Prospects for Conflict Transformation in Maluku: Mapping Assets, Spaces, and Moments for Peacebuilding

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Abstract

Despite the complex and bitter nature of the Maluku conflict, openings and levers for sustainable peace exist. Finding strategic opportunities and leverage points will benefit from interpretation of a multi-dimensional “peacebuilding map” that attempts synthesis of current best practices in conflict analysis. We begin the process of mapmaking by establishing conflict transformation as the goal in Maluku. A core tenet of conflict transformation is that social contexts—where identities are fashioned and given value—remain mutable. Therefore, just as the social identities of religion and ethnicity were politicized and polarized, so can they be transformed and reconciled in fertile social spaces where mediative capacity is actively enhanced. The peacebuilding map will locate peacebuilding actors, activities that tap into their inherent mediative capacity, and social spaces where they are working and collaborating in Maluku. A temporal dimension is incorporated in the map to ensure that peacebuilding activities are appropriately suited to the situation in post-war Maluku. Finally, an analysis of current conflict transformation strategies will suggest future prospects for peacebuilding in Maluku.

1 Introduction

Not long ago, Maluku was a candidate for the world’s “most deadly civil war” (Reilly, 2002). During the period 1999–2001, between
5,000 and 10,000 lives were lost, and as many as 700,000 persons were displaced (International Crisis Group, 2002). Today, vestiges of normalcy have returned to Maluku: the state of emergency has been lifted, a gubernatorial election has been held, the regional university has reopened, and violent episodes are relatively rare. These conditions offer potential footholds on a path to peace.

Even given certain footholds, however, Maluku’s path promises to be slippery. It is widely observed that proximate consequences of violent conflict—disrupted economies and social services, population displacements, and heightened fighting capacities—provide fertile ground for relapse and deepening of conflict over time (Collier, 2003, Kriesberg et al., 1989, Lederach, 2002). Perhaps the greatest obstacle facing peace and reconciliation efforts in Maluku, though, is the damage that has been done to social identities. Under pressure, shared Maluccan and Indonesian identities unraveled and were recast. Neighbors, co-workers, and friends who had once together built and maintained a society that was frequently touted as an example of Indonesia’s tolerance of diversity became enemies—agents of threat, vengeance, and conspiracy. Religious identity widely functioned to assign battle colors and provide calls for violent action, rather than serve as framework for adherents’ practices of worship, fraternity, and charity (Winn, 2000).

Given this recent experience of trauma and polarization, how can embittered enemies shed their combatant identities and become neighbors, colleagues, and schoolmates once again? What can be done to prevent violent conflict in Maluku from becoming entrenched and endemic? How can peace gain traction before conflict becomes intractable? We suggest that answers may be found

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1It is widely argued that common Maluccan and Indonesian identities were tenuously held together by New Order authoritarian enforcement of Pancasila and repression of SARA (Suku, Agama, Ras dan Antar golongan) topics. Even if it was of a “negative” variety, it is also true that this relative peace created conditions in which marriages, institutional memberships, and settlements brought together members of divergent ethnic and religious identities. Though largely overwhelmed during active conflict, such remnants of cross-group understanding have worked to enable peacebuilding progress post-conflict, as will be explored in detail later in this paper.
by creating and analyzing a peacebuilding map for Maluku.

Recent conceptual innovations, taken from peacebuilding practice, now enable a complement to the well-established tool of conflict mapping. Below, several of these innovations with high relevance to social identity conflict will be described and synthesized to create the conceptual foundation for a peacebuilding map. The map developed will locate assets for conflict transformation, principally civil society and governmental actors, as well as the tools, actions, and qualities they employ to advance peacebuilding. The paper’s final sections will interpret the map’s features to suggest strengths and weaknesses of current conflict transformation efforts and to identify strategies for strengthening underdeveloped assets.

2 Conflict Mapping and its Proposed Complement

Better understanding a conflict requires the ability to fully describe its origins, dimensions, and dynamics, including the factors that sustain it. Various conflict analysis tools have been developed to accomplish this. Among these, conflict mapping has several advantages.

