Turning toward Edification

Foreigners in Chosŏn Korea

Adam Bohnet

UNIVERSITY of HAWAII PRESS

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REIGNS OF CHOSŎN KINGS

T'aejo (1392–1398)	Kwanghae-gun (1608–1623)
Chǒngjong (1398–1400)	Injo (1623–1649)
T'aejong (1400–1418)	Hyojong (1649–1659)
Sejong (1418–1450)	Hyǒnjong (1659–1674)
Munjong (1450–1452)	Sukchong (1674–1720)
Tanjong (1452–1455)	Kyǒngjong (1720–1724)
Sejo (1455–1468)	Yǒngjo (1724–1776)
Yejong (1468–1469)	Chǒngjo (1776–1800)
Sǒngjong (1469–1494)	Sunjo (1800–1834)
Yǒnsan-gun (1494–1506)	Hǒnjong (1834–1849)
Chungjong (1506–1544)	Ch'ǒljong (1849–1863)
Injong (1544–1545)	Kojong (1864–1907)
Myǒngjong (1545–1567)	Sunjong (1907–1910)
Sǒnjo (1567–1608)

Map of the Korean Peninsula with Chosŏn Provinces.
(Drafted by Thomas Quartermain.)

Introduction

IN THE EARLY SEVENTEENTH CENTURY, shortly after invading Japanese soldiers had been expelled from Chosŏn Korea, Chŏng Inhong (1535–1623), a leader of a righteous militia, was called to account for his relationship with several Ming Chinese soldiers, deserters from the armies sent by the Ming to help fight the Japanese. Perhaps the most controversial relationship was one he had with Shi Wenyong, a geomancer to whom, it was said, Chŏng had forced into marrying the daughter of a woman who had been raped by the Japanese. Those who were hostile to Chŏng Inhong pointed to the shamefulness of marrying “someone from a foreign state,” while those who supported Chŏng alluded to Chŏng’s own ancestry. Chŏng, as it happens, claimed descent from a Song merchant from Zhejiang who had settled in Korea during the Koryŏ dynasty (918–1392). Chŏng Inhong’s actions, they declared, were thus in accord with a fully understandable desire on his part to support “hometown friends,” for the Chinese soldiers who he helped were without exception from Zhejiang.

Such support gave Shi Wenyong influence during the reign of Kwanghae-gun (r. 1608–1623), when Chŏng Inhong’s faction was dominant, but after Injo’s (r. 1623–1649) coup d’état of 1623, Shi Wenyong was executed along with his former protector Chŏng Inhong. However, Shi Wenyong’s execution was not the last word for him, for during the eighteenth century his memory was revived and his descendants raised in status, from the disreputable ranks of descendants of deserting Ming troops to ritual representatives of the glorious Ming and of Chosŏn’s undying loyalty to the Ming and to the Sinitic/Confucian tradition. Thus, the late Chosŏn monarchs, all heirs of Injo, had the descendants of one of Injo’s victims appear as ritual representatives of Chosŏn’s loyalty to the Ming, in rites practiced in the presence of the monarch himself.

In this book I seek to understand the process underlying the transformation of foreigners and people of foreign ancestry in Chosŏn Korea in order to explore the changing nature of the collective identity and worldview of Chosŏn’s *sajok* aristocracy. I analyze these changes in relation to the greater bureaucratization and centralization of late Chosŏn Korea, and indeed of Eurasia as a whole, during the eighteenth century. Shi Wenyong was one of many foreigners who made their home in Chosŏn. From the very foundation of the Chosŏn

dynasty, people whose origins lay outside of the Korean peninsula played a variety of roles within it, as technical specialists, soldiers, and diplomats. Indeed, the early Chosŏn (which for convenience I date from 1392 to 1592) had been the center of an extensive network of Jurchens and Japanese, with varying degrees of affiliation with the Chosŏn state, both inside and outside Chosŏn's borders. These networks were disrupted and transformed with the large-scale entrance of foreigners during the Imjin War (1592–1598), which brought both Ming Chinese and Japanese soldiers onto Chosŏn soil and the Ming-Manchu wars of early seventeenth century Liaodong, which drove both Jurchen and Sinophone Liaodongese refugees south into Chosŏn. After the wars, armies retreated and refugees were expelled and repatriated, but some soldiers deserted and some refugees evaded detection to become part of the population of the Chosŏn state.

How were these foreigners treated? A common assumption, reflected in much scholarship, is that the Chosŏn state would have treated Chinese migrants much better than Jurchens and Japanese.¹ This view fits in well with our understanding of Chosŏn as a Sinocentric state, loyal to the Ming Chinese hegemon. It is true that the Chosŏn monarchy was assiduous in sending envoys to offer submission to the Ming court, indeed dispatching at least three diplomatic missions a year. In return the Chosŏn monarch received from the Ming monarch the Ming calendar and the investiture of the Chosŏn monarch with the title of “king” or “prince of state” (K. *kugwang*, Ch. *guowang*) to which the Chosŏn monarch responded by referring to himself as “subject” (K. *sin*, Ch. *chen*) in official communications to the Ming emperor and accepting the Chosŏn state's status as *fan* (vassal) of the Ming empire. Having accepted Chosŏn's subordination, the Ming monarch respected the autonomy of the Chosŏn monarch in domestic matters and indeed interfered only rarely in Chosŏn's relationships with other neighboring states.² This was no mere pro forma submission, however, for as Pae Usŏng has discussed, Chosŏn elites also internalized the centrality of Chinese/Confucian traditions³—which I will term, following South Korean scholarship, *Chunghwa*, the Korean pronunciation of the Chinese *Zhonghua*. With this I do not refer to the modern concept of a Chinese nation-state, although that is the current meaning of *Zhonghua*, but rather to *Zhonghua* as “central efflorescence,” a term with a range of overlapping “civilizational” meanings encompassing the broad corpus of rituals, writings, and “Confucian” philosophical ideas that originated in China; a universal standard of civilization; Chinese political formations; and the geographic space of the north Chinese plain.⁴

Although they were frequently less enthusiastic about individual emperors and Ming officials, Chosŏn *sajok* aristocrats fully accepted the vital civilizational

role of idealized emperors centered in China, acting peacefully, in the manner of Mencian sage kings, across the divide between the civilized and barbarians (Ch. *hua-yi zhi bian*, K. *hwa-yi chi pyŏn*) and bringing barbarians to pay tribute and receive the transforming edification of civilization. By the early Chosŏn, Korea had also obtained for itself the sobriquet Lesser Chunghwa (*Sojunghwa*), which might be translated, following Sixiang Wang, as “small central efflorescence.”⁵ Most of the government documents produced by the Koryŏ and Chosŏn courts were composed in Literary Sinitic, and most literary and historiographic texts were not only written in Literary Sinitic but followed Chinese literary and historiographic genres. The dominant philosophical tradition during much of the Chosŏn period was Zhu Xi’s (1130–1200) interpretation of the Chinese Confucian tradition, which Chosŏn *sajok* aristocrats made their own, with most rejecting as heretical the Ming enthusiasm for Wang Shouren’s (1472–1529) philosophy.⁶ Moreover, such was the devotion of Chosŏn’s *sajok* elites to the Ming that after the fall of the Ming to the Manchu Qing, the Chosŏn court continued to fulfil its status as Lesser Chunghwa by engaging in ritual commemoration of the Ming emperors. Despite outwardly submitting to the Qing, the Chosŏn court maintained a continued connection to the Ming in the form of an altar within the palace complex at which Chosŏn monarchs offered sacrifice in person. Additionally, Chosŏn *sajok* aristocrats expressed their rejection of Qing hegemony by dating documents according to the reign of the last Ming emperor, the Chongzhen emperor, who committed suicide in 1644. By the eighteenth century, Chosŏn *sajok* aristocrats considered themselves to be the last remnant of Chunghwa culture and political order, continuing a tradition that the Qing empire, as a barbarian Manchu dynasty, could not possibly represent.

Yet, as I show in this book, despite the enthusiastic participation of Chosŏn’s *sajok* aristocracy in Chunghwa cultural and political norms, they did not extend this enthusiasm to individual Chinese people or Chinese migrants in Chosŏn—the hostile reception of Shi Wenying by some *sajok* was not an exceptional case. During the large-scale entrance of foreigners during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the Chosŏn state did not welcome Chinese over Jurchens and Japanese, but, if anything, showed a notable preference for its established subjects, the Jurchens. Even after Chosŏn submitted to the Manchu Qing empire in 1637, the Chosŏn court continued to administer all three groups according to the same tax category of submitting-foreigners (*hyanghwain*), which granted them protection from most personal taxes but which otherwise provided them with very little prestige. It was only following the mid-eighteenth century that the Chosŏn court actively sponsored those who, like Shi Wenying’s descendants,

could claim Ming origins. This gave the descendants of Ming migrants higher status, better access to low-ranked positions in the bureaucracy, and the privilege of participation in court-sponsored Ming loyalist rituals.

What caused this change in attitudes toward Chinese migrants? The purpose of this book is to explain this transition—to explore why Jurchens, Japanese, and Chinese were categorized together as submitting-foreigners until the mid-eighteenth century, after which Chinese descendants were clearly distinguished from other people with foreign ancestors. This shift cannot be understood as driven by “Sinocentrism” or “Confucianization,” for the mid-eighteenth century is two centuries after the rise of activist Neo-Confucianism during the sixteenth century, and well after the growth of Neo-Confucian ritualism during the seventeenth. The reason for these changes, and how they relate to cultural, political, and ideological shifts in Chosŏn, must thus be explained in some other manner.

Nationalism and Sinocentrism in Korean History

The presence of foreigners in Chosŏn, and the response of Chosŏn to those foreigners, has interesting implications for understanding the nature of the imagined community of late Chosŏn Korea. A major (although by no means universal) thread in twentieth-century Korean historiography has been to read the sense of a unified, homogenous Korean nation backward into the distant past, to the supposed reign of the mythical king Tan’gun. Such nationalist historiography is dominant in North Korea,⁷ although it is increasingly marginalized among academic historians in South Korea. Even in South Korea, until recently grade-school students were taught that they were part of a homogeneous race, the descendants of Tan’gun, who had preserved their homogeneity through the supposed 5,000 years of Korean history.⁸ The presence of foreigners as a constituent part of the late Chosŏn state cannot but be a challenge to what was once the orthodoxy of South Korean public education and forces a reconsideration of the imagined community of Chosŏn Korea.

South Korea itself has become, since the early 1990s, an increasingly multicultural society, with people of diverse origins, especially from other regions in East and Southeast Asia, making their homes in South Korea, intermarrying with South Korean citizens, and indeed becoming South Korean citizens themselves.⁹ This has spurred academic interest in uncovering a multicultural past for Korea. The foreign presence in late Chosŏn has certainly been part of this trend. Quite a number of scholars, writing in Korean and English, have noted the acceptance

of foreigners in Koryŏ and early Chosŏn as clear evidence that claims of “pure blood” are an anachronistic obsession of twentieth-century historians, and that in pre-modern Korea, people had no such concern.¹⁰ This interest in multicultural pasts, indeed, has extended beyond purely academic publications to works directed toward the broader reading public.¹¹ The emergence of imperial subjects such as Shi Wenyong’s descendants—court-honored representatives of the Ming dynasty—has generally been explained as an example of Chosŏn’s Sinocentrism, with anthropologist Kyung-koo Han arguing that Jurchens and Japanese were still discriminated against by a Sinocentric Chosŏn state that was positively inclined toward Koreans and Chinese. Consequently, the Chosŏn state, Han argues, may not have been nationalist or racist in the modern sense, and it may even have been multicultural, but it was nevertheless characterized by ethnic discrimination.¹² John B. Duncan, by contrast, argues that the shift toward imperial subject status reveals the development of a “proto-national consciousness” in late Chosŏn Korea. As he imagines that submitting-foreigner (*hyanghwain*) status had been primarily concerned with assimilation, he sees what he believes to be the disappearance of this status, and its replacement with an ethnicized imperial subject status, to signal the end of assimilationism in Chosŏn Korea, and perhaps the emergence of an idea of “pure blood-lines.”¹³

Such scholarship, emerging in the 1990s, was reacting against a considerable accumulation of scholarship that, since 1894, had sought to naturalize the concepts of race and nation within Korean history. Beginning with the intellectual ferment that followed the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), and continuing through much of the twentieth century, many historians viewed Korean history as characterized by the struggle of the Korean ethnic nation under pressure from outside powers and evaluated figures according to how well they protected the autonomy, the native culture, and the territorial integrity of Korea. Above all else, Chosŏn’s cultural engagement with Chinese civilization, and political subordination to various Chinese dynasties, has often been considered shameful, with many (following the trend of Japanese historians of Korea) seeing it as a sign of a flaw in the Korean character and a tendency toward toadyism (*sadae-juŭi*) or “serving the great.”¹⁴ For the pioneering modern historian Sin Ch’aeho (1880–1936), who believed that the subject of history was the ethnic-nation (*minjok*), this shameful toadyism and betrayal of its national identity had been imposed upon Chosŏn by Sinophilic elites at key points in Korean history. For Sin Ch’aeho, as well as for other nationalist historians influenced by Social Darwinism, it was self-evidently the case that an ethnic nation, understood in almost biological or racial terms, was in constant competition with other ethnic

nations. Chosŏn's acceptance of Chinese culture was thus an abandonment of natural law and the extinction of the self (understood to mean the ethnic nation as a whole) in favor of the other or non-self (*pi'a*).¹⁵

Such attempts to downplay the significance of foreign influence, and especially Chinese influence, has been a frequent aspect of much later South Korean scholarship and has attracted considerable attention from scholars working in the English language, who often treat the matter unproductively as an either-or between admiration for China and a sense of national identity. Studies of diplomatic relations with later Chinese states have often been at pains to assert the pro-forma nature of the submission of Korean states, to treat it as simply a diplomatic strategy, for the weak to manipulate the strong.¹⁶ Han Yǒngū, for instance, in his study of the early Chosŏn official Yang Sǒngji (1415–1482), argues that when Yang used the term “serve the great” (*sadae*) in the context of Chosŏn's relationship to the Ming emperor, he was thinking exclusively in terms of practical diplomacy, with no implication of cultural or political subservience to the Ming, and in the context of the full assertion of Chosŏn's “self-determination and independence” (*chaju tongnip*).¹⁷ Such scholarship, of course, has not been without its critics, and in English, a substantial body of work has specifically attempted to take Korean scholarship to task for its nationalism, and to argue, with reference to Benedict Anderson, for a strong rupture in identities between “pre-modern Korea,” on the one hand, and twentieth-century nationalism, on the other. Such scholars have frequently opposed the “Sinocentrism” of pre-modern Korean elites to twentieth-century nationalism, arguing that *sajok* aristocrats of the Chosŏn period had no Korean identity but rather an attachment to “a cosmopolitan civilization centered in China.”¹⁸

This unhelpful binary between the Sinocentric past and the nationalist present distorts the reality of Sino-Korean relations during the Chosŏn period. To be sure, officials in the Ming and Qing both referred often to the Chosŏn model when constructing their relationships with other *fan* (vassal states).¹⁹ As Hyewon Chae, however, has argued, such was the diversity of relations with smaller countries pursued by the Ming and Qing that it is nearly impossible to identify any standard or model “tribute practices,” including those pursued by Chosŏn—especially as key aspects of Chosŏn's tribute practices, such as its three diplomatic missions a year, were in fact asserted despite the initial opposition of the Ming empire. In general, Chosŏn's relationship with China was often tumultuous and characterized by controversy and ill-faith.²⁰ As discussed in chapter 1, Chosŏn pursued relations with Japanese and Jurchens not only in violation of Ming demands but sometimes in open rivalry with the Ming. As is discussed in chapter 5,

during the late Chosŏn, the Chosŏn court developed ritual practices that denied the Qing empire's right to rule even as they also sent diplomatic missions to the Qing capital formally accepting Qing hegemony.

Recent South Korean scholarship, especially, has transformed our understanding of Chunghwa ideology. Ch'oe Chongsŏk has pointed out that the period of Mongol hegemony saw the beginning of a general acceptance by Koryŏ's *sajok* aristocrats of the right to rule an empire based in China, even while they in no way abandoned their own prerogatives and rights as members of the ruling class of Korea.²¹ This ideological shift continued into the period of Ming hegemony, during which, as Kim Sunja has argued, civil bureaucrats had begun to speak of China as having an exclusive right to empire that was not available to peoples such as the Mongols who originated from outside of Chinese territory.²² Ultimately, the concept of China as civilization, or Chunghwa, was in part geography, but also included rites, manners, clothing, hierarchical political organization, and association with a body of literature that might be called Confucian.

Moreover, subject kingdoms, including Chosŏn, could and did claim mastery over cultural symbols of Chunghwa. As Don Baker points out, the fifteenth century in Chosŏn was ideologically complex, and monarchs could appeal to a mix of Confucian, Buddhist, and Daoist justifications for their rule and could even allow for language that implied that the Chosŏn royal house had received a separate mandate of heaven.²³ As Pae Usŏng argues, Chosŏn *sajok* aristocrats and intellectuals envisioned Chosŏn as both an autonomous state and part of the broad realm of Chunghwa culture and politics. Even as Chosŏn's ruling elites saw themselves as participants within a broader Chunghwa sphere, they by no means lacked particularist identities or loyalties, nor were their identities entirely subsumed into the Sinocentric cosmopolis. Rather, Chosŏn *sajok* aristocrats clearly defined themselves as having membership within a Korean historical entity, seen as having existed since early times in the constant geographic location of the Korean peninsula, which thus naturally possessed cultural and linguistic differences with China.²⁴ They referred to this historical and geographic entity with such names as Haedong (East of the Sea), Tongguk (Eastern Kingdom), Chwaha (Left the Sea), or Samhan (Three Han)—which certainly represented Korea by using its geographic relation to China but which also were terms that referred to Korea without regard to individual dynasties.²⁵

In fact, many contentious issues during the Chosŏn period, which are now seen as revealing a divide between nativists and Sinocentric understandings, can in fact be shown to have been concerned with topics that do not fit clearly with present-day obsessions or fall neatly alongside current fault lines. Debates

during the early Chosŏn—for instance, concerning whether or not to offer sacrifices to heaven directly or concerning the use of the vernacular alphabet *hun-min chŏngŭm*—which are often interpreted now as debates over dependence on China versus autonomous culture and politics, were actually debates on subjects that now seem obscure and hard to fit into modern categories, and in contexts that assumed both the existence of an independent Chosŏn culture (in part determined by geographic difference) and the cultural and political preeminence of Ming China.²⁶ Late Chosŏn intellectuals, like twentieth-century intellectuals, made revanchist claims on the Liaodong region of the Qing empire, asserting that it was properly Chosŏn territory—but unlike the twentieth-century nationalist intellectuals, they did so because the Qing conquest had broken the Chunghwa unity that they imagined had linked early Chosŏn with Ming Liaodong.²⁷ For that matter, as Hŏ T'aeyong has argued, late Chosŏn intellectuals explored not only symbols related to China but also such Korean heroes as the Koguryŏ general Ŭlchi Mundŏk who was known for defeating the Chinese Sui dynasty in 612 C.E. In the twentieth century, Ŭlchi Mundŏk became a national symbol of nativist resistance to China. In this, modern historians were building on the work of late Chosŏn historians, who also admired Ŭlchi Mundŏk, but who saw him as a symbol of military strength and loyalty that needed to be revived in an East Asia in which the barbarous Qing had conquered China. In other words, late Chosŏn intellectuals remembered Ŭlchi Mundŏk as both a source of pride as a Korean military hero and as a paragon of Chunghwa and Confucian civilization.²⁸

My purpose here is not to wade into the debate between those who Anthony D. Smith calls primordialists and modernists,²⁹ or indeed to continue the debate on whether Chosŏn can properly be called a “nation” or a “proto-nation.” Rather than trying to read twentieth-century nationalism back to the Chosŏn period, I intend to define the changing nature of collective identities during the Chosŏn period. If the Chosŏn monarchy was different from the states of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe, it was also organized very differently from prenationalist medieval and early modern Europe. As Jahyun Kim Haboush says, much of the discussion of nations and nationalism is irreducibly Eurocentric and applies poorly to the circumstances of East Asian states.³⁰ A similar point is made by Nicholas Tackett, who makes use of Benedict Anderson’s concept of an imagined community³¹ to compare Song self-identity to modern nationalism. Tackett points out that the Song had abandoned the universalistic goals of the Tang and was content to govern only those regions inhabited by Sino-phone Huaxia (Chinese). Song’s governing elite, the *shidafu*, were, unlike the

capital-based ruling class of the Tang, from all ends of Song territory and were bound together, in part through meritocratic exam competition, to each other by horizontal bonds. In this they resembled the colonial bureaucrats and creole elites of nineteenth-century European colonies, whose identities, following Anderson, were in part determined by the colonial territory to which their careers were restricted. During the Song, educated people who did not pass, or even write, the exams were nevertheless linked as part of a broad imaginary community via commercial printing—in much the same manner as, following Anderson, the new European and American nations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were formed by print media. As Tackett argues, although the resulting society was notably different from the national communities of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Song should not be understood as either pre-nationalist or proto-nationalist, but rather on its own terms, as a different form of imagined national community.³²

No reading of Chosŏn dynasty texts could possibly lead one to the thoroughly indefensible claim that Korea in the abstract is an entirely modern concept. Rather, in many ways, Chosŏn resembles the Song as discussed by Tackett, with an elite operating exclusively within the boundaries of the Chosŏn state and linked together by statewide networks. To be sure, in contrast to late imperial China, Chosŏn was characterized by a far more rigid system of social status, with an endogamous hereditary aristocracy that nevertheless advanced into the higher ranks of bureaucracy only through competing in challenging examinations. Chosŏn *sajok* were organized into descent-groups marked by a combination of a surname (*sŏng*) and clan seat (*pon'gwan*), which referred to the power base of the descent-group's supposed founding ancestor (*sijo*), often from the late Silla or early Koryŏ periods, and which had nothing to do with the residence of members of a descent-group, or indeed with the place of residence of any recent ancestor. A member of the Munhwa Yu in the fifteenth century, for instance, might have no recent connections at all to the administrative district of Munhwa in Hwanghae province.³³ At the same time, during the Koryŏ and early Chosŏn periods, *sajok* status had a close relationship with success in the examinations and participation in officialdom. Indeed another term for *sajok* is *yangban*, referring to the “two orders” (*pan*) of officialdom, civil and military—*sajok* status thus had a close connection to participation in the civil (*munkwa*) or military examinations (*mukwa*), with civil examinations having much greater prestige.³⁴ An additional set of examinations, the *chapkwa* (miscellaneous examinations)—on languages, medicine, math, and other technical subjects—was avoided by Chosŏn *sajok* and was thus generally the province of

those outside of the ruling elite; by the seventeenth century, though, families who took the chapkwa had also formed their own social status grouping, that of the *chungin* specialists, who were below the *sajok* in social terms but stood clearly above commoners and slaves. Commoners made up the majority of the population and carried most of the burden of taxation and corvée labor, while base people (*ch'ŏnmin*) made up approximately 30 percent of the population and included private slaves—"the hands and feet of the yangban"—public slaves, and hereditary practitioners of various base professions.³⁵

What mobility had existed in the late Koryŏ between rural strongmen (*hyangni*) traveling from the countryside and the capital-based aristocracy located in Kaesŏng came to an end with the establishment of various laws during the early Chosŏn specifically designed to narrow the range of those who could take the civil examinations and participate in the higher ranks of the bureaucracy. Hyangni, reduced steadily to the ranks of petty subbureaucrats, were fixed to their home locales and suffered significant restrictions in taking exams, while the descendants of yangban men and base-born secondary wives, the so-called *sŏŏl*, were simply banned from participation in the civil examinations—both became, in broad terms, part of the chungin class. No restrictions were placed on commoners taking the examinations, but that was simply because, in practice, commoners lacked the resources necessary to take even the various preliminary examinations. The *sajok* aristocracy further cemented their unity through intermarriage, as is made evident by the earliest surviving genealogies, which reveal an extremely high level of intermarriage between *sajok* descent-groups during the early Chosŏn.³⁶

This ruling elite, it should be noted, was entirely bound within the Korean peninsula, in both their aristocratic and bureaucratic identities. Although some *sajok* descent-groups did claim distant Chinese ancestors, there was rarely any solid evidence, or even detailed descriptions, concerning those supposed distant ancestors or the generations immediately following them, to the extent that the historical reality of these ancestors generally is to be doubted. By contrast, the actual formation of *sajok* descent-groups, and the development of more than one branch within their genealogies, almost always occurred in Korea during the Koryŏ period, and the clan seats themselves invariably referred to a location within the Korean peninsula. By the Chosŏn period, *sajok* descent-groups did not seek to marry people from beyond Korea, and officials, whether civil or military, pursued their careers exclusively within Korea. Though many *sajok* did have strong connections to particular locales, the regions themselves were not administered, as in Europe, by prominent local aristocrats, but by exam-passers

selected by the central court and dispatched from the capital. Chosŏn's *sajok*, for all their mastery of Literary Sinitic and of texts from the "Chinese" tradition, pursued their careers exclusively within the territory of the Chosŏn state and maintained social networks that only rarely and to a distinctly limited extent passed over into China.³⁷ They also generally did not speak Chinese—a technical skill that was handed over to their interpreters, their social inferiors and members of the *chungin* specialist class.³⁸

To be sure, the Chosŏn *sajok* aristocracy became more and more differentiated during the later Chosŏn. Military *yangban*, for instance, became increasingly distinguished from civil *yangban*, with the lower ranked military officials not placed within the ranks of the *sajok* aristocracy. Politically, during the sixteenth century, *sajok* also divided by factions centered on key private schools (*sŏwŏn*). This process began with the split between Sŏin (Westerners) and Tongin (Easterners) in 1575, followed by the fissuring of the Tongin into Pugin (Northerners) and Namin (Southerners) in 1589, and the division of the Sŏin into the Noron (Old Doctrine) and Soron (Young Doctrine) during the late seventeenth century. Although factions were by no means impermeable social barriers, they went beyond mere political rivalries to include divergent scholarly traditions and were also key factors in forming marital alliances. They also had a regional aspect, as Namin and Pugin, on the losing end of the factional conflict, were generally based in Kyŏngsang province far from the capital. Otherwise, during the late seventeenth century, a small number of capital-based *sajok* descent-groups, generally from the Noron faction, increasingly dominated all significant bureaucratic positions. This left rural *sajok*, often resident in single-surname villages and associated with private schools with specific factional identities, to organize themselves through local governance associations and pursue prestige and social status without any relationship to bureaucratic advancement.³⁹

Much as Tackett has for the Song, Rian Thum has identified the development of an imaginary community among the Turkic-speaking people of Western China who are now called Uighur. He accepts, of course, that the modern category of Uighur, which was revived from the medieval Uighur empire, is indeed a new creation. However, he also traces the development of an earlier Altishari identity formed through handwritten manuscripts and visits to Islamic shrines among the Turkic people of the oases of what is now Xinjiang. In addition to the modern national community, Thum argues, we should "look for other kinds of imagined community and other associations between such identities and common historical contexts."⁴⁰ Similarly, even after Chosŏn's *sajok* fractured into separate factions, their networks continued to be primarily restricted to

Chosŏn, and the subjects concerning which they disputed were also overwhelmingly Korea-centered, including questions of court rites, disputes over royal marriages, policy concerning slavery, and the debates over the merits of different Korean Confucian teachers.⁴¹ To be sure, Chosŏn *sajok* were not engaged in the search for national uniqueness that is characteristic of modern nationalists,⁴² and indeed their education linked them to the Chinese tradition. Yet from the beginning of the dynasty until the end, their careers and social networks were overwhelmingly located within the Korean peninsula. They hardly doubted the existence of a dynastic tradition specific to Korea, or that their primarily loyalties were to the Chosŏn state. With Chosŏn, as with the Song and the Altishari Turks, the proper question is not when a “nation” was born in Chosŏn Korea, but how people imagined the boundaries of the Chosŏn state, how this imagined community related to the social and political organization of Chosŏn, how this imagined community changed over time, and how this changing imagined identity determined who was accepted as an insider and who was excluded as an outsider.

Aliens and Subjects: Social Status and Belonging in Late Chosŏn

Identity throughout the late medieval and even early modern periods was generally fluid and relational, with key markers of difference and group connection—language, clothing, religion—operating with only limited relationship to formal political divisions.⁴³ During the early modern period, however, some European states sought to strengthen their control by imposing exclusionary religious and national identities on the diverse subjects under their control. For instance, Anthony Marx argues that the formation of the exclusionary religious identity of early modern states in western Europe developed through the elimination, assimilation, and marginalization of domestic religious minorities. According to Marx, the early modern French collective identity was formed through the violent purging of the Protestant minority, the early modern Spanish identity through the purging of Jews and Muslims, and the early modern English identity specifically through attacks on Catholics—developments that were vital, as they allowed the growing early modern states to mobilize securely their heterogeneous populations.⁴⁴ Similarly, Peter Sahlin has shown that the concept of absolute citizenship—defined as absence of the disabilities suffered by noncitizens (*aubain*), and embracing French subjects regardless of class—had already come into being in the late sixteenth century.⁴⁵

As the risk of reinforcing the Eurocentric assumptions that Western Europe is the norm, it is profitable to compare the circumstances of Chosŏn Korea with that of early modern Europe. Despite the complete disestablishment of Buddhism during the sixteenth century, the hostility among Chosŏn's *sajok* elites and bureaucracy to shamanistic popular religious practices, and following the late eighteenth century, the purges of the tiny Catholic community, little in Chosŏn history resembles the vigorous purges of large religious minorities of early modern Europe. However, Chosŏn, especially the early Chosŏn, was not a homogenous realm, nor was homogeneity an imagined goal, and attitudes toward migrants from outside of the peninsula were markedly different from those of twentieth-century South Korea. For instance, one of the key foundation myths of the Korean dynastic tradition during the Chosŏn period involved a migrant, namely Kija (Ch. Jizi). Along with Tan'gun, the reputed founder of the Old Chosŏn state during the reign of the legendary King Yao, Kija was treated as a secondary founder, the one who brought moral civilization and "Confucian" rites and laws to Korea. The story varied, but, roughly, Kija/Jizi was a loyal Shang official who had fled to Old Chosŏn to avoid serving the new Zhou dynasty, but who later nevertheless offered tribute to King Wu. He also provided King Wu with instruction, the "Great Plan" (Ch. *Hongfan*, K. *Hongbŏm*), an apocryphal text and a chapter within the *Venerated Documents* (Ch. *Shangshu*, K. *Sangso*). Although the connection between Kija and Chosŏn seems to have entered into Chinese historiography only during the Han period,⁴⁶ by the late Koryŏ, this story had become an accepted part of the Korean historical tradition,⁴⁷ with both Tan'gun and Kija receiving ritual honors—Tan'gun, as founder of the Korean dynastic tradition and Kija as the one who provided moral edification and the beginnings of a Korean Confucian tradition. Disputes concerning their relative priority in state-sponsored rituals were unrelated, as Pae Usŏng has shown, to debates of nativism versus Sinocentrism, but were rather concerned with disputes about the proper priority between Tan'gun as initial ruler and Kija, as unrelated subsequent ruler who was nevertheless significant enough to gain supreme honors himself.⁴⁸

The treatment of these two figures strongly diverged following the development of modern historical scholarship and Korean nationalism. Tan'gun was reinvented, not as a dynastic founder but as a *racial* ancestor—with Koreans describing themselves increasingly as "descendants of Tan'gun" (*Tan'gun ūi chason*). By contrast, Kija was frequently ignored, his historicity denied while the even more incredible accounts of Tan'gun were asserted as undeniable historical truth; even when Kija's historicity was accepted, he was nevertheless seen as a

problem for the national narrative that was in need of explanation, at times even by transforming him into a Korean.⁴⁹ Kija, as migrant, could be a representation of a Korean historical continuity and Chosŏn's collective identity during the Chosŏn period, but was rendered inappropriate for just this role during the twentieth century by the very fact that he was a migrant.

Not surprisingly, considering that the early Chosŏn court traced the Korean dynastic tradition itself to a migrant, it showed little of the discomfort concerning foreign elements that characterized twentieth-century Korea. As I discuss in chapter 1, the early Chosŏn state emerged, like the Ming, from the collapse of the Mongol empire. During the period of submission to the Mongols, Koryŏ subjects had been full participants in the Yuan empire, competing against and working with the Eurasian elite who governed the Yuan. With the collapse of the Mongol empire, first the Koryŏ and then the Chosŏn state competed for the loyalties of former Yuan subjects, including especially Koreans, but also Jurchens and others. In fact, many of foreign ancestry allied themselves with the Korean monarchy during the chaos of the Yuan-Ming transition. Notably, the founding monarch of the Chosŏn dynasty, Yi Sŏnggye, was himself from a family of Korean administrators of the Yuan empire who had operated in the culturally diverse world of Korea's northeast.

The early Chosŏn state, especially during its first century, was tasked with governing not only Koreans but also diverse Yuan subjects within its territory and Jurchens and Japanese on its frontiers. Chosŏn officials established a diverse apparatus of techniques to exert influence on Jurchens located in Chosŏn's chaotic northern borderlands and Japanese from the Japanese islands, which were then decentralized and often in a state of civil war. The Chosŏn court encouraged borderlanders to replace raiding with trade (to adapt a phrase by Kenneth R. Robinson) and brought their leaders into a formal relationship with the Chosŏn court by offering them titles, positions in the Chosŏn bureaucracy, tribute visits to the Chosŏn capital of Hansŏng, and positions in the palace guard.⁵⁰ In fact, outsiders were also allowed to settle on Chosŏn soil, in exchange for which they were granted submitting-foreigner status, which involved protection from most taxes and the granting of land, farm tools, and often wives. Ultimately, through these techniques, the Chosŏn state created networks of people, inside and outside territory directly administered by the Chosŏn court, who had varying degrees of political, cultural, and economic connections to the Chosŏn court, and who linked the Chosŏn state, through informal ties, to the outside world. In addition to ruling Chosŏn, the Chosŏn monarch placed himself at the center of a number of small and semi-independent polities, including Jurchen towns

and small Japanese states, and most famously including the island of Tsushima located between Japan and Korea.⁵¹

Such divisions had their ideological aspect as well. The Chosŏn court depended heavily on these informal ties, which also raised the status of the Chosŏn monarch by situating it as a civilizing center, operating in much the same manner as the Ming empire to which Chosŏn was subordinate. The ritualized submission of outsiders in the Chosŏn capital of Hansŏng established the Chosŏn monarch as the center of Chunghwa civilization in its own right. Indeed, often the Chosŏn court made rhetorical use of the Confucian distinctions between civilized (Ch. *hua*, K. *hwa*) and barbarian (Ch. *yi*, K. *i*), although this logic was imposed variably according to the particular needs of the Chosŏn court at the time. By no means was a strict distinction drawn, and Jurchens or Japanese were not necessarily unwelcome or marginalized by the Chosŏn state. In fact, ultimately Jurchens and Japanese were weakly controlled subjects of the Chosŏn court who nevertheless played a vital role in Chosŏn's defense, diplomacy, and ideology, and they thus could not be simply excluded or condemned.

The Chosŏn court's tools for managing its frontiers were put to the test during the half century following 1592, when first the Japanese, and then the Jurchen, coalesced to form powerful and centralizing states, which eliminated the diverse polities that had previously controlled the island of Japan and the Jurchen regions to Chosŏn's north. This in turn brought war, and large numbers of foreign soldiers, into Chosŏn territory. In chapter 2, I discuss the first of these wars, the Imjin War of 1592–1598, which brought large armies of invading Japanese into Chosŏn, followed by a similarly large and culturally diverse Ming military force, which came to defend Chosŏn. A significant number of these soldiers remained in Chosŏn after the war and were integrated into the Chosŏn state. Chapter 3 continues the discussion of foreign invasions, focusing on the early seventeenth-century wars associated with the rise of the Manchu khanate, which was formed initially from a coalescence of Jurchen groups, including former Jurchen subjects of the Chosŏn court. As the Manchu khanate expanded, eventually forming itself into the Qing empire that invaded the Ming empire between 1644 and 1661, it drove diverse peoples into Chosŏn territory, including Chinese-speaking refugees from Ming Liaodong and Jurchen refugees from the Tumen River.

Within this chaos, the Chosŏn court continued to make use of much the same techniques for administering foreign subjects that it had employed before 1592. The Chosŏn court continued to compete actively for the loyalties of Japanese and Jurchens, especially as the Japanese brought military skills that the

Chosŏn court needed. In fact, the Chosŏn court was if anything less welcoming to deserters and refugees from Chosŏn's Ming hegemon. Ming deserters and Liaodongese refugees, like Japanese deserters, were welcomed by the Chosŏn court, especially if they had valuable skills. However, in contrast to Japanese and Jurchens, whose submission to the Chosŏn court could be envisioned, much as it had before 1592, as submission to the Confucian edification of the Chosŏn monarch, the submission of the Ming migrants and refugees carried with it the implication of disloyalty to the Ming state to which the Chosŏn court was, supposedly, loyal. As for common people, I have found less evidence of ethnic resistance than of cultural fluidity, and indeed, the ease with which large numbers of Ming, Jurchens, Japanese, and border-crossing Koreans were able to move across cultural boundaries—by changing clothes or learning new languages—became a source of anxiety for the Chosŏn court. Whether Liaodongese, Japanese, or Jurchen, the Chosŏn court was concerned to prevent them from passing to easily across social, cultural, and political barriers, and through that, outside of the administrative control of the Chosŏn court. Thus, more important than questions of civilized versus barbarian were questions of outsiders and insiders, which is to say, the question of who could, and who could not, be trusted to participate loyally under the Chosŏn monarch and within Chosŏn's system of social hierarchy.

New Identities in the Age of Centralizing Empires

Pamela Kyle Crossley has argued that the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were an age of civilizing empires, as such military formations as the Qing, the Ottomans, and the Saffavids made elaborate claims to their inheritance of the grand classical traditions of earlier empires and religious revelations.⁵² Taking advantage of much expanded literacy and availability of texts, these empires also sought to create new typologies for the peoples under their control, in the case of the Qing, “inventing coherent if formulaic cultural identities for its historical constituencies of Uighurs, Mongols, Manchus, Tibetans and Chinese, and producing histories of the origins of them as homogeneous peoples.”⁵³ These new identities and histories, of course, were brought under the grand and overarching imperial project. Her argument accords well with scholarship by Alexander Woodside and Victor Lieberman, who note a worldwide trend toward territorial consolidation, notable in the decline of small polities in Southeast Asia and the rise of large states such as Burma, Vietnam, and Thailand. Woodside and Lieberman also discuss the vernacularizing of high culture, whereby in East and Southeast Asia elite cultural norms (Confucian in Vietnam, Buddhist in Siam

and Burma) were extended over minority populations and lower-class communities, even as distinctions in social status themselves were preserved.⁵⁴ Evelyn S. Rawski and Laura Hostetler, similarly, point to the role that new technologies and economic structures, in some cases originating from maritime Europe, played in the construction of increasingly centralized states in East Asia.⁵⁵

Social and political developments in the late Chosŏn show much similarity to those happening elsewhere in the early modern world. To be sure, the late Chosŏn monarchy had pretensions to universality but was not an empire in the manner of the Qing, or indeed in the manner of the emerging Southeast Asian states.⁵⁶ In contrast to the early Chosŏn, late Chosŏn's influence was limited to the eight provinces that it governed directly through civil and military officials dispatched from the center aided by hereditary local petty subofficials and the local *sajok* aristocracy. Unlike the Qing empire, and indeed unlike Edo Japan and unlike Vietnam, the late Chosŏn monarchy did not have border peoples, minorities, or conquered populations over which to exert its civilizing mission. Yet the late Chosŏn monarchy, at once the subject and rival of the Qing empire, nevertheless maintained a community of foreign subjects—Jurchen, Japanese, and especially Chinese—who were governed and understood, initially at least, using much the same language that had been employed for foreigners during the early Chosŏn, even as the domestic and international contexts were completely different. Indeed, Chosŏn's 1637 submission to the Qing brought to an end its active participation in the wars and conflicts of East Asia and signaled an end to the arrival of migrants. As both Japan under the Tokugawa shogunate and Manchuria and China under the Qing were reorganized under centralized control, the small polities with which Chosŏn had previously pursued its network of foreign affairs vanished, with the single exception of the island of Tsushima. Chosŏn clarified its own boundaries, establishing a joint border with the Qing in 1712, and generally policing border crossing closely in coordination with both the Qing empire to the north and the Tokugawa shogunate to its south.⁵⁷

Nevertheless, as I discuss in chapter 4, although very few migrants continued to arrive in Chosŏn, submitting-foreigner status, which had become essentially hereditary, continued to be used to administer migrants who had arrived before 1637. It was imposed identically on all foreigners and their descendants, Chinese, Japanese, and Jurchens, and it continued to be expressed rhetorically, by both Chosŏn court officials and by submitting-foreigners themselves, as a protected status granted to outsiders who sought the Confucian edification of the Chosŏn monarch. As a tax status, it certainly became part of the centralizing tax reforms of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as the Chosŏn court

sought to assert greater control over all of its subjects. However, except for a few submitting-foreigners who gained significant positions in the military or as interpreters, it was also a status notably lacking in prestige, such that its recipients, who inherited their status on the maternal line just like slaves, were frequently exposed to the extralegal exactions of petty functionaries.

Change in the status of submitting-foreigners did not occur until the mid-eighteenth century. The eighteenth century saw an ideological shift in the Chosŏn court. Through much of the seventeenth century after Chosŏn's submission to the Qing, the Chosŏn court engaged in secret and largely ineffectual plotting against the Qing empire, which they considered to be a barbarous usurper of the Ming legacy. With the fall of the last Ming successor in 1683, this plotting had gradually shifted to a belief that Chosŏn was the last remaining representative of the Chunghwa tradition, a belief that was expressed ritually through an altar, the Taebodan, established in the Chosŏn palace complex, and through the active involvement of eighteenth-century monarchs in these rituals. This ritualization of the Chosŏn court's Ming loyalism resulted, as is discussed in chapter 5, in the transformation of the social status of those submitting-foreigners who could claim Ming migrant origins. Those who could were recategorized as "imperial subjects," given preferment in military examinations, and encouraged by the Chosŏn court to participate actively in rituals in the Taebodan. These changes benefited the Chosŏn court by strengthening its claim to inheritance of the Ming mantle. It was beneficial also to the imperial subjects themselves, who gained a much-improved social status as a result.

Clearly, one cannot treat these developments as simply a reflection of the Confucian nature of Chosŏn's monarchy and sajok aristocracy, for the simple reason that there had been no obvious growth of Confucianism during the eighteenth century that could account for such a shift. Nor should it be seen, superficially, as simply a response to changes in court ritual, or as an aspect of the rise of Ming loyalist ideology.⁵⁸ Rather, these developments were deeply bound up with broader trends occurring both domestically and internationally. Domestically, the developments were related to the fiscal reforms of the eighteenth century and were part of a series of attempted reforms of the tax system. In this sense, as Kimura Takao has argued recently, the development of imperial subject status was related to the general attempts during the eighteenth century to strengthen the monarchy.⁵⁹ It may thus be seen as a part of broader state activity to expand the reach of the central state by rationalizing the tax system, registering the unregistered, and extending state surveillance of frontier regions and offshore islands.⁶⁰

Internationally, these reforms were linked to attempts by increasingly centralized empires to define the identities of the peoples under their control. Above all, the rise of imperial subject status has echoes in the Qing empire, which, unlike the Ming empire, governed as a multiethnic empire over diverse peoples: Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan, Uighur, as well as Han Chinese. During the eighteenth century, the Qing court increasingly sought to mold these formerly fluid and relational subject identities into absolute bureaucratic categories clearly under Qing control. Both by weeding out those with the wrong genealogy, and by standardizing Manchu and Mongol customs, the Qing created new categories for these groups, which were under the direction of the Qing court. For instance, the Qing court actively sought to clear out those with Han Chinese genealogies from the Manchu banners. In fact, although the Qing had only defeated the Ming through the support of the Ming defectors, during the eighteenth century these same defectors were posthumously condemned for betraying the Ming, by the Qing court, which by this time saw itself as the only proper heir to the Ming.⁶¹ The formation in Chosŏn of imperial subject status, a court-defined, ritualized identity, predicated on the absolute nature of their ancestors' loyalty to the Ming, must be seen as a parallel development. Indeed, considering the extensive interaction between the Qing and Chosŏn courts, Chosŏn trends should be seen in part as responding to Qing developments.

There is a significant quantity of sources available concerning foreigners in late Chosŏn, although this is to some extent obscured by the fact that the different sources reveal a very different image of migrants. Especially for the early Chosŏn, the bulk of surviving sources are official court records, including the *Journal of the Royal Secretariat* (*Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi*), the *Transcribed Records of the Border Defense Command* (*Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok*), and the *Journal of the Office of the Custodian of Foreign Visitors* (*Chŏn'gaeksa ilgi*), as well as legal documents and Household Registry documents. These texts reflect the position of foreign groups and their descendants at the time that they were written from the perspective of high officials, and the institutional challenges in managing foreigners. Broadly speaking, they reveal above all the generally low social status of most foreigners, and the difficulties from the point of view of the Chosŏn court in administering them, although they also reveal considerable shifts over time in the Chosŏn court's response, with those written post-1750 increasingly reflecting the development of imperial subject status. Also in this category are the *Veritable Records* (*sillok*) for each reign, which were compiled at the death of each monarch and made up of court documents, organized chronologically according to date, edited, simplified, and frequently sanitized, eliminating doubt, debate,

and views and information that were uncomfortable to the editors, although the extent of this sanitization varied from reign to reign. Somewhat different from these official sources were notes and private writings of scholars who encountered foreigners and foreign descendants before the 1750s. These private writings, appearing in the collected works of prominent scholars, in private histories, or in collections of stories, were inevitably more personalized than official documents and less concerned with matters of policy.

Especially beginning with the 1750s, however, a new category of text appears: biographies of Ming Chinese migrants produced either under court auspices or by private authors, including Ming migrants themselves. As I discuss first in chapter 5, and in greater detail in chapter 6, the formation of imperial subject status required the compilation of new texts and new archival materials. These new texts were sometimes based on edited versions of earlier documents, and sometimes, seemingly, entirely fraudulent new documents. Earlier records, especially those produced by private historians, could result in the Chosŏn state looking for the descendants of a Ming migrant to honor. At the same time as the Chosŏn state discovered new claimants to imperial subject status, it often uncovered documents—at times of doubtful veracity—to confirm their claims. Genuine documents that had undergone editing and reinterpretation were gathered together along with fraudulent documents in new archival collections, such as the late eighteenth-century *Traces of the Acts of Imperial Subjects* (*Hwangjoin sajŏk*). They were also edited and fashioned into biographies contained with the court-sponsored *Collected Texts on Honoring the Zhou* (*Chonju hwip'yŏn*), or into collections produced by Kyujanggak scholars such as the *Noble Purpose* (*Noeroe nangnak*) by Yi Tŏngmu (1741–1793) or the *Biographies of Remnant Subjects of the Imperial Ming* (*Hwangmyŏng yumin chŏn*) by Sŏng Haeŭng (1760–1839). While the contents of the biographies differed, they all agreed in treating Ming migrants as a coherent category. Instead of the low-status refugees in fishing villages, intermarrying with base-born Chosŏn women, that we find in seventeenth-century sources, these palace-sponsored narratives created elite and educated Confucian paragons whose retreat to Chosŏn was entirely determined by their hostility to the Qing and their recognition of Chosŏn's exclusive inheritance of Chunghwa civilization.

As will be discussed in chapter 6, during the nineteenth century imperial subjects themselves took control in this process, actively internalizing court-sponsored narratives and developing them further in often incredible directions, often far beyond what the palace scholars had been willing to accept, even as they further strengthened their ritualized Ming loyalist identity by

creating their own Ming loyalist shrines and altars. Through this process, new texts were written, based in part upon the official court narratives but frequently involving flights of fancy that went far beyond what the court would accept, including *The Record of Remnant Subjects of the Imperial Dynasty* (*Hwangjo yumin nok*) by Wang Tökkü, or the improved and expanded *Collected Works of Mohadang* (*Mohadangjip*), which provided a much more orthodox history for a key Japanese defector lineage in Chosön. By doing so, these foreign descent-groups fully accepted the historical identities the Chosön court had imposed upon them. This represented a vernacularization of the Chunghwa ideology of Chosön's sajok aristocracy. These texts have continued to be reproduced by the descendants of imperial subject families, who have gathered them together in easily accessible form,⁶² and they have in turn attracted a certain amount of scholarly attention, including excellent studies by U Kyöngsöp and Liu Chunlan, with Liu especially using them to provide a pioneering survey of the key migrants and descent-groups.⁶³ On face value, they seem to have very little relation to the records from the period of migration or from the seventeenth century, and it can thus seem as if we suffer from a dearth of records on Ming migrants to Chosön.⁶⁴ However, read carefully, these texts reveal echoes of the very different circumstances of the seventeenth century and also provide a window into the later social processes experienced by the migrants. Much like the spread of norms of widow chastity among low-status people, the spread of surnames among slaves, and cultural assertions of chungin specialists and petty functionaries during the same period,⁶⁵ this involved a spread of elite norms to nonelites. Imperial subjects were not a diasporic community of Chinese rediscovering their identities, but Koreans, of generally foreign ancestry and of low or middling status, internalizing a narrative provided for them by the Chosön court.

Chosön's sajok aristocracy formed an imagined community that was markedly different from that of the modern nation-state, and certainly with only limited resemblance to the racialized nation-state of twentieth-century Korea. During the early Chosön, despite the presence of the admired Ming empire that most sajok aristocrats agreed in honoring, Chosön formed its own rival Chunghwa centrality, through which it encompassed Jurchens, Japanese, and indeed Ming deserters who it brought under its control. The late Chosön saw a shift, not to nationalism, but to a more bureaucratic and centralized relationship with people seen as foreign, as the Chosön court, which at this point considered itself to be the only remnant of Chunghwa civilization, defined some of its foreign subjects as "imperial subjects" and representatives of the fallen Ming. Understanding migrants and foreigners during the Chosön period requires us to look beyond the

clichés of Western nationalism and rather to consider the changing ideological and administrative contexts of the early modern Chosŏn state.

A Note on Names, Languages, and Dates

An omnipresent challenge when writing about border-crossers is the question of names. Many of the people I discuss began their careers in China and ended them in Korea. In the sources, their names are written in Chinese characters, but when writing in English it is necessary to choose between pinyin romanization (which represents them as Chinese) and McCune-Reischauer (which represents them as Korean). My general solution is to romanize the names of the original migrants in pinyin, while occasionally placing the McCune-Reischauer in parentheses—for instance, Kang Shijue (K. Kang Sejak). However, in the case of the Shang migrant Kija (Ch. Jizi), I use the McCune-Reischauer because the story of Kija had become so thoroughly Koreanized. Titles of books published in Chosŏn containing the name of the migrant are also rendered in McCune-Reischauer (for instance, *Kang Sejak chasul*), as are the names of the Korean-born descendants of the migrants. In some cases, this will result in the surnames of the original migrants becoming confusingly different from their descendants—thus, the surname of the Uighur Xie Xun is pronounced “Söl” in Korean.

Most foreign terms and titles used in this book are Korean, with some in Chinese. In some cases, I provide both Korean and Chinese romanizations: for instance, Chunghwa (Ch. Zhonghua). When I refer to Japanese (Ja.), Jurchen (Ju.), Russian (R.), Mongol (Mo.), or Manchu (Ma.) terms, I generally indicate this specifically unless it is otherwise obvious. As a general rule, foreign terms are Korean (K.) unless noted otherwise.

My translation of terminology follows a mix of authorities, referring to Hucker’s *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China*,⁶⁶ as well as the online glossary provided by the Academy of Korean Studies⁶⁷ and Sun Joo Kim’s “Korean History Glossary,”⁶⁸ which themselves are compiled based on the work of earlier authorities.

This book discusses a considerable diversity of premodern nationalities, or *ethnies*, to use Anthony Smith’s terminology.⁶⁹ Perhaps the most difficult *ethnie* to refer to consistently are Koreans. Although it may seem anachronistic to some, it is simply impossible not to use the term Korean, for instance to distinguish Korean subjects of the Chosŏn court from those of Japanese, Jurchen, and other origins who had also become subject to the Chosŏn court. It is also

necessary to use “Korean” when referring to people across dynastic traditions. Of course, as I have discussed in this introduction, there were terms such as *Tongguk* that did indeed refer to Korea without respect to dynastic boundaries, so it is not perhaps as anachronistic as some might imagine. The group that I refer to as Jurchens, for that matter, was both internally diverse and, especially in Chosŏn records after the late fifteenth century, frequently referred to very simply as *ho*, *hoin*, or *yain*—northern nomads or wild people. My use of “Jurchen” is thus an anachronistic simplification, but also hard to avoid.

Finally, most dates within this text refer to the lunar-solar calendar in standard use in early modern Korea and China. I do provide the year in the Gregorian calendar that corresponds to most of the East Asian lunar-solar year. However, as the Gregorian year and the East Asian lunar-solar year are not precisely identical, there is some mismatch—so, the thirtieth day of the twelfth month of the *pyŏngja* year under Injo is in fact early 1637 according to the Gregorian calendar, not 1636. I only rarely make note of such inconsistencies.

Foreign Communities in Early Chosŏn

ALTHOUGH THE CHOSŎN STATE often appears in the history books as a homogenous regime, it in fact included a considerable foreign community and was linked to networks of people extending far beyond Chosŏn's borders. The new Chosŏn state emerged from the Koryŏ state that had been fully integrated as a subordinate kingdom into the cosmopolitan Yuan dynasty and inherited some of this diversity, including the Northeast Asian officialdom of the Yuan empire. Furthermore, both the northern terrestrial frontier of the Chosŏn state and its southern maritime frontier with Japan were chaotic, violent spaces, characterized by small polities and independent actors who subsisted partly through plunder. The early Chosŏn state responded to these circumstances by organizing petty rulers among the Jurchens to their north and the Japanese to their south into a subordinate relationship with the Chosŏn monarchy. It also encouraged outsiders to settle on Chosŏn soil as subjects of the Chosŏn monarch.

Although the early Chosŏn monarchy accepted its subordination to the Ming empire, it also asserted its own independent status. This was reflected by the institution that it employed to settle foreigners on its soil, namely submitting-foreigner (*hyanghwain*) status. This status not only encompassed a series of bureaucratic practices for settling foreign migrants in Chosŏn but also was imbued with ideological content, namely the idea that the Chosŏn monarch was his own civilizing center, edifying outsiders who submitted to the Chosŏn state and bringing moral transformation not only to Jurchens and Japanese, but even in some cases to Chinese who chose to reside in Chosŏn.

The complexities of the Chosŏn court's ideological position vis-à-vis China is also reflected in its dealings with those of its subjects and their descendants who had entered the state from China and Inner Asia in the period of Yuan dominance, during which time Koryŏ had become part of a vast international empire centered on the Yuan capital of Daidu. Links established at that time continued

after the fall of the Yuan, and the descendants of the Yuan newcomers were in high demand at the early Chosŏn court, where they played a vital role as technical specialists in language, law codes, and rites, albeit in positions subordinate to those of the *sajok* aristocrats, who alone had access to the top positions.

Yuan Subjects of Koryŏ and Chosŏn

In 1388, Yi Sŏnggye, a general from a Korean family that had served the Mongols in Ssangŏng in northeastern Korea, refused to fight the Ming armies sent against Koryŏ, and instead turned his army against King U. By 1392, Yi Sŏnggye established a new dynasty, called Chosŏn; after a stormy beginning, under his son, Yi Pangwŏn (1367–1422), posthumously known as T'aejong (r. 1400–1418), relations with the Ming empire to Chosŏn's west were finally stabilized. No longer integrated into the vast Eurasian Yuan empire, and free from the chaos of the Yuan-Ming transition, the Chosŏn state continued to host remnants of the period of Yuan domination—descendants of the Eurasian officialdom of the Yuan period who were integrated into the Chosŏn state in a subordinate position within the Chosŏn status hierarchy.

The early Koryŏ court had generally accepted the overall supremacy of the various Chinese empires, but, thanks to the disunion of China, was able to maintain considerable independence in its relations with them. After Koryŏ submitted to the Yuan in 1259, it was deeply integrated, in the manner of other subordinate kingdoms, into the Yuan state, with considerable exchange in officials and overlapping administrative structures.¹ During the reign of King Kongmin (r. 1351–1374), the Koryŏ state reoriented itself toward the new Ming empire. Although the deep integration that had characterized relations with the Yuan came to an end, the late Koryŏ and early Chosŏn accepted a far more thorough subordination to the Ming than the Koryŏ had offered Chinese dynasties before the Mongol conquest.² The submission of the Koryŏ and Chosŏn courts to the Ming, moreover, went beyond *realpolitik* and involved the acceptance by both court and *sajok* aristocracy that the Ming emperor had achieved his position through the mandate of heaven and was required by his position to act as a transformative force over subject kingdoms. Like earlier Chinese dynasties, the Ming's right to hegemony was seen to be based on the Ming dynasty's position as civilized and civilizing center (Ch. *hua*, K. *hwa*). In return, the barbarian (Ch. *yì*, K. *ì*) kingdoms on its frontiers, also known as vassal, fence, or boundary kingdoms (Ch. *fan*, K. *pŏn*), were supposed to act as a defensive shield for the Chinese empire.

Yet, despite accepting such seemingly ethnicized distinctions between Chinese and non-Chinese, and despite placing itself securely within the category of vassal to the Ming, first the Koryŏ court and then the Chosŏn accepted migrants from China in distinctly subordinate roles, clearly marking them below the Korean *sajok* aristocracy that controlled the civil bureaucracy of the Chosŏn state. Even before its submission to the Mongols, Koryŏ had been the recipient of diverse migrants of all classes and origins, including Parhaeans, Jurchens, Khitans, Turks, Japanese, and Song Chinese traders. Once in Koryŏ, these migrants were frequently offered a range of benefits to encourage their settlement, including land, tax reductions, and even wives. Korean surnames were frequently granted to those who did not have them, and even Song people and others who already had Chinese-style names and surnames could be given new ones. Prominent migrants of all origins were granted titles and official positions to strengthen their loyalty. Although the overwhelming objective for the Koryŏ court seems indeed to have been to increase its tax-paying population, migrants entering Koryŏ were often employed in the military and as craftsmen. Others were brought in specifically for their particular skills, with some notable migrants, especially Song merchants, also gaining prominent positions in the bureaucracy.³

The period of Mongol supremacy was characterized by especially intense population exchange. As with other subordinate states, Koryŏ sent its crown princes to the Mongol capital to serve in the Yuan *keshig* (palace guard), Koryŏ officials to serve in the Yuan capital, and Koryŏ women and eunuchs to serve in the palace in Daidu. In exchange, Koryŏ received Chinggisid princesses as royal brides, and Yuan *darughachi* as administrators who linked Koryŏ's internal administration with the administration of the broader Yuan empire. Regions on the frontiers of Koryŏ came under direct Yuan control for varying lengths of time, including Tongnyŏng in present-day North P'yŏngan Province in Koryŏ's northwest, T'amna on the island of Cheju to Koryŏ's south, and Ssangsŏng commandery in present-day Hamgyŏng in Koryŏ's northeast.⁴ Members of Koryŏ's *sajok* aristocracy took the civil service exams in the Yuan or otherwise gained extensive experience in the Yuan capital. In fact, Yi Sŏnggye himself came from a Korean family that had served the Mongols over several generations in Manchuria and Ssangsŏng; his father, Yi Chach'un (1315–1361) submitted to Koryŏ under Kongmin (r. 1351–1374) in 1356 as Mongol power declined and Koryŏ occupied Ssangsŏng commandery.⁵

Not only did Koryŏ officials serve the Yuan, but Chinese and Inner Asians served in the Koryŏ court during the period of Mongol supremacy, with many continuing to serve with the Chosŏn monarchy as well. Ideologically, even as

the Koryŏ court was subject to the Chinese emperor, Koryŏ and Chosŏn civil bureaucrats saw their monarch as receiving subordinate people from abroad who were attracted to Korea's civilized culture and manners. Thus, before and during submission to the Yuan, the Koryŏ monarch granted outsiders, whatever their origins, Korean names and clan seats (*pon'gwan*), marking them as subjects of the Koryŏ court even if their ancestors originated somewhere else and allowing them to establish minor office-holding descent-groups.⁶

A somewhat anomalous case is that of the southern island of Cheju, which, as T'amna, was under direct Yuan administration following 1273 and under joint Koryŏ-Yuan administration following 1294. As discussed by Kim Iru, during the period of Mongol and joint Mongol-Koryŏ rule, the area received extensive influence from the Yuan at a popular level, in the form of Mongol soldiers, prisoners, and horse breeders on the island and intermarriage between Mongols and local Cheju people. Already culturally distinct from Koryŏ, and having been under a semiautonomous ruler, Mongol influence brought even greater distinction. As Kim describes, the names of islanders appearing in *The History of Koryŏ* (*Koryŏsa*) are often Mongol in origin, suggesting that they are either Mongol descendants or from mixed Mongol-Cheju households.⁷ Such cultural eclecticism carried with it political implications, as the T'amna horse-breeder (Mo. *hachi*) elites, of mixed Mongol-Cheju parentage, had a connection to the Yuan empire that was unmediated by Koryŏ or Chosŏn. As a result, during the period of Koryŏ orientation against the Yuan, the *hachi* elites revolted several times, notably in 1375 when King Kongmin, in response to Ming commands, attempted to supply Cheju horses to the Ming war effort against the Northern Yuan.⁸

Nor did the eventual suppression of the *hachi* revolts bring an end to the cultural hybridity of Cheju. The Ming Hongwu emperor continued to entertain claims on Cheju even after it was restored to Koryŏ rule. Although actual Ming claims could be deflected, the Ming not only demanded special tribute in horses but also continued the Yuan practice of using the island as a prison island—exiling to Cheju, on the assumption of good treatment, defeated Mongol rivals and also members of the defeated Yunnan kingdom that formed after the collapse of the Yuan empire.⁹ Reflecting this fact, in *The Augmented Survey of Korean Geography* (*Sinjŭng Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam*), included among the surnames for Cheju are those such as Cho, Yi, and Sŏk that are listed as having the clan seat Wŏn (implying Mongol origins) and those such as Yang, An, Kang, and Tae, whose clan seat is listed as Unnam (Yunnan), which in a note is explicitly connected to the exile of the leaders of Yunnan during the early Ming.¹⁰

Outside of the unusual context of Cheju, there were also Yuan officials who continued to serve the Koryŏ and Chosŏn courts. An example of the persistence of Yuan-period networks during the early Chosŏn may be seen with officials originating among the Uighurs, the Central Asian people who gave the Mongols their script and frequently served in a scribal capacity within the Mongol empire. The best-known Uighur official in Koryŏ and Chosŏn is Xie Xun (K. Sŏl Son). Xie's original name was Xie Boliaoxun. He was from a prominent family of Uighur *semuren*,¹¹ officials based in the lower Yangzi who had a notable tradition of exam success. Like other Uighur *semuren* in the Yuan, the Xie continued to play an important administrative role as Uighur officials even after they were cut off from their homeland, the Uighur kingdom of Qocho (Ch. Gaochang), when it fell to the Chaghatai khanate in 1275.¹² Xie Xun himself advanced both through his mastery of the Confucian knowledge and through his status as a *semuren*, the later identity linking him through patronage networks to the Mongol-dominated court. As with many *semuren*, he began first as a valet (Mo. *sügürchi*) to the Yuan khan, but then showed his mastery of the Chinese literary tradition by passing the *jinshi* exam in 1345, after which he held such positions as compiler in the Yuan Hanlin academy and a judge in the Bureau of Tibetan and Buddhist Affairs. He also obtained a position as a corrector of documents in the imperial heir apparent's study, for which both his knowledge of the Zhu Xi school of Neo-Confucianism and his facility in Uighur were likely useful. In 1356, the collapse of the Yuan and the rise of the Red Turban rebels drove him to Koryŏ from his residence north of Beijing. Not only was his family's home near Nanjing rendered inaccessible by the growing civil unrest, but Xie Xun had formed a connection with the king of Koryŏ, King Kongmin, when, as crown prince, he had been stationed in the imperial keshig in Daidu. King Kongmin thus welcomed Xie Xun upon his arrival in Koryŏ in 1358, granting him the titles of Marquis of Puwŏn (*Puwŏnhu*). In a nod to Xie Xun's Uighur origins, Kongmin also granted him the title Earl of Gaochang (*Koch'angbaek*), with this linking Xie to the Uighur homeland that had been under the control of the Chaghatai khanate since before he was born. As Michael C. Brose argues, it is likely that, beyond pure personal connections, King Kongmin was eager to benefit from the influence and connections of an important Yuan official from a large Yuan Uighur official family, an advantage cut short by Xie Xun's death soon after his arrival.¹³

Indeed, while some prominent foreign families fell into obscurity during the Chosŏn period, a significant number of Yuan-origin officials, many of whom were fleeing the chaos of the Red Turban uprising, continued to serve under the

Chosŏn court, employing their skills especially in diplomacy and the military, while providing the benefit of their linguistic abilities and their connections. These officials included Na Se, a Mongol, who served loyally under Yi Sŏnggye in a military capacity, participating in the campaigns against Japanese pirates both during the late Koryŏ and early Chosŏn and dying in the harness at the age of seventy-eight in 1397, five years after Chosŏn's founding.¹⁴ Another notable example is Xie Xun's son Xie Changshou (K. Sŏl Changsu, 1341–1399). He began his career in Yuan, but took his examinations under King Kongmin and participated in diplomatic exchanges with the Ming. He may have lost some of his prominence after the assassination of King Kongmin, but he emerged once more in an influential position during the later years of King U, gaining particular importance after Yi Sŏnggye deposed King U in 1388.¹⁵ Notably, Xie Changshou maintained his ancestor's connection to China and fluency in Chinese, as may be seen in the letter that Xie Changshou received from the Hongwu emperor in 1387 after a diplomatic mission. Intermixed with numerous criticisms, the emperor did state that, in contrast to the low-ranking interpreters that the Koryŏ court had previously sent to the Ming capital of Nanjing, Xie Changshou was of an old official family and could be expected to communicate properly his commands to the Koryŏ court.¹⁶ After 1388, Xie continued to play a prominent diplomatic role, defending Yi Sŏnggye's overthrow of King U to the Ming's Hongwu emperor. As Im Sŏnbin points out, the fact that his uncle was serving as envoy on the Ming side was likely a key reason for the selection of Xie Changshou, as was his ability in foreign languages; indeed, he was sent on diplomatic missions to the Ming capital of Nanjing eight times.¹⁷ In Chosŏn, his linguistic skills were put to use when he was employed as a supervisor (*chejo*) in the Interpreters' Bureau (*Yŏgwŏn*), a role in which he contributed to organizing education in Chinese, Mongolian, and the Uighur script.¹⁸ Socially, he intermarried with a Korean aristocratic family and maintained extensive connections with prominent officials in the Koryŏ and Chosŏn courts.¹⁹

Other members of what became the Sŏl descent-group continued to play a prominent role in the late Koryŏ and early Chosŏn, acting both as linguistic and ideological experts on Chunghwa civilization for the Korean court. Sŏl Kyŏngsu (b. 1376) and Sŏl Maesu (fl. 1370s–1420s), for instance, both worked as interpreters but also served in the Office for Special Councilors (*Hongmun'gwan*), an institution concerned not only with literary matters but also with providing advice on policy based on the tradition of Chinese classics and statecraft. In the following generation, Sŏl Sun (d. 1435) gained especial prominence, eventually rising to the position of governor of Kangwŏn Province. More significantly, he

obtained a position in the Academy of Worthies (*Chiphyŏnjŏn*), the institution that, under King Sejong, became a central organ for royal advice and for research on statecraft, legal matters, and indeed linguistics and natural philosophy. In this capacity, Sŏl Sun was commissioned by King Sejong (r. 1418–1450) to compile a guide to Neo-Confucian morality—*The Illustrated Conduct of the Three Bonds* (*Samgang haengsil do*).²⁰

By no means was the Sŏl descent-group unique. Other Yuan officials and their descendants acted as officials, generally in a diplomatic capacity, frequently showing their ability specifically in such technical matters that were usually beneath the notice of prominent civil officials of Korean origin. A common feature uniting many Yuan-origin officials in Chosŏn was their close association with Yi Sŏnggye before he gained control of the Koryŏ state in 1388. For instance, Yi Hyŏn (?–1415) was another Uighur who, on account of his Chinese language ability, participated extensively in diplomatic exchanges with the Ming on Chosŏn's behalf. He seems to have been the grandson of a man named Bayan who came to Koryŏ as retainer of the Chinggisid princess Cheguk, the daughter of Khubilai, who arrived in Koryŏ in 1286 as the bride of King Ch'ungnyŏl (r. 1274–1308). The precise history of Bayan's descendants is not clear, but it seems that they maintained their Eurasian character, for Yi Hyŏn was employed during the early Chosŏn as both diplomat and interpreter.

As well, there were several Han Chinese-origin officials. For instance, Wu Jin (K. O Chin), of Han Chinese origin, played an active role as interpreter during the early Chosŏn, even rising to the lofty heights of second rank. This fact was pointed out in 1430, when Wu's wife was punished brutally for committing adultery with another official. Court discussion of this case noted that the old interpreter Wu Jin "was not originally of an official family," and despite his high rank had "failed to distinguish inner [feminine] and outer [masculine] spheres in administering his household."²¹ Another interpreter, Li Mindao (K. Yi Mindo, 1336–1395), the descendant of a prominent Yuan official, Li Gongye, rose to prominence during the late Koryŏ as a supporter of Yi Sŏnggye. After Yi Sŏnggye had established the new dynasty, Li Mindao was granted the status of merit subject and was enfeoffed by Yi as Lord of Sangsan (*Sangsan'gun*), the hometown of his Korean wife. He reformed the clothing style according to Chinese precedent during the late Koryŏ and showed his skill in both fortune-telling and medicine.²² Tang Cheng (K. Tang Sŏng, 1337–1413), also of Chinese origin, showed a knowledge of legal statutes (*yullyŏng*). In a hagiographic account written after his death, he was remembered for bravely challenging Yi Sŏnggye's rival Ch'oe Yŏng, who was ignoring the law to pursue a personal vendetta. Tang

Cheng also demonstrated his skill at writing diplomatic documents to be sent to the Ming court.²³ Finally of note is Mae U, whose grandfather Mei Junrui (K. Mae Kunsö) fled the collapse of the Yuan and served in an official capacity during the late Koryö, as did both Mae U himself and his father, Mae Wönjö.²⁴

The presence of officials skilled in translation was vital for the early Chosön state as it negotiated its position in a turbulent Northeast Asia. The Ming did not, however, encourage the private movement of people that had characterized the Yuan. Indeed, a few decades after Chosön's foundation, the almost invariable response of the Chosön court to the arrival of Chinese in its borders was to repatriate them to the Ming. This limited movement of people resulted in a lack of expertise for the court in either spoken Chinese (*Hanö* or *Hwaö*) or the written vernacular of the Ming bureaucracy (*imun*). Under T'aejong, worry was specifically expressed that the Chosön court was so dependent on Tang Cheng's ability in the written vernacular that Tang's death would be disastrous for Chosön's diplomatic capabilities.²⁵ During the reign of Sejong, the contribution of the migrants from the Yuan, such as Xie Changshou, in maintaining spoken Chinese language skills among Chosön interpreters was well recognized.²⁶ In fact, the Chosön court under Sejong twice went against the ordinary precedent of repatriating to the Ming any Chinese captives of the Jurchen recovered by the Chosön court, in both cases specifically pointing to the dearth of competent Chinese interpreters.²⁷ Such cases, however, were rare and should be seen as unusual exceptions to the rule.

Frontier Peoples in Early Chosön

Although Chinese and other Inner Asians largely ceased to migrate to Chosön after the turmoil of the Ming-Qing transition, migration itself to Chosön did not cease. The early Chosön state was bounded by zonal frontiers and characterized by a mismatch between the territory claimed by the monarch and the regions in which the monarch could exert effective administrative jurisdiction. Partly as a result, the early Chosön monarch ruled over culturally heterogeneous peoples, including Jurchens from the Hamgyöng region, Japanese from the island of Tsushima that was claimed, but not administered, by the Chosön monarch, and diverse peoples who arrived from beyond the administrative reach of Chosön in order to pursue trade or other opportunities.

Through its relationship with these peoples, Chosön maintained its own separate and autonomous system of foreign affairs, whereby Chosön acted as the civilizing Chunghwa to barbarian peoples on its frontiers. As Kenneth R.

Northern Korea and Six Garrisons during the Early Chosŏn.
(Drafted by Thomas Quartermain.)

Robinson has said, “the King of Chosŏn Korea showed different faces to different people,” and even as it subordinated itself to the Ming emperor, it acted as an equal under the same Ming-centric order with the king of Ryukyu and the shogun of Muromachi Japan, and acted as a supreme ruler in charge of his own domain with Jurchen clan leaders on its northern border and petty Japanese and Ryukyuan potentates on its maritime frontier.²⁸ These networks provided an extension of Chosŏn’s monarchical authority beyond the lands directly under its effective administrative control and created a class of intermediate people, at once subjects of Chosŏn and foreigners.

