Asia Pacific
Security Survey
2007

Report
by
Jim Rolfe

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FOREWORD

This report presents the results of a survey completed by 104 security analysts from 17 countries across the Asia Pacific region as well as European specialists in this field. This is the second year that the East-West Center has conducted this survey, and it reflects an expansion in the number of participants from the previous year as well as some changes in the content of the survey. The report includes comparisons with the previous survey.

We believe that the information compiled from the survey provides a generally accurate representation of the state of thinking about the security outlook in the region among security specialists. We hope that the report—and the series—will help fill a gap in the current literature on the regional security outlook by bringing together and comparing responses from a variety of country perspectives to the same set of questions.

We are grateful to Dr. Jim Rolfe, formerly of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, who drafted the report, and to Michael Lee, a degree fellow at the East-West Center, who processed the responses and produced the graphics in the report. The Center’s Publications Office oversaw the final preparations and the posting of the report on the Center’s website (www.EastWestCenter.org).

We welcome any comments you may have on the report—especially if you believe that our assessment of the findings does not accurately reflect the state of opinion among specialists on any significant point or if you believe that the survey neglected important issues or areas of the security landscape. Responses should be sent to Richard Baker, coordinator of the survey, at BakerR@EastWestCenter.org.

If you are interested in participating in future surveys, please also contact Mr. Baker, providing information on your country, institution, and area of specialization.

We are confident that you will find the report useful.

Charles E. Morrison
President
East-West Center
SUMMARY

This report is based on a detailed questionnaire completed by analysts of international relations and security in the Asia Pacific region. A detailed analysis of the responses is in the body of this report, and the full text of the questionnaire is given in the appendix. The following points summarize the major issues and findings of the survey.

Using the Report. The survey and report focus on the views of scholars and professionals, most of whom are English-speaking international security specialists; the survey should not be taken as a measure of broad public opinion on the issues examined.

One hundred and four surveys were completed. Four countries—Australia, India, New Zealand, and the United States—had 10 or more respondents. Countries with between 5 and 10 respondents include Canada, China, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Russia, and the European grouping.

For analysis, respondents were grouped according to the generally accepted subregions of South Asia, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Oceania, North America, and Europe. Overall findings were computed giving each of the subregions equal weighting, in order to compensate for the uneven numbers of responses by country. In the report, the regional averages are compared with the subregional responses—and with national responses where there are sufficient numbers to support generalization at the national level.

Inevitably there is a certain homogenizing effect in any survey such as this, with averaged responses tending toward a bell curve representing the conventional wisdom and departures from that. However, the report also shows where there is a strong preponderance of professional opinion at one or another end of the spectrum, either in the overall pattern or among national or subregional groups.

Little Overall Agreement. The results of the survey are noteworthy for the diversity of opinion at the overall regional level. There is a reasonable level of agreement across the region on the important short-term issues, but less agreement as to the order of importance among these issues. There is far less agreement among the full sample regarding the longer-term issues, but a higher level of agreement at the subregional and national levels. It is also worth noting (though not surprising) that the responses on most issues tend to group around the middle ground, with few responses at the extremes of the range of choices offered.

Jim Rolfe is a senior fellow at the New Zealand Centre for Strategic Studies. He has recently completed six years at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies where the focus of his research was on the ways the states of the region cooperate to achieve security.
**Dominant Issues.** As in 2006, China’s role in regional affairs is a central interest to the analysts. Not only is China’s position key to many of the specific issues seen as important—such as tensions in the Taiwan Strait or potential competition over scarce resources—but also a large majority of respondents see China’s broad role in the region as a major uncertainty. While most respondents do not believe that China’s rise will be destabilizing, they see the U.S. response to China’s rise as being a major factor in the eventual outcome.

Other issues identified as being of short-term importance include terrorism and Korean Peninsula issues, violent Islamic extremism, and the need for greater transparency in military plans, spending, and procurement. These are similar to the concerns expressed in 2006.

In the period beyond five years, the issue identified as most important is the potential for competition over scarce resources; this issue moved from out of the top five short-term issues to the leading position. Issues relating to China (Sino-U.S. tensions and Chinese nationalism) also move into the top five in the long term (to second and third place, respectively). The North Korea nuclear weapons issue drops out of the top five, but more general concern over instability in the Korean Peninsula remains in fifth place. Tensions in the Taiwan Strait remain near the top group (in sixth place). Other issues making both lists are terrorism and violent Islamic extremism.

Other issues of some concern to the respondents over the long term include most manifestations of potential regional instability and issues over geographic claims, including tensions between Russia and Japan over the Northern Territories and the potential for problems in the South China Sea.

**The Role of the United States.** As in the 2006 survey, in 2007 the analysts are ambivalent about the U.S. role in the region. As just noted, the way the United States works with China is one of the analysts’ top long-term uncertainties. The respondents generally believe that U.S. standing in the region has been hurt by the war in Iraq, but most anticipate that relations will recover over the next decade. There continues to be wariness of the prospect of U.S. unilateralism, and more analysts than in 2006 believe that the United States will be prepared to intervene militarily in the region; however, this belief is still not strongly held. Similarly, a small plurality believe that regional countries are tending to cooperate to limit the ability of the United States to act unilaterally, or to reduce the effects if it does act unilaterally.

On the other hand, the United States’ forward presence is held to be very important for regional security. However, a small majority sees the specific U.S. missile defense project as likely having a destabilizing impact on the region, and there is widespread though not strong support among the respondents for the proposition that after Korean reunification the government should ask the United States to withdraw forces from the Peninsula.

**Iraq.** Participants generally view the war in Iraq as having a negative impact on regional security. A plurality believes that the war increases the likelihood of terrorist attacks in the region. A significant number also believe that the war has had a debilitating effect on the United States’ ability to operate effectively in the Asia Pacific, although U.S. respondents generally do not share
this view. Some respondents also argue that the war has reduced the United States’ ability to soundly analyze the situation in the region.

In response to an open-ended question, a few of the analysts suggest other possible consequences of the Iraq war. These included the likelihood of intensified intra-Islam disputes and that China’s regional position will be enhanced because of the war. Highlighting the uncertainties in the outlook, predictions were offered both that support for Muslim extremism in Southeast Asia will diminish and that it will increase.

The Korean Peninsula. The respondents are generally optimistic that the issue of North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons will be resolved, and a majority rate the situation on the Peninsula as more peaceful in 2006 than the previous year. This presumably reflects the March 2007 timing of the survey, coming after a major Six-Party agreement in February. Most believe that there will be continued slow, if uneven, progress toward denuclearization. However, in one of the more pointed differences within the group, a significant minority are more pessimistic, believing that negotiations will be broken off leading to a return to sanctions and a standoff between the sides. Japanese analysts express the greatest concern in this regard; most other respondents assign less continuing importance to this issue.

Terrorism. The respondents as a group consider terrorism to be the most important short-term issue for the region as well as one of the important issues in the longer term. A clear majority believe that the United States’ war on terrorism has increased the danger of terrorism in the region. Reflecting a similar reaction to the U.S. policy, an even larger majority believe that future military responses to terrorism should require authorization by the United Nations.

A significant plurality of the analysts also see terrorism as a significant threat to the internal security of their own country, but only a minority believe this threat has increased over the past year. They see the threat as coming from organized international networks (rather than homegrown groups) and they believe there has been increasing international cooperation to counter the threat. They also judge, however, that the current level of cooperation is still not adequate.

Interventions, Force, and International Relations. The respondents were asked their views as to the appropriateness of various levels of intervention by the international community in five situations (four actual, one hypothetical). In the case of clear humanitarian crises and/or ethnic cleansing (Darfur was the example), the group strongly supported military intervention. However, the more political the issue, the less support there is for military intervention or even for strong sanctions. Thus, in response to the situation in Burma, cited for suppression of human rights and a war against minorities, there is only limited support for military intervention but this is coupled with considerable support for some level of sanctions. In the cases of the civil wars in Sri Lanka and Lebanon, there is substantially less support for sanctions and more for diplomatic pressure and dialogue/good offices. The Lebanon civil war attracts slightly more support for military intervention than does the Sri Lanka conflict, with those responses coming from across the whole region, but this did not necessarily correlate with support for military responses in the other situations.
Asked for their recommendation for the posture of the international community on Iraq in the event of continuing civil/sectarian war following a U.S. withdrawal, half of the group favors dialogue and/or good offices while a quarter recommend diplomatic pressure only. There is very little support for strong sanctions, and even less (only 2 of 103 respondents) for military intervention.

