Under the policies of the United States, it will be very difficult to prohibit schools of this kind unless it were definitely proven that they were teaching treasonable things.

--- P. P. Claxton, U. S. Commissioner of Education

This article critically examines how the 1919 Federal Survey of Education in Hawaii, under the guise of a scientific study to guide educational reform was used as the means to implement colonial policies over the territory’s largest ethnic group, the Nikkei, people of Japanese ancestry. Furthermore, the survey was also used by various other political and religious parties and individuals to further their own objectives. Although there were many facets to the federal survey, this study focuses only on the debate surrounding Japanese language schools, the most sensational issue of the survey. The battle over the control of Japanese language schools among the white ruling class, educational authorities, and the Nikkei community in Hawaii created the foundation for an anti-Japanese language school movement that spread to the West Coast of the United States. The survey was also a catalyst for Nikkei in redefining their Japanese language schools and a battleground concerning their future and identity. Despite numerous studies on Japanese Americans in Hawaii, and studies of the Japanese language schools, neither the process, results, nor effects of the survey have been critically examined to date. This paper analyzes the process of how the federal survey evolved and arrived at its conclusions through an examination of the Education Bureau’s files in order to illuminate the origins of the Japanese language school control movement and its chapter of ethnic American educational history.

The Federal Survey of Education in Hawaii, conducted in 1919, is among the most influential education surveys done by the United States Bureau of Education in the years following World War I. The opportunity to invite a survey committee to any community was offered nationwide by the federal government. It was intended to provide a “first hand study of local conditions” conducted by national education leaders to share their expertise with local authorities so that “children of all the people may be prepared for national life.” School surveys, which flourished from the late 1910s to 1920s, were both an instrument of progressive educators and a reflection of the movement’s values.
As historian Diane Ravitch and others have demonstrated, progressive education was a “complex series of related movements.” One of the tenets of progressive education was to examine the whole educational environment surrounding a school using “objective” methods in order to discover the “facts” and offer recommendations for educators to “base action on evidence rather than on tradition or speculation.” Surveys were supposed to bring local educational issues and facts into the public sphere.

When the federal survey came to Hawaii, the governor, the superintendent of public schools, as well as civic, business, and religious leaders, each had their own research agenda and attempted to influence the survey team’s “scientific study.” The primary issue the territorial legislature requested the survey to investigate was the 163 Japanese language schools accused of instilling “anti-Americanism” in over 20,000 Japanese American students in Hawaii. During World War I, the American public’s tensions over ethnic diversity became intense; the dominant group’s perception of immigrants was that diversity signified disloyalty, creating the impulse for “100 percent Americanism” throughout the early 1920s. In education, Americanizers in states such as California and Minnesota, mandated English by law as the basic language of instruction in elementary schools both public and private, while other states, such as Nebraska, prohibited teaching a foreign language in early grades at any school. In Hawaii, the casting of Japanese language schools as an “educational problem” reflected the control aspirations of the Territorial Department of Public Instruction (DPI), supposedly representing the people’s interest, despite the fact that nearly half of Hawaii’s population was of Japanese descent.

Background

As Gary Okihiro, Ronald Takaki, and others have demonstrated, there was an interplay between colonialism and the recruitment of Japanese to Hawaii as laborers on sugar cane plantations. Hawaii’s sugar industry grew rapidly and became the center of power on the islands controlled by a group of elite haole, Caucasians, who were mostly descendents of pioneering American and British missionaries. The Reciprocity Treaty of 1875 enabled Hawaii to send sugar tariff-free to the United States and tremendously boosted Hawaii’s economy; as can be seen by the growth of plantations from 20 in 1875 to 63 only five years later. The increase, however, aggravated labor shortages which were already strained when Chinese workers who were initially recruited as plantation laborers abandoned their abysmal working conditions
once they completed their contracts. Even before the first 150 Japanese immigrants, the *gannenmono*, were brought to Hawaii in 1868, Japanese were envisioned as the solution to Hawaii’s labor needs. The Nikkei population steadily increased to about 60,000 in 1900, 80,000 in 1910, and 110,000 by 1920, representing 42.7% of the Islands’ population. Planters were initially overjoyed as many Japanese workers in the 1900s changed their perspectives from one of sojourners to settlers. Workers brought wives and “picture brides” from Japan, so that by 1920 the second generation, or Nisei, made up 44.5% of the territory’s Nikkei population. Many whites feared that the Japanese Americans in Hawaii would dominate the Islands, a paranoia built on Japan’s military victories and colonialism in Asia and increasing Nikkei assertiveness in the 1909 and 1920 plantation strikes. This paranoia was exacerbated by the fear that the Nisei, who were American citizens (their parents were not allowed to become American citizens until 1952), would become the dominant-voting block in the territory’s electorate. This specter was fanned by a network of Japanese exclusionists who dramatized the increase of Nikkei in Hawaii as a part of their campaign to exclude Japanese immigration and limit Japanese ability to own land and even to remove the constitutional protection of the Nisei’s American citizenship.

The first Japanese language school in Hawaii was established in 1893 to teach Japanese to Nisei children in order to assist their smooth transition when they went “back home” and entered a school in Japan. Japanese immigrant parents in Hawaii, many of whom worked from dawn to dusk in plantations, appreciated the schools as daycare facilities as well as their teaching “correct” Japanese to Nisei who spoke a mixture of English, Japanese, and Hawaiian. Hawai’i’s Japanese language schools were administered by groups of parents, Christian churches, or Buddhist temples, and were supported by tuition fees. Many were also subsidized by plantation owners who primarily saw them as incentives to keep their cheap labor on the farm. Planters welcomed Buddhist missions at first since they used racial/cultural differences to prevent unity among laborers and to foster inter-group competition. Buddhist priests and planters saw each other as serving mutual interests; Buddhist priests, initially standing on the side of the planters, reconciled troubles between Japanese workers and their plantation managers in exchange for the planter’s support for their ministry. With some exceptions, this symbiotic relationship continued until the 1919 higher wage movement. Then, Bishop Imamura of Hongwanji and priests of several other Buddhist sects sent a letter asking the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association (HSPA) to yield to the demands of the Japanese laborers.
This eventually worsened into total confrontation as negotiations fell through, leading to the 1920 Oahu sugar plantation strike when Japanese schools were used for strike meetings and shelters for dispossessed workers. Buddhist teachers and officials of the Young Men’s Buddhist Association played a prominent role in the six-month strike.

The religious war between Christian and Buddhist clergy characterizes another aspect of the Japanese language school controversy in Hawaii. Japanese Christians started missionary work in the Islands around the 1890s and initially managed to convince some Issei, first generation Japanese immigrants, to send their children to Christian Japanese schools. The majority of Issei, who were predominantly Buddhist, “considered Christianity an irrational and austere religion” and soon joined the Buddhist temples and their Japanese language schools once they were established at the turn of the century. As a result, enrollment at the school established by Rev. Takie Okumura, a leader of the Japanese Christian missionaries in Honolulu, plunged overnight. With large congregations and the planters’ endorsements, Buddhist denominational schools, especially Hongwanji’s, prospered, suggesting to some that “the Japanese were determined to stoutly resist assimilation and to reinforce their own religious and cultural heritage.” They became a target of the post-World War I Americanization movement that often blurred the line between “Americanizing” and Christian proselytizing. Christians charged Buddhist schools with raising children as “subjects of the Japanese Emperor.” As this religious rivalry escalated, Rev. Okumura, losing so much of the battle to the Buddhist temples, seized any chances to label Buddhist temples and schools as un-American and constantly projected this image to the public. Hawaii’s leading dailies, the Pacific Commercial Advertiser and Honolulu Star Bulletin, also alleged involvement of the Japanese government in plotting “a peaceful invasion” of the United States.