Chosŏn and Maritime Peoples

The Koryŏ-Chosŏn transition coincided with disorder in the maritime world by Korea’s coastal regions. As the Kamakura Bakufu (1185–1333) of Japan went into collapse in part because of the challenge of the Yuan invasions of the late thirteenth century, new potentates asserted their independent control within the maritime world of Northeast Asia. These potentates gained power in key locations near significant shipping routes and were able to lead multiethnic crews

of maritime peoples on raids not only within Japan but also further afield against Chinese and Korean coasts. This disorder continued after the formation of the Muromachi Bakufu (1336–1573) in Japan.²⁹

Partly in response to this chaos, during the late fourteenth century the Ming empire turned away from the active support for international commerce that had characterized the Yuan dynasty. Beginning in 1371, the Ming empire banned private travel overseas and restricted commerce to tribute trade at a set number of ports. This forced the Muslim merchants based in China's coastal cities who wished to pursue overseas trade to move to other countries entirely, especially Southeast Asia.³⁰ In their place, the Ming cultivated sea lords based in the Ryukyu island chain between Kyushu and Taiwan, allowing former raiders and pirates based on those islands to act as intermediaries in China's maritime trade, culminating in the formation in 1429 of a single kingdom based on the island of Okinawa. Whether in its disunited form or as a unified kingdom, Ryukyu maintained a regular tribute relationship and beneficial trading connections with the Ming, which in turn hoped to redirect the potentates of islands away from piracy and toward peaceful trade.³¹

In Korean records, piratical groups based in Japan and Ryukyu are referred to as Japanese raiders (K. *waegu*, Ja. *wakō*), the term with which they are most often known in current scholarship. Beginning in 1350, and with increasing regularity after 1370, Koryŏ and Chosŏn suffered numerous attacks from these Japanese raiders, who came in fleets ranging from fifty to two hundred ships, at times striking deep inland, causing great destruction in southern Korea especially and interrupting tax-grain shipments to the capital.³² Both Koryŏ and Chosŏn responded militarily to the threat and some of Yi Sŏnggye's early successes were against Japanese raiders. These campaigns continued after Yi Sŏnggye's ascent to the throne, even extending to direct attacks onto the island of Tsushima (K. *Tae-mado*), located almost equidistant from Japan's Kyushu and Chosŏn's Kyŏngsang Province. These military campaigns culminated in a successful attack on Tsushima in 1419.³³

In addition to such military means, the Chosŏn court also attempted to use diplomacy to bring order to its coasts, initially forming relations with the state with which it could relate as a status equal, namely the Muromachi Bakufu. Chosŏn's ties with the Bakufu, generally described as neighborly (*kyorin*) relations in Japanese and Korean scholarship, were of little efficacy, as the Muromachi shogun had only weak control over the Japanese potentates of Kyushu and southwestern Honshu, who were especially vital for maintaining the security of Chosŏn's maritime frontier. As a result, Chosŏn formed direct relationships

with these potentates, whereby the Chosŏn monarch received tribute and provided in exchange bureaucratic titles, trading rights, and indeed the right to visit the Chosŏn capital. Through these ties, the Chosŏn monarch sought to eliminate the threat of Japanese raiders.

The Chosŏn court received the Japanese and Ryukyuan potentates with whom it formed relationships into four hierarchical grades, with the highest grade granted to the kings of Ryukyu and Japan; the next grade granted to powerful families of southwestern Honshu and Kyushu, such as the Ōuchi and Shōni families; the third grade granted to the governor (Ja. *shugo*) of Tsushima and the regent (Ja. *tandai*) of Kyushu; and the fourth to islanders from Tsushima and Iki as well as those Japanese who had been granted a military post by the Chosŏn court. These reception grades, along with the bureaucratic ranks that the Chosŏn court granted its Japanese allies, integrated Japanese potentates as members of the Chosŏn bureaucracy and thus subjects of the Chosŏn state. Beyond that, Chosŏn also actively promoted and participated in the reception of Japanese monk-envoys and the submission of Buddhist texts and objects to Japan and Ryukyu. By cultivating subjects in Japan, the Chosŏn court established interlocutors through whom it could, for instance, repatriate Chosŏn subjects who had been captured by raiders, and, indeed, prevent the actions of Japanese raiders in the first place. From the perspective of those Japanese potentates who had been granted such status, tribute missions to the Chosŏn capital were, above all, opportunities for trade.³⁴

Especially following its 1419 invasion of Tsushima, Chosŏn centralized much of its diplomatic engagement with Japan on the island itself. Tsushima had played the role of intermediary between the Koryŏ court and Japanese regimes from the twelfth century until the attempted Mongol invasion of Japan from Korea. Located close to southern Korea (to the extent that it is visible from Pusan on a clear day), but otherwise infertile, it became a major center for the Japanese raiders during the late Koryŏ. In the early Chosŏn, it was under the control of the Sō family of governors, to whom, by the mid-fifteenth century, the Chosŏn court granted the right to mediate nearly all trade and diplomatic relations between it and the Japanese and Ryukyuan, including issuing passports to Japanese envoys and traders who wished to trade with Chosŏn and controlling access to the three southern ports at which much of the trade with Japan occurred.

The governor of Tsushima's position as intermediary between Chosŏn and Japan was made possible because the Chosŏn court considered it to be originally part of Korea. This view contrasted with the attitudes of the Koryŏ court (which had recognized Tsushima as a foreign state) and, moreover, did not imply a real

attempt by the Chosŏn administration to impose any actual administration upon the islands. The court did dispatch officials for the purpose of investigation (*kyŏngch'agwan*), reception (*sŏnwiſa*), and inspection (*chech'alsa*). Although these offices primarily served a diplomatic purpose, the terms of their mandate were domestic, rather than diplomatic.³⁵ Tsushima, in the language of the Chosŏn court, was a hedge or fence (*pŏlli* or *pŏn*) for Chosŏn, informing it of matters in Japan and acting on its behalf to facilitate the return of Chosŏn people who had been abducted during raids or whose ships had run ashore in Japan. Tsushima was at once part of, and foreign to, Chosŏn.

Chosŏn and Northern Peoples

Similar processes also occurred in Chosŏn's relationship with the Jurchens residing, together with other related groups, in the forested regions on the northern border of Korea and in present-day Manchuria, where they practiced a mix of agriculture, herding, and hunting. They played a significant role in Korean history, especially during the Koryŏ period, when control over the Jurchens was a key point of contention and rivalry between the Khitan Liao and Koryŏ. Jurchens also served in Koryŏ armies and were brought in to fill bureaucratic positions within Koryŏ, while those outside of Koryŏ itself were granted bureaucratic and other specialized positions.³⁶ Such active influence by Koryŏ over Jurchens was inevitably curtailed with the rise of a Jin state based among the Jurchens in the twelfth century and later by the annexation of Jurchen lands in both Koryŏ and Manchuria by the Mongols in the thirteenth. After the collapse of Mongol rule in Northeast Asia, Jurchens formed independent polities in the land north of Ming Liaodong and northwest of Korea, with economies depending in part on raiding against the sedentary peoples—Chinese and Koreans—with whom they shared borders. Their rise thus required a range of military and diplomatic responses by Chosŏn to defend its northern frontier.

In contrast to Chosŏn's almost exclusively defensive and economic relationship with its southern maritime frontier, its relationship with the Jurchens was shaped by the fact that the Chosŏn royal family itself had its original base in the northeast and extensive connections with Jurchen groups of the region that became Hamgyŏng Province. When Yi Sŏnggye's father, Yi Chach'un, submitted to Koryŏ, he brought with him an army of personal retainers of diverse backgrounds, including Jurchens.³⁷ When Yi Sŏnggye expanded his own power, he maintained his base of support in Hamgyŏng, then simply called Tongbungmyŏn (Northeastern District). One of his key supporters was a Jurchen leader named Kulun Turan Timur (1331–1402), known more usually as Yi Chiran

(sometimes Yi Turan), a Korean-style name that presumably was granted to him by the Koryŏ court. Yi Chiran's father, Ara Buka, was a leader of a thousand (*minghan*) under the Yuan. By submitting to Koryŏ in 1371 during the reign of King Kongmin, Yi Chiran was thus allowed by the Koryŏ court to inherit his father's position.³⁸ Having chosen to take the side of Koryŏ during the turbulent Yuan-Ming transition, he also served Koryŏ loyally under the direction especially of Yi Sŏnggye, for whom Yi Chiran achieved victories against the Japanese raiders in 1377 and 1380, and against a rival Jurchen leader called Hobaldo in 1383, obtaining merit subject status as early as 1385 under King U. Most important, in 1388, he supported Yi Sŏnggye when the latter turned his armies around at the Yalu in order to overthrow King U. He also assisted the Ming in 1392 in military activities against other Jurchens and played what Yi Sŏnggye considered to be a positive role in the political strife of the early Chosŏn. As a result, he was also one of the most decorated of merit subjects, even being honored by the Ming.

Although the early Chosŏn court had a closer historical relationship with the Jurchens than with the Japanese, Jurchens nevertheless launched raids on Chosŏn's northern borders, especially in the chaos following the collapse of the Yuan. Just as in its approach to the Japanese, Chosŏn sought to reduce Jurchen raiding activity by binding Jurchens to the Chosŏn state through the granting of bureaucratic positions and by encouraging trade and visits to Hansŏng by Jurchen leaders. Through this, the court hoped to give them a material reason for avoiding conflict and transform them, like Yi Chiran, into subjects of the Chosŏn state. Yi Chiran, especially, brought with him the loyalty of the so-called native Jurchens (*t'och'ak Yŏjin*), who resided to the south of Kilchu (which the Jurchens called "Haiyen") in such districts as Hamhŭng (Ju. Hal-lan) and Tanch'ŏn (Ju. Tulu). Other Amurian peoples generally categorized as Jurchens—the Uriankhais (K. *Orang'ae*), the Odolis, and the Udihas—who came south to the frontiers of Chosŏn after the collapse of the Yuan, were also brought into the Chosŏn social and economic orbit, through the granting of titles and trading rights, and above all the privilege of tribute missions (*naejo*) to the Chosŏn capital.³⁹

Thus, in the 1380s, Möngke Timur of the Odoli moved south and settled in the region of Hoeryŏng (Ju. Omohoi), even as other Jurchen leaders moved to Chosŏn's vicinity, including Ahacu of the Hurka and Burhu of the Udiha. Following their arrival, the Odoli, along with Uriankhai Jurchen groups, raided Koryŏ's territory, but they were successfully brought under control by the Chosŏn court, generally through the granting of rank and trade privileges. In

1392, Chosŏn granted court rank to Uriankhai leaders and, in 1395, received the tribute of Möngke Timur, who was given an honorary military rank in 1404. Ahacu, similarly, submitted to the Chosŏn court during the 1390s.⁴⁰

Chosŏn, however, was not the only power competing for influence among the Jurchens. Chosŏn's hegemon, the Ming empire, was in fact deeply suspicious of Chosŏn's influence in the region. The Ming, having gained control over Liaodong, placed it under a regional military commission (Ch. *duzhibui shishi*), thereby making it the frontline of the Ming's defenses against Mongols and Jurchens in the northeast. The Regional Military Commission of Liaodong also served as a key organ for managing the Ming relationship with Chosŏn. Additionally, the Ming court under Yongle (r. 1402–1424) established an additional Regional Military Commission of Nurgan, in theory to control Jurchens who were residing outside of Liaodong. In practice, it was largely ineffective and fell into terminal decline by the late fifteenth century.⁴¹ Further afield, various Jurchen groups, including the Haixi from the vicinity of Harbin, the Jianzhou from the frontier region between the Ming Liaodong and Chosŏn, and the Wild Jurchens (Ch. *ye'ren*, K. *yain*) to Chosŏn's north, were organized into guards (Ch. *wei*). These guards did not in fact allow for direct Ming control or administration of these Jurchen groups, but rather, like the bureaucratic titles granted by the Chosŏn court to its own Jurchen allies, they organized them into a subordinate relationship to the Ming court and facilitated Jurchen trade and tribute with the Ming.⁴²

Despite its subordination to the Ming, the Chosŏn actively competed against the Ming for control over the Jurchens, with the competition at times approaching the level of a proxy war. Especially during the reign of T'aejong, the Chosŏn court attempted to counter the growing interest of the Yongle emperor in forming relations with the Jurchens, as the Chosŏn monarchy believed the Jurchens to be properly under Chosŏn authority and thus actively competed against the Ming to maintain its influence. The Ming did have considerable success in luring Jurchen leaders into its own sphere of influence, notably attracting Ahacu, whose daughter was in the Yongle emperor's harem, away from the Chosŏn sphere of influence in 1403 by granting him control over the Jianzhou guard, while his son Möngke Buka was put in charge of the Maolian guard among the Uriankhais of the upper Yalu on the Chosŏn border. The Ming even sought to exert its influence over those Jurchens who lived to the south of the Tumen River. In 1403 the Ming employed a Jurchen leader formerly associated with Yi Sŏnggye to lure Jurchens in the Tumen River region over to Ming authority and demanded that Chosŏn transfer to Ming authority even Jurchens from regions

south of the river that were clearly under Chosŏn control. Chosŏn, however, successfully resisted the Ming demands both by providing inducements and rewards to Jurchens to keep them clearly under Chosŏn control and by presenting arguments to the Ming that Hamgyŏng Jurchens had had close relations with the Chosŏn royal family, had intermarried with other Chosŏn subjects, and were paying both tax and corvée to the Chosŏn court.⁴³ This did not bring the competition to an end, however—even Möngke Timur was lured into the Ming sphere in 1405. In response, the Chosŏn state briefly closed the Kyŏngwŏn border market through which they had traded with Möngke Timur and launched attacks against Jurchens who had abandoned Chosŏn for the Ming. Fearing similar revenge attacks, Möngke Timur moved with his tribe to Fengzhou, securely within the Ming sphere of influence, where he was made leader of the Left Jianzhou guard.⁴⁴

Such competition for influence did not cease with the defection of Möngke Timur in 1405, who, in fact, moved back into the vicinity of Chosŏn in 1423, seeking out a position between the Chosŏn and Ming spheres until his assassination in 1433. Especially after the reign of Sejo, Chosŏn generally conceded the Jianzhou Jurchens to Ming influence, in part because the Ming were hostile to Chosŏn interference and attempted to prevent Chosŏn from asserting its influence within this region. Additionally, Chosŏn viewed P'yŏngan Province, through which Jianzhou Jurchen had to travel for tribute missions to the Chosŏn capital, to be far too sensitive a region militarily to allow for the passage of potential enemies, which caused officials under Sŏngjong (referring to early policy under Sejo) to call for all interaction with the Jianzhou Jurchen to be redirected via the “back gate of Hamgil.”⁴⁵ Otherwise, the Ming, weakened by their defeat at the hands of the Oirat in 1449, began to see Chosŏn less as a rival than as a possible ally in the control of the Jurchens, and, in fact, asked for Chosŏn support in suppressing troublesome Jurchen leaders. Among them was a descendant of Ahacu, Li Manchu, who rose in revolt along with other Jurchens in 1449, and who was defeated by a joint Ming-Chosŏn expedition in 1467, bringing an end to powerful Jurchen leaders for nearly a century.⁴⁶

Even as Chosŏn's influence over the Jianzhou Jurchens waned, it remained strong over the Jurchens of the Tumen River region throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Between 1433 and 1444, Chosŏn established the six garrisons (*yukchin*), including Puryŏng on the Hamgyŏng range, Hoeryŏng on the upper Tumen, and then, farther downstream on the Tumen, Chongsŏng, Onsŏng, Kyŏngwŏn, and Kyŏnghŭng. Chosŏn settlers from the southern provinces of Kyŏngsang and Chŏlla were moved north to settle within this

territory, while a line of fortifications was also constructed along the Tumen River through which Chosŏn sought to regain control over the home region of the Chosŏn royal family. These fortifications in turn involved the creation of a dense network of ties with Jurchen groups on both sides of the Tumen River, to which the Ming court largely acquiesced.⁴⁷ In 1454–1455, for instance, the Chosŏn court compiled a census of the peoples on its border, recording their numbers, the names of their leaders, the bureaucratic ranks they had received, as well as their ethnic affiliations.⁴⁸ Later records tended to omit ethnic affiliations but did nevertheless describe a significant number of Jurchen villages near Chosŏn's fortifications. Much like Tsushima to the south, these Jurchen allies played the role of the eyes and ears of the Chosŏn court, acting both as a fence or hedge (*pŏn*) against Jurchens farther off—the deep-dwelling Jurchens (*simch'ŏ hoin*)—and as a source of information concerning them. They also became a source of luxury products—sable furs and ginseng—that were prized in the Chosŏn court.⁴⁹ They became known during the sixteenth century as the “Jurchens in the vicinity of the fortifications” (*sŏngjŏ hoin*) or, by the reign of Sŏnjo (r. 1567–1608), as *Pŏnho* (fence, border, or vassal Jurchens).⁵⁰ As also in the case of Tsushima, these Pŏnhos were on the outer fringes of Chosŏn's effective administration—indeed, the Chosŏn court sent investigation and inspection officials to them but did not attempt to administer directly their internal affairs.⁵¹

The Jurchens and Japanese who interacted with Chosŏn operated at least in part out of the desire for trade and profit, and no doubt also prestige. Their relationship with Chosŏn provided Jurchens and Japanese not only trading rights but also the ability to send tribute missions to the Chosŏn capital of Hansŏng. Alternately, receipt of a bureaucratic title from the Chosŏn court did not on its own result in much limitation to the autonomy of the Jurchen or Japanese potentates, as is revealed by the numerous Jurchens, especially before the mid-fifteenth century, who simultaneously held both Ming and Chosŏn bureaucratic titles,⁵² and the very large number of fraudulent identities, especially during the sixteenth century, assumed among Japanese and Jurchens seeking to engage in trade with Chosŏn.⁵³

For the Chosŏn court, however, these relationships were in part motivated by the desire to maintain peace on its frontiers. Thus, it frequently turned a blind eye to fraudulent Japanese, Jurchen, and Ryukyuan envoys because establishing connections with fraudulent envoys nevertheless served the purpose of encouraging peaceful exchange over conflict.⁵⁴ These ties also raised the status of the Chosŏn monarch himself. Tribute missions to Hansŏng by Japanese and Jurchens at set times of the year were structured according to established

guest rituals, similar to Chosŏn's own diplomatic missions to the Ming capital. Jurchens would enter via Chosŏn's military establishments on the Tumen River, follow a set route along the post road via Kyŏngsŏng, then proceed down the eastern coast through Kangwŏn Province, turning inland at Yangyang and from there to Hansŏng, where they were presented before the Chosŏn monarch. Along the way, they were put up in guesthouses especially designed for them and they participated in receptions (*chŏptae*) with Korean officials during which both Koreans and Jurchens were organized according to rank.⁵⁵ A similar process occurred with Japanese envoys, who arrived first at one of the three ports in the south, after which they were directed along set routes at Chosŏn expense until they could pay court to the Chosŏn monarch at Hansŏng, where they were feasted and entertained with music in exchange for their submission.⁵⁶ Indeed, fifteenth- and sixteenth-century records refer with great frequency to a diversity of foreigners assembling before the monarch—with Jurchens (often specified as divided into the categories Udiha, Uriankhai, and Odoli), Ryukyuan, Japanese, and others.⁵⁷ Foreigners living in Chosŏn—as well as foreign envoys—also participated in the *manggwŏllye* (Rites at a Distance from the Palace) at the birthdays of the Ming emperor.⁵⁸

Such guest rituals themselves, as Robinson, following Catherine Bell, points out, integrated Jurchens and Japanese into the Chosŏn court hierarchy while distinguishing them, as foreigners, from other officials, and clearly locating them in a network of power relations centered on the Chosŏn monarch.⁵⁹ Indeed, in the case of the *manggwŏllye* rituals, Jurchens and Japanese were brought into the hierarchy linking them to the Ming emperor via the Chosŏn monarch. The ritual participation thus had a significant ideological meaning for the Chosŏn court, something that was expressed clearly by Cho Chun's (1346–1405) eulogy to T'aejo shortly after he took the throne, in which Cho Chun declared that the arrivals of envoys from raiders from across the sea, as well as from Ryukyu and Southeast Asia, were proof of the moral transformation achieved by T'aejo's rule.⁶⁰ The ideological meaning was also visible in instructions given by Sejo (r. 1455–1568) to Kwak Yŏnsŏng (?–1464), the deputy provincial commander of Hamgil Province (as Hamgyŏng was then known), shortly after Sejo had seized the throne from his nephew Tanjong (r. 1452–1455):

Jurchens (*yain*) and Japanese (*waein*) are at once our fence, and our subjects. A monarch looks upon them with equanimity and makes no distinctions, making use of their strength or the information that they provide. One must not allow small errors to discourage them from coming to submit.

Since I have ascended to the throne, a great many people from among the southern Man barbarians and the northern Di barbarians (*namman puk-chök*) have wanted to become my children. That occurred through the connivance of Heaven, and not through my own wisdom or strength.⁶¹

As Pak Chöngmin argues, this statement by Sejo reveals the prestige that the arrival of Jurchen and Japanese envoys provided to the Chosön monarch. By stating that the arrival of Jurchens and Japanese was not the result of his own strength or wisdom but happened thanks to the connivance of heaven, Sejo was employing the rhetoric of the Mandate of Heaven, treating the submission of Jurchens and Japanese as signs of heaven's approval for his rule.⁶² To be sure, Sejo was an unusual case. In the process of seizing power from his nephew, he had killed a number of officials with particular expertise on the Jurchens of northern Hamgyöng and thus needed to take an especially active policy vis-à-vis the Jurchens.⁶³ He was also unusually willing to assert his own monarchical authority through ritual means.⁶⁴ Yet, in this, Sejo differed only in degree from other monarchs of the early Chosön, for whom the ritual submission of Jurchens, Japanese, and other foreigners served to advertise their own role as monarchs of a kingdom that acted as its own civilizing center, even if its civilizing activities were part of the broader Ming empire.

Submitting-Foreigner Status

Chosön's relations with Jurchen and Japanese potentates were shaped by the ritual structures whereby these potentates were submitting to the court as subjects, often accepting positions in its bureaucracy. These structures in turn created diverse categories of foreign subjects of the Chosön court. On its frontiers, the Chosön court cultivated the formation of fences or vassals among its Jurchen allies to the north and the island of Tsushima to the south, establishing subjects of the court who were nevertheless outside of its direct administrative jurisdiction, and who were given special privileges in exchange for acting as intermediaries in Chosön's foreign relations. For foreigners who settled farther inland, Chosön employed a separate tax category of submitting-foreigners, which confirmed the Chosön monarchy's role for transforming barbarians from abroad.

Among the bureaucratic tools available to the Chosön court for settling people from outside the peninsula and Chosön states was submitting-foreigner (*hyanghwain*) status. *Hyanghwa* (Ch. *xianghua*), literally turning or moving toward transformation or edification, envisioned peoples from the unstable

frontiers traveling to Chosŏn in order to receive the transformative influence of the Chosŏn monarch. The term, along with equivalent terms such as *kwihwain* (Ch. *guihuaren*—to turn to edification or turn to civilization), *t'uhwain* (Ch. *touhuaren*—to submit to edification), and *hyanggugin* (Ch. *xiangguoren*—to submit to the state) originated in Chinese antiquity.⁶⁵ As Donald S. Sutton points out in his discussion of the Qing administration of the Miao of Southwest China during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, such terms conceptualized the submission of outsiders to a Chinese polity in terms of voluntary surrender to the moral edification of the monarch, even as the actual practice of encouraging the submission was often notably violent.⁶⁶

In Korea, submitting-foreigner status had origins preceding the Chosŏn dynasty. It was adapted from Tang models already employed during the Three Kingdoms period and was used extensively during the Koryŏ period, especially in the forms of *t'uhwa* (submit to edification) and *naet'u* (come to submit), although *kwihwa* (turn to edification) was also used—and was employed with little regard to the origin of the migrant in question, whether Jurchen, Khitan, Parhaean, Turk, or indeed Chinese.⁶⁷ The term “hyanghwa” became dominant during the Chosŏn period, when the primary recipients of the status were Jurchens or Japanese. The Myŏngjong-era’s (1545–1567) *Annotations on the Great Code for State Administration* (*Kyŏngguk taejŏn*) glossed hyanghwa as “those among Jurchens and Japanese who have submitted to transformation (*t'uhwa*) with regard to the kingdom (*hyangguk*).”⁶⁸ Descriptions from the early Chosŏn suggest that submitting-foreigners were settled by granting them, according to their status, land, clothing, Korean surnames, and, because of the incongruity of imposing military service obligations on those who had come from abroad, exemption from military service.⁶⁹ Although Chosŏn imposed its authority in part through force, as in China, submission was usually phrased rhetorically as the voluntary act of outsiders in response to the moral suasion of the Chosŏn monarch. As No Sasin (1427–1498) said in 1497 during his discussion of Jurchens from the borders of P’yŏngan Province who wished to submit and become members of Chosŏn’s royal guard, “Since antiquity, emperors and kings did not refuse any outside peoples who, longing for morality, came to submit to transformation. However, I have not yet heard of a case of [outside peoples] coming to submit in response to one who [deliberately] sought to obtain [their submission].”⁷⁰

Duncan and Sŏ Kŭnsik, among others, have discussed submitting-foreigner relations in Chosŏn as an example of the early Chosŏn’s freedom from the nationalistic ideology of pure blood and “homogenous ethnicity” that dominated South Korean official discourse before the 1990s.⁷¹ Submitting-foreigner status

should not, however, be confused with naturalization of immigrants or the assimilationist practices of modern states. The status, rather, marked foreign subjects in Chosŏn as clearly distinct from the rest of the population, which itself was divided into distinct social groupings. Above all, it tended to become a hereditary status. Although the *Great Code for State Administration*, which was completed in 1485, simply states that “submitting foreigners are freed from tax for three years,”⁷² other sources suggest that several generations could enjoy aspects of that status. During the reign of Sejong, submitting-foreigner status, at least insofar as it applied to the examination of talents, was specifically limited to one generation after migration, with the grandchildren of migrants no longer allowed to claim the status.⁷³ This rule seems to have had only limited efficacy, as during the reign of Sŏngjong, the court debated imposing military service on the grandchildren of Jurchens and Japanese who had submitted (*t’uhwa*)—this was considered improper by a number of officials, who considered that doing so violated the principle of “treating well those who had come from afar” upon which Chosŏn’s guest rituals were based. Eventually the opinion of the Board of Rites was followed, which is to say that, while it was considered improper to impose military service on the grandchildren of those who had come to submit, it would be acceptable to impose it upon the great-grandchildren.⁷⁴

A number of scholars have argued that the ideological content of “submitting to edification” implied by the term “hyanghwa” could not, for this reason, be used to refer to Han Chinese.⁷⁵ This is understandable, considering the language of the sixteenth-century annotation to the *Great Code of State Administration* cited above, but, in fact, both the forms of submitting-foreigner status, and at times the terminology, were used to settle Chinese speakers as well. The “Sejong Gazetteer” (*Sejong chiriji*), for instance, lists a number of surnames as those of “Chinese who submitted to edification” (*Tang t’uhwa sŏng*),⁷⁶ while a request by Myŏng Kwisŏk, a descendant of Ming Sheng, for freedom from military service and corvée was rejected specifically because, according to the precedent for other submitting-foreigners (*hyanghwa ye*), too many generations had elapsed for the rule to apply.⁷⁷

More generally, just as it did with Jurchens, Japanese, and others, the Chosŏn court settled Chinese and other Sinophones through the granting of clan seats,⁷⁸ in the process giving them a status as Chosŏn people and subjects of the Chosŏn monarch. The Uighur descendant Yi Hyŏn, for instance, complained during the reign of T’aejong that, although his family had received royal grace for several generations since its arrival, it still did not have a clan seat located in Korea. He thus requested that he be granted a Korean clan seat in the same manner as

others who “submitted to the state” (*hyanggugin*), an equivalent term to submitting-foreigner. In response to this request, the court granted him the clan seat of Imju.⁷⁹ Similar grace was offered to others, including Xie Changshou, who received the clan seat of Kyōngju; Wu Zhen, who was given the clan seat of Haeju from T’aejong in 1415; and Li Mindao, whose son apparently received the clan seat of Kyōngju during the reign of T’aejong.⁸⁰ Most vividly, during the reign of Sejong, when a descendant of Mei Junrui requested a clan seat, he lamented that, despite the service of his ancestors to both Koryō and Chosōn, their clan seat was still located in the central plain. The Board of Personnel responded to this case by granting him the clan seat of Ch’ungju, using language, however, that would not be out of place in a discussion of Jurchens or Japanese: “The Emperors and Kings of Old, when people of different regions and unusual customs came in admiration [of royal rule], would at times grant surnames (*sōng*) and at times clan-names (*ssi*). Through this they revealed their intention of comforting and embracing [outsiders].”⁸¹

Most foreigners in Chosōn, however, were frontier people, who could securely be described as barbarians submitting to civilized rule, including both Jurchens and other continental peoples from Korea’s north and maritime peoples, especially Japanese, but also including Ryukyans and Muslims from the seas to Korea’s south. During the very early Chosōn, large numbers of Japanese raiders who surrendered to the court were accepted as subjects, with official titles granted to the leaders of these submitting Japanese and land to the rest. These included former raiders, and Japanese merchants, who during the reign of T’aejo had no restrictions on their entry into Chosōn. Ryukyans also took refuge in Chosōn, including the self-styled son of a deposed king of the southern kingdom of Sannan, who took residence in Kyōngsang Province, and who, during his relatively short life, was integrated into court ritual.⁸² While the surrender of Japanese raiders largely ceased after the reign of T’aejong, during the reign of Sejong, Japanese were also brought to the Chosōn court after the attack by the Chosōn army on the island of Tsushima. Japanese from Tsushima also fled to Chosōn during the reign of Sejong and were accepted as submitting-foreigners. Additionally, a group of people called Hoehoe (Ch. *Huihui*) or Muslims are recorded as entering from Kyushu and Western Honshu. Although Muslims had entered in significant numbers during the period of Yuan dominance,⁸³ this particular community seems to have been part of the Muslim diaspora trading community of coastal Chinese cities that had scattered abroad after the Ming court began instituting its policy of maritime prohibition.⁸⁴ People described as Hoehoe formed part of the Chosōn network of allies in the maritime world,

with Hoehoe merchants in Kyushu offering the Chosŏn court tribute,⁸⁵ and Hoehoe people from southwestern Honshu settling in Chosŏn, including one man described as a Hoehoe monk (*Hoehoe samun*), by which presumably *shaikh* is meant, who arrived in Chosŏn in 1412.⁸⁶ Beyond that, Japanese communities were established at certain ports on the southern coast, which were formed as the Chosŏn court abandoned its earlier policy of allowing Japanese traders to pursue unrestricted commerce on Chosŏn's southern coast. At one point, as many as three ports were designated for Japanese merchants, who rose to a total population of more than 3,000 people by 1494,⁸⁷ although eventually (after Japanese residents revolted in the Riot of the Three Ports in 1510) greater restrictions were placed on their residency and all were concentrated in the one port of Pusan.⁸⁸

Jurchens, however, entered Chosŏn with Yi Sŏnggye's armies, where they became submitting-foreigner royal guards and resided in the capital, later to be followed by many other Jurchen and Japanese submitting-foreigners who similarly sought out residence in Hansŏng with the status of royal guard. In the northeast, the Jurchen communities already present at the founding of the Chosŏn state continued to live there and were governed initially through submitting-foreigner status—in fact, during the reign of Sejong, the entire population of Hamgyŏng north of Tanch'ŏn was described as descendants of Jurchen submitting-foreigners, who had been thoroughly converted into ordinary subjects of the Chosŏn state, paying all the required taxes.⁸⁹ By the sixteenth century, on the outer fringes of Chosŏn's authority, Pŏnho villages had formed that were neither fully within Chosŏn authority nor completely outside of it. In 1591, the recorded population of Pŏnho villages had risen to 8,523 households. Following Han Sŏngju, when this figure is multiplied by an assumed five people per household, this suggests a Pŏnho population of 42,000.⁹⁰ This figure surely understates the actual population of Jurchens in Chosŏn, as in addition to Pŏnho villagers on Chosŏn's northeastern frontier, there would have been Jurchens not registered under Chosŏn authority, and, of course, submitting-foreigner Jurchens farther inland who did not reside in Pŏnho villages.

Within Chosŏn society, submitting-foreigners pursued diverse roles. Their entry itself was at times a reward for helping to repatriate Chosŏn people who had been abducted by raiders. In other cases, Japanese monks came to establish themselves in Chosŏn monasteries, while both Jurchens and Japanese in Hansŏng were employed as guards. Otherwise, in addition to farming and fishing, many were employed in a range of skilled crafts such as medicine and weapon-making. Ryukyuan boatbuilders were especially prized by the Chosŏn state, while among Hoehoe migrants, several are recorded as skilled in mining

for crystals and crafting gems.⁹¹ There were cases of submitting-foreigners rising to positions of significant prominence. One example is Yi Sönggye's Jurchen supporter Yi Chiran, whose son Yi Hwayöng (?–1424) also became a merit subject, and whose family, the Ch'önghae Yi, became a sajok descent-group with particular success in military matters, even intermarrying with the Chosön royal family.⁹² Another less prominent case is that of the Chönju Chu family. They were the descendants of Chu In and Chu Man, two Jurchen leaders who, along with their subordinates, submitted to Yi Sönggye,⁹³ with Chu Man being honored as a merit subject for his support. Based in Hamhŭng, the Chönju Chu became a locally important descent-group who were successful especially in military examinations.⁹⁴ Beyond that, the "Sejong Gazetteer" lists a number of surnames in Hamgyöng province as pertaining to "those who submitted to the state" (*hyang-guk söngssi*), including Chu Man's descendants in Hamhŭng, four surnames in Puryöng, and six in Samsu. Other than the Chönju Chu and the Tanch'ön Tong (whose founder, Tong Allo, married his daughter to Yi Hwayöng),⁹⁵ very little is now known about the other surnames, except that they were of sufficient local prominence to be listed in the gazetteer.⁹⁶

The border-crossing status of many submitting-foreigners made them well suited to the roles in diplomacy, intelligence, and trade in which the Chosön court employed them,⁹⁷ and there were submitting-Japanese holding official positions with the Chosön court living outside the boundaries of the Chosön state in Japan.⁹⁸ Some submitting-foreigners rose to positions of great significance within Chosön's diplomatic service, comparable to the status received by the Chinese. An example of this was P'i Sangüi. P'i Sago, a Japanese raider who had submitted to T'aejo in 1395 and who had served in the royal guard, received a junior seventh-rank title before his death in 1399. His son P'i Sangüi was born in 1395, possibly in Chosön, and, as the son of a submitting-foreigner, was given preferred access to a position in the bureaucracy, without taking examinations. In particular, as a Japanese-Korean interpreter, he participated in six diplomatic missions to Japan, as well as taking an active role in discussions with Japanese envoys who arrived in Hansöng.⁹⁹ Another notable example was Tong Ch'öngnye, a submitting-foreigner officer on patrol (*hyanghwa pujang*), who, as a descendant of Möngke Timur, had many relatives in Jianzhou but was trusted by the Chosön court. He thus was the obvious intermediary in negotiations between Chosön and Jianzhou Jurchens.¹⁰⁰ Tong led several missions deep into Jianzhou during the late fifteenth century, well after the Ming had begun to actively discourage Chosön interaction with Jianzhou.¹⁰¹ Such were his ties to diverse Jurchen potentates that, after he was implicated in a conspiracy against

Chungjong and executed in 1508, Chosŏn's relations with the Jurchens were significantly damaged, with some Jurchen leaders threatening revenge.¹⁰²

For the most part submitting-foreigners were brought in to become part of a Chosŏn monarchy that sought not to eliminate difference but to organize people according to hereditary categories. This may be seen in the attempts by the Chosŏn state to manage their marriages with Chosŏn people. As a general rule, submitting-foreigners were encouraged to marry Chosŏn women,¹⁰³ and indeed, in one of the few actual state-organized demands for assimilation, in 1427, Sejong argued that the unusual clothing, and especially headgear, of the Muslims in Chosŏn (which at one time must have made for a desirable display during court ceremony) prevented their marriage with other Chosŏn subjects. In order to further their assimilation, he banned all future use of Muslim clothing and brought an end to their prayers during court ceremonials.¹⁰⁴ References to *Hoe-hoe* in Chosŏn disappear at this point, although no doubt they lingered, outside of the interest of the court, for some time afterward. In any case, it is notable that the Sejong's overwhelming concern was to reduce their difference from the surrounding population by encouraging intermarriage.

Actual criticism of intermarriage between foreigners and Koreans seems to have been very rare. One unusual case is in 1433, when the minister of the Board of Personnel Hŏ Cho (1369–1439) memorialized against allowing two Ryukyuan boatbuilders Obo and Yago to take wives, as Chosŏn was a country of rites and refinement, and thus incompatible with such rustic Ryukyuan. However, he was strongly opposed in this matter by Maeng Sasŏng (1360–1438) and Hwang Hŭi (1363–1452) who argued that the two Ryukyuan had lived in Chosŏn for a long time, and unless they were about to return to Ryukyu it would be harmful to prevent their marriage. Ultimately, the monarch declared that they should not be prevented from marrying if they had already started making plans in that direction.¹⁰⁵ In general, Hŏ Cho's position seems to have been a minority position, for there are frequent references to the presumably Korean wives of Ryukyuan boatbuilders,¹⁰⁶ although in at least one case a Ryukyuan boatbuilder is described as returning to Ryukyu to visit his (presumably Ryukyuan) wife.¹⁰⁷

Prominent submitting-foreigners such as the Ch'ŏnghae Yi descendants of Yi Chiran did indeed intermarry with *sajok* families and even the royal family, but most submitting-foreigners married women of low status. During the reign of Sejong, in response to the request by Sigaro and Yattae, two prominent Jurchens, that they be allowed to marry, the court of Sejong specified that they, as with later submitting-foreigners, should be given daughters of women of servile

background who had married commoner men,¹⁰⁸ perhaps because commoner-base unions were illegal, and thus their offspring could be easily pressed into service by the state.¹⁰⁹ Commoner women who formed families with servile men could also be forced to marry foreigners as punishment, as was the case that came to light during the reign of Sejong, when a commoner woman named Ka-I was being sentenced for the murder of her Japanese husband, Sonda (Ja. Tadamasa). The background to this case was that Ka-i had been punished for illegally forming a relationship and having children with a servile man. In response, the magistrate in charge had her married to the “Japanese bastard” (*waeno*), an act that the Chosŏn court does not seem to have fully supported, as they considered it a somewhat mitigating factor in considering Ka-I’s sentence.¹¹⁰

There were, of course, exceptions to this rule. When Möngke Timur’s son Tong Ch’ang (Ch. Tong Cang, 1419–1467) requested to marry a woman of a good (commoner) family from Hoeryŏng, the court of Sejong referred to it as a minor departure of protocol. Although in Chinese history the sending of women from official families or from the imperial family to marry barbarians was done only when no other solution was possible, Tong Ch’ang was merely requesting a commoner woman. While that was not in accord with the usual practice of providing base-born women or women of mixed commoner-base origins to Jurchen royal guards (including some of Tong Ch’ang’s own underlings), granting Tong Ch’ang’s wish was seen as beneficial to the Chosŏn court, as it facilitated the expansion of Chosŏn’s influence over Tong Ch’ang’s network in Jianzhou. As a result, Tong Ch’ang’s request was approved.¹¹¹

Not all agreed that it was undesirable for sajok women to be married to submitting-foreigners. Yang Sŏngji (1415–1482), for instance, argued that the marriage of all Jurchens, regardless of social status, to women of such low status was a violation of the duties of the Chosŏn monarch to show care for people who came from far away and also in breach of standard Confucian rituals. Instead, he asserted that Jurchen who submitted to the Chosŏn court should have marriages arranged for them according to their political strength, with those leading large communities married into families of officials who owed their position to hereditary protection (*im*) privilege, those leading medium-size groups into families of officials in technical fields, those leading the smallest groups into commoner families, and Jurchens “in the vicinity of the fortifications” with local soldiers in the north—presumably leaving ordinary Jurchens to marry with the base born.¹¹² Yang advocated, in other words, the organization of Jurchens according to Chosŏn’s social hierarchy. It does not seem that his advice was put into effect to any great extent.¹¹³ Nevertheless, he provides an example of an assimilationist

position, even to the extent of associating powerful Jurchen leaders with members of Chosŏn's sajok aristocracy.

The marriage of submitting-foreigners to Chosŏn subjects was useful for the Chosŏn court. In the case of Tong Ch'ang's marriage, some were worried that he might leave Chosŏn with his bride. Countering this concern, however, was the strengthened connection to Chosŏn that would likely result if Tong Ch'ang's bride then returned to Hoeryŏng to visit family. As Paek Okkyŏng argues, the Chosŏn court used intermarriage ultimately as a tool, either to link Jurchen potentates more closely to Chosŏn, or to transform the objectionable or un-Confucian aspects of Jurchen culture and lifestyles.¹¹⁴ When Yi Sŏnggye sent Yi Chiran to administer the Jurchen lands of the northeast, he specifically encouraged him to "change [the Jurchens'] practice of letting out their hair, to cause them to wear hats, change their animalistic customs and accept propriety, to have them marry people of our country, to impose on them the same corvée and taxation as ordinary subjects, to make them ashamed to be led by their chief and to make them all want to become subjects of the kingdom."¹¹⁵

To be sure, such intermarriage could cause difficulties for the Chosŏn court, as it created people with ambiguous relationships to Chosŏn. During the reign of Chungjong, a man of Jurchen origin named Kim Inbok, who had served as a royal guard, requested a slave as payment. Although the Chosŏn officials discussing his case agreed that submitting to royal edification and serving as a royal guard were beautiful acts, they noted that Kim Inbok's father, Kim Ch'ŏnsu, had already submitted to the Chosŏn court and served in the royal guard and that, moreover, not only had Kim Ch'ŏnsu's mother been Korean but so was his wife, Kim Inbok's mother. Thus, though Kim Inbok had been born in Jurchen territory, it was hard to determine whether he should be seen as having submitted himself (*kisin hyanghwa*) or had merely submitted by descent (*chaji hyanghwa*).¹¹⁶ Although the court officials did conclude that, because he had been born in the Jurchen homeland (*ponto*), Kim Inbok should be treated as having submitted himself, King Chungjong personally objected to the granting of such status to one whose paternal grandmother, father, and mother had all been Chosŏn subjects.¹¹⁷ Perhaps reflecting heightened suspicion of Jurchens during the sixteenth century, both Chungjong and these high officials also expressed wariness regarding the reckless mixing in northern Hamgyŏng Province between Jurchens who had submitted and those who had not.¹¹⁸

A more troublesome case was that of a Pŏnho named Pak San who had employed his riches and his fluent Korean to contract numerous marriages with submitting-foreigner women in northern Hamgyŏng. The magistrate of

Chongsŏng complained that the women in question were from families who submitted long ago and so were simply ordinary subjects of the Chosŏn monarch. He thus objected to their removal across the river into Jurchen territory. Moreover, concerned that there would be more of Pak San's sort, the magistrate sought to establish bans on such indiscriminate contact between Pŏnhos and submitting-foreigners,¹¹⁹ a likely futile program that nevertheless was also characteristic of Chosŏn's administration of Japanese submitting-foreigners in Chosŏn, who were discouraged from forming links with Japanese in Japan.¹²⁰

Attempts to administer and form precise distinctions between foreign groups—between Japanese abroad and Japanese settled in Chosŏn, between Pŏnhos and submitting-foreigners—were likely rendered futile by the fluid cultural and social circumstances of late medieval Northeast Asia and indeed very diplomatic structures whereby Chosŏn organized its relationships with peoples on its frontiers. There were cases of Japanese who requested the right of domicile in Chosŏn on account of Korean parents who had settled in Japan, presumably, either because their parents were taken as slaves by Japanese raiders or indeed because they participated in raiding themselves.¹²¹ Because submitting-foreigner status was granted not only to those within Chosŏn territory but also to those residing outside of it, the distinction between submitting-foreigners and Pŏnhos that was at the core of the Pak San case must have frequently been meaningless.

The purpose of Chosŏn's diplomatic relations with Japanese and Jurchen potentates was generally to integrate those potentates as a different sort of subject of the Chosŏn court. In terms of cultural politics, the Chosŏn court actively sought to exploit spheres of common identification. Jurchen groups in northern Hamgyŏng had, of course, a long-lasting association with the Chosŏn court, such that the Chosŏn court could claim, in discussion with the Ming, that they were no different from any other subjects of the Chosŏn court—and while in part this was simply rhetorical, and at other times the Chosŏn could rather treat them as an outside force, to a substantial extent it was simply an expression of the reality of Chosŏn governance within the Tumen valley region. In the case of Japan and Ryukyu, while both states were outside of Chosŏn governance, Chosŏn could still rely on historical connections between Japan and Korea extending to the Three Kingdoms period, for instance, when a key ally of the Chosŏn monarchy, the Ōuchi family of western Honshu, requested that the Chosŏn court support their claim of descent from Paekche kings.¹²²

Ultimately, according to circumstances, Jurchens and Japanese could be ordinary subjects, or outsiders coming to receive protection, barbarians coming to receive edification, or untrustworthy barbarians implacably opposed to civilization.

The fourth aspect has dominated recent scholarship on Jurchens and Japanese, and it is true that there is no shortage of dehumanizing descriptions of them in the *Chosŏn Veritable Records*. Appearing with some frequency are phrases such as “They are not of our family, so their minds must also be different,” with descriptions of them as having “the faces of people but the minds of beasts.” While the former phrase originated during the Zhou period, when it was used to refer to rivalry among aristocratic families, it gained a new meaning within post-Han standard histories, in which it was employed to discourage close association with the Xiongnu and other nomads of the steppes. In this sense, it could be used to describe the dangers of association between barbarians and civilized peoples.¹²³ It gained prevalence during Chosŏn in this sense. For instance, during the reign of Sŏngjong, an official criticized what he saw to be an excessively lax approach to interaction with the Jianzhou Jurchens, whereby “those who came were not refused and those who left were not pursued.” Such laxity toward those who “are not of our family, so whose minds must also be different” could only pose military dangers in the future.¹²⁴ During the reign of Chungjong, the necessity of driving off Jurchens who were farming within Chosŏn territory was justified through a variation of that phrase: “Although not of our family, they are farming in our territory, so it is proper that we drive them off.”¹²⁵ Two years later similar wording was used to justify building up fortifications around border towns “to prevent the civilized and the barbarians from mixing.”¹²⁶

Jurchen and Japanese subjects of the Chosŏn monarch, whether Pŏnhos or submitting-foreigners, played vital defensive, economic, and ideological roles in the Chosŏn state. They could not simply be rejected as troublesome outsiders. As Shao-yun Yang has discussed for the Tang, stereotypes concerning barbarians could be made to serve diverse purposes, including encouraging greater forbearance toward them.¹²⁷ As was also true of the discussion of barbarians during the Tang, contemptuous phrases concerning Jurchens and Japanese during the early Chosŏn were used to argue not for limiting involvement with Jurchens but in fact for greater lenience. For instance, after the defeat of Li Manchu in 1467, his sons continued to search for titles, trade, and tribute missions to Hansŏng, and the Chosŏn court justified granting titles and ranks to them with the logic that, as entities “with the face of humans but the minds of beasts,” any failure to accommodate them would result in unrest on the frontier.¹²⁸ More generally, Chosŏn’s Japanese and Jurchen subjects were vital members of the Chosŏn polity and played irreplaceable roles in Chosŏn’s defense.¹²⁹ As a result, in the 1550s, during Pŏnho and Udiha revolts at Sŏsura in response to Chosŏn’s establishment of a new garrison fort north of the river, even officials, who argued that Pŏnhos

as barbarians were fundamentally inferior to Koreans, could plead in favor of forbearance (for what else could one expect of barbarians), and saw it as above all vital that the Chosŏn court show its concern to protect the all-important hedge provided by Chosŏn's Pŏnho vassals.¹³⁰ Certainly, it was accepted by most that, despite the revolt, the protection of Chosŏn's fence of Jurchen allies was of the greatest importance. The Chosŏn monarch should, like any Confucian king, deal with barbarians by not driving off those who submitted to him and not pursuing those who left him.

How did Chosŏn's Jurchen and Japanese subjects themselves understand their relationship to the Chosŏn court? It is rare, of course, to find any explicit documentation of their point of view. Some of the complexities of these circumstances can, however, be seen in the deathbed announcement of Yi Chiran, who is recorded as having written the following memorial to the king: "Your minister is originally a man of the homeland (*pont'o*) who is dying in a foreign land (*iguk*). Please burn my corpse and return me for burial to the homeland (*pont'o*). Your majesty, please have your officials bury me according to the practices of the home country. And please, your majesty, rule with prudence and cultivate your virtue and preserve Chosŏn for all time."¹³¹

Standing out in this passage is not only Yi Chiran's view of Chosŏn as a foreign country, but also his confident use of "homeland" in addressing the king, who was also from the same northeastern region. Even a prominent Jurchen like Yi Chiran stood out as an outsider in the very state that he had been instrumental in constructing, although this outsider status was one he shared, in a sense, with the Chosŏn monarchy itself. More generally, Jurchens of submitting-foreigner origin were brought directly into the Chosŏn state, as subjects accepting the moral edification of the Chosŏn king. Further afield, the Pŏnhos of Chosŏn's northern boundary stood at an ambiguous point between subjects of the Chosŏn state and aliens to it and could pass from one side of that line to the other. Chosŏn officialdom dealt with them in diverse ways according to the ideological preconceptions of the official in charge.

THE EARLY CHOSŎN, though not as diverse as Koryŏ before and during Yuan domination, was nevertheless far from a homogenous realm. Its officialdom, especially in the lower ranks, included Uighurs, Mongols, and Han Chinese, and its military was made up at least in part of Jurchens and Japanese. Although, in contrast to Koryŏ officials during the period of Mongol dominance, Chosŏn officials were no longer part of a broader Eurasian elite, they were by no means

cut off from the wider world. Yuan subjects and their descendants continued to reside in Chosŏn, Japanese were a significant presence on its southern coast, and Jurchens dominated much of the northeast. Within a status-conscious Chosŏn society, none of these outsiders were able to perturb the preeminence of Chosŏn's *sajok* aristocracy, although some foreign descent-groups did achieve local prominence or distinction in technical fields such as interpreting.

Chosŏn, as a smaller *Chunghwa* but not the actual center, was at once a subordinate participant in the Ming world order and a separate civilizing center in its own right. These foreign elements were administered through submitting-foreigner status, which, in form at least, would seem to imply that Chosŏn was treating itself as a civilization center similar to China. Chinese and their descendants, notably, were also administered according to this status. Although the Chosŏn court after the early fifteenth century was in no position to receive Chinese, for the simple reason that there was no longer an intermediate group of Chinese travelers available for Chosŏn to receive, this did not, by any means, imply that the Chosŏn court in any way considered it improper to bring in Chinese people as supplicants in need of edification. Although the distinction between the civilized and the barbarian was a vital part of the conceptual framework by which the Chosŏn court managed foreign peoples, it should not be seen as the master key by which all of the Chosŏn officialdom's responses to foreigners should be understood. Ultimately, the Chosŏn court's interaction with the outside world was determined by diverse factors, including its defensive, economic, and administrative needs, and it was in the interest of the *sajok* aristocracy to maintain its social and political dominance against all rivals, whether Korean, Jurchens, Japanese, Uighur, or indeed Chinese.

Civilizing Barbarians and Rebellious Allies

Japanese Defectors and Ming Deserters during the Imjin War

THE INSTITUTIONS FOR MANAGING foreign communities within or at the borders of Chosŏn were put to renewed strain when war broke out in 1592. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, prior to the onset of war, Chosŏn was faced with minor military threats only, the effects of which were limited to its outer borders. The largest military crises of the sixteenth century were of primarily local concern, including the revolt of Jurchen subjects under Nit'anggae in 1583, a second Tumen River Jurchen revolt in 1587, the Three Ports uprising of Japanese merchants of 1510, and the Ŭlmyo Japanese pirate raid of 1555. The Chosŏn court responded to these crises with a number of reforms, including the development of a covered craft, the *p'anoksŏn*, as the primary naval vessel of the Chosŏn fleet, the establishment of a Border Defense Command (*Pibyŏnsa*), and the reorganization of the military into a local defense system (*chesŭng pangnyak*). However, these conflicts were not so large as to require a fundamental rethinking of its military and diplomatic institutions and protocols, and Chosŏn's inefficient system for funding the military, which was imagined to be a self-supporting militia but in practice was financed through a corrupt and burdensome tax that "military support tax payers" did their best to avoid, limited the efficacy of any reforms.¹

Certainly, none of these disturbances prepared Chosŏn for the Imjin War of 1592–1598. In 1592, Toyotomi Hideyoshi (ca. 1536–1597), shortly after overcoming his last major rivals in Japan, directed the Japanese army to attack Chosŏn as a prelude to an invasion of the Ming empire. The Japanese army was perhaps the largest military force of any country in the world during the sixteenth century and was made up of soldiers hardened by the constant strife of Japan's Warring States period.² A substantial number of the invading Japanese soldiers were armed with arquebuses, a weapon with which the Chosŏn military was unfamiliar. Within several months the Japanese army overwhelmed much of the peninsula, conquering first the southern county of Tongnae (present-day

Pusan), destroying much of the Chosŏn army at Ch'ungju, and then forcing the Chosŏn monarch to flee the royal capital of Hansŏng, past the fortified city of P'yŏngyang, and onto the very border of Chosŏn at Ŭiju on the Yalu (Amnok) River. One branch of the Japanese army under Katō Kiyomasa even crossed the Tumen River in Hamgyŏng Province and launched raids against the Jurchen on the northern bank. Despite the superior Chosŏn navy and significant pockets of resistance throughout the peninsula, only the arrival of Ming armies pushed the Japanese back, with the Ming army under Li Rusong (1549–1598), a Liaodongese general of Korean-Chinese origin, defeating the Japanese in the fourth battle of P'yŏngyang in the first month of 1593. Even this battle was not decisive, and the Ming reversal at the Battle of Pyŏkchegwan by the end of the month allowed the Japanese to hold out at its fortifications on the southern coast for several years of stalemate. This stalemate came to an end with the “Chŏngyu Offensive,” the second Japanese offensive of 1597–1598, which was launched with the more limited goal of conquering Chosŏn territory and which devastated the southwestern Chŏlla Province that had been largely untouched during the first invasion. This offensive also ended in a resounding defeat for the Japanese at the hands of the joint Chosŏn-Ming military.³

The Imjin War had substantial demographic implications for Chosŏn. While the precise number of dead is unknowable, it is clear that the war resulted in widespread civilian death from disease and starvation, in addition to those directly killed in the fighting.⁴ Many Koreans left the peninsula, either as captives of the Japanese or willingly, following the Ming armies.⁵ The armies themselves were enormous. Of great significance were the large numbers of foreign soldiers who entered Chosŏn. In total, the estimated 150,000 Japanese soldiers who served in the first campaign in Chosŏn launched in 1592, with another 140,000 serving in the second Chŏngyu Offensive launched in 1597, exceeded the population of the Chosŏn capital of Hansŏng at its pre-nineteenth-century peak of 200,000. The Ming military was significantly smaller, but still significant, amounting to approximately 167,000 over the course of the war.⁶ Beyond that, an uncertain number of traders and camp followers also took part, with traders especially traveling widely throughout the peninsula.⁷ Assuming a prewar population of 9.8 million and postwar population of 7.8 million,⁸ the combined Japanese military presence over the seven years of war came to between 3 and 4 percent of Chosŏn's total population, while the Ming military, not considering the traders who traveled with them, amounted to approximately 1 to 2 percent.

A substantial number of outsiders established themselves in Chosŏn during the conflict. Of the many Japanese soldiers who took part in it, at least 10,000

remained behind in Chosŏn, frequently serving in the Chosŏn military, as also did a significant number of the Ming soldiers brought to Chosŏn. Neither of these two groups fit fully into Chosŏn's established framework of bringing outsiders for edification by a civilizing Chosŏn monarch, and both carried with them a far greater political risk than the foreigners who had entered Chosŏn before the war. At the same time, as with earlier submitting-foreigners, both groups brought useful skills. In the crisis of war, the Chosŏn court could not easily abandon these skills and so had to adapt its framework for administering and integrating outsiders.

Japanese Defectors and the Chosŏn State

The Japanese armies that advanced on to Chosŏn in 1592 were vastly different from the raiders that had launched attacks on Chosŏn during the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries, just as the Japan of Hideyoshi was vastly different from the poorly centralized Muromachi Bakufu. Following the Ōnin War (1467–1477) that devastated much of the Japanese capital of Kyōtō, Japan was thrown into nearly a century of warfare known as the Warring States period. Initially, this conflict destroyed the limited unity of the early Muromachi period, as *daimyō* aristocrats, Buddhist monks, peasant groups and local strongmen formed rival states that made only limited acknowledgment of the shogun. However, the nearly constant warfare of the period inevitably resulted in the consolidation of these petty states and improvements in military technology and techniques. Large armies of peasant infantry equipped by the late sixteenth century with European arquebuses partly replaced the cavalry and samurai of the early Muromachi. As well, powerful strongmen—first Oda Nobunaga (1534–1582) and then, after his assassination, Hideyoshi—brought unity and discipline to the previously disunited and disorganized armies of Japan.⁹

Chosŏn's established tools for relations with the Japanese were not suited to the increasingly unified and militarized Japanese state under the control of powerful warlords, and indeed the intermediate position of Tsushima, that had been to Chosŏn's advantage before the Imjin War, became a military tool for the invading Japanese. Following the Ōnin War of the mid-fifteenth century, Chosŏn had ceased sending envoys past Tsushima, which, depending as it did on the profits of trade with Chosŏn, provided only information that was likely to please the Chosŏn court. This, combined with the fact that many of the Japanese envoys by the sixteenth century had imposter identities, left the Chosŏn court with few sources of information on Japan. As a result, on the eve of the

war, the Chosŏn court was deeply ignorant of the changing military and political situation in Japan under Hideyoshi.¹⁰ Worse, the Japanese traders who had previously passed to and from Chosŏn and the bicultural and bilingual islanders of Tsushima, who had originally been used by the Chosŏn state to pacify pirates and raiders, became the interpreters and guides for Hideyoshi's conquest of Chosŏn.¹¹ Writing shortly after the war, Yi Sugwang (1563–1629) expressed pain that the inhabitants of Tsushima, whose ancestors he imagined to be Korean migrants, should have aided “the plunder” of Korea, especially as the “Japanese of Tsushima know everything that is to be known about matters related to our country, and understand our country's language, so they engage in all sorts of trickery and deception.”¹²

Such flexible loyalties could work to Chosŏn's benefit as well, as significant numbers of Japanese soldiers switched sides to Chosŏn.¹³ Beginning in 1593, Japanese soldiers began submitting to Chosŏn, although generally in relatively small numbers, with the Ming under Li Rusong (who brought Japanese defectors with him to Liaodong) generally being more welcoming to defectors. By 1594, Chosŏn began to take a more active role, deliberately encouraging Japanese soldiers to switch sides.¹⁴ Defect they did—although precise numbers are not available. In 1595, Sin Ch'ungil (1554–1622), in discussion with an envoy of Nurhaci named Ma Sin, claimed that five to six thousand Japanese soldiers had deserted to Chosŏn.¹⁵ In 1597, officials discussing Japanese defectors serving with Kim Ŭngsŏ (1564–1624) estimated that a thousand Japanese defectors were serving under Kim Ŭngsŏ himself, and that, within Chosŏn as a whole, there were likely some ten thousand Japanese defectors.¹⁶ Considering that Japanese continued to desert after the end of the war in the early 1600s,¹⁷ the number quite likely grew.

What caused the defection of such a significant number of Japanese? In Han Munjong's survey of the war, he points out the decline of morale within the invading Japanese army after the initial success in 1592, as the war became drawn out over seven years. Caught up in fortifications on the southern coast with insufficient food, and dealing with violent superior officers, many chose to improve their difficult circumstances by escaping to Chosŏn ranks. Thus, in 1597, several Japanese soldiers under the command of Katō Kiyomasa were lured by another Japanese defector agent, a man named Seiso. These defectors reported to Seiso that the labor duty imposed upon them had become excessively heavy, and their officers had become violent and abusive. No longer able to endure the hardship, they had fled the camp and defected to Chosŏn. This problem was more common in the ranks under Katō Kiyomasa, who had lost the support of his own troops, of whom “more than one hundred were deserting and escaping back to

Japan every day.”¹⁸ Contributing to defection, no doubt, was the fact that the united Japanese state was a very recent creation, still a work in progress under Hideyoshi. Thus, many low-ranked soldiers, especially, are likely to have had no strong loyalties to the central state, and thus no great interest in participating in the conflict.

Beginning in 1594 with the departure of much of the Ming army, the Chosŏn court became increasingly active in creating its own inducements to defect. Not surprisingly, there was some initial resistance within the Chosŏn court to accepting Japanese defectors, especially during 1593, when the Japanese soldiers were being brought back to Liaodong by Li Rusong. That year, Chief State Counselor Ch’oe Hŭngwŏn, for instance, complained that Japanese deserters left under Chosŏn supervision by Ming brigadier commander Shen Weijing could not with justice be executed but were not properly contained within the military camps, as by forming connections with Chinese (*Tang*) troops, they were able to travel about the villages freely, plundering the possessions of the common people. He described the Japanese established in Yongsan, to the immediate south of Nam-san and the Hansŏng city walls, “as like a tiger that has escaped its cage, or a scorpion in our sleeves.” Moreover, he worried that the number of Japanese brought up to Hansŏng by the Provincial military commander Li Rusong might possibly include those who had made false surrenders in order to spy out the strengths and weaknesses of Chosŏn’s defenses.¹⁹

Despite the widespread suspicion and hatred of the Japanese, the Chosŏn court soon changed course and not only began to accept Japanese defectors but actually to take an active role in encouraging defections. Noting the growing exhaustion and declining morale within the Japanese ranks, it encouraged defection in exchange for privileges. This policy resulted in a significant number of Japanese submitting to Chosŏn, which offered such inducements as food and housing and military rank.²⁰ King Sŏnjo in 1594 had already declared the need to avoid executing Japanese deserters, saying,

The killing of Japanese defectors is utterly without advantage. I have already expressed this view. Kim Ŭngsŏ, by not killing enemy soldiers, has already been able to gather eighty-nine deserters, while Kim Ch’ungmin has also brought six Japanese defectors. Those who leave their ranks and come to us must be given rations, so that they don’t starve. They should also be given titles to comfort them. In Japan, they kill others freely, and so even the people from that country are perturbed and frightened. There will certainly be many who hear of our customs and leave their camp for ours.

Rewards will also be considered for those who convince many Japanese to abandon their own side.²¹

Indeed, the Chosŏn court actively sent people to encourage Japanese to defect. Song Ch'angse, an agent sent in 1594 to sow dissension among the Japanese, claimed that "the lower ranks of the Japanese are mutinous, the officers are pained and resentful, and [the Japanese] are in the autumn of heavenly punishment. We truly have an opportunity to divide the army against itself at this moment, and we should not miss the chance by being too suspicious."²²

In addition to the motive of sowing dissension in the ranks of the Japanese army and weakening Japanese troop numbers, the fact was that many Japanese had key military and technical skills, notably the ability to employ arquebuses and Japanese swords. Reference to the employment of Japanese in a military capacity begin in 1594, early in the period of active inducement of Japanese to surrender. During that year, there are numerous references in the journal of Admiral Yi Sunsin, for instance, concerning the arrival of Japanese deserters, who were generally employed either in the unspecialized but vital position of oarsmen or in the more specialized role of cannoneer.²³ Similarly, in 1594, the Border Defense Command reported on its trials of thirty-eight Japanese deserters in shooting and swordsmanship. Disappointingly, only two showed the ability to shoot, while the rest were found worse than Chosŏn marksmen and were ordered sent to Hamgyŏng Province, except for three who claimed an ability to make gunpowder, and four who asserted skill in swordsmanship.²⁴ Such efforts continued to the end of the war, with particular inducements given to those Japanese who were able to teach superior swordsmanship, gunpowder production, and the use and manufacture of guns.²⁵ According to a report by Kwŏn Yul, this caused considerable worry to the Japanese military, which was concerned not only by the number of Japanese defectors but also by their efficacy and success in communicating military techniques to Chosŏn, including improved means for building mountain fortresses. Kwŏn Yul's report also indicated general knowledge among Japanese soldiers of the good treatment (including wives and official titles) that defectors received from Chosŏn; the main deterrent to defection was the risk of execution should their intention to desert become known to their superior officers.²⁶

Japanese, in fact, as the report above suggests, were used in very active roles, such as fighting against Japanese. They were also used as spies and agents. Of course, it was standard practice for Chosŏn officials to interrogate Japanese defectors for information about the Japanese military in Chosŏn.²⁷ But beyond

that, Japanese defectors were also dispatched to sow dissension among Japanese troops. As agents, they gathered information concerning the circumstances of the Japanese army and encouraged desertion, with some indeed being sent to Tsushima to gain intelligence concerning Japan's domestic circumstances. A representative example of espionage is a case in 1597, when two Japanese defector agents plotted to enter the camp of Katō Kiyomasa to burn supplies and weapons and attract defectors as well as to see the state of Katō's army.²⁸ As for military activities, Japanese were used widely by the Chosŏn court in a number of battles during the second Japanese offensive of 1597, with many rewarded for their exemplary success, often through military titles and the granting of Chosŏn names.²⁹ Even those Japanese whose skills were not so exemplary as to be kept in the southern provinces, and who were sent consequently to the north-eastern border in Hamgyŏng Province, showed their metal, and indeed the Japanese arquebusiers were praised for their contribution to the Chosŏn pacification of Yŏksu, a fortified town controlled by rebellious Jurchen slightly to the north of the Tumen River.³⁰ Japanese defectors, despite entering Chosŏn as enemies, had become vital elements in Chosŏn's defense.

Ming Deserters

Posing as many problems as the Japanese deserters were the large numbers of Ming soldiers who entered Chosŏn during the war, many of whom, much like the Japanese defectors, stayed after the withdrawal of the Ming army in 1600. Chosŏn, of course, would almost certainly have fallen without Ming military support, although, since Hideyoshi's stated objective for the war was to attack the Ming, the Ming military response was motivated in part by self-defense. As was suggested in one memorable court discussion, the goal of the Ming intervention was to keep the war out of Ming territory and "in the outer yards of China."³¹ Yet the presence of a large force of soldiers and officers connected to Chosŏn's Ming overlord, upon whom, in war time, Chosŏn depended absolutely, left an inevitable mark. Politically, Ming generals could and did make destructive demands on the Chosŏn court. As has been discussed by both Han Myŏnggi and Nam-lin Hur, the economic and ecological burden of maintaining a large Ming force on Chosŏn soil was indeed ruinous, requiring a Chosŏn court already strapped economically as a result of the destruction brought about by the war to redirect scarce supplies toward its Ming allies, further impoverishing its own population and considerably weakening its own military capabilities.³² Indeed, one reason for the peace negotiations with Japan following 1593 was the

inability of the Chosŏn agricultural economy to support a substantial force of Ming soldiers.³³ As Han Myŏnggi has discussed, the monarch Sŏnjo in general seemed to prefer emphasizing the military role of the Ming (whose aid, he, as monarch subordinate to the emperor, had the exclusive right to demand), rather than pass credit onto Chosŏn's own righteous militias who had fought the Japanese in the south after his flight to Ŭiju and compared to whom the Chosŏn monarch could easily seem to have lost his legitimate right to rule.³⁴ Nevertheless, politically, the presence of Ming generals and officials on Chosŏn soil could not but weaken the political position of the Chosŏn monarch, and the peace negotiations between the Ming and Japan between 1593 and 1596 were pursued with little regard to Chosŏn's own interests.³⁵

In addition to such political and economic challenges, one must also consider the problem of the Ming soldiers themselves. In the official sources we are shown the actions of a state attempting to maintain its control over a refractory and often semicriminal group of soldiers and deserters at the same time as it sought to make use of those members of the Ming migrant community who had skills useful to the state; popular romances and hagiographic biographies contain a similar diversity of images, from descriptions of violent, destructive Li Rusong in *The Record of the Imjin War (Imjin-rok)*,³⁶ to Ming soldiers interacting on a friendly and informal level with local people, and even to deeply moral Ming loyalists. Ideologically, Ming military enthusiasm for such religious practices as the cult of Guan Yu placed them not so much as representatives of Chunghwa but as people involved in troublesome and heretical religious activities.³⁷ Ultimately, rather than welcoming Ming migrants with open arms, the overburdened Chosŏn court attempted to restrict the activities of the communities of Ming deserters, preventing them from establishing themselves on Chosŏn soil.

Additionally, the Chosŏn state had to deal with numerous runaway soldiers. There is considerable reference in *The Chosŏn Veritable Records* to violence committed by Ming deserters, or *todangbyŏng* (literally, "runaway Tang troops").³⁸ In 1601, in the immediate post-Imjin period, Third Royal Secretary Yun Ansŏng (1542–1615) emphasized the particular destruction caused by runaway Ming soldiers in the P'yŏngan and Hwanghae provinces, which he saw as having nipped in the bud the beginnings of the restoration of agriculture in these regions. Indeed, he claimed that the destruction caused in the region was ten times worse than when the Ming army was stationed there.³⁹ While unrest, violence, and brigandage were hardly unknown among Korean soldiers during this period,⁴⁰ Ming deserters were an additional, and significant, source of worry.

Although the policy of the Ming court itself was to force the return of Ming deserters, there seems to have been a general resistance to this from the soldiers themselves, many of whom, despite the destructiveness as discussed by Yun An-sŏng, had put down roots in Chosŏn. Yi Kŭngik described the Ming army as comprising “more than 221,500 soldiers . . . mobilized from Zhejiang, Shanxi, Hubei, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan and Burma.”⁴¹ This diverse list no doubt fails to cover the full diversity of the Ming army, which also included Mongols and Jurchens and many other groups, but it does remind us that, for the diversity of peoples from Yunnan or for Mongols from the border of Shanxi, or indeed for Chinese-speakers from Sichuan, Chosŏn may have been no more foreign than Shandong or Beijing; this, as well as conflicts with superiors, often encouraged Ming deserters to stay in Chosŏn rather than make the trip back to Ming. Thus, in 1601, court discussion described a group of runaway soldiers and Ming merchants living in Chosŏn. Their reasons for staying in Chosŏn are variously given as injury, the loss of their merchandise, or conflict with their commanding officer. After desertion, they established themselves either as farmers or as salt merchants. They were strongly opposed to repatriation, to the extent that some threatened to submit to the enemy (the Japanese) rather than return to China.⁴²

Nor was the Chosŏn court's opposition to the continued presence of Ming migrants in any way absolute—in fact, it also made considerable use of Ming deserters. Medicine, geomancy, and other technical fields became established Chinese specialties. Of numerous examples discussed by Han Myŏnggi,⁴³ the 1596 case of the two Yunnanese Li Yi (K. Yi Ŭl) and Hua Yingchun (K. Hwa Ŭngch'un) stands out. The Chosŏn court chose to employ them for their ability to make gunpowder and poison powder. They were described as choosing to remain in Chosŏn because of illness—closer investigation suggested, however, that their real reasons were that, as Yunnanese, they did not want to make the return journey, and also because, as associates of an executed Ming officer, they were themselves at risk of arrest.⁴⁴ Another figure also discussed by Han, Sun Long (K. Son Yong), who deserted from the Ming military on account of conflict with his superiors, was employed in Chŏlla as an instructor in the production of gunpowder, poison powder and landmines, activities which “the people of our country (Chosŏn) cannot do.”⁴⁵ Even beyond their military abilities, the very presence of Ming deserters could have value as a deterrent—Chosŏn officials deliberately formed a military unit of Ming deserters specifically to be shown to the Japanese, because they imagined that the Japanese would be less likely to repeat an invasion if they imagined that Ming soldiers were still present.⁴⁶ Another common area of specialty associated with Ming deserters was

geomancy. Geomancers such as Shi Wenyong were able to find employment in the Chosŏn court itself,⁴⁷ while on a private level Du Shizhong, another deserter, seems to have gained a reputation as a geomancer among contemporary sajok aristocrats.⁴⁸

It is impossible to establish with any certainty the number of Ming deserters who remained in Chosŏn—with or without official connivance—after the formal withdrawal of troops. It can be assumed, however, that in the general disorder of the post-Imjin period, when death and flight among the commoner population rendered the state incapable of raising taxes on one-third of the land, and when the household registration system was largely ineffectual, far more Ming soldiers would have established themselves in Chosŏn than are recorded within court documents such as *The Chosŏn Veritable Records* or in later biographies. While some Ming deserters, as described above, declared the intention of leaving for Japan before they would return to Ming China, or participated in uprisings, many more would simply have kept out of the sight of the state in the first place. The Chosŏn state responded to them differently, according to its needs. Certain Ming deserters were seen as useful, and their presence in Chosŏn was actively supported by authorities, even as attempts were made to gain control over the large, sometimes criminalized bands of Ming deserters.

Integration into Chosŏn society did not necessarily make the Ming soldiers any more welcome, as their ignoring of obligations to the Ming emperor could be seen as contributing to a general failure to fulfill status obligations in Chosŏn as well. At the same time, the context of the Ming camp life, in which large numbers of Chosŏn subjects participated, weakened Chosŏn-Ming boundaries, and these weakened boundaries ultimately resulted in the departure of Chosŏn subjects with the Ming armies, further reducing Chosŏn's already limited ability to demand tax and corvée obligations of its subjects. According to the Military Training Agency (*Hullyŏn togam*) in 1594, many Chosŏn subjects "starving and with no means of maintaining their livelihood . . . changed their clothes" as preparation for crossing the Yalu River into Ming territory. The office called for the employment of these internal refugees in special military roles to prevent their departure.⁴⁹ In general, the loss of skilled labor, and especially of potential soldiers, was a matter of considerable concern to the Chosŏn court.⁵⁰ It was fighting a losing battle, however, and a great many soldiers in the camp of the departing Ming officer Liu Ting were described as Korean-speakers from Kyŏngsang.⁵¹ Even as Ming soldiers left Chosŏn, Yun Ansŏng, discussing the problems caused by deserters in Hwanghae and P'yŏngan, conceded that "one cannot know the exact number of Ming deserters scattered about the region, or

who is or is not a runaway soldier,” so deeply had they integrated themselves into village life in Chosŏn.⁵²

In fact, it was quite easy for Ming and Chosŏn subjects to cross over from one affiliation to another. Frequently, this was achieved through cross-cultural marriages. Just as with other sorts of uncontrolled fraternization, sexual and marital unions between Ming and Chosŏn subjects were a matter of considerable concern to the court. At the same time, it is clear that such unions were extremely common indeed. A variety of sources suggest that Ming soldiers during the Imjin War quite frequently gained Chosŏn lovers—for instance, Liu Ting in 1594 is said to have left particular orders to the Chosŏn court to protect his lover while he was in China—a request that, on account of his high status, was accepted only slightly grudgingly.⁵³ Indeed, in the early seventeenth century, Yi Sugwang described a prophecy in which the Imjin War would end when “children know their mothers but do not know their own fathers.” This, he argued, was proven correct when, as a result of the war “sons grew old but did not know their father’s face, while women who were defiled by Ming soldiers would give birth to children and not know the father’s surname.”⁵⁴

The above quotation reveals that the Ming soldier–Chosŏn woman union had become a widely recognized type by the time that Yi Sugwang was writing in the early seventeenth century, with adulterous Ming–Chosŏn unions becoming a stereotype. More stable marriages were also contracted between Ming Chinese and Chosŏn Koreans. According to *Miscellaneous Records from a Time of War* (*Nanjung chamnok*), an account written by Cho Kyŏngnam (1570–1641), who participated in the war as a member of a righteous militia, many of the Ming soldiers under the Liu Ting’s command in Namwŏn had married Chosŏn women from Chŏlla and Kyŏngsang provinces. One officer took a woman of private slave origin from Sŏnsan in Kyŏngsang Province as his concubine. Seemingly during the period of stalemate between 1593 and 1597 he successfully brazened his way past the border guards when he returned with her to Sichuan. There she gave birth to a son, and as he had no heir, he had their son raised by his wife. In 1598, when he returned for the final offensive against the Japanese, he brought her with him and purchased her from her original owner for several thousand taels of silver. However, such regular unions were not much more popular with the authorities than adulterous unions. Indeed, according to Cho Kyŏngnam, Chosŏn women departing with their Ming soldier husbands were all stopped by the Ming authorities at Shanhaiguan and thus forced to remain in the Liaodong and Liaoxi region. According to Cho, the total population of such women in Liaodong and Liaoxi reached several tens of thousands, although he also asserted

that they were all returned to Chosŏn in 1609.⁵⁵ Indeed, although the Chosŏn court generally treated the departure of women as less serious than that of men, it was concerned by the large number of women leaving with Ming soldiers, and, in 1593, attempts were made to prevent Chosŏn women secretly leaving in the company of Ming soldiers.⁵⁶ Of course, it is doubtful that either the Chosŏn or Ming states were able to effectively prevent the departure of many women, or to repatriate them all after they had departed to Liaodong.