The technique is well established, having been first proposed and named by Wehr (Wehr, 1979) and continuously adopted and evolved by a host of users, including researchers, analysts, and intervention agents working to resolve conflict. Today, conflict mapping is seen by many in the field to represent best or standard practice—as reflected in its acceptance by such international organizations as the United Nations Development Program, the Department for International Development (UK), and various universities (Amsterdam, Bradford, Harvard, etc). Conflict mapping is also increasingly being employed in Indonesia by members of the Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network, and academics, particularly those at Gadjah Mada and Duta Wacana universities. It is also being increasingly pursued as a participatory process involving community members and Community Based Organizations
Though some of these users do employ geographic mapping (that is, locating phenomena spatially), generally speaking, conflict maps are descriptive and conceptual documents, built on both secondary and primary data. This data is typically compiled to describe the conflict’s context, parties, causes and consequences, contrasting beliefs, dynamics, goals and interests, functions, and potential for regulation by internal or external actors (Wehr, 1998). Those creating and analyzing these maps are usually conflict mediators or parties to the conflict who seek clarity about the contours of conflict.

The intent of the proposed peacebuilding map is to clarify how the situation can be moved beyond conflict. It will attempt to illuminate this path by first answering the following questions:

- What is the goal of peacebuilding efforts?
- Where does the conflict currently stand?
- What broad strategies will push the situation from where it is toward the defined goal?
- What are the most significant roadblocks to peace?
- Who are the actors that can move the process past these barriers toward peace?
- In which niches are these actors most effective?
- What specific activities can these actors carry out in these strategic spaces to build peace?

Bringing the Maluku experience together with recent conceptual innovations in peace practice and theory will provide answers and suggest a framework for analysis.

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2For both theory and practice, participatory conflict mapping tends to borrow inspiration from Participatory Rural Appraisal, Participatory Action Research, and other participatory approaches (Paffenholz, 2001).
3 Determining the Goal: Conflict Transformation

The assertion that peace can return to Maluku—as well as the caution that untangling conflict is inevitably arduous—derives from the established theory and growing practice of conflict transformation (Kriesberg et al., 1989, Lederach, 1995, UNDP, 2000, Paffenholz, 2001, Ropers and GTZ, 2002, Satha-Anand, 2002). Several characteristics recommend “conflict transformation” as the most appropriate goal and peacebuilding framework for Maluku. Importantly, its objectives are both immediate and long-term peace. In the near term, conflict transformation is concerned with the ending of hostilities. Yet, the absence of violence is merely the absence of conflict symptoms, often referred to as “negative” peace. Unfortunately, the attention of governments, funders, and the media often wanes after this patina of peace appears. In the case of Maluku, where deep damage has been done to social relationships and institutions, efforts for peace must go further if some semblance of the status quo ante is to be found.

Over the longer-term, conflict transformation also seeks to create the underlying conditions for sustainable peace, such as correcting power imbalances and depoliticizing social identities. Conflict transformation aims to bring about a supportive environment for peace, ending not only the effects, but also the root causes of violent conflict. It is here, in stepping towards “positive” peace, that conflict transformation differentiates itself from other peacebuilding goals. Having clarity on a desired end state allows us to fix a goal for the peacebuilding map.

4 Where the Conflict Stands: Stages of Conflict

Two conceptual frameworks are associated with conflict transformation: the “contiguum model” and a staged peacebuilding timeframe. Determining the current stage of the conflict will enable us to identify the most critical assets in the peacebuilding map.

Meta-studies have noted that conflicts typically have linked, yet observably distinct, stages. In the 1990s, theorists posited a
staged conflict continuum. Along this somewhat predictable continuum, peacebuilding measures could be brought to bear on different strategic points (Ropers and GTZ, 2002). Further reflection on this model revealed that stages were inter-related but did not necessarily unfold in a linear progression. Conflict could recycle through various stages depending on the success of peacebuilding efforts and other contextual factors. Moreover, adding geographic space as a further layer on the model demonstrated that the localization of conflict could mean that various localities within a larger jurisdiction (or across jurisdictions) were contending with different stages of conflict at various times. Thus, the continuum model is currently reframed as a contiguum. Along this contiguum Ropers has distilled five phases: (1) latent conflict; (2) confrontation; (3) violent conflict; (4) end of war; and (5) post-war peace consolidation (Ropers and GTZ, 2002).

