Academic Freedom:  
The Third World Context

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"Academic freedom lies at the heart of any true university," asserted the vice-chancellor of the University of the South Pacific in the course of a disagreement with the government of Fiji in 1986. At one time or another, most other heads of universities in the Third World and, for that matter, the First World too, have used similar rhetoric. In this case, a cartoon (Figure 1) followed in the student newspaper, showing him wagging his finger impotently in the air, with a rubber-headed arrow stuck to his heart labeled "Fiji Government Warning." It was a fair and apt comment: all the university could do was orate, but the government did not choose to use an arrow with a lethal tip.

More serious issues were to follow in Fiji, testing in practical terms the operational meaning behind the rhetoric. How much freedom, and in what respects? What defines a "true" university, and how close to its "heart" can you get before it dies? In May 1987, a military coup overthrew the newly elected government of Fiji, which, as it happened, contained three former members of the university faculty. Although for a few days there were military patrols on the campus, these were quickly withdrawn; over the subsequent months, however, there followed a series of skirmishes. These involved harassments and intimidation, such as brief but highly unpleasant spells of detention for a few faculty members; the expulsion from the country of an expatriate academic; fear of the activities of informers in administrative offices and classrooms; threats to the university by army spokesmen, on the radio and elsewhere, alleging covert anti-
regime activities by academics under the protection of the administration and, in some ways more damaging, ethnic discrimination in the grading of students; hints that funding (already low) would be reduced if this and that were done or not done by the university. All this took place in a climate of fear and uncertainty which pervaded the whole country but particularly afflicted the university, where the faculty was tensely waiting to see the implications of political events of which it was acutely aware but could do nothing to influence.

In June 1988, the government proclaimed a comprehensive and draconian Internal Security Decree (Fiji 1988); a little research showed this to be
virtually identical to the Republic of Singapore’s Internal Security Act of 1985, though it was not at all clear whether this was a good or bad omen. Among other things, this decree gave to the minister responsible for internal security general powers to detain without trial and to suppress and seize publications. It also gave him certain specific powers which would enable him to close the university and other educational institutions and to veto the appointment of university staff, if such steps appeared to him to be in the national interest of Fiji. These powers were not in the event used against the university and the decree was suspended by the government in December 1988. Indeed, the university was repeatedly assured of its continued freedom to publish, to arrange meetings, and to discuss in ways which are necessary for its academic purposes, provided its members did not behave in a “subversive” fashion. (The definition of subversion, of course, was critical and lay in the opinion of the minister.) The government, in other words, armed itself with legal powers to take action against the freedom of the university and its staff, but at the same time publicly pledged itself not to “abuse” these powers provided the university, for its part, exercised these freedoms “responsibly.” This was laid out in formal statements by the government to the University Council (see Appendix).

In the course of these events, a number of incidents were experienced by the faculty as intimidatory threats to “academic freedom,” although the government was careful not to define them in such terms. Examples were the arrest at different times and for short periods of three faculty members: either no reason was given or the reason given was explicitly unrelated to their university employment. In these cases, the university made vigorous efforts to secure the release of those concerned, in its capacity as an employer who had been deprived without cause of the services of an employee. The university avoided claiming special privileges for them as academics, while the authorities for their part avoided allegations of offenses related to their work as academics. The question of “academic” freedom was never explicitly raised, although the demeanor of the troops involved certainly suggested that the detentions were an attempt—possibly unauthorized—to intimidate the individuals in their academic role, and their colleagues also. Similarly, in the case of the expatriate who was refused renewal of his work permit, no reasons were officially given, though there was little doubt that this was connected with his university activities and possibly also with the desire of the authorities to replace him with a sympathetic local appointee.
It is not intended in this paper to recount the particulars of this story, though it should be noted that all of them are reflected in the history of other Third World universities. For my colleagues and myself, however, they demanded daily examination and reexamination of the meaning of “academic freedom,” the manner in which it could be defended, and the extent to which it was desirable and expedient to do so. It was, and is, an anxious process, one which amply bears out the observation made by Malcolm Waters (1979) that “academic freedom is a central element in the self-conception of members of universities. Any threat thereto is a threat not only to the conditions under which such members work, but also to their very identities. An emotional response to that threat is therefore predictable.”

**Academic Freedom**

The purpose of this paper is to examine the elements of “academic freedom” in different contexts, especially in the Third World, and thus perhaps, in the tradition of academic discourse, to decrease the emotional content of the argument and increase the rational; to set it in perspective and thus provide some kind of aid to cool and prudent responses to similar threats in the future wherever they may occur.

In this section I shall look at some of the different meanings that are given to the term, and how these have been expressed in different contexts. In the next section I shall describe the characteristically Third World context in which universities operate. In the final section I shall attempt to see what elements of academic freedom can, and should, be preserved in that context, and how it might be done.

**Limits**

As an absolute, “academic freedom” (the freedom of the individual academic to teach, to do research, and to publish without any interference externally) and the related, but not necessarily concomitant, “institutional autonomy” (the freedom of the university, functioning collectively, to make its own decisions on all these matters) are ideals which cannot be, never have been, and arguably should never be, totally realized. The main concern in this paper is with the freedom of the individual, but in many contexts the autonomy of the institution is a necessary, though never a sufficient, condition for this, and the one most immediately threatened.
There are proper and inevitable constraints on both. The need to secure funds from outside agencies, whether state or private sponsors, necessarily and properly involves inhibitions for the institution on the use of those funds; the need to allocate those funds within the institution necessarily means that some scholars will not be able to do the research they would like to do; the need to distribute teaching assignments in the interests of the students necessarily means that some teachers will have to teach courses they would rather avoid. Some academics are appointed to the faculty, others are not; some on tenured terms, others not; some students will be admitted to the exclusion of others whom some of the faculty would rather have taught.

Such decisions, all involving some degree of infringement of freedom, are obviously involved in any organized social activity, such as university teaching and research. In the university context, however, any one of them can be the occasion of a complaint about denial of "academic freedom," often provoking major controversy. The number of pathological occasions is minimized, generally, by conformity to procedures agreed both within the university and externally. These procedures are themselves constantly under review and negotiation in order to ensure that they work in a manner acceptable to all the parties concerned: the individual academics, the departmental hierarchy, the university administration, the private or public agency, and the state in its general responsibility for public order and national interest. Every party to these negotiations has its own interest to preserve and weigh against the others, and these interests change over time and from one social or political context to another.

Academic Freedom in a Free Society

One very important respect in which contexts vary is the extent to which a society guarantees general freedoms to its citizens. For example, in a society in which freedom of speech is protected by law for all citizens (as in the United States) the question for negotiation by the university is whether academics, by virtue of their profession, should enjoy less freedom than they enjoy as citizens. To put it another way, in relation to certain activities, if the state has no sanctions against them as citizens, can the university legitimately have any as their employer? Can they be dismissed, or not promoted, or reprimanded, for views they express? Does it affect the issue if they confine these views to outside the university, or carry them into the classroom? (These were the controversial issues in the United States in the
1950s and 1960s, when many attempts were made to penalize academic staff for their views or actions on general political issues, notably in relation to the clusters of questions around communism and desegregation.) The original German concept of academic freedom was confined within the university and did not include any right for academics to engage in politics outside their employment. The more liberal British (and Commonwealth) and American conventions are an expansion of this principle, and even there it is generally accepted that “the exercise of free speech (a general right) is legitimately regulated by the educational needs of the university,” as John Searle put it. It is therefore, for example, “perfectly reasonable for the university’s promotion committees to inquire into whether a communist professor is using the classroom for indoctrination and propaganda,” (Searle 1971, 192, 208) though not to penalize that professor within the university either for expressing communist views outside it, or for presenting them in a scholarly and balanced way in the classroom.

There are no absolute answers to the questions posed here. Academics have certain obligations, by virtue of their status, which may, in some circumstances, restrain their freedom of speech. In a very full discussion in the American context of the rights and responsibilities of the academic as a citizen, Thomas Emerson and David Haber (1964) have pointed out that because the university certifies to the community that faculty members are entitled to “special attention in the marketplace of ideas” they must, morally, confine their judgments in their own field to matters in which they are using their expertise and in which they can substantiate them by normal academic standards. Philosophical defenders of academic freedom in the West go further. Robert McIver, for example, declared that outside the institution, the academic has the same liberty as others, “except that he should be careful not to associate his institution in any way with extra-academic utterances or actions, and should avoid any public behaviour that would tend to bring discredit on his institution” (1955, 8). Edward Shils extended the moral obligation still further, to adhere “in all circumstances to certain standards of intellectual integrity” (1977). At the institutional level, the obligation may be even greater. If the university is to be immune from having the power of the state used against it (even in a “free” society) it has, as an institution, to be “neutral” on questions of social and political controversy outside those relating to its own primary social purposes of education and research. It is always a question of balance. C. Vann Woodward (1977), describing to a conference on the future of
universities in Southern Africa the effects of the desegregation crisis in southern United States universities, described how "the delicate balance that seeks to avoid institutional commitment to ideology, public policy and politicization, and at the same time maintain the freedom of the individual to inquire, to criticize and to act, is eternally in jeopardy and most of all in time of social crisis." At such times of crisis, when feelings run deep, there will be those on both sides—those for change and those against it—who will seek to embarrass the university by implicating it in the struggle.