Japanese language schools were also perceived as a competitor of and even a threat to public education. Of the 20,651 Japanese students who accounted for close to 50% of Hawaii’s public schools’ enrollment, 20,196 or 97.8% also attended Japanese language schools in 1920. In this early period, Japanese language schools were conducted in accordance with the principles of the Japanese National Education policy and followed the way that Japanese public elementary schools were conducted. Schools brought teachers from Japan, adopted textbooks compiled by the Japanese Ministry of Education, and celebrated Japanese holidays including the Emperor’s birthday. On the Emperor’s birthday, many
Nisei children did not go to public schools and attended the ceremony held in their Japanese language schools, paying respect to the Emperor’s picture and reading the Imperial Rescript on Education. Because of the absences of the majority of the students, some of Hawaii’s public schools had no choice but to close for the day. Public school teachers also complained of Japanese American children who spoke “Hawaii Creole English,” popularly called “Pidgin English.” This actually was not a “problem” of only Japanese children. In fact, “only 2 or 3 percent of all students entering public school spoke Standard English” as late as 1920. Public school teachers blamed this language problem on Japanese language schools. White parents also protested that their children were placed in classes “where Hawaii Creole English was the spoken language, and where, among ‘swarms of Orientals,’ their children would ‘unconsciously pick up and adopt Oriental manners and mannerisms.’” Until 1910, most children from haole families who were in the upper class went to a private school that limited the admission of non-whites. However, continued migration of middle-class whites, following Hawaii’s 1898 annexation by the United States, completely changed the territory’s educational contours. These white children, unable to attend costly and overcrowded private schools, were sent to public schools with Asian American children. Frustrated white parents complained about the public school system and demanded sweeping changes.

Amid this turmoil, former Territorial Senator Albert F. Judd launched a Japanese school control law campaign on January 4, 1919 in the Islands’ leading newspaper, the _Pacific Commercial Advertiser_. He proposed a bill that would require public and private school teachers to pass a certification exam on knowledge of English, American history and civics. Understandably, Japanese language educators strongly opposed Judd’s bill since, if enacted, it would mean the death of most schools as few Japanese teachers spoke fluent English. After the territorial legislature tabled the bill, on March 10 Lorrin Andrews, a Republican offspring of an old Hawaii missionary family, proposed to the House that all private schools be licensed by the DPI and that an inspector of foreign language schools should be appointed. While Andrews’ bill was still in the House, the Chairman of the House Education Committee, Henry Lyman, revived the Judd bill on March 20, and on April 11 he introduced another bill to restrict the operating hours of language schools. Facing strong protests from the Japanese community and perhaps having an awareness of the State Department’s warning to California to halt its exclusion movement, the legislature passed neither Andrews’ nor Lyman’s bills. After these school control bills failed in 1919, the legislature
passed an act authorizing Governor Charles McCarthy and Superintendent of Public Instruction Vaughan MacCaughey to request the United States Bureau of Education to conduct a survey of education in Hawaii.

Precursors to the Survey

Momentum for the 1919 Federal Educational Survey had actually developed over time. Correspondence between Commissioner of the Bureau of Education, Philander P. Claxton and other interested parties in Hawaii illustrate how the mission of the federal study evolved, and the Japanese language school issue became the focus of the 1919 survey. As early as June 1914, H. B. Penhallow, Chairman of the Hawaii Senate Committee on Education, requested the Bureau of Education to investigate the possibility “for the College of Hawaii to take over the Normal School as a preparatory department” and also study administrative aspects of the DPI. Although Claxton acknowledged Penhallow’s request, Claxton received no response to a follow-up inquiry.

Two years later, Agnes Weaver, Chairman of the Service Committee of the College Club, a social reform organization of some 200 college-educated women in the islands, wrote Claxton. Weaver complained of the poor quality of teachers that the Territorial Normal School supplied for public grammar and primary schools in Hawaii; the majority of whom, she noted, were of Asian ancestry. She claimed that the graduates of the Normal School had merely four years of training at the school above the eighth grade, and that they have better opportunities for employment than more qualified teachers among “our very own” (presumably whites), who added teacher’s training to their high school diploma and college degree in the mainland United States. The club empowered its critique of the status quo by flexing white supremacy.

Commenting on a list of Normal School graduates the College Club states:

Notice how largely they are drawn from social group the least American in blood and bringing up. That they should share in all forms of our Island life is best, but that they should dominate our schools, seems doubtful.

Contrary to Weaver’s claim, however, the statistics showing the ethnicity of teachers in Hawaii’s public schools in 1916 indicate that whites occupied 52% (American 47.8% and British 4.2%), and the total of Portuguese, Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean all combined accounted for only 15.4% of all teaching positions, despite the fact that students of these groups made up over 72% of the public school population. We cannot test Weaver’s claim as to whether whites who received higher education outside
the Islands were treated unequally with graduates of the Hawaii Normal School in either “salary or in other conditions of employment,” but the statistics above show that the “social group” Weaver perceived as “the least American in blood and bringing up” certainly did not dominate public education in Hawaii.

Weaver who was frustrated by months of resistance by Governor Lucius E. Pinkham and the Superintendent of Public Instruction, Henry W. Kinney against a federal survey, implored Claxton, “The governor is on the ragged edge of nervous breakdown, senile dementia and insane egotism,” and “the Superintendent . . . has never made good in [sic] anything.” Weaver further classified the commissioners as big businessmen, who “take their work as Commissioners lightly.” She even accused the Inspector General of Schools and the Superintendent of the Normal Schools of being corrupt. Weaver begged Claxton to come to Hawaii on his own initiative. Governor Pinkham, knowing of the College Club’s direct plea to Claxton, defended himself, writing to Claxton, “there seems to be a rather hazy idea being publicly expressed by these ladies that there should be a Federal Survey made of our schools.” After stalling on the issue for several months, Pinkham sent an “unofficial” invitation for Claxton to come to the Territory of Hawaii as a “personal visit,” but not for an official investigation. He asked Claxton to investigate a way to improve the Islands’ institutions of higher education, but insisted that the focus not be on the quality of the Normal School. Later, at a meeting with Weaver and Kate W. Forbes, President of the College Club, Pinkham finally conceded to the demands for a federal survey.

On April 12, 1917, Pinkham signed a bill officially inviting a federal survey; however, the invitation from the governor was not sent for another nine months. Superintendent Kinney also wrote Claxton to welcome his survey committee. In his letter, Kinney described Hawaii’s situation as one of getting public school students “to turn towards agricultural and mechanical directions” rather than “clerical and similar occupations.” From this perspective, he asked Claxton to send “practical school men, Normal trained and with actual experience as teachers, rather than educational theorists.” Meanwhile though, Charles James McCarthy succeeded Pinkham as governor on June 22, 1918, which postponed the survey until the new governor officially re-invited the Commissioner’s survey team. Claxton wrote McCarthy that he was planning to conduct the survey from January to March 1919. However, the bureau’s work in postwar educational planning again delayed the survey team.
These exchanges between Claxton and different parities in Hawaii exemplified worldviews of Hawaii’s hegemony in the two decades following annexation. In Hawaii, major positions in the territorial government remained appointments, and most government officials were under the influence, if not control, of the oligarchy, white business leaders who started as agents for the sugar plantations, but later built complex interlocking corporations. They monopolized insurance, utilities, wholesale and retail merchandising firms as well as rail and sea transportation, thus controlling much more than simply the territory’s economy.

The concern of territorial officials, under the oligarchy’s influence, was not to give Japanese American children educational opportunities and a chance to move upward, but rather to contain them in the lower rungs of society as plantation laborers. In fact, many oligarchs viewed public schooling beyond the fourth grade not only as a waste of their taxes, but as a menace that “will destroy us.” As Fuchs demonstrates, the oligarchy saw raising future leaders as entirely the mission of the private schools for haoles, and they wanted public schools to preserve the remaining people of color as docile laborers.

Shortly after the study’s postponement, the territorial legislature and media began calling for a Japanese language school control bill. The momentum for the survey to focus on Japanese language schools mirrors the Hawaii of the time: the Japanese higher wage movement and the ensuing large-scale strike in Oahu sugar plantations in January 1920. This was also influenced by the postwar revival of the Japanese exclusion movement in California started by Senator James D. Phelan (Democrat, California) to realize their objectives of a stringent alien land law and federal legislation terminating Japanese immigration, and removing Nisei citizenship.

The 1919 Federal Survey

The April 8, 1919 appointment of Vaughan MacCaughey as Hawaii’s Superintendent of Public Instruction dramatically changed the scene. MacCaughey informed Claxton that he was “anxious to hasten the Federal School Survey.” A former head of the Department of Natural Sciences and Vice President of the Territorial Normal School, MacCaughey had been Professor of Botany at the College of Hawaii since 1910 and was also the Director of the Hawaii Chapter of the National Education Association (NEA). Unlike his predecessor, MacCaughey seemed obsessed with the idea of bringing the federal survey and had
his own agenda that would greatly influence the investigation. Over the next few months, MacCaughey sent Claxton a flood of anti-Japanese propaganda and editorials against language schools. With false modesty, he wrote Claxton, “I do not wish to ‘pester’ you with promiscuous clippings, but I do feel that your survey committee should sense our local situation with reference to the Japanese Language Schools.”

