Asia Pacific Security Survey 2006

Report by
Richard W. Baker
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## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Findings: Survey Questions and Results</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix I: Respondents by Country and Region</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix II: Text of Questions</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Foreword

This report presents the results of a survey completed by 73 security analysts from 15 countries in the Asia Pacific region plus two other “country groups”—Europe and the Pacific Islands. We believe that the information compiled from the survey provides a generally accurate representation of the state of thinking about the security outlook in the region among security specialists.

This survey is a new undertaking for the East-West Center, one that we hope fills a gap by providing an assessment from a variety of country perspectives. We would welcome any comments you may have on the report—especially if you think we have erred in our assessment of the findings.

The survey is an outgrowth and continuation of the “Asia Pacific Security Outlook” project and book series launched in 1997 under the joint sponsorship of the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE), the ASEAN/ISIS institutions, and the East-West Center. For financial reasons, the three institutions are suspending the publication. However, we believe the questionnaire sustains the essence of the project, which is to provide a diversity of perspectives on regional security issues.

If you have comments on the survey, or if you would be interested in participating in future surveys, please contact Richard Baker, survey coordinator and author of the report, at BakerR@EastWestCenter.org. If you would like to participate in future surveys, please provide contact information as well as your country, institution, and area of specialization.

We hope that you will find the report useful.

Charles E. Morrison
President
East-West Center
Summary

This report is based on a detailed questionnaire completed in late December 2005–early January 2006 by 73 security analysts from 15 countries in the Asia Pacific region plus two other “country groups”—Europe and the Pacific Islands. Participation was by invitation, but responses were anonymous except for country affiliation. Background information on the questionnaire and a breakdown of the responses are contained in the full report and the appendices.

**China dominates:** China is overwhelmingly the principal long-term concern (five-years plus) of the analysts. China figures prominently in all of the top five long-term issues based on the overall ranking by respondents. This conclusion is substantially comparable to the findings of a similar questionnaire for 2005 even though that survey was completed by a much smaller group of regional analysts.

Interestingly, the views of the Chinese participants are the singular exception to this consensus. The Chinese list only tensions in Sino-Japanese relations among their long-term top 10 concerns; this may reflect, in part, the recent problems in this relationship.

China is less prominent in the analysts’ ranking of short-to-medium term concerns (less than five years). The top five concerns in this category focus on three areas: the Korean peninsula (the North Korean nuclear weapons problem ranks first), the terrorism/Islamist extremism nexus, and tension in the Taiwan Straits which directly involves China. Nevertheless, all the other China-related concerns fall in the top half of the short-term list (ranking between sixth and twelfth).

In response to other questions, the group (with the exception, again, of the Chinese participants) registers strong agreement that China’s regional policies have effectively promoted its regional relations and that China’s future conduct is the greatest regional uncertainty and, at the same time, the most important factor affecting regional security. Furthermore, China is identified by 30 respondents as the most likely threat to their nations, far more than any other country. (Of these respondents, 10 were Americans.) Thus, this group fully acknowledges China’s critical importance to the region and its recent successes in enhancing its position, but nevertheless is uneasy about China’s future role and actions.

A more nuanced rating of China’s potential influence emerges from other questions that ask respondents to rate the likelihood that China’s rise will be destabilizing and that China’s military spending will pose a threat. On the general question, the respondents are almost evenly divided between those who see a “very high” or “moderate” threat and those who see the risk as “limited” or “very slight.” A similar breakdown exists on the question of military spending but with more bunching on the two middle responses, and the seriousness rating of the military threat is lower than the general impact of China’s rise on regional stability.

**Ambivalence over U.S. policy:** U.S. unilateralism, a frequently discussed subject in recent years, ranks among the group’s top 10 short-term concerns (the Chinese and Americans are the exceptions). However, it falls below the top five and drops well out of the top 10 for the long-term concerns. This at least suggests that this issue may be primarily
connected to regional perceptions of the current U.S. administration. The analysts also indicate a relatively low level of concern over future U.S. military intervention in the region, while the contrary possibility—a U.S. military withdrawal from Asia—is a top 10 concern either short or long term for half the country groups and rises in both rank and seriousness on the full group’s long-term list. Thus the survey appears to document the ambivalent attitude toward the role and future security presence of the United States in the region that has been noted in other analyses of regional opinion.

Watch List issues: A series of more limited surveys that preceded the 2006 effort have tracked a number of Watch List security issues identified as particularly salient to the regional security outlook. The original list of four issues (the Korean peninsula, relations among the large powers, territorial disputes, and regional arms races) has been supplemented over the years by four more concerns (the regional economy, stability in Indonesia, the war on terrorism, and Indo-Pakistani relations).

According to the 2006 survey, respondents feel that none of these issues underwent a dramatic change in outlook in 2005. Modest improvements are seen in stability in Indonesia and Indo-Pakistani relations (which the group separately identifies as the areas of the most positive regional developments during the year), the regional economy, and territorial disputes. The outlook for the Korean peninsula and relations among the large powers are seen as essentially unchanged, and slight deterioration is noted in the outlooks for regional arms races and the war on terrorism. The only noteworthy differences here from the smaller 2005 survey are a higher ranking of stability in Indonesia, and a lower ranking for the regional economic outlook and the outlook for harmonious relations among the large powers.

Terrorism and Iraq: The survey extensively probed the analysts’ assessment of public opinions on the war on terrorism and the intervention in Iraq as well as their personal views on these subjects. Given a choice among several alternative future courses of action in Iraq, the analysts’ views are diverse. Their most favored option is to transfer the external security and reconstruction roles from the U.S.-led coalition to the United Nations (UN) with or without continuing U.S. participation in the operation. However, the option of early withdrawal attracts considerable support. It is the Europeans’ preferred option and ties for first with the transfer option among the South Asian (predominantly Indian) group and is the second choice of the Northeast Asians. Continuing the present course is the strong second choice for the Oceania group and the North Americans, while it is slightly preferred over withdrawal by the Southeast Asians. The only clear change here from the 2005 results is the shift in European preferences from supporting a continuation of the present course to favoring early withdrawal, a change that may simply result from the larger size of the 2006 sample but could also reflect a gradual decline in the already-problematic level of European confidence in the Iraq venture.

Both the analysts’ assessment of public opinion in their countries and their own opinions clearly indicate disapproval of the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, a similar position in the 2005 survey. However, the level of disapproval by both public opinion and analysts in the 2006 survey is slightly reduced from the previous survey. In the current survey, the proposition that the war on terrorism is actually a war on Islam is rejected somewhat more strongly than in the previous year. Although these changes could indicate that both
the public and analysts are becoming more accustomed to or even accepting of the U.S. antiterrorism campaign, the shift is not significant and, in fact, responses to other questions move in the opposite direction. The rating of the appropriateness of the overall U.S. response to the September 11 attacks has moved from modestly positive to modestly negative over the same period, and the overall view that the U.S. military response to terrorism is a greater danger than terrorism itself has moved from modest disagreement to modest agreement. The most that one can say based on these survey results is that opinion on these questions remains ambivalent (and therefore probably amenable to further evolution in either direction in response to events or future policy decisions).