Despite preventing the departure of such women, the court did not exert itself to treat well those who remained behind. Certainly, during the last years of Sŏnjo (r. 1567–1608) and the early years of Kwanghae-gun (r. 1608–1623), officials demanded action against women in Hansŏng who had been seduced by Chinese soldiers and who were suspected of continuing to engage in sexual relationships with the participants of various visiting Ming legations. In shocked tones they suggested that the soldiers had been so shameless as to seduce even women of good families; even after the departure of Ming soldiers, many such women became prostitutes for the Ming legations that visited the capital. Under both kings, such women were ordered to be sent into exile, either ten *li* outside of Hansŏng or even as far as Pusan. Exceptions were to be made for cases in which the women had not entered into the relationships of their own free will—although how such a determination would have been made is unclear.⁵⁷

There were, in fact, some cases of serious crimes committed by Ming deserters who formed ties with Chosŏn subjects. For instance, in 1599, one Chosŏn official, Hong Yŏsun, complained about Chosŏn village functionaries (*hyangni*) using Ming soldiers to attack more prominent officials.⁵⁸ During the same year, a slave from Suwŏn named Maktong who lived in the Ming camp claimed to be Chinese in order to attack sajok families within the area, “terrifying sajok wives, plundering their possessions, and when he broke in at night, raping female slaves, and when someone did not follow his orders, leading Tartar troops and raising revolt.” He was able to claim Ming military support, not only because he was part of the Ming army but also because “in clothes and language he imitated the appearance of a Chinese person (*Tangin*).”⁵⁹ By donning Ming uniforms and mastering Chinese, Chosŏn subjects could benefit from the status of a Ming subject to leave Chosŏn for Ming China or commit crimes against their superiors in Chosŏn.

Loyal Outsiders and Disloyal Allies

Why did the Chosŏn state worry about the Ming Chinese intermarrying with, or masquerading as, Chosŏn subjects? The Chosŏn state was not a modern nation-state, seeking to impose a universal culture on its subjects, but a court and elite that maintained authority through the scrupulous protection of status distinctions. Both Ming soldiers and Japanese soldiers were alike in providing useful military skills to the court, and all could potentially be the source of strife, but Japanese submission could be justified ideologically as serving the maintenance of the Chunghwa moral order in a way that Ming soldiers, whose transfer to Chosŏn involved an act of desertion from the Ming emperor, could not.

The Neo-Confucian philosopher Kang Hang, who is well known for the role he played as prisoner of war in introducing Yi Hwang's (1501–1570) brand of Neo-Confucianism to Japan, is informative in this context.⁶⁰ He argued against killing Japanese defectors, in part because it was a “violation against humanity to kill those who have already surrendered.” Moreover, as a Confucian thinker himself, he also argued that the attractions of Chosŏn's benevolent civilization would be a powerful lure to ordinary Japanese who had been forced out of their families in early youth and afterward deprived of all rights to a family. This made them easy to detach from the Japanese state, as “they do not entertain a longing for their hometown, parents, wives or children.” Kang argued that Japanese soldiers with whom he conversed could see a contrast between the harsh routine of the Japanese army and the gentle life in the fertile land of Chosŏn. He represented his conversations with Japanese soldiers as follows:

When these soldiers gather, they often say to one another, “Chosŏn is utopia! Japan is a truly vile country.” One or another [of us] may rejoin with, “Our government treats Japanese who surrender with kindness and generosity. It provides them with food and clothing worthy of a general. I even heard of a high official posted to the third rank.” They could not help being amazed by the story and would sincerely wish to surrender.⁶¹

To be sure, Kang Hang's position cannot be extended to include Chosŏn society as a whole, as he was in any case a devoted Mencian, believing that human nature was naturally good and seeking solutions to the problems of the world by activating this nature. However, similar rhetoric of transformation does appear with great regularity in *The Chosŏn Veritable Records*. Notably, during the discussion between Sin Ch'ungil and Ma Sin of the Jianzhou Jurchen, Sin Ch'ungil specifically described the Japanese defectors in such a manner. As he said to Ma

Sin, when asked by Ma how many Japanese had submitted, he answered not only that Chosŏn had provided them with “clothing and headgear,” both established accouterments of Chunghwa civilization, but also that “to those Japanese defectors who long for morality and come to submit, our country offers them food and drink and places them at their ease. They are moved by our kindness and hold feelings of gratitude, and we settle them at our borders as a protection for the state.”⁶²

Sin Ch'ungil's rhetoric was no doubt aimed at encouraging the Jianzhou Jurchens not only to show a healthy respect for the presence of Japanese defector gunmen at the northern border but also to emulate the Japanese in their proper appreciation for Chosŏn's civilizing power. Yet, such language also appears in contexts where rhetorical threats are not required. In one especially notable example described by Kim Ŭngsŏ, a Japanese soldier named Sabaekku defected to Kim Ŭngsŏ, only to be sent on to serve under the military official Paek Sarim because Kim Ŭngsŏ lacked the necessary resources to support him. During the Japanese offensive of 1597, Paek Sarim was in charge of Hwangŏk Mountain fortress, which fell to the Japanese after the soldiers from Kimhae fled the fortress, having conspired with the Japanese attackers. They left their leader Paek behind. As Paek had become excessively fat, he could not escape easily and was in great danger. Sabaekku, however, did not betray him and not only managed to shoot four Japanese attackers but even concealed Paek behind stones and vegetation, and by tricking the Japanese guard at the gate, was able to move Paek out of the fortress to safety. Sabaekku even managed to enter the fallen fortress again to obtain provisions by pretending to be a soldier from the Japanese army. As a reward, Sabaekku was given a Korean surname, with Kim Ŭngsŏ noting especially: “These days educated people of our country will not save the head of their household or their wives and children. Yet, in this case, [even] a barbarian reveals an honest mind, which should cause shame to others. Sabaekku should be succored with an especially substantial reward. Japanese defectors, already knowing the route of self-preservation, wish to form a far-sighted plan and adopt Chosŏn names. The court should settle the matter of granting surnames to Japanese defectors quickly.”⁶³

Sabaekku, as a Japanese defector, was assumed to be less capable of acting morally than an educated Chosŏn official. To the extent that he acted with much greater morality and bravery, he attracted the particular praise of the Chosŏn court, which, in response to Kim Ŭngsŏ's request, offered him a Chosŏn name. Sabaekku's reward for loyalty was to receive many of the usual benefits offered to submitting-foreigners.

In contrast to such cases one might note the controversy concerning the famous Ming migrant named Shi Wenyong, who was drawn into the factional politics of the period after the Imjin War. The son of another Ming officer, Shi was from Pujiang in Zhejiang, but for reasons that are now somewhat obscure, remained in Chosŏn after the general departure of Ming troops. Within Chosŏn he became associated with an influential and controversial volunteer militia leader of the Pugin faction named Chŏng Inhong (1535–1623), who became known for sheltering several Ming soldiers within his base area of Sŏngju. Because of his influence, and no doubt also because of the significant suspicion under which leaders of Imjin-era militias fell during the reign of Sŏnjo, his sheltering of Ming migrants became fuel for his political enemies. These criticisms were included in somewhat shortened form in *The Chosŏn Veritable Records* and in more complete detail by An Pangjun (1573–1654) in *The Collected Records of Lies and Truth* (*Honjŏng p'yŏllok*), an anthology of documents related to factional disputes between 1575–1650.

While the factual basis of the claims of the rival factions is now hard to evaluate, as each was clearly seeking to find pretexts to either discredit or defend Chŏng Inhong, the nature of the arguments used for understanding the role played by Ming deserters in Chosŏn are fascinating for what they reveal about attitudes toward Ming deserters. *The Revised Veritable Records of King Sŏnjo* (*Sŏnjo sujŏng sillok*), which was compiled during the reigns of Injo (r. 1623–1649) and Hyojong (r. 1649–1659) specifically to counter the bias in favor of the Pugin faction within the original *Veritable Records of Sŏnjo* (*Sŏnjo sillok*), which had been published during the reign of Kwanghae-gun (r. 1608–1623), includes an attack on Chŏng Inhong by Yi Kwi (1557–1633), a member of the Sŏin faction, based primarily on information obtained from his relative Yi Si'ik (1567–1642).⁶⁴ Yi Kwi's accusations against Chŏng were focused on Chŏng's continued exploitation of the privileges he enjoyed as a leader of a righteous militia within the area of Sŏngju, despite royal commands to disperse and despite the fact that the Imjin War had been over for three years. As a part of a general charge that Chŏng had abused his power in the region of Sŏngju, Yi Si'ik accused him of compelling the daughter of a sajok man to marry a base person (slave) with a very close relationship to Chŏng's family, and forcibly marrying a sajok woman (*punyŏ*), who had previously been taken captive by the Japanese, to a "runaway Chinese soldier who knew geomancy."⁶⁵

This general accusation of lawlessness by Yi Si'ik could not go unanswered, and although *The Veritable Records of Sŏnjo* may have left out Yi Kwi's original memorial, it did include O Yŏn's memorial in response in defense of Chŏng

Inhong. Notably, O's memorial provided considerable detail absent from Yi Kwi's. O, for instance, developed a counterargument to Yi Kwi's accusation that Chŏng Inhong had forced a sajok woman to marry a man whom Yi Kwi had called a "runaway Chinese soldier who knew geomancy." O partly confirmed the story and indeed identified the soldier as Shi Wenyong, but insisted that Chŏng Inhong's actions were entirely laudable. Chŏng's ancestor was Zheng Chenbao, a man of Pujiang in Zhejiang who left for Koryŏ because he refused to serve the Yuan after the Yuan conquest and so his descendants had remained in Korea. This explained Chŏng Inhong's exemplary treatment of Ming generals serving in Chosŏn, including Chen Gang and Mao Guoqi, whom he treated as elders from the same village (*hyangjang*). It also encompassed his good treatment of Shi Wenyong, an officer from Pujiang, who had "fallen behind and had been unable to return to the Ming. Shi would occasionally visit Chŏng Inhong, and Chŏng had been unable to drive him out simply because of the ancient duties of the shared hometown (*hyangjong*)." Similarly, there was nothing untoward in the marriage between Shi Wenyong and a local woman, as the mother of the girl was still alive, and the father's kin were also alive. All suggestions of forced marriage were simply inventions of Yi Si'ik.⁶⁶ In other words, according to O, Chŏng's actions in all respects had been fully in line with Chosŏn's alliance with the Ming, further strengthened by a familial connection to the fallen but much-admired Song dynasty. Chŏng conceded that Shi Wenyong had no terribly clear reason for remaining in Chosŏn (although in contrast to Yi Kwi, he does not specifically refer to him as a deserter or runaway), but ultimately described Chŏng Inhong's actions as inspired by his desire to help a member of his own home community.

O Yŏn's defense itself did not go unanswered and indeed resulted in a much more developed attack than that launched by Yi Kwi. Yang Hongju (1550–1610) claimed to have built on Yi Kwi's and Yi Si'ik's criticisms out of frustration that Yi Kwi's memorial had been so fruitless. His countermemorial, which is found in simplified form in *The Veritable Records of Sŏnjo*, and in much more elaborate and detailed form in *The Records of Lies and Truth*, attacked Chŏng Inhong's activities as specifically undermining the Chosŏn status system. He maintained that Chŏng Inhong's home had become a lair for former righteous militia members and runaway slaves (both private and public). Yang also developed the accusation as related to Shi Wenyong, clarifying that it was not Shi Wenyong's wife, but his mother-in-law—the wife of Chang Ham—who had been captured by the Japanese and (it is implied) raped. Shi Wenyong's wife, by contrast, was still a young girl at the time of capture and so was able to escape rape. As Yang Hongju

argued, forcing Chang Ham's wife to marry a Ming soldier would have been bad enough, even though she had been "dirtied" by the Japanese, but to force the innocent daughter into such a situation was simply unacceptable—a sign of complete contempt for the law of the land and for sajok status.⁶⁷ As is recorded in the more extensive version found in *The Records of Lies and Truth*, this forcible marriage would have been unacceptable for a commoner, many of whom, during the chaos of the Imjin War, had experienced captivity, and even more so for the daughter of a sajok. "In the customs of our country to marry a person of an alien land, not to mention ladies of sajok background, is considered shameful even by male and female peddlers."

Worse, in contrast to O Yŏon's claim that Chŏng Inhong's support for Ming soldiers was inspired entirely by a feeling of connection to people from Zhejiang, Yang Hongju argued that Chŏng Inhong's actions amounted to disloyalty to the Ming court itself, for when the Ming sent an envoy to capture and return Ming soldiers hiding in Chosŏn, Chŏng Inhong ignored the order and concealed five Chinese deserters, including Shi Wenyong, Zhu Jiansong, and Guan Yinghua, at his home. His actions had wider implications as they encouraged hundreds of Ming deserters to conceal themselves throughout the two southern provinces of Kyŏngsang and Chŏlla. Yang Hongju asked how public order and social hierarchies could survive in Chosŏn, "with Chŏng Inhong acting as lord of runaways, including Chosŏn commoners of our country fleeing from corvée labor, public and private slaves rebelling against their masters, and Ming deserters ignoring imperial commands?"⁶⁸

Was the marriage between Shi Wenyong's and Chang Ham's daughter forced, as the Sŏin faction claimed, or was it with the full consent of her parents, as O Yŏon maintained? What was the nature of Chŏng Inhong's relationship with Ming migrant groups—was he merely helping them as people from his ancestral hometown, or was there some broader plot on his part to accumulate a private army of runaways and deserters? Although it is perhaps impossible now to determine the truth of many of these accusations and counteraccusations, Yang's attacks on Chŏng are meaningful for what they tell us about the continued ambivalence concerning the presence of Ming deserters in Chosŏn. The core of the Sŏin position, as asserted by Yang Hongju and to a lesser extent already by Yi Kwi, was that the presence of Ming deserters in Chosŏn under Chŏng Inhong's leadership was corrosive to the entire social structure of society. Yang Hongju's assertion that it was impossibly shameful for ordinary Koreans to marry foreigners can certainly be rejected. There is no shortage of examples of such inter-marriage, these being in fact a key reward granted to submitting-foreigners of

Jurchen and Japanese origin, although as I discussed in chapter 1, these unions tended to be with women of low status. Thus, they might well have been shameful for sajok women by the late sixteenth century. In part, Yang Hongju was arguing (falsely) that marriage to a foreigner would always be considered shameful in order to establish, despite O Yŏn's denials, that the marriage between Shi Wenying's and Chang Ham's daughters must have been coerced. It is nevertheless meaningful that it was possible, even as a rhetorical flourish, to claim that Ming soldiers were people of an alien state with whom no union could be contemplated, much as marriages with Jurchens and Japanese could be considered out of bounds for members of official and royal families. Ultimately, the problem of intermarriage with Ming deserters for Yang Hongju was caught up with the general problem of disorder in post-Imjin Chosŏn, including concerns about the possible disloyalty of captured Chosŏn commoners.

Alternately, O Yŏn's defense of Chŏng Inhong sought to emphasize that Chŏng's connections with Ming deserters had thoroughly honorable origins—and indeed envisioned the connection between Chŏng Inhong and Ming deserters in a Zhejiang that crossed state boundaries. In fact, Chinese migrants in Chosŏn were administered according to the same submitting-foreigner category as Jurchens and Japanese, and in this sense all three could equally be called “people of alien lands,” but at the same time Chosŏn sajok possessed a cultural identification with Chunghwa, which was not restricted to, but also did not ignore, China as a political entity. Nobody envisioned a Chosŏn state existing outside of the Ming, but Chosŏn's sajok aristocrats also considered themselves to set a standard of civilization in their own right. Moreover, Chosŏn had an ambivalent attitude to the many Ming soldiers in Chosŏn. On the one hand, the Ming intervention was vital to Chosŏn's survival, and an exclusive emphasis on it served the interests of the Chosŏn monarchy (which avoided granting honors to Korean military leaders). On the other hand, the task of feeding and supporting the Ming army had been a logistic nightmare and a source of considerable conflict between Korean civilians and Ming military. O Yŏn's emphasis on the Zhejiang connection reminded the Chosŏn court of the vital role of the Ming military, despite these stresses.

At least during the reign of Kwanghae-gun, O Yŏn's argument must have been successful, as Shi Wenying was employed in what later became one of the scandals of the Kwanghae-gun era—the expensive reconstruction of Kyŏngbok-kung, an important royal palace that had been destroyed during the Imjin War. Shi Wenying, along with a Chosŏn monk named Sŏngji, was employed prominently in this project as a geomancer.⁶⁹ The *Journal of King*

Kwanghae-gun (*Kwanghae-gun ilgi*) includes numerous references to him, but because the *Journal* was compiled under Injo, the editors added derogatory comments about Shi Wenyong in the form of either interpolations or editorial comments.⁷⁰ The first reference to Shi Wenyong in the *Journal* is the statement by Sŏng Chinsŏn, the governor of Kyŏngsang Province, that “Shi Wenyong, a Chinese person, knows geomancy very well. He should be given a horse and sent up to the capital.” The editors of the intermediate draft (*chungch’obon*) directed that “deserter” be added to “a Chinese” in the expression “Shi Wenyong, a Chinese person,”⁷¹ an addition that is present in the corrected draft (*chŏngch’obon*) completed under Hyojong. More often, the compilers simply added a note declaring Shi Wenyong to be a Ming deserter who was selected through the corrupt influence of Chŏng Inhong.⁷² Finally, the *Journal* notes that Shi’s labors came to an end in 1623, when, after the overthrow of Kwanghae-gun, he attempted to escape but was captured and executed.⁷³

Not only could deserting Ming soldiers, by violating their loyalties to the Ming emperor, imply the collapse of social order and even the revolt of slaves against their masters, but the relationships they formed with Chosŏn women threatened the clarity of the Chosŏn court’s own rule over its subjects. In his discussion of the Japanese trading colony in Pusan, James B. Lewis describes the tightening restrictions on sexual and marital relations between Japanese and Chosŏn subjects following the Three Ports uprising and the Imjin War—this he argues, was not inspired by Confucian disapproval of irregular unions, or by national hostility to foreigners establishing roots in Chosŏn, but by a fear, made especially strong following the Imjin War, that mixed subjects with multiple political affiliations could pose a military threat to the Chosŏn state.⁷⁴ Similarly, although Ming soldiers were subjects of an empire that was seen by most Chosŏn officials as the font of civilization, Chosŏn officials also often considered intermarriage between Chosŏn subjects with Ming soldiers as a significant threat to the social order.

THE IMJIN WAR tore apart the elaborate relationships formed by the Chosŏn court with Japanese and Ryukyuans to its south and put considerable strain on its relationship with the Ming. Even before the invasion itself, first Oda Nobunaga and then Hideyoshi had eliminated the petty states with which Chosŏn had formed its relationships, although the Chosŏn court became aware of this only on the eve of war. The invasion itself brought widespread demographic displacement to Chosŏn, including not only departures of Chosŏn subjects—forced or willing—to other parts of the world but also the entrance of huge numbers of

Japanese and Ming soldiers onto Chosŏn soil. Many of these soldiers became migrants, as deserters from both Japanese and Ming armies abandoned their posts, formed ties with Chosŏn subjects, and elected to stay in Chosŏn.

For reasons related to both economic difficulties and distrust of the loyalties of those arriving, the Chosŏn state sought to police the floating population within its borders, making use of the tools for governing foreigners that it had developed in the previous two centuries. To a surprising degree, civilizational categories (barbarian/Confucian), or what might be termed “proto-national categories” (Chinese/Japanese/Korean) mattered less than the security of a migrant’s affiliation. The Chosŏn court actively sought to attract both skilled Japanese and Ming deserters and encouraged, where possible, the settlement of both in Chosŏn territory as secure subjects of the Chosŏn monarchy, although Ming deserters, who had revolted against the Ming state to which the Chosŏn court also claimed to be loyal, posed ideological challenges that Japanese, who had been submitting to the Chosŏn monarchy since the beginning of the dynasty, did not.

Border Peoples and Flexible Loyalties in Chosŏn during the Seventeenth Century

THE PERIOD OF PEACE in Chosŏn after the departure of the Ming armies in 1600 was soon followed by renewed conflict in Liaodong to Chosŏn's north, as a new power, the Jianzhou Jurchens, under their charismatic leader, Nurhaci, rose to prominence in the borderlands between Ming Liaodong and Chosŏn Korea and became a growing challenge to both Ming authority and the Chosŏn state. Nurhaci consolidated his control over previously disunited Jurchen tribes (increasingly named Manchu during this period)¹ and indeed over Mongol and other groups as well. Politically, he formed the region north of Chosŏn into a centralizing polity under his rule, establishing the Later Jin dynasty in 1616. War erupted in 1618 when Nurhaci countered Ming attempts to block his trade in Liaodong by occupying the Liaodongese trading town of Fushun. The Ming responded in 1619 by sending a massive military force, including troops provided by its allies, such as Mongols, Yehe (a Jurchen group), and indeed Chosŏn, but bad coordination caused by rivalry among Ming officers allowed Nurhaci to destroy the Ming force sent against him in the decisive battle of Sarhu. Following this, both he and his successor, Hong Taiji, as leaders of first the Later Jin and then the Qing empires, were able to pursue the conquest of Liaodong and Liaoxi against a Ming court otherwise weakened by widespread popular unrest. This culminated in 1644 with the Qing occupation of the Ming capital of Beijing after it had already fallen to the rebels under Li Zicheng.²

Badly weakened by the Imjin War, Chosŏn's direct military involvement in the conflict was limited and controversial. After the debacle in Sarhu in 1619, Nurhaci chose to spare the Chosŏn contingent, even while executing the other surviving Ming soldiers. This resulted in the rumor, spreading among both Ming and Chosŏn officials, of a conspiracy between the then-king Kwanghae-gun of Chosŏn and the new Manchu power. This rumor became one of the justifications for the coup d'état that overthrew Kwanghae-gun and put

Injo on the throne in 1623.³ The Chosŏn court under Injo, already beholden to the Ming for their military assistance during the Imjin War, had very little room for diplomatic maneuvering after justifying its own takeover of the Chosŏn state in part on Ming loyalist grounds. Injo's regime had a weak base of support (as revealed by the 1624 revolt of Injo's supporter Yi Kwal) and so could not devote resources to the defense of its northern border. As a result, it suffered the Chŏngmyŏ Invasion by the Later Jin under Hong Taiji in 1627, after which Chosŏn was forced to abandon its direct military assistance to the Ming and agree to a younger-brother relationship with the Later Jin.⁴ When it failed to maintain the terms of this agreement and also rejected Hong Taiji's attempts to claim imperial status and a new Qing dynasty in 1636, the Chosŏn court suffered a second Manchu assault, the Pyŏngja Invasion of 1636–1637, at the conclusion of which Injo was forced into a humiliating and public submission to Hong Taiji.⁵ By the terms of the surrender, Chosŏn was required to break off all ties to the Ming and accept Qing overlordship. As a surety, Injo had to send the Sohyŏn crown prince (*Sohyŏn seja*, 1612–1645) and his second son, the Pongnim great prince (*Pongnim taegun*, 1619–1659, later Hyojong r. 1649–1659), as well as a number of high officials, as hostages to the Qing capital of Mukden. Chosŏn also suffered the capture of large numbers of ordinary Chosŏn subjects as prisoners of war, the execution of a number of anti-Qing officials under Qing auspices,⁶ and the forced participation in military activity alongside the Qing armies against the Ming.⁷

Ideologically, these troubles represented a major crisis to Chosŏn's elite, who felt a deep obligation to the Ming empire and to a civilization centered on Chunghwa, in which category they did not include the new Qing empire. Demographically, however, the Manchu invasions were significantly less disruptive than the Imjin War and resulted in far less loss of life. Chosŏn, in fact, suffered far less than did much of the world during a notoriously troubled seventeenth century, severely affected, as Geoffrey Parker has argued, by a cooling climate.⁸ However, like the Imjin War, the wars between the Manchu and Ming in Liaodong generated large numbers of refugees and displaced peoples, notably Chinese-speaking Liaodongese and Chosŏn's own Jurchen vassals, the Pŏnhos of the Tumen River. As with the Japanese defectors and Ming deserters of the Imjin War, these refugees carried significant political risks, as all were potentially beholden to other regimes. In particular, Liaodongese refugees, who came in huge numbers, placed a heavy economic burden on a Chosŏn state already weakened by the Imjin War. Moreover, Pŏnhos and Liaodongese, like the Ming and Japanese deserters of the Imjin War, were highly mobile culturally, socially,

Northeast Asia during the Ming-Qing Transition.
(Drafted by Thomas Quartermain.)

and politically, and this posed new challenges for the Chosŏn state as it sought to maintain its control in the face of chaos in Northeast Asia.

Chosŏn's Jurchen Subjects during the Rise of the Qing

Beginning with the late sixteenth century, growing unrest threatened the delicate balance on Chosŏn's northern border, with its combination of military garrisons and Pŏnho vassals; some of these vassals now cast their lot with the deep-dwelling Jurchen groups against whom they were supposed to form a barrier. The elaborate defensive network of relationships that the Chosŏn court had formed with Pŏnhos on its northern border had already shown signs of collapse with the Nit'anggae uprising of 1583. The Imjin War further weakened Chosŏn's control over the region, as Pŏnhos rose up in revolt during and after Katō Kiyomasa's occupation of Hamgyŏng Province,⁹ leading to further unrest in 1594 by the Yŏksu tribe that had formed a fortified town north of the Tumen. Among other problems, the Imjin War drained the Chosŏn court of the finances needed to provide its usual support to its Jurchen allies, including their all-important

visits to the capital. Then, immediately following the war, between 1598 and 1600, Chosŏn suffered a series of destructive uprisings by Pŏnhos, including the Not'o tribe upstream from Hoeryŏng. These were put down only with great difficulty.¹⁰

In 1599, during a discussion of the Not'o uprising, Yi Tŏkhyŏng (1561–1613) expressed concern that if the Not'o were not brought thoroughly under control, “abroad the authority of the kingdom will suffer, and domestically we will lose the support of the multitude. Far and wide there will be none who do not despise us. Then if sundry Jurchens continue to rise in revolt, and someone like Nurhaci hears of it, and if that moves his mind toward aggression, then how will we maintain control? That is the road to destruction.”¹¹ By “someone like Nurhaci” Yi Tŏkhyŏng was referring not only to Nurhaci himself, then indeed causing concern to the Chosŏn court, but to a whole class of powerful new leaders of Jurchen confederacies. Although the Ming and Chosŏn together had eliminated powerful Jurchen leaders following the joint attack on Li Manchu of the Jianzhou confederacy in 1467, by the late sixteenth century new Jurchen confederacies had emerged, driven by economic development in the Jurchen lands, with Jurchens selling ginseng and pelts to Ming and Chosŏn in exchange for handcrafted goods from both. This trade brought the Jurchen lands into the Ming’s silver economy and drove both increased social differentiation and the formation of fortified towns. These economic and social developments encouraged the formation of new military confederacies, initially in the region north and east of Tieling among the “Four Hülün,” namely the Ula, Hoifa, Yehe, and Hada. In 1548, Wan of the Hada established himself as leader of the Four Hülün, while also extending his control over part of the Jianzhou and Wild Jurchens. Generally accumulating power with Ming support, he also claimed the Mongol title “khan.”¹² However, the dominance of the Hada over the Hülün did not survive Wan’s death in 1582. Closer to Chosŏn’s borders, the Jianzhou Jurchen confederacy experienced somewhat slower political development—one leader, Wang Gao (d. 1575), came into conflict with the Ming and was defeated by the combined force of the Ming and Wang Tai in 1575. In 1583, during the conflict that followed Wang Tai’s death, Giocangga and Taksi, two prominent leaders of the Jianzhou, were both killed, partly through the connivance of Nikan Wailan, who attempted to work with the Ming to advance his own position. This resulted in a temporary setback to the Jianzhou Jurchens. Nurhaci, the son of Taksi, gradually consolidated power over the Jianzhou Jurchens. After Nurhaci’s victory over an alliance of the Four Hülün and their allies in 1593, he expanded his power more broadly over the Jurchens as a whole.¹³

The emergence of confederacies to Chosŏn's north made it increasingly challenging for Chosŏn to maintain control over the Pŏnhos. Even before Nurhaci, the Ula, a branch of the Hülün based on the Sunggari River, had sought to exert their control over the Pŏnhos of northern Hamgyŏng. Bujantai, the younger brother of Mantai of the Ula, was captured after the Hülün defeat in 1593 and taken to Jianzhou by Nurhaci. He was allowed by Nurhaci to return to the Ula, in theory as a vassal of the Jianzhou, in 1596. Despite the fact that the alliance between Bujantai of the Ula and Nurhaci of the Jianzhou was strengthened through marital ties, Bujantai actively conspired with Šurgaci (Nurhaci's then co-ruler and younger brother) against Nurhaci himself. Bujantai's rise ended only when he was defeated in battle by Nurhaci in 1613.

In Chosŏn accounts, Bujantai was known initially by an Idu rendering of his nickname Hashū, which is perhaps to be glossed as "left-handed archer."¹⁴ His group, the Ula, were generally referred to in Chosŏn texts as Hülün (K. Horon or Hollaon), of which the Ula were only one part.¹⁵ Kim Siyang (1581–1643), a Chosŏn official who was exiled to the garrison of Chongsŏng near the Tumen River between 1608 and 1618, claimed that Bujantai was already intervening in the affairs of the Pŏnhos in 1591.¹⁶ This is unlikely, as Bujantai was not then an autonomous power, but it is indeed true that when the Hülün confederacy, including the Ula under Mantai, challenged Nurhaci in 1593, they had allies among the Jurchens from Jušeri, in the region of Mt. Paektu on Chosŏn's northern border.¹⁷ As an independent force, the Ula under Bujantai first appeared in the area of Hamgyŏng shortly after the Imjin War. Between 1601 and 1605, especially, Bujantai led the Ula in an active military campaign for dominance over the Pŏnhos, launching frequent raids against northern Hamgyŏng and taking prisoners and allies back with him as he prepared for conflict with his father-in-law and erstwhile ally Nurhaci. In 1603, Bujantai deployed a massive army against Tonggwan and Chongsŏng in northern Hamgyŏng, successfully preventing the Chosŏn military from intervening against his dominance over the Pŏnhos from these regions. In order to restore its weakened authority among the Pŏnhos who had only learned to fear "the Hülün while thinking that Chosŏn could not be trusted,"¹⁸ Chosŏn sent a military official named Kim Chongdŭk and a Pŏnho named T'aktu to lead a force against Bujantai's temporary base of Kŏnt'oe north of the Tumen River. The Chosŏn army, however, suffered a humiliating military defeat and a complete loss of authority over those Pŏnhos still in the vicinity of Hamgyŏng Province. With a significant military victory to his credit, the next year Bujantai was able to demand bureaucratic titles and trading privileges from

Chosŏn via the Hamgyŏng governor, significantly improving his position in intra-Jurchen political and military competition.¹⁹

Bujantai, however, faced a rival in Nurhaci for the control of the Jurchens. During the 1590s, Nurhaci had expanded his power to the extent that he was able to offer military assistance to Chosŏn during the Imjin War. The offer was refused but did result in a limited exchange of communication between the Chosŏn court and Nurhaci, despite a general policy of avoiding direct contact with the Jianzhou over which the Ming court also exerted its claims.²⁰ Much of the discussion between Nurhaci and Chosŏn concerned disputes over the northern border, especially illegal Chosŏn ginseng diggers. However, as his rivalry with Bujantai grew, Nurhaci increased his efforts to block the expansion of Bujantai's dominance among the Pŏnhos. He himself clearly had abundant connections to Chosŏn's Pŏnhos. During his visit to Nurhaci's capital in 1595, Sin Ch'ungil was told that a recent raid on Chosŏn was the responsibility of a man named Kim Waedu (Ma. Adun), whose father, Jeocangga, had served in Hansŏng for eight years under the name of Kim Kisŏng. The son had abandoned Chosŏn and moved to Komigae in the region of the "four abandoned counties" in the upper Yalu River in the vicinity of Mount Paektu.²¹ Other evidence, however, suggests that Waedu was not the independent actor described in this passage but in fact was a close associate of Nurhaci.²² He was not the only member of Chosŏn's Pŏnhos to form such a connection. In 1601, *The Chosŏn Veritable Records* mentions that associates of such rebellious Pŏnhos as Nit'anggae and the Not'o tribe had joined with Nurhaci.²³

In fact, Nurhaci did not simply wait for Pŏnhos to come to him but actively pressed his claims over those Pŏnhos still under Chosŏn control. In 1595, he sent an unprecedented demand to Hŏ Uk (1548–1618), the magistrate of Kanggye, to repatriate all Jurchens who lived as submitting-foreigners in Chosŏn, a request that Hŏ simply ignored.²⁴ Beyond such minor expansions of Nurhaci's authority, in 1607 Nurhaci directly challenged Bujantai's forces at Munam/Ogaram on the opposite bank from the Chosŏn fortified town of Chongsŏng, even leading his armies through northern Hamgyŏng. At the conclusion of this fighting, which brought Nurhaci's armies south of the Tumen River, he broke Bujantai's control over the Pŏnhos and gained direct jurisdiction over the Jurchen town of Fio-hoton (K. Hyŏnsŏng) north of the mouth of the Tumen River, within the administrative region of the present-day city of Hunchun.²⁵ Having eliminated Bujantai's influence in the region, Nurhaci was able to pursue the active removal of Pŏnhos from Chosŏn control into his power base in Jianzhou, taking with

him, according to the *Old Manchu Archive*, two thousand Pönho households from Hesihe, Fenehe, and Omho Sure.²⁶

Ultimately, Nurhaci's assertion of control over the Pönhos was driven by the same material and ideological logic as his expansion over the Jurchens as a whole. Like Wan of Hada before him, Nurhaci was organizing a confederacy. He was establishing a state centered upon himself by bringing disparate Jurchen political structures into his orbit. In common with earlier steppe confederacies, he pursued not only military means but also administrative and cultural strategies to fuse diverse Jurchen groups into one coherent identity with a putative common ancestry.²⁷ Thus, in 1599, he had his minister, Erdeni Bakši, design a written language, allowing for the development of a proper bureaucracy. Nurhaci also steadily elevated his political status. He had begun his career as a *beile* (headman) along with his brother Šurgaci, although he often elevated this title to *sure* ("wise" or "felicitous") *beile*. As his power grew, he also asserted his rights to the Mongol title *khan* (Ma. *han*), that had also previously been claimed by Wan of Hada. He further centralized his rule during the early seventeenth century by organizing the hunting parties of disparate village units (Ma. *gašan*) into companies (Ma. *niru*, literally "arrows"). By 1615 he had grouped them into eight banners (Ma. *gušan*), each headed by a Jurchen potentate, but all ultimately under the overall direction of Nurhaci himself.²⁸ Beginning under his reign, the culturally diverse Jurchen groups, which were at the center of Nurhaci's *khanal* project, were renamed Manchu, a designation that under his successor was enforced legally, such that it became a serious offense to use the term "Jurchen." Indeed, Nurhaci and his successor Hong Taiji even appropriated a myth of origin centered in Changbaishan for their own Aisin Gioro lineage and for the new Manchu nation (*gurun*) as a whole, transforming themselves into an imperial lineage that could claim an antiquity to rival the Ming.²⁹

Such ideological consolidation may also be seen in Nurhaci's rhetoric concerning the Pönhos. In Manchu documents concerning the forcible removal of the Pönhos from Chosŏn, Nurhaci referred to them with the ethnonym "Warka" (the Manchu term for the Uriankhai Jurchen) and described them not as captives, but as his own estranged subjects. In 1607, for instance, *The Old Manchu Archives* has Nurhaci (there referred to by his *khanal* title "Sure Kundulen Han") assert that "We are one country, separated by the Ula far away, so you lived submitting to the Ula. But now that I, the Han of our own country, have set out and destroyed the army of the Ula, you should submit to [me], the Han of our one country."³⁰

Chosŏn is notably not mentioned in this passage, although it was almost certainly Chosŏn Pŏnhos who were being removed from their land. However, an explicit reference to the Pŏnhos does appear in a document in *The Old Manchu Archive*, dated to 1609, in which it is claimed that Nurhaci, as “Sure Kundulen Han,” had formally requested that the Wanli emperor, referred to as “the Wan Lii Han of the Great Chinese State” (Ma. Amba Nikan Gurun), arrange for the repatriation of Nurhaci’s subjects living in Chosŏn. This request he based on an interpretation of history, whereby during the time of the Han of the Old Jin—meaning the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1115–1234) that dominated northern China and the steppes until it fell to the Mongols—the Warka had scattered, entering Korea (Ma. Solho) and living on Korea’s frontiers ever since. Nurhaci requested that an investigation be made and that all Warka be returned to him. The document claims that the Wanli emperor did indeed order the “Han of Korea” to repatriate the Warka to Nurhaci. Additionally, it says that the Han of Korea, who at this date would have been Kwanghae-gun, allowed the Sure Kundulen Han, then in his fifty-first year, to bring back a thousand Warka households on the second month of that year.³¹

The key aspect of both these passages from *The Old Manchu Archive* is Nurhaci’s assertion of a preexisting right to all Jurchens. His historical claims to the former supporters of Bujantai or to Pŏnhos under Chosŏn’s control were, of course, entirely without merit. Certainly, the regular diplomatic exchange referred to in the second passage has no equivalent in any Ming or Chosŏn source that I have been able to check. It is possible that such an exchange occurred not with the central Ming state but with local Ming officials in Liaodong, although it does not, in fact, sound at all like something the Chosŏn court would have supported.³² The document, however, is clearly a genuine product of the early Manchu state and suggests that Nurhaci, at this point, wished to assert both that he had a historically determined right to control all Jurchens, and that his right to rule all Jurchens was supported by both the Ming and Chosŏn monarchies.

With Chosŏn, at least, it is quite clear that this was not the case. Although even after Nurhaci’s victory over Bujantai in 1607, when it had entirely lost its limited means to defend the Pŏnhos against Nurhaci, it did not cease to claim its rights over them. In fact, throughout the troublesome period after the Imjin War, the Chosŏn court was clear that the Pŏnhos were their subjects, even though the Pŏnhos fell on the barbarian side of the civilized-barbarian divide. Even in 1594, as Chosŏn planned reprisals against the Pŏnho rebels among the Yŏksu Jurchens, the Border Defense Command was at pains to distinguish

those Jurchens such as the Yöksu, “who had forgotten the kindness of [our] kingdom to them” and “who had committed such terrible crimes that they could not but suffer the celestial punishment of military action in response to their crimes” from the other “innocent Pönhos,” who maintained their connection to the kingdom, and to whom “greater kindness and care should be granted, to prevent them from holding any doubts or fears [concerning the Chosŏn state].”³³ Such sentiments did not fade as Bujantai and Nurhaci increasingly interfered with Chosŏn’s control over the Pönhos. Rather, the Pönhos’ identity as subjects of the Chosŏn state, and the vital role that they played in maintaining Chosŏn control, were mentioned in nearly every discussion of the military crisis to Chosŏn’s north. Thus, in 1603, the Border Defense Command argued that the military situation was very dire indeed. Before the Imjin War, the Pönhos at the foot of the fortifications could be relied upon to stay loyal, as they themselves benefited from their relationship with the Chosŏn court, but since the Imjin War, the officials at the command worried, Jurchens had noted the military weakness of the Six Garrisons and had started to despise them, thus bringing about the uprising by the Not’o and Adanggae in the region of Horyŏng. The most recent violence in the region of Onsŏng and Kyŏngwŏn, they worried, threatened to eliminate entirely the Chosŏn “fence” of Pönhos, and with that gone, the Six Garrisons would be in the situation of “teeth without lips.”³⁴ Yi Sugwang, probably writing in 1614, used a nearly identical expression to describe the problem. He worried that “those Jurchens who live at the foot of the fortifications and are thus called Pönhos” had left the region, either voluntarily joining with Nurhaci, or retreating south, or being forcibly removed by Nurhaci to Jianzhou, leaving Chosŏn in the situation whereby “though someone settles right on our borders, or even illegally enters deep into our territory, nobody even dares ask who that person is. When the lips are gone the teeth grow cold—this is an unspeakable worry!”³⁵

There are, moreover, frequent references to the Pönhos themselves asserting the importance of their connection with Chosŏn by fleeing south. A secret report in 1609 by the Office of the Censor General (*Saganwŏn*) concerning the security of Kanghwa Island suggested a very large number of Jurchens indeed had retreated into settlements in Chosŏn proper. According to the report, in Hwanghae, Kyŏnggi, Ch’ungch’ŏng, and Chŏlla provinces, so many Jurchen settlements had been established that there was no part of those regions without them, with an especially large number residing in coastal Ch’ungch’ŏng and Chŏlla, where their skill in fishing considerably exceeded that of Koreans. Within those four provinces, Jurchens had built with their own hands more

than two hundred fishing boats—a number that seems rather more impressive considering that they had been in the region for no more than a decade.³⁶

During this period, both Jurchens and Japanese begin to appear in a different form of record—namely household registries. Legally, the Chosŏn court launched a survey of their population once every three years. The process began when the county office collected records of individual households (*hogu tanja*) from the householder (*chubo*). The county office would then compose draft registries, usually on the level of ward (*li*) or district (*myŏn*), which were then formed into a complete household registry (*Hojŏk taejang*) for the county as a whole, which in turn was submitted to the provincial office and ultimately to the central court. According to law, all households were to be recorded, but in practice the information was incomplete and became less complete and accurate through each stage of its drafting, with the result that, by some estimates, the population record provided by the household registry was a mere 40 percent of the actual population. The fundamental problem was that the household registry was not a census so much as a record of tax obligations and a tool of governance, and so many people would evade being recorded, although such evasion was illegal and failure to be recorded in the household registry also excluded one from the protection of the state (for instance, in the case of famine). While household registry documents contain immensely valuable information, they are not comprehensive demographic records but rather are limited by the always changing capacity of the state to gather precise information on its subjects and to enforce tax obligations. For instance, following a series of reforms in the mid-seventeenth century, their accuracy likely improved, while they seem to have declined in quality during the period of political turmoil during the nineteenth century.³⁷ Read carefully, household registry documents provide insight into how Chosŏn officials saw its population and how Chosŏn people responded to the power of the state. There is also a great deal of demographic information about people too humble to appear consistently in other records.³⁸

Among our surviving household registries from the early seventeenth century are those from the two coastal communities of Ulsan and Haenam. These reveal a significant presence of both Japanese defectors and submitting-foreigners, who from their clan seats would appear to be of Jurchen origin, either Taewŏn (referring to the Mongol Yuan dynasty) or Hŭngnyong-gang (referring to the Heilongjiang or Amur River).³⁹ Early seventeenth-century Chosŏn was still recovering from the extreme damage to the state caused by the Imjin War, and so the household registry documents of 1609 would have been of limited accuracy. Nevertheless, *The Ulsan Household Registry of 1609* provides an interesting

snapshot of a small Jurchen community within a county otherwise revealing clear signs of postwar chaos, including the low percentage of slaves (who possibly fled during the chaos), and a large number of displaced persons (*yumin*). The total recorded population of the surviving portions of *The Ulsan Household Registry of 1609* amounted to 4,109 persons within 1,245 households, implying that (considering missing portions of household register) a total recorded population of about 4,500.⁴⁰ Within Nongso-ri in the Eastern District (Tongmyŏn) of Ulsan, there was a single *t'ong* of eleven households all of which were headed by submitting-foreigners as well as an additional submitting-foreigner household in the subsequent *t'ong*, for a total of twenty-seven submitting-foreigner Jurchens (as well as two slaves of seemingly Korean origin).⁴¹ Within Yudŭngp'o-ri in the Eastern District, in a *t'ong* otherwise dominated by slave households, there were five submitting-foreigners, along with two wives of Korean origin, making up three households.⁴² In the case of the Southern District, there were no recorded concentrated communities of submitting-foreigners. However, in Onyang-ri in the Southern District there were several cases of people of Jurchen ancestry, including a slave woman with a Jurchen father,⁴³ and the Jurchen wife of a commoner.⁴⁴ There were also five households headed by Jurchen householders. Within these five households, four Jurchen men intermarried with Korean women, either of a slave background or from the Yangyang Ch'oe descent-group of post-station petty officials, and only one Jurchen married to another Jurchen.⁴⁵ If non-Jurchen spouses are excluded and their children are included, the total recorded population of Jurchens in the surviving portions of *The Ulsan Household Registry of 1609* comes to forty-two people. In the summaries (*isang*) of each *li*, six physically mature men (*changnam*) of submitting-foreigner ancestry are recorded for the county center (*naebu*), eleven for Nongso-ri, two for Yudŭngp'o-ri, and seven for Onyang-ri.⁴⁶ As the number of physically mature males listed in the summaries for Nongso-ri, Yudŭngp'o-ri, and Onyang-ri amounts to nearly 50 percent of their recorded submitting-foreigner population, it seems likely that there would have been a total of approximately twelve submitting-foreigners recorded for the county center register, which does not now survive. Thus, there would likely have been a total of fifty-four submitting-foreigners of Jurchen origin for Ulsan as a whole, amounting to slightly more than 1 percent of the total recorded population of Ulsan.

The Jurchens in this community were thus only one community of displaced people in a community of refugees, yet in 1609 they had maintained their distinctiveness. The community was largely endogamous—they are generally recorded as intermarrying with other submitting-foreigners, and there are only

a few cases of marriage with non-Jurchen spouses.⁴⁷ Japanese defectors were not recorded as submitting-foreigners in Ulsan, and, not surprisingly, married generally with Korean spouses, reflecting no doubt the very different context of their migration as deserting soldiers who would overwhelmingly have been single men. On the other hand, in the surviving records from Ulsan at least, Japanese defectors maintained their distinctiveness for much longer and continued to be recorded into the late seventeenth century.

Both Japanese and Jurchens were divided by social status, with some being blessed with extensive titles, and some falling to the ranks of slaves and intermarrying with them. We are not given much information about the migration history of either community. In some cases for Onyang-ri, there is evidence that they must have been present for some time, as they had ancestors who are recorded as (presumably Korean) post-station servants (*yŏkcha*) or fishermen (*haech'ŏk*), often of the Yangyang Ch'oe descent-group.⁴⁸ In Nongso-ri or Yudŭngp'o-ri, however, there are also two cases of submitting-foreigners described as having "crossed the river." The first, Yi Munsang, thirty-five years of age, with the clan seat Taewŏn, "crossed the river" at some unspecified date, perhaps in the *kihŏe* year (1599), a date that is attached to his registration, but which cannot be his birth date, in contrast to nearly all other Jurchens recorded in this registry. It is evident from this that his father, grandfather, and great-grandfather, who are listed in the household registry as submitting-foreigners, must have been based north of the Tumen, but already possessed a relationship with the Chosŏn state, as was also the case with his wife, whose ancestors are similarly all listed as submitting-foreigners. Another case is that of Yi Yunsŏk, thirty-two years of age, also with the clan seat Taewŏn but who shares no ancestors with Yi Munsang. In his case, the date attached to him is likely his birth year, which is 1576. He, however, was also listed as "crossing the river." His ancestors, and the ancestors of his wife, were all listed as submitting-foreigners.⁴⁹

Other similar communities would have been formed during this period, as Jurchens continued to leave both Nurgan and the Tumen River area throughout the reign of Kwanghae-gun. There was movement in the other direction as well—in 1610, one submitting Jurchen, Pak Yodo, sought to return home (whether to Hamgyŏng or Jianzhou is not specified). He received the help of a deputy commander (*chunggun*) to this end. The account suggests that both Pak and the deputy commander were severely punished. While surely there must have been other such cases (as indeed the report at the time suggested),⁵⁰ Jurchens continued to enter the Chosŏn state. In 1617, two years before the Battle of Sarhu, a Jurchen named Nagada left Jianzhou with eleven others to submit

to the Chosŏn court. According to his discussion with the Jurchen-language interpreter Ha Seguk, he left with the support of Nurhaci, who sent away some Jurchens to Chosŏn to alleviate the hunger caused by recent floods. Yi Siŏn (?–1624), a provincial military commander from P'yŏngan Province, reporting on this matter, expressed concern that the steadily increasing number of Jurchens submitting to Chosŏn, “naked and begging for food” (*chöksin kölsik*), risked exhausting the resources of the already burdened Chosŏn state.⁵¹

Even among those Jurchens who could not escape Nurhaci, a number of documents point to the continued feeling among them of a link to Chosŏn. According to the report preserved in the *Journal of King Kwanghae-gun*, two escaped Korean prisoners informed the court of their conversation with a slave of the captured Chosŏn general Kang Hongnip (1560–1627). The slave said that, among the former submitting-Jurchens and Pŏnhos, “there were none who did not call Nurhaci a great bandit who lusted after wealth and loved war.” In fact, according to their account, the Pŏnhos in Nurhaci’s camp actually wished him dead. For that matter, whenever the Pŏnhos of the Six Garrisons spoke about “our country” they meant Chosŏn, and they still had not forgotten the benefits they had received from the officials there, and whenever they spoke with Koreans, they would deeply lament their forcible removal to Nurhaci’s camp.⁵²

Whether or not this was self-justifying propaganda on the part of the Chosŏn court, it remains significant that even after the defeat in the battle of Sarhu it still considered the Pŏnhos their subjects and hoped to reassert its claim over them. In fact, Chosŏn’s claim to the Pŏnhos and the continued presence of submitting-foreigners of Jurchen origin in Chosŏn were the subject of diplomatic protest by the Manchu state under both Nurhaci and Hong Taiji. Former supporters of the Yi Kwal rebellion who fled to the Manchu in 1625 informed the court of Hong Taiji that there were hundreds of Warka households to the south of Hansŏng (Ma. Han i hecen), a matter that greatly concerned the Manchus.⁵³ The Manchu state continued to make complaints with great regularity, until after the submission of the Chosŏn monarch to the Qing empire in 1637, at which point the Qing empire was finally in a position to compel the Chosŏn court to repatriate its Jurchen subjects.⁵⁴

Ultimately, for the Chosŏn court, the Pŏnhos continued to have a significant military and cultural role in the state well after the rise of the Manchu state. While the court was always clear that the Pŏnhos were distinct from other Chosŏn subjects, it asserted its claim over them as long as it could. As with the Japanese defectors during the Imjin War, Pŏnhos possessed abundant cultural and economic connections to Chosŏn. The ultimate removal of many of Chosŏn’s Pŏnhos and

other Jurchen subjects occurred through the rise of the Manchu khanate and over the opposition of both the Chosŏn court and many Pŏnhos themselves.

Liaodongese Refugees Following the Battle of Fushun

Posing other problems for the Chosŏn court were the large numbers of Liaodongese Chinese who had also fled to Chosŏn between 1619 and 1637, escaping the war between the rising Manchu state and the persistent Ming military effort in Liaoxi and the Liaodong peninsula. In part organized by Mao Wenlong (1576–1629), a Ming general with only weak loyalties to the Ming empire, Liaodongese refugees further strained Chosŏn's already weakened agricultural economy, even as they carried with them considerable political risk. While many of these migrants were later repatriated to Liaodong by either the Ming or Qing armies, a portion also remained in Chosŏn. As with Ming deserters during the Imjin War, the dealings of the Chosŏn state with Liaodongese refugees were driven by concern for the potential disruption that such a large community of nonsubjects could pose, and by the difficulties in providing for them.⁵⁵ At the same time, Liaodongese who were useful to the state obtained positions within Chosŏn, while other Liaodongese simply avoided the state as they established themselves in their new home.

For the Ming, Liaodong played a vital role, preventing Jurchens from aligning themselves with Mongols, and both Jurchens and Mongols from aligning with Chosŏn. During the Yuan period, numerous Koreans had settled in the region, and there had been Korean speakers in the region at least up to the late fifteenth century.⁵⁶ Its key cities (Fushun, Tieling, Shenyang, and Kaiyuan) became important nodes of political interaction with Chahar Mongol and Jurchen groups, and many of the leading citizens of these commanderies themselves originated from among the Jurchens.⁵⁷ It was a zone of encounter between Jurchens, Mongols, Han Chinese, and others, with many “transfrontier” Chinese residing in Jurchen settlements and acting as intermediaries between Sinophone Liaodong and Jurchen Nurgan.⁵⁸ To the south, the Liaodong peninsula in particular was linked via the “Bohai maritime sphere” to the Shandong peninsula, with islands, such as those of the Miaodao archipelago between Liaodong and Shandong, becoming refuges for tax dodgers and smugglers from Shandong.⁵⁹

During the two decades following the Ming defeat in 1619, the Manchu state steadily expanded its control of Liaodong and Liaoxi. Unfortunately for Chosŏn, although it did not send a formal army against the Manchu after 1619, the strength of the ties between the Chosŏn and Ming courts, and the fact that

the conflict was taking place right at its northern border, meant that Chosŏn continued to be intimately involved in the struggle. In particular, in 1621, Mao Wenlong was able to reconstitute his army at Zhenjiang at the mouth of the Yalu. Shortly afterward, he was pushed across the Yalu into northern P'yŏngan Province, moving once more in 1622 to Ka Island off the coast of Ch'ŏlsan. Employing Chosŏn as a base, and demanding considerable logistic support from Chosŏn, he organized a large number of Liaodongese refugees. Nearly autonomous in his actions, and receiving his support from a community of refugees from Liaodong and tax-dodgers and pirates of the Bohai maritime sphere,⁶⁰ he was largely able to control Ming-Chosŏn interaction until, as doubts grew concerning his military efficacy and rumors spread of his double-dealing, he was executed in 1629 by the Ming general Yuan Chonghuan (1584–1630).⁶¹ The result of this execution, however, was not the elimination of the threat from island dwellers and Liaodongese refugees, but the rebellion of Mao's subordinates. First Liu Xingzhi (d. 1631), one of two commanders placed in charge of the island in the wake of Mao's execution, rebelled, killing his fellow commander Chen Yingsheng in 1630 and moving his forces against the islands off Dengzhou in Shandong with the goal of taking control of Dengzhou itself. Unsuccessful in this, he retreated and was killed in a Ming attack in 1631. The very brief restoration of Ming control in 1631 came to an end with the overthrow and mutilation of Huang Long (d. 1633) in the same year. This unrest culminated in the mutiny of two Liaodongese of Shandong origin, Kong Youde (1602–1652) and Geng Zhongming (d. 1649), who overwhelmed Dengzhou in 1632–1633,⁶² before defecting to the Manchu Qing and giving the Qing the navy and gunpowder weapons necessary to overcome Chosŏn in 1636–1637 and the Ming in 1644.⁶³

While a certain amount has been written on the large number of Korean prisoners of war taken by the Qing armies in 1627 and 1636–1637,⁶⁴ relatively little has been said about the Liaodongese who entered Chosŏn in the preceding period. The border between northern P'yŏngan Province and Liaodong had always been somewhat porous and became more so during the Imjin War; after that war, officials complained that subjects on either side of the river had begun to make a habit of crossing the river "under the pretext of engaging in trade," with some entering deep into each other's territory.⁶⁵ The real increase of Liaodongese migrants in Chosŏn occurred after the 1618 Battle of Fushun and the 1619 Battle of Sarhu, with their numbers steadily increasing as Nurhaci and his Later Jin dynasty strengthened control in the region.⁶⁶ While precise numbers are not generally given for Ming deserters in the pre-Sarhu period, post-Sarhu saw extensive discussions between the Ming and Chosŏn courts concerning the Liaodongese refugee community.

In 1621, a military official, Tao Langxian, estimated that no fewer than 200,000 Liaodongese had been forced to take refuge in Chosŏn.⁶⁷ In 1622, Sun Chengzong, who was then in command of the anti-Manchu campaign, estimated a population of more than 100,000 Liaodongese migrants in northwestern Chosŏn. He recommended that they be placed under the control of Mao Wenlong.⁶⁸ Similarly, in 1626, shortly before the first Manchu invasion, the Chosŏn court reported to the Ming on the growing troubles caused by Liaodongese refugees and claimed that the constantly increasing population of Liaodongese, coupled with the flight of Korean commoners and duty soldiers from the chaos of the northern P'yŏngan region, had resulted in a state of affairs where the guests (the Liaodongese) outnumbered the hosts (Koreans) in the area "south of Ŭiju and Ch'angsŏng and north of Sukch'ŏn and Anju," making up 60 to 70 percent of the population.⁶⁹

As mentioned in chapter 2, a total of 167,000 Ming soldiers in Chosŏn served during the seven years of the Imjin War. However, when Tao Langxiang mentions 200,000 Liaodongese refugees, his number refers only to those present in Chosŏn in 1621—the total number of Liaodongese who entered Chosŏn throughout the period between 1618 and 1637 may be assumed to have been much higher, especially if those who fled beyond northern P'yŏngan Province are taken into account. If Tao's number is taken at face value, then in 1621 alone the population of Liaodongese who fled to Chosŏn from the lower Yalu was equal to that of Hansŏng, the capital, at its pre-nineteenth-century peak of 200,000 and was approximately 2 percent of the population of Chosŏn⁷⁰—an astonishingly large number, for only one year.⁷¹

Merely demographically, such a large number of Liaodongese could not but cause social unrest. Thus, in 1624, reference is made to Liaodongese (*yomin*) "scattering throughout Kwansŏ [P'yŏngan]" and plundering the goods of the residents of that region.⁷² Certainly, the appeal made by the Chosŏn court to the Ming, cited above, suggests that the large-scale entrance of Liaodongese was a source of both violence and of economic hardship. Having recently escaped from the "barbarian lair," and with the coastal islands controlled by Mao insufficient to support them, they were forced to seize what they could in Chosŏn, with the strong resorting to force and the weak to begging. The people of northern P'yŏngan, however, being seriously burdened by military duties and still recovering from the Imjin War, were ill-equipped to deal with the triple burden of supporting Mao's establishment on the coastal islands, supporting the Chosŏn army, and dealing with the depredations of numerous starving Liaodongese; in a no doubt considerable overstatement, the Chosŏn court argued that "the land farmed by one person is required to feed a hundred."⁷³

Exaggeration aside, that northern P'yŏngan Province was overburdened by Liaodongese refugees can hardly be doubted. The situation was further worsened by the fact that the Liaodongese were organized militarily by Mao Wenlong. Clashes between the Chosŏn officials and Mao Wenlong were extremely frequent, especially during the reign of Injo (r. 1623–1649). Thus, in 1627, Sin Taldo, in the process of investigating Mao Wenlong's activities, discussed numerous violent raids against civilians in P'yŏngan Province, describing both the theft of goods and often of people, with the numbers of women taken captive to Ka Island by Chinese ships being, in his words, uncountable.⁷⁴ This in turn should not be seen as exclusively an issue of Chosŏn-Ming relations but a general difficulty engulfing both the Ming and the Manchu, as poor harvests and realigning politics meant that large communities were on the move, both spatially and politically. Alongside the increasingly violent atmosphere of Liaodongese in Chosŏn must be set the nearly contemporary Liaodongese uprisings against the Manchu in 1623 and 1625, with its brutal reprisals,⁷⁵ as well as the 1622 White Lotus uprising in neighboring Shandong.⁷⁶

In the "Story of Ch'oe Ch'ŏk" (*Ch'oech'ŏkchŏn*), a Ming soldier of Korean extraction, Ch'oe Ch'ŏk, and his son, a Chosŏn soldier, are described slipping unseen across the border into Chosŏn and through the peninsula into the southern provinces, while Ch'oe Ch'ŏk's wife, Yi Ogyŏng, crosses from Shandong to Chosŏn by boat.⁷⁷ In a poetic attack upon that story, Yi Minsŏng made particular reference to the improbability of people passing into Chosŏn without being noticed by the formal state. Surely, they would be caught by the guards on the Yalu and subjected to elaborate investigations and lengthy interrogations in P'yŏngyang!⁷⁸ As many of the preceding references have shown, from the last years of the Imjin War to the fall of Chosŏn to the Qing, *The Chosŏn Veritable Records* makes considerable reference to attempts by the state to control the movements of Liaodongese. One example is that of Li Chenglong, the descendant of Imjin-era general Li Rumei, who was intercepted in 1630 as he fled by sea to Chosŏn and caused considerable embarrassment to the Chosŏn court when the Ming military establishment on Ka Island demanded his repatriation.⁷⁹ His case was surely unusual, as the biographical information we have for Liaodongese and Shandongese migrants suggests that most migrants entered Chosŏn with little regard to formal bureaucratic procedures. Quite a number of Chinese, in fact, are described, like Yi Ogyŏng, as passing over the Yellow Sea into Chosŏn, although, as will be discussed in chapter 6, in some cases these stories seem to be later inventions. One seemingly genuine example is that of Ma Shunshang, reputedly the grandson of Imjin-era Ming general Ma Gui, who was captured

by the Manchu after the Battle of Sarhu, but escaped to Dengzhou in 1625, from where he seems to have continued military activities against the Manchu. While pursuing his duties around Dengzhou in 1627, the same year as Hong Taiji's first invasion of Chosŏn, he was blown off course near the Miaodao Archipelago, coming ashore at P'ungch'ŏn in Hwanghae Province; from there, as the only member of the twenty-nine-person crew to survive, he set out for Kwangju in Chŏlla Province, where he established himself as a silk farmer and was discovered by the illustrious official Kim Yuk (1580–1658).⁸⁰ Such stories suggest that the narrative of Yi Ogyŏng's journey over the Yellow Sea is less unusual than Yi Minsŏng thought.

The first-person account of the Liaodongese refugee, Kang Shijue, provides a much more vivid image of the chaos of that period and the lack of direct official involvement.⁸¹ Kang, having been involved in the battle of Sarhu and also in the series of conflicts with the Later Jin in the early 1620s, was eventually captured after serving in a righteous militia (*ŭibyŏng*), probably one connected with Mao Wenlong, in Mt. Fenghuang near the Chosŏn border at Ŭiju.⁸² He described how he was captured by the Manchu, successfully escaping, however, and passing into Chosŏn via Mamp'o in the eighth or ninth month of 1625.⁸³ He did not, at this point, join Mao Wenlong's army but wandered aimlessly around the forty-two administrative districts of P'yŏngan and Hwanghae provinces for about a year, moving to Hamhŭng in southern Hamgyŏng Province only in the seventh month of 1626. Following this, he resided in a series of communities (most of them quite isolated) in Hamgyŏng, spending at least half a year and generally a much longer time in each. He lived out the remainder of his life in that province, coming to the attention of the central court only in the 1660s.⁸⁴

The Chosŏn court, as quoted in *The Ming Veritable Records* in 1626, was concerned that the large number of Liaodongese in P'yŏngan Province threatened to erase the distinction between "host" and "guest," and worried that, with the overwhelming power of the guests within northern P'yŏngan Province, the status of the host was badly shaken, while the situation of the guests was by no means secure.⁸⁵ Far from treating the arriving Liaodongese as representatives of a superior Chinese civilization, the Chosŏn court itself, in an official document sent to the Ming court, referred to Chinese in Chosŏn as "guests," and, with full expectations of an understanding Ming court, spoke of the need to maintain the supremacy of the Korean hosts within Korean territory. However, it would also be a mistake to look for some generalized hostility to all foreigners—just as it had done during the Imjin War, the Chosŏn court continued to seek to employ skilled Ming migrants within Chosŏn. Even more would have settled in areas

that were beyond the range of effective surveillance by the central government. Kang Shijue and Ma Shunshang, along with many others, established themselves in various regions of Chosŏn on an informal basis, only coming to the attention of the court much later. Nevertheless, even as the Chosŏn state varied in its approaches to them, the Liaodongese, like Imjin-era Ming deserters, found corners of Chosŏn society in which to establish themselves.

Managing Chaos

In earlier Korean scholarship it was once common to assume a state of conflict between the people of Chosŏn and those outside of the Chosŏn state, to imagine the Chosŏn people as a community in full resistance to the foreign outsider, with this hostility especially prevalent during the violence of the wars of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.⁸⁶ However, just as Ming and Japanese deserters had passed with considerable ease across the cultural boundary into Chosŏn during the Imjin War, Jurchens and Liaodongese, with cultural connections to the Chosŏn state going back many generations, were able to cross the barrier with very little difficulty at all, forming links with Chosŏn subjects. Faced with bringing the chaotic population under control while under pressure from the Manchu khanate, the Chosŏn state was relatively uninterested in “civilizational” categories (barbarian versus Confucian Koreans and Chinese), while bureaucratic categories themselves possessed an unstable relationship with cultural practices and geographic origin.

Even more so than Ming soldiers, Liaodongese, with their roots on the frontiers of Jurchen and Mongol worlds, were hard to categorize and control. The Ming court itself distrusted their loyalties and suspected Liaodongese transfrontiersmen of possessing a cultural affinity to the Manchu enemy.⁸⁷ Such worries were not without their basis. There are numerous records of Liaodongese willingly submitting to Nurhaci. Both the Ming and Chosŏn were worried about the proliferation of White Lotus cultists in Liaodong, especially one sect led by Jin Deshi based near the Yalu River. From his surname, equivalent to the common Korean surname Kim, Jin may well have been of either Korean or Jurchen origin, and the Ming and Chosŏn courts did, in fact, see him as a potential ally of Nurhaci.⁸⁸ More broadly, many Liaodongese commoners considered their loyalties negotiable, submitting willingly to Nurhaci initially but later rejecting Nurhaci and their Manchu overlords through poisonings and outright revolt.⁸⁹

This fluidity was as much a problem for Chosŏn as for the Ming. In the royal response to Nam Isin’s report on Jin Deshi’s sect in Qinghebao, reference was

made particularly to the fact that, since the Ming intervention in the Imjin War, the people of Liaodong had gained extensive knowledge of Chosŏn through frequent trips across the border; moreover, they almost certainly were a mixture of Jurchens (I) and Chinese (Han). After considering a number of worrisome possibilities—that Chosŏn might be forced to participate in the suppression, that the rebels might conspire with Nurhaci to attack Chosŏn, or that they might be forced into Chosŏn by the Ming armies—the monarch suggested an extensive program of military preparation, including espionage by local soldiers with good knowledge of Chinese who could be dressed in Chinese attire and sent to investigate the plans of the cultists.⁹⁰

If Chosŏn functionaries could be sent wearing Chinese clothes to investigate Liaodongese refugees, they were faced equally with Liaodongese who could return the compliment and dress in Korean clothes. Thus, three years after the Battle of Sarhu, in 1621, the governor of P'yŏngan Province, Yi Sanggil (1556–1637), made particular reference to the large number of fugitives from the Chinese military (*Tangjang*) in Yongch'ŏn. They had stayed a long time and had started wearing Chosŏn clothes. He suggested thorough patrols to control them.⁹¹ The challenge to the Chosŏn court of the Liaodongese refugees was thus not just their military ability but also their participation in multiple cultural spheres, including the Korean, which made it hard to distinguish them from the population properly present in Chosŏn.

The difficulty with Jurchens, who had been intermarrying with Chosŏn subjects in Hamgyŏng Province and visiting Hansŏng for generations, was even greater. Although the Chosŏn court had sought to defend them from Bujantai and Nurhaci when they were on Chosŏn's northern border, as they passed south of the border they did indeed cause some concerns about security. Yi Sugwang himself, who had earlier expressed his support for the Pŏnhos as a defensive barrier, was nevertheless worried about the large community of submitting-Jurchens in Kyŏnggi Province. These were the very Pŏnhos who had fled south rather than face assimilation in Nurhaci's new state, but Yi worried about their density in Kyŏnggi Province, where "the fires of different Jurchen villages are visible to each other." This large concentration of Jurchens, Yi thought, presaged serious unrest.⁹² He was not alone in this worry. Thus, in 1603, the court debated the case of Kilsang, a submitting-Jurchen residing in Hamhŭng, but originally from Hoeryŏng, who had participated in the suppression of the Nor'o uprising. He had illegally left Hamhŭng to move in with his son-in-law in a community called Nuwŏn in Yangju, near Hansŏng.⁹³ The village of Nuwŏn to which he fled was in fact in the process of becoming exclusively Jurchen. The court demanded

that the Jurchens of Nuwŏn be moved to settlements farther from the capital. However, the Jurchens themselves resisted such a move, perhaps because they had a historical relationship to the capital shaped by the state-sponsored visits to Hansŏng during the early Chosŏn. In the end, the court was only able to move them as far as Yongin, south of the Han River across from Hansŏng, to an area of empty settlements vacated by submitting-foreigners who had fled during the Imjin War.⁹⁴

At times, Jurchens were a source of concern even when they were based in the fishing communities in the south. In a 1610 report, concern was expressed about the large number of Jurchens inhabiting fishing communities on the west coast of Chosŏn. The Office of the Censor-General (*Saganwŏn*) had been wrestling with the implications of these settlements for the security of the militarily vital Kanghwa Island to the west of the capital at the mouth of the Han River. “[The Jurchens] have become so used to sea routes, that they use boats as if they were horses, and in fact far exceed the people of our country. Should there be a serious [military] crisis, then they most certainly would be of dual loyalties, perhaps communicating with them [the enemy] and blocking [the escape of the court to Kanghwa Island]. How can this be a minor worry?”⁹⁵ Court discussion, however, turned against such xenophobic suspicion. As officials argued, the affairs of the realm were determined by nothing but the force of circumstances (*se*)—when these are favorable, even Vietnamese and steppe peoples could be friends, and when unfavorable, even people in the same boat could become enemies.⁹⁶

Despite occasional worries, the Chosŏn court was not at all interested in removing either Japanese or Jurchens from its territory and was in fact willing to defend their presence in Chosŏn against diplomatic pressure for their repatriation. In 1609, Chosŏn established a treaty with Edo Japan, in part to negotiate for the return of Korean captives from Japan. In 1634, however, when the lord of Tsushima demanded the return of Japanese defectors, Yi Sŏ (1580–1637) and Sin Kyŏngjin (1575–1643) recommended that Chosŏn refuse, because numbered among the defectors were highly skilled and unusually brave soldiers: “Not only are their technical skills admirable, but when ordered into battle they give no thought to their own survival. If treated well, they act affectionately toward their superiors as they march to the field of death. When placed within the military, the advantages that they provide are not minor.”⁹⁷

To be sure, Japanese in Chosŏn found other ways of making a living, notably farming, trading, and hunting,⁹⁸ but they excelled in military matters. At times, the Chosŏn court seemed at pains to deny this very feature—no doubt to avoid excessive demands. Thus, in the wake of the disastrous 1619 defeat of the Ming

and its allies, including Chosŏn, at the hands of the Manchu khanate under Nurhaci, Chosŏn faced renewed demands to send arquebusiers to the Ming, to which the court under Kwanghae-gun responded that use of firearms was not a talent characteristic of Chosŏn subjects. The few thousand Japanese arquebusiers in Chosŏn either had been captured by the Manchu or were too old and weak even to defend Chosŏn.⁹⁹ Indeed, in 1622, discussion of defense in the Border Defense Command turned to Japanese defectors. It was pointed out that, thirty years having passed, the few remaining Japanese defectors were old and frail, and of little use, although a few could still be used for training others.¹⁰⁰ Nevertheless, in 1624, the year after Injo's own coup d'état, there were evidently enough trained soldiers among the Japanese defectors and their descendants that there were Japanese soldiers among both the government troops and the rebel armies during the Yi Kwal uprising. Surrendered Japanese arquebusiers and their descendants were used several times in key roles by the rebels. For instance, they routed a unit of government forces at Kangr'an near Songdo (Kaesŏng),¹⁰¹ while during the Battle of Hwangju they attacked the Chosŏn army, flourishing swords, and succeeded in forcing the Chosŏn army to retreat.¹⁰² In response to the rebellion, many Japanese defectors within military divisions under Yi Kwal's command or associated with Yi Kwal were executed.¹⁰³ Indeed, one official, Yi Min'gu (1589–1670), wondered if the fundamental differences between civilized people and barbarians was at the root of Japanese participation in Yi Kwal's rebellion. He stated: "Those Japanese defectors who followed the rebel were especially murderous. It seems that this is because they are not of our kind, and so their minds must also be different. Because there are so many of them . . . let us first criticize them with the purpose of offering forgiveness and then divide them up and send them north."¹⁰⁴

At the same time, some notable Japanese defectors continued to show considerable loyalty, contradicting Yi Min'gu's claim of absolute differences. One especially well-known defector, Kim Ch'ungsŏn, also known by his Japanese name Sayaga, showed both loyalty to the court and military success.¹⁰⁵ Having served the Chosŏn court against the Japanese during the Imjin War, in 1628, he once more attracted the interest of the Chosŏn monarchy, when he was specifically praised for his bravery during the Yi Kwal uprising. He was especially lauded for the vital role that he played in bringing surrendered Japanese with shaky loyalties back under Chosŏn control and presenting to the court the severed head of one notable Japanese defector ally of Yi Kwal, an action that is also highlighted in the yearly record within Kim Ch'ungsŏn's collected works.¹⁰⁶ More broadly, he was described as playing a vital role in the military activities of Injo's

army. He displayed the same loyalty during the Chǒngmyō Manchu invasion in 1627, when he spontaneously took twenty men under his command to battle, of whom eighteen were cavalry.¹⁰⁷ In reward for such loyalty, the Capital Guard office (*Ŭyǒngch'ōng*) recommended that his sons, among whom some were impoverished and without an official position, be employed for their skill with arquebuses and swords, and that the Japanese defectors under Kim Ch'ungsŏn be formed into a military unit with their own earmarked funding.¹⁰⁸

Even as Chosŏn placed Japanese arquebusiers under Kim Ch'ungsŏn, it faced growing demands from the emerging Manchu state under Hong Taiji to “repatriate” both Han Chinese and Jurchen refugees to the Manchu state. The Manchu state demanded the repatriation of Han Chinese based on the simple logic of conquest—as Hong Taiji expressed in a diplomatic communication to the Chosŏn court in 1636, “heaven” had granted Liaodong to the Manchu khans, and so also the right to control the Liaodongese themselves.¹⁰⁹ Chosŏn itself had no established relationship with the Liaodongese refugees, who had largely established themselves in Chosŏn territory without the approval of the Chosŏn state. This contrasted markedly with the situation of Jurchen migrants, who often had a relationship with the Chosŏn state and populace that extended over several centuries, and over whom the Manchu claimed the right to rule based on a supposed historical continuity extending to the Jurchen Jin dynasty that fell in the thirteenth century. Thus, a letter sent by the Jicin beile, along with other beile of the “Great Manchu Kingdom” to the Chosŏn court in 1627 had specifically complained that, when “our [Manchu] armies” (*Ma. meni cooha*) were taking away “our [Manchu’s] Warka” (*Ma. meni Warka*), the Chosŏn court had, for no good reason, “passed out of the boundaries of the Chosŏn state and attacked our armies.”¹¹⁰

Before 1637, the Chosŏn court was better able to stand up to this demand and even write positively of the cross-border identity of its former Jurchen subjects. For instance, in 1628, shortly after the first Manchu invasion of 1627, the Chosŏn court referred to its former Jurchen subjects to resist Later Jin demands for trade at the Hoeryōng border market. The Chosŏn court declared that such a market was pointless because of the absence of the Jurchens who had formerly resided in the region. As was recorded in the letter of the royal secretariat, “Formerly, a great many Pōnhos lived in the Six Garrisons, and of the merchants of the country, many gathered together at that place, but now, since the disturbance of the Imjin Year (1592), there is not a single Pōnho still present, and it has been impossible to engage in trade in the region for a long time. The fact that the barbarians of the eastern bank are requesting such a market suggests that they know of the former

situation, but not of the current one.”¹¹¹ This letter, in addition to including obviously insulting language, referring to what had by then become a brother country as “the barbarians on the east bank of the river,” was clearly needling the Later Jin about their forcible repatriation of the Pönhos of the Six Garrisons of northern Hamgyŏng, while avoiding direct reference to that act. Moreover, the term “Pönho” itself referred specifically to the Chosŏn court’s established relationships with the Jurchens and thus rejected the Manchu state’s claims.