Conflict in Maluku can currently be best described as falling into phases 4 and 5. In phase 4, though termed “end of war”, hostilities may still be sporadic under tenuously held peace agreements. In phase 5, peacekeeping remains a priority while physical, political, and psychosocial rebuilding are taking root.

5 Peacebuilding Efforts For to Post-Conflict Maluku

By employing the contiguum model, which is sensitive to the nuances of temporal cycles and geographic space, we may attempt to identify various peacebuilding efforts that are most appropriate to the various conflict phase(s). Lederach suggests a series of four peacebuilding stages that chiefly correspond to Roper’s conflict phases 4 and 5. Within the conflict phase 4 “end of war”, we find two peacebuilding stages, (a) crisis management, and (b) post-conflict preparedness. Meanwhile, conflict phase 5 connects with peacebuilding stages (c) promoting structural stability and (d) strengthening capacities and visions of the future. It is important to note that the peacebuilding stages are deeply interrelated. Efforts supportive of each stage should begin concurrently, come to
In order to assist agents and institutions promoting conflict transformation with the timing of their efforts, Lederach also links these stages to a suggested activity and planning timeframe. While the timeframe appears to relate to an “idealized”, unidirectional, uni-layered unfolding of conflict, local conditions in Maluku must

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Phase</th>
<th>Phase 4: End of War</th>
<th>Phase 5: Peace Consolidation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace-Building Stage</td>
<td>Crisis Management</td>
<td>Post-Conflict Preparedness</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Promoting Structural Stability and Strengthening Capacities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time Frame</td>
<td>Immediate Activities (2–6 mo.)</td>
<td>Short-term planning (1–2 years)</td>
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</table>

Figure 1: Conflict Phases and Corresponding Peacebuilding Stages Applied to the Current Situation in Maluku
dictate the implementation of peacebuilding efforts. The primary intent behind using this timeframe is to reflect the long-term view required for conflict transformation processes to achieve positive peace. As can be seen by the table above, a significant portion of the work of peacebuilding requires sustained effort with a timeline extending from 3 to 20 years and beyond. These frameworks provide a temporal guide for peacebuilding efforts.

Thus far, we have established that conflict transformation holds advantages as an approach for peacebuilding in Maluku due to its concern with lasting peace; that the undoing of conflict requires a long-term view and commitment; and that we can identify peacebuilding strategies to address conflict in its different phases. In the next sections we will identify the central impediment to peacebuilding in Maluku, the peacebuilding roles suited to social identity conflict, and the types of actors best positioned to accomplish those roles.

6 Social Identity as the Central Challenge to Peacebuilding in Maluku

Given the number of variables and layers to the Maluku conflict, it is beyond the scope of this paper to assess all roles or actors that should be brought to the service of peacebuilding. In what follows, then, our focus will sharpen to examine a central—if not the central—facet of the Maluku conflict: social identity.

The conflict in Maluku is most frequently depicted as one of conflicting religious or ethno-religious identities. Maluku is seen to mimic a global pattern where social identity serves as the “fault line” for conflict. Holding common currency, especially among the media and many of the parties to conflict is a primordialist explanation—asserting that different social identities (be they religious, class, and other belongings or ascriptions), since the end of the Second World War, has been staggering. Some estimates attribute half of all violent conflict from 1945–1960, and seventy-five percent from 1960–1990, to intra-state social identity or cultural conflict (Crawford, 1998).
ligious, ethnic, gender, etc.) must inherently conflict because they are based on non-negotiable belongings and ascriptions.

However, a growing number of observers dismiss the social identity argument in its primordialist guise as a red herring (Díez-Medrano, 2002). Their argument is persuasive. They begin by pointing to the many instances globally where group identity difference does not produce conflict, or where it does so only very rarely or non-violently. To determine what kind of role social identity may have, if any, multi-country meta-analyses have been performed. These studies have tested for the extent to which social identity difference is predictive of conflict and the extent to which it is more or less statistically associable with conflict than other variables such as economic growth, good governance, percent of GDP spent on military expenditure, etc. (Reilly, 2002, Crawford and Lipschutz, 1998). Findings have generally shown that the primary function played by social identity is transactional rather than primordial. That is, religion, ethnicity, etc. serve as a coalescing identity through which political and other interest-based organizing can take place. Frequently, identities are exploited for how they serve as a basis for (re) distributions of power and resources.