**Institutions and their Effectiveness.** The analysts were asked their assessment of the effectiveness of selected regional institutions in (a) building a sense of community and (b) stimulating practical cooperation and problem solving. Overall, the group rates the institutions as more effective at building community than as instruments for action. Even in the former case, the analysts do not see the institutions as “highly effective,” but rather as “somewhat effective” or, more rarely, “generally effective.”

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is considered the most effective of the regional institutions, rating highly on both community building and practical outcomes. At the other end of the scale, ASEAN’s South Asian counterpart, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), is rated as ineffective on both counts by most respondents, especially those from the Subcontinent.

Respondents generally support a more active approach to developing the regional security architecture. Most believe that there should be a trilateral China-Japan-U.S. security dialogue, that there should be more regular and structured security discussions within the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation process (APEC), that there should be an official security forum for Northeast Asia, and that the various regional forums should coordinate on political and security issues. If the wider community of policymakers shares these views, this suggests there may be opportunities for progress in this area. Also of interest, the analysts’ assessment represents a shift from the 2006 survey, when the report concluded there was a “lack of strong support for the institutional options for regional cooperation.”

**New Issues.** The survey focused primarily on traditional military security issues. However, respondents were also given an opportunity to comment on nontraditional security issues such as pandemics, environmental degradation, and vulnerability to natural disasters. As in 2006, the responses on these issues suggest that “a broader definition of security challenges is taking firm hold, at least among security analysts.” In fact, in 2007 the nontraditional issues are generally rated as more important for regional security—at least in the longer term—than the traditional issues. Further, when invited to suggest additional areas for the survey nearly half the responses suggest more emphasis on nontraditional issues.

**BACKGROUND**

This project is designed to tap the views of security analysts across the Asia Pacific region regarding the outlook for regional security and the emerging issues. Other surveys tend to rely on essays by regional and/or subject matter experts who are not necessarily from the countries,
but this survey is, so far as we know, the only one based on responses to a detailed questionnaire by analysts from a wide range of countries across the region and from outside it. This approach does bring out clearly how opinions on different issues vary across the region. As such, the report offers policymakers an understanding of the issues considered to be important by a wide range of analysts; it also gives analysts of the region additional data for their own work and insight into areas needing additional research.

The report is based on a questionnaire sent in March 2007 to approximately 300 security analysts and professionals who specialize in the security of the Asia Pacific region. The analysts, who represent 17 regional countries and two regions (Europe and the Pacific Islands), were chosen because of their recognized expertise in the affairs of the region. Participation was by invitation, but responses were anonymous except that data on country affiliations were collected. This year, 104 substantive responses were received, compared with 73 usable responses in the 2006 survey. Despite efforts to increase participation from each country included in the survey some countries had only one or two respondents. Although responses from those countries are included in overall and regional averages, they are not generally singled out for discussion of national results unless there is a specific point to be made.

The intent of the questionnaire and this report is to gather and present the opinions of professionals who spend a considerable amount of their time thinking about issues of regional security. As such, this report presents a snapshot of opinion as it relates to specific issues within the region, giving a range of views based on national, ideological, and other perspectives. What is interesting and important is the extent to which views coalesce or where they remain diverse. This report shows clearly where there is agreement and where there is disagreement over the issues discussed.

Some preliminary and general conclusions are drawn regarding both national and regional attitudes of the policy analysis community. These are average positions for both country and regional responses and, especially in the case of single- or low-response countries, may not reflect broader positions at all. The regions have been selected according to more or less standard criteria. Southeast Asia encompasses the ASEAN respondents and South Asia encompasses the SAARC respondents. Northeast Asia includes not only China, Japan, and South Korea, but also Russia, Mongolia, and one respondent from Taiwan.

The issues by and large were selected for the analysts and they responded to them as presented. The respondents also had the opportunity in a number of open-ended questions to suggest issues they considered to be important. Between the open and closed questions we have a robust understanding of the issues important to the region, the relative importance given to them, and the ways that analysts from different countries and different parts of the region might differ in their views as to the significance of the issues.

This is the second year in which a large group has been invited to respond to the questionnaire. In the interests of comparative analysis, the questions this year were kept similar to those of last year. Some new questions were added and some deemed not relevant were dropped or altered. Where comparisons can be made they have been.
FINDINGS

Participation. Figure 1 shows the breakdown of respondents by broad geographic region. Four countries (Australia, India, New Zealand, and the United States) each provided 10 or more of the 104 respondents. Nine additional countries provided five or more respondents. In regional terms, East Asian countries provided 39 percent of the respondents (Northeast Asia, 19 percent; Southeast Asia, 20 percent) and South Asian countries 17 percent, although South Asian respondents came from only India and Pakistan, and most of those from India. North America contributed 16 percent of the respondents and Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands, 22 percent. Europe contributed 6 percent of responses. (See Appendix I for a breakdown of respondents.)

The numbers represent not only a substantial increase from 2006 when there were 73 respondents, but also a broadening of the base of respondents. In 2006 only one country, the United States, provided 10 or more respondents, three other countries provided five or more respondents, and countries such as South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand were not represented at all. The increase in numbers and the broader base give us increased confidence in our ability to make at least limited generalizations from the responses.
Traditional Security Issues: Short and Long Term. Respondents were asked to rate 26 issues as to their importance for regional security in both the short/medium term (that is, over the next five years) and in the longer term (beyond five years). The questions here focused on “traditional” politico-security issues such as instability in Central Asia, tensions in the Taiwan Strait, or nuclear proliferation in East Asia. Two politico-economic issues, dealing with the competition for scarce resources and with other economic conflicts, were included. Apart from minor changes in wording, the questions were very similar to those asked in 2006. Nontraditional issues such as environmental degradation and drug trafficking were dealt with in a later question. The scale used for measuring importance was from “not an issue” to “very important.”

Figure 2 shows the relative importance of the issues in the short/medium-term and figure 3 shows their long-term importance.

There are some differences in long- and short-term perceptions, the most interesting of which is the appearance of Chinese nationalism as the second most important issue for the region in the longer term, but its nonappearance as an issue for the short term. In the short term the most important issue is the problem of Sino-Japanese relations closely followed by terrorism, the competition for scarce resources, North Korea’s nuclear program, and tensions on the Korean Peninsula, in that order. In the longer term the order of importance is the competition for scarce resources, Chinese nationalism, terrorism, the North Korean nuclear program, and tension in and across the Taiwan Strait.

One notable difference between the issues in 2007 and in 2006 is that this year Sino-U.S. relations dropped off the list of top five long-term issues. Also, the competition for scarce resources appears this year as both a short- and long-term issue. In 2006 it did not appear as a short-term issue, although it was seen as an issue for the longer term.

When the issues are examined according to regional preferences, there is more diversity. Tables 1 and 2 give the short- and long-term regional impressions of the important issues. The tables speak for themselves in terms of the diversity of regional opinion and, when read in conjunction with figures 2 and 3, give a good overview of the state of regional opinion as it relates to the importance of the different issues.

Some issues are seen by all or most as relatively unimportant for regional security. They include generally (although with regional variations) Russo-Japanese problems over the Northern Territories; South China Seas issues; and instability in the South Pacific, Russia, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia.

At the national level there are differences between country respondents, although few see any issue as being quite or very important. Of those national groups that do identify important issues, the Chinese respondents see tensions in Sino-U.S. relations as quite important in the short term (U.S. respondents consider this of middling importance); Japanese analysts rate the North Korean nuclear weapons program as quite important (the Chinese also consider this important, but not at the same level, and South Korean respondents do not); and the Pakistanis consider both terrorism and U.S. unilateralism as important short-term regional security issues.
Figure 2. Perceptions of short-term importance

a. Terrorism
b. Violent Islamic extremism
c. US unilateralism
d. Restructuring/reduction of US military presence in Asia
e. Chinese nationalism
f. Japanese nationalism
g. Contention between Japan and Russia over the "Northern Territories"
h. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula
i. Tensions in/across the Taiwan Strait
j. Tensions over claims in the South China Sea
k. Tensions in Sino-US relations
l. Tensions in Sino-Japanese relations
m. Tensions between India and Pakistan
n. Instability in Russia
o. Instability in China
p. Instability in North Korea
q. Instability in Central Asia
r. Instability in Southeast Asia
s. Instability in the South Pacific
t. Instability in South Asia
u. Asian arms races
v. North Korean nuclear weapons program
w. Nuclear proliferation in East Asia
x. Nuclear proliferation in South Asia
y. Competition for scarce resources
z. Other economic conflicts (for markets, jobs, investment)
Figure 3. Perceptions of long-term importance

