treat either American or Ifaluk concepts as underlying entities. Basically, she argues that her explanation is richer, not that Spiro's is necessarily wrong.

Lutz goes on to distinguish among several varieties of emotion theories. These concluding remarks make explicit what the preceding anecdotes and analysis made vivid: theories of emotions as things separate from human moral activity presuppose alienation of the individual or the body from experience and relatedness. Lutz argues that emotional activity and talk illuminate social life in both Ifaluk and American worlds, so academic emotion theory must be considered a product of Western ideas, rather than a reflection of experience.

Lutz has largely succeeded in presenting Ifaluk lives and discourse as having meaning apart from Western preconceptions of them. She has identified ways in which Americans are apt to reduce others' communications to natural behaviors or drives and procedures to resist such reduction. She provides a model of self-conscious and other-respecting ethnography that, I devoutly hope, will be followed and amended by anthropologists in the next few years.

JOHN KIRKPATRICK
University of Hawaii at Manoa

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Few works of scholarship, especially those resulting, as this does, from the multiple endeavors of a large team of researchers over many years, have about them so refreshing a sense of humility as this useful volume. It is the publicly available fruit of a project that began in 1974 under the auspices of the Man and the Biosphere (MAB) program initiated by UNESCO in 1971. It draws together the most important aspects of research on the islands of Lomaiviti and Lau in eastern Fiji that were previously published in a difficult-to-obtain series of project working papers, island reports, and general reports (obtainable from the Australian National University).

The distillation benefits, however, from a return visit to eastern Fiji in 1983 by the chief investigators and their decision to write a book “about what has happened in Eastern Fiji, and what this might add to the sum of knowledge about the colonial and post-colonial experience of the developing world” (xv). It also benefits from their conclusion, as a result of the military coups of 1987, that their analysis had been more culturally conditioned than they had realized. “Even when a real effort is made to ‘understand’ the minds of a people being studied,” the editor writes, “social scientists inevitably find themselves asking questions which derive from their own disciplinary systems of theory, and moreover reasoning from the norms of their own society” (10).

The team was fascinated by young people who had experienced the
conveniences and stimulations of urban society yet returned willingly to the harsh material environment of an island like Kabara in Southern Lau and spoke around the *yaqona* bowl in the evenings of the deeply satisfying sense of autonomy and self-esteem that they enjoyed. Like many other visitors, the team was also initially puzzled by the ambivalence of Fijians who exercised their prerogative of private criticism of the authority of the chiefs yet humbled themselves in their presence. They believed they had discerned the increasing dependence of the periphery on the national economy and saw the perpetuation of the “Fijian way of life” in the outer islands as the result of the imposition of central authority that succeeded only in the absence of something better. They had seen the beginnings of a new politics in which class might soon become more important than race. “The fact that we were wrong,” writes editor Tim Bayliss-Smith “… throws into question all our interpretations in this book” (6).

However, being wrong does nothing to diminish the value of the detailed research that the book contains, and it suggests that the implications of what has happened in eastern Fiji for our understanding of “the colonial and post-colonial experience of the developing world” may be different from what it might have been, but no less important.

Chapters on the historical geography of eastern Fiji, derived largely from secondary sources, are followed by detailed work on externalities such as droughts and hurricanes, physical resources of the reefs and islands, and the interlocking economies of the villages, islands, regions, and wider world in which individual Islanders participate. Patterns of population growth, age structure, and migration are selectively tabulated, mapped, and analyzed. Comparisons are made between energy expended and nutritional value obtained through participation in subsistence, local market, and export economies, and the relative importance of wage-labor opportunities and remittances from Suva and overseas is quantified. In spite of Ratu Sukuna’s advice that hurricane relief was unnecessary in southern Lau—“The people affected are about the hardiest in Fiji and no distress is anticipated” (143)—the increasing importance of hurricane relief in subsidizing the mixed economy of the outer islands is demonstrated.