MacCaughey further wrote:

The bulk of Hawaii’s school population attends Japanese language schools six days per week, throughout practically the entire year. The teachers in these schools are all aliens and are imported from Japan. They have little or no knowledge of American institutions or ideals.69

To MacCaughey, Hawaii’s educational problem was the 40,000 alien illiterates, created by an “artificially stimulated immigration,” importing “low grades of agricultural labor (mostly Asiatic)” to work on the sugar plantations.70 His sharpest attacks were against the Japanese, the largest ethnic group on the Islands, pointing out that Japanese American pupils were 40% of the public schools’ enrollment, growing from 1,300 in 1910 to 16,000 by 1919, and 20,651 the next year. The problem, wrote MacCaughey, is not only in their dominant and increasing numbers, but also their language schools that were mostly “under the control of reactionary Buddhist priests.” He labeled the latter as “medieval, ultra-superstitious and intensely Japanese,” teaching “Mikado-worship,” claiming they directly conflict with “the efforts of the public schools toward genuine Americanization.”71 Emphasizing the importance of religious education in an article published before his appointment, MacCaughey contended that Asian immigration brought an extraordinary number of “Buddhist Oriental households,” and that “Hawaii cannot be American until she truly Christianizes her population.”72 This and other evidence suggests that MacCaughey’s passion to indict Japanese language schools was rooted in his affiliation with the Congregational Church and the Hawaiian Evangelical Association.73 Louise H. Hunter, who studied Buddhist-Christian conflict in Hawaii, wrote that “With the exception of Takie Okumura, probably no one was more opposed to foreign language schools (the Buddhist in particular) than Vaughan MacCaughey” even before he became Superintendent.

MacCaughey, in fact, was largely responsible for inflating the Japanese school “issue,” as it was not on the federal survey agenda before he succeeded Kinney.74 Aware of his attitudes towards Buddhist language schools, “the Japanese press took careful note of MacCaughey’s tirades,” and as predicted, the Japanese community found itself amid controversy before the end of MacCaughey’s first year in office.75
On October 10, 1919, Frank F. Bunker, the bureau’s urban education specialist, and the survey’s director arrived in Hawaii on the Munea. The other two members of the commission joined Bunker later that month. They were William W. Kemp, Chairman of the Education Department at the University of California, who was sent to study elementary and normal schools, and Parke R. Koble, President of Akron’s Municipal University, who was charged with investigating higher education. The territorial government allocated $3,000 to finance the survey for three months.

Bunker conferred with Hawaii’s civic leaders, such as the governor, the superintendent of public instruction, territorial education committee members, the deputy attorney general, immigration officials, principals of Honolulu’s schools, former Governor Frear, and other prominent leaders. Bunker reported that everyone’s attitude “towards the survey appears to be all that we could possibly ask.” Bunker quickly identified two problems requiring careful study: teacher supply and the Japanese language schools. On the first problem, he explained that most of the rural schools are isolated, remote, and mostly inhabited by “Oriental laborers,” that offer “no inducement for a refined, educated young woman.” The teachers from the territorial normal schools are products of “the spell of a desire for numbers.” This simply repeats “the vicious circle” in which children of immigrants, whom Bunker believed spoke imperfect English themselves, parallel “the blind attempt[ing] to lead the blind.” Bunker stressed the Japanese language school issue, calling it “beyond all other questions.” He also asked Claxton to send him the bureau’s files on wartime suppression of foreign language teaching and state laws prohibiting foreign language teaching, such as Nebraska’s ban on German language instruction.

The survey team visited schools on each of the four major islands by boat, car, and horseback. After visiting public schools and Japanese language schools on the island of Hawaii for almost a week, Bunker called the experience illuminating and was confident despite the complicated problems that “require much hard, painstaking work to unravel.” Within the first few weeks, Bunker realized they had underestimated the travel expenses of the study and that he had not understood the importance of the private schools. He explained to Claxton that private schools dominate the entire situation, while public schools were considered merely a means to satisfy the “foreigners.” After a search for additional funds, the governor approved MacCaughey’s suggestion to allocate an additional $2,000 to cover the difference
and also the expenses for a fourth survey team member, George R. Twiss, Ohio State University Professor of Secondary Education and State high-school inspector, to examine the private schools.87

In addition to observing schools, survey commission members conferred with “all of the civic clubs of the Islands” including the Social Science Club and the College Club. In addition, the commission sent questionnaires to all teachers and principals on the Islands. They also solicited opinions of the schools from another 200 unspecified “representatives citizens of all races in the Territory.” 88 Japanese voices, however, were marginalized or at least not recorded.

News of the federal survey made headlines daily in the territory’s English and Japanese newspapers, and was also routinely editorialized on in an effort to influence the commissioners. The Ad Club, a group of elites mostly in advertising and related businesses, held a meeting on November 5 to discuss “the Japanese language school problem” in Hawaii. Keynote speaker Richard H. Trent condemned the present territorial legislature for failing to enact the Japanese language school control bills. He reprimanded them as “sowing a wind which … will be reaped as a whirlwind, and shake the foundation of Americanism.” 89 As a banker and president of the Honolulu Stock Exchange, Trent, like much of the club’s membership, was doubtlessly close to the oligarchy.90 Trent lambasted the legislature’s prolonging the existence of the Japanese schools, which he claimed had grown so much that lawmakers now could not even put them under DPI supervision. He suggested a remedy to what he called the “dual schooling situation” by having Japanese parents choose either to send their children to public schools or privately funded Japanese schools so that no child could attend both. Trent’s alternative proposal was to call for a special session of the legislature “for the purpose of legislating them out of existence” and encouraged his audience to note which legislators “betray our Americanism.” 91 The Ad Club endorsed Trent’s recommendations amid the presence of the invited guests from the federal survey commission. The Maui News approved of Trent’s proposal and called for immediate action.92 Four days after Trent’s speech, Rev. Albert W. Palmer, pastor of Honolulu’s prestigious Central Union Church, lectured on the Japanese language school issue to an audience of American Legionaries.93 “These Islands must be 100 percent American,” proclaimed Palmer, adding, “It is our responsibility to make them so.” Palmer claimed, “The first and most obvious step is the elimination of the foreign language school,” and he proposed a campaign to explain Americanization and “why the foreign language schools are bad and seek their cooperation.” He
cautioned that ruthless, tactless methods could raise resistance towards Americanization and suggested that pupils in the eighth grade or above should have opportunities to take any language in public school if there is sufficient demand. The Ad Club later adopted Palmer’s suggestion in its recommendations on “policy and program [for the] foreign language school question.”

Fred Makino, activist and publisher of the Hawaii Hochi, blamed plantation owners of reviving “the school agitation … again to cloud the higher wage movement among plantation laborers.” It is important to understand that the federal study team came to Hawaii in the midst of a dispute between plantation workers and the HSPA. Japanese American workers reorganized the Association for Higher Wages, dormant since the 1909 strike, and were demanding higher wages and changes to the bonus system which was not adjusting to the skyrocketing postwar inflation. Makino and others in the higher wage movement perceived the planters’ attack on Japanese language schools primarily as an instrument to distract attention from labor’s plea for increased pay. Makino ridiculed how the planters rationalized their act of abolishing language schools on the incredulous basis that “they are prompted by [the] patriotic motive” of Americanization. He correctly predicted that “abolition of the language schools would be unconstitutional.” In addition, the Hawaii Shimpo warned sugar plantation owners that abolishing Japanese language schools would result in a shortage of plantation laborers, as it would encourage Japanese to leave Hawaii. On the other hand, Yasutaro Soga, the accommodationist editor of the Nippu Jiji, blamed Buddhist priests for the Japanese school agitation.

