ex post facto ascription of modern Chinese national identity upon Mongol khans.
The mchod-yon dyad established between Tibet and the Mongol Empire has been interpreted differently by modern Tibetan refugee historians and by officials of the People's Republic of China—each according to their own preconceptions and in accordance with the "novel" experience of presenting this material to the West for political consideration. I present these two general styles of interpretations as examples of the historian as actor, demonstrating not only "event" history of Tibet, but as an active discourse representing the rhetorical opposition between modern Tibetan refugees and the Chinese occupiers of their land—separatist Tibetan nationalism on one hand, "Great Motherland" nationalism on the other.

Establishment of Mchod-yon in the 13th Century

Tsepon W.D. Shakabpa was the Tibetan Minister of Finance under the regime of Dalai Lama XIV from 1930–1950. In exile, he has served as representative of the Dalai Lama in New Delhi, de facto ambassador of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile to the host Government of India. His views of Tibetan history are in essence the official Tibetan exile version of history—a history that is utilized to formulate a presentation of Tibetan national claims to the world at large. Shakabpa's Tibet: A Political History (1984 [1967]) has accordingly been acknowledged by the Dalai Lama:
"Since Tibet has remained isolated for many centuries there are very few people who know much about Tibet and its people... there is no doubt that [this book] will be of immense value in presenting a true picture of Tibet..." (Dalai Lama XIV, in Shakabpa 1984)

According to Shakabpa, Mongol armies under Chinggis Khan invaded the Tangut Empire (parts of modern Gansu and Inner Mongolia) in 1207. Tibetan rulers, fearing imminent invasion, sent a tribute delegation to the khan and secured a peace with the Mongols. After the death of Chinggis in 1227, the Tibetans ceased to send tribute and Godan Khan, a grandson of Chinggis, invaded Tibet in 1240. Godan sent a letter to the Sakya Pandita, Kunga Gyaltsen (Kun-dga' rgyal-mtshan) (1182-1251):

"I, the most powerful and prosperous Prince Godan, wish to inform the Sakya Pandita, Kunga Gyaltsen, that we need a lama to advise my ignorant people on how to conduct themselves morally and spiritually." (Shakabpa 1984:61-62 from the Gdung rabs)

Considering the power of the Mongol prince, this was in fact an ultimatum. The Sakya hierarch, accompanied by his nephews Phagpa Lodro Gyaltsen (Phags-pa blo-gros rgyal-mtshan) and Chakna (Phyag-na), finally acquiesced and met Godan in Gansu in 1247.

Shakabpa's interpretation suggests that the Sakya Pandita began to instruct the Mongol court in Buddhist practice, while Godan Khan invested the Sakya hierarch with temporal authority over Central Tibet (Ü-Tsang: dbus-gtsang), an action which no doubt increased the latter's spiritual authority in Tibet with the ascendancy of the
Sakya sect by Mongol patronage. Godan and Kunga Gyaltsen died contemporaneously, and were succeeded by Khubilai Khan and Phagpa Lodro Gyaltsen respectively in 1251 and 1252 (Shakabpa 1984:64). From the official Tibetan point of view, a protocol was established. Khubilai would occupy a lower seat than his lama when taking his Buddhist initiation (dbang), whereas the khan would assume a higher throne in secular audiences (Shakabpa 1984:64; also Hoffman 197–53).

According to Shakabpa, Phagpa was invested with spiritual and temporal authority over the three provinces of Tibet: Ü-Tsang, Kham (khams), and Amdo (a-mdo) (see Fig. 4). To reflect his new status, Phagpa was accorded the Chinese title Ti-shih (帝師 "Imperial Preceptor"): "this letter, then, is my [Khubilai's] present. It grants to you [Phagpa] authority over all Tibet." (Shakabpa 1984:65, from the Gdung-rabs)

Phagpa returned to Tibet to consolidate his new authority, again returning to the court of Khubilai in 1268. Just before Phagpa died in 1280, Khubilai Khan had finally succeeded in becoming the first Yüan Emperor of China.

For many Tibetan historians, the relationship between Phagpa and Khubilai had set a pattern for the ideology of the mchod-yon relationship between the Tibetan state and its military patron, the hierarch of Tibet religiously testifying to the mandate of the Mongol khan's rule over the latter's own territory. In return, the hierarch was offered military protection, economic support and even authority.
Fig. 4. Map of Tibet According to Refugee Claims
(based on original at Information Office of H.H. Dalai Lama 1981,
Reprinted with permission)
over the entire Tibetan monastic establishment (the Sakya were but one of several sects) (Hoffman 197-:54).

To Shakabpa, the Mongols not only stopped short of conquering Tibet, but in fact gave it to the Sakya hierarch in return for Buddhist legitimation of Mongol rule in their own territories and those which they "formally" subjugated (such as China). This donation, essentially, is the original claim of the Tibetan government-in-exile for the recognition of their independence.

This interpretation differs significantly from many contemporary western interpretations, which look upon the Sakya abbots as essentially viceroyys for the khans (e.g. Snellgrove and Richardson 1968:151; Rerikh 1973 [1958]). Rerikh's interpretation, much of which is based on many of the same primary texts that Shakabpa used, suggests that although the Sakya hierarch's spiritual authority over Tibet was recognized by the khan, the appointment of a special official (dpon-chen) to conduct the civil and military affairs of Tibet indicates that the hierarch's role was limited to religious affairs. It was the dpon-chen who received authority over the three provinces of Tibet (Rerikh 1973:47), not the Sakya hierarch. It seems fairly well accepted by modern western historians that Tibet at this time was no more than a province of the Mongol empire.

Shakabpa's interpretation, as we will see with various native chroniclers of the past, seems to differ from western
and Chinese accounts primarily on the basis of a tacitly accepted foundation in the ideals of sbyin-bdag reciprocity among native historians. I suggest that the understanding of this context is essential for comprehending the refugee claim for Tibetan independence. This context is, of course, not notably absent in the modern, official history of the Tibetan region by the Chinese:

Wang Furen and Suo Wenqing, researchers at the Central Institute of Nationalities (Beijing) have written *Highlights of Tibetan History* (1984), a work which seems to paraphrase the modern claims of the People's Republic of China to Tibet. The main principle of the Chinese claim to Tibet is partly maintained by the same sort of retroactive ascription of authority common in many politically or ideologically-based histories, including the Tibetan. Chinggis Khan was Chinese—not Han, but a member of the Mongol national minority of the Great Motherland.

According to Wang and Suo, Mongols began unifying the country (China) in 1206, subjugating local independent regimes and bringing "all nationalities under a central government" (1984:57). The Wang and Suo sequence of events portraying the interaction between Chinggis Khan and the Sakya Pandita, and their successors, seems to be identical to Shakabpa's. For example, both accounts suggest that Tibetans were willing to provide tribute to the Mongol court with an assurance that Tibet would not be occupied.
Utilizing the same primary material as Shakabpa (the Sa-skya'i gdung rabs "Sakya's Lineage") Wang and Suo state however, that

"Tibet had become a vassal territory of Mongolia and that the Mongol leader Go-dan had appointed Sa-skya [Pandita] and other officials to help govern Tibet." (1984:59)

Godan, as well as Chinggis, had served well in the unification of Tibet and the entirety of the Chinese nation.

Phagpa's visit to Khubilai Khan is also noted with similar detail, including the awarding of the title Ti-shih. One divergence in the Wang and Suo account, however, has Phagpa moving to Beijing with Khubilai, whereupon the Sakya hierarchy was put in charge of a council handling Buddhist affairs for the empire: "thus Phags-pa became a high official in the central government" (1984:61). According to Hoffman, Phagpa did spend a significant portion of his time at the Yuan court (197-:54).

It is perhaps more important, however, to note that no mention of the mchod-yon relationship appears in the Wang and Suo text. The differences in interpretation of the mchod-yon seems to be the basic division between official Chinese and Tibetan-exile histories. Shakabpa was challenged on the matter of mchod-yon by PRC historians, notably Tang Ke-an (T. Thang khre an), writing from Lhasa in Tibetan in 1985. His article, Mchod-yon 'brel-ba'i chab srid-kyi go don ("Priest-patron relations in political contexts?") questions the very existence of mchod-yon
matters in anything other than a strictly religious application. Shakabpa is viewed as an agent of a "separatist clique," and has distorted history towards these goals.

Shakabpa subsequently wrote a colorful article 'Khyog bshad-kyi rnag khrag 'byin byed bden-pa'i gtsag-bu ("Using the Lance of Truth to Draw out the Purulence of Crooked Explanations") published by the Information Office of H.H. Dalai Lama in Dharamsala (1986). Shakabpa refutes Tang's historical explanations of mchod-yon, utilizing rather graphic Tibetan idiom. In reference to Tang's alleged slanderings of Tibetan history for propaganda reasons and in defense of native Tibetan historical interpretation, Shakabpa suggests to the reader that:

"You don't have to put many carcasses of horses, sheep, and men before the wolf to note the pattern of its powerful greed; and you don't have to lance a festered boil many times to begin to draw off the purulence." (1986:1)

In other words, a few unimpeachable references to the operation of the mchod-yon dyad in a political context between Tibet and its patrons should prove to the world the sham of the entire Chinese justification for the occupation of that region.

One extraordinary feature about this article is not so much its content as its language. Although sponsored by the Tibetan government-in-exile, this article shows a uncharacteristic vehemence against the Chinese—uncharacteristic
in the sense that one rarely notes such strong language appearing in English-versions of texts. Inflammatory rhetoric of this nature is rare in official Tibetan press designed for the world audience, as it conceivably runs contrary to the Gandhian ideals of nonviolent opposition professed by the current Dalai Lama in exile.

The presentation of the Tibetans as a peaceful, isolated, and oppressed people is the theme that the Tibetan government-in-exile and other diaspora institutions choose to portray to the outside world, and is in a sense representative of a strategy of being virtuous recipients of the benefactions of the world, apparently considered essential in the attempted establishment of clientage with the West. On one occasion, the Information Office of H.H. the Dalai Lama commented on their translation of Kunsang Paljor's *Tibet: The Undying Flame* (1977):

"The original Tibetan version of the work contains a fair amount of invectives and abuses directed at the Chinese, and paragraphs, especially at the beginning and end of each chapter...Although this is quite an acceptable practice for Tibetan readers, especially in the context of its subject matter, we have decided that Western readers are not likely to be interested in them." (emphasis added)

Inherent in the orthodox notion of the recipient in the religious shying-bdag dyad is the ritual purity of the "receiver of gifts." This has been extended from the traditional category of "priest" to mean the Tibetan people as a whole in the refugee context, as I will develop in subsequent chapters. It is important, therefore, for the
Tibetan exile press to present themselves as innocent victims (thus "appropriate recipients"), and strong rhetoric is notably absent in much of their English press.

With perhaps a similar intention of portraying Tibetans as having an unique, pristine culture in his major work, Shakabpa suggests that "this [mchod-von] relationship between the Mongol rulers and the Tibetan lamas cannot be defined in Western political terms" (1984:71). This phrase has been parroted by other native writers, and by some western Tibetologists as well, perhaps to justify the latter's own research into a "unique" Tibetan phenomenon of divine rule through incarnation. Richardson suggests:

"The relationship between the two [Dalai Lama and Gushri Khan in the 17th century] is an example of the purely Central Asian concept of Patron and Priest [mchod-von] in which the temporal support of the lay power is given in return for the spiritual support of the religious power. That had been the formal description of the bond between the Mongol Emperors of China and their Lama Viceregents for Tibet. It is an elastic and flexible idea and not to be rendered in the cut-and-dried terms of modern western politics. There is in it no precise definition of the supremacy of one or the subordination of the other; and the practical meaning of the relationship can only be interpreted in the light of the facts of the moment." (emphasis added 1962:41-42)

Richardson has suggested a major premise of my thesis: that the mchod-von relationship is always subject to interpretation based on the perceptions of history interacting with the practical circumstances of the moment. But state-level patron/client relationships between the hierarchs of a "universalistic" religion and a powerful
secular ruler is not a "uniquely Central Asian" phenomenon. A general perspective may be useful in my attempt to move away from the particularistic excesses of the Shangri-la view of Tibetan history.

A Roman Analogy

In European history, there exists a powerfully convincing general analogy between the ideals of the "universal Christian empire" of Rome and the Holy Roman Empire, and the religio-political relationships between the Mongol empire and Tibet in the 13th century as they have been interpreted from the standpoint of religious ideology, a context inherent in native Tibetan history written after the establishment of the Tibetan theocracy in the 17th century.

This example is discussed in some detail to demonstrate the power of ideology in conditioning social and political forms and to suggest that there may be a general pattern to some systems of state-level religious patronage. Furthermore, I suggest that the modern Tibetan reference that the mchod-yon is unique is a political statement which helps further accomplish Tibetan national identity.

The Papacy had maintained a long-standing claim to temporal rule, originally over the Roman Empire (and thus the "world") and subsequently over the Papal States of Central Italy. In the modern age, strictly temporal sovereignty is confined to the State of Vatican City. After
a long debate over the "Roman Question," the Lateran
Conciliazione negotiated between Pope Pius XI and Mussolini
in 1929 formally recognized the respective sovereignties of
the Vatican and the Kingdom of Italy (Kent 1981). I suggest
that the "Tibetan Question" is perceived by modern Tibetans
in a manner similar to the position of the Catholic Church
during the unification of Italy. Basically, if the
"reality" of the religious ideologies is assumed, both the
Roman and Tibetan pontiffs have "valid" claims to
sovereignty over their lands. This is maintained quite
logically with the assumption that a paramount ecclesiastic
ruler is inherently superior to any secular ruler.

The analogy between Tibetan lamaistic ritual and
material culture, and that of the Roman Catholic Church, was
first suggested by the missionaries Abbé Huc in 1844 (1853)²
and Austine Waddell (1895). However, the comparison may be
extended to the history of the Papacy and the Tibetan
pontificate as well. The second parallel was first noted by
Bogle, the first Englishman to visit Tibet (1774):

"Any one that would give himself the trouble,
might draw a striking parallel between the Lamas
and the ancient Roman Pontiffs. The situation of
the former, with respect to the monarchs of China,
might well be compared to the protection and
authority, which the successors of St. Peter
derived from the German emperors." (in Markham,
ed., 1971 (1879):196)

But according to Papal interpretation, St. Peter's authority
did not devolve from Caesar, but from God. Similarly, the
authority of the Tibetan hierarch was not based on the
authority of the Chinese emperor either, from the Tibetan point of view. Furthermore, both pontifical states claimed temporal independence from their patrons all along (but this was, in fact, retroactive). This sort of logic is the ultimate basis for Tibetan refugee claims of independence from the PRC. The underlying similarity may be more than mere coincidence, and based perhaps on some underlying factor inherent in the duality of divine kingship. The structural parallel between the pope-king of the West and the "god-king" of Tibet was noted by Hocart (1936), but there seems to be little subsequent application of this significant theme in Tibetan studies.

In the Rome of the 8th century, a document appeared which declared that in the 4th century, Constantine, Emperor of Rome and Pontifex Maximus, granted to the Bishop of Rome and his successors the

"diadem or crown, together with the purple mantle also and the scarlet tunic and all the imperial trappings. We bestow upon him also the imperial scepter, with all the standards and banners and similar ornaments."

(Chamberlin 1969:25)

In abandoning Rome for Byzantium, Constantine had apparently given the pope the western Roman Empire. More importantly, perhaps, was that this pronouncement further suggested, by reason of the sacred office of the Papacy as Christ's representative on earth, that the Eastern emperor would henceforth be inferior to the pope.
The imagery was that of a dyarchy of universal rule, the "two swords of God" united in a Holy empire. The power of the sword of the emperor was mundane—the sword of the pope was the sacral power of excommunication, the ability to deny entry of souls into the transcendent world. The sacred ideally took precedence over the profane. This is almost identical to the ideology inherent in the present Tibetan view of the mchod-yon in 13th century Central Asia—the doctrines and body of the Church are separate, and superior, to those earthly powers which support them.

Hocart's comparative study of divine kingship is suggestive:

"This opposition between order and bloodshed may explain why the maintenance of law [e.g. the Papacy] and the slaying of those who transgress the ritual [the functions of the secular power] are vested in different persons. The upholder of the law must be serene; the conqueror of evil must use violence. Hence two different persons are required, one to set the course for the stars and men, the other to rout the forces of evil in nature and man." (1936:177)

Although the Donation of Constantine was much later discovered to be a forgery (an instantaneous "invention of tradition"), the myth of the devolution of secular authority of the Roman emperor upon the pope was nevertheless put into action by the appearance of a strong Frankish patron, Pepin, who successfully fought the powerful Lombards in the defense of the Papacy. Without question, Pepin "restored" the former Lombard territories of Central Italy, with complete sovereignty, to St. Peter's successor in Rome (Chamberlin 1969:26). The Donation myth had become fact,
constructed around the notion of patron/client reciprocity, with the client considering himself ultimately superior. It did much more than give the temporal rule of the pope its actuality: "It had established the precedent that the German monarch was the natural protector of the Papacy" (Chamberlin 1969:28). On Christmas Day, 800, Pope Leo reciprocated, crowning Pepin's son Charlemagne Roman Emperor. Leo stood as a vicar of God duly consecrating his caesar.

There is remarkable correspondence in the perceived relationship between Phagpa of Tibet and Khubilai Khan's own empire-building according to Tibetan historians, and the arrangement between Charlemagne and the Pope. With a long-durational perspective, the analogy is evident. In both cases from the clients' point of view, the respective empires were founded upon twin symbols of authority. The Roman and Sakya hierarchs wielded the spiritual authority of their empires, legitimating the temporal rule of each emperor over the latter's own territories. Both the Pope and the Sakya hierarch were given temporal control over their own estates, however, as the Papal States and Tibet. Charlemagne, as Khubilai (in Tibetan history), allegedly recognized that their authority did not extend to either the territory of St. Peter or Tibet, respectively. In theory, neither region should be considered a part of the empire. In return for this legitimation of divinely ordained
imperial rule, both Tibet and the Papal States were defended by their strong patrons. It is reasonable to suggest that neither Charlemagne, Khubilai, and subsequent emperors in both regions supported these views.

The ideological formation of both patron/client relationships set into motion at the establishment of empires, whether consciously fabricated (as in the Donation of Constantine) or by a more gradual development (as in modern native Tibetan history), had its apparent origins in sacred text. The Roman Catholic legitimacy of the supremacy of the pope is based, of course, on the Bible and on the accepted words of Christ to Peter:

"And I tell you that you art Peter, and on this rock I will build my church." (Matthew 16:18)

"Take care of my sheep." (John 21: 18)

As apostolic succession to religious authority seems to have been derived from biblical sources, so was the argument for temporal authority of papal vicarage. Christ, after all, was to return to earth to rule as king until last judgement. St. Peter and the popes were his viceroy until the Second Coming. Thus was set the stage for centuries of bitter struggle for supremacy between the Papacy and powerful European monarchs, whose interpretations of such ideology did not match. It was a long-term structural opposition between ecclesiastic and secular political systems, the claims of the former being based on a legitimacy ultimately grounded in the directives of the divinity himself. 3
The Ashokan Model

No such clearly successional message is seen in Buddhist sūtras. From the earliest Buddhist documents, it seems likely that the Buddha did not leave an ecclesiastic vicar much less a temporal one (Conze 1983). The Tibetan ideology of the prototype mchod-yon state apparatus appears to refer to the foundation of the Ashokan Empire in India, about 250 years after the historical Buddha's parinirvāṇa (Skt. "final enlightenment"), and also was influenced by Buddhist patronage systems developed in T'ang dynasty China. The actual mchod-yon was an invention of Yüan times, which at the time seems to have lacked many of the sacred contractual arrangements later ascribed to it by Tibetan historians.

A great empire had indeed been built by Ashoka and his father, and a clear message of the state support of religious institutions (of all types, not just Buddhist) in the empire was carved into rock and upon pillars throughout India after the conquests were made. Buddhism was becoming an important political force in welding the South Asian empire together. The vigorous proselytizing of dharma (in this context, a code of ethics and law drawn from many religious sources), successfully replaced the sword as a means of expansion and control. From the Third Rock Edict:

"It is good and proper to render dutiful service to one's father and mother, to friends, to acquaintances and relations; it is good and proper to bestow alms on Brahmans and Śramans
[Buddhist monks], to respect the life of living beings, to avoid prodigality and violent language. The clergy shall then instruct the faithful in detail in the spirit and in the world." (in Dutt 1983:42)

And from the First Pillar Edict:

"And my officers, superior, middling, and subaltern, conform themselves to [religion] and direct the people in the right path, and keep them in cheerful spirits; and so too my frontier officers work. For the rule is this: government by religion, law by religion, progress by religion, and security by religion." (Dutt 1983:102)

Although Ashoka himself became a pious Buddhist, he was careful to not appear to show favoritism. According to later native Tibetan history, Mongols and Manchus utilized the same sort of model to consolidate and expand their own empires. The Tibetan model "works" if one assumes that Ashoka, and the Yuan and Ch'ing emperors were exclusively Buddhist sovereigns.

Buddhism during Ashoka's reign had been influenced by Brahmanic ideas of the rightful rule of the cakravartin (Skt. "wheel-turner," i.e. religious emperor). The concept was subsequently idealized and sacralized ex post facto and attributed to the Buddha himself in the later development of Buddhist states in Asia. The account of a later traveller to India, I-tsing, mentions that the Buddha himself prophesied Ashoka:

"more than a hundred years after his nirvana, 'when there will arise a king named Ashoka, who will rule over the whole of Jambudvipa [India].'" (in Dutt 1983:61)
The Divyavadāna has a similar prophecy (Dutt 1983:61). The Kangyur (bka'-gyur) division of the Tibetan canon contains the Mañjuśrī-mūla-tantra, which has a number of prophecies concerning the spread of Buddhism, and mentions Ashoka in particular:

"One hundred years after the Teacher will have passed away, in the city of Kusumapura there will appear the king Ashoka who will live 150 years and worship the monuments of the Buddha during 87 years." (in Obermiller's translation [1932] of Butson:118)

This sort of retrospective ascription of authority to the word of a religiously inspired being is common, of course, in religions throughout the world and is not less characteristic of Tibetan Buddhism. Tantras, for example, form the basis of much of Tibetan Buddhist practice. They were probably written throughout the first millennium A.D., but were proclaimed to be the word of the Buddha, hidden from "profane" eyes until an "appropriate" time for their revelation. Retrograde ascription (such as the "discovery" of a prophecy) is one device by which inevitable change maybe accommodated within apparent continuity. A recent Tibetan example can be seen with the Tibetan Declaration of Independence of 1913:

"I, the Dalai Lama, most omniscient possessor of the Buddhist faith, whose title was confirmed by the Lord Buddha's command, from the glorious land of India, speaks to you as follows:..." (emphasis added--quoted from Shakabpa 1984:246)
There is, of course, no reference to the establishment of the institution of the Dalai Lama in early Buddhist texts. Both the Dalai Lama and the state mchod-yon were invented traditions, yet credited to the Buddha and to the ideal of a "Buddhist empire" established by Ashoka. The sbyin-bdag dyad ideology of the mutual rights and obligations of the laity and the clergy seems to be the link that ties more modern institutions to the Buddha. Sbyin-bdag ideology provides apparent continuity to this particular series of "events" (the life of the Buddha followed by the successive appearances of the Ashokan, Mongol, and Manchu cakravartins to protect and propagate the dharma and saṅgha). This effectively links contemporary practice with a perceived past.

In the context of the Declaration, the 13th Dalai Lama notes that the Manchu throne, occupied by the righteous successors of Ashoka as the cakravartin, is defunct. The Dalai Lama thereupon frees his subjects from their remaining bonds with China. 6

Shakabpa's official Tibetan government interpretation of 13th-century history shows the establishment of an independent Tibet existing by the grace of the Mongol khan, providing a spiritual mandate for the khan's legitimacy to rule as a Buddhist emperor outside of Tibet. This suggests a certain logic providing religion is ultimately considered superior to temporal domains (as modern Tibetans apparently
suggest). In Europe, some imperial successors attempted to substitute the primacy of the temporal over the spiritual, and claimed the lands of the Donation of Constantine to be an integral part of the Holy Roman Empire. This appears to have been the case in Tibet as well. While Tibetans might claim that the modern Chinese have misunderstood the "true nature" of the mchod-yon relationship, I suggest that it is more likely a differential interpretation on the part of modern Chinese political ideologues (both communist and Nationalist) as to the "proper" position of religion in the state. It is a matter of whether the interpretation of the client as a religious institution is considered supra- or subordinate to the state. Historical meaning is always contingent upon contemporary experience.

The interpretation of history on the basis of present circumstances and political ideology is evident in Wang and Suo's account of 13th-century China. Some intriguing questions are generated. First, was the Mongol empire the Yüan dynasty of China, or was China a part of a supra-ordinate foreign dynasty? It should be recalled that the same Mongols also conquered most of Eurasia, extending as far as Lithuania in the West and Persia in the South. Yet are Lithuanians to be considered minorities in Motherland China by that occurrence? Is the Crimea an "integral part" of the PRC? By the same logic that makes Chinggis Khan Chinese and subsequently Tibet a part of China, the PRC
could likewise claim most of Eurasia. Secondly, the Chinese official history seems to carry an error of omission in regards to the Tibetan version. The forgery of the Donation of Constantine in regards to the independence of the Papacy was also largely constructed by an omission. The "real" document "stated unequivocally that the emperor retained in his hands all the apparatus of civil government" (Chamberlin 1969:25). The following was omitted in Wang and Suo's history, but added in Shakabpa's. Khubilai Khan's letter grants to Sakya hierarch Phagpa,

"authority over all Tibet, enabling you to protect the religious institution and faith of your people and to propagate Lord Buddha's teachings." (Gdung-rabs quoted in Shakabpa 1984:65-66).

What sort of "authority?" Was Phagpa merely viceroy to the Yuan, or had an independent pontificate been established? Without Mongol backing, the hegemony of the Sakyapa over other Tibetan sects quickly evaporated (Hoffman 1977:54; Snellgrove and Richardson 1968:152; Stein 1972:87-79; Rerikh 1973:49). Apparently the Sakyapa were not all that popular among the Tibetan laity either, especially among the lay nobility. It is easy to dismiss the validity of these Sakya documents if one does not presume the context of the ideal mchod-yon model in which they were framed by later Tibetan historians.

With almost all other dates and interpretations being roughly similar between the Shakabpa and Wang and Suo versions, the omission of this letter in the Chinese history
is conspicuous. (Wang and Suo's history is supported by other Chinese historians, notably Li [1960]). Taken by itself, one could argue that the Tibetan account may merely be a forgery of addition. If it has indeed been an invention, it is a well-entrenched one.

In modern native Tibetan accounts, as well as those from the 17th-19th centuries, the mchod-yon dyad is shown as existing throughout various periods of Sino-Tibetan political history, having an apparent establishment in the ideology of the Buddhist sovereign in India as well as cakravartin patterns established in T'ang-dynasty China. From my own ethnographic experience, the more general sbyin-bdag category of gifting to religious institutions seems to exist at all levels of Tibetan society as an ideal relationship between lay/clerical segments of society, as well as within the general ideology of gifting. The mchod-yon appears to help define this relationship as it relates the state to outside forces. It is used by refugees to justify the existence of Tibet in the modern world, as it was used by 17th-20th century Tibetan government historians to justify the "special" status of Tibet to the Manchu empire.

From the Tibetan Buddhist perspective, the mchod-yon dyad appears continuous. This apparent continuity serves to maintain Tibetan national identity in exile, as well as to promote their claims for independence to their newly assumed
patrons in the West. I suggest that the "real" mchod-yon institution of the Yüan dynasty, as it is interpreted by western historians as a Mongol viceroyalty granted to a regional ecclesiastic prince in Tibet, was structurally transformed on two occasions: 1) in the 17th century during the rise of the Manchus, and 2) with the fall of that dynasty in the early 20th century. In both cases, new meaning was ascribed upon old categories, which effectively changed the relationships between those categories. These structural realignments can be seen in the changing relationship between the Tibetan laity and clergy from Yüan times to the present. The first intended reproduction of the mchod-yon occurred with the establishment of new patron/client bonds with the Mongols and the rising Manchus of the 17th century. The mchod-yon was given new meaning, corresponding to the development of a fairly centralized Tibetan theocracy. From this paradigm, which will be discussed in the next chapter, a second structural transformation began after the Chinese revolution of 1911—a transformation which leads us into the modern diaspora.
Notes

1. Lan med rang du bshag na spyang ki rta gzan lug ros mi 'grang ba'i dpe ltar ham pa dpa' thal dang/ Ngan pa byas rgyal du phyen dwogs rnag thog gtsag 'khel gyi lan 'debs chung zad byed rgyar/

2. The Catholic abbot, visiting Tibet in 1844, remarked as follows:

"The cross, the mitre, the dalmatica, the cope, which the Grand Lamas wear on their journeys, or when they are performing some ceremony out of the temple; the service with double choirs, the psalmody, the exorcisms, the censer, suspended from five chains, and which you open or close at pleasure; the benediction given by the Lamas by extending the right hand over the heads of the faithful; the chaplet, ecclesiastical celibacy, spiritual retirement, the worship of the saints, the fasts, the processions, the litanies, the holy water, all these are analogies between the Buddhists and ourselves." (Huc 1853:50)

Lillie continues:

"The good Abbé has by no means exhausted the list, and might have added confessions, tonsure, relic worship, the use of flowers, lights and images before shrines and altars, the sign of the cross, the Trinity in Unity, the worship of the Queen of Heaven, the use of religious books in a tongue unknown to the bulk of the worshippers, the aureole or nimbus, the crown of saints and Buddhas, wings to angels [sic--angels?], penance, flagellations, the flabellum or fan, popes, cardinals, bishops, abbots, presbyters, deacons, the various architectural details of the Christian temple." (quoted in Dutt 1983:73-74)

Dutt is making the point that perhaps the forms of the Buddhist Church diffused westward, influencing the development of Roman Catholicism (1983:74-76). Huc suggested the opposite. I would contend, however, that it is more likely a parallel development, based perhaps on some underlying convergent structural similarities in "archaic" state-level theocracies.

3. The Protestant Reformation can be analyzed according to the gradual triumph of the secular ruler over the universalism of the pope/Holy Roman emperor system. With the
break-up of the empire, so rose the modern nation-state. A similar process can be seen with the collapse of the late Ch'ing empire, with the modern state of Mongolia and the persistent nationalism of the Tibetans being some of the results.

4. *Sūtra* refers to the texts attributed to the Buddha himself.


6. See Appendix for full text.
Invention of the Dalai Lama

According to Shakabpa, the fall of the Yuan dynasty and the accession of the Han Ming (1368), concluded the mchod-von dyad for the time being. It was a relationship with the Mongols, not with China per se (1984:82). Notably, the Sakya political fortunes declined at this point as well, never to return. Although the Ming court, sensing the success of the Yuan relationship with Tibet, had attempted to reinstate a notable cleric as Ti-shih, no ruling lama of any consequence would accept the invitation (Shakabpa 1984:83). The Karma Kagyupa (Kar-ma bka'-rgyud-pa) sect had been gaining political strength in Tibet with the decline of the Sakya, and had invented the now familiar succession of incarnate lamas (sprul-sku), replacing the principle of heredity formerly utilized in Tibet for both the succession of lay and clerical aristocracy. Although the Karmapa (Kagyupa hierarch) had visited the court of Ming Yung-lo and received the title Ta Pao Fa Wang (Great Precious King of the Buddhist dharma), lamas from other sects had also visited and were similarly entertained with titles and gifts (Wylie 1980:336).
Essentially, the Ming did not successfully renew the mchod-yon relationship with Tibet because Tibet itself had been undergoing a political transformation with the rise of reforming rival sects. The mchod-yon, from both the Ming and Tibetan viewpoints at the time, was probably too closely identified with the discredited Mongols. Secular power began to reassert itself in Tibet under Jangchub Gyaltsen (Byang-chub rgyal-mtshan [1302-1373]), and with it the imagery of a fully independent state along the lines of the old Tibetan empire (7th-9th centuries) (Hoffman 197-54). The ideology of the mchod-yon was, however, eventually fused with symbols of the past imperial period to create the institution of the Dalai Lama.

The idea that notable personages from the "Golden Age" had actually been popular bodhisattvas, thus divine representatives from the Buddha-realms, had become clearly established in Tibet by the 14th century (Farquhar 1975:11). This, too, was eventually incorporated into the ideology of the relationship between the Dalai Lama and the emperor.

Various minor lamas went to Beijing during the Ming dynasty and were given titles, but the founder of the eventually paramount sect, Tsongkhapa (1357-1419 Hoffman 197-55) of the Gelugpa (the "yellow hats" to some in the West) apparently refused the Ming invitations. Perhaps this refusal reflected contemporary attitudes as demonstrated by the "revival" of the imperial model of Tibetan independence
(from the 7th-9th centuries). I suggest the mchod-rvon, as experienced under the Mongols, had not yet become an "ideal" relationship during the time of Tsongkhapa. It did become an ideal, however, with its incorporation with other symbols of Tibetan nationality.

Wylie suggests that Tsongkhapa's refusal is deleted from the official Chinese history of its time (Ming Shih), as the refusal would have brought disgrace to the Confucian supremacy of the emperor (1980:337). (Official censorship has had a long history in Chinese historiography). And according to Hoffman, official Chinese records give incorrect dates for his life (1417-78; 197-55). The Han Ming evidently had resorted to the T'ang tactic of bribing rather insignificant Buddhist priests to keep, in this case, the Tibetans away from the Mongols and thereby keeping Tibet in a state of political disarray. A Tibeto-Mongol alliance would have been a serious threat to the Ming dynasty, but the Ming policy towards Tibet seemed aimed more towards avoidance of the threat than subjugation of the region (Sperling 1980:284). Tibet appears to have been fully independent during this time, and independence which was not conditioned by substantial foreign patronage.

During much of the Ming dynasty, Tibet was torn between rival religious sects, which included the Kagyupa (who developed the system of lama reincarnation), the Sakyapa (a hereditary system which had former imperial connections with
the Yuan dynasty), the Nyingmapa (Rnying-ma-pa) (the oldest tantric sect founded by the Indian saint Padmasambhava), the Bonpo (a pre-Buddhist, shamanistic organization), and the new Gelugpa (Dge-lugs-pa) (under Tsongkhapa). Tsongkhapa was an indefatigable reformer who set upon the reorganization of the monastic establishment and the enforcement of more orthodox Buddhist discipline including celibacy according to the early vinaya rules. The implementation of "law and order" in the new Gelugpa monasteries assured not only the growth of the new sect but eventually the reunification of Tibet under its aegis. A major innovation of the Gelugpa involved a creative combination of several past inventions and symbols of Tibetan separateness. This quickly evolved into a powerful institution in the early 15th century, and one which still resists Chinese attempts at the incorporation of Tibet—the Dalai Lama. I suggest that the Dalai Lama as a symbol of the state gradually developed through a novel combination and reinterpretation of the following pre-existent elements in Tibetan society:

1. succession through incarnation (a Kagyupa innovation)
2. incarnation of the patron deity of Tibet (Chenrezi [T. Spyan-ras-gzigs]/Skt. Avalokiteśvara) in the person of the Dalai Lama
3. incarnation of the primal progenitor of the Tibetan race (the same Chenrezi) in the Dalai Lama
4. allusion to the "god/king" ruler idea and its application to the "Golden Age" of 7th–9th century Tibet (which was in fact often non-Buddhist).

7th-century Tibetan emperor Songtsen Gampo (Srong-btsan sgam-po) is proclaimed to have also been Chenrezi (earliest reference in 14th-century chronicles—see Beyer 1973:10).
5. hegemony over all of Tibet by a Tibetan pontiff in a mchod-yon dyad with a cakravartin emperor (allegedly from the Sakya/Yüan)
6. synthesis of various Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna elements to form a binary pair of bodhisattvas of equal standing—Avalokiteśvara in Tibet, and Mañjuśrī in China.

The success of the Gelugpa institutions ultimately lead to patronage by Manchu tribes, some of which were devoutly Buddhist. This led a perceived re-establishment of state mchod-yon between Tibet and China in the formation of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1644.

The events of this apparent re-establishment are noted by the official Tibetan refugee historian, Tsepon Shakabpa: Tsongkhapa founded the three great monasteries of Lhasa: Ganden (Dga'-ldan) (1409) (Shakabpa 1984:85), Drepung ('Bras-spungs) (1416) and Sera (Se-ra theg-che gling) (1419) (Buckley and Strauss 1986:139-140). These remained the largest monasteries in the world until the occupation of Tibet in the 1950s. One of Tsongkhapa's successors was Gedun Truppa (Dge-'dun grub-pa) (1391-1475), who founded Tashilhunpo (Bkra-shis lhun-po) at Shigatse, the capital of Tsang. This disciple was succeeded by an incarnation, Gedun Gyatso (Dge-'dun rgya-mtsho) (1475-1542), then by Sonam Gyatso (Bsod-nams rgya-mtsho) (1543-1588) (Shakabpa 1984).

In 1578, according to Shakabpa, Sonam Gyatso accepted an invitation of Altan Khan of the Tumet Mongols, and visited his capital at Koko Khotan (sic) (T. Mkhar sngon-po; Mo. Köke khot; modern Hohhot, capital of modern Inner
Mongolia). According to Shakabpa, the meeting set into motion the re-establishment of mchod-yon. The khan made the following proclamation at Sonam's arrival:

"The Buddhist religion first came to our country in earlier times, when we gave our patronage to Sakya Pandita. Later, we had an emperor named Temür [Timur], during whose reign our people had no religion and our country degenerated; so that it seems as though an ocean of blood had flooded the land.

Your visit to us has now helped the Buddhist religion to revive. Our relationship of patron and lama can be likened to that of the sun and moon. The ocean of blood has become an ocean of milk." (from Dngos-grub shing-rta quoted in Shakabpa 1984:94)

Altan reciprocated. In exchange for the religious instruction given by Sonam Gyatso, Altan conferred upon him the title "Ocean (Mo. dalai) Lama" as well as "Holder of the Thunderbolt" (T. Rdo-rje chang; Skt. Vajradhāra) and "Religious King" (T. Chos-rgyal; Skt. Dharmarāja).

According to Shakabpa, Altan additionally prophesied that eighty years hence his descendants would rule all Mongolia and China (1984:95). Sonam ascribed his title posthumously to his two previous incarnations, and thus became the 3rd Dalai Lama. Notably, Sonam Gyatso, as had his spiritual antecedent, Tsongkhapa, declined an invitation to the Ming court (Shakabpa 1984:96).

The 4th Dalai Lama, Yonten Gyatso (Yon-tan rgya-mtsho)², was discovered incarnate in the great-grandson of Altan Khan. This strengthened the ties between the Mongols and the Gelugpa sect. With Mongol military backing, the
Gelugpa monasteries successfully defeated Kagyupa opposition to their own growing ascendancy. In fact, the Gelugpa converted many Kagyupa monasteries in Central Tibet by force.

In 1620, under the new 5th Dalai Lama (Ngawang Lozang Gyatso [Ngag-dbang blo-bzang rgya-mtsho]), Mongol armies successfully took Tsang province for the Gelugpa. Representatives of Drepung, Sera, and Ganden then approached the new Mongol converts, the Oirat, Dzungar, and Chahar tribes, for further assistance at consolidation in Tibet. The Mongol military leader, a Khoshot named Gushri Khan, became an ardent supporter of the Gelugpa, quelling internecine strife in Tibet wherever it occurred.

Finally, on the fifth day of the fourth month of the Water Horse year (1641), the fifth Dalai Lama was enthroned at the capital of Tsang at Shigatse. On that day, according to Shakabpa, Gushri Khan

"declared that he conferred on the Dalai Lama supreme authority over all Tibet from Tachienlu in the East up to the Ladakh border in the West."
(Shakabpa 1984:111)

Tibet was again unified due to Mongol backing. According to Dhondup (1984), another refugee historian, Gushri Khan offered the Dalai Lama ritual gifts (T. map-dal rten-gsum) at the latter's enthronement, a symbolic display of the mchod-yon. Significantly the Khan occupied a lower throne than the Dalai Lama in this religious context, an arrangement reflecting both the subordinate status of the
secular to the religious, and re-enacting the seating arrangements between Khubilai Khan and the Sakya hierarch several centuries before (Dhondup 1984:25).\textsuperscript{3}

The capital was moved to Lhasa, the seat of the heroic religious king Songtsen Gampo of the 7th century Tibetan empire. To commemorate the reunification of Tibet, Dalai Lama V began construction of the Tse Potala Phodrang ("Potala Peak Palace") in 1645 on the site of the palace of this early king atop Marpo Ri ("Red Hill"). This symbolic act provided apparent continuity with the Golden Age of Tibetan independence and strength (see Beckwith 1980:30-38), as well as integrating more recent political innovations such as the rule by incarnation through an externally supported monastic establishment (\textit{mchod-yon}). (From my own observations, the Potala, although officially a museum, remains a key symbol of Tibetan independence for many local and refugee Tibetans).

The establishment of Ganden Phodrang and the move to the Potala mark the first structural transformation of the \textit{mchod-yon} system. It was not merely a reproduction of the dyad. Various symbols of ancient Tibetan glory and independence were merged with the politically and economically practical attributes of the Sakya/Yuan \textit{mchod-yon} in the person of the Dalai Lama and in the establishment of the Ganden Phodrang administration. This "reproduction" resulted in major changes in the relationships between
primary components of the old structure. The power of the old Tibetan hereditary nobility, which had experienced a brief renaissance during the Ming, was replaced by an ecclesiastic nobility whose "reproduction" was not dependent upon biology but rather incarnation. By incorporating ancient symbols of Tibetan independence, the developing theocracy was perhaps in a better position to define the mchod-yon not as a viceroyalty to a powerful empire, but as an independent state with religious ties to a pious, outside ruler. The institution of the Dalai Lama, as reflected in the religio-political ideology of the time, is made to appear to be continuous with the entire span of Tibetan history, with the Buddha himself prophesying the establishment of the system.

While Tibetans were forming new mchod-yon alliances with the Mongols, the Manchu tribes of northeast Central Asia had formed political/military bonds with the Mongols as well. What was soon to become the Ch'ing dynasty was established as a political amalgamation of various Tungusic, Han, and Mongol factions, united in segmentary opposition out of a common regional interest (see Lattimore 1935:43). It could be said that the Tibetan clerics formed an integral part of this assembly of "barbarian" forces that were soon to rule from Beijing (from 1644).

According to Shakabpa, between 1649-1651, the new Manchu emperor, Shin-chih (Shinzhi), sent repeated
invitations for the 5th Dalai Lama to visit Beijing (1984:113). The Tibetan leader finally accepted in 1652. The Tibetans, per official Tibetan refugee history, felt that this occasion would accomplish the prophecy that the descendants of Altan Khan would rule Mongolia and China in 80 years time. Manchus were considered closely linked to Mongol tribes. To show respect for the Dalai Lama, the Manchu emperor wished to meet him at the Chinese frontier, but was advised against such action "by Chinese officials" (Shakabpa 1984:115). The meeting took place close to Beijing, the emperor clasping hands with the Tibetan pontiff. The party then proceeded to Beijing amid stately pomp. Titles were exchanged--the Dalai Lama receiving a golden tablet inscribed with the title "Dalai Lama Dorje Chang" (T.& Mo. "Ocean Lama, Holder of the Thunderbolt"), the emperor invested with "Namgyi Lha Jamyang Gongma Dakpo Chenpo" (1984:116) (gnam-gIi lha 'jam-dbyangs gong-ma bdag-po chen-po, T. "God of the Sky, Mañjuśrī [an iconographic variant of Mañjuśrī] Emperor, Great Master4"). The idea of the Manchu emperor as the bodhisattva Mañjughoṣa is also used throughout Dalai Lama V's "autobiography" of 1680 (see Farquhar 1975:9).