International intervention: A related finding concerns attitudes toward action by the international community in situations of instability in the region. By large majorities, the analysts agree with the basic proposition that it is appropriate for the international community to intervene in crises where the local government has lost control of a crisis or is actually contributing to it. Similarly, large majorities approve of the interventions in East Timor and Afghanistan in 1999 and 2001. A plurality (though not a majority) approves of the 2003 police intervention in the Solomon Islands. However, in the still ongoing case of Myanmar, a plurality supports only dialogue with a smaller number supporting mild sanctions and only a very small minority approving military intervention (although the 2006 group is more willing to support some action against the Myanmar regime than the group from the smaller 2005 survey).

Reluctance to take strong action in specific ongoing situations is also clearly revealed in opinions on how to handle the North Korean nuclear problem. All the subregional groups except the South Asians give first priority to continuing negotiations with North Korea. However, the second preference is to press the United States to be more accommodating to North Korea while sanctions rank a distant third. These latter two positions are reversed from the 2005 poll. (There was no support for military action in either survey.) Thus, within the overall Asia Pacific group, general acceptance of the right of the international community to intervene is not matched by approval of new interventions or even the imposition of strong sanctions, and the burden of proof remains clearly with those proposing more muscular approaches.

Asian institutions: In another interesting nuance to the views on action by the international community, the analysts display a mixed but somewhat skeptical attitude toward the structural aspects of regional security cooperation. Although there is strong support for the proposition that there should be an official security forum for Northeast Asia (especially among the Northeast Asians and North Americans), there is less consensus on the desirability of a China-Japan-U.S. security dialogue with the Chinese group registering distinctly less enthusiasm than either the Japanese or the Americans on this point. While increased transparency in defense matters receives general support, several of the country groups seem to doubt that steps in this direction would have a significant, positive impact. The group also registers only lukewarm support for a more structured political and security discussion within the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, reflecting at least a lower current priority for this objective.

A decline from the already-low 2005 assessment of the responses to terrorism on the part of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) further demonstrates the lack of strong support for the institutional options for regional cooperation.
New security issues: Finally, although most of the survey dealt with traditional security concerns in the region, one question explicitly asked participants to rank a number of factors affecting their countries’ security. These factors include new issues that are not traditionally classified as security matters, and the responses show that these new issues clearly dominate the rankings. Disease, environmental degradation, economic downturns, drug trafficking, and income inequality/social instability outweigh economic disputes, instability in and rivalries with neighboring countries, ethnicity and separatism at home, and immigration. Certain countries and groupings express rather predictable concerns over some of the more traditional threats, e.g., ethnic nationalism and separatism for Indonesia, the Philippines, and Russia, and instability in a neighboring country for Singapore, Japan, Mongolia, and the South Asians. Overall, the survey confirms that a broader definition of security challenges is taking firm hold, at least among security analysts in the region.
Background: The Survey, Responses, and Tabulation

The purpose of this project is to tap the views of security analysts across the Asia Pacific region regarding the outlook for regional security and the priority issues anticipated to be the focus of attention in the coming year. Although there are a number of assessments on security issues each year that reflect the views of participants from multiple countries, as far as we know, no similarly broad survey has been conducted in the past. Thus it is our hope that this survey will fill a gap, and that security analysts and others will find it useful.

The survey was emailed in late December 2005 to approximately 300 analysts in the Asia Pacific region as well as analysts from Europe who focus on Asia Pacific issues. Responses were requested by January 10 and could be submitted online. Despite the distractions of the holiday season, we received 73 responses from 15 countries plus the Pacific Islands and Europe, which we considered a sufficient number to permit reasonable generalizations on most of the issues covered. In all but five cases there were more than two responses in each country group. A breakdown of the responses by country is included as Appendix I.

Respondents were asked to identify themselves by country or, if they were reluctant to do this, as “Other.” Responses (most with numerical ratings on a scale) were coded by country and then by subregional groups, and finally for the full survey. Subregional scores were computed on the basis of one vote per country, and the overall scores were computed on the basis of one vote per subregion to compensate for an uneven number of responses per country. In some cases, the “Other” group was included in the universal totals.

Total participants by subregional groups were as follows: North America 18 (13 were from the United States); Southeast Asia 14; Northeast Asia 13; Oceania 12; South Asia 7; and Europe 5. Four respondents chose “Other.” Unfortunately, no participants from Korea, Malaysia, or Thailand identified themselves, and only one each from Pakistan and Vietnam. (Burma, Laos, and Cambodia were not included in the survey due to the relatively low number of potential respondents identified in each of these countries.) Although there may be responses from the first five countries in the “Other” category, these non- or low-response rates somewhat distort the subregional totals as well as the overall scores in which these countries appear. (In the case of Pakistan, this means that the South Asian totals effectively represent only Indian responses.) In an effort to compensate for this problem for Pakistan and Vietnam, the single responses have been used selectively (or with caveats) in tabulating the regional totals. (An Excel file containing the raw scores may be obtained from the author upon request.)

The 2006 survey was derived from a questionnaire administered to country analysts participating in the Asia Pacific Security Outlook (APSO)* project between 1998 and 2005, and it is intended in part to continue the record from those previous surveys. For purposes of continuity, most of the questions on the 2005 survey were repeated in the

2006 survey, and pertinent comments on the comparisons between the two have been included in the report. However, it must be recognized that the numerical basis of the two surveys is quite different—one or at most two analysts per country in 2005 versus multiple analysts in almost all cases for 2006. (By subregion, the 17 analysts in 2005 broke down as follows: Northeast Asia 5; Southeast Asia 6; South Asia 1; Oceania 2; North America 2; and Europe 1.)

Finally, we recognize that any broad survey such as this one inevitably has a homogenizing effect with tabulated results tending toward the middle of the bell curve, which is to say toward the “conventional wisdom” on these questions. The downside of this dynamic is that it tends to screen out contrarian views or new insights that may in time prove prescient. On the other hand, the survey does provide a reasonably good measure of mainstream opinions among experts in the field as well as the major differences in outlook between country and subregional groups, which was the primary purpose of this project.

Findings: Survey Questions and Results

The survey contained 18 substantive questions (the first question asked for the country affiliation of the respondent). The full text of the questions is contained in Appendix II.

Question 2 asked respondents to indicate the relative importance, in (a) the short/medium term (next five years) and (b) the long term (more than five years) of 26 security issues and to rank the seriousness of each issue from 1 (not an issue) to 10 (extremely important). The issues covered hot spots, key relationships, and generic issues such as arms races and nuclear proliferation.

In the responses, China overwhelmingly emerges as the principal long-term concern of the participating analysts. In the overall tabulation (which weighs each country/group average as one entry), China ranks significantly in all five of the top long-term concerns. In rank order, these are: Chinese nationalism, competition for resources, and tensions in Sino-Japanese relations, the Taiwan Straits, and Sino-U.S. relations.

By comparison, only one of the top five overall short-term concerns (Taiwan Straits tension) is centrally a China-related issue. The other concerns focus on the Korean peninsula (with North Korean nuclear weapons leading the list) and the terrorism/Islamist extremism nexus. The North Korean and terrorism issues are seen as subsiding in the long term, (although the subjects remain among the top 10 long-term concerns), while the other four China-focused issues rise in their ranking.