Provoking more public outrage, the Advertiser claimed that not only did Japanese schools not teach Christian religion, but that they taught a religion that “regards the Mikado as divine,” incompatible with the principles of Americanism. Furthermore, the Advertiser agitated readers by asking, “Can we afford to have future American citizens brought up in the belief that the ruler of a foreign land is superior to the government of this country?” The editor also pointed out the prevailing use of “pidgin English” among the Japanese children and erroneously claimed that foreign language schools prevented them from learning English, and even worse, that “they quickly contaminate the children that come from English-speaking homes.”

Upon receiving Bunker’s first draft of what became the report’s first chapter, Claxton complemented Bunker’s work on the “population situation,” and replied with further instructions. Claxton,
by that time fully aware of MacCaughey’s thoughts on the Japanese schools, encouraged Bunker to “confer freely with MacCaughey about what should be done in regard to the Japanese language schools.” However, Claxton cautioned, “Under the policies of the United States, it will be very difficult to prohibit schools of this kind unless it were definitely proven that they were teaching treasonable things.” Claxton’s own view of Hawaii’s Japanese school situation, shared with Bunker before his departure was that these children should learn their parents’ native tongue as a second language in the public schools just as other European languages are offered. He reiterated this view in his letter: “Of course, this [offering Japanese at public schools] would not prevent the organization and maintenance of religious schools of any kind – Christian, Mohammedan, Buddhist, or what not, but democracy and freedom must always assume the risks inherent in their very nature.” On one hand, Claxton had a rather liberal perspective on Americanization; he had taken an unpopular position by defending teaching German during World War I and had a reputation for never making “any religious distinctions in administrative policy.” On the other hand, that Claxton instructed Bunker to work with MacCaughey suggests pragmatism at best, since Claxton understood MacCaughey’s desired outcome for the educational survey. In either case, Claxton’s heeding seemed not to discourage Bunker’s attack on the Japanese schools.

On December 23, Bunker informed Claxton that he would receive a draft of the second chapter of the report, an examination of the foreign language school situation. Bunker’s letter exudes excitement and pride for completing what he called an “accurate study of the facts.” However, “to be absolutely certain,” Bunker claimed he had submitted his report to several “Japanese scholars.” Bunker wrote Claxton that the “Japanese will make splendid American citizens” and cleared the Japanese government of “attempting to exercise any political control over her people in the Territory.” Rather he saw the Americanization problem as “a religious one [,) and the Buddhist and Shinto religions provide a mighty poor soil for the growing of American citizens.” He was convinced that if the present Japanese language schools were wiped out, “thousands of Japanese parents . . . will be glad for their children to occupy their entire time with the English language alone,” since he believed these children attend those schools only out of “the fear which their parents have of Buddhist priests and teachers.” Bunker arrogantly predicted that once the Japanese schools were terminated, few of the Japanese students would study Japanese even if the opportunity were offered at public schools.
In the same letter, Bunker encouraged Claxton to confer with Governor McCarthy when he came to Washington, D.C., in January. According to “a number of inquiries among confidants of the Governor,” Bunker wrote, McCarthy was quite pro-Japanese and “rather inclined to let the language schools alone.” In fact, on August 5, 1918 the newly appointed Governor McCarthy had delivered an official address at the Hongwanji Temple and publicly approved “the existence and extension of the Japanese school system.” He praised the Buddhist temple’s 20 years of teaching Japanese children born in Hawaii the language of their parents. The governor told Japanese parents, “I believe you should educate your children to be good citizens of the United States, that they be taught the Japanese language and whatever religion their parents or guardians think proper.” However, Bunker had been informed that the governor had changed his perspective and became quite “as anti-Japanese as are the rabid agitators on the mainland coast.” The letter continued that the governor implied an alarming situation, arising between the United States and Japan to editors of the leading newspapers and advised them to “begin, somewhat quietly, the policy of arousing public sentiment against the Japanese.” The change of heart reflects how the oligarchy co-opted McCarthy. As governor, McCarthy was initially critical of the oligarchy and gave them a hard time. He and his treasurer Delbert Metzger administered strict laws to one of the oligarchy’s operations, the insurance business. They also significantly raised the assessment on land belonging to the oligarchs by re-evaluating them with Metzger’s formula. However, when McCarthy, who came from a poor Irish family and was unsuccessful in various businesses, was approached by one of the Big Five, Henry Baldwin, McCarthy enjoyed being flattered and became more “pliable and acquiesced.” Although McCarthy “publicly endorsed the Japanese schools as a secondary system for the education of the Japanese,” this was before the revival of the Japanese higher wage movement. Later, he became even more anti-Japanese to the extent that he came out in favor of California Senator Phelan’s proposal for a constitutional amendment to deny the Nisei’s citizenship. Bunker urged Claxton to find out the governor’s true opinion on the Japanese language school issue to make sure that the survey report would not fail the governor’s expectations. After Kolbe and Kemp finished their work and left for home, Twiss finally arrived in Hawaii on December 23, accompanied by his wife and Mrs. Bunker. Bunker’s surviving Hawaii correspondence ended on January 6, 1920, reporting he was waiting for the next ship to return. Finally, on May 28, 1920, Bunker mailed from Washington, D.C., 2,000 copies of the report for
MacCaughey to distribute in the Islands. The report was also serially published in the *Honolulu Star Bulletin* throughout June 1920.

The bureau’s files reveal even more actors behind the scenes. Around the time the commission was engaged on the Hawaii survey, Claxton’s office, the Bureau of Education, received a confidential Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) memoranda regarding Hawaii’s Japanese language school problem. As the United States and Japan competed for power in the Pacific, Hawaii became an important strategic location for America’s commercial and military interests. This, combined with the Nikkei population and labor movement, and Japan’s growing military, led Hawaii’s military intelligence community to become suspicious. Umetaro Okumura, Rev. Okumura’s son, working as an HSPA translator and also an ONI informant since at least 1918, was likely responsible for some of the “information” that influenced the federal survey. An ONI report of August 20, 1919 dealt with conflict within the Nikkei community on the language school issue and struggles with the series of foreign language school control bills. The report began with the line, “The Buddhist priests who hold that the advancement of Emperor worship must be put first and foremost in teaching and training of the American born Japanese children … won another victory in the Japanese Language School controversy.” According to the report, the *Nippu Jiji*’s Soga criticized the Buddhists’ inconsistent attitude of dealing with the school issue and playing a double game; “though the mission emphatically tells the Americans that it favors the preaching of Americanism, as a matter of fact it is preaching and spreading the principles of Buddhism through its educational work.” The report further “confirmed” the popular theory that “Buddhist schools are anti-American,” writing “these Japanese themselves in Hawaii who have turned away from Buddhism to Christianity will not concede any possible harmony between Buddhist and American democratic ideals.” The report cynically portrayed the Japanese as gloating over the victory against the language bill, and praised “the wiser element” who “began at once to plan a reformation of the Language School policy” in response to growing public sentiment. We may never know the identity of this informant, but it is suggestive that Takie Okumura uses almost the identical language in his book, *Taiheiyo no Rakuen* [Paradise in the Pacific].

The ONI had conducted its own investigation of Japanese in Hawaii, and identified, based on the May 1918 Army’s Military Intelligence Division’s Merriam report, three supposed sources of anti-Americanism: the Japanese government, Japanese schools, and Buddhism. The August 14, 1918 ONI
report, produced by “a Japanese informant in Hawaii,” was very similar to the one Claxton received dated August 20, 1919 charging, “Buddhist priests in Hawaii, while ostensibly loyal to the United States, are in reality doing everything in their power to undermine any American allegiance entertained by the Japanese in Hawaii.” Army Intelligence also investigated what it perceived as Japanese subversion in Hawaii and the means to terminate it. McCarthy wrote to Claxton’s superior, the Secretary of Interior, to inform him that “at the request of the Intelligence Bureau of the Hawaiian Department, there was introduced at the regular Session of the Legislature in 1919 an act providing for the regulation of foreign language schools.” Facing intense resistance of the Japanese to the school control bills and their defeat, the military urged legislative support for military control. These ONI and MID reports on “Japanism” and subversive agents labeled the Japanese language schools and Buddhist temples as centers of anti-Americanism.