According to refugee history, titles granted by the "Chinese" emperor to Tibetans were pure gifts--they were not exchanged in a manner that would warrant submission of Tibetan hierarchs to the emperor: 1) the Dalai Lama was
already Dalai Lama by reason of the Mongols Altan and Gushri Khan's support. The title exchange merely confirmed Manchu acceptance of the status quo, not authorization of such (as Chinese historians claim). 2) At the meeting of the 5th Dalai Lama and Shun-chih, the emperor himself accepted a title from the Dalai Lama, in fact a bestowal of bodhisattva status upon the emperor.

These acts, according to refugee history of Shakabpa and Dhondup, clearly underscore a perceived structural similarity in the positions of the Gelugpa Tibetan pontiff and the emperor--both were bodhisattvas, both were temporal rulers of their respective countries. As equals, each ruler had his respective role to play in regards to the other. This arrangement conceivably lasted to the fall of the Manchu empire in 1911.

The Wang and Suo version of this critical period of the re-establishment of mchod-von is significantly different from the refugee version:

"following the unification of the whole country [China] by the Qing dynasty...the Dalai Lama was granted his title by the court...and it was this occasion that marks the inception of an institution by which all generations of the Dalai Lama had to be confirmed by the central government." (1984:90)

A subsequent establishment of the Panchen Rinpoche (also a lineage of Tsongkhapa's disciples) was additionally ordained by the Manchus (Wang and Suo 1984:91).
According to Wang and Suo, the Tibetans, sensing a decline in the Ming dynasty, sent a good-will mission composed of representatives of Gushri Khan and the Dalai and Panchen Lamas to the pre-dynastic Manchu capital of Mukden (Shenyang) in 1642 (1984:93). The Manchus had sent prior invitations to Tibet, but

"behind all such gestures made by the Manchus were political motivations. Because many people in the Qing domain, particularly the Mongols, were believers in Lamaism, the Manchus planned to make use of this faith to lull the people to support them so that their rear areas might be consolidated as they marched on to unify China." (Wang and Suo 1984:93)

This policy was maintained with the accession of Shun-chih in Beijing. Furthermore, early Manchu policy was to separate religion from politics, on this occasion granting to Gushri Khan vice-regal authority over Tibet, with the religious leadership, exclusively, passing into the Dalai Lama's hands (Wang and Suo 1984:94).

This sort of historiographic device, a retroactive ascription of present ideology to past events is common in official Chinese history, whether it is Marxist or dynastic. It is also a characteristic of the Tibetans. In regards to the Blue Annals (1476) by renowned Tibetan historian, 'Gos gzhon-nu dpal, Wang and Suo state:

"With Buddhist idealism as his guiding ideology, the author ['Gos gzhon] naturally could not free himself from distortion and prejudices in dealing with the development of history." (1984:77)
'Gos-gzhon (as are more contemporary Tibetan historians) is criticized for not seeing Marxist reality, as Tibetan refugee historians criticize the Chinese for not seeing Buddhist reality. Being oblivious of "reality," both sides assume that the other is conscious of their "errors," and as such, their respective works are considered penned solely for propagandistic and subversive purposes. Retroactive ascription is characteristic of the interpretation of perceived past events according to modern praxis—the intent to deceive is not necessarily a part of this process. For modern Tibetans, the presentation of this sort of historical account is a demonstration of nationalism.

Wang and Suo's Marxist history of Tibet, of course, stands in marked contrast to the Buddhist ideological history promoted by Tibetan refugees (and their predecessors of the last few centuries), wherein religious motives are believed to have been the primary considerations of important actors such as Khubilai Khan and Shun-chih.

I summarize the disparate historical voices of the PRC and Tibetan refugee historians on the matter of the mchod-rten by noting the relative position of religious ideology:

1. as a relationship between a subordinate lama and an emperor in a temporal sense with the lama superior in the religious realm (refugee version of the Phagpa/Khubilai dyad).
2. as a relationship between equals in both spiritual and temporal realms (refugee version of twin bodhisattva/twin earthly monarchs, such as the 5th Dalai Lama/Shun-chih).
3. as a relationship between master and subordinate, with religious institutions additionally subordinate to the state (modern Chinese version of Sino-Tibetan relations in general)

I propose that the dialectic which exists between modern Chinese and Tibetan historians does not exist as a conscious, propagandistic device by either side. While it may subsequently serve to promote unification ideals by the Chinese, or underscore separation by modern Tibetans, I believe that the underlying ideology of either side is tacitly accepted by those parties, and the portrayals of those "realities" are the paramount motivations for these interpretations. In this way I differ from Grunfeld (1987), who similarly noted the polemic yet suggests that the refugee historians are particularly propaganda-oriented, the Chinese only slightly less so. I suggest, on the other hand, that the refugee version of Sino-Tibetan relations is not based on present disenfranchisement, but is essentially continuous with certain past styles of Tibetan historiography (as are the Chinese). In other words, both refugee historians and past Tibetan historians base their interpretations on Buddhist ideology; the Chinese perhaps base their history upon other considerations, including imperial and Confucian, Nationalistic and Communist at various times. It is this apparent continuity which significantly contributes to the Tibetan refugee's "persistent identity" in exile.
The apparent Tibetan historiographic continuity can be demonstrated by going beyond Shakabpa and Dhondup to primary material written by native historians, some of which were written near the time of the first structural transformation of the mchod-yon.5

The Mchod-yon in 17th-19th-Century Tibetan Documents

I have provided a sample of the materials collected by refugee archivists for my particular interest in the development of Tibetan national identity throughout history. When compared with the interpretations of many western historians for the period, these primary materials often reflect various "inventions of tradition" and retroactive ascriptions to the past. However, I suggest that these accounts are "real" for modern Tibetans, and that their presentation to the West (through myself in this instance) is itself a demonstration of Tibetan national consciousness.

The first reference I present is from legal codes written by an anonymous monk official at Rdzong gsang sngags bde-chen, circa 1653-1658, at the time that the mchod-yon was being re-established between Tibet and the new Manchu empire:

"These are the laws founded by the mchod-yon, sun and moon:6

Like in the Tārā Age7, the dawning of an auspicious epoch, the mchod-yon, the sun and the moon, became the Universal Monarch [Skt. cakravartin] through the power of the law they founded.6 (1)
Because of the achievements of the Dalai Lama [V] and the good laws of the two, mchod [and] yon, the people enjoy peace and prosperity. (2)

Related here is just a drop from the ocean of good deeds of the mchod-yon. (3)

In the past in India with the coming of each Buddha, there was a Universal Monarch. In the same way at the time of Sonam Gyatso, the third Dalai Lama, there came the very powerful religious king [T. chos-rgyal; Skt. dharmarāja], Altan [khan]. It was prophesied in a sūtra, 'May this religion spread northward from the North'. Because of this prophecy in the sūtra, Sonam Gyatso and Altan the religious king became mchod-yon. (4)

At the time of His Holiness Yonten Gyatso, the 4th Dalai Lama, who was of the Tho-me lineage, there was a very powerful King, Khor-lo Che. Under these two, mchod [and] yon, Buddhism in general and the secret mantra vajrayāna practice in particular, spread. (4)

The regent Sonam Chöphel [Bsod-rnams chos-'phel], who was [additionally] born of this lineage, performed incredibly well in his spiritual and temporal capacities. On account of this, he was respected by all people, high and low. Due to their aspirations and karmic connections, the two [Dalai Lama and Regent] came at the same time and drew the dharma chariot up the slope. The Regent also helped Gushri Khan and they became friendly like the sun and the moon, and the names of the mchod-yon spread throughout the land. Sonam Chöphel caused Buddhism to dawn. He also became mchod-yon with the Chinese Emperor and travelled to China, arriving in one and a half years. Sonam Chöphel was able to accomplish even more than Drogon Chögyal Phagpa [the Sakya hierarch] who [previously] went to China and was also mchod-yon with the Emperor. (7)

These three mchod-yon, the 5th Dalai Lama, Sonam Chöphel, and Gushri Khan spread Buddhism through temporal and spiritual methods... (7)

...From among all the mchod-yon, the achievements of these three mchod-yon were unparalleled. The spiritual and temporal laws of the mchod-yon were proclaimed in the Red and Black papers [edicts]
and spread from the upper region of Dza-ta'i gyu­pe lung-pa to the lower region of Mo-dar thag-pa in China..." Il (9)

The association of the establishment of the mchod-yon with the Manchu empire with the ideology of the Universal Monarch of an Enlightened Age is evident. The Dalai Lama, as vicar of the Buddha in this age (i.e. as a bodhisattva), is supported by a powerful patron—­together they combine temporal and spiritual realms into a coherent system. It is interesting to note that there is little mention here of the previous mchod-yon established between the Sakya hierarch and the Yuan dynasty, except in demonstrating that the new arrangement was superior to the previous work of Phagpa. This omission may be a device used to show the superiority of Gelugpa over other sectarian accomplishments in the past.

A reference to the meeting of the 5th Dalai Lama and Manchu Emperor Shun-chih (1651-1653--Hoffman 197--57) is noted in a manual for officials of the Ganden Phodrang (the Tibetan theocratic government) by Dbang-'dus tshe-ring nor-nang between 1886-1888:12

"Concerning successive mchod-yon:

...the first emperor of the Manchu dynasty, Shun-chih, the fifth of his lineage, invited the [5th] Dalai Lama to his palace in the year of the earth ox [1649]. The subjects carried out the preparations for the reception according to the orders given by the emperor. The Dalai Lama was then 36 years old." (13)
On the 27th day of the 3rd month of the water dragon year [1652], the Dalai Lama went from Drepung to Beijing and met the emperor. The emperor received the Dalai Lama with homage and from then on the mchod-yon were united..." (13) (emphasis added)

Although separated by over two hundred years, both statutory instructions of the Ganden Phodrang allude to the special nature of the mchod-yon relationship between the Dalai Lama and his imperial patrons. The image of two equal-status partners again emerges from a document of the late 18th century, at a time when many western writers assume that Ch'ing influence was at its greatest in Tibet (see Bogle's journal of 1778; Richardson 1962; Hoffman 197-:61). The meeting of the Third Panchen Lama, effective ruler of Tibet at the time, and the Ch'ien-lung emperor, was chronicled by a contemporary Tibetan historian--Dkon-chog' jigs-med dbang-po, the Second 'Jam-dbyangs bzhad-pa of Bla-brang bkra-shis 'khyil (1728-1791) (1971):

"22nd day of the 7th month of the Iron Bird year--1780:

A reception party comprised of persons of various ranks went to meet [the Panchen Lama] on horseback, [arranging themselves] in a very long line. They dismounted and prostrated three times upon his arrival. They offered scarves and told him that they had been sent by the Emperor. After they received blessings, they mounted their horses and took leave. In this way, there was a continual stream of reception parties that came to pay respect [to the Panchen Lama]. This continued for a very long time. Then [the Panchen Lama] proceeded on. Placed at a distance of two arrow shots apart were groups of eight, headed by a captain with a peacock feather in his hat. When they came to the top of a pass, they saw the city of Zhe-hor [Jehol (Chengde)] from a distance.
As they reached the base of the hill, many officers came to receive them, aided by high-ranking officials such as Er-le phu-gung, Ho-sa ta-zhin, Ku-tsha gang-phing zhe jai-len. Thousands of monks and lay people joined them. As they proceeded further on, they were received with the Emperor's canopy and musicians playing various instruments such as violins, flutes, and so forth. It was quite amazing, like the coming of a Universal Monarch.

As they reached the Chang-tri gate, the entourage dismounted. To the left and right within the gate were high ranking officers with badges on their caps. They were holding scarves, umbrellas of various colors, and religious items. It was a beautiful and awe-inspiring sight! After passing through many gates, the party finally reached the palace.

Although the Mañjuśrī Emperor requested that [the Panchen Lama] not dismount, the latter got down upon seeing the Emperor. At the gate [of the audience hall], he was received by Prince Dug-pa chen-po, two cabinet ministers, and the abbot [of the Jehol monastic complex].

...[the Panchen Lama] saw the Emperor surrounded by thousands of his subjects. Here the two, mchod [and] yon met each other for the first time. The Panchen Lama offered a scarf, a statue made of precious metals, and a pearl rosary to the Mañjuśrī Emperor. The Emperor was extremely pleased, and with all due respect, he offered a very long scarf and asked about the Panchen Lama's journey. The Mañjuśrī Emperor said to him, 'it must have been a lot of trouble to travel such a long distance.' To this the Panchen Lama replied, 'because of your grace, I had no problems on the way. I felt warm in places where it is cold, and cool in places where it is hot.' The Emperor was overjoyed to hear this and said, 'that is very fine.' The Emperor took Rje [Lord] Lama's hand and led him into his inner apartments. They sat together on an exceptionally large throne, and talked for a long time while facing each other. Chang-kya Rinpoche offered a scarf to the two, mchod [and] yon. Brother Thrin-ley, the attendant Gang-jen Abbot, and many other people offered scarves and received them in return. When tea was served, the Emperor requested the Precious Lama to drink. They drank together at the same time." (315-324) (emphasis added).
Much attention is given to the proxemical arrangements between the emperor (here considered a form of the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī [as the Mañjughoṣa emperor, T. 'Jam-pa'i dbyangs gong-ma]) and the Lama. This relationship is interpreted by a contemporary western diplomat as one between equals, an attitude which is paralleled by modern refugee historians such as Shakabpa and Dhondup as well. Indian Viceroy Warren Hastings' representative at the court of the Panchen Lama at the time, George Bogle, was not present at the meeting of emperor and lama at Jehol, but was in Tibet during the preparations for the Panchen Lama's journey from Tibet. His letter to Hastings (1778) seems to reflect the prevailing attitude of the Tibetan court at the time in regard to the motives of Ch'ien-lung:

"The Emperor of China is now seventy years of age. He is of the Tatar religion, of which the Lamas are the head. The Changay Lama [Chang-kya Rinpoche in the Tibetan document above], who is older than him, and resides at Peking, is said to have much influence over him. He has expressed a great desire to see Teshu Lama [the Panchen] before his death, and has at length, after repeated applications, prevailed on him to go and meet him." (emphasis added) (from Markham, ed., 1971 [1879]:207)

Bogle's associate, the Nepali Purungir Gosain, however, did accompany the Panchen on his trip to China, and essentially confirms Dkon-chog jigs-med dbang-po's contemporary account:

"At the first interview the Emperor met the Teshu Lama at a distance of at least forty paces from his throne, and seated him on the uppermost cushion with himself, and at the right hand." (in Markham 1971:208)
For this particular event, at least, cross-referencing between contemporary Tibetan and English accounts tend to support each other. The Manchu emperor, to the Tibetans, may well have been a "Universal Monarch," but he was nevertheless of equivalent status to the hierarch of Tibet. This point is contrasted with modern Chinese historical accounts, such as Wang and Suo, who conclude that the dominance of the Ch'ing over Tibet was greatest at this particular time (1984:93-103).

The overriding question in these historiographic oppositions in the re-establishment of mchod-yon in the Ch'ing dynasty is whether the Manchus were sincere practitioners of Tibetan Buddhism, or whether they merely patronized religion for its political benefit to appease the powerful Mongols and to unify Tibet under their control. No one questions the Yüan khans' conversion to Lamaism. But did the Manchus, that Mongol-Han-Tungusic political hybrid that it was, manipulate the mchod-yon for their own benefit?

As we will see, it was developed among Tibetans and Mongols to consider the emperor not only the Universal Monarch but the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī as well—this idea was not solely limited to Inner Asia. In the T'ang dynasty, Mañjuśrī cults were popular in China. Mañjuśrī was considered a special protector of the nation—his major shrine was on Wu-t'ai shan (in Shansi [Shanxi]). Buddhist leader Amoghavajra (705-774) took this development as a sign
that the ruler of China could become a cakravartin (Birnbaum 1983:25). Mahāyāna ideology suggests that when great Buddhas and bodhisattvas exist on earth, temporal rulers also rise to greatness (Birnbaum 1983:37). Further development of the cakravartin ideal among Tibetans and Mongols were perhaps influenced by the Chinese cult of Mañjuśrī and its association with patronage of Buddhism by the T'ang emperors.

Textually, the 5th Dalai Lama's meeting with the Emperor Shun-chih, and the visitation of the Panchen Lama at the court of Ch'i'en-lung reinforce the image of the emperor as Mañjuśrī himself as well as cakravartin. All the Manchu emperors to Ch'i'en-lung were rich patrons of Tibetan Buddhism, founding monasteries and temples such as the monastic complexes in Jehol and Dolon Nor in Beijing. Official funds were often used (Farquhar 1975:24). The assumption of a bodhisattva persona by a Manchu emperor would, of course, be of practical political advantage in dealing with the vexatious problems of marauding Mongol tribes in the Northwest. The emperor as bodhisattva could at least provide the same level of spiritual authority as the Dalai and Panchen lamas in Tibet and Mongolia.

The Bodhisattva Ideology of the Mchod-yon

In the highest audience hall in the Red Palace at the Potala in modern Lhasa, there is an alcove in which a thang-ka (T."painting") of the Ch'ing Emperor Ch'i'en-lung is
prominently displayed. I noted that contemporary Chinese-sponsored guides eagerly point out this exhibit—a suggestion, perhaps, that the Tibetans worshipped the Chinese emperor. The painted, silk-framed scroll depicts the Emperor seated on his throne, his left hand holding the Wheel of Law (Skt. dharma-cakra), his right assumed in the mudrā of argument (Skt. vitarka-mudrā). He is surrounded by numerous Buddhist deities from the Three Realms, in accordance with the standard conventions of Tibetan religious iconography. In front of the thang-ka is a tablet in Chinese, Mongolian, Manchu, and Tibetan, the latter of which translates,

"Sovereign of [this] Age,
The Emperor [huang-ti].
May he live 10,000 years!
May he live 10,000 times 10,000 years!"15

There is a similar thang-ka in the Imperial Collection in Beijing, one in Stockholm, and another in the former Feng-t'ien Museum in Mukden (Farquhar 1975:8). The emperor is depicted as the bodhisattva Manjusri (T. 'Jam dpal; or variant 'Jam dbyangs, Skt. Mañjuśrī). The thang-ka in the Imperial Collection seems practically identical to the portrait in the Potala.

But the mere depiction of a historical figure in Tibetan iconographic form does not by itself imply deification in the western sense. It is certainly an honored or sanctified representation, but does not denote deification. It was common practice in Tibet to portray
contemporary notables and historical figures on thang-kas. In fact, I discovered in the Norbulinka Palace outside of Lhasa a fine example of the central figure of the present Dalai Lama surrounded by members of his cabinet and even foreign ambassadors.16

In regards to the Ch'ien-lung portraits, while the Tibetans did not perhaps worship the Manchu emperor in the manner that modern Chinese officials would seem to profess, the iconographic form indicates that he was considered the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī a deity of equivalent status to that of the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara incarnate in all the Dalai Lamas. The two emanations (residing in the heavenly realm but active on earth through their incarnate manifestations) can be shown to be structurally equivalent, or complementary according to some iconographic and textual canons. I suggest that the concept of twin bodhisattvas reflects the ideal of the Tibetan state from a native point of view: each bodhisattva, aside from his particular spiritual duties, has a specific temporal realm of activity. Avalokiteśvara's domain is Tibet; Mañjuśrī's realm is China. As both bodhisattvas are of equal status, yet separate, the two realms are temporally independent.

Textually, the Tibetans clearly regarded the Manchu emperors as Mañjuśrī, as apparently some of the Mongols had accorded Khubilai towards the end of the Yüan (Farquhar
1975:11-12). In another example, from the Mongol Kangyur of 1718-20...

"The Holy Emperor T'ai-tsung of the Manchus (Man. Abahai, r. 1626-43), after having become the ruler of the great tribes and states of the autonomous Mongolian princes and having gathered them together as his subjects, became ruler of the government of China. After that, the holy Emperor Shih-tsu, who (ruled under the name of) the holy Shun-chih assumed the golden throne, and consoled and gave protection to all of his peoples. After he invited the Fifth Dalai Lama to Peking...for the benefit of those who desired salvation and for all creature, the religion of Buddha came to be spread even more than before. The emperor, his ministers, and all his subject peoples made a vast number of offerings and oblations, and showed the most profound respect (to the Religion). Then Manjusri the savior of all living forms (with the) intellect of all the Buddhas, was transformed into human form, and ascended the Fearless Lion Throne of gold; and this (was) none other than the sublime Emperor K'ang-hsi-Mañjusri who assisted and brought joy to the entire vast world, and who, because he was the veritable Mañjusri in his material essence..." (in Farquhar 1975:9)

The emperor as bodhisattva has been professed by Chinese rulers from time to time (e.g. Sui Wen r. 581-604), but most common Buddhist self-appellation was that of Great Patron (Skt. mahādānapati) or the Emperor Who Turns the Wheel of Law (Skt. cakravartin) (Farquhar:10-12). Both terms have root in India, as does the general system of Buddhist patronage. T'ang dynasty emperors were considered cakravartins by the Mañjuśrī cultists (Birnbaum 1983). But the ascription of bodhisattva status to the emperor seems to be particularly applied by Tibetan and Mongol lamas to the emperors of the Yuan and Ch'ing dynasties, and only
occasionally publicly professed by the latter, as seen in
the examples of Shun-chih, K'ang-hsi, and Ch'ien-lung.

According to Farquhar, the idea of the ruler as a
bodhisattva had its origins in Tibet in the 13th and 14th
centuries. This notion influenced the Mongols, whose
chroniclers began ascribing bodhisattva status to their own
Yüan emperors. This practice was largely ignored during the
Ming, but restored with great enthusiasm with the foundation
of the Ch'ing (Farquhar 1975:33).

Iconographic representation similarly suggests Tibetan
ideas of partnership with, rather than subordination to, the
Manchu emperors. Certain factors must be taken into account
as one attempts to interpret these images: First, there are
numerous sectarian differences in manner and focus of
iconographic representation within the Tibetan forms of
practice. Second, there is bound to be some innovation in
the Tibeto-Manchu interface, where Lamaistic ideology is
interacting with more "traditional" Mahāyāna ideology
present in China. Thus for clarity, I will attempt to
present a generalized view of the relationship between the
ideology of the position of the Tibetan hierarch and that of
the emperor (after the foundation of the Ganden Phodrang) by
noting some of the conventions in the Mahāyāna system.

In some traditions of Mahāyāna cosmology, Buddhas,
"saints," bodhisattvas, and other perfected beings and
essences dwell in three hierarchical realms or Buddha-
bodies. The Ādi-Buddha represents the formlessness of total transcendence, the total void (Skt. maha-śūnyatā) of the Dharma-kāya realm or "Self-Existing" body (svabhāvika-kāya) (in some Tibetan sects, the Ādi-Buddha is called Samantabhadra, Vajrasattva, or Vajradhara [cf. Getty 1962 (1914)]). In some of the Tibetan tantric traditions which represent later developments, four Buddha-bodies are created with the Self-Existing Body being placed above the Dharma-kāya (Snellgrove 1987: 250-1). This lower Dharma-kāya is populated by five quiescent (or three in some schools—cf. Snellgrove) Buddhas of Meditation, the Dhyāni-Buddhas, who owe their existence to the Ādi-Buddha. Each Meditation Buddha has his own attributes reflecting the five elements, locations, senses, colors, etc. Similarly, each Buddha represents dominion over one of the five epochs of time (Getty 1962). In addition, each meditation Buddha has provided both active agents of creation in the world through dhyāni-bodhisattvas who live in the lower paradises of the Sambhoga-kāya, and earthly representatives, the historical Buddhas. The dhyāni-bodhisattvas dwell in the heavenly Sambhoga-kāya realm, but have active reflections who may be incarnated on earth. The lowest realm (Nirmāna-kāya) is of the historical Buddhas. Dhyāni-bodhisattvas and earthly Buddhas are agents of their respective dhyāni-buddhas, who are in turn agents of the totally transcendent Ādi-buddha.
In many Mahāyāna traditions there have been four historical Buddhas (i.e. Krakucchanda, Kanakamuni, Kāśyapa, and Gautama Śākyamuni) associated with different ages (Skt. kalpa), with the fifth yet to come. Since these Buddhas have passed into nirvāṇa, the most active agents for religious propitiation are now the dhyāni-bodhisattvas in the tantric tradition. Each of the dhyāni-buddhas has sent active agents, "spiritual sons" to bridge the gap between the heavenly and earthly realms. From time to time, these bodhisattvas have incarnated themselves in human form, and each retains some of the characteristics of their meditative "fathers." Each has his own special province, yet all are equal.

The following diagram represents the hierarchical relationship between the Ādi-Buddha, dhyāni-buddhas, and bodhisattvas common in many Mahāyāna traditions, based on Getty (1962) and Snellgrove (1987). It corresponds to a great degree with the exoteric Mahāyāna system that many Tibetan lamas profess to the laity, and is basically the system espoused to me by the Nechung Rinpoche.
Adi-Buddha

Total transcendence

Dhyāni-buddhas (Dharma-kāya)

Vairocana Aksobhya Ratnasambhava Amitābha Amoghasiddhi

Location:
Center: east south west north

Era:
First: second third fourth fifth

Dhyāni-bodhisattvas (Sambhoga-kāya)

Samantabhadra Vajrapāṇi Ratnapāṇi Avalokiteśvara Viśvapāṇi (Mañjuśrī in the 8-fold system)

Earthly Buddha (Nirvāṇa-kāya)

Krakucchanda Kanakamuni Kāśyapa Śākyamuni Maitreya

Avalokiteśvara

Activities: God of Compassion
-- Creator of this world
-- Progenitor of Tibetan race
-- Manifested on Mt. Potala

Some earthly incarnations:
-- Tibetan King Srong-btsan sgam-po (d. 649)
-- Karmapas
-- Dalai Lamas

Mañjuśrī

God of Wisdom and Science
-- Cakravartin (lawgiver)
-- Savior of the Chinese
-- Manifested on Mt. Wut'ai

Some earthly incarnations:
-- Manchu emperors
-- Tibetan King Khri-srong ib-etsan (r. 755-97)
-- Khubilai (Farquhar 1975)
-- Ming Hung-wu (r. 1368-98) (Farquhar 1975: 16)
-- Tsongkhapa and Padmasambhava (Getty 1962: 111; 177)

Fig. 5. Relationship of Mañjuśrī and Avalokiteśvara
According to some systems, in the absence of a historical Buddha, an emanation of a dhyāni-bodhisattva serves to maintain the Doctrine. Getty suggests that

"the fourth world is the present one, created by Avalokiteśvara...His spiritual father, Amitābha..., manifested himself on the earth in the form of Gautama-Buddha, Śākya-muni. The Northern Buddhists believe that Avalokiteśvara continues the work that Gautama Buddha began, and, in order to do so, incarnates himself in each successive Dalai-Lama of Lhassa."

(1962:46)

According to some practices, the bodhisattvas Avalokiteśvara and Mañjuśrī together with Vajrapāni (the God of Power) form a triad upon which religious propitiation is especially effective (Getty 1962:46). Snellgrove suggests that this is a survival from an earlier scheme, referred to as the "Lords of the Three Families" (T. rigs-gsum mgon-po) (1987:195). While human incarnations of Vajrapāni seem rare, the general pattern seems to be seen in the development of two divine lineages of active bodhisattvas—one appearing in the ruler of Tibet, the other in the emperor of China—certainly by the time of the establishment of the Ch'ing. According to Farquhar,

"...it represents a blending of the Tibetan theory of bodhisattva metempsychosis in identifiable mortals, in particular rulers who spread the Law [i.e. the cakravartins], and the Chinese Buddhist tradition of Mount Wu-t'ai as the locus for Mañjuśrī the Chinese bodhisattva par excellence." (1975:15)

Each is of similar standing in the pantheon, but charged with different responsibilities. Mañjuśrī as a dhyāni-bodhisattva usually fits into the system of eight (or 16),
rather than five bodhisattvas, yet is usually associated with the dhyāni-buddha Akṣobhya, as is Vajrapāṇi in the five-fold system. Although there appears to be innumerable variants in these systems, in many Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna cosmologies, Avalokiteśvara and Mañjuśrī appear to be equivalent bodhisattvas. In Tibetan practice Avalokiteśvara became to be associated with Tibet, Mañjuśrī with China.

This is essentially the ideology of the position of the two bodhisattvas, especially in regards to the Gelugpa sect founded in the 15th century by Tsongkhapa. It is the practice of the Established Yellow Church, whose religious and secular position are maintained to this day by the exiled Dalai Lama and the Ganden Phodrang government. The thang-ka that exists in the Potala Palace in Lhasa, and the one provided by Farquhar (1975:7) in Beijing both contain a smaller image of Tsongkhapa directly above the main figure of Ch'ien-lung. In iconographic parlance, this usually indicates that the main figure is spiritually descended from the superior one. Tsongkhapa, considered an incarnation of Mañjuśrī himself, could provide an "invented" historical lineage between the alleged consecration of the Yuan emperors as Mañjuśrī and the later Ch'ing ascription of the same status. Furthermore, the symbolism of the ideal mchod-yon is evident. In both images the emperor is shown holding the
Wheel of the Law (dharmacakra), and is thus a cakravartin (i.e. the Universal Monarch who upholds the Faith).

Tsongkhapa as Mañjuśrī is also noted in Tibetan texts, notably from his biographer Dar-han mkhan-sprul blo-bzang 'phrin-las rnam-rgyal (1843):

"'Lord Tsongkhapa is Mañjuśrī himself.' According to Blo-bzang 'jam-dpal rgya-mtsho, 'the ruler of the tenth [bodhisattva] level, Mañjuśrī draws worldly beings to the laws of the dharma. He manifested himself in purified human form. Since he was the incarnation of Mañjuśrī, through such deeds the Yellow Hat school flourished. Because of the transformation made on the earth by his spiritual power, there was praise and devotion to this school. All the people faithfully respected and accepted it. All the heretics were subdued by his meritorious power and the dharma was protected as if by an iron fence. Due to his skill, the Gelugpa school became the predominant religious sect and it remains so even during this era of degeneration.'" (303)

The two major events discussed in this chapter and the preceding one, i.e. the conversion of the rising Mongols to Tibetan Buddhism in the 13th century and its attempted structural re-enactment in the 16th and 17th, are both based on an apparent continuity of pattern provided by various sbyin-bdag relationships. The model was at its earliest suggested by the empire-building of the great Indian emperor Ashoka. Later, Ashoka becomes identified with the ideal of the great Buddhist emperor. It became a part of the ideology of general Mahāyāna developments in India, which later spread to East Asia. The ideal of the cakravartin ruler was certainly not unknown in China—high-level Buddhist patronage was important during the T'ang dynasty.
Tsongkhapa appears to be the innovative link between the mchod-yon dyad of the Yüan dynasty and that of the Ch'ing. Farquhar indicates that bodhisattva status was being applied to Yüan emperors by Mongol chroniclers towards the end of the dynasty (1975:11-12), with Khubilai specially named as Mañjuśrī. Tsongkhapa, who lived during the Ming dynasty, was later considered Mañjuśrī by Tibetans. This bodhisattva subsequently appeared in the Manchu emperors. The successors of Tsongkhapa, the Gelugpa, with strong Mongol patronage, managed eventually to emerge victorious over the Kagyupa for hegemony over Tibet and its religious institutions. They combined 1) the idea of the sprul-sku succession of the Kagyupa, 2) the concept of Tibet's living patron-bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara, 3) the principle of strong and exclusive patronage from rising powers in Inner Asia (the Sakyapa innovation--mchod-yon), and 4) certain themes and symbols of the ancient Tibetan empire including the idea, well established by the 14th century, that early Tibetan kings were important bodhisattva incarnations. This was the institution of the Dalai Lama.

Both the Sakyapa (perhaps with the hope of retrieving lost glory) and Gelugpa, according to Farquhar, worked to convert the rising Manchus in the early 17th century. Ch'ing emperors were reascribed with Mañjuśrī bodhisattva status as was considered the practice in Yüan times. This formed a counterpoint to Tibet's own living bodhisattva in
the Dalai Lama. A mchod-yon ideology was considered re-established--the emperor once again becoming the cakravartin, the Tibetan pontiff his guru. Although an intended action, the mchod-yon from the Yuan period had not been reproduced. New meaning had been ascribed to the old relationship, which in effect changed the relationship. A new definition of Tibet was being achieved by Tibetans, one which did not consider the region a mere province of a foreign empire, but suggested the existence of two independent realms linked together by the contractual bonds of mchod-yon.

The Tibet viewpoint of history (from at least the 17th century) often makes this gradual process seem continuous and accepted by both sides of the mchod-yon system. According to Farquhar, however, whatever feelings Manchu emperors had in sympathy to actual Buddhist practice, they had to show restraint (1975:26-27). With the conquest of China, Manchu leaders had to not only be partisans of Confucian virtue, but ought not to show preference to one Buddhist sect (i.e. the Gelugpa of Tibet and Mongolia) to the alienation of other traditions in the empire. To rule China effectively, Manchu rulers had to support not only the various schools of Buddhism, but Taoism and Confucianism as well. (This is a similar position to the "real" Ashoka in India, who also had a pluralistic empire to handle). Although perfectly acceptable to the Tibetans and Mongols,
"To call themselves [the Ch'ing emperors] bodhisattvas would have put them squarely in opposition to the prejudices of most of the ruling classes of China, the educated landlords." (Farquhar 1975:33)

The Manchu fortunes and future lay in China, as eventual sinification of the court would show. Yet the defense of their empire and their throne rested with the Mongol alliance, which undoubtedly would be facilitated by the patronization of Buddhism in Mongolia and Tibet. Such an idea could have been promoted in the Manchus' acceptance of the role of the Manjusri bodhisattva appellation for Mongol and Tibetan subjects only. To some Chinese historians, then, it might seem that the Manchu strategy toward patronage of Lamaism was entirely a practical matter, one which was utilized solely for the unification and centralization of the Chinese motherland.

Grupper (1984) sees the situation as much less manipulatory: the early Manchu emperors, at least, were sincere practitioners of Tibetan Buddhism. According to Grupper, the relationship between the early Manchus and the Tibeto-Mongols was based on four considerations: 1) personal piety, 2) legitimation of the Mandate of Heaven, 3) stability of rule, and 4) mutual interests (1984:50). Although not stated here, these are precisely those relationships inherent in the ideology of mchod-yon from the Tibetan point of view.

17th-century documents from Tibetan, Mongol, and Manchu sources suggest the movement of lamas eastward to Manchuria
(Grupper 1984:51). The consolidation of Ch'ing dynasty-founder Nurhači's regime corresponds to the arrival of these Tibetans at court (1621). Nurhači received his initiation into Buddhist practice, and subsequently appointed lama Olug-darhan-nangso as Dharma-master of the Realm (1984:51).

The first instance of Manchu patronage of Lamaism appears to be the construction of Olug's temple at Liaoyang. To Grupper, the structure of this temple's household reflects the usual dichotomy of secular and religious spheres seen in purely Tibetan or Mongol areas. Thus, at the Manchu court itself, a theoretical equality between emperor and chaplain may have been maintained (1984:51). Grander yet was the vast Mahākāla complex built by Nurhači's son Abahai at the pre-dynastic Manchu capital of Mukden. This complex, honoring a high tutelary god of the Tibetan faith (particularly of the Sakya sect), dwarfed all Lamaistic architecture save the Potala palace in Lhasa itself.

Grupper suggests that vast establishment in Mukden served as the foundation temple for the dynasty (1984:52). The extent of this building indicates more than a manipulatory interest in religion--rather, the Ch'ing dynasty was founded as a "religiously inspired monarchy head[ing] a theologically-grounded state," which is a reasonable suggestion considering the close ties between the early Manchus and the Mongols (Grupper:1984:53). It is
certainly not unreasonable to imagine that the selection of a national religion by the Manchus represented a true conversion of Manchu clans to Lamaism. Such action would simultaneously duplicate the perceived Mongol conversion in the 13th century, bolstering the Manchu affectation to be the descendants of the Chin and Yüan dynasties, as well as realizing the Tibetan prophecy that a descendent of the "Mongols" would again rule China.

Whatever hesitation individual Manchu rulers had towards potentially alienating Confucian or Taoist elements of Chinese society, there appears to have been little perceived inconsistency between Buddhist, Taoist, Confucian and shamanistic ceremonies held at the Manchu court—as in Yüan times. The Ch'ien-lung emperor, for example, publicly took a Lamaistic initiation as cakravartin in 1746 (Grupper 1984:58). Farquhar disagrees, suggesting that lamaistic practices were private, in order to prevent alienation from the Han Chinese (1975:33). This does not diminish a view that the Manchu ruling class were converts to Tibetan Buddhism, nor by itself can it lead to the assumption (traced to Lattimore's work in the West) that the Manchu simply used the good offices of Tibetan and Mongol belief to have influence in those regions. Without the ideological considerations of the actors taken into account, such a system could indeed seem manipulatory. It is these
sorts of differing presumptions which construct the dialectic between Tibetan and Chinese historians.

It is commonly accepted that the Manchu court became completely sinified by the end of the dynasty, forgetting their language and many other aspects of their Tungusic culture. But even at the end of the Ch'ing dynasty, courtesans such as Princess Der Ling (1929) allude to the practice of secret shamanistic and tantric rituals in private within the Forbidden City. And there is abundant evidence that Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi (Ci Xi) was herself a devout Buddhist (Warner 1972). In 1908, the Dalai Lama himself officiated at the funeral of Tz'u-hsi and the Emperor Kuang-hsu, and subsequently the enthronement of the Hsuan-t'ung emperor (P'u Yi), the last monarch of the dynasty (Shakabpa 1984:222-223). The presence of the Tibetan pontiff at court seems to be the last, desperate attempt to lend legitimacy to the Mandate that was all but lost.

The public/private differential upheld by the later Manchu court seems apparent. Official dynastic chronicles, such as the Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li (1818 quoted in Farquhar 1975:25), uphold the Confucian aspects of the emperor's position as center of the universe. In such records, all states are subordinate to the emperor. Under such limitations, it is hard to imagine a condominium existing between China and Tibet. Such records,
additionally, serve well the modern Chinese historians in rationalizing the subordination of Tibet under Chinese rule. However, such data that can be provided by "unofficial" sources such as courtesan diaries and Tibetan and Mongolian records, seems to provide a glimpse into a court that sincerely professed Tibetan Buddhist ideology. There may indeed have been a "special" relationship between the Tibetan pontiff and the emperor throughout much of the Ch'ing dynasty, and a sincere profession of a sacred mchod-yon by both sides of the dyad. The evidence is suggestive; to many modern Tibetans it is conclusive.

Tibet's allegiance to "China" was an allegiance to the Manchu emperor in a spiritual/temporal condominium. From the Tibetan point of view, there was never an allegiance to China per se. On the eighth day of the first month of the Water-Ox year (1913), following the collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty, the Dalai Lama issued a formal declaration of independence (see Appendix). The rationale being that since there was no longer a Manchu emperor (as the bodhisattva/cakravartin), the personal bonds of mchod-yon were at an end. A month earlier, Mongolia and Tibet entered into a treaty recognizing each other's independence (Richardson 1962:265-267). The bonds had been with the Manchu empire, not with "China."

The primary title used officially in court throughout the reign of the Manchus was Ta Ch'ing Huang-ti ("Emperor of
the Great Ch'ing"), a title which was retained under the Articles of Favourable Treatment by P'u-yi in exchange for his abdication to the Republic of China (Johnston 1934:114). Although P'u-yi was never officially "Emperor of China," the Republic lost no time in claiming the conquests of the Manchus for "China."

Why the West did not support the national aspirations of Tibet is an intriguing question. Perhaps the best explanation is from Lattimore:

"The smothering of the Great Wall frontier by the power which China drew from the West finally in one of the most extraordinary situations in all Chinese history: the proclamation of the Chinese republic and the recognition of a Chinese title to sovereignty in Manchuria, Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan, and Tibet. The West, far from realizing the extraordinary character of the situation thus created, took it all as a matter of course: a beautiful example of the application of stock ideas to a radically new problem. International practice from at least the time of the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 had come squarely to the point of treating the Manchu Empire as if it were the Empire of China. This lead as a matter of course to the assumption on the part of the Western nations, when the Chinese Revolution of 1911 overthrew the Manchu Empire in China, that China stood heir to the Manchus and could claim possession of the Outer Domains.

There is no doubt whatever that the Mongols and the Tibetans, the two most solid national groups affected by this historic reversal...regarded the fall of the Manchu Empire as the destruction of a framework, which ought simply to have allowed the original component parts of the Empire to resume their own national identities. Nor can there be any doubt that legally and historically they were right. They had never 'belonged' without the intervention of the West. The fall of the Empire would have left a China independent of 'barbarian' control and a group of 'barbarian' nations standing free either of commitment to Manchuria, to each other, or to China." (Lattimore 1934, quoted in Barnes 1934:14-15)
Having no emperor who required the affirmation of a divine mandate, and no need to appease the Tibetans and Mongols with even a facade of imperial confederation, the succeeding secular Nationalist and communist governments claimed Tibet as a subordinate, integral part of China. And much of the West, through historical "misunderstandings," backed the Han Chinese assertion. Mongolia successfully obtained a different sort of western patron, the Soviet Union, and managed to retain at least the outward trappings of independence. Tibet has thus far been unsuccessful.

I suggest that the nationalistic claims of modern Tibetans are fairly consistent with the ideology of the founding of the Ganden Phodrang theocratic government and the institution of the Dalai Lama, which, as we have discussed, combined many symbols of past national achievements into an apparently coherent whole. In the intended reproduction of the mchod-yon during the Ch'ing, neither the original concept of the mchod-yon nor the original structural relationships between components of that system remained. "Traditional" Tibetan society was transformed as a result. A fairly centralized Gelugpa theocracy was born which largely displaced much of the power of other sects as well as the old nobility. These powers had been significant decentralizing factors under the older mchod-yon between the Mongols and the Sakyapa, even though the ideology of the new Ganden Phodrang presented an image
of continuity from the Sakyapa/Yüan period, and ultimately stretching back to the Buddha himself.

With the demise of the Manchu empire, the mchod-yon was again terminated. I suggest that the modern period of Tibetan nationalism, characterized by the attempt of the Tibetan State to establish religiously-inspired patron/client relationships with other outside powers, leads directly to the present-day Tibetan refugees. The second attempted reproduction of the mchod-yon under perceived western agency and the subsequent structural reorientation of Tibetan society, are the subjects of the following chapters.
Notes

1. From the *Mani bka'-'bum* (Yeshe De Project 1986:102), and popular Tibetan myth. According to this, the Tibetan people sprang from the union of Avalokiteśvara and a rock demoness, and lived in the caves at Tse-thang on the Tsang-po (Brahmaputra). This site is still very popular for Tibetan pilgrims. According to Beyer, the demoness is considered an incarnation of the goddess Tārā, Avalokiteśvara's consort in many Tibetan religious systems and a very popular deity in contemporary lay practice (1973:4). See also my article on Tārā (Klieger 1982).

2. Rgya-mtsho is Tibetan for "ocean," thus is synonymous for the Mongolian title "dalai."

3. Gushri, according to Richardson (1962), retained the title of King of Tibet (T. chos-rgyal "religious king"; Skt. dharmarāja). With few exceptions, this was a merely titular title to his descendants. It was abandoned altogether after the Dzungar wars in 1720 (Richardson 1962:42). By that time, of course, the Manchus had succeeded to the status of cakravartin.