These results are substantially comparable to the 2005 questionnaire findings. The top five short-term issues are the same in both surveys, although the wording of one terrorism question has changed from an emphasis on regional networks to violent Islamist extremism. The 2005 results also showed an increase in the salience of China-related issues in the long-term listing with Taiwan Straits tension ranked number one. North Korea and terrorism were among the top five long-term issues in 2005 though in 2006 they dropped to the second five behind the more China-centered issues (which reinforces the growing focus on China).
SHORT- TO MEDIUM-TERM ISSUES 2006/2005
(In descending order of importance in 2006 survey)

ISSUE

* In 2005 this question asked about "Terrorist networks in Asia Pacific"
** Not asked in 2005
Question 2  (Long-Term Issues)

In 2005 this question asked about "Terrorist networks in Asia Pacific"

** Not asked in 2005
In terms of the seriousness attributed to these issues (on the 1-to-10 scale), all five of the China-related long-term issues show increases from their short-term rankings, in four cases by one full point. Interestingly, the analysts assign a higher absolute level of seriousness in the long term for all but six of the issues, and none of these ratings fall by as much as a full point. (Four of the issues that decline in seriousness rating are the North Korean and terrorism/Islamic extremism issues that dropped from the top five in the short-term list. The fifth is U.S. unilateralism, which is discussed below.) Reinforcing the increased seriousness of the long-term concerns, 20 of the 26 issues have an absolute rating of above 5 (the median point on the scale) compared with 14 in the short-term list (although virtually all of the top five issues on both lists are rated over 5), and almost every country group rates its top-ranked issue in the range of 7 or above on the 10-point scale. It is fair to conclude that the respondents see these issues as being significant threats to regional security.

Recognizing the lack of strict comparability between the two surveys, the seriousness conclusion can be somewhat qualified by the fact that all the 2006 rating levels are lower than those assigned to them by the 2005 analysts, in most cases by more than one point. The sole exception here, consistent with the other 2006 findings, is that the seriousness of Chinese nationalism rises in 2006 (albeit by less than half a point).

The views of the Chinese participants are the singular exception to the above generalizations. Of issues directly related to China, only competition for resources (ranked fourth) also appears in China’s long-term top five concerns, and although China is clearly a major factor in this issue, its role is not mentioned. Of the issues in which China is mentioned, only one—tensions in Sino-Japanese relations which ranks sixth in long-term concerns—falls in the top 10 on either list, which seems understandable given the recent level of criticism of Japan by China.

In comparison, the rather large group of U.S. respondents rates the same issues in the top 10 for both the short and long term. (Pakistan is the only other country with identical lists in both categories, but this represents only one respondent.) However, the relative rankings of the top five issues do change significantly. On the short-term list, the top three relate to Northeast Asia (conflict in Korea, Taiwan Straits tension, and Sino-Japanese tensions), followed by terrorism and violent Islamic extremism. For the long term, the top five issues all relate to China with Korean issues and terrorism/Islamic extremism falling into the second five. In this respect the U.S. results parallel those of the survey group as a whole. What is unique is that no other issue rises into the top 10 in the Americans’ long-term view.

U.S. unilateralism, a frequently discussed subject in recent years, ranks among the top 10 short-term concerns in all the tabulations except for the United States, China, and the Pacific Islands. (For the Southeast Asians, it ties with the Israel-Palestine conflict as the top short-term concern.) However, it declines in importance in the long-term assessments. Four of the 15 country groups—Russia, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the Philippines—retain this issue on their long-term top 10 list and two (Mongolia and Vietnam) include it, but in none of these cases does this concern rank in the top five. (On the Southeast Asian list, it drops to eleventh.) This suggests that this issue may be primarily connected in the analysts’ minds with the policies of the current U.S. administration. The relatively low level of concern over future U.S. military intervention in the region indicated on Question
3 is consistent with this finding of reduced concern for U.S. unilateralism over the long term.

At the same time, seven of the country groups list the possibility of a U.S. withdrawal from Asia among their top 10 concerns either short or long term. Included in the seven are China, Indonesia, and Vietnam. For the latter two, it is a long-term concern and ranks higher than their concern over U.S. unilateralism. Three countries (Japan, Mongolia, and Vietnam, notably all immediate neighbors of China) rank this issue among their top three long-term concerns; for India, also a China neighbor, it ranks in the second five. There seems to be a clear ambivalence in the region concerning the U.S. presence and policy with fear of American interventionism being exceeded over time by concerns over a possible withdrawal. This is another conclusion that supports more anecdotal assessments of regional opinion.

**Question 3** asked respondents to indicate agreement or disagreement with 13 statements on regional security within a range from +2.0 (strong agreement) to –2.0 (strong disagreement). (The full list is in the appendix.) In the tabulation, we set the threshold score to qualify as actual agreement or disagreement as a value of more or less than 1.0.

On this basis, only four of the 13 questions yielded overall agreement, and none approached strong agreement (+2.0). No questions yielded overall disagreement. The four endorsed statements were, in rank order:

- China’s regional policies have effectively promoted its regional relations. (1.26)
- There should be an official security forum for Northeast Asia. (1.20)
- China’s future conduct is the greatest regional uncertainty. (1.08)
- Increased transparency in defense matters would enhance stability. (1.07)

Three others came close to the 1.0 level:

- The U.S. forward military presence is important to regional security. (0.93)
- A China-Japan-U.S. defense dialogue would be good. (0.88)
- Japan should be a “normal” country (re: expanded military capabilities). (0.87)

Perhaps more interesting, although not especially startling, were the topics which exhibited considerable variation or disagreement among the responses.

a. China’s three neighbors—Japan, Russia, and Mongolia (remembering that there were no identified Korean responses)—were the only groups to register less than full agreement (i.e., below +1.0) on the effectiveness of China’s policies in promoting its relations with the region.

b. India, the Philippines, Brunei, and New Zealand recorded less than concurrence on the desirability of an official security forum for Northeast Asia.

c. Only the China participants registered a negative reaction (–0.25) regarding the uncertainty of China’s future regional role. In strong contrast, the Japanese
analysts gave this question a top score of +2.0 (the only group to do so). For their part, the Chinese were the only group to give a negative rating on the desirability of Japan being a “normal” country. (However, we should note that these differences probably reflect current strains in Sino-Japanese relations.)

d. India, Mongolia, Brunei, Singapore, Australia, and the Pacific Islands groups registered less than significant agreement (i.e., less than +1.0) that increased transparency would enhance regional stability. The North Americans were the strongest supporters of this concept.

e. The respondents from China, Japan, Indonesia, and Canada did not register group agreement on the future importance of the U.S. forward military presence, while Brunei and the Pacific Islands registered modest disagreement on this proposition.

f. The only statements to receive overall negative ratings were that the current level of information sharing on terrorism is adequate (–0.46) and that the United States will be more willing to intervene militarily in the region in the future (–0.22). These scores can be taken as indicating the general thrust of opinion on these questions but not firm positions one way or the other. The Canadians were the only group to reach the 1.0 level on this question, seeing intervention as less likely (–1.00 even), while the Americans were marginally less certain (–0.85). The only positive numbers (indicating some concern) came from the Indian and Philippines groups, but these barely registered above neutral.

g. On the question of a China-Japan-U.S. security dialogue, the Japanese and American groups approved of this idea (by 1.00 and 1.15, respectively), while the Chinese analysts were distinctly less enthusiastic (0.33).