- Terrorism
- Violent Islamic extremism
- US unilateralism
- Restructuring/reduction of US military presence in Asia
- Chinese nationalism
- Japanese nationalism
- Contention between Japan and Russia over the “Northern Territories”
- Tensions on the Korean Peninsula
- Tensions in/across the Taiwan Strait
- Tensions over claims in the South China Sea
- Tensions in Sino-US relations
- Tensions in Sino-Japanese relations
- Tensions between India and Pakistan
- Instability in Russia
- Instability in China
- Instability in North Korea
- Instability in Central Asia
- Instability in Southeast Asia
- Instability in the South Pacific
- Instability in South Asia
- Asian arms races
- North Korean nuclear weapons program
- Nuclear proliferation in East Asia
- Nuclear proliferation in South Asia
- Competition for scarce resources
- Other economic conflicts (for markets, jobs, investment)
Table 1. Regional short-term issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subregion</th>
<th>Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Terrorism, Chinese nationalism, competition for scarce resources, U.S. unilateralism, Taiwan Strait tensions, Sino-Japanese tensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast Asia</td>
<td>Korean Peninsula tensions, Sino-U.S. tensions, North Korean nuclear weapons, Sino-Japanese tensions, nuclear proliferation in East Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>Competition for scarce resources, terrorism, Sino-Japanese tensions, Sino-U.S. tensions, violent Islamic extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>Terrorism, other economic conflicts, U.S. unilateralism, competition for scarce resources, violent Islamic extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>India-Pakistan tensions, instability in North Korea, North Korean nuclear weapons, Korean Peninsula tensions, Sino-Japanese tensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>India-Pakistan tensions, terrorism, Korean Peninsula tensions, violent Islamic extremism, Taiwan Strait tensions, North Korean nuclear weapons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Regional long-term issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subregion</th>
<th>Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Chinese nationalism, terrorism, competition for scarce resources, violent Islamic extremism, U.S. unilateralism, North Korean nuclear weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast Asia</td>
<td>Instability in North Korea, North Korean nuclear weapons, Korean Peninsula tensions, nuclear proliferation in East Asia, competition for scarce resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>Competition for scarce resources, instability in North Korea, Chinese nationalism, terrorism, violent Islamic extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>Competition for scarce resources, other economic conflicts, U.S. unilateralism, violent Islamic extremism, terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>Taiwan Strait tensions, competition for scarce resources, India-Pakistan tensions, North Korean nuclear weapons, Sino-U.S. tensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>Competition for scarce resources, Korean Peninsula tensions, Taiwan Strait tensions, terrorism, Chinese nationalism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For the longer term, South Korean respondents identify competition for scarce resources as being quite important. Their colleagues in Pakistan agree unanimously. They add other economic conflicts to the list of important issues and continue to see U.S. unilateralism as quite important. Chinese respondents continue to see Sino-U.S. tensions as the important regional security issue in the long term (and their U.S. colleagues continue to disagree), while the Japanese continue to worry about North Korean nuclear weapons and also see the potential for nuclear proliferation as another important issue.

Overall, there is limited Asia Pacific-wide agreement on the importance of issues. There is less agreement as to importance in the long term than there is in the short term. We have to look to the subregions to gain any significant measure of agreement, and even here that agreement is not in any way complete between the states making up the subregions.

Propositions on Regional Security. Sixteen statements dealing with regional security issues were presented to the analysts, who were asked to state their reactions on a range from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” The 2006 questionnaire had 13 statements requiring responses. Ten of those statements reappear in the 2007 questionnaire and there were six additional propositions.

Figure 4 shows the issues in their relative importance for the region. Overall, only four issues indicate any tendency toward strong agreement across the region: greater transparency in military plans, spending, and procurement; a tripartite China-Japan-U.S. dialogue among defense ministers or officials; more coordination/integration between the various regional forums on political and security issues; and an official security forum for Northeast Asia.

Two of these issues, the need for a Northeast Asian security forum and the need for greater transparency, also figured in the list of strongly endorsed positions in 2006. Of the other two issues, the one on the need for a tripartite defense dialogue received slightly less support last year than this year and the other was not asked about last year.

The first four components to this question relate to China, its role in the region, and the way the United States will respond to it. Respondents from North America and Oceania agree with the proposition that China’s emergence as a great power is the biggest uncertainty in the region. Responses from the other four regional groupings range between agreement and neutrality on the question. At the national level, respondents from Japan, the United States, and New Zealand agree more strongly with the proposition, with all other national responses between agreement and neutrality. In 2006, three of the regional groupings were inclined to agree with the statement and one grouping, South Asia, disagreed, perhaps indicating that in the last year China’s future place in the region had become slightly clearer to some.

Few respondents have any concern that China will have a destabilizing effect on the region. Only Northeast Asia and Oceania respondents are at all inclined to agree with the proposition and then not strongly. Most regional groupings are neutral on the issue, inclining toward disagreement. There are disparities in national views. Chinese respondents, not surprisingly, disagree with the proposition, while Japanese respondents—as well as the respondent from Taiwan—agree. Respondents from the United States most strongly disagree.
Figure 4. Importance of traditional security issues

1. How China emerges as a great power is the biggest uncertainty in the region.
2. China’s rise will have a destabilizing impact on the region.
3. How the US responds to China’s rise will largely determine the future political environment in the region.
4. The US will see China’s rise as a threat.
5. Regional countries are increasingly cooperating to limit the US’ unilateral power.
6. The US forward military presence in Asia is very important to regional stability in the coming decade.
7. If Korea is reunified, the Korean government should ask US forces to leave the Korean Peninsula.
8. A US missile defense system will have a destabilizing impact on the Asia Pacific region.
9. Japan should be a “normal” country, capable of making security commitments to other countries.
10. To enhance stability in the region, there should be greater transparency in military plans, spending, and procurement.
11. There should be a China-Japan-US dialogue among defense ministers or officials.
12. The discussion of political and security issues in APEC should be more structured and regular.
13. There should be an official security forum for Northeast Asia.
14. There should be more coordination/integration between the various regional forums on political and security issues (ASEAN/ARF, APEC, Asian Summit).
15. Differences over values (such as democracy and human rights) are a significant source of international disputes and tensions in the region.
Across the region there is general although not strong agreement that the U.S. response to China will determine the future regional political environment. Southeast and Northeast Asian respondents are stronger in their agreement than are analysts from the other regions.

The analysts consider it possible that the United States will see China’s rise as a threat, with respondents from Northeast Asia and Oceania being slightly stronger in their agreement with this than their colleagues from other regions. Chinese respondents tend toward neutrality on the question, whereas their South Korean counterparts much more clearly support the proposition. U.S. respondents are even more neutral than their Chinese colleagues.

The next five issues relate to U.S. actions in the region and to regional reactions toward the United States. There is little support (although more than there was in 2006) for the proposition that in the future the United States will be more willing to intervene militarily in the region. In a change from the 2006 results, analysts from Northeast Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia mildly agree with the proposition. In 2006 none of the regional groupings agreed with the proposition.

There is some sentiment, mostly held in Northeast Asia, that regional countries are increasingly cooperating to limit the United States’ unilateral power, but the proposition is not strongly supported overall. There are no significant regional variations in the results.

Respondents agree, although not strongly, that the U.S. forward military presence in Asia is very important to regional stability. European respondents support the proposition most strongly, although they are still only on the neutral side of agreement and South Asian respondents lean toward disagreement with the proposition. Of the national groups, the Japanese agree most strongly that the U.S. presence is a stabilizing factor, and those from Pakistan are the strongest in disagreement.

That the United States should be asked to leave if the Korean Peninsula is reunified has a similarly low measure of support as the previous proposition. Again, there is little regional variation in opinion with all regions on the favorable side of neutral, but only slightly. National responses vary from the tendency toward disagreeing with the proposition by South Korean respondents (other Northeast Asian states are neutral tending toward agreement), while the Philippines and Malaysian respondents most strongly agree. Analysts from the United States are neutral on the issue. In 2006 there was much more disagreement with the proposition. Three regions (Europe, North America, and Northeast Asia) disagreed and only South Asian respondents agreed. Perhaps the easing in tensions on the Peninsula and the recent positive movements in the Six-Party Talks have affected regional attitudes, or perhaps there is skepticism about a U.S. role on a unified Peninsula.

On the question of whether a U.S. missile defense system will be destabilizing, there is once again only marginal support for the proposition and little regional variation in attitude. South Asia respondents agree most strongly that it will be destabilizing, while Northeast Asians are almost neutral on the agreement side and North Americans are neutral tending toward disagreement. National responses vary from the analysts in Pakistan and Malaysia who agree
relatively strongly that the system will be destabilizing, to their colleagues in the United States and Japan as well as Taiwan, who are neutral or lean toward disagreement with the proposition.