**Academic Freedom in a “Non-free” Society: The Sanctuary**

In a “non-free” society, in which the state takes general powers to restrict freedom, two different questions arise. The first is whether academics, or the university, by virtue of their profession, can successfully claim certain immunities from these general laws in order to do their work. In some circumstances, the university may be able to establish for its campus the status of physical “sanctuary.” This has been a familiar convention in Latin America, deriving from the continental European tradition, and is indeed in some cases embodied in law. Luigi Einaudi, for example, cited a Venezuelan law to the effect that “the university grounds are inviolable” (1964, 211–212). It is, however, a freedom which may have strict limits. The state is not going to permit the campus to be used as a base for operations against it. Describing events in Mexico in 1968, when the army occupied the campus of the National University and 325 students were killed, Daniel C. Levy wrote:

> Students violated the rules of the game. Organizational and disruptive activities were extended beyond the campus, and included direct, harsh criticism of the president. The government may tolerate a good deal of student activity as long as it is confined to the campus. The principle of territorial sanctity—the university conceived of almost as a sanctuary—has a long tradition in Latin America. . . . By moving beyond their institutional sanctuary, the students risked government violation of that sanctuary. (1980, 30–31)

He has described elsewhere in the same book how, for that very reason, the authorities in Mexico were opposed to the idea of “an open university,” taking the university outside the limits of the campus into continuing education and other extension work. There were not to be “immune” activities in the community at large. Echoes of this “sanctuary” principle
can be found elsewhere in the Third World. During the Biafran civil war in Nigeria, a special federal military unit was employed to protect the campus of the federal University of Ibadan, and especially the safety of those Ibo staff who at some risk remained in the service of the university, even though it was in the heart of Yoruba territory (Van den Berghe 1973). After the military coup in Fiji, the new authorities undertook that “there will be no military presence on the university campus” (usp 1987) and promised “special attention” to the security of students, staff, and property there. In this case, there was a political (though not a legal) analogy with the inviolability of diplomatic territory, since the campus housed students from many other South Pacific countries, to whom the university could be said also to “belong,” and to which Fiji had obligations the military authorities wished to honor.

This kind of “exempt” status—which may even extend to permitting for the university types of publication and speech that would not be tolerated elsewhere in a generally repressive society—was the type of academic freedom established by the medieval guild-universities in Europe. It is in contrast to that of the nineteenth-century universities in the United States, where academic freedom was needed “exclusively to protect the independence of professors from trustees, colleagues, administrators, students, alumni and public opinion . . . an intra-academic privilege” (Van den Haag 1964). Immunities granted by the medieval state to monasteries and other guilds derived in part from a general theory about the relationship between state and church. Authoritarian regimes in the modern world, however, tend to act from expediency rather than conviction. They “may tolerate a degree of non-control, non-support and even opposition, as long as that opposition does not form a direct threat to replace the regime,” as Levy observed in describing the National University of Mexico as “a bastion of democratic freedoms in a society which generally limits them” (1980, 210–211). In this respect, Eric Ashby, writing in 1966, may have been too gloomy in concluding flatly that “a country which does not permit freedom of speech and publication to its ordinary citizens cannot grant academic freedom to its universities. In such countries, academic freedom is in eclipse, and accordingly universities cannot flourish” (293). Fortunately, in a world which now contains probably far more such countries than those of the other type, there are a number of examples to the contrary.
Specific Anti-University Powers

The other type of situation in a "non-free" society is when the state takes specific powers against the universities, powers which are even more restrictive than its general powers. There are unfortunately many examples of this. A particularly crude one was Peron's University Law of 1947, in Argentina, which, after piously proclaiming the "autonomy" of universities, enacts that "professors cannot defend any interest which may collide, oppose, or compete with those of the nation." This was backed up in practice by the "use of young persons employed by the security organizations and registered as students" in order to ensure that professors in fact complied (Einaudi 1964, 210–211). A recent example is the Internal Security Decree of 1987 in Fiji, already cited, which provided in Section 42 (which was not, however, enforced) that "no Fiji citizen shall be admitted as an employee to any institution of higher education" unless they hold a "certificate of suitability" which will not be granted if the government considers they would "be likely to promote or otherwise participate in action prejudicial to the interests or security of Fiji" (Fiji 1988). (As already noted, this provision, like the rest of the law, is identical in wording with that of the Singapore Internal Security Act of 1985, except that the Singapore Act provides for the exclusion of students rather than employees, who are dealt with in other ways. Circumstances alter cases, but the spirit is the same.)

The political style of a society is thus one important element of the context in which the degree of academic freedom has to be negotiated. It is not a simple free or non-free dichotomy. Walter Kamba, vice-chancellor of the University of Zimbabwe, analyzed the situation in his address to the Perth Congress of the Association of Commonwealth Universities:

Too often this issue is conceptualized in an oversimplified, bimodal formulation, linked with the concept of "academic autonomy." In this conceptualization there are on the one hand those "liberal-democratic" contexts which afford university institutions and the intellectual community which they represent the opportunity to assume a critical stance to the sociopolitical status quo with relative impunity. On the other hand there are those "totalitarian" contexts which suppress dissent and prohibit debate in the open marketplace of ideas. Academic freedom—and by extension the genuine university—can, it is suggested, only exist in the former.
Past and present societal realities provide no basis for such a clear-cut binary typology. They suggest rather a broad spectrum of degrees of academic autonomy on which the actualities of university experience are located in response to a constantly shifting configuration of sociopolitical dynamics. Clearly our academic ethos seeks a location on this spectrum which is close to the polarity of autonomy; it is equally clear that we are differentially placed on this spectrum with no assurance that what pertains today will hold tomorrow. The lesson to be derived from this is that while sociopolitical context is clearly important it cannot, in itself, define our enduring political role. Nor can we allow it to become the definitional criterion for what we designate as a university. (Kamba 1988)

Wealth, Ethnic Homogeneity, Size

Though important, the general political configuration of a society is not the only determinant element of the context in which the degree of academic freedom has to be negotiated. Another is its wealth—or poverty. A rich society is able to afford a good deal more experimentation in its social institutions, and patronage for its critical scholars, scientists, and artists, than a relatively poor one. Another determinant is the degree of ethnic or ideological homogeneity in a society, both within the university and at large. Where there is ethnic dissonance, pressures to adopt non-academic criteria for advancement in the profession, or in the admission of students, will have to be accommodated by the university. The size of the society—or rather the size of the top class of the society—is yet another factor. Where university staff and students constitute a large proportion of the society’s elite population, they may well have to accept restraint on their freedom as a price of their relative importance.

Academic Freedom within the University

Freedom for individual academics is, of course, not only a matter of their—and on their behalf the university’s—relations with the state, even though these may loom largest because of the concentration of financial and coercive power there. On a microlevel and from day to day, as I have noted, academics may feel that their freedom is most threatened by others within the university, by the administration, by their head of department, or even by their colleagues. Commonly, for example, “a dominant departmental group may prove intolerant of divergent views entertained by younger members of their staff and, by refusing to recognize the scholarly merits of the latter, may themselves violate the academic freedom they
profess to defend" (McIver 1955). Commonly, too, academics may see the enemy within the university as the administration, and possibly the trustees or council, who seem to be themselves pursuing external nonacademic objectives. Abundant examples of this exist in the American experience, and much United States jurisprudence in the matter is concerned with this relationship of individual academic freedom to institutional autonomy, which may be inimical to it (Metzger 1988). In such cases it is frequently the state (or the courts applying public constitutional or civil law) which intervenes to prevent the abuse of internal university power. For example, in 1904, the government of imperial India enacted the Indian Universities Act “to stop what they believed to be the degeneration of Indian universities” and to reassert government influence. They “did not see themselves invading university autonomy. Quite the reverse. They believed they were protecting the educational role of the university against the baleful influence of ambitious and politically interested Indians” (Rudolph and Rudolph 1972). Without judging the merits of this particular historical episode, it is certainly possible to envisage many situations in which the state, as a legitimate regulatory authority, intervenes in the affairs of social institutions (even universities) in order to assert the interests and freedoms of individuals against what may have become a corrupt internal power structure. Autonomy is certainly not a guarantee of individual academic freedom.

ACADEMIC FREEDOM: THE THIRD WORLD CONTEXT

Relevant Third World Characteristics

Most writing about the nature of academic freedom has, understandably, referred to “Western” universities and, in particular, to those in the major traditions of continental Europe, North America, and Britain and its Commonwealth. Almost all Third World universities derive from one or more of these traditions. Third World societies and states, however, offer a very different political and social context, and in this section I shall outline those characteristics likely to be relevant in assessing the degree to which universities, and individual academics, can negotiate about academic freedom. I shall also illustrate the ways in which, in different situations, some of these characteristics have impinged directly on the universities.

For every generalization about “Third World” or “developing” coun-
tries there will be many exceptions: they are as diverse as Western societies. In the introduction to his book of essays *Higher Education in the Third World*, Philip Altbach (1982a) confessed to doubts about the continued utility of such generalizations, particularly noting the exceptional cases of the "advanced developing countries," such as Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, South Korea, the oil-rich Middle Eastern states, and much of Latin America. Nevertheless there are similarities (particularly in the political context) and Altbach found it useful to persist, as I do. (In some cases, indeed, it is startling to find similarities in the experience of such different countries as, for example, Fiji, Malaysia, and Zaire in the handling of ethnic differences within the university.)

Third World countries like to describe and define themselves as "developing" countries. It is a term which is unfortunately often over-optimistic and begs the question of whether development is actually taking place. Nevertheless it lacks the overtones of "less-developed" or "underdeveloped"—two other old international favorites. A contemporary euphemism is "south," which has a rough global geographical accuracy, but is unacceptable to someone writing from the South Pacific, whose southern neighbors are First World Australia and New Zealand. Other defining adjectives might be "tropical" or even "poor," or at least "relatively poor." The neutral "Third World" is preferred in this paper: Webster's Dictionary chooses as its synonyms "emergent" and "underdeveloped."