h. Only the Philippines and Brunei respondents exceeded the approval threshold on the proposition that a reunited Korea should ask U.S. forces to leave. More modest support was registered by the Chinese, Russian, and Mongolian groups and by India and Canada, while the Japanese and Oceania respondents were neutral. The Singaporeans, Europeans, and Americans (in that order) registered modestly negative reactions to this proposition. In the case of the Americans, the group average was –0.17, an indication that these analysts doubt but do not completely dismiss the proposition.

i. At best, the group expressed lukewarm support for a more structured political and security discussion in APEC; the average score was 0.70 with only the Indonesians registering a negative view. This suggests that this is not a serious regional priority at the moment. Similarly, the modest negative rating for the proposition that information sharing on terrorism is adequate also suggests that this is not a major topical issue.

j. The possible destabilizing effect of a U.S. missile defense system did not arouse strong views among the participants in this survey in either direction, suggesting that this too is not currently a priority issue in the region. There
was more concern than support on this statement (net score 0.57 for a destabilizing impact), but only the Canadians and Bruneians registered at 1.00 or above with the Chinese and Indonesians approaching that threshold. On the other side, the Philippines analysts rejected the destabilization argument (–1.00), and the Americans and Singaporeans nodded in that direction (–0.46 and –0.25 respectively).

Comparing the 2006 and 2005 results, statements on the effectiveness of China’s regional policy and the uncertainty of China’s impact on the region (ranked first and third in 2006) gain in both relative and absolute scores from 2005, as do support for an official Northeast Asian security forum and the view that the U.S. forward military presence is important in the region. At the other end of the spectrum, the belief that greater transparency enhances stability and support for Japan as a “normal” country both fall in absolute as well as relative terms between the two surveys.

Question 4 asked respondents to rank 10 factors affecting their country’s security on a scale from 1 to 10. These were nonmilitary factors such as disease, drugs, environment, inequalities, communalism, immigration, economic downturn, economic/trade disputes, and problems of neighboring countries. (The significance threshold for this scale is 5.0.)

The five top overall concerns, which earned an average weighting of over 5.0, are: diseases, environmental degradation, economic downturn, drug trafficking, and income inequality/social instability. These five outweigh economic disputes, neighboring instability and rivalries, ethnicity and separatism at home, and immigration. An interesting element of this response is that the top five all could be termed new issues not traditionally identified as security concerns. The other concerns are more traditionally seen as sources of security threats (with the possible exception of immigration, which in any case ranks last among the 10 issues).

Overall, the group identifies the threat of highly infectious diseases as the top concern, with a weighting of just under 6.0. All the individual country groups are closely clustered around this number: The North Americans, Pacific Islanders, Indians, and Australians rank it as their top concern while the Chinese rank it second. Europe and Japan both rate this issue below the concern threshold (4.8 and 4.5 respectively) although the Europeans rank it third despite the relatively low absolute score.

Indonesia and China demonstrate the highest level of concern over degradation of their environment while Australia, Canada, and Japan are the least concerned. This would seem a plausible contrast since those three countries all have relatively advanced environmental protection programs.

The Southeast Asians are most concerned about the threat of a serious economic downturn and are followed by China and Russia. All these countries rate this concern at level 6 or above.

The Pacific Islands group expresses the highest level of concern over economic and social inequality (7.5). The basis for this high rating is unclear, but the small size of the group (2) may be a factor. More predictably, subsets of Northeast and Southeast Asian
countries are close behind: the Philippines, Indonesia, and Brunei (combined 7.39); and Russia, Mongolia, and China (combined 7.3). For all six countries, this issue ranks among their top five concerns. Singapore (4.0) and Japan (2.5) are the outliers in their respective subregions, well out of the range of serious concern and not among their top five issues.

In several cases, individual country groups express serious concerns for issues not ranked in the top five overall. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Russia rank ethnic nationalism/separatism among their top two concerns, and all give it a rating above 6 on a 1-to-10 scale. Only India and Europe list increased foreign immigration among their top five concerns (for India, it places second with a weighting of 6.3). Singapore, Japan, Mongolia, and India-Pakistan rate concern over instability in a neighboring country above level 6 while Singapore, Japan, and Mongolia rate the spillover of rivalries from other countries among their top two concerns. North Americans, the Oceania group, the Japanese, and the Mongolians rank trade and economic disputes among their top five concerns (New Zealand ranks it first while Canada ranks it second), and all groups except Europe and Australia (both 4.0) consider trade and economic disputes as potentially serious.

Comparing the 2006 results of this question with the previous year, the top four 2006 concerns are also the top four in 2005, although disease and the environment have displaced drugs and economic downturn in first and second place. It may also be noteworthy that the seriousness ratings have risen for all but one of the 10 issues and, in almost all cases, by more than a half a point. (The exception is instability in a neighboring country, which has fallen only slightly in absolute terms but slipped in ranking from sixth to eighth place.)

**Question 5** asked the respondents for their assessment of changes from the previous year in a series of ongoing issues. The APSO project developed a Watch List of security issues that the group followed from year to year and to which new topics were added as the regional landscape evolved. This question presented the original four issues and four additions. In each case the participating analysts were asked to rate (from +2.0 to –2.0) whether the outlook has changed for the better or worse over the preceding year.

The issues are:

- a. Peace on the Korean peninsula
- b. Harmonious relations among large powers
- c. Peaceful settlement of territorial disputes
- d. Dampening of potential regional arms races
- e. The regional economy
- f. Stability in Indonesia
- g. The war on terrorism
- h. Indo-Pakistani relations

The first observation is that, using a significance threshold of +1.0 or –1.0, none of the overall findings and very few of the individual country ratings reach the threshold. (The
OUTLOOK FOR "WATCH LIST" ISSUES
(Ordered by overall average, from most positive to most negative)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE</th>
<th>Average of Regions</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Northeast Asia</th>
<th>Oceania</th>
<th>South Asia</th>
<th>Southeast Asia</th>
<th>North America</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stability in Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic outlook</td>
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<td>Harmonious large power relations</td>
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<td>Dampening of potential regional arms races</td>
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top two are given ratings of +0.64 and +0.51 respectively.) Thus the judgment of this
group is that none of these issues underwent a significant change in outlook in 2005.

As to relative rankings, the 2006 respondents rank the outlook for stability in Indonesia
as the most improved issue, followed by Indo-Pakistani relations, the regional economy,
and peaceful settlement of territorial disputes. They rate the outlook for the Korean
peninsula as unchanged over the year. (However, since the prospect of conflict on the
Korean peninsula ranks fifth on the group’s overall listing of short-term security concerns
and the North Korean nuclear weapons program tops that list, the unchanged rating does
not imply that the outlook on this issue is good.)

The issues on which the group judges the outlook to have deteriorated are, from most to
least deterioration: the prospects of dampening regional arms races, the war on terrorism,
and harmonious relations among the major powers. (However, we should note that the
rating on major power relations is so low at –0.03 that it basically indicates no change.)

In 2005, the APSO analysts rated six situations as having improved and only two (arms
race potential and the war on terrorism) as having worsened. As in 2006, no rating
exceeded the 1.0 level. The top ranked issues that were also rated higher than +0.5 were
Indo-Pakistani relations and the economic outlook, with Indonesian stability in third
place. The notable differences between the two years are that Indonesian stability has
risen to first place and is above the +0.5 level, the economic outlook has fallen to third
place and below the +0.5 level, and the outlook for harmonious relations among major
powers has slipped two places and moved from slightly positive to slightly negative.