The Report

The published federal survey report consists of eight chapters, of which chapter three, “The Foreign Language Schools,” was written by Bunker himself. The report seems greatly influenced by Rev. Okumura in terms of his perspective on the Japanese language school situation in relation to his conflict with the dominant Buddhist sect. The first half of the chapter describes the origin of the Japanese schools, credited much to early Japanese Christian missionaries brought over by the Hawaii Mission Board. The report introduces the now famous narrative of why Okumura established the first Japanese school in Honolulu. The story is of a little Nisei girl’s language, an unintelligible mixture of English, Japanese, and Hawaiian words, which not only concerned Okumura, but also gave him “a further opportunity . . . to advance the Christian faith in the goodwill of the people of their race.” The school started in very poor conditions, yet soon received contributions as the number of students multiplied, and Okumura erected a school building. However, worried that the success of his school would give Buddhists a pretext for starting their own schools, Okumura supposedly separated himself and religion from the school’s administration. In his Seventy Years of Divine Blessings, Okumura gave an account of his struggle with cutting off the relationship between religion and Japanese education. He wrote of frankly discussing his concerns with Hongwanji Bishop Enmyo Imamura and of their supposed reaching of an agreement. However, Okumura claimed that Buddhists simply opened their own schools, and enrollment at his school
plunged from 700 to 200. Okumura explained, “this was the real beginning of oft-repeated friction
between religiously-independent and Buddhist schools.”

Bunker’s report on the Buddhist schools focuses on the Hongwanji sect, emphasizing its scale:
75,000 members, 60 churches and substations, 30 Young Men’s Buddhist Association, 40 Young Women’s
Buddhist Association chapters, and 42 Japanese language schools, embracing some 7,100 children and 155
teachers in Hawaii alone. The report then stresses its strength as an organization and power over its
followers depicting the image of a medieval and dogmatic cult. Bunker wrote that the head of the sect, the
“Hoss,” is seen as “a living Buddha,” and his representative in the islands, the “Kantoku,” (Bishop
Imamura) “has absolute authority.” The image of the teachers at Hongwanji schools, the report portrays,
is of anti-democratic agents of “Japanism” providing fuel for the anti-Japanese activists’ charge that they
teach “Mikadoism.” The report casts suspicion on the schools’ preference for teachers from Japan over
Hawaii Nisei. It used the following quote by a Buddhist priest to show that this was not only because of the
different language ability of teachers but also because

Any man who is to teach Japanese language schools should not be a man with
democratic ideas. The language school is not a place for a man with strong
democratic ideas. A man of strong Japanese ideas should be its teacher.

This episode is also found in Okumura’s Taiheiyo no Rakuen, regarding an incident that supposedly
happened at a Maui Japanese Education Association conference.

The survey’s summary of the Japanese Education Association was written in an ambiguous
manner, either the result of editing or Bunker’s hope that one would read between lines to understand its
intent. Teachers established the association in 1914 to coordinate affairs of the Japanese language schools.
According to the survey, it was originally proposed to include members besides teachers, but this was
rejected at the first meeting. Their meetings since “have had no representation from those outside the
teaching corps.” This refers to Okumura’s 1915 effort to revise the fifth article of the association’s
proposed bylaws, restricting regular memberships in the association to teachers in Hawaii. Bunker’s
description of the association suggests that the association, consisting exclusively of Japanese teachers,
many of whom were Buddhist priests, had been administered without external review although Okumura
and Christian Japanese schools proposed to open it to the public in order to reduce public suspicion of these
schools. The report also implied how Buddhist language schools cause trouble and need outside control.
Bunker wrote, “Indeed, the association has so far found it very difficult to outline an educational policy which will command the support of the Hongwanji, the Jodo, the Independent, and the Christian groups.”\textsuperscript{133}

The federal commission also examined the Japanese language textbooks that were originally compiled by the Japanese Ministry of Education but revised by the association in accordance with their policy of Americanizing the Nisei.\textsuperscript{134} The report was equally critical of their contents, including remarks such as, “There are no distinctly American subjects treated in this book, and only one Hawaiian subject”; “One only No. 16, entitled ‘Washington’s Honesty,’ . . . deals with an American subject”; and, “Only two lessons,” in Book Four “touch on matters in any sense American.”\textsuperscript{135} The translations or synopsis of stories of loyal samurai, a famous Buddhist priest, a Japanese folktale, and the Japanese Imperial Rescript on Education were included in the report. It even hinted of the Japanese government’s involvement in the textbook revision as it used funds from the Prince Fushimi Memorial Educational Fund.\textsuperscript{136}

Some anonymous public school teachers’ and principals’ opinions of the Japanese language schools, in response to the commissioner’s questionnaire, were included in the published survey. Almost all of the printed responses expressed themselves in opposition to Japanese language schools; e.g., “It is too much physical and mental work on the children”; “retarding the children’s progress on English”; “a large measure to counteract patriotism and Americanization”; and, many simply said, “they have to go.” Most of these opinions were likely influenced more by the media’s hysterical portrayal of the Japanese schools rather than on personal experience. Many teachers claimed that “The Japanese schools, under cover of religious instruction, teach the children loyalty to their Emperor and country”; “The Japanese school at ___ is under the control of priests whose religion opposes the making of real Americans”; “If the Japanese schools are continued we shall have a mongrel citizenship, both in language and customs”; and, “What compatibility is there between Mikado worship, ancestor worship and the teaching of democracy?” Their opinions also spelled out the idea of assimilating a subordinate culture to the dominant society, and also of white supremacy. They stated that “We can eventually mold them into real Americans if we have no Japanese competition”; “We must help them to assimilate and to develop a true love and respect for our American ideals and ideas”; and, “It is a lasting insult to every real American teacher to have to compete with this survival of medievalism and nationalism flaunted under our very noses.”\textsuperscript{137}
A key part of the survey was the recommendations of three patriotic and civic organizations, the Daughters of the American Revolution, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Ad Club of Honolulu for legislative action. The report offers no explanations as to why these white civic organizations were labeled important and somehow representative of public sentiment. Each of the three organizations had passed resolutions opposing the Japanese language schools. The Daughters of the American Revolution concluded that “foreign-language schools are not only unnecessary, but a menace to the unity and safety of our Nation.”138 The Chamber of Commerce and Ad Club both recommended the schools be placed under DPI supervision. The Ad Club further proposed a policy for their gradual elimination “as rapidly as may be wise.”139

The commission concluded its analysis that the language schools are “centers of an influence which, if not distinctly anti-American, is certainly un-American.” Perceiving the foreign language school issue through religious lenses, they indicted these schools:

> Although the commission recognizes the inherent right of every person in the United States to adopt any form of religious worship which he desires, nevertheless it holds that the principle of religious freedom to which our country is unswervingly committed does not demand that practices and activities must be tolerated in the name of religion which make the task of training for the duties and responsibilities of American citizenship a well-nigh hopeless one. The commission, therefore, feels no hesitancy in recommending as a first and important step in clearing away the obstacles from the path of the Territorial public-school system that all foreign-language schools to be abolished.140

The survey commission’s recommendation was radically more severe than the measures resolved by either the Chamber of Commerce or the Ad Club which proposed to allow these schools to survive under DPI supervision. The commission also predicted that few Japanese parents would have their children learn Japanese once pressure from Buddhist priests was removed. The commission’s most important recommendations on Japanese language schools were: (1) that the legislature abolish all such schools at its next session; (2) create a foreign language division in the DPI; (3) take over the Japanese school buildings for the use of the public school system; (4) that public schools should offer foreign language classes taught by teachers employed by the DPI at the pupils’ expense; and (5) lengthen the school day to add agricultural and vocational instruction.141 It should be noted that the recommendations were largely drawn from proposals by the Ad Club, with the exception of recommending “immediate abolition,” rather than “gradual elimination” proposed by the Ad Club. However, the most distinctive characteristic of the report was that it not only suggests the abolition of such schools, but offered specific instructions on how to do so; Japanese
school buildings after closing should be purchased inexpensively and utilized for public school use, and it went so far as to suggest how to conduct this project peacefully so that “it may be accomplished with good feeling and good will on the part of all.” The commissioners tried to project an air of objectivity and authority as a federal study without stating specifically what aspects of these schools the commission saw as “un-American” and should be abolished.