The suggestion that Japan should be a “normal” country (defined in the question as being able to make security commitments) reflects, yet again, little regional variation in the responses with all falling between Europe, which is the most supportive of the proposition, and Northeast Asia, at supportive tending toward neutral. This is a similar result to the 2006 responses. Nationally, the most supportive country of those with more than just one or two respondents was Indonesia, with a support level at between agreement and strong agreement, and the least supportive (and strongly so) was South Korea. Japanese respondents were mildly supportive, as were the Chinese respondents, while U.S. respondents were more supportive than either of those countries, tending to agree with the proposition.

The most strongly supported of the propositions, with all regions accepting it at a level between “agree” and “strongly agree,” is the suggestion that to enhance regional stability there should be greater regional military transparency. Agreement by national groups reflects this support except for the Chinese respondents who are closer to neutral on this point than other groupings; they place themselves between agreement and neutrality. This is an increase in support over 2006 when all regions agreed with the proposition but not at this level of support. This finding suggests that this is an issue that could easily be (re)introduced onto the official regional agenda (it has been on the Track II agenda for some time).

A tripartite defense ministers’ or officials’ dialogue between the United States, China, and Japan is supported across the region with little variation, although the Europeans are slightly more neutral on the issue, perhaps because they are somewhat distanced from the issues. In 2006, South Asian respondents disagreed with the statement. Of the countries named in the proposition, the Japanese are the most supportive, the Chinese almost equally so, and the U.S. respondents only slightly less so than those countries. In 2006, Chinese respondents were distinctly less supportive of the idea than their Japanese and American colleagues.

Northeast Asian analysts tend toward strong agreement with the proposition that there should be a more structured discussion of security issues within APEC, while European and Southeast Asian respondents are in mild agreement. In 2006, regional positions were more neutral. National positions range toward strongly supportive by South Korea and China, toward disagreement by Malaysia, and at absolute disagreement by Indonesian respondents. Indonesian respondents also replied negatively to this issue in 2006. Perhaps the support for an APEC security agenda represents some doubt about the role of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), or perhaps it reflects the fact that APEC has a leaders’ summit and the ARF does not.

That there should be an official security forum for Northeast Asia is one of the strongly supported propositions, with the average across the region being between agreement and strong agreement. The level of support for the proposition has risen since 2006 when the responses were between agreement and neutrality, although leaning toward agreement. Northeast Asian respondents are the most supportive of such a forum. Southeast Asia and North America also tend toward strong support. Europe is the most neutral but still supportive. National results
range from the South Koreans who unanimously strongly agreed with the proposition to the Indians who mildly agreed.

The need for more coordination/integration between the region’s multilateral institutions is also strongly supported with little regional or national variation in the responses. China and South Korea are the most supportive national groups and Australia and Canada the least so (but still tending toward support). How such coordination or integration would occur and what the institutions would coordinate on were questions not asked and therefore represent an opportunity for analysis.

The final part to this question suggests that differences over values are a significant source of international disputes and tension in the region. The region is neutral to the proposition, tending toward supportive, whereas in 2006 the overall response was neutral tending toward negative. South Asian respondents were in least agreement, being neutral tending slightly toward disagreement as they were in 2006. This could reflect the fact that differences between India and Pakistan are indeed to a large extent about interests rather than values. At the national level, Chinese respondents are the least supportive of the proposition (tending toward strong disagreement), followed by Pakistan and Australia (both nearer to neutral than in disagreement), while the most supportive are the respondents from the Philippines.

Nontraditional Security Issues. Respondents were asked how a range of issues affected their own country. The 10 issues considered in 2006 were repeated almost verbatim in 2007 and four additional issues were addressed. In this analysis, European respondents have been excluded from the subregional and country analyses because the question asked for responses in relation to national (rather than regional) security and therefore European concerns on this question fall outside of this survey’s scope.

The last column in figure 5 (Average of Regions) shows the importance of the issues across the region overall. The most important issue for national security is environmental degradation, but leaning only slightly toward the important end of the scale from neutral, and the least important are ethnic nationalism/separatism and foreign immigration, tending toward the not particularly important. These overall positions are not reflected evenly throughout the region or between individual countries. For example, the least important issue overall—foreign immigration—is still important for countries such as both Pakistan and Malaysia, each scoring it toward the quite important end of the scale.

In terms of overall perspectives on the importance of the various potentially threatening issues there is considerable variation by subregion. Respondents from Oceania are the most optimistic about the security issues in question, generally rating them as having low or no importance. At the other end of the scale, South Asian respondents tend to consider all of the issues generally as mildly important for their own country’s security outlook, and perhaps might be considered to be more worried about their security overall.

Responses to specific issues differ considerably by subregion. Table 3 shows the top five issues for each subregion. No single issue appears in the top five in importance for every subregion. Two
Figure 5. Importance of nontraditional security issues

- Drug trafficking
- Environmental degradation
- Ethnic nationalism or separatism in your country
- Income inequalities and social instability
- Instability in a neighboring country
- Instability of rivals in other countries
- International financial issues (currency flows, exchange rate fluctuations)
- Possibility of serious economic downturn
- Diseases such as AIDS, SARS, or Avian Flu
- Vulnerability to natural disasters
issues, environmental degradation and the possibility of severe economic downturn, are rated as a potential national threat by four of the five regional groupings. A number of issues appear on the list of most important issues for one region but are considered to be among the least important by another. Northeast Asian respondents, for example, consider competition for scarce resources to be the most threatening issue whereas it is one of the least important for Southeast Asian respondents. But one of Southeast Asia’s most important issues, disease pandemics, is on the Northeast Asian respondents’ list of least important issues. In South Asia, ethnic nationalism or separatism is an important issue; in Southeast Asia it is not.

Within subregions there are occasionally significant national variations and these variations are most notable in Southeast Asia. Pakistani respondents are consistently gloomier than their Indian colleagues with the most extreme gap being over international financial issues. Pakistani respondents see this issue as being of high importance and their Indian colleagues tend to see it as being between neutral and unimportant. Another considerable variation between South Asian respondents is over the issue of foreign immigration, with Pakistani analysts seeing this as important and Indian analysts again being between neutral and seeing the issue as less than important. Within Northeast Asia there are significant differences of opinion as to the importance of drug trafficking. South Korean respondents tend to see it as less than important, with their Chinese and Russian colleagues being neutral and tending toward importance respectively. The issue of ethnic nationalism or separatism is of minor importance to Japanese respondents, but is much more so for Chinese respondents who see it as neutral tending toward important.

While comparisons with 2006 as to the relative importance of issues cannot be made directly because additional questions have been asked, some broad generalizations can be drawn. There

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subregion</th>
<th>Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northeast Asia</td>
<td>Competition for scarce resources, environmental degradation, instability in a neighboring country, serious economic downturn, vulnerability to natural disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>Vulnerability to natural disasters, disease pandemics, serious economic downturn, income inequalities and social instability, international financial issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>Environmental degradation, income inequalities and social instability, ethnic nationalism or separatism, economic globalization, competition for scarce resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>Environmental degradation, disease pandemics, drug trafficking, economic globalization, serious economic downturn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>Serious economic downturn, environmental degradation, disease pandemics, vulnerability to natural disasters, drug trafficking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
has been a change in perception of the seriousness of some issues. In 2006, drug trafficking was one of the top issues; this year it has dropped to number nine. Economic disputes were not a serious cause for concern in 2006; this year the question was reworded as “competition for scarce resources” and is the second highest concern overall.

**Watch-List Issues.** Respondents were asked to consider how eight issues had changed over the previous year: peace on the Korean Peninsula; harmonious relations among the large powers; peaceful settlement of territorial disputes; dampening of potential regional arms races; the regional economic outlook; danger of domestic instability; the war on terrorism; and Indo-Pakistani relations. Seven of the eight issues canvassed were the same as in 2006 and the eighth was changed from a specific question about stability in Indonesia to a generic one dealing with domestic instability. Figure 6 shows the results.

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**Figure 6. Watch-list issues: change in outlook over the previous year**

- **a.** Peace on the Korean Peninsula
- **b.** Harmonious relations among the large powers
- **c.** Peaceful settlement of territorial disputes
- **d.** Dampening of potential regional arms races
- **e.** Regional economic outlook
- **f.** Dangers of domestic instability (political/communal violence, insurgencies, secessionism)
- **g.** “War on Terrorism”
- **h.** Indo-Pakistani relations
No issue is, according to the analysts, significantly better or worse than last year. The outlook for the regional economy is the most improved with the average considering it to be marginally improved over the year. The least improved outlook is that of the danger of domestic instability, which is marginally worse than the response last year. In 2006 the most improved issue (of those asked again this year) was the outlook for Indo-Pakistani relations and the least improved was the outlook for dampening potential regional arms races.