4. According to Jäschke (1965 [1881]:268), bdag-po in some contexts denotes "patron," which could certainly be read into the emperor's title by Tibetans. In an English translation, the differences between "Great Master" (or "Great Liege-lord") and "Great Patron" would be substantial.

5. This material, drawn by the good assistance of the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, Dharamsala, has not apparently appeared in English before.

6. Mchod-yon in some contexts is considered a singular pair. In others, it refers to both individuals separately.

7. Skt.; T. egrol-ma.

8. This is a reference to the Ashokan model of universalistic Buddhist rule.

9. Note that the Dalai Lama is equated with the status of the Buddha.

10. The family of the Mongol Altan khan.
11. For transliteration of these documents, see Appendix.

12. Gzhung zhabs rnam la nye bar mkho ba bla dpon rim byon gyi lo rgyus tham deb long ba'i dmigs bu/

13. The three prostrations and the offering of the scarf are still performed by modern Tibetans meeting high lama.

14. The traditional offering of the map-dal rten-gsum by Tibetans, usually to high religious personages.

15. Bskal pa'i mnga' bdag hwong de'e sku tshe khri phrag sku tshe khri phrag khri phrag/ While the portrait is of Ch'ien Lung, the tablet was granted by K'ang Hsi, according to the Cultural Relics Administration Committee (1982:44).

16. I was not able to photograph this fresco in the main throne room. It is particularly interesting in that it was painted in a "photo realism" style apparently peculiar to the 1940s-1950s.


18. In other systems, there have been seven Buddhas plus Sakyamuni; others have 24 mythical Buddhas plus Sakyamuni; others yet mention 1,000 Buddhas. (see Getty 1962:10)

19. The Karmapa hierarch of the Karma Kagyupa is considered an emanation of Avalokiteśvara/Chenrezi (see Tashi Tsering 1984). The co-existence of the Dalai Lama as Avalokiteśvara presents little paradox in the Tibetan system. Deities may have multiple incarnations. A similar non-paradox occurred when the 13th Dalai Lama visited Beijing in 1908. Dowager Empress Tz'u-hsi considered herself an incarnation of Kuan Yin, the Goddess of Mercy (Warner 1972)--the very same deity as Avalokiteśvara, manifested in the Dalai Lama through a different tradition of northern Buddhism. Johnston, however, suggests that upon T'zu-hsi's death,

"the lama fraternity in Peking, and many of the Peking populace, found a striking illustration of the well-know fact that if two "Living Buddhas" or two incarnations of the same bodhisattva are rash enough to manifest themselves simultaneously in the same locality, one of them must perforce withdraw to another world to await in patience the result of one more revolution of the wheel of metempsychosis." (Johnston 1934:73)
At least in modern Tibetan Buddhism, this is not necessarily the case. The present Dalai Lama-Avalokiteśvara has frequently met with the Karmapa-Avalokiteśvara, and the two sphul-sku of the same bodhisattva coexisted for many years.

20. The color yellow was associated with the Manchu ruling clan, and particularly the Manchu emperor. Sumptuary laws, in fact, forbade the use of this color in non-imperial contexts. Yellow became the imperial color of the Manchus in contrast to the red of the Ming. Prior to the founding of the dynasty, the Tibetan Tsongkhapa, founder of the Gelug-pa, chose yellow as the color of his sect in distinction to the red of the older sects. K'ang-hsi and other emperors referred to the establish church as the "Yellow Church," the place of the Tibetan hierarch in Beijing as the "Yellow Palace" (Huang Ssü). This may be a mere coincidence. However, sumptuary regulations on the use of this color are still in effect among Tibetan refugees--only Gelugpa monks, and especially the Dalai Lama, may properly display this color for personal use.

21. According to Bracken (his major biographer), P'u Yi was a devout Buddhist as well (1975). This is also suggested in the last emperor's autobiography (Aisin-Gioro Pu Yi [sic] 1964).
The twelve blue and red rays of the Tibetan flag encircle a yellow sun, rising over a white mountain. Emblazoned on this peak are the twin snow lions of State supporting the Triple Jewel of Buddhism. And on the early morning of March 10, 1987, Tibetan flags are rising defiantly above the slate-covered huts and shops in the community of Upper Dharamsala. Occasionally, I spot an Indian national flag—as if to remind one of the host.

March 10 targets the annual rite of renewal of the secular Tibetan nation, and Dharamsala becomes the center stage for patriotic demonstrations throughout the international diaspora. On March 10, 1959, between the high festival of Lo-sar (New Year) and the start of the Mon-lam (T. smon-lam, the "Great Prayer" or month of Buddhist teachings), the people of Lhasa rose in revolt against Chinese occupation. The relative disorder of the festival season allowed the Dalai Lama and government officials to spirit themselves away to India, beginning the exodus of refugees.

On this day 28 years later, Tibetans from all over the world converged on the exile capital to not only renew their patriotism but to show the world of their ambitions and
claims to independence. Several thousand people gathered that morning in front of the Central Cathedral at the hilltop complex which includes the modest palace of the Dalai Lama.

Whereas the festival of New Year's during the preceding week was the happiest in the calendar, and the forthcoming Mon-lam was to be the most pious, the Commemoration of March 10 appeared to surely be the most emotional for Tibetans and visitors alike. It is a renewal of that act of sacrifice that many Tibetans performed in 1959—the defiance of the Chinese by upholding the traditional position of their Dalai Lama as sovereign, an act which resulted in the death or voluntary exile of many thousands. Annually at this time, Tibetans reaffirm their status as refugees, and by doing so, demonstrate for the liberation of their homeland.

The Security and Information Offices of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, serving as protocol chiefs, made sure that the crowd sits or stands in the sections that are assigned to them. These divisions only roughly recreate the strata of traditional Tibetan society, a certain accommodation to the present-day dominance of the secular in the exile Tibetan government. In the strict order of precedence, status can be judged on the basis of 1) whether you were standing or sitting, 2) the proximity of one's seat to that of the sovereign (Dalai Lama), and 3) the size of the chair or cushion that one has been authorized to sit on.
So, amid the flowering cherry trees, the dark pines and junipers of this remote Indian hill station, atop the peak of this miniature Potala of the Tsulagkhang and Thegchen Chöling in Dharamsala, the people of the diaspora collectively recreate the tradition of an independent Tibet. The Dalai Lama, seated upon his throne in the center of the canopied veranda of the Cathedrals' second story, is flanked by his religious and secular minister, abbots and other religious hierarchs, department heads of his various ministries, a Tibetan "secret service," and an Indian honor guard. Below, surrounding the square which lies between the Cathedral and the Palace stands a few thousand Tibetans--students of all grades in their schools' uniforms, lay adults in native costume. On the west side of the square sit a few hundred ordinary monks and nuns--on the east sits the "official" delegation from the West, consisting primarily of about 50 young tourists and one anthropologist.

After a brief introduction by a lama-official, His Holiness the Dalai Lama, King of Tibet, and Vicar of the Buddha on Earth to most of the people assembled, approaches the podium embossed with the twin snow lion Seal of State, to the fanfare of Tibetan Alpenhorns (dung-chen). The crowd rises; the Tibetan national flag is hoisted, accompanied by the sedate Buddhist hymn which serves as the national anthem:
"Let the radiant light shine from Buddha's wish-fulfilling gem teachings, the treasure-mine of all hopes for happiness and benefit in both worldly life and liberation.

O Protectors who hold the jewel of the teachings and all beings, nourishing them greatly, may the sum of your virtuous deeds grow full! Firmly enduring in an adamantine state, guard all directions with compassion and love.

Above our heads may divinely appointed rule abide, endowed with a hundred benefits, and let the power increase with four-fold auspiciousness. May a new golden age of happiness and bliss spread throughout the three provinces of Tibet, and the glory of religious/secular rule expand.

By the spread of Buddha's teachings in the ten directions, may everyone throughout the world enjoy the glories of happiness and peace. In the battle against dark negative forces, may the auspicious sunshine of the teachings, the beings of Tibet, and the brilliance of a myriad of radiant prosperities be ever triumphant."

The non-violent theme of the anthem is echoed in the speech of the Dalai Lama. First, he recognizes the current dangers to Tibetans in their occupied land—the lack of religious freedom, the neglect of Tibetan education, health and welfare by the Chinese, and the recent influx of Chinese immigrants into the area (English version published by the Information Office, 1987). Secondly, the Dalai Lama once again encourages the path of non-violence, and that "force and confrontation can only bring about temporary gains."

Typically falling short of the demand for independence, the Tibetan pontiff nevertheless hints that the past provides an ideal model for the present and future:
"In the past, too, Tibet had played an important role as a neutral buffer contributing to the stability of the region. This historical precedence provides the basis for working out a solution to the issue of Tibet for the benefit of all parties concerned." (Information Office 1987)

In other words, an independent, peaceful buffer state, as it was considered by Tibetans in the past, is the solution for the future. The past is made manifest in the present; the ideal past is a model for the future.

At the conclusion of the speech, the Dalai Lama remains at the podium while a color guard presents a salute. It is the people's turn to demonstrate their nationalism, and the tone of the event turns decidedly martial. Four young men appear in the square below. In the front, the Tibetan national flag is presented by a man in the garb of the Central Province (dbus). Directly behind him is a Khampa warrior in a leopard-trimmed chupa (phyu-pa "dress") holding a golden mace in his right hand. On either side of him are two honor guards holding red flags with snow lions, representing the twin pillars of Church and State. The Dalai Lama returns to his throne.

At attention, the assembled masses stand to enthusiastically sing their song, the "Song of the People's Uprising" (Long Shog) to the accompaniment of the marching band complete with a giant bass drum:
"Rise up! For ten years now,
The people have been tortured.
We've had it down to our flesh and bone.\(^2\)

In the year 1959,
All the patriots could no longer endure.
The only action was to rise up for truth and human rights.

Rise up! Rise up, all Tibetan peoples!
All peoples of the world,
Support and rise up behind us.
Be witnesses for the truth.

Tibet follows its true leader...
The Great Protector, His Holiness the Dalai Lama,
Accepted by Tibetans in and out.

The red-handed butcher-enemy,
The imperialistic Red Chinese,
Will surely be kicked out of Tibet.
Rise up all patriots!\(^3\)

Compared with the halcyon lyrics of the National Anthem, the militant *Long Shog* creates quite a different emotion. Tibetans are distracted, so much so that the next speakers, the senior minister of the *bka'-shag* (i.e. the prime minister) and the Chairman of the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies, are largely ignored. The common lay Tibetans and monks, with the contingent of 50 westerners, are preparing for the long march down the hill to the Indian town of Dharamsala proper.

Again, an order of precedence is established by the Protocol Officers. Several hundred monks begin the procession, followed by lay Tibetan students. Then an "international" contingent of western tourists carrying a banner "Global Support for Free Tibet," is followed by the masses of lay Tibetans.
The parade consisted of about 2,000 people shouting "Long live the Dalai Lama," eventually passing through the streets of Dharamsala about 5 km distant. Curious Indian townspeople lined the streets or appeared on their balconies. They seemed particularly amused by the appearance of the westerners. A few Indians joined the procession. Finally the crowd arrived at the town square in lower Dharamsala, where speeches were given by both Tibetans and local Indian officials, and then the group dispersed.

Many Tibetans and myself immediately hailed taxis for the bus depot, for another large demonstration of Tibetan nationalism was scheduled for New Delhi, 520 km and 36 hours away. March 12 is the commemoration of the women's uprising in Lhasa in 1959, and on this occasion women throughout the diaspora were to gather and march in the Indian capital.

About 700 women, representative of the 23 regional offices of the Tibetan Women's Association, gathered in the very early morning of March 12 at the triumphal Indra Gate in New Delhi (the "Boat House"). The parade permit was in order, yet the entire processional way leading to Parliament (a survival of the British Raj) had been cordoned off by the police. Due to the large expanse of parkway on both sides of the avenue, there was little chance for potential spectators to even note that the Tibetan women were demonstrating. However, the media were present: Indian newspapers and television, the Tibetan refugee press,
and one not too inconspicuous Chinese agent. The day before, leaflets were handed out with suggested slogans for home-made placards. Among the more militant phrases I noted:

"Chinese get out of Tibet!"
"Nothing short of complete independence is our demand!"
"Tibet belongs to Tibetans!"
"We will never forget the massacre of 1.2 million Tibetans by the Communist Chinese!"

And for the Indian hosts...

"Long live Indo-Tibetan friendship!"
"Tibet's independence is India's security!"

The march was quite orderly, until the ladies reached a police blockade approximately 1 km from Parliament. At this point, matters began to get out of hand. Some women attempted to climb over the obstacles, and were repulsed by the heavily armed police. Others fainted, and were carried away by Tibetans to a makeshift first aid center. Many of the Tibetan ladies were wailing loudly, others quietly weeping. Order was eventually restored, and the group assembled in the park on the side to hear a speech by the president of the organization, Rinchen Choegyal, making a special appeal to the mothers in exile:

"Because our struggle is not just for more rights but for the survival of our religion, our culture, and our national identity, the education and upbringing of our children assumes great importance. I appeal to every Tibetan woman to see that your children are brought up with the right values and with the will and courage to fight for the independence of Tibet...I also
appeal to women all over the world to help and support the Tibetan women in our efforts to preserve our culture and our national identity and to struggle for the independence of Tibet." (English version handed out at rally).

A message of support from Vijay Laxmi Pandit, Nehru's sister, was also read. According to the Tibetan Review, a delegation of 13 women were escorted to the Chinese embassy where they posted a letter of protest on the gate (April 1987).

China protested these events to the Indian government, as they usually do, stating that "a small number of Tibetan trouble-makers [had demonstrated], aiming to split China and undermine its national unity" (Tibetan Review 1987:5). The refugee press responded in its usual way, too, calling such accusations "outrageous" (Tibetan Youth Congress 1987:6).

Thus was concluded the annual rite of renewal of Tibetan nationalism enacted by refugees in India. I had participated in the same sort of demonstration in 1978, and the basic structure was essentially the same. It is significant to look at how these 1987 events affected two of the more "distanced" refugee youth.

Gyalpo Chung, a young Swiss-born refugee, had been in Dharamsala several weeks before the Uprising Commemoration. He spoke Tibetan poorly, and had managed to offend just about all his Dharamsala peers, by his "uppity, western ways." He showed no restraint in wearing fine European clothes and brandishing expensive camera equipment, and
keeping exclusive company with western tourists. To me, he appeared to utilize western material culture to maintain some sort of "face" in opposition to his perceived lack of competence as a Tibetan. His countenance assumed a mixture of condescension and utter confusion. Gyalpo finally seemed to grasp the meaning of the Tibetan cause at the women's rally in New Delhi. He was deeply moved that day, and remained speechless. But that was just about the last time I saw him, as he was off to Kathmandu for more sight-seeing.

On the other hand, Parche Gyatso's approach to the South Asian refugee community was entirely different. Parche was from Canada, yet had been raised speaking Tibetan and in contact with the far-flung diaspora. He had worked, in fact, at several of the Tibetan government-in-exile's foreign offices. He knew "everyone" in Dharamsala, and out-did himself covering the events of March 10 there and in New Delhi on the 12th for the Tibetan press. A more diligent Tibetan nationalist could not be found anywhere. To Parche, the events of March 10-12 were all rather routine in a life dedicated to preserving Tibetan national identity. Parche continued on to Tibet to learn more of the state of his people there, followed by apparently quite a number of young western women who apparently found his patriotic machismo irresistible.
A Religious Community Re-consecrated

In Dharamsala, the secular "traditions" of nationalism of March 10 are followed by the month-long Mon-lam teachings by the Dalai Lama. This occasion attracts religious devotees from around the world: high lamas from the various monastic missions in the West, western and Tibetan monks and nuns, and lay Tibetans and westerners alike. Traditionally, the Mon-lam period in Lhasa was a time when the secular rule of the city would be replaced by direct monastic rule. Lamas would pour out of the monastic colleges of Sera, Drepung, and Ganden in the surrounding hills and descend upon the city with their own police force. A type of martial law would be declared, and the lamas took over power from the civil magistrates (mi-dpon). This apparently was a rite of intensification during the days of the theocracy—a mnemonic to the urban populace of Lhasa that the monastic community was ultimately in charge of matters and ultimately superior to the more worldly ways of secular administration.

This "reminder" is re-enacted in the diaspora at the Mon-lam in Dharamsala, usually in late March to early April. On these days, the Dalai Lama and his priestly retinue descend from the Palace to give a series of Buddhist teachings to the public. In contrast to the secular emphasis of the March 10 observation, the Mon-lam provides absolute precedence to the ecclesiastical. Whereas on March
10, Tibetan ministers and bureaucrats, lay or clerical take precedence over non-officials, during the Mon-lam, all clerics take precedence over all the laity. In addition, the protocol chiefs are again busy making sure that seating reflects the internal stratification within the two general categories.

In 1978, I was present during many of the Mon-lam teachings. The Dalai Lama would sit enthroned in the center of the Cathedral. By his side were the Senior and Junior tutors (the Dalai Lama's principle gurus), followed by the abbots of re-established State monasteries (such as Ganden). Lesser abbots and rinpoches sat on progressively smaller seats and at a greater distance from the center. The ranking continued throughout the various ranks of ordination, filling the Cathedral with priests. Significantly, no Buddhist nuns were seated inside. They were relegated, as were laymen, to positions along the windows outside of the temple. Lay officials and remnants of the old lay aristocracy were assigned appropriate positions along this outer perimeter, while the common-folk found spaces wherever they could beyond the ordered space.

The establishment of this spacial order representing the strata of the clerical world became apparent to me in a most uncomfortable manner, undoubtedly the biggest faux pas of my fieldwork tenure. At my first attendance of the teachings in 1978, I arrived at the Cathedral just after
dawn, foolishly assuming that seating would be "first come, first served" as it is so often in the West. I staked out a nice spot outside the walls by a large window which afforded a good view of the interior. No one else was around, and I did not really notice that parties had "reminded" outsiders of their ascribed territories by placing mats and carpets at other spots along the wall. After several hours, the Cathedral filled with monks, and well-dressed lay Tibetans began to take their assigned locations outside. Just as the Dalai Lama's procession started, one Tibetan approached me and barked a command for me to leave in a very uncharacteristic manner. I was immediately torn between my own feelings of "eminent domain" and the sensitivity to my hosts. Fortunately, to prevent further embarrassment, an adjacent nun silently motioned me to join her sororal party. By sitting with nuns, an apparent compromise had been reached between the lofty aristocrat and the interloping westerner.

"Religion and Politics Combined"

Taken together, the praxis of the new secular holiday of March 10 and the re-established religious Mon-lam teachings represent the Tibetan paradigm of chos-srid zung-'brel ("religion and politics combined") (see Nowak 1984). During each of the events, either the lay or clerical segment of society takes its respective precedence. On March 10, the secular government renews its worldly claims
for national independence, using metaphors which are currency in the international parlance of the modern nation state. Innovations and are evident, along with the general theme of modernization. The Mon-lam, on the other hand, attempts to ground refugee society in the notion of the ultimate superiority and changelessness of the Buddhist doctrine, and the priesthood which embodies it. Orthodoxy seems to reflect the state of the unchanging, incorruptible trans-mundane realm of Śūnyatā (Skt. "nothingness") in Tibetan ideology. The two celebrations are not spurious traditions, however. Many of the nationalistic symbols evident on March 10 were developed during the reign of Dalai Lama XIII. The Mon-lam has it origins with the rise of the Gelugpa theocracy.

Taken as a pair, March 10 and Mon-lam represent the dynamic of change and continuity, the outward and the inward, the profane and the sacred, the nation and its religion. The unifying symbol bridging both events is the Dalai Lama, the "king and god," the active agent between this world and the next.

Although March 10 is commemorated as a special event for nationalistic expression, the modern period of refugee Tibetan social and political life does not begin with the 1959 diaspora. The Lhasa Uprising itself was merely a demonstration of a sentiment that dates to the
disestablishment of the mchod-yon bond between Tibet and the Manchu Empire in the early 20th century.

The Demise of Manchu Patronage and the Rise of the West

Some writers, such as Grunfeld (1987), suggest that the Dalai Lama and his supporters, having fled after 1959 and established themselves in South Asia, invented such symbols of national independence which were to "convince" the world of a prior "independence" that was ethereal at best. This "fabrication," however, began long before the 1950s. The accomplishment of Tibetan national identity has been a continuous process--accelerated perhaps, but certainly not initiated by recent Chinese occupation. The gradual decay of the Ch'ing dynasty, culminating with the 1911 revolution, marked the beginning of a new cycle of foreign sbyin-bdag patronage solicitations by the Tibetans--one which looked to the West for the first time. The current refugee diaspora ultimately has its origins here, not in the events of 1959. In addition, most of the symbols of the modern nation-state displayed at the March 10 demonstrations were introduced during this period--the flag (1912), the anthem, the western-style color guard and military bands. In attempting to re-establish a client relationship with either Britain or Russia, Tibet apparently began to choose the language of western statesmanship to symbolize its national integrity.

Despite the rich bodhisattva and cakravartin imagery that the Tibetans and early Manchus ascribed to the
mchod-yon relationship, it does not appear that the mutual understanding of the rights and obligations of both partners survived much beyond the K'ang Hsi and Ch'ien Lung emperors. As the prestige and power of the Ch'ing began its long decline, so too did the mchod-yon. As the Manchu court became more sinified, neo-Confucian ideology began to replace the more Inner Asia mode of political ideology. Accordingly, the emperor could have no earthly equal such as a Tibetan pontiff, and Tibet began to be treated as a subordinate state to a Chinese empire. The mchod-yon relationship with influential lamas may have been a powerful force in the building of the Manchu state (as it had in the Yüan), but in its decline it was a liability.

The period from the mid-18th century to the fall of the Manchu can be considered a time of perpetual Chinese interference in what Tibetans thought to be their own affairs. Attempts were made by the Manchus to depose the "dissolute" 6th Dalai Lama in the early 18th century (Hoffman 197-:59; Richardson 1962:49), and "confirm" his successor with a candidate of their own choice. Tibet was then invaded by the Dzungar Mongols (1717), who wished to restore the rightful Dalai Lama. This led to a chain of events which ultimately led to direct Manchu influence in Tibet. A Manchu army was sent in, the Dzungars were defeated, and the Manchus left two civil officers as
permanent residents in Lhasa representing the emperor (Man. amban). The Manchus also ignored the donation of Gushri khan (Hoffman 197-:60).

Manchu intrigue from this time on can be summarized by the imperial court 1) trying to influence the selection of the Dalai Lamas, 2) trying to create a rivalry between the Dalai and Panchen Lamas, 3) rushing to the aid of Tibet during various border wars with the intent of subsequent occupation, 4) forcing the Tibetans to seal their borders to prevent outside interference, and 5) attempting to maintain a state of regency in Tibet to prevent the rise of any Dalai Lama to their full powers. It is easy to see how these factors could be construed in modern China and in the West as being indicative of Tibet's subordination to the empire. On the other hand, Tibetans resolutely resisted these measures. The emperor was no longer fulfilling his role as Patron, only emphasized when the Manchu forces failed to intervene in the Dogra invasion of West Tibet in 1841 and the Gurkha invasion in 1855 (Richardson 1962:72), leaving the Tibetans to their own devices.

The last years of the Manchu empire generally saw a resurgence of nationalism throughout the border regions of the empire. Korea, Mongolia, Vietnam, and Tibet all attempted independence around this time, and those countries which were successful did so by the agency of western colonization. The Tibetan State crystallized as a nebulous
independent country in the modern sense through the geopolitical forces of the encroachment of the Russian empire to the Northwest and the British Raj to the South. This occurred roughly in proportion to the loss of Manchu influence in Tibet.

On the eighth day of the eighth month of the Wood-Sheep year (1895), the 13th Dalai Lama, Thubten Gyatso (Thub-bstan rgya-mtsho) (r. 1876-1933 Hoffman 197-:63) came of age and assumed power—thus becoming (along with the 5th and current 14th Dalai Lamas) one of the few Tibet rulers to have survived long enough to dispense with the often corrupt Regency. Thubten Gyatso was to become a driving force for the independence of Tibet, and was to establish those nationalistic precedents that carry us into the refugee diaspora.

The policy of the British towards Tibet at this time was largely linked to protecting the borders of its Indian Empire, and to prevent the perceived expansion of Russia ever-deeper into Central Asia. The question of Russian influence in Tibet during the late 19th century and early 20th is an intriguing one—hampered to a large extent by the sealed archives of the Leningrad Museum where documents relating to the Tibeto-Russian connections are allegedly stored (Beckwith; Tashi Tsering: personal communications). The Russian expansion into Central Asia was based on the idea that the empire was successor to the lands of her
former Mongol conquerors (Richardson 1962:78). Some Mongol groups, in fact, viewed the tsar as a sort of White Khan. Slowly, Tatar, Kazak, and Mongol areas were brought into the empire: Tashkent (1865), Samarkand (1868), Bokhara (1869), Khiva (1873) Turkmenistan (1881) (Richardson 1962:79).

The Russian conquest of Siberia brought the Mongols into the Russian sphere, and these Mongols (Torgut Kalmucks and Buriats; Hoffman 197-:67) were largely adherents of the Gelugpa sect of Tibetan Buddhism. Some Kalmuks, in addition, gradually settled in the Volga basin, yet remained faithful to the Lhasa Church. Through the monastic political structure linking these Mongols with both Russia and Tibet, a certain amount of cooperation between the two polities was forged on mutual interest. Through the intrigues of a certain Mongol monk named Dorjiev, a direct relationship between Tsar Nicholas II and Dalai Lama XIII was established at the turn of the 20th century. Costly gifts were exchanged, and there was some thought that the "White Khan" (or the avatar Kalki of Buddhist apocalyptic doctrine; see Hoffman 197-:67) might well serve as a fine patron of Tibetan Buddhism, especially now since the Manchu emperor had become increasing ill-suited to the task.

Whatever the nature of the overtures of Russia towards Tibet, it is clear that the British to the south took great interest in the matter. British policy up to then had been one of consolidation of the Indian dominions, and the
securing of most souther and western Himalayan states which at various times had been vassal states to Tibet (Ladakh, Sikkim, Bhutan, and parts of Assam). Britain wished to maintain Tibet as a buffer state under vague Manchu suzerainty, as a counter to the perceived threat from Russian expansionism (Richardson 1962). In fact, the political career of the Viceroy, Lord Curzon, seems to have been dedicated to this single goal. Curzon, however, had made several substantial miscalculations: 1) the Manchu emperor (and therefore the Chinese) had very little influence upon Tibetan affairs at the time. 2) Russia had most likely much less influence in Tibet than was imagined in India. 3) The Tibetan government essentially wished to be left alone by all three parties, except in the matter of support for their monasteries.

Fearing Russian intrigue, Curzon sent a Mission into Tibet in 1903 under Col. Francis Younghusband to negotiate with the Chinese and Tibetans on what had become the "Tibetan question," and to establish a trade agreement. As the Tibetans were not agreeable to deal with such a foreign power, what had been intended as a mission by the British was perceived as an invasion by the Tibetans. The Tibetan army tried several times to turn back the British and failed, at the loss of 600 men (Richardson 1962:87). Younghusband finally arrived in Lhasa in 1904, but the Dalai Lama and Dorjieiv had fled. The Manchu amban, moreover, was
discovered not to have any authority over Tibetans. The 
Ganden Tri Rinpoche, who had been appointed Regent at the 
departure of the Dalai Lama, finally appeared and signed an 
Anglo-Tibetan Convention. Soon afterwards, the British 
withdrew.

The Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1904, despite Tibet's 
xenophobic hesitations, ironically is now used to support 
the claim of Tibet's independence. By signing with 
Britain, Tibet demonstrated perhaps the single most 
important attribute of sovereignty, that is, the ability to 
make treaties with other sovereign powers. China did not 
participate, although they had been asked by the British in 
order to maintain the myth of Chinese suzerainty. And 
although no doubt intended to dissuade Tibet from thoughts 
of Russian interference, Article IX of the Convention 
essentially raises Britain to the position of protector of 
Tibet:

"The Government of Thibet engages that, without the 
previous consent of the British Government--

(a) No portion of Thibetan territory shall be 
ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given 
for occupation, to any Foreign Power;
(b) No such Power shall be permitted to intervene in 
Thibetan affairs;
(c) No Representatives or Agents of any Foreign 
Power shall be admitted to Thibet,
(d) No concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, 
mining or other rights, shall be granted to any 
Foreign Power, or the subject of any Foreign Power. In 
the event of consent to such Concessions being granted, 
similar or equivalent Concessions shall be granted to 
the British Government;
No Thibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any Foreign Power, or to the subject of any Foreign Power." (in Richardson 1962:255)

Although Tibet had essentially been forced to sign, it nevertheless was a lesson in modern foreign diplomacy to the Tibetan leaders, a relationship which could be advantageous in carving out its independence. Britain went on to mollify the Chinese through the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906 and the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, essentially recognizing the principle of a vague suzerainty of China over Tibet. "Suzerainty" was basically the British interpretation of the history of the mchod-ron relationship between Tibet and the Chinese empire—yet, as one could expect, neither China nor Tibet (who was not consulted in these latter treaties) were pleased. China pressed for sovereignty by their interpretation of mchod-ron, Tibet for independence.

Independence in the western sense appears to have been a reinterpretation of the Tibetan concept of mchod-ron and the more general sbyin-bdag relationships as they were interpreted with the founding of the theocracy. They had been ideologically based on equality and mutual reciprocity between patron and client (or strictly speaking, upon the slight superiority of the religious client). The novel experiences of dealing with foreign powers such as Britain and Russia led not only to the second attempted re-establishment of the mchod-ron with them, but to the
transcription of the traditional manner of dealing with foreigners such as the Mongols and Manchus to the parlance of western diplomacy. Western agency, in some powerful circles at least (see Dhondup 1984), was replacing Manchu and Mongol support, and with it, western ideas of statesmanship, which a vigorous, fully-empowered Dalai Lama XIII tried to use to its greatest advantage.

The resurgence of Chinese Han nationalism corresponded with the twilight of the Manchus in Beijing. The British Younghusband Mission to Lhasa was certainly a great loss of face for the Chinese. The Dalai Lama visited Outer Mongolia, and in 1906 visited the Kumbum monastery in Amdo, where he received an invitation to visit the Beijing court. While being feted by the dissolute Emperor Kuang-hsu and the powerful Tz'u-hsi in 1908, the Dalai Lama learned that he had been "deposed" by his otherwise hospitable hosts. The Chinese government, hearing of the subsequent riots in Lhasa, reinstated the Dalai Lama, with the rather belittling title of "Most Faithfully Obedient and Enlightened Buddha of no Restraint in the Western Paradise" (Hoffman 197-:69).

Perhaps sensing the end to the Manchu mchod-ron, the Dalai Lama visited the America, British, and Japanese ambassadors as well (Shakabpa 1984:222).

Having been symbolically levelled then restored by the tottering throne, the Dalai Lama stayed on to officiate at the funerals of Dowager Empress Tz'u-hsi (Warner 1972:262)
and Emperor Kuang-hsu, and to consecrate the enthronement of
the infant P'u Yi as Hsuan-t'ung, the last Manchu emperor in
1908.

Soon afterwards the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa and
was presented with a seal by the Tibetan people themselves
(Shakabpa 1984:223). A new issue of coins was minted in the
name of the Tibetan government (Ganden Phodrang), and a
Foreign Bureau was established. Meanwhile, the Manchu
general Chao Erh-feng had been invading eastern Tibet for
several years. In 1910, the Chinese army entered Lhasa.
For the second time, the Dalai Lama appointed the Ganden Tri
Rinpoche as Regent and fled into exile, this time with his
new friends, the British. Thubden Gyatso, prior to his
arrival in India, sent the following message to British
officials:

"...I have been receiving every courtesy from the
British government, for which I am grateful. I
now look to you for protection, and I trust that
the relations between the British government and
Tibet will be that of a father to his
children..." (in Shakabpa 1984:230)

Perhaps it is not too preposterous to suggest that the
Dalai Lama was seeking a mchod-yon-like relationship with
the mighty British empire. In India, Thubden Gyatso used
Article IX of the 1904 Anglo-Tibetan treaty to remind the
new Viceroy Minto (Curzon had been severely criticized for
the Younghusband Mission) of the British promise to honor
the integrity of Tibet and resist all other attempts by
foreign powers (China) to interfere in Tibetan affairs. The
Dalai Lama was calling in those perceived assurances that Britain would sponsor the Tibetan fight for liberation.

Back in Beijing, an edict was immediately published once again "deposing" the Dalai Lama (Richardson 1962). A Chinese invasion, a flight to India, a deposition of a Dalai Lama--fifty years later this sequence of events was to be repeated. Furthermore, the actions of 1909 and 1959 were all based on the same sort of differential interpretations of the historical status of Tibet. To the Chinese, Tibet was a subject province of greater China. To the Tibetans, she was an state in equal rank to China. To the British (and independent India), Tibet was considered an autonomous border region under vague Chinese suzerainty. 1909 had been a rehearsal for 1959.

Like the policy of the Kuomintang and the Communists after him, the policy of Yüan Shih-k'ai was designed to resist foreign imperialism and promote nationalism, acts which ironically seemed to follow the way of imperialism (Werake 1980:49). A British official noted:

"One of the most important steps Yüan Shih-k'ai took when the Manchu Emperor abdicated was to get the Emperor to sign a statement transferring all of the lands formerly belonging to the Manchus to the new Republic." (Teichman in Werake 1980:54)

The new president of the Republic of China attempted to change the traditional status of Tibet to a province with representation and equality with other political units of China:
"I, the President, have set out with determination to wipe out the evil practices of the old regime.

But in recent years, high officials of the frontiers have used evil and oppressive methods and exploited [the people]." (in Werake 1980:57).

Manifestations of the "equality of the five races of China" were represented in the five-barred flag of the Republic (Red—Han, Yellow—Manchu, Blue—Mongols, White—Tibetans, and Black—Muslims). Symbols of this ideology, of course, are carried over onto the flag of the People's Republic, with one large star representing the Han and four small stars representing the others.

It certainly was not the British intention to infuriate China by supporting Tibet's claim of independence, as fifty years hence the Indian Government was to refuse to honor its treaty obligations in a similar deference to China (Mitter 1964). British policy from 1909 to 1947 (and India to 1950) was essentially to maintain a perceived status quo, a de facto independent Tibet under a vague Chinese suzerainty—a peaceful buffer state guarding the northern flanks of South Asia, and existing without unnecessarily alienating the rich coffers of Sino-British trade and diplomacy (Richardson 1962).

Yet because the Chinese declined to enter earnestly into tripartite agreements with Britain and Tibet (notably the 1914 Simla Conference), Britain felt obligated to sign solely with Tibet. By this action, under some
interpretations of international law (e.g. Van Walt 1987 and the Tibetan government-in-exile in general), Tibet became a de jure independent country as well. Britain possibly had established an unanticipated patron/client relationship with Tibet.

The powerful 13th Dalai Lama, no doubt having learned much of western statesmanship through his various exiles, embarked on a campaign of acquiring those symbols of nationhood that were accepted in the world community: flags, national anthems, marching bands, a modern army, a postal system (first stamps issued in 1912—see Appendix), a telegraph system, and to the consternation of many orthodox monasteries, a slow but definite tendency towards political "modernization." This process has continued unabated in refugee life, including a trend towards democratization and secularization of political institutions.

From the experiences of Thubden Gyatso in India in 1909 to the present day in Dharamsala, a major ethic of Tibetans has been a perpetual declaration of independence to an audience of perceived western supporters. In the attempt to reproduce the structure of the mchod-yon with the West (with Britain [and/or Russia] in the early 20th century, and with the general "world community" after 1959), "modernization" was accomplished. This relationship is not the same mchod-yon as had existed ideologically between Tibet and the Manchu empire, as that mchod-yon was not the same that had
existed between the Sakyapa and the Mongols during the Yuan dynasty. While there may have been thoughts that the Russian czar may be an incarnation of a deity, there is no evidence that the British king-emperor was ever considered a bodhisattva by Tibetans, nor was the British sovereign ever consecrated and legitimated as rightful secular emperor as were the Manchus. The perceived relationship was, at least, on the order of the more general sbyin-bdag dyad.

In the attempt to replace Manchu patronage by western agency, certain basic relationships in the traditional structure of Tibetan society unintentionally changed. This can perhaps be seen most clearly in the erosion of the special privileges of the traditional monastic feudal political structure in regards to an emerging "state" which is becoming increasingly secularized along western lines.

The King who would be Man: The Changing Status of the Dalai Lama

We have seen that the institution of the Dalai Lama is a continuing tradition, but one which was ultimately based a 600-year old invention of tradition synthesized from of various historical precedents in earlier history of Tibetan statecraft. In native Tibetan history, the Dalai Lama institution was believed to have been prophesied by the Buddha himself. Such progression is still continuing under the exigencies of the modern diaspora interacting with the modern world. It is through the medium of the Dalai Lama
that the articulation of Tibetan national identity is presented to the world's notable and powerful.

It is well documented that identity systems often persist amidst massive (crisis-based) replacement or addition, reinterpretation and revision (i.e. Spicer 1976; Adams 1981; Gorman 1981; Walker 1981; Talai 1986; Hostetler 1963). Such systems, built upon vital yet adaptive cores of meaning can survive despite such potential forces of change such as relocation and oppression. Not just the "products" of structure, but structures themselves can change yet still provide some sort of continuity of meaning throughout. This may be manifested in continuing identity despite change. The Dalai Lama institution is changing, but not its significance to the Tibetan people.

The continuation of identity systems, and thus the "people" who identify with them in opposition to "outsiders," must not be confused with the continuation of certain "key" or summarizing symbols (Ortner 1973; Geertz 1973; Schneider 1977). Key symbols may indeed be spurious in regards to tradition--innovations occur in the process of accommodating change (Handler and Linnekin 1984). Yet key symbols, such as a flag, may nevertheless be rallying points for social solidarity and identity--this, despite the fact that a national flag may be a recent innovation. It is the structural process of identification which seems to remain more constant than the life of various symbols.
which are its products. "Big Macs" are a powerful symbol of the American way of life, but the phenomenon of Big Mac underlies a deeper level of meaning inherent in, and consistent with, longer patterns of American cultural expression.

Tibetan refugee culture has many such summarizing symbols. Nowak (1984) has referred to the present conceptualization of the Dalai Lama's status, the metaphor of independence (rang-btsan "self-determination" [compare with Hindi svā-rāj]), and the annual March 10 Lhasa Uprising Commemoration (cf. Gold 1984) as key symbols by which refugee solidarity is constructed. To this I would add the use of imported western symbols that were developed by the Tibetan government in the early 20th century, but did not gain widespread usage until after the diaspora: a national flag, a national anthem, foreign embassies, postage stamps, uniform coinage, and currency, a written constitution, a national assembly, and passports. These symbols, considered necessary implements of sovereignty by international custom, are thereby appraised by modern Tibetan refugees to be essential for their claims to nationhood.

With the exception of the basic concept of the Dalai Lama, none of these symbols, however, have had a long history in Tibetan culture. One may even argue that the Dalai Lama institution, which is over 500 years old, is
relatively recent considering the 1,300-year span of written Tibetan history. The mchod-yon dyad itself is ultimately an innovation (Yüan dynasty). But regardless of age, these symbols in modern practice are considered continuous with the past.

The Dalai Lama institution, as a core (Geertz 1972) or summarizing symbol (Ortner 1973), is noted for its polysemic nature. As numerous as popular books on Tibet, the role and functions of the Dalai Lama have been widely discussed (notably Paul 1982; Michael 1982; Nowak 1984; Goldstein 1978). Yet the symbol remains enigmatic. According to Turner, powerful symbols tend to be contradictory, simultaneously revealing and concealing themselves (1967). This inherent tendency is literally "tantalizing"—they expose one to the mysteries of another world, yet provide just a glimpse. Mysteries and secrets, partly revealed, are powerful. The ability of the present Dalai Lama to skillfully manipulate this complex of meaning and present it to his people and the world is part of his success as a leader.

The theme of modern "divine kingship" was brilliantly applied in Hayden's (1987) study of the dynamics and power of the modern British monarchy, which despite its apparent anachrony in the "Age of Modern Man," is a source of immense prestige and national cohesiveness. This model might be
useful in understanding the apparent transformations in the modern presentation of the Dalai Lama to the world.

According to Hayden, the British Queen's success is due to a skillful manipulation of contradictory messages. There are reasons why the British monarchy still exists while the haughty Romanov and Habsburg dynasties are no more. One of these reasons is the somewhat ironic ability of the Queen to appeal to "common" sentiment and values, yet not appear commonplace.

In the accommodation of the past with the present, much of modern royal praxis involves a distortion of time. Many "ancient" royal ceremonies are, in fact, modern creations, yet are designed to appear timeless. Similarly, Hayden presents "the absolute incongruity of a Queen who does not know how to dress (1987:77)." The Queen is not a couturier's model for routine royal functions, but tends to wear very conservative fashions. According to Hayden, this helps maintain an opposition between present time through a "timeless" royal countenance—by being out of fashion, she is not merely of the present, but represents the past. This studied anachronism is a reversal of a display which once maintained the status of the monarch through the other extreme of ostentation (in the modern British monarchy this is reserved for great state events). The crowns and ermines worn by the Queen are functional equivalents to the frumpy hats and shoes worn in everyday royal routine—they both
provide an opposition to the normative. Among the other oppositions characteristic of the role of the Queen is that she is popularly viewed as politically powerless, yet she is the ultimate source of prestige and social standing in a highly stratified society (which, of course, is political power).

The present Dalai Lama similarly presents contradictory images. In fact, the whole modern institution is a study in the reconciliation of opposites: The Dalai Lama often refers to himself as a "simple Buddhist monk" (e.g. Tibetan Bulletin 1988), yet he is the head of the Tibetan faith and presently comes closest to the image of a Buddhist pope in the modern world by his visibility. Additionally, he is both human and a god (Chenrezi). He is a world-renouncing monk, yet a world-encompassing king as well. This paradox is similar to the position of the Buddha in Buddhist ideology (see Tambiah 1976:156). (The same paradox, of course, has existed with the Roman pontiff, as representative of Heaven, on one hand, and viceroy for Christ's Kingdom on Earth on the other).

The bodhisattva Chenrezi himself exhibits a duality of forms, appearing at times as the gentle God of Compassion; he can also assume the form of the wrathful Haryagriva (T. Tam-drin), a fierce protector of the religion and Tibet (Dhondup and Tashi Tsering 1979:11). Such duality is an important feature of tantric practice, and it can be
expected that the Dalai Lama manifests multiple symbolic meanings in both ideology and practice.

The Dalai Lama is both **pater** and **genitor** of his people. According to the Tibetan creation myth (Yeshe De Project 1986), Chenrezi, the God of Compassion, sent an emanation of himself in the form of a monkey. The monkey mated with a Himalayan ogress, producing the Tibetan race. On the other hand, as patron deity of Tibet, Chenrezi sent emanations of himself to rule over his people through a lineage of sprul-sku successors, the Dalai Lamas. Spiritual inheritance, and well as biological ancestry, tie the Tibetan people to the symbol of the Dalai Lama.⁵

Reflecting the ideology of the patron/client dyad, the reconciliation of opposites is also made manifest by the institution of the Dalai Lama in these twin lines of succession. One line is biological, the other spiritual. This is also evident in the ideology of Tibetan polyandry and in epic myth, wherein Robert Paul has suggested the operation of a bilateral symmetry between senior male (biologically reproductive) and junior (spiritually reproductive) patrilineages (1982). The elder brother in many Tibetan families is the usual heir to family property. The junior brother either becomes a submissive partner in a fraternal polyandrous union, or leaves for the monastery. In a polyandrous marriage, the younger brother usually acknowledges the senior as **pater** and often **genitor** of all
the children. As such, the younger brother is often referred to as paternal uncle (a-khu) by the children. It is the duty of the elder to provide for the material needs of the younger.