While it has been shown that social identity cannot fully explain the conflict in Maluku, its role can hardly be overstated. In Maluku, social identity has long influenced the parceling of political and economic assets, by both state and non-state actors. Those pursuing peacebuilding and hoping to restore intercultural relations must keep the legacies of this practice in mind. For example, Dutch colonial authorities maintained a unique relationship with Christian Maluccans that led the region to become a Christian enclave in predominantly Muslim Indonesia. In more recent years Indonesian “affirmative action” programs attempted to correct a disparity in the provincial civil service.

“Political entrepreneurs” especially in post-colonial and modern settings comprise another group that has used culturally defined identities to attempt restructuring of economic, social, and political relationships (Crawford, 1998). Political entrepreneur-
ship recognizes that various social groups find themselves relatively privileged or disenfranchised by proximity to, and by favor with, those in power (or with access to other assets). For example, preman (gangs) and military political entrepreneurship added to Maluku’s instability.

Whether primordial or transactional, social identity difference clearly played a hugely powerful role in both sparking and fueling conflict. Economic, political, ecological and other factors were undeniably prerequisites for conflict as well. Yet social identity—especially religious identity—stirred emotion, provided shorthand explanations, and offered easy labels in a singularly powerful way. The conflict in Maluku quickly came to be framed as a sectarian conflict, and over time took on religious identity as its prime engine. While deconstructing multifactor causality clearly has a place in peacebuilding, conflict transformation efforts must recognize that the Maluccan conflict was most widely seen and felt as religious.

Peacebuilding efforts must also keep sight of a corollary point: even as social identity drove conflict in Maluku, so did conflict alter social identities. As conflict became pervasive and persistent, it began to affect the range of activities, symbols, and institutions of the conflicting parties. In such cases, Lederach (Lederach, 2002) has observed that the conflict itself comes to partly define group social identity. The segregated social spaces, the disintegration of friendships and working relationships, and the disappearance of festivities and rituals once shared by Muslim and Christian alike are evidence of the power of conflict in Maluku to mutate social identities, norms, and relationships. The more conflict takes root in personal and group identities, the further conflict becomes self-reproducing and intractable.

We have seen thus far that social identities can be transformed for political purposes to induce conflict, and that conflict, in turn, can transform identities. The remedy? As Kriesberg reminds us, “even the non-negotiable core construct of social identity that every individual and group brings to a conflict is subject to change
as social contexts change. Once [this] becomes known, it becomes important to identify and cultivate the conditions of change from intractable to tractable” (Kriesberg et al., 1989).

7 Social Spaces

Social identities and contexts are largely defined in social spaces. Lederach (Lederach, 2002) suggests that where it has been intense or protracted, “conflict has created sharp divisions, more often than not along the lines of constructed and collective identities”. As conflict pervades society, few institutions or points of interaction between the conflicting parties are left untouched. Schools, businesses, housing, and transportation settings are all examples of social spaces typically colored by the conflict.

However, in select social spaces there still exists room for individuals of different identities to see past those facets of their identities that are in conflict. In these social spaces, confidence building, and even peacebuilding, can or could occur. What makes these spaces unique? Typically, they evoke identities that are resilient to conflict or more fundamental than those in conflict. For example, in the events and contexts nurtured by the Baku Bae peace initiative, culture (adat) was evoked as a commonality that transcended religious ascription. People were reminded that they were Maluccan first. Other social spaces where Maluccans have found common identity have included clinics and hospitals, soccer stadiums and volleyball courts, marketplaces, workplaces, and schools. As space is allowed for people to recall and live out a shared identity, the facets of identity in conflict are pushed from the center to the margins.

8 Actors, their Activities, and Advantages

Agents and institutions working to transform social identities and contexts in conflict are principle forces for change in identity-based conflict. We can locate these actors and their activities in our peacebuilding map by the three societal “levels” at which they operate.
Each level—designated “macro”, “meso”, and “micro”—provides a unique niche for peace building (Lederach, 2002).

At the macro level one finds powerful, high visibility agents and institutions. Examples are politicians, military leaders, international agencies, and, sometimes, religious leaders. Their approaches to peacebuilding frequently include high-level negotiations and the employment of high status mediators. To their advantage, these actors and actions have the authority to effect institutional and systems changes. However, they are typically not engaged at the grassroots levels and are often hamstrung from making politically difficult decisions by the expectations of their various constituencies.