**Economic Development: Contribution of Universities**

As nations, the overriding objective of those in the Third World is to be less poor and more developed, and to apply their human and other resources to that end. Their universities are not exempt from that imperative. In both their education and their research function, the national demand is that in return for resources they involve themselves first and foremost in contributing to national advancement, in industry, agriculture, health, technology, and trade. At the seminal workshop of the Association of African Universities in 1972, reported by Yesufu, the role of the "truly African university" was analyzed as the pursuit, promotion, and dissemination of "practical" knowledge "immediately useful to the generality of people and therefore locally oriented and motivated"; research with priority given to the "amelioration of the life of the ordinary man and the rural poor"; the provision of intellectual leadership in the planning and execution of "meaningful programs of economic and social develop-
ment”; human resources development, especially skilled middle-level workers; involvement in the process of social and economic modernization, with academics becoming “extension workers” helping to improve production and economic organization; and the promotion of “intercontinental unity and international understanding” (Yesufu 1973, 40–44). Such imperatives fit a little uneasily with the vision which many Western-educated academics have of their own professional mission, though they do have similarities to the original thinking behind the establishment of the American land-grant colleges in 1862, which were funded by the state expressly in order to promote “useful” studies such as engineering and agriculture alongside more traditional ones. In the event, the demands being made of new universities in the new African nations proved in many ways quite unrealistic. As Kwapong observed in 1973, “in the atmosphere of approaching independence, high hopes and expectations were entertained about universities, and they were credited with almost magical qualities and near-miraculous powers. A decade and a half later, no one expects African universities to work miracles” (1973, 3). In many ways, however, miracles were still expected, and the effects of the consequential disillusion are being felt by the universities. The problem is made worse in many Third World countries by the fact that universities (of which there may well be only one) are often the only source of relevant expertise, and they are exposed to huge pressures on that account.

It may be that governments can be persuaded to concede that the universities themselves are the best judges of how to meet these demands. This is partly because they are perceived to be the conduits for the flow of international knowledge into the new countries, partly because they provide a center for critical thinking independent of the comings and goings of politicians. Walter Kamba has described this perception as one in which universities “can serve as information terminals within the state, which can act as a conduit for global perspectives and knowledge,” and has argued that in spite of the impatient demands of Third World societies for “immediately applicable certitudes,” there is nevertheless also a demand for the scrutiny of these, for the existence of an independent court of inquiry providing a continuous evaluation of the premises and policies which direct societal histories. It is to this imperative that the academic ethos is responsive, and the strength of this imperative is of such importance that political structures are willing, sometimes grudgingly, to allow the universities to perform this role. (Kamba 1988)
A recent World Bank report analyzing the contribution of African universities to development similarly describes them as "a source of analytical perspective on social problems and their possible solutions that is independent of, and often a usefully pluralistic counterpart to, political and religious authorities" (1988).

But the recognition of the value of universities is often a grudging one on the part of political and religious authorities more accustomed to dealing in dogma than in the "contingent cognitive truth" that characterizes the academic mode (Kamba 1988). If they are to be allowed to go on making their contribution, the universities must make it clear that it is indeed a contribution to development, that they are not "a dangerous intellectual bourgeoisie," as political leaders fear (Mugabe 1982, 4-7), and that they are not merely pursuing their own professional self-interest by playing some esoteric research game which offers to the winners rewards in terms of international recognition but which is irrelevant to the societies in which they work. (Such an attitude to research as a form of self-indulgence on the part of the academic is widespread, and not, of course, confined to Third World societies. In some Western countries too—a current example being Britain—there are increasing and powerful demands that university activities be directed almost exclusively toward "wealth-creation.")

This obsessive pursuit of "development" naturally determines the directions in which public funds are allowed to flow, and there will be pressures, either directly by government or through political membership of university councils and other governing bodies, to step up some kinds of activities (often the most parochial and, in high academic terms, "low-level") and curtail others (often the most abstract, fundamental, and "international"). On the whole, however, the relationship between Third World universities and governments has, on this front, been reasonably benign. For their part, universities have been content to accept general directives about educational goals, and governments have been prepared to leave them to work out for themselves the best ways of implementing these. There has been little interference in the details of curriculum or pedagogy, and the universities have seen the advantage in themselves playing an important part in conferences and coordinating committees set up by governments to indicate the future directions for their development. (There are many examples, one being the 1983 conference on Future Directions for the University of the South Pacific (USP 1983), attended by
representatives of the eleven South Pacific countries who fund the university, together with external aid agencies and academics. The academics felt it necessary toward the end of the conference to remind the government representatives that the charter of the university required it to serve "the peoples and communities" of the South Pacific, rather than just their governments. On this occasion, the government representatives were not provoked by the implication that there might well be a difference, and the report has provided general guidelines for the development of the university ever since.

However, even in the area of development friction can arise when the government's ideological prescriptions for economic advancement are contested by individual academics, and they surely will be. There will be socialist economists who object to capitalist oriented development plans (as in Fiji) and vice versa (as in Tanzania)—and they will teach their students accordingly. The university has to persuade the government that the presentation of alternative points of view is in itself essential to the pursuit of national development: it is often difficult, and becomes more so the more the government is authoritarian or insecure. It only becomes impossible, however, when the university is faced with a totalitarian government which lays down that the teaching of only one economic ideology is permissible and imposes this orthodoxy on all university teachers.

Cost of Universities

The first characteristic of Third World societies is, then, their overwhelming concern with national development and how to bring it about. Moreover, the fact that they are relatively poor, while universities are absolutely expensive, adds to the heat that can be applied by governments to universities. When national budgets are considered, the high cost of the university calls attention to it from all political quarters. It has Western standards of consumption, and it demands that its academics are paid sufficiently to deter them from selling their talents in a Western-dominated international academic market. If these requirements are to be met (and the extent to which they have been is remarkable), there will be insistent demands for a high return on the investment.

Visibility of Universities

For other reasons too the university is in the center of the public stage. The articulate, educated, political elite is likely to be very small in relation
to the whole population, and university staff and students make up a high, visible, and often very audible proportion of that elite. Nothing that goes on in the university will escape public attention. Van den Berghe wrote of Ibadan, for example, that “everything that happens at the university, down to the smallest student group protesting about the quality of food in their dining hall, hits the newspaper headlines and is a matter of widespread concern and public debate” (1973, 57–62). If that is true even of a huge country like Nigeria, it is even more true of small countries. In Fiji, for example, a fight between students, or a quarrel over academic promotions, which might get a headline in a college newspaper in the United States, will be all over the national press and attract immediate attention from politicians and their constituents.

Two sociological case studies of Third World universities (Meek on the University of Papua New Guinea [1982] and Van den Berghe on the University of Ibadan [1973]) have shown the complexity and intensity of relationships between university staff on the one hand and individuals in the power structure outside the university on the other: not just broad ethnic identification, but specific ties based on kinship and places of origin. Formal, detached relationships between the institution and, say, the Ministry of Finance or the Army are constantly being confused or subverted by highly informal communication between “cousins.” These are often at quite surprisingly different levels in the respective hierarchies (e.g., professor’s secretary is minister’s sister) and, in any case, the formal hierarchies do not necessarily represent the true distribution of power, particularly on the government side. This intimate untidiness, which appears so anarchic to a Western-trained bureaucrat, is a characteristic which can be used by the academic community to its advantage, but it confounds any strategy based on the use of “proper channels” or the confidentiality of “confidential” memoranda. In the preface to his Political Values and the Educated Class in Africa, Mazrui (1978) illustrated the extent to which the wider political system had penetrated the university with a revealing anecdote about a discussion he had in Uganda with President Obote and his ministers. In the course of it the president referred to a diagram the professor had drawn on the blackboard for his first-year class at Makerere University. He had been discussing the relationship of the new social classes emerging in Uganda with old tribal boundaries, and had illustrated this with a diagram which the president now complained he had not been able to understand. Not only was President Obote deeply interested in what went on in Professor Mazrui’s classroom, but he also had informers
among the students there who would duly report it back to him. The point that Mazrui made is that in such a small elite society, his classroom and Obote's cabinet were, in a sense, both parts of the same political system, inextricable from each other.

**Overseas Influence**

Another relevant characteristic is that most Third World countries are themselves only recently independent, and that for many their universities were founded more or less under the influence of the previous colonial administration and were originally staffed mainly by nationals of the colonial power. Many still retain high proportions of "expatriate" staff, certainly in senior posts. Their position is particularly interesting, and has been analyzed by A. P. Hunter (1977) and by M. Crawford Young (1981).