Still, the concern persisted that essential differences among Jurchens and Japanese—a different mindset, the lack of established loyalties to the Chosŏn state—could become the cause of serious unrest. Yet, although a number of Chosŏn officials did worry about the presence of Jurchens in Chosŏn proper, there seems to be no records of actual revolts among Jurchens south of Hamgyŏng. An apparent exception is an isolated entry in the *Journal of the Royal Secretariat* from the time of the Pyŏngja Invasion that describes unrest among the Jurchen refugees residing in Namyang in Kyŏnggi Province (now part of present-day Hwasŏng). Yun Chip (1606–1637) reported with concern about the situation of his family in Namyang in Kyŏnggi Province, where his brother Yun Kye (1583–1636) was serving as magistrate. Yun Chip had heard disturbing news from Sŏ Hŭnnam (?–1667), a base-born person who had been gathering information for the Chosŏn court.¹¹² Sŏ had informed Yun Chip that on his return from Suwŏn he had heard that the submitting-Jurchens of Namyang had risen in revolt, such that the magistracy and all the private [commoners’] houses had fallen to the enemy.¹¹³

It isn’t clear that the revolt actually happened. Unknown to Yun Chip and Sŏ Hŭnnam, Yun Kye had already been executed by the Qing in battle as a leader of a loyalist army.¹¹⁴ It seems quite likely that this Jurchen revolt was no more than a rumor emerging from the fog of war. If Jurchen migrants did revolt, it is not likely that they did so out of loyalty to the Manchu invaders (whom the Jurchens had, after all, fled several decades earlier) but because of feelings of betrayal, when they, like Korean fugitives from the Qing, resisted being repatriated to the Qing by force.¹¹⁵ More generally, it does not seem that Chosŏn officials were right to suspect Jurchen refugees of disloyalty or collusion with the enemy.

After the defeat of Chosŏn in 1637, the Chosŏn court was no longer able to insist on its control over those in its territory, but was forced, by the terms of their surrender, to hand over the three categories of people (*samsaegin*): Koreans who had been captured by the Qing and then fled back to Chosŏn (*chuhoeja*), Liaodongese (*Hanin*) who had fled Liaodong for Chosŏn, and Chosŏn’s Jurchen subjects. Despite the inability of the Chosŏn court to resist Qing demands, they were nevertheless faced by the difficult challenge of finding people who

had already assimilated into Chosŏn society. Even Liaodongese, despite often limited connections to Chosŏn from before their migration, blended well into Chosŏn. Thus, in *Official Reports from Mukden*, a recently recaptured Liaodongese fugitive reported to the Qing that his two fellows, both Liaodongese who were competent in Korean, were taken as slaves by a landholder, while only he was returned to the Qing. The same passage also reports on a Korean captive who fled back to Korea, with his wife, a Ming (that is, “Chinese”) person, and who had sought to avoid repatriation by sending his wife back while he himself remained in Chosŏn.¹¹⁶ Another later passage, largely concerned with Jurchens who had fled back to Korea, describes one man named Sor’ongsa who had made a “Han woman (*Hannyō*) his wife, and was living with her.” The Qing court demanded that the “Han woman” be repatriated with great haste. Described as “living [in] the Pak family household,” Sor’ongsa may possibly have been a slave. His name may be translated as a “little interpreter” and perhaps suggests a facility in spoken Chinese that might indeed have been useful for someone living on the Yalu. It also might explain his marriage to the Han woman.¹¹⁷ On the one hand, these cases all suggest that Liaodongese migrants were able to vanish into Korean society through personal connections or familiarity with Korean language and customs, especially if one considers the near certainty that many more, in the chaos of post-Imjin Chosŏn, managed to evade detection by the Chosŏn and Qing states altogether. The servile or semiservile positions that many Liaodongese fell into in Chosŏn, on the other hand, reminds us that such border crossings would not necessarily have been entirely to the benefit of the Liaodongese fugitives in question.

In the case of the Jurchens, of course, a long period of residence within Chosŏn made it most difficult indeed to remove them. The *Official Reports from Mukden* records the negotiations for their repatriation in considerable detail. Within this text, the Jurchen subjects being repatriated are, in nearly all cases, referred to simply as “submitting-foreigners” (*hyanghwain*), “submitting-foreigner descendants” (*hyanghwain chason*), “submitting-Jurchens” (*hyanghwa hoin*), or even as “Qing people” (*Ch’ōng’in*). With the crown prince himself in captivity in Mukden, the Manchu were able to impose their own particular historical justification for the repatriation of the Jurchen onto the Chosŏn court. Thus, in the third month of 1638, the Qing generals Mafuta and Inggūldai upbraided the crown prince for failing to repatriate more than a few Chosŏn fugitives or submitting-foreigners,¹¹⁸ to which the crown prince asserted as his excuse the fact that submitting-foreigners, when risking capture, simply went into hiding and were thus immensely difficult to track down.¹¹⁹ Later that same year, when Inggūldai

and Mafuta criticized the crown prince for his failure to repatriate any submitting-foreigners other than a single weak and elderly man, the crown prince defended himself by arguing that, since submitting-foreigners had been in Chosŏn so long and had intermarried with Chosŏn subjects, repatriating not only those who had submitted themselves, but also their descendants, would be impossibly difficult and would cause immense hardship to the population. Moreover, the crown prince pointed out that the original agreement between Qing and Chosŏn had not required the repatriation of submitting-foreigner descendants.

Inggŭldai responded with a brief history lesson:

Our country and Chosŏn both have old historical writings. Has the crown prince alone not read them? Of old, the state of Jin was to the left [east] of the Liao river, but after it declined, the subjects of the Jin scattered into Chŏlla and Kyŏngsang Provinces. These are indeed the descendants of submitting-foreigners who we referred to previously as those who do not need to be repatriated. However, in the case of those during the current dynasty who submitted to the Chosŏn court, even if they are not the ones who submitted themselves, as the children and grandchildren of them, they are ultimately the same as those who submitted themselves, so how can they not be repatriated? The recently repatriated Kang Ch'undang may not have submitted himself, but his grandfather was a submitting-foreigner, and so equally the grandson is a submitting-foreigner as well. Of submitting-foreigners here there are many who still have children and siblings in Chosŏn. It is human sentiment to wish that fathers live together with their children, and older brothers with younger brothers. Chosŏn people seek to redeem their younger siblings and children, so why should submitting-foreigners not also follow their desires? . . . We have established a list of more than 690 people, with their area of residence, names and surnames . . . if you do not send them all back, then among the two of us one will have to go and bring them ourselves.¹²⁰

The history provided here by Inggŭldai is similar to that found in *The Old Manchu Archives* for the reign of Nurhaci, although Inggŭldai, in contrast to Nurhaci, did not claim all who descended from the diaspora of the Jurchen Jin. Inggŭldai's demands were still quite expansive, in that he sought the repatriation of not only the submitting-foreigners but their descendants as well. Even though he likely referred only to those Jurchens who had migrated to Chosŏn in relatively recent periods, he still made claims to people who had become deeply integrated into Chosŏn society.

Of course, in Chosŏn “submitting-foreigner” had traditionally encompassed all foreigners settling in Chosŏn territory, not just Jurchens. The restriction of the term in *The Official Reports from Mukden* to refer to Jurchens alone should be understood in the context of the negotiation of terminology between Chosŏn and the Qing. Thus, in *The Official Reports from Mukden*, Liaodongese refugees are nearly invariably referred to as Han people (Hanin), which also happens to be the term used to translate Nikan, the preferred Manchu term for Liaodongese. Since, as will be discussed in chapter 4, Chinese were classified as submitting-foreigners in the period following the 1640s, it is unlikely that the Chosŏn court felt any ideological objections to using the term “submitting-foreigner” for Chinese as well. Rather, the Liaodongese refugees, in contrast to the Jurchens, had without exception entered without the permission of the Chosŏn court—they had not submitted formally to royal edification. By contrast, Jurchens from Chosŏn did, at one point, go through the process of submitting to the Chosŏn court, or at least their ancestors had done so. More important for the Qing, Jurchens were recorded in Chosŏn documents as submitting-foreigners and so served as an equivalent of the Manchu term “Warka.” Indeed, in a number of texts in *The Veritable Records of Emperor Taizong*, one may find entries that alternate between the two terms, “Warka” and “submitting-foreigners” (Ch. *xianghuaren*),¹²¹ the later a term that was more generally used to describe those who had submitted to the Manchu state. By accepting its use when referring to Jurchens who had submitted to the Chosŏn state, they were accepting, at least in part, an identity for the Warka that was determined by Chosŏn administrative categories.

In fact, although the Qing imposed their own historical narrative in order to demand the repatriation of the Warka, in order to repatriate those who lived south of Hamgyŏng, they needed to make use of Chosŏn records to identify who was Warka and who was not. The Qing officials themselves clearly acknowledged this fact. In one of the first discussions of the repatriation of Jurchens in *Reports from Mukden*, the generals Inggŭldai and Mafuta insisted that the Chosŏn court was dishonest when it claimed that it had repatriated all submitting-foreigners that it could possibly find. Rather, the generals declared, it should be able to hunt down submitting-foreigners, because when they submitted to the Chosŏn court the officials in charge would surely have recorded all significant information about them and distributed this information to the regions in which they had been settled. Thus, distinguishing those of Jurchen origin from the surrounding population should be a simple matter of investigating the records of each county. The failure of the Chosŏn court to do so, the two generals insisted, was simply

an example of the duplicity and insincerity of Chosŏn officialdom, quite like its failure to return more than six runaway Korean captives of the at least ten thousand who had fled from their Qing masters and the continued presence of Chinese fugitives in Chosŏn.¹²²

Chosŏn records themselves, of course, were often ambiguous, incomplete, and open to dispute. Inggŭldai and Mafuta had insisted, on the model of Kang Ch'ungdan, that descendants of submitting-foreigners also were subject to repatriation. In later discussions, the Qing's chief Korean-language interpreter Chŏng Myŏngsu made a long demand for the repatriation of the children of submitting-foreigners in Chosŏn recorded in a Korean vernacular text that he seemingly had obtained by interrogating submitting-foreigners who had already been repatriated. In the process, nevertheless, he conceded that deportation should be limited to the descendants of submitting-foreigners on the paternal line, and he excluded Korean spouses of submitting-foreigners from demands for deportation,¹²³ although the fact that debates on this subject reoccurred suggests that these rules were not observed consistently.¹²⁴ Inevitably, there were many uncertain cases—and the task of identifying submitting-foreigners themselves was complicated by the limited knowledge of the officials in charge. For instance, in 1638, a high civil official Ch'oe Yuyŏn (1587–?) reported from within the Border Defense Command concerning six submitting-foreigners from Kyŏngsang Province who were being prepared for deportation to the Qing. Among them was a “Jurchen child” (*Ho'a*) who, upon investigation, was from Chongsŏng in Hamgyŏng Province but was probably not a submitting-foreigner. Ch'oe Yuyŏn suggested that an inquiry concerning the child's ancestry be sent to Chongsŏng county, and that the child's repatriation be delayed until a proper determination could be made. The court agreed with Ch'oe Yuyŏn and made the general statement that in such cases, people should only be repatriated to the Qing after careful consideration. No doubt, the local functionaries in Kyŏngsang Province who had likely arranged the original deportation would have assumed that any migrant from the alien world of northern Hamgyŏng would have Jurchen origins, quite without regard for the child's actual ancestry—and would not, in any case, have necessarily had the documentation to make the determination. Even for the central government, it was not easy to distinguish a person of submitting-foreigner status from other residents of Chongsŏng.¹²⁵

Ultimately, the porous reality of the social worlds of seventeenth-century Chosŏn made it very hard to determine people's ancestry. Jurchens, especially, frequently married Korean spouses, which complicated their status, and especially the status of their children and their spouses. In general the Chosŏn

and Qing courts had agreed to “repatriate” those Jurchens registered as submitting-foreigners and their descendants, but not the Korean wives of Jurchens.¹²⁶ This solution did not please either court, entirely, and inevitably caused considerable dissatisfaction from the mixed Korean-Jurchen families being split up. In one especially interesting case, Kim Kyedük, a Korean illegal ginseng digger from Hamgyöng captured in Qing territory, was identified as a Jurchen “submitting-foreigner” by another “submitting-foreigner” who had already been repatriated.¹²⁷ As the Qing sought to have him and his family repatriated, the Chosön court first objected that his wife was in fact a Korean slave attached to a post-station in Hamgyöng Province and so was not the proper object of repatriation.¹²⁸ Later they expanded their objections to claim that Kim Kyedük was never a registered submitting-foreigner in the first place but had simply been seeking to avoid judgment for his crimes and repayment of his debts that he had accumulated through his criminal life as a ginseng smuggler. The Qing response was informative—although Kim Kyedük may not have been registered as a submitting-foreigner, as he originated in the heavily Jurchen worlds of Hamgyöng Province, he could be assumed to be a Jurchen.¹²⁹

Ultimately, Chosön officials, while fully subscribing to the central importance of the Chunghwa tradition then represented by the Ming emperor and court, did not consider individual Chinese, and certainly not ordinary Liaodongese refugees, to be representatives of that tradition. Whether Liaodongese, Japanese, or Jurchens, the court sought in vain to limit their disruptive entry into Chosön, especially into areas near the Chosön capital. Nor were they eager to hand anybody back to the Qing, least of all their new Japanese arquebusiers or their long-established Jurchen subjects, especially as the task of distinguishing who was Jurchen, who was Liaodongese, and who was Korean was not at all easy.

THE MING-MANCHU WARS during the early seventeenth century brought about a second wave of migrants to Chosön, in addition to the already substantial number of migrants who had come during the Imjin War. As with that earlier wave of migrants, Chosön’s response was not primarily determined by a Confucian desire to distinguish the civilized from the barbarian, although at times this did become part of court debates on the subject. Rather, the Chosön court was often more favorably disposed toward the Jurchens and Japanese, with whom it had an established relationship, than toward Liaodongese migrants, whom it could not control and whose loyalties it could not but suspect. Beyond that, Chosön’s response to the migrants was driven by such concerns as the desire to maintain social order and protect the fragile postwar Chosön economy.

The problem faced by all the rival states competing in Northeast Asia was that the cultural categories that they sought to impose did not map reliably onto the reality of the social and cultural worlds of the populace that they governed. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the distinctions between Jurchens, Koreans, and Liaodongese had been by no means precisely drawn, and the initial result of the chaos of the wars of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries had been to confuse these distinctions still more, as migrants and refugees intermarried with each other and settled in each other's communities. Chosŏn's response to migrants in its territory inevitably had to take into account the rival claims of the Ming empire and the Manchu Qing. All the states involved also had to struggle against the resistance and cultural fluidity of the migrants themselves.

Administration of Foreign Communities after the Wars

CHOSŎN'S DEFEAT AT THE hands of the invading Qing in 1637, however disgracefully it may have been seen by many of Chosŏn's bureaucratic elite, brought an end to a period of nearly constant warfare, leaving Chosŏn as an island of peace within the otherwise strife-torn seventeenth-century world. It also brought an end to the large-scale migration of peoples that had characterized the period following the Imjin War. With a few exceptions, new migrants did not settle in Chosŏn, even as turmoil continued to engulf the seas around it, as castaways were arriving on its shores, and rumors of the Ming loyalist struggle were spreading among high and low. Domestically, communities of Jurchens, Han Chinese, and Japanese and their descendants—those who had avoided repatriation by the Qing after 1637—continued to reside in Chosŏn. No doubt they became steadily less distinguishable in language and dress throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but they continued to be defined, much as their ancestors were, by the same tax category of “submitting-foreigner.” Despite a much-restricted diplomatic sphere after 1637, Chosŏn continued to administer them as foreigners, and indeed to treat them, regardless of whether they were of Ming Chinese, Jurchen, or Japanese origin, as outsiders submitting to Chosŏn to receive edification from the Chosŏn court.

Migrants and Submitting-Foreigners in a New, Bordered World

In 1637, their eastern flank secured by Chosŏn's submission, the Qing were able to launch attacks that gave them control of Beijing by 1644. Warfare continued on the Chinese mainland until the Qing suppressed the Revolt of the Three Feudatories of southern China in 1681. To the north and west, the Qing contended for control over Mongols as well as with the expanding Russian empire in Amuria but managed to largely confirm its control through a series of treaties with Russia in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.¹ The seas presented particular challenges to the Qing, and the southern and eastern shores

long remained under the control of piratical sea lords, notably those from the Zheng family who claimed loyalty to the Ming. Even this challenge, however, was brought to an end with the Qing's successful invasion of the Zheng family's kingdom of Dongning in Taiwan in 1683.² To Chosŏn's east, Japan fell to the Tokugawa house after the battle of Sekigahara in 1600. Tokugawa Ieyasu established Edo (modern-day Tokyo) as his shogunal capital, and, through a series of reforms, centralized Japan to a far greater degree than before, proscribing Christianity, banning Iberian traders, restricting Dutch merchants to a single port, and preventing Japanese daimyō from military adventurism by banning Japanese from overseas travel, bringing an end to its status as an overseas pirate haven. As the Edo shogunate established greater control over trade, it limited trade with Chosŏn to the exclusive domain of the daimyō of Tsushima.³

Chosŏn, by then an island of relative peace in a tumultuous northeast Asia, looked on these events uneasily. After 1637, the Qing empire compelled Chosŏn to serve it in almost all respects exactly as Chosŏn had previously served the Ming, demanding that it send several diplomatic missions each year to the Qing capital (first Mukden, then Beijing) to make obeisance to the Qing emperor, thereby demonstrating that the mandate of heaven had truly passed from the Ming to the Qing.⁴ For this very reason, to most of Chosŏn's *sajok* aristocracy, Chosŏn's submission to the Qing in 1637 was a shameful capitulation and a betrayal of the Ming empire that had intervened on Chosŏn's behalf during the Imjin War.⁵ Ostensibly, at least, Chosŏn monarchs continued to represent themselves to domestic audiences as loyal to the Ming and opposed to the Qing, with Hyojong (r. 1649–1659), especially, plotting a military conspiracy against the Qing, called the Northern Expedition (*pukpŏllon*),⁶ the discussion of which was revived again under Sukchong (r. 1674–1720) during the Revolt of the Three Feudatories.⁷

Although one can doubt how serious these military preparations ever were,⁸ during the seventeenth century the monarchy and most of the *sajok* bureaucracy of Chosŏn cultivated their self-image as the last remaining heirs to the Chunghwa tradition with a responsibility to restore the Ming to its proper place in East Asia, a phenomenon that Hŏ T'aeyong calls the Chunghwa Restoration Consciousness.⁹ They continued to date documents unlikely to be seen by the Qing according to the calendar of the Ming Chongzhen emperor and to refer to the Qing invaders with hostile and delegitimizing language in private contexts. Within Chosŏn, *sajok* aristocrats called for the restoration of the Ming, though in practice Chosŏn envoys engaged in the same rituals of obeisance to the Qing that they had offered to the Ming.¹⁰ Although there was very little

practical military preparation, Chosŏn's Chunghwa Restoration Consciousness was taken very seriously indeed, contributing, as Haboush has argued, to the angry factional disputes of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. With the Pugin (northerner) faction largely driven from the court after the overthrow of Kwanghae-gun in 1623, court politics became divided between the Namin (southerner) and Sŏin (westerner) factions, with the generally dominant Sŏin faction splitting into Noron (patriarchs) and Soron (disciples) factions during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Playing a key role in these disputes were questions of court ritual, a matter that was given greater urgency by the widespread belief that, with the fall of the Ming, proper Confucian rites could be found nowhere outside of Chosŏn itself.¹¹

Although Chosŏn's *sajok* aristocrats shared their Ming loyalism with many in Southeast Asia, Japan, and with the network of Maritime Chinese in the East and South China seas, Chosŏn's need to avoid renewed conflict with the Qing empire made any alliances or links with Ming loyalist forces outside of Chosŏn impractical. Moreover, as both the Edo Bakufu and the Qing empire consolidated control over their territories and centralized their administrations, Chosŏn no longer had access to the networks of Japanese and Jurchen potentates who had acted as intermediaries in trade, diplomacy, and military matters. To its north, the Qing reorganization of Manchuria eliminated the Pŏnhos, and as the former Jurchens were moved south to serve in the banner armies of the Qing in China proper, the area became substantially emptied of population. This removed a major source of migrants to Chosŏn. Furthermore, after the joint expedition in 1712 to demarcate the border, both the Qing and Chosŏn cooperated to limit illicit border crossing in either direction.¹² Although Chosŏn resumed trade relations with Japan in 1609, it restricted Japanese merchants to the Japan House in Tongnae (present-day Pusan). The *daimyō* of Tsushima continued to act as an intermediary and monopolize the trade between Korea and Japan, but the Chosŏn court no longer allowed visits to Hansŏng by Japanese potentates, and the Chosŏn-Japan trade became a sharply controlled bureaucratic process.¹³ The seas were less easy to control, as both European and Chinese vessels impinged from time to time on Chosŏn territory.¹⁴ Before 1683, maritime Chinese owing loyalty to the Ming became at times a source of political controversy in Chosŏn,¹⁵ although in practice the options were to send them to Japan (which would execute them should they prove to be Christians),¹⁶ return them to the Qing to receive punishment, or have the magistrate push them back out to sea without reporting to the capital, to avoid diplomatic controversy. In fact, as such supposedly Ming loyalist castaways were associated with piratical regimes, with

little relation to any legitimate Ming state, few in the Chosŏn court were interested in supporting them or accepting them on Chosŏn territory. After 1683, of course, such castaways could simply be returned to the Qing without any controversy at all.¹⁷

Bordered by two centralized states, and with a policy of returning castaways and outsiders to either Edo or the Qing empire, Chosŏn, with some exceptions as late as the early nineteenth century,¹⁸ no longer settled foreigners on its soil. Nevertheless, submitting-foreigner status continued to be employed to administer those foreigners and their descendants who remained. Migrants and their descendants—Chinese, Japanese, Jurchen, and Dutch—still had roles in Chosŏn society that marked them as foreigners. Despite the supposed Ming loyalism of the post-1637 Chosŏn court, the descendants of Ming migrants were not treated notably differently from those of Jurchens and Japanese, although among submitting-foreigners and their descendants some few were able to leverage their military skills, their connections to prominent *sajok* aristocrats, or their claims of good family background during the Ming to obtain relatively good treatment.

Japanese Defectors after 1637

Unaffected by Qing demands were the Japanese defectors and their descendants. To be sure, defectors were not immune from politics. Yang Hŭngsuk discusses the case of the Korean-born descendant of a Japanese defector who was implicated in the conspiracy of Sim Kiwŏn (1587–1644).¹⁹ Sim was accused of conspiring to raise another member of the royal family, Yi Tŏgin (?–1644), to the throne and to bring the reputedly Ming loyalist military official Im Kyŏngŏp (1594–1646) to serve as the leader of the joint Ming-Chosŏn anti-Manchu forces.²⁰ Na Yŏngnok (1599–1644), the defector in question, lived in Ansan in Kyŏnggi Province and had successfully passed the military exam in 1637. According to the transcript of the investigation, the Chosŏn court, having identified Na Yŏngnok as a follower of Sim Kiwŏn, attempted to arrest Na Yŏngnok and his family, but they had already fled. Instead, the court arrested a number of people associated with Na Yŏngnok, including his brother, Na Yŏngnam (initially mistaken for Na Yŏngnok), who had fled to Yŏnp'ung in Ch'ungch'ŏng Province.²¹ Na Yŏngnam, under torture, implicated a number of other people, including a Japanese defector named Kim Taesu, an officer in the Capital Guard (*Ŏyŏnggun*), who lived in Chuksan in interior Kyŏnggi Province.²² Na Yŏngnam also suggested that his brother and nephews would likely have fled with their family to the Taegu region of Kyŏngsang Province, to stay with one of the many

Japanese defectors in the region.²³ His claim was revealed to be correct, when Na Yŏngnok and his two sons were indeed captured near the homes of prominent Japanese defectors in Taegu.²⁴ The investigation ultimately led to the execution of Na Yŏngnok and his two sons,²⁵ although not before they had implicated others, including one other person specifically referred to as a Japanese defector, Yi Kyŏngsŭng of the Capital Guard.²⁶

While clearly a disaster for Na Yŏngnok's family, was this more broadly a sign of discrimination against the descendants of Japanese defectors? Yang thinks so, pointing to a decision by Injo not to degrade the name of Ansan (as might be expected for the home district of a traitor) because, according to *The Veritable Records*, "he is the descendant of a Japanese defector, and so should not be punished in accordance with the practices for someone of this country."²⁷ Certainly this suggests, as Yang says, a general belief in the distinctiveness of the descendants of Japanese defectors, even where the defector in question had taken a Korean name and successfully passed the military exam. Yet the more detailed account in the *Journal of the Royal Secretariat* explains this decision as being determined not only by Na Yŏngnok's status as submitting-foreigner but also by the frequency of his moves: "Yŏngnok is a descendant of a Japanese, and thus one who has come to submit from abroad, and he has also moved frequently and has no established residence. Thus, in accordance with the sage instruction [of earlier kings], the law should not be imposed upon him in the same manner as upon our country's people."²⁸ From this record, one can tell that the usual legal distinctions imposed upon submitting-foreigners were also imposed on Na Yŏngnok, and that, perhaps because of his foreignness, but explicitly because of his frequent moves, Na Yŏngnok was not considered truly a man of Ansan.

From the case as a whole, it is abundantly clear that the root of Na Yŏngnok's troubles was not that he was the descendant of a Japanese defector, but that he had the misfortune to be identified as a "close confidant" (*simbok*) of Sim Kiwŏn. He may have also participated in Sim Kiwŏn's supposed conspiracy against the throne. Court treason investigations of this sort generally began with the initial targets and spread outward, often aided by torture, through known "close confidants," very often low-status people associated with the palace or the official under suspicion.²⁹ Military officials, like Na, were often at risk of suspicion because their military skills would be needed in any coup d'état. Not only Na, but a number of other people were investigated for their close association with Sim, of whom only four (if Na Yŏngnok's sons are included) were specifically described in surviving sources as the descendants of Japanese defectors. There is also no reference in the surviving records to any punishment being meted out

to the Japanese defectors with whom Na Yŏngnok and his family had sought to take refuge. Moreover, although Na Yŏngnok's brother Na Yŏngnam was initially condemned to death,³⁰ he seems later (through a process not entirely clear) to have been pardoned, for he was later rewarded for his exemplary cooperation in helping to identify his brother.³¹ This case does reveal a continued tendency to distinguish Japanese descendants from other Koreans, but we do not, in fact, have sufficient evidence to say that Japanese status was itself a reason for persecution.

It is significant that Na Yŏngnok, Kim Taesu, and Yi Kyŏngsŭng all had military positions. The connection between military skills and Japanese defector origins continued after the war. Household registry records reveal a continued close association with military organization among the descendants of Japanese defectors. Urok-ri, a community established by Kim Ch'ungsŏn in Sunnam-myŏn within Taegu, is especially interesting, because we have not only household registry documents, but also writings by Kim Ch'ungsŏn and his descendants, including a genealogy of the family. These family documents provide scholars with the context for the public records.

Urok-ri was an unusual village established by Kim Ch'ungsŏn, in part to represent himself as a Japanese soldier who had submitted to Chosŏn because he longed to reside within the cultural sphere of Chunghwa. In "Annals of Deer Village" (*Nokch'ŏnji*), one of his few surviving writings, he referred to his decision to settle in Urok-ri, or "Befriending Deer Village," in part being driven by his desire to live as a Confucian gentleman in retirement, "befriending deer," and in part modeled on the great Song Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi's "White Deer Grotto." Such language, of course, would likely please other sajok aristocrats in Chosŏn who traced the orthodox Confucian lineage to Zhu Xi. Similarly pleasing to a Chosŏn sajok audience would have been Kim's claim that he named a rock face Phoenix Rock Face (Pongam) because phoenixes, as an omen of cultured rule, flew during the reign of the legendary sage king Shun, and he hoped to see new beginnings of cultured rule in Chosŏn. He also showed off his education by naming one peak Crane Peak (Hakpong), because cranes were birds associated with immortals (*sŏnin*); he appropriately quoted a tale from the Chinese tradition to embellish his choice. Otherwise, he described how he remained in retirement in the village, only to leap out occasionally in rage at various enemies of Chosŏn's Confucian civilization. He left the village briefly, as discussed in chapter 3, to fight against Yi Kwal and the two Manchu invasions. In the end, however, he, like other loyal Chosŏn officials, was faced by the shame of Injo's submission to the Qing: "Crying out in pain, I said, 'How can the

Country of Rites and Manners in the East endure to bend its knees before those of the rank of dogs and sheep,' for I doubted that the way of honoring the Zhou and rejecting barbarians could be maintained between heaven and earth."³² Even if, as Fujiwara Takao points out, some of this Confucian language was added by Kim Ch'ungsŏn's descendants,³³ still either he or his descendants were careful to represent Kim Ch'ungsŏn as one who shared Chosŏn hostility to the Qing, and who had truly submitted to Chosŏn because of what he believed to be its special connection to Chunghwa civilization.

The household registry of the village itself strongly shows the imprint of Kim Ch'ungsŏn as military hero and leader. Following the analysis by Yang Hŭng-suk, it is notable that the 1681 household registry for Sunnam-myŏn reveals that none of the 143 men listed for the village of Urok-ri, in contrast to other villages in Sunnam-myŏn, had positions associated with civil sajok, including the humble position of young student (*yubak*). Many of the men of Urok-ri are listed with military positions, with the more senior positions held especially by those known to be sons of Kim Ch'ungsŏn or to have a marital connection to Kim Ch'ungsŏn's family—for instance, one son, Kim Kyŏngwŏn, is listed as having the senior third rank of halberd-splitting general (*chŏlch'ung changgun*), while acting as first deputy commander (*sanghogun*) of the western command of the Five Military Commands. A grandson, Kim Chinmyŏng, had the rank of disgrace-blocking general (*ŏmo changgun*), which was also senior third rank but below that of halberd-splitting general. He acted in a junior fifth rank (*pusagwa*) within the eastern command of the Five Military Commands. Another son, Kim Kyŏngsin, had previously held a sixth-rank title (*sagwa*) in the Five Military Commands, while Ha Wich'ŏng, a somewhat distant relative by marriage to Kim Kyŏngwŏn, is revealed to have purchased a senior third-rank title (*t'ongjŏng taebu*). Lower ranks represented in the village include a range of military units, the most prominent of which is the Special Capital Cavalry Brigade (*kyŏngbyŏl-dae*) in which some fifty-four men of the village were enrolled, either as soldiers or as support-tax payers. This would seem to be a later manifestation of the institution headed up by Kim Ch'ungsŏn himself on the order of Injo in 1627.³⁴

Although the village originated as a community of Japanese defectors, the official documents make no use of the term "Japanese defector" (*hangwae*) to describe residents in Urok-ri. This contrast with the much less famous Japanese defector descendants recorded in *The Ulsan Household Registry* who, to an admittedly decreasing extent during the seventeenth century, had their Japanese defector origins recorded.³⁵ Near the village of Urok-ri itself, elsewhere in Sunnam-myŏn, a number of people are listed specifically as a "support-tax payer for

the Japanese Defectors” (*hangwae poin*) or even as “Japanese Defector Special Capital Cavalry Brigade” (*hangwae poin kyöngbyölda*). Presumably the term is not used in Urok-ri proper because the origin of the Special Capital Cavalry Brigade within the village was too well known to be worth mentioning.³⁶

In fact, the household registry, especially when combined with the genealogy, reveals a strong tendency of the descendants of Japanese defectors to marry the descendants of other Japanese defectors and to reside within the village together. Kim Kyöngwön, the chief householder (*chubo*) of the village, married a woman surnamed Kim, with the *sajok* title of *ssi* (often translated “Madame”) and the clan seat of Ch’öngdo. Her father, Kim Kyech’ung, was a Japanese defector who had served under Kim Ch’ungsön. Another one of Kim Ch’ungsön’s sons, Kim Kyöngsin, married another woman surnamed Kim and with the clan seat of Ch’öngdo, but with the commoner title of *choi*. Her father, Kim Kusöng, had served with Kim Ch’ungsön, as had her grandfather Kim Söngin, who was important enough to have a “Record of His Acts” (*Haengnok*) appended to Kim Ch’ungsön’s complete works. All of them likely received the surname Kim according to the common practice whereby a company of Japanese defectors were granted the same surname.³⁷

Ming Remnants after the Ming

In the fourth month of 1644, the Chosön court received an edict from the Qing’s recently enthroned Shunzi emperor (r. 1644–1661) which stated that it had long been the desire of the deceased emperor (Ch. *huang kao*), Hong Taiji, to stop demanding that Chosön seek out and return remaining Warka in its territory, for Chosön was fully part of the Qing empire, “if people were within Chosön, that was no different from being within the Qing,” and that the Qing would thus forever refrain from demanding the repatriation of people within Chosön territory.³⁸ In fact, the Shunzi emperor, still a young child, was under the supervision of the regent Dorgon (1612–1650). Dorgon’s own interests had shifted away from Chosön and toward northern China, for slightly less than a month earlier Beijing had fallen to Li Zicheng, and the Chongzhen emperor of the Ming had committed suicide, while less than a week after this edict, Dorgon moved south to occupy Beijing with the support of the turncoat Ming general Wu San’gui.³⁹ As he prepared his resources to occupy Beijing and northern China, Dorgon likely wished to redirect administrative resources toward the conquest of China, while also placating Chosön, and his edict likely was designed with this shift in mind. Indeed, he succeeded in the latter, for the response of the Chosön court

was to note with pleasure the greater security implied by describing the edict as the original intention of the previous emperor; they resolved to thank the Qing officials during the next diplomatic mission.⁴⁰ Following this, reference to forcible repatriation disappears from Chosŏn court records, no doubt in part because, after occupying Beijing, the Qing were preoccupied with fighting bandits and the Ming remnants to its south, and consequently too busy to direct its resources to searching out remnants in Chosŏn.

The Qing do not in fact seem to have been much worried by Ming fugitives mobilizing militarily in Chosŏn. Consider the case of Tian Haoqian (ca. 1610–1678). In *The Record of Talented People within the World* (*Pyŏngse chaeŏn rok*), Yi Kyusang (1727–1799), writing during the eighteenth century but basing his description on the tomb inscription (*myojimyŏng*) by Pak Sech'ae (1631–1695), stated that Tian Haoqian was from a family of Ming officials, including a grandfather who rose to the rank of minister (*shangshu*). Through some process not made clear, he served against the Manchu in Ka Island and was captured after the Manchu conquest of the island, but was released by the Qing officer in charge because of his “extraordinary physiognomy.” After his escape, he wandered about Chosŏn begging until he befriended Ku Koeng (1577–1642), a military official who had played a prominent role in the coup d'état that brought Injo to the throne, and who was thus in a position of influence. Through the influence of Ku Koeng and Ku Koeng's nephew Ku Inhu (1578–1658), who became director of the Military Training Agency, Tian, along with a Namman (southern barbarian/southeast Asian) called Pak Yŏn, was placed in charge of a troop of surrendered Japanese and Chinese. After Hyojong's ascent to the throne in 1649, Tian was offered a position as border officer (*pyŏnjang*), which he refused because of his ignorance of Korean. In 1685, during the reign of Sukchong, he was given the special rank of fourth deputy commander (*puhogun*, jr. 4) and at his death was buried near the submitting-foreigner village (*hyanghwa-ri*) on the western slope of Surak mountain, in Yangju, near the capital.⁴¹

Much is left unclear in this account, of course. How Ku Koeng determined Tian's status and his lineage, and why he selected him from among the many Liaodongese refugees, is not clear, although perhaps Ku encountered him earlier during his interaction with the Ming outpost on Ka Island. In any case, despite Qing pressure on Chosŏn between 1637 and 1644, this pressure did not prevent Chosŏn from establishing a military unit under the command of a former Ming officer. Indeed, records suggest significant complicity on the part of the Qing in allowing select Han Chinese to enter Chosŏn. Qing munificence in this regard even extended to women from the Ming palace, of whom a significant number

were allowed to take refuge in Chosŏn, with one, Cui Huijie, coming to particular royal attention on her eightieth birthday in 1699, dying but six years later in 1705.⁴² The Qing also allowed Ming soldiers to enter Chosŏn. At least eleven Ming migrants who later came to prominence seem to have traveled to Chosŏn with the Sohyŏn crown prince and to have been formally emancipated from the Qing by the Pongnim great prince. Described as the “Nine Righteous Officials” during the nineteenth century, these migrants, namely Wang Fenggang, Feng Sanshi, Huang Gong, Wang Meicheng, Yang Fuji, Wang Wenxiang, Pei Sansheng, Zheng Xianjia, and Liu Xishan, were described in later sources as vigorous loyalists who chose to accompany the Pongnim great prince to Chosŏn in order to fulfil the prince’s heartfelt desire to avenge the Ming. They certainly seem to have later become very closely associated with the Pongnim great prince (later Hyojong), although precise sources during Hyojong’s life are not available. Sources from the Sukchong era suggest that the Ming migrants in question were formally emancipated from the Qing at the request of the Chosŏn court,⁴³ as do later biographies.⁴⁴

These Ming migrants presumably included some of the Chinese who were under the command of Tian Haoqian. As such, these so-called Ming loyalists were clearly present in Hansŏng with the full knowledge of the Qing state. In Hansŏng, they were joined by other foreigners, including not only surrendered Japanese but also Dutch. The “southern barbarian” Pak Yŏn, described above as leading the troop along with Tian Haoqian, was one such example. His original name was Jan Janse Weltevree, a Dutch castaway who had arrived with two others in 1627, after pirating a Chinese ship from Amoy and seemingly then being put ashore when the Chinese crew successfully mutinied; upon arrival in Chosŏn, he and his three companions were enrolled in the military, with him acting as their captain or *hopman*.⁴⁵ Although his two companions seemingly died during the Pyŏngja invasion, he, according to later Chosŏn accounts, married a Korean woman, with whom he had two children, and a successful career, gaining a good reputation for his military abilities, and for his skills at crafting cannons. He also had sufficient knowledge of Literary Sinitic in order to read military classics, and possibly even to pass the military examinations. Both he and his descendants (concerning whom sadly nothing is known), served in the Military Training Agency as part of the Wheel Register (*ch’ajŏk*), which likely, as Gari Ledyard points out, refers to a class of artisans operating wheel-driven machinery in the Military Training Agency.⁴⁶

More than twenty years after his arrival, moreover, he was joined by other Dutch, who also appear in Korean records simply as “southern barbarian,” which

is to say, a Southeast Asian. Famously, in 1653, Hendrik Hamel, a Dutch castaway and employee of the Dutch East Asia Company, arrived in Cheju in 1653 with thirty-five others. The Chosŏn officials who encountered them described them as speaking in an “incomprehensible speech and using a strange script,” with visages characterized by “large noses, and blue eyes and short beards” and with a cargo of medicinal plants, deer skins, and scented wood.⁴⁷ According to Hamel’s own account, which he wrote following his escape from Chosŏn in 1666, after their arrival in Cheju they were apprehended and placed under close guard. Their desire to be sent to Nagasaki was refused, bad news which was passed on to them by Jan Janse Weltevree, who also informed them that he himself had been told, upon his arrival, that: “We do not send strangers away from our country. We will take care of you, giving you board and clothing, and thus you will have to finish your life in this country.”⁴⁸ They were brought up to Hansŏng where they were housed with, and placed under the direction of, Chinese soldiers. They were enrolled in military units, given muskets, ordered to report to their general twice a month, and given two bolts of hemp cloth to use as currency.⁴⁹ After an escape attempt by two Dutch castaways, who endeavored to contact the Qing envoy (whom the Chosŏn court bought off with a bribe), the other Dutch castaways were beaten and forced to retreat to the Namhan Mountain fortress whenever Qing envoys approached, lest they be detected.⁵⁰ To prevent them from colluding with each other, they were also eventually separated and sent to the south where they continued to serve in menial positions within military garrisons, such as standing at attention or gathering arrows. They were also forced into productive activity like pounding rice and making rope, and frequently had to supplement their limited income by begging. They finally escaped this hardship in 1666 when some of the Dutch castaways successfully fled to Japan, following which the Edo shogunate had those still remaining in Korea repatriated to the Netherlands.⁵¹

As has been pointed out, the experiences of Dutch castaways in Chosŏn is revelatory of the complex nature of the treatment of submitting-foreigners in the seventeenth century, and indeed Weltevree is referred to in some texts as a “Namman submitting-foreigner.”⁵² In contrast to its treatment of the so-called Nine Righteous Ming officials, the Chosŏn court was clearly at pains to conceal the presence of Dutch in Chosŏn from the Qing, presumably because the court was hoping to use the Dutch castaways to develop Chosŏn’s military capabilities against the Qing. Indeed, when the Chosŏn court, through Weltevree, informed the castaways that “Chosŏn did not allow foreigners who arrived in their country to depart,” the court was not telling the truth. As Sin Tonggyu

has argued, until 1627, all foreigners from countries with which Chosŏn had no relations were sent to Beijing to be repatriated to their homelands by the Ming court. In this case of Weltevree, however, such a plan was rendered impossible by the Manchu invasion of 1627, and so the Chosŏn court attempted to repatriate the three Dutch castaways via Japan, but were rebuffed by the Japanese as the three were not Japanese. In the case of Hamel and crew, of course, the Chosŏn court could have repatriated them via Beijing (since the route to China was no longer blocked) or indeed via Japan (since Japan had by then formed a strong relationship with the Dutch), and while a possible humanitarian reason may have existed for not sending them to Japan, which had in the past executed Christian castaways,⁵³ there was no such humanitarian reason not to send them to Beijing. Although I am not convinced by Ledyard's suggestion that they were not returned to the Qing because of concerns about bureaucratic challenges in dealing with the Qing,⁵⁴ in other respects the state of Chosŏn relations with the Qing surely played a role. Available Korean sources reveal quite clearly that the Chosŏn court confirmed that the castaways were also Namman and hoped that they would, in the same manner as Pak Yŏn previously, be "enrolled in the palace guard, for, in general, those people are good with cannons."⁵⁵ In other words, the specific context of covert anti-Manchu military preparation during the reign of Hyojong evidently created a demand for military skills, and that, combined with wariness within the Chosŏn court of involving the Qing, likely contributed to the long imprisonment of the Dutch castaways in Chosŏn.

Indeed, as Sin Tonggyu points out, the lives of the Dutch castaways in Korea resembles that of other skilled submitting-foreigners, whether Japanese, Jurchens, or others, both during the early Chosŏn or indeed during the seventeenth century itself.⁵⁶ A significant number of Ming migrants came to the attention of court officials during this period and gained a limited role in the Chosŏn court. Records of encounters with Ming migrants are often brief and episodic. Kim Yuk, in his *Brush Notes of Master Chamgok* (*Chamgok sŏnsaeng p'ildam*), for instance, recorded two encounters of that sort. He described how in Kwangju he met Ma Shunshang, a supposed descendant of Ma Gui, who claimed to have arrived in a shipwreck in 1625, and with whom Kim Yuk discussed the sericulture methods used in the lower Yangzi.⁵⁷ Kim Yuk also told a story of another Ming migrant from Liaodong, which he heard from an official during a diplomatic mission to Beijing. This official claimed that in 1641 he had met a Chinese man named Zhang Yunqi in Hŭnghae in Kyŏngsang Province. Zhang Yunqi called himself Zhang the Daoist. According to Kim Yuk's story, he wandered about Kyŏngsang Province until he encountered Ch'oe Kyehun (1601–1657), to whom

he revealed an extraordinary ability to tell fortunes.⁵⁸ Kim Yuk's son Kim Sökchu (1634–1684) encountered Zhang Yunqi directly in 1665 and was able to tell the story of Zhang Yunqi in greater detail, describing how Zhang Yunqi had fled from Zhenjiang near Üiju into Chosŏn in 1622 and “on account of the war, was not able to return, and so disappeared east over the sea.” This initial crossing of the sea in 1622 occurred at much the same time as Mao Wenlong's decampment to Ka Island and the migrant-fueled White Lotus uprising in Shandong and should be seen in the context of the more general chaos of the era. In Tongnae, when Kim Sökchu encountered him, “Zhang the Daoist” was employed making hemp cloth.⁵⁹

Considering how fortuitous these encounters with Ming migrants often were, it seems quite likely that a fair number entered Chosŏn but stayed largely out of the sight of the state. A colorful example is that of Kang Shijue. Kang, a Ming soldier, fled to Mamp'o in P'yŏngan Province in 1625. From there he moved to Hamgyŏng Province, and eventually settled in a place called Togon on the upper Tumen, upstream from Hoeryŏng. In those days, the area around Togon was not directly administered by Chosŏn. It was also situated immediately across from regions under Qing control. Located though he was in this thoroughly isolated place, Kang had the good fortune to come to the attention of two prominent officials (both later associated with the Soron faction of the Sŏin), Nam Kuman (1627–1711) and Pak Sedang (1629–1703). Both officials advocated strengthening Chosŏn's control of its northern frontier by populating it with Korean settlers from farther south, and both recorded their encounters with Kang in biographies and poems that were cited in court discussion and by other officials, especially those who were members of the Soron faction.⁶⁰

Nam's biography would seem to have been especially influential. It was Nam, in particular, who described the supposed military glories of Kang's ancestors (probably spurious, as they cannot be confirmed in Ming sources)⁶¹ and his military activity against the Qing after his escape from the Battle of Sarhu. It was also Nam who wrote of Kang Shijue's resistance to border crossing as seen in his refusal to purchase Qing products in the market or to thatch his roof with reeds (presumably because using reeds would suggest time spent near the river). This also would seem to be at least in part spurious, considering that the region where he established himself on the Tumen River was originally called Togon, which is Manchu for “river crossing” or “ferry point.” Moreover, when he first settled there, it was not yet a region of legal habitation, which strongly suggests that Kang had a tendency to ignore legal restrictions on his movements. It was also Nam who argued for the morally valuable effect that Kang Shijue had on the

region, when he described Kang as refusing his wife's request to have a shaman treat their son when he was ill, in this manner marking Kang as a settling Confucian influence in what was deemed a notoriously superstitious region.

The encounter between Kang Shijue and these two high officials had a transformative effect on his status. Kang Shijue had clearly settled in an area of border crossings but was soon employed to police the border region. Thus, in 1675, he was employed as interpreter to deal with an attempt by a number of Chinese from Manchuria to take refuge in Chosŏn in the very region in which Kang Shijue had established himself, although by then it was called P'ungsan Garrison (P'ungsanjin).⁶² The Chinese fugitives were described in *The Veritable Records* as three Qing northern barbarians (*ho*) and by the official in charge as wearing Qing clothes, but they shouted out from the opposite bank that they were "Chinese (*Tangin*) who, since the uprising of Wu San'gui in the Qing, had become increasingly weak and lonely, and wanted to take refuge." The military official in charge of P'ungsan Garrison, the subarea commander (*manho*) Kim Kyŏngnok, did not of course allow them to enter.⁶³

More consequentially, in 1688, *The Chosŏn Veritable Records* informs us that Sukchong demanded the manumission of the children of Kang Shijue. In this text he is referred to as a man of the imperial Ming (*Hwangmyŏngin*) who had entered the northern territory of Chosŏn, where he formed a connection with a kisaeng of Kyŏngwŏn and had fathered many children. This manumission of Kang Shijue's children is in turn described as being in response to the report of the governor of Hamgyŏng Province.⁶⁴ This somewhat uninformative report received greater elaboration some twelve years later, when Yun Chi'in (1656–1718) memorialized that the Chinese (*Tangin*) Kang Shijue was a descendant of a scholar-official clan of the Ming, whose ancestors had all fallen in battle on behalf of the Ming, including his father, who had died in the battle of Sarhu. Kang Shijue himself, a participant in the same battle, had managed to escape into Chosŏn territory, ultimately settling in Hoeryŏng, where he showed great loyalty, refusing to purchase Qing products in contrast to other residents of northern Hamgyŏng who depended on Qing traders for clothes. He also requested on his deathbed that his many sons and grandsons live together "within the same hedge." Because of the likely good effect that he would have on the customs of northern Hamgyŏng, Yun Chi'in requested that Kang Shijue be given a posthumous rank at the lowest grade and that his sons and grandsons be rewarded with pensions. Sukchong approved this request.⁶⁵

Why was Kang Shijue selected from the mass of Liaodongese in Chosŏn for special treatment—which, notably, was not granted to Zhang Yunqi, who

was left to weave hemp cloth in Tongnae, or Ma Shunshang, who remained in Kwangju? It would seem that, at least in part, this was because of his good luck in meeting high officials, notably those with a particular interest in the northern border. Nam Kuman, especially, advocated resettling areas in northern Hamgyŏng formerly inhabited by Jurchens, in order to keep the Qing from returning to the region. This opinion he asserted despite the widespread view at the time that northern Hamgyŏng should be kept empty to prevent the Qing from retreating through it as they returned to their homeland (in accordance with the prevalent belief that the Qing would not survive long as rulers of China).⁶⁶ Thus, the biographies by Nam Kuman and Pak Sedang were careful to establish Kang Shijue as a reliable representative in a region without the *sajok* aristocracy upon which the Chosŏn court depended to maintain control of its southern provinces. Indeed, a note by the Chongsŏng magistrate Yi Tonguk (1646–1708) described Kang Shijue as having a good knowledge of military matters. Yi reported that Kang addressed precisely how Chosŏn should respond to an invasion of Hamgyŏng by the Qing—notably, he advised against retreating to the garrison fortifications, but instead advocated placing troops to block the Qing advance at the few feasible crossing points.⁶⁷ Whether in his ability to act as an interpreter, his Confucian morality, or his military skill, Kang Shijue was thus seen as an extremely useful person by the Chosŏn court as it expanded settlement in northern Hamgyŏng.

Self-evidently, these court measures were of enormous importance to Kang Shijue's descendants. The first act, in 1688, freed Kang Shijue's descendants from the burden of base status, which they inherited from their base-born mother. The second act of 1700 described royal action on behalf of Kang Shijue's descendants as explicitly responding to Kang Shijue's origin in a high-ranked Ming family of loyal subjects, to his own loyalty and hostility to the Qing, and to the likely salutary influence that he would have on the morality of a famously immoral and disloyal border region of northern Hamgyŏng—"edge country" (*pyŏnji*), to use the Chosŏn terminology, far from the edifying influence of the monarch. By granting Kang Shijue and his descendants rank, the court moved them from their former status as base-born border people into the ranks of those of intermediate status. Indeed, his descendants were enrolled in the Royal Cavalry (*ch'ingwi*) in 1727 and given employment as outpost officers (*kwŏngwan*, jr. 9) by 1730.⁶⁸

Other submitting-foreigners were also able to improve their social status by providing key talents to the Chosŏn court. Some, like Kang Shijue and Huang Gong, were employed as interpreters.⁶⁹ A more prominent example was Wen

Keshang, “a guest from Liaodong,” who, in the words of a poem by Ku Ch’iyong (1590–1666),⁷⁰ was specifically recruited by Sukchong as an instructor for the Chinese interpreters and was provided with a military position, a house, and a salary.⁷¹ Kim Chinam (1654–?), in the *Gazetteer of the Interpreters’ Bureau* (*T’ongungwan ji*), noted that Wen achieved promotion to the senior third rank and wrote a language textbook, *The Chinese Language* (*Hanŏ*). However, Kim claimed that Wen was not from Liaodong but from Hangzhou, and that he was the descendant of a high official during the Song dynasty. According to Kim, in 1635, Wen’s ship was blown off-course, and he came ashore in Ŭnyul in Hwanghae Province. Because his route home was blocked by the Pyŏngja invasion of 1636, he settled in Ŭnjin in Ch’ungch’ŏng Province. Kim also recorded a poem written by Wen.⁷² Whatever the truth of a Wen’s origins, a southern Chinese literati lineage and an ability to write poetry would certainly have helped Wen survive Chosŏn’s social hierarchy.

Other Ming migrants and their descendants who could convincingly claim an elite background rose in the military ranks. Notable especially are the descendants of Li Chenglong, a descendant of the Ming military official Li Rumei, who was the brother of Li Rusong, a hero of the Imjin War. According to Kwŏn Chŏk in a memorial in 1738, Li Chenglong, after fleeing to Chosŏn following the Battle of Sarhu, had come under the protection of the high official Chang Man (1566–1629), whose family also shielded him from the Qing demands for repatriation and had him settled in Chŏlla, where he married a local woman. His son by this marriage, Yi Pŏndŭk, passed the military exams, after which he served as a royal messenger (*sŏnjŏngwan*), a position which, as Eugene Y. Park points out, was often preliminary to a successful military career and was generally restricted to members of established clans of military officials.⁷³ Yi Pŏndŭk had four sons, Tongjae, Tongbae, Tongbal, and Tonguk; his son Tongbae benefited from a friendship with Yu Tŭgil (1650–1712), a high official, and was able to take a position as border officer (*pyŏnjang*) and was even appointed magistrate of Namhae.⁷⁴ The *Journal of the Royal Secretariat* is more detailed and describes a very successful military career for Yi Tongbae that included becoming a magistrate of Sin’gye in P’yŏngan Province in 1667⁷⁵ and also serving as area commander of Chemul (present-day Inch’ŏn),⁷⁶ as commander of an empty palace (*kawijang*) for Kyŏngbok-kung,⁷⁷ commander of the Five Military Commands (*Owijang*),⁷⁸ and garrison commander (*ch’ŏmsa*) of Ch’angju in P’yŏngan Province,⁷⁹ before finally being sent to serve as magistrate of Namhae.⁸⁰ Certainly, his career seems to have been helped by what was, in Chosŏn, a distinguished family—the descendant of the younger brother of a distinguished Ming military officer, Li

Rusong, who had come to the rescue of Chosŏn during the Imjin War. In 1721, another magistrate of Kanghwa by the name of Yi T'aejwa (1660–1739) noted the presence on the island of Yi Tongbae's impoverished nephew, Yi Myŏn. Yi Myŏn “had been unable to obtain even the most low-ranking position in the military,” but his ancestor was Li Rumei, the younger brother of “the Provincial Military Commander Li Rusong, who when the [Ming] was pacifying the East during the Imjin Year, came to reestablish the state, and made many extraordinary contributions, such that to the present day people do not cease their praise of him. It is most fortunate that his line of descent has not been broken, but [that his descendants have] wandered about to reside in the Eastern Land [of Korea].” Such merit, Yi T'aejwa argued, was certainly worth a salary for his descendants, among whom, with the death of Yi Tongbae, only Yi Myŏn remained. Yi T'aejwa argued that Yi Myŏn should be offered a military position as subarea commander of Ch'oji in Kanghwa, an argument that was indeed accepted by the monarch.⁸¹ No doubt as a result of this intercession, Yi Myŏn later obtained the position of special commander of Changgot in Kanghwa⁸² and also that of subarea commander of Okkang in P'yŏngan Province.⁸³

The descendants of Tian Haoqian, the Ming officer who had commanded the unit in which Hamel had served, also continued to acquire military positions. In 1711, Sukchong made a point of enquiring about which descendants of Tian Haoqian had taken military positions and was informed that they included Tian Haoqian's son Chŏn Hoe'il, who had risen to the rank of garrison commander (*ch'ŏmsa*), Chŏn Chŏngil, who was then serving in a special patrol (*pyŏlch'o*) of the Capital Guard office (*ŏyŏngch'ŏng*), and Chŏn Sŏngil, who was a former subarea commander (*manho*). One of his grandsons Chŏn Manch'u had also received a military position serving in the Forbidden Guards (*Kŭmgun*). Another grandson, Chŏn Manch'un, was listed as *hallyang*, a term that during the late Chosŏn was increasingly associated with military officialdom to the extent that it might best be translated as “degreeless military student.”⁸⁴ Notably, none of Tian Haoqian's descendants had passed the military examinations. Having received this report, Sukchong summoned Chŏn Sŏngil, Chŏn Chŏngil, and Chŏn Manch'u, the three descendants of Tian Haoqian still pursuing military positions, and singled out Chŏn Manch'u by giving him a position with the Special Guards established by Hyojong.⁸⁵ The family continued to acquire military offices, with Chŏn Paengnok, a member of the family from Hamgyŏng Province, serving as a naval officer under Sukchong, and Chŏn Sŏngil taking the position of commander of the Five Military Commands (*Owijang*, sr. 3) under Yŏngjo as part of a general policy of countering the excessive emphasis on civil skills.⁸⁶

In addition to being employed in the military, as descendants of a Ming official they could also be useful in other ways. Thus, in 1711, Chŏn Chŏngil traveled on a diplomatic mission to Beijing. One of the goals of this mission was to investigate pirates off the Chinese coast, and Chŏn Chŏngil, along with several other Chosŏn officials, met and drank with one of his own relatives in Beijing, Tian Weishu, through whom they were able to obtain some certainty that the pirates would not pose much of a risk to Chosŏn.⁸⁷

When Sukchong granted Wen Keshang and another Ming refugee named Zheng Xianjia positions as instructors in the Interpreters' Bureau, the high official Kim Sŏkchu (1634–1684) informed them that “this is not because you speak Chinese (*Hwaŏ*) well, but because we value the fact that you are people of the Ming Dynasty (*Myŏngjoin*).”⁸⁸ Indeed, for those, such as the descendants of Tian Haoqian or Li Chenglong, who could credibly claim a link to a prominent Ming official, Ming origins could be beneficial, at least in maintaining their status as military officials, interpreters, and other members of intermediate status. However, Ming origins were not an unalloyed benefit. This may be seen in an attempt by Yun Hyu (1617–1680), a well-known advocate of a Northern Expedition against the Qing, to manipulate Huang Gong to get the Chosŏn court to launch a vigorous military response to the Qing during the Revolt of the Three Feudatories. According to *The Veritable Records*, “the Chinese (*Tangin*) Huang Gong memorialized a request to have him sent as a special envoy across the ocean to Zheng Jin,” in Taiwan. To strengthen his point, Huang also presented a piece of Hyojong's own calligraphy, no doubt to underline his connection to the deceased monarch, and declared that he was “skilled in the eighteen military arts, and wished to be employed to teach soldiers.” This *Veritable Records* historian, however, noted that “Huang Gong was a vapid, arrogant man. Yun Hyu was then about to call for establishing diplomatic relations with Zheng Jin and thought that as Huang Gong was a Chinese person (*Taegugin*), he would be believed by the king, and so encouraged him to present the memorial. However, Huang Gong had no actual intention of going [to Taiwan].”⁸⁹ Confirming the historian's judgment, the next day Yun Hyu responded enthusiastically to Huang Gong's memorial, saying that “sending Huang Gong across the sea, if your sage highness could do so, would truly be a grand plan on behalf of the state. If Huang Gong does indeed have this intention, it is very good indeed, and we must discuss it in secret and plan it with care.”⁹⁰

If Yun Hyu was really attempting to use Huang Gong's Ming origins to successfully advocate for his plan of a direct military aid to the Revolt of the Three Feudatories, he was not convincing, perhaps because his plan had, from

the outset, been far too transparently manipulative. Indeed, the next day the discussion continued, and Hŏ Chŏk (1610–1680), of the same Namin faction as Yun Hyu, went through a list of Huang Gong's deceptions, describing how, despite having been emancipated from the Qing by Hyojong, he had falsely claimed to be able to make gunpowder. When first setting up in Ch'ungh'ŏng Province, he had announced that the earth there was not suitable and so had asked to be sent to Hamgyŏng Province, but after arriving there, he still did not make any gunpowder, for he had only gone there to meet a woman. Others chimed in with accusations against Huang Gong; one, a military official Yu Hyŏg'yŏn (1616–1680), claimed that he had several times asked Huang Gong to demonstrate the use of the halberd, but that Huang had each time made an excuse at the last minute, pleading illness. Chŏng Sŏnjin (1614–1677) went so far as to assert that all the Chinese who had asked to stay in Chosŏn after 1597 by promising to teach military skills had proven incompetent.⁹¹ To be sure, all officials involved in the discussion, with the exception of Yun Hyu, were in any case suspicious of the value of an alliance with either the piratical Zheng Jin or the former turncoat Wu San'gui, but Yun Hyu's attempt to make use of Huang Gong as a representative Ming loyalist ran into the difficulty that Ming status was not treated as universally positive or prestigious within the Chosŏn court.⁹²

Indeed, Huang Gong, along with the other Ming officials who had served under Hyojong, had a clearly defined, but not particularly prestigious, status. Their military unit seems to have been reorganized under Hyŏnjin in 1673 as the Han Ivory Troops (*Hanin abyŏng*), still under the control of the Military Training Agency.⁹³ The precise function or origin of these Han Ivory Troops is somewhat unclear. The category was not a particularly distinguished one. "Ivory troops" is short for "Soldiers below the Ivory Standard (*ch'ihabyŏng*)" and referred to soldiers stationed as the personal aides of a military commander. In Chosŏn, ivory troops were developed as a local regional army under the control of the governor during the sixteenth century, when provincial governors responded to widespread corvée avoidance by commoners and to the growing problem of banditry by recruiting base people to serve.⁹⁴ These troops became a key aspect of Chosŏn's provincial defense after the Imjin War. The other key aspect of regional defense, the *sog'o* troops made up of servile soldiers, were placed under the provincial military commanders (*pyŏngsa*). By contrast, the ivory troops were directly under the control of the governor himself and were stationed in the provincial capital and were thus considered an important support for gubernatorial authority. There were also ivory troops within the Anti-Manchu Division

(*Ch'onggyungch'öng*) and Royal Defense Command (Suöch'öng), both of which were military divisions that were organized to defend the capital, but in practice also functioned as the provincial military for Kyönggi Province.⁹⁵

Socially, during the seventeenth century, ivory troops were described by one contemporary observer Pak T'aeho (1654–1689) as being selected from among wandering people (*yumin*) who were without roots or who had recently settled in a community.⁹⁶ During the reign of Sukchong, the ivory troops within the Anti-Manchu Division on Kanghwa Island were described as being mostly comprised of public and private slaves along with a few commoners.⁹⁷ Many of them suffered double service duties both to their owner (either a public office or a private family) and to the ivory troops.⁹⁸ In this they were socially not far distinct from sog'o slave troops in social status.

As for the Han Ivory Troops, they were perhaps the very definition of wandering people who had recently put down roots. They were organized as musketeers but were supposed to keep themselves alive by fishing in the Han River.⁹⁹ Yi Kyusang claimed that this economic activity was as a result of the Zhejiang ancestry of many of the troops,¹⁰⁰ presumably because he assumed that Zhejiang people liked to fish. In fact, relatively few of the Ming migrants residing in the capital were of Zhejiang origin, in contrast to Kyöngsang Province, where Ming descendants with their clan seat in Zhejiang were very common. Rather, the act of fishing should be understood as a typical tax on submitting-foreigners, including Jurchens and Japanese. Along with their association with a military unit, which at best was associated with commoner status, their fishing hardly suggests much prominence or importance within Chosön society.

The uncertain status of Ming migrants in Chosön may be seen in Nam Kuman's biography of Kang Shijue. In it, Nam Kuman claimed that the manumission of Kang Shijue's children was motivated by the concern within the court that a descendant of a Ming cap-and-gown household should be tainted by base status.¹⁰¹ However, Nam did not consider Kang Shijue typical of Chinese migrants. Rather, Nam contrasted him with other migrants and emphasized strongly his loyalty to the fallen Ming. According to Nam, Kang Shijue was different from the Chinese in Chosön who "were haughty and greedy and begged shamelessly." By contrast, "Only Shijue did not engage in vain boasting, only he did not take that which was not his due. He did not speak duplicitously or engage in suspicious activities. His reputation spread throughout the village and he taught his good habits to his sons. That is why he is worth writing about."¹⁰²

Submitting-Foreigner Tax Status in the Seventeenth Century

The relatively marginal status of Ming migrants and their descendants may also be seen in a range of other documents produced during the seventeenth century concerning submitting-foreigner status. Although very few foreigners entered Chosŏn after 1637, submitting-foreigner status did not disappear. Although this status had been originally designed as a temporary category in order to settle people who had come from abroad, in practice it became a permanent and hereditary one. Within a hierarchical Chosŏn state primarily driven by the importance of heredity, submitting-foreigners became a new, protected, but not particularly desirable social status. In turn, during a seventeenth century much preoccupied with the need for tax reform, it was a category that got caught up in the statecraft debates of the era. Nevertheless, it was a notably ambiguous status—in some ways comparable to servitude, and in others, less invidiously, classifiable with the intermediate status groups. Until the 1750s, however, variations in the treatment of submitting-foreigners continued to have very little relationship to their country of origin, with those of Jurchen and Japanese origin receiving much the same treatment as those of Chinese origin. Above all, it was an inherited status in a kingdom in which heredity was extremely important. Whether for those of Chinese, Jurchen, or Japanese origin, it provided protection, but not prestige.

The seventeenth century, cursed as it was by poor harvests, also suffered from serious unrest and social strife.¹⁰³ This did not, however, seriously challenge sajok dominance, whether in the capital or in the countryside. Especially in the southern provinces, established sajok aristocratic descent-groups, often centered on single-surname villages, maintained their privileges through marriage with other sajok, and by their support for private educational and ritual institutions, thereby generally maintaining their hold on power at the village level.¹⁰⁴ Largely able to free themselves from all personal taxes through young scholar (*yuhak*) status, sajok aristocrats paid only a land tax, which was kept deliberately low. This caused serious fiscal problems for the early Chosŏn state, which financed itself through a mix of taxes and service obligations, including a tax on land, corvée labor, and a tribute of special products. As with all aspects of Chosŏn society, these were imposed variably according to the social status of the subject in question. The sajok aristocrats ultimately evaded personal taxes, including especially military taxes, and paid only the land tax, while a large base-born population of slaves acted either as the hands and feet of the sajok in the case of private slaves or as the workforce of government offices in the case of public

slaves. Generally, slaves of both sorts owed service not to the state but to their masters. Last, but not least, the majority of the population were commoners who bore most tax and service obligations, including military service, with the latter often simply being referred to as commoner service (*yangyŏk*).

During the early Chosŏn, the tribute in special products required not only the provision of said products, but also their transportation to the capital. Consequently, the system was inefficient and burdensome and was applied unevenly upon taxpayers, generally falling on those too weak to evade what were generally rotating obligations. By the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries it had in practice largely been replaced by levies of grain organized at the local level, which were then granted to tribute brokers, who then provided the desired product to the palace. Unfortunately, the profit motive on the part of the tribute broker and the possibilities for corruption among the numerous middlemen, especially the local clerks, runners, and tribute brokers, meant that tribute became a large and unpredictable burden on the commoner population. As for military service, aside from the specialized Military Training Agency, the personnel were made up of rotating duty soldiers, all being supported by tax payers theoretically selected from among the adult male commoner population. However, the larger and more expensive armies of the post-Imjin period, corruption and illegal exactions in the collection of the tax, the ability of *sajok* to exempt themselves from military service, the flight of commoners from the military tax through purchase of *sajok* status, the growth of the slave population, and the consequent worsening of the tax load on those commoners unable to evade the military tax all conspired to push the military support system into a state of recurring crisis during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.¹⁰⁵

The challenges with tax collection, in turn, drove the Chosŏn state to pursue a range of reforms aimed at increasing intake and reducing the intrusion on the commoner population. Although inevitably reforms at times had to step lightly around the privilege of the *sajok* aristocrats and local strongmen who benefited from the inefficient collection of taxes, the overall result of these reforms was to provide greater centralization and regularization of local administration. For instance, the Chosŏn court attempted to deal with the corrupt and uneven collection of tribute through the Uniform Land Tax Equalization Law (*Taedong-bŏp*), which converted tribute payments to a tax on land that was adjusted according to productivity. Instituted in a gradual fashion, and interrupted both by opposition from vested interests and, initially, the lack of local institutions capable of putting the reforms into effect, the Uniform Land Tax Equalization Law was first attempted in 1608, and then, after fits and starts, gradually expanded

to encompass the entire country by 1708. Although this did not end the problems of corruption and tax evasion or eliminate all regional tribute levies, it did reduce the burden on common people, and as an unintended consequence, it also opened up a space for private merchants to sell what had once been tribute goods to the palace.¹⁰⁶ To compensate for the shortage of commoners to pay the military tax, the Chosŏn state responded in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries through a mix of policies, none terribly successful. To increase the commoner population, attempts were made to impose the matrilineal law (*Chongmo-bŏp*), whereby slave status, which had generally in the past been inherited by the children if either parent was a slave, was to be inherited only from the mother. This law, associated with the Sŏin faction and opposed by the rival Namin faction, was imposed intermittently during periods of Sŏin dominance beginning in 1669, but was only firmly established in 1731, and in any case is unlikely to have had an immediate impact on slave numbers.¹⁰⁷ Additionally, during the reigns of Hyŏnjong (r. 1659–1674) and Sukchong, there were increasing efforts on the part of the court to record and track the population of the state as a whole. The Household Tally Law (*Hop'ae-bŏp*), by which all subjects of the Chosŏn court were required to possess a household tally establishing their identity, and the Five Household Control Law (*Oga chakt'ong-bŏp*), by which groups of five households would be combined together to form a *t'ong* for the purposes of tax, corvée, and social control, were hotly debated during the reign of Hyŏnjong and eventually brought into effect under Sukchong, who also, through the Revised Rules for Commoner Service (*Yangyŏk pyŏnt'ong chŏlmok*) and the Village Quota System (*Ijŏngbŏp*), expanded the reach of centralized state control into the countryside.¹⁰⁸

Submitting-foreigner status is an interesting sideline in the debates concerning tax and corvée reform during the seventeenth century. Although the seventeenth century was no longer characterized by the zonal frontiers that had initially driven the formation of submitting-foreigner status, the status category did not cease to exist. Indeed, as may be seen in the cases of Tian Haoqian, who was buried near the submitting-foreigner village in Yangju, and of the Han Ivory Troops, the tax category of submitting-foreigner status continued to include, as it had during the early Chosŏn, Chinese descendants. Thus, despite the ostensible Ming loyalism of the Chosŏn *sajok* aristocracy, descendants of Ming migrants were placed within the same category as Jurchens and Japanese. Indeed, in 1751, Hong Ponghan (1713–1778) described the submitting-foreigners, according to documents preserved in the Board of Rites, as including “the Pŏnhos of the Six Garrisons, with clan names such as Hŭngnyong-gang (Ch. Heilongjiang;

R. Amur) who settled within Chosŏn territory, Japanese who came during the Imjin War but did not return to Japan, and finally “Liaodongese who fled after the *kapsin* year (1644)¹⁰⁹ and who have clan names in Sichuan, Taiyuan and Zhejiang; they came and did not return to China. Their descendants are also called submitting-foreigners.”¹¹⁰ As the above list suggests, these were the distant descendants of migrants who entered Chosŏn during the early seventeenth century and yet were still categorized as submitting-foreigners. In another record referring to Chŏlla Province, a secret censor, Han Kwanghoe, described submitting-foreigners as divided between Chinese Remnant Subjects (*Taeguk yumin*) and commoners who wandered in from other regions (*Iyŏk yumaeng*). As Han said: “It is clear that they should not have the same corvée duties imposed upon them as on ordinary subjects. When they first arrived, the Board of Rites provided them with especially generous treatment and worried that they had no livelihood, settled them on the coast, and had them fish for a living. Submitting-foreigner tax status alleviated their impoverishment by removing personal service duties—truly the epitome of the sage monarchs’ desire to comfort people who have come from far away.”¹¹¹

Above all, submitting-foreigner status was used for determining tax, corvée, and military service burdens of people whose ancestors were foreigners. As discussed in chapter 1, already during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, submitting-foreigner status was becoming hereditary. The reports of Han Ponghan and the Secret Censor Hong Kwanghoe reveal that during the eighteenth century the status could be perpetuated over hundreds of years after it had first been granted, and that its recipients, no doubt in most outward respects identical to their Korean neighbors, were still seen as outsiders in need of the protection of the monarch. This the monarch did provide, by placing them under the Board of Rites and exempting them from corvée duties except for a tribute to the Board of Rites, with those on the coast providing a tribute in fish, and those dwelling in inland communities receiving farming equipment but paying a tribute in cloth.¹¹² The category did not provide high social status, and so submitting-foreigners were very much exposed to the illegal exactions of petty functionaries in the villages.