Among the 2006 results for individual issues and country groups, the following are also
worth noting:

a. The Indonesian group rates the outlook for stability in its country as having
improved significantly (+1.33), which in itself is a positive development since
it reflects elite opinion in that country. The only country group that rates the
situation in Indonesia as having worsened is Japan (–0.50). Insofar as this
rating also reflects opinion in economic circles, it presumably may impact
Japanese investment flows to Indonesia.

b. A contrary situation applies in the case of India-Pakistan relations with the
Indian respondents rating it as unchanged (and the Pakistani response giving it
a negative score) while all others (except for Brunei) see the outlook here as
improved. This paradoxically produces an overall positive rating despite some
skepticism from the parties directly concerned.

c. No country or subregional group is negative on the economic outlook
although several, including Australia and the South Asians, are neutral.

d. On territorial disputes, many of the country groups are neutral though Japan
and New Zealand gave a negative rating. Japan’s significant negative view
(–1.0) may reflect the continuing stalemate between Japan and Russia over
Japan’s claim to the Northern Territories. New Zealand’s very modest
pessimism (–0.17) may reflect concerns over unresolved territorial issues in the Pacific Islands or possibly the South China Sea.

e. Regarding the outlook on the Korean peninsula, only the Australians see a significant change, and this is in a positive direction (+1.0) while Europeans and Canadians register negative opinions (both below –0.5). The respondents who did not identify themselves by country, however, expressed a significant negative view (–1.0).

f. On the potential for regional arms races, only the Pacific Islanders (+0.5), and the Chinese and Canadians (both +0.25) give positive assessments, all very modest in absolute terms.

g. Regarding prospects for the war on terrorism, the Americans, Europeans, and (more strongly) the Australians register somewhat negative views (–0.17, –0.2 and –0.67 respectively). All of these groups have been victims of terrorism and are involved in the war in Iraq. (In the case of Europe, only some members are participating in the war.)

h. Finally, country assessments of the prospects for harmonious relations among the major powers are widely dispersed with only Canada (+1.25) and Japan (–1.0) registering opinions at the significant level.

**Question 6** asked respondents to identify one change that could most positively affect Asia Pacific security. This unstructured question elicited responses from 65 of the 73 participants.

Overall, the responses to this question reinforce the sense that future situations and relations involving China are the most important factors (for good or ill) affecting regional security. Twenty-eight of the 65 responses refer specifically to China with many citing China’s relations with the United States and/or Japan. Twelve refer to subjects such as major power relations or security forums and cooperation that clearly involve China in a central role, while seven focus on the Korean Peninsula/nuclear problem in which China’s role is also very important. The other 18 responses vary widely and include regional cooperation, democracy, sources of conflict, U.S. policy, and terrorism.

There are no noteworthy changes in either the subject matter or the distribution of the responses from 2005, although the size of the sample has obviously increased substantially.

**Question 7** asked if the people of the respondent’s country have any particular country in mind when they think of security threats and, if so, which country or countries. We should note that this question explicitly asked the analysts to report on public opinion in their countries, not to give their own views as to the reality or seriousness of the threats.
On this question, about half the respondents (38) say their countrymen see specific threats. (The largest single group is the Americans with 11.) In most cases, they identify multiple countries as the sources of concern for a total of 69 named threats.

Once again, the results of this question are not surprising. Of the countries mentioned by a significant number of respondents, China leads with 30 references (10 of which are from Americans and most of which mention other countries as well as China). The United States comes in second with 12 mentions (excluding a presumably perverse vote from an American respondent). The only other country mentioned by a number of respondents is North Korea (seven mentions from Americans, Canadians, and Japanese). Some specific country groupings produce predictable responses: Singapore names Malaysia and Indonesia; India and Pakistan, and Russia and the United States name each other; and Indian respondents also mention Bangladesh and Nepal.

The only noteworthy difference between the 2005 and 2006 responses to this question is the smaller percentage of respondents. China, the United States, and North Korea were also the most popular nominees in 2005 and tied with two mentions each (out of 10).

Question 8 asked respondents to assess a number of specific recent developments in terms of their impact on the regional security environment using a scale of +5 to –5. Any score exceeding 1.0 is considered representative of a positive or negative opinion. Fourteen developments were listed (see attachment). The net assessments were split evenly with seven developments considered positive and seven negative.

The group assesses the peace agreement between the Indonesian government and the Aceh secessionists as the most positive development on the list (+2.51). All groups except the Northeast Asians rank this development first (it is fourth for the Northeast Asians). Resumed India-Pakistan negotiations ranks second (+1.80) and is listed in second or third place by most of the country/subregional groups. This is followed closely by cooperation among the Malacca Straits littoral countries (+1.71), which is middle-ranked among the positives by most subregional groups; the Six-Party Talks on Korea (+1.56), which is ranked first by the Northeast Asians and the Europeans; and the responsiveness to the December 2004 tsunami (net +1.54), which is ranked greater than 1.0 by all the subregional groups except Europe (+0.6) and China (−1.0). The first East Asian Summit also receives a positive rating (+1.29) and is ranked in first place by the Japanese and second place by the Indians.

The continuing U.S. involvement in Iraq is assessed by the group as the most negative development of the period (−2.49) and ranks first or second for all groups except the Americans (who rank it third) and Northeast Asia (who rank it fourth).

The notable changes from 2005 impact two of the three holdover topics. Assessment of the impact of the Six-Party Talks has fallen from +2.80 to +1.56, a significant absolute decline presumably reflecting the general opinion that the talks are now stalemated although not useless. The impact of U.S. military involvement in Iraq is seen as marginally less negative (up from −2.82 to −2.49), which may indicate that analysts are becoming accustomed to this feature of the security landscape.
IMPACT OF 2005 DEVELOPMENTS ON REGIONAL OUTLOOK
(Overall and by subregions; ordered from most positive to most negative overall rating)
Question 9 asked respondents to mention any other developments over the year that they believed had a significant positive or negative influence on the regional security outlook. A third of the respondents (25) made suggestions. Some of the suggestions relate to developments already on the list but most are new. Among the new ideas:

- U.S. presence in Afghanistan (one viewed the presence as a negative, another viewed possible premature cutbacks as a negative); resurgence of insurgent activity in that country (negative);
- U.S. threat to Iran;
- Japan’s economic improvement (positive) and re-arming (negative);
- Continued very high rate of growth of China (is it sustainable?);
- Incidents of local anti-government violence in China;
- China-Taiwan relations—several aspects: China-KMT ties, slowdown of Taiwan’s move toward independence, military acquisitions by both sides;
- Problems of the Doha Round of trade negotiations;
- Discussion of institutional strengthening in ASEAN;
- Problems in Myanmar’s relations with ASEAN;
- Sliding stability in the South Pacific;
- Improved conditions in East Timor including its relations with Indonesia;
- Improvements/stability of U.S.-China relations;
- Trend toward consolidation of the democratic transition and economic liberalization in the region;
- Signs of growing competition for resources (e.g., pipeline projects).

The length and variety of this list indicates both the dynamism of the regional situation and the number of uncertainties in the security outlook. Again, there are no significant differences from the issues suggested for future inclusion on the survey although the number has substantially increased.

Questions 10 and 11 were new to the 2006 survey and both concerned China.