In the pre-independence period, the expatriate academics may be seen by the colonial administration as sources of trouble, being likely to be much more "radical" than the civil servants of the same nationality. This was, for example, the experience of the Australian administration in Papua New Guinea, which indeed tried to exclude some troublesome Australian academics from the country and therefore from the university. After independence, the emphasis shifts: the newly independent government now tends to distrust the expatriate academic, who is seen to be less concerned with the national development goals of the government and may still cling to international standards and values which appear inappropriate. The reaction can be quite sharp. Gabriel Gris, who went on to become the first local vice-chancellor of the University of Papua New Guinea, headed a national commission in 1975 which asserted uncompromisingly that "the university's first and foremost responsibility is to national needs. This surpasses any need for it to conform to international standards. The university should embody the 'Melanesian way' and sever all its links with the Western world" (Meek 1982, 199–200). During this stage, the expatriate staff may choose to lie low politically, and the political anxieties of the new government concerning the university shift to the likelihood of dissent among the local student body and the increasing number of young local academics. The process has been seen elsewhere: Young described it in relation to East and West Africa:

Authority-conscious regimes, sensitive as to their stability and survival, partly because of a preoccupation with the potential fragility of the nation-state, are necessarily attentive to basic political control over the university.
triates dominate the university, the issue is posed in terms of its responsiveness to the national and development goals traced by the regime. Once the staff is African, however, the latent threat exists of the university becoming a citadel of local opposition. (1981)

Modes of Knowledge

The historical relationship with the former colonial power, and the contemporary relationships of the government with a variety of external powers and agencies which are ambivalently regarded both as a source of development assistance and as agents of “neocolonialism,” give heavy political overtones to what is a general international phenomenon, the “Westernization” of the contemporary intellectual world. The scientific rationalism which is the dominant mode of post–nineteenth-century Western universities is often at odds with the traditional cultural norms which the new nation is struggling to reassert as a feature of national identity. Political anticolonialist attitudes therefore become entangled with the heavy intellectual dialogue between “rational” and other modes of knowledge. Although for the most part the university stands firmly in the former camp, the dilemma facing the academic is a real one. The scholars, especially in the humanities and the social sciences, are called on to reexamine their methods of work. Mazrui has dealt with this in depth:

The study of history can, in societies seeking a sense of historical identity, dictate that its purpose is not an unconditional pursuit of truth, but a search for those elements of the truth which would help society to shape its identity. The university has to ask itself whether it has a function as a myth-maker where new myths are acutely needed. (1978, 247)

He suggested that early in the history of the universities in Europe, they were indeed myth-makers, and wondered whether “the trouble with the African university is not simply that it is an institution which comes from a foreign country, but also that it is an institution which is derived from the wrong historic period.” He illuminated this notion with a description of the difficulties which African scholars have in contending with the traditional sources of knowledge and authority, which he characterized as the Sage, the Warrior, and the Elder (Mazrui 1978, 261). In their rationalist mode, the contemporary academics tend to undermine all three of these traditional sources, which are highly distrustful of dissent and dispute. This means that when institutional conflicts about autonomy and
freedom arise, the university has an extremely difficult task in establishing that its values, expressed in universalistic terms of meritocracy, objectivity, and so on, are those which are useful to the new nation, since the nation is itself, in one aspect, a resurrection of old precolonial social identities. There is a consciousness of chronic conflict, expressed for example by Asavia Wandira (1977), in the light of his experience in more than one new African university, with the question, How far can the African university, in its quest for a new identity, remain confined within the particulars and circumstances of its continent without losing the ability to transcend them?

This kind of dilemma tends to be regarded by politicians with some impatience: At a conference on the future of the University of Zimbabwe at which academics pondered such questions, Prime Minister Mugabe (1982) roundly asserted, "higher education is too important a business to be left entirely to deans, professors, lecturers and university administrators." It was by no means the first or last time that Clemenceau's aphorism about war and generals has been adapted in this sense.

Ethnic Diversity

Deeply relevant to the position of a university, and its ability to pursue universal academic values, is the fact that the "new nation" is very often a collection of different and often antagonistic precolonial nations, with their own languages, their own cultures, their own social hierarchies, and their own religious groupings, imperfectly homogenized by the brief years of colonial rule which imposed on them their new frontiers. After economic development, therefore, the next major preoccupation of the government is "national integration," the creation of a new national identity. The chosen policies for doing this may take different forms, which blur into one another. Varying degrees of hegemony may be established by one tribe (or race or religious group) over others. Ways may be sought of securing access to top posts in rough proportion to the national ethnic or tribal mix, and these will have consequences for student admissions and probably also for faculty appointments. Or an ethnic free market may be allowed. The trouble with the last course is that it may well result in the dominance of one group over economic, intellectual, or political life, which eventually becomes unacceptable politically and leads to civil strife. Most governments, in this situation, have therefore felt bound to make some attempts to manage the ethnic marketplace. Unfortunately, the eth-
nic free market is the only policy which is fully compatible with the universalistic academic value of ethnic nondiscrimination blindness and meritocracy, which is, indeed, embodied in many university charters and legislation (not to mention the United States Constitution). It is therefore not surprising that many conflicts within the Third World university and between it and governments revolve around ethnic issues. In the admission and grading of students, and in the appointment and promotion of staff, governments may consider it essential to pursue certain ethnic policies which conflict very sharply indeed with academic values, and with the "liberal" international ethic. It is worth considering in more detail the consequences of this for the university.

**Ethnicity and Academic Freedom**

To take an extreme case first: South Africa. The annual T. B. Davie Memorial Lectures at Capetown University were established in 1959 by the students on a theme related to academic freedom, "in order to keep before the university a reminder of the seriousness of its loss, and to keep alive its faith that the lost academic freedom will one day be restored" (Nolan 1986). The occasion of the loss was the 1959 Extension of University Education Act, which established separate colleges for nonwhite students, and thus took away "the freedom of the universities to accept students on the basis of academic merit." Since then, of course, there have been many other ways in which general freedoms (and academic freedom in particular) in South Africa have been diminished, but the critical step was seen at the time to be the political imposition of ethnic criteria for admission to the university, instead of universally accepted meritocratic criteria.

Marshall Murphree has analyzed, in an essay entitled "Universalism, Particularism and Academic Freedom," the significant case of the University of Rhodesia (1977). Its foundation in 1955, with strong support from the British government, owed much to a deliberate political intention to create a multiracial university in Southern Rhodesia, in order "to promote harmony between different groups." This contrasted with earlier political demands from the white population for racially segregated colleges. The charter of the new college consequently prescribed nonracialism, and there was established "an autonomous university in the universalistic tradition, protected against some of the more flagrant particularisms of its environing society by its royal charter." In 1962, however, a government
came to power “committed to the reaffirmation of the racial principle as a fundamental factor in the structuring of Rhodesian society.” From then until the final overthrow of that government nearly twenty years later, the university was thrown onto the defensive, regarded as a “Trojan horse in the midst of a country fighting for its existence as a White State.” It managed to survive, with considerable political difficulty, and playing all the cards in its hand. These included a degree of independent funding from overseas sympathizers; the fact that it was the country’s only provider of trained workers in certain fields, and, perhaps strongest of all, the recognition that its very existence was, in a sense, an important symbol of international legitimacy for a government which desperately needed it. (A token, perhaps, that Rhodesia was not South Africa.) In the circumstances of that time, conversion of it to becoming a “white” university would have meant a mass desertion by faculty (there were very few local staff) and an end to international recognition. “Its existence was a major legitimating factor for the state, the strength of which, paradoxically, was in direct proportion to the degree to which it was permitted to operate in its universalistic mode.” In other words, the state of Rhodesia, at that time under deep international suspicion of not being free, not being multiracial, and indeed of hardly being a state at all, was able to say to a skeptical world, “We have a free, multi-racial, international university,” and acquire some legitimacy from doing so. There are parallels in the world today. In all these difficult years, the university maneuvered on many different fronts to “manipulate its resources in the bargaining process to maintain the degree of autonomy necessary to perpetuate the universalist, rational ethos of the university tradition.”

However, from 1980 onward, the successor to the University of Rhodesia, the University of Zimbabwe, was operating in a quite different political climate, in which the black African majority which now formed the government was demanding radical changes in the university. The price of survival under the previous white government had, among other things, been a pace of Africanization of academic staff that was felt to be slow, and although black students had continued to be admitted, it was nothing like in proportion to the ethnic makeup of the population. As Professor Patel pointed out to the 1981 conference on the future of the university:

While the university maintained the principle of non-racialism and often defended it, nevertheless the pace of Africanization seen in terms of student
intake and staff appointments has, for a variety of reasons, been quite slow. This has been a cause of much tension and suspicion as between black and white: this remains even though over the years there has been cooperation and intermingling. In spite of these major shortcomings, the university has been able to maintain a degree of autonomy and academic freedom. (Patel 1982)

It was apparent that under a repressive minority white government the university’s meritocratic values had been an instrument for preserving black African participation in a multiracial university, but under a representative African government the university would have to pay attention to the need to increase this on a racially sensitive and selective basis.

In general terms, the achievement of some kind of ethnic or tribal balance has been the demand of most African governments. As Mazrui put it, it is essential to “ensure that the universities produce an intellectual elite which is ethnically diversified. High-level manpower in Africa has to be tribally mixed if we are to avoid generating emotions which are nationally dangerous” (1978, 271). Young has analyzed the consequential tensions in an important article, in which he points out that African leaders acknowledge that “the basic values which form the informal charter of the African university are implicitly anti-ethnic. The principle of merit should govern its critical decisions: evaluation of students, designation and promotion of staff” (1981, 148). Nevertheless, with the university as the main gateway to elite status, a government dominated by one ethnic or tribal group cannot permit a university forever dominated by another, as was seen in Kenya (with Luo academics ranged against a Kikuyu regime), in Nigeria (with Ibo dominance at Ibadan), and in many other situations. Nor can any government with a long-term view of the need for national integration permit some ethnic groups to remain off the highways to participation in the national elite. The potential for conflict is severe, especially since in almost every case it will be found that one or more ethnic groups have established a superiority in educational and economic achievement which, by meritocratic standards, would lead to a dominance in the university which the government will not be able to accept (eg, Chinese in Malaysia, Indians in Fiji, Europeans in Zimbabwe, Ibos in Nigeria).