Hamel and crew, as Dutch castaways, were clearly administered as submitting-foreigners in the same manner as Chinese who had settled in Chosŏn. Within his journal, Hamel complained bitterly of the unfair exactions imposed upon him and his fellows within the military garrisons, when they had the bad luck to be placed under a corrupt or violent commanding officer.¹¹³ Such complaints were made by other submitting-foreigners as well, who suffered from

taxations levied upon them by competing vested interests. Already in 1645, very shortly after Qing pressure on Chosŏn had been loosened with respect to the forced repatriation of Jurchens, there are records in the *Journal of the Office of the Custodian of Foreign Visitors* of a certain Yi Nandolsi, a submitting-foreigner of unspecified origin, who appealed to be returned to the Board of Rites. He informed the board that he had not been properly cared for since the court had transferred the boat tax from the Board of Rites to the then financially strapped Board of Taxation in 1637. On the contrary, the Board of Taxation actually had him pay taxes to both the Military Training Agency (*Hullyŏn togam*) and the Merit Awards administration (*Ch'unghunbu*), thus forcing him into untenable circumstances. He begged that he and other submitting-foreigners be placed once more under the control of the Board of Rites and be treated with the same care as before.¹¹⁴ The court ruled, however, that while they recognized his hardship, they could see no great difference in the consolation provided by the two boards. For this reason, his appeal was dismissed, with, however, the recommendation that the earlier protection provided to submitting-foreigners from miscellaneous exactions be restored.¹¹⁵

A similar complaint, with a different outcome, was made in 1649 before the royal procession by Sŏ Pongnyong, the leader of a community of submitting-foreigners in Hansan in Ch'ungh'ŏng Province. In his appeal, Sŏ Pongnyong described his ancestors as Amur Jurchens who, admiring the beautiful customs of Chosŏn, had fled to the Tumen River, where they served as Pŏnhos by providing information to the Chosŏn court about other Jurchens. With the rise of Nurhaci, they had been relocated southward by a concerned Chosŏn court, although they continued to provide great service to the state by informing it about activities of the rising Manchu state. They had been settled according to the general precedent of submitting-foreigners. Those involved in agriculture were granted farming tools and oxen and exemption from personal taxes and corvée, while those involved in fishing were freed from all personal taxes and corvée except for a small tribute in fish to be provided to the Board of Rites. This state of affairs, which Sŏ described as showing true care on the part of the Chosŏn state, was interrupted by the Pyŏngja invasion, during which the entire community was scattered, and many died. Those who survived, moreover, were faced with worsening conditions, for not only was the boat tax imposed upon them, but they also had to pay both a range of miscellaneous taxes and even tribute to the Board of Taxation not required of ordinary commoners, while their fishing boats were at risk of being seized by the Merit Awards administration. As rootless people, each bearing the tax load of two, they begged for the protection of the state

and the restoration of their former status. Indeed, the court took pity on these survivors of the Pyŏngja invasion and sent instructions to the various agencies to respect their submitting-foreigner status.¹¹⁶

Such interoffice conflicts did not cease, however, with the reign of Injo. Indeed, during the reign of Sukchong and the early part of the reign of Yŏngjo (r. 1724–1776), such debates continued, although frequently pleas to the monarch to continue the protection of rootless people who had come from afar were mixed with concern from the Board of Rites that a valuable source of earmarked revenue might be lost. Thus, in 1677, the Board of Rites expressed worry that Injo's attempts to protect submitting-foreigners from the random extortion of various offices had failed. Such were the exactions imposed on submitting-foreigners that they would soon be unable to survive. Moreover, these exactions were clearly in violation of Injo's original intentions in this regard and should thus be stopped.¹¹⁷ That this was also an institutional demand for the Board of Rites was clearly expressed in a number of documents, notably by Yi Suk (1626–1688), who worried that a temporary decision to move the proceeds of the boat tax to Chŏlla Province needed to be reversed, as the Board of Rights, notoriously short of funds, needed the earmarked taxation of submitting-foreigners to pay its low-ranking clerks.¹¹⁸ This problem was mentioned again under Kyŏngjong (r. 1720–1724). Yi Kyo'ak (1653–1728), an official in the Board of Rites, expressed concern that within the county of Okku in Chŏlla the fish provided by submitting-foreigners as part of their boat tax had been illegally redirected toward the local Agency for the Elderly (*Kirosŏ*). Such a state of affairs, Yi Kyo'ak worried, was problematic not only because it violated the original royal purpose of providing succor to people from other lands but also, once more, because the Board of Rites was otherwise very poor and needed the fish tax to pay the board's clerks. Moreover, unless this diversion of the boat tax was stopped, it might spread to other regions, exposing submitting-foreigners to double taxation.¹¹⁹

The fact that formal requests were also occasionally made to allow for the direction of the boat tax to other agencies such as the Merit Award administration suggests that, at times at least, the Board of Rites' regular appeals on behalf of submitting-foreigners had some effect.¹²⁰ Indeed, in 1700, a local *sajok* called for the elimination of submitting-foreigner status for the fourth generation of those of Chinese origin in Ch'ungch'ŏng Province. He made particular reference to those whose ancestors had migrated to Chosŏn before 1591, arguing that if the court took his advice it would gain tens of thousands of elite soldiers (a claim that seems dubious). The Board of Rites protested vigorously, arguing that to change established methods in this case would only cause confusion.¹²¹

In a 1713 report, we are told that the Board of Rites issued a wooden talley to confirm the protected status of submitting-foreigners.¹²² Although it is not clear from this statement when the practice began, it is clear that submitting-foreigner identity was, like other status categories during the seventeenth century, increasingly organized from the court, and subject to more organized collection of household registry information.¹²³ Submitting-foreigners do continue to appear in household registry documents, although because not many documents survive, and because those that do survive are of limited accuracy, it is hard to calculate their relative population. The status vanishes from the Ulsan household registry after 1609, although it is now unclear whether they were forcibly repatriated to the Qing, or whether they had simply dispersed and avoided being counted during a period during which the collection of household registries was much less intensive than it was to become. The numbers of submitting-foreigners would likely have varied considerably according to region, with larger numbers perhaps on the Ch'ŏlla archipelago and in Hamgyōng Province, and with some regions having none or very few. A further challenge is that the household registry was compiled locally by people with local concerns—thus, as was discussed above, Sunnam-myōn in Taegu recorded some 141 people who were clearly Japanese defectors, but whose registry documents do not describe them as such, perhaps because their status was well known, and their obligation to the military unit was all that needed to be recorded.

In fact, in one of the most complete household registry documents, *The Tansōng Household Registry* (*Kyōngsangdo Tansōng-hyōn hojōk taejang*), there is only one household that is described as descended from submitting-foreigners. A commoner woman (she is referred to as *choi*, the usual title for commoner women) named Yu is recorded in the 1662 household register as the wife of Ch'oe Tongbo of the village of Panghwabok-ri in the district of Saengbiryang. Her father, a duty soldier (*chōngbyōng*), is named Yu Moŭlsōgi, which is probably an Idu rendering of the decidedly servile-sounding name of T'ōldori or “hairy.” He is also described as the descendant of submitting-foreigners, as also, presumably, were her paternal grandfather, Yu Malchilhōm (perhaps better rendered as Kkūtchōm, which might be translatable as “end-point”); her paternal great-grandfather, Yu Hūngbyōk; and possibly also her maternal grandfather, Han Malchilman/Kkūtman.¹²⁴ Either because they moved away or because they successfully bribed the petty functionaries in charge of the household registry, this family does not appear again, as submitting-foreigners or otherwise. It is notable that Yu Moŭlsōgi/T'ōldori is listed as a duty soldier, suggesting that he was no longer freed from commoners' obligations for military service.

Even as the Chosŏn state sought to regularize submitting-foreigner status, it continued to be a distinctly ambiguous one for its recipients, one that provided them with protected but unprestigious status. According to one record included in *The Law Code of 1746* (*Sok Taejŏn*), when sorting out the tax and service responsibilities in those cases where a submitting-foreigner married a woman who was a public or private slave, the daughters followed the mother's status and sons followed the father's status, consistent with the precedent for slaves attached to post-stations. However, in the case of marriages between submitting-foreigner women and either public or private slaves, all the children followed the mother's status and were entirely under the purview of the Board of Rites, to which they were required to provide one *p'il* of cloth, according to the precedent of the Office Auxiliaries (*Yuch'ŏnggun*).¹²⁵ This was a military unit established through the merging under Yŏngjo of the auxiliary troops (*Poch'unggun*, a military organization in which the children of sajok and base women were placed as a condition of manumission) and the Truants' Army (*Nakkanggun*, a military organization established in order to receive tax payments from those commoners who had enrolled in county schools to avoid taxes, but who did not attend lectures). Notably, however, in contrast to the children of sajok who had originally been enrolled in the auxiliary troops, submitting-foreigner status was inherited from the mother's side, as with slaves; moreover, in the case of submitting-foreigner men, the inheritance of the status was explicitly modeled on post-station slaves.

SUBMITTING-FOREIGNERS WERE a permanent foreign presence within Chosŏn. As early as the reign of Injo, it had been recognized that the Jurchen community under Sŏ Pongnyong had clearly become subjects of the Chosŏn court, although this did not change the intention of the court to protect the submitting-foreigners from tax and service obligations. Notably, Sŏ Pongnyong continued to place great weight on the story of his ancestor's origins in the Amur region, their long establishment as Pŏnhos in the Tumen Valley, and their unsuccessful quarrel with Nurhaci; the fact that he brought up these matters in an official discussion suggests that this particular historical origin was by no means a source of shame. While Sŏ Pongnyong was within living memory a member of an active and autonomous Tumen Valley Pŏnho community, even in the eighteenth century submitting-foreigners continued to emphasize their Jurchen lineages through the Hŭngnyong-gang clan name; whether or not all using that name were in fact descendants of Jurchen is perhaps less important than the fact that, until the mid-eighteenth century, it was considered desirable to have such status in the first place.

Whatever the original purpose of submitting-foreigner status, during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it most certainly was not seen as a means to assimilation. As with slave status and various forms of taxation or *corvée* labor, submitting-foreigner status developed through the interaction between royal commands, established local practice, and the resistance to taxation among the populace. As a result, it does not seem to have been unquestionably desirable. Submitting-foreigners were, after all, permanent recipients of protection and charity, and efforts on the part of the Board of Rites to protect them from other forms of taxation or the imposition of *corvée* labor seem to have been only intermittently successful. Attempts both to reform this status and to preserve it, however, faced difficulties, because of the distress potentially caused by its elimination, and because of widespread locally generated corruption. For the submitting-foreigners themselves, whether they were of Japanese, Jurchen, Chinese, or Dutch ancestry, submitting-foreigner status was one more category to be manipulated for their benefit. During the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the fact that the status confirmed upon its bearer foreign and exterior status was not a major source of concern to the state.

Ritual Transformation of Foreign Communities

IN 1790, KING CHŎNGJO recalled the history of the Han Ivory Troops as he was preparing to engage in the sacrificial ceremonies to the Ming emperors. The Ming migrants in question had accompanied the Hyojong court from Mukden to Chosŏn, where they settled at the foot of the palace of Öüi-gung, which was Hyojong's birthplace. Yet despite this proof of their loyalty, they were organized as an ivory troop under the command of the Military Training Agency and were required to support themselves through fishing. Even worse, Chŏngjo complained, they were forced to wander about without financial support and were so utterly mistreated as to be cast in educational martial arts displays in the role of squads of Japanese soldiers—most shameful, Chŏngjo claimed, for the descendants of Chinese officials.¹

His description of them would hardly have shocked Chosŏn officials during the seventeenth century, who found no problem in describing Ming migrants as submitting to the edification of the Chosŏn monarchy, in much the same manner as Jurchens, Japanese, Dutch, and others. Nor would their fishing (a standard activity for submitting-foreigners) or their association with Japan (during the reign of Injo they had been joined in the Military Training Agency by Dutch and Japanese soldiers) have concerned the seventeenth-century court. Yet, in 1790, Chŏngjo considered all these features as quite unacceptable. Ideological changes during the eighteenth century altered the position of Ming descendants, as they became exemplars of Chosŏn's emerging Ming loyalist ritualism. This in turn was related to more general changes in Northeast Asia, as the Qing empire, in particular, increasingly divided its subject peoples into state-determined categories and treated their loyalties and cultural identification as immutable.

Late Chosŏn Ming Loyalism

During the eighteenth century, the Qing empire, no longer threatened by any serious possibility of a Ming revival, could turn its attention toward consolidating

its legacy. Although during the seventeenth century it had been dangerous to express continued loyalty to the Ming, by the reign of the Qianlong (r. 1735–1796) emperor, the Qing regime had become sufficiently confident of its position to espouse the Ming loyalist cause as its own, labeling those Ming turncoats who had continued their official careers under the Qing as “twice-serving” or “duplicious” ministers (*erchen*). Alternately, the substantially Liaodongese Hanjun (Han Martial), who had been a core component of the Qing conquest elite, were not similarly accused of duplicity but were reorganized and clearly distinguished on the basis of their genealogies from Manchu or Mongol banners.² Indeed, both Manchus and Mongols were redefined under a Qianlong emperor who saw himself as the sponsor of both. Mongols were to worship Chinggis, use the Mongolian language (which was actively sponsored by the Qing court), and serve in Qing-sponsored banners, while Manchus were also defined by their language, their skill in mounted archery, their attachment to the Manchu homeland, and their practice of Manchu shamanism. The Qing court took an active role, especially, in defining Manchus, preventing them from abandoning their state-mandated Manchu identity, and assimilating with the majority Han Chinese culture. Thus, the Qianlong emperor did not treat Ming loyalty as being in conflict with loyalty to the Qing, as the Ming was merely one of several cultural and dynastic traditions that Qianlong had inherited.³

Chosŏn also experienced an ideological shift during the eighteenth century. Whether or not Chosŏn’s Ming restorationists had been sincere in their military preparation during the seventeenth century, by the eighteenth century all hope of a Ming restoration had been abandoned except within popular rumor and conspiracy theories.⁴ In practice, Chosŏn became a notably compliant subject state of the Qing. However, Ming loyalism did not lose its emotional or ideological appeal in Chosŏn for the monarch or for sajok aristocrats, even though the Qing empire itself embraced its own form of Ming loyalism. In fact, Chosŏn intellectuals increasingly reimagined Chosŏn as the last remaining bastion of the Ming empire and of a Chunghwa legitimacy that had elsewhere been destroyed by the Qing invasion. As a result, Chosŏn’s loyalty to the Ming was expressed during the eighteenth century primarily through shrines, public and private, raised to honor the fallen Ming, and through rituals to the Ming that most of Chosŏn’s sajok aristocrats were convinced could not be practiced properly anywhere else.

A notable feature of this ideological shift was a renewed attention to the ritual commemoration and historical reassessment of loyal martyrs. Similar to the commemoration of Ming loyalists in the Qing empire under the Qianlong emperor, Chosŏn monarchs including Sukchong, Yŏngjo, and Chŏngjo took

an active role in honoring those who had been purged or executed for loyally resisting the authority of the Chosŏn dynasty, including the officials who had defended Nosan-gun (r. 1452–1455, renamed Tanjong under Sukchong) when he was deposed and then executed by his uncle Sejo,⁵ and the loyal officials who had refused to abandon their loyalties to the Koryŏ monarch.⁶

Similarly, numerous shrines were established to commemorate the Imjin War and the Pyŏngja Manchu invasion—whereby, following Yi Uk's analysis, the fading memories of these conflicts were “ritualized” and kept as part of public memory.⁷ This ritualization of course was primarily concerned with key Korean participants in these wars, such as the great admiral Yi Sunsin, and the monk-soldier Yujŏng (1544–1610).⁸ Shrines had also been established following the Imjin War to honor, in some respect or another, Ming soldiers who had served in it. Many of these shrines saw revived use beginning in the late seventeenth century. Among them, the most prominent was perhaps the Sŏnmusa (Shrine to Martial Might) in the capital, established in 1598, which honored two Ming officers who were thought to have provided especial aid to Chosŏn. These were Xing Jie (1540–1612), who served as Ming minister of the Board of War during the war, and, after 1604, the inspector-general (*jinglüe*) Yang Hao (?–1629), who as military official had been enormously popular in the Chosŏn court. Although the Sŏnmusa seems to have been maintained only as a minor shrine throughout the seventeenth century, it attracted renewed royal interest beginning in the early eighteenth century.⁹ In P'yŏngyang, the Muyŏlsa (Shrine to Martial Passion) was established in 1593 in honor of Shi Xing and was later expanded to include such notable Ming officers as Li Rusong, Yang Yuan, Li Rubai, and Zhang Shijue. The shrine seems to have been largely neglected, however, until in 1709 Sukchong noted the lack of regular rituals at the Muyŏlsa as a serious deficiency in the ritual calendar and established regular rituals coordinated with the more general Ming loyalist ritual of the court.¹⁰ Throughout the country, small shrines to Guan Yu were established by Ming soldiers, notably two in the capital, the Nammyo (Southern Temple to Guan Yu) in 1598 and the Tongmyo (Eastern Temple to Guan Yu) in 1602. Although controversial at the time of its construction, beginning in the 1690s the Tongmyo also became a place where Chosŏn monarchs would themselves formally honor the Ming military effort.¹¹ During the Imjin War, the Minch'ungdan (Altar for Pitying the Loyal) was raised in honor of Ming soldiers who had died in battle. Although it had fallen out of use by 1636, sacrifice at the altar was once more revived in 1668.¹²

The politics of ritual commemoration was intimately involved in the competition for power between the state as represented by the monarchy and the

civil aristocrats who monopolized the leading positions within the bureaucracy, but sought also to exert their power independently without regard to the royal court. Thus, by the late seventeenth century, the powerful Noron subfaction of the Sŏin, and especially the disciples of Song Siyŏl (1607–1689), had begun to advocate for the establishment of a shrine to the Wanli and Chongzheng emperors themselves in a site under the control of their faction. Song Siyŏl had retired to Hwayang in Chŏngju, Ch'ungch'ŏng Province. In accord with his emulation of Zhu Xi, Song Siyŏl ascribed to the landscape within Hwayang meanings associated with Zhu Xi and other aspects of the Chinese past that he particularly admired. Notably, he carved the calligraphy of Ming emperors into the rock face. A line from the *Analects*—"Do no move if not in accord with Ritual" (K. *pirye pidong*, Ch. *feili feidong*)—was inscribed, together with four other pieces, in the Chongzhen emperor's own calligraphy. Before Song's death by poison at the order of the monarch in 1689, he instructed his disciple Kwŏn Sangha to establish at the site both a school, the Hwayang school (Hwayang sŏwŏn), and a shrine to the Wanli and Chongzhen emperors, the Mandongmyo (All-Streams-Flow-to-the-East Shrine). This caused considerable controversy among officials of the Noron and Soron subfactions of the Sŏin, but eventually the shrine received support from Sukchong and was completed in 1703, with sacrifices being made there from 1704 onward.¹³ However, in the same year, Sukchong asserted the supremacy of the Chosŏn court through the establishment on palace grounds of a shrine to the Ming Wanli emperor, the Taebodan (Altar of Great Gratitude), also called the Hwangdan (Imperial Altar).

Sukchong made relatively little use of the Taebodan, but his two successors, namely Yŏngjo (r. 1724–1776) and Chŏngjo (r. 1776–1800), made it an essential part of the palace calendar. Yŏngjo, notably, expanded the rites at the altar in 1749 to include the first and last Ming emperors—the Hongwu emperor (honored on the tenth day of the fifth month) and the Chongzhen emperor (honored on the nineteenth day of the third month)—to supplement rituals already offered to the Wanli emperor on the twenty-first day of the seventh month. He also placed far greater emphasis on his personal involvement in these rituals than did Sukchong, performing rituals in person at the altar itself or facing it from a palace nearby during all but five years of his reign following 1749. This practice of regular personal worship was also maintained by his successor, Chŏngjo, who further entrenched Ming loyalist ritualism as an essential aspect of the Chosŏn state.¹⁴

In effect, the establishment of these ritual practices, although directed toward the vanished Ming, constituted an elevation of Chosŏn and the Chosŏn

monarchy. During the debates concerning the initial establishment of the Mandongmyo and Taebodan, Soron officials had asserted that the rites implied an unjustified appropriation of the prerogatives of the Ming emperor by a subordinate lord (*chebu*). Kwŏn Sangha countered that by performing them, they were following in the tradition of the state of Song, which itself had continued the rites of the Yin dynasty, and of the state of Qi, which had continued the rites of the Xia. He cited Confucius's description of those two subordinate states, Song and Qi, as the final heirs to the rites and manners of the two dynasties of the Xia and the Yin.¹⁵ Chosŏn was a subordinate, but just as Qi had exclusively inherited the rites of the Xia and Song the rites of the Yin, and indeed as Confucius's own state of Lu had inherited the rites of the Zhou, so Chosŏn also was the exclusive heir of the Chunghwa tradition as represented by the Ming.

This marked a transition, to use Hŏ T'aeyong's terminology, from the Chunghwa Restoration Consciousness to the Chunghwa Inheritance Consciousness (*Chunghwa kyesŭng ūisik*). In other words, Chosŏn officials abandoned their fantasy of plotting to restore the Ming and instead simply treated Chosŏn as the sole legitimate heir of a grand Chinese/Confucian tradition.¹⁶ This should not be seen as a move to some sort of protonationalism, as such narrow particularism was still alien to Chosŏn thinking, and the possibility of the revival of a legitimate realm within the geographic confines of China had not yet been completely abandoned. At no point did Chosŏn *sajok* seek to establish a particularist Chosŏn identity that could be separated from the broader Chunghwa tradition as a whole.¹⁷ Still, Chunghwa Inheritance Consciousness was without question directed primarily inward, toward the self-identity of Chosŏn's monarchy and *sajok* aristocracy. The practice of rites to the Ming was predicated on the assumption that no other country in the world could now appropriately perform them. Moreover, Chunghwa Inheritance Consciousness did involve a general reconsideration of Korean history, with people such as Im Kyŏngŏp (1594–1646), who had been considered a traitor by Injo when he was alive, being transformed into a glorious hero of anti-Qing struggle during the reigns of Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo.¹⁸ Indeed, aspects of Korean history with no obvious connection to the Ming, such as Koguryŏ's defeats of the Sui and Tang and the story of Kija's travel to Chosŏn, were brought into a broader narrative confirming the existence of an independent Chunghwa tradition in Korea, while the courts of Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo made a point of honoring early Korean dynasties, notably Koryŏ and Silla, even as they asserted their special connection to the Ming.¹⁹

Rectification of Names

These new intellectual trends strongly influenced Chosŏn's responses to submitting-foreigners. Despite the ostensible Ming loyalism of the seventeenth-century Chosŏn court, court officials in Chosŏn had seen no problem in categorizing the descendants of Ming refugees, together with Jurchens, Japanese, and Dutch, as submitting-foreigners. In the decades following the establishment of the Taebodan, however, the court reimagined the Ming migrants, often considered as a nuisance and a threat when they arrived, as loyalist refugees fleeing to the last remnant of the true Ming tradition in Chosŏn. On the one hand, their presence in Chosŏn confirmed the state's own self-image, and on the other, their categorization as submitting-foreigners came to be seen as scandalous and a serious flaw to be rectified. As a result, during the reigns of Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo, those submitting-foreigners who could assert Chinese origins were recategorized as "Chinese descendants" (*Hwain chason*), "imperial subjects" (*Hwangjoin*) or the "descendants of imperial subjects" (*hwangjoin chason*), with the term "imperial subject" eventually becoming the standard. This recategorization gave them a social status equivalent to intermediate status groups such as *chungin* specialists and low-ranking military officials.²⁰

Before the eighteenth century, Chinese in Korea had been referred to by a variety of terms, not all of them particularly laudatory.²¹ Tang person (Tangin) was probably the most common, although, especially under Qing influence, Han person (Hanin), an equivalent to the Manchu category Nikan and the preferred term within the Qing empire, was also used with some frequency. Central Dynasty person (Chungjoin), Superior Country person (Taegugin), and Celestial Dynasty person (Ch'ŏnjoin) were also common, although even a term as seemingly positive as Celestial Dynasty person could appear in passages otherwise hostile to the Ming people in question.²² "Imperial subject" (Hwangjoin) came into use during the reign of Yŏngjo to specify descendants of the Ming residing in Chosŏn. Literally meaning "Imperial Dynasty person," it referred to subjects of what was then considered by Chosŏn to be the last imperial dynasty (Hwangjo), namely the fallen Ming. The initial uses of the term "imperial subject" were nearly always in connection with Ming loyalist ritual, especially at the Taebodan. For instance, in 1725, Yŏngjo asked, while discussing the Mandongmyo, which imperial subjects other than members of the Chŏn family (the descendants of Tian Haoqian) had received official employment. He was answered by Hong Hoin (1674–?), who said that Yi Tongbae, former magistrate of a special county (*hyŏllyŏng*), and Yi Myŏn, former subarea commander, both of them descendants

of Li Rumei, had also received official employment.²³ In 1735, Yǒngjo expressed joy at the good news that Chǒn Tūgu, the son of Chǒn Manch'u, had shown skill in archery, and so he pushed him directly toward the palace military examination.²⁴ In 1736, Yǒngjo intervened to have another member of the Chǒn family, Chǒn Ch'iu, provided with a position in the special guards (*pyǒlgunjik*),²⁵ a royal guard established by Hyojong and staffed in part by Ming migrants.²⁶

Yǒngjo's active interest in Chosǒn imperial subjects grew after 1749, the year that Taebodan rituals were expanded to include the Hongwu and Chongzhen emperors. In the third month of that year, for instance, Yǒngjo also called for civil and military officials who were the descendants of imperial subjects or of "loyal and chaste" (*ch'ungjǒl*) Chosǒn people to be granted pensions or employment by the Board of Personnel or the Board of War.²⁷ As part of this process, he ordered all descendants of imperial subjects who were enrolled in the military and in possession of a bow or musket to assemble with their weapons before the Ch'ǒngyang gate of the royal palace.²⁸ After bringing them before him, he called for the employment of imperial subjects who demonstrated military skills as ritual guards for the Imperial Altar.²⁹ All this was done in the space of a few days. As the result of the show of talent provided by the imperial subjects in question, Chǒng Naeju, an extraordinary cavalry officer (*pyǒlmusa*) within the Military Training Agency, was raised above the senior third rank for his success in the archery trials, and two soldiers from the Han Ivory Troop, Wang Tuhwi and Wang Hǔngsǒk, were allowed to advance immediately to the final palace military exam on account of their success in musketry trials. Additionally, Yǒngjo ordered the promotion of the Chinese company commanders (*Hanin ch'ogwan*) Chǒn Manha and Chǒng Ikchu.³⁰ A few days later, during the fourth month, Yǒngjo ordered that ritual guards should be selected especially from among the descendants of those Ming people who had followed Hyojong from Mukden and were then residing in Ōi-dong.³¹

Initially, positions were offered primarily to the descendants of Ming refugees who had obtained some significant bureaucratic position within the Chosǒn court upon arrival, with some consideration for talent and ability. The case of Ho Tup'il is an especially interesting exception, revealing the increasing categorization of imperial subjects as a type to be rewarded for their connection to the Ming, with little regard for skills or qualifications. In 1725, during the first year of Yǒngjo, *The Chosǒn Veritable Records* informs us that Ho Tup'il, a ninth-generation descendant of late Song official Hu Anguo (1074–1178), but by then living in Pukch'ǒng in southern Hamgyǒng Province, memorialized to the court his desire to take a position in the Mandongmyo, so as to show his sincere

desire not to forget China (Chungguk). Hwang Cha (1689–?), a civil official, responded to Ho's request by saying that this would indeed be in accord with the desire of both Hyojong and Sukchong to maintain the greater meaning of the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, as well as the original purpose of the Mandongmyo.

But was Ho Tup'il employable? The account of *The Veritable Records* suggests that there was considerable doubt in this regard. Yǒngjo tried to sweep these doubts aside: "How could a descendant of a high official of the Superior Country not become a brilliant general?" As Ho was an imperial subject (*hwangjoin*), Yǒngjo demanded that the local magistrate in southern Hamgyōng place him under the special care of the state, and that an investigation be made to see if any of his family had some notable skill in either civil or military matters.³² As for Ho's abilities, the *Journal of the Royal Secretariat* also records Yi Sōngnyong's (1672–1748) much less enthusiastic description of Ho Tup'il as a man who, "though not utterly vicious or stupid," was nevertheless both incapable in military matters and illiterate, and thus not really employable by the Chosŏn court. There was no evidence, other than hearsay, for the claim that Ho Tup'il was descended from a prominent official, and indeed Ho's family maintained that their documents had all been burnt. Still, Yi Sōngnyong did not think that Ho could be simply abandoned, as to do so would hardly be in accord with the principle of "succoring those who have come from distant regions." Ho Tup'il had a cousin, a resident of Maengsan in interior P'yōngan Province, who was literate and capable in military matters, so Yi Sōngnyong suggested him as a possible alternative.³³

Yi Sōngnyong's initial statement is consistent with the usual rhetoric concerning submitting-foreigners and the responsibility of the Chosŏn court to succor those foreigners who had come from afar. By contrast, Yǒngjo's response suggests the growing idea of a Ming descendant as a Ming loyalist type,³⁴ even if that type had not yet solidified into the stable bureaucratic category that it was to become. Indeed, in 1731, the court decided to provide Ho Tup'il and his descendants with greater privileges. This support was modeled on the precedent already established by his fellow northerner Kang Shijue, the Ming migrant discovered by Pak Sedang and Nam Kuman during their term of office in Hamgyōng Province in the late seventeenth century. Yet, in contrast to Kang Shijue, who was described by nearly all Chosŏn officials as both literate and skilled in military matters, Ho Tup'il's general incompetence was still not in doubt. The only common aspect shared by Ho and Kang was Ming Chinese ancestry.³⁵

The true expansion of imperial subject status and the privileges attached to the descendants of Ming migrants occurred after 1751, when Yǒngjo went

beyond granting royal favors to a few fortunate and well-known Ming descendants. From that time onward, Yǒngjo increasingly treated Ming descent as an important category worthy of consideration in itself. This change in attitude also took place a year after the Equal-Service Tax Law (*Kyunyŏk-pŏp*) was brought into effect, and was closely associated with it. The Equal-Service Law was part of a policy pursued by Yǒngjo to spread the burden of the military tax equally across the population. Initially, at least, Yǒngjo had sought to extend the tax to encompass sajok aristocrats as well, but when this move attracted too much opposition, Yǒngjo abandoned it, instead extending the levy across the commoner population, while cutting the tax rate in half. To make up for the loss of revenue and to tax sajok to a somewhat greater extent, Yǒngjo also raised the land-tax rate, imposed a levy on students who failed qualifying exams, and raised a number of other minor levies.³⁶ As discussed by Haboush and Kim Paekch'ŏl, apart from the practical problem of military tax reform, the Equal Service Law, and the concern for the common people implied by it, was also part of Yǒngjo's own rhetorical self-representation as a sage king in the tradition of Yao and Shun, ruling selflessly on behalf of the people upon whom the very survival of the state depended.³⁷

As with other fiscal reforms during the late Chosŏn, the reform of submitting-foreigner status required the development of institutions capable of handling these reforms, and on generating new knowledge and records through which these forms could be put into effect. The challenge facing the Chosŏn court was, well into the eighteenth century, that the central state still did not know who properly belonged within the submitting-foreigner tax category. During the tenth month of 1751, while touring the birthplaces of earlier kings, Yǒngjo's attention turned to the birthplace of Hyojong, and thus to the Ming migrants in the Ōi-dong neighborhood, in particular the members of the Han Ivory Troops. One official, Nam T'aegi (1699–1763), pointed out as a matter of concern that the term “submitting-foreigner,” which ordinarily referred to those Jurchens and Japanese who had come to settle in Chosŏn, also encompassed all imperial subjects who resided in Kyŏngsang Province; these latter were so deeply resentful of the term “submitting-foreigner” that they would prefer to accept the burden of corvée labor and the heavier tax load of commoners than be included in that invidious category. Other officials in Yǒngjo's presence noted the same trend. Yǒngjo's response was to lament his own lack of sincerity toward the imperial dynasty. He reflected on the phrase in *The Confucian Analects* (*Lunyu*) “that there must be a rectification of names” and called upon the Board of Rites to investigate who was classified as a submitting-foreigner.³⁸

In a very short while, Yǒngjo received responses to his request. In the same year, the director of the Capital Guards (*ōyōng taejang*), Hong Ponghan, informed the king that, having consulted with provincial governments and broadly investigated documents within the Board of Rites, he was able to establish that the category encompassed non-Korean lineages, including former Pōnhos, Japanese defectors, and Chinese who had entered during the Ming-Qing transition. In response to Hong Ponghan's report, Yǒngjo once more demanded the rectification of names: henceforth, the term "submitting-foreigner" should be restricted to the descendants of Jurchens and Japanese, while the descendants of Ming migrants should be referred to as Chinese descendants (*Hwain chason*). Yǒngjo then decreed that, while Chinese descendants should continue to be under the administration of the Board of Rites, they should be freed from all personal taxes and military service requirements. This demand Hong Ponghan accepted as showing sage concern on the part of the monarch, but he also worried that if the transferal were in name only and included no financial contribution, then in the future other government agencies would look down on the status, and local administrations might think that they could expand their source of military tax without interfering in any way with the finances of the Board of Rites. To prevent such future corruption of Yǒngjo's sage intentions, he advocated having Chinese descendants pay a small contribution in local products insofar as it could be collected without any great effort, so that, if in the future some Chinese descendants did have a complaint, the Board of Rites would at least know who was under their care and protect them from such extralegal exactions by local administrations. This revision Yǒngjo accepted, even as he called for officials in both the capital and the provinces to show greater vigilance in enforcing the tax-exempt status of Chinese descendants.³⁹

Indeed, investigation revealed quite a number of prominent Ming migrant descendants recorded in *The Compendium of Submitting-Foreigners* (*Hyanghwain sōngch'aek*), such as Yi Hwōn, the fifth descendant of the Yōngwōn Marquis Li Chengliang, and the members of three Ming migrant families, namely the descendants of Chu Haichang, Tian Shitai, and Fan Zijian.⁴⁰ Yǒngjo responded by freeing these families from corvée labor in perpetuity and demanded that the Hansōng administration and the Board of Rites should carefully review the names within *The Compendium of Submitting-Foreigners* in order to transfer Chinese descendants into *The Record of Chinese* (*Hwain-rok*). This record was to be distributed to the provinces, to prevent Chinese descendants from suffering unjust exactions. Additionally, the descendants of Chu Haichang were freed from the base status that they had gained on account of

an ancestor marrying a low-status woman, while Yi Hwŏn was offered a new position in the military.⁴¹

From this point on, officials directed their concern to distinguishing both the designation and the tax obligations of Chinese descendants from the diverse peoples who were in possession of submitting-foreigner status. The Chosŏn bureaucracy did not, however, have the knowledge or records to make these distinctions easily. In 1754, Yi Ch'ŏnbo referred to a report from Kim Hanch'ŏl, the governor of Hamgyŏng Province, who worried that, in putting the new order of the Board of Rites into effect, the bureaucracies of the various local administrations were faced with the significant presence of unrelated families mixed in with submitting-foreigners and Chinese descendants. As a result, local administrations, required to collect a limited tax from submitting-foreigners and Chinese descendants, and fearing criticism for not doing so, imposed double taxation on a fair number of people, throwing the province into disorder. As this certainly was not the original intention of the monarch, Kim Hanch'ŏl recommended that the new policy be delayed until each local magistracy could complete a full investigation of the identity of submitting-foreigners and Chinese descendants within their county. Yi Ch'ŏnbo supported Kim Hanch'ŏl's request, but warned that in some cases local magistracies might simply be looking for excuses to delay implementing the policy. He thus advocated following Kim Hanch'ŏl's suggestion while also investigating and punishing any local official who seemed to be stalling.⁴²

Despite the fact that both Kim Hanch'ŏl and Yi Ch'ŏnbo had been careful to distinguish submitting-foreigners from Chinese descendants, Cho Yŏngguk responded to them by providing the historical background of these two categories, pointing out that Chinese (Hwain) included both those Ming soldiers who came to Chosŏn during the ten years of the Imjin War and had then remained after the end of the war and those members of Mao Wenlong's army who had wandered into Chosŏn. Submitting-foreigners, alternately, comprised those few Jurchens (*yain*) who avoided being removed by Nurhaci to Jianzhou, but who had stayed in Chosŏn. Cho Yŏngguk then added that much of the empty land within the Six Garrisons region in northern Hamgyŏng Province had once been inhabited by these same Jurchens. Cho's brief historical background caused embarrassment to Yi Ch'ŏnbo, who apologized for discussing the matter without first informing himself properly.⁴³ Yet Cho himself was no closer to sorting out the basic problem of distinguishing genuine submitting-foreigners and Chinese descendants from other categories of subjects. Indeed, a year later, Cho continued to express concern over the administrative problems associated with

submitting-foreigners and Chinese descendants during a general discussion of the problems connected to tax collection in Hamgyŏng, including such issues as the fraudulent imposition of taxes on nursing babies, and the number of public slaves who had managed to falsely claim descent from Yi Sŏnggye's ancestors.

Yŏngjo responded by pointing out that false identities (*moch'ing*) of that sort were also found in aristocratic genealogies and were an extremely difficult problem to solve. Cho agreed but still emphasised how difficult reforming submitting-foreigners status in northern Hamgyŏng could be. Because submitting-foreigners made up such a large proportion of Hamgyŏng's population, the task of searching out and identifying Chinese descendants from among them was extremely onerous. Worse, some of the most common clan seats associated with Chinese descendants could in fact refer to Korean place-names, including Tŭngju, which could refer to Dengzhou in Shandong but also to Anbyŏn in Chosŏn's Kangwŏn Province, and T'aewŏn, which could refer to Taiyuan in Shanxi but also Ch'ungwŏn in Chosŏn's Ch'ungch'ŏng Province. An investigation of records would doubtless classify the bearers of these clan seats as Chinese descendants, even if they referred to Korean place-names, and Cho worried that this would be a source of complaints in the future from those upon whom double taxation was imposed as a result. He thus advised that careful distinctions be made. Yŏngjo did not respond to his broader administrative concerns but reiterated the importance of distinguishing imperial subjects from submitting-foreigners.⁴⁴

The creation of Chinese or imperial subject status did not eliminate concern about submitting-foreigner status. In 1758, the Board of Rites noted the loss of revenue from submitting-foreigners who were copying Chinese descendants by not providing their tribute as before, as well as the excessive growth of the category to include "the maternal descendants of maternal descendants."⁴⁵ A month later, Yŏngjo responded by limiting inheritance to paternal and maternal descendants (presumably eliminating the maternal descendants of maternal descendants that had caused concern).⁴⁶ He also recognized that, in an era where all Chosŏn subjects had had their military tax burden reduced to a single *p'il* of cloth, submitting-foreigners, who had already been paying only that levy to the Board of Rites, might feel resentment at having received no tax reduction. Court officials also mentioned that submitting-foreigners in Chŏlla Province suffered excessive exactions, not only paying the military tax at the same level as commoners, but even having duplicate taxes imposed upon the deceased to be paid by their descendants. Yŏngjo deplored this burden placed on them, which went against the high intentions of his ancestors who had established the status.

Regretting that he could not cut their payments in half, let alone completely eliminate their military tax burden, he demanded that a *Compendium of Submitting-Foreigners* be distributed to the provinces in the same manner as *The Compendium of Chinese*, with strict punishments levied against magistrates who allowed such unjust exactions to take place.⁴⁷

Considering the problem of irregular taxation, it is not surprising that submitting-foreigners aimed to upgrade to Chinese status or, especially during the reign of Chǒngjo, imperial subject status. Although even many of the successful claims to Chinese status, such as that of Ho Tup'il, seem now to be of doubtful veracity, by no means were all claims accepted. The case of Pak Sǔngbok, a self-styled "submitting-foreigner of the Imperial Dynasty" living in Yǒngam in Chǒlla Province, is especially interesting in this regard. His case is included in a survey of improper petitions in a 1798 entry in Chǒngjo's *Record of Daily Reflection* (*Ilŏngnok*). Most of these (which included appeals on behalf of convicted murderers) were rejected out of hand, in some instances with an additional penalty, but a number were seen to be worthy of further consideration, among which was that of Pak Sǔngbok. His appeal was confirmed as improper, but some aspects concerned Chǒngjo, who ordered a more detailed investigation. He was concerned by Pak Sǔngbok's complaint that, as a "descendant of submitting-foreigners of the Imperial Dynasty," he felt that people of his sort were no longer being cared for as in the past. Chǒngjo ordered an investigation throughout Chǒlla Province of irregular taxation and corvée imposed on submitting-foreigners as alleged by Pak Sǔngbok. He also demanded that a survey be made of improper use of terminology, notably the inappropriate reference to Ming descendants as submitting-foreigners and to communities inhabited by Ming descendants as submitting-foreigner villages. As Chǒngjo said: "These days, the teaching of proper social distinctions has been declining, and those in authority no longer know how to foster the worthy. The damage has reached helpless submitting-foreigner villages. How can this not be most disturbing! It is utterly nonsensical to describe the descendants of imperial subjects who fled to our country as submitting-foreigners."⁴⁸

In response, an investigation was indeed launched, as a result of which the governor of Chǒlla Province, Yi Tŭksin (1742–1802), emphatically dismissed Pak Sǔngbok's claims. He declared baseless or largely baseless each of Pak Sǔngbok's many accusations of corruption. Interestingly, he also rejected Pak Sǔngbok's own claim to imperial subject status. Not only was Pak not a Chinese surname, but the magistrate in charge discovered earlier documents that suggested that Pak Sǔngbok and his family were of Jurchen origin—his ancestors had first

used the Jurchen clan seat of Hŭngnyong-gang (Ch. Heilongjiang), although they had later corrected it to Taewŏn, which could be either Jurchen or Ming Chinese. From this, Yi Tŭksin was able to assert that it was “clear without a doubt that Pak is falsely claiming [imperial-subject status].” The general survey of submitting-foreigners and imperial subjects throughout Chŏlla Province did not turn up any serious failure to rectify names, or indeed any unjust taxation, at least at the county level (some customary payments were demanded on the level of the commandery or island administrations). In Naju, imperial-subjects and submitting-foreigners were scattered about the islands and hills, and so there were no collective villages whose names were to be corrected. In Kobu, Imp’a, Okku, Muan, Hamp’yŏng, and Puan, those who called themselves submitting-foreigners lived scattered among other communities or in some cases formed their own villages, but when the governor asked about their ancestry, he discovered that they knew nothing at all about the subject. In Sunch’ŏn, Posŏng, Kimche, Haenam, Hŭngdŏk, Kwangyang, Kangjin, Hŭngyang, and Mujang, he found that the names of submitting-foreigner villages and imperial subject villages were clearly distinguished from each other. There were also people of foreign origin in Yŏnggwang, but, without any clear evidence of their ancestry, it was not possible to change the names of their villages to “imperial subject villages.” Throughout, the governor noted, there were reports of people who claimed imperial subject status but who had, like Pak Sŭngbok’s ancestors, the clan seats Hŭngnyong-gang or Taewŏn. Until the early seventeenth century the Chosŏn court itself had granted submitting-foreigners clan seats and Korean surnames, but this history seems to have been forgotten by the late eighteenth century. From the governor’s point of view, the proliferation of the same clan seat among people of different surnames made no sense, suggesting the “proliferation of lies.” Pak Sŭngbok, the governor concluded, “was of the same ilk” as other fraudulent imperial subjects.⁴⁹

Although the decision went strongly against Pak Sŭngbok, whose case became the precedent for rejecting later baseless claims of the same sort,⁵⁰ it also confirmed the term “imperial subject” or “imperial subject descendant” as the official designation for those who could establish descent from the Ming—and indeed other terms largely disappear from the official record. Even as the supposed descendants of Ming migrants, during the reigns of Chŏngjo and Sunjo, appealed their classification as submitting-foreigners, demanding instead to be referred to as imperial subjects, so the Board of Rites struggled, in much the same manner as before, to distinguish the false claimants to Ming migrant status from the legitimate ones.

The Formation of Imperial Subject Identity

Both ideological change within the state and the interests of the Chinese descendants themselves encouraged the creation and development of Ming migrant descent-groups and the emergence of imperial subject status as distinct from submitting-foreigner status. Ming migrants, when requesting imperial subject status, frequently claimed to have lost the vital documents. The Chosŏn court, in turn, exerted itself to evaluate their claims, investigating the records for any documentary evidence of Chinese ancestry. The category of imperial subject or Chinese, in other words, developed through the interaction between the fiscal and ideological needs of the Chosŏn court, on the one hand, and the desire for social improvement among Ming descendants, on the other. Conversely, to the modern scholar, the fact that the category needed to be created and clarified during the reigns of Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo is a reminder that before that period the distinction between the two categories was not made consistently and that even in the vigorously anti-Qing political atmosphere during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Ming Chinese descendants were routinely ranked as equal to Jurchens and Japanese.

Angela Zito has described the grand sacrifice (*dasi*) during the Qing under the Qianlong emperor as producing “social bodies,” bringing ritual participants into hierarchies, and creating the relationship between the *yang* body of the emperor and the *yin* body of the other participants.⁵¹ As social bodies produced through key palace rituals involving the Chosŏn monarch, imperial subjects enjoyed social benefits that went far beyond tax advantages. Submitting-foreigners during the seventeenth century had in theory enjoyed the special concern of the state and exemption from personal taxes. Their marginal status, however, left them at the mercy of competing government agencies, each seeking to impose taxes upon them. In addition, they inherited their status on the maternal line in the same manner as the base born. By contrast, imperial subject status brought with it recognition of distinguished ancestry, a family background that accorded with late Chosŏn’s state ideology, and privileged access to military examinations. Although Ming migrants in no way rose to the ranks of civil *sajok*, their participation in Ming loyalist ritual gave them a position in the Chosŏn court hierarchy and brought them into a social relationship with the Chosŏn monarch that they had previously lacked. It also gave them an increasingly visible role in the Chosŏn court, from whose point of view the presence of Ming loyalist migrants on Chosŏn soil reflected its own self-identity as the last remnant of the true Chunghwa tradition.

During the early Chosŏn, Jurchen and Japanese submitting-foreigners had assembled before the Chosŏn monarch during visits to the capital and had even been organized as royal guards. Under Yŏngjo, instead of Jurchens and Japanese, descendants of Ming migrants were assembled before the monarch, often as part of the monarch's participation in Ming loyalist rites at the Taebodan. Just as had been the case with the Jurchens and Japanese during the early Chosŏn, their presence served, as Kimura Takao has recently pointed out, above all to strengthen royal authority.⁵² At times, these assemblies would also involve a distribution of provisions to these descendants, presumably in nearly all cases people from the area of Ŏŭi-dong. Participation in these rituals continued to grow throughout his reign. For instance, in 1771, Yŏngjo, after a lengthy prostration before the altar, called the Ming descendants for review.⁵³ Such royal visitations continued to occur under Chŏngjo also, frequently resulting in the widespread hiring of Ming migrants for the military bureaucracy.⁵⁴

Indeed, military traditions according to which Ming migrants had been organized since 1637 continued to shape their institutional relationship with the state. Tian Haoqian's descendant Chŏn Tŭgu continued to do well, gaining the position of provincial military commander (*pyŏngsa*) of Kyŏngsang Province in 1773, at the same time that another Ming migrant descendant, Hwang Sejung (whose ancestor was Huang Gong), acquired the position of chief commander (*yŏngjang*).⁵⁵ Kang Shijue's descendants also maintained their prominence, obtaining hereditary positions as sixth-rank military officers under Chŏngjo.⁵⁶ According to a contemporary observer, although they continued to be based in northern Hamgyŏng Province, they made frequent trips to the capital,⁵⁷ which no doubt raised their position considerably above their neighbors in the isolated frontier region of Musan. Beginning in 1764, the Chosŏn court facilitated the participation of imperial subjects in the military bureaucracy through the establishment of the Examination for the Loyal and Good (*ch'unghyanggwa*), specifically instituted for the descendants of Ming migrants, as well as the descendants of loyal Korean subjects who had fallen resisting the Qing during the Pyŏngja invasion and were honored in the Hyŏnjŏlsa (Shrine to the Wise and Chaste) and Ch'unghyŏlsa (Shrine to the Loyal and Passionate). Indeed, note was made of imperial subjects who passed the examinations during the reigns of Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo, including a descendant of Li Rusong in 1769,⁵⁸ the above-mentioned Hwang Sejung in 1775,⁵⁹ and a descendant of Kang Shijue in 1800.⁶⁰

The linking of imperial subjects with the descendants of loyal officials brought them into the mainstream of Chosŏn's Chunghwa Inheritance Consciousness. During the reigns of Yŏngjo and his successors, imperial subjects

and “descendants of loyal and good” (*ch’ungnyang chason*) Chosŏn subjects were made a constituent part of the Ming loyalist rites, often with special military examinations accompanying the rites. According to *The Monograph of the Imperial Altar* (*Hwangdanji*), a text from the Chŏngjo era, descendants of imperial subjects, descendants of loyal Chosŏn subjects, members of the royal family, and military and civil officials, arrayed according to rank, were brought in to participate, generally by standing at attention and bowing at set moments, either to the monarch as he passed before them or northward toward the spirit tablets of the emperors. Imperial subjects, along with the descendants of loyal Chosŏn subjects, participated in nearly all aspects of the Ming loyalist rite, from the inspection of the sacrificial utensils by the officiant (frequently the monarch or crown prince) through to the sacrifice itself, and the monarch’s departure.⁶¹

In *The Veritable Records*, most such cases are listed briefly, with a passing reference to the descendants of imperial subjects and loyal Chosŏn subjects participating in the rites,⁶² or perhaps being called into the presence of the monarch after the rites.⁶³ The *Journal of the Royal Secretariat* often provides lists of all participants as well, dividing them between civil and military officials, along with their famous ancestor. In 1800, for instance, the *Journal* lists the people participating in the Ming loyalist rites, informing us that two civil officials of imperial subject status, both descendants of Huang Gong who had achieved the status of young scholar (*yuhak*), were brought before the monarch along with 156 civil *sajok*, generally of a similarly low rank, who were descendants of thirty-six “loyal and good” Chosŏn subjects. As for military officials participating during that year, imperial subjects exceeded the descendants of the loyal and good in number, with forty being descendants of ten original migrants (including Kang Shijue, and the Chinese who accompanied Hyojong from Mukden), and twenty-two being descendants of thirteen loyal and good Chosŏn subjects.⁶⁴ The association between imperial subjects and military matters was reflected in their placement during Ming loyalist rituals. According to the rule established by Chŏngjo, during the ritual inspection of the utensils, the imperial subjects stood to the west of the music platform facing north toward the shrine, while the descendants of loyal subjects were placed to the east of the platform, with both groups assembled in front of the civil and military officials.⁶⁵ During the sacrifice itself, imperial subjects were placed to the west with military officials and members of the royal family, while the descendants of loyal subjects were placed to the east along with civil officials.⁶⁶ This not only put them below the descendants of loyal Chosŏn subjects according to the usual civil-military hierarchy but also placed them in front of other more prominent civil and military

officials and included them in a central ritual practice of the monarch. Socially, it brought them into the company of the monarch and high officials—no small matter in a society as hierarchical as Chosŏn.⁶⁷

The transformation of Ming descendants into ritual subjects of the Chosŏn court may also be seen in the reorganization of the Han Ivory Troops, the military unit in which many of the Ming descendants residing in Ōŭi-dong had been enrolled. Located near the palace grounds in the eastern ward of Kōndōk-pang, just north of the main market street of Chongno, and associated with the monarchy beginning with Hyojong, Ōŭi-dong had, as discussed above, attracted Yŏngjo's interest early on. When he arrived for his initial visit in 1751, only five members of the Han Ivory Troops had heard in time to present themselves before the monarch. Yŏngjo asked them for their names and origins and was informed that they were P'ung Myŏngbok, a descendant of Feng Sanshi; Yang Sŏnggŏn, a descendant of Yang Fuji; Wang Suhan, a descendant of Wang Wenxiang; Yang Sehŭng, another descendant of Yang Fuji; and Pae Ikhwi, a descendant of Pei Yisheng. Upon establishing their names and antecedents, Yŏngjo turned his attention to their tax status, inquiring if they had to provide the local urban corvée of Hansŏng residents—the notoriously burdensome “ward corvée” (*pangyŏk*).⁶⁸ He was informed that they were free of local corvée as well. He also inquired about the numbers of Ming migrant descendants in and around the Ōŭi-dong neighborhood and was informed of the presence of more than forty Ming migrant households within the neighborhood and more than fifty outside, although those who had left Ōŭi-dong often had to provide a certain amount of local corvée. Because Ōŭi-dong was small and cramped, many had decided to leave. Yŏngjo was further informed that the population of Ming descendants in Ōŭi-dong had grown since the time of migration from slightly more than twenty to over 150. In the end, this was not a very substantial number, even though households outside of the neighborhood do not seem to have been included.⁶⁹

Under Chŏngjo, the organization of the Han Ivory Troops took a new turn. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, in 1790, Chŏngjo outlined the history of these troops, seeing the category as utterly unbecoming the descendants of Ming migrants. He inaccurately suggested that this had perhaps been inevitable during the period immediately post submission to the Qing “when much had to be concealed,” with this statement forgetting or ignoring the fact that the Ming migrants of Ōŭi-dong had come to Chosŏn with the full knowledge and cooperation of the Qing. Chŏngjo's solution was to reorganize the imperial subjects militarily by renaming their command the Han Brigade (*Hallyŏ*), presumably as doing so removed the implication of commoner status, or even servile status,

inherent in ivory troops. The total number within the Han Brigade he set at thirty people, and while he continued to have them administered with the Military Training Agency, he had their rank and financing determined according to the precedent of the Agency Exam Passers (*kukch'ulsin*) among the palace guards and the Special Cavalry Brigade (*pyölgidae*) within the Capital Garrison of the Military Training Agency. Additionally, Chǒngjo took advantage of this reform to reorganize the Taebodan guards (*sujikkwan*). He lamented that, when the Taebodan had first been established, the guards had been drawn from the ranks of eunuchs, later to be supplemented by the base-born cleaning staff (*subok*) for tombs and temples. In place of such base guards, he ordered that three members of the Han Brigade be selected as guards at the Taebodan, thereby strengthening their connection to Ming loyalist ritual.⁷⁰

Constructing the Nongsǒ Yi

Such court involvement in the creation of an imperial subject identity can also be observed on the level of individual descent-groups. A notable example is that of the Nongsǒ Yi. The Nongsǒ Yi family were descendants of Li Chengliang, a prominent Liaodongese military official, likely of Hamgyǒng Jurchen ancestry, although he was remembered in Chosǒn as Korean in origin. Three of Li Chengliang's sons, Li Rusong, Li Rumei, and Li Rubai, served against the Japanese during the Imjin War, with Li Rusong playing a particularly prominent role. As was discussed in chapter 4, during the seventeenth century, the descendants of Li Rumei had gained limited status in Chosǒn as military officials. As they were from the same family as a prominent savior of Korea during the Imjin War, they attracted regular court attention. Because they were residents of Kanghwa, Kanghwa magistrates were especially concerned about their well-being. During the reign of Yǒngjo, shortly after imperial subject status was instituted, Kwǒn Chǒk, the magistrate of Kanghwa Island, expressed concern that Yi Myǒn, a descendant of Li Rumei, was near starvation on Kanghwa Island, despite the earlier intercession of Yi T'aejwa under Kyǒngjong. Considering that Yi Myǒn's ancestor Li Rumei had contributed incomparably more to Chosǒn than the ancestor of Chǒn Manch'u (an imperial subject then the focus of considerable court interest), Kwǒn Chǒk argued that he should be provided with proper employment, if only to prevent the end of Li Rumei's line.⁷¹ Yǒngjo responded affirmatively to Kwǒn Chǒk's request and, indeed, Yi Myǒn was given a range of military positions, including garrison commander of Wǒlgot in 1735,⁷² commander at the Five Military Commands (*Owijang*, senior 3),⁷³ fifth minister in

the Office of Ministers without portfolio (*ch'ŏmjisa*),⁷⁴ and commander at the Loyal Command (*Ch'ungikchang*).⁷⁵ In addition to his military career, Yi Myŏn reinforced his status by regularly participating in the rites at the Taebodan, a salutary practice that was noticed by Yŏngjo himself.⁷⁶ Such prominence benefited his descendants. His son Yi Hun was given the position of commander of the Five Military Commands (Owi t'ongjesa),⁷⁷ became a member of the special forces unit (*pyŏlgunjik*),⁷⁸ and attained the rank of senior fourth minister of the Office of Ministers-without-Portfolio (*tongjisa chungch'ubu*, jr. 2).⁷⁹ Under Yŏngjo, his grandson Yi Kwangsŏk was also granted the important preliminary position of royal messenger.⁸⁰

However, the interest of the Chosŏn court did not stop at simply benefiting the careers of Yi Myŏn and his offspring or encouraging their participation in Taebodan ritual. Rather, both Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo actively sought to form them into a descent-group worthy of their noble ancestor Li Rumei and to emphasize their status as a living connection to General Li Rusong, who had long received sacrifice at the Muyŏlsa in P'yŏngyang and supplementary honors in the Taebodan.⁸¹ Thus, in 1740, Yŏngjo asked the minister of the Board of Rites, Yi Kijin (1687–1755), whether the descendants of imperial subjects practiced ancestral sacrifices to their ancestors. Yi Kijin responded that Yi Myŏn had not yet made an ancestral tablet (*sinju*). When Yi Kijin visited Yi Myŏn on Kanghwa Island, he noticed that the family did not have the resources even to pay for the ritual of moving the ancestral tablet. Yi Kijin recommended that the monarch order the Board of Rites to pay for the ritual.⁸² In fact, Yŏngjo went so far as to have the tablet itself made for Yi Myŏn and to order the establishment of a shrine at which these rituals to Li Rumei and Li Chengliang could be performed.⁸³ Via a diplomatic mission, Yi Chŏ, a cousin of Yi Myŏn, who also pursued a military career, was able to obtain an image of Li Chengliang,⁸⁴ but this itself became a source of concern. Kim Yangt'aek (1712–1777), after participating in rituals at the Ch'ungnyŏlsa on Kanghwa Island, noted that Yi Myŏn lived nearby. Remembering Yŏngjo's salutary example of providing salaries to Ming migrant descendants, he went to see him. There he discovered that Yi Myŏn, although possessing the portraits of both Li Chengliang and Li Rumei and offering sacrifices to them, nevertheless lived in a simple thatched hut. He asked that Yŏngjo order the provision of proper utensils and food, so that Yi Myŏn could practice the ancestral sacrifice properly.⁸⁵

This interest on the part of the Chosŏn court not only enriched Yi Myŏn's family, but soon expanded it to include two new branches, both direct descendants of Li Rusong. The first of these new branches was discovered in 1755,

during the early period of the construction of imperial subject status. The man in question, Yi Hwŏn (later renamed Yi Wŏn),⁸⁶ benefited from the discovery of his status by attaining the rank of company commander (*ch'ogwan*) with the Military Training Agency (*Hullyŏn togam*) without first taking the exams.⁸⁷ He continued to rise in the ranks, attaining such positions as right naval inspector for Chŏlla Province (*Chŏlla usu uhu*, sr. 4),⁸⁸ even becoming local magistrate (*hyŏn'gam*) of Chinhae in Kyŏngsang Province.⁸⁹ His son Kwangu (who was eventually renamed Hyosŭng) also attracted the interest of the monarch and served in military posts, holding, among other positions, that of magistrate of Kyŏnghŭng.⁹⁰ They became, in other words, part of the same military sajok descent-group as the descendants of Li Rumei in Kanghwa.

Yi Hwŏn owed this preferment to the declared belief among Chosŏn officials that he was "a remaining descendant of Li Rusong" whose aid to Chosŏn "must never be forgotten."⁹¹ The fact that he seems to have been a skilled soldier,⁹² however, no doubt also furthered his military career. Li Rusong's shadow, extended indirectly, had already benefited the Kanghwa branch of the Nongsŏ Yi, but certainly direct descendants would have had a stronger claim. Yet the evidence for Yi Hwŏn's ancestry seems to have been very weak indeed. Presumably, the connection to Li Rusong was based on the official record found within *The Compendium of Submitting-Foreigners* when Yi Hwŏn was first identified as a Ming migrant in 1755, although it is notable that, at that point, he was still described simply as a descendant of Li Chengliang. And even according to comments made by Chŏngjo himself in 1799, before Yi Hwŏn came to the court's attention,⁹³ he "was a plowman on a Ch'unch'ŏn mountain-side, living among herders and firewood gatherers. His selection for [military] office was based only on rumor."⁹⁴

In fact, following their own genealogical account available to the Chosŏn during the late eighteenth century, the historical background of this family would seem to be much less certain than that of the Kanghwa branch. According to this account, Li Rusong, before heading out into the battle in which he was to fall, told his family that with the rise of the Manchu they should flee to Chosŏn, where they could avoid having their heads shaved by the Manchu, and where, on account of his good deed in saving Chosŏn, they would not be forced into any base occupations.⁹⁵ Li Rusong's son Li Xingzhong also fell in battle in 1644, but first managed to order his son Yingren to flee to Chosŏn, and indeed Li Yingren is described as arriving in Hansŏng in 1648, whereupon he refused all office, "as with his country destroyed and his family gone, what of fame and profit?" He then retreated deep into the Kŭmgang mountains, to Changjŏn-li in

Hwiyang in Kangwŏn Province, where he was allotted farmland by the Chosŏn court. There he became a recluse, and “to the end of his days, he did not change his Chinese speech, and his feet did not leave the village. In the days set aside to commemorate the Imperial Dynasty, he would climb up the mountain behind the house, look to the north and weep.”⁹⁶

This touching story suffers from being uncorroborated in almost any other source and also from being inherently improbable. Leaving aside Li Rusong’s prophecy of the Manchu rise, despite his dying in battle against Mongols in 1598, Li Yingren’s flight to Chosŏn is supposed to have occurred in 1648, long after historically verifiable migration there by Liaodongese had come to an end. In contrast to Li Chenglong, he would not have been recognizable by high Chosŏn officials either, since he was the child of a Ming official with whom they had no previous contact. There were, of course, no contemporary records of his presence in Chosŏn. Indeed, according to Yi Kyusang, writing in the eighteenth century, the Chosŏn court attempted to confirm the lineage of the Nongsŏ Yi by importing a genealogy from the Qing empire but was unable to find support for the stories found within Yi Hwŏn’s own lineage. Yi Kyusang assumed that this reflected genealogical fraud, not on the part of the Chosŏn branch, but on that of Li Chengliang’s descendants in the Qing empire, who, he believed, might have sought to protect themselves by hiding the evidence.⁹⁷

In fact, it is clear that the connection between Li Rusong and Yi Hwŏn and other members of the Nongsŏ Yi was one that the Chosŏn court worked very hard to cultivate, interfering heavily in the compilation of the genealogy itself. According to excerpts from the *Nongsŏ Yi Genealogy* found in *The Traces of the Acts of Imperial Subjects*, in 1754 Yŏngjo, after removing Yi Hwŏn from *The Register of Submitting-Foreigners*, brought him into his presence, when, coincidentally, Yi Hun was also there. Bringing the two together, Yŏngjo established the familial relationship, but contrasted the two, describing Yi Hun as one who had taken the military exams long ago, and Yi Hwŏn as a peasant from a mountain valley (*hyŏmmaeng*). To address the difference, he had Yi Hwŏn’s skills examined, and Yi Hwŏn did so well as to cause Yŏngjo to exclaim that “you, who have never held a bow, can shoot so well because you have received your ancestor’s nature.”⁹⁸ Furthermore, in 1760, Yŏngjo said to Yi Hwŏn that Yi Hun’s son Yi Kwangsŏ’s appointment to the rank of messenger (*sŏnjŏngwan*) revealed that his family (including both the Kangwŏn and Kanghwa branches) had become military sajok. He then took this opportunity to inquire about the genealogical information that was available to them. When informed by Yi Hun that they had obtained a printed copy of their genealogy from China, Yŏngjo requested

that “in all further printings, please make Li Rusong your first ancestor (*sijo*), as he did so much for our country.”⁹⁹

The record in the *Journal of the Royal Secretariat* and *The Chosŏn Veritable Records* suggests a somewhat less smooth process, and less advanced knowledge on the part of the monarch, but with much the same royal interest in developing the genealogy. According to the *Journal*, Yŏngjo was still sorting out the precise genealogical relationship in 1768, when, in an exchange that resulted in improved employment for both Yi Hun and Yi Hwŏn, he asked Yi Hun if he was the descendant of Li Rusong. Yi Hun answered honestly that he was in fact the fifth-generation descendant of Li Rumei and the sixth of Li Chengliang.¹⁰⁰ In 1771 (after Yi Hun’s death), Yŏngjo likewise discussed the matter with reference to Yi Hwŏn, confirming his status as a descendant of Li Rusong and placing great emphasis on the fact that his ancestor Li Chengliang had Korean origins. While Yŏngjo mentioned the contribution to Chosŏn of all three sons of Li Chengliang, he referred to them as “the three sons, including the Provincial Military Commander (K. *chedok*, Ch. *tidu*) who contributed so much to Chosŏn,”¹⁰¹ clearly emphasizing Li Rusong, who had attained that rank.

More important, the Chosŏn court actively involved itself in establishing appropriate rituals on behalf of Yi Hwŏn’s descendants, even as it was expanding its own personal role in the worship of Li Rusong. Early on in his rise to prominence, Yi Hwŏn was given ritual responsibilities involving an altar in honor of Li Rusong that was connected to the Sŏnmusa shrine and located in Noryangjin south of Hansŏng.¹⁰² Moreover, especially under Chŏngjo, the Chosŏn state actively worked to establish a shrine to Li Rusong under the direction of the Kangwŏn branch. During court discussions, Chŏngjo himself noted that he had heard that Yi Myŏn’s descendants lived in “a tiny house with a minute courtyard, barely capable of keeping out the wind and the rain, and much too small for the offering of sacrifice to Li Rusong.” In response, Chŏngjo had a new house purchased for them specifically to allow them to pursue ritual activities.¹⁰³ Indeed, having been told by Yi Hwŏn that the lineage lacked an ancestral tablet for ancestral sacrifices, he had one produced for them, based on the erroneous assertion that Li Rusong received no sacrifices in China.¹⁰⁴ The king also composed his own account of Li Rusong’s life and had it placed in the shrine to Li Rusong, called the Chedoksa (Shrine of the Provincial Commander) and located in Hansŏng.¹⁰⁵ In fact, when Yi Hwŏn was in P’yŏngyang, Chŏngjo specifically had him offer rituals at the Muyŏlsa according to the practices of both the Sŏnmusa and the Chedoksa.¹⁰⁶

Such were the advantages to descendants and the court alike of a connection to Li Rusong that, by 1794, a third branch came to the attention of the court.

The person in question, Yi Hŭijang, was described as a descendant of Li Rusong and a local woman surnamed Kŭm, whom he had met during his long stay in Chosŏn during the Imjin War. This branch had supposedly fallen into obscurity on Kŏje Island in Kyŏngsang Province, until, under Chŏngjo, Yi Hŭijang was brought to royal attention as a degreeless military student (*hallyang*) with “some limited ability to read [literary Sinitic],” but who, “on account of not having reached adulthood, was as yet excluded from archery.”¹⁰⁷ Yi Hŭijang’s ancestry also seems to have been quite obscure. To be sure, an imperial subject village (Hwangjinch’ŏn) on Kŏje Island had already been commemorated in a poem by the important Ming loyalist historian Hwang Kyŏngwŏn (1709–1787), possibly based on an encounter during his exile to Kŏje in 1761.¹⁰⁸ That village was later associated with the descendants of Li Rusong, but Hwang does not mention that connection. It would seem most unlikely that Hwang at this point was aware of any such link, for, as an enthusiastic Ming loyalist, he most certainly would have mentioned had he known about it.¹⁰⁹ Otherwise, in none of the official discussions of the discovery of the Kŏje branch of the Nongsŏ Yi in the 1790s was any evidence provided of a genuine tie between Li Rusong and the Kŏje branch, which had clearly not been of interest to the Chosŏn court previously, despite the immense prominence of their supposed ancestor.

Despite Yi Hŭijang’s inauspicious ignorance of writing and military matters, he passed the military examination in 1800. Chŏngjo considered this a cause for celebration, as the Kŏje branch, which had not appeared in any records since the Imjin War, had finally come into its own.¹¹⁰ The Chosŏn court, in other words, connected three families of mountain peasants and island dwellers of uncertain relationship with each other, to construct one unified military quasi-sajok descent-group. Ultimately, the formation of this descent-group was a reassertion of Chosŏn’s Imjin-era connection with the Ming, a connection that also had enormous benefits for the families themselves.

Court and Imperial Subject

The active involvement of the Chosŏn court in determining the genealogy of the Nongsŏ Yi had its echo in the Qing court of the same period, which also launched genealogical investigations to clarify the proper affiliation—Manchu, Mongol, or Han—of members of its banner armies. Of course, as Pamela Kyle Crossley points out, genealogy was a blunt instrument when used to untangle families formed by the diverse historical and social circumstances of Northeast Asia. While both the Manchu and Hanjun banners under Nurhaci and Hong

Taiji had been ethnically diverse and determined more by their lifestyle than their ancestry, by the eighteenth century the Qing court under Yongzheng and Qianlong pursued an active policy of sorting out members on the basis of genealogy. As the eighteenth century was also a period during which the Qing court actively sought to reduce the size of its Hanjun banners, those Hanjun who wished to remain within the banners felt pressed to assert a genealogy that linked them securely to the Jurchens of Nurgan, or at the very least established their position from among the original Nikan of Liaodong who had served Nurhaci early on in the conquest. For Manchus themselves, the Qing court reorganized and sanitized their clan affiliations, papering over the frequently arbitrary manner in which clan affiliations themselves had been formed under Nurhaci.¹¹¹

The Chosŏn court under Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo were faced with a similar lack of good genealogical evidence. Whether in the case of the Chenam Wang family, or the Nongsŏ Yi, the actual past history of Ming migrant descendants did not fit well with the category of “imperial subject” that the Chosŏn court was in the process of constructing. Chosŏn monarchs nevertheless supported such weak claims as those of Yi Hwŏn in Ch’unch’ŏn, Yi Hŭijang of Kŏjedo, or Ho Tup’il in Pukch’ŏng, likely because the presence of Ming migrants on Chosŏn soil provided ideological support for their own royal authority. Perhaps the doubt expressed by some high officials (for instance, by Yi Sŏngnyong concerning Ho Tup’il, as discussed above) reflected a difference in the interests between civil officialdom and the monarchy—although of course the Chosŏn court itself was made up of high officials who were fully participant in the politics of ritual commemoration. The Chosŏn court as a whole pushed forward the process of ritual commemoration, re-creating the claimants to the status into descent-groups that could appropriately claim their status as imperial subjects, in the process of which they received the active support also of the imperial subject descent-groups themselves.

For example, in 1791, during the period of Chŏngjo’s rediscovery of the Nongsŏ Yi, an additional Ming migrant family was discovered in Kangwŏn Province, in this case in Anhyŏp, a county now contained within present-day Ch’ŏrwŏn. Two brothers, Sŏk Hanyŏng and Sŏk Hanjun, asserted that they were related to the Ming official Shi Xing (1538–1599), who in his lifetime had been somewhat controversial, but who, by the eighteenth century, was widely praised in Chosŏn for his role in directing military aid during the Imjin War. When asked by Chŏngjo for a more elaborate description of their origins, they answered that they were the descendants of Shi Kui, the younger brother of Shi Xing, who, along with a monk named Huizhen, had fled the Manchu by

entering Chosŏn through the abandoned four counties in the upper Yalu. From there Shi Kui and the monk passed through Mamp'o, eventually arriving at Anhyŏp, where they had gone into hiding. Shi Kui's descendants had remained there. The two brothers presented to the court *The True Facts of the Chaju Sŏk* (*Chaju Sŏk-ssi kisil*), written by a local Anhyŏp man named Yi Seyŏng.