Conclusion

Reaction on the islands was immediate. Lorrin A. Thurston, publisher of the Advertiser, criticized the commission’s report and the subsequent school control bills as un-American, devoid of the spirit of freedom, and “inexcusably tyrannical . . . to make it a penal offense for a man to teach his own child his own language.” However, the power of a study conducted and published by the United States government was enormous and encouraged many organizations to produce school control bills. The federal report also led Japanese community leaders to yield to the dominant group’s desire despite all their endeavors to protect their cultural and linguistic heritage. Rather than further aggravating hostile territorial legislators by defending Japanese language schools, a group of Japanese leaders drafted a compromise bill. With an endorsement by Honolulu’s Chamber of Commerce, it easily passed at a special session of the Hawaii legislature and was immediately signed by Governor McCarthy on November 24, 1920. Act 30, as it became known, was written following the guidelines recommended by the commission with only a few modifications. It placed foreign language schools under the DPI, “so that Americanism of their pupils would be promoted” and required their teachers to obtain certification from the DPI. The effect of the report was not limited to the Islands. After the vehement resistance of Japanese in Hawaii was suppressed, a school control bill modeled after Hawaii’s was passed “without strong opposition from the Japanese” in California. This encouraged the exclusionists’ attack on Nisei’s rights of American citizenship on the false premise that language school attendance was evidence of their “disloyalty” to the United States.

The federal survey of education in Hawaii conducted by the Bureau of Education was a typical example of progressive research, whereby professionally trained scholars systematically collect data and scientifically analyze a problem and propose solutions. The study, as we have seen, however, was limited as well as highly biased. Although the commission supposedly solicited opinions on the schools from
“some 200 representatives citizens of all races in the Territory,” there is no record they ever contacted Japanese teachers or the community in general, with the probable exception of Rev. Okumura and his son. The commission’s analysis of the Japanese schools was highly biased, based on rumor and prejudice against Buddhism. It officially condoned the exclusionists’ image of these schools as agents of the Japanese Imperial government. Moreover, modern progressive researchers could not overcome the constraint of colonialism, as exemplified by the College Club’s Agnes Weaver, who wrote “Ten per cent of us are trying to make the ninety per cent an English speaking people with the fundamental institutions of the family, property, customs and morals . . . health regulations etc after the pattern of the United States.”

Claxton’s view of Hawaii’s Japanese schools is still not clear and his remarks that “Under the policies of the United States, it will be very difficult to prohibit schools of this kind unless it were definitely proven that they were teaching treasonable things,” could be interpreted either as discouraging a recommendation to close such schools or insinuating the need to produce “evidence.” However, given the pressure from military intelligence as well as from Hawaii’s government and oligarchy through his superior in the Department of Interior, Claxton’s personal or even professional opinion might have had little to do with the published recommendations.

The role of the HSPA on the federal survey concerning the Japanese language schools seemed to have been one of ambivalence. When Issei leaders fought several school control measures in early months of 1919, one of their strategies was to send resolutions to their plantation bosses requesting support for its defeat. At a March 1919 HSPA meeting held in Hilo, planters unanimously agreed that if the foreign language school control bill in the legislature (Lyman’s bill) passed, its implementation should be delayed for two to three years until the current teachers would be ready to meet the requirements. The planters’ attitude towards Japanese language schools was not for abolition, but rather to maintain them. However, this was just before the higher wage movement organized first by the Young Men’s Buddhist Association members on the island of Hawaii began in October 1919. Beforehand, many planters had subsidized these schools as an enticement for Japanese laborers to stay in Hawaii; however, as Nikkei became the largest labor force and learned to organize themselves to improve their working conditions, planters endeavored to reassert control.
Hawkins suggested that planters held varying opinions on the Japanese language schools. Some thought a measure to eliminate these schools would bring undesirable consequences over the long term, since modern public education would raise Nisei as “too” American to stay at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder. Granting Japanese Americans their own education system would separate them from access to the mainstream, and in turn, from the worlds of politics and economy. This echoes Miyasaki’s observation on how the oligarchy perceived public education. She criticized the irrelevance of Fuchs’ explanation for the oligarchy’s detachment from public education between the Annexation and 1920. She argued that “it would be absurd for the oligarchy to bring such a [public education] system under its wing, finance it, empower it with the task of training and Americanizing the thousands of children of their labor force, and yet allow it to run itself as it pleased . . . as indeed, it did not.” The same theory would apply to Japanese schools. The planters, who supplied land, constructed school buildings, and sometimes subsidized teachers’ salaries, had no reason not to take advantage of these schools and attempt to retain some control over the Japanese laborers through control of these schools. This split among the planters is a more likely explanation as to why the Japanese school control bills initially did not become law, in addition to the vehement protest from the nonenfranchised Japanese community. The report likely satisfied the oligarchy’s expectations since the threat of abolition of the schools allowed them either to wipe the schools out completely or “with mercy” and permit survival under their terms.

As this study of the Federal Survey of Education shows, the movement to control Japanese language schools in Hawaii was a pioneering effort of nativist Americanizers to “stamp out cultural and ideological diversity;” however, it also involved a more complex set of actors desiring to control Japanese Americans’ future. Nativists saw their control over the schools as critical since it would allow them to influence the habitus of the Nisei, establishing a foundation of physical and mental structure for them to remain in the lower class of the white dominant society. They endeavored to influence the education of second generation immigrants since they knew that education was the most promising investment to mold “mass” laborers by a handful of the ruling class. For the oligarchs, controlling the Japanese language school situation was a double-edged sword. They perceived the schools as agents of social control over the Issei, who in turn believed the schools equaled hope for Nisei to maintain their heritage and go beyond what they achieved as immigrant laborers. The planters kept such schools as a
“hostage,” economically supporting them when the Issei parents behaved well as tamed workers, but threatening the life of the schools when the laborers went beyond their control.

For Japanese immigrants, the Japanese language school was a public sphere and symbol of cultural preservation and success as immigrant communities in Hawaii, and it was also a contested symbol of power and economic resources for religious organizations. This echoes Tamura’s synthesis that the real Japanese language school question was “who would control this teaching, the territorial government or ‘alien’ groups like Buddhist organizations and immigrant associations.” The religious conflict between Christian and Buddhist clergy developed amidst the tightly woven battlefield, nativists’ ruling stance vs. Japanese community resistance; Christianity was raised to a means and measurement of Americanization, while Buddhism was labeled as a sign of Japanese origins and ethnic identity. As Okumura, representative of the Christian missionaries was obviously losing this battle, he later created a tie with the planters, and under the guise of Americanization, Okumura promoted the idea among Nikkei to present themselves as the ideal labor force to support Hawaii’s future economy.

Bunker, the year after the publication of the Hawaii school survey, was “rewarded” for his work with an executive position in Honolulu’s Pan-Pacific Union which was supported by private and public funds to promote the relations between Pacific nations. Confident and proud of the report, Bunker wrote, “I believe, furthermore, that it will be accepted by all as a satisfactory solution to a very difficult problem. I am very sure, therefore, that no statement has been made which can be challenged.” Bunker’s prediction, however, soon proved to be dead wrong. The Palama Japanese Language School, and eventually 84 other schools, challenged the constitutionality of the DPI’s harsh school control actions in *Farrington v. Tokushige*. After several territorial court challenges, on February 21, 1927, the United States Supreme Court supported the Ninth Circuit Court’s decision and declared Act 30 unconstitutional in light of the Fourteenth Amendment based on Supreme Court precedent, *Meyer v. Nebraska*, *Bartels v. Iowa*, and *Pierce v. Society of Sisters*.

The survey branded Japanese language schools as “un-American, if not anti-American,” an accusation that would haunt Japanese Americans for the next three decades. In order to understand the social meanings of the Japanese language school attack in relation to the formation of Japanese American
identity, historians should fully explore the movement against Japanese language schools as developed on the mainland in tandem with Hawaii.167
1 I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Joan Hori, Hawaiian Collection, University of Hawaii Library, Junko I. Nowaki, Librarian, University of Hawaii-Hilo, and the staff of the National Archives.

Roger Daniels (University of Cincinnati) and Andrew Wertheimer (University of Wisconsin - Madison) made valuable suggestions that improved my paper. I also want to recognize the assistance of Kathleen A. DeLaney (University at Buffalo Archives), Stephen Janeck (Drexel University Archives), Gail Kleer (Western Washington University), Judi Olson (Yankton College Records Manager), and historians Sandra C. Taylor and Rosalee McReynolds. I am also grateful to Eileen Tamura and the blind reviewers whose scrutiny helped me to produce a greatly improved draft. An earlier version of this paper was read at the History of Education Society Annual Meeting 2001 at Yale University.