Respondents from Southeast Asia and North America are slightly more optimistic about the likelihood of peace on the Korean Peninsula than are their colleagues from Northeast Asia who see things as being very much the same as last year. This result is similar to that in 2006, although South Asian 2006 respondents were marginally pessimistic whereas this year they are marginally optimistic. National perceptions on any change in the outlook for peace on the Peninsula vary widely. Within Northeast Asia, Japanese respondents are quite pessimistic whereas Chinese and South Korean respondents are marginally optimistic. The most optimistic national groups are the Thais and Singaporeans, closely followed by Canadians, all of whom believe that the outlook for peace is clearly better.

Harmonious relations among the large powers are also seen as improving marginally. The most confident regional groups are the Southeast Asians and South Asians. The least hopeful are Northeast Asians, who see the relationships as essentially unchanged. Again, this result is much the same as last year. This year no regional group saw relations as worsening whereas in 2006 both the South Asians and Europeans did, although only marginally.

The issue of the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes is also in the middle stratum, buoyed by a belief that there has been marginal improvement from last year. Southeast Asian and South Asian respondents hold this view whereas the Northeast Asians believe the situation is very marginally worse, with Chinese, South Korean, and Taiwanese respondents holding that position and the Japanese, Russian, and Mongolian respondents being more positive. In 2006 no regional group thought the situation was worse than the year before.

There is some difference between subregions over the outlook for regional arms races being dampened. Southeast Asian and North American respondents see the outlook as slightly improved, while the other regional respondents tend to see it as slightly worse than a year ago, but across the whole region the judgment is that the outlook is very much the same as it was last year. The gloomiest respondents are from South Korea who see the situation as clearly worse, whereas their colleagues from Russia are the most optimistic, seeing the outlook as being between the same and better.

The outlook for the regional economy is slightly more positive than last year. Southeast Asians are the most positive while North Americans are slightly more inclined to argue that the outlook is much the same as last year, but the differences are barely significant. Respondents from Thailand, however, see the outlook as clearly worse and their colleagues from Pakistan are inclined to agree. Indian respondents see the economic outlook as being clearly better than last year.

The prognosis for domestic instability is the worst for the issues considered, with the overall judgment being that the danger of domestic instability is very slightly higher than the results last
The most positive regional group is Northeast Asia, believing the outlook is just marginally improved over last year, while the Oceania group, probably in a reflection of regional instability in the Pacific Islands over the last year, inclines toward seeing the outlook as worsening. Australians and Thais are the most pessimistic national groups of those with more than one respondent.

The outlook for the war on terrorism, according to the analysts, has also become slightly worse over the last year. South Asian respondents are the most pessimistic, and of those the Pakistani respondents believe more strongly that the outlook is worse than do their Indian colleagues. Only Russian and Filipino respondents see the outlook as having improved slightly.

Indo-Pakistani relations have changed positively. The most positive responses come from South Asia where respondents are closer to seeing the outlook as better rather than the same. Respondents from the other regions are more likely to see the outlook as unchanged or only very slightly tending toward improvement. Of the national groupings, only those from Japan, Singapore, and Canada see the outlook as having worsened over the year, and in each case only slightly.

The Single Most Important Change. A qualitative response was required for the question: “What do you believe is the one change that could most positively affect Asia Pacific security?” This question is unchanged from 2006. Responses were coded according to the issue or issues raised. If both the United States and China are mentioned as needing to ensure that their relationship worked, both countries are included in the results. Some responses contained more than one issue; again, each of these issues is included in the results. Consequently, 18 separate issues or issue areas were identified 128 times by the 96 respondents to the question.

As in 2006, issues involving China are clearly the most significant. China—in the context of its relations with other states, its economic health, democracy, and the resolution of the Taiwan Strait issue—is mentioned 34 times.

Unsurprisingly, the United States and U.S. actions are also prominent, appearing in 18 of the responses. These respondents indicate that the United States should end its unilateralism, rethink the war on terrorism, and ensure stability with other major powers, especially China.

Fourteen of the responses indicate that a resolution of Korean Peninsula issues would be the most positive improvement for regional security, and the same number indicate that the development of cooperation and trust through regional processes is important. Korean issues were also prominent in the 2006 results, while regional cooperation was also mentioned.

Other significant issues mentioned by respondents between 4 and 10 times were Sino-Japanese relations, economic well-being, major power relations, and resolution of the India-Pakistan disputes. A number of apparently less significant issues such as a “reversal of nuclear proliferation” and a “decrease in extremism in Southeast Asia” garnered one or two mentions from respondents.
**Threats from Specific Countries.** Another open-ended question seeking a qualitative response asks respondents to indicate whether security issues in their own country were discussed with a particular other country (or countries) in mind, and if so to indicate which country was the focus of the discussion. The question is unchanged from 2006.

Sixty-two of the 102 respondents to this question indicate that the security discussion in their country has another country in mind, a slightly higher percentage than in 2006 when about half of the respondents gave this answer. Nineteen countries are mentioned by name, their names appearing a total of 107 times (several responses included multiple countries in their answer). These include China, mentioned 30 times (mostly by respondents from India, the United States, and Australia); Pakistan, 14 times; and the United States, 11 times.

Of the countries with larger response numbers, 9 of the 11 Australian respondents name a country, with Indonesia figuring six times. All 14 Indian respondents name China and Pakistan more or less equally as the subject of their national debate, and 9 of the 10 U.S. respondents name a country. For the U.S. respondents the most prominent other country is China.

All four Chinese responses suggest that the United States and Japan figure in their national debate as security threats. Two of the three South Korean respondents see Japan as the threat in the national discussion (the other sees North Korea), while the Japanese respondents see China and North Korea as the threats more or less equally. Singaporean respondents saw “neighboring countries” (Malaysia and Indonesia) as threats, along with China in the background. Clearly, if the respondents are reflecting the national debate, there are issues in both Northeast and Southeast Asia about levels of trust and the degree to which regionalization can occur.

**Significant Developments in 2006–2007.** Regional issues and developments over the last year and their impact on the overall security of the region were presented to the analysts who were asked to rate the impact on a scale from positive to negative. Seventeen areas were addressed of which 10 related to questions asked in 2006. Four issues from the 2006 questionnaire were dropped on the grounds that they were not topical for 2007, and seven more topical questions were added.

Figure 7 shows the responses. Nine of the issues are seen as having negative impacts, seven have positive impacts, and one is neutral. The analysts see the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan as having the most negative impact. Other issues with a significant negative response are North Korea’s nuclear tests in October 2006, the continuing insurgency in the southern Philippines and in southern Thailand, and the U.S. military “surge” in Iraq. Events seen as having a significant positive impact on security are the continued India-Pakistan negotiations, cooperation between Malacca Straits countries on security in the Straits, and the East Asia Summit process.

Where the questions of the two years correspond, it can be seen that issues that were positive in 2006 are still considered to be positive in 2007, and the issues that were negative in 2006 are still considered to be negative.
Figure 7. Significant developments in 2006–2007

- US military "surge" in Iraq
- Resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan
- North Korean nuclear test (October 2006)
- February 2007 agreement in Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear program
- China's shoot down of a satellite (January 2007)
- Election and new government in Aceh
- Coup in Thailand (September 2006)
- Continuing violence/insurgency in southern Thailand
- Continuing insurgency in the southern Philippines
- Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore-Thailand cooperation on Malacca Straits security
- Inauguration of ASEAN Defense Ministers' meetings (May 2006, Kuala Lumpur)
- The East Asia Summit process
- Further cases of avian flu (H5N1), especially in Indonesia
- Continued India-Pakistan negotiations, resumption of transport links
- Abe succession to Koizumi as prime minister of Japan
- Continuing issues in Japan's relations with China and South Korea
- Stability of international oil prices compared to sharp rise in 2005
Negative issues raised in response to an open-ended question and not otherwise included in the questionnaire include

- Russia’s move from democracy;
- a growing anti-U.S. alliance and growing fears about the quality of U.S. leadership;
- Japan’s treatment of the comfort women issue (and more generally, Japan’s relations with its neighbors);
- Iran’s nuclear program;
- impacts of climate change;
- human rights issues;
- political uncertainty in Bangladesh (and Thailand and the South Pacific); and
- the Japan-Australia security agreement.

Positive developments new for 2007 and not otherwise directly included in the survey (although some were implicit) include

- confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan;
- weakening of the U.S. dollar;
- greater consciousness of the effects of environmental degradation on economic life and greater regional cooperation to resolve the problems;
- Democratic Party control of the U.S. Congress;
- election of Ban Ki Moon as General Secretary of the United Nations; and
- the probability that ASEAN will develop a formal charter.