These ethnic problems may be particularly acute in many Third World countries, but they are certainly not confined to them. In the United States, one of the few serious value conflicts remaining in the academic world concerns the issue of granting preferential academic access to cer-
tain ethnic groups in order that the distribution of social status will in future more closely reflect their distribution among the population at large. There is pressure from governments to achieve this—varying in strength with the political complexion of the government—but also much controversy within the academic world itself. As this essay is being written, for example, the vice-chancellor of the University of California at Berkeley, Dr Park, is reported as saying: “If we do not achieve a society in which all ethnic groups participate in our political, economic and professional leadership, we will find ourselves in 20 years looking much like a nineteenth-century Third World colony . . . with political instability and a lack of economic productivity.”

Conflicts on ethnic issues do not, of course, simply arise because governments are anxious to impose an ethnic policy upon a reluctant, homogenous, and virtuously meritocratic university. In Van den Berghe’s study of Ibadan, he observed that “tribalism” was assumed there to be the main reason behind all academic promotions. Ethnicity constituted “one of the main centers of political conflict at the university. Notably in the press, accusations of tribalism are rampant, and candidates and decisions are almost invariably evaluated in terms of ethnicity” (Van den Berghe 1973, 217–249). In Nigeria, indeed, the head of state intervened on the side of virtue. Major General Gowon formally addressed the council of the University of Ibadan in 1967:

It is a matter of regret that the University, made up of eminent scholars, has not been able to set the right example for the whole country by containing the more glaring manifestations of tribal chauvinism. I know the university is called upon to pursue the truth at all times. The trouble in Nigeria is that most Nigerians tend to see the truth only as it affects themselves or their own particular tribal groups. (Van den Berghe 1973, 223)

It is not easy for the individual academic to resist the pulls of tribal loyalty. In the postcolonial period, struggles for ethnic domination—or survival—are being fought out in all institutions, and the university is an important arena for social warfare. Ethnicity is the most readily available tool for advancement and the easiest excuse for being passed over. The administration, if it is not in the thrall of one faction or another, is pummeled from all sides. In Fiji, for example, it was vigorously and publicly attacked by one faculty group in 1986 for forming a “Polynesian-European” alliance to deprive Fiji Indian staff of promotion opportunities. A
year later, in a much changed political climate, it was being equally strongly (and unjustly) attacked for favoring Indian staff, academics, and students at the expense of Fijians. To quote Van den Berghe again,

The expectation of "tribalism" calls forth its actual manifestation, and the latter reinforces the expectations. . . . The concept of tribalism becomes the mental wastebasket which gives one a satisfyingly simple explanation for a bewilderingly complex whole. . . . Accusations of tribalism become a form of blackmail, a political weapon in the contest for power, and a defensive justification for one's own prejudices. (1973, 247)

Indeed, where an ethnically dominated government is looking for scapegoats (or wastebaskets), it can require a good deal of courage on the part of academics to adhere to their standards. In Fiji, for example, the Fijian-dominated Military Forces alleged at one time that (local) Indian staff were systematically favoring Fiji Indian students at the expense of Fijians (FMF 1988). One Indian faculty member was assaulted by a group of soldiers, allegedly because of this. The situation at that time in the University of the South Pacific was strikingly similar to that reported vividly by Young in the very different society of Zaire thirteen years earlier:

Whatever the narrow limits of the ethnic variable as empirical determinant, the climate of insecurity, suspicion and low confidence in the conformity of examination outcomes to the universal norms of objective merit poisoned the atmosphere. Allegations of ethnic favoritism became rife. This in turn created agonizing difficulties for Zairean staff who were vulnerable to such allegations. While ethnicity in grading is very difficult to prove, it is equally hard to disprove. The professor is liable to a charge of ethnic discrimination, which can quickly gain some credence, thus placing the teacher in the nearly impossible situation of concretely demonstrating his innocence. This makes the examination process an ordeal for the academic staff beyond the sheer tedium associated with grading papers. It creates subtle pressures towards charitable evaluation, in particular circumspection by some (though not all) over failing grades. It is also one of the various mechanisms enforcing great caution in political expression, as the use of tribalism charges in grading as indirect leverage over those who stray too far in voicing anti-regime sentiments is by no means an unknown device. At the same time, the power of the moral code of the university culture can never be underestimated. On a number of occasions I was deeply impressed by the remarkable courage displayed by Zairean staff in resisting improper interventions, in the face of palpable personal risks. (Young 1981, 157)
As we have seen, a particularly acute problem arises when, as is often the case, the principles of academic merit would result in the admission of students, or recruitment of staff, from one or more ethnic groups in the population who, for one reason or another, are considerably more advanced educationally (and often economically) than others. An example is in Malaysia, where the Malay-dominated government has responded by putting in the forefront of its educational policy the need to redress the situation caused by the “combination of economic backwardness and political power among the indigenous (Malay) population,” and to eliminate the “identification of ethnicity with economic status” (Ahmat 1980). In other words, to give the Malay population preferential access, in relation to the Chinese and Indian minorities, to higher education, in order, it is hoped, to improve their relative economic status. This has led to a frontal assault on “meritocratic values.” As Ahmat put it:

The government is unable to leave the issue of accessibility in the hands of the universities, who may wish to admit only the best students. In Malaysia, an admissions policy which is based solely on academic merit will result in the exclusion of many Malays from universities, and this will have adverse effects on efforts to promote national unity. This issue continues to be a volatile one, and subject to misunderstanding and political exploitation. (1980)

A particular problem, still to be solved, is to find enough Malay students qualified to enter university programs, especially in science and technology, where their secondary school preparation has been inferior and where other cultural problems also enter. Attempts to consolidate the policy, by requiring universities to use the Malay language for instruction, have also run into difficulties, since this tends to leave Malay scientists, in particular, at a disadvantage in the international world of science. We are back again with our universalist-particularist problem.

A similar situation exists in Fiji, where educational achievement is consistently higher among the Indian half of the population than among the Fijian half. Successive governments have allocated more government scholarship support to Fijian students (thus, incidentally, relieving the university from the responsibility of discrimination in selection, which would be contrary to its charter), but the achievement gap remains at secondary school and in the university itself. There is a consequential problem over faculty appointments, but this has been mitigated (or postponed) to some extent by the policy of the council of the University of the South Pacific in
insisting on the continued appointment of “expatriates” whenever these are better qualified than rival local candidates. It is a policy which derives in part from the perception that local replacements would, in present circumstances, mostly be from the Fiji Indian population, which would not be welcome either to the ethnic Fijians who dominate the government of Fiji, or to the governments of the ten other Pacific Island states whose educational achievements lag for the most part still farther behind. This policy in relation to localization is in marked contrast to the general pattern (for example in Africa and in Papua New Guinea) of replacing expatriate staff by local academic staff as soon as there are any of the latter qualified. The policy at the University of the South Pacific has been combined with a no-tenure policy, and has the effect of preserving academic staff places against the time when there are more candidates from the less educationally advanced local ethnic groups, in a situation where there is great disparity. (Tenure systems in new Third World universities have the great disadvantage of tying up faculty positions for many years in the hands of those, from whatever group or however barely qualified they may be, who happen to be first in line.) Again, we can see here how similar situations in very different parts of the world produce similar responses. Young observed of Nigeria that an exception to the usual principle of replacing expatriate staff was when

the immediate beneficiaries of an accelerated European exodus will be nationals of inconvenient regional provenance. Such has been the case in Northern Nigeria, where Northern opinion preferred the retention of a substantial and eventually replaceable expatriate cadre to a largely Nigerian staff that would, initially, be mainly Southern. Spaces are thus reserved for the later appearance of qualified Northern candidates. (Young 1981, 153)

Clearly, problems of this nature cannot be resolved by the simple application of “selection by merit,” and if a university were to insist on its right to do so in all circumstances, it would soon find its freedom of action constrained. The university’s task is to respond sensitively to the needs of the wider society, to interpret these in its own way, and to negotiate that way with those who have power. If it is fortunate enough to be in a free society, this will be negotiation with those who have such power legitimately. But if not, not.
Political Fragility

These characteristics of Third World societies—ethnic complexities and the ambivalent attitudes toward intellectual traditions—combine to produce what Ayandele (1982) has described as “unprecedented cultural fluidity.” Along with them comes “political fragility.” Mazrui described African governments as existing in a “permanent state of emergency comparable to a war situation . . . [the] emergency concerns the two crises of political stability and underdevelopment.” It is a state in which questioning, the characteristic posture of the Western academic, is always a dangerous activity, since it threatens the often ramshackle power structure and sometimes the very structure of the state itself. He contrasted the “different predicaments of developed and developing countries. The former suffer from ‘entrenched values and rigid institutions,’ the latter from ‘fluid values and fragile institutions’ ” (Mazrui 1978, 201). The university has to depend on an often vulnerable government, which nevertheless virtually monopolizes both funds and power. It therefore becomes incumbent on both government and university to respect the fragility of the other.

The first quality a university must cultivate at a time of change is tolerance. Government leaders, for their part, may have to accept and tolerate juvenile academic debate on campus, and to resist rushing in with the police on the first appearance of staff or student dissent. In turn, the university community needs to learn the distinction between academic and responsible debate, and outright political opposition and sabotage. The one calls for tolerance and accommodation. The other invites suspicion and sometimes sanctions. (Wandira 1982, 15)

Or, as Smelser put it, because of the questioning nature of the universities “the governing authorities in societies and the institutions of higher education in those societies stand in chronic ideological tension with one another. The relationship is never settled” (1988, 14).