On the other end of the power and visibility spectrum are the micro- or grassroots-level actors. In many ways, this is the essential realm of conflict transformation, in contrast with conflict management and conflict resolution. The inclusion of the grassroots in reconciliation recognizes that conflict has touched society deeply—impacting identities and social spaces far beyond the rarified political space and select personas around the negotiation table. Agents and institutions situated at the micro level include local leaders, teachers, smaller NGOs, women’s organizations, and local religious figures. The comparative advantages of these actors in peacebuilding rest on their understanding the local context (how conflict has been framed locally) and locally appropriate requirements for peace work. Activities include: the formation of local peace coalitions; psychosocial healing work; local peace education; and the general mobilization of local communities towards peacebuilding. Working at this level, however, usually precludes influence beyond the locality to build larger coalitions and take on larger initiatives. The policies and other structural determinants of the macro conflict setting are beyond the purview of the micro level.

Lederach perceives a central role for the meso level in bridging work between micro and macro. Typical agents and institutions at this level include large NGOs, influential leaders in business, art,
education, and faith communities, as well as the media. Because meso actors have alliances and understandings at both micro and macro levels, they often act to enable transactions across an otherwise difficult gulf separating different ontologies, understandings of conflict, and notions of peacebuilding work. In concrete terms, the peacebuilding work of meso level actors includes: convening preliminary peace roundtables and negotiations; facilitating peacebuilding training; and conducting monitoring of peace agreements. Despite the ability to travel in both worlds, as it were, the meso actors do not have authority at the macro level or the local credibility or understanding to mobilize the grassroots.

9 Mediative Capacity as a Broadly Distributed Asset

The activities described above apply especially to organizations and individuals whose social roles formally relate to conflict. Beyond these more formal, and typically more visible and powerful, actors and activities, peacebuilding strategies also need to support pre-existing, under-supported assets of peacebuilding. A sociological or anthropological approach is often helpful in eliciting and locating these assets. The most important assets are often members of conflicting groups who possess a high degree of real or latent “mediative capacity”.

The invented term mediative capacity was born of the recognition that mediators are able to create a “quality of relationship” and interaction around the mediation table that helps parties be open to change, risk taking, and compromise. This quality of interaction can be termed mediative. Those tools, skills, and understandings a mediator uses in creating the mediative interactions represent her mediative capacity (Lederach, 2002).

An oft-cited example of mediative capacity is that of the women of Somalia who, usually outside of any organized effort, performed informal diplomacy, even as their clans were wracked by violent conflict. Because of their particular positions within and across groups, and their roles within the larger society, these women were
uniquely able to contribute to peacebuilding. The custom of cross-clan marriages led women to generally oppose violence that pitted their sons against their brothers, and it allowed them to travel in relative safety between the social spaces of the clans themselves—where they played a role in advocating negotiations and bringing about ceasefires. Additionally, women’s societal role as managing market life and finances—a function that went on even when other institutions broke down—ensured their contact with members of other clans in the social space of markets. There, they saw each other as mothers, small business people, and maintainers of the family economy and survival. These identities transcended the conflicting identities of rival clan member (Lederach, 2002).

In Maluku, many parallel examples of natural peacemakers also exist. Bapak Raja and other adat leaders have received some attention in this regard. However, other groups, whose meditative efforts might successfully be bolstered, have worked less visibly. Women and health workers are two such groups who will be profiled in some detail below.

10 A Peacebuilding Map for Actor Identification

The previous sections have profiled essential elements for identity-based conflict transformation based on recent theoretical and practice in the field of peacebuilding. By linking these elements and conditions of change, a cohesive strategy for peacebuilding is proposed: In strategic social spaces and moments, the peacebuilding activities and capacities of select actors, operating at various societal levels, can transform conflict. The following sections will suggest concrete ways to employ this strategic framework.

The first step in operationalizing the peacebuilding map is to transform the strategic framework into a matrix for analysis. Locating peacebuilding agents and institutions is the primary concern of this matrix. Yet, like a conflict map, the peacebuilding map aims to be highly descriptive and links actors to other conditions for change.
Some conflict mapping efforts have begun to move in a similar direction. Lederach (1997) has suggested an assets inventory that locates actors, especially in relationship to one another, and the structures that provide the context for conflict. The present conflict map will attempt to add utility for peacebuilding planners by taking Lederach’s mapping framework a step or two further. First, the aspect of social spaces will be added, locating the activities of peacebuilding actors in Maluku’s social context. Then the activities of these actors will be categorized by the peacebuilding stages they address.