As was noted in 2006, these additional developments testify to the complexity of the regional geo-political environment and the uncertainties that complexity brings. This is especially the case when some issues are seen as both positive and negative by different respondents.

**International Intervention.** Respondents were invited to suggest “appropriate” courses of action by the international community in five specific situations: the situations in Darfur, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, and Iraq following U.S. disengagement and assuming civil or sectarian war with outside support. The six options given were arranged on a scale of weak to strong and ranged from “no action” through “dialogue/good offices” to “diplomatic pressure,” “mild sanctions,” “strong sanctions,” and “military intervention.” In 2006 a similar question was asked, but the situations to which the responses might be applied were different and thus no comparison between the questions can be made.

Figure 8 shows the responses. Looking at this topic generally, South Asian respondents are the least inclined to propose strong interventions—something between dialogue and diplomatic pressure is generally preferred—while the remainder of the region places itself between diplomatic pressure and mild sanctions on average, with North American respondents being at the higher end of that scale and respondents from Oceania being at the lower end.
For Darfur, the preference across the region is for action between mild and strong sanctions, with most subregions suggesting either strong sanctions or military intervention but with South Asia being slightly less enthusiastic and inclining toward mild sanctions. On a national basis, Pakistani respondents all prefer mild sanctions and their Indian colleagues incline toward strong sanctions, whereas some respondents from Australia, Pacific Islands, Brunei, Thailand, the United States, and Canada want military intervention, with the remainder in those countries supporting strong sanctions. All respondents from Europe, Japan, New Zealand, and Indonesia as well as the one respondent from Taiwan favor strong sanctions.

The situation in Myanmar did not elicit such a strong response. Both European and North American respondents are prepared to impose sanctions, while respondents from the rest of the region are more inclined to rely on diplomatic pressure. Respondents from Canada particularly want stronger responses than their colleagues from the rest of the region. Respondents from Japan, Singapore, and the Pacific Islands are noticeably less inclined to put pressure on Myanmar, with their preferred responses varying between dialogue/good offices and diplomatic pressure.

The civil war in Sri Lanka elicited even less desire for a strong response from the international community. Subregional responses are consistent. Respondents from New Zealand, India, and China are less inclined to intervene strongly than respondents from other states. For India and China this is probably because of their own issues with separatist movements and in India’s case
their history with Sri Lanka itself. For New Zealand this is more likely to be a reflection of a national disinclination to intervene for political as opposed to humanitarian reasons. Canadians are more inclined to intervene relatively strongly, with some respondents suggesting that sanctions are appropriate.

Responses to the war in Lebanon are similar to those of the previous case, Sri Lanka. National responses were very even across all countries. New Zealand respondents again are the least inclined to material action and Japanese respondents are the most, supporting mild sanctions as opposed to lesser interventions.

The question about Iraq after U.S. disengagement is hypothetical but assumes continuing civil war and/or sectarian strife with external support for the warring parties. Again, perhaps reflecting weariness (or wariness) with Middle Eastern politics, very few want sanctions or military intervention and an overwhelming majority opt for the lesser interventions of diplomatic pressure or dialogue/good offices. Only Northeast Asian analysts are inclined to go significantly beyond diplomatic pressure and apply mild sanctions. Of those countries with a significant number of respondents, the United States is clearly the most inclined to use sanctions as the preferred intervention.

Overall, these cases reflect a disinclination by the community of regional analysts for military interventions or even strong sanctions and a preference for dialogue and diplomacy. The exception to that generalization is where there is a clear humanitarian crisis, in which case strong sanctions and military intervention become much more acceptable.

Iraq. Four possible impacts of the conflict in Iraq were posed and the analysts were invited to suggest their likelihood from “very unlikely” to “very likely.” Figure 9 shows the responses.

The first possible impact posited was that U.S. credibility and standing in the region would be significantly eroded and U.S. security engagements in the region would be substantially reduced. The average across the region is a neutral position. European respondents see this as less than likely. Averaged responses from the other regions vary between the slightly unlikely side of neutral to approaching the likely side. Differences between national respondents on this question are greater. Respondents from Pakistan, Indonesia, and Brunei all see this as quite or very likely. This might partly be explained by the fact that the countries are predominantly Muslim, but Malaysia, also with a significant Muslim population, rates the likelihood much lower, very slightly on the likely side of neutral. U.S. allies are mixed on the issue. Analysts from Singapore, Thailand, and Japan all assess the outcome as quite unlikely, and Australia and New Zealand are on the unlikely side of neutral. Not all U.S. allies are in this camp. Korean respondents (perhaps considering bilateral issues wider than just the war in Iraq) assess the likelihood of a significant erosion in relationships as being quite likely, as did those from Canada and the Philippines.

There is more consensus on the second possible impact: a short-term erosion in U.S. standing followed by a recovery in the United States’ position. The region as a whole is between neutral on the issue and thinking it quite likely. South Asian respondents consider this to be a slightly unlikely outcome, influenced by the Indian group (the only country from which the respondents
considered this to be less than likely). Respondents in Singapore, the Philippines, and the United States assess the likelihood at between quite and very likely.

The third possible impact is that threats and activities by terrorists would increase in the region. The region is neutral overall. Oceania as a subregion and China, Russia, and the Pacific Islands respondents see this as less than likely, while most respondents assess the possibility as moderately likely. Respondents from Taiwan, Singapore, and Brunei assess the likelihood as quite likely or higher.

The final impact presented is that regional states would enhance security cooperation to deal with post-Iraq war uncertainty. Again, the region is overall neutral. The European and Oceania subregions and Japanese, Thai, and U.S. national respondents all consider this to be less than likely. At the other end of the scale, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Brunei all set the likelihood at quite likely or higher (with one respondent from the Philippines assessing it as very likely).

Perhaps the most that can be said about these results is that the broad weight of expert opinion holds that the effects on the region of the war in Iraq are not particularly likely to be extreme or long lasting, but that there are significant national variations from the consensus.
A qualitative follow-up question asked respondents if they believe there would be any major impact of the war in Iraq on Asia Pacific security in addition to those already presented. Thirty-eight responses were received, with some respondents making multiple suggestions. Most reinforce the points already made relating to a general debilitating effect on the ability of the United States to operate effectively in the region, although none of the U.S. respondents answered in these terms. Other issues raised concern the possibility of greater U.S. unilateralism, reduced U.S. capacity to make sound judgments about the region, the possibility of intra-Islam disputes, changing support for Islamic militants in Southeast Asia, hastened Japanese rearmament, and a strengthened Chinese role. Other possibilities mentioned include an economic downturn, increased oil prices, and more international terrorism and copycat suicide bombings.

**North Korean Nuclear Weapons.** Respondents were asked to choose from a range of options and assess the outlook for the North Korean nuclear issue following the agreements on nuclear concerns in February 2007.

Of the 96 responses to this question, a majority (51 respondents) believes an incremental outcome of further (perhaps slow and uneven) progress toward the declared goal of denuclearization is probable, and a large minority (33 respondents) believe there will be a breakdown in the next phase of negotiations and a return to standoffs and sanctions.

The regional majority view is replicated in each of the subregions except Europe, from which most respondents believe there will be a breakdown in the next phase of negotiations. There is almost no expectation across the region or subregionally that the other possible outcomes (see Appendix II) are likely.

**Terrorism.** The analysts were asked to assess the current state of the terrorism threat and score nine possible responses on a scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” Figure 10 shows the breakdown of responses.

The first part of the question asserts that terrorism is an active or serious threat to the respondent’s own country’s internal security. On a subregional basis, South Asian respondents agree most strongly that it is, with Indian analysts being somewhat more worried about terrorism than their Pakistani colleagues. Respondents from Europe, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and North America all score the seriousness of terrorism for their countries as moderately strong (for Europe) toward ambivalent (for Northeast Asia). Respondents from Oceania disagree moderately strongly that terrorism is a threat. In Northeast Asia most opinion was neutral to disagreeing with the statement, while in Southeast Asia the Indonesian, Thai, and Filipino respondents agreed mildly with the statement, and their colleagues from Singapore and Malaysia are neutral. Compared with last year, respondents are slightly more accustomed to living with the threat of terrorism.