Chŏngjo responded to this by reminding the court how greatly Chosŏn was indebted to Shi Xing, who had nevertheless died in prison. Chŏngjo initially expressed some faith in the truth of this story and had the two brothers participate in the Ming loyalist rites at the Taebodan. He worried, however, that direct descendants of Shi Xing might be discovered who would have a superior claim and so hesitated to establish a separate family shrine for them as had been done for the descendants of Li Rusong. Instead, he ordered that the Board of War provide them with post horses to allow them to travel to P'yŏngyang to pay respects at the Muyŏlsa where Shi Xing was enshrined. Depending on the nature of the genealogical evidence, they would either have a house purchased for them where they could continually provide sacrifices to Shi Xing, or alternately be given the status of a branch family, so they could practice somewhat less prominent rites, "for how could Shi Xing accept rites in a Central Plain that had fallen [to the barbarians]?"¹¹²

The problem, however, was as Chŏng Sangu (1756–?), representing the Capital Guard Office and the Office of Robust and Brave Guards (*Changyongyŏng*), expressed, the evidence for the connection between the two brothers and Shi Xing was poor or nonexistent. As he pointed out, the evidence used by the Chosŏn court had amounted only to three texts: "True Facts Concerning the Chaju Sŏk Descent Group, Remnant Subjects of the Imperial Ming" (*Hwangmyŏng yuyŏ Chaju Sŏk-ssi sasil*), "Tale of Gentleman-in-Retirement Sŏk" (*Sŏk kŏsa chŏn*), and a letter supposedly written to a child of the descent-group called Sŏk Tohyŏn. Yet, when officials of those offices had sought to investigate the matter, they found that none of those texts could be confirmed in records either in Anhyŏp or in the Kangwŏn Provincial Office, where absolutely no information about any Sŏk descent-group could be found. Not only that, it was impossible to find any information about Yi Seyŏng, the author of the texts, whose cognomen (Chŏng Sangu informed the king) was the poetic "Old Man of the Foxglove Tree" (*Odong noin*). Upon asking the two Sŏk brothers themselves, it became evident that they been orphaned at an early age and had wandered about until they arrived in Yŏnch'ŏn, where they were adopted by a petty shopkeeper (*chŏmhan*) of the Sŏk family called Sŏk Ilhu—and so surely could not have had any good knowledge of the subject. As for the texts themselves, Chŏng Sangu

began his critique with the statement “your majesty has already read them?” seemingly implying that the books were obviously to be doubted.¹¹³

Chǒngjo, while accepting that the evidence was weak indeed, nevertheless called for a strong effort to verify the connection, which if found would allow the family to participate in Ming loyalist rites. Very few imperial subjects had good evidence for their status, he conceded, mentioning as exceptions only the descendants of Tian Haoqian, who had a proper genealogy that confirmed their origins, and the descendants of Chen Fengyi, a man who had married into the Ming imperial family and whose family had in their possession an edict of the Wanli emperor, confirming their status as Ming migrants.¹¹⁴ Otherwise, such cases of actual documentation were extremely rare. After all, as Chǒngjo pointed out, the evidence for the direct descendants of Li Rusong had also always been initially quite weak, but had since, he thought, been established with some certainty. He thus ordered that no expense be spared in obtaining a genealogy of the Shi descent-group in Beijing.¹¹⁵

Of course, for those claiming the status, the advantages provided by asserting Ming origins were of considerable material and social significance. Thus, people of submitting-foreigner ancestry tended to actively assert their status by demanding royal writs (*wanmun*) confirming special tax protections, taking advantage of a court that was willing to suspend disbelief. For instance, a descent-group of submitting-foreigner status in Kangnŭng with the surname Yu has kept records of the process whereby, during the reign of Chǒngjo, they were able to achieve imperial subject status based on an entirely undocumented connection to a Ming refugee and an elite Song dynasty scholar-official family.¹¹⁶ Other families, though better positioned socially, also made such requests. For instance, during the reign of Chǒngjo, Ch’o Kak, a descendant of Chu Haichang residing in Myǒngch’ŏn in northern Hamgyǒng, with the undistinguished but civil-sajok and tax-protected rank of young student (*yuhak*), requested that his status as an imperial subject (*hwangjoin*) be confirmed on the basis of Yǒngjo’s decision in 1754. As his ancestors had participated in the rituals at the Taebodan, the court confirmed his status, despite what turned out to be a complete absence of documents in the Board of Personnel attesting to Chu Haichang’s arrival in Chosŏn.¹¹⁷

Such expansion of the category of Ming loyalist descendants continued under Sunjo. For instance, in 1806, two other young students similarly demanded the right to participate in the rites at the Taebodan. The first was Pan Ch’unggyŏm of Kŭmhwa in Kangwon Province, who claimed that his ancestor, Pan Tengyun, had come to Chosŏn along with Mo Manren and Li Yingren, but had settled in

Kūmhwa, while Li Yingren had settled in Hwiyang. Pan Ch'unggyōm's account strongly emphasized his ancestors' Ming loyalism, stating that Pan Tengyun's father had fallen in battle, his mother "had committed suicide in order to avoid rape," and Pan Tengyun himself had moved to Chosŏn to avoid cutting his hair in the Qing fashion.¹¹⁸ The other, Ch'ŏn Ilsi of Myōngch'ŏn in Hamgyōng Province, claimed he was a descendant of Qian Wanli, an Imjin War-era Ming officer who had settled in the area of Andong in Kyōngsang Province. According to Ch'ŏn, Qian Wanli, heartbroken by the events of 1636–1637, had moved north and settled in Myōngch'ŏn because its first written character, Myōng, was the same as that of the Ming dynasty. Ch'ŏn, however, lacked documentation for this story, because most of the relevant texts had unfortunately been burned in a house fire.¹¹⁹ In this he did not differ from Pan Chunggyōm, for although the Chosŏn court did find some records that established that Pan Tengyun and Qian Wanli were at least Chinese in origin, they could find no evidence of the Ming loyalist activities asserted by Pan Chunggyōm, or any documents tracing their migration. The court nevertheless approved both of their requests to participate in the rituals at the Taebodan.¹²⁰

Indeed, the cases in question were not much different from other examples of status mobility during the reigns of Yōngjo and Chōngjo. A feature of the politics of commemoration in Chosŏn, much strengthened during the eighteenth century, was the granting of ritual roles to the supposed descendants of heroes, martyrs, and royalty, as was the case with the T'aewŏn Sōnu (the supposed descendants of Kija) or the Kaesōng Wang (the descendants of the Koryō royal house), and the Ch'angwŏn Kong, who during the eighteenth century were treated (erroneously) as the descendants of Confucius.¹²¹ Beginning in the late seventeenth century, especially, it became common for base-born people without surnames to rise in status, claiming surnames and clan seats (not always in that order) and obtaining titles associated with commoners, often followed by military and even civil-sajok titles.¹²² These benefits did not, in fact, entitle them to take significant office or truly act as rivals to established sajok lineages. This also was not much different from similar demands by the descendants of filial sons and chaste women and of earlier monarchs (including those who claimed descent from Silla monarchs). As Kim Hyōk argues, the very act of requesting special privileges through such royal writs revealed conversely that the claimant was of low or indifferent status. No true sajok, as it were, needed or wanted to make similar claims.¹²³ Yet such documents did provide their recipients with an improved social position and tax status.¹²⁴ In fact, not all families that could claim Ming ancestry rose via assertion of imperial subject status. People claiming

to be descendants of Qian Wanli in Söktae-dong in Tongnae, for instance, also rose from non-sajok origins, and in some cases base status, through low-level military ranks to low-level civil-sajok ranks by the early nineteenth century,¹²⁵ yet, from my review of the family's documents, it seems they did not make any claim to imperial subject status.¹²⁶ In the end, those who pursued status advancement through an appeal to foreign origins were no different from their fellow Chosŏn subjects who were similarly accumulating the outward forms of sajok status.

In the case of Ming migrants, however, in improving their social status, they reworked their family histories and their ritual identity to accord more closely with that of the state-sponsored Chunghwa Inheritance Consciousness. The Kōje branch of the Nongsŏ Yi is once more informative. In 1800, when Chŏngjo welcomed Yi Hŭijang, of the Kōje branch of the Nongsŏ Yi, to the ranks of officialdom, he had Yi Hŭijang offer sacrifice at both the Chedoksa and the Sŏnmusa, alongside Yi Hwŏn's son Yi Kwangu (by then renamed Hyosŭng), who was the primary heir (*pongsason*) of the main branch of the Nongsŏ Yi descent-group.¹²⁷ Yi Hŭijang obeyed the royal command but failed to please Chŏngjo. As Chŏngjo said:

I have heard that the household tally of the commander's descendant Yi Hŭijang had a [Qing] era name on it. How could a scribe who carries the jade [of the official] be so pedestrian in his thoughts? He clasped that tally while prostrating himself at the shrine! He truly is an ignorant person. I do not know whether there was sweat on Hŭijang's brow, but how could the commander, whose spirit flows through the land like water, have been pleased when he saw his descendant prostrate himself? Make one household tally and stamp it with the royal jade seal. Then call [his relative] Yi Hyosŭng and have him give the new household tally to Yi Hŭijang. Then have the petty functionaries in the Sŏnmusa take him to make another prostration at the shrine this very day, after which he should make another prostration within the family shrine. Henceforward, may the household tallies of such people, and the royal instructions concerning them, all follow this precedent.¹²⁸

As a matter of fact, this did indeed become the precedent, as may be seen when Kang Pungnam, a descendant of Kang Shijue, passed the exam and was provided with a household tally "as is usual for such people, without the [Qing] era name but with the *kanji* alone, following established precedent."¹²⁹ Yi Hŭijang himself survived the royal declaration that he was a pedestrian and ignorant man, as may be seen in continued court interest in his well-being as a descendant

of Li Rusong.¹³⁰ More significantly, however, this passage reveals the process by which the monarchs themselves transformed the identities of the Ming loyalist remnants they claimed to be discovering. Whether or not Yi Hūijang was really the descendant of an illegitimate union between Li Rusong and a Chosŏn woman, the Chosŏn court believed this to be the case, actively establishing the Kōje branch of the Nongsŏ Yi as subordinate to the Kangwŏn branch represented by Yi Hyosŭng, making their continued employment in military positions a matter of state concern and encouraging their involvement in Ming loyalist rituals. Yet, Yi Hūijang had been entirely unaware—indeed shockingly ignorant, from Chŏngjo's point of view—of the Ming loyalist and anti-Qing ethos of which he was supposed to be a representative. Such a ritual identity had to be imposed upon him and other imperial subjects through royal command.

WHAT HAD CHANGED? It is impossible to find the origin in the emergence of imperial subject status in some unchanging Confucian admiration for China, as the term “submitting-foreigner” had been used to categorize Chinese and their descendants, along with Jurchens and Japanese, during an equally Confucian seventeenth century. It had become a source of difficulty, ultimately, only during the eighteenth century.

One should make note first of what had not changed. Imperial subjects were, like submitting-foreigners, distinguished from other Chosŏn subjects by a special tax status. As with submitting-foreigners during the early Chosŏn, imperial subjects participated in rituals focused on the monarch himself. As these assemblies did not occur after 1637, the development of imperial subject status could, in a sense, be seen as a revival. Additionally, like submitting-foreigners during the early Chosŏn and like Japanese defectors and Chinese deserters during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, imperial subjects were frequently organized into military units and given military titles.

What had changed was the narrative according to which Ming migrants were organized. Before the 1750s, they, like the descendants of Jurchens and Japanese, had been described as outsiders submitting to the edification provided by the Chosŏn and receiving in exchange succor and protection. Following the 1750s, they were still receiving the special protection and concern of the Chosŏn monarch, but not because they had come to Chosŏn to receive edification. As loyalists, they had already been edified and civilized, and for this very reason they were unable to endure life under the barbarian Qing. Rather than being a sign of Chosŏn turning away from assimilation, the new terminology meant that they were being formally assimilated into the evolving rituals of the Chunghwa

Inheritance Consciousness. Within a Chosŏn state organized according to the maintenance of clear status distinctions, the Chosŏn court actively assimilated Ming descendants by constructing a new status category for them. By the late eighteenth century, the descendants of Ming migrants were in no way a culturally or linguistically distinct group, and they had already intermarried extensively with the surrounding population. Just as the Qianlong emperor had to actively compel Manchus to use the Manchu language, to engage in mounted archery, and to marry other Manchus, so the courts of Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo had to remove inappropriate claimants to the category of “Chinese descendant.” As in the case of Yi Hŭijang, the court of Chŏngjo had to create a consciousness of Ming loyalism in the minds of those who were supposed to be the Chunghwa Inheritance Consciousness’s prime representatives.

New Narratives

UNTIL THE OPENING of Chosŏn to the imperialist world order in 1876, the descendants of Ming migrants were the largest community in Korea that continued to be classified as foreigners. Substantially Korean, and fully part of Chosŏn society, they were nevertheless distinguished from other Chosŏn subjects through the imperial subject status that had been developed under the courts of Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo. Beyond bureaucratic convention, the foreignness of these imperial subjects was produced and maintained also through historical narratives that transformed the often-messy process whereby Liaodongese migrants established themselves on Chosŏn soil into a glorious history of Ming loyalist heroism. Pan Ch'unggyŏm, as discussed in chapter 5, transformed his ancestor Pan Tengyun (concerning whom the Chosŏn court could find nearly no records) into a Ming loyalist paragon whose father and mother both had been martyred for their opposition to the Qing, while Sŏk Hanyŏng presented to the court an actual, if rather dubious, text describing his ancestors as Ming loyalists.

Even as the Chosŏn court organized the new category of imperial subject, it also sponsored the compilation of biographical anthologies of Ming migrants. The descendants of these migrants were no mere passive onlookers but were active participants, both creating their own biographical texts and establishing private Ming loyalist shrines. Both the written biographies and the physical shrines have come to the attention of modern researchers, and much of the modern scholarship on Ming migrants in Korean, Chinese, and English takes the histories provided in these biographies at face value, treating them as genuine family chronicles of the migrants themselves.¹ It is true that these narratives contain a certain amount of genuine information concerning the original migration of Ming migrants during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Yet, written after the growth of Ming loyalist ritualism and the creation of imperial subject status, they overwhelmingly reinterpret the lives of the original migrants to reflect the new ideological and ritual context of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Chosŏn.

Ming Loyalist Sites in Chosŏn Korea.
(Drafted by Thomas Quartermain.)

In this chapter, then, I will engage in a critical discussion of these new narratives. In part, my purpose is to demonstrate the gap between the seventeenth-century realities and their eighteenth-century reinterpretations, and by doing so, show the problems with treating these narratives as accurate accounts of the original migrants during the seventeenth century. Additionally, a close analysis of these texts is also informative because it reveals the social and ideological processes whereby imperial subject families internalized the Chosŏn court's Chunghwa Inheritance Consciousness, making state ideology part of their own identity.

Accepting the Attire of Civilization

By the late eighteenth century, as the Chosŏn state sought to recategorize and redefine submitting-foreigners, submitting-foreigners themselves responded by transforming themselves to fit the court-sponsored categories, taking the historical narratives imposed upon them and making them their own. This was by no means unique to them, and may be seen, following Alexander Woodside and Victor Lieberman,² as part of a broader worldwide shift toward cultural and territorial consolidation and the vernacularizing of high culture. In Vietnam, during the same period, the dominant Vietnamese spread out to Cham, Khmer, and Tay areas, while lower-status people were brought into a “Confucian” ritual order associated with the governing ruling class. In Burma, a regularized system by which boys were sent to spend time in Buddhist monasteries spread not only literacy but also a common language and religious morality to a far larger class. Certainly, differences of social status and ethnicity were not eliminated, but East and Southeast Asia in general did experience an expansion of common cultural norms across ethnic and social boundaries within increasingly centralized polities.

Such vernacularization often leaves its trace on historical narratives, as people rewrote their family histories to fit in with their new historical identity. For instance, as Michael Szonyi has shown, the process by which Dan fishing people in coastal Fujian transformed themselves into north Chinese migrants is often still visible. In many cases, it is possible to find references in both the written genealogical materials and the oral traditions to the actual Dan origins of the lineages as well as to their adopted northern Chinese origins.³ David Faure, studying the formation of lineages in the Pearl River delta, has explored the role the state played in defining and organizing lineages as well as the role the emerging lineages themselves played in integrating the Pearl River delta into the Ming and Qing states. Emerging lineages, defined in part through *lijia* tax status, subsumed local religion into ritual Neo-Confucian orthodoxy and tied Pearl River identities to a broader Ming and Qing Han Chinese identity, a process that can be uncovered through careful investigation of the discontinuities and contradictions within family narratives.⁴

The late Chosŏn also experienced a general expansion of elite norms and rituals to encompass lower-status people, who in turn rewrote their histories to reflect their newfound improved status. During the late Chosŏn, for instance, the ideal of widow chastity spread to low-status women, a change that was also made visible in new narratives of chaste widows that included women from

lower-status groups.⁵ Members of what Kyung Moon Hwang calls “intermediate status groups” were also notably active in establishing narratives that raised their status by associating themselves with the ethos of *sajok* society. As Kim Hyönyöng describes in his study of the T’amjin Ch’oe family, the T’amjin Ch’oe of Ch’ön’gok in Chölla were the descendants of Ch’oe Sarip, a general who died fighting the Qing during the Pyöngja War of 1636–1637. Following the recognition of his sacrifice by Yöngjo in 1766, this politically and economically marginal lineage had produced texts through which they established that their ancestor had been declared a merit subject, and so they demanded to be freed of tax and corvée burdens. While this document, along with two others—one describing the suffering of one ancestor during the Kimyo Literati Purge of 1519 and the other describing the military activities of Ch’oe Sarip—could hardly rival the extensive collection of records held by established *sajok* families, and although the surviving documents contained numerous obvious inaccuracies, they did succeed in protecting the T’amjin Ch’oe from tax and corvée, and thereby gave them marginal, but still valuable, *sajok* status.⁶

Similar processes were also visible for the families of *sööl*, that is to say, the descendants of *sajok* men and base women, whose criticism of the persecution that they experienced was not generally intended to overthrow the system of social status but to improve their own position within it. It was also characteristic of numerous literary works of the period, such as *The Mirror of Clerks* (*Yönjo kwigam*), that sought to reveal a depth of scholarship, devotion to Confucian values, and loyal participation in the kingdom and system of social status by village clerks (*hyangni*), who were otherwise limited in their access to bureaucratic positions.⁷ Collections, such as Yu Chaegön’s (1793–1880) *Things Seen and Heard in Ordinary Villages* (*Ihyang kyönmun nok*), praised the loyalty and intelligence not only of members of intermediate status groups but also of slaves who had shown their superior morality by loyally serving the state and their *sajok* masters.⁸

This example of intermediate status groups is significant, as above all the descendants of Ming migrants could not aspire to anything higher. Söng Haeüng (1760–1839), for instance, in his “Biographies of the Eight Surnames” (*P’alsöng-jön*), noted that when they first came to Chosön, the official families (*sadaebu*) “had not treated them as being of equal status.” Söng thought this to be in stark contrast to earlier Korean tradition, as “numerous Chinese of prominence and fame came to the Eastern Kingdom from the Three Kingdoms to the Koryö period,” but only the remnant descendants of the imperial dynasty were so despised and mistreated that they all became “townspeople, or hid deep in the mountains and countryside, or wandered obscurely at the water’s edge and would net fish

to offer as tribute. At first it was a token offer showing their sincerity, but over time it became a most burdensome tax. Also, when they organized militarily, they were daily insulted as Japanese soldiers. This was a most extreme insult.”⁹

Sŏng’s history was wrong, of course. As was discussed in chapter 1, Chinese officials did not often rise into high official ranks in either Koryŏ or early Chosŏn Korea but were generally placed clearly in low-ranked clerical or technical positions. Moreover, although Sŏng viewed the category of townsperson as a status reduction, if anything, the evidence suggests that this was not a fall but rather a rise in status for most submitting-foreigners of Ming origin or otherwise. Despite often uncertain origins, and despite contracting marriages with base women, Ming migrants during the late Chosŏn were able to improve their social status significantly by obtaining minor posts, generally in the military. Although they were never allowed to rival the powerful *sajok* families of the capital, some of them at least were able to rise to the ranks of intermediate status groups, enjoying the advantages of military posts and bringing their histories in closer accord with that of the official ideology of the Chosŏn state.

This process of transforming narratives occurred not only with those of Chinese ancestry but also with the descendants of the Japanese defector Kim Ch’ungsŏn. In the mid-seventeenth century, this family of Japanese defectors was considerably more prominent than most Ming migrants. Not only had they established a village for themselves at Urok-ri, but from early on they had sought out connections to prominent Chosŏn *sajok* officials and had already developed a connection with the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy of the Chosŏn court. They solidified their status as a family of exceptional Japanese defectors with their publication, in 1798, of the complete works of Kim Ch’ungsŏn, called *The Collected Works of Mohadang* (*Mohadangjip*), and, in 1842, with an expanded version.¹⁰ These volumes had much more material available to them than was the case for Ming migrants, for the simple reason that both Kim Ch’ungsŏn and his descendants seem to have been significantly better educated and more active as writers than were most Liaodongese refugees. As a result, in contrast to many Ming migrant descent-groups, they did not need to justify a lack of evidence with a facile claim that all their vital documents had been destroyed.

As I discussed in chapter 4, writings by Kim Ch’ungsŏn, such as the “Annals of Deer Village,” deliberately represented Kim Ch’ungsŏn as submitting to Chosŏn because he saw Chosŏn as being the true representation of Chunghwa civilization. To be sure, it is possible, as Fujiwara Takao argues, that many of the texts in the collected works were revised by the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century editors to fit Kim Ch’ungsŏn’s story into the changed

ideological context. Certainly, Fujiwara argues effectively that those documents in the collection that would seem to date Kim Ch'ungsŏn's defection to immediately after his arrival in 1592, or which declare his defection to be motivated by a Confucian admiration for the civilization of Chosŏn, are either later works or had been interpolated by later editors. Kim Ch'ungsŏn's own writings are unclear on this subject, but broadly it would seem that he, like most Japanese, defected after 1593. Fujiwara claims also that later editors interpolated descriptions of Kim Ch'ungsŏn submitting to Chosŏn out of a longing to conform to Chosŏn's Chunghwa order, which seems quite possible. It also seems possible, as I suggest in chapter 4 following work by Yang Hŭngsuk, that Kim Ch'ungsŏn and his sons might have themselves included such claims as part of their negotiations to survive in Chosŏn during the politically turbulent seventeenth century.

A text that clearly fits Fujiwara's conditions for a late or interpolated text is the "Record of Mohadang" (*Mohadang-gi*). Kim Ch'ungsŏn or his descendants named their house "Mohadang"—literally "Longing for China Hall," with "China" in this case represented by the Xia (K. Ha), the semilegendary first dynasty among the idealized Three Dynasties of ancient China. Xia also became the standard name for "Chinese" during the Song. This also became both Kim Ch'ungsŏn's sobriquet and the title for his complete works. By using it as the title of the complete works, his descendants clearly represented his decision to defect to Chosŏn in the language of submitting to Chunghwa civilization. This is explained clearly in the "Record of Mohadang," which deciphers the title as follows: "I longed for the rituals of Chungha (Ch. Zhongxia), I longed for the civilization of Chungha, I longed for the clothing of Chungha, and I longed for the popular customs of Chungha." Yet it also leaves no doubt that Chosŏn itself was Chungha/Chunghwa:

Even this region of Ch'ŏnggu,¹¹ isolated on a remote corner of the sea, has achieved the proper proportion of adornment and simplicity, and has achieved perfection in rites and teachings. It maintains the relationships of father and son, king and official, husband and wife, elder and junior and friend with friend. In the conduct of true goodness, righteousness, rites, wisdom, filiality, respect for elder brothers, loyalty and honesty, one may say that it is little different from the reigns of Yao and Shun, and one may say that it is the fourth of the three dynasties [of Xia, Shang and Zhou]. In its hats, clothes and civilization, in comparison to the great Chungha it is a lesser Chungha.¹²

It was by no means unusual for late Chosŏn *sajok* aristocrats to express the intention of establishing a state that equalled the golden age of Yao and Shun. Even the most fulsome flatterer might avoid declaring that Chosŏn under Sŏnjo had reached a level of civilization that equaled the idealized Three Dynasties of early China—that Chosŏn was a fourth dynasty, to accompany the Xia, the Shang, and the Zhou, and logically then must have exceeded both the Song and Ming in moral excellence. In the mouth of a foreigner—a defector to superior civilization, and a submitting-foreigner—such over-the-top praise became acceptable. The phrasing followed the established ideological content of submitting-foreigner status of the early Chosŏn, updated to fit the Chunghwa Restoration Consciousness of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Kim Ch'ungsŏn's descendants did not have to transform themselves alone. By matching their family's identity so closely to the Chunghwa Restoration Consciousness, they inevitably received the support of prominent civil *sajok*. For instance, Sŏ Chonggŭp (1688–1762), an influential civil official and a disciple of the Noron intellectual leader Kwŏn Sangha, wrote a preface for a genealogy of Kim Ch'ungsŏn's descendants, published in 1759 that was also included in the 1795 edition of *The Collected Works of Mohadang*. Sŏ began his preface by comparing Kim Ch'ungsŏn to the Chinese sage kings Shun and Wen, who were both, according to tradition, born among barbarians but were transformed by Chunghwa culture and traditions. It was most unfortunate, Sŏ wrote, that Kim Ch'ungsŏn had been born outside Chunghwa civilization and had been forced to dress in barbarian fashion. It would have been tragic if he had been forced to live that way until the end of his days. It was consequently most fortunate and praiseworthy that he should have escaped such a fate. Indeed, Sŏ cited an official document directed to Kim Ch'ungsŏn's son Kim Kyŏngwŏn, which stated that “the officer Kim Ch'ungsŏn showed integrity in his submission to edification and return to morality, and showed complete loyalty to the kingdom. He is truly praiseworthy. May his descendants always be rewarded with salaries and employment, and may they be granted freedom from personal taxes and corvée duties.”¹³

The advantages for Kim Ch'ungsŏn's descendants in a preface of that sort are not hard to divine. Kim Ch'ungsŏn's descendants, like Ming migrants, were military officials based in the countryside, and the attention of Sŏ, an influential civil official closely associated with the Noron faction, inevitably benefited them in terms of social status. Certainly, on the one hand, the decision of Sŏ to emphasize the privileges that they were owed in the context of the reworking of submitting-foreigner status during the eighteenth century must have been welcome. On the other hand, this preface ultimately benefited the Chosŏn state

as well, reinforcing the claim by *sajok* elites that they were the last remnants of Chunghwa civilization, and indeed that Japanese could choose Chosŏn, and not the Ming, as a place to receive edification. The comparison between Kim Ch'ungsŏn and Wen and Shun (also present in the "Record of Mohadang" attributed to Kim Ch'ungsŏn), reminded the reader that not only Kim Ch'ungsŏn, but Chosŏn itself, had passed from their former barbarian conditions into the refinements of civilization and Chunghwa.

A similar intervention by *sajok* elites into the histories of foreign descent-groups may be noted in the case of the Liaodongese refugee Kang Shijue. Kang Shijue was unusual in that he had biographies written of him during the late seventeenth century as a result of his fortuitous connections with two prominent officials concerned with settling the border, namely Nam Kuman and Pak Sedang.¹⁴ Because this occurred before the formation of imperial subject status, many of the details of his early biographies were troublesome and in need of editing to fit the new ideological context. This may be seen in a biography of Kang Shijue, the "Record of Chu Hat Hall" (*Ch'ogwandang-gi*), written by Hwang Kyŏngwŏn (1709–1787), an official and Ming loyalist historian known especially for his history of the Southern Ming.

This brief piece begins with the sentence, "The Chu hat hall is the ancestral hall of the Kang descent-group of Hoeryŏng. Hoeryŏng is at the mouth of the Tumen River." Having established in one short passage extreme geographic ignorance concerning northern Hamgyŏng Province (first, because the region in which Kang Shijue lived had by then been reorganized as Musan, and second because Hoeryŏng is in fact considerably upstream on the Tumen River, and nowhere near its mouth), Hwang Kyŏngwŏn proceeded to outline briefly the history of Kang Shijue and his family by summarizing Nam Kuman's work. Following that, he launched a comparison of Kang's fate with that of the Ming remnant subjects who took refuge in Southeast Asia:

As they moved from the Ming to the south, all the high Ming officials who fled to Burma were killed, and of the eighty imperial princes who entered Siam, a minute number did not cut their hair or tattoo their bodies. Only Kang Shijue of Hoeryŏng, living out his life in the village, did not change his Chu hat. I once said that of all subordinate countries, none has been so close to a Chinese dynasty as our country has been with the Ming. Had the gentlemen of our country fled to the Ming, then the early emperors would surely have accepted them. So when Kang came to our country from Fenghuang, he did not worry that he would not be well received.

Hwang then lamented that the Ming high officials and princes had not come to Chosŏn:

Was it perhaps that the eastern sea is too wild and wide and the ships could not pass over the winds and the waves? Was it not because the world had already been transformed, and they could no longer move to our kingdom? Of those gentlemen of the Ming who stayed among the southern barbarians, few indeed could preserve themselves, but Kang, residing in our country, lived at ease in the village for sixty years and ended his life there. So how can the world say that we do not receive the gentlemen of the Ming! Alas! Kang left Xingwen and stayed in our country, where he could no longer ascend the Jiuyi mountain and could no longer boat in the Xiang River. There was no need for him to long for Xingwen, but because he grew up there, however old he became, he would never forget it. Even as he lived at ease, he never changed his Chu hat. *The Classic of Poetry* says: "He did not change his appearance." This poem could be referring to Kang. After Kang died, the people of Hoeryŏng all pitied him, and so they named his sacrificial hall after his Chu hat. And so I have recounted this. Both of Kang's two sons were good at mounted archery and had the airs of Chu gentlemen.¹⁵

Hwang Kyŏngwŏn, as a well-established official, was also, in his private capacity, one of the leading Ming loyalist historians of Yŏngjo's era, writing not only a history of the Southern Ming, but also a collection, the "Biographies of Secondary Subjects" (*Myŏng paesin chŏn*), that praised those Chosŏn subjects such as Hong Ikhan who had shown exemplary loyalty to the Ming. The concept of *paesin*, "subjects of subjects," connected Chosŏn officials—who were subjects of the Chosŏn king who was in turn a subject of the Ming emperor—within the broader Ming world order, and mirrored the ritual category of descendants of the loyal and good who had, along with the descendants of imperial subjects, been encouraged to participate in Ming loyalist rites at the Taebodan.

Hwang's ideological orientation to the Chunghwa Inheritance Consciousness caused him to add historical inaccuracy to his geographic illiteracy in his account of Kang Shijue. When men like Kang Shijue were first crossing the boundary between Liaodong and Chosŏn, they were accused not of refusing to change their Chinese-style clothes but of slyly insisting on changing them the better to conceal their identities. And Kang Shijue himself was, as surely Hwang Kyŏngwŏn must have known, hardly a good example of how well Chosŏn treated all refugees from the Ming. During Hwang's own lifetime, the descendants of

these refugees were seeing their statuses raised by a monarch, Yǒngjo, who specifically lamented the poor treatment they had received in the past. Kang's Chu hat was not noted by Nam Kuman or Pak Sedang or anybody else who encountered him while he was still alive, and so it seems likely that Hwang invented it himself. This impression is strengthened by the fact that Hwang mentioned the Ming hats of other Ming migrants as well. For instance, in a poem concerning the Ming remnant subjects of Tǒkch'on-ri in Kōje, Hwang began by lamenting that "after the Manchu conquered the divine capital [of Beijing], the whole realm wears hair in a barbarian fashion." Further down, he praised the Ming remnant community for concealing themselves in Chosŏn to avoid "changing their clothing and hats."¹⁶

The historical inaccuracy of Hwang's account is less significant than the ideological meaning that he imposed upon the imperial subjects. In a similar manner to Sō Chonggūp, who had Kim Ch'ungsŏn leave Japan for Chosŏn to accept a proper Confucian clothing style, Hwang could describe Kang Shijue and the Tǒkch'on-ri villagers as proof of Chosŏn's unique role as defender and last remnant of Chunghwa culture. As Hwang argued, although a proper Confucian clothing style had vanished from all other parts of the world, it continued to survive in Chosŏn, as proved by Kang Shijue's retreat there with his Chu hat intact.

Anthologies, Official and Unofficial

Important though Hwang's private Ming loyalist historical work was, during the reign of Chǒngjo it was subsumed into state-sponsored Ming loyalist historiography. Through the Kyujanggak Library established by Chǒngjo near the Ch'angdōk-kung Palace, scholars, many of sŏl background, were encouraged by Chǒngjo to gather Qing books and produce works of their own that would rival the scholarship of the lower Yangzi River region and the Four Treasuries project of the Qianlong court.¹⁷ While one effect of a wider participation in Qing scholarship was a decline in hostility toward the Qing,¹⁸ Kyujanggak-based scholars were still taking as their starting point the Qing's illegitimacy and Chosŏn's exclusive identity as inheritor of Chunghwa civilization. One representative Kyujanggak scholar, Sōng Haeūng, produced a considerable body of work emphasizing Chosŏn's position as heir of the Chunghwa tradition and calling for better defenses in Chosŏn's northern border in preparation for the turmoil of the last gasps of the Qing.¹⁹ Under the overall direction of Chǒngjo, he participated in the drafting of *The Collected Texts on Honoring the Zhou* (*Chonju hwip'yŏn*), a work that explicitly denies the legitimacy of the Qing. Nevertheless, even such

openly anti-Qing scholarship showed the evidence of Qianlong-era Qing historiography, including those works, such as *The Record of the Dynastic Foundation* (*Kaiguo fanglue*),²⁰ that attempted to formalize a Manchu heritage that was both venerable and free of Chinese influence.²¹ Sŏng Haeŭng compiled a work related to *The Collected Texts on Honoring the Zhou*, his *Biographies of the Remnant Subjects of Imperial Ming* (*Hwangmyŏng yumin chŏn*), partly through reference to Qianlong-era texts. As his sources, he listed some simply as authored by “many officials of the Qianlong era,” also referring to such Ming loyalist works as those by Huang Zongxi (1610–1694), which presumably had been obtained through the Beijing book trade and interaction with Qing officials by Chosŏn legations.²²

In fact, the uncompromising Ming loyalism of the Chosŏn court was not necessarily at odds with Qianlong histories of the Ming-Qing transition, which, as described by Lynn Struve, aimed generally to “sanitize and dignify the Ming versus Qing armed conflict,” “defend monarchical control and proper institutional balance,” and “encourage loyalty unto death for the ruling dynasty,” and which consequently tended to demonize those Chinese officials who had abandoned the Ming to serve the Qing.²³ Sŏng Haeŭng, in fact, read the Qianlong-sponsored *Biographies of Twice Serving Ministers* (*Erchen zhuan*) and wrote his impression of it, in which he agreed substantially with the Qianlong emperor that their disloyalty had been unforgivable. He differed from the Qianlong emperor in attacking them for serving under “dogs and sheep” like the Manchus.²⁴ More positively, Sŏng’s *Biographies of Remnant Subjects of the Imperial Ming* was an anthology of biographies praising those who had refused, in some manner, to “serve two surnames” or to “shave their heads.” Whether their refusal took the form of courting death, of retreating to the countryside, or of fleeing to other countries including Chosŏn, he treated them as worthy of admiration.²⁵ Ultimately, although Sŏng was explicitly anti-Qing, he shared much of his ideological tendencies with the Qing court under Qianlong.

Such Ming loyalist publications became fertile ground for the creation of anthologies of Ming migrant biographies, a process that was also connected with the push, during the reign of Chŏngjo, to identify and classify subjects with Ming migrant lineages. For instance, the last few pages of *The Collected Texts on Honoring the Zhou* contain a series of biographies of Ming loyalist migrants at the end of a long section of biographies of loyal Chosŏn subjects that were derived from Hwang’s *Biographies of Ming Secondary Subjects*. Almost identical biographies of Ming loyalist refugees in Chosŏn were anthologized by Sŏng Haeŭng in his *Biographies of Remnant Subjects of the Imperial Ming*, and by another Kyujanggak scholar, Yi Tŏngmu (1741–1793), in a collection of biographies

called *Noble Purpose* (*Noeroe nangnak*). Both Söng's and Yi's works anthologized biographies of Ming loyalist refugees in Chosön together with biographies of Ming loyalists in China and Southeast Asia. The biographies in *Collected Texts on Honoring the Zhou* also closely resemble a collection of sources, possibly gathered as preparatory text material for *The Collected Texts*, called *The Sources for the Acts of Imperial Subjects* (*Hwangjoin sajök*).²⁶

Anthologies, as Thomas A. Wilson argues, create lineages and hierarchies, clarifying the boundaries of the canonical.²⁷ The migrants whose stories were recounted in these biographies were by then a familiar group, beginning with Kang Shijue (whose biographical tradition was the oldest) and including the supposed descendants of Li Rusong, comprising the Ming migrant community in the Chinese Village in Öüi-dong, as well as other more minor figures such as Ma Shunshang, Wen Keshang, and so forth. This brought the diverse group of Ming migrants together into one coherent category, giving a historical shape to what had become a key ritual category within the Ming loyalist rites at the Taebodan. *The Collected Texts of Honoring the Zhou*, by combining biographies of imperial subjects with those of Chosön loyal subjects, put into textual form the pairing of imperial subjects and the descendants of Chosön loyal subjects that was well established in Ming loyalist rites. Moreover, just as imperial subjects were subordinate to Chosön loyal subjects in Ming loyalist rites, so too, in *The Collected Texts of Honoring the Zhou*, the biographies of imperial subjects comprise a small number of pages at the end of far longer and more extensive biographies of Chosön loyal subjects. By contrast, Söng Haeüng's *Biographies of Remnant Subjects of the Imperial Ming* and Yi Töngmu's *Noble Purpose* linked Chosön's imperial subject descent-groups to the broader Ming loyalist world, benefiting in this from the research into Ming history that improved intellectual exchange with Qing scholars had made possible. These Ming loyalist connections, however, were also anachronistic, as Chosön's plans for restoring the Ming during the seventeenth century had been pursued with nearly no actual cooperation with pro-Ming forces elsewhere. This fantasy is meaningful, however, as it reveals that even Kyujanggak scholars like Yi Töngmu and Söng Haeüng could at once imagine Ming loyalist migrants in Chosön as part of an inward-looking, Chosön-centric tradition when they participated in the court-sponsored *Collected Texts* and position themselves as part of a broader Ming loyalist world when they wrote privately.

Following Chöngjo's death in 1800, anthologies of Ming migrant loyalists were produced outside the purview of the court. Two notable examples are *The Record of Remnant Subjects of the Imperial Dynasty*,²⁸ written by Wang Tökku

(1788–1863), a Taebodan guard (*sujikkwan*) and member of the Chenam Wang lineage of Ming migrant descendants,²⁹ and, in 1830, the eclectic but clearly sourced *Unofficial History of a Lesser Chunghwa*, by O Kyöngwön (1764–?), which also included biographies of Ming migrants and their descendants, divided into three sections: “Those Who Stayed in Chosön after the War against the Japanese,” “Those Who Had Fled Their Land to Come East,” and “Those Imperial Palace Women Who Came East.” Many of O Kyöngwön’s biographies followed the account in *The Collected Texts on Honoring the Zhou* (which is cited frequently), as also did Wang Tökku’s *Record of the Remnant Subjects of the Imperial Dynasty*. At the same time, O Kyöngwön and Wang Tökku both brought in a great deal of new information from new sources, and new biographies of otherwise unanthologized migrants, including the Imjin-era refugee Du Shizhong and the seventeenth-century refugee and supposed descendant of Shi Xing, Shi Jizu.

These new, private accounts represented significant reconsiderations of the established court tradition. Indeed, Wang Tökku, in his preface, described the composition of this new history as a matter of great urgency. He wrote that, “in the final years of the Chongzhen reign, remnant bastards of the Jurchen took the capital and controlled China, dressing the Central Continent on the left [in barbarian fashion].” As a consequence, “countless numbers of high officials sailed east across the sea [to Chosön], while an also incalculable number were taken captive, refused to humble themselves and were taken as prisoners to Mukden.” As for his own ancestor Wang Fenggang, Wang Tökku noted how he and the other Ming remnant subjects in Mukden had so impressed the future King Hyojong (in Wang’s account referred to as Sönmun-wang) during his captivity in Mukden, that when he was allowed to return to Chosön he brought Wang Fenggang and the other eight Ming loyalist Chinese back with him. In Hansöng, Hyojong housed the nine outside the palace gate, where “not a day went by that they did not discuss the matter of revenge [against the Qing].” Although the death of the king brought this great plan to an end, the glorious intention of his ancestors and of the other Chinese of Öüi-dong was still worth preserving for later ages. Because Wang Tökku believed the memory of that spirit was in danger of being lost to the changing eras, he “gathered together the traditions of all the families, cautiously organizing them together into a book.”³⁰

Of course, the fear he expressed of losing the grand purpose of his ancestors would seem to be largely without foundation, since biographies of his ancestors and the ancestors of the other Öüi-dong imperial subject families had already been produced under court auspices for circulation by prominent scholars.

Within these official biographies, the ancestors of Wang Tökku and his fellow imperial subjects had already been clearly described as vigorous opponents of the Qing, who had even engaged in effective anti-Qing plotting. This is most unlikely, as Wang Fenggang and the others had in fact been allowed to move to Hansŏng by the express permission of the Qing. Nevertheless, *The Collected Texts on Honoring the Zhou* described Wang Fenggang, also known as Yiwen, as from Jinan in Shandong, and as the grandson of a prominent Ming official. After Wang Fenggang had been taken as a prisoner to Mukden, he had encountered the Sohyŏn crown prince and had been allowed, along with migrants surnamed Feng, Yang, Zheng, Liu, Pei, and one other, to return with the crown prince to Chosŏn after Beijing fell to the Qing. There he had settled outside the palace gates, refusing the offer of a bureaucratic position by Hyojong because he saw himself as a sinner who had betrayed both emperor and family; he wept whenever he heard of matters related to the Ming. Wang Fenggang's wife became a lady-in-waiting to Queen Insŏn (1618–1674). After Wang Fenggang's death, those of his descendants who could were encouraged to catch fish and present them to the court. *The Collected Texts* described how they were later placed within the Military Training Agency and freed from the responsibility of offering fish to the court. Finally, *The Collected Texts* recounted that all but one of the Nine Righteous Officials had many children, becoming an especially productive group among the townspeople of the capital after the establishment of the Taebodan by Sukchong.

Wang Tökku's biography of his ancestor, who he called Wang Yiwen, differs little in the basic outline from that in *The Collected Texts on Honoring the Zhou* but does develop a number of additional interpretations. Some of Wang Tökku's elaborations seem plausible, including, for instance, his description of Wang Yiwen being captured by Kong Youde's (?–1652) pirate regime in the Gulf of Bohai before being taken to Mukden, in contrast to *The Collected Texts*, which simply had him appear in Mukden with little explanation. However, Wang Tökku granted his ancestor greater moral independent agency. It was for this account that Wang Tökku first coined the name "Nine Righteous Officials" (*kuŭisa*) for those nine Ming loyalists who were redeemed from the Qing by Hyojong. This new title, as Kimura Takao points out, placed Wang Fenggang and others as the driving force of conflict with the Qing, instead of simple beneficiaries of royal grace.³¹ Wang Tökku also largely ignored the history of eighteenth-century developments in imperial subject status (although these had been of great importance in the official court tradition), and, at the same time, anachronistically imagined those eighteenth-century developments were fully in

place already in the 1640s. For instance, the entire text uses southern Ming era-names, including Hongguang and Yongli, thereby revealing primarily that Wang Tökku had benefited from Chosŏn research into the southern Ming during the eighteenth century, since of course his ancestor, imprisoned in Mukden or taking refuge in Chosŏn at this time, could have been, at best, only dimly aware of the dynastic changes occurring in the southern Ming. Throughout the text, Wang Tökku referred to the community where Wang Yiwen and other Ming refugees resided in Hansŏng as “the imperial subject village,” a term that, in contrast to “the Ming village” and the “Chinese village,” was not used to any great extent before Chŏngjo. In other cases, he substantially altered the meaning of specific events. For instance, Wang Tökku discussed Wang Fenggang’s fishing, not as an aspect of submitting-foreigner status, but as an example of mistreatment under Hyŏnjong who, worried about the growing number of Ming remnants residing in Hansŏng, had ordered Wang Fenggang placed in an uncompensated position within the Military Training Agency. Receiving no salary, he and his sons were to survive by fishing in the Han River. Wang Tökku’s description of the fishing, however, makes it seem to be neither a tax obligation nor a tool for survival, but rather an aesthetic expression of his Ming loyalism. In Wang Tökku’s account, whenever Wang Fenggang came upon a tree by a picturesque river bank, “he would sit all day, from flowery morning until moonlit evening, silently weeping, attracting the pity of all travelling along the Han River.”³²

Beyond such embellishments, perhaps the greatest innovation of Wang Tökku’s history was his anachronistic re-creation of the community of imperial subjects in the seventeenth century, although they had been formed through the activity of Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo during the eighteenth century. Thus, Wang Tökku added to his biography accounts of his ancestor’s interaction with other Ming migrants, including such historically well-attested cases as the Ming palace women and Tian Haoqian, as well as those who had no recorded connections to Hansŏng, namely the descendants of Ma Gui previously encountered by Kim Yuk. And it is here that we can clearly see that Wang was not so much preserving family records as responding creatively to the evolving category of imperial subject status at that time.

As was discussed in chapter 4, the only evidence for Ma Shunshang’s migration to Chosŏn and settlement in Chŏlla Province during the first half of the seventeenth century was a brief note by Kim Yuk (1580–1658) in *Brush Notes of Master Chamgok*.³³ This, along with a story concerning Wen Keshang found in the *Gazetteer of the Interpreters’ Bureau* was enough to allow Chŏngjo to call for a general search for the descendants of both men.³⁴ What a monarch searches for

he often finds, and Chŏngjo did turn up claimants to the status, who nevertheless had a family tradition that was at odds with the matter-of-fact story of the arrival of Ma Shunshang, as described by Kim Yuk. The Sanggok Ma discovered by Chŏngjo's court traced their ancestry to a man named Ma Pengzhi (K. Ma Pongjik). The story of Ma Pengzhi, as recounted by Wang Tŏkku, was certainly much more exciting than that of Ma Shunshang. It had Ma Pengzhi leaving Chosŏn by boat in 1636 to defend the Ming against Qing aggression, then moving first to Huian and then Nanjing to defend the Ming until both fell to the Qing, at which point he returned to Chosŏn, staying in T'aean in Ch'ungch'ŏng Province. After this he moved to Sŏksŏng, where the local *sajok* purchased a farm and house for him, and where he made his living from fishing. Otherwise, he would occasionally climb up onto a high hill, look west, and weep while thinking of the Ming. He also made friendships with the Ming remnant subjects who settled in Hansŏng, only later to wander off in the mountains of Kangwŏn Province, never to be seen again.³⁵ This new story, although containing clear evidence of the submitting-foreigner origins of the Sanggok Ma descent-group (notably in the description of his fishing), otherwise fits far better into the image of the Ming loyalist that Wang Tŏkku himself was cultivating than does the story of Ma Shunshang. It was also more interesting, and so Wang Tŏkku made use of it, ignoring in its entirety Kim Yuk's more reliable account.

Similarly, new stories concerning Wen Keshang also came to Wang's attention. The biographies found in *The Biographies of Remnant Subjects of the Imperial Ming* and *Collected Texts on Honoring the Zhou* had followed the original account found in *The Record of the Interpreters' Bureau* closely by describing Wen as traveling from the Yangzi River in 1635 to Üryu in Hwanghae Province.³⁶ By contrast, Wang Tŏkku's *Record of Remnant Subjects of the Imperial Dynasty* either expanded upon this description or found an entirely new account, and claimed that Wen had been a retiring scholar forced by the advance of the Manchu (presumably in 1644–1645) to set out from Shamen for Chosŏn, where he engaged in regular conversation with another Ming migrant named Zheng Xianjia.³⁷ The connection between Wen and Zheng is indeed historical, as both were employed as translators at the same time during the reign of Sukchong. The date for Wen's arrival, however, would seem to be a later invention.

Such elaborations seemingly proved irresistible for later scholars. Writing two decades later, and consulting Wang Tŏkku's work, O Kyŏngwŏn, instead of choosing between Ma Shunshang and Ma Pengzhi, took both. Whereas Wang Tŏkku had Ma Pengzhi leaving Chosŏn for Nanjing without first telling us that he had arrived in Chosŏn, O Kyŏngwŏn overcame this contradiction by making

Ma Pengzhi the son of Ma Shunshang, thus including both Ma Shunshang's original arrival in Chosŏn from the camp of Mao Wenlong and the exciting and improbable story of Ma Pengzhi's later return to the struggle in Nanjing.³⁸

Moreover, O described Ma Pengzhi as the author of a text called, like the book by Wang Tökku, *Record of Remnant Subjects of the Imperial Dynasty*. O sourced this account to the *Sanggok Ma Genealogy* (*Ma-ssi kasŭng*). This text seems to have been immensely useful to O, allowing him to give historical reality to a number of figures whose self-styled descendants had claimed imperial subject status during the reign of Chŏngjo, notably Shi Jizu and Pan Tengyun, as well as such mysterious figures as Liu the Fortune Teller and Chinese Wang. In fact, O attributed the "Travels to the East of the Chao and Shi Lineages" (*Cho-ssi Sŏk-ssi Tongnae ki*) to Ma Pengzhi, although this text seems to include the same information that was described in court discussions during the reign of Chŏngjo as having been authored by Yi Seyŏng. As discussed in chapter 5, Yi Seyŏng was a mysterious and, to the Chosŏn court, unreliable Chosŏn wanderer adopted into the Sŏk family. Much like the story told by Yi Seyŏng according to court reports during the reign of Chŏngjo, the story provided by O also has Shi Jizu fleeing to Chosŏn with a Daoist, in this case referred to as Grand Preceptor Daoguang. However, perhaps in a similar manner to Wang Tökku's rewriting of the history of Wen Keshang, either O or the author of the original text—whether Yi Seyŏng or Ma Pengzhi—took the phrase "during the disturbances of the *kapsin* year" literally, to mean not just the Ming-Qing transition in general but 1644 itself. Indeed, the text, improbably, has the two fleeing from the Qing invasion of Beijing in 1644 to Liyin Hermitage in Liaodong. According to the account, only six years later they then escaped to Kanggye in P'yŏngan Province, where Shi Jizu encountered Li Rusong's descendants and formed a close connection with Ma Pengzhi's family as well. Eventually, Shi Jizu moved to Anhyŏp, having married a woman from there.³⁹

These narratives clearly developed out of the mainstream historiographic tradition—indeed, were frequently linked with the very myth of origin for Chosŏn Korea: The story of Kija, the great legendary migrant to Chosŏn of the Shang-Zhou transition. Perhaps the earliest account that linked Ming migrants to the story of Kija was in discussions of the geomancer and Ming deserter Du Shizhong. When Du was still alive and active in Chosŏn, a prominent Sŏin minister Yi Sibal (1569–1626) wrote a poem in his honor, in which he compared Du's decision to remain in Chosŏn to Confucius's expressed desire to live among the Nine Yi (often interpreted as Chosŏn); Yi ended the poem by suggesting that, since the heritage of Kija's enfeoffment is good, there was no reason to

leave Chosŏn.⁴⁰ Although Yi died before the fall of the Ming, he described Ming migrants in terms that were echoed the nineteenth-century private histories. For instance, O, in the postscript to his “Record of Remnant Subjects of the Imperial Dynasty” in *The Unofficial History of a Lesser Chunghwa*, suggested that Chosŏn’s exclusive preservation of Confucian clothing and culture, as well as the vestiges of Kija’s sage rule, made it worthy of the residence of Ming migrants.⁴¹ Additionally, Hwang Kich’ŏn, in his postscript to *The Record of Remnant Subjects of the Imperial Dynasty*, argued that the preservation of Yin culture in Chosŏn by Yin migrants following Kija after Yin’s fall to the Zhou was comparable to the preservation of Ming culture in Chosŏn by Ming migrants;⁴² if anything, it was a far more desperate affair, as Chinese civilization was maintained following the rise of the Zhou but was obliterated after the rise of the Qing.⁴³

Yet, although these private histories were in many ways in accord with orthodox historiography, they were too weakly sourced and unbelievable to be credible even during the Chosŏn period. They certainly did not measure up to the evidentiary standards even of the biographies within *The Collected Texts on Honoring the Zhou*. Indeed, Sŏng Haeŭng, one of the key scholars involved in compiling those biographies, wrote a response, the “Biographies of the Eight Surnames,” to correct what he saw as the inaccuracies of Wang Tŏkku’s account.⁴⁴ Presumably writing after his retirement from the Kyujanggak in 1815,⁴⁵ he took a much more critical view of material concerning Ming migrants than he had when he was compiling the biographies for *The Collected Texts*. Although he did not appear to doubt the importance of the Ming migrants as a whole, he found that the evidence for many Ming migrants’ family histories left a great deal to be desired. His primary criticism was directed toward Wang Tŏkku’s scholarship. As Sŏng said of Wang: “[Wang Tŏkku’s] biographies of the eight surnames are called the *Record of the Remnant Subjects of the Imperial Ming*. However, there is much there that does not agree with my own account. All of that material lacks reference to proper sources, so that I cannot tell what is correct and what is incorrect. I record these matters briefly, to wait for the investigation of another day.”⁴⁶

Sŏng especially identified problems in Wang’s account of Wen Keshang. Sŏng noted that Wang had Wen Keshang travel directly from the Yangzi River to Chosŏn following 1644, which contradicted the official record that had him arriving in 1635. Moreover, Sŏng suggested that it was far more likely that Wen Keshang had, like many Ming migrants, passed into Chosŏn via Mao Wenlong’s satrapy on Ka Island.⁴⁷ Sŏng raised similar doubts about the story of Ma Pengzhi as related by Wang Tŏkku, pointing out the contradiction in having two

different ancestors for the same lineage and also the unreliability of Ma Pengzhi's story, involving as it did Pengzhi traveling from the Yangzi to Chosŏn after the fall of Nanjing; travel by land was clearly to be ruled out, and even travel by sea rather unlikely. As he wrote: "The two records do not agree, and my opinion is that, after the fall of Nanjing, there would have been no road on which Shunshang could travel to Chosŏn; or perhaps we are to suppose that he made the trip by sea!"⁴⁸

In O Kyŏngwŏn's and Wang Tŏkku's accounts, both Wen Keshang and Ma Pengzhi are described as fleeing to Chosŏn after the fall of Beijing. They also more clearly establish the migrants as anti-Qing, pro-Ming heroes, rather than the more likely reality of escape from the chaos of Mao Wenlong's satrapy. For Wang Tŏkku, only recently established as a Taebodan guard, this emphasis was a response to the state's reclassification of him and his lineage as Ming loyalists. Despite Sŏng's involvement in, and support for, this very process of classification, the mythmaking in Wang Tŏkku's account went beyond what Sŏng, as a careful scholar, could accept.

Although Sŏng began his discussion critiquing Wang Tŏkku's scholarship in particular, by the end of his critique he had raised enough doubts to undermine much of his own earlier scholarship. In the conclusion he noted that frequently the Ming migrant descent-groups were completely without any evidence at all for their high status. "The Liaodongese [refugees] had frequently lost their documents, and their descendants have generally been stupid, and so cannot clarify their descent lines precisely, on account of which people accuse them of having transformed themselves and falsified their identities."⁴⁹ This statement he followed with a long list of Ming migrant descent-groups—the Sŏk of Anhyŏp, the Tu of Turŭng, the Wang of Kanggye, and the Song of Kangnŭng, with the regular refrain that "they say that they are the descendants" of some famous Chinese official—claims for which "truth and falsehood cannot be distinguished clearly." The extent of the certain knowledge of Ming migrants, Sŏng argued, was that "many celestial soldiers were left behind in our territory and did not return. Following this, their descendants have become numerous."⁵⁰

An example of his far more extensive critique may be found in his discussion of Chen Fengyi, a migrant who had been considered especially well attested by Chŏngjo on account of his possession of an imperial edict confirming Chen's status as an imperial in-law.⁵¹ Indeed, a brief biography of Chen Fengyi was included in the official historiographic tradition of *The Collected Texts on Honoring the Zhou*, in which Sŏng had been involved. This biography had been straightforward and had hinted at no doubts, telling the reader not much more than that

Cheng Fengyi had married a woman of the imperial family and had a document to attest to this. However, in his “Biographies of the Eight Surnames,” Sŏng took a much more critical line, noting that while a fair number of migrants did indeed have the story of their arrival in part referred to in contemporary private histories (Ma Shunshang, of course, was an example, having had his arrival recorded by Kim Yuk), this was distinctly not true of Chen Fengyi. As Sŏng pointed out, there were no sources attesting to the supposed arrival of Cheng Fengyi during the Imjin War, and later histories that discussed this matter claimed that an ancestor of the Chin family had found the imperial edict, which provided their only evidence of a connection to Chen Fengyi and his imperial bride, in a well. Sŏng considered it ridiculous that anybody would hide an imperial edict in a well and believed that the lack of documentation otherwise made the status of the Chin family very doubtful.

Chŏngjo’s attempts to discover Ming migrant lineages and his support for the anthologizing of their biographies resulted, among other things, in a greatly expanded list of Ming migrant lineages and biographies. On the one hand, the labors of scholars working under his direction in the Kyujanggak, such as Sŏng Haeŭng and Yi Tŏngmu, allowed for the collection and rewriting of already extant documents. On the other hand, just as Yŏngjo’s and Chŏngjo’s push to find Ming migrant lineages resulted in many lineages in isolated regions requesting court approval for their claim of Ming migrant descent, so, too, court support for the establishment of Ming migrant biographical anthologies had, as one result, the proliferation of accounts, some of them highly improbable, produced by members of imperial subject descent-groups themselves. These biographies were part of the classifying activity of the state, but imperial subjects actively supported this classification in order to secure their new status.

Private Shrines and New Lineages

Until very recently, the Chojongam continued to be the center of ritual Ming loyalist activity, with the families of the Nine Righteous Officials maintaining Ming loyalist rituals on behalf of the Ming, even after they had ceased to be practiced in the Taebodan. Indeed, especially under South Korea’s military rulers (1961–1987), one member of the P’ung family of Ming migrants, P’ung Yŏngsŏp, compiled a collection of sources (generally photocopied texts from the Kyujanggak),⁵² and through this managed to attract considerable attention from scholars working in Chinese and Korean.⁵³ He even succeeded in attracting the attention of a scholar working in English during the 1990s.⁵⁴ As a result, the

descendants of the descent-groups associated with the Chojongam have become established in the scholarship as typical examples of Ming loyalists. They are not alone, however, and other imperial subject descent-groups during the nineteenth century also asserted a corporate Ming loyalist identity to which they gave concrete form through the establishment of shrines to the Ming, or more mundanely, the writing of genealogies and collection of documents asserting the status of their ancestor as imperial subject.

Although in some literature the shrines established at Chojongam are treated as representative of Ming loyalism, in fact, the location was of marginal significance until the nineteenth century. The significance of the location can be traced to the seventeenth century, when three self-rusticated scholars, Hō Kyōk (1607–1691), Yi Chedu (1626–1687), and Paek Haemyōng (?–?), noted that the stream in the region flowed east rather than west, in accord with the famous phrase in Xunzi that compared human morality to the fact that all streams must flow to the east—a generalization that is true for northern China but not for most of Korea.⁵⁵ Consequently, they carved Confucian phrases into the rocks and maintained unofficial Ming loyalist rituals at the location.⁵⁶ For this they received the encouragement of Song Siyöl,⁵⁷ whose disciples nevertheless directed their interests toward the Mandongmyo—whose very name refers to the phrase “All streams flow east” (Ch. *wanzhi bidong*, K. *manjöl p’ildong*), which determined the selection of Chojongam’s location. The three scholars also received some public notice from Chosŏn monarchs during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries,⁵⁸ and a discussion of Chojongam was also included in the court-sponsored *Collected Texts on Honoring the Zhou*.⁵⁹ Such public praise gave the location some status, although it did not grant it anything approaching the status of the court-sponsored Taebodan or the Noron-sponsored Mandongmyo. Still, by the late eighteenth century, it had already become a site for private commemoration of the Ming loyalist cause.⁶⁰

As Angela Zito, following Catherine Bell, points out, the act of participating in rituals should not be seen as separate from the process of theorizing or debating rituals; ritual practitioners themselves are frequently active theorists of ritual, imposing rival meanings and distinctions on the very activities in which they are participating.⁶¹ Such rival theorizations may also be discovered among imperial subject descent-groups, who, as some of the key beneficiaries of the new narratives surrounding Chunghwa Inheritance Consciousness, sought to take control of Ming loyalist ritual practices and theorizations in order to raise their status beyond what they had gained during the late eighteenth century. Thus, in 1831, two former Taebodan guards Wang Tökku (author of *The Records of Remnant*

Subjects of the Imperial Ming) and his brother Tögil, for reasons not completely clear, left the capital for Chojongam in Kap'yöng, Kyönggi Province.⁶² At this site, they established two shrines, one to the Nine Righteous Officials called the Kuüi haengsa (Temporary Shrine to the Nine Righteous Officials), and one to the Ming Hongwu emperor, called the Taet'ong haengmyo (Temporary Shrine to the Ming Calendar). Within these shrines, instead of the Chongzhen era-names employed by the Chosön court and sajok aristocracy, they used the Yongli era-name. By the late nineteenth century, their ritual and calendrical practices had both come to the attention of the anti-foreign Confucian activist Kim P'yöngmuk (1819–1891), whose discussion of the shrines and the Nine Righteous Officials was quoted in the *Chojongam Gazetteer* (*Chojongamji*).⁶³ Centered on these two new shrines, the group engaged in a range of publication activities, producing, among other texts, genealogies that traced the descendants of all of the Nine Righteous Officials.⁶⁴

Wang Tökku and Wang Tögil, as well as Kim P'yöngmuk, claimed that a major impulse for their formation of the shrine was the declining interest and knowledge concerning Ming loyalism and Ming migrant families during the nineteenth century. Indeed, hostility to the Qing did decline during the nineteenth century, and this resulted in part in a decreasing emphasis by the nineteenth-century court on Ming loyalist rituals in the Taebodan,⁶⁵ although Ming loyalism and hostility to the Qing continued to be major features of Chosön intellectual life until the fall of the dynasty.⁶⁶ Notably, Wang Tögil, in a private letter, treated their establishment of a personal shrine as a restoration of the order developed under Yöngjo and Chöngjo, whereby Ming migrant descendants, as the direct subjects of the Ming, were placed in a superior position to the Chosön officialdom; under Chöngjo, after all, Ming migrant descendants had been placed in front of the court officials during rituals at the Taebodan.⁶⁷ This claim is dubious—as was discussed in chapter 5, descendants of Chosön loyal subjects were also placed in front of court officials, and by being placed on the same side of the ritual space with civil officials, were situated in a seemingly superior position to Ming migrant descendants who were placed before military officials and members of the royal family. Rather than viewing these developments as the result of worsening treatment of imperial subjects, they should rather be understood as part of a process whereby Ming migrant descent-groups formed collective identities, by establishing private shrines and separate imperial subject villages and, through this, their own private access to Ming legitimacy.⁶⁸

The descendants or claimed descendants of Ming migrants formed descent-groups that, notably, have clan seats located in China. The descendants

of Wang Fenggang, for instance, use the clan seat Chenam, which is the Korean pronunciation of Jinan, in Shandong. The P'ung descent-group of descendants of Feng Sanshi have the clan seat Imgu, which refers to Linqu, also in Shandong. This is in contrast with the Chinese migrants of late Koryŏ and early Chosŏn who were deliberately granted Korean clan seats. Yet, while their Chinese identities were marked with their clan seats, the Chosŏn court encouraged them to construct shrines to their ancestors near their homes, strengthening their Chosŏn ritual identity. Examples include the shrines to Li Rusong and Li Rumei in Kanghwa and Hansŏng, which, as discussed in chapter 5, were established through the extensive support of the Chosŏn court even though they were essentially the shrines of the Nongsŏ Yi descent-group. This process then took on a life of its own and, by 1853, in addition to their original establishments in Kanghwa and Hansŏng, the Nongsŏ Yi descent-group had formed a Nongsŏ Yi village of military sajok in Kang-dong, near P'yŏngyang and the Muyŏlsa shrine. There they had obtained the hereditary right to one of the two positions as shrine guardians (*ch'ambong*), with the other going to a local military official who had obtained the position through merit.⁶⁹ Other imperial subject villages were formed at various locations on the peninsula. By the eighteenth century, Kang Shijue's descendants were recognized as a key descent-group in the county of Musan in Hamgyŏng.⁷⁰ Indeed, these descendants, the T'ongju (Ch. Tongzhou) Kang, were praised in a preface to an early twentieth-century genealogy for being an unusual example of a properly organized descent-group in the disordered and déclassé world of northern Hamgyŏng.⁷¹ The descendants of Du Shizhong formed a village near Taegu, with a building memorializing Du Shizhong's admiration for the Ming, the Momyŏngjae—"the Longing for the Ming Studio"—although its existence is not well attested before the twentieth century.⁷²

The descendants of Shi Wenying are also recorded as establishing a shrine to the Ming, initially, at least without the clear support of the Chosŏn state. To this day there is a Korean descent-group called the Chŏlgang (Ch. Zhejiang) Si claiming to be Shi Wenying's descendants. Shi Wenying, however, is clearly recorded in *The Veritable Records* as having been executed after the Injo restoration on account of his close connection with Chŏng Inhong, Kwanghae-gun, and the Pugin faction.⁷³ Well before Chŏng Inhong was rehabilitated, Shi Wenying and his descendants had their good name restored, although in the process of the rehabilitation, much of Shi Wenying's actual well-documented history had to be simply ignored.

Consider, for instance, the account in O Kyŏngwŏn's *Unofficial History of a Lesser Chunghwa* of Shi Wenying and Xu He, a man supposedly from the same

village in Zhejiang as Shi who also founded a descent-group, the Chŏlgang Sŏ. O described Shi and Xu as participating in the Ming intervention against the Japanese invasion of Korea of 1597. Sadly, however,

Shi Wenying became extremely ill and could not return, and along with Xu He resided below Sŏngsan in the county of Sŏngju in Yŏngnam. He erected an altar behind his house on the mountain, and on the first day of each month both men would prostrate themselves four times facing the north. . . . They also painted the landscape of Zhejiang on the house, so the local people called the village Taemyŏng-dong (Great Ming Village). As a result, Sogyŏng-wang [Sŏnjo] took pity upon them in their refuge, and recognizing that they had achieved merit worth recording, granted Shi Wenying a pension and the title of Fifth Minister in the Office of the Ministers-without-Portfolio.

Following this, O provided an account of Shi Wenying's involvement in the reconstruction of the Kyŏngbok-kung Palace, "during which he made specific and vital suggestions for rehabilitating the foundations, which still survive today." O also noted Shi's scholarly talents in military matters, fortune-telling, and geomancy, subjects on which he wrote three books. Sadly, and predictably, none of the books survived. O gave the day of Shi's death as the *kyemi* year (1643),⁷⁴ moving his death to a date exactly twenty years later than it actually was and thus removing from him the implication of association with the despised Kwanghae-gun and Chŏng Inhong.

This seemingly deliberate distortions of Shi Wenying's death dates was closely tied to the altar, Taemyŏngdan (Great Ming Altar), that became the focus of many of the narratives produced concerning him. We know such an altar existed already by the eighteenth century. There are references to a Shi descent-group residing in the Taemyŏng-dong of Sŏngju during the reign of Chŏngjo in 1793, in which Chŏngjo refers to the Taemyŏng-dong as the old residence of the Ming soldier Shi Wenying, "who became a Chosŏn person." The purpose of Chŏngjo's discussion was to ensure that Shi Wenying's descendants, like other imperial subjects, be freed from all base labor services, although by then they had dispersed from Sŏngju.⁷⁵ Chŏngjo also referred to a Ming loyalist altar behind Shi Wenying's house, upon which Shi Wenying had offered obeisance northward to the Ming.⁷⁶ Two years later, *The Chosŏn Veritable Records* reported that an unspecified number of Shi's descendants were being encouraged to take military exams and pursue bureaucratic positions, no doubt thanks to their newly discovered imperial subject status.⁷⁷

Although it is clear that an altar to the Ming was raised in the Taemyŏng-dong in Sŏngju long enough before 1793 that Chŏngjo could notice it, not all early accounts make reference to it, and there is significant discrepancy concerning the date. Quite a number of accounts from the nineteenth century agree with *The Unofficial History of a Lesser Chunghwa* in dating the establishment of the altar improbably to the period immediately after Shi Wenyong's arrival in Chosŏn.⁷⁸ An exception is a far more elaborate reference by Hong Chikp'il (1776–1852), who composed the inscription for a pillar raised at the location of Shi Wenyong's house. In this text Hong described Shi and Xu as raising the altar only after the Qing invasion of Chosŏn in 1636–1637 forced upon them the realization that they could never return to their homeland. Hong agreed with other accounts in dating the death of Shi Wenyong to 1643, “the year before the Chongzheng emperor martyred himself on behalf of the altars of the earth and grain.” By dating the establishment of the shrine to the period post-1637, Hong Chikp'il could free Shi Wenyong from any implication of disloyalty to the Ming—surely a potential problem with many of the earlier accounts. While this date makes better sense than the period immediately after Shi's arrival in Chosŏn, Hong does not explain why Shi would have built an altar to the Ming in 1637, before the Qing conquered Beijing.

Whatever else may be said about the original founding of the shrine, Hong Chikp'il also discussed the revival of rituals at the Taemyŏngdan during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. According to Hong, after Shi Wenyong's death, those of his descendants who still lived in the village prostrated themselves at the altar in the direction of the Ming every new moon. As this was not in accord with the rites, they then followed the practices of the Taebodan, prostrating themselves on the anniversaries of the deaths of the three emperors. The transformation of the descent-group occurred, according to Hong Chikp'il, in 1832 (the fourth anniversary of the Imjin War according to the sixty-year cycle), when Si Ch'ibak, Shi Wenyong's seventh-generation descendant, decided to gather together the descent-group to rebuild the altar, and again in 1834, when he organized the decent-group to build a house, named P'ungch'ŏn, at the location where Shi Wenyong's had been, and also to establish a stone inscription in honor of Shi Wenyong, authored, of course, by Hong Chikp'il.⁷⁹

While it seems unlikely that there would already have been an altar in the 1640s, there must have been some sort of one by the late eighteenth century for Chŏngjo to have noticed it. The description of the descent-group practicing Taebodan rites at that altar is certainly credible, and also informative, as it reveals the spread of the rites practiced by the Chosŏn court to the remote countryside

of Kyōngsang Province well before the Chenam Wang built their own shrine in Kap'yōng. More broadly, Hong's account makes it clear that the reconstruction of the Taemyōngdan and the construction of a building called P'ungch'ōn over the remains of Shi Wenyong's old house played a vital role in forming the corporate identity of the Chōlgang Si during the nineteenth century. Whatever the beginnings of the Ming loyalist ritualism by Shi Wenyong's descendants, by the early nineteenth century it had become substantially an extension of the Chosŏn court's Ming loyalist rituals at the Taebodan.

Yet, the problem in all cases was that Shi Wenyong was a well-known figure specifically associated with the deposed King Kwanghae-gun and Chōng Inhong who had been executed after Injo's coup d'état of 1623. Simply, it was never possible to claim that Shi Wenyong was an exemplary Ming loyalist, although such attempts were made by the Chōlgang Si descent-group when they produced a collection of writings concerning him in 1917.⁸⁰ The Chōlgang Sō descent-group, residing in the same community and associated with the same shrine, notably made no reference at all to connections to Shi Wenyong in their genealogy, clearly in the hope of eliminating any hint of a connection to a famed ally of the purged Chōng Inhong.⁸¹

Of course, it is hardly surprising that liberties might be taken with the truth in the construction of an appropriate genealogy. But it is notable that the Chosŏn state itself was actively involved in Shi's rehabilitation, while completely ignoring the connection to Chōng Inhong. Surely, Chōngjo himself could not have been ignorant of the actual history of Shi Wenyong. In fact, one version of Yi Kūngik's *Yōllyōsil Narrative* (*Yōllyōsil kisul*), for instance, repeated the tradition of Shi Wenyong's Ming loyalism in the supplementary volumes, but did not refer to the altar, and moreover, described Shi as a deserter from the Chinese army (*ch'ōnbyōng*).⁸² The book, moreover, included clear reference to controversies associated with Shi in its narrative of the reigns of Sŏnjo and Kwanghae-gun.⁸³ Even O Kyōngwŏn's *Unofficial History of a Lesser Chunghwa*, quoted above, referred to Shi's involvement in the restoration of Kyōngbok-kung Palace; although the text did not describe Shi's involvement negatively, an educated reader would surely have recognized the reference to one of the key controversies of Kwanghae-gun's reign.

In contrast to the Chinese migrants who settled in Chosŏn before the Imjin War, the clan seats of the imperial subjects clearly marked them as foreign by referring specifically to locations in China. The rites in which they participated, and the narratives produced concerning them, all emphasized their foreign status. Yet it must also be noted that, even as the descendants of Ming migrants

pursued a new designation that conferred upon them official foreign status, they did so within the particular context of late Chosŏn identity. In terms of marriage, surviving genealogies suggest that they only very rarely married with other imperial subject lineages. There were notable cases, such as Yi Chŏ, an eighteenth-century military official and member of the Nongsŏ descent group, who married the granddaughter of Tian Haoqian, the Ming migrant who led the foreigners' brigade along with Weltevrete.⁸⁴ However, nearly all of the marriage partners of the Chŏlgang Si, the Chŏlgang Sŏ, the Yŏngyang Ch'ŏn, and the descendants of the Nine Righteous Officials, had Korean clan seats, although (hardly surprising, since imperial subjects were not actually of particularly prominent status) none showed any significant sign of marriage to people of high bureaucratic rank.⁸⁵ Seunghyun Han's analysis of imperial subject genealogies has shown that, during the early nineteenth century, there was a growth in intermarriage between imperial subject descent-groups, something that was extremely rare during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and then twentieth centuries. Certainly, Han is correct to understand this as revealing a sense of a collective "Ming" identity among imperial subjects,⁸⁶ although it also should be noted that even during the early nineteenth century most marriages were with descent-groups with no Ming connection.

Ultimately, imperial subject status, while an improvement over the status that they had possessed before, clearly marked them as inferiors to the *sajok* aristocrats who dominated Chosŏn society. U Kyŏngsŏp is correct that many of the surviving texts concerning imperial subjects, including those authored by kings Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo themselves, lament the poor treatment accorded to Ming migrants.⁸⁷ One such lament discussed in this chapter was by Sŏng Haeŭng, who asked why officials from the Ming who migrated by Chosŏn should be treated so much less well than those from earlier Chinese dynasties who had migrated to the Three Kingdoms or Koryŏ. Yet, his own work served to rationalize just this discrimination, when, in the "Biographies of the Eight Surnames," he pointed out how incredibly weak the historical claims of these supposed descendants of Ming officials were. Any *sajok* official could discover, with only a little research, that the Chŏlgang Si's ancestor had in fact been executed in 1623, that Kang Shijue, the ancestor of the T'ongju Kang, had married a *kisaeng*, and that the supposed descendants of Li Rusong had been living obscurely in Kangwŏn Province until they were informed of their identities. These narratives at once confirmed the status of imperial subjects and clearly set boundaries on their social advancement.

MING MIGRANTS AND THEIR DESCENDANTS, as imperial subjects, gained ritualized identities from the Chosŏn court during the late eighteenth century. This identity defined them as permanent foreigners within the Chosŏn state, even as it brought them into the very heart of Chosŏn court ritual during regular Ming loyalist rites at the Taebodan. Through new bureaucratic categories designed to distinguish them from submitting-foreigners of Jurchen and Japanese origin, and through new historical narratives linking them to the eighteenth-century court's official Ming loyalism, those who could claim ancestry among Ming migrants following the Imjin War could enjoy significantly improved social status compared to the invidious status under which most had suffered during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.