Two examples of Maluku peacebuilding actors, Gerakan Perempuan Peduli (Concerned Women’s Movement) and Kesehatan Sebagai Jembatan Perdamaian (Health as a Bridge for Peace), will be given here to demonstrate application of this matrix. These two cases were selected to highlight the use of often underutilized societal assets for peacebuilding (women and health workers) and the strategic position of meso-level actors in effecting change.

Gerakan Perempuan Peduli (GPP) was formed in August, 1999 by Sister Francesco Moens and other women leaders from the Catholic, Muslim, and Protestant communities. While its membership comprised of local clergy and other women might suggest the organization operates predominantly at the micro level, very high level women have been among the ranks too, including the then Vice Governor, Mrs. Paula Renyaan-Bataona. This meso placement has allowed GPP to carry out a range of innovative peacebuilding activities from psychosocial work with women and children traumatized by warfare to meetings with the Governor and Regional Military Commander. Not only have their activities transcended various social contexts, but they also have run temporally from the height of hostilities through to reconciliation in the final phases of conflict and post-conflict—a critical long-term approach for addressing the ruptures of religious strife. As in Somalia and elsewhere, women in Maluku have again shown that they are effective, entrepreneurial peacebuilders and an inherent conflict transformation asset worthy of support.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Spaces</th>
<th>Strategic Role (by level)</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Peacebuilding Stages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>– Village (even where faced with opposition) – IDP camps – Military bases – Govt buildings</td>
<td>– Appeals to macro level authorities (governor, mayor, regional military commander, provincial police chief) – Appeals to Micro level religious leaders – Training micro level</td>
<td>Training women to counsel children</td>
<td>Stages A-D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Training mothers to discourage youth participation in violence</td>
<td>Stage A, B, C</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public education</td>
<td>Stages A-D</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Joint (Christian-Muslim) statements/calls for peace</td>
<td>Stages A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Activities for Muslim and Christian children</td>
<td>Stages A-D</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Joint ceremony (common breaking of fast)</td>
<td>Stage D</td>
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Figure 2: Peacebuilding Map Excerpt: *Gerakan Perempuan Peduli*
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Spaces</th>
<th>Strategic Role (by level)</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Peacebuilding Stages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>– Village</td>
<td>– Training for micro leaders</td>
<td>Setting up save passage of health workers and medicines</td>
<td>Stages A-D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(even where faced with opposition)</td>
<td>– Training for policy influence on macro level (limited but more through WHO and UGM)</td>
<td>Training health workers in peace building</td>
<td>Stage A-D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Hospitals and clinics</td>
<td></td>
<td>Set up communication links between health personnel</td>
<td>Stages A-D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Villages</td>
<td></td>
<td>Training in assessing impact of conflict on health sector</td>
<td>Stages A-C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– DepKes</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: Peacebuilding Map Excerpt: *Kesehatan Sebagai Jembatan Perdamaian*
Another social group that has been recognized as having inherent mediative capacity and access to strategic social spaces is that of health workers. The World Health Organization (WHO) has recognized that not only do health and medical personnel have a respected role in conflict (typically excepted from violence), but that their perceived impartiality as healers and the universal need for health care equips them well for bridging work in post-conflict peacebuilding. While the Health as a Bridge for Peace (HBP) curriculum has been developed by WHO based on global experience, in Maluku training was implemented by Gadjah Mada University (UGM) and the Department of Health (DepKes), and the work was carried out on the ground by local clinical and public health workers. This diversified support allowed HBP to function as a meso actor, mediating between communities and patients at the grassroots and national and international bureaucracies. Like GPP, the efficacy of HBP in peacebuilding across social space and conflict times owes largely to the mediative capacity and social niche of health workers.

11 Interpreting the Peacebuilding Map

The value of these multi-dimensional peace assets depends on the level of analysis. Locating peacebuilding agents and institutions and identifying their activities is a first level of value. Peacebuilding planners should create and maintain an exhaustive inventory to find gaps and redundancies in efforts. Funders and other decision makers using such inventories can better direct scarce resources.