The conclusions that might be drawn from this mass of information about “the colonial and post-colonial experience of the developing world” are different now from what they would have been when the study commenced. The context then, as Gisbert Glaser indicates in his introduction, was that created by the early work of Paul Ehrlich and the Club of Rome, in which the environmental crisis was perceived as the product primarily of overpopulation, mostly in the Third World. Inequalities, both international and within rich and poor countries, were not yet seen as relevant to the environment, and economic growth was seen as a universal panacea for the ills of the world. Population, resources, and environment were the components of the vital equation that was up to social scientists to solve so that “rational” decisions could be taken


by fully informed politicians and planners. Islands were seen as having special advantages for research because of their small size and isolation, the nearest thing to a laboratory the social scientist was ever likely to get.

One consequence of this was that eastern Fiji became something of a magnet of research in the 1970s. Apart from the sixteen foreign scholars who were associated with the MAB project, there was a group of medical students from the University of Cambridge, Stephen Hooper living for two years on Kabara, A. C. Reid on Lakeba, Bruce Knapman on Vanua Balavu, and myself on every island south as far as Ono-i-Lau. Simon and Rosemary Best worked for several successive years on Lakeba as well as other islands, and Garth Rogers both supported Simon Best and did three months of independent work on Ono-i-Lau in 1982. Another expedition was led by Gilbert S. Grosvenor of the US National Geographic magazine in 1974.

In retrospect, it seems extraordinary as well as unfortunate that there was no formal collaboration. Though there were some incidental contacts and plenty of gossip from our tolerant hosts, our subsequent theses, papers, and publications take little account of our common experiences. Transport is a major problem of research in areas of this kind and one that collaboration might have solved. As it was, the MAB project was, of necessity, focused on those islands that could be reached at the opportune time by commercial or government shipping, and the time spent on any one island was determined often by the logistics of shipping rather than academic judgment.

Given such constraints, a degree of subjectivity was inevitable. Bayliss-Smith points out that geographers have long wanted to establish their expertise in the integrated study of population and environment problems and have therefore made the implicit claim that their work produces “value-free” insights that possess universal “scientific” status. He confronts the problem of inescapable subjectivity in this project by a discussion of the methodological debate between Winch (American Philosophical Quarterly 1964; 1970) and Jarvie (in Explanation in the Behavioural Sciences, 1970).

Winch argued that it was necessary for the researcher who wished to understand the institutions of a primitive (sic) society to accept the internal rationale of that society, a principle that has long been accepted by most Pacific historians. It means, usually, a period of prolonged fieldwork and learning the language well. Jarvie argued, on the other hand, that the use of the norms of one’s own society (presumably industrial society) as a necessary instrument or sounding board is “the principle way in which sociological understanding of alien societies is reached.” While no one can work in Fiji for any length of time without coming to believe they are a successful disciple of Winch, the anxiety of geographers to achieve the status of objective scientists makes them vulnerable to the arguments of Jarvie. It was consistent with an inclination toward Jarvie’s point of view, to which Bayliss-Smith retrospectively confesses (8), to discern in the Islanders’ rejection of what Sukuna called “the octopus of the modern world” evidence of their irrationality.
For example, in one of the early reports (1978), Bedford concluded that the people of Kabara had by then lost the optional relationship with the market economy that Laura Thompson had recorded in 1940 and Hooper was to confirm again in 1982. Migration to Suva had become, Bedford thought, the preferred response to natural disaster rather than a revival of the subsistence culture.

Similarly, on the island of Koro, the word *stagnation* rather than *stability* is used to describe a situation in which “the vast majority of village producers do not seem to perceive any advantage in a commitment to greater dependence on any particular cash crop, let alone the market sector as a whole” (206).

Yet, in view of the figures for calorie and protein intake from subsistence (66.2% and 70.8% respectively on Kabara in 1975) compared with that derived in return for cash (33.8% and 29.3% respectively), the rationality of less than full commitment to the cash economy is self-evident.