This state of ritual "foreignness" did not exclude imperial subjects from the Chosŏn state. Late Chosŏn Chunghwa ideology, although clearly centered in Chosŏn, imagined Chosŏn not in the terms of modern, racialized nationalism but within the broader language and symbolism of the Chunghwa sphere that also encompassed China. As Ming migrants gained identities that identified them with the key struggles that made up the sacred history of the late Chosŏn state, their identities came more closely in line with the official ideology of the Chosŏn court and Chosŏn's *sajok* aristocracy. Within a Chosŏn state organized hierarchically according to hereditary status groups, imperial subjects had their identities assimilated into the ruling ideology of the Chosŏn state. Nor was it a unidirectional process. As imperial subjects benefited from their improved social status, they actively produced their own versions of the court-sponsored narratives of their ancestors, often in language that went far beyond the relatively cautious state-supported histories. As the active role of the Chosŏn monarchy in the Ming loyalist rituals in the Taebodan declined, the Ming migrants themselves created their own private centers of Ming loyalist ritual practices, building shrines and altars to the Ming and making them the focus of their emerging imperial subject descent-groups. In ritual terms, they played much the same role as the Jurchens and Japanese who offered obeisance to the Chosŏn monarchy during the early Chosŏn. However, although imperial subject descent-groups were marked as foreign, their acceptance of these new ritualized foreign identities revealed them to be fully part of late Chosŏn society. These new private narratives and rituals thus amounted to a vernacularization of Chosŏn's ruling ideology among previously marginal people.

Conclusion

DESCENT-GROUPS OF THE JAPANESE and Ming submitting-foreigners still live in Korea. Hardly to be distinguished from other Korean descent-groups, and certainly not in any way part of a diaspora, sites associated with them have nevertheless been enshrined as part of regional heritage administrations. Sites related to the Japanese defector Kim Ch'ungsŏn, the Ming deserter Du Shizhong, as well as the complex at Chojongam associated with the Chenam Wang and Imgu P'ung, have all been developed as locations for tourism, with those sites associated with the Chinese often targeted specifically at Chinese tourists. Although an embarrassing fact during much of the twentieth century, twentieth-first-century South Korea has increasingly celebrated these migrants as an aspect of Korea's multiculturalism.¹

While such narratives are valuable for bringing out aspects of the past that were largely ignored by earlier scholarship, they risk committing significant distortions, for ultimately, the submitting-foreigners and imperial subjects did not relate to the Chosŏn state in the same manner as the "ethnic minorities" of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The late nineteenth century brought migrants to Korea who were governed by the new concept of citizenship and were protected by both consulates and force of arms. They were thus substantially different from the submitting-foreigners and imperial subjects of the Chosŏn.² At the same time, beginning in the late nineteenth century and continuing through the twentieth, a Korean diaspora formed communities around the world that were governed by states that considered citizenship, race, and ethnicity to be primary and often absolute units of classification.³ Currently, for that matter, the multiculturalism of present-day South Korea, like the multiculturalism of other countries, does not escape the logic of national categories—like state-sponsored multiculturalism around the world, it further entrenches and essentializes nationalism, placing the emphasis on assimilation, and at best celebrating superficial markers of difference—"traditional" clothing, foods, and dance⁴—a phenomenon that would have made little sense in the late Chosŏn.

Ultimately, it is a distortion to use the language of multiculturalism with reference to the foreign communities of Chosŏn Korea. Submitting-foreigner status, as it developed during the early Chosŏn, was not concerned with "assimilation,"

but with submission to the civilizing power of the Chosŏn monarch. Emerging from the Koryŏ period, it had originally been used to govern the multiplicity of Koryŏ's relationships with the outside world, while maintaining the broader centrality of the Koryŏ monarch. During the Chosŏn period, it was primarily used to govern Jurchens and Japanese on Chosŏn's frontiers; it granted to its recipients important economic and military roles and conferred upon the Chosŏn monarch the status of civilizing center. Above all, submitting-foreigner status was a tool used to manage the culturally fluid world of the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries, creating zones of Chosŏn influence that extended beyond the regions the Chosŏn state could administer directly.

It would have been meaningless, whether during the early, mid-, or late Chosŏn, to speak in terms of Korean bloodlines or Korean race. In 2004 the football player Hines Ward, the child of a Korean mother and an African American soldier father, attracted a mix of guilt (on account of the discrimination experienced by his mother and by mixed-race people in South Korea) and pride (on account of his sports success as a Korean in the United States) in South Korea.⁵ During the Chosŏn period itself, however, it would be inconceivable to speak of somebody being half-Korean or of Korean blood. When, during the sixteenth century, Chosŏn officials worried about Jurchens who had been born in Korea taking a position in the royal guard, the worry was not determined by blood quotient but by the seeming success of certain Jurchen figures at gaming the system. The Chosŏn court was equally worried about Pŏnhos pursuing multiple relationships with submitting-Jurchen women in Hamgyŏng Province, even though all parties involved in these relationships were Jurchens. While the Chosŏn court did at times refer to matters such as clothing and marriage and funeral customs, as they had a clear relationship to Confucian rites and morality, issues that greatly concern the modern state—language, culture, and physical appearance—were not part of the conversation.

Indeed, the language of assimilation (*tonghwa*) requires an object: "Assimilation to what?" Chosŏn, as a society divided by distinctions of social status, did not seek to enforce homogeneity or similarity, for people were assumed to have different roles and orientations according to their social status. Within the hierarchical world of Chosŏn, all outsiders—Chinese, Jurchens, Japanese, and Koreans—to the close-knit circles of the sajok aristocracy were equally alien and unacceptable as marriage partners for sajok. Despite some attempts to match Jurchen hierarchies with Chosŏn hierarchies during the early Chosŏn, the wives given to submitting-foreigners were the descendants of commoners and slaves; the product, in other words, of illegal unions, whose lives could be mobilized

by the state with relative ease. When the Chosŏn court reformed the status of Ming migrants during the eighteenth century, it reorganized them according to patriline, with little interest in the origins of their female ancestors. In fact, if female ancestry were considered, most descendants claiming Jurchen, Japanese, or Ming origins would be considered overwhelmingly Korean according to modern racialized language. The reorganization of submitting-foreigners of Ming ancestry in the eighteenth century transformed a group of people of mixed but overwhelmingly Korean ancestry into descent-groups with a ritualized foreign identity; it neither created, nor responded to, a diaspora.

Nor do we improve matters by attempting to approach the subject via the Hua-Yi “Neo-Confucian” dynamic, because such an approach assumes enormous temporal homogeneity within the Chosŏn state and ignores the considerable changes, domestic and international, which occurred during the same period. As I discussed in chapter 1, one can find expressions of hostility toward Jurchens quite easily, but by the same token one can find much more positive references elsewhere. For that matter, it is a mistake to imagine that, during the wars of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Ming Chinese migrants were representatives of China and thus welcome, or that Jurchens were representatives of barbarity and thus unwelcome. As this book has shown, it was not until the reigns of Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo that it was considered at all problematic to classify the descendants of Ming Chinese as submitting-foreigners along with Jurchens, Japanese, and other groups such as the Dutch.

Ultimately, Chosŏn Korea was not a society driven by the rigid pursuit of Confucian ideals, but a society profoundly influenced by the social hierarchies according to which it was organized, with which these Confucian ideals were themselves often in significant tension. Chosŏn’s institution of hereditary slavery, for instance, fit awkwardly with Confucian understandings of human nature and was not present in China to the same extent.⁶ In the case of foreigners of Chinese origin, sajok officials and elites may have made their participation in the broader Confucian world a core part of their cultural identity but were certainly not going to submit to Chinese refugees from outside of their circles. During the early Chosŏn, Chinese and other Northeast Asian officials were clearly subordinated to the sajok aristocracy and placed in distinctly supplementary roles as interpreters or clerks, well outside of the ranks of the dominant civil sajok descent-groups. None of the Chinese refugees or their descendants who came during the Ming-Qing transition gained truly prominent social status in Chosŏn. Insofar as they did gain higher status during the reigns of Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo, they merely achieved an improved but subordinate and

supportive role, similar to what was granted to other members of intermediate status groups. Kang Shijue (discussed in chapter 4) made himself useful to the local administration in northern Hamgyŏng during the 1670s and 1680s, and his sons continued to play the role of prominent local elites and low-ranking military *sajok*. Prominent *sajok* aristocrats like Nam Kuman and Pak Sedang may have been willing to appeal to Kang Shijue's claimed descent from Ming officialdom in order to allow him to play the role of intermediary in northern Hamgyŏng, but they were in no danger of actually allowing him to join the capital aristocracy in Hansŏng. "*Hua* and *yi*" was a logic that helped the Chosŏn court and elite make sense of the world around them, but it was imposed variably according to the needs—political, ideological, and economic—of the *sajok* elite.

In many ways, in fact, the transformation of the social status of Ming migrants represented a continuation of their earlier ritual role by bringing them into a ritual relationship with the Chosŏn monarchy. By participating in rituals in the Taebodan, Ming migrants were playing an almost identical role to Jurchen and Japanese leaders of the early Chosŏn court in Hansŏng, with the major difference being the changing conception of the Chosŏn state. A fifteenth-century Jurchen leader offering tribute in Hansŏng in exchange for a bureaucratic title in Hansŏng was confirming Chosŏn's role as a lesser center in the context of overall Ming hegemony. Similarly, when the descendants of Ming migrants, who had received the ritualized status of imperial subjects, participated in the rituals at the Taebodan, they confirmed the Chosŏn monarch's status as the one remaining representative of the Chunghwa order. Both the Jurchen envoy and the imperial subject acted clearly in subordination to the Chosŏn monarch and the *sajok* civil officials who dominated the court. Despite attempts by people like Wang Tŏgil to claim higher status (as a self-styled official of the original Ming central court), imperial subjects had considerably less power, influence, and autonomy than the Jurchen and Japanese potentates who submitted to the early Chosŏn court, but who maintained a base outside of Chosŏn's effective administration.

To the extent that the language of assimilation is at all appropriate, it is not in the sense that it occurs in a modern nation-state, but in the manner of vernacularization as conceptualized by Victor Lieberman. Jurchens, Japanese, and others during the Chosŏn period operated in a world where boundaries were unclearly defined, and the regions that are now Japan, the Chinese northeast, and northern Hamgyŏng were under the control of small and fluid polities. Chosŏn, emerging from the chaos of the collapse of the Mongol empire, sought to establish control over this fluid and chaotic frontier by binding the leaders of these small polities into a relationship with the Chosŏn court, to make them

act as intermediaries on Chosŏn's behalf. While during the early Chosŏn these groups had only been weakly controlled, and often attached to small polities on Chosŏn's frontiers, geopolitical shifts during the seventeenth century eliminated these small polities and the borderland peoples who had operated out of them. Moreover, the growing centralization of the Chosŏn state during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries gave Chosŏn's central court far greater control over its subjects. As part of Chosŏn's assertion of its own Ming loyalist identity, the Chosŏn refashioned some people of foreign origin into Ming loyalists. In contrast to the Chinese in Koryŏ and early Chosŏn, who had received Korean clan seats, during the eighteenth century, Ming migrant descent-groups used clan seats that referred to Chinese place-names. Yet, the entire identity of these Ming migrant descent-groups, including the shrines at which they practiced Ming loyalist rites, integrated them fully into a Chosŏn identity.

Imperial subject status confirmed its recipients as eternal subjects of the fallen Ming, and the Chosŏn court under Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo actively sought to entrench and clarify their foreign status, finding genealogies or evidence of their Ming origins, seeking to limit their residence to clearly defined imperial subject villages, and correcting their ritual activities to fit better with the Chosŏn court's conception of a Ming loyalist remnant subject. However, ultimately, they were not foreigners at all. This is not to say that their genealogical claims were fraudulent, although many likely were. As was discussed in chapter 6, the historian Sŏng Haeŭng himself, though an active participant in creating the Ming loyalist histories, revealed that many of the genealogical claims of imperial subjects were simply impossible and based on weak or absent sources. I expect that most claimants to imperial subject status would have been from submitting-foreigner communities, where the Chosŏn court generally went looking for Ming remnants. The Chosŏn court did look for documentation and did reject inappropriate claimants such as Pak Sŭngbok. Yet as the very case of Pak Sŭngbok reveals, surnames and lines of descent among submitting-foreigners were often unstable, many submitting-foreigners lived outside of submitting-foreigner villages, and most submitting-foreigners married with Koreans. The eighteenth-century Chosŏn court created the ritualized imperial subject status out of submitting-foreigner communities that had lived for several generations in close association with low-status Koreans, with whom, in most respects, they would have been completely indistinguishable. The desire to have a ritualized foreign element on its soil was such that, even with the vanishing of actual borderland communities, the Chosŏn court subsidized and supported a permanent foreign community, often ignoring a complete lack of credible sources, overlooking

facile claims that all documentation had been burned, and even accepting, in the case of the descendants of Chen Fengyi, that someone might choose to hide an imperial edict in a well.

Dipesh Chakrabarty has cautioned against the tendency, within much historical scholarship, to treat regions outside of Europe primarily through their success or failure to achieve a normative European standard of historical development and to view them through the language of “lack” and inadequacy.⁷ As I have argued in this book, the self-identity of Chosŏn during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can certainly be appropriated for the uses of modern nationalists and multiculturalists, but it was structured according to a logic of its own. The Chosŏn court and *sajok* aristocracy imagined themselves to be part of a historical entity based in the Korean peninsula that fully participated in a Chunghwa identity and believed that, after the fall of the Ming, they were the last representatives of the Chunghwa ideal. This ideal was certainly not identical to the narrow and exclusionary nationalism that developed in Korea post-1894, but it was also clearly oriented to the geographic, social, and political space of Chosŏn. For late Chosŏn elites, particularism based on Chosŏn was not in conflict with a cosmopolitan outlook that embraced China, nor did it require homogeneity and resistance to foreign influences and people. There was also no contradiction between admiring the Ming and accepting the submission of ordinary Ming Chinese, for the simple reason that identification with Chunghwa as a larger political and cultural project did not involve national identification, and individual subjects of China were not representatives of Chunghwa. Ming migrants had to be made representatives of the Ming—by discovering genealogies that gave them elite and loyal ancestors—a process that brought them into a hierarchical community centered on the Chosŏn court and dominated by aristocratic *sajok* descent-groups. They were not a heterogeneous element but were people possessing a distinct status in a society where explicit status distinctions were normalized, and they were not so much foreigners as Chosŏn subjects transformed to support Chosŏn court’s own image of its role in the broader world.

NOTES

Introduction

1. For instance, No Hyegyŏng, “Yŏngjodae hwangjoin e taehan insik,” *Tongyang kojŏn yŏn’gu* 37 (December 2009): 127–160; Ha Ubong, “Chosŏn chŏn’gi taehoe kwan’gye e nat’anan cha’a insik kwa t’aja insik,” *Han’guksa yŏn’gu* 123 (December 2003): 247–270; Kyung-koo Han, “The Archaeology of the Ethnically Homogeneous Nation-State and Multiculturalism in Korea,” *Korea Journal* 47, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 8–31.

2. This outline follows Ji-young Lee, *China’s Hegemony: Four Hundred Years of East Asian Domination* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017); Yuan-chong Wang, *Remaking the Chinese Empire: Manchu-Korean Relations, 1616–1911* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019); and Donald N. Clark, “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations under the Ming,” in Vol. 8, *The Cambridge History of China*, ed. Denis Twitchett and Frederick W. Mote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 286–288.

3. Pae Usŏng, *Chosŏn kwa Chunghwa: Chosŏn i kkum kkugo sangsang han segye wa munmyŏng* (P’aju: Tolbege, 2014).

4. Sixiang Wang, “Co-constructing Empire in Early Chosŏn Korea: Knowledge Production and the Culture of Diplomacy, 1392–1592” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2015), 30–33.

5. Sixiang Wang, “Co-constructing Empire,” 32, note 75.

6. Martina Deuchler, “Reject the False and Uphold the Straight: Attitudes toward Heterodox Thought in Early Yi Korea,” in *The Rise of Neo-Confucianism in Korea*, ed. Wm. Theodore de Bary and JaHyun Kim Haboush (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 375–410.

7. Chŏng Yŏnghun, “Nam kwa Puk ŭi Tan’gun insik kwa Tan’gun sungang,” *Kojosŏn Tan’gunhak* 12 (June 2005): 177–219; Yi Sŭngho, “Yŏksa wa sinhwa, kŭrigo minjok,” *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 117 (November 2016): 218–237; Stella Xu, *Reconstructing Ancient Korean History: The Formation of Korean-ness in the Shadow of History* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016), 151–156.

8. A subject discussed by Hyung Il Pai, *Constructing “Korean” Origins: A Critical Review of Archaeology, Historiography, and Racial Myth in Korean State-Formation Theories* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000).

9. The multicultural turn in South Korea is more generally discussed in the articles in John Lie, ed., *Multiethnic Korea? Multiculturalism, Migration, and Peoplehood Diversity in Contemporary South Korea* (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, 2014).

10. For instance, Sö Künsik, “Chosŏn sidae hyanghwa kaenyŏm e taehan yŏn’gu—Chosŏn wangjo sillok ūl chungsim ūro,” *Tongyang kojŏn yŏn’gu* 37 (December 2009): 7–31.

11. For instance, Pak Kihyŏn, *Uri yŏksa rŭl pakkun kwihwa sŏngssi: Uri ttang ūl t’aekhan kwihwain tŭl ūi palchach’wi* (Seoul: Yŏksa ūi ach’im, 2007); Saramŭro ingnŭn Han’guksa kihŏek wiwŏnhŏe, ed., *Imi uri-ga toen ibangin tŭl* (P’aju: Tongnyŏk, 2007).

12. Kyung-koo Han, “The Archaeology of the Ethnically Homogeneous Nation-State.”

13. John B. Duncan, “Hwanghwain: Migration and Assimilation in Korea,” *Acta Koreana* 3 (July 2000): 99–111.

14. Andre Schmid, *Korea between Empires, 1895–1919* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 61–64.

15. Henry H. Em, *The Great Enterprise: Sovereignty and Historiography in Modern Korea* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013), 80–83.

16. An example in English is Peter I. Yun, “Rethinking the Tribute System: Korean States and Northeast Asian Interstate Relations, 600–1600” (PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1998).

17. Han Yŏnggu, *Chosŏn chŏn’gi sahŏe sasang* (Seoul: Chisik sanŏpsa, 1983), 197–198.

18. Em, *The Great Enterprise*, 78, quoting Carter Eckert, *Off-spring of Empire: The Kŏch’ang Kim and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876–1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991), 226–227. However, it is a minor point in Eckert but central to Em’s discussion of changing attitudes to sovereignty between the “premodern Korea” and the twentieth century.

19. Yuanchong Wang, *Remaking the Chinese Empire*, 50–85.

20. Hyewon Chae, “Was Joseon a Model or an Exception? Reconsidering the Tributary Relations during Ming China,” *Korea Journal* 51, no. 4 (Winter 2011): 33–58.

21. Ch’oe Chongsŏk, “Koryŏ hugi ‘chasin ūl Iro kanju hanŭn Hwa-I ūisik’ ūi t’an-saeng kwa naeyanghwa—Chosŏnjŏk chagi chŏngch’esŏng ūi mot’ae rŭl ch’ajasŏ,” *Minjok munhwa yŏn’gu* 74 (February 2017): 161–220; Ch’oe Chongsŏk, “Koryŏ malgi. Chosŏn ch’ogi yŏngjo ūirye e kwanhan saeroun ihae mosack—Pŏn’guk ūiju ūi sogae wa pogwŏn,” *Minjok munhwa yŏn’gu* 69 (November 2015): 269–309.

22. Kim Sunja, “Wŏn-Myŏng kyoch’egi wa Yŏmal Sŏnch’o ūi Hwa-I ron,” *Han’guk chungsesa yŏn’gu* 10 (April 2001): 115–145.

23. Don Baker, “Rhetoric, Ritual and Political Legitimacy: Justifying Yi Seong-gye’s Ascension to the Throne,” *Korea Journal* 53, no. 4 (Winter 2013): 141–167.

24. Pae Usŏng, *Chosŏn kwa Chunghwa*, 93–123.

25. See Hŏ T’ae-yong, “Chŏn’gŭndae Tongguk ūisik ūi yŏksajŏk sŏnggyŏk chae-gŏmt’o,” *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 111 (May 2015): 443–470; Kim Munyong, “Tongguk ūisik kwa segye insik—Chosŏn sidae chiptanjŏk cha’a ūisik ūi han tanmyŏn,” in *19 segi Chosŏn ūi Munhwa kujo wa Tongyŏkhak*, ed. Kang Sangsun (Seoul: Somyŏng ch’ulp’ansa, 2013), 15–48; Remco E. Breuker, *Establishing a Pluralist Society in Medieval Korea, 918–1170: History, Ideology, and Identity in the Koryŏ Dynasty* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 36–44.

26. Pae Usŏng, *Chosŏn kwa Chunghwa*, 124–192.

27. Schmid, *Korea between Empires*, 63–64.
28. Hō T'ae-yong, *Chosŏn hugi Chunghwaron kwa yŏksa insik* (Seoul: Ak'anet, 2009), 102–107.
29. Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 47–65.
30. Jahyun Kim Haboush, William Joseph Haboush, and Jisoo M. Kim, *The Great East Asian War and the Birth of the Korean Nation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 9.
31. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalisms* (London: Verso Editions and NLB, 1983).
32. Nicholas Tackett, *The Origins of Chinese Nationalism: Song China and the Forging of an East Asian World Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 1–27.
33. Song Chun-ho, *Chosŏn sahoesa yŏn'gu: Chosŏn sahoe ūi kujo wa sŏnggyŏk mit kŭ pyŏnch'ŏn e kwanhan yŏn'gu* (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1997), 68–108.
34. Javier Cha, “To Build a Centralizing Regime: Yangban Aristocracy and Medieval Patrimonialism,” *Seoul Journal of Korean Studies* 32, no. 1 (2019): 35–80. For a venerable discussion of the balance between meritocracy and aristocracy, see James B. Palais, “Confucianism and the Aristocratic/Bureaucratic Balance in Korea,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 44, no. 2 (December 1984): 427–468.
35. Eugene Y. Park, *A Family of No Prominence: The Descendants of Pak Tŏkhwa and the Birth of Modern Korea* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 14–18.
36. Eugene Y. Park, *A Family of No Prominence*, 11–12; Martina Deuchler, *Under the Ancestors' Eyes: Kinship, Status, and Locality in Premodern Korea* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 58.
37. For internal social networks, see Cho Hwisang, “The Epistolary Brush: Letter Writing and Power in Chosŏn Korea,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 75, no. 4 (2016): 1055–1081. Of course, Chosŏn officials did occasionally correspond with Chinese officials encountered during diplomatic missions, but this was a rare and highly valued experience.
38. Pae Usŏng, *Chosŏn kwa Chunghwa*, 128–137.
39. Martina Deuchler, *Under the Ancestors' Eyes*, 237–338.
40. Rian Thum, *The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).
41. For a critical discussion of late Chosŏn factionalism, see Jahyun Kim Haboush, “Constructing the Center: The Ritual Controversy and the Search for a New Identity in Seventeenth-Century Korea,” in *Culture and State in Late Chosŏn Korea*, ed. JaHyun Kim Haboush and Martina Deuchler (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asian Center and Harvard University Press, 1999), 46–90.
42. Schmid, *Korea between Empires*, 5.
43. For a discussion on these lines of early modern identities, with a focus however on Venice and the Ottoman Empire, see Eric Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 11–22.

44. Anthony W. Marx, *Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
45. Peter Sahlins, *Unnaturally French: Foreign Citizens in the Old Regime and After* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).
46. Jae-hoon Shim, "A New Understanding of Kija Chosŏn as a Historical Anachronism," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 62, no. 2 (December 2002): 271–305.
47. Han Young-woo, "Kija Worship in the Koryŏ and Early Yi Dynasties: A Cultural Symbol in the Relationship Between Korea and China," in *The Rise of Neo-Confucianism in Korea*, ed. Wm. Theodore de Bary and JaHyun Kim Haboush (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 349–374; Sun Weiguo, "Legend, Identity, and History," *Chinese Studies in History* 44, no. 4 (Summer 2011): 20–46.
48. Pae Usŏng, *Chosŏn kwa Chŭnghwa*, 102–109.
49. Stella Xu, *Reconstructing Ancient Korean History*, 116–117.
50. Kenneth R. Robinson, "From Raiders to Traders: Border Security and Border Control in Early Chosŏn, 1392–1450," *Korean Studies* 16 (January 1992): 94–115.
51. Kenneth R. Robinson, "An Island's Place in History: Tsushima in Japan and in Chosŏn, 1392–1592," *Korean Studies* 30 (January 2006): 40–66.
52. Pamela Kyle Crossley, "The Imaginal Bound of 'Empire' and 'Civilization' in Eurasian History," *Verge: Studies in Global Asias* 2, no. 2 (Fall 2016): 84–114.
53. Pamela Kyle Crossley and Gene R. Garthwaite, "Post-Mongol States and Early Modern Chronology in Iran and China," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 26, no. 1–2 (January 2016): 293–307.
54. Victor Lieberman, *Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800–1830* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Alexander Woodside, *Lost Modernities: China, Vietnam, Korea, and the Hazards of World History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
55. Laura Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Evelyn S. Rawski, *Early Modern China and Northeast Asia: Cross-Border Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
56. I adapt a comment made to me by Pamela Kyle Crossley.
57. James B. Lewis, *Frontier Contact between Chosŏn Korea and Tokugawa Japan* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Seonmin Kim, *Ginseng and Borderland: Territorial Boundaries and Political Relations between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea, 1636–1912* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017).
58. An example of a scholar who sees changes in Ming migrant status primarily through the lens of Ming loyalist ideology is U Kyŏngsŏp, "Chosŏn hugi kwihwa Hanin kwa Hwangjo yumin ūisik," *Han'gukhak yŏn'gu* 27 (June 2012): 335–365.
59. Kimura Takao, "Chōsen ō chō Yonjo ni yoru kajin shison sōshutsu no hakei," *Tōyō bunka kenkyū* 19 (March 2015): 31–52.
60. Adam Bohnet, "Ruling Ideology and Marginal Subjects: Ming Loyalism and Foreign Lineages in Late Chosŏn Korea," *Journal of Early Modern History* 15, no. 6 (2011):

477–505. This article, based on my 2008 dissertation, anticipates Kimura in seeing the creation of imperial subject status in terms of the general growth of royal power. One key difference is that it explores these changes in a broader international context.

61. Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Mark C. Elliott, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 133–174.

62. The most widely cited collection is P'ung Yŏngsŏp, *Taemyŏng yumin sa* (Seoul: Myŏngŭihoe, 1989).

63. U Kyŏngsŏp, *Chosŏn Chunghwajuŭi sŏngnip*; Yu Ch'ullan [Liu Chunlan], “Myŏng-Ch'ŏng kyoch'egi Hanjok ŭi Chosŏn imin” (master's thesis: Han'guk chŏngsin munhwa yŏn'guwŏn, 1997).

64. U Kyŏngsŏp, *Chosŏn Chunghwajuŭi sŏngnip*, 123–130.

65. For these developments, see Ji-Young Jung, “Widows' Position and Agency in the Late Chosŏn Dynasty,” *Journal of Korean Studies* 14, no. 1 (Fall 2011): 61–82; Kwŏn Nachyŏn, *Nobi esŏ yangban ŭro, kŭ mŏnamŏn yŏjŏng: Ŏnŭ nobi kagye 2 paengnyŏn ŭi kirok* (Seoul: Yŏksa pip'yŏng, 2014); Sun Joo Kim, “Fragmented: The T'ongch'ŏng Movements by Marginalized Status Groups in Late Chosŏn Korea,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 68, no. 1 (June 2008): 135–168.

66. Charles O. Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985).

67. Online glossary, provided by the Academy of Korean Studies, is available at <http://digerati.aks.ac.kr:94/>.

68. Sun Joo Kim's “Korean History Glossary” is available at <https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/gpks/resources-0>.

69. Smith, *Nationalism*, 10–16.

Chapter 1: Foreign Communities in Early Chosŏn

1. David M. Robinson, *Empire's Twilight: Northeast Asia under the Mongols* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Yi Myŏngmi, *13–14 segi Koryŏ. Mongol kwan'gye yŏn'gu—Chŏngdong haengsŏng sŏngsang puma Koryŏ kugwang kŭ pokhapchŏk wisang e taehan t'amgu* (Seoul: Hyeon, 2016); Yi Kanghan, *Koryŏ wa Wŏn cheguk ŭi kyoyŏk ŭi yŏksa: 13–14 segi kamch'ujŏin kyoryusang ŭi chaegusŏng* (Seoul: Ch'angbi, 2013).

2. English accounts of the origin of the Chosŏn dynasty include John B. Duncan, *The Origins of the Chosŏn Dynasty* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000). For the international context, see David M. Robinson, “Rethinking the Late Koryŏ in an International Context,” *Korean Studies* 41 (January 2017): 75–98.

3. Chŏn Yŏngjun, “Koryŏ sidae iminjok ŭi kwihwa yuhyŏng kwa chejŏngch'aek,” *Tamunhwa kontench'u yŏn'gu* 13 (October 2012): 407–434; Yi Chinha, *Koryŏ sidae Songsang wangnae yŏn'gu* (Seoul: Kyŏngin munhwasa, 2011), 137–142.

4. Robinson, *Empire's Twilight*. Hamgyŏng Province has gone through several name changes. Between 1392 and 1416, it was called Yŏnggil Province, then had its name changed to Hamgil Province in 1416, and to Yŏngan Province in 1470, until finally gaining the name Hamgyŏng Province in 1509. Currently, North Korea has divided it into several administrative districts including North Hamgyŏng and South Hamgyŏng. For clarity, I will generally refer to it simply as Hamgyŏng or the Northeast, except in those cases where some reference to the name then in use is necessary. Also see the map of northern Korea in chapter 2.

5. Yun Ŭnsuk, *Monggol cheguk ŭi Manju chibaesa: Otchigin wangga ŭi Manju kyŏngyŏng kwa Yi Sŏnggye ŭi Chosŏn kŏn'guk* (Seoul: Somanu, 2010), 272–281.

6. These are surveyed by Peter I. Yun, “Foreigners in Korea during the Period of Mongol Interference,” in *Embracing the Other: The Interaction of Korean and Foreign Cultures: Proceedings of the 1st World Congress of Korean Studies*, vol. 3 (Seongnam, Republic of Korea: Academy of Korean Studies, 2002), 1221–1228; Peter I. Yun, “Mongols and Western Asians in the Late Koryŏ Ruling Stratum,” *International Journal of Korean History* 3 (December 2002): 51–69.

7. Kim Iru, *Koryŏ sidae T'amna sa yŏn'gu* (Seoul: Sinsŏwŏn, 2008), 331–353.

8. Kim Iru, 353–385.

9. Kim Iru, 349–351.

10. *Sinjŭng Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam* (Seoul: Myŏngmundang, 1994), 661.

11. Literally, “people of various categories,” *semuren* referred to those officials who were not classifiable as Mongols, northern Chinese, or southern Chinese.

12. Michael C. Brose, *Subjects and Masters: Uyghurs in the Mongol Empire* (Bellingham: Center for East Asian Studies, Western Washington University, 2007).

13. Michael C. Brose, “Neo-Confucian Uyghur *Semuren* in Koryŏ and Chosŏn Korean Society and Politics,” in *Eurasian Influences on Yuan China*, ed. Morris Rossabi (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2013), 178–199.

14. Robinson, *Empire's Twilight*, 134–135; Peter Yun, “Mongols and Western Asians,” 54–55. For Na Se's age at death, see *T'aejo sillok* 12:5b, *T'aejo* 6 (1397)/9/17 (*pyŏngin*).

15. Michael C. Brose, “Neo-Confucian Uyghur *Semuren*,” 188–190.

16. *Koryŏsa* 136:18a–18b; Pak Chongyŏn, “Chosŏn ch'ogi kwihwa Chunggugŏ t'ongyŏkkwan yŏn'gu—*Chosŏn wangjo sillok* ŭi kirok ŭl chungsim ŭro,” *Chungguk ōmun hak* 37 (December 2016), 385–386.

17. Im Sŏnbin, “Chosŏn ch'ogi kwihwain ŭi sahyang kwa t'ŭkching,” *Tongyang kojŏn yŏn'gu* 37 (December 2009): 63–91; *T'aejo sillok* 11:9b, *T'aejo* 6 (1397)/4/17 (*pyŏngin*).

18. Michael C. Brose, “Neo-Confucian Uyghur *Semuren*,” 190; *T'aejo sillok* 6:17a–18a, *T'aejo* 3 (1394)/11/19 (*ŭlmyŏ*).

19. Paek Okkyŏng, “Yŏmal sŏnch'o Sŏl Changsu ŭi chŏngch'i hwaldong kwa hyŏnsil insik,” *Chosŏn sidae sabakpo* 46 (September 2008), 24–31.

20. Michael C. Brose, “Neo-Confucian Uyghur *Semuren*,” 190–192.

21. *Sejong sillok* 48:23b–24a, *Sejong* 12 (1430)/5/25 (*kapcha*).

22. *Koryŏsa* 72:19b.
23. *T'aejong sillok* 25:34b–35a, T'aejong 13 (1413)/11/3 (*kimyo*).
24. The above officials, from Yi Hyŏn down, are discussed by Im Sŏnbin, “Chosŏn ch'ogi kwihwain,” 68–80.
25. *T'aejong sillok* 8:4b–5b, T'aejong 4 (1404)/8/20 (*kich'uk*).
26. *Sejong sillok* 93:21a, Sejong 23 (1441)/8/11 (*ŭrhae*).
27. *Sejong sillok* 36:5a, Sejong 9 (1427)/4/16 (*kapsul*); *Sejong sillok* 93:23a–23b, Sejong 23 (1441)/8/22 (*pyŏngsul*). *Sejong sillok* 94:8a–8b, Sejong 23 (1441)/10/22 (*ŭryu*); Pak Chongyŏn, “Chosŏn ch'ogi kwihwa Chunggugŏ t'ongyŏkkwan,” 395–400.
28. Kenneth R. Robinson, “Centering the King of Chosŏn: Aspects of Korean Maritime Diplomacy, 1392–1592,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 59, no. 1 (February 2000): 109–125.
29. Peter D. Shapinsky, *Lords of the Sea: Pirates, Violence, and Commerce in Late Medieval Japan* (Ann Arbor: Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan, 2014).
30. John W. Chaffee, *The Muslim Merchants of Premodern China: The History of a Maritime Asian Trade Diaspora, 750–1400* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 162–180.
31. See Gregory Smits, *Maritime Ryukyu, 1050–1650* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2019); Akamine Mamoru, *The Ryukyu Kingdom: Cornerstone of East Asia*, trans. Lina Terrell (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2017), 20–57.
32. Benjamin Harrison Hazard, “Japanese Marauding in Medieval Korea: The Wakō Impact on Late Koryŏ,” PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1967; Kim Pohan, “Kamak'ura Waegu wa Muromach'i Waegu ūi sŏnggyŏk kwa kū chuch'e yŏn'gu,” *Han-Il kwan'gyesa yŏn'gu* 52 (December 2015): 61–89; Yun Sŏngik, “Chosŏn ch'o Myŏng ŭro ūi Waegu ch'imgu chŏngbo chegong e taehan Chosŏn ūi t'aedo—1419 nyŏn ūi sagŏn ūl chungsim ŭro,” *Tongguk sahak* 54 (June 2013): 245–277; Tanaka Takeo, *Wakō: Umi no rekishi* (Tōkyō: Hanbai Kyōikusha Shuppan Sābisu, 1982); Yi Yŏng, *Waegu wa Koryŏ. Ilbon kwan'gyesa* (Seoul: Hyeon, 2011).
33. Han Munjong, “Chosŏn ch'ogi Waegu taech'aek kwa Taemado chŏngbŏl,” *Chŏn-buk sahak* 19/20 (1997): 155–177.
34. Kenneth R. Robinson, “Centering the King of Chosŏn.”
35. Kenneth R. Robinson, “An Island's Place in History”; Chŏng Taham, “Chosŏn ch'ogi yain kwa Taemado e taehan pŏlli pŏnbyŏng insik ūi hyŏngsŏng kwa kyŏngch'agwan p'agyŏn,” *Tonghang hakchi* 141 (March 2008): 221–226.
36. Remco Breuker, “Narratives of Inauthenticity, Impurity, and Disorder. Or: How Forgeries, Half-castes, and Hooligans Shaped Pre-modern Korean History,” *Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies* 11, no. 2 (October 2011): 183–208.
37. Ch'oe Chaejin, “Koryŏ mal Tongbungmyŏn ūi t'ongch'i wa Yi Sŏnggye seryŏk sŏngjang—Ssangŏng ch'ongggwanbu Subok ihu rŭl chungsim ŭro,” *Sahakchi* 26 (1993): 179–180.
38. *Koryŏsa* 43, Kongmin wang 20 (1371)/2/20 (*kapsul*).
39. Kim Kujin, “Chosŏn ch'ogi e Hanminjok ŭro tonghwa toen t'och'ak Yŏjin,” *Paek-san hakpo* 58 (2001): 139–180.

40. Kenneth R. Robinson, "From Raiders to Traders: Border Security and Border Control in Early Chosŏn, 1392–1450," *Korean Studies* 16 (January 1992): 94–115.

41. Nam Ŭihyŏn, "Wŏnmal Myŏngch'ŏ Chosŏn, Myŏng ŭi Yodong changt'alchŏn kwa kukkyŏng punjaeng koch'al," *Han-Il kwan'gyesa yŏn'gu* 42 (August 2012): 82–111.

42. Morris Rossabi, "The Ming and Inner Asia," in *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 8, pt. 2: *The Ming Dynasty: 1368–1644*, ed. Denis Twitchett and Frederick W. Mote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 258–262.

43. *T'aejong sillok* 35:45a, T'aejong 18 (1418)/5/4 (*kyech'uk*); *T'aejong sillok* 7:20b–21b, T'aejong 4 (1404)/5/19 (*kimi*). See Kim Kujin, "Chosŏn ch'ogi e Hanminjok ŭro tonghwa toen t'och'ak Yŏjin." Pak Wŏnho, *Myŏngch'ŏ Chosŏn kwan'gyesa yŏn'gu* (Seoul: Iljogak, 2002), 170–175.

44. Pak Wŏnho, *Myŏngch'ŏ Chosŏn kwan'gyesa yŏn'gu*, 179–180; Clark, "Sino-Korean Tributary Relations under the Ming," 286–289.

45. *Yŏnsan'gun ilgi* 19:4a–5a, Yŏnsan 2 (1496)/11/2 (*ŭlsa*); Sŏngjong sillok 153:23a, Sŏngjong 14 (1483)/4/25 (*chŏnghae*); Kawachi Yoshihiro, *Mindai jioshinshi no kengkyū* (Kyōto: Dōhōsa, 1992), 390–394; Han Sŏngju, *Chosŏn chŏn'gi sujik Yŏjinin yŏn'gu* (Seoul: Kyŏngin munhwasa, 2011), 130–143.

46. For Möngke Timur and Li Manchu, see Pak Wŏnho, *Myŏngch'ŏ Chosŏn kwan'gyesa yŏn'gu*, 169–232, and Clark, "Sino-Korean Tributary Relations under the Ming," 286–289. Clark, however, largely restricts his discussion of the Chosŏn-Ming-Jurchen relationship to the period before 1467, and thus, perhaps unwittingly, exaggerates the extent to which Chosŏn influence over the Jurchens receded during the sixteenth centuries.

47. Pak Chŏngmin, *Chosŏn sidae Yŏjinin naejo yŏn'gu* (Seoul: Kŏngin munhwasa, 2015), 112.

48. Kawachi, *Mindai jioshinshi no kengkyū*, 126–130, 372–374.

49. Kawachi, *Mindai jioshinshi no kengkyū*, 637–656.

50. Adam Bohnet, "Debating Tumen Valley Jurchens during the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries," *Korean Studies* 39 (December 2015): 23–44; Han Sŏngju, "Chosŏn ŭi tae Yŏjinin kwan'gye wa 6 chin chiyŏk saram tŭl," *Han-Il kwan'gyesa yŏn'gu* 49 (2014): 3–42.

51. Chŏng Taham, "Chosŏn ch'ogi yain kwa Taemado e taehan pŏlli pŏnbyŏng insik."

52. Han Sŏngju, *Chosŏn chŏn'gi sujik Yŏjinin*, 117–152.

53. Yu Chaech'un, "Chosŏn chŏn'gi wisa palsaeng yoin e tachayŏ," in *Waegu. Wisa munje wa Han-Il kwan'gye*, ed. Han-Il kwan'gyesa yŏn'gu nonjip p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe (Seoul: Kyŏngin munhwasa, 2005), 202–220; Han Munjong, "Chosŏn chŏn'gi waein t'ongjech'aek kwa t'onggyo wibanja ŭi ch'ŏri," in *Waegu. Wisa munje wa Han-Il kwan'gye*, 223–259; Sin Tonggyu, "Chosŏn wangjo sillok sok ŭi Ilbon kugwangsa wa wisa," *Waegu. Wisa munje wa Han-Il kwan'gye*, 261–297; Yi Hun, "Yugu kugwangsa wa wisa," *Waegu. Wisa munje wa Han-Il kwan'gye*, 299–322; Kenneth R. Robinson, "Violence, Trade and Imposters in Korean-Japanese Relations, 1510–1609," in *The East Asian War, 1592–1598*, ed. James B. Lewis (Abingdon, NY: Routledge, 2015), 42–69; Yonetani

Hiroshi, “16 seiki Nitchō kankei ni okeru gishi haken no kōzō to jitai,” *Rekishigaku kenkyū* 697, no. 5 (1997): 1–18.

54. Kenneth R. Robinson, “Violence, Trade and Imposters,” 56–57; Sin Tonggyu, “*Chosŏn wangjo sillok* sok ūi Ilbon kugwangsa wa wisa,” 269–278.

55. Kenneth R. Robinson, “Residence and Foreign Relations in Peninsular Northeast Asia during the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries,” in *The Northern Region of Korea: History, Identity, and Culture*, ed. Sun Joo Kim (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010), 18–36.

56. Han Munjong, “Chosŏn chŏn’gi ūi Yōjinin chŏptae wa yŏak,” *Han-Il kwan’gyesa yŏn’gu* 36 (August 2010): 39–65.

57. For instance, *Munjong sillok* 10:2a, Munjong 1 (1451)/10/3 (*mujin*); *Sejong sillok* 3:1a, Sejong 1 (1419)/1/1 (*pyŏngŏ*).

58. See Kuwano Eiji, “Chōsen seisodai no girei to ōken taimin yohai girei to kankyudansaishi o chūshin ni,” *Kurume daigaku bungakubu kiyō. Kokusai bunka gakkahen* 19 (March 2002): 89–114.

59. Kenneth R. Robinson, “Organizing Japanese and Jurchens in Tribute Systems in Early Chosŏn Korea,” *Journal of East Asian Studies* 13 (2013): 337–360.

60. *T’aejo sillok* 2:17a, T’aejo 1 (1392)/12/16 (*imsul*).

61. *Sejo sillok* 8:25a, Sejo 3 (1457)/7/29 (*kyŏngin*).

62. Pak Chŏngmin, *Chosŏn sidae Yōjinin naejo*, 102–103.

63. Hasumi Moriyashi, *Mindai Ryōtō to Chōsen* (Tōkyō: Kyūko shoin, 2014), 357–378.

64. See Kuwano Eiji, “Chōsen seisodai no girei.”

65. Chŏn Haejong, “Kwihwa e taehan sogo—tongyang kodaesa e issōsō k ū ūiui,” *Paeksan hakpo* 12 (1972): 1–25.

66. Donald S. Sutton, “Ethnicity and the Miao Frontier in the Eighteenth Century,” in *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity and Frontier in Early Modern China*, ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 190–228, especially 195–196.

67. A standard work, and general survey, on the subject is Pak Okkŏl, *Koryŏ sidae ūi kwihwain yŏn’gu* (Seoul: Kukhak charyowŏn, 1996).

68. *Kyŏngguk taejŏn chuhae*, entry for “hyanghwa” within the “Suse” [taxation] section in the *Hojŏn* [regulations concerning finance] chapter, in the “hujip” (second volume).

69. Han Munjong, *Chosŏn chŏn’gi hyanghwa sujik waein yŏn’gu* (Seoul: Kukhak charyowŏn, 2001), 99–113.

70. *Yŏnsang-gun ilgi* 24:1a, Yŏnsan 3 (1497)/6/1 (*sinmi*).

71. Duncan, “Hwanghwain”; Sŏ Kŭnsik, “Chosŏn sidae hyanghwa kaenyŏm e taehan yŏn’gu—*Chosŏn wangjo sillok* ūl chungsim ūro,” *Tongyang kojŏn yŏn’gu* 37 (Dec. 2009): 7–31.

72. *Kyŏngguk taejŏn*, entry for “hyangha” within the “Suse” [taxation] section in the *Hojŏn* [regulations concerning finance] chapter.

73. *Sejong sillok* 85:36a–36b, Sejong 21 (1439)/5/29 (*pyŏngja*).

74. *Sŏngjong sillok* 207:4a–4b, Sŏngjong 18 (1487)/9/7 (*kyemi*).

75. Paek Okkyŏng, “Chosŏn chŏn’gi e hwaldonghan Chunggugin ijumin e taehan koch’al,” *Han’guk munhwa yŏn’gu* 16 (June 2009), 201–203; Paek uses for evidence the fact that during the early seventeenth century Liaodongese refugees were not classed as submitting-foreigners. Kyung-koo Han and No Hyegyŏng use as their evidence the fact that during the mid-eighteenth century the Chosŏn court specifically forbade the use of the term. See Han, “The Archaeology of the Ethnically Homogeneous Nation-State”; No Hyegyŏng, “Yŏngjodae hwangjoin.” Kimura Takao differs in his discussion of later periods, but otherwise follows the above arguments for the early Chosŏn. See Kimura, “Chōsen ō chō Yonjo niyoriu kajin shison sōshutsu no hakei,” 31–32.

76. For instance, *Sejong sillok* 150: 9a.

77. *Sŏngjong sillok* 282:9b–10a, Sŏngjong 24 (1493)/9/11 (*imin*).

78. Im Sŏnbin, “Chosŏn ch’ogi kwihwain,” 68–80.

79. *T’aejong Sillok* 12:36b, T’aejong 6 (1406)/12/9 (*kabo*).

80. *T’aejo sillok* 7:6b, T’aejo 4 (1395)/3/9 (*imin*); *T’aejong sillok* 29: 18a, T’aejong 15 (1415)/4/11 (*muin*); *Sejong sillok* 84: 21b, Sejong 21 (1439)/yun2/2 (*kyŏngjin*).

81. *Sejong sillok* 84:21b, Sejong 21 (1439)/yun2/2 (*kyŏngjin*).

82. *T’aejo sillok* 13:5a, T’aejo 7 (1398)/2/16 (*kyesa*).

83. Kim Chŏngwi, “Koryŏ mal Hoegorin ūi kwihwa wa Isŭllam ūi Hanbando tŭng-jang,” *Paeksan hakpo* 91 (December 2011): 117–241.

84. Chaffee, *The Muslim Merchants of Premodern China*, 162–180.

85. *T’aejong sillok* 29:35a, T’aejong 15 (1415)/5/25 (*sinyu*).

86. *T’aejong sillok* 13:3a, T’aejong 7 (1407)/1/17 (*imsin*); *T’aejong sillok* 23:14b, T’aejong 12 (1412)/2/24 (*kimyo*); *T’aejong sillok* 23:21a, T’aejong 12 (1412)/3/29 (*kyech’uk*); *T’aejong sillok* 26:4b, T’aejong 13 (1413)/7/16 (*kyesa*).

87. Murai Shōsuke, *Chūsei Wajin den* (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1993), 85.

88. Lewis, *Frontier Contact*, 195–196.

89. *Sejong sillok* 82:2b, Sejong 20 (1438)/7/7 (*kich’uk*). At this point, Hamgyŏng was referred to as Hamgil.

90. Han Sŏngju, *Chosŏn sidae pŏnho yŏn’gu* (Seoul: Kyŏng’in munhwasa, 2018), 66–67.

91. *Sejong sillok* 59:53b, Sejong 15 (1433)/3/23 (*pyŏngja*). See below for Ryukyuan boat-builders.

92. Wŏn Ch’angae, “Hyanghwain ūi Chosŏn chŏngch’ak sarye yŏn’gu—Yŏjin hyanghwain ūl chungsim ūro,” *Tongyang kojŏn yŏn’gu* 37 (December 2009), 46–52.

93. *Sejong sillok* 78:27a, Sejong 19 (1437)/8/7 (*kapcha*).

94. Wŏn Ch’angae, “Hyanghwain ūi Chosŏn chŏngch’ak,” 42–49.

95. *T’aejong sillok* 25:29b, T’aejong 13 (1413)/6/9 (*pyŏngjin*).

96. Wŏn Ch’angae, “Hyanghwain ūi Chosŏn chŏngch’ak,” 45–49. At this point, Hamgyŏng was called Hamgil.

97. Han Munjong, *Chosŏn chŏn’gi hyanghwa sujik Waein*, 91–102.

98. Han Munjong, *Chosŏn chŏn’gi hyanghwa sujik Waein*, 105–132.

99. Han Munjong, “Chosŏn ch’ogi hyanghwa Waein P’i Sangsŏn ūi tae-Il kyosŏp hwaldong,” *Han-Il kwan’gyesa yŏn’gu* 51 (August 2015): 7–94.

100. *Yönsan-gun ilgi* 16:15a, Yönsan 2 (1496)/7/23 (*mujin*).
101. Han Söngju, “Chosön Yönsan’gun dae Tong Ch’öngnye üi Kōnju samwi p’agyön e tachayö,” *Manju yön’gu* 14 (December 2012): 7–35.
102. Kwön Yöngnan, “Chosön chön’gi tae Yöjin chöngch’aek kwa Yöjin kwi hwain Tong Ch’öngnye,” *Yöksa wa hyönsil* 62 (April 2017): 77–115.
103. For a discussion of such marriages, see Paek Okkyöng, “Chosön chön’gi hyanghwain e tachan honin kyujöng kwa yösöng,” *Yöksabak yön’gu* 34 (October 2008): 42–65.
104. *Sejong sillok* 36:1a, Sejong 9 (1427)/4/4 (*imsul*).
105. *Sejong sillok* 61:42a, Sejong 15 (1433)/yun8/18 (*mujin*).
106. *Sejong sillok* 63:31a, Sejong 16 (1434)/3/20 (*chöngyu*); *Sejong sillok* 65:31a, Sejong 16 (1434)/9/26 (*kyöngja*); *Tanjong sillok* 6:39a, Tanjong 1 (1453)/6/8 (*kyesa*).
107. *Sejong sillok* 70:4a, Sejong 17 (1435)/10/24 (*imsul*).
108. *Sejong sillok* 80:18a, Sejong 20 (1438)/1/28 (*kyech’uk*). Yattae could also be romanized Yajiltae, however, the *chil* here likely represents the *sai siot*.
109. Paek Okkyöng, “Chosön chön’gi hyanghwain,” 57.
110. Lewis, *Frontier Contact*, 194. *Sejong sillok* 41:13a–13b, Sejong 10 (1428)/9/3 (*imja*).
111. *Sejong sillok* 81:25b, Sejong 20 (1438)/6/29 (*sinsa*).
112. *Sejo sillok* 40:11a, Sejo 12 (1466)/11/2 (*kyönggo*).
113. Paek Okkyöng, “Chosön chön’gi hyanghwain,” 53.
114. Paek Okkyöng, “Chosön chön’gi hyanghwain,” 56.
115. Pak Ch’anghüi, trans., *Yöckchu Yongbiöch’ön ka* (Söngnam: Han’gukhak chun-gang yön’guwön, 2015), 2:273–279.
116. *Chungjong sillok* 52:42a, Chungjong 19 (1524)/12/14 (*kapchin*).
117. *Chungjong sillok* 52:43b–44a, Chungjong 19 (1524)/12/15 (*ülsa*).
118. *Chungjong sillok* 52:44b, Chungjong 19 (1524)/12/18 (*musin*).
119. *Chungjong sillok* 40:35a, Chungjong 15 (1520)/9/17 (*sinmi*).
120. Han Munjong, *Chosön chön’gi hyanghwa sujik*, 58–60.
121. Murai Shösuke, “Wakō to wa dareka: Juyon, jugo seiki no Chōsen hantō wo chūshin ni,” *Tōhōgaku* 119 (2010): 2–3; Rawski, *Early Modern China and Northeast Asia*, 41–42; *Sejong sillok* 93:6b, Sejong 23 (1441)/6/25 (*kich’uk*); *Tanjong sillok* 13:27b, Tanjong 3 (1455)/2/20 (*pyöngsin*).
122. Kenneth R. Robinson, “Policies of Practicality: The Chosön Court’s Regulation of Contact with Japanese and Jurchens, 1392–1580s” (PhD diss., University of Hawai‘i, 1997), 324–334.
123. Tamara T. Chin, “Antiquarian as Ethnographer: Han Ethnicity in Early China Studies,” in *Critical Han Studies: The History, Representation and Identity of China’s Majority*, ed. Thomas S. Mullaney et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 130–134.
124. *Söngjong sillok* 153:21b–23b, Söngjong 14 (1483)/4/25 (*chönghae*).
125. *Chungjong sillok* 47:48b–49a, Chungjong 18 (1523)/yun 4/17 (*chöngsa*).
126. *Chungjong sillok* 54:6b–7a, Chungjong 20 (1525)/4/5 (*kabo*).

127. Shao-yun Yang, “What Do Barbarians Know of Gratitude?—The Stereotype of Barbarian Perfidy and Its Uses in Tang Foreign Policy Rhetoric,” *Tang Studies* 21 (2013): 28–74.
128. *Sejo sillok* 16:1b–2b, Sejo 5 (1459)/4/8 (*kimi*).
129. Han Sŏngju, “Chosŏn Myŏngjongdae ūi Chosŏn ibuk chiyŏk ūi chi sŏlch’i sido,” *Han-Il kwan’gyesa hakpo* 42 (August 2012): 172.
130. Bohnet, “Debating Tumen Valley Jurchens,” 23–44.
131. *T’aejong sillok* 3:20b, T’aejong 2 (1402)/4/9 (*sin’yu*).

Chapter 2: Civilizing Barbarians and Rebellious Allies

1. Han Munjong, “Korea’s Pre-war Domestic Situation and Relations with Japan,” in *The East Asian War, 1592–1598*, ed. James B. Lewis (Abingdon, NY: Routledge, 2015), 33–37; Yi Minung, “The Role of the Chosŏn Navy and Major Naval Battles during the Imjin War,” in *The East Asian War, 1592–1598*, 122.
2. Kenneth M. Swope, *A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail: Ming China and the First Great East Asian War, 1592–1598* (Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 2009), 5.
3. Book-length surveys of the war include Kenneth M. Swope, *A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent Tail*, and Samuel Hawley, *The Imjin War: Japan’s Sixteenth-Century Invasion of Korea and Attempt to Conquer China* (Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, 2005). While both may be consulted for the broad outline of the war, they both are limited in their selection of primary sources. See Nam-lin Hur, “Works in English on the Imjin War and the Challenge of Research,” *International Journal of Korean History* 18, no. 2 (2013): 53–80.
4. See Ch’oe Yŏnghŭi, *Imjin waeran chung ūi sahoe tongt’ae—ūibyŏngŭl chungsim ūro* (Seoul: Han’guk yŏn’guwŏn, 1975), 82–105.
5. Han Myŏnggi, *Imjin waeran kwa Han-Jung kwan’gye* (Seoul: Yŏksa pip’yŏngsa, 1999), 145–152; Yonetani Hitoshi, “Kinsei Nitcho kankei ni okeru sensō horyo no sōkan,” *Rekishi hyōron* 595 (November 1999): 28–41.
6. See Swope, *A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail*, 4–5 and 381.
7. A discussion of traders in Chosŏn may be found in Han Myŏnggi, *Imjin waeran kwa Han-Jung kwan’gye*, 98–105. For more recent work, see Masato Hasegawa “War, Supply Lines, and Society in the Sino-Korean Borderland of the Late Sixteenth Century,” *Late Imperial China* 37, no. 1 (June 2016): 109–152.
8. Such is the population estimate made by Tony Michell, “Fact and Hypothesis in Yi Dynasty Economic History: The Demographic Dimension,” *Korean Studies Forum*, no. 6 (Winter–Spring 1979–80): 77–79. Also see table on 71–72. An alternate figure is suggested by Kwŏn T’achwan and Sin Yongha, “Chosŏn wangjo sidae ūi in’gu ch’ujin ūi kwanhan il siron,” *Tonga munhwa* 14 (1977): 289–330, who see the population as peaking at 14,095,000 in 1591, declining to 11,791,000 by 1599, and continuing to fall during the early seventeenth century (especially see table on 324–328).

9. Mary Elizabeth Berry, *Hideyoshi* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).
10. Kenneth R. Robinson, "Violence, Trade and Imposters," in *The East Asian War, 1592–1598*, 42–69.
11. Lewis, *Frontier Contact*, 32–33.
12. Yi Sugwang, *Chibong yusöl*, trans. Na Mansöng (Seoul: Üryu munhwasa, 1994), 1:80.
13. Work on this subject includes Han Munjong, "Imnan'gi Hangwae üi t'uhang kwa paegyöng kwa yökhal," *Inmun kwahak yön'gu* 36 (March 2013): 324–325; Han Munjong, *Chosön chön'gi hyanghwa. Sujik Waein yön'gu* (Seoul: Kukhak charyowön, 2001), 133–173; Che Changmyöng, "Imjin waeran sigi Hangwae yuch'i wa hwaryong," *Yöksa wa segye* 32 (December 2007): 95–122; Yi Changhüi, "Imnansi t'uyök Waebyöng e taehayö," *Han'guksa yön'gu* 6 (September 1971): 247–264; Kim Munja, "Imnansi hangwae munje," in *Imjin Waeran kwa Han-Il kwan'gye*, ed. Han-Il Kwan'gyesa Yön'gu Nonjip P'yönch'an Wiwönhoe (Seoul: Kyöngin Munhwasa, 2005), 327–367. My selection of primary sources benefited enormously from the earlier work by these authors.
14. Han Munjong, "Imnan'gi Hangwae," 324–325.
15. *Sönjo sillok* 71:47a, Sönjo 29 (1596)/1/30 (*chöngyu*).
16. *Sönjo sillok* 88:26a, Sönjo 30 (1597)/5/18 (*musin*).
17. Han Munjong, "Imnan'gi Hangwae," 326–336.
18. *Sönjo sillok* 81:36b, Sönjo 31 (1597)/4/21 (*sinsa*).
19. *Sönjo sillok* 41:59b, Sönjo 26 (1593)/8/30 (*sinhae*).
20. Han Munjong, *Chosön chön'gi hyanghwa*, 133–137.
21. *Sönjo sillok* 50:17, Sönjo 27 (1594)/4/17 (*ülch'uk*).
22. *Sönjo sillok* 55:4b, Sönjo 27 (1594)/9/4 (*kimyo*).
23. Kitajima Manji, "Nanjung ilgi e poinün Hangwae e taehayö," in *Imjin waeran kwa Chölla chwasuyöng kürido Kōbüksön*, ed. Yösu haeyang munhwa yön'guso and Han-Il kwan'gyesahakhoe (Seoul: Kyöngin munhwasa, 2011), 16–18.
24. *Sönjo sillok* 54:1b, Sönjo 27 (1594)/8/2 (*chöngmi*).
25. Han Munjong, *Chosön chön'gi hyanghwa*, 160–163.
26. *Sönjo sillok* 88:25a–26b, Sönjo 30 (1597)/5/18 (*musin*).
27. Kitajima Manji, "Nanjung ilgi e poinün Hangwae," 15–16.
28. *Sönjo sillok* 86:18b, Sönjo 30 (1597)/3/4 (*pyöngo*).
29. Han Mujong, *Chosön chön'gi hyanghwa*, 154–157.
30. *Sönjo sillok* 56:25a, Sönjo 27 (1594)/10/11 (*ülmyo*).
31. Nam-lin Hur, "The Celestial Warriors: Ming Military Aid and Abuse during the Imjin War," in *The East Asian War, 1592–1598*, 239–245; *Ming Shenzong xianhuangdi shilu* 250:4648–4649, Wanli 20 (1592)/7/3 (*gengshen*).
32. Han Myönggi, *Imjin waeran kwa Han-Jung kwan'gye*, 125–184; Nam-lin Hur, "The Celestial Warriors," 244–250.
33. Yi Changhüi, *Imjin waeransa yön'gu* (Seoul: Asea munhwasa, 1999), 245–250.
34. Han Myönggi, "Chaejo chi ün kwa Chosön hugi chöngch'isa—Imjin waeran Chöngjo sigi rül chungsim üro," *Taedong munhwa yön'gu* 59 (September 2007): 191–230.

35. Sajima Akiko, “Hideyoshi’s View of Chosŏn Korea and Japan-Ming Negotiations,” in *The East Asian War, 1592–1598*, 11–21; Han Myŏnggi, *Imjin waeran kwa Han-Jung kwan’gye*, 42–67.

36. As Im Ch’ŏrho points out in *Sŏrhwa wa minjung ūi yŏksa ūisik—Imjin waeran sŏrhwa chungsim ūro* (Seoul: Chimmundang, 1989), 79–113, descriptions of Li Rusong in the *Record of the Imjin War* vary quite widely, with some describing him uncomplicatedly as a hero, others suggesting doubt through description of his family background or his geomantic vandalism, and some oral traditions collected during the twentieth century suggesting extreme sexual misdeeds on his part.

37. Joshua Van Lieu, “A Farce That Wounds Both High and Low: The Guan Yu Cult in Chosŏn-Ming Relations,” *Journal of Korean Religions* 5, no. 2 (October 2014): 39–70.

38. Discussed in detail by Han Myŏnggi, *Imjin Waeran kwa Han-Jung Kwan’gye*, 152–155. Hwang Paek kang, *Imjin waeran kwa silgi munhak* (Seoul: Ilchisa, 1992), 60–61 and 107, includes hostile descriptions of Ming soldiers and deserters recorded in diaries by Chosŏn officials.

39. *Sŏnjo sillok* 136:12a–b, Sŏnjo 34 (1601)/4/14 (*sinsa*).

40. The process by which righteous guerrillas became rebels or brigands is discussed by Ch’oe Yŏnghŭi, *Imjin waeran chung ūi sahoe tongt’ae*, 128–164, esp. 154–157, while Yi Changhŭi, *Imjin waeransa yŏn’gu*, 315–361, discusses general popular unrest during this period.

41. “Nanjung chamnok,” “Sŏnjo kosa ponmal,” in *Yŏllyŏsil kisul* 17, *Kukyŏk Yŏllyŏsil kisul* 4:336.

42. *Sŏnjo sillok* 142:10a–b, Sŏnjo 34 (1601)/10/19 (*kyemi*).

43. Han Myŏnggi, *Imjin waeran kwa Han-Jung kwan’gye*, 152–156. In general, my selection of primary sources for this section owes a great deal to Han Myŏnggi’s work.

44. *Sŏnjo sillok* 72:5b–6a, Sŏnjo 29 (1596)/2/14 (*sinhae*). See Han Myŏnggi, *Imjin Waeran kwa Han-Jung kwan’gye*, 154.

45. *Sŏnjo sillok* 133:20a–b, Sŏnjo 34/6/21 (*kabo*).

46. Han Myŏnggi, “Imjin waeran sigi Myŏnggun tomangbyŏng munje e tachan ilgo,” *Han’gukhak yŏn’gu* 44 (February 2017): 474–478.

47. Kim Tugyu, *Chosŏn p’ungsu hagin ūi saengae wa nonjaeng* (Seoul: Kungni, 2000), 318–343.

48. Yi Sibal, “Chŭng Tusach’ung,” in *Pyŏgo yugo* 2:25a.

49. *Sŏnjo sillok* 56:11a–b, Sŏnjo 27 (1594)/10/8 (*imja*).

50. *Sŏnjo sillok* 54:31a, Sŏnjo 27 (1594)/8/25 (*kyŏngo*).

51. *Sŏnjo sillok* 109:16a, Sŏnjo 32 (1599)/2/8 (*muo*).

52. *Sŏnjo sillok* 136:12a–b, Sŏnjo 34 (1601)/4/14 (*sinsa*).

53. *Sŏnjo sillok* 55:17a, Sŏnjo 27 (1594)/9/13 (*muja*).

54. Yi Sugwang, *Chibong yusŏl* 2:354.

55. Cho Kyŏngnam, *Nanjung chamnok*, book 6, fr. 16, Kyujanggak # kyu 6586-v.1–16 [1594 (*kabo*)/8/2].

56. *Sŏnjo sillok* 41:13a–b, Sŏnjo 26 (1593)/8/6 (*chŏnghae*).

57. *Sŏnjo sillok* 147:13a–b, Sŏnjo 35 (1602)/yun2/23 (*pyŏngjin*); *Kwanghae-gun ilgi chungch'obon* 6:50a, Kwanghae 1 (1609)/4/5 (*pyŏngjin*). It is not clear that either order was carried out—certainly, the fact that the order was made more than once suggests that the first was not successfully carried out.

58. *Sŏnjo sillok* 109:2a, Sŏnjo 32 (1599)/2/1 (*sinhae*).

59. *Sŏnjo sillok* 109:21a–b, Sŏnjo 32 (1599)/2/12 (*imsul*); *Sŏnjo sillok* 109:23b–24a, Sŏnjo 32 (1599)/2/14 (*kapcha*).

60. Yi Hwang is often known by his sobriquet T'oegye.

61. Kang Hang, *A Korean War Captive in Japan, 1597–1600*, ed. Jahyun Kim Haboush and Kenneth R. Robinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 64–65.

62. *Sŏnjo sillok* 71:47a, Sŏnjo 29 (1595)/1/30 (*chŏngyu*).

63. *Sŏnjo sillok* 92:9a–9b, Sŏnjo 30 (1597)/9/8 (*ŭlmi*).

64. The compilers of *The Revised Veritable Records of Sŏnjo* specifically note that this memorial was left out of the original *Veritable Records of Sŏnjo* by its Kwanghae-gun-era editors.

65. *Sŏnjo sujŏng sillok* 36:2b, Sŏnjo 35 (1602)/yun2/ 1 (*kabo*).

66. *Sŏnjo sillok* 154:13b–14a, Sŏnjo 35 (1602)/9/25 (*kapsin*).

67. *Sŏnjo sujŏng sillok* 34:2a, Sŏnjo 36 (1603)/5/1 (*pyŏngjin*).

68. *Honjŏng p'yŏllok* 7, in *Kukyŏk Taedong yasŭng* (Seoul: Minjok munhwa ch'ujinhoe, 1971), vol. 16. Korean translation is on page 525, Classical Chinese original is on 114.

69. Kim T'ak, *Chosŏn ŭi yeŏn sasang* (Sŏngnam: Pukk'oria, 2016), 1:179–181.

70. For other examples of political score settling in the *Kwanghae-gun ilgi*, as well as the elimination of evidence exculpatory to Kwanghae-gun and his supporters, see Han Myŏnggi, *Imjin waeran kwa Han-Jung kwan'gye*, 310–311; Han Myŏnggi, *Kwanghae-gun: T'agwŏrhan oegyo chŏngch'aek ŭl p'yŏlch'in kunju* (Seoul: Yŏksa pip'yŏngsa, 2000), 20–26.

71. *Kwanghae-gun ilgi, chungch'obon* 34:5a, Kwanghae 7 (1615)/10/5 (*musin*). Note also that Shi Wenyong is written Shi Wenlong in this text.

72. For instance, *Kwanghae-gun ilgi* 39.67b, Kwanghae 9 (1617)/3/19 (*kapsin*) and *Kwanghae-gun ilgi* 40.60a, Kwanghae 9 (1617)/6/21 (*kabin*).

73. *Kwanghae-gun ilgi* 64:64a, Kwanghae 15 (1623)/3/14 (*kapchin*).

74. Lewis, *Frontier Contact*.

Chapter 3: Border Peoples and Flexible Loyalties in Chosŏn during the Seventeenth Century

1. Giovanni Stary, “The Meaning of the Word ‘Manchu’—A New Solution to an Old Problem,” *Central Asiatic Journal* 34, no. 1/2 (1990): 109–119.

2. Frederick E. Wakeman Jr., *The Great Enterprise* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Gertraude Roth Li, “State Building before 1644,” in *Cambridge History of China: Part 1, The Ch'ing Empire to 1800*, ed. Denis Twitchet and Frederick W.

Mote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 9–72; Gertraude Roth, “The Manchu-Chinese Relationship, 1618–1636,” in *From Ming to Ch’ing: Conquest, Region, and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century China*, ed. Jonathan D. Spence and John E. Wills, Jr. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 1–38; Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, 129–176; Elliott, *The Manchu Way*, 39–88.

3. Han Myōnggi, *Imjin waeran kwa Han-Jung kwan’gye*, 244–304.

4. Han Myōnggi, *Imjin waeran kwa Han-Jung kwan’gye*, 353–373.

5. There are currently two excellent works concerning the Pyōngja invasion in Korean. There is a narrative history, namely Han Myōnggi, *Pyōngja horan* (Seoul: P’urūn yōksa, 2013), and a close analysis of the invasion from the Qing perspective, namely Ku Pōmjīn, *Pyōngja horan—Hong Taiji ūi chōnjaeng* (Seoul: Kkach’i kūl’bang, 2019). The only extensive discussion of the war in English is in Evelyn S. Rawski, *Early Modern China and Northeast Asia*.

6. Kim Kyōngmi, “Sohyōn seja ūi ‘Ch’ōng’ ch’ehōm kwa munhwa suyong, *Han’guk munhwa yōn’gu* 10 (June 2006): 133–167; Hō T’aegu, “Sohyōn seja ūi Simyang ōngnyu wa injil ch’ehōm,” *Han’guk sasangsahak* 40 (April 2012): 1226–9441; Nam Ūn’gyōng, “*Simyang ilgi yōn’gu*: Sohyōn seja, Pongmim taegun ūi Simyang ch’ehōm chungsim ūro,” *Tongyang kojōn yōn’gu* 22 (June 2005): 31–60.

7. Kye Sūngbōm, *Chosōn sidae haeoe p’abyōng kwa Han-Jung kwan’gye: Chosōn chibaech’ūng ūi Chungguk insik* (Seoul: P’urūn yōksa, 2009), 215–240.

8. Geoffrey Parker, *Global Crisis: War, Climate Change, and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013).

9. Chōng T’aesōp, “Pukkwan taech’ōp kwallyōn saryo ūi chaegōmt’o pon Chōng Munbu ūibyōnggun injōk kusōng,” *Myōng-Ch’ōng Sahak* 27 (April 2007), Ogūmsōng kyosu Chōngnyōn kinyōm t’ūkchip ho, 153–188.

10. Chang Chōngsu, “Sōnjodae tae Yōjin pangō chōllyak ūi pyōnhwa kwajōng kwa ūimi,” *Chosōn sidae sahak po* 67 (December 2013): 169–213; Sō Pyōngguk, *Sōnjo sidae Yōjik kyosōpsa yōn’gu* (Seoul: Kyomunsa, 1969), 66–133.

11. *Sōnjo sillok* 115:26a–b, Sōnjo 32 (1599)/7/27(*kapsul*).

12. Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, 139; Gertraude Roth-Li, “State Building before 1644,” 272–300.

13. For a survey of these developments, see Gertraude Roth Li, “State Building before 1644,” 9–72.

14. Kim Chuwōn, “Yōjinjok ch’ujang Hajiri ūi Silloksang p’yogi e taehayō,” *Inmun nonch’ong* 64 (2010): 51–74.

15. Chang Chōngsu, “Sōnjodae tae Yōjin pangō,” 182–190.

16. Kim Siyang, *Kwanbuk kimun*, in *Taedong p’aerim*, comp. Sim Nosung (Seoul: Kukhak charyowon, 1997), 22:508–565.

17. *Qing Shilu*, vol. 1, “Manzhou Shilu” (Taipei: Hualian chubanshe, 1964), 130–131. Entry for the ninth month of 1593.

18. *Sōnjo sillok* 167:13a–13b, Sōnjo 36 (1603)/10/25 (*musin*).

19. Chang Chōngsu, “Sōnjodae tae Yōjin pangō,” 190–197.

20. Inaba Iwakichi, *Kōkaikun jidai no Man-Sen kangkei* (reprinted by Asea Munhwa in Seoul, 1986), 50.

21. *Sŏnjo sillok* 71:46b, Sŏnjo 29 (1596)/1/30 (*chŏngyu*).

22. Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, 92–93.

23. *Sŏnjo sillok* 134:29a–b, Sŏnjo 34 (1601)/2/20 (*kich'uk*).

24. *Sŏnjo sujŏng sillok* 29–3b, Sŏnjo 28 (1595)/7/1 (*imsin*).

25. For the location of Fio-hoton, I follow Koryŏ Tachakkyo, Minjok Munhwa Yŏn'guwŏn, and Manju sillok Yŏkchuhoe, eds., *Manju sillok yŏkchu* (Seoul: Somyŏng Ch'ulp'an, 2014), 138.

26. *Manbun Rōtō (Tongki Fuka Sindaba Hergen i Dangse)*, trans. Kanda Nobuo (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1956), 1:4–5; *Qing Taizu chao lao Man wen yuan dang*, ed. Kwang Lu and Li Xuezhi (Taipei: Zhong yang yan jiu yuan li shi yu yan jiu suo, 1970–1971), 1:12–13; *Jiu Manzhou dang* (Taipei: National Palace Museum, 1969), 1:6–7; *Qing Shilu*, vol. 1, “Manzhou Shilu,” 130–131, entry for 1607; Inaba, *Kōkaikun jidai no Man-Sen kangkei*, 50–59.

27. Pamela Kyle Crossley, “Manzhou yuanliu kao and the Formalization of the Manchu Heritage,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 46, no. 4 (November 1987): 761–790; Joseph Fletcher, “The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 46, no. 1 (June 1986): 19–21; Elliott, *The Manchu Way*, 6 and 39–72.

28. Elliott, *The Manchu Way*, 56–63.

29. Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, 296–202.

30. *Manbun Rōtō* 1: 4–5; *Jiu Manzhou dang* 1: 6–7.

31. *Manbun Rōtō* 1:10; *Qing Taizu chao lao Man wen yuan dang* 1:19; *Jiu Manzhou dang* 1:11; *Qing Shilu*, vol. 1, “Manzhou Shilu,” 138–139, entry for second month of 1609.

32. Chang Chŏngsu, during discussion at the AAS in Asia conference in Korea University in June 2017, suggested that such an exchange could have occurred between Nurhaci and Ming officials, only to have records of it lost in the political chaos of late Ming Liaodong. I suspect, however, that any such exchange would have looked very different in a Ming or Chosŏn document compared to the surviving Manchu documents.

33. *Sŏnjo sillok* 56:26b, Sŏnjo 27 (1594)/10/11 (*ŭlmyo*).

34. *Sŏnjo sillok* 169:11a–11b, Sŏnjo 36 (1603)/12/30 (*sinhae*).