With the worldly succession passing through the elder line, spiritual succession descends through the younger line in an asexual transmission between uncle and younger nephew as guru and student. Thus the relationship between nephew (dbon) and paternal uncle becomes parallel to the father/eldest son dyad (Paul 1982:33). The agency of biological ascription is matched in the junior line by spiritual initiation.

A younger brother who chooses to retreat into the monastery, however, assumes a higher status in the family by crossing the sacral boundary. The biological lineage is made subordinate to the status of the monastic lineages, who "reproduce" themselves by incarnation and initiation. Paul explains the history of Tibetan monasticism as a slow movement away from biological inheritance to spiritual inheritance with the mandate to rule—the junior line has slowly become pre-eminent.

The worldly line provides the personnel and material support for the sacred system, and the spiritual line sanctifies the practice. According to Mauss, "to accept without returning or repaying is to face subordination, to become a client..." (1967:72). But in Tibet, the innate
submissiveness of the client in a "normative" patron/client relationship is reversed when crossing the boundary between the profane and the sacred. This is an important consideration in the Tibetan interpretation of its history. This is why the Tibetan state could receive material assistance from foreign patrons without considering itself submissive to those agents. Being an ecclesiastical state, it considered itself ideally the superior partner in the mchod-yon system.

As the biological and spiritual "father" of the Tibetan people, the Dalai Lama reconciles both lineages at its summit. The Dalai Lama is the ultimate focus of patronage and the ultimate source of "grace" in his style as the God of Compassion. In the role of the secular king, however, he transforms the gifts of accumulated religious patronage into public works and administration, forming a redistribution network with the Dalai Lama at the center. Within Tibetan society, including the diaspora, the Dalai Lama is both patron and client.

From the eclectic repertoire of symbols which comprises the institution, the Dalai Lama may be selective in the presentation of self. In diaspora, the Dalai Lama has chosen to be quite visible to his people and the world. This is a significant departure from pre-1959 Tibet. According to western accounts in the 1930s-1940 (i.e. Harrer 1953, Richardson 1962) the Dalai Lama's public appearances
were limited to two or three annual events: the state procession of the court from the Potala winter palace to the Norbulinka summer palace and back (the pontiff being hidden from view in a silken palanquin), and an New Year's appearance at the Jokhang Cathedral. This seems to suggest an emphasis on the celestial nature of both the body natural and the body politic. At that time, the Dalai Lama was not so much a public or national symbol as he was merely the apex of an elaborate hierarchy of ecclesiastic and secular noblemen. This symbol was revealed only through fleeting glimpses, magnifying the awesome mystery and majesty of the descendant god.

The image that the present Dalai Lama most often chooses in appearing before his exiled people and the world is that of a human. The Dalai Lama can be seen frequently being driven around Dharamsala in a jeep, visiting day-care centers or rug factories. Starry-eyed westerners, returning from the frequent audiences that he grants, have often expressed to me the incredulous image of the "god/king" scratching his nose or rubbing his head. Such expressions of the "body natural" do not detract from the status of the Dalai Lama--far from it, as it adds to his personal charm and charisma. It maintains that incongruous image of a divine form in a human body.

Furthermore, appearing as a simple monk to the world deflates his opponents who might consider the whole diaspora
to be nothing more than the vain-glorious attempts of a former elite to maintain its privileged position (for China's perceived position, see Dhondup 1986:140). Appearing as a common monk (a mendicant one at that) perhaps arouses much more empathy for the cause of Tibet in the world community than appearing as a dispossessed Shah of Iran or King Farouk.

In the diaspora communities, the Dalai Lama has assumed the symbolic significance of a modern, western constitutional monarch. Much of his appeal, therefore, is that of a public symbol, one which represents the nation more entirely than perhaps any other. Following common western practice, the Dalai Lama issued in 1974 a series of denominated Tibetan postal stamps bearing his portrait (see Appendix). Such stamps promote the image of Tibet existing as an independent entity. Yet the practice of Dalai Lama portraiture on something as mundane as a stamp would probably be unthinkable in pre-occupational Tibet. My informants wondered if it would be proper to submit the sacred image to the indignities of being "cancelled" and run through further desecration through a postal system. (I will discuss in detail the power of this icon as an aspect of individual nationalistic praxis in Chapter 11).

The transmutation of the Dalai Lama into a public symbol reflects to some extent the truncation of traditional status relationships which have occurred in exile. I noted
that to many of my informants, the Dalai Lama was an "all-or-nothing" source of authority (this supports Nowak's argument). No secular prime minister nor even lesser incarnate lamas could ever claim authority on their own, according to my informants.8 By this sort of truncation, at least the Dalai Lama as a public symbol conceals the ecclesiastic and secular hierarchies which are still intact. This logically could be useful in presenting the "sufferings of the common Tibetan" to the outside world as opposed to displaying the dispossession of elites. By revealing himself, the Dalai Lama conceals the traditional hierarchies, which may indeed be operating despite an apparent secularization of government.

The Modernization of Government

The changes in the Tibetan political system from the 19th and early 20th centuries to the diaspora system can be seen in the comparison of Figs. 6 and 7. Fig. 6 represents the structure of the Tibetan government as ascertained by British agent Richardson and Tibetan diplomat Shakabpa. Fig. 7 illustrates the structure of the exile government compiled from the Information Office of the Dalai Lama and my own observations.

The most obvious difference is the apparent elimination of most monastic offices following the re-establishment of the exile government. The modern Tibetan government is no longer a dyarchy of equivalent ecclesiastical and secular
Fig. 6. Structure of the Tibetan Government (Ganden Phodrang) prior to 1959.
Fig. 7. Structure of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile
offices. State-level religious matters are now handled by a ministry-level post in the Department of Religious and Cultural Affairs, by the rather obscurant (and aptly named) Private Office of H.H. the Dalai Lama, and by sectarian representation in the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies. Many of the appointments made by the Dalai Lama to the higher echelons of the exile civil service are based on achievement rather than ascription. Twelve of the members of the Assembly are elected under universal suffrage in the diaspora. These members represent the three provinces of Tibet (Amdo, Kham, and Ü-Tsang). Five of the members are appointed by each of the five religious sects (Information Office).

The western-style democratization of the Tibetan government is perhaps most evident in the Constitution promulgated by the Dalai Lama in India in 1963, a charter which would apparently come into effect in a liberated Tibet. In the "Forward" of the document, the Dalai Lama states:

"Even prior to my departure from Tibet in March, 1959, I had come to the conclusion that in the changing circumstances of the modern world the system of governance in Tibet must be so modified and amended as to allow the elected representatives of the people to play a more effective role in guiding and shaping the social and economic policies of the State." (Bureau of H.H. the Dalai Lama 1963:v)

The State is established as a "unitary democratic [one] founded upon the principles laid down by the Lord Buddha" (Bureau of H.H. the Dalai Lama 1963:3), yet a separation of
church and state seems at least superficially present. In his secular capacity, the Dalai Lama is chief executive with the power to appoint ministers, promulgate laws, grant pardons, etc., yet:

"Nothing in this article ([on executive power] shall be deemed to alter or affect in any manner the power and authority of His Holiness the Dalai Lama as the Supreme Spiritual Head of State" (1963:13)

The legislative authority is vested in the National Assembly of which 75% of the members are elected by the people in their traditional territorial constituencies, 10% elected by the monasteries, 10% elected by regional and district councils, and 5% nominated by the Dalai Lama from the fields of arts and sciences (1963:18). There is a provision for a Supreme Court, members of which are appointed by the Dalai Lama.

The constitution of the government proposed for a free Tibet resembles a parliamentary democracy, yet nothing precludes the status of the Dalai Lama as spiritual head of state which has always been ultimately supra-ordinate to the temporal power. Nothing in the constitution stipulates the powers and privileges of the ecclesiastic hierarchy. One could suggest perhaps only two conclusions: that the traditional theocratic power no longer exists, or that it is congruently as powerful yet it has been occluded.

The latter proposition is seductive—after all, the Dalai Lama owes his position to the discovery of his reincarnation and subsequent training and socialization by
monsks of the established, Gelugpa Church. Yet abuses of this power during regency periods have been articulated even by native Tibetan historians. Dhondup (1986) suggests, for example, that the monastic and aristocratic rivalries during the interregnum between the 13th and 14th Dalai Lamas (1933-1950), undid much of the national unity and independence that the 13th Dalai Lama had accomplished.

I offer a possible "middle" path between the two extremes suggested in the power of the diaspora church. The reproduction of the sbyin-bdag system in exile has not only provided for the re-establishment of the monastic hierarchies, but has allowed the common, lay Tibetan direct access to outside support. The accumulation of surplus "foreign aid" among the common laity further accomplished by subsequent entrepreneurial activity, has created an economic and political force that the Tibetan exile administration must come to terms with.

The Dalai Lama perhaps anticipated this development in the 1963 Constitution. A Council of Regency is to assume the executive powers of the secular state during the minority, absence, or incapacity of the Dalai Lama (Bureau of H.H. the Dalai Lama 1963:15). The council would consist of three members appointed by the National Assembly (75% popularly elected), only one of which "will be an ecclesiastical representative," according to the Constitution (1963:16). But again, nothing would preclude
the Dalai Lama's position as Religious Head of State, which continues to be nearly inviolable.

The framework suggested for a free Tibet exists in the present structure of the Tibetan government-in-exile. The envisioned Tibetan State is ideally a temporal phenomenon ultimately based on the power of the Tibetan people. The Church has been disenfranchised from much of the operation of the State, yet it is still represented at various levels, most notably at the top.

I suggest that the attempted reproduction of the sbyin-bdag in exile and its orientation towards the West has been the source of its own structural transformation. Direct access to outside support by the laity has reoriented the traditional power differential between the laity and the clergy. Change is evident in the increasing levels of secularization and democratization that began under the reign of the 13th Dalai Lama and is accelerating under the 14th.

The image of the Tibetan State as articulated by modern Tibetans inside and outside of Tibet will be presented in the next chapters. Such praxis is an "interplay of ideology and experience," an attempted accommodation of the perceived past with the present (Nowak 1984). I suggest throughout this work that much of this practice is considered by the Tibetans as co-extensive with tradition.
Notes

1. The Tibetan National Anthem was translated and scored by the kind assistance of K.K. Wangchuk, Director of the Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts (Dharamsala). The full score of this song is in the Appendix.

2. "Flesh and bone" is a double entendre in this context, referring both to the state of the body natural, and the state of the Tibetan body politic. Tibetan descent is determined patrilineally on the bone (T.rus) lineage, and matrilineally on the flesh lineage (T.sha).

3. Long Shog was translated by Thinley Dhondup and myself. I have scored this from field tapes with help from William Sugane and Jan Matesewski. To my knowledge, it appears here in print for the first time. See Appendix for full score.

4. In a pamphlet issued by the Office of Tibet in New York (the exile government's representative in the USA), the entire history of treaties with foreign powers are listed to substantiate Tibet's claim to independence. This documentation has often been utilized by modern Tibetan refugee claims at the United Nations and among the International Committee of Jurists (World Court). Although the earlier treaties were regional, by the late 19th century Tibet was playing on the world stage. This list is quoted in its entirety, with the Tibetan explanations of its particular claims:

1. Ladakh-Tibet treaty of 1684. Proving the treaty-making powers of Tibet.
4. Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890. To show Tibetan defiance of treaties signed by China without Tibetan participation.
5. Anglo-Chinese Trade Regulations regarding Tibet of 1893. To show the treaties signed with China without Tibetan participation were not implemented.
8. Tibetan Declaration of Independence, 1912. [Refuting the mchod-yon relationship with the Manchu emperor].
9. British Memorandum of 17 August, 1912 to
Chinese Government. Showing that Britain had drawn the attention of the Chinese Government to the fact that Indo-Tibetan affairs had been settled directly between the two in the past.

10. Chinese Government's reply of 30 January, 1913. Showing that the Chinese Government had accepted the British Memorandum of 17 August, 1912 as the basis for negotiations.

11. British proposal of 26 May, 1913 to the Chinese Government. Proposing a joint conference in which Britain, Tibet, and China would be participating.

12. Statement of the Chinese President, 4 June, 1913. Accepting the proposal for tripartite negotiations.

13. Discussions between Chinese Vice Foreign Minister and British representative at Peking of 14 July, 1913. Showing that a Tibetan Plenipotentiary entered the Simla Conference on an equal footing with the other Plenipotentiaries.


15. Chinese Foreign Office note of 7 August, 1913. Stating that the Chinese representative would go for negotiations "for a treaty jointly with the Tibetan Plenipotentiary." Showing that Tibetan Plenipotentiary entered the Simla Conference on an equal footing with the Chinese Plenipotentiaries.


17. Chinese representative's statement of 13 October at the Simla Conference. Proving that China admitted that Tibet was regarded as distinct from China for the purposes of the Conference.

18. Credentials of the three plenipotentiaries at the Simla Conference. Showing that Tibetan Plenipotentiary participated on an equal footing with the Chinese Plenipotentiary.

19. Extract from the Simla Conference meeting on 18 November 1913. Regarding Chinese representative's agreement to Indo-Tibetan boundary question being discussed separately between the British and Tibetan representatives.


Britain would have to sign separately with Tibet.


23. British Foreign Office letter of 8 August 1914 to the Chinese representative. Stating that the agreement reached with Tibet represented the settled views of the British Government.


27. Tibetan refusal of transit facilities to China 1942-43. Showing Tibetan control of her external relations.


31. Government of India's note date 9 March, 1948 to the Chinese Embassy in Delhi. Showing that India had succeeded to the treaty-making rights and obligations between former British India and Tibet.

---(Office of Tibet, NY n.d, based on information from the Bureau of H.H. the Dalai Lama, New Delhi 1965).

5. The God of Compassion in the iconography of Mahāyāna Buddhism, in addition, has male as well as female forms (e.g. Kuan-yin), benign and wrathful manifestations (see Getty 1962).

6. Hayden notes the aspect of asymmetrical gift exchange in regards to the British Queen, who "gives" by receiving (1987:102). This is precisely the argument I suggest for ideology between secular patron and religious client in Tibet.
7. The Dalai Lama was dismissed from his Chairmanship of the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet by the PRC in 1964, as "an incorrigible running dog of imperialist and foreign reactionaries who has organized a bogus government and a bogus constitution." (Dhondup 1986:140).

8. Several informants told me that if they had important business, such as learning about the conditions in Tibet, they would report it directly to the Dalai Lama. Despite the innovations and democractizations that have been presented to the Tibetans in exile, it seems that few are willing to accept authority from lesser beings, especially if it might compromise their image of an all-powerful Dalai Lama. The metaphor of rang-btsan or "self-power" has been discussed extensively by Nowak (1984) as an evolving concept to deal with this personal enfranchisement of everyday Tibetans into the power-structures of the modern experience.
CHAPTER VII
WESTERN PATRONAGE OF THE CLERGY

A Tibetan Monastery for Westerners

On a typical day in an unexceptional restaurant in the Thamel tourist district of Kathmandu, a bejeweled drifter-tourist nonchalantly sits in the courtyard—bare feet propped conspicuously on an adjacent chair. He snatches his dinner from the imperturbable Nepali waiter, the latter receiving no appreciative acknowledgement. One woman sits dispassionately, her hair resembling raw jute. Another westerner seems sutured together by innumerable shiny cords. Deep tans and red faces—one lady wears what looks like old dishrags around her neck. Bikers' jackets and baseball caps—one diner wears a blanket. Prim waiters scurry about, wielding trays of ersatz chocolate cake, fluorescent lemon pie, water buffalo pizzas, and cinnamon rolls with raisins (or on one occasion, a baked bee). Meanwhile, the Tibetan proprietor sits quietly by his cash box, counting the day's generous receipts.

Kathmandu, Nepal, still maintains its somewhat notorious reputation for being a time-warp for counter-culture westerners from the 1960s. I noticed this during my first visit in 1978, but was indeed astounded by its perpetuation in 1987. At the later date, however, it appeared that most local tourist entrepreneurs were now
Tibetan. It appears that the tourist service business has been institutionalized, or standardized to a long-term pattern of catering to the perceived values of drifter-tourists. Tibetan refugees are active agents in this service.

It may be that capital required for entrepreneurial investment towards developing services for indiscriminate drifter-tourists is relatively low—and thus ideally suited to landless yet otherwise prosperous Tibetan refugees. According to one Tibetan settlement officer that I interviewed, Kathmandu is rapidly becoming more "Tibetan" by emigration from the various rural refugees communities. Tourism is a bonanza for Tibetan exiles, and tourism directly or indirectly supports the maintenance of re-established Tibetan institutions.

On the bulletin board of this courtyard restaurant, which could be typical in the low-budget tourist district of Kathmandu, I found an announcement for meditation classes at Kopan Monastery. My interest kindled, I found these posted at other restaurants, hotel front-desks, and even at the American Embassy. Also advertised at these locations was a Tibetan language class taught by local monks, touting basic tourist-level of competence for trips to Tibet—NRs 600 (US $30.00).

Kopan monastery lies just beyond the pilgrimage center at Bodhanath outside of Kathmandu. It was the seat of the
late Lama Thubden Yeshe, a Gelugpa lama who had quite a substantial following in the West. Established in 1969, the thriving dharma center is now run by Lama Thubden Zopa Rinpoche. My tenure in the field roughly corresponded to some major events with the Kopan institution, events which reveal some of the relationships between clerical Tibetans and their western religious patrons.

The meditation class that I noted had 80 western students. It runs as a residence program for 10 days, and is scheduled six times a year. The cost is NRS 1000 per student (US $50.00). In addition, they offer an annual one month course in meditation in November, exoteric studies of the sūtra, a two-week Tibetan language class, thang-ka painting, and other activities.

One student described the routine of the 10-day meditation classes: meditation sessions around 6 am; breakfast with tea; classes on Buddhist philosophy; lunch with tea; more classes; meditation; dinner; evening classes; mediation to 9 pm. I observed the lamas teaching their students in "Socratic" fashion—under the trees in the garden. Most of these students were college-aged girls. There were but a few young men. Some of the students with whom I talked were recognizable as a "type" I had encountered numerous times at dharma centers in the U.S. and in South Asia. On occasion, I perceived a certain arrogance
in their speech and deportment, as if they jealously guarded their "esoteric" knowledge from a defilement by the outside world.

My lay Tibetan informants have also expressed their perceptions to me regarding this category: a "holier-than-thou" attitude, a conceit of knowledge. Such demeanor is considered blasphemous to many Tibetans, as it violates the spirit of Buddhist universalism. Ideally, those with knowledge of the dharma should never be boastful of their franchise. Whether in Kathmandu, Dharamsala, or Tibet, my native informants were always quite animated expressing their indignation at the irreverent behavior of certain western nouveaux illuminés towards their institutions and values. It was often a stimulating nexus for gossip.

A tea-shop stood adjacent to the main structure at Kopan, stocked with the usual collection of western essentials: coffee, tea, sodas, chocolate bars (Cadbury), and toilet paper. Two young novice monks were in attendance. One was clad in an American flag "tank-top" shirt under his monastic robes; the other wore a red Coca-Cola t-shirt. English seemed to be spoken exclusively at Kopan. The bulletin board was strewn with flowery entreaties to Buddhist practice as well as announcements for various other classes and retreats.

Simple arithmetic suggests that this one series of meditation classes would gross about US $25,000 per year--a
fortune by Nepali standards. But, as in any business, expenditures must be made. The maintenance of the physical plant, the boarding of the monks (as home to 75-80 young monks from Nepal and Tibet as the "Mount Everest Centre"), the payment of the mortgage, publications, and the expenses of the extensive international travel of the principals must be met. Lacking the old, feudal arrangements of corvee labor on large monastic estates and long-term redistributive "gifting" in the sbyin-bdag system, many of the diaspora Tibetan Buddhist institutions have had to rely on cash from western students and tourists.

The Tushita Retreat Centre in Dharamsala was Lama Thubten Yeshe's monastic seat in the refugee capital. Unlike Kopan, Tushita does not have facilities for training Tibetan novices in conjunction with western-oriented teachings. Rather, the Tushita complex is essentially a small retreat for western Buddhists. It consists of a large throne/assembly room, a small library/bookstore, three "A-frame" retreat cottages and other small rooms, and a kitchen. Posted conspicuously around the center are numerous signs in English, outlining the rules and regulations of the institution. Often rather brusque, many of these rules delineate proper bodily deportment on the temple grounds (e.g. smoking, drinking, shoes, what to do with flatulence, etc.). I felt this to be a translation into a western idiom of the standard Buddhist Vinaya rules
of monastic order, which too, is largely concerned with deportment: how to sit, how to behave in a layman's house, how to eat quietly, how to receive gifts.

Whereas Tushita and even Kopan are relatively small, the organization itself is extensive. Lama Thubten Geshe and Thubden Zopa Rinpoche's Tushita and Kopan have monastic outposts in the U.S., with three centers in California under the Vajrapani Institute for Wisdom Culture (Information Office 1981), as well as in other countries.¹

The discovery of the reincarnation of Lama Yeshe became a western media event of extraordinary proportions during my visits to Kopan and Tushita. As reported in Newsweek (1987) in March of 1984, just before Lama Yeshe died, he confided to an American Buddhist nun that he would be reborn as the son of a Spanish woman. When the child was born less than a year later, Thubden Zopa Rinpoche brought the promising child to the attention of the Dalai Lama. After a series of traditional tests, the Dalai Lama recognized the little Tibetan boy, Osel, as the incarnation of Lama Yeshe (Newsweek 1987:43).

In March of 1987, little Lama Osel was scheduled to be brought from Spain to be enthroned at Kopan. Many of my Tibetan informants, as well as the Tibetan press were perplexed at the world-wide media attention. To many Tibetans, although Lama Geshe should be rightly venerated by his western disciples and themselves for his success at
spreading the dharma, he was just not all that important in the hierarchy. Quite a few high rinpoches have passed away in recent years, with hardly a notice outside of the diaspora—why all the fuss with this one?

Tsering Wangyal stated in his editorial in the Tibetan Review (May 1987) that it was

"sufficient that Yeshi's disciples are satisfied with the choice of Osel Torre, and the matter should have been allowed to rest there. Unfortunately, the disciples chose to build up a media image of him as one of the most important lamas. And look what happened! Some Tibetans could not take it lying down and spoke their minds to inquisitive journalists. The papers then gave the impression that there is some sort of power struggle between Tibetans and Westerners at the Nepal headquarters of the world-wide Buddhist centres founded by the late teacher. There is no such thing..." (1987:3-4)

With all the media frenzy about, ironically the actual whereabouts of little Osel was unknown to outsiders (including myself). He was scheduled to be enthroned at Kopan, but at the last minute was consecrated at Tushita (after I had already left for Kathmandu for the occasion). My informants told me that this candidate had been denounced by Ladakhi lamas, and not officially recognized by the Dalai Lama, the State Oracle (understandably, for he was dead), or other high incarnates. While Tibetan refugees often seek out media attention in order to make their nationalistic goals visible to the world community, they do hope that their story is accurately portrayed. The Osel case seemed to release much suppressed frustration that some Tibetans had endured over the years of western misunderstandings and
romanticization in the popular world press. Perceived slanderings of their culture as being racially bigoted for fussing about the qualifications of a minor, western-born lama, struck the Tibetans hard. To many Tibetans, "Tibetaness" is an achieved status, totally incongruous with the popular western notion of Tibetan society being a closed, secretive system.

Westerners were blamed for 1) not seeing the traditional order of things, 2) making distinctions where none should be made, and 3) trying to find sectarian power struggles where none exist. Westerners were criticized for not practicing the universality of Buddhism, which ideally recognizes no difference in ethnicity, race, or even gender as a qualification for divine favor. Osel, was in fact, the fifth, not the first western incarnate. Yonten Gyatso, the fourth Dalai Lama, was a Mongol; the god Mañjuśrī incarnated in the line of Manchu emperors.

National Religious Unity vs Sectarianism in Exile

From my perspective as a westerner, it is perhaps easy to see the first "fault" of western individuals trained in Buddhism at monastic missions abroad (i.e. not realizing the "traditional" social order). In the West, Buddhist students often do not have the opportunity to know the position of their teacher in regards to the traditional (or re-established) hierarchy. There is sometimes a tendency to presume that one's preceptor is a more important personage
than they actually are within Tibetan society. The sacred bonds of guru and student, although always idealized in Buddhist thought, are perhaps amplified in a distanced western context. It can sometimes be disturbing to experience the relegation of one's guru into a relative position of subordination with the arrival of more superior lamas from the traditional hierarchy:

In Hawaii, I was fortunate to spend several years as the student of Nechung Rinpoche, the abbot of the State Oracle and a very high lama in the traditional hierarchy. The Dalai Lama visited our temple in October, 1980. I was quite disconcerted to notice my guru sitting on an ordinary cushion as the Dalai Lama was on his throne. In most circumstances, the resident lama always assumes a very high seat of honor. Similarly, it was distracting to note Rinpoche's use of very high honorifics in addressing the Tibetan pontiff and his submissive deportment in general. At the original Nechung monastery in Tibet, and at the re-established one in Dharamsala, I was also surprised to see an ordinary cushion serving as the abbot's seat in front of a high throne for the Dalai Lama. In all fairness, however, it should be noted that a student's respect and veneration for his own "heart-guru" is an important ideological tenet in Buddhism. Assuming the importance of one's own guru over others may indeed be a means of demonstrating relative
status within the western community of Buddhist practitioners, though it appears to be hardly condoned by Tibetans themselves.

The second expressed conceit of western practitioners noted by Tibetans is a matter of making distinctions were none exists ideologically. A topic of discussion in Dharamsala was the status of women in clerical orders. A few western nuns had recently been very active in demanding "equal rights" with male clerics: equal opportunities for education and advancement, a restoration of nun lineages, and more financial support for their convents. In my discussion with male lay Tibetans, I suggested the Theravada Buddhist viewpoint that men or women, when renouncing the world to take up the robe, also renounce sensuality, sexuality, and the assumption of the cultural distinctions between the roles of men and women in society. One informant disagreed, stating that there has been some bad influence from westerners, particularly with the women's movement in the West. He explained that women are biologically different, therefore psychologically different, and remain women despite religious vocation. They naturally have a different role to play in the Church, he added, and there is no need to split the institution further by the creation of separate bhikṣunī (Skt. "female renunciates") lineages. (Again, this may be compared with orthodox Roman Catholic theology).
The third general Tibetan perception of westerners deals with the latter envisioning flagrant sectarian rivalries where few exist. Here, a certain gap between ideology and practice can be seen. The Dalai Lama is careful to give equal respect to the four other Tibetan Buddhists sects. Yet rumors are constantly surfacing among the western community of factional arguments and friction between these units of diaspora Tibetan Buddhism. A Tibetan scholar writing in the exile press, also views sectarian religious disunity with alarm:

"The present trend of Tibetan activities in setting up meditational centres in the U.S. and Europe is good as far as it goes. It may be providing much needed spiritual healing for the mentally tired people of a materialistic world. However, there is nothing new in this movement. Far from it, it is a logical extension of the old sectarian bias interest seeking foreign patronage. The sectarian bias is not only thus maintained, but also imparted to those faithful western followers who naturally feel that it is their duty to uphold such differences." (Samten 1977:26)

Unity of the Church is ideally and practically valued in exile, and great efforts are made by the Tibetan government, through the Private Office and the Information Office, to display unity. Many of these sects, however, have had a long history of autonomy in Tibet itself. Perhaps as a response to the general trend towards centralization of the Tibetan government which has been accelerated by exile, all modern sects generally acknowledge the Dalai Lama as the leader of Tibet. Yet many of these lineages have their own intricate networks of missions
abroad, and are not necessarily economically dependent upon the Dharamsala establishment or the Dalai Lama's own Gelugpa lineages. This is essentially as it was in the past, characteristic of those twin forces of centralization and decentralization which competed at the expense of the unification of the Tibetan State (see Goldstein 1971; also Goldstein and Paljor Tsarong 1985).

One Sect's Rebirth in the West

The Gelugpa Church is the State Church, yet other sects have had great success in re-establishing themselves in exile. For example, Rumtek Monastery (Shied Dubchoekhor Ling) in Sikkim (now India), seat of the late 16th Karmapa of the Kagyupa sect, is located in the traditional, and still active, region of royal patronage from the Kings of Sikkim and Bhutan. In addition, they have perhaps the widest network of missions abroad. They seem to be quite autonomous, economically, from Dharamsala. Fig. 8 illustrates the extent of Kagyupa missions abroad under the auspices of high lamas (such as the Kalu, Shamar, and Situ Rinpoches) under the general supervision of the Karmapa.

In India, Sikkim, Nepal, and Bhutan, the Kagyupa maintains 36 monasteries, consisting of 1,060 monks, 124 tantric masters, and 127 nuns (Information Office, 1981). Other sects, such as the Nyingma, Gelugpa, and Sakyapa have similarly established monastic missions abroad as well as in South Asia. From the records at the Council for Religious
USA

1. Kagyud Dzamling Kunchab --New York City
2. Karma Ngawang Yonten --Santa Fe, NM
3. Kagud Do-Nga Kunchab --Los Angeles
4. Kagyud Penday Choling --N. San Juan, CA
5. Kagyud Dorden Kunchab --San Francisco
6. Kagyud Tinley Kunchab Ling --Watertown, MD
7. Kagyud Jangchub Choling --Portland, OR
8. Kagyu Theg Chen Ling --Honolulu, HI
9. Maitreyeya Institute --Honolulu, HI
10. Rimay O Sal Ling --Maui, HI
11. Karma Tengay Ling --San Mateo, CA
12. Karma Triyana Dharma Chakra --Woodstock, NY
13. NYC Karma Thegsum Choling
15. Columbus (Ohio) Karma Thegsum Choling
16. Katonah (NY) Karma Thegsum Tcheuling Choling
17. Troy (NY) Karma Thegsum Choling
18. Los Angeles Karma Thegsum Choe Ling
19. Idyllwild (CA) Karma Thegsum Choe Ling
20. Los Altos (CA) Karma Thegsum Choe Ling
21. Santa Barbara Karma Thegsum Choe Ling
22. Santa Cruz (CA) Karma Thegsum Choe Ling
23. Tusum Ling --Burton, WA

Europe and Canada

24. Karma Kunchas Choling --Vancouver, Canada
25. Tibetan Center --Toronto, Canada
26. Marpa Institute --Suffolk, UK
27. Kanpo Gangra Kagyud Ling --Beichem, Belgium
28. Karma Drubgyud Choeling --Athens
29. Pal Karmai Choe Kyil --Rome
30. Karma Namgyal Ling --Vienna
31. Karma Tengyal Ling --Berlin
32. Karma Drub Dhy Ling --Hamburg
33. Karma Sopa Ling --Osterrade, W. Germany
34. Karma Kagyud Ling --Duisburg, W. Germany
35. Dhagpo Kagyud Ling --Dordogne, France
36. Kagyud Dzong --Paris
37. Kagyud Ling --Toulon sur Arrouz, France
38. Kagyud Rintchen --Montpellier, France
39. Karma Gon --Saint-Arroman, France
40. Kagyud Shenpen Katchab Ling--Marseilles
41. Karma Phuntsos Choe Ling --Aix-en-Provence
42. Karma Nalanda --Blommenlyst, France
43. Karma Migjur Ling --Saint-Marcellin, Fr.
44. Karma Tjo Pael Ling --Rodby, France
45. Karma Gelek Tardje Ling --Odense, France

Fig. 8. Kagyupa Establishments in the West
USA

24. Karma Kunchas Choling
   --Vancouver, Canada
25. Tibetan Center
   --Toronto, Canada
26. Marpa Institute
   --Suffolk, UK

Europe and Canada

46. Karma Dru Dji Ling
    --Copenhagen
47. Karma Choephel Ling
    --Vleuten, Holland
48. Karma Lodu Gyamtso Ling
    --Krakow, Poland
49. Karma Tashi Ling
    --Oslo
50. Karma Shedrub Dargye Ling
    --Stockholm
51. Karma Gyalwai Shjing
    --Helsinki

In addition to these Dharma centers, the late Chögyam Trungpa Rinpoche was also associated with the Kagyupa. The Nalanda Foundation, the Vajradhatu, and the Naropa Institute in Colorado are the main centers, consisting of Naropa and at least 21 centers in the United States (1981).

and Cultural Affairs office of the Dalai Lama as published by the Information Office, there was a total of 146 established Tibetan monasteries and nunneries in South Asia in 1981, with 6,072 monks, 601 tantric masters, and 421 nuns. The population of Tibetan clerics in South Asia may be larger, as these figures do not account for mendicant monks and nuns and those who are otherwise not normally associated with any one monastery.

In Dharamsala, the 1981 records only indicate six monastic centers with a total of 146 monks, 18 tantric masters, and 50 nuns. By 1986 there were eleven monasteries (Council for Religious and Cultural Affairs of H.H. the Dalai Lama 1986:71). When I arrived in 1987, there were two more, with others under construction.²

Methodologically, trying to count monks and nuns is problematic, for like modern lay Tibetans in Dharamsala, clerics travel extensively. Western and Tibetan lamas and nuns cannot usually be considered settled at any one center. In addition to international travel, clerics visit various centers and pilgrimage spots in South Asia (and recently Tibet) throughout the year. The only gauge that seems to be even modestly reliable is set in stone—the construction of new monasteries. From my perspective, the growth of monasteries in Dharamsala alone has been phenomenal from 1978 to 1987. (I noted a similar trend in Kathmandu).
This development has not only been quantitative, but qualitative. For example, the Nechung establishment with which I am most familiar, was but an old, tin-roofed flat in 1978, with room only for the Oracle, Abbot, and a few monks. The new Nechung Monastery in Dharamsala is an impressive complex, with perhaps facilities for 50 monks, in addition to fine residences for the Abbot, Oracle, and the Dalai Lama when he visits. The Nechung institution, however, maintains but one monastic outpost in the West, in Hawaii.

**Contractual Spiritualism**

The foregoing example of the re-established Kagyupa sect in the diaspora provides an illustration of both the complexity and size of the edifice, as well as its diffuseness. These religious institutions are supported most directly with a reconstituted *sbyin-bdag* system. Tibetans support their lamas with gifts as before, yet the bulk of some of these establishments' growth most likely can be traced to foreign capital. Western Buddhists contribute cash, labor, or gifts in kind to their local temple. These temples in turn gift their parent monasteries in South Asia. The Tibetan government or the Dalai Lama may chose to sponsor monastery construction, or the parent monasteries may chose to contribute to various programs of the Tibetan exile government. The giver receives intangible "merit" for his part, but no cleric bestows this merit. The receiver is under no ethical obligation to return the gift, but simply
to be an appropriately pure vessel for receiving the gift. The "reciprocity" which occurs is effected by the praxis of giving, not by the agency of the religious recipient. Ideally, the Buddhist priest executes his duties of teaching and ritual performance as an aspect of his sacred vocation, not out of a contract of balanced or generalized reciprocity.

This system in Tibet may be practically described as a redistributive network, not as according to Devoe (1983) and Aziz (1978), a true reciprocity system. On one hand, donations flow from the periphery to a political center. On the other, a return is operationalized through a metamorphosis of the gift into merit by supra-mundane agency. The basics of this system in exile are essentially unchanged from the practice in old Tibet.

Standing at the center of this system of religious redistribution, of course, is the Dalai Lama—who additionally is the head of the Tibetan State. An act of religious practice, as gifting, performed in Missoula, Montana, may therefore ultimately be transformed into support for the Tibetan exile government and its nationalistic goals—"religion and politics combined." The result may be just as unintentional for the practitioner as the American taxpayer's payments to the IRS becoming day care centers or support for the liberation of Nicaragua.
The re-establishment of religious sbyin-bdag relationships through western agency has had some unintended consequences for Tibetan refugees. Westerners, by entering into this system as donors and practitioners, have had the effect of bringing in western ideas to the traditional system.

Tibetans accept foreign men and women into the system without too much reservation, yet there is one western concept that most of my informants find particularly offensive--charging fees for religious functions, a common practice in the West. As Luther broke from the Catholic Church partly in disgust with the practice of selling Papal indulgences, Tibetans find the buying or selling of religious instruction equally offensive. Since the "return" of merit is outside of sacerdotal agency, no earthy power can determine which actions are meritorious or not, or ascribe a price or value upon the sacred teachings. The Buddhist message should be made accessible to all, regardless of their "donation." It is the spiritual level of the practitioner, rather than the size of the wallet, that unlocks the door to knowledge and liberation, according to many Tibetans.

Yet for the practical circumstances of rebuilding the Tibetan religious system, supporting the monks, flying the high lamas around to their diffuse missions around the world, the sbyin-bdag relationship with the West has become
monetized. Although some westerners contribute to their monasteries in a traditional manner, such as providing corvee labor or in some cases donating a child to become a cleric (as in Osel's case), most support for these institutions are made in the form of cash—as dues, "admission" tickets, special fund-drives for specific purposes, or tuition for dharma classes. These funds are usually handled by temple administrators, not by the monks themselves (there are vinaya rules against the handling of money). In many centers, the simple method of paying cash for services rendered is a successful way of generating funds in the West. As it is compatible to western economic practice and expectations, this convention would tend to be readily accepted in the West. Furthermore, because monetized systems are often not embedded in the social system, no additional obligations are incurred by cash payments, thus no long-term commitment has to be made to any western Buddhist center. Again, this seems compatible to general western contractual transiency in various social dealings.

A recent brochure from Tarthang Tulku's Nyingma Institute in Berkeley, California, explicitly describes the costs and benefits of various Buddhist teaching sessions, suggesting that

"Residential intensives offer students ready to commit their full energy the opportunity to dissolve unwanted patterns and limitations through focused practice and study. Participants normally meet six days a week, from seven in the morning until ten at night. The programs include practice sessions, classes, study, and
work periods for integrating what is learned into daily activities. Cost includes instruction, accommodations, and meals." (Nyingma Institute 1988:2)

Potential applicants are told quite clearly of the spiritual benefits and financial obligations involved in these programs:

"NP 820 Two-Month Study of Dharma Program
June 25-August 26, 1989

An active encounter with the teachings of the Buddha as a path to transformation of human being. The path is understood as it is traveled, and is traveled through the integration of study, vision, practice, and action. Based on traditional texts and the writings of Tarthang Tulku. Cost is $2,000; Focus on Dharma participants receive a 10% discount. Participation in the first two weeks: $300 per week; participation in the first four weeks: $1,000; evening sessions only: $400. Please write for a brochure." (1988:3)

"TSK 810 Love of Knowledge: Ten Month Program
November 20, 1988-August 31, 1989

This training will be the most intensive investigation ever conducted into the Time, Space, and Knowledge vision. The program focuses on Tarthang Tulku's Love of Knowledge. Eight hours of study and practice daily, with close supervision by senior faculty. Individual research projects. Cost is $7,500, including attendance at several special weekend conferences, to be announced. Please write for a brochure." (1988:3)

"Supermarket" spiritualism in general is unthinkable to most of my Dharamsala informants. Entering into the sbyin-bdag system is a long-term, personal commitment—as it was among Tibetan hierarchs and Mongol/Manchu emperors under the mchod-yon, and as it is among lay Tibetans and their own lamas. Accepting a guru or becoming a patron is essentially a personal affair, one which is totally embedded in the social environment. It is not a contract of
"performance for value given," but rather a lifetime social arrangement. Gifting, as in the Maussian sense, establishes a unimpeachable social commitment of reciprocity. Gifting in the Tibetan context practicably brings one into a system of social rights and obligations, characteristic of exchange in many non-monetized societies. But monks, by taking their vows, are already under the obligation to teach. A patron entering into a sbyin-bdag relationship is under the obligation to give, yet the monk is not obliged to teach because of the act of receiving. It is a precondition of his sacred role. The monk, by this status, is obliged to receive without differentiating upon the quantity and quality of the gift, or the status of the patron. And he must teach regardless of the nature of his clientage.

Superficially, the laws of karma are a system of reciprocity—yet because the monks are only "appropriate vessels" for the receipt of gifts rather than agents for return reciprocity, the sbyin-bdag is something other than a system of reciprocal exchange. The interchange of land, labor, and capital in the sbyin-bdag system of Tibet is more clearly described as a system of redistribution.4

Practically speaking, however, a generous patron socially endears himself to the community, lay and clerical alike. The monasticism of Tibet, old and new, as with Spiro's Burma (1970), serves the needs of both the laity and the monks. Giving to a religious personage is a social act
as well as being religiously meritorious. Ideally, no one may be denied the benefices of the Buddhist dharma because he or she did not give, but one may be denied social acceptance by other actors. This subtle distinction between ideology and praxis seems to be recognized by Tibetans operating within the sbyin-bdag system, yet many Tibetans understandably misinterpret its application in regards to the vicissitudes of monetized, western circumstances. My informants have asked me how it is possible to give a gift to a monk (e.g. by paying "admission" to a Buddhist ritual in the West) and not feel any sense of long-term obligation to either the monk or the religious community that he represents.

Some western devotees that I have interviewed suggest that their dues, admission fees, and tuition merely go "to pay the rent," and the teachings themselves are free. Many of my Tibetan informants, however, feel the western practice of essentially charging the laity for the services of the lamas is an affront to the spirit of voluntary contribution. And the monk, by his renunciation of the world, is nevertheless obliged to teach. In the West, the long-term social relationships of the sbyin-bdag system have been abbreviated into a system of immediate exchange, which to many Tibetans seems distant, cold, and out of character with the spirit of Buddhist practice.
Accommodation within Local Practice

There are many contemporary myths circulating in Dharamsala among refugees which seem to reflect western and Tibetan differential understanding of social, as well as spiritual, commitment to Buddhist praxis. One tale that I frequently heard describes western nuns taking their ordination, then defrocking themselves after only a few months in their vocation, as if they were casually changing wardrobes from season to season. Another has mentally unbalanced westerners demanding audience with the Dalai Lama, claiming to be recognized for their "miraculous powers" as the reincarnation of some famous saint. There is probably a bit of substance to both. In the latter case, nearly all the westerners I have ever talked to had either been to see the Dalai Lama privately or were planning it. This casualness is quite disconcerting to Tibetans. Nowak cites the shame felt by one Tibetan:

"Every two-bit freak goes to ask His Holiness weird questions. And sometimes you feel bad. They would have a harder time trying to meet President Carter, but it's easy for them just to talk to His Holiness and ask questions. I don't mind if people really talk to His Holiness, but there's something important there...We try never to abuse this privilege when we see His Holiness." (1984:134-135)

Westerners visiting Dharamsala, from my observations, are not only perceived as potential patrons of free Tibet, but are brought into the system at a relatively high level in the social hierarchy. The "international contingent" of
westerners at the March 10 Commemoration who were given special seating and courtesies by the Tibetan government (Chapter 6), were to me simply a rather odd assortment of tourists and students from varying socio-economic levels. There apparently was no thought of "qualifying" these potential patrons—they represented the West to Tibetans.