In political terms, the insecurity of Third World governments has led them to become increasingly authoritarian, so that there are now very few indeed in which “competitive democracy” survives. The authoritarian government will invariably identify its own survival with “the national interest,” and will be tempted to label as “subversive” activities which the academic sees as legitimate, but the government considers “destabilizing.”
Such activities may include critical classroom examination of political issues; publications, more or less scholarly in nature, which reflect badly on the government and its policies; actual political activity, off or on the campus. Often it goes further. Altbach has pointed out that “in many Third World countries topics such as national integration, ethnic or religious policies are taboo, even in the classroom [and] political loyalty is expected from the academic community, and those who violate accepted standards of political discourse are often dealt with harshly” (1982b, 50). This is the atmosphere in which crises occur in the relationship between government and university. If not controlled, these can only result in defeat for the university, because the government has more power and has less to lose. That power can be and is from time to time used to close the whole university or to detain, dismiss, or deport individual academics. In Kenya, for example, Court (1980) has traced how involvement by academics in public policy has led to involvement in politics, which has led to repeated confrontations and “a history (in Nairobi) of being summarily closed by government whenever differences become severe and public.”

The Military

Such crises are typically more acute when the government concerned is a military one. The army in Third World countries is likely to be drawn from groups who lie outside the more closed elite circles, which may include civilian politicians and civil servants and academics. They may have seized power because of the apparent failure of those very groups. They are likely to come from rural districts rather than towns and to be drawn from ethnic groups who do not have access to other privileged positions. Unlike the city sophisticates, they have not themselves experienced higher education either at home or overseas, and are likely to have a view of education which does not tolerate questioning, let alone encourage it. Mazrui described the transition in some African states from “meritocracy to militocracy,” observing that the first wave of postindependence African rulers were “basically intellectuals,” but that this was not true of the soldiers who replaced them, since “the colonial armed forces turned to the most disadvantaged state of society for their soldiers.” Moreover, “the warrior is an older phenomenon in Africa than the writer; his attitude to knowledge carries weight, and the emergence of soldiers as rulers was a matter of profound educational significance” (Mazrui 1978, 15–20). The military perceive unambiguously (and often correctly) that the universities
are likely to be a base for those who work for their overthrow, and they have no reason to be intimidated by the international legitimacy or scientific authority of the academic profession. As MacKenzie put it: “Men who come to power through armed struggle in daring coups are not likely to be daunted by the disapproval of academics” (1986, 119). Nor do their young soldiers care much for the privileges of their student contemporaries. These attitudes are apparent under any regime in which the military exercise a strong influence, including, for example, the interim government in Fiji today, where the military forces at lower levels have made allegations against the university in terms which have caused much anxiety to the academic community, even though their attitudes do not appear yet to be endorsed by the government itself (FMF 1988). Of all the types of authoritarian society in which the university has to survive, therefore, it will have most trouble in accommodating to those in which power is held by the Army.

The university in a Third World society is therefore typically operating in an environment in which it absorbs a large—but for its own purposes too small—part of the national budget, in the hopes that it will fulfill unrealistic expectations of making major contributions to economic development; in which its staff forms a large and highly visible part of a small national elite, but tends to question many of the values and policies of that elite; in which universalist and international academic values are at odds with the particularist aspirations of new nations; in which it depends for social order on increasingly authoritarian and often military governments, which feel vulnerable to the questioning and dissent in which academics are likely to indulge.

**The Preservation of Academic Freedom in a Third World Context**

How then does the Third World university survive at all, let alone as a free university? Only by a process of constant adaptation, negotiation, and compromise, punctuated by dramatic events and even closures when the negotiations fail. On which of the many dimensions of academic freedom are these compromises least damaging? Are any of them so important that they do indeed define “the university” in the sense that without them there is no university worth having? What cards does the university have to play in this game? Or rather, since it soon ceases to be a game, what weapons
does it have to use? It would be convenient if we could provide some sort of tactical handbook of answers to these questions, but situations vary so widely that each university, and its staff, has to work them out for itself. Experience applied to principles does however suggest some of the considerations which have to be borne in mind, and in this section I shall outline them.

*The Public Interest*

The first is that universities and their staff have to act, and be seen to be acting, in the public interest. The pursuit of private objectives, however loftily defined, is simply not open to institutions dependent on public funds and the forbearance of public authorities. This does not necessarily mean that they must accept any particular definition of the public interest that may be dictated by external authorities. Indeed, a major part of their public utility may, paradoxically, be to provide alternative views of the public interest. Third World writers themselves have emphasized this in describing the university’s role. Mazrui (1978) wrote of “controlled skepticism” in contributing to the society’s “intellectual sobriety,” and demanded of the university “social commitment, not social conformity.” Kamba (1988) likened the university to a standing “independent court of inquiry,” adopting toward society the “critical stance inherent in the academic function,” which can amount to “inconvenient cognitive subversion.” This is close to Western academics’ insistence on their essential duty and moral obligation to present to society, and indeed to their own colleagues and students, “inconvenient facts” and “negative evidence” (Trow 1985; Shils 1977). To the extent that those in universities fulfill this obligation are the universities, as institutions, entitled to claim a peripheral share in the decision-making function of a representative democracy, even though they have not been elected to that responsibility. For example, the British universities in 1980 asserted the advantages to society of alternative diagnoses of the national interest, though they were scantily heeded in the years of centralist government that have followed. In a memorandum to a Parliamentary Select Committee, they wrote:

The needs of society must always be foremost among the concerns of those who make university decisions, although it must be recognized that defining those needs is often the major problem. But in matters of higher education they are unlikely, in most cases, to be best discerned centrally by government agen-
cies. Forty-five universities, each making its own informed interpretation of national needs, may well, between them, arrive at several valid versions of the best long-term pattern of research and teaching, while the inevitable mistakes will not be on the grand scale of government miscalculations. We consider it highly desirable, in the national interest, that the present pluralistic system of decision-making in higher education be preserved. (UK Committee 1980)

Reporting on African universities in 1987, the World Bank echoed this with its reference to “a usefully pluralistic counterpart to political and religious authorities” (1988).

In the Third World context, the offer of alternative diagnoses to those of a political hierarchy which is itself fragile may not readily be appreciated. (This may be particularly true where there is only one university in the country, as is often the case. Wandira discussed this in his chapter, “The Special Tasks and Problems of the ‘One-Country-One-University’ Institution in Middle Africa” [1977, 37–58].) If this role is to be accepted, it is essential for the university, or rather for its academic staff, to take the public interest seriously and to demonstrate that it is doing so; to act in a fully professional manner; to preserve a proper balance between different scholarly approaches; to avoid political provocation and perversity; and to seek to understand the positions of those in power, however much they may disagree with them.

*International Standing*

In the many negotiations which will sustain (or perhaps destroy) the desired relationship of mutual and wary tolerance, an important card on the university’s side is its international legitimacy. This serves two purposes, first to validate the university’s own claim to differ on occasions from the government’s perception of the public interest in matters of teaching and research, and second to help the government itself to present a respectable front to the Western world and to other Third World countries, on the goodwill of which it is in many ways dependent, however unpalatable this may sometimes be. At the same time as the university seeks in its work to serve the national interest, it must therefore be doing everything possible to preserve its credibility in the international academic world, both as a high quality institution overall, and also discipline by discipline. The great difficulty of doing this, given staffing and resource problems, has been documented in the World Bank report (1988) and else-
where. It remains a major imperative if academic freedom, with all its social value, is to be maintained.

Educational Role

However, most of those in positions of power in an authoritarian society, and, for that matter, most people in a democracy, require first and foremost from their universities a more direct kind of service, one which is often felt by the academic to be in conflict with the one just described. In Wandira’s words, the universities are “the most essential instrument in a country seeking to enter the modern world” (1977). Their most important task is seen to be the education of future leaders and the training of future professionals and highly skilled workers. However much academics may see the value of their “critical stance” role, and however much they may succeed in persuading some others of this, they will not prosper (and may not survive) if they are not also doing their primary educational job well. If the university does not accept the broad educational goals set for the society, it is likely to be replaced by some other institution. On the other hand, if the university shows itself sufficiently conscientious, it may earn freedom to determine curricular and teaching strategies for achieving those goals, and even a place in the political mechanisms that the society has for determining what they should be. But at the end of the day the university can neither reject nor ignore the goals set for it, however much this may be felt by some academics to abridge their freedom to teach what they want and how they want. Provided the university does continue to demonstrate success in its major educational role, however, it may well hope to achieve a degree of indispensability which will go far to protect it in the discharge of its other critical, independent, and often inconvenient functions.

Acceptance of these “broad educational goals” set from outside, however, can impinge upon the university’s discretion in other areas than, say, the balance between different curricular fields such as accountancy, teacher training, science, humanities, medicine, law. National policies concerning access to top jobs in the country may well involve the fixing of ethnic and other quotas for student admissions, and the admission of students will then be constrained within certain categories. The university may no longer then be teaching “the best,” by meritocratic standards, of the country’s secondary school output. But if such a policy has to be accepted as a compromise with universalistic values, it is still important
for the university to try to set limits on it. The university alone is responsible for the certification of its graduates, and pressures to certify one category of students at a lower level than others—to "cook" the examinations in favor of a particular ethnic group, for example—would indeed vitiate the whole educational process as well as violate the professional ethical imperative to treat all students equally. In all such matters, the vital consideration must be to maintain the internal integrity of the institution itself, and to protect its freedom to conduct its own research, teaching, and evaluation according to procedures which meet universal academic and ethical standards. This may mean that in some situations teachers have to teach the students they are assigned by the state the subjects the state wants them taught—not a desirable position, but perhaps an acceptable one. Unacceptable, however, would be a situation in which the state required the subjects to be taught according to a particular ideological formula, or stipulated which students should graduate, which not, or even prescribed in detail the requirements for graduation.