By analyzing social levels of operation, timing, and modes of interaction using the proposed dimensions of the matrix, this assessment becomes more refined, and oft overlooked levers for conflict transformation can be identified and supported. New insights about strengths and weaknesses of the range of peacebuilding efforts operating at any given time can also be elicited by analyzing multi-dimensional matrices for every peacebuilding actor identified by an inventory.
In an attempt to unearth new insights about peacebuilding in Maluku, this author has analyzed approximately 10 peacebuilding agents and institutions seen to be representative of the field.\(^4\) For reasons of space these could not all be presented in matrix form here. However, an analysis of these matrices has yielded the following set of observations. Observations generally fall into two groupings: (1) sub-strategies that are vibrant and maximized; and (2) sub-strategies that may have potential to be further maximized.

11.1 Vibrant and Maximized Sub-Strategies

Conflict Dissent

A key approach for transforming identity conflict is the role of dissenters (primarily an endogenous initiative). When a subset of one or both conflicting parties is able to carry on cooperative or conciliatory relationships with the other, this can work to redescribe group value identities and norms for group relations (Northrup, 1989). This has been one of the most actively pursued strategies in Maluku. Among the examples:

- *Baku Bae*;
- pan-religious peace marches;
- Health as a Bridge for Peace;
- efforts of Mercy Corps and other NGOs to insist that staff, training, grant reviews, etc. all have participation from both Christian and
- Islamic communities.

\(^4\)Judith Large (Large, 2001) has noted that 112 new NGOs were recently created over the course of a single year on Ambon island alone.
Superordinating a Shared Identity

A positive counterweight for the failure of state intervention in Maluku, was a renewed reliance on local institutions (i.e., the rajas with Sultan of Yogyakarta). Though not a goal, the effect of reviving local institutions has been to superordinate Maluccan identity over (subordinated) Christian and Muslim identities (Northrup, 1989).

11.2 Sub-Strategies that Might be Further Maximized

Depoliticizing Social Identity Through Structural Change

In one meta-study of social identity, entitled The Myth of “Ethnic Conflict”, Crawford et al suggest the following explanation: (1) identity-based conflict becomes intensified (violent) when identities are politicized; (2) the extent to which politicization is relevant over time depends on “rules of political membership” (voting rights, civil service hiring practices, citizenship qualifications, etc.) and structures and norms of asset allocation; and (3) strong institutions can be designed to channel conflict in non-violent ways or otherwise mitigate tendencies for conflict (Crawford and Lipschutz, 1998).

Recasting Identity Linked Behavior

State power, especially state power perceived as non-biased, to establish the rule of law is a critical transformative step. As long as vigilantism and militia warfare is seen as just self-defense and not prevented or prosecuted, individuals and groups will maintain their identities as defenders. If the rule of law was strengthened and attacks and counterattacks were prosecuted as criminal, identities can be shifted (Northrup, 1989). Caution, of course, must be employed here as there is the risk that criminal prosecution might only inflame tensions—especially if they are perceived as biased. Advocates of truth and reconciliation processes would argue that
that process is more transformative and that amnesty is a prerequisite to lasting peace. The more difficult issue in operationalizing the recommendation may in fact be that the central government is unable to establish rule of law because of the weakness of state structures.

12 Conclusion

Peacebuilding maps are an excellent technique for conflict transformation efforts. A body of peacebuilding theory and practice has provided the conceptual planks to gird this innovation. The peacebuilding matrix suggested in this paper is a functional application.

In the Maluku case it has been shown that the mapping of peacebuilding assets can reveal opportunities for coordination and needs for resource allocation. Using a series of representative matrices for analysis has suggested two well-used strategies for advancing peace, namely dissent from conflict participation by influential actors and the superordinating of Maluccan identity over that of polarized social sub-groups. Supporting such successful approaches, as well as those still in need of development—such as further attempting to depoliticize identity in the civil service and other positions of power and enhancing the rule of law—can offer important anchor points on the path to peace in Maluku. However, parliamentary and presidential elections in coming months will offer serious tests. Assessing whether Maluku is clearly making progress towards conflict transformation, or whether a negative peace slips back into conflict will have to wait until after these elections.

REFERENCES


