stitution and possible power sharing. Far more troubling was the response of extremists within the Methodist church and Fijian nationalist movement. Opposed to both Ratu Mara and the Constitutional Inquiry and Advisory Committee recommendations, these extremists favored "solutions" similar to those proposed by the army officers in May. Their radicalism was demonstrated on 15 October when a Muslim mosque and three Hindu temples were gutted by firebombs in the western city of Lautoka. These attacks were part of a nation-wide campaign aimed ostensibly at opposing the relaxation of the Sunday Observance Decree, but more generally at undermining the interim government and perhaps at precipitating military intervention.

To the Indo-Fijian population, the Lautoka firebombings were violations of immeasurable proportion. Communal unity was forged. Shops, businesses, and schools closed to demonstrate mourning and solidarity. University students stayed away from classes. Celebrations marking the Hindu festival of light, *Diwali,* were canceled. However, calm was maintained and the feared spiral of violence failed to materialize. Instead the country was plunged into a different kind of mourning by the death from cancer of coalition leader, Dr Timoci Bavadra, on 3 November.

No single event since the coup has had such a momentous impact. Dr Bavadra's funeral at the chiefly village of Viseisei was witnessed by one of the largest gatherings in Fiji's history. Up to sixty thousand people attended or tried to attend. The event was testament to the strength of support for Dr Bavadra as well as the cause with which he was identified.

The loss of Dr Bavadra's leadership was regarded as a major challenge and setback for the coalition. However, within weeks Adi Kuini Bavadra, Dr Bavadra's widow and a high chief, was named the movement's new leader. This bold and astute move promised to retain the coalition's multiracial following and the loyalty that Dr Bavadra had inspired.

If members of the interim government felt uncomfortable having to respect and accommodate the mourning of the deposed prime minister it was not evident. Both the president and the interim prime minister were overseas at the time. The army was spared the embarrassing task of giving a state funeral to the prime minister it deposed when Dr Bavadra's family and elders refused the cabinet's reluctant offer.

The state funeral of the former governor general and *Vunivalu* (paramount chief of Fiji), Ratu Sir George Cakobau, preoccupied the army and the government as the year drew to a close. There were few murmurs of surprise when the interim government's term was extended another month (to 5 January 1990) in deference to the passing of the *Vunivalu.* Indeed, some would recognize the move as the familiar political tactic of buying time.

SANDRA TARTE

New Caledonia

At the beginning of 1989 New Caledonia was more peaceful than it had been for many months. The Matignon

Accord, that had brought the pro-independence coalition, the *Front de Libération Nationale Kanake et Socialiste* (FLNKS), and the "loyalist" *Rassemblement pour la Calédonie dans la République* (RPCR) toward a tentative agreement, had been signed and approved in a national referendum; overt violence was no longer apparent; new financial benefits were trickling into the territory; and high world nickel prices had rejuvenated the mining industry after years of depression. Both the FLNKS and the RPCR sought to gain Melanesian support through greater economic development in rural areas.

Inside New Caledonia, however, the stability was uncertain as there was dissidence within the FLNKS, notably from Yann-Célène Uregei's *Front Uni de Libération Kanake* (FULK), and from the more radical *Parti de Libération Kanake* (PALIKA). The loyalist side was also under some pressure from the right-wing *Front National,* which had experienced renewed support in 1988. Early in the year the FLNKS strongly criticized the French government's revision of the electoral rolls, and objected to the restricted roll being used only for the 1998 referendum on independence, and not for intervening elections. Outside New Caledonia there was strong support for the Matignon Accord. Vanuatu conceded that France had a role to play in the region. Both Vanuatu and Australia drew closer to France, and France increased its aid to the region, especially to Fiji. Forty-seven Kanak militants were released from jail, and New Caledonia entered a period of convalescence.

In the March municipal elections there was increased support for the pro-independence parties and a setback for RPCR leader Jacques Lafleur in Dumbea. The turnout was just under 70 percent, rather higher than the 63 percent for the previous year's referendum on the Matignon Accord. The FLNKS improved on its performance in the 1983 elections, winning twenty of the thirty-two municipalities. Although the largest party in the FLNKS coalition, Jean-Marie Tjibaou's *Union Calédonienne* (UC), claimed about 53 percent of the pro-independence votes, it appeared to have lost ground to PALIKA, which emerged as the second largest party in the FLNKS. The FULK scored poorly except in the Loyalty Islands. The RPCR lost its monopoly in Noumea, with UC gaining a seat and three right-wing parties gaining seven seats (*PR,* 16 March 1989). Dissident Wallisians and Futunans, who had usually supported the RPCR, ran their own candidates and did well in Paita. In the east-coast towns of Poindimie and Ponerihouen there were violent disputes between different parties within the FLNKS over the outcome of the elections.