Next, respondents were asked to consider whether the level of terrorism threat to their country had increased over the past year. Only South Asian respondents clearly agree that the terrorist threat had increased. Within the regions, Thai respondents are gloomier than their Indonesian
Figure 10. Terrorism and its effects

a. Terrorism poses an active/serious threat to internal security in your country.
b. The level of the terrorism threat to your country has increased over the past year.
c. The response to terrorism by the government of your country has been effective.
d. Organized international terrorist networks pose an active/serious threat to regional security.
e. The level of the terrorism threat to the region has increased over the past year.
f. The terrorism threat has been a significant factor in enhancing regional security cooperation.
g. The current level of anti-terrorism cooperation in the Asia Pacific region is adequate.
h. The US “war on terrorism” has increased or spread the danger of terrorism in the region.
i. International military responses to terrorism (including state support of terrorism) should be coordinated and/or authorized by the UN.
and Singaporean colleagues, probably reflecting the upsurge in violence in Southern Thailand over the last year. Respondents from the Philippines disagreed that there is an increased threat over the past year.

The analysts were then asked to agree or disagree that their governments had responded effectively to the threat of terrorism. South Asian respondents tend to disagree with the proposition, but not strongly, and the other subregions are on the agreement side of ambivalence.

Respondents across the region agree strongly that organized international terrorist networks pose an active or serious threat to their country. South Asian analysts are the most worried and those from Oceania the least so, tending to disagree mildly with the proposition. Of the country groups, Indian, Chinese, and Filipino analysts are the most worried about the danger of organized terrorist networks. The results for this question in 2006 were similar.

The proposition that the level of terrorist threat to the region has increased over the last year is agreed to mildly, with respondents from North America, Southeast Asia, and Oceania being neutral on the question and those from South Asia and Northeast Asia tending to agree with it. There was little difference between regional and national responses to this question.

That the terrorist threat has been a significant factor in enhancing regional anti-terrorist cooperation is widely agreed to, with only Australian respondents being on the “disagree” side of neutral. But even if there is agreement that terrorism has motivated cooperation, the proposition that the current level of regional anti-terrorism cooperation is adequate is met with mild disagreement. Malaysian respondents agree with the proposition significantly more strongly than their colleagues from other countries.

Next, respondents were asked to agree or disagree that the U.S. war on terrorism had increased or spread the danger of terrorism in the region. There is general agreement across the subregions that it has, but the level of agreement is in all cases between neutrality and agreement (rather than strong agreement) indicating that those who strongly agree with the proposition are spread fairly evenly among the regions. U.S. respondents disagree with the proposition, the strongest stance from the national groups.

The final question in this section asked respondents for their views on UN coordination and authorization of international military responses to terrorism. Support for the proposition that the UN should do this is evenly spread across the subregions with European respondents and those from Oceania tending toward neutrality on the proposition and other subregions agreeing, although not strongly. Nationally, respondents from South Korea tend toward strong support for the proposition as do those from Malaysia. In 2006 the responses to this question were very similar.

**Regional Institutions.** The analysts were asked how effective 10 institutions/regimes were as instruments for building a sense of community in the region. Responses were sought on a scale from “ineffective” to “highly effective.”
The impacted institutions/regimes are the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation process (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN-Plus-Three grouping (APT), the East Asia Summit (EAS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Six-Party Talks, the U.S. alliance and defense cooperation mechanisms, and Track II dialogue processes such as the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific.

The institutions are not all comparable in their activities, but that is not the point. The objective is to determine relative effectiveness measured against an independent criterion, that of community building. Some of the institutions such as ASEAN, SAARC, and the SCO are comparable in that they have a secretariat, a wide-ranging agenda, and a developing regional identity in their own right. Others are comparable in that they are primarily about dialogue. The ARF, Six-Party Talks, Track II processes, and perhaps the East Asia Summit process fall in this camp. No matter how comparable or otherwise they are, they all endeavor to bring participants in the regional processes together to consider common problems and through that to develop norms of cooperation and perhaps common positions. To that extent all the institutions have an element of community building inherent in their task.

Figure 11 gives the relative standings of the various institutions. Across the region, ASEAN is considered to be the most effective institution, rating at the high end of the scale between somewhat and generally effective at building community. Both SAARC and the Six-Party Talks rate between ineffective and only somewhat effective at this, and all the other processes rate between somewhat and generally effective.

Respondents from South Asia are the most enthusiastic about regional processes, rating both ASEAN and the ARF as tending toward highly effective and only SAARC itself as being less than somewhat effective. The least enthusiastic toward the community-building capacities of the institutions are the Southeast Asian respondents who rated APEC, ARF, EAS, SCO, SAARC, and the Six-Party Talks as between ineffective and only somewhat effective.

ASEAN is rated highest by South Asian respondents at between generally effective and highly effective, while respondents from ASEAN itself and the rest of the region place it overall between somewhat and generally effective. South Asian respondents also rate APEC and the ARF higher as community-building enterprises than do their colleagues from the other regions. None of the other institutions is rated as even generally effective by any subregional group.

National responses vary widely. South Korean and Chinese respondents find no processes to rate below at least somewhat effective in building community, although their counterparts from Japan rate the SCO and the Six-Party Talks below that level. Respondents from the Philippines and Malaysia assess five and six regional processes respectively as being less than somewhat effective. Chinese analysts rate the SCO highly as being more than generally effective, but their Russian colleagues and fellow SCO members assess it as only somewhat effective. Equally wide are the results dealing with the U.S. alliance system. Australian, Canadian, Malaysian, and Indonesian respondents rate it as less than somewhat effective at community building. U.S. respondents
Figure 11. Regional institutions and community building

Highly Effective

Generally Effective

Somewhat Effective

Ineffective

ASEAN
APEC
ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN-Plus-Three
East Asia Summit
Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Six-Party Talks (Northeast Asia)
US alliance/defense cooperation mechanisms
Track II dialogue processes (e.g., PECC, CSCAP)

Europe  Northeast Asia  Oceania  South Asia  Southeast Asia  North America  Average of Regions
Figure 12. Regional institutions and practical cooperation
rate it as middling between somewhat and generally effective, while Chinese and South Korean respondents rate it as generally effective.

Based on these results, there is some evidence that a sense of community is being developed by most of the institutions discussed, but clearly there is a long way to go before success can be declared. The regional organizations ASEAN, SCO, and SAARC (and perhaps APT and EAS) have the clearest mission to develop a sense of community among their own members. Of those groups, both the SCO and SAARC have a lot of work to do to achieve this.

There is even more skepticism as to the practical effectiveness of the institutions than there is on their community-building capabilities. Figure 12 shows the regional assessment. ASEAN is again seen as the most effective institution, but it receives a lower assessment for practical cooperation and problem solving than it did for its community-building capacities, although still between somewhat and generally effective. A drop in effectiveness from the community-building assessments to the practical solutions assessments is seen for all the institutions examined except the Six-Party Talks and the U.S. alliance cooperation mechanisms, each of which was assessed as being slightly more effective at practical matters than at community building, which is not surprising given that those two institutions/processes are designed to achieve practical outcomes rather than to establish a sense of community.

At the low end of the scale, APEC, the EAS, SCO, and SAARC are all assessed as being between ineffective and somewhat effective with SAARC again the lowest. The East Asia Summit is not, or not yet, designed to be a problem-solving institution so it could be seen to be slightly hard to measure it against this criterion.

South Asian respondents are the most positive about the practical effects of cooperation, rating ASEAN as more than generally effective and only SAARC itself and the Six-Party Talks as less than somewhat effective. Northeast Asian respondents are almost as positive as South Asian, while the other regional groupings are distinctly less positive about the practical outcomes across the range of institutions.

Although ASEAN is clearly seen as the most effective, one respondent from Southeast Asia (country not identified) sees it as being ineffective at cooperation and problem solving. Many respondents from across the whole region see SAARC as ineffective. Overall, Australian respondents are the least convinced as to the effectiveness of regional cooperation. Clearly, there is a differentiation between community building and practical outcomes and clearly the institutions by and large are seen as being more effective at community building than they are at achieving practical outcomes.