As I have discussed, it is perhaps that very same accessibility and visibility that is the key to the success of the Dalai Lama on the world stage, and subsequently the Tibetan cause for national aspiration. By making himself approachable to westerners, he begins to chip away at the western myth of Shangri-la, revealing to the world the "reality" of Tibet and its people, and their rights to self-determination. And by imparting an image of humanity, he also reinforces the humanity and viability of his people—Tibetans exist in the modern world, and they wish to exist as Tibetans. This is in contrast to the accessibility of the Dalai Lama in the native context, where apparently some in the traditional social hierarchy still seek to maintain a distance between the common individual and the source of prestige and power. From one informant's experience, arranging an audience with the Dalai Lama is very difficult. The informant, in fact, asked me to arrange it for him.

The accommodation of the West into the religious patronage system of Tibet has presented few ideological
problems, following the ideal, perhaps, of the universality of Buddhist practice. Support of this nature has contributed greatly to the continuation of institutions which most Tibetans consider vital to their continuation as a people. Thus western sbyin-bdag actors have achieved a certain level of inclusiveness in the Tibetan system. On the other hand, sectarian differences continue to preserve the autonomy of particular lineages abroad and their independence from Dharamsala. Western dharma centers, from my observations, tend not to be the bastions of Tibetan resistance and nationalism. Support for these latter causes are often indirect and unintentional consequences of individual western practice by the actors themselves.

I suggest that the real impetus for the rise in Tibetan nationalism generates from the novel circumstance of outside support flowing directly to the secular diaspora. This, too, has been interpreted by many Tibetans as a sbyin-bdag action, and it has resulted in an increase in the political and economic power of the laity, rather than towards the benefit of traditional clerical institutions. Foreign aid and individual lay sponsorship have more than compensated for the decentralizing tendencies of sectarian religious interests in exile. It is on this basis that the modern Tibetan state in exile is being built.
Notes

1. While I have not fully investigated the extent of Kopan's international centers, I was interested in learning that my own home town of Missoula, Montana, now has a chapter.

2. The list compiled from the Council for Religious and Cultural Affairs Office of the Dalai Lama (1986), and my own field data includes:
   1. Nechung (State Oracle)
   2. Namgyal (Dalai Lama's personal monastery)
   3. Gaden Choeling Nunnery (ani gompa)
   4. Dep Tsechok Ling
   5. Zilnon Nagyeling (Nyingma--seat of Nagpo Rimpoché)
   6. Rinzin Namdal Ling
   7. Tashi Choeling
   8. Nyung Nei Lhakhang
   9. Buddhist School of Dialectics
  10. Thardhoe Ling
  11. Nyen Tsampa
  12. Gaden Shartse Khangsar Monastery
  13. Gaden Tsethang Rabten

3. Again, I can neither confirm nor deny this suggestion. To date, no one has been able to determine the extent of foreign financial support for these religious institutions. Nor should they, according to my informants. In the ideology of gifting, no one should discriminate or deliberate on the value of the gift. The business affairs of the monastic community are strictly private. But considering the extent of the Dharma center establishment abroad, these contributions nevertheless must be substantial vis-à-vis the local Tibetans.

4. Nechung Rinpoche once told me that all capital, once converted into religious form, can never be reconverted into a secular form. For example, once one buys a statue of some deity and has it consecrated by a lama, that object must never be sold for a profit—or, if it is sold, any capital gain must be reconverted into a sacred form as well. It is reasonable to imagine that in Tibet, the long-term consequences of this ideology was to freeze capital surplus donated by laymen within the sacred realm.
CHAPTER VIII
WESTERN PATRONAGE OF THE LAITY

Secular Sbyin-bdag

The recreation of the sbyin-bdag between devotees and their lamas in the diaspora has appeared to proceed with but few modifications from traditional practice. One innovation that appears, however, is the monetization of the gifting procedure now common between western Buddhists and the religious establishment. Conceptually, this appears to be a structural reproduction with minimal change and minimal "unintended consequences" for Tibetans. Yet by establishing a patron/client relationship with the West outside of the network of traditional religious practitioners, a radically new feature has been introduced into the system that has had significant consequences for Tibetan society. This is the agency of foreign aid, which for the first time in its history, benefits the Tibetan laity directly. Foreign aid to the secular Tibetans has had the effect of changing the differential relationships between the primary segments of traditional Tibetan society, the laity and the clergy.

The establishment of a secular sbyin-bdag relationship with the West may be overcoming the decentralizing tendencies of the traditional religious sbyin-bdag and may help explain the modernization and strengthening of the
Tibetan government along secular lines. Pan-Tibetan nationalism in exile is the beneficiary.

Power and wealth are no longer the exclusive franchise of the monks in refugee life, but may now be acquired by any lay Tibetan individual (or organization) that successfully achieves foreign sponsorship. The trend of secularization that is seen in the development of Tibetan nationalism in exile (which had its origins with the fall of Manchu patronage), may indeed be a result of the laity's access to foreign resources. In many cases, this capital has contributed to the success of individual enterprise and lay entrepreneurship.

In the attempt to reproduce the traditional structure of the sbyin-bdag, the structure of Tibetan society in exile itself has changed, as the laity now has access to a gift network that was traditionally the exclusive privilege of the monks. Most importantly, however, is that it is ideologically compatible to traditional practice--to receive in a sbyin-bdag interaction does not merit submission to the donor. One Tibetan suggest that foreign aid and international relief agencies were:

"...new concepts, new words, to us...People came seeking to provide, to give." (A Tibetan government administrator, quoted in Devoe 1987:59)

"Agencies have money to give, that they have to give..." (Tibetan government worker, quoted in Devoe 1987:59)
The only requirement to qualify, apparently, was to be Tibetan. As the monks of old Tibet qualified to be appropriate vessels for the bestowal of gifts by their vows, the Tibetan laity qualify for support by their profession of Tibetaness. Nationalism, ethnic boundary formation and secularism are thus economically and ideologically reinforced by the novel circumstances of foreign aid.

The Development of Foreign Aid

In 1959 the Dalai Lama asked for, and was granted, asylum in India. Leading members of his government and important lamas followed. However, soon after (notably the years 1959–1963), tens of thousands of ordinary Tibetans joined their leader in exile. The overwhelming majority of these people were destitute laymen. India in particular lent immediate assistance.

Emergency transit camps were initially established by the Indian Government near the border. Subsequently, plans were made to settle refugees in suitable villages, but dispersed throughout India. Nehru did not wish the Tibetans to settle en masse around the Dalai Lama, especially on the border, were they might provoke attack from China or assert themselves as a political block which could compromise India. (And to this day, the Tibetan leader is discouraged by his host from making overtly political speeches). The Indian Ministry of Rehabilitation became the primary relief agency for the Tibetan resettlement and rehabilitation
programs (under the Central Relief Committee), which distributed food, medicines, clothing, etc. The first foreign aid came by the Government of Australia (£A 10,000), followed by £ 50,000 from the British in 1961 (Richardson 1962: 236). Grunfeld estimates that the Indians spent over US $6,000,000 by 1962 (1987:189). International relief agencies, such as CARE, the International Red Cross, the YMCA, Catholic Relief, Church World Service, the International Rescue Committee, and Save the Children Fund all contributed to the Tibetan refugee problem (Grunfeld 1987:189). Later, the Swiss, U.N., and U.S. governments contributed, the latter contributing US $5,300,000 during the first ten years of exile (Grunfeld 1987:190).

Private funds from organizations abroad followed, including the Norwegian Refugee Council, Swiss Aid to Tibetans, Christian Aid (London), Tibetan Refugee Aid Society (Canada) Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, Arbeiterwohlfahrt, OXFAM, London Relief Services, etc. (Information Office 1981:97). Many of the groups were encouraged to financially adopt individual refugees.

By 1979, there were 38 formally planned settlements, with a total population of 47,472 Tibetan refugees. The major agricultural settlements own approximately one acre per person. The total agricultural acreage of the South Asian diaspora was 23,738 acres in 1979.¹ There are several industrial settlements, and sponsored handicraft centers.
The major handicraft scheme in Dharamsala is the Tibetan Handicraft Production-cum-Sale Co-operative Industrial Society Ltd, a Tibetan rug-crafting center and exporter, with 229 employees (1979 figures). By 1979, there were also 43 schools run under various relief programs in India, and seven schools in Nepal, not to mention hospitals and dispensaries. From Tibetan exile government figures, the Tibetan Children's Village in Dharamsala alone has received a total of US $4,600,000 since its inception in 1960 to 1979 (Information Office 1981). Another important source of funds for the rebuilding of Tibetan institutions in exile is the remnant of the old Tibetan treasury. In the early years of Chinese occupation, the Dalai Lama shipped part of his treasury in the form of gold and silver bullion to Sikkim. The Tibetan government, according to Grunfeld, has set the value of this deposit at US $11,000,000 (1987:189). From this fund, the Dalai Lama generously contributes to all kinds of monastic and lay development projects. This treasury represents part of the final depository of wealth at the apex of the sbyin-bdag network, enriched by centuries of gifting. It is now being transformed and redistributed as aid to Tibetan resettlement, no doubt reinforcing the Dalai Lama's other position as secular Head of State.

No one to date has ventured an estimate of the total amount of foreign and South Asian aid that has gone for the
rebuilding of the Tibetan economy in exile. This is partly due to the unknown factor of private gifts and funding which are not necessarily disclosed (as with the monastic organizations). But from my own observations of Dharamsala and other communities in the period from 1978 to 1987, the relief-based economy has gone from one which provided basic subsistence, rehabilitation and health care to one which is attempting to rebuild its entire society, including the funding of an international lobbying effort to promote the concept of Tibetan independence.

The South Asian diaspora has become a welfare state within a state—one which additionally has national aspirations. Foreign capital, being ideologically and economically compatible to traditional patterns, helps prevent the assimilation of Tibetan diasporates into their host societies.

**The Ideology of Lay Patronage**

Due perhaps to the original sacred nature of the *sbyin-bdag* relationship, being a recipient is positively, not negatively sanctioned in refugee society. Being an unassimilated refugee, not bound to the economic system of the host society, is congruent with the ideal of independence. The Dalai Lama himself has commented about his own refugee status:
"Being a refugee has been very useful. You are much closer to reality...I became a refugee. Very good. So there was a good opportunity to gain experience, and also determination and inner strength." (quoted in Avedon 1980:21)

Devoe ingeniously suggests that the refugees' concept of their status is akin to the Tibetan Buddhist notion of the "refuge" one seeks for spiritual attainment (1987:60).

I could expand upon this notion: as the monk seeks traditional refuge in the triple-gems of the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha (the sacred assembly) and thus is sanctified as an appropriate vessel for receiving gifts from patrons, the lay refugee seeks sanctuary in his special status as a landless exile and thus may honorably receive support from benefactors. As a monk has voluntarily renounced the world, the refugee layman has had his world renounced for him by Chinese occupation. In the diaspora, the pre-existent system for accommodating the donations of foreign powers to the monasteries of Tibet has been seized by lay Tibetans as well. The monastic organizations in exile have been deprived of their exclusive franchise in the process.

Secular access to this capital may have the effect of overriding the traditional tenancies towards sectarian decentralization, as the layman's primary qualification now is to be a Tibetan patriot rather than the follower of a particular monastic estate and lineage. In the long-term, the position of the Dalai Lama is strengthened, as he represents the leadership of a pan-Tibetan national
identity. The access to sbyin-bdag by commoners in exile has resulted in a certain truncation of status relationships from that of the traditional society. One example is that the Dalai Lama is more directly accessible. The laity is no longer dependent on the old structure of monastic bureaucracy.

Today's Tibetan refugees in Dharamsala have benefited from an almost cradle-to-grave welfare system initially established but still largely maintained by gifts from foreigners. Since many basic needs of Tibetans are now taken care of, the securing of additional or personal sbyin-bdags has become a means of acquiring and displaying prestige in the local community and an agency of capital acquisition funding entrepreneurial activities.

**Patronage: From Subsistence to Prestige**

The collection of dedicated, high-quality patrons and demonstrating their acquisition by showing the gifts, photos, and letters from these individual westerners in Dharamsala is an important means of achieving status in the refugee community and for procuring wealth by which one may rise above the level of the welfare state. Noting this, in some refugee-managed institutions, such as the local resident schools, gifts from individual patrons are pooled and then distributed equitably in order to "lessen jealousy among the children." Nevertheless, the impression of individual support is conveyed to the patrons.
Solicitations (channeled through the relief agencies) are made to support Child X, and Child X must send a letter to Patron Y thanking him or her for gift Z. Quite often, however, Child X never received the particular gift that was intended for him or her (according to informants).

While this practice was designed to both establish a familial bond between an absent patron and his charge and to insure an equitable distribution of gifts, some Tibetans in the community see the system as a pretext for fraud and corruption. This seems to be indicative of a general notion that the relationship between patron and client must on all accounts be of an honest and personal nature. As the relationship between old Tibet and Imperial China was couched in the language of a personal relationship between the respectful rulers of those countries, the relationship between a patron and a client in ordinary circumstances is genuinely familial—the patron becomes a part of the Tibetan family.

In pre-1950 Tibetan society, there were several kinds of mutual aid, rotating credit, or reciprocity systems. Beatrice Miller (1956) and Aziz (1978) discuss the ga-nye as an important system of reciprocity. According to Aziz, ga-nye is a network that binds households to neighborhoods to villages and other communities for mutual support. As such, it serves as 1) an action and moral system, 2) a system of recruitment, and 3) a reciprocation system.
(1978:189). It basically serves as a personalized resource system, which is very effective during various individual rites of passage. The support from the ga-nye is a measure of one's social esteem (Aziz 1978:191). The system is a good example of Mauss’ theory of reciprocal gifting and the social and moral responsibilities that are established by its recruitment.3

Ga-nye may be thought of as an important exchange system between lay individuals, as the sbyin-bdag was an important exchange system between secular and sacred divisions of society. Perhaps in exile, with the advent of foreign assistance, lay Tibetans have for the first time become recipients in the sbyin-bdag system. This is demonstrated by my informants' use of the term sbyin-bdag referring to any foreign patron in the refugee communities, the receiver in the sbyin-bdag system (cf. Ugen Gombo 1985).

Devoe considers the western lay sbyin-bdag system as a system of reciprocity, which it could be if one includes an intangible return such as merit or degree of inclusiveness within a Tibetan family—yet I suggest that it serves primarily as a redistributive network which supports both the re-established monasteries as well as the goals of Tibetan nationalism. Devoe suggests that the return of the gift is a tacit promise for a place in Shangri-la for the donor (1983:128), and for intimate participation in a colorful, exotic culture. The motivation for western relief
agencies is, of course, that they have to give, but I certainly agree that many individual donors wish to become part of Tibetan society. Both intentions are readily gratified by lay recipients.

Lay Tibetans who are recipients ideally maintain an image that they are "appropriate vessels for receiving gifts," a parallel to the ideology of the religious sbyin-bdag. Devoe suggests:

"Striving to maintain good intentions or motivations as givers even while they are on the receiving end, Tibetan refugees have earned the reputation of being extremely attractive recipients." (1983:89)

This can be accomplished by according high respect to the visiting donors, as one would a lama or aristocrat (Devoe 1983:143-144).

Becoming attractive recipients and appropriate vessels requires a certain level of Goffman-esque impression management by the refugees, including the fortification of moral codes of loyalty and the appropriateness of Tibetans to be Tibetans according to western perceptions. To be a "good" recipient is a reinforcement to maintain the label "refugee" and not assimilate into the host society. The opposition between Tibetans and South Asians is thus maintained by western agency. To be a good recipient is a reinforcement to remain Tibetan, however spurious or genuine that tradition may be in exile. To remain a refugee is to become a Tibetan patriot.
The acquisition of foreign patrons is a device for obtaining prestige in the lay refugee community in a manner that is similar to traditional ga-nye practices, yet with little tangible obligation to the donor other than a respectful attitude. It is not surprising that there is overt competition for this resource on an individual basis. As direct solicitation is considered improper, Tibetans will often tell foreigners their entire life history. They will express their wishes and desires, and speak of the hardships in their life in such a manner that it soon becomes evident that they are in fact requesting one's patronage.

As an anthropologist collecting life histories and accounts of daily life, I naturally had many occasions wherein the "interview" I thought I had been collecting was in fact a patronage solicitation. This practice seems especially conspicuous among the younger Tibetan refugees. With their basic needs for food, shelter, education, and medical care largely provided by the institutionalized relief organizations managed by the Tibetan government, the securing of additional, individual patrons is a means to acquire additional material comfort, career advancement, or enhanced standing in the community. At times, the competition for securing patrons of this nature seemed to be a game of status competition among young Tibetans:
Ribong Karpo worked hard at his family's restaurant in McLeod Ganj (the lay Tibetan village in Dharamsala). It was not the most popular cafe as far as westerners were concerned—the menu was limited to a few noodle and rice dishes, whereas more successful restaurants baked the usual cakes, pies, and donuts which seem to be indispensable for attracting foreigners. Ribong was a frustrated youth of 25 years—highly educated, fluent in English, Hindi, Nepali, and Tibetan. Yet Ribong felt chained to the tasks of running his marginal family enterprise. As eldest son, he was responsible not only for the restaurant, but the education and well-being of his five siblings, mother, and sickly father. Ribong worked from sunrise to about 10 pm—drawing water, preparing the stoves, buying provisions, waiting on tables, and generally assuring the efficient management of the establishment. Ribong occasionally would have a day off, perhaps once a month. On those occasions he would often visit the family lama.

Ribong had a valuable linguistic gift—yet there were few possibilities of advancement in Dharamsala. The Tibetan civil service did not pay enough to maintain his familial responsibilities, and the family capital was too heavily involved in the restaurant to afford ventures in other entrepreneurial activities.
Ribong had secured a German couple as sbyin-bdag as a few years back, but once they returned to their homeland, he never heard from them again. He was bitter from this experience, and by the fact that his father never gave him any spending money or suitable clothes. Ribong confided in me that his wish was to move to Tibet for a few years, and work as a tour guide. His English was flawless, and I perceived that he was wasting his talents in McLeod Ganj. He was planning on leaving his Cinderella life for greater opportunities in Tibet in the spring of 1987, and asked me to go with him as a "protector."

To secure permission from his family, Ribong told his parents that I would be sbyin-bdag and would insure both his financial and physical security. Foreigners, it seems, were considered ideal travelling companions in occupied Tibet, for it was felt that the Chinese would not attempt to use overt pressure to attempt to repatronize visiting Tibetan refugees if they were in the company of foreign guests. I was not informed of Ribong's assurances to his family, but Ribong did become my primary informant throughout much of my work in India, Nepal, and Tibet. Ribong went on to become a very successful tour guide in Lhasa (his story continues).

Ribong was not a quisling, he felt, for serving as a tour guide to tourists in Tibet could be an opportunity in which to relate the native story of the Tibetan occupation,
and thus countering perceived Chinese propaganda in the tourist establishment. This was a novel, patriotic act for him.

This is a particular example of a patron/client relationship having been established through generally honest communication and by worthy intent. It is in contrast to the following story of the attempted establishment of patronage by yet another young Tibetan man:

Cheema Singge, 24, was also a long-time McLeod Ganj resident. He spoke English well and was especially adept in the use of the American idiom. He was something of a womanizer, and especially liked hanging around the local disco-bar. He did not appear to have any sort of regular job, yet would often give the impression of working at the bar whenever westerners would enter. He would jockey the tapes of bootlegged disco tunes, and "buy" beers for his guests, saying that it was "on the house."

Cheema spoke of his late wife, who had died in childbirth. This had left him responsible for his infant son and his aged mother who lived in a poor part of McLeod Ganj. I was told of his bicycle accident in Delhi, when he was run over by a truck. I was shown letters vouching for Cheema's character from his former sponsors.

Over several weeks of daily meetings lasting several hours each, Cheema told a story of his successes as well as
missed opportunities as a loyal Tibetan. His family, it was said, were formerly high officials in the court of the Panchen Lama of Tashilumpo. His father, a colonel in the Tibetan army, had been a personal bodyguard for this high lama. Cheema said his uncle lived near the Kumbum Monastery in Amdo (Qinghai provence), and was still highly connected with the Panchen Lama living in Beijing.

If I went to Kumbum with him, Cheema said that his uncle would take him to the Panchen Rinpoche. Not only would this action help renew family ties, but the high lama, in his capacity as an official for the PRC, may be able to compensate Cheema's family for the confiscation of their estates in 1959. I was needed for "security" from the Chinese--a common assumption in Dharamsala was that no Tibetan traveling with westerners were ever impeded or harmed. In accordance with my new role, I was given the nickname "Chuck Norris."

Cheema showed me a picture of his infant son dressed in maroon and yellow robes of a monk. He said that he thought his son to be the incarnation of a recently deceased high lama, and that he needed the discovery by no less than the personage of the Panchen Rinpoche to verify his suspicions.

I had little reason to doubt him--several high lamas had passed away in recent years, and speculation was rife in the Dharamsala community as to the identity of their
reincarnates. When I told him that he could travel with Ribong and I to Lhasa in the spring, Cheema was overjoyed. He ran out of my room and returned quickly with a kha-btags for me, allegedly from his mother.

It was not until we had arrived safely in Kathmandu, in transit to Tibet, that I learned that the entire story had been a fabrication. Old friends in Kathmandu knew Cheema well—I had been misguided by Cheema in order to secure safe passage to Tibet. Cheema was an outcast from official refugee society. As such, he could not hold a job, nor could he travel abroad as an official stateless refugee, being in bad stead with the exile government. He had given me a standard sbyin-bdag "sales-pitch" to entice me to take him under my wing. He thought he could make a new life in Lhasa, where no one from the refugee community would know of his rather notorious reputation. As astonishing as his story might seem, it is typical of many bona fide refugee life histories, and I had no cause to seek verification in Dharamsala.

Long before the fabrication was disclosed, Cheema and Ribong not only competed to show me gratitude (buying little gifts, running errands, teaching me Tibetan, demonstrating respect and loyalty), but would often emphasize the merits of their particular hardships to the decrease of the other's. Only over a long period of time did I develop an appreciation for the relative truth of
these two stories. It is important now to examine how westerners are perceived in Dharamsala.

**Westerners in Dharamsala**

The separateness of Dharamsala and its environs from association with India is evident culturally as well as politically. What Nehru feared has become a reality (see Mitter 1964). Although Tibetans are settled throughout India and Nepal, Dharamsala has very much become an autonomous capital of a stateless Tibet. The Indian government has given *de facto* recognition to the exile government by essentially leaving it alone.

One India writer states that McLeod Ganj is an unusual attraction for Indian visitors because of the overwhelming presence of Tibetan refugees and westerners (Shekhawat 1985). The popular misconception of Tibetans as a xenophobic, closed society is evidenced in Shekhawat's perceptions. Specifically, he fears that exposure of Tibetans to western influence will adversely affect the stated goals of the Tibetan refugees for the reproduction and continuation of traditional cultural patterns in exile (Shekhawat 1985:17). I have been suggesting the opposite.

Tibetan culture is seen by Shekhawat as a delicate system especially susceptible to change from the outside. In Mcleod Ganj, the agents of change from this point of view are, in addition, not particularly desirable:
"McLeod Ganj is so full of young Westerners that one becomes curious about them. Goa and Manali, the two big junctions of the hippie trail are comparable."
(Shekhawat 1985:17)

While this particular example of Indian scholarship is a rather simplified stereotyping of westerners living among the Tibetans, it nevertheless seems representative of the attitude of some other South Asian social scientists and observers of the situation in Dharamsala. The general sentiment seems to be that Tibetan society was long insulated from the outside world, refugee society faces extreme danger from over-exposure to western influence. One Indian sociologist told me, perhaps in demonstrating her impressions of Tibetans as traditionally xenophobic, that Tibetan refugees were quite secretive and not cooperative for interviews, surveys, etc. A Nepali official told me, with a certain relief, that some Tibetans there seem to be finally assimilating.

It is quite evident that the combination of Tibetans and westerners living in the village of Mcleod Ganj is a curiosity to many Indians. I observed on various occasions Indian tourists not only photographing Tibetan refugees, but even asking westerners to pose. Since the Tibetans are exotic to many Indians, one would could suppose that the westerners that chose to be with them are similarly exotic and counter-culture:
"...the young Germans [in Dharamsala] are also more keen to get out of their country. They are more critical of their own society and have a lesser sense of belonging. It comes as no surprise that in Germany itself there are quite a few counter-culture and alternative groups. The French with a need to express themselves in their own language tend to stick to their own tribe. They appear to be more conscious of their looks and like to dress up ethnic." (Shekhawat 1985:17)

Stereotyping aside, one problem with this perception of the impact of the West upon life in the Dharamsala area is a matter of numbers. Even in 1978, when the drifter tourist circuit in South Asia led young "hippies" from Kathmandu, Goa, and Varanasi in the winter to Kashmir, Manali, and other hill regions in the summer, Dharamsala could hardly have been the type of expatriate mecca as some have written. In fact, during the pleasant spring months in the Dharamsala of 1978, there were fewer than a dozen westerners in Dharamsala at any given time, most of whom were long-term residents. This figure included one rug merchant, two anthropologists, two professional thang-ka painters, a nurse, and a western Tibetan nun--expatriates perhaps, but not exactly what comes to mind when one thinks of drifter-tourists.

In 1987, while the total number of westerners in Dharamsala seems to have increased over 1978, my typology of these visitors does not appear to have changed appreciably according to my observations. During the period from January 7 to February 4, 1987, I managed to survey every westerner visitor to Dharamsala and interview most of them.
There were only 46 westerners that had passed through town during this period. On one day there were only four of us in McLeod. On the basis of these interviews and my own classification, the following suggests their purposes for being in Dharamsala:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper budget tourism</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low budget tourism (&quot;hanging out&quot;)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion/language students</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholars/researchers</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional artists</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical treatment</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Almost 40% of this population (teachers, students, scholars, and artists) were relatively long-term residents of Dharamsala (six-month visas) and had the opportunity (and motivation) for intensive contact with Tibetans. Again, this is not the sort of population mix or numbers one might associate with either mass tourism or expatriate drifter communities (see Cohen 1976). Unlike the situation found in many lower budget tourist communities such as Kathmandu or Goa, these westerners did not form a self-support network. Aside from the weekly Sunday "swap-meet" at the edge of town, westerners seldom engaged in any sort of cooperative
ventures among themselves. There were no community bulletin boards, organized brokerage for transportation, medical services, or tourist advice available. Interactions were vectored between westerner and Tibetan refugee.

The drifter population appears to increase during the summer months, as the hills of the Kangra district bring welcome relief from the sweltering plains of India. The exact magnitude of this seasonal increase is only estimated. Based on the hotel capacity of McLeod Ganj, this amounts to only a maximum of a few hundred western visitors on any given day.

In any case, and with seasonal fluctuations taken into consideration, the total numbers of westerner visitors to the Dharamsala region is quite small compared with larger tourist centers such as Kathmandu, Kashmir, or Goa. Significantly, a large percentage of these visitors to McLeod are not tourists but students of Tibetan Buddhism, scholars, aid-project volunteers, journalists, or businessmen. Appropriately, this latter group of western residents in Dharamsala tend to demonstrate an interest in Tibetan cultural survival. This behavior of this selected sample is often interpreted by the Tibetans as a fact of world-wide support for their maintenance and nationalistic goals.

As I had mentioned in Chapter 6, westerners had not been given "official" status for the March 10 Commemoration
prior to the event in 1987. That would have violated a cardinal precept of the sbyin-bdag status: one does not solicit gifts. The Tibetans simply had to wait for westerners to ask if they might participate officially. When they did in 1987, the adulation was universal among the refugee community.

The major western accommodation in 1987 was that westerners were officially accorded position in the March 10 festivities. Inquiring the day before, an American attorney secured permission from the Tibetan Security Office for the participation of all the westerners in McLeod Ganj for the event, about 50. While we stayed up much of the night painting "Free Tibet" slogans on placards, Tibetan officials notified the press and roped off a special area on the lawn of the Central Cathedral for us. We seemed to have been accorded the same rank and privileges on this particular March 10 as would have been accorded a foreign diplomatic delegation to pre-1950 Tibet. Old Tibetan men and women bowed with hands folded as we passed in procession on the hot march down to Dharamsala. In contrast, a few Indian spectators along the route laughed at our apparent trumpery. Whether we were simply tourists or otherwise, we nevertheless represented the "friendly West" to both official and everyday Tibetans.

But western influence upon the Tibetan community is vectored not as much through the physical presence of
western tourists in the area as in the interaction between the West and the Tibetan refugee establishment through the infra-structure of relief organizations, Buddhist centers, import/export concerns, and government-in-exile offices throughout the diaspora. Yet westerners in Dharamsala do provide a pool of potential individual donors for lay refugees--representative of some undifferentiated and assumed supportive West (Klieger 1987).

Tibetans of Dharamsala are quick to capitalize upon this idea, and to present to the Indian government the impression of boundless western support. Most western visitors to Dharamsala will be considered potential sbyin-bdag for some Tibetan enterprise or individual. Due no doubt to the decades of nearly total support that often unseen western agency has provided for the Tibetan resettlement, little differentiation is made between westerners who are proven patrons and those who have just "gotten off the bus." Generosity of one westerner is perceived as generosity of all westerners. Hospitality, affection, and attention is often freely given to all comers.

A Case of Sbyin-bdag Chicanery

The establishment of the bond between a potential patron and a potential client is a process of interpreting the relative merits of the case presented by the intended recipient and the potential altruism presented by the
anticipated sponsor. One might imagine that over nearly 30 successful years of establishing and maintaining foreign support that the pattern of presenting oneself to the outside world would be common knowledge in the Tibetan communities. Secondly, it might also be conventional knowledge that westerners as a whole can provide boundless support for all sorts of individual and collective Tibetan enterprises. Certain stereotyping of the unquestioning altruism of westerners and the honesty and appreciation of Tibetan refugees has occurred. On another occasion, this stereotyping further demonstrated the potential for fraud in patronage solicitation:

The great stupa at Bodhanath in Kathmandu is a convergence point for large numbers of Tibetan pilgrims and vendors and western tourists. One afternoon in Bodhanath, Ribong and I had been buying provisions for the trip to Lhasa in the bazaar which surrounds the stupa. A young Tibetan man approached me, and explained in English that he was collecting contributions for the Tibetan refugee settlement at Solo Khumbu. Despite the fact I was with another Tibetan, he did not anticipate that I would have been well-informed on the subject of refugee aid. The conversation continued:

me: "That's odd...the officials at Gaden Khangshar [Tibet Office in Kathmandu] tell me that the Solo Khumbu settlement is to be discontinued."
solicitor: "Well, it is associated with a monastery at Dharamsala [opens a ledger book with signatures and amounts]. Here is a book of western donors to this project."

me: "Which monastery?"

solicitor: "The S.O.S. [Save the Children] office in association with His Holiness in Dharamsala."

me: [knowing that there is no S.O.S. office in Dharamsala] "But which monastery?"

solicitor: "A Nyingma monastery."

me: "Yes, but which one?"

solicitor: "You know, the one by the Tibetan Library—the small monastery next to it."

me: "Oh, Nechung Gompa—but that's not Nyingma! There's only Zilnon [in Dharamsala]."

solicitor: "Yes!—that one!"

me: "But they don't have a program such as that. I'm sorry, I'm not really interested."

Ribong had a look of shock and pain as the solicitor walked off to find an easier target. A few months later, after returning to Kathmandu from Tibet, I was again solicited by the same man. After the first few moments of his now-familiar dialogue, the man recognized me and ran away.

**Maintaining an Opposition with Host Society**

Whereas some Indian scholars have felt certain barriers between themselves and Tibetans, some western researchers working among Tibetan refugees often note characteristics of openness, understanding, and acceptance by the same Tibetan people (see Devoe 1983; Nowak 1984; Gold 1984). It is tempting to suggest that while strong ethnic barriers have
been formed between the immediate hosts (Indians and Nepalis) and the refugees, the boundaries between westerners and Tibetans seems much less defined. There is, in fact, the long-enduring sbyin-bdag category for accommodation of foreign supporters within Tibetan society which naturally should include Indians and Nepalis. However, the threat of assimilation into the host society is of greatest concern to Tibetan refugees, and it is reasonable to suggest that boundaries must be maintained—economically, socially, and politically. Perhaps a distant patron is more desirable than a near one, due to this threat of assimilation. (A jovial, wealthy uncle may be preferable to a demanding, yet similarly wealthy father). This has been seen in the Manchu-Tibetan patronage system. As long as the Manchus were far away in Beijing or Mukden, the Tibetans could maintain de facto independence. The stationing of Chinese, however, within Tibet at various historical periods was never well-received.

One of the greatest successes in the refugee movement in the Dharamsala region is that the Tibetan do not tend to compete directly with the local Indians for jobs, aid, or in the marketplace. This appears to be a policy established early-on by the Dalai Lama (Goldstein 1978), and helps allow the Tibetans to live as Tibetans in exile.

According to the perceptions of my Tibetan friends (and one Nepalese government official that I interviewed), the
policy of both the Indian and Nepalese governments is directed towards the eventual assimilation of the Tibetan minority group into a pluralistic Indian or Nepalese national consciousness. The refugees of Bhutan, at the extreme, have been forced to apply for citizenship or face deportation (Information Office 1981). Western supporters, on the other hand, are viewed as supporting the separateness of Tibetan society and culture and even their nationalistic goals. As yesterday's Tibetans did not assimilate into foreign cultural patterns under Mongol or Manchu patronage, there is little concern among many of today's Tibetans that the modern patron of Tibet, the West, will have deleterious effects on the maintenance of Tibetan culture in exile. If anything, the opposite is true: Lamaism spread to Mongolia and Manchuria with the establishment of patronage. In the modern era, Tibetan Buddhism has spread to the West. Tibetans did not become Mongols or Manchus, and Tibetans will not become westerners.

The sbyin-bdag system can accommodate foreigners within the outer limits of Tibetan identity by assigning a place for these patrons within a redefined traditional Tibetan system. Although Indian and Nepali patronage is graciously acknowledged, it is not received in exchange for assimilation. The "Tibetan question" is a matter for the world to decide, not India, Nepal, or China, according to my informants.
Notes


2. Some representative examples: 1) The Tibetan Women's Cooperative Association, which later became the major Tibetan handicraft center in Dharamsala—started with Rs 14,258 from the Dalai Lama. 2) Loan to the Tibetan Refugee Self-help Handicraft Society, Simla—Rs 60,000. 3) Loan to Tibetan Refugee Handicraft Centre: Phuntsokling (H.P.)—Rs 150,000. 4) donation to Tibetan Industrial Rehabilitation Society. 5) Donations, share capital and loans to Norgyeling Tibetan Refugee Settlement, Bhandara—Rs 92,745. 6) Share capital investment with Tibetan Refugee Settlement, Jawalakhel, Nepal—Rs 50,000. 7) Land and Rs 15,000 for Tibetan Welfare Delek Hospital, Dharamsala (Information Office 1981).

3. Traditional Tibetan society also had the *kidu*, a capital pool from which members contributed from time to time. The association would then sponsor corporate events, such as donations to monasteries, funeral rites, etc. Laymen as well as monks had their *kidu* (see Richardson 1986).

4. The Tibetan terms for "white" (*dkar-po*) and "black" (*nag-po*), as in English, carry the connotations of "good" and "bad."

5. "Dharamsala" in this popular context refers to the Tibetan village of McLeod Ganj as well as the entire Tibetan community of the Dharamsala region. "Dharamsala" here is not meant to be used in reference to the Indian city that is the seat of the Kangra District of Himachal Pradesh.

6. I delimit "upper-budget" from "lower-budget" tourists on the basis of the former insisting on western amenities in their accommodations, such as hot water, private baths, etc. These facilities tend to be very expensive, relatively, in Dharamsala where the water supply and sanitation is minimal.

7. In this matter, one Tibetan hotel manager gave me an ingenious estimate on the basis of her "chocolate cake ratio." As one cake is consumed per day by westerners in her restaurant during the winter/spring months, seven cakes a day are consumed in the summer. If there were 46 westerners in town on a typical period during the off-season, she reckons, there would be seven times that number, or 322, in the summer!
CHAPTER IX
PATRONAGE AND ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITY

Surplus and Prestige

Due to the perceived goals of the South Asian host governments towards assimilation, Tibetan diaspora communities often attempt to circumvent the host system of refugee aid and craft export trade and deal directly with the West whenever possible. Not only does this practice facilitate Tibetan control over their own economy, but it also can help reinforce notions of Tibetan separateness, nationality, and "independence."

Acquiring a foreign patron is not only a matter of prestige within the community, but it can also be a source of investment capital in an otherwise marginal, landless economy. Individual entrepreneurial activity can be stimulated by these acquisitions. Direct access to foreign capital can be procured on an individual basis, without much bureaucratic redistribution by South Asian or even Tibetan relief and self-help programs.

Perhaps a good example of how foreign assistance has moved from a subsistence level to a surplus by 1987 in Dharamsala, can be seen in the comparison of patronage solicitations that I received in 1978 in contrast to 1987. Solicitations in 1978 seemed to have been generated by those individuals who had 1) not quite matriculated into the
institutionalized support network, 2) not qualified for one reason or another, or 3) been refused because their simply was not enough resources to support everyone in the community. One request that I received was from a poor waitress in a tourist hotel who had to support her destitute parents living in the South of India. Another was from a mendicant "monk" who was not supported by any monastery. In addition, it was still a common practice in 1978 for monastic monks to go out searching for alms from westerners in Theravada style, a practice which I never saw in the Dharamsala of 1987. In 1978, a young layman, frustrated with the meager support received from his settlement's relief organization, only circuitously asked for a bit of assistance from me, and only after a rather long association.

Happily by 1987, solicitations had taken on a decidedly non-subsistence nature. Among the requests that I received from the people that I worked with were:

--fashionable clothes from Singapore and Hong Kong
--Nike tennis shoes
--cassette player, tapes
--send friend to accounting school
--buy coffee table book on Chinese porcelain
--bring Atari video games
--bring movie videotapes
--send Bluegrass or country & western tapes
--sponsor son into the U.S.
--request to marry American woman for U.S. resident status

Furthermore in 1987, I saw practically no destitute Tibetan laymen beggars or mendicant monks, although I did encounter
a few mendicant nuns. Refugee aid had been successful in providing the basics for the Tibetan refugees in the community. Now the lay sbyin-bdag system seemed more akin to the "spirit of capitalism" and its motivation for the upward mobility of individuals seeking to rise above the welfare society.

I support my own concept of metamorphosis from potential subsistence donor in 1978 to "cargo" provisionist by 1987 with my observations of bulletin board advertising changes during this period. In 1978, there were many solicitations posted in English at tea houses and restaurants in Dharamsala--monks X needs support...such-and-such relief agency needs funds...family Z is poor and destitute... The only solicitations of this nature I found in 1987 were 1) the Yong Ling Creche and Kindergarten needs funds, and 2) the Tibetan Drama Centre requires US $65,000 to rebuild after a disastrous fire. The bulletin boards more often noted that "a little girl needs English lessons in exchange for Tibetan lessons," and a Spanish lady "does laundry for Rs 4--pants, Rs 2-shirts, Rs 1-socks, extra Rs 2 if something disgusting." Also offered were video cassettes of a movie about the Dalai Lama, and a meditation course at the re-established Sakya monastery.

The following life histories are perhaps typical of the younger generation of Dharamsala refugees in 1987. It is two householders' attempts to satisfy the economic needs of
their families and reach beyond the almoner's rations—and doing so while remaining loyal to the Dalai Lama and his policy which discourages permanent settlement in the host country.

Dawa Ngonpo, the Traveling Salesman

I had first met Dawa in Dharamsala in 1978. He was a rather scruffy boy of 20 at the time, and lived with his family in the village of Kamrao in the Sirmur district of Himachal Pradesh. Dawa was born in Lhasa and had been brought to India with his family during the 1959 Tibetan uprising. He had received the equivalent of a high school education, and had remained associated with the relief agency of the self-help rehabilitation program at Kamrao. The project, under the Tibetan Industrial Rehabilitation Society, was designed to rehabilitate approximately 4,000 refugees, mostly in light industries and crafts. The region has been settled with Tibetans working in the limestone quarries, in rug weaving, and agriculture.

After his seasonal chores at the Handicraft center at Kamrao were done, Dawa was fond of idling in McLeod Ganj and making western friends. His goal, as with so many others of his generation, was to secure an individual western sponsor who might provide direct support over and above the subsistence-level institutional aid he received. Dawa spoke English and had additional skills from his experience in the rug cottage industry.
In 1978 I initially secured Dawa as my Tibetan teacher. As poor as he was, however, he never directly solicited me for long-term patronage. Rather, such a relationship was implied within the bonds of friendship and inclusiveness. In addition to periodic Tibetan lessons, Dawa would frequently bring me sol-ja (Tibetan butter tea), chang (beer), or present me with kha-btags, symbolic scarves of friendship. No cash payment was ever requested. No money was ever exchanged for Dawa's services because it was expected that I would later provide some other beneficial scheme for Dawa's benefit.

After establishing the Central Asian Carpet Company in late 1978, I hired Dawa to be an Indian-based buyer and shipper of Tibetan rugs and other handicrafts for my enterprise in Hawaii. Dawa bought rugs from Dharamsala-area weavers or would supervise the production of custom designs that I would send him. In addition, he often sent me art work or other particularly rare and interesting objects of Tibetan craftsmanship.

During the two years that he was in my hire, Dawa learned a bit of western taste and marketing demand, as well as the procedure for exporting and shipping from India to the United States as an independent agent. This experience probably provided him with a basis for his own entrepreneurial activity as a private merchant of Tibetan arts and crafts.
Eventually I lost track of Dawa in India. Six years later, however, while walking in the main bazaar of Lhasa, Dawa and I were reunited. From that chance meeting until the time I left Lhasa two months later, Dawa showered me with most considerate hospitality and valuable gifts of turquoise and silver. I was apparently a returning sbyin-bdag, the foundation patron for his initial entrepreneurial activity, and Dawa felt an obligation to honor me in the traditional manner. He was now a wealthy petty merchant, boasting that he had NRs 40,000 (US $2,000) in the bank.

Dawa's occupation now takes him on a regular, seasonal circuit from the Dharamsala area to Kathmandu (where he has a wife), to Lhasa, and back to Dharamsala. On his trip in the spring of 1987, Dawa had brought Kathmandu-produced copper bracelets and rings of Tibetan design to Lhasa to sell in the bazaar. Tourism in Lhasa in 1987 had not yet produced a substantial souvenir industry of its own, although apparently the demand was high. Consequently, trinkets had to be imported from Nepal but were offered as "authentic" Tibetan craftwork in the Lhasa bazaar.

To help market his goods as indigenous products, Dawa cleverly hired local Khampa tribeswomen to serve as walking jewelry stores. The women, bedecked from head to toe with strands of synthetic turquoise, Nepali copper and silver brackets, rings, earrings, and other ornaments, would
stroll through the market and approach their prospective western customers with English chants of "This... how much?"
The image that was created suggested that these women were selling their precious heirlooms, reinforced by the rote "Chinese are bad and we need money."

The conversion of high-quality material goods to cash had been the case in Tibet during the Cultural Revolution and in South Asia during the initial years of exile. I could still find valuable artifacts in Dharamsala in 1978. Dawa's scheme in Lhasa merely capitalized on the expectations of westerners trying to find a bargain in an apparently distressed market. In fact, souvenirs had replaced heirlooms in Lhasa tourist shops in 1987, as they had in Dharamsala by the late 1970s. These items are inventions of tradition for western consumption.