The prevailing mood of cautious optimism was rudely shattered by the murder of the president and vice-president of the FLNKS, Jean-Marie Tjibaou and Yeiwene Yeiwene, on 4 May 1989 in Ouvea. They had gone to Ouvea for a custom ceremony to mark the end of one year's mourning for the victims of the Ouvea violence. The two were shot by Djoubelli Wea, a local pro-independence leader, previously a member of FULK and PALIKA, who was unhappy with the signing of the Matignon Accord and concerned that indepen-

dence had effectively been postponed indefinitely. He was shot and killed by Tjibaou's bodyguards.

The assassinations struck the political movement a grievous blow. In New Caledonia, as elsewhere in Melanesia, politics is very much about personalities. The Melanesian leader who absolutely dominated New Caledonia politics throughout the turbulent 1980s was Jean-Marie Tjibaou. Even the deputy leader of FLNKS, Yeiwene Yeiwene, was largely unknown outside New Caledonia. Tjibaou was also leader of the UC, the longest established political party in New Caledonia, and the only party with support throughout the territory. Perhaps two-thirds of all pro-independence Kanaks are members. Throughout the five-year existence of the FLNKS, and even when the stage seemed set for an independent Kanaky, there were regional and other divisions within the coalition. Tjibaou was able to cope with dissent and division and forged a united front on most of the issues that were crucial to achieving the timetable for independence.

Tjibaou was born in 1934 in the Tiendanite valley, inland from Hienghene, where he later became mayor. He went to a Catholic school at Canala, studied sociology at the Sorbonne, and attended a seminary in Paita. After a decade he dropped out of the priesthood, married Marie-Claude Wetta, and became leader of the *Union Calédonienne* in 1977. He was briefly vice-president of the Territorial Assembly in 1982. Yeiwene was born in 1945 in Mare. He became a member of the Territorial Assembly in 1977, was the deputy leader of the UC, one-time chairman of the Loyalty Islands region, and chairman of the domestic airline, *Air Calédonie*.

Both the UC and the FLNKS faced the challenge of finding new leaders, and particularly of uniting the FLNKS for the long and difficult road to independence. It proved to be an arduous task for a coalition that had for too long assumed that Tjibaou would always be there. By the end of 1989 no decision had been made regarding the FLNKS leader. The FULK was further marginalized when it failed to condemn the murders. There was dissent on when a congress should be held, and strong views that the leadership of the FLNKS should come from a party other than the UC. The always hesitant unity of the FLNKS was severely threatened, as it had previously been by the Matignon Accord, the municipal elections, and the frustration of waging a long and bitter struggle with so little reward. Leadership is likely to impose severe burdens; few of the potential candidates have the stature of Tjibaou, are known to be as moderate, and appear to be capable of achieving consistent unity.

Two weeks after the murders the executive of the UC chose as its new leader François Burck, the last survivor of the group that in 1977 had led the UC to demand independence. The others, Tjibaou, Eloi Machoro, and Pierre Declercq, have all died in tragic circumstances. Burck was born in Noumea in 1939, the son of a part-Melanesian father and a European mother, thus claiming "Kanak roots and European branches" (*Le Monde*, 22 May 1989). Like his close friend Tjibaou, he was a former Catholic priest, and he promised to continue the poli-

cies of Tjibaou and Yeiwene. But by stressing that he sought "independence for everyone," he distanced himself from the "Kanak independence" that had previously been demanded.

New provincial elections were held in June. Again nearly 70 percent of the electorate took part in the poll, which predictably gave the RPCR an absolute majority in the South (based on Noumea), and the FLNKS equally convincing majorities in the North and the Loyalty Islands. However, most of the provincial seats were allocated to UC members, especially in the Loyalty Islands, thus alienating members of other parties in the FLNKS, principally PALIKA. The presidents of the North and Loyalty Islands, Léopold Jorédie and Richard Kaloi, are both from the UC. With control of 27 of the 54 seats, the RPCR just failed to get an absolute majority in the territorial congress. The FULK opposed the elections, but a promised active boycott failed to materialize. The hard-line *Front National,* which had opposed the Matignon Accord, won three seats in the South; two other seats were won by the extreme right wing *Calédonie Demain.* Center parties had no impact, although a new party, *Union Océanienne,* representing Wallis and Futuna Islanders, won two seats in the South, indicating support for their view that migrants had been ignored in the Matignon Accord.