**Academic Appointments**

Similar considerations apply in the even more sensitive area of academic staff appointments and promotions. The extreme view of academic freedom would require that the university (which in this context must mean the academic staff of the university, not its governing body) must be entirely free to appoint whomever it perceives to be "the best" candidate for any position, regardless of any nonmeritocratic constraint, such as immigration controls over the employment of noncitizens. (To this end, for example, the University of Oxford pursued difficult negotiations in the 1970s to persuade the British government that the only acceptable candidate for an academic post at Oxford was the "best" of whatever nationality, and that the university’s selection for any post, if a foreigner, should therefore automatically be given an immigration permit to work regardless of the strength of the field of available and qualified British candidates. At that time, this position was accepted, with some reluctance, for Oxford but without prejudice to the position of "other" British higher education institutions. The academic freedom of some was, in this respect, apparently more in the public interest than that of others.) All over the world this position has been heavily modified and we have seen that in many Third World countries there are government requirements to the effect that "qualified" national candidates are always to be preferred to
"expatriates." In others there may only be a requirement that they are to be preferred if they are "equally" qualified. The latter is a provision that effectively leaves it to the discretion of the university appointing body how best, and at what rate, to "localize" the teaching staff. This is a discretion that has to be exercised with great care and conscience. The university is presented with real dilemmas, choices between "immediate efficiency" and "long-term institutional development and credibility," as Hunter (1977) has described them, pointing to the danger that senior academics may well be tempted to tip the balance too much toward the shorter term, thus inviting intervention. But it is not just a question of "immediate efficiency" secured by employing experienced expatriates to do today's teaching job better. There is a sense in which every university needs to be able to argue like Oxford, and aspire to attracting the best scholars from an international field, if the "local" faculty are to be confident in their "critical" role. Otherwise the "brain drain" from the Third World to the West will always be one way.

There may also be pressures from government for "affirmative action" on behalf of the appointment of certain groups of local staff rather than others, as we have already seen. This may lead to other troubles: Wandiwa, for example, has asked in the excellent chapter "Appointments and Promotions" in his book, The African University in Development, "What is the remedy to a pattern of poor applicants emanating from some region or tribe? Should selection committees make concessions to such candidates in the interests of a more even distribution of academic posts?" and concluded that such questions, which may have to be answered many times in a year, may lead to a situation in which "frustrated academics often align with insecure politicians to cause havoc in the university" (1977, 86–127).

The important thing is for the university to retain as much control over its own academic recruitment as possible. To do so, it must always bear in mind the particularistic social policy implications of its decisions as well as its universalistic academic values, and exercise its own discretion as to how to weigh and balance these. In this connection, it is probably more important that meritocratic values be maintained in the promotion of existing staff than in the appointment of new staff, since promotion is a principal extrinsic incentive for good research and teaching by individuals. The imposition of irrelevant criteria such as ethnic balance or political inclination must therefore damage the educational processes of the univer-
sity itself—and thus the professional integrity of all those working in it—in the same way as it would in the case of student evaluation discussed earlier. In the case of both appointments and promotions, it is perhaps even more damaging if patronage is exercised on behalf of individuals rather than on behalf of groups, since a habit of this would speedily lead to a situation in which individuals turned to authorities outside the institution for reward for themselves (and sanctions against others), with a consequent erosion of the university's (and their own) independent academic role.

As we have seen, in the cases of both student and staff evaluation, the threats to academic due process (and therefore to individual academic freedom) can come from within as well as from outside the university, and this is as true in the Third World as elsewhere. It is of the utmost importance that the university establish regular meritocratic procedures, free from untoward influence by powerful groups within the university, to deal with the assessment of both students and staff. In this way the university can present a model for social advancement alternative to the ethnic or political ones which may prevail outside. The exemplification of a meritocratic, achievement-based, process is in itself a service to society. As Young put it in relation to Nigeria, and comparing that country favorably with Zaire:

Strategies (for status allocation) are available to maximize the force of the culture of the university. An individual may protect himself from particularist pressures by collegial procedures in the high voltage spheres of personnel policies and evaluation. . . . the legitimacy of process and the cultivation of the internal law which expresses the culture of the university is critical. (Young 1981, 163)

Most serious of all forms of attack upon freedom in the area of staffing comes when a government attempts a purge of unsympathetic faculty members, or exercises a veto on their appointment. Such violations have been frequent in Latin America, where "purges and political criteria have repeatedly ravaged the university's autonomy to appoint, promote and fire" (Levy 1980, 69), less so in Africa, although there were serious cases in Ghana under Nkrumah in the early 1960s (Ashby 1966, 328–332) and, ironically, in Rhodesia at the same time under its "white" government (Murphree 1977). Western governments have of course also been guilty, for example the nonappointment of Marxists in postwar Germany (Van
de Graaf 1976, 29), and the purge of Japanese university staff under the postwar occupation (Cummings and Amano 1977, 61–62). There are also many current and past examples of governments that have taken specific legal powers to dismiss university staff, even though these may not have been frequently used.

**Political Activities**

Such crises are likely to arise because of activities, actual or imputed, by the staff concerned in the wider national political sphere, rather than in relation to their university-related activities. Indeed, it is over the broader aspects of what might be called “off-campus freedom” that there is most likelihood of friction between universities and external authorities in Third World countries, most of which to some degree limit freedom of speech and publication on the part of all their citizens. Broadly speaking, it is true to say that universities function better (i.e., serve their societies better) in free societies than elsewhere, and therefore that they have an institutional interest in promoting greater freedom at large, an interest that will clearly set them in potential conflict with an authoritarian government. Specifically, such conflicts can arise when students or staff invite outside speakers onto the campus who oppose the government; or when students or staff themselves attack the authorities (or aspects of their policy) either on or off the campus; or when students or staff use university facilities to organize political opposition to the authorities. In a free society, all such activities can be justified under the general rubric of academic freedom, meaning that no special sanctions against such conduct should be applied by the university (see Searle’s discussion of what he calls the “general theory of academic freedom” [1971, 191–197]), provided it does not interfere with the teaching and research business of the university. Indeed, the argument can be put even more strongly, in terms of the university’s obligation to insist that the presentation of the whole range of political viewpoints by outside speakers is a part of the educational function of the university, and that for the university to deny a campus to any significant viewpoint constitutes a form of self-censorship which is a major threat to academic freedom (see Trow 1988).

In an authoritarian society, however, it is not possible to claim special privilege and exemption from the prevailing political norms because of the academic status of the university staff, unless it can be convincingly shown that the political activity in question is directly related to the primary
teaching and research functions of the university. Attempts can, and will, be made to show such a relationship, for example, by making a speech by an invited dissident part of an academic course; or by organizing under academic auspices a conference on some controversial topical question; or by publishing an attack on government policy in the form of a research paper (usually in the social sciences). Such attempts will probably, however, be taken by the authorities to be more or less provocative, and they always run the risk of provoking a reaction which will damage, or even destroy, the primary function of the university. This may take the form of selective punitive action against the individual staff members concerned, or even against the entire institution, which is always under the threat of a reduction in funds.

Conversely, in the case of the political activities of faculty members "in their own time," they can do all they can to dissociate these from their employing university. But in Third World societies such role differentiation is rarely acceptable or even understood, and vigorous political activity by a faculty member always runs the risk of provoking sanctions against the university, as well as against the individual. As Altbach put it at the conference on the University of Zimbabwe:

The challenge is to somehow recognize the necessary political involvement of the academic community, to attempt to insulate the university as an institution from direct political strife and to convince all the participants in the academic community to keep political activity within appropriate boundaries. (1982b, 53)

It is therefore always a question of judgment by the individual how far he or she should go in particular circumstances in imperiling the freedom of the university to do its job of teaching and research, a part of the purpose of which is to advance (or retrieve) freedom in society generally. These individual judgments frequently become questions of judgment for the institution also, since it has to determine whether such activities are compatible with the status of the individual as an employee, or whether they prejudice the successful performance of the primary task of the university and should therefore be stopped. All experience (in the Third and Western worlds alike) shows the extreme difficulty of such judgments. But if the university is to keep them in its own hands, it will inevitably be bound to exercise them on occasions in ways which affront individual staff members. They are likely to feel, and to protest, that, because they
are academics, it is academic freedom which has been violated, whereas in fact they may have suffered only the same deprivation of civil liberties as have all other members of society.

On the other hand, it is the case that academics are more likely to be treated harshly by an authoritarian regime than most others in the society. This is because they are articulate; they are seen to be in a position to influence students, who are always an unpredictable political force and have been known to bring down governments, and also because, like their students, they have access to the media and, indeed, to facilities such as printing presses, copying machines, word processors, amplifiers, even meeting rooms, all of which can be readily appropriated for political purposes.

It is also the case that social scientists are, by the nature of their discipline, more likely to be involved in political issues than others. It is impossible, for example, to teach or write about political science without making or implying some statements about the local political situation, and the judgments required of individuals are extremely difficult if they are to avoid total self-censorship and betrayal of their own professional values. Their natural scientist colleagues do not run the same risks, and are liable to be unsympathetic, and even hostile, to those who they may think are endangering the whole enterprise by pursuing their discipline in an embarrassing way. Interdepartmental conflict on such matters has to be mediated, usually by the administration.