With the proceeds from his souvenir business, Dawa would purchase authentic jewelry from Khampa pilgrims, old and valuable carpets, pieces of Chinese porcelain, and ancient paintings which could, with perseverance, still be found in Tibet. This merchandise would be taken to Kathmandu in the fall after the Tibetan tourist season was over, to be sold in pricey boutiques in that town or exported to Hong Kong. (The main tourist season in Nepal is in the fall and winter months). Dawa would return to Dharamsala in early spring to help in the co-op rug business, and then begin the circuit again.
Dawa told me that this sort of activity was not only traditional for Tibetan traders, but was expedited by the fact that he could travel freely as a refugee through India, Nepal, and the T.A.R. His refugee status was an asset for both his occupational activity and towards his identity as a Tibetan. At our parting in Lhasa, Dawa, in recognizing the continuing relationship of patron/client, wrote up a "wish-list" of items he wanted me to send him from the USA--most of which have been previously mentioned.

**Karma Tashi, the Rug Merchant**

Another of my long-term informants is Karma Tashi of Dharamsala, a man in his mid-thirties. I had met Karma through business correspondence, as I was buying rugs and he was the manager of a large, Tibetan government-sponsored handicraft production and export center in Delhi. Like most civil servants in exile, Karma's salary was very low (civil servants start at Rs 400 per month--US $33.33) and he had a young wife and sons to support in the city. Karma's foreign patrons, a wealthy couple from California, however, had supported his education--including Karma's MA degree in economics.

Eventually, Karma managed to secure enough investment capital to hire weavers, build looms, and start a rug business of his own in the early 1980s back in Dharamsala. Karma experimented with new weaving techniques, such as using natural dyes rather than the more usual bright,
synthetic colors. He increased the usual knot density from 48 per square inch to 100. This had the effect of generally increasing the quality of his rugs. In addition, he was particular about the quality and execution of traditional designs. Dismayed at what he perceived as a gradual degeneration of traditional designs in the attempt to suit western taste, Karma would suggest that above all, Tibetan rugs should be look Tibetan:

"Dragons should look like dragons—not snakes; snow lions should be snow lions—not puppies; phoenixes—not parrots!"

Karma was upset that the heraldic emblem of Tibet would be thought of as the puppy in the West.

The success of Karma's entrepreneurial activity was evident. He had just built a new house in Dharamsala, with two bedrooms and enclosed bath. He had hired a local Pahari woman as general servant. The kitchen was well stocked with a butane stove and plenty of utensils. His living room possessed a stereo and a television set. He was planning to buy a motorcycle. Recently his patrons had sent Karma and his wife on a first-class tour of New Zealand.

When I left Karma in Dharamsala, he asked me to photograph his family in front of his new house and forward it on to his patrons, to "let them know what their gifts have prompted me to do for myself." Karma was considered a success in the community, for he had managed to focus his desire for financial achievement upon an activity which
brings a product of Tibetan culture to the outside—a product whose design has been carefully negotiated between the native interpretation of "traditional" and the expectations of a world market. He is a patriot.

**Tibetan Refugee Handicrafts**

Karma's success is an example of private support as well as individual initiative to succeed in the rug business. In contrast to private enterprise, the Tibetan government-in-exile has helped support several large handicraft centers around Dharamsala, including the THPCSCISL in McLeod Ganj, The Handicraft Society at Simla, and The Tibetan Industrial Rehabilitation Centres in Bir, Tashi Jong, Kamrao, and Bhuppur (Information Office 1981). The Tibetan government itself, under the Economic Office, maintains an export and retail marketing center in McLeod Ganj and New Delhi, under His Holiness' Charitable Trust. Tibet House in Delhi is also an outlet in association with the exile government. Many of these centers, and others, were initially supported and maintained by foreign aid.

The total share of the Tibetan contribution to India's rug exports is significant. In 1981, Tibetan government-sponsored centers were producing approximately 360,000 square feet per annum. At the going rate of Rs 44 to 51 per square foot, the total value was Rs. 17,390,000 (US $2,173,750). Private centers and individual weavers account for an additional 18-20,000 square feet (Klieger and Sangha
1983). This 380,000 square feet represent 5.4% of the total Indian rug exports to the U.S. Tibetan rugs account for 2.13% of the total rug footage imported into the U.S. from the six largest rug exporting nations in 1982 (Klieger and Sangha 1983).

Recent figures of Tibetan rug production in Nepal are even more impressive. In 1986, the handicraft centers produced 807,000 square feet of Tibetan carpets (Kelly 1986:16)—a top export and source of foreign capital for that developing country. In a government sponsored travel brochure, however, the "Tibetan" rug has been transformed into a "Nepali" product:

"...the wool used in Nepalese carpets is hand-spun..."

"One of the most popular items among tourists for which Nepal is renowned--the carpet." (Nepal Traveller 1986:42)

Nepal did not produce carpets prior to the arrival of Tibetan refugees, nor are present designs or techniques anything other than Tibetan. Nepal has apparently nationalized what is essentially a Tibetan refugee enterprise. Tibetans insist, however, that these rugs are "Tibetan" by virtue of either being made by Tibetans or traditional by technique or design. Most rugs made in South Asia carry the label "Made in India (or Nepal as required by import/export law) by Tibetan Refugees."

Tibetan rugs are nearly an ideal product for refugee enterprise, as 1) they provide an internationally marketable
product that is relatively non-competitive with the host economy, 2) they are a source of direct foreign exchange, and 3) they are marketed whenever possible as a "Tibetan" product. The latter, symbolic value of the Tibetan rug cannot be underestimated. Tibetan rugs are unmistakable, vis-à-vis Persian, Turkish, or even Chinese rugs. This distinctiveness is an asset not only for differentiating rugs in the western retail market by potential buyers, but concomitant with the message that "Tibetans still exist" and that their products, and people, are different from Indian and Chinese varieties. This factor is suggested in Karma's statement that Tibetan rugs must "look Tibetan."

Tibetan rugs provide not only a direct, productive link beyond the sbyin-bdag welfare system, but can communicate the message of Tibetan nationalism as well. From my own experience in marketing these rugs in the West, I suggest that in order to sell a Tibetan rug, one often has to reinforce the image of the "barbaric splendor of Shangri-la" in order to secure the sale. One often has to promote Tibet in order to sell the products of its people in the West. Distinctiveness in design and technique of such products conveys the message of the separateness of Tibet from other Asian cultures, and thus fortifies nationalistic oppositions.

Rug weaving is not a refugee innovation, yet foreign merchandising is. Most Tibetans that I have dealt with
prefer to utilize what they consider traditional designs. Yet over the years, there has been a perceptible fusion of horizons. Many rugs made in 1987 contain motifs that seem to suggest what westerners believe to be typically Tibetan features. Yaks, pictorial scenes of the Potala or a nomadic camp, were to my knowledge never utilized traditionally. Perhaps the most telling example of this change in response to perceived market demands is the weaving of the English world "Tibet" on some of the smaller rugs—an instantaneous and unambiguous communication to the West of the existence of their country.

Metal-working, embroidery, boot-making, wood carving, and other crafts have all survived in Dharamsala, but many of these lesser artifacts have indeed "degenerated" into what some would call souvenirs (see Smith 1982; Linnekin 1982; Cohen 1982). While Tibetans still use carpets in the home, mostly as sleeping mats, these other objects seem to be made strictly for tourist consumption—I never saw these objects in Tibetan homes in Dharamsala.

The village of McLeod Ganj, with a population of only a few thousand, and relatively light tourism, had 34 souvenir shops by 1987 (see Fig. 3). Cheaply made cotton shirts are available which vaguely look like authentic clothing (including the colors maroon and yellow, the traditional monastic prerogative). Strange black vests with Bhutanese cloth trim, broad-loomed bags with "Tibet" across the top,
beads, Tibetan flag pins made in Japan and decals, Tibetan incense, a few books from the popular western press on Tibet, little cloth dolls with Tibetan features and apparel, machine-knitted sweaters, Dalai Lama photos, candles, matches, biscuits, Nescafé—these are some of the items stocked in these stores.

In 1978, on the other hand, I found good turquoise and coral jewelry, old silk chupa (National dress), offering cups, human femur trumpets, fox-fur hats—material that had been made most likely in Tibet prior to the diaspora. These were all gone, replaced by inexpensive souvenirs.

The fine arts, such as religious statuary and thang-ka painting, have not been modified for mass consumption, as they have, for example, in certain areas in Kathmandu.3 These items are rarely for sale in the Dharamsala shops, however, due to the prohibitions of profiting from the sale of religious icons, according to my informants. One must seek out a painter or sculptor and commission the work. One thang-ka painter that I knew was occupied with commissions for the next two years. Much of his business is providing paintings for the monastery building-boom and the government-in-exile.

In 1978 there were just three small hotels for westerners in McLeod Ganj. In 1987, there are nine (see Fig. 3.), including the large, monolithic Hotel Tibet run by the Finance Office of the Tibetan government-in-exile. The
Government of India's Tourist Ministry has built a large, deluxe hotel near the Dalai Lama's Palace. Most westerners seem to prefer the smaller, Tibetan-style inns that also accommodate Tibetan pilgrims to Dharamsala. One of these smaller hotels is run by a young Tibetan couple. It is their practice to staff the inn with disadvantaged Indian children from poor families in Bihar. These children were well fed and clothed, and seemed very happy to be there—they especially liked getting tips from westerners with which they bought toys. (One little girl, in fact, threw quite a tantrum when she had to go back home).

The couple suggested to me that since they have had good fortune, it would now be meritorious for them to help Indians not as blessed. One of the greatest contrasts that I saw between 1978 and 1987 was the change in personnel occupying the more menial jobs. In 1978, Tibetans were building roads and working in heavy construction—in 1987, local Indian men and women had replaced them. Hotel and restaurant servants in 1978 were Tibetan—in 1987, many were Indian—most notably at the Tibetan government-in-exile sponsored Hotel Tibet. I was told that most of the Indian residents in McLeod Ganj are in fact not native but Kashmiri who have moved to Dharamsala.

Before the Tibetan exodus, Dharamsala had seen better days. The end of the British Raj seemed the end to Dharamsala as well. Much of its modern prosperity is due to
the far-sightedness of the unofficial mayor of McLeod Ganj, Parsee businessman Nauser Nowrojee—the scion of a family who has been in McLeod since 1856. It was Nowrojee who successfully arranged for the Dalai Lama and his government to resettle in Dharamsala, and he remains a culture broker par excellence.

Patriotism and Entrepreneurism

But despite its apparent success as a refugee capital, Dharamsala is in a predicament. The young generation of Tibetans that have been so well educated and maintained by the Tibetan institutions founded on refugee aid are leaving. Government service does not pay well; tourism is limited; land cannot (or should not) be purchased by non-Indian nationals (as are the refugees); the more menial jobs are unattractive. Individual foreign support has not only provided wealth and power to lay individuals, it has simultaneously released them from their dependency on re-established traditional institutions as a means of support. There are no more monastic estates. Some, such as Dawa, have become itinerant merchants—many sell woolen sweaters at Indian tourist destinations throughout India (Breckenridge 1987), which again seems to be an economic niche that requires little investment capital and little political commitment towards permanent settlement. Others have moved to cities such as Delhi to put their educations to more profitable use. Still others have quietly returned to Tibet
to seek better opportunities, yet have nevertheless professed allegiance to Tibetan nationalism. Predictably, the return of refugees to Tibet a matter of great concern to the Tibetan exile establishment.

There is certainly a strong sentiment of disillusionment among the new exile generation in Dharamsala, which is one of the themes of Nowak's work (1984). Maintaining the equation "refugee=patriot" is an ideal, but it requires not obtaining Indian or Nepali citizenship, and therefore not being able to purchase land and settling down.

A certain degree of affluence, a lack of diverse or primary employment, the opening of Tibet, and the scattered nature of the diaspora communities (Government of India policy) are factors which have made Dharamsala a highly mobile community by 1987. Refugees these days are highly mobile. Many of these factors were absent in my 1978 study. Then, Tibetan families lived and stayed in the community throughout the year as there were few alternatives. It is ironic that the success of various Tibetan government schemes of education and vocational training and certain entrepreneurial affluence have strengthened the diaspora network at the expense of the stability of the Dharamsala community. Yet diversification and mobility can be suggested as strategies which both strengthen the exile diaspora and help prevent assimilation into the host
culture. Maintaining refugee status as opposed to settling in to mainstream South Asia society is a Tibetan ideal.

The western tourist trade in the Himalayas seems to provide to the Tibetan refugees 1) an avenue for the acquisition of liquid capital and 2) a livelihood which could ideally present "things Tibetan" to the outside world—an exercise in nationalism. Both factors contribute to rang-btsan, the independence of the individual from institutional support, and the independence of the collective. Westerners in general are perceived as being curious about Tibet and Tibetans.

One of the more unanimous opinions among my Tibetan informants was that it is their duty to present themselves to western visitors as "good Tibetans," and distinctive from Indians and Nepalis in South Asia. This attitude has extended to Tibet itself, with the opening of the homeland to large amounts of western tourists. The inauguration of Tibet to the West has provided an opportunity for Tibetan refugees to strengthen their association with their patrons, to promote their nationalistic goals, and to make a living beyond the welfare state of Dharamsala and other refugee settlements.
Notes


2. One refugee designer once tried to convince me that the dragon motif used on many traditional Tibetan rugs was originally Tibetan, and that the Chinese had borrowed the idea from them.

3. The traditions of thang-ka painting and statue casting is very much alive in Kathmandu, but much of the work displayed in the tourist areas, such as Thamel, is often substandard and would not qualify for "sanctification" according to Buddhist iconographic canon. This practice is not seen in Dharamsala.
CHAPTER X
THE RETURN

Tourists as Patrons

In the last few years, Tibetan refugees have been returning to visit their homeland without immediate obligation for repatriation. This is an unprecedented shift in direction for the diaspora movement. Large numbers of western tourists are also visiting Tibet. Tibet is among the last places on earth to be subjected to the aegis of tourism. The political, economic, and social aspects of these developments will be examined in this chapter and the next. I suggest that the sbyin-bdag dyad of accommodating outsiders into the Tibetan system has been extended to tourists as a perceived agency for the goal of Tibetan nationalism. Local Tibetans have been encouraged to extend such categorization by returning Tibetan exiles, who have had extensive experience working with westerners and western support agencies throughout the diaspora. The result of these interactions is evident in the recent rise of nationalism within occupied Tibet.

Co-existence of Tourists, Refugees, and Homeland Tibetans in Tibet

Visitors to modern Tibet seem to fall into four general categories: 1) group tourists, 2) middle-class independent tourists, 3) "drifter tourists," and 4) visiting Tibetan
refugees. Considering Tibet's reputation of being a forbidden Shangri-la (see Richardson 1962; Harrer 1985), is ironic that these various groups would co-exist in Tibet during the period from late 1984 to the uprisings in September and October, 1987. "Open Tibet" seems to be an incongruous term—yet from 1984 to late 1987, this seems to be an accurate concept. The impact of unstructured, or unofficial tourism upon this region is especially profound. It has affected Tibetans on both sides of the border and has frustrated the attempts of even the most liberal Chinese reformers to develop the region without incurring certain political liabilities.

The combination of rapid tourist development, sudden release from decades of severe regulation of Tibetan life, and the return of refugees intent on securing independence for their country has resulted in an unique political atmosphere. The volatility of situation can be analyzed from the standpoint of the phenomenon of tourism interacting with the long-term structural history of Tibet.

I characterize foreign tourism in Tibet during this period as having two widely-separated components: 1) a tourist development sponsored "from above" by the PRC government through their China International Travel Service (CITS), which mainly deals with organized group tours, and 2) a development "from below" by local entrepreneurs
catering primarily to independent tourists. Local Tibetans and Tibetan refugees interact predominately with foreigners in the second sector.

Group tourism, commonly promoted in many socialist countries, brings the economic benefits to the host country at a minimal risk of sociocultural interference. Group tourism in general insulates the visitor from all but certain selected features of the host region (Schmidt 1980: 125-157). Unstructured tourism, on the other hand, can provide much more tourist volume overall— but it can also increase the potential of sociopolitical disruption due to the greater level of interaction between tourists and local inhabitants.

**History of Tourism in Tibet**

Travel to Tibet has always been very difficult logistically and politically. The period of the 19th and 20th century Kipling-esque adventurers, moon-struck pilgrims, scholastic colonialists, and foreign mercenaries in Tibet came to an end with the Chinese occupation in 1950. Tibet was sealed as never before. A few carefully selected western visitors, whose sympathies with the Chinese (or Communist) view of history was unimpeachable, were allowed brief glimpses of Tibet in the 1960s to mid-1970s. Subsequently, some of these visitors wrote of the of the apparent transformation of Tibet from "barbaric
feudalism" to a developing socialist region under Chinese benefaction (e.g. Gelder and Gelder 1964; Epstein 1983).

By 1979, overt Tibetan resistance had long ended, Mao was dead and the "Gang of Four" discredited. A sweeping policy of economic reform was inaugurated throughout China. Full economic autonomy was granted to Tibet and Buddhism was again permitted. One source of local self-sufficiency considered for Tibet was the development of tourism—in carefully measured stages, warranted by the necessary infrastructure development. There was the added political benefit of demonstrating to the West the opening of China by easing travel restrictions to Tibet—traditionally the most forbidden of all regions. First came group tourism, then independent tourism, the latter of which brought more western foreigners into Tibet than ever before.

The following chronology of events demonstrates the coexistence of refugees, independent tourists, and of course local Tibetans within Tibet, and some of the important events which have taken place during the 1978-1987 period:

1. 1978--Tibet opened to selected (and expensive) CITS group tours (Booz 1986:32).
2. 1979--General Ren Rong, communist party chief for the past ten years in the T.A.R. is dismissed by Beijing (Buckley and Strauss 1986:17).
4. 1979--First refugee visits Tibet (Tsultim Chhonphel Tersey 1979).
8. September 1984--independent tourists allowed to visit certain areas of Tibet with proper Alien Travel Permits (Buckley and Strauss 1986:7).
9. April 1985--overland route to Nepal opened to individual travelers, trekkers, etc. (Buckley and Strauss 1986:201).
11. late 1985--Lhasa Hotel (Holiday Inn) opens (Booz 1986:39).
12. February 1986--ATPs no longer required for Lhasa and other Tibetan regions. (Buckley and Strauss 1986:6)
13. Spring 1987--large numbers of independent travelers, Tibetan refugees, and foreign pressmen in Tibet (field observations).
14. Summer 1987--border fighting between China and India. Overland route to South Asia officially closed "for repairs" (field observations).
17. October 1, 1987--thousands of Tibetans demonstrate for Tibetan independence in Lhasa. Tibetans are killed and wounded; some foreigners arrested then deported. Other foreigners told to leave Tibet. (Press Releases, Office of Tibet, NY).
18. October 10--independent tourism is again prohibited in Tibet. Reverts to carefully supervised CITS tour operations (Press Releases, Office of Tibet, NY).
Group Tourism and Chinese Impression Management

CITS group tourism in Tibet, as in many socialist countries, attempts to impress upon the visitor the progressive nature of their communist reformation. In the early years of group tourism in Tibet, travelers were shown a vision of a barbaric old Tibet which had been replaced by a progressive, modern one. Tourists were inevitably led to the Museum of the Tibetan Revolution in Lhasa, which was designed to disgust the visitor with collections of opulent artifacts from the old feudal aristocracy, juxtaposed with flayed skins and bones from alleged victims of traditional Tibetan justice or monastic human sacrifice (Harrer 1985).

With the coming of independent tourism, the Museum has been largely dismantled (it housed a floral exhibit when I was there) and much of the overtly idealistic impression management is absent even in the CITS sector. Chinese propaganda has become more subtle. Some of the more important monasteries and temples are being restored at Chinese expense. But I observed that they often have just enough realism to convey the impression that they never had been damaged by the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. In Lhasa, certain rooms in the palaces of the Potala and Norbulinka have been restored, and work is progressing on the Central Cathedral of the Jokhang, Drepung, Sera, and Ganden monasteries. Outside of the capital, however, I saw little official restoration. The main exception, perhaps to
show the importance of the status of the cooperative Panchen Lama, the Tashilumpo Monastery in Shigatse is undergoing official renovation. The castle of Yumbu Lakang in the Yarlong Valley of the Kings, the oldest (7th century) monument to Tibet's past and completely destroyed in the 1960s, has hastily been rebuilt by the Chinese.

The present underlying strategy of impression management by the present Chinese system of tourism development, other than occluding the scars of occupation, is to demonstrate that Tibet has always been an integral part of China. Monastery and palace custodians, and of course CITS guides, point out chapels and paintings honoring Chinese emperors. I observed that tourists are additionally led to rooms containing gifts from the emperors to the hierarchs of Tibet: official seals, tablets bestowing titles, statuary, silks, etc. Books, postcards, and other material available at government gift shops reify the image of Chinese impact on traditional Tibetan civilization. One coffee-table book published by the government, for example, states:

"The building of the Potala Palace...is a story of national co-operation and international cultural exchange in the history of Chinese architecture."
(Cultural Relics Administration Committee, T.A.R. 1982)

Images of the Dalai Lamas in accommodating interactions with Chinese leaders of the past are also touted. Captions on
two of the limited styles of postcards available in the market read:

"The Thirteenth Dalai paying respects to Emperor Guang Shu and the Empress Dowager Ci Xi of the Qing Dynasty."

"The Fifth Dalai paying respects to Shun Zhi, first emperor of the Qing dynasty." (personal collection)

In short, the official tourist establishment is now intent on convincing the visitor of the perpetual political and cultural alliance between the province of Tibet and the central Chinese government. The Chinese are also eager to show the results of their recent liberalization with the restoration of monasteries and to hide the scars of thirty years of occupation with a pastiche of distorted Tibetan traditionalism.²

Independent Tourism and Tibetan Impression Management

Independent tourists in Tibet, as other non-group visitors elsewhere, tend to be a hardier lot. I define an "independent tourist" as one who generally has an open itinerary, and usually avoids organized, escorted tours, packaged accommodations and travel arrangements. An independent tourist has to interact with his local hosts to secure basic services. Such a tourist voluntarily sacrifices many of the conveniences and services of group tourism for a more direct and personal encounter with the "natives." Others, whose budget is more limited, have no choice but to suffer the relative lack of insulation from
the host society. Drifter-tourism is a sub-set of independent tourism.

In Tibet, there appears to be two types of independent travelers: those who have come overland from South Asia and those who have come overland from China. I noted that those tourists from China entering Tibet have often developed certain survival skills for dealing with Chinese banks, hotels, restaurants, and transportation services and have certain knowledge to cope with the bureaucracies, delays, and frustrations common to tourists in China proper. Conversely, those coming directly from South Asia often seem ill-equipped to handle these problems. Most of the South Asia tourists have passed through Kathmandu, a city whose tourist industry is greatly influenced, if not dominated by Tibetan refugees (Ugen Gombo 1985). Many tourists, additionally, in keeping with their overall interest in Tibet, have even visited Dharamsala or other refugee communities in South Asia prior to their visit to Tibet. In fact, I recognized many faces in Tibet that I had seen previously in Kathmandu and Dharamsala. South Asian visitors, including refugees, often seemed to travel in a cohort.

Many of these tourists are perhaps more adept in dealing with Tibetan refugee ideas of accommodation, transportation, food, etc. (As we have seen, the opening of Tibet to independent, budget travel has in fact stimulated
tourism in South Asian Tibetan communities). In general, South Asian tourists in Tibet seemed more likely to utilize the services of Tibetan refugees for cultural brokerage and basic information about the country. Independent tourists from China, perhaps due to budget limitations, also seemed to rely on the Tibetan segment for basic services and information.

Among the motivations for refugee repatriation as previously discussed is the opportunity for entrepreneurial activity in the tourist sector in Tibet. Many refugees in Lhasa have established souvenir shops in Lhasa, some work as unofficial guides, and others teach English to local Tibetans so they may in-turn work the tourist sector. Refugees have stimulated local Tibetans to similarly engage in entrepreneurial tourist activities. This grass-roots development caters primarily to the independent tourists and is by-and-large not regulated by Chinese officialdom.

One could infer that this grass-roots development might be considered a revitalization of local handicrafts and culture as it has in other areas of the world. McKean (1977) and Noronha (1979) have discussed the revival of Balinese art in response to independent tourism. Erik Cohen has examined the impact of refugee art in Thailand (1982). What is revived, however, is not necessarily an authentic tradition. Gaviria (1976), Kaeppler (1970), D. Kirch (1984), and Valene Smith (1982) point out cases of the
decline in cultural and artistic standards and the reversion to souvenir production under the impact of mass tourism. One only has to look at Waikiki in Hawaii to witness the transformation of real Hawaiian cultural traditions into spurious ones for the sake of the tourist dollar (see Linnekin 1982). In these cases, the marketplace has adjusted to the expectations of the tourists' perceptions of what traditional culture ought to be.

The independent tourist market in Tibet is conforming to the notions of "traditional" Tibetan arts and crafts brought forward by Tibetan refugees based on their experience in South Asia, as I suggested with the story of itinerant refugee merchant, Dawa from Dharamsala. I suggest that refugee entrepreneurism has provided a model for local Tibetans. Refugees not only know the expectations of independent tourists, but have expertise in production, distribution, and marketing directly to foreigners. Visiting refugees are in great demand, therefore, by both local Tibetans and independent tourists alike. Their services and products reflect not pre-occupational Tibetan culture, but the distilled and revitalized refugee version of traditional Tibetan culture. Perhaps because homeland Tibetans lack experience with western tourists, they have chosen the diaspora model of providing goods and services to visitors. This is neither a true revitalization nor a dissipation of pre-occupational culture— it is an extension
of Tibetan refugee culture. Local Tibetan tourist development seems susceptible to the Dharamsala style of presentation in the marketing of goods and services to the foreign visitor.

With great demand for "local" Tibetan artifacts by tourists, the lack of continuing local craft traditions, and the relatively short period of time for local production to have been established, entrepreneurs have imported "Tibetan" carpets, jewelry, bags, and metal craft overland from refugee communities in South Asia. I have seen these items sold to unsuspecting tourists as locally produced, traditional artifacts. At present, some of these articles are being copied by local entrepreneurs, and local carpet production is being re-established, but apparently not sufficiently so as to stop the import of South Asian rugs over the Himalayas. In any case, the model has been provided by refugees.

The use of refugee guides in Tibet is another characteristic of independent tourist development. Naturally, English-speaking refugees are in great demand as translators and guides, especially by visitors from South Asia who are not experienced in dealing with the Chinese, who have sympathies with the refugee political cause, or who want to experience more of the "real" Tibet. Western group tourists, too, who have managed to escape the scheduled supervision of CITS tours, put a high premium on refugee
assistance. I asked a few of these defectors why they would prefer to leave the comforts of Lhasa Hotel and the insulated bubble of the group tour. Some of the responses were that they were frustrated with the bureaucratic machinations of CITS, they were insulted at the Chinese version of Tibetan history, they disliked being isolated and segregated from the Tibetans, and that the refugees were more polite, understood the western idiom, and spoke English better. Whether conscious of it or not, tourists were replacing Chinese impression management with the Tibetan refugee version.

One of my main refugee informants, Ribong Karpo, provides an example of the state of the demand for cultural brokerage by independent tourists and the digressors from CITS-planned group tours:

The two guides-to-be in my party from Dharamsala got off to an early start in their occupational training. In the Nepal/PRC border town of Khasa, Ribong and Cheema Singge (the "White" and "Black" clients) secured a minibus for the trip overland from a Tibetan driver. I served as an intermediary to round up stranded western tourists to fill the bus (a broker for a broker?). While on board, Ribong and Cheema took turns playing tour-guide in a land which they themselves were unfamiliar. Occasionally, one of my Tibetan friends would discreetly ask me the name of some landmark. If I knew, they would turn around and articulate
their newly acquired knowledge to western passengers. Asking me involved a bit of embarrassment for Ribong and Cheema--after all, they should know more about their country than a foreigner. When we arrived safely in Lhasa, Ribong began posting notices at the budget hotels, offering his services as translator/guide (his first assignment was to procure haemorrhoid medicine for one bus-weary traveler). Meanwhile, he had asked to borrow my American guide book (i.e. Buckley and Strauss 1986) in order to study Tibetan history and examine western tourist expectations.

Ribong and I would often visit the Potala, Jokhang, and other sites--I would assume the role of ignorant tourist, and Ribong would act as guide, occasionally dropping out of character to ask me the name of some deity or another. Eventually the word got out that an articulate, polite, and resourceful Tibetan was available as an unofficial guide. Within two weeks of his arrival in Lhasa, Ribong could pick and choose his tours, demanded and received an average of ¥150 per day for his services (the average monthly income for local Tibetans is ¥46 [US $12.43] [Grunfeld 1987]!).

The innovations introduced to the local community by Tibetan refugees are not limited to material culture. The placement of westerners within the sbyin-bdag paradigm by local Tibetans seems to have been introduced from the refugees as well. The history of pre-occupational Tibet, gleaned from the 19th and early 20th century writers seems
to indicate a general mistrust and suspicion towards foreigners. This was certainly in part due to the isolationist policies of some Tibetan officials. But the everyday Tibetan simply had no point of reference in which western visitors could be placed. An overview of Tibetan history shows that large groups of cooperative foreigners, such as the Mongols and early Manchus, were eventually placed into the category of patrons of Tibet. I suggest that modern western tourists, particularly of the independent variety, have been placed by homeland Tibetans into the patron category. In this regard, the process may have been accelerated by the presence of visiting refugees, whose experience with western support comes highly recommended to local Tibetans. (This will be illustrated with ethnographic examples in Chapter 11).

**Comparison of Tibetan and Chinese Tourist Strategies**

The presence of foreigners as potential patrons of a free Tibet seems to be evident in the Tibetan attitudes towards tourism development, in contrast to Chinese notions. This is illustrated in Fig. 9. Five popular tourist sites in Lhasa were selected. The differing presentations communicated to tourists are summarized from actual tours I took of these sites and listening to official (Chinese) guides or unofficial (Tibetan refugee) guides, reading local tourist literature and announcements.
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<td>1. Potala winter palace</td>
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<td>capitol of Tibet</td>
<td>example of Sino-Tibetan cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Jokhang central Cathedral</td>
<td></td>
<td>Holy of Holies</td>
<td>demonstration of restoration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Norbulinka park</td>
<td></td>
<td>sacred summer palace</td>
<td>public utility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ganden destroyed state monastery</td>
<td></td>
<td>symbol of wonten Chinese destruction</td>
<td>example of Chinese restoration attempt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Culture Park</td>
<td>former swamp at foot of Potala</td>
<td>destruction of woodlands</td>
<td>public utility --drained unhealthy swamp</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 9. Conceptual Categories of Popular Tourist Sites in Lhasa
on the subject on both sides, and talking with other individuals somehow connected with tourism in Tibet.

To Tibetans, the major edifices of Lhasa are sacred, confronting a person with an experience distanced from the profane world (see Eliade 1976, v.1:140-1). Cheema told me that the Potala palace was built by the gods and not man, because no mortal could possibly build something so perfect.

Of course, what is sacred to some is profane to others. The Chinese vs Tibetan tourist impression management can be summarized by 1) the Chinese de-emphasizing the symbolic boundaries between Tibet and China, and 2) the Tibetans emphasizing the symbolic boundaries between Tibet and China. Thus, it reflects the political contentions which exist, and have existed between the two parties.

The Chinese view of tourism in general has undergone a bit of evolution as well. No longer touted are the Soviet-style pilgrimages to shrines of Marxist ideology. Evidence of economic progress, especially as a result of the T.A.R. reforms of the early 1980s, are proudly displayed in Tibet. This is certainly one reason why the area was opened to tourism. Modern hotels, with their gleaming flush toilets, perky coffee shops, and color t.v.'s in every room symbolize the new western paradise.

The Chinese were eager to open Tibet, perhaps the PRC's most contentious region, to demonstrate their new-found
liberalism to the world. Capitalism was also encouraged no doubt to stimulate local productivity and relieve the central government from the burden of subsidizing the Tibetan economy. Yet the development of a nationalistic tourism by Tibetans was an obvious "unintended consequence" (Sahlins 1981) of these Chinese reforms.

Consequences of Rapid Tourist Development

The development of tourism in Tibet follows the same general scheme as proposed by Schmidt (1980) in regards to world tourism, yet at a geometric rate. According to Schmidt, foreign explorers, ambassadors, and philosophers are generally the first to arrive in a new area. This eventually leads to visitations by the wealthy and the aristocracy. As the hospitality infrastructure increases (and the costs decreases), the middle class arrive next. Finally the working class can afford to make the journey. Schmidt's time line for this sequence in the development of world tourism is noted in Fig. 10., with the literature generated in each period as a baseline. I have done the same with tourism in Tibet.

The interesting feature about this diagram is although the the types of travelers follow in identical sequence, and the popular literary traditions correspond, the time-line for world tourism is arithmetic procession, while the Tibetan is geometric.
World 1600 1650 1700 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who travelled</th>
<th>ambassadors</th>
<th>general aristocracy</th>
<th>middle class</th>
<th>working class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Schmidt 1980:81) philosophers</td>
<td>upper class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scientists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literary traditions</th>
<th>1642--first</th>
<th>1655--Royal Society pub.</th>
<th>1834--first modern Baedeker pub. guidebooks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(James Howell)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who travelled</th>
<th>socialist</th>
<th>middle class</th>
<th>working class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ambassadors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>philosophers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scientists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literary traditions</th>
<th>1834--first travel</th>
<th>coffee-table books</th>
<th>modern guidebooks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T. grammar tales popular</td>
<td>(Csoma Koros)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Waddell's Lamaism)</td>
<td>1933--Hiton's Lost Horizon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 10. Comparative Travel Periods: World vs Tibet
Fig. 11 shows the numbers of tourists in Tibet from 1981 to the first quarter of 1988 (based on various sources). Quite simply, tourism has had an extremely rapid development in Tibet, and there are many indications that neither Tibetan nor Chinese society has had sufficient time to adjust to the rapid social, economic, and political consequences that the entry of tourism entails.

Tibetans, Chinese, and the Tibetan refugees who have moved back to their homeland from India and Nepal have quickly taken advantage of western tourism. Only two years ago, restaurants were largely unknown in Lhasa—after all, Tibetans usually ate at home. If you were a pilgrim to the Holy City, you usually camped outside of town and made do with dried yak meat, butter, and tsampa (parched barley flour). But western tourists (as perceived by both Chinese and Tibetan developers) like their toast and coffee, pancakes, and fried eggs.

Apart from the monolithic tourist establishments of CITS, both Tibetan (refugee and local) and independent Chinese entrepreneurs have proliferated a collection of rather unusual eateries around Lhasa. These establishments, sprouting higgledy-piggledy fashion since the opening of Tibet to independent tourism in 1984, offer an assortment of dishes presumed to be appealing to western taste. One such restaurant is located conveniently between the five budget tourist hotels. The sign board outside shows a
Fig. 11 Graph of Tourist Population in Tibet (1981-1988)
beckoning Oriental lady inviting the tourist to dine in apparent romantic surroundings. Inside, customers sit at oversized tables on undersized chairs reminiscent of the Mad Hatter's Tea Party. One selects for a menu largely consisting of greasy pork stir-fry and pressure-cooked rice. Dogs roam around one's legs as beggars solicit scraps above the waistline. Then you may add the questionable ambiance of colored lightbulbs flashing in syncopation with blaring Hong Kong-copied disco tunes.

Another tourist restaurant offers "fried" eggs which are in fact boiled in oil and are consistently served without any sort of eating utensils. Here, money changers and trinket vendors, Dawa's young ladies festooned from head to toe in fake turquoise, replace the dogs and beggars for one's attention. One Chinese restaurant has even hired a quadrilingual Mongol to expedite orders from English and Tibetan speaking customers. East meets West at the "Rambo Bar" noodle house situated just in front of the looming Potala. Here, a signboard of bare-chested Sylvester Stallone replete with machine gun competes with the Winter Palace for prominence along the frontage. Rambo, a westerner, is of course the epitome of rang-bstan, "self-determination." And Rambo, the supreme patron, guards the southern flanks of the Dalai Lama's mountain citadel.

Lhasa, Shigatse, and other tourist centers in Tibet have an overwhelming sense of play between refugees,
locals, and the bulk of western tourists. Tourism is very much a novelty. Entrepreneurism and the spirit of free enterprise born of the Chinese reforms is omnipresent in the streets of Tibetan towns.

In general, critics of tourism tend to look at the activities of foreign visitors as a type of cultural debasement—a pollution of sacred sites (Schmidt 1980; see also Kaeppler 1970; Kirch 1984). Native refugee writer Jamyang Norbu has written in the diaspora's Tibetan Review that tourism in Tibet should be discouraged, since it aids the Chinese more than the Tibetans. After all...

"aside from the [Chinese] immigrants, what has tourism brought to the Tibetans? Very little, except maybe the opportunity to sell the few items of jewelry and the family heirlooms that the Chinese somehow overlooked, and to pester tourists for Polaroid shots and pictures of the Dalai Lama." (Jamyang Norbu 1986:8)

Another Tibetan refugee writing in the same journal expresses similar notions—that Chinese immigration into Tibet has been stimulated by the tourist trade. The Tibetans have little to benefit in its overall development (Tsering Tashi 1987:20-21).

One western critic of tourism in Tibet points to Kathmandu's overdevelopment as an example of the evils of mass tourism (Hovell 1987) which might befall Tibet. Andersson (1987:11) specifically warns the would-be tourist not to fall into the net of "Chinese propagandism." It would seem to some of these critics that conditions in Bhutan, with its carefully controlled and selective tourism
would represent an ideal of minimal cultural impact for Tibet. Between these two extremes, however, is a suggestion that tourism is but another form of modernization, and like other modernizations, requires careful planning and thought to minimize destructive impact—be it ecological, economic, or cultural (de Kadt 1979). Due no doubt to the rapid rise in foreign tourism in Tibet, and the destabilizing impact of refugees leaving the South Asian settlements, the topic of tourism was certainly the most lively subject for speculation and argument in Dharamsala during my work there—both officially and otherwise.

More moderate sentiments seem to be reflected in the Tibetan government-in-exile attitude towards tourism in Tibet, in contrast to the more radical refugee press. Tourism, whether by westerners or refugees, is encouraged: What better chance for one to see what the Chinese have done, and how the resilient Tibetans have been? In this regard, Dharamsala had actually planned on publishing its own tour guide to Tibet (HHDL Information Office—personal communication). To the leaders of Free Tibet, Tibetan impression management of tourism must overwhelm the Chinese version. The naive tourist must be guided towards the "truth," and in this aspect, tourism in Tibet is potentially a good opportunity (for both sides, of course).
The Dharamsala establishment encourages refugees to visit their homeland to ascertain the poor conditions, yet permanent repatriation is naturally an unacceptable option. This is widely articulated in the Dharamsala community. All returning refugees, if they are in good standing with the community, are required to visit the Security Office of the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala to receive traveling papers. These papers certify the individual as a refugee to the Indian government for purposes of leaving the country. Some refugees even request audience with the Dalai Lama. They are encouraged to be "good Tibetans" while in their homeland, and to present the best possible image to tourists and local Tibetans. They are charged with the responsibilities of representing the legitimate government of Tibet and exemplifying the successes of the exile government's continuing traditions—in other words, to be good patriots.

Drifter Tourism in Tibet

Some tourism critics take particular note at the potential impact of the "bottom-end," drifter-tourist. Fears of illicit drug traffic, sexual promiscuity (and AIDS), and other undesirable influences on the host community is common. Many of my Tibetan informants look upon the the conversion of Kathmandu to a Babylon in the 1960s and 1970s as evidence of what could happen in sacred Lhasa. This is a popular misconception, as studies seem to
indicate. The bottom-ended tourist market often has little direct interaction with the host community.

Erik Cohen notes that there is little actual contact between drifter-tourists and local populations (1973:98). Drifter-tourists tend to develop social infrastructures which eventually insulate them from host society. Furthermore,

"in its social dynamics, mass-drifter tourism develops a tendency parallel to that observed in ordinary mass tourism: a loss of interest and involvement with the local people, customs and landscape, and a growing orientation to the in-group: other drifters in our case, [and] members of the group in the case of the collective mass-tourist." (Cohen 1973:99)

I could not make a more precise assessment of drifter tourism in the Tibet of 1987. More middle class tourism, on the other hand, seemed notably extroverted and focused on the Tibetans as an objective for their tour.

Since independent tourism along the overland route from Nepal was opened in 1984, the drifter-tourist has made his presence known in Lhasa. Most of the drifters I encountered had come from South Asia. My classification of the drifter-tourist apart from the more normative independent tourist is rather subjective. Most independent tourists in general develop some sort of ragamuffin visage due to the rigors of the overland route into Tibet. The drifter-tourist in Tibet, however, seems to set himself apart by continuous and exclusive in-group association (as Cohen suggests).
Typically, many of these visitors live in the cheapest accommodations in budget hotels. At one Tibetan-run hotel in Lhasa that I visited, two cooperatives have been established for drifter-tourists. One cooperative exchanges information on road conditions and transportation arrangements, and sponsors book, clothing, and western medicine exchange. Another enterprise was formed to make and sell cookies, sandwiches, and cheesecakes for their group. The latter did not seem to be patronized by more "normative" independent tourists in the hotel, who apparently relished the opportunity to forage in the Tibetan bazaar or eat at the lively Tibetan and Chinese restaurants in town.

I learned that cooperative organizers would rotate management, "visa-hopping" between Kathmandu and Lhasa every few months as their respective visas expired—they were generally long-term expatriots. It appeared to me that membership in these groups is signalled through distinct and unusual combinations of ethnic clothes familiar to the counter-culture of the 1960s. Some individuals of both sexes wore combinations of vibrant Indian scarves, pillbox Kulu hats, black felt Tibetan boots, silken Punjab pajamas, with a coarse Kathmandu sweater thrown in for good measure.

It appeared that leaders of these groups did not usually act in the role of culture brokers between westerners and Tibetans or Chinese, however, but simply served to disseminate information passed on from other
western drifter-travelers. Counter-culture oriented guidebooks, such as Buckley and Strauss (1986) have become dogma and one from the outside is well advised not to attempt to point out any errors in such gospels. Such faith in the Word got me into plenty of arguments with the drifters.

It is most important to note that drifter-tourism in Tibet is *sui generis*. Being essentially self-contained, drifter-tourists have little use for the services of Tibetan refugees as culture brokers. There is little contact between drifter-tourists and Tibetans except occasional and largely uncompensated translation requests. Most of my refugee informants, based on their experience with these types of westerners in South Asia, usually did not wish to associate with drifters.

Cheema Singge, on the other hand, attempted to ingratiate himself with drifters as a last resort to find employment. Cheema, having a poor reputation with Tibetan refugees in Lhasa stemming from his Dharamsala experiences, had great difficulty establishing himself as a guide to the middle class independent tourist. Having been rejected by the refugee infrastructure, and even CITS, Cheema sought employment as a guide and translator among the drifters. But many drifters had neither the need nor the money for his services. Although he attempted to endear himself with the drifters by drinking and smoking hashish with them, the
sorts of employment that he actually received tended to be of the most medial nature (for example, buying a bus ticket). I felt that drifters were not interested in learning even very basic Tibetan phrases, and did not at all appreciate anything indicative of local culture.

The phenomenon of exclusivity has been similarly noted in Cohen's study of drifters in Eilat, Israel (1971: 217-233). I have noted that local Tibetans who deal with tourists have generally not developed the skills of differentiating various categories of westerners as the refugees have. In many cases, rich group tourists, middle class tourists, and drifters are serviced in the same manner by local restaurants, hotels, and transportation facilities, often to the embarrassment of all foreign parties concerned.