Question 10 asked how respondents rate the potential that China’s rise as an Asia Pacific power will be destabilizing. Options were: very high (4); moderate (3); limited (2); very slight (1); and cannot judge (0). All but four of the 73 participants responded to this question with none choosing “cannot judge.”

Those who responded divide almost equally between “very high” or “moderate” (37) and “limited” or “very slight” (32). Fourteen respondents put the risk at “very high” versus 12 at “very slight.” Of some interest, the 12 Americans who responded also split evenly between these two groupings. Five of the six Indian respondents fall in the “very high/moderate” range (the other choosing “limited”), giving India the highest country score of 3.33 (and the only average score above 3). All Chinese participants who answered this question chose 1 (“very slight”). Except for Vietnam, all the other country and regional groups averaged above 2, and the overall average of the subregional scores was 2.62.
POTENTIAL FOR CHINA'S RISE TO BE DESTABILIZING

NUMBERS OF RESPONDENTS

Europe: Limited/Very Slight
North America: Moderate/Very High
China: Limited/Very Slight
Northeast Asia: Limited/Very Slight
Oceania: Moderate/Very High
Other: Limited/Very Slight
South Asia: Limited/Very Slight
Southeast Asia: Moderate/Very High
All in all, these results suggest broad uncertainty (except for the Chinese respondents) over the impact of China’s further rise, which echoes the ranking of the regional security issue in Question 2.

Question 11 focused specifically on China’s military spending, asking how seriously respondents consider China’s military spending and potential as a possible threat to regional security. The same scale was used for Question 10, and the responses are broadly parallel although more concentrated on the moderate-limited middle choices (3 and 2). The scores of several country groups (including the United States, Australia, and Europe) are lower than on the previous question, and the overall average is also lower at 2.23. The seriousness scores for Mongolia, Russia, India (which again registers the highest level of concern at 3.67), and the Philippines all increase from the previous question but not by more than half a point. Again these results can be taken as expressing concern over China’s military potential, but less concern over the military threat than over the general danger that China’s rise may reduce regional stability.

Question 12 asked for respondents’ views on the appropriateness of international humanitarian intervention in crises where the local government has lost control of a crisis or is actually contributing to it. The example cited was Sudan. The choices were “yes,” “no,” and “unsure.”

On this question, four participants did not respond and nine indicated “unsure.” Of the 60 other responses, however, there are only five “no” votes, suggesting a very strong consensus on the general proposition that the international community has a responsibility in such situations. Both the “unsure” and the “no” responses are distributed fairly evenly among the subregional groups with no significant trends or contrasts apparent. (For example, the “unsure” group includes two Americans, two Chinese, two Russians, an Indian, a New Zealander, and a Filipino.)

The responses to this question in 2005 were basically the same as in 2006—an overwhelming majority of “yes” answers.

Question 13 asked respondents’ opinions on the appropriateness of actions by the international community in four specific situations: East Timor in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, the Solomon Islands in 2003, and (prospectively) Myanmar/Burma. A graduated range of possible responses was available: military intervention (4), strong sanctions (3), mild sanctions (2), dialogue only (1), or no action (0).

The strongest conclusion that emerges from the responses is that the Asia Pacific analysts are quite accustomed to and comfortable with the use of sanctions, up to and including military intervention, although they are generally not enthusiastic about the latter course.

The intervention in East Timor is supported by 64 percent of the individual respondents and by most of the country and subregional groups except China (sanctions only) and Russia (only one out of four support the intervention). Somewhat unexpectedly, two of the four Indonesian analysts support the intervention (retrospectively). The Afghanistan invasion is supported even more strongly by 82 percent of all respondents and by clear
majorities in all the country groups except Indonesia (only one of the three Indonesians who responded indicates support).

In the case of the Solomon Islands, there is considerably less overall support (42 percent) for the peacekeeping intervention with only the Oceania and North American groups providing strong support (more than 75 percent in each case). It is possible that this less strong response reflects the fact that the Solomon intervention was a police and peacekeeping action and conducted at the request of the local government. Because of this, some analysts may not consider this a bona fide military intervention.

Finally, in the still unresolved case of Myanmar, only 4 percent of the total sample favors military intervention (one each from Canada, India, and New Zealand). Fifty-eight percent favor strong sanctions but 14 percent support milder sanctions and 22 percent, which spans the subregions, prefer only dialogue. Thus, within the overall Asia Pacific grouping, the burden of proof remains with those proposing more muscular approaches.

There are only two differences of any note between these findings and the 2005 questionnaire. First, the level of positive (retrospective) overall support for the interventions in East Timor, Afghanistan, and the Solomon Islands has fallen, though by less than half a point in each case. One possible explanation is that continuing uncertainties in all three of these countries plus the problematic status of the Iraq situation, have dimmed enthusiasm for these otherwise successful interventions. Second and probably more instructive, support for action against the Myanmar regime has risen. However, this is mostly due to a 1.75 point increase in the score for South Asia (to 2.75), moving this group from the dialogue only category toward support for strong sanctions. The Europeans have also moved up within the dialogue only category (to 1.60 from 1.0), and the Oceania group has moved closer to strong sanctions (to 2.78 from 2.0). Support for sanctions from the North Americans has declined from strong sanctions into the mild sanctions zone (to 2.88 from 3.00) although it should be noted that this figure is still the highest of any group. Given that the 2005 findings represented views by only one or two persons in most of these cases, these comparisons are of limited utility but, nevertheless, the trends seem plausible.

Questions 14 and 15 asked for respondents’ views on the best course of action in Iraq and on the North Korean nuclear issue respectively. In the case of Iraq, the options ranged from continuing the U.S.-led present course to transferring responsibility to the UN or the earliest possible U.S. withdrawal. On the North Korean issue, options included pressing the United States to be more accommodating with Pyongyang, a negotiations-only approach (even at the risk of living with North Korean nuclear weapons), further diplomatic isolation, strong sanctions, and military action. In each case, the respondents were also given the opportunity to suggest other courses of action (although when tabulating the results, the alternative suggestions were grouped with the major option with which they seemed most closely aligned).

There is a wide dispersion in the preferences expressed on the Iraq conflict. However, the most favored option is to transfer the external security and reconstruction roles from the U.S.-led coalition to the UN (with or without continuing U.S. participation in the operation). This is the first choice for all groups except the Europeans whose preferred
PREFERRED COURSE OF ACTION ON IRAQ

AVERAGE OF REGIONS

- Europe: Transfer, Present Course, Withdraw
- Northeast Asia: Transfer, Present Course, Withdraw
- Oceania: Transfer, Present Course
- South Asia: Transfer, Present Course, Withdraw
- Southeast Asia: Transfer, Present Course, Withdraw
- North America: Transfer, Present Course, Withdraw
PREFERRED COURSE OF ACTION ON NORTH KOREA

AVERAGE OF REGIONS

PRESS U.S. TO ACCOMMODATE
CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS
TAKE MILITARY ACTION
IMPOSE SANCTIONS
FURTHER ISOLATE

EUROPE
CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS

NORTHEAST ASIA
PRESS U.S. TO ACCOMMODATE
IMPOSE SANCTIONS
CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS

OCEANIA
PRESS U.S. TO ACCOMMODATE
IMPOSE SANCTIONS
FURTHER ISOLATE
CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS

SOUTH ASIA
PRESS U.S. TO ACCOMMODATE
TAKE MILITARY ACTION
FURTHER ISOLATE
CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS

SOUTHEAST ASIA
PRESS U.S. TO ACCOMMODATE
IMPOSE SANCTIONS
FURTHER ISOLATE
CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS

NORTH AMERICA
PRESS U.S. TO ACCOMMODATE
IMPOSE SANCTIONS
FURTHER ISOLATE
CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS
option is early withdrawal, and the South Asians for whom it ties with the withdrawal option. For the Northeast Asians, withdrawal is the second choice. Continuing the present course is the strong second choice for the Oceania group and the North Americans, while it is slightly preferred over withdrawal by the Southeast Asians.