**Comments on the Questionnaire.** The final question invited respondents to give comments and suggestions. Of the 30 responses, about half suggested that the survey should place more emphasis on nontraditional security issues generally: this point is well taken. Others suggest additional questions on specific issues/contingencies such as China/Taiwan, Russia’s role, and the avian flu. There were suggestions for questions on the role of history in the international relations of the region and on the U.S. role in Asia.
APPENDIX I

Breakdown of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subregion</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea (ROK)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Oceania</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Islands</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No country specified</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX II

ASIA PACIFIC SECURITY SURVEY 2007

1. Please check your country or group:
   - Australia
   - Brunei
   - Cambodia
   - Canada
   - China
   - Europe
   - India
   - Indonesia
   - Japan
   - Korea (ROK)
   - Laos
   - Malaysia
   - Mongolia
   - New Zealand
   - Pacific Islands
   - Pakistan
   - Philippines
   - Russia
   - Singapore
   - Thailand
   - United States
   - Vietnam
   - Other (please specify)

2. Please indicate how important you regard the following issues for Asia Pacific regional security (a) in the short/medium term (next five years) and (b) in the long term (more than five years). Please indicate the seriousness of each issue to you by ranking it from 1 (not an issue) to 5 (very important).
   a. Terrorism
   b. Violent Islamic extremism
c. US unilateralism
d. Restructuring/reduction of US military presence in Asia
e. Chinese nationalism
f. Japanese nationalism
g. Contention between Japan and Russia over the “Northern Territories”
h. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula
i. Tensions in/across the Taiwan Strait
j. Tensions over claims in the South China Sea
k. Tensions in Sino-US relations
l. Tensions in Sino-Japanese relations
m. Tensions between India and Pakistan
n. Instability in Russia
o. Instability in China
p. Instability in North Korea
q. Instability in Central Asia
r. Instability in Southeast Asia
s. Instability in the South Pacific
t. Instability in South Asia
u. Asian arms races
v. North Korean nuclear weapons program
w. Nuclear proliferation in East Asia
x. Nuclear proliferation in South Asia
y. Competition for scarce resources
z. Other economic conflicts (for markets, jobs, investment)

3. Please indicate your opinion on the following statements:
[Options: Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, Strongly Disagree]
a. How China emerges as a great power is the biggest uncertainty in the region.
b. China’s rise will have a destabilizing impact on the region.
c. How the US responds to China’s rise will largely determine the future political environment in the region.
d. The US will see China’s rise as a threat.
e. The US will be more willing to intervene militarily in the future in the Asia Pacific region.
f. Regional countries are increasingly cooperating to limit the US’ unilateral power.
The US forward military presence in Asia is very important to regional stability in the coming decade.

If Korea is reunified, the Korean government should ask US forces to leave the Korean Peninsula.

A US missile defense system will have a destabilizing impact on the Asia Pacific region.

Japan should be a “normal” country, capable of making security commitments to other countries.

To enhance stability in the region, there should be greater transparency in military plans, spending, and procurement.

There should be a China-Japan-US dialogue among defense ministers or officials.

The discussion of political and security issues in APEC should be more structured and regular.

There should be an official security forum for Northeast Asia.

There should be more coordination/integration between the various regional forums on political and security issues (ASEAN/ARF, APEC, Asian Summit).

Differences over values (such as democracy and human rights) are a significant source of international disputes and tensions in the region.

Please indicate in your own personal view on a scale of 1 (not important) to 5 (very important) how importantly the following factors affect your own country's security.

Drug trafficking

Environmental degradation

Ethnic nationalism or separatism in your country

Income inequalities and social instability

Foreign immigration

Instability in a neighboring country

Spillover of rivalries of other countries

Economic globalization

Competition for scarce resources

Trade and economic disputes

International financial issues (currency flows, exchange rate fluctuations)

Possibility of serious economic downturn

Diseases such as AIDS, SARS, or Avian Flu

Vulnerability to natural disasters
5. Indicate how you feel the outlook in the following areas has changed over the past year:  
   [Options: Much Better, Better, Same, Worse, Much Worse]  
   a. Peace on the Korean Peninsula  
   b. Harmonious relations among the large powers  
   c. Peaceful settlement of territorial disputes  
   d. Dampening of potential regional arms races  
   e. Regional economic outlook  
   f. Dangers of domestic instability (political/communal violence, insurgencies, secessionism)  
   g. “War on Terrorism”  
   h. Indo-Pakistani relations

6. What do you believe is the one change that could most positively affect Asia Pacific security?

7. When people in your country discuss national security threats, do you think they usually have any particular other country in mind as a source of such threats?  
   No, no particular country in mind.  
   Yes, a particular country or countries in mind. Which ones? Please specify:

8. How do you assess the impact of the following developments on the overall Asia Pacific Security Outlook? (Rank from negative -3 to positive +3)  
   a. US military “surge” in Iraq  
   b. Resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan  
   c. North Korean nuclear test (October 2006)  
   d. February 2007 agreement in Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear program  
   e. China’s shoot down of a satellite (January 2007)  
   f. Election and new government in Aceh  
   g. Coup in Thailand (September 2006)  
   h. Continuing violence/insurgency in southern Thailand  
   i. Continuing insurgency in the southern Philippines  
   j. Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore-Thailand cooperation on Malacca Straits security  
   k. Inauguration of ASEAN Defense Ministers’ meetings (May 2006, Kuala Lumpur)  
   l. The East Asia Summit process  
   m. Further cases of avian flu (H5N1), especially in Indonesia
n. Continued India-Pakistan negotiations, resumption of transport links
o. Abe succession to Koizumi as prime minister of Japan
p. Continuing issues in Japan's relations with China and South Korea
q. Stability of international oil prices compared to sharp rise in 2005

9. Are there any other recent developments over the year that you believe have had a strong and durable positive or negative influence on the regional security outlook? (Indicate)

10. What actions by the international community do you think are or would be appropriate in the following situations:
   (Check the strongest level of action you believe should be considered; options: No Action, Dialogue/Good Offices, Diplomatic Pressure, Mild Sanctions, Strong Sanctions, Military Intervention.)
   a. Sudan (Darfur) (humanitarian crisis, ethnic cleansing)
   b. Burma/Myanmar (suppression of human rights, wars against minorities)
   c. Sri Lanka (renewed civil/regional war)
   d. Lebanon (civil/sectarian war with outside support)
   e. Iraq post-US disengagement (civil/sectarian war with outside support)

11. Please rank the likelihood of the following possible impacts of the Iraq conflict on Asia Pacific security over the next decade? Rank from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely).
   See also Question 12 below for other options.
   a. US credibility and standing in the Asia Pacific region will be significantly eroded and US security engagement in the region will be substantially reduced.
   b. US standing in the region will be eroded in the short term, but the US security role and relationships will continue to be valued and confidence on both sides will largely recover over the next decade.
   c. Threats and activities by terrorists and other violent groups will increase, bolstered by the successes and strengthened support bases of such groups in Iraq and the Middle East.
   d. The states of the Asia Pacific region will greatly enhance their own security cooperation in order to deal with the uncertainties of the post-Iraq security landscape.

12. If you believe there will be other major impacts of the Iraq conflict on Asia Pacific security, please indicate here.
13. How do you assess the outlook for the North Korean nuclear issue following the February 2007 agreement?
   a. Further (if slow/uneven) progress toward the declared goal of denuclearization
   b. Breakdown of next phase of negotiations and a return to standoff and sanctions
   c. Additional North Korean nuclear and missile tests
   d. Acceptance by international community of North Korea as a nuclear power
   e. Military conflict (either incidents by North Korea or pre-emption by US)
   f. Other - including if more than one of the above (specify)

14. How do you assess the current state of the terrorism threat and responses to it? (Please indicate your views on the following statements.) [Options: Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral/Ambivalent, Disagree, Strongly Disagree]
   a. Terrorism poses an active/serious threat to internal security in your country.
   b. The level of the terrorism threat to your country has increased over the past year.
   c. The response to terrorism by the government of your country has been effective.
   d. Organized international terrorist networks pose an active/serious threat to regional security.
   e. The level of the terrorism threat to the region has increased over the past year.
   f. The terrorism threat has been a significant factor in enhancing regional security cooperation.
   g. The current level of anti-terrorism cooperation in the Asia Pacific region is adequate.
   h. The US “war on terrorism” has increased or spread the danger of terrorism in the region.
   i. International military responses to terrorism (including state support of terrorism) should be coordinated and/or authorized by the UN.

15. How do you rate the effectiveness of the following institutions as instruments for building a sense of community in the Asia Pacific region? [Options: Ineffective, Somewhat Effective, Generally Effective, Highly Effective]
   a. ASEAN
   b. APEC
   c. ASEAN Regional Forum
   d. ASEAN-Plus-Three
   e. East Asia Summit
   f. Shanghai Cooperation Organization
   g. SAARC
h. Six-Party Talks (Northeast Asia)
i. The US alliance/defense cooperation mechanisms
j. Track II dialogue processes (e.g., PECC, CSCAP)

16. How do you rate the effectiveness of the following institutions as mechanisms for practical cooperation and problem-solving? [Options: Ineffective, Somewhat Effective, Generally Effective, Highly Effective]
   a. ASEAN
   b. APEC
   c. ASEAN Regional Forum
   d. ASEAN-Plus-Three
   e. East Asia Summit
   f. Shanghai Cooperation Organization
   g. SAARC
   h. Six-Party Talks (Northeast Asia)
i. The US alliance/defense cooperation mechanisms
j. Track II dialogue processes (e.g., PECC, CSCAP)

17. Please give any other comments, including on this questionnaire (e.g., questions you would like to see deleted or additional questions you would like to see included).