I have attempted in Table 1 to show a distribution of tourist hotel facility "types" in Lhasa. But these figures cannot represent the demography of tourism in the city by themselves. For one, the occupancy rate of the large group tour hotels was consistently low in the spring of 1987--the budget hotels, on the other hand, seemed almost always filled. What is perhaps most surprising in the critiques of tourism in Tibet is the fact that there are actually very small numbers of drifter-tourists. The core of the drifter community was located at the hotel where I lived, and seemed to be only about 15-20 individuals in the cohort at any given time. It seems reasonable, at least, to suggest that
**TABLE 1**  
**HOTEL CAPACITY AND TYPES IN LHASA, 1987**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hotel</th>
<th>type</th>
<th>features</th>
<th>beds*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Snowland</td>
<td>budget</td>
<td>refugee owned</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banok Shol</td>
<td>budget</td>
<td>local Tibetan owned</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>budget</td>
<td>refugee operated</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yak Hotel</td>
<td>budget</td>
<td>refugee operated</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kailash</td>
<td>budget</td>
<td>refugee operated</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>569</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal #2</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>Chinese clientele</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional #1</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>180</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CITS Guesthouse</td>
<td>expensive</td>
<td>group tours</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibet Guesthouse</td>
<td>expensive</td>
<td>group tours</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lhasa Hotel</td>
<td>expensive</td>
<td>group/indep</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1370</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2119</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note—Characteristic of very rapid tourist development, rooms and anexes were always being added or closed off for remodeling.

These figures are only approximate for the period in the spring of 1987.
there are perhaps less than 10% of the entire Lhasa tourist population in the drifter category. In addition, many more affluent tourists, who could easily afford the Lhasa Hotel, stay at the budget establishments as an escape from Chinese overregulation of their activities and to be closer to the Tibetans. The budget hotels all are located within the old, Tibetan part of town. Local Tibetans and refugees also live at these hotels.

I suggest that the overwhelming majority of tourists to Tibet in 1987 are middle class, non-group tourists. With the bottom-ended drifter-tourists and upper-ended group tourists insulated from daily life in Tibet, it is the this other sort of visitor who more likely comes in contact with local Tibetans and is the potential market for the brokerage services (and nationalism) provided by Tibetan refugees. They are not regulated (as the CITS groups), yet have money to buy Tibetan goods and services (which the drifter-tourist has not). Almost without exception, the tourists in this category whom I talked to were actively interacting with Tibetans.

This type of tourist motivation is akin to Valene Smith's category of "ethnic tourism" (1977:2-3), an immersion in the local color in some areas currently deemed exotic. The Tibet of Shangri-la is exotic. These motivations stand quite apart from "historical tourism," the viewing of monuments, museums and ruins in isolation from the context
of the living culture—a type which seems to be the strategy of Chinese tourist management.

A recent article by Andersson in the refugee press again assumes that the overwhelming majority of tourists to Tibet are ignorant of the region's history, and thus are at the mercy of Chinese "propagandism":

"The average tourist will see the ruins everywhere which have become the landmark of Tibet. He knows somewhat vaguely that they are the result of the activities of the red guards, but on the other hand he reasons that was a long time ago, and moreover, monasteries are being wonderfully renovated today." (Andersson 1987:11)

I have met tourists who indeed felt that the ruins peppering the Tibetan landscape were quite ancient—but they are quickly corrected by their more knowledgeable peers. The tourist ignorant of Tibetan history may well be the ideal visitor for the Chinese, but removed from the supervised group tour, he or she usually does not remain ignorant for long.

While indifference and ignorance may be characteristic of mass and charter tourism as noted by anthropologists studying the phenomenon, knowledge-seeking "ethnic" tourism seems to be most prevalent among independent tourists in Tibet in 1987. Armchair critics of tourism in Tibet, such as Jamyang Norbu, Tsering Tashi, and Andersson note the potential for mass tourism and its destructive impact upon the Tibetans. Certainly the infrastructure has been provided by the Chinese, as evidenced from the number of
high budget accommodations in Lhasa. Mass tourism could be a excuse for continuing Chinese imperialism in the region. Economic delveopment in Tibet by Chinese helps legitimize their rule. I have attempted to show that at least by 1987, these "destructive" conditions (to Tibetans and their western sympathizers) have not materialized. In fact, independent tourism in particular has become a vehicle for articulating Tibetan nationalism. Therefore tourism, as encouraged by the Tibetan government (and discouraged by some Tibetan and western critics), has been beneficial to the Tibetan cause of independence.
1. Among the reforms proffered for Tibet in 1980 were:
   1. abolition of representational taxes for the T.A.R.
   2. increase in State subsidies
   3. dismantling of many communes
   4. free choice for crop selection by individual farmers
   5. nomad could return to traditional pastoralism
   6. some forms of Buddhist practice was legalized
      (Buckley and Strauss 1986:18)

2. Creating parodies of disenfranchised minority cultures is common practice in tourist development "from above." One remembers the old American practice of parading Indian chiefs around western resort hotels to lend an air of native charm to a region otherwise devoid of active Indian culture. The creation of "Tibet World" by Chinese governmental development schemes is particularly insidious to Tibetan refugees and many westerners, although the very same refugees have created a spurious Tibetan culture in Dharamsala.

3. My role a sbyin-bdag to Ribong, had been previously established. This status was often articulated in Ribong's interactions with westerners in Tibet. Quite often I became an intermediary between tourists and refugees, who were themselves culture brokers to the local Tibetans. On one occasion, Ribong and I worked out a scheme were I would wear my Tibetan boots around tourist hotels--Ribong got a commission from the handicraft venture that produce them. Tourists would ask me where I got the boots, and I would send them on to Ribong. This nesting of brokerage roles ended, however, as my Tibetan friends became more competent and confident in their activities.

4. I stress that only refugees "in good standing" need apply. The fact that only the Security Office can issue the appropriate papers, "undesirable" elements (presumably those who might embarrass the Tibetan government-in-exile or the prestige of the Dalai Lama and his programs) can be barred from easy access to Tibet. One of my informants, Cheema Singge, who had a bad reputation in Dharamsala, tried to circumvent the de facto policing system by going directly to the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi to receive an Overseas Chinese Passport. While this was easily obtained, without refugee papers he had no official standing in India or Nepal, which he obviously had to travel through to reach Tibet. He needed visas for these countries as any other foreigner. On payment of a fine of NRs 600 ($30.00) in Kathmandu, however, he was given an exit permit. The possibility of a legitimate return to South Asia, however,
was in jeopardy. By the fact that Dharamsala can effectively regulate the foreign travel of the refugees demonstrates yet another de facto point of autonomy or even sovereignty of Dharamsala vis-à-vis the host government.
CHAPTER XI
PATRONAGE AND NATIONALISM IN TIBET

Tourism as Pilgrimage

One of the vexatious questions that addresses the accomplishment of Tibetan national identity in the homeland concerns the apparently favored position of foreign westerners as potential patrons over the ever-present Chinese. Why would distant strangers be more desirable to the Tibetans than the Chinese whose professed intentions have been to improve the lot of the Tibetan people (see Wang and Suo 1984)? I suggest that the activities of the western tourist in Tibet are easily categorized into a traditional practice of the Tibetans themselves: pilgrimage. Whether the tourist is aware of this or not, he or she often demonstrates his solidarity with Tibetans by visiting the "sights" which are, in a different context, sacred. According to many Tibetans, the tourist is here to try to see and participate in Old Tibet, not to destroy it. As such, the tourist, often unintentionally, becomes a partisan of the Tibetan cause.

Graburn (1977) has pointed out certain similarities between modern tourism and pilgrimage. Modern tourism, the "Grand Tours" for European adolescents in the 18th and 19th centuries, the old pilgrimages to the Holy land, the hajj, etc., are all socially sanctioned activities in which one
may spend leisure time or attempt to gain status. They tend to be liminal and set apart, spatially and temporally, from normative and routine behavior.

Tourism in general is structurally similar to pilgrimage activity. Pilgrimage among Tibetans is a well-known, traditional practice inextricably bound to internant trade (Aziz 1978; Ekvall 1964, 1968). Pilgrimage is also a motivation (or excuse) for refugees to visit Tibet. For many young Tibetans, visiting Tibet in general is a pilgrimage to their own sacred soil. The structure and content of independent tourists' experiences in Tibet are similar to that of the returning Tibetan refugees most particularly. This similarity may indeed be recognized in the interactions between tourists and refugees in Tibet, and provide the nexus of understanding which appears to exist between these two groups as well as among local Tibetans. This similarity may also illustrate how and why Tibetans would subsume the tourist into the sbyin-bdag system. I will provide examples in this chapter that demonstrate this inclusion.

Structurally, the independent tourists in Tibet have affinity to the activities and outlook of Tibetan refugees. First, both groups engage in self-affirming activities. Tourists everywhere have their pictures taken with some familiar landmark as background, or carve their names on available trees or stones. These "self-locating" rituals
(Schmidt 1980:166) attempt to place the individual within the larger scheme of the site's historical or present significance. In a sense, they unify past, present, and future (photos of the *fait accomplis* might be shown to friends back home). For the young Tibetan refugees, the trip to Tibet is essentially an identity affirming activity--a visit to the ancestral homeland helps affirm a notion of "Tibetaness" among an ethnic minority in exile. In addition to having themselves likewise photographed, "doing things Tibetan" (wearing Tibetan clothes, making offerings at temples, handing out Dalai Lama photos and blessing cords [*srung-mdud*]) reaffirms their cultural heritage with their native homeland. It too binds the past with the present and future.

Secondly, common to both tourism and among refugees returning to Tibet is liminality and *communitas* (Turner 1969). Among tourists, previous roles and statuses are largely undifferentiated and individuals are usually grouped together in a manner that would not likely occur back home. Whether in the fashion of the deluxe or budget hotels, tourists occupy a type of ghetto in which the real world is kept at a respectful and relative distance (depending on one's budget and inclinations). Tourists of widely differing backgrounds share in common experiences. Among refugees as well, the initial period of activity in Tibet proceeds without status differentiations. As I discussed in
Chapter 10, many Tibetan refugees live together and associate with tourists, especially the more outwardly expressive "middle class" tourists. As some refugees settle into their new entrepreneurial work roles, new statuses may be achieved in "rites of passage" fashion. Ribong, for example, went from a relative low status restaurant worker in Dharamsala, through a period of liminality in Lhasa, to a high status role as an independent guide among his refugee peers.

Schmidt also suggests that in the relationship between the tourist and the site, a characteristic overconcern with hygiene often occurs (1980:167). One may argue that in most of developing Asia, this concern is justified—and travel in Tibet adds the factor of physiological adjustment to hypoxic conditions. I could not fail to notice that many of the conversation topics among tourists centered around allegedly inedible food, undrinkable water, and unbreathable air. What is unknown is dangerous.

This third structural similarity between the tourist and refugee behavior was observed, with some surprise, among Tibetan refugees. Ribong, for example, noticed with alarm that his cheeks were turning brown and that he had more pigment in the sclera of his eyes. After a anxious trip to the sprawling Lhasa Hospital, the malady turned out to be no more that a suntan—the effect of Tibet's intense
ultra-violet radiation. Other informants similarly complained of a host of otherwise explicable ailments.

Fourthly, no one can dispute that tourism is set within the context of a "state of play" (see Norbeck 1974; Huizinga 1950). In the case of Tibetan refugees, playing various roles in regards to tourists was a prelude to securing actual jobs as guides, importers, and professional culture brokers.

As tourists are marginal, so are visiting Tibetan refugees. Tibet is a special place for many tourists, following its Shangri-la image in the West. It is a special place for young refugees, as (by now) it is an almost mythical sacred homeland. It seems reasonable to suggest that the refugees have much in common with mainstream tourism in Tibet, and that this nexus of commonality is a significant justification for interaction. Furthermore, the ease of interaction between the independent tourist and the refugee perhaps has provided a model for interaction between tourist and local Tibetan.

We have investigated the incorporation of foreigners within the sbyin-bdag system as evident in South Asian refugee communities and in the long-term history of Tibet. It is possible, that the concurrent presence of returning refugees might have expedited the process of acceptance and categorization of westerners into the sbyin-bdag paradigm among local Tibetans. The diaspora innovation of
substituting westerners for Manchus and Mongols under the old system of patronage may well have been introduced to the local Tibetans by the simultaneous presence of independent tourists and returning refugees.

On the overland route to Lhasa, a Danish friend and I met an old Tibetan woman in Gyantse. She was not the least bit curious about us, but rather immediately praised us in Tibetan for "having undertaken such a long pilgrimage to the Holy Land" and spoke of the wonderful bounty of merit such action had accrued for us. This ascription of a traditional, inclusive category (foreigner as pilgrim) helps transform a western tourist into a potential patron.

The types of exchanges that occur frequently between independent tourists and local Tibetans, and the "meaning" conveyed by these transactions will be demonstrated to support these arguments:

**Symbolic Interchanges between Tibetans and Westerners**

Nash (1977:42) has suggested that an appropriate approach to the anthropological study of tourism might involve three research strategies. First, a micro-sociological analysis of tourist-host interaction perhaps of the nature of Goffman (1959; 1967) might give some insight into the dimension of meaning transmitted between individual and host. One could look additionally at the nature of various institutions in which the tourist interacts. Thirdly, some note of exchange theory would be relevant to
the understanding of why these interactions take place at all. I have attempted to understand the phenomenon of tourism in Tibet and its impact upon the Tibetan diaspora by concentrating on the exchange of Dalai Lama photographs and other sacred paraphernalia between the independent tourist and the Tibetans. By looking at these exchanges in an interactive context, I hope to demonstrate the operation of the sbyin-bdag paradigm as a mechanism for incorporating strangers within a traditional category of Tibetan life. By that incorporation, outsiders participate in the accomplishment of Tibetan national identity by being ascribed status as patrons.

Buckley and Strauss' "drifter-tourist" guidebook to Tibet (1986) encourages visitors to stock up on photographs of the exiled Dalai Lama to distribute to local Tibetans. But to Tibetans, these photos are not mere trinkets for barter that the guidebook seems to indicate. I will show that Dalai Lama photos and similar objects are powerful symbols with manifold meaning to the Tibetans. Their frequent exchange provides not only a nexus of interaction between tourist and Tibetans, but can demonstrate deeper levels of meaning within the Tibetan social system.

I have previously mentioned that Tibetan refugees often categorize western visitors to their South Asian communities within their traditional paradigm as potential supporters of their culture and nationalistic goals. Do the Tibetans in
their homeland similarly respond to their western guests, adding a new element to the pre-existant pilgrim ascription? If so, perhaps the model for this sort of interaction has been bolstered by the returning refugees, and with it, an encouragement for more active nationalism.

Images of the "god/king" in Chinese-occupied Tibet have long been banned since his 1959 exile to India. As the Dalai Lama had been officially discredited as a "lackey of foreign imperialism...an anti-China tool of the Indian reactionaries," (Van Walt 1987:169) the possession of even a photograph of him, especially as it might symbolize his role as secular ruler of the country, was long considered seditious. Furthermore, with the suppression of religion during the Cultural Revolution, even the role of the Dalai Lama as a religious figure was dismissed by the Chinese.

With the reforms initiated by Teng Xiao Ping, Buddhist practice has been cautiously allowed to return to Tibet since the early 1980s. The collective madness (both Chinese and Tibetan, see Grunfeld 1987) of the Cultural Revolution had destroyed, along with the monasteries and monastic infrastructure, much of the religious art of Tibet—statues, paintings, silver and gold alter-pieces, brocade furnishings, and sacred photographs of the great lamas. However, the object most in demand for the consecration of recently reconstructed private and monastic chapels and altars seems to be photographs of the Dalai Lama—they have
high symbolic value, yet are much more portable and of lower capital investment than, say, a gilded bronze Buddha.

Eventually, it became accepted by the Chinese officials that the Dalai Lama could be recognized as a religious figure by local Tibetans without undue significance. This is in keeping with post-Enlightenment western ideas (including Marxism) that Church and State can be (or must be) successfully separated. After the reforms of the early 1980s, individuals were allowed to possess his photograph. However, the Chinese have perhaps greatly underestimated the Tibetans in their loyalty to their exiled ruler and the symbolic significance of his image. To the pre-diaspora Tibetans, as we have seen, Church and State are inseparable as an ideal in "righteous leadership," an ideal which harkens back to Ashokan India.

In the early 1980s, the Chinese were facing the prospects that the Dalai Lama might even be able to return in a limited capacity: His role was envisioned by the Beijing authorities as an exclusively religious position as high lama, in a similar capacity to that of the Panchen Lama, the second highest lama in Tibet who has remained in China and has cooperated with the Chinese. In the early 1980s, several delegations of representatives hand-picked by the Dalai Lama were sent on fact-finding missions to Tibet to determine if the conditions were ripe for his return (Tibetan Review 1979-80).
Yet, what does not seem to have been considered by the Chinese is the traditional inseparability of the role of the Dalai Lama as king from the role of pontifex maximus among the local Tibetans. It is impossible, according to my interviews with native Tibetans, to respect the Dalai Lama as head of Buddhism and not to follow his politics.

Accordingly, the possession of a Dalai Lama photograph becomes at once a statement of Tibetan nationalism as well as a religious sentiment. A separation of the two is unheard of and unthinkable to many homeland Tibetans (even though the diaspora government is becoming increasingly secularized). Immediately after the reforms of 1979 which legalized the practice of Buddhism, there was a tremendous demand for Dalai Lama photographs. Characteristic of the past suppression of religious artifacts in China, the photographs were not initially available in Tibet. The Tibetans had to wait for the independent tourist and the refugees to personally bring in this very scarce resource. (Needless to say, group tourists have never been encouraged by CITS to have much contact with Tibetans, let alone distribute Dalai Lama material). Visitors began bringing in this "cargo," helping to fuel a revitalization of Buddhist practice and the cult of the "god/king."

What is particularly interesting about the exchange of Dalai Lama photos is the multiplicity of meaning inherent in this symbol to the Tibetans, a meaning which is transmitted
essentially from the Dalai Lama's exile institutions, through westerners or refugees, to the local Tibetans.

First, the presentation of a Dalai Lama photograph is a special gift, and functions as a social exchange within the traditional Tibetan system of merit-making (sbyin-bdag agency). Its giving can demonstrate the double meaning of being an offering of religious devotion as well as a political act.

As seen in the examples that follow, one can also convey to the recipient the notion of nang-pa, the message that the giver is "one of us" (T. nang-pa "a Buddhist," nang-po "a bosom-friend," nang-mi "members of a household"). By giving Dalai Lama photos, an outsider can instantly communicate that he is a Buddhist, is sympathetic to the political aspirations of the Tibetan people, and/or that he indeed understands Tibetan customs and its etiquette. This type of transaction conforms to Mauss's notion of the practice of gifting in the role of maintaining social solidarity (1967).

Third, Dalai Lama photographs also possess some of the attributes of money, and can serve as a type of barter and even limited currency among Tibetans. They are contextually variable "special purpose" money (see Bohannan 1963). Dalai Lama photos can be a means of exchange, a standard of value, and a means of payment, but only under certain circumstances (and certainly not for satisfying PRC government
obligations). These photos appear to have a set value; they are almost universally accepted by Tibetans; they are readily convertible for goods and services among the participants; they come in various denominations; and their utility is limited to exchange or display. An analogy with baseball card exchange between American boys seems useful. Some symbols and actions can have simultaneous sacred and secular aspects (Arens 1978)—meaning, as such is articulated in their exchange.

I participated in around 50 of these exchanges in Tibet, drawing from the large cache of Dalai Lama photos and other paraphernalia I had obtained in India, Nepal, and Lhasa itself. I also noted other exchanges, for example between refugees and homeland Tibetans, or between western tourists and local Tibetans. The following cases are representative of the general categories of interactions that I engaged in:

Case Studies

1. In the throne room of the 6th Dalai Lama at the Potala palace in Lhasa, an old caretaker/monk had been eyeing a photo button that I wore. It displayed the Dalai and Panchen Lamas side-by-side, with an image of a Buddha in the background. I had been viewing the religious statues and paintings with a certain respect and reverence, and probably because of this demeanor the monk did not ask me directly for the button. That would have been a breech of
etiquette in the "merit-making/merit-taking" system (like the reluctance for direct patronage solicitations in Dharamsala previously discussed). I told him that although this particular button was mine, I would get him another and return in a few days. I went to the central bazaar, purchased the duplicate for ¥5 (US $1.25), and returned to the Potala a few days later. When I gave the monk the button, he immediately threw ceremonial scarves (kha-btags) around me and my western friend. We removed these after thanking the monk and asked if he might present these to the throne of the 6th Dalai Lama. After placing the scarves at the foot of the enthroned image of this previous incarnation of the Dalai Lama, the monk again threw more scarves around us with the implied order to keep these for ourselves. We then left the room, but could not fail to notice a certain look of appreciation from Tibetan pilgrims, as well as a bit of envy from other westerners as we wore our scarves. We had presented a gift, and were in-turn blessed by the monk. It was a typical sbyin-bdag interaction, one which identified the respective roles of the actors.

2. The great Sakya temple in southern Tibet had been the home of the Imperial Preceptor to the Court of Khubilai Khan (Chapter 4). The monastery and the associated village have now largely been destroyed as a consequence of Chinese occupation, but a few pilgrims have resumed their
circumambulations of the remains of the sacred edifice. On one occasion I encountered an elderly blind woman slowly finding her way along the path around the monastery. As I approached, children kept begging for Dalai Lama photos, but my gift was intended for the old pilgrim. I gently approached her and pressed into her hands a wallet-sized color print of the Dalai Lama. She held it closely before her weak eyes, and then proceeded to thank me profusely. Soon, however, two young Tibetan ladies ran up to me. Dressed in modern clothing and uncharacteristically aggressive, the two accosted me for photographs. Although I had no more pictures to give, the ladies apparently expected me to be a boundless source of these gifts.

3. The Jokhang Temple in Lhasa is considered the "holy of holies" in Tibet, and although it suffered tremendous destruction during the Cultural Revolution (used as a guesthouse), it is slowly being restored to its former splendor. I had visited the Jokhang on many occasions, and a favorite spot was the shrine of the Hidden Palden Lhamo goddess on the third floor. As I was a frequent visitor, I had become familiar with the two attendants of the chapel. Both were young boys—one was a monk and the other a lay Tibetan. During one visit, when all the tourists had left the room, one boy showed me a hidden door and invited me to enter a special tantric meditation room. In the corner was a stairs which ascended to the spectacular roof, with its
golden eaves, parapets, and a magnificent view of the city. Having exhausted my film on the top of the cathedral, I returned to the Lhamo Chapel, to find the two youths shyly asking for Dalai Lama pictures. In this case, photographs of one nature were exchanged for photos of a different nature. On many other occasions when visiting temples, the doors of officially off-limits areas literally flew open and photographic regulations disappeared at the prospect of the receipt of these images.

4. At the Tashilumpo monastery in Shigatse, Dalai Lama photos were exchanged for information as to the India-China military border clashes south of Gyantse, information which was naturally important to foreign visitors and unobtainable by official methods.

5. Dalai Lama photographs could be exchanged in the city of Shigatse in the main bazaar. After bargaining for souvenirs, when the price had been agreed upon, the proffering of a Dalai Lama photo would consistently merit a ¥5 discount. On the streets of Lhasa, Dalai Lama photos could secure a standard ¥5 premium from the host of ever-present money-changers. One Dalai Lama photo also was more than sufficient to pay for four cups of tea in Lhasa.2

From the foregoing examples, one can see a movement away from the use of Dalai Lama photo presentations as "pure" gifts (Mauss), through gifts in which return performance is expected, to exchanges based solely on
market exchange dynamics. In the first interaction, the exchange was made according to traditional system of lay/monastic merit-making and merit-taking. The second example shows intent to make merit by gifting the old pilgrim, but the context of my motivation to give was changed by the entry of the two rude interlopers. The third and fourth situations are examples of balanced reciprocity--exchange for anticipation of immediate return. All four situations demonstrate exchanges within social, rather than market, contexts. The use of Dalai Lama photos as "money" is demonstrated in the fifth case. Little social context was established, the photos had consistent value in a number of exchanges for different goods and services. There was no concern for merit nor demonstration of group inclusiveness by such exchanges. More importantly, perhaps, was that the notion of membership within the category of nang-pa was not expressed in Case 5.

Because of the multiplicity of meaning inherent in Dalai Lama photos, and the various types of interchanges that can be realized from their exchange, misunderstanding and confusion as to the expectations of the giver and recipient was frequently observed between westerners and Tibetans. Not all westerners can be expected to have been socialized into the system. The dual contextual nature of the photos, as a highly meritorious gift within the cultural system or as a medium of market exchange outside of it, can
be demonstrated in examples wherein the context of exchange was misinterpreted between giver and recipient:

Foreign tourists have learned from their guidebooks (e.g. Booz 1986; Buckley and Strauss 1986) that Dalai Lama pictures can be used, essentially, "to get Tibetans to do things for you." On one occasion western tourists were observed in the Barkhor bazaar in Lhasa handing out photos indiscriminately to anyone who asked. When they soon ran out, the tourists were pulled at, chased and hounded by large masses of Tibetans shouting "Dalai Lama! Dalai Lama!" Foreign tourists were seen practically "mugged" in the central courtyard of Tashilumpo monastery by Tibetans of all ages because they apparently did not elect to distribute their photos with a certain respectful attitude. One lady had her purse grabbed from her, and several Tibetan ladies pulled its contents out in the pursuit of Dalai Lama photos. At Sakya, I saw that a rather presumptuous western couple had refused to give the resident monks photos. They were then caught sneaking unauthorized snapshots of the temple's interior by the same monks. One monk yanked the camera off the lady's hand in anger, and refused to give it back unless the film was destroyed. The "photo for photo" contractual rule of reciprocity had been violated.

In these cases, the expectations of both the givers and the recipients had been different. Tibetans seemed to
anticipate a sbyin-bdag presentation, whereas some tourists' 
cavaleer attitude towards presentation apparently belied 
understanding of the traditional exchange.

**Types and Sources of Photos**

Dalai Lama photographs are produced in various formats, 
from crude photostats to large, full-color glossy prints. 
On the basis of my collection of Dalai Lama photos from 
various sources inside and outside Tibet, and as witnessed 
as actually having been distributed in Tibet. Fig. 12 shows 
my typology of Dalai Lama photograph categories.

In Tibetan refugee communities in South Asia, large 
photographs of the Dalai Lama with Nehru, Indira or Rajiv 
Gandhi, or portrayed in conjunction with images of King 
Birenda of Nepal, are commonly displayed in houses, 
businesses, and offices. In occupied Tibet, the Hindu 
leaders are often substituted with photos of the Dalai and 
Panchen Lamas with Mao. The most commonly distributed 
photos are, however, "wallet" or medium-sized photos in 
printed format. In market exchange transactions, these 
photos consistently command a value of ¥5.

Many tourists, perhaps again not appreciating the 
"sacred" nature of the images, have had xeroxed copies made 
beforehand from books. Recent photos of the Dalai Lama are 
pREFERRED over older ones by Tibetans, and photo buttons are 
popular as they can be worn as talismans.
A. Media
1. original photos
2. copies of photos (duplicates of prints)
3. printed photos
4. xeroxed photos

B. Format
1. large photos suitable for prominent display (8x10"
+)  
2. medium-sized photos (3x5" to 8x10"
)  
3. playing card-size photos
4. wallet-sized photos
5. multi-frame photos
6. photo buttons
7. photos in amulets (ga' u)

C. Image
1. young Dala Lama (in Tibet)
2. older Dalai Lama (in exile)
3. Dalai Lama with others
   a. w/Panchen Lama
   b. w/Mao and Panchen
   c. w/ other spiritual or political leaders
      1. Pope Paul VI or John Paul II
      2. Nehru family
      3. w/ Nechung Oracle in trance
      4. w/ other high lamas
      5. as "product endorsements" (authors, important patrons)
   d. w/ his mother
4. Dalai Lama representing specific religious functions
   a. wearing yellow teaching robes
   b. wearing yellow hat of Gelugpa (zhwa-ser)
   c. wearing red hat of Atisha (zhwa-mar)
   d. wearing Sakya-like turban
   e. wearing Gelugpa processional hat (rtse-zhwa)
   f. wearing king's crown (various types)

Fig. 12. Dalai Lama Photograph Typology
Dalai Lama photos also vary as to the robe or hat worn by the god/king. He may be wearing the yellow "teaching" robes and yellow, conical hat of the Gelugpa order, the turban of the old Sakya order patronized by Khubilai Khan, the red conical hat of the ancient Nyingmapa, the dragon robes of the kings of Tibet, or the costume of a tantric priest, with bone and ivory ornaments. These various images reflect the multifarious roles that the institution of the Dalai Lama represents. Tibetans collect and swap these various "poses" and styles much as we would collect baseball cards. Despite the variety of images, it is the context of exchange that is important, not necessarily the content.

A collection of photos inside amulet boxes (ga'yu) are often worn on the body (especially by Tibetan nomads)—the more the better. Talismans of this nature are thought to protect one from misfortunes such as sickness and accidents. In general, the greater the collection of Dalai Lama photos the greater the protection, merit, or prestige garnered by the recipient. This corresponds to popular Tibetan Buddhist practice where, for example, 100,000 prayers muttered are 100,000-times better than one. Repetition is the key to increasing one's stock of merit.

Other than original or xeroxed photos, most Dalai Lama photographs are produced from three sources: 1) In catering to western tourists and Tibetan refugees, Tibetan entrepreneurs in Kathmandu, Delhi and Dharamsala have
printed large quantities of photographs printed for sale.

2) Some western publishers that specialize in works of Tibetan religious studies have produced Dalai Lama photos (e.g. Snow Lion Press). 3) The exiled Tibetan government of the Dalai Lama provides generous numbers of photos for distribution to visiting westerners planning forays into Tibet. In this case, the political meaning behind Dalai Lama photos is clearly evident. In addition, small photography shops in Dharamsala, Kathmandu, and even Lhasa undertake their own photo-reproduction and sales of Dalai Lama photos. In the main bazaar of Lhasa, the Barkhor, one occasionally sees wallet-sized photos for sale, again at the standard price of ¥5.

On the basis of my observations, I suggest the following "meanings" inherent in Dalai Lama photographs which may be articulated in the act of exchange:

1. Dalai Lama photos possess "merit," which can be realized for the giver by the act of giving. Merit may additionally accrue to the recipient by subsequently treating the object respectfully and displaying it in a prominent place.

2. Photos symbolize nang-pa cultural solidarity.

3. Photos symbolize aspirations of the return of the Dalai Lama and the rightful independence of Tibet.

4. Photos symbolize the whole system of theocratic monarchy, not just the present Dalai Lama XIV.

5. Photos symbolize the protective nature of the Dalai Lama as bodhisattva Chenrezi, the God of Compassion; and as a Fierce Protector of Buddhism (Tam-drin). In this sense, photos are worn as amulets.
6. The existence of the photos in Tibet indicates the renewed "presence" of the Dalai Lama.

7. Photo exchange displays knowledge of proper etiquette when greeting or making friends. In effect, they can also substitute for the tradition exchange of scarves (kha-btags).

8. Photo exchange can symbolize the entire system of "merit-making/merit-taking" (sbyin-bdag) which is the backbone of the Tibetan cultural system.

It is during the act of giving that the multiple symbolic content inherent in the photographs can be made manifest. The process of giving Dalai Lama photographs in a non-market exchange is essentially a type of communication, one which can convey subtle political as well as religious messages in a country which is under foreign domination.

Still, in a different context, the full symbolic potential need not be communicated. Dalai Lama photos may simply be exchanged for goods and services, and the recipients may choose to later pass them on, communicating the symbolic meanings of the photos in the process.

It is interesting to note that the NBC reporters in Tibet in the fall of 1987 were prohibited by Chinese officials from airing scenes of their distribution of Dalai Lama photographs. Clearly, the Chinese only now understand that the symbolic value of these photographs is not limited to religious sentiment alone.

Travel to Tibet has again been restricted to carefully restricted, group tours, and in all probability, Dalai Lama photos will no longer be brought in for the immediate
future. In retrospect, during that brief period of 1985-1987 in which unrestricted tourist and refugee travel was allowed in Tibet, the Dalai Lama again existed in his homeland--his presence was evident in his images.  

Exchanges between Refugees and Local Tibetans

The exchange of Dalai Lama paraphernalia, including photos and other objects, such as blessed knotted-cords to be worn as talismans (srung-bdud) and "precious pills" (mani ril-bu), was active between my refugee informants and local Tibetans. All distributions observed were between refugees as donors and local Tibetans as recipients, and all interactions were within the context of merit-making/merit-taking. Refugees tried to be sbyin-bdag to their Tibetan brethren, and the process of giving sacred items to Tibetans was an identity-affirming action, as it conveyed the message of nang-pa most clearly. The first exchange, however, was not without a certain consternation among the refugees themselves. As Ribong and Cheema competed with each other to present an image of a more deserving client to me in Dharamsala, they competed in Tibet to demonstrate their respective superiority as patrons to their local compatriots:

1. The first real opportunity for my refugee informants to give Dalai Lama paraphernalia occurred just outside of Shigatse, en route to Lhasa. Prior to that time we had stopped in villages with large concentrations of PLA. At
the town of Narthang our driver stopped briefly to relay a message. It was sunset, and as the bus drove up, what seemed like the entire population of the village soon surrounded our vehicle in wide-eyed wonder. It was clear that this village, off the road some distance, probably had had little contact with either westerners or returning refugees.

Cheema Sengge sensed his cue, and asked me to fetch the cache of Dalai Lama photographs from my bag. He handed a few out judiciously through the bus window, pausing to exchange a few words of greetings each time. Each recipient bowed slightly, and held their photos close to themselves. Finally the village headman appeared as people stood back from his approach. Cheema, with dramatic flourish, offered the chief a photo. The entire crowd cheered. Cheema had been received as practically an emissary from the Dalai Lama's court, which pleased none of the refugees on board save himself. Ribong Karpo, for one, was furious that Cheema had received merit from the bestowing of someone else's possessions (which were actually Cheema's, but kept in my possession for safety's sake). In addition, neither Ribong nor Jigme Jug had the opportunity to fetch their sacred souvenirs in time to circumvent Cheema's upstaging. Cheema, it was said, amassed all the prestige for himself by this distribution, when it would have been more proper for all the refugees (and myself) to share in the distribution of the photos.
2. Sera monastery, a few kilometers north of Lhasa, was the second largest in Tibet with a population of over 5,000 monks. A Gelugpa center, Sera was one of the three State monasteries of the inner court of the Dalai Lama. Sera has had a rather martial tradition in the affairs of Tibet, having taken part in an attempted coup d'etat in 1947, holding their own against the Tibetan army in defense of the ex-regent, Reting Rinpoche. Sera now stands almost completely deserted, with few monks and few visitors. On one occasion, Ribong and I rode bicycles up the dusty trail to what had been a pre-eminent monastery in the Lhasa valley. The monastery was not inhabited by monks, but by large numbers of Ceberean dogs, which jealously guarded the shuttered temples and barred courtyards from intrusion. As we gingerly walked through this field of canine sentries, Ribong spotted three old pilgrims sitting in the shade of a courtyard's wall.

Like the witches from MacBeth, the three old ladies sat muttering their *mantras*. Ribong fished through his bag and found Dalai Lama blessing cords to present to the women. The women were delighted to receive these tokens, and promptly besieged Ribong with a thousand questions about the health of the Dalai Lama, and the nature of life in exile with their departed leader. Ribong and the women motioned me to join them, and the women sat us down and began giving
us a history lesson. The elderly ladies apparently had experienced the rule of the 13th Dalai Lama, but had never seen the 14th. They would like to, but said they were too old now. All the while the old pilgrims looked upon Ribong as their lost grandson, and saw their chance to impress upon this young refugee some of the feeling for old Tibet and his responsibilities for its future. Upon leaving, the toothless pilgrims said they would stay here at Sera, and would pray for him (and me). To these women who have seen many years, Chinese rule in Tibet was a transitory phase in the long-term experience of the Tibetan people. We were fortunate to have experienced the direct presence of the Dalai Lama, according to the pilgrims, and were honorable for having passed on his blessings through the cord-talisman.

3. The monastery of Nechung was the home of the State Oracle of Tibet, and housed at an adjacent compound just below what had been the largest monastery in the world, Drepung (over 10,000 monks). According to the lamas and monks, Nechung had been badly damaged throughout the period of Chinese occupation, and was at a time used as a garrison for PLA troops. The monastery was given back to the few remaining Nechung monks in 1983, and it was being restored, not by Chinese subsidies, but from pilgrims' contributions. A small village is built at the foot of the monastery, and there is a strong sense of community at the site. My
informants told me that many of the local families have contributed a son to the monastery—the ties between gompa and village are again strong. Ribong and I visited the monastery, carrying much Dalai Lama paraphernalia. As we were touring the various chapels, the word was being spread to the village that Tibetans from Dharamsala had arrived bearing sacred cargo. We were cornered on a balcony overlooking a six meter statue of Padmasambhava by what must have been the entire village. Men, women, and children tugged at us, bowed and begged for blessing cords and photos. To prevent a riot, we could only distribute a few before discreetly hiding the rest under our clothing.

4. Before leaving Nechung, a tiny old monk presented me with a bag of tshogs (-kyi khor-lo, "Holy Communion"), little dried balls of tsampa flour which had been consecrated by the monks. I learned that this was a great blessing to me. Therefore, on subsequent occasions I would present a piece of tshogs to Tibetans, and they would receive it in the customary nang-pa manner with heads bowed and hands held high. Ribong had been planning on taking a small group of tourists to Gyantse, and I asked if he would visit a the charming old grandmother there that we had first met on our trip up to Lhasa. I gave him a kha-btags and a few pieces of Nechung tshogs to present her as a gift. Two months later I was myself in Gyantse, and met the old woman again. To my amazement, she said not a word, but began
dancing around holding an imaginary scarf. It dawned on me that she was mimicking the shamanistic dance of the Nechung Oracle. It was her way of thanking me for passing on the tshogs from Nechung. "Merit" had been transferred from the Dalai Lama through Ribong and me to the presentation at Nechung. This came back to me as tshogs, which was given to the old lady at Gyantse, and back to me again by her dance! An entire network of merit-making/merit-taking activity had been realized.

These four cases, unlike some of the previous exchanges of Dalai Lama photographs discussed, were all within the contextual understanding of the sbyin-bdag paradigm. There was no confusion in the mutual expectations of the actors. In the fourth example, the roles of merit-maker and merit-taker were continually reversed as the exchanges proceeded from individual to individual. At each exchange of sacred material, the notion of nang-pa solidarity was communicated. I, an outsider, was accorded nang-pa status by my participation in the proper performance of the merit exchange. In no way did I feel that my treatment was any different in these incidences than from that accorded my refugee informants.

Inherent in all mutually acknowledged nang-pa transactions of sacred material are the messages that the giver respects Buddhism and traditional Tibetan traditions. Furthermore, the demonstration of respect for Buddhism and
Tibetan customs articulated through the exchange of Dalai Lama paraphernalia suggests a statement of oneness within the most inclusive levels of Tibetan identity.

**Exchange and Tibetan Identity**

Ekvall studied the criteria of Tibetan identity in 1960 based on interviews with then recent Tibetan refugees:

"With reference to a number of criteria the Tibetan affirms this 'oneness' with the other persons who recognize the validity of the same criteria. So doing, he calls them Tibetans and all others non-Tibetans. Listed in the order of their importance, as the Tibetans state and rate them, these criteria are: 1) Religion: chos lugs gcig (religion manner one); 2) Folkways: kha lugs gcig (mouth or part manner one); 3) Language: skad lugs gcig (speech manner one); 4) Race: mi rigs gcig (human lineage one); 5) Land: sa cha gcig (soil extent one).

In both importance and sharpness of definition these five criteria are not equal. The first (religion) is the dominant one; the last two (race and land) are admittedly of lesser importance." (Ekvall 1960:376)

The interaction of Tibetans, refugees, and some westerners around the nexus of Dalai Lama paraphernalia does not invalidate Ekvall's assessment of the nature of Tibetan identity and confirms its continuing operation after nearly 30 years of occupation and diaspora. I would agree that the most important criteria for determining who is a Tibetan from non-Tibetan seems to be the demonstration of mutual religious affiliation and knowledge of Tibetan customs. Language, race, and land affiliations are secondary. The three lesser criteria are contributory— the first two are mandatory. This conceptualization of Tibetan identity seems
in marked contrast to some other Asian cultures, for example the Japanese, where "race" seems the most significant criteria for oneness.

Participating in merit-making/merit-taking actions places one within the sbyin-bdag paradigm. It seems plausible that shared communication of Tibetan Buddhist identity, as demonstrated here with Dalai Lama paraphernalia exchange, is the most inclusive type of Tibetan identity. It is in keeping with the general structure of Tibetan identity noted by Goldstein (1971), Nowak (1984), Ekvall (1960), and Saklani (1984). Ekvall in fact notes that certain "racial" Tibetans who have become Muslims are no longer recognized as being "unequivocally" Tibetan (1960: 377). The achieved status of Tibetan identity as a participant in the religious system and culture would seem to take precedence over the ascribed. Tibetan national identity, I have been suggesting, is achieved through certain performative strategies which are based on the actors' perceived historical preconceptualizations.

I have questioned my refugee informants on the nature of achieved "Tibetaness," and they have often commented that it certainly possible for a foreigner to become a Tibetan. Cheema, in fact, quoted the "Tiger's Stripes" proverb (see Chapter 1). In fact, I know one American, "Khampa Jose," whom Tibetans rumor carries refugee papers issued by the exiled government.
Symbolic exchanges of sacred Dalai Lama paraphernalia are no doubt identity-affirming activities for young Tibetan refugees in Tibet, but "foreigners" as well may be brought into the system by the fact of their patronage--genuine or merely assumed by the native actor. This high level of inclusiveness is perhaps based on the egalitarian, caste and color-blind ideals of original Buddhism. What may be interpreted by those on the outside as simple religious practice, is for those on the inside (nang-pa) a demonstration of support for Tibetan political and cultural solidarity as well. Dalai Lama photos and other paraphernalia are symbols of his presence in an occupied country, their exchange is utilized as an expression of a high-order identity.

Other symbols of national identity which have been promoted since 1959 in the refugee community, which are largely innovative responses to western notions of sovereignty (as I have presented) have also been brought into Tibet by refugees and westerners. Their appeal, however, is by no means universally favorable among local Tibetans. The Tibetan national flag, for example, although first appearing during the rule of the thirteenth Dalai Lama, never gained wide acceptance prior to 1959 in Tibet. In fact, the use of flags as symbols of national identity was late in much of Asia, and only adapted in wide measure following wide economic and diplomatic exposure to the West.
But the Tibetan flag has been promoted as just such a symbol in Dharamsala, in the exile government's attempt to model the notion of the Tibetan state along western lines of sovereign nationality. Perhaps because the Tibetan flag is an unambiguous symbol of independence in the western sense, its use in the refugee communities is greatly restricted by the hosts' governments. In Dharamsala and other Indian refugee communities, the display of the Tibetan flag is limited to a few holidays in the year—in Nepal, it use is prohibited during these same holidays and all other times. I have seen the multi-striped universal Buddhist flag substituting for the Tibetan one in such circumstances (which may also support my argument of the close association between Tibetan and Buddhist identity). In occupied Tibet, the display of the Tibetan flag can be considered a counterrevolutionary act, and under Chinese law is a capital offense.