The “rationality” that has led to an emphasis on copra production for the benefit of the national economy on which the “pampered periphery” ostensibly depends is belied by the comparative returns from copra production for export and the production of *yaqona* for the local market. The 7,250 tonnes of copra produced by the whole Eastern Division in 1981 were worth F$1.98 million to producers. On the other hand, 850 tonnes of *yaqona*, an outgrowth of the subsistence economy and of ceremonial and social importance, brought in F$3 million in 1982. This in spite of an expensive superstructure—of Coconut Board, grading stations, freight subsidies, and agricultural extension officers—that supports the copra industry.

Analysis of food energetics produces similar results. While copra returns to the producer have generally been low, fluctuating, and beyond the control of individual producers, the subsistence sector has usually been dependable and more rewarding.

In spite of this evidence, a gradual Westernization is both perceived and, at times, applauded. Thus, “Wage labour offers a secure and regular income, and wherever that income is perceived as adequate it is widely sought. With it has come the unofficial but clear beginnings of a ‘market’ in Fijian land, and the emergence of trade in food among rural Fijians... The formation of a class structure... would perhaps be accelerated by such a trend” (263).

Despite the rhetoric of development the writers occasionally employ, much of the research points to the conclusion that if the World Bank, UNESCO, hurricane relief, and the procession of academics that the Islanders have encountered in the last two decades had passed them by, they would probably be no worse off than they are. In discussing this realization, Bayliss-Smith asks, “Is not the real weakness of the coconut industry the growing unsuitability of an export-based approach to development?... if so, is there any point in trying to replace one export base with another? Might not any real hope for future economic growth in the eastern region lie in another direction altogether?” (266). What might this direction be? And what might this “add to the sum of knowledge about the
colonial and post-colonial experience of the developing world”?

In 1971, when the MAB project began, the continued growth of the global economy seemed assured. The problem, in spite of the minority misgivings of those on the left, was how the undeveloped nations, among them Fiji, were to be enabled to catch up with the industrialized world. How dated that perception seems now. In spite of three decades of scholarship and advice, pilot projects, conferences, aid, research, and copious government reports and development plans, the poor are poorer and the rich are richer in both poor countries and rich, and the gap between poor and rich countries has grown.

The early successes in east Asia are unlikely to be repeated in Africa or the Pacific. The current buzzword that reflects that realization, *sustainable development*, will soon dissolve into its two inherently contradictory components, and the choice between the mirage of development, as we have understood that word in the past, and sustainability, which may yet be within our grasp, will become apparent.

The value of such studies as this will then be not what their ambivalent conclusions can teach planners and politicians about development, but what the research that went into them can teach us about sustainability. Richard Bedford et al (*The Small Islands and the Reefs* 1978, 33), quoting M. C. Howard, point out that the people of Kabara have cause to sympathize with those in the industrialized world, who have only one way of life to choose from. Kabarans “not only have yours, but our own as well,” a choice they have wisely continued to exercise. As Bayliss-Smith observes, the people of the eastern islands have stubbornly resisted efforts to convert them to wholly cash-crop producers. They have retained control over their own means of subsistence “whilst selecting among the available alternatives for ways of earning money in a rational manner.” Tim McNaught’s conclusion that “in a world running out of easy answers, no one will be surprised if the entire nation looks to its Fijian heritage for some of the arts of living well on islands” (81) can also be extended, in the context of the 1990s, to the wider world. As industrialized society, both east and west, reaches the limits of ecological tolerance and abandons its claims to control of the global periphery, the kind of rational opportunism that this book documents so well may have lessons for the rest of us.

JOHN YOUNG

*University of Adelaide*

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In September 1989 the New Zealand Labour government, headed by Geoffrey Palmer, took a controversial decision to join Australia in a major and long-term naval-frigate construction project. Part of the rationale for this decision was that it would enhance New Zealand’s capacity to play a security role in the South Pacific. Since this