35. Yi Sugwang, *Chibong yusŏl* 1:91–92; the English translation is based on Adam Bohnet, “On Either Side the River: The Rise of the Manchu State and Chosŏn’s Jurchen Subjects,” in *Toronto Studies in Central and Inner Asia*, No. 9, *the Exploitation of the Landscape of Central and Inner Asia: Past, Present and Future: Papers Presented at the Central and Inner Asia Seminar*, University of Toronto, May 15–16, 2007, ed. Uradyin Erden Bulag, Gillian Long, and Michael Gervers, 112–113.

36. *Kwanghae-gun ilgi*, chungch'obon 56a–57a, Kwanghae-gun 1(1609)/4/10 (*sinyu*).

37. Kwŏn Nachyŏn, “Chosŏn hugi hojŏk ŭi chaksŏng kwajŏng e taehan punsŏk,” *Tae-dong munhwa yŏn'gu* 39 (2001): 63–96.

38. Chŏng Chiyŏng, *Chilsŏ ŭi kuch'uk kwa kyunyŏl: Chosŏn hugi ŭi hojŏk kwa yŏsŏng tŭl* (Seoul: Sŏgang tachakkyo ch'ulp'ansa, 2015), 83–134.

39. Im Haksöng, “17 segi chönbán hojök charyo rül t’onghae pon kwihwa yain üi Chosön esö üi saenghwal yangsang—Ulsan hojök kwa Haenam hojök üi sarye chungsim üro,” *Komunsö yön’gu* 33 (August 2008): 95–128.

40. See Kyujanggak bibliographic note (*haeje*) for *Kyöngsangdo Ulsanbu kiyusik changjök* (kyu # 14986).

41. *Kyöngsangdo Ulsanbu kiyusik changjök* (kyu # 14986), 25. I consulted the digitized version made available online by the Kyujanggak.

42. *Kyöngsangdo Ulsanbu kiyusik changjök*, 37.

43. *Kyöngsangdo Ulsanbu kiyusik changjök*, 62.

44. *Kyöngsangdo Ulsanbu kiyusik changjök*, 65.

45. *Kyöngsangdo Ulsanbu kiyusik changjök*, 66, 71, 73, and 74.

46. *Kyöngsangdo Ulsanbu kiyusik changjök*, 10, 26, and 78.

47. Im Haksöng, “17 segi chönbán hojök charyo rül t’onghae pon kwihwa yain üi Chosön esö üi saenghwal yangsang—Ulsan hojök kwa Haenam hojök üi sarye chungsim üro,” *Komunsö yön’gu* 33 (August 2008): 95–128.

48. *Kyöngsangdo Ulsanbu kiyusik changjök*, 66, 71, and 73.

49. *Kyöngsangdo Ulsanbu kiyusik changjök*, 25.

50. According to a 1618 report, many Jurchen suffered poor treatment within Chosön from their magistrates, which may have encouraged their departure. See *Kwanghae-gun ilgi chungch’obon* 46:110b, *Kwanghae-gun* 10 (1618)/7/9 (*ülmi*).

51. *Kwanghae-gun ilgi*, chungch’obon 39:22b–23a, *Kwanghae-gun* 9 (1617)/2/13 (*musin*).

52. *Kwanghae-gun ilgi*, chungch’obon 51:123a, *Kwanghae-gun* 11 (1619)/12/17 (*pyöngin*).

53. *Manbun Rôtö* 3:955–958, esp. 957; *Jiu Manzhou dang* 6:248–256, esp. 251.

54. Kim Chongwön, “Ch’ogi Cho-Ch’öng kwan’gye e taehan ilkoch’al: Pyöngja horansi üi p’iroin munje rül chungsim üro,” *Yöksa hakpo* 71 (September 1976): 53–85.

55. “Liaodongese” is here used, as by Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, 57–88, to represent the border-crossing community of Jurchen, Chinese, and Koreans within the Ming region of Liaodong.

56. Yi Hyöngu, “Koryö hugi iju e taehan ilkoch’al—t’uhangmin sarye rül chungsim üro,” *Han’guksa yön’gu* 158 (September 2012): 269–300; Sö Inböm, “Chosön chön’gi yönyaeng-nok saryo üi kach’i wa kü hwaryong,” *Myöngch’öngsa yön’gu* 30 (October 2008): 13–48.

57. For this subject, see Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, 53–128, and “The Tong in Two Worlds: Cultural Identity in Liaodong and Nurgan during the Thirteenth through Seventeenth Centuries,” *Ch’ing-shih wen-t’i* 53, no. 1 (June 1993): 21–46.

58. Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise*, 38–46.

59. Christopher S. Agnew, “Migrants and Mutineers: The Rebellion of Kong Youde and Seventeenth-Century Northeast Asia,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 52, no. 3 (2009): 508–517.

60. Agnew, “Migrants and Mutineers”; Chöng Pyöngch’öl, “Myöngmal Yodong iltae üi haesang seryök,” *Myöngch’öngsa yön’gu* 23 (April 2005): 143–170.

61. For Mao Wenlong, see Chöng Pyöngch’öl, “Myöngmal Yodong iltae,” and Han Myönggi, *Imjin waeran kwa Han-Jung kwan’gye*, 374–406.

62. This rebellion is discussed by Agnew, in “Migrants and Mutineers.”
63. Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise*, 194–202.
64. For instance, see Pak Yŏngok, “Pyŏngjoran p’iroin sokhwan’go,” *Sach’ong* 9 (1964): 51–67; Kim Chongwŏn, “Ch’ogi Cho-Ch’ong kwan’gye e taehan ilkoch’al.”
65. *Kwanghae-gun chungch’obon* 9:107a, Kwanghae-gun 2(1610)/2/14 (*kyŏngsin*).
66. Han Myŏnggi, *Imjin Waeran kwa Han-Jung kwan’gye*, 281. I became aware of many primary sources for this section through Han’s work.
67. *Ming Xizong Zhehuangdi shilu* 10:15, Tianqi 1 (1621)/5/12 (*guichou*), entry 4.
68. *Ming Xizong Zhehuangdi shilu* 24:15a, Tianqi 2 (1622)/7/16 (*gengshu*), entry 5.
69. *Ming Xizong Zhehuangdi shilu*, Tianqi 6 (1626)10/22 (*xinyu*), entry 2.
70. See chapter 2, page 76, for a discussion of population figures.
71. Chŏng Pyŏngch’ŏl, “Myŏngmal Yodong iltae,” 145–149.
72. *Injo sillok* 5:24b, Injo 2(1624)/3/20 (*kapsul*).
73. *Ming Xizong Zhehuangdi shilu*, Tianqi 6 (1626)10/22 (*xinyu*), entry 2.
74. For instance, Sin Taldo, *Mano sŏnsaeng munjip* 5:11b (National Library # ko: 3648-40), 3:24.
75. See Roth, “The Manchu-Chinese Relationship, 1618–1636,” and Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise*, 66–74.
76. See Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise*, 429–430.
77. I follow the printed text of the “Story of Ch’oe Ch’ŏk” as found in Pak Hŭibyŏng, ed., *Han’guk hanmun sosŏl kyohap kuhae* (Seoul: Somyŏng ch’up’ansa, 2005), 421–451. The event described above may be found on pages 441–442. Scholarship on the text includes Min Yŏngdae, *Cho Wihan kwa Ch’oech’ŏkchŏn* (Seoul: Asea munhwasa, 1993).
78. Yi Minsŏng, “Che Ch’oe Ch’ŏk chŏn,” in “Si,” *Kyŏngjŏngjip* 4:3b–4b.
79. *Injo sillok* 23:25a, Injo 8 (1630)/10/22 (*chŏngmyŏ*).
80. The story of Ma Shunshang originates in Kim Yuk’s *Chamgok sŏnsaeng p’ildam* (Kyujanggak # 6685, fr. 18). A modified version is also recorded in the *Hwangjoin sajŏk* (Kyujanggak # 2542), fr. 57.
81. The self-account can be found in a number of editions, but here I follow that preserved in *Hwangjoin sajŏk*, fr. 10–25, where it is called the “Kangsejak chasul.” At the very earliest, the text would have been written in the 1680s. For bibliographic details concerning the text, see Adam Bohnet, “From the Chu-Hat-Hall Duke to Kang Shijue, and Back Again: Biography and State Control in Northern Hamgyŏng,” *Korean Histories* 3, no. 1 (2012): 3–22.
82. *Hwangjoin sajŏk*, fr. 14–23.
83. *Hwangjoin sajŏk*, fr. 23–24. The self-account describes him as setting out into the wilderness on the eighth month of the fifth year of Tianqi (1626) and arriving in Mamp’o after thirteen days.
84. *Hwangjoin sajŏk*, fr. 23–24.
85. *Ming Xizong Zhehuangdi shilu*, Tianqi 6 (1626)10/22 (*xinyu*), entry 2.
86. For instance, Yi Sangbae, *Chosŏn hugi chŏngch’i wa kwaesŏ* (Seoul: Kukhak charyowŏn, 1999), 62–63. This point of view was also held by the late Jahyun Kim

Haboush and is especially visible in her posthumously published book, *The Great East Asian War*.

87. Crossly, “Tong in Two Worlds.”

88. Li Guangtao, *Mingjie liuko shimo* (Nan’gang: Zhongyang yanjiu yan lishi yuan yanjiusuo, 1965), 4.

89. Roth Li, “State Building before 1644,” 65–79.

90. *Sŏnjo sillok* 127:27b–28b, Sŏnjo 33 (1600)/7/20 (*sin’yu*).

91. Yi Sanggil, “Yuji” [*sin’yu* (1621)/6/1] in “purok,” *Tongchŏn’jip* 4:10 (National Library # ko 3648-62), fr. 72.

92. Yi Sugwang, *Chibong yusŏl* 1: 91–92.

93. Yi Sŏnhŭi, “Kilsang sagŏn ŭl t’onghae pon 17 segi ch’o hyanghwain silt’ae wa han’gye—hyanghwain tŭngnok ŭl chungsim ŭro,” *Tongyang kojŏn yŏn’gu* 37 (December 2009): 93–126.

94. *Sŏnjo sillok* 145:2a, Sŏnjo 35 (1602)/1/8(*sinch’uk*); Yi Sŏnhŭi, “Kilsang sagŏn ŭl t’onghae pon 17 segi ch’o hyanghwain silt’ae wa han’gye.” Nuwŏn is in fact within the city limits of present-day Seoul, on the west bank of the Chungnang-ch’ŏn, in the district of Dobong-gu. Currently, one can walk from Nuwŏn to the city walls in about three and a half hours.

95. *Kwanghae-gun ilgi*, chungch’obon 6: 56a–57b, Kwanghae-gun 1(1609)/4/10 (*sin’yu*).

96. *Kwanghae-gun ilgi*, chungch’obon 6:57b, Kwanghae-gun 1(1609)/4/10 (*sin’yu*).

97. *Injo sillok* 30:44b, Injo 12 (1634)/12/15 (*chŏng’yu*).

98. Han Munjong, *Chosŏn chŏn’gi hyanghwa*, 179.

99. *Kwanghae-gun ilgi* chŏngch’obon 143:6b–7a, Kwanghae-gun 11 (1619)/8/7 (*chŏngsa*).

100. *Kwanghae-gun ilgi* chŏngch’obon 177:1a–1b, Kwanghae-gun 14 (1622)/5/1 (*pyŏngsin*).

101. *Injo sillok* 4:19b, Injo 2 (1624)/2/8 (*imjin*).

102. *Injo sillok* 4:15b, Injo 2 (1624)/2/4 (*muja*).

103. Yang Hŭngsuk, “Chosŏn hugi Hangwae ŭi chonjae yangsang kwa chŏngch’ak: Taegu-si Urok-ri Kim Ch’ungsŏn ŭi huson sarye rŭl chungsim ŭro,” *Taegu sabak* 122 (February 2016): 8.

104. *Injo sillok* 5:24b–25a, Injo 2 (1624)/3/20 (*kapsul*).

105. Yang Hŭngsuk, “Chosŏn hugi Hangwae ŭi chonjae yangsang,” 7–11. Although by far the best-known defector, Kim Ch’ungsŏn’s history is so colored by later myth-making that I have largely relegated discussion of Kim Ch’ungsŏn to chapter 4, where I discuss the formation of a village made up of Japanese defectors under his direction, and to chapter 6, where I discuss the development of the biographical tradition concerning Kim Ch’ungsŏn.

106. Yang Hŭngsuk, “Chosŏn hugi Hangwae ŭi chonjae yangsang,” 7–9; Kim Ch’ungsŏn, *Mohadangjip* (Kyujanggak # kyu 4255), 1:15b.

107. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 20:57a, Injo 6 (1628)/2/2 (*kabo*).

108. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 21:27a–27b, Injo 6 (1628)/4/23 (*kabin*).

109. *Taizong wenhuangdi shilu*, Tiancong 10 (1636)/4/15 (*jichou*).
110. *Manbun Rōtō* 4:39; *Jiu Manzhou dang* 6:2617. The same document also complains about Chosŏn's support for Ming and for Mao Wenlong.
111. *Injo Sillok* 18:30a, Injo 6 (1628)/2/22 (*kabin*). At Hoeryŏng, however, the Manchu were on the western not eastern bank of the Tumen. It would see what the Border Defense Command must have been thinking of the stretch of the Tumen River downstream from Onsŏng when they used this phrase. Similar texts are found in Qing sources, although there the Pŏnhos are called Warka. See *Taizong Wenhuangdi shilu*, Tiancong 2 (1628)/3/8 (*jisi*); *Jiu Manzhou dang* 6:243; *Manbun Rōtō* 4:125–126.
112. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 54:137b, Injo 14 (1636)/12/26 (*pyŏngsin*).
113. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 55:39a–40b, Injo 15 (1637)/1/7 (*chŏngmi*)
114. *Injo sillok* 37:37a, Injo 16 (1638)/12/30 (*muo*).
115. For instance, *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 72:25a, Injo 17 (1639)/11/16 (*kisa*).
116. *Simyang changgye* 56b–56a, 1638 (*muin*)/9/28. Yi Kangsu et al., trans. *Simyang changgye: Simyang esŏ on p'yŏnji* (Seoul: Ch'angbi, 2008), 218–220.
117. *Simyang changgye* 8:40b, 1642 (*imo*)/11/25 [Yi Kangsu, trans., 818].
118. *Simyang changgye*, 2:8b–9a, 1638 (*muin*)/3/18 [Yi Kangsu, trans., 142].
119. *Simyang changgye* 2:9a, 1638 (*muin*)/3/18.
120. *Simyang changgye* 32b–32b, 1638 (*muin*)/7/8 [Yi Kangsu, trans., 179–180].
121. *Taizong wenhuangdi shilu* 46, Chongde 4 (1630)/5/4 (*gengshen*).
122. *Simyang changgye* 37b, 1637 (*chŏngch'uk*)/9/6 [Yi Kangsu, trans., 104].
123. *Simyang changgye* 7:8a, 1642 (*imo*)/1/28 [Yi Kangsu, trans., 638–640].
124. This issue reoccurs in *Simyang changgye* 64b–65a, 1642 (*imo*)/6/26 [Yi Kangsu, trans., 511–512]; *Simyang changgye* 70b–71a, 1642 (*imo*)/7/24 [Yi Kangsu, trans., 520–521].
125. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 66:14a, Injo 16 (1638)/8/5 (*ŭlmi*).
126. *Simyang changgye* 7:8a, 1642 (*imo*)/1/28 [Yi Kangsu, trans., 638–640].
127. *Simyang changgye* 36a, 1641 (*sinsa*)/11/13 [Yi Kangsu, trans., 590–591].
128. *Simyang changgye* 8a, 1642 (*imo*)/1/28 [Yi Kangsu, trans., 640].
129. *Simyang changgye* 7:65a, 1642 (*imo*)/6/26 [Yi Kangsu trans., 732].

Chapter 4: Administration of Foreign Communities after the Wars

1. Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 134–173.
2. For a discussion of the rise of Zheng Zhilong's maritime empire, and the development of the Ming loyalist maritime regime of his descendants, see Xing Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia, c. 1620–1720* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
3. See Ronald P. Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1984).

4. Yuanchong Wang, *Remaking the Chinese Empire*, 27–49.
5. Han Myōnggi, “Chaejo chi ün kwa Chosŏn hugi.”
6. Yi Hüihwan, “Hyojongdae üi chŏngguk kwa pukpöllon,” *Chŏnbuk sahak* 42 (April 2013): 201–222.
7. Hong Chongp’il, “Sambönnan üi chŏnhuhan Hyŏnjong Sukchong yŏn’gan üi pukpöllon—T’ükhi yurim kwa Yun Hyu rül chungsim üro,” *Sahak yŏn’gu* 27 (June 1977): 85–108; Hŏ T’aeyong, “17.18 segi pukpöllon üi ch’ui wa pukhangnon üi taedu.” *Taedong munhwa yŏn’gu* 69 (March 2010): 374–418.
8. Kye Sŭngbŏm, “Chosŏn üi 18 segi wa t’al-Chunghwa munje,” in *Chŏngjo wa 18 segi*, ed. Yŏksa hakhoe (Seoul: P’urŭn yŏksa, 2013), 106–109.
9. Hŏ T’aeyong, *Chosŏn hugi Chunghwaron*, 113–134.
10. Jahyun Kim Haboush, “Contesting Chinese Time, Nationalizing Temporal Space: Temporal Inscription in Late Chosŏn Korea,” in *Time, Temporality and Imperial Transition*, ed. Lynn Struve (Honolulu: Association for Asian Studies and University of Hawai‘i Press, 2005), 115–141.
11. Jahyun Kim Haboush, “Constructing the Center.”
12. Mark C. Elliott, “The Limits of Tartary: Manchuria in Imperial and National Geographies,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 59, no. 3 (August 2000): 603–646; Seonmin Kim, *Ginseng and Borderland*.
13. Lewis, *Frontier Contact*.
14. Pak Ch’ŏnhong, *Angnyŏngi ch’ulmor hadŏn Chosŏn üi pada: Sŏyang kwa Chosŏn üi mannang* (Seoul: Hyŏnsil munhwa, 2008), 1–154.
15. Kim Munsik, “Sŏng Haeüing chŭngbo han Chŏngmi chŏnsin rok,” *Chindan hakpo* 115 (August 2012): 93–122.
16. Pierre-Emmanuel Roux, “The Prohibited Sect of Yaso: Catholicism in Diplomatic and Cultural Encounters between Edo Japan and Chosŏn Korea (17th to 19th Century),” in *Space and Location in Circulation of Knowledge (1400–1800): Korea and Beyond*, ed. Marion Eggert, Felix Siegmund, and Dennis Würthner (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Academic Research, 2014), 124–128.
17. Adam Bohnet, “Lies, Rumours and Sino-Korean Relations: The Pseudo-Fujianese Incident of 1687,” *Acta Koreana* 19, no. 2 (December 2016): 1–29; Kim Ch’angnyong, “17 segi chungyŏp Chunggugin üi Cheju p’yoch’ak—Hyŏnjŏng p’allyŏn (1667) Myŏngnara sangin Im In’gwan irhaeng üi Cheju p’yoch’ak ch’ŏri rül chungsimüro,” *T’amna Munhwa* 25 (2004): 25–59.
18. *Sunjo sillo* 4:08, Sunjo 2 (1802)/3/15 (*üryu*).
19. Yang Hŭngsuk, “Chosŏn hugi Hangwae üi chonjae yangsang,” 49–51.
20. Saeyoung Park, “Memory, Counternarrative and the Body Politic in Post-Imjin War Chosŏn Korea,” *Journal of Korean Studies* 19, no. 1 (Spring 2014), 156–160.
21. Untitled investigation, *Ch’uan küp kugan* 5:816–825, *kapsin* (1644)/5/21 to *kapsin* (1644)/5/25.
22. Untitled investigation, *Ch’uan küp kugan* 5:835, *kapsin* (1644)/5/26. It is not clear that Kim Taesu was ever successfully apprehended. That he was the descendant of a

Japanese defector is mentioned not in the *Ch'uan küp kugan* but only in the *Journal of the Royal Secretariat*. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 88:116b, Injo 22 (1644)/5/29 (*pyŏngjin*).

23. Untitled investigation, *Ch'uan küp kugan* 5:833, *kapsin* (1644)/5/26.

24. Untitled investigation, *Ch'uan küp kugan* 5:839, *kapsin* (1644)/6/7.

25. *Injo sillok* 45:33a, Injo 22 (1644)/6/11 (*chŏngmyŏ*).

26. Untitled investigation, *Ch'uan küp kugan* 5:851, *kapsin* (1644)/6/10.

27. *Injo sillok* 45:33a, Injo 22 (1644)/6/11 (*chŏngmyŏ*); Yang Hŭngsuk, “Chosŏn hugi Hangwae ūi chonjae yangsang,” 50.

28. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 88:149a, Injo 22 (1644)/6/19 (*ŭrhae*).

29. Kim Insuk, “Injodae ūi kungjung chŏju sagŏn kwa kŭ chŏngch'ijŏk ūimi,” *Chosŏn sidae sabakpo* 34 (December 2004): 113–145.

30. Untitled investigation, *Ch'uan küp kugan* 5:837, *kapsin* (1644)/5/26.

31. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 88:158b, Injo 22 (1644)/6/26 (*imo*).

32. Kim Ch'ungsŏn, “Nokch'onji,” *Mohadangjip* 1:21b–25a.

33. Fujiwara Takao, “Sayak'a no jugaku shisō yōrei,” *Yuhak yŏn'gu* 24 (August 2011): 321–356; Fujiwara Takao, “Sayak'a (Kim Ch'ungsŏn) ūi t'uhang yoin kwa sigi ūi yunsaeck munje,” *Chosŏnsa yŏn'gu* 23 (October 2014): 83–116.

34. See chapter 3.

35. Yang Hŭngsuk, “Ulsan-bu hojŏk taejang ūl t'onghae pon Chosŏn hugi hangwae ūi chonjae wa chŏngch'ak,” *Han-Il kwan'gyesa yŏn'gu* 54 (August 2016): 229–261.

36. Yang Hŭngsuk, “Chosŏn hugi Hangwae ūi chonjae yangsang,” 12–19.

37. Yang Hŭngsuk, “Chosŏn hugi Hangwae ūi chonjae yangsang,” 23–26.

38. *Shizu zhang huangdi shilu*, Shunzi 1 (1644)/4/11.

39. Wakeman, *Great Enterprise*, 297–318.

40. *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok* 8:60b, Injo 22 (1644)/4/24.

41. Yi Kyusang, Minjok munhak yŏn'guso hanmun pun'gwa trans, *18 segi Chosŏn immulji: pyŏngse chaeŏn rok* (Seoul: Ch'angjak kwa pip'yŏngsa, 1997), 179–182. The village would seem to have been quite close to Nuwŏn, the submitting-foreigner village where Jurchens resided during the early seventeenth century. Also, see the discussion of Yi Kyusang's representation of Chinese in Sŏ Sinhye, “Yi Kyusang i *Pyŏngse chaeŏn rok* e ssŭn Myŏngin kirok ūi tŭngjang chŏbyŏn—'Uyerok,' 'P'ungch'ŏllok' ūi ūiui wa kwallyŏnhayŏ,” *Ŭmun yŏn'gu* 38, no. 2 (June 2010): 423–444.

42. *Sukchong sillok* 33:50b, Sukchong 25 (1699)/11/23 (*chŏngsa*); *Sukchong sillok* 42:4b, Sukchong 31 (1705)/5/30 (*imjin*).

43. Thus, one of the more notorious members of this group, Huang Gong, is described by Hŏ Chŏk as lacking the proper gratitude to serve the Chosŏn court honestly even though he was emancipated by Hyojong. *Sukchong sillok* 3:24a, Sukchong 1(1675)/4/3 (*sinmyŏ*).

44. For instance, Sŏng Haeŭng, “P'alsŏngjŏn,” *P'ungch'ŏn-rok*, in *Yŏn'gyŏngjae chŏnso* sokchip 15. These families received some of their first modern scholarly attention from Liu Chunlan. See Yu Ch'ullan, “Myŏng-Ch'ŏng kyoch'egi Hanjok ūi Chosŏn imin,” 58–61.

45. Gari Ledyard, *The Dutch Come to Korea* (Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, 1971), 36–37.
46. Ledyard, *The Dutch Come to Korea*, 27–37; Yun Haengim, “Pak Yŏn,” in *Haedong oesa, Sŏkchaego* 9, fr. 23–25.
47. *Hyojong sillok* 11:24b–25a, Hyojong 4 (1653)/8/6 (*mujin*).
48. Hendrik Hamel, John Paul Buys of Taizé, trans., *Hamel’s Journal and a Description of the Kingdom of Korea, 1653–1666* (Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society Korea Branch, 1994), 8–9.
49. Hamel, John Paul Buys of Taizé, trans., 15–15. Hamel, *Verhaal van hetvergaan van het jacht de Sperwer*, 21–22.
50. Hamel, *Verhaal van hetvergaan van het jacht de Sperwer*, 24–25.
51. Ledyard, *The Dutch Come to Korea*, 65–74.
52. Ch’oe Sŏnhye, “Chosŏn ūi munhwajŏk sosuja, hyanghwain,” *In’gan yŏn’gu* 12 (January 2007): 93–123; Yun Haengim, “Chŏn Hogyŏm,” in *Haedong oesa, Sŏkchaego* 9, fr. 11.
53. Sin Tonggyu, *Kŭnse Tong Asia sok ūi Il, Cho, Nan kukche kwan’gyesa* (Seoul: Kyŏngin Munhwasa, 2007), 209–265; Roux, “The Prohibited Sect of Yaso.”
54. Ledyard, *The Dutch Come to Korea*, 45–46.
55. *Hyojong sillok* 11:24b–25a, Hyojong 4 (1653)/8/6 (*mujin*).
56. Sin Tonggyu, *Kŭnse Tong Asia sok ūi Il, Cho, Nan*, 200–206.
57. Kim Yuk’s *Chamgok sŏnsaeng p’ildam*, fr. 18. For the later historiography of Ma Shunshang, see chapter 6.
58. Kim Yuk, *Chamgok sŏnsaeng p’ildam*, 28–29.
59. The origin of this piece of information is in the preface “Poem to Daoist Zhang,” which is found in the *Sigam sŏnsaeng yugo*, the collected works of Kim Sŏkchu (1634–1684). It seems to have been written when he was magistrate in charge of the Japan House in Tongnae (Pusan). A slightly altered version of the text can be found in the *Hwangjoin sajŏk* frame 51, the *Sohwa oesa* 2:281. Kim Sŏkchu, “Chŭng Chang Tosa,” in “Ch’ilŏn yulsi,” *Sigam sŏnsaeng yugo* 4:61b.
60. Nam Kuman, “Kang Sejak chŏn—mujin,” *Yakch’ŏnrip* 28:27b–31b; Pak Sedang, “Kang Sejak chŏn,” *Sŏgyejip* 8:24a–26a; Bohnet, “From Chu-Hat-hall Duke to Kang Shijue.”
61. Wu Xinli, “Chaoxian zu Tongzhou Kangshi shipu zhongde Ming-Man guanxi shiliao,” *Qingshi ziliao* 1 (1980): 179–185.
62. See Bohnet, “From Kang Shijue to Chu-Hat-Hall Duke,” 4–13.
63. *Sukchong sillok* 3:53b–54a, Sukchong 1(1675)/5/28 (*pyŏngsul*).
64. *Sukchong sillok* 19:8a, Sukchong 14 (1688)/3/8 (*sinsa*).
65. *Sukchong sillok* 34:10a–10b, Sukchong 26 (1700)/9/28 (*chŏngsa*).
66. Kang Sŏkwa, *Chosŏn hugi Hamgyŏngdo wa pukpang yŏngt’o ūisik* (Seoul: Kyŏngsewŏn, 2000), 36–38.
67. Yi Kyusang, *18 segi Chosŏn inmulji*, 177–178.
68. Bohnet, “From Kang Shijue to Duke Chu-Hat-hall,” 14–19.

69. See Kim Munsik, “Sōng Haeŭng chungbo han *Chōngmi chōnsin rok*.”
70. Ku Ch’iyong, *Ugyodang yugo* 1:1b.
71. *Sukchong sillok* 6:19b, Sukchong 3 (1677)/3/22 (*musul*).
72. Kim Chinam, *T’ongmungwanji* 8:3a–4b.
73. Eugene Park, *Between Dreams and Reality*, 113.
74. *Yōngjo sillok* 47:49b, Yōngjo 14 (1738)/12/13 (*sinmyo*).
75. *Sūngjōngwŏn ilgi* 202:83a, Hyōnjong 8 (1667)/6/21 (*kabo*).
76. *Sūngjōngwŏn ilgi* 426:7a, Sukchong 31 (1705)/8/24 (*kyōngsul*).
77. *Sūngjōngwŏn ilgi* 451:83b, Sukchong 35 (1709)/11/9 (*ŭrhae*). Following Injo’s coup d’état, the rebuilding of the once important palace Kyōngbok-kung, a major and controversial project under Kwanghae-gun, was abandoned. Thus, it was an empty palace.
78. *Sūngjōngwŏn ilgi* 490:46a, Sukchong 41 (1715)/9/1 (*kyesa*).
79. *Sūngjōngwŏn ilgi* 490:64b, Sukchong 42 (1716)/8/7 (*kabo*).
80. *Sūngjōngwŏn ilgi* 517:154b, Sukchong 45 (1719)/7/23 (*kabo*).
81. *Sūngjōngwŏn ilgi* 531:111b–112a, Kyōngjong 1 (1721)/yun6/15 (*ŭrhae*).
82. *Sūngjōngwŏn ilgi* 531:117a, Kyōngjong 1 (1721)/yun6/16 (*ŭrhae*).
83. *Sūngjōngwŏn ilgi* 536:5b, Kyōngjong 2 (1721)/1/3 (*kich’uk*).
84. Eugene Park, *Between Dreams and Reality*, 41–42 and 150–151.
85. *Sukchong sillok* 50:7b, Sukchong 37 (1711)/8/29 (*pyōngsul*).
86. *Yōngjo sillok* 20:14b, Yōngjo 4 (1728)/12/19 (*pyōngsul*).
87. *Sukchong sillok* 50:17a, Sukchong 37 (1711)/4/4 (*pyōngsul*).
88. *Sukchong sillok* 6:19b, Sukchong 3 (1677)/3/22 (*musul*).
89. *Sukchong sillok* 3:23b, Sukchong 1 (1675)/4/1 (*kich’uk*).
90. *Sukchong sillok* 3:24a, Sukchong 1 (1675)/4/2 (*kyōngin*).
91. *Sukchong sillok* 3:24a–25b, Sukchong 1 (1675)/4/3 (*sinmyo*).
92. This incident is discussed by Bohnet, “Lies, Rumours and Sino-Korean Relations,” 16–17.
93. Wang Tōkku, *Hwangjo yumin rok* (National Library # ko 25669), dates the institutionalization of the Ming migrants under the Military Training Agency to 1673, by which I assume he means the formation of the Chinese Ivory Troops.
94. Kim Sunnam, “16 segi Chosŏn chibang kunja ūi tongyo—Abyōng ūi hyōngsōng chungsim ūro,” *Chosŏn sidae sahakpo* 73 (June 2015): 229–262.
95. Song Yangsŏp, “17-19 segi abyōng ūi ch’angsŏl kinŭng,” in *Chosŏn sidae ūi kwagŏ wa pyōsŭl*, ed. Hō Hŭng-sik et al. (Seoul: Chimmundang, 2003), 351–381.
96. Pak T’aebō, *Chōngjaejip* 5:37a–40a.
97. *Pibyōnsa tŭngnok* 39:43b–44a, Sukchong 11 (1685)/3/28.
98. *Pibyōnsa tŭngnok* 39:116b–118b, Sukchong 12 (1686)/9/7.
99. *Chōngjo sillok* 29:49a, Chōngjo 14 (1790)/3/19 (*kihae*).
100. Yi Kyusang, *18 segi Chosŏn inmulji*, 175.
101. Bohnet, “From Kang Shijue to Chu-Hat-Hall Duke,” 13.
102. Bohnet, “From Kang Shijue to Chu-Hat-Hall Duke,” 11. Nam Kuman, *Yakch’on-jip* 28:31b.

103. Bok-Rae Kim, “Korean nobi Resistance under the Chosun Dynasty (1392–1910),” *Slavery and Abolition* 25, no. 2 (August 2004): 48–62.

104. Fujiya Kawashima, “A Study of Hyangan: Kin Groups and Aristocratic Localism in the Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Korean Countryside,” *Journal of Korean Studies* 5, no. 1 (January 1984): 3–38.

105. James B. Palais, *Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions: Yu Hyöngwön and the Late Chosön Dynasty* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996), 46–50 and 70–77; John S. Lee, “The Rise of the Brokered State: Situating Administrative Expansion in Chosön Korea,” *Seoul Journal of Korean Studies* 32, no. 1 (June 2019): 81–108.

106. Palais, *Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions*, 769–814.

107. Bok-Rae Kim, “Korean nobi Resistance,” 48–62; Palais, *Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions*, 231–232 and 247–252.

108. Martina Deuchler, *Under the Ancestors’ Eyes*, 260–265; Kwön Nachyön, “Sukchongdae chibang t’ongchi’ron üi chön’gae wa chöngch’ae unyöng,” *Yöksa wa hyönsil* 25 (1997): 87–112; O Yönggyo, “Chosön hugi chakt’ong che üi kujo wa chön’gae,” *Tongbang hakchi* 73 (December 1991): 71–130.

109. The *kapsin* year refers not to 1644 but to the “The Ming Qing transition” as a whole. Obviously, nearly all Liaodongese migrants to Chosön arrived well before 1644. It was understood literally to refer only to the single year in some later narratives, as will be discussed in chapter 6.

110. *Süngjōngwön ilgi* 1076, Yōngjo 27 (1751)/11/26 (*muja*).

111. *Chön’gaeksa ilgi* 9, *kyeyu* (1753)/9/10.

112. *Süngjōngwön ilgi* 693:82a–82b, Yōngjo 5 (1729)/9/9 (*kyōngjin*).

113. Br. Jean-Paul Buys of Taizé, trans., *Hamel’s Journal and a Description of the Kingdom of Korea, 1653–1666* (Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, 1998), 26–28.

114. *Chön’gaeksa ilgi* 3, *üryu* (1645).

115. *Chön’gaeksa ilgi* 3, *üryu* (1645).

116. *Chön’gaeksa ilgi* 4, *kich’uk* (1649)/11/10.

117. *Pibyönsa tūngnok* 33:63b–64a, Sukchong 3 (1677)/8/11.

118. *Süngjōngwön ilgi* 300:145b, Sukchong 9 (1683)/7/21 (*kyōngin*).

119. *Süngjōngwön ilgi* 531:63a–63b, Kyōngjong 1 (1721)/yun6/5 (*kapcha*).

120. *Pibyönsa tūngnok* 70:89a, Sukchong 43 (1717)/4/19.

121. *Sukchong sillok* 34:15a, Sukchong 26 (1700)/10/12 (*sinmi*).

122. *Süngjōngwön ilgi* 477:97b, Sukchong 39 (1713)/4/22 (*kisa*).

123. Kwön Nachyön, “Sukchongdae chibang t’ongchi’ron.”

124. *Kyöngsangdo T’ansönghyön Hojök Taejang, chönsan deit’a beisü* (Seoul: Tongasia haksul yön’guwön, Taedong munhwa yön’guwon, Sönggyun’guan tachakkyo, 2003), CD 4, 1762–06 saengbiryang, entry # 1020, Saengbiryang 6 ri (panghwagok), 2 t’ong, 2 ho, Ch’oe Tonbo’s household.

125. Kim Chaero, ed., *Soktaejön* 3:34a–b (National Library # kojo 33), fr. 127–128.

Chapter 5: Ritual Transformation of Foreign Communities

1. *Chǒngjo sillok* 29:49a, Chǒngjo 14 (1790)/3/19 (*kihae*).
2. Pamela Kyle Crossley, “The Qianlong Retrospective on the Chinese-martial (*Han-jun*) Banners,” *Late Imperial China* 10, no. 1 (June 1989): 63–107.
3. Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, 296–336.
4. A very late example of such conspiracy theories, from the late eighteenth century, is discussed by Yamauchi Kōichi. See Yamauchi Kōichi, “Chōsen o motte Tenka ni ō tarashimu—Gakushūin daigaku zō *Kishi hachi jō shi* ni miru zaiya rōron chishikijin no yume,” *Tōyō kakuhō* 84, no. 3 (September 2002): 1–31.
5. Yi Hyōnjin, *Chosŏn hugi chongmyo chŏllye yŏn’gu* (Seoul: Ilchisa, 2008), 284–320.
6. Eugene Y. Park, *A Genealogy of Dissent: The Progeny of Fallen Royals in Chosŏn Korea* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2019), 111–119.
7. Yi Uk, “Chosŏn hugi chŏnjaeng ūi kiŏk kwa Taebodan chehyang,” *Chonggyo yŏn’gu* 42 (March 2006): 127–163.
8. Saeyoung Park, “Sacred Spaces and the Commemoration of War in Chosŏn Korea”; Saeyoung Park, “The Expansion of Ideal Subjecthood in Chosŏn Korea: Remembering the Monk Yujŏng,” *Korean Studies* 39 (January 2015): 45–74; Chǒng Tuhŭi, “Yi Sunsin e taehan kiŏk ūi yŏksa wa yŏksahwa,” in *Imjin waeran Tong Asia samguk chŏnjaeng*, ed. Chǒng Tuhŭi and Yi Kyŏngsun (Seoul: Hyumanisŭt’ŭ, 2007), 187–232; Maya Stiller, “The Politics of Commemoration: Patronage of Monk-General Shrines in Late Chosŏn Korea,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 77, no. 1 (February 2018): 83–105.
9. *Hyŏnjong kaesu sillok* 18:44a, Hyŏnjong 9 (1668)/2/18 (*chŏnghye*); *Sukchong sillok* 38: 61b–62a, Sukchong 29 (1703)/6/18 (*pyŏngjin*).
10. Yun Hyemin, “Chosŏn hugi Sŏk Sŏng e taehan insik pyŏnhwa wa kŭ ūimi,” *Chosŏn sidae sahakpo* 70 (September 2014): 207–237; *Sukchong sillok* 47:39a–39b, Sukchong 35 (1709)/9/11 (*muin*); *Sukchong sillok* 47:39a–39b, Sukchong 54:23b, Sukchong 39 (1713)/9/12 (*pyŏngjin*).
11. Joshua Van Lieu, “A Farce That Wounds Both High and Low”; Kim T’ak, *Han’guk ūi Kwanje sinang* (Seoul: Sŏnhaksa, 2004), 62–69.
12. For a survey of shrines receiving state support during the late Chosŏn, see Yi Yŏngch’un, “Chosŏn hugi ūi sajŏn ūi chaep’yŏn kwa kukka cherye,” *Han’guksa yŏn’gu* 118 (September 2009): 195–219, and Kuwano Eiji, “Chosŏn Korea and Ming China After the Imjin Waeran.”
13. Concerning the establishment of this shrine, Chǒng Yongu, “Hwayang sŏwŏn kwa Mandongmyo e taehan il yŏn’gu,” *Hosŏ sahak* 18 (1990): 135–176; Yi Wanu, “Hwayang-dong kwa Uam sajŏk,” *Changsŏgak* 18 (December 2007): 89–162. For the name of the shrine, see chapter 6.
14. For a recent treatment of the subject in English, see Seung B. Kye, “The Altar of Great Gratitude: A Korean Memory of Ming China under Manchu Dominance, 1704–1894,” *Journal of Korean Religions* 5 no. 2 (October 2014): 71–88. This article summarizes his more extensive discussion in Korean in his book. Kye Sŭngbŏm,

Chŏngjidoen sigan: Chosŏn ūi Taebodan kwa kŭndae ūi munt'ŏk (Seoul: Sŏgang Tac-hakkyo Ch'ulp'anbu, 2011).

15. *Sukchong sillok* 39:5a, Sukchong 30 (1704)/1/10 (*kyŏngsul*). This passage refers to the *Confucian Analects* (*Lun yü* 3.9).

16. See Hŏ T'acyong, *Chosŏn hugi Chunghwaron*.

17. See Pae Usŏng, *Chunghwa*, 259–327, for Chosŏn perceptions of Chinese geography after the fall of China to the Qing.

18. Saeyoung Park, “Memory, Counternarrative and the Body.”

19. Hŏ T'acyong, “Imjin waeran ūi kyŏnghŏm kwa Koguryŏ insik ūi kanghwa,” *Yŏksa hakpo* 190 (June 2006): 33–60.

20. I note that the broad outlines of the institutional development of imperial subject status have also been explored by Sun Weiguo in *Da Ming qihao yu xiao Zhonghua yishi: Chaoxian wangchao zun Zhou si Ming wenti yanjiu, 1637–1800* (Beijing: Shangwuyin shuguan, 2007).

21. I here differ with Kye Sŭngbŏm, “Chosŏn hugi Chunghwaron ūi imyŏn kwa kŭ yusan—Myŏng-Ch'ŏng kwallyŏn hoch'ing ūi pyŏnhwa rŭl chungsim ūro,” *Han'guk sabaksa hakpo* 19 (June 2009), 62–63.

22. For instance, see *Sŏnjo sillok* 109:7a, Sŏnjo 32 (1599)/2/2 (*imja*), where Sŏnjo announces that “Celestial dynasty people are so completely without shame that they do much that cannot be understood.”

23. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 606:108a, Yŏngjo 1 (1725)/12/13 (*pyŏngja*).

24. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 749:86a, Yŏngjo 8 (1732)/9/18 (*imin*).

25. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 826:116a, Yŏngjo 12 (1736)/5/29 (*imsul*).

26. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 833:118a, Yŏngjo 12 (1736)/9/15 (*pyŏngjo*).

27. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 1041:166b, Yŏngjo 25 (1749)/3/25 (*kyeyu*).

28. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 1041:177b, Yŏngjo 12 (1749)/3/27 (*ŭrhae*).

29. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 1041:184a–184b, Yŏngjo 12 (1749)/3/28 (*pyŏngja*).

30. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 1041:184b, Yŏngjo 25 (1749)/3/28 (*pyŏngja*).

31. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 1042:54a, Yŏngjo 25 (1749)/4/9 (*pyŏngsul*).

32. *Yŏngjo sillok* 8, Yŏngjo 1 (1725)/12/13 (*pyŏngja*).

33. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 606:101a, Yŏngjo 1 (1725)/12/12 (*ŭrhae*).

34. This is also pointed out by Kimura Takao, “Chŏsen ō chō Yonjo niyoriu kajin shison sōshutsu no hakei,” 34–37.

35. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 728:123a, Yŏngjo 7 (1731)/8/10 (*kyŏngja*). For Kang Shijue, see chapter 4.

36. Palais, *Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions*, 550–568; Ch'a Munsŏp, “Imnan ihu ūi yangyŏk kwa kyunyŏkpŏp ūi sŏngnip,” *Sabak yŏn'gu* 10 (April 1961): 115–30 and 11 (June 1961): 495–518; Chŏng Yŏnsik, *Yŏngjo dae ūi Yangyŏk chŏngch'aek kwa Kyunyŏkpŏp* (Sŏngnam: Han'gukhak chungang yŏn'guwŏn ch'ulp'anbu, 2015).

37. Kim Paekch'ŏl, *Chosŏn hugi Yŏngjo ūi T'angp'yŏng chŏngch'i—Soktaejŏn ūi p'yŏnch'an kwa paeksŏng ūi chaeinsik* (P'aju: T'achaksa, 2010), 193–278.

38. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 1075: 44a–44b, Yŏngjo 27 (1751)/10/8 (*sinch'uk*); the term “rec-tification of names” (Ch. *zhengming*, K. *chŏngmyŏng*) first appears in *Lunyŭ* 13:3.

39. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 1076:146b–147a, Yŏngjo 27(1751)/11/26 (*muja*); *Yŏngjo sillok* 74:25b, Yŏngjo 27(1751)/11/26 (*muja*).

40. These three Ming migrants are otherwise obscure.

41. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 1108:69a, Yŏngjo 30 (1754)/6/12 (*kyŏngsin*).

42. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 1111:47a–47b, Yŏngjo 30 (1754)/9/10 (*pyŏngsul*).

43. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 1111:46b, Yŏngjo 30 (1754)/9/10 (*pyŏngsul*).

44. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 1118:113a, Yŏngjo 31 (1755)/4/24 (*chŏngmyo*).

45. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 1159:128, Yŏngjo 34 (1758)/8/26 (*kimyo*).

46. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 1158:36a Yŏngjo 34 (1758)/9/5 (*muja*).

47. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 1158:27b–28a, Yŏngjo 34 (1758)/7/5 (*kich'uk*).

48. *Chŏngjo sillok* 49:29a, Chŏngjo 22 (1798)/9/1 (*sinyu*).

49. Chŏngjo, *Ilŏngnok* 632:71–84, Chŏngjo 23 (1799)/4/6 (*kabo*).

50. *Chŏn'gaeksa ilgi* 10, Sunjo 7 (1807)/9/3.

51. Angela Zito, *Of Body and Brush: Grand Sacrifice as Text/Performance in Eighteenth-Century China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 215–216.

52. Kimura Takao, “Chŏsen ō chō Yonjo niyoru kajin shison sōshutsu no hakei.”

53. *Yŏngjo sillok* 116:16b–17a, Yŏngjo 47 (1771)/3/19 (*kyŏngsin*).

54. *Chŏngjo sillok* 25:4a, Chŏngjo 12 (1788)/1/12 (*ŭlhae*).

55. *Yŏngjo sillok* 120:10b, Yŏngjo 49 (1773)/3/6 (*ŭlmi*).

56. *Chŏngjo sillok* 11:79a, Chŏngjo 5 (1781)/yun5/12 (*kabin*).

57. Yi Kyusang, *18 segi Chosŏn inmulji*, 178.

58. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 1292:46b–47a, Yŏngjo 45 (1769)/5/10 (*sinmyo*).

59. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 1361:27a, Yŏngjo 51(1775)/3/5 (*imja*).

60. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 1821:22b, Chŏngjo 24 (1800)/4/5 (*chŏngsa*).

61. *Chonju hwip'yŏn* (Seoul: Yŏgang Ch'ulp'ansa, 1985), 2:17–110. The organization of these rituals is discussed in detail by Yi Uk, “Chosŏn hugi chŏnjaeng ŭi kiŏk.”

62. For instance, *Chŏngjo sillok* 44:21a, Chŏngjo 20 (1796)/3/2 (*musin*).

63. *Chŏngjo sillok* 19:43b, Chŏngjo 9 (1785)/3/19 (*mujin*); *Chŏngjo sillok* 51:60b, Chŏngjo 23 (1799)/5/10 (*chyŏngmyo*); *Sunjo sillok* 5:26a, Sunjo 3 (1803)/5/10 (*kyemyo*); *Sunjo sillok* 5:30b, Sunjo 3 (1803)/7/21 (*kyech'uk*); *Sunjo sillok* 6:13a, Sunjo 4 (1804)/3/19 (*musin*).

64. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 1822:75a–76b, Chŏngjo 24 (1800)/5/10 (*sinmyo*).

65. *Chonju hwip'yŏn* 2:25.

66. *Chonju hwip'yŏn* 2:35.

67. For the arrangement of people during Ming loyalist rituals, and the changing or-ganization of Ming loyalist ritual, see Yi Uk, “Chosŏn hugi chŏnjaeng ŭi kiŏk,” 150–160.

68. For the “ward tax,” see Yun Kyŏngjin, “Chosŏn hugi Hansŏng-bu ŭi hojŏk kwalli wa unyŏng,” *Hyangt'o Sŏul* 184 (June 2013): 5–46.

69. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 1075: 42a–44b, Yŏngjo 27 (1751)/10/8 (*sinch'uk*).

70. *Chǒngjo sillok* 29:49a–50a, Chǒngjo 14 (1790)/3/19 (*kihae*).
71. *Yǒngjo sillok* 47:49b–50a, Yǒngjo 14 (1738)/12/13 (*sinmyo*).
72. *Sǔngjǒngwǒn ilgi* 797:53b, Yǒngjo 11 (1735)/3/25 (*ŭlmi*).
73. *Sǔngjǒngwǒn ilgi* 909:25a, Yǒngjo 16 (1740)/3/19 (*kyǒngsin*).
74. *Sǔngjǒngwǒn ilgi* 905:137a, Yǒngjo 16 (1740)/1/25 (*chǒngmyo*).
75. *Sǔngjǒngwǒn ilgi* 1066:144b, Yǒngjo 27 (1751)/3/25 (*imsul*).
76. *Sǔngjǒngwǒn ilgi* 1066:144b, Yǒngjo 27 (1751)/3/23 (*kyǒngsin*); *Sǔngjǒngwǒn ilgi* 1006:171b, Yǒngjo 22 (1746)/17/28 (*imsul*).
77. *Hwangjoin sajök*, fr. 80–83.
78. *Yǒngjo sillok* 53:22b, Yǒngjo 17 (1741)/4/17 (*sinhae*).
79. *Yǒngjo sillok* 111:8a, Yǒngjo 44 (1768)/7/21 (*pyǒngo*).
80. *Sǔngjǒngwǒn ilgi* 1188:49b, Yǒngjo 36 (1760)/12/9 (*kimyo*).
81. For the rites to Li Rusong, see Kuwano Eiji, “Chosŏn Korea and Ming China After the Imjin Waeran,” 299–302.
82. *Sǔngjǒngwǒn ilgi* 915:64b–65a, Yǒngjo 16 (1740)/yun6/8 (*chǒngmi*).
83. *Yǒngjo sillok* 54:21a, Yǒngjo 17 (1741)/9/14 (*pyǒngja*).
84. *Yǒngjo sillok* 53:22b, Yǒngjo 17 (1741)/4/17 (*sinhae*).
85. *Sǔngjǒngwǒn ilgi* 1066:139a–140b, Yǒngjo 27 (1751)/3/23 (*kyǒngsin*).
86. *Sǔngjǒngwǒn ilgi* 1118:113a, Yǒngjo 31 (1755)/4/24 (*chǒngmyo*).
87. *Sǔngjǒngwǒn ilgi* 1113:97b–98a, Yǒngjo 31 (1754)/11/22 (*chǒngyu*).
88. *Sǔngjǒngwǒn ilgi* 1194, Yǒngjo 37 (1761)/6/24 (*sinmyo*).
89. *Chǒngjo sillok* 12:9a, Chǒngjo 5 (1781)/7/12 (*imja*).
90. For instance, *Sǔngjǒngwǒn ilgi* 1489:87a–87b, Chǒngjo 5 (1781)/7/12 (*imja*); *Chǒngjo sillok* 46:25b, Chǒngjo 21 (1797)/3/19 (*kimi*). Both name changes occurred through royal command, according to Yi Kyusang, *18 segi Chosŏn inmulji*, 174.
91. *Sǔngjǒngwǒn ilgi* 1244:17b, Yǒngjo 41 (1765)/6/22 (*chǒngmyo*).
92. *Sǔngjǒngwǒn ilgi* 1109:167a, Yǒngjo 30 (1754)/7/18 (*ŭlmyo*).
93. In this text, however, Yi Hwŏn’s name had been changed to Wŏn.
94. *Chǒngjo sillok* 52:12b, Chǒngjo 23 (1799)/7/29 (*ŭryu*).
95. *Hwangjoin sajök*, fr. 61–62.
96. *Hwangjoin sajök*, fr. 58–59.
97. Yi Kyusang, *18 segi Chosŏn inmulji*, 174.
98. *Hwangjoin sajök*, fr. 62.
99. *Hwangjoin sajök*, fr. 63–64.
100. *Sǔngjǒngwǒn ilgi* 1282:64b–65a, Yǒngjo 44 (1768)/7/21 (*pyǒngo*).
101. *Sǔngjǒngwǒn ilgi* 1319:56a, Yǒngjo 47 (1771)/7/10 (*musin*).
102. *Sǔngjǒngwǒn ilgi* 1181:126b, Yǒngjo 36 (1760)/5/29 (*imo*).
103. *Chǒngjo sillok* 26:25a, Chǒngjo 12 (1788)/11/6 (*kapcha*).
104. *Sǔngjǒngwǒn ilgi* 1597:164a–164b, Chǒngjo 10 (1786)/3/22 (*pyǒngo*).
105. *Chǒngjo sillok* 26:28a–29b, Chǒngjo 12 (1788)/11/13 (*sinmi*).
106. *Chǒngjo sillok* 35:65b–66a, Chǒngjo 16 (1792)/9/18 (*kabin*). He is called Yi Wŏn in this record.

107. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 1738:21a, Chŏngjo 18 (1794)/11/2 (*pyŏngsul*).

108. Hwang Kyŏngwŏn, “Suk Kŏjebu kan Tŏkch’ŏn taemyŏng yumin sogŏ,” in *Kanghanjip* 2:17b–18a.

109. U Kyŏngsŏp, *Chosŏn Chunghwa juŭi*, 109n45, claims that his poem was written in 1761, when Hwang was exiled to Kŏje, which certainly seems likely, although I note no clear evidence of this. U also claims that it was written about the descendants of Li Rusong, but not only does it seem unlikely that Hwang was aware at this point of their association with Li Rusong, it also seems quite likely that the residents of the village had not yet asserted such ancestry. Kŏje, as an island, was after all a very typical residence for submitting-foreigners of all ancestries.

110. Chŏngjo, *Hongjae chŏnsŏ* 36:34a–b, “Kyo” 7; *Chŏngjo sillok* 54:24a, Chŏngjo 24 (1800)/4/8 (*kyŏngin*).

111. Pamela Kyle Crossley, “The Tong in Two Worlds: Cultural Identities in Liaodong and Nurgan during the 13th–17th Centuries,” *Ch’ing-Shih Wen-T’i* 4, no. 9 (June 1983): 21–46; Crossley, “The Qianlong Retrospective.”

112. *Chŏngjo sillok* 32:36a–36b, Chŏngjo 15 (1791)/3/19 (*kyesa*).

113. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 1811:171b, Chŏngjo 23 (1799)/7/29 (*pyŏngjin*).

114. The descendants of Chen Fengyi certainly benefited from their status. Notably, one Chin P’ilhan had a successful career under Yŏngjo. See *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 1128:185a, Yŏngjo 32 (1756)/2/24 (*imsul*); Sŏng Haeŭng, “Hwangjo yumin chŏn,” 7, *Yŏn’gyŏngjae chŏnsŏ*, 43. Notably, Chen Fengyi’s descendants’ claim to prominent Ming origins was also based on very shaky foundations. See chapter 6 for further details.

115. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 1811:172a, Chŏngjo 23 (1799)/7/29 (*ŭryu*); *Chŏngjo sillok* 52:12b–13a, Chŏngjo 23 (1799)/7/29 (*ŭryu*).

116. Yi Suhwan and Yi Pyŏnghun, “Chosŏn hugi kwihwa Chunggugin e taehan chŏngch’aek kwa Kangnŭng Yu-si Kagyŏng 2 nyŏn ch’ŏmmun,” *Minjok munhwa nonch’ong* 43 (December 2009): 502–533.

117. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 1773:17b, Chŏngjo 21 (1797)/2/3 (*kapsul*).

118. *Chŏn’gaeksa ilgi* 53, Sunjo 6 (1806)/3/17.

119. *Chŏn’gaeksa ilgi* 53, Sunjo 6 (1806)/2/19–27.

120. This case is also discussed in Adam Bohnet, “From Liaodongese Refugee to Ming Loyalist: The Historiography of the Sanggok Ma, a Ming Migrant Descent-group in Late Chosŏn Korea,” *Review of Korean Studies* 15, no. 1 (June 2012): 117–120; *Chŏn’gaeksa ilgi* 53 Sunjo 6 (1806)/7/11.

121. Park, *A Genealogy of Dissent*, 131.

122. Kwŏn Nachyŏn, *Nobi esŏ yangban ŭro*; Kyungran Kim, “A Study on the Transformation of the Surname System in Late Chosŏn—The Phenomenon of Surname Acquisition by the Name-less Class,” *International Journal of Korean History* 21, no. 1 (February 2016): 221–247.

123. Kim Hyŏk, *T’ŭkkwŏn munsŏro pon Chosŏn sahoe—wanmun ŭi munsŏ sahoehak-chŏk t’amsaek* (P’aju: Chisik sanŏpsa, 2008).

124. For instance, see Martina Deuchler, *Under the Ancestors’ Eyes*, 388–392.

125. Son Sukkyŏng, “Chosŏn hugi Tongnae Sŏktae-dong Ha-ri ūi Yŏngyang Ch’ŏn-ssi Kagye ūi sahoe chiwi wa kŭ idong—pihyangban esŏ hyangban ūro ūi sahoe idong kwa pyŏn’gyŏng chiyŏk sahoe ūi yŏkdongsŏng,” *Komunsŏ yŏn’gu* 35 (August 2009): 37–66.

126. Son Sukkyŏng, *Chosŏn hugi Tongnae Sŏktae-dong Ha-ri ūi Yŏngyang Ch’ŏn-ssi kamun kwa idŭr ūi komunsŏ* (Pusan: Tonga tachakkyo sŏkdanghaksurwŏn Han’gukhak yŏn’guso, 2009).

127. Yi Hyosŭng’s status as primary heir involved in ancestral sacrifices is specified in *Sunjo sillok* 2:40b, Sunjo 1 (1801)/3/2 (*muin*).

128. Chŏngjo, *Hongjae chŏnsŏ* 36:34a; translation adapts the quote found in Adam Bohnet, “Ruling Ideology and Marginal Subjects: Ming Loyalism and Foreign Lineages in Late Chosŏn Korea,” *Journal of Early Modern History* 15, no. 6 (2011): 501–502. The translation in my article is based not on *The Complete Works of Hongjae* (*Hongjae chŏnsŏ*), but on the less detailed text found in *The Veritable Records of King Chŏngjo: Chŏngjo sillok* 54:3a, Chŏngjo 24 (1800)/4/10 (*imjin*). I have thus edited and expanded my translation to fit the longer and more detailed version.

129. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 2147:42b, Sunjo 21 (1821)/11/17 (*kapcha*).

130. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 2107:81b, Sunjo 18 (1818)/12/20 (*kyemi*).

Chapter 6: New Narratives

1. For instance, David Mason, “The Samhyang paehyang Sacrificial Ceremony for Three Emperors: Korea’s Link to the Ming Dynasty,” *Korea Journal* 31, no. 3 (August 1991): 117–136. Even U Kyŏngsŏp’s unusually detailed work on the subject falls into this error. See U Kyŏngsŏp, *Chosŏn Chunghwa juŭi sŏngnip kwa Tong Asia* (Seoul: Yunisŭt’ori, 2013); U Kyŏngsŏp, “Chosŏn hugi kwihwa Hanin kwa Hwangjo yumin ūisik,” *Han’gukhak yŏn’gu* 27 (June 2012): 335–365; U Kyŏngsŏp, “Chosŏn hugi Taemyŏng yumin ūi mangbo chi ūi—Chenam Wang-ssi kamun ūi sarye,” *Han’gukhak yŏn’gu* 36 (February 2015): 179–206. The same may also be said of Liu Chunlan’s pioneering master’s thesis. See Yu Ch’ullan [Liu Chunlan], “Myŏng-Ch’ŏng kyoch’egi Hanjok ūi Chosŏn imin.”

2. Woodside, *Lost Modernities*; Lieberman, *Strange Parallels*.

3. Michael Szonyi, *Practicing Kinship: Lineage and Descent in Late Imperial China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002).

4. David Faure, *Emperor and Ancestor: State and Lineage in South China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).

5. Ji-Young Jung, “Widows’ Position and Agency.”

6. Kim Hyŏnyŏng, “Chosŏn hugi ūi issŏsŏ ‘chŏnt’ong ūi ch’angch’ul,” in *Chosŏn sidae sahoe ūi mosŭp*, ed. Kim Hyŏnyŏng and Yi Yŏngch’un (Seoul: Chimmundang, 2003), 15–43.

7. Sun Joo Kim, “The T’ongch’ŏng Movements.”

8. Kwŏn Kisŏk, “*Ihyang kyŏnmun nok* surok inmul ūi sahoe kyech’ŭngjŏk wisang kwa sinbun kwannyŏm,” *Chosŏn sidae sahakpo* 72 (March 2015): 269–338.

9. Sŏng Haeŭng, “P’alsŏngjŏn,” in *Yŏn’gyŏngjae chŏnjip*, sokchip, 15.

10. See Fujiwara Takao, “Sayak’a (Kim Ch’ungsŏn) ūi t’uha yoin”; Han Munjong, “Imjin waeran si ūi Hangwaejang Kim Ch’ungsŏn kwa *Mohadangjip*,” *Han-Il kwan’gye yŏn’gu* 24 (April 2006): 69–99.

11. “Green Hill” [K. Ch’ŏnggu, Ch. Qingqiu] is an alternate name for Korea.

12. “Mohadang-gi,” in *Mohadangjip* 1:25a–27a.

13. “Sasŏng Kimhae Kim-ssi sebo kusŏ,” in introductory material in *Mohadangjip*.

14. See chapter 4.

15. Hwang Kyŏngwŏn, “Ch’ogwandang-gi,” in *Kanghanjip* 10:20a–21a.

16. Hwang Kyŏngwŏn, “Suk Kŏjebu kan Tŏkch’ŏn tae Myŏng yumin sogŏ,” in *Kanghanjip* 2:17b–18a. Also see the discussion of the Nongsŏ Yi in chapter 5. It must be noted that the term that I translate as “wear hair in a barbarian fashion,” *p’ibal*, literally means “let down one’s hair,” which is not, of course, what the Qing demanded of their subjects.

17. The Four Treasuries project is surveyed by Kent Guy, *The Emperor’s Four Treasuries: Scholars and the State in the Late Ch’ien-lung Era* (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies Harvard University and Harvard University Press, 1987). Evidential scholarship is surveyed by Benjamin Elman, *From Philosophy to Philology* (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies Harvard University and Harvard University Press, 1984).

18. Within this category are included such so-called Northern Learning scholars as Hong Taeyong, Pak Chiwŏn, and Pak Chega. They are discussed by Yu Ponghak, *Yŏnam ilp’a pukhak sasang yŏn’gu* (Seoul: Ilchisa, 1995), with their revision of attitudes toward the Qing being discussed on pages 124–143.

19. Sŏng Haeŭng’s scholarship is discussed by Kim Munsik, *Chosŏn hugi kyŏnghak sasang yŏn’gu*, 74–115.

20. For instance, see the *Chonju hwip’yŏn* 1:22, where *The Record of the Dynastic Foundation* (*Kaiguo fanglue*) is quoted, if only to contradict it.

21. Crossley, “*Manzhou yuanliu kao*.”

22. Sŏng Haeŭng, *Hwangmyŏng yumin chŏn*, in *Yŏn’gyŏngjae chŏnjip*, 37. Huang Zongxi’s works were listed as extant in the Four Treasuries catalogues but not included in the project, possibly because of philosophical tendencies toward Wang Yangming, but more probably because of the anti-Manchu tendency in his writing. See Guy, *The Emperor’s Four Treasuries*, 111.

23. Lynn Struve, *The Ming-Qing Conflict, 1619–1683: A Historiography and Source Guide* (Ann Arbor, MI: Association for Asian Studies, 1998), 66–67.

24. “Tok Hwangjo isin chŏn,” in *Yŏn’gyŏngjae chŏnjip* 34:15b–16b.

25. *Hwangmyŏng yumin chŏn*, *Yŏn’gyŏngjae chŏnjip* chapters 37–43; “The introduction to *The Biographies of Remnant Subjects of the Imperial Ming* (*Hwangjo yumin chŏnsŏ*) may be found in *Yŏn’gyŏngjae chŏnjip* 31:5b–7b.

26. *Hwangjoin sajök* (Kyujanggak # 2542).
27. Thomas A. Wilson, *Genealogy of the Way: The Construction and Uses of the Confucian Tradition in Late Imperial China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995).
28. Wang Tökku, *Hwangjo yumin rok* (National Library # ko 25669).
29. The life of Wang Tökku, as well as his brother, Wang Tögil, is outlined in the “Ch’anghae Wang sönsaeng chön” in the supplement to Wang Tökku’s *Ch’anghaejip* (Kyujanggak # 3424–5), fr. 3:18–24.
30. Wang Tökku, *Hwangjo yumin rok*, fr. 2–3.
31. Kimura Takao, “Chösen kōki ni okeru “Kyūgishi” seiritsu no keii: Taimin giriron no tenkai ni soko shite,” *Tōyō bunka kenkyū* 17 (March 2017): 31–52.
32. Wang Tökku, *Hwangjo yumin rok* 1:2.
33. Kim Yuk, *Chamgok sönsaeng p’ildam*, fr. 696. Concerning Ma Shunshang’s biographies, see Bohnet, “From Liaodongese Refugee to Ming Loyalist.” This section partly follows that article.
34. “Kyo 7,” *Hongjae chönsö* 36:38a–b. While the document in the *Hongjae chönsö* is undated, from the *Kukcho pogam pyölp’yön* 8:25a–25b, the discussion would seem to have occurred in the fifth month of Chöngjo 24 (1800).
35. *Hwangjo yumin rok*, fr. 7.
36. *Yön’gyöngjae chönjip* 43:23a–b.
37. *Hwangjo yumin rok*, fr. 18.
38. *Sohwa oesa* 2:278–279.
39. *Sohwa oesa* 2:281.
40. Yi Sibai, “Chüing Tusach’ung,” in *Pyögo yugo* 2:25a.
41. *Sohwa oesa* 2:295.
42. Yin is an alternative name for the Shang dynasty.
43. *Hwangjo yumin rok*, fr. 38.
44. Söng Haeüing expresses his doubts on this subject cautiously in the preface to *The Biography of Eight Surnames*, but the overall tenor of his criticisms suggests considerable doubt as to the scholarly value of Wang Tökku’s collection. See “P’alsöngjön,” in *Yön’gyöngjae chönjip*, sokchip 15:33a–b.
45. Kim Munsik, *Chosön hugi kyönghak sasang yön’gu*, 74–75.
46. *Yön’gyöngjae chönjip*, sokchip 15:33a–b.
47. *Yön’gyöngjae chönjip*, sokchip 15:37a–37b.
48. *Yön’gyöngjae chönjip*, sokchip 15:36b–37a. The translation follows Adam Bohnet, “From Liaodongese Refugee to Ming Loyalist,” 133.
49. *Yön’gyöngjae chönjip*, sokchip 15:40a.
50. *Yön’gyöngjae chönjip*, sokchip 15:40a.
51. See chapter 5.
52. P’ung Yöngsöp’s *Taemyöng yumin sa* (Seoul: Myöngüihoe, 1989).
53. Sun Weiguo, *Da Ming qihao yu xiao Zhonghua yishi*.
54. David Mason, “The Samhyang paehyang Sacrificial Ceremony.” Mason does not seem to have consulted texts directly, however.

55. See *Xunzi* 21 (*youzuo*): 5.
56. The passage may be found in chapter 28 of *Xunzi*. See Wang Zhonlin, *Xunzi duben* (Taipei: Shanmin chupanshe, 1974), 407–408.
57. Song Siyöl, “Tap Yi Han’gyön,” in *Songja taejön soksŭbyu* 1:20b–21a.
58. *Sukchong sillok* 46:1b, Sukchong 34 (1708)/1/5 (*kyech’uk*); *Yŏngjo sillok* 40:22b, Yŏngjo 11 (1735)/3/27 (*chöngyu*).
59. *Chonju hwip’ön* 2:148–152.
60. An excellent recent discussion, which has heavily influenced my discussion here, is Seunghyun Han, “Ming Loyalist Families and the Changing Meanings of Chojong’am in Early Nineteenth Century Chosŏn,” *Acta Koreana* 21, no. 1 (June 2018): 169–203, esp. 172–178. Another exploration of the Chojongam and the Ming loyalist families is Kimura Takao, “Chōsen kōki ni okeru “Kyūgishi” seiritsu no kei: Taimin giriron no tenkai ni soko shite,” *Tōyō bunka kenkyū* 17 (March 2017): 31–52.
61. Angela Zito, *Of Body and Brush*, 55–56; Catherine Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 49–54.
62. See Wang Susöl, “Chojongam kosil yŏnp’yo,” in *Chojongamji* (Kyujanggak # ko4653, 1:60–65).
63. Kim P’yöngmuk, “Ku’isajön,” *Chojongamji*, fr. 32–46.
64. P’ung Hakcho, *Hwangjo yumin segye wölyu ko* (National Library # ko 2-1817); U Kyöngsöp, “Chosŏn hugi Taemyöng yumin ūi Mangbok chi ūi—Chenam Wang-ssi kamun ūi sarye,” *Han’gukhak yŏn’gu* 36 (February 2015): 179–206.
65. Cho Söngsan, “18 segi huban—19 segi chönb’an tae Ch’öng insik ūi pyönhwa wa saeroun Chunghwa kaenyöm ūi hyöngsöng,” *Han’guksa yŏn’gu* 145 (June 2009): 67–113; Seunghyun Han, “Ming Loyalist Families,” 170–172.
66. Joshua Van Lieu, “The Politics of Condolence: Contested Representations of Tribute in Late Nineteenth-Century Chosŏn-Qing Relations,” *Journal of Korean Studies* 14, no. 1 (Fall 2009): 83–115; Pae Usöng, *Chosŏn kwa Chunghwa*, 515–572.
67. Seunghyun Han, “Ming Loyalist Families,” 194; Wang Tökku, “Tap Chöng Nüngwön Sökhwa,” *Ch’anghaejip* 1:51b.
68. Seunghyun Han also discusses the relationship between the establishment of shrines at Chojongam and the formation of collective Ming migrant identities. My account differs with his primarily in that I do not agree that declining hostility to the Qing played a significant role in the changing status of imperial subject descent-groups.
69. *Süngjöngwön ilgi* 254:145a, Ch’öljong 4 (1853)/4/20 (*kabo*).
70. For instance, Kim Monghwa (1723–1792), *Ch’iramjip* 3:62, *kon* 60a–63b.
71. *T’ongju Kang-ssi sebo*, 3–6.
72. See Chin Pyöngyong, “Tu Sach’ung ūi saengae wa Momyöngjae e taehan yöksajök koch’al,” *Taegu sabak* 119, no. 3 (May 2015): 177–209. Although Chin does not specifically emphasize the weak evidence for the Türlüng Tu before the twentieth century, it is an aspect that I noticed strongly upon reviewing the article.
73. See chapter 2.
74. O Kyöngwön, *Sohwa oesa* 2:274–275.

75. *Chǒngjo sillok* 38:4b, Chǒngjo 17 (1793)/7/27 (*muo*).
76. *Chǒngjo sillok* 38:13a, Chǒngjo 17 (1793)/9/2 (*imjin*).
77. *Chǒngjo sillok* 42:45a, Chǒngjo 19 (1795)/yun2/26 (*musin*).
78. Yu Chǒnghyŏn, “Taemyŏng-dong myŏng,” *Chimgye sŏnsaeng yugo* 5:14a–15a.
79. Hong Chikp’il, “Hwangmyŏng tosa ch’ungdong wanjung Si-gong yuhŏbi,” *Mae-san sŏnsaeng munjip* 34:39b–41b.
80. Si Sŏngsik et al., *P’ungch’ŏnjip* (National Library # ko 3648-44-9).
81. Chǒlgang Sŏ-ssi seboso, ed., *Chǒlgang Sŏ-ssi sebo* (1978).
82. Yi Kungik, “Chunggugin,” in “Pyŏnŏ chŏn’go,” in *Yŏllyŏsil kisul pyŏljip* 18:32a.
83. For instance, “Kye-hae choejŏk,” “Injo ponmal,” *Yŏllyŏsil kisul* 25:50b.
84. Yun Haengim, “Chŏn Hogyŏm,” in *Haedong oesa, Sŏkchaego* 9, fr. 13. Yi Chŏ was discussed briefly in chapter 5.
85. P’ung Hakcho, *Hwangjo yumin segye wŏllyu ko* (National Library # ko 2-1817); Chǒlgang Sŏ-ssi seboso, ed., *Chǒlgang Sŏ-ssi sebo* (1978); *Chǒlgang kasŭng* (Yŏmsujac: 1872); Chǒlgang P’yŏn-ssi taedong seboso, ed., *Chǒlgang P’yŏn-ssi taedong sebo* (Naju: Kwanunje, 1975).
86. Seunghyun Han, “Ming Loyalist Families,” 183–187.
87. U Kyŏngsŏp, “Chosŏn hugi Taemyŏng yumin ūi Mangbo chi ūi.”

Conclusion

1. Chin Pyŏngyong, “Tu Sach’ung ūi saeng’ae wa Momyŏngjae”; Pak Kyŏngha, “Kwi-hwain Kim Ch’ungsŏn (Sayaga) ūi saeng’ae wa yŏksa munhwa k’ŏnt’ench’ŭ roŭi chae-hyŏn sarye,” *Tamunhwa kŏnt’ench’ŭ yŏn’gu* 19 (August 2015): 45–76. The Chojongam, where Wang Tŏkku reestablished Ming loyalist rituals, is now a registered cultural heritage property of Kyŏnggi Province and is listed as a key tourist site of Kap’yŏng county. When I visited Du Shizhong’s Momyŏngjae in Susŏng-gu in Daegu in 2012, I noted both the presence of explanations for Chinese tourists and facilities for Chinese tour buses. Later I noted ads in Chinese for the site on the express train from Seoul Station to Incheon International Airport.

2. Sinwoo Lee, “Blurring Boundaries: Mixed Residence, Extraterritoriality, and Citizenship in Seoul, 1876–1910,” *Journal of Korean Studies* 21, no. 1 (2016): 71–100.

3. Jaeun Kim, *Contested Embrace: Transborder Membership Politics in Twentieth-Century Korea* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016).

4. For some of the current debates concerning multiculturalism in South Korea, see especially Thomas Lim, “Late Migration, Discourse, and the Politics of Multiculturalism in South Korea,” in *Multiethnic Korea? Multiculturalism, Migration, and Peoplehood Diversity in Contemporary South Korea*, ed. John Lie (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 2014), 31–57; Euyryung Jun, “Tolerance, *Tamunhwa* and the Creating of the New Citizens,” in *Multiethnic Korea?*, 80–94.

5. Ji Hyun Ahn, “Rearticulating Black Mixed-Race in the Era of Globalization: Hines Ward and the Struggle for Koreanness in Contemporary South Korean Media,” *Cultural Studies* 28, no. 3 (2014): 391–417.

6. Palais, *Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions*, 212–213 and 232–237.

7. Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, rev. ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 27–34.

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