The only significant change from the 2005 results is a move by the Europeans from supporting a continuation of the present course to favoring early withdrawal. This may just result from the larger sample but may also reflect the gradual decline in the already-problematic level of European confidence in this venture.

On the North Korean nuclear issue, all the subregional groups give first priority to the “continue negotiations” option except for the South Asians, whose collective first choice is to press the United States to be more accommodating. The negotiations option is the first choice of nine country groups and ties for first in the ratings of six other country groups. The accommodation option ranks second overall, being first for the South Asians and tied for first with China, Mongolia, and Australia. Sanctions are a distant third while no group supports military action.

The only noteworthy change from the 2005 responses is that in 2005 the sanctions option was rated second and the option of pressuring the United States to accommodate North Korea was third. That these two choices have switched places may suggest less confidence in the relatively tough negotiating stance of the U.S. administration.

These questions regarding interventions produce an overall sense that the survey respondents as a group prefer multilateral, accommodating approaches to both of the ongoing major situations in the Asia Pacific region where one government is out of step with the community as a whole.

Questions 16, 17, and 18 dealt specifically with the problem of terrorism and government response to terrorism. Question 16 asked participants to assess public opinion in their country on a number of points (see appendix), and Question 17 asked for the analysts’ own views on these same issues. Responses were scored from +2.0 (strongly agree) to –2.0 (strongly disagree) with +1.0 and –1.0 being the thresholds of significance. Question 18 asked participants to grade the responses to terrorism by major Southeast Asian countries and institutions (again scored from +2.0 to –2.0).

On the eight propositions regarding public opinion, the survey produced significant conclusions on only two: Organized international terrorist networks are a major danger to regional security (+1.11), and the U.S. attack on Iraq was not an appropriate action in the war on terrorism (–1.30). Average scores approach the significance threshold on two other points: Terrorism is an active/major danger to the analysts’ country (0.91), and military interventions in response to terrorism threats should be explicitly approved by the UN (±0.76).

Noteworthy judgments by individual country groups include:

- Public opinion across the board considers the U.S. attack on Iraq as inappropriate;
Of the countries surveyed, only the Indonesia and Brunei publics are believed to regard the U.S war on terrorism as a war on Islam (by +1.50 and +1.33 respectively);

- Public opinion in Indonesia does not regard terrorism as a danger to that country or to regional security (low significance: –0.33);
- Only the American analysts disagree that military interventions should have UN approval (by –0.92).

When the same propositions are put to the analysts themselves, the only one that produces a significant overall finding is the (in)appropriateness of the U.S. attack on Iraq. This is met with disapproval (by –1.25), with every country group registering disapproval at level 1 or above except Mongolia (–0.33) and New Zealand (+0.17). (The U.S. group’s score is –1.17.) The danger of terrorism to individual countries and the region averages in the +0.5 range with the South Asian, Philippines, and U.S. groups scoring above 1.0 for their countries. The South Asians rate the threat above level 1 for the region as a whole.

The major contrast between these results and the findings of the 2005 questionnaire is that opinions today are less supportive of robust antiterrorism actions. In 2005 the analysts agreed that terrorism was a significant danger on all four of the relevant questions, whereas in 2006 the only statement that gains approval is the danger of organized terrorism to regional security. The U.S. attack on Iraq was met with disapproval by both public opinion and the analysts in 2005. It still is but with a slight reduction in the level of disapproval. The rating of the overall U.S. response to September 11 has moved from a modestly positive (though subthreshold) level to modestly negative (approaching neutral in the case of the analysts at –0.17). The scores on whether the U.S. response to terrorism is a greater danger to security than terrorism itself show an identical shift toward a more negative view of U.S. actions.

The trends between 2005 and 2006 are rather different on the question of whether the war on terrorism is actually a war on Islam. Modestly negative verdicts reflecting both public opinion and the analysts’ own views have become more negative although they still do not register at level 1 (–0.33 to –0.64 for public opinion and –0.33 to –0.70 for the analysts’ opinion). Regarding public opinion, this reflects an improved opinion for all of the subregional groups except Northeast Asia, where the score eroded by 0.18 between the two surveys. The opinions of the analysts are more mixed with Europe, Oceania, and South Asia indicating increased confidence in the U.S. position (the South Asian rating moved from +2.0 to –0.83, nearly reaching the threshold on this question). The North Americans’ judgment remains at the –1 level, sustaining a significant rejection of this proposition. The Northeast Asians and Southeast Asians have weakened in their rejection, falling from –1.4 to –0.46 and from –0.60 to –0.35 respectively, suggesting some erosion of confidence in the American position among analysts in these subregions.

Regarding the response of their own governments to terrorism, the analysts in 2005 saw a mixed picture which averages to a modestly positive rating. The 2006 rating has moved into negative territory, primarily reflecting a decline in the assessment of public confidence in South Asia and Northeast Asia.

Finally, on the need for UN approval for interventions in response to threats of terrorism, the assessment of public opinion remains the same as in 2005 (modest support of the
need for UN approval). The analysts, by contrast, have moved from very modest opposition to this proposition (−0.20) to modest support (+0.49).

Noteworthy individual findings from the 2006 survey:

- Among the country groups, the overall U.S. response to September 11 is regarded as appropriate only by the New Zealanders (+1.00);
- The analysts from Indonesia and Brunei do not fully agree with the publics’ views that the U.S. war on terrorism is a war on Islam (+0.33 and +0.50 respectively) which indicates some agreement with their publics but below the significance threshold.

As to the response of Southeast Asian governments and institutions to the terrorism challenge, the analysts solely rate Singapore at the significant positive level (+1.21) with Malaysia (+0.88) and Indonesia (+0.75) not far behind but below the threshold. Thailand receives the lowest rating (−0.07). The ratings for ASEAN and the ARF, while not negative, are very low (+0.26 and +0.18 respectively). Only China, Japan, Mongolia, and the Philippines give a significant positive rating to the two institutions (+1.00 in all cases).