The student body—which also wants its own freedom—is another potentially inflammatory element in the situation. Indeed, the most likely immediate cause for university closures in the Third World is student political action, probably with some faculty support. The administration has to find a way of maintaining the confidence of the student body, without provoking the authorities, who may well fear the students as the largest concentration of articulate, politically malleable, and possibly reckless, people in the country. Campuses are usually located in the capital city, where all the political action is in any case concentrated, and this too makes them both suspect and vulnerable.

As an institution at times of crisis the university is not naturally monolithic. Judgments and skill are needed to prevent different groups within it from pursuing their own causes and endangering the fundamental purposes of the enterprise.

The difficult judgments are also not only on the university’s side: the
authorities have to make them too. Mazrui's account of the banning of Odinga (then leader of the opposition in Kenya) from the Nairobi campus in 1969 is instructive.

In January 1969, the Political Science Club of the University of Nairobi had invited Mr. Odinga to address a meeting of the University College. The Kenya Government banned the meeting. The students were indignant and asked to see the Minister of Education. When the Minister deferred a meeting, the students boycotted lectures. The Government retaliated by closing down the university.

The Kenya Government was unwise when it prevented the students from having a speaker of their own choice, particularly when the speaker was at that time a free and eminent citizen of the country. To deny a university audience the right to hear controversial views was, so the students rightly thought, to attack the very essence of freedom of discussion.

But people do sometimes go too far in defending what is legitimately their right; or they may go too far in exercising these rights. There were many in East Africa at the time who believed the Government was wrong, but also that the students in a country such as Kenya, where political authority was still inadequately consolidated, were wrong to have defied the government so conspicuously.

And yet when the Government had closed down the university and forcibly sent the students to their homes all over the country the next step needed was what, at the time, I called "academic amnesty": an unconditional forgiveness of those whose excesses were motivated by a desire either to exercise or to safeguard academic freedom. The Kenya Government rose to the occasion and did extend an academic amnesty to all but the alleged ringleaders. (Mazrui 1978, 363–364)

What in hindsight seem like mistakes can always be made in such situations on either side, and are hard to retrieve. There has to be room for consultation in advance: a "hotline" between government and university, for use in crisis. As Mazrui said elsewhere, "What the university owes the government is neither defiance nor subservience, but intelligent cooperation" (1978, 275), or at least a willingness to engage in that if the government is prepared for its part to do so. It might be added that such cooperation, in highly charged political situations, frequently needs to be covert. On the sides both of the university and the government, there will be leaders whose readiness to compromise is threatened by activists all too ready for confrontation.
"Relative Autonomy": The Bargaining Process

But there should be no misunderstanding about this. Any diminution of any dimension of academic freedom diminishes the effectiveness of a university. This is the case provided that—and this is by no means always so—the university and its staff are acting with full regard both to universalistic academic values and to their perception of how they can best further the interests of the particular society in which they are located. But other social institutions have more power and more resources than the university, and accommodation is therefore always necessary.

For the university there are only degrees of relative autonomy. No state will support a university or allow it to exist within its midst unless this existence is perceived to be functional for its preservation and extension. The university has its own functional requisites and, insofar as it has a universalistic perspective, will have its own reference point for action embedded in an academic subculture which is international. The degree to which it attains the autonomy necessary to maintain this perspective will depend upon a continuous bargaining process between the institution and its enviroring society. Its role and its status is therefore the result of a tradeoff, an exchange, which is constantly being redefined. (Murphree 1977, 117)

Importance of Survival

In this process of bargaining the university must always give priority to its own survival in order to pursue its primary responsibilities of teaching and research. These responsibilities are themselves political and they give the university a political role. In Third World contexts, the political role, thus defined, is more potent than in more diffuse and stable Western societies. It is a role which does not, however, involve taking stands on major political issues. It is a different one, with two dimensions of political importance, the education of the young leaders of society, and the questioning pursuit of truth. It is this role which must be protected when universities are under threat, as frequently they are. At such times, the best course may be to avoid the public political stage as far as possible, to avoid public confrontation with the authorities, and on controversial issues to remain silent. It is noteworthy that two African vice-chancellors, both notable for their defense of freedom in difficult circumstances, have at different times expressed this view with force. At the 1981 conference on the future of the University of Zimbabwe, Professor Wandira, then vice-chancellor of Makerere University in Uganda, said:
There is no freedom without responsibility. . . . Institutions and individuals, be they academic or not, working in delicately balanced societies, bear great responsibility when considering whether or not to act in contradiction to national consensus. There are times in the affairs of men when greater service to society lies in silence, when the articulation of the things that bind men is more important than the propagation of those that divide them. (1982, 11)

Seven years later Professor Walter Kamba, then vice-chancellor of the University of Zimbabwe, said in an address to the Association of Commonwealth Universities:

Silence on the part of the academic community can itself be a political statement, and it can be cogently argued that in certain circumstances the low profile mode of expression is the best discharge of its political role that a university can engage in. This is true as long as an important qualification is observed—that the tactic remains a means and is not allowed to become the end, that the survival in form of an academic institution (or career) does not supplant the political role which is an integral dimension of the academic ethos. (1988)

Nor are such views peculiar to the Third World context. John Searle, for example, wrote of the American university in the difficult days of the late 1960s:

The university is a specialized institution, not a city state. If it abandons its side of the agreement with the community it can hardly hope to survive as an educational institution, because as a political agency it will be taken over by the strongest political forces of the day. As an actor in the political arena it would lose its right to claim immunity from political interference, a right which it has only in its capacity as an educational institution. (1971, 201)

Such silence or neutrality involves no sacrifice of academic principle, although there will be those who say that it does. In almost every situation it is, in principle, better to preserve the existence of an institution within which there is some freedom, even if limited, to pursue truth and academic values—and to pass on these things to others—than it is to have no such institution. The answer to the rhetorical and impatient question so often heard at times of political crisis for the university, Is it worth trying to run a university at all under these conditions? is always yes. The activities of a university are complex and esoteric. In the detail of their private academic lives, they are surprisingly hard to control, though easy to extinguish. If universities can patiently avoid provoking extinction by impatient and powerful people, they generally find that they can operate with
surprisingly little control over the things that really matter in their mission, even in the most unpropitious circumstances.

APPENDIX

Excerpts from Report of University Council Meeting

This statement was made formally to the Council of the University by Mr Filipe Bole on behalf of the government “Council of Advisers” one month after the military coup in Fiji. It was intended to reassure the university and has been substantially reiterated, and honored, since, even after the Internal Security Decree a year later. Because of its relevance to many of the matters discussed in this paper, and because it has not been widely published, extended extracts are reproduced here:

3 . . . I have a mandate from the Governor-General and his Council of Advisers to give the University certain assurances which have been sought.

4 . . . Fiji continues to recognise the regional character of the University and its autonomy to carry out its activities in response to or in accordance with the needs and the aspirations of the member countries and the various communities the University exists to serve. We also appreciate the valuable contribution the University has already made since its establishment in 1968 in fulfilling Fiji’s manpower needs and thus facilitating our country’s social and economic development.

5 . . . We continue to recognise and respect the concept that the University must be able to operate in an atmosphere of academic freedom in order to be able to carry out with optimum success its teaching and learning activities, research and consultancy. However, we wish to remind the University that this recognition and respect are based on the assumption that there is a reciprocal recognition on the part of the University that implicit in this academic freedom is the obligation to exercise this freedom with a sense of responsibility. We feel that we should also remind the University that the recognition and respect we have assured the University ought not to be taken for granted. Such recognition and respect have to be merited by all their recipients and in our view the main criterion for meriting it is the sense of responsibility with which academic freedom is utilised. Respect for such freedom is mutual; the maintenance of it cannot be guaranteed in perpetuity by legislative measures alone; it has to be earned by all those participating in the University who value it and seek its preservation and enhancement.

6 . . . These assurances are given readily and ungrudgingly but in the
expectation that all their recipients will continue to be mindful of their responsibilities to member countries. In particular, there is the expectation that in the present circumstances when the Emergency Regulations are in force, all students and staff of the University, in particular those who are not citizens of Fiji, will not engage in any activity that might aggravate the current political and economic situation in Fiji or induce its prolongation. Within the framework of these expectations, the University is given the following assurances:

(i) The security of all its students, staff and property would continue to be given special attention.
(ii) There will be no military presence on the University Campus in Fiji.
(iii) Staff and students of the University may hold such meetings and conduct such discussions and related activities on the University Campus as are necessary for the pursuit of learning, teaching, research, consultancy and other related activities of the University.
(iv) Staff and students of the University may publish such material as are in accordance with the aims and objectives of the University as an institution of higher education but which do not violate the integrity of Fiji as an independent sovereign State or which are of a subversive nature.

7 . . . We trust that this statement, in particular the expectations and assurances embodied in it, will help all concerned to determine the future direction of the University which will continue to receive Fiji’s full support. (USP 1987)

Notes

1 The University of the South Pacific (USP) is the national university of eleven very small island countries in the South Pacific, none of which is big enough to support its own international-standard university. Its main campus is in Fiji, from which come 70 percent of its students and about the same proportion of its funds. Its staff and its students are multinational and multiethnic. Geoffrey Caston has been vice-chancellor of the university since 1983, is British, and therefore, in the term commonly used in Third World universities, an “expatriate.” The material about USP used in this paper is drawn from his own experience; references to other Third World countries are, for the most part, drawn from accounts and analyses based on the personal experience or participant observation of their authors.

2 Searle discusses the concept of institutional neutrality at length (1971, 199–208).
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