Under such prohibitions, it is difficult to imagine how the national flag of Tibet, a relatively recent symbol, is presently received among local Tibetans. However, one of my refugee informants (living in the West) chose to wear a flag pin on his clothing and even distributed a few to local Tibetans. The reception was apparently mixed.4

The relative lack of regulation in China regarding the exchange of Dalai Lama photos, and the severe prohibitions from the display of the Tibetan flag, is indicative of the
Chinese attitude towards the separation of church and state, especially regard to Tibetans. To the Chinese, the Dalai Lama can legally represent a religious figure to the local Tibetans. The flag, on the other hand, is representative of a purely secular, and separatist idea—a western conveyance of the idea of sovereignty. But it is not within the tradition of pre-diaspora Tibetans to separate the two: the Dalai Lama is the symbol of the Buddhist Church and the Tibetan State—the two aspects are inseparable to many Tibetans, especially to homeland Tibetans who have not been a part of the diaspora trend towards increasing secularization. A Dalai Lama photo in Tibet expresses both aspects, and it is far safer to display than a Tibetan flag.

The symbol of the Dalai Lama is a vehicle that can accommodate past with present (and future). As such, it can additionally bridge the gap that at times is evident between young refugees and young local Tibetans. Some of my refugee informants did not have an easy time with young locals. Western affectations, relative affluence, rumors of boundless foreign support, good education and the ability to read and write in elegant Lhasa Tibetan, and the perceived continuation of Tibetan cultural traditions in exile were some of the points that apparently caused resentment among indigenes. The refugees had "run away," leaving their brothers alone and helpless to face Chinese aggression. Who is then to be considered more patriotic?
Cheema and Ribong frequently visited the Lhasa disco, especially on Saturday nights. They told me that there were many fights between young refugee and local men. Apparently, the homeland youth felt they were no match for the flashy refugees in attracting women.

Additionally, young local Tibetans might resent the prosyletizing behavior of some refugees. Cheema often boasted of scolding young locals for letting their respect of the Dalai Lama and traditional values wane. Of course, refugees largely did not have to face the limitations imposed by a Chinese occupation on a day-to-day basis. The action of giving Dalai Lama paraphrenalia seemed to heal the breach, conveying the notion of mutual identity and inclusiveness.

Dalai Lama paraphrenalia exchange appears to be a symbolic medium whereby nang-pa solidarity between actors may be articulated. I suggest that in exchanges between foreign tourists, refugees and local Tibetans, nang-pa inclusiveness may also convey nationalistic sentiment. They also can transmit notions of an increasingly secularized and westernized exile government developing in Dharamsala. The general phenomenon of tourism, matched by the presence of refugees, has not only stimulated a revival of sbyin-bdag practice, but has allowed the concept of a western-style, sovereign Tibet to enter the occupied region. Western visitors, often unintentionally, have become agents in the
wave of nationalism that has been sweeping the T.A.R. Western agency in Tibet through tourism, and among refugees in exile as foreign aid and individual support, is conceived by many Tibetans as a means by which they can ideologically and practically continue to be Tibetans. This is accomplished by applying past practices of the incorporation of outsiders onto the novel circumstances of tourism and foreign aid.

The Door Closes

The experiment of an open Tibet apparently has not worked for the Chinese. Following the busiest tourist season ever in Tibet (see Fig. 11), a series of nationalistic uprisings precipitated in Tibet beginning in September, 1987 (and are still continuing at the time of this writing). These demonstrations for independence have been the most dramatic since the 1959 Lhasa Uprising. Hundreds of tourists were witness to the demonstrations, and many of them have written of their experiences in the western press (e.g. Spence 1988; Tibetan Review, Nov. 1987; Ver Berkmoes 1987). China responded quickly, sealing the border and reverting to carefully supervised group tours. Gone are the independent tourists, now apparently considered by Chinese officials at least passive agents in the rise of Tibetan nationalism. Gone too are the refugees.

According to Lord Ennals and Fredrick Hyde-Chambers, reporting in the Tibetan Review (1988b) on the basis of
first-hand observations, the Chinese are discussing plans to close down the Tibetan tourist establishment, confining tourists to Chinese run hotels and restaurants. This will no doubt have a devastating affect on the individual Tibetan entrepreneur who has invested in the tourist boom. A news item in the same *Tibetan Review* suggests that Tibetans themselves are not allowed to leave or enter the country, apparently either local Tibetans or refugees--there are rumors of arrest (1988b:5).

In effect, China has been trying to free herself from political competition in the Tibetan sector of tourism by eliminating it. Ironically, this action will tend to perpetuate the image of a lost, "forgotten world of Shangri-la" rather than to banish the name of Tibet from the consciousness of the West. Select western visitors in the future will continue to provide tantalizing glimpses of the region through coffee-table books and exclusive articles. And Tibetans in exile will continue to try to present an image of themselves indicating that they are still a viable tradition.

The liberalizing government of the PRC is in a double-bind. Sealing Tibet from the world is an admission that there is a serious problem there, deflating the pride that some liberal reformers in Beijing have had since 1979 in regards to easing restrictions in the region. Opening
Tibet again to the aegis of independent tourism, on the other hand, would likely encourage new rounds of Tibetan nationalism in its homeland.

Ribong Karpo, my primary informant, successfully escaped Lhasa, crossing the treacherous Himalayan passes into Nepal during the winter (December, 1987). He was not permitted by the Chinese embassy in Kathmandu to return to fetch his personal possessions. He returned to Dharamsala, trying to re-establish his credibility as a patriotic Tibetan, a suspicion generated by his act of leaving the professed status of a refugee to visit occupied Tibet. Ribong has told me of his displeasure with local villagers. He was shocked that his actions, which were for him patriotic and identity-affirming, would be interpreted by some in Dharamsala as counter-productive to the cause of Tibetan freedom. I cannot say that the Chinese action of permitting refugees to visit Tibet was designed to disrupt exile Tibetan communities—but it has resulted in a certain amount of social ambiguity in some cases. The Tibetan government-in-exile itself has sanctioned such visits, reflecting perhaps the ideal of an open exchange between homeland and refugee Tibetans. But repatriation per se is hardly encouraged.

The Dharamsala officialdom is further concerned with destabilizing factors generated by some forms of western patronage. In late 1987, the Congress of the United States
mandated 15 new scholarships for Tibetans wishing to enroll in post-graduate studies in the U.S (Tibetan Review 1988a:8-9). As administered by the Council for Tibetan Education, however, these scholarships have been reserved for individuals who have a strong record of civil service in the Tibetan exile communities. In the announcement published in the Tibetan Review in August 1988, candidates

"must undertake to sign a bond to return and serve in the Tibetan community for at least five years after completion of their studies in the USA." (Tibetan Review 1988d:24)

This statement reflects the problem of attracting young exiles to relatively low-paying positions in the government-in-exile. Furthermore, applicants should not ethically use the benefits of such foreign support as a "stepping-stone" for eventual emigration to the West. Applicants must also be in good standing as bona-fide refugees (i.e. patriots):

"Candidates are required to submit their parents' RC [registration certificate] number and Rangzen Green Book number along with a letter from Bod Rangwang Denpai Legul." (Tibetan Review 1988d:24)

The "Bod Rangwang Denpai Legul" seems to be a semi-official organization that assesses the status of one's individual political commitment to the goal of Tibetan independence in the community (according to informants). Patriotism, it would seem, is consciously articulated, adjudicated, and qualified within Dharamsala society.

Collectively, Tibetan exiles must present themselves to the world as "refugees" in order to qualify for assistance.
On the other hand, individual refugees have to qualify as "patriots" to their own society before the benefits of such aid is disbursed to them by various Tibetan organizations. The formula "refugee=patriot" practiced on the individual level has been imposed on the perceived relationship between the exiled Tibetan State and its western supporters. Thus western agency, as religious gifting, relief aid, or tourist "interest," is interpreted by many Tibetans as being indicative of western support of a free Tibet.

Securing an independent patron is one way that a Tibetan exile can receive support without necessarily having to qualify his or her eligibility as a patriot before a government-in-exile organization. Cheema Singge, the "Black Client," failed institutional acceptance in Dharamsala because of an alleged unseemly past. Furthermore, because his apparent misrepresentation was revealed to a potential foreign sbyin-bdag, his potential as a suitable client was further diminished. Cheema voluntarily remained behind in Tibet, having apparently secured a position with the official Chinese tourist establishment. He has repatriated. In short, the denial of access to patronage funds functionally served as a policing mechanism in Cheema's case.

Dawa Ngangpo (the itinerant salesman), on the other hand, not only returned to northern India safely, but casually wrote to tell me that he had "made a lot of money
on this trip." Dawa had skillfully utilized both institutional support (the Kamrao Self-Help group) and individual patronage to establish himself in the unambiguous role of petty trader.

In Dharamsala, the exile ship of state listed and rocked through the recent events in Tibet, but has quickly resumed its course in showing the flag of nationalism. Recent statements by the Dalai Lama, as they have been interpreted in the West, have caused yet another occasion in which the notion of Tibetan nationality must be consciously articulated among Tibetan refugees.

Further Accomplishment

The Tibetan demonstrations had very wide world media attention in 1987-1988. Bills for the respect of Tibetan rights have been passed in the U.S. House and Senate (Congressional Record 1987). Various lobbies, such as the U.S.-Tibet Committee have quickly sprung up. More fund-drives, letter-writing campaigns, and rallies are being held in the West (various Press Releases, Office of Tibet, NY), meanwhile western dharma centers continue to spread instruction in Buddhist practice. The Dalai Lama continues to make the rounds of his supporters around the world.

The Dalai Lama has recently proposed a "middle-path" solution between the calls for independence or oblivion in Tibet. In a speech before the European Parliament in Strasbourg on June 15, 1988, the Tibetan leader outlined a
plan that would hopefully achieve genuine local autonomy within the framework of the People's Republic of China:

"The whole of Tibet known as Cholka-Sum (Ü-Tsang, Kham and Amdo) should become a self-governing democratic political entity, founded on law by agreement of the people for the common good and the protection of themselves and their environment, in association with the People's Republic of China.

The Government of the People's Republic of China could remain responsible for Tibet's foreign policy. The Government of Tibet should, however, develop and maintain relations, through its own Foreign Affairs Bureau, in the fields of commerce, education, culture, religion, tourism, science, sports and other non-political activities..."

"I would like to emphasize, however, that whatever the outcome of the negotiations with the Chinese may be, the Tibetan people must be the ultimate deciding authority. Therefore, any proposal will contain a comprehensive procedural plan to ascertain the wishes of the Tibetan people in a nationwide referendum." (from the Tibetan Review, July, 1988c).

Some in the western press see these sorts of statements (first suggested by the Dalai Lama in April, 1988) as a radical compromise in the enduring polemic (San Diego Union April 10, 1988; Amrita Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, April 12, 1988), and a blow to all independence-minded Tibetans. To date, however, the Dalai Lama has always fallen short of demanding full and sovereign independence. The "compromise" proposed by the Dalai Lama is nothing more than a call to China to re-establish the status-quo before 1950, complete with the "vague " attachment to China that the British once called suzerainty (see Richardson 1962). This proposal is a request to resume, in earnest, a patron/client relationship.
The Dalai Lama suggests

"not complete independence, but equal status and mutual respect--our own land within a Republic of China where we are the master and China is helper." (San Diego Union, April 10, 1988)

This is precisely the ideology of the state-level mchod-yon system that we have been following through various periods in Tibetan history through the present: equal status between the emperor and the pontiff; between the worldly defender of Tibet and the Tibetan people incarnate. The Dalai Lama's European Parliament speech, furthermore, contains those major innovations that have developed in exile, including increased secular participation and the ultimate authority of the people of Tibet in its governance.

These statements have been disappointing to some of my informants, who wish for complete independence. Yet the Dalai Lama, a skillful politician, may really be bargaining for the results of that referendum which would be a "comprehensive procedural plan to ascertain the wishes of the Tibetan people." Complete independence might well be the wishes of those people. Thus, the Dalai Lama can suggest a mollifying compromise to his opponents (and more moderate western governments) while remaining loyal to the wishes of his people, be they nationalistic or otherwise.

Such a plebiscite would be supervised by the West, perhaps through the United Nations. This would, in effect, call upon Tibet's presently perceived western patron to witness and execute the wishes of its client.
Notes

1. While it is widely regarded that the Japanese emperor renounced his divinity following World War II, I suggest that the opposite occurred: he kept his divinity as a sacred symbol of state, and renounced his political power as king. In exile, the Dalai Lama similarly seems to want to give his political power to the people, and retain the divine aspects of his position.

2. I myself never bartered with Dalai Lama photos. This was the action of my "accomplise" Keith Liker, whose contributions to these data is thankfully acknowledged. Some of these exchanges I observed, others were related to me.

3. "Presence" in Tibetan (skun-mdun) is the most frequent term of reference and term of address to the Dalai Lama. It connotes the presence of the desendent bodhisattva to the world.

4. According to my informant, only the elderly were familiar with the design of the Tibetan flag. Naturally, it was a totally new concept to the younger generation of local Tibetans.
CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSION

I have been motivated in this project to challenge statements such as Tibetans "are being rapidly assimilated into their host cultures..." (Grunfeld 1988:26). I have seen these sorts of statements in the popular western press, and expressed to me by a Nepali official. According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary, assimilation is defined as

"[a] sociocultural fusion wherein individuals and groups of differing ethnic heritage acquire the basic habits, attitudes, and mode of life of an embracing national culture." (1966:132)

The Merriam-Webster Dictionary states that "assimilation" refers to the absorption into another cultural tradition (1974:57). These lay definitions are comparable to technical anthropological usage, which suggests that assimilation involves a loss of traditions and separate identity (see Moone 1981). This is a different phenomenon than "acculturation," which connotes a more continuous transmission of traits between diverse groups, a transmission which nevertheless changes its form and results in novel patterns.

From my own observations in the field, and from what my informants have expressed to me, the Tibetan refugees of Dharamsala at least are not "assimilating." They are adapting to a new set of socio-economic circumstances while
maintaining a perceived continuity with the past. Rather than losing their identity in exile, the Tibetans appear to be strengthening it. Whether this revitalized tradition is genuine or spurious (Handler and Linnekin 1984) is not as important to my perspective as the fact that these apparent patterns have a meaningful continuity for Tibetan refugees. All else can change, but what must remain continuous for the persistence of a people is the identity system itself (Castile and Kushner, et al 1981). A major component of the opposition process that has defined Tibetans from others in the past and present are the mchod-yon and sbyin-bdag dyads. In the modern diaspora, the "sacred client" category initially interpreted as being possessed by the sangha and subsequently the theocratic state, has become a role assumed by all patriotic Tibetans as recipients of various forms of western patronage.

The relocation of approximately 100,000 Tibetan refugees in South Asia following the Chinese occupation of Tibet in the 1950s has become a largely unresolved political and social issue nearly thirty years later. Not only have Tibetan exiles maintained a steadfast call for national independence, their continuing professed status as refugees in India and Nepal has many socio-economic advantages over the alternative of assimilation. I suggest that Tibetan refugees have been "successful" in perpetuating their cultural identity not merely because the have been
materially successful in maintaining traditional patterns of life and institutions in exile, but rather because their worldview regarding their present status is ideologically compatible to other events in their long history. It is this apparent continuity which helps individual Tibetans define their existence as Tibetans in exile, and lends resistance against the forces of assimilation prevalent in their host societies.

Tibetan refugee communities in South Asia do not, as some have suggested, represent the last remnants of a fossilized, archaic civilization. On the contrary, they are heirs to a cultural system that for over thirteen centuries has maintained a set of oppositions which has effectively defined themselves apart from others. This system has been flexible, allowing for the accommodation of agents of potential change. This system is still operating in the Tibetan diaspora, providing a notion of continuity between present circumstances and a perceived historical past. There is an long-enduring pattern of patron/client relationships which has formed the foundation of a system which serves to define the Tibetan people in the past as well as in the present. Such a system links the Tibetan refugees to their past. It has been capable of accommodating innovations, generating and regenerating symbols by which Tibetans identify, and creating ethnic oppositions between themselves and others. The patron/client dyad has
been redefined in exile, and that a new concept of Tibetan national identity has arisen from this process.

Recent demonstrations of nationalism in the homeland and in the diaspora reflect an assumption common to many modern Tibetans: the free West will support the independence of the homeland, because the West has, for nearly thirty years, helped to maintain refugee settlements in South Asia and in other areas through international relief agencies and individual sponsorship. The West, as it is apparently perceived by many Tibetans, has replaced the traditional means of support of the Tibetan state, an agency which in the past was provided by various Mongol and Manchu patrons. Altogether, three types of assumed western patronage have contributed to the Tibetan exiles' concept of continuing outside support, a perception which reinforces their persistence as a people:

First, being refugees, the Tibetan laity qualifies to receive direct foreign aid from many international agencies. This provides a certain socio-economic independence from their immediate South Asian hosts, who have been, nevertheless, very generous in helping to establish various resettlement communities. A system of individual sponsorship of Tibetans by western benefactors has also been established. From my own observations of Dharamsala and other exile communities in 1978 and 1987, the relief-based economy has changed from one which provides basic
subsistence, rehabilitation and health care to one which is attempting to rebuild its entire society, including the funding of an international lobbying effort to promote the concept of Tibetan independence. It is economically and politically advantageous, therefore to remain refugees. The Tibetan exile welfare state, although still dependent on distant patronage, is in a socio-economic position of being able to circumvent immediate host dependency and subsequently certain forces of primary assimilation.

The second major factor contributing to the persistence of Tibetan identity in exile has been the creation of Tibetan Buddhist centers in the West. These monastic missions contribute directly to the continuation of re-established Tibetan religious institutions in India and Nepal. And of course, the Tibetan clergy has been the source of political power in their culture for many centuries. Such funds generated in the West as a part of the religious system of donations are consequently transformed into political support for the Tibetan theocratic state. Perhaps due to the private nature of monastic accounts, no one to date has ventured to estimate the amount of money that is generated in the West by this religious activity. But even a cursory observation would indicate that this funding which flows back to the mother monasteries in South Asia is substantial. Western Buddhists contribute cash, labor, or gifts in kind to their local
temple. These temples in turn gift their parent monasteries in South Asia. The head monasteries may choose to contribute to the various programs of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile. Gifting by a western devotee, an act of religious practice, may ultimately be transformed into support for the Tibetan exile government and its nationalistic goals by this sort of redistribution.

The third form of western agency that has contributed to the perpetuation of Tibetan national identity is tourism on both sides of the Himalaya. The opening of Tibet to independent tourism in the last few years is coincidental to the situation whereby Tibetan refugees currently residing outside of Tibet have also been allowed to visit their families and homeland for extended periods, significantly without immediate obligation for repatriation into the PRC. There has been a significant level of interaction between western tourists and refugees within Tibet itself. Tibetan exiles tend to categorize these western visitors within their own paradigm as being potential supporters of their traditional culture and nationalistic goals (as generated from the experience of foreign aid and western ecclesiastic patronage). Homeland Tibetans have been encouraged by visiting exiles to respond to their western guests in a similar manner of accommodation. The presence of foreigners as potential patrons of free Tibet seems to be evident in the native attitude towards tourism development in the
T.A.R., and stands in marked contrast to official Chinese tourist policy. The dialectic that was being maintained between indigenous and official tourist development prior to the uprisings is summarized by the Chinese de-emphasizing the symbolic boundaries between Tibet and China, and the Tibetans emphasizing these boundaries. Western agency, in the form of tourism, was seen to be beneficial by both sides, as it provided a world audience by which each faction could respectively present their version of the status of Tibet. The political impact of this situation upon local Tibetans may have been one of the contributing factors in the recent nationalistic uprisings, and one reason that China has again sealed Tibet to all except well-supervised, Chinese managed group tours.

I suggest that these three forms of foreign agency contribute to a persistence of national identity because they are ideologically compatible to perceived historical patterns of outside support of the religious community, and by extension, the Tibetan State and its people. This perceived support not only preserves a notion of continuity of national identity in exile, but serves as a justification for remaining stateless refugees. I suggest further that this model has been recently introduced into Tibet proper.

The ideology of the Tibetan government from the 17th century to the Chinese revolution in 1911, and one which was further ascribed to the Mongol period of the Yüan dynasty in
the 13th century, defined the relationship of the state to the empire according to the personal, spiritual bonds between the Tibetan hierarch and the emperor. The mchod-yon dyad is a special type of a more general patron/client relationship (sbyin-bdag) whereby a lay patron is responsible for the material needs of his religious preceptor. This is, of course a very old idea in Indian religious systems (śramana/dānapati; guru/student). The cleric, who has normally renounced the world, receives the material necessities of life, whereas the donor receives religious instruction or merely intangible merit for these contributions. Inherent in this dyad, however, is the notion that the client, by his or her sacred status, is ultimately superior to the patron.

The particular historical application of this ideal dyad, the mchod-yon, has defined the relationship between Tibet and the Mongol and Manchu empires. According to native Tibetan interpretations, in both modern refugee praxis as well as in native records back to at least the 17th century, no hint of client subordination can be seen. In native practice, the Tibetan state, as the estate of the Dalai Lama, should be considered at least equal to those agents which support it materially. A patron, however powerful, has no rights of interference in the affairs of his sacred client. The empire, by entering into a mchod-yon relationship with the Tibetan hierarch, and consequently
with Tibet, according to native interpretation, had no right
to claim the region. The mchod-yon with the Manchu empire
ended with the abdication of P'u-yi in 1911. Without such
sacred bonds of mutual allegiance, the 13th Dalai Lama
declared Tibet independent of the succeeding Republic of
China. Subsequently, the Tibetans have sought to re-
establish patron/client relationships with the West. Tibet
sought these out with the Russian and British empires in the
early 20th century. In recent years, Tibetan exiles have
found support unofficially, through the agencies of
individual and organizational relief aid, monastic missions
abroad, and through individual western visitors. I suggest
that this sort western agency has been interpreted by many
Tibetans as being compatible to the historical practice of
the mchod-yon dyad.

The ideology of the patron/client dyad reinforces the
notion that it is honorable to be in a position to receive,
as the client is providing the patron a vehicle by which the
latter may incur merit. As monks qualify to be appropriate
vessels for receiving gifts by their renunciation of worldly
life, many Tibetan exiles consider themselves equally
qualified for having abandoned their property and means of
existence in Tibet to follow the Dalai Lama into exile. In
Tibetan refugee society, to be a client is positively
sanctioned. Maintaining refugee status is often equated
with patriotism.
The patron/client dyad in Tibetan culture provides a mechanism whereby forces and personnel from the "outside" can be utilized to support traditional notions of Tibetan identity. Due in part to the universality of Buddhist practice, which seems to be the paramount criteria for inclusiveness in the Tibetan system, identity can be achieved by action. It can be applied to those on the outside whose actions, whether consciousness or not, are interpreted by Tibetans as consistent with patronage. Mongols, Manchus, the Communists during the early years of occupation, and presently foreign relief organizations and individual sponsors of Tibetan exiles, as well as western tourists in South Asia and Tibet proper, have all been given a social function in Tibetan society as potential agents for the support and apparent continuation of Tibetan culture.

By finding a place for potentially disruptive outside agency, and by utilizing it to economically and ideologically support the perceived continuation of Tibetan cultural patterns, the Tibetans have historically maintained themselves as Tibetans. This process still continues in the diaspora, as is perhaps most clearly evident in the modern expression of Tibetan nationalism.

Change and continuity is an on-going, negotiable process between "event" and the past (Sahlins 1981). Living actors which draw some sort of meaningful identity from this process must be heard if one professes an interest in Tibet.
One cannot corral a synchronic or diachronic segment of a
continuing tradition, and refer to that parcel as "the real
Tibet." If the diaspora culture at times appears to be
synthetic, it is partly because its audience is pre-occupied
with Shangri-la images of a people who cannot coexist with
the modern world. The Tibetans themselves, through their
handicraft industry, have often helped perpetuate that
spurious image.

What I have attempted to provide is a demonstration of
the changes in the patron/client system at various periods
of Tibetan history, and demonstrate that present cir-
cumstances are often perceived by native actors to be
consistent with the past. This assumed continuity provides a
succession of negotiated oppositions that have maintained an
idea of "Tibetaness." To this end I have called upon both
living Tibetan actors and Tibetan government chroniclers as
historical actors to demonstrate the accomplishment of
Tibetan national identity.

As wrathful tantric deities are called upon by lamas to
protect the Doctrine and its practice, the potentially
destructive forces of assimilation are turned upon
themselves to help maintain a notion of "traditional"
society. The occasionally vehement insistence by its
occupiers that Tibet is an integral part of China because
Chinggis Khan was Chinese, serves no other cause but to
maintain the polemic and create, not destroy, the idea of Tibetan separateness to the world.

Changing circumstances and important events have at times reoriented some basic structural oppositions within that system, such as shown with the development of an increasingly powerful lay franchise in the diaspora. Sahlin (1981) and others suggest that change and continuity are not merely bipolar points on a continuum—they are aspects of the same phenomenon. Attempted structural reproduction itself becomes the agency for change. The mchod-von system that had existed under the Mongols was felt to have been restored under the Manchus, when in fact, the relationship between the emperor and hierophant, and between the empire and Tibet, changed with the development of the theocracy in the 17th century. With the downfall of the Ch'ing dynasty, there are some indications that the idea mchod-von, or at least the more general sbyin-bdag dyad, was reviving under western aegis.

The events of the 1959 Uprising and exodus are indicative of a native sentiment that India and the West would support the Tibetan cause of independence. Subsequent international relief aid, the success of the spread of Tibetan Buddhism to the West, and the phenomenon of tourism in the Tibetan diaspora and homeland regions, have further strengthened this native perception. The attempted reproduction of the dyad in this case seems to have changed the relationship
between the lay and clerical segments of the old order. In the modern refugee world, the laity is usurping the once exclusive position of the clergy as client. Secularization of the government seems to be reflective of this process, as is the valued ideal of retaining refugee status.

During the Sakya period, Tibetans built Mongol-style temples; during the Manchu period, Tibetan officials wore the dragon robes and peacock feathers of the Beijing court. Today, officials in Dharamsala and the Office of Tibet in New York wear three-piece worsted suits, and lamas professing their calling to the West live in split-level, suburban houses. It is the context of interaction, not the content, which in appearing to remain traditional, provides a perceived continuity with the past. Reorientation of state and individual sbyin-bdag relationships toward the West appears consistent with past practices, yet certain innovations, such as democratic secularization, have resulted. This has perhaps allowed Tibetan society to accommodate the vicissitudes of everyday experience within the idea of continuing tradition.

Innovations, as such, appearing to be consistent with the past, provide a continuity wherein Tibetan identity is maintained. There is nothing uniquely Tibetan in this process, except perhaps the particular usage of the patron/client dyad and calling it "Tibetan" throughout various periods of time. Conceptual consistency in the
mchod-yon dyad may explain why the Tibetans have been around as a distinctive civilization for over 1,300 years, perhaps superceding the Shangri-la paradigm of apparent physical isolation, or xenophobia, as a prime explanatory devices for the existence of Tibet. It might also explain how 115,000 refugees and six million Tibetans in their homeland occasionally manage to over shout one billion Chinese.

Sahlins, in inverting Pouillon's famous dictum, suggests that "plus c'est la même chose, plus ça change" (1981:7). While the intent of a system is stability, the result of structural reproduction is often unintended change. I offer, in my final analysis, a similar notion of change as an inherent component of structure, as expressed in Buddhist ideology. From the Mahā-parinibbāna-sutta, the Buddha's last instructions were:

"Decay is inherent in all component things! Work out your own salvation with diligence." (in Rhys Davids 1969:114)

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"I, the Dalai Lama, most omniscient possessor of the Buddhist faith, whose title was conferred by the Lord Buddha's command from the glorious land of India, speak to you as follows:

I am speaking to all classes of Tibetan people. Lord Buddha, from the glorious country of India, prophesised that the reincarnations of Avalokiteśvara, through successive rulers from the early religious kings to the present day, would look after the welfare of Tibet.

During the time of Genghis Khan and Altan Khan of the Mongols, the Ming dynasty of the Chinese, and the Ch'ing dynasty of the Manchus, Tibet and China co-operated on the basis of benefactor and priest relationship. A few years ago, the Chinese authorities in Szechuan and Yunnan endeavored to colonize our territory. They brought large numbers of troops into central Tibet on the pretext of policing the trade marts. I, therefore, left Lhasa with my ministers for the Indo-Tibetan border, hoping to clarify to the Manchu Emperor by wire that the existing relationship between Tibet and China had been that of patron and priest and had not been based on the subordination of one to the other. There was no other choice for me but to cross the border, because Chinese troops were following with the intention of taking me alive or dead.

On my arrival in India, I dispatched several telegrams to the Emperor; but his reply to my demands was delayed by corrupt officials at Peking. Meanwhile, the Manchu Empire collapsed. The Tibetans were encouraged to expel the Chinese from central Tibet. I, too, returned safely to my rightful and sacred country, and I am now in the course of driving out the remnants of Chinese troops from Do Kham in eastern Tibet. Now, the Chinese intention of colonizing Tibet under the patron-priest relationship has faded like a rainbow in the sky. Having once again achieved for ourselves a period of happiness and peace, I have now allotted to all of you the following duties to be carried out without negligence:

(1) Peace and happiness in this world can only be maintained by preserving the faith of Buddhism. It is, therefore, essential to preserve all Buddhist institutions in Tibet,
such as the Jokhang temple and Ramoche in Lhasa, Samye, and Traduk in southern Tibet, and the three great monasteries, etc.

(2) The various Buddhist sects in Tibet should be kept in a distinct and pure form. Buddhism should be taught, learned, and meditated upon properly. Except for special persons, the administrators of monasteries are forbidden to trade, loan money, deal in any kind of livestock, and/or subjugate another's subjects.

(3) The Tibetan government's civil and military officials, when collecting taxes or dealing with their subject citizens, should carry out their duties with fair and honest judgment so as to benefit the government without hurting the interests of the subject citizens. Some of the central government officials posted at Ngari Korsum in western Tibet, and Do Kham in eastern Tibet, are coercing their subject citizens to purchase commercial goods at high prices and have imposed transportation rights exceeding the limit permitted by the government. Houses, properties, and lands belonging to subject citizens have been confiscated on the pretext of minor breaches of the law. Furthermore, the amputation of citizens' limbs has been carried out as a form of punishment. Henceforth, such severe punishments are forbidden.

(4) Tibet is a country with rich natural resources; but it is not scientifically advanced like other lands. We are a small, religious, and independent nation. To keep up with the rest of the world, we must defend our country. In view of past invasions by foreigners, our people may have to face certain difficulties, which they must disregard. To safeguard and maintain the independence of our country, one and all should voluntarily work hard. Our subject citizens residing near the borders should be alert and keep the government informed by special messenger of any suspicious developments. Our subjects must not create major clashes between two nations because of minor incidents.

(5) Tibet, although thinly populated, is an extensive country. Some local officials and landholders are jealously obstructing other people from developing vacant lands, even though they are not doing so themselves. People with such intentions are enemies of the State and our progress. From now on, no one is allowed to obstruct anyone else from cultivating whatever vacant lands are available. Land taxes will not be collected until three years have passed; after that the land cultivator will have to pay taxes to the government and to the landlord every year, proportionate to the rent. The land will belong to the cultivator.
Your duties to the government and to the people will have been achieved when you have executed all that I have said here. This letter must be posted and proclaimed in every district of Tibet, and a copy kept in the records of the offices in every district.

From the Potala Palace. (Seal of the Dalai Lama)"

(from the Tibetan Government Archives, cited and translated by Shakabpa 1984:246-248)
APPENDIX B

Song of the People's Uprising

Fig. 13. Long Shog
Song of the People's Uprising
(translated by Thinley Dhondup and P. Christiaan Klieger)

"Rise up! For ten years now,
The people have been tortured.
We've had it down to our flesh and bone.

In the year 1959,
All the patriots could no longer tolerate.
The only action was to rise up for truth and human rights.

Rise up! Rise up, all Tibetan peoples!
All peoples of the world, support and rise up behind us.
Be witnesses for the truth.

Tibet follows its true leader...
The Great Protector, His Holiness the Dalai Lama,
Accepted by Tibetans in and out.

The red-handed butcher-enemy,
The imperialistic Red Chinese,
Will surely be kicked out of Tibet.
Rise up all patriots!"

(This song is sung on March 10 in Dharamsala and elsewhere in the diaspora. Its author is unknown).
The Tibetan National Anthem

Fig. 14. Tibetan National Anthem
The Tibetan National Anthem
(translated and scored by K.K. Wangchuk)

"Let the radiant light shine from Buddha's wish-fulfilling gem teachings, the treasure-mine of all hopes for happiness and benefit in both world life and liberation.

O Protectors who hold the jewel of the teachings and all beings, nourishing them greatly, may the sum of your virtuous deeds grow full! Firmly enduring in an adamantine state, guard all directions with compassion and love.

Above our heads may divinely appointed rule abide, endowed with a hundred benefits, and let the power increase with four-fold auspiciousness. May a new golden age of happiness and bliss spread throughout the three provinces of Tibet, and the glory of religious/secular rule expand.

By the spread of Buddha's teachings in the ten directions, may everyone throughout the world enjoy the glories of happiness and peace. In the battle against dark negative forces, may the auspicious sunshine of the teachings, the beings of Tibet, and the brilliance of a myriad of radiant prosperities be ever triumphant."

(Date and authorship unknown).
APPENDIX C

1912 Issue

1974 Tibetan Government-in-Exile Issue

Fig. 15. Tibetan Postage Stamps
APPENDIX D

Transliteration of Tibetan Historical Documents

1. Tibetan Legal Codes of 1653-1658:

mchod yon nyi zla zung gi brims yig bzhugs pa dge/
e ma sgron bsikal gnyis pa zhig/ gsar du shar ba'i dus bzang por/ mchod yon nyi zla zung gchig gis/ bka' khrims stobs kyi 'khor los bsgyur/ (1)
de lta'i rgyal mchog dam pa 'di nyi kyi (rgyal dbang lnga pa 1617-1682) mdzad pa 'phrin las dang mchod yon rnam gnyis kyi bka' khrims bzang pas dus bde sa 'jam pa/ (2)
mchod yon gyi mdzad pa rgya mtsho nas chu thigs tsam zhig brjod par bya sto/ (3)

rgyal ba 'de rnams la (rgyal ba sku 'khren lnga par) sngon rgya gar du sangs rgyas rer 'khor los bsgyur ba' rgyal po re 'byung ba dang chus mthun par thams cad mkhyen cing gzigs pa chen po bsod rnams la rgya mtsho dang dus gchungs par sog yus yangs pa'i rgyal kham ku lal tan chos kyi rgyal po zhes bsod rnam dnag stobs 'byor mgon bar mtho ba'i rgyud chen po zhig byung zhing mdo rgyud rnams nas lung bstan pa lta/ sangs rgyas kyi bstan pa 'di gyang nas byang ga'i phyogs su rgyas par 'gyur/ zhes gsungs pa lta/ smon lam gyi dbang gis thams mkhyen gsogs chen po bsod rnam rgya mtsho dang al tan chos kyi rgyal po mchod yon du 'bres// (4)

rgyal ba yon tan rgya mtsho zhes mkhas sheng grub pa de nying tho med kyi rgyal phyud du sku 'khrungs 'di dang dus mnyam du rgyal po 'khor lo che zhes stos mnga' thang che ba zhig byung zhing mchod yon 'di gnyis spiyr sangs rgyas kyi bstan pa gyi dang bye brag gsang sngags rdo rje theg pa'i stan pa che cher rgyas pa mdzad/ (4)

rigs rus de rnams las 'khrungs pa'i da lta'i lde srid bsod rnams chos 'phel zhes lugs gnyes kyi mdzad pa bsam gyis mi khyad pa mngon mtho bsod rnam kyi dpal las legs par grub pa'i rgyal rgyud chen po rnams dang skye bo mchog dman thams cad kyi gtsug tu 'phur ba 'di nying rgyal mchog dam pa 'di dang dus mnyam par smon lam rten 'bres gyi mchog dam sbyar nas 'phrin las kyi shing rta gyon du 'dren pa'i kha lam pa chen po mdzad go shir'i las ka yang 'dzin cing bstan 'dzin chos kyi rgyal po dang thug ying gcig tu 'dros gnam la nyi zla zung gcig dang sa la mchod yon gnyis su grags pa 'ur gtam snyan grags kyi sgro 'dog ma yin pa 'di'o/ rgyal mchog dam pa 'de nyid kyi sangs rgyas kyi bstan
pa nyi ma shar ba ltar mdzad cing rgya nag gong ma rin po che dang mchod yon du 'brod zhing thugs rje dang rdzu 'phrul gyi rgya nag lo phyed gnyis la zhabs kyi bcags lha ldan gyi yul du snyan grags bsam gyi mi khyab pa dang bcas phyag phebs sngon 'gro mgon chos rgyal 'phags pa rgya nag la phebs pa'i sa hor yon mchod du 'bre ba'i rnam thar yis tshang las kyang rgyal mchog dam pa 'di nying kyi thugs rjes dang rdzu 'phrul che bar grags so/ (7)

mchod yon 'di gsum gyi (1 rgyal dbang lnga pa chen/ 2 phyag mdzod bsod rnam rab brtan/ 3 gu spre'i khang bstan 'dzin chos kyi rgyal po) lugs gnyis sgo nas sang rgyas kyi bstan pa dar rgyas du mdzad pa dang/ (7)

di thams cang kyi nang nas mchod yon 'di gsum gyi zhabs tog gnang ba ni 'gran gyi zla dang bral ba yin no/ mchod yon 'di sgum gyi lugs gnyis kyi bka' khrims bzang po'i bka' shag dmar shag gi lung gi stod dza ta'i rgyud pas bsdungs pa nas smad rgya mo dar 'thag pa tshun khyab par mdzad/ (9)

2. **Dga' ldan pho brang** Codes of 1886-1888 by Dbang 'dus tshe ring nor nang:

'dir blo dpon mchod yon rim phebs kyi lam rgyus/:  
gong ma mnya'i ju rgyal rabs dang po shan ci khri bzhugs lnga pa sa bya'i lo gong ma shan ci bdag po chen po nas t'a la'i bla ma rin po cing pho brang du gdan zhu'i me sha mngags don gong sa mchog dgung lo so drug tu phebs pa shan ci khri bzhungs dgu pa rab byung gong bzhon bcu gcig pa'i chu 'brug zla 3 ches 27 la 'bras spungs nas pe cing brgya khab tu chebs 'sgyur gyi gong sa mchod yon zhal 'dzes gus 'dud bkur bzos chad med kyes 'de nas bzungs mchod yon zung du 'brel/ (13)

3. From the biography of the 3rd Panchen Lama by 'Jams dbyangs bzhad pa dkon mchog 'jigs med dbang po II:

1780 lcags spyi zla 7 ba de ka'i ches nyer gnyis kyi nyin shing gung nas bteg ba'i phebs lam rnam su gong nas chebs bsur mngags pa'i las gos dang las zhwa tog dang sgro mdong kyis mdzes pa'i nang gi blon po che chung mang po shin tu rings pa'i tshul gyi sa rta brtugs te 'ong nas chibs rags kyi ne nyin pa dang rta las babs nas phyag gsum btsal te gong nas chibs bsur btang ba'i gans tshul mjal dar dang bcas phyag dbang zhus shing slar yang rta zhon nas bdrugs te 'gro ba sogs byed de rjes chibs bsu ba rdeng ma ring pa mang po yang snga ma ltar 'ongs nas rim pas chibs bsu zhus de yang chibs bsu sngon ma rnam phar 'gro ba dang rjes ma rnam tshur 'ong ba nying ba'i tshul du nyam ma chang par byung de nas rims gnyis phebs par mda' rgyang gnis re'i sar phebs byams 'degs mi brgyang re dang de'i mgo pa rma bya'i sgro
mdong can gyi dpon po re bcas rim pa ltar 'phod pa nas phebs kyi zhabs phyi zhus te rim gyis la chung zhig gi rce mor phebs pa na zhe hor gyi yul gru chen po rgyal rgyang nas gzegs/ (315-316)

ri gsham du phebs pa na gong ma'i dgung blon thams cang kyi rce mor son pa er le phu gung dang ho sa ta' zhin sku tsha gang phing zhe ja'i lon rnam kyis gtsom mdzang blon po che chung mang po dang...ser skyang shtang prag mang po chibs bsur 'byor...de nas rim gyis phebs pa na gong ma chen po'i sku mdun gyi yo byang 'dugs rgyad mtshan ba dan khrims las kyi shing rnam ga'i brjung bzod par dka' ba pi lbang...ging bu...rdza rnga...rnga zlum dung chen gcus ma dang kha zlum sog rol mo rnam$s grans mang po dus gcig tu dkrol ba dang 'bud pa dang brdung ba'i sgra rnga brja'i yid da 'ong ba rgyal srting rten rna bdun dang bcas pa'i 'khor lo bsgyr ba'i rgyal po'i che ba dang ldam pa'i gzi brjed 'chi med dbang po'i dpal la 'gran du bzod pa pho brang chen po'i leag ri phor yug shin du yangs pa'i rgyal rgo'i 'gag gtsang 'phris zhes pa'i ra ba chen po'i 'phris su 'byor pa na zhabs phyi rnam kyis rta las bass rgyal rgo'i nang phebs lam gyi gyas gyon du 'ang las zhwa las gong ltar gyi dpa' bo stag shar du ma tshar du dang ra ba'i lag na kha dog rnam par bkra' ba'i go bzang po'i gdu naang bsil yab la sogs pa'i mchod rdzas kyi bye brag dpag tu med pa mdzes shing rnga brjed dang ldam pa dag dang rgyal sog rim pa mang po bgrod pas pho drang chen po'i gi dma chung nang ma'i 'gag bar rje blama mchog phebs byams las ma gzhol bar phebs dgos pa'i gong gi bka' byung yang/ (316-319)

'jam pa'i dbangs gong ma bdag po chen po pho brang nang ma'i gi dam chung 'gag tu phebs pa gzigs ma thag phebs byam las gzhol ba mdzad de lha sras dug pa chen po dang blon gnyis gsoi dpon mchan po bcas nas phyga ga 'brei zhabs phyi zhus te phebs pa na...(319)

...gnyim chung nang ma'i 'gag der 'khor tshog mdun na 'don rgyal phran grangs med pas bskor te bzhugs 'dag par mchod yon rnam gnyis thog mar gser zhal 'dzam 'phral rje nyid nas 'jam pa'i dbongs gong ma bdag po chen por nang mdzod kha btags sku brtan li ma mu tig gi shal pa tam ne'i rgyan ldam bchas 'bul ba mdzad... gong ma chen po nas dgyes pa'i gus pa chen po rje nyed la nang mdzod kha btags dre med srid du ring ba 'bul ba 3nang ste sku khams dangs po le byung sa thag ring po'i phebs lam la thugs sun po byang yod 'gro zhes bka' phebs par 'jam pai gong ma chen po'i thugs rjes skyon gtan nas ma byung lam grang dang che sa rnam la na'i dro bo byung tsha ba che sa rnam la ni bsal po byungbas ngal dub gang yang ma byung shes shu ba mdzad par 'dgyes pa chen pos yi phe bayar zhes bka' phebs te rje bla ma mchog la gong ma chen po rang nas phyag 'brei zhu ba gnang ste gzims chung spug mar gser khris mtho zhing yangs pa gcig gi
4. From the biography of Tsang kha pa by Dar han mkhan sprul blo bzang 'phrin las rnam rgyal (1843):

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