2 Claxton to Bunker, December 6, 1919. Bunker was the director of the federal survey in Hawaii.


5 Territory of Hawaii Session Laws, 1917, 509-10; quoted in Halsted, 81-82.


7 Ravitch, 54. The meaning of progressive education has long been debated among education historians. Ravitch reviews some of the most significant interpretations. See also Robert L. Church, Michael B. Katz, Harold Silver and Lawrence A. Cremin in the forum, “The Metropolitan Experience in American Education,” History of Education Quarterly 29 (1989): 419-446. Also see William J. Reese, Power and the Promise of School Reform: Grassroots Movements during the Progressive Era (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986).

8 Lagemann, 82.


11 Ronald Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans (New York: Penguin, 1989); Okihiro
Japanese traditionally met their marriage partner through relatives and acquaintances, by typically exchanging pictures at first. Often times, the hard life and the cost of transportation to Japan discouraged Issei men to go home and find a wife; instead, they asked fellow villagers to find a suitable spouse for him.

Although the population of Japanese descent in Hawaii had declined since 1920 from 42 to 37%, it was commonly predicted that they would eventually become the majority. Roger Bell, Last Among Equals: Hawaiian Statehood and American Politics (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984), 72.


The first Japanese language school was established in Kohala, Hawaii Island in 1893. Hideo Kuwahara, the teacher of the school taught around 30 Japanese students. Ozawa, 20.


13 Fuchs, 21.
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17 Tamura, 30
18 Although the population of Japanese descent in Hawaii had declined since 1920 from 42 to 37%, it was commonly predicted that they would eventually become the majority. Roger Bell, Last Among Equals: Hawaiian Statehood and American Politics (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984), 72.
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21 Tamura, 146.
22 Halsted, 69.
23 Okihiro, 130-31.
25 Hunter, 95.
26 Hunter, 93.
27 Hunter, 96.

29 The 20,651 also includes a small number of Japanese students who attended private schools in Hawaii. Koichi G. Harada, “A Survey of the Japanese Language Schools in Hawaii.” (Master’s thesis, University of Hawaii, 1934), 102. The entire enrollment of in the public schools were 41,350 students in 1920, and according to Tamura, 47% of which were the Nisei students. Tamura, 30.

30 Ozawa, 49.

31 Ozawa, 84. The Imperial Rescript on Education is the codes of morality, created around the idea that loyalty and obedience to the Emperor, the head of the state, is equivalent to loyalty and obedience to the state. Yuji Ichioka, The Issei (New York: The Free Press, 1988), 201.


33 Tamura, 96.


35 Tamura, 107-08.

36 Fuchs, 274.

37 Tamura 110. In response to these parents’ complaints, the DPI experimentally introduced an English examination to enter Central Grammar School in Honolulu at the end of World War I, and the parents appealed to have more of such “English Standard schools” in 1920. See Tamura 108-15, for more details of on what essentially was segregation of students by ethnicity.

38 Judd was a lawyer and had served as a representative of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association in their 1906 effort to secure Filipino laborers. John William Siddall, Men of Hawaii (Honolulu: Star Bulletin, 1917), 553.

39 Judd defined “teachers” as including administrators, and “schools” as “all schools in the Territory,” except “Sabbath” schools. Halsted, 94.
Halsted, 93-95.

Ozawa, 97-106.


The College of Hawaii later became the University of Hawaii.


“Hawaii,” National Archives. Hereafter referred to as HSF.

Claxton to Penhallow, June 30, 1914, HSF.

Weaver to Claxton, August 28, 1916, HSF.

College Club, “Letter to the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii, Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Commission of Public Instruction,” copy sent to Claxton, November 15, 1916, HSF.

College Club, “Letter to the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii, Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Commission of Public Instruction,” copy sent to Claxton, November 15, 1916, HSF.

Reinecke, *Language*, 80-81. According to Reinecke, the percentile of teachers of Portuguese and Spanish ethnicity combined was 8.5%, while that of Chinese, Japanese, and Korean are 4.7%, 2.0% and 0.2%, respectively. The number of students with Portuguese, Spanish, Chinese, Japanese and Korean ethnic backgrounds were tabulated from Department of Public Instruction, *Biennial Report 1923-4*, 113.

College Club, “Letter to the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii, Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Commission of Public Instruction,” copy sent to Claxton, November 15, 1916, HSF.

Weaver to Claxton, December 18, 1916, HSF.

The Superintendent of the Normal Schools was Edgar Wood from 1897 to 1921. Tamura, 198.

Weaver to Claxton, December 18, 1916, HSF. After sending off the letter, Weaver immediately sent a cablegram as well as another letter to Claxton to express her regret for being so personal, and asked Claxton to destroy her first letter. Weaver to Claxton, December 21, 1916. However, a public high school teacher (who happened to confer with one of the federal survey committee members, and was asked about the schools in Hawaii) also informed of similar problems in her letter to Claxton, writing, “so many of their
principals and teachers are old, inefficient,” who smoke cigarettes and live immoral lives.” She also pointed out corruption among school administrators, such as positions given to friends. R. H. Wallin to Claxton, January 2, 1917, HSF.

54 Pinkham to Claxton, December 15, 1916, HSF.

55 Although Pinkham used the Governor’s official letterhead, Pinkham underlined the “Personal” to emphasize it was not official invitation. Pinkham to Claxton, March 8, 1917, HSF.

56 Pinkham to Claxton, March 8, 1917, HSF.

57 Pinkham had his stenographer transcribe their interview of December 5, 1916, and sent a copy to Claxton with his letter of March 8, 1917, HSF.

58 The College Club to Claxton, May 8, 1917, HSF.

59 Kinney to Claxton, January 22, 1918, HSF. Claxton originally planed to send H. W. Fought, Bureau of Education Specialist in Rural School Practice, and Willis E. Johnson, President of Northern Normal and Industrial School, South Dakota to undertake the survey in the fall of 1918.

60 Reinecke, Feigned, 621.

61 McCarthy to Claxton, November 8, 1918, HSF. The 1919 regular session of Senate passed an Act to authorize the Governor and Superintendent of the Department of Public Instruction to invite the Bureau of Education to investigate the educational situation in Hawaii. Matsubayashi, 111.

62 Claxton to McCarthy, November 23, 1918, HSF.


64 Bell, 42. Fuchs, 22.

65 Fuchs, 263.

66 Fuchs, 268-69, 272.

67 Daniels, Politics, 81-83. California’s exclusionists were around this time preoccupied with establishing a revised alien land law, and a Japanese language school was not on the agenda until the initiative vote for the 1920 alien land law passed on November 1920.

68 MacCaughey to Claxton, April 8, 1919, HSF. MacCaughey was appointed Superintendent of Public Instruction for the Territory of Hawaii by Governor McCarthy, and took office on April 1, 1919.
MacCaughey to Claxton, July 25, 1919, HSF.


MacCaughey, 100.

MacCaughey, 100-01.

A resolution, under the names of MacCaughey and missionaries Takie Okumura, Orramel H. Gulick and Teiichi Hori manifested his participation in a campaign to wipe out Buddhist influence from the Japanese community by cutting off its financial resources:

The Japanese Section of the Hawaiian Evangelical Association believes that Hawaiian sugar planters’ continuous financial support to non-Christian organizations would hurt Hawaii’s welfare as well as hamper the Christianization and Americanization of the foreigners in Hawaii. (Hawaii Hochi, July 12, 1920. Translation by the author).

Shortly after Kinney resigned, he shared his opinion of Japanese language schools in the Pacific Commercial Advertiser based on his investigation of these schools and examination of their textbooks during his term. Kinney reported that he found no evidence suggesting Buddhist language schools instill Emperor worship or contradict Americanization. It is a groundless claim, continued Kinney, who found them working to promote Americanism. He implied that this accusation against Japanese language schools stemmed from a minority religious denomination’s efforts to damage the Japanese language schools run by the competing religious group. The Jiji Shimpo (Tokyo) April 15, 1919. Cited in The Japanese Education Association, 262. Hawkins, however, describes Kinney as being against Japanese schools. Hawkins, 47.

Hunter, 108. MacCaughey took office in March 1919.

Pacific Commercial Advertiser, October 11, 1919.

Bunker to Claxton, November 20, 1919, HSF.

MacCaughey to Claxton, September 4, 1919, HSF.

Bunker to Claxton, October 13, 1919, HSF.