These findings show some but not major differences from 2005. Singapore was also top-rated in 2005 (+1.41) with Malaysia second (+0.80) and Thailand at the bottom (+0.02). The ratings of the Philippines and Indonesia have improved between the two years while those of ASEAN and ARF have fallen. One significant change is in the North Americans’ ratings of the two regional institutions, which have fallen from significantly positive (+1.00 for both) in 2005 to 0.25 and 0.00 respectively in 2006. Possible reasons for the decline include the relative lack of engagement of the two organizations in the response to the Sumatra tsunami and a temporizing response to the Burmese junta’s stonewalling on moves toward democracy. There may also be some skepticism about the move to an East Asia Summit, which takes some of the spotlight off ASEAN.
## 2006 Asia Pacific Security Survey
### Respondents by Country and Region

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<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
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Appendix II

Text of Questions

1. (Asked for respondent’s country or group identifier)

2. On the following issues, please indicate how important you regard them for Asia Pacific regional security (a) in the short/medium term (next five years) and (b) in the long term (more than five years). Please indicate the seriousness of each issue to you by ranking it from 1 (not an issue) to 10 (extremely important).

   a. Terrorism
   b. Violent Islamic extremism
   c. Japan-Russia tensions over the Northern Territories
   d. Conflict in the Korean Peninsula
   e. Taiwan Straits tension
   f. Tensions over claims in the South China Sea
   g. U.S. military withdrawal from Asia
   h. U.S. unilateralism
   i. Chinese nationalism
   j. Japanese nationalism
   k. Tensions in Sino-U.S. relations
   l. Tensions in Sino-Japanese relations
   m. Instability in Russia
   n. Instability in China
   o. Instability in North Korea
   p. Instability in Central Asia
   q. North Korean nuclear weapons program
   r. Asian arms races
   s. Instability/secessionism in Indonesia
   t. Nuclear proliferation in East Asia
   u. Nuclear proliferation in South Asia
   v. Instability in the South Pacific
   w. India-Pakistan conflict
   x. Israeli-Palestinian conflict
   y. Competition for resources
   z. Other economic conflicts (for markets, jobs, investment)
3. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:

   a. Increased transparency in military plans, spending, and procurement would significantly enhance stability in the region.
   b. How China emerges as a great power is the biggest uncertainty in the region.
   c. There should be an official security forum for Northeast Asia.
   d. The U.S. forward military presence in Asia is very important to regional stability in the coming decade.
   e. Differences over values (such as democracy and human rights) are a significant source of regional tension.
   f. Japan should be a “normal” country, capability of making security commitments to other countries.
   g. There should be a triangular China-Japan-U.S. dialogue among defense ministers or officials.
   h. The discussion of political and security issues in APEC should be more structured and regular.
   i. If Korea is reunified, the Korean government should ask U.S. forces to leave the Korean peninsula.
   j. The United States will be more willing to intervene militarily in the future in the Asia Pacific region.
   k. A U.S. missile defense system will have a destabilizing impact on the Asia Pacific region.
   l. China’s regional economic and security policies in the past two-three years have been effective in promoting China’s relations with the region.
   m. Current sharing of information and cooperation on international terrorism is adequate.

4. Please indicate in your own personal view on a scale of 1 (not important) to 10 (very important) how importantly the following factors affect your own country’s security.

   a. Drug trafficking
   b. Environmental degradation
   c. Ethnic nationalism or separatism in your country
   d. Growth of income inequalities and social instability
   e. Increased foreign immigration
f. Instability in a neighboring country

g. Serious economic downturn

h. Spillover of rivalries of other countries

i. Diseases such as AIDS, SARS, or Avian Flu

j. Trade and economic disputes

5. Indicate how you feel the outlook in the following areas has changed over the past year:

(Much Better; Better; Same; Worse; Much Worse)

a. Outlook for a peaceful Korean peninsula

b. Outlook for harmonious relations among large powers

c. Outlook for peaceful settlement of territorial disputes

d. Outlook for dampening of potential regional arms races

e. Economic outlook

f. Outlook for stability in Indonesia

g. “War on Terrorism”

h. Indo-Pakistani relations

6. What do you believe is the one change that could most positively affect Asia Pacific security?

7. When people in your country discuss national security threats, do you think they usually have any particular other country in mind as a source of such threats?

No, no other country in mind.

Yes, a particular country or countries. (Which ones? Please specify.)

8. How do you assess the impact of the following developments on the overall Asia Pacific Security Outlook? (Rank from negative –5 to positive +5)

a. Continuing U.S. military involvement in Iraq

b. Terrorist strikes (e.g., Bali) and government responses

c. The Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear program
d. The U.S. force-restructuring plan in Asia  
e. The December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and international response  
f. The peace agreement between Indonesia and the Aceh separatists  
g. Continuing insurgencies in southern Thailand and Philippines  
h. Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore-Thailand cooperation on Malacca Straits security  
i. The first East Asian Summit meeting (December, Kuala Lumpur)  
j. Outbreaks of avian flu in Northeast and Southeast Asia  
k. Resumed India-Pakistan negotiations  
l. Moves toward lifting constitutional limits on Japan’s military  
m. Tensions in Japan’s relations with China and South Korea  
n. Spike in international oil prices in the third quarter of 2005

9. Are there any other developments over the year that you believe have had a strong and durable positive or negative influence on the regional security outlook? (Indicate)

10. Looking ahead, an important question is whether China’s rise as a power in the Asia Pacific region will be peaceful or will be destabilizing and/or a source of conflict. How do you rate the potential for a destabilizing impact?  
   (Very High; Moderate; Limited; Very Slight; Cannot Judge)

11. China’s growing military expenditure and potential have been cited by some observers as a potential threat to regional security. How serious do you consider this threat?  
   (Very High; Moderate; Limited; Very Slight; Cannot Judge)

12. In general, do you think it is appropriate for the international community to intervene militarily in areas of extreme humanitarian crisis (such as Sudan) when the local government has lost control or is contributing to the crisis?  
   (Yes; No; Unsure)

13. What international actions do you think were or are appropriate in following past or current situations? (Check the strongest level of action you would support, from left to right.)
14. What do you believe is the best course of action for dealing with the continuing conflict in Iraq?

a. Continue present course (U.S.-backed government conducting elections; UN support but limited operational role; major U.S./coalition security role, training of Iraqi forces to progressively take over security function)

b. Transfer international role in security and reconstruction completely from the U.S./coalition to the UN (with or without continuing U.S. role in security operations)

c. The earliest possible withdrawal of all foreign forces, leaving Iraqis to work out future security and political arrangements on their own

d. Other (describe)

15. What do you believe is the best course of action for dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue?

a. Continue negotiations but take no further action, even if it means living with North Korean nuclear weapons

b. Further isolate North Korea diplomatically

c. Impose sanctions on North Korea (for example, an economic embargo or blockade)

d. Take military action against North Korea

e. Pressure the U.S. to be more accommodating to North Korean demands

f. Other (describe)

16 and 17: Terrorism and the responses to terrorism:

(16.) Please give your assessment of public opinion in your country on the following statements:

(17.) Please indicate your own views on these statements:

(Strongly Agree; Agree; Neutral/Ambivalent; Disagree; Strongly Disagree; Very Divided)

a. Terrorism is an active/major danger to internal security in your country.

b. Organized international terrorist networks are a major danger to regional security.
c. The overall U.S. response to the 9/11 attacks (invasion of Afghanistan, the “war on terrorism”) has been appropriate.

d. The U.S. attack on Iraq was an appropriate action in the war on terrorism.

e. The U.S. military response to terrorism is a greater danger to international/regional security than terrorism itself.

f. The U.S.’ “war on terrorism” is actually a war on Islam.

g. The response to terrorism by the government in your country has been adequate.

h. Any foreign military interventions in response to threats of terrorism (including state support of terrorism) should be explicitly approved by the UN.

18. How would you rate the response by the following Southeast Asian governments and institutions to the terrorist challenge?

(Strongly Positive; Positive; Neutral; Negative; Strongly Negative; No Opinion)

Indonesia; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; ASEAN; ARF