The annual conference of the *Union des Syndicats des Travailleurs et Kanaks Exploités* (USTKE) decided by an overwhelming majority to leave the FLNKS coalition, partly out of disappointment with the Matignon Accord, but primarily in order to focus on industrial and employment issues. Since the *Group des Femmes Kanakes Exploitées en Lutte* (GFKEL) is no longer active, and *Libération Kanake Socialiste* (LKS) remains outside the coalition, the FLNKS is now composed of UC, PALIKA, and the relatively small *Union Progressiste Mélanesienne* (UPM) and *Parti Socialiste de Kanaky* (PSK). The FULK also remains a member, despite talk of expulsion because of its opposition to the Accord.

On the economic front, nickel mining expanded substantially as prices remained at their highest levels for a decade, and the New Caledonian Congress introduced new fiscal measures to encourage the industry. Tourism continued the revival that began in 1988, but numbers were still well below the record levels of 1984. A large new hotel opened at Ouémo (Noumea), and other smaller hotels were completed in Poe (Bourail), and in the Loyalty Islands. Under the provisions of the Matignon Accord there was progress toward setting up a port city at Nepoui in the north, and expanding employment and training in rural areas. One of the most surprising economic events was the purchase of the *Banque d'Indosuez* in both French Polynesia and New Caledonia by the Australian bank Westpac. This expanded Westpac's banking interests in the Pacific substantially, and made it the first foreign bank in New Caledonia. There were other facets of economic change. An increase in overt unemployment, especially among young urban Melanesians and Polynesians, was attributed to "galloping demography and an inadequate job market" and resulted in a significant increase in juvenile delin-

quency and urban violence. The 1989 census revealed that the population had grown to 164,000, with Melanesians representing 45 percent of the total. There was little progress on land reform, despite repeated promises.

The year drew to a close with the pardoning of 26 Kanaks jailed after the murder of four gendarmes in April 1988, the incident that had precipitated the Ouvea violence. Although opposed by the right wing, the amnesty indicated the further distancing of New Caledonia from the violence of the immediate past. The year ended as peacefully as it had begun. But it had added one more violent chapter to the recent history of New Caledonia, and witnessed what apppeared to be the declining fortunes of the FLNKS, despite its continued electoral support.

JOHN CONNELL

Papua New Guinea

This was Papua New Guinea's most difficult year since independence in 1975. On Bougainville Island more than fifty people died and many more were injured in clashes between security forces and militant landowners near the giant Panguna copper and gold mine, and in outbursts of ethnic violence between Bougainvilleans and migrants from other provinces. The forced closure of the mine in May 1989 had serious economic consequences, especially for government revenues and the country's balance of payments. More important, however, were the political and social implications of the Bougainville crisis. The national government was unable to negotiate or impose a solution, while the undisciplined behavior of its security forces served to exacerbate existing ethnic and separatist tensions.

Growing dissatisfaction with Bougainville Copper Limited's response to certain long-standing grievances had led some landowners to adopt militant tactics in late 1988. The initial campaign of bombing and arson directed against company property was orchestrated by a group of landowners, led by a former mine employee, Francis Ona, who had become disenchanted with the leadership and approach of their representative body, the Panguna Landowners Association. However, Ona's group, associated with the so-called new Panguna Landowners Association, and based in Nasioi villages close to the mine, was not the only one active in 1989. Acts of violence were also committed by individuals and groups in broad sympathy with Ona's anticompany and secessionist sentiments, but pursuing their own particular agendas (May 1989, 23–25). Most of the action, which included the toppling of power pylons and shooting at traffic on the Port-Mine Access Road, was designed to put the mine out of production.

While some landowners, notably the officers of the trust fund set up in 1980 to invest compensation payments on behalf of landowners, the Road Mining Tailings Leases Trust (RMTL), were prepared to negotiate a settlement, Ona's group was still sticking to its original demands at the end of the year. These included 50 percent of the total revenues generated by the mine since production commenced in 1972, and K10 billion to compensate for envi-