Bunker to Claxton, October 13, 1919, HSF.

Bunker to Claxton, October 13, 1919, HSF.

Bunker to Claxton, October 14, 1919, HSF.

Bunker to Claxton, October 28, 1919, HSF.
Bunker to Claxton, October 28, 1919, HSF.

Bunker to Claxton, November 20, 1919, HSF.

Bunker to Claxton, October 30, 1919, HSF.

Bunker recommended Twiss. Bunker to Claxton, October 30, 1919, HSF.

Bunker to Claxton, November 20, 1919, HSF.

Pacific Commercial Advertiser, November 6, 1919.

Banking was one of the Oligarchy’s key industries. Bell, 42. Fuchs, 22.

Pacific Commercial Advertiser, November 6, 1919.

Maui News, November 7, 1919.

Palmer’s “congregation at the Central Union Church included many of Hawaii’s leading capitalists.” During the 1920 strike, Palmer also preached a sermon to present a plan for ending the strike. Reinecke, Feigned, 110.

Pacific Commercial Advertiser, November 10, 1919.


Okihiro, 67.


Pacific Commercial Advertiser, November 7, 10, 1919.

The newspapers’ stands were summarized in the Pacific Commercial Advertiser, November 7, 1919.

Pacific Commercial Advertiser, November 6, 1919.

Pacific Commercial Advertiser, November 6, 1919.

Claxton to Bunker, December 6, 1919, HSF.


Lewis, 191.

Bunker to Claxton, December 23, 1919, HSF.

Bunker to Claxton, December 23, 1919, HSF.
McCarthy’s speech was reprinted in the Pacific Commercial Advertiser, December 29, 1919.

Bunker to Claxton, December 23, 1919, HSF.

The “Big Five” agents for the sugar plantations were C. Brewer & Co. Ltd., and Castle & Cook Ltd., American Factors Ltd., Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd., and Theo. H. Davies & Company Ltd.

Fuchs, 186-87.

Honolulu Advertiser, August 6, 1918. Cited in Hunter, 107.

Fuchs, 187.

Phelan proposed disallowing the children of “aliens ineligible to citizenship,” that is the children of Asian immigrants and residents, including the Nisei to become citizens. Daniels, Politics, 88, 104; Okihiro, 159.

Bunker to Claxton, December 23, 1919, HSF.

Bunker to MacCaughey, May 28, 1920, Telegram, HSF.

Halsted, 82.

This confidential ONI report was circulated among several government offices, such as the Army’s Military Intelligence Division, the Department of State, and the Bureau of Education. ONI, August 20, 1919, HSF.

Okihiro, 102-3. This was despite the fact that Japan was an American ally in World War I.

Okihiro, 131, 295.

ONI, August 20, 1919, HSF.

ONI report, August 20, 1919, HSF. In Taiheiyo no Rakuen, [Paradise in the Pacific] (n.d., n.p.), Okumura was very critical and resentful of the anti-school control bill movement conducted by the Japanese, writing in August 1919 (but not published until later) that:

The movement of the anti-school control law, conducting throughout the islands and working at the legislature, ended with success. It was a big celebration, giving letters of thanks to the leaders of the association and parties for the teachers to thank for their efforts. However, it is wondered if this movement actually made a hindrance for the Japanese future and our relationship with America… If the Americanization of the Japanese in Hawaii is the key to our success for the future, the movement against the school control bill is considered to have destroyed the foundation of our success. (Okumura, 276-7: Translation by the author).
Okumura’s solution to the school control bill would be to place these schools under government supervision and disconnect the ties with religious organizations. Actually, when the Judd bill was introduced, there was a rumor that Okumura was the source of the bill in order to retaliate to the Hongwanji schools. However, Hunter who studied Okumura’s personal papers did not see Okumura’s direct involvement with the bill. She wrote, however, “his peripheral activities and his later ‘projects’ for Americanizing the local-born Japanese were motivated by the desire to liquidate Buddhism and all Buddhist institutions.” Hunter, 113.

122 Office of Naval Intelligence (Washington, D.C.) to State Department, Operations, and Military Intelligence Division, August 14, 1918, RG 165 MID, File No. 1052-37/1. National Archives; See also Okihiro, 102-05.

123 Although appointed by the President, the Hawaii’s Governor reported to the Secretary of the Interior. Fuchs, 184.

124 C. J. McCarthy to Secretary of Interior, January 31, 1921, File of the Governors, McCarthy, General Files, U.S. Department, Interior Department, Re. Japanese Language Schools. This bill was probably the so-called Lyman’s bill. Cited in Okihiro, 108.

125 Bunker also wrote chapters one and two. The fourth and fifth chapters were written by Kemp, while the sixth and eighth were produced by Twiss, and Koble was in charge of chapter seven. (Bunker to Claxton, November 20, 1919, HSF). This paper analyzes the Japanese language issue, and does not examine the survey’s other findings. For analyses of these, see Tamura 199, Fuchs 270-73, Benjamin O. Wist, A Century of Public Education in Hawaii (Honolulu: Hawaii Educational Review, 1940).


127 Takie Okumura, Seventy Years of Divine Blessings (Honolulu, 1940), 41.

128 U. S. Department of the Interior, 111.


130 During the conference, a Buddhist priest supposedly boasted that “Democracy is an American philosophy, so that Japanese are not supposed to have the idea of democracy . . . should we let a teacher
who has the idea of democracy, teach our children, it would be our shame.” Okumura, *Taiheiyō no Rakuen*, 259.


132 This was at the first Japanese Education Association meeting on February 23, 1915. The Japanese Education Association, *Hawai Nihongo*, 22-23.


134 U. S. Department of the Interior, 115. A special session of Japanese Education Association was held in August 1915 to discuss the compilation of a new textbook series based on the present Monbushō (the Japanese Ministry of Education) textbooks. The guidelines for the compilation were following. 1) The purpose of the Japanese language school is to teach standard Japanese and develop students’ morals. 2) The teaching subject is the Japanese language only. However, other subjects (such as sewing, singing, physical education and abacus) can be added if necessary. Special attention was drawn to the treatment of historical materials incorporated in a reading. It was decided that it should cover the events and people of both Japan and America, and introduce subjects that can be found in both countries and teach them in relation to both contexts. These policies show that the attitude of the Japanese educators behind the textbook compilation was rather passive; not to defy Americanism, although this was a significant leap for them to abandon the idea of raising Nisei children as Japanese and try to raise them as American citizens.


140 U. S. Department of the Interior, 134.

141 U. S. Department of the Interior, 139-42.

142 U. S. Department of the Interior, 142.


144 Hunter, 127.
145 Halsted, 95-96.

146 Halsted, 97.

147 A companion bill, Act 36, specified criteria for non-English language schoolteachers to obtain certificates from the DPI by exams on English and American ideals. Halsted, 98.


150 Bunker to Claxton, November 20, 1919, HSF.

151 Also see Hunter, 125.

152 Weaver to Claxton, January 27, 1917, HSF.

153 The Department of the Interior was not only home of the Bureau of Education, but also oversaw administration of United States territories.

154 Ozawa, 99.

155 Okihiro, 67.

156 Miyasaki, 21. Fuchs, 266.

157 Tamura, 149.


159 Tamura, 157-58. Italics added by the author.

160 An annual series of “New Americans” conference between 1927 to 1941 conducted by Okumura aimed first to Americanize the Issei but later targeted coming-of-age Nisei to raise awareness of themselves as new American citizens; what they could do to fulfill their responsibilities as American citizens. The actual purpose of the conference, however, was to encourage the Nisei to choose a career as workers in the sugar and pineapple plantations, “‘the most stable industry’ in Hawaii.” Tamura, 131.


162 Bunker to Claxton, December 23, 1919, HSF.
Although there was no mass forced relocation of Japanese Americans in Hawaii, Japanese language school principals in Hawaii were among the community leaders detained during World War II. Okihiro, 209, 218.

My larger study of the attack on Japanese language schools also compares the situation in Hawaii and the West Coat in order to examine the various agendas behind the attacks. See my paper “The Issei Challenge to Preserve Japanese Heritage during the Period of Americanization,” in Nikkei disAppearances: Twentieth Century Japanese Americans and Japanese Canadians in the Pacific Northwest, eds. Louis Fiset and Gail M. Nomura, (forthcoming).