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Shifting Terrain
The Domestic Politics of the U.S. Military Presence in Asia

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The U.S. military presence in Asia today impacts the domestic politics of Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Most American forces are based in Okinawa, Japan, and throughout South Korea, and troops regularly visit the Philippines for training and joint exercises.
Summary

The United States has maintained military forces in the Asia Pacific region since the end of World War II and its alliances with key countries in the region continue today to be seen as critical to regional peace and stability. Academic and policy attention has focused on the shifting regional balance of power or the new sources of instability in the region, yet a parallel story has gone largely untold. Complex social and political changes in the countries that have hosted U.S. forces are changing the way governments in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines manage the American troops stationed in their countries.

The history of each U.S. alliance in Asia has demonstrated the challenge to national sovereignty that accompanies the presence of foreign troops. Public sensitivities to the terms of the U.S. presence have pitted citizen’s claims against the protections afforded to American troops by Tokyo, Seoul, and Manila. Democratic transitions in each society have produced calls for greater national government discretion over the use of U.S. forces stationed in these countries. Early in the postwar era, the Japanese government called for a revision in the initial security treaty with the United States, adding a stipulation for “prior consultation” with the Japanese government in the event of use of these forces beyond the mission of Japan’s defense. Decades later, similar calls for amending the original terms of the U.S. presence were evident in the Philippines and South Korea. Constitutional revision in the Philippines recalibrated the decision-making powers of the executive and legislative branches of government, with the result that the United States was asked to withdraw from two of its strategic bases in Asia. More recently, in South Korea, the continued need for U.S. forces to defend the South against the North produced revisions in the Status of Forces Agreement that outlines the terms of the presence as the democratization process gained momentum.

Policymaking surrounding the American military presence in these societies, however, extends beyond the high politics of national security planning agencies and national political leaders. Outside of government, and often in localities far from the center of national power, the goals and the impacts of U.S. military forces deployed in the Asia Pacific region are viewed more in terms of their social costs than their strategic value. The national government’s policy agenda is increasingly questioned and challenged by local governments and citizen activists. Crimes and accidents reverberate nationally, revealing significant changes in the complexion of anti-base sentiments. New citizen interest groups, including those advocating for protections and rights of women and environmental conservation, have helped recast the issue of the U.S. military presence in national politics.

As the U.S. government seeks to transform its global military presence, and as the process of realigning America’s overseas military forces proceeds, Washington must consider these new domestic influences on governments that host U.S. forces. Broad public support in these societies for a shared security agenda will be the foundation for future alliance cooperation. But Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, and Manila must give greater attention to the local impacts of U.S. forces and develop policies that mitigate the pressures on local residents. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, to be successful new initiatives for managing the presence of American forces in each of these societies will need to conform to domestic law and meet public expectations for government accountability. National governments in Asia’s democracies must balance their national security goals with these new norms of democratic practice.


**Introduction**

For nearly half a century, the United States has maintained military forces in the Asia Pacific region. These forces, based in Japan, South Korea, and, until 1992, in the Philippines, were central to the broad network of alliances created in the wake of World War II. From their inception, these alliances were designed to defend against communist expansion, and the strategic rationale for U.S. forward-deployed military forces was to project American power in a global Cold War competition with the former Soviet Union.

Today, more than a decade after the end of the Cold War, the United States has adopted a new and very different military strategy, one designed to respond globally to a variety of new threats—most notably the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. To accomplish this, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has completed its Global Posture Review, and has announced significant changes in the organization of America’s military. This is a global transformation in the operations and deployment patterns of the U.S. military, but it has significant regional impact. To incorporate these new priorities in the Asia Pacific region, the United States has already expanded its security cooperation with its key allies—the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea. In 2004 and 2005, respectively, agreements were concluded with the Republic of Korea and Japan regarding the realignment of U.S. forces in these countries. If successfully implemented, the U.S. military presence in the Asia Pacific region will look significantly different within a decade.

But there is an equally important shift underway that will ultimately shape this process of transforming the American military presence in the Asia Pacific region. Domestic political change in these key allied societies has increased significant pressures from within that cannot be ignored by the governments hosting U.S. forces. Host governments have argued that the presence of these forces contributes to national security and indeed to the regional balance of power. Yet, the tension between the national goal of security planning and the often localized impact of foreign troops makes this argument less than persuasive for those who bear the brunt of the associated costs. Already, the public perception that there are significant costs associated with the U.S. presence has had an impact on alliance policymaking in the region. In each alliance, the host government has faced considerable domestic complaints about the terms of the U.S. military presence. The most dramatic result was the request for the U.S. military to leave the Philippines in 1991, but domestic political tensions in Japan in 1995 and South Korea in 2001 also led to intense local opposition to national government initiatives to realign American military forces in these countries. In both instances, tens of thousands of citizens took to the streets to demonstrate against their government’s management of the U.S. presence, suggesting deep discontent with the terms of the presence in each society. These large-scale demonstrations have been peaceful, but they also raise questions about the sustainability of a sizeable foreign troop presence in democratic societies.

Clearly, the future of the U.S. military presence in the Asia Pacific region rests as much on the tolerance of host societies as it does on government efforts to forge new strategic alliance goals. Yet, we still know little about what prompts moments of citizen outrage and, more importantly, about the policy changes that result. What are the internal pressures on governments that affect the policy of maintaining U.S. military bases and forces overseas? Are these protests aberrations in response to specific incidents, or do they represent longer term and more deeply rooted citizen concerns about security cooperation with the United States? How do national governments seek to address citizen concerns?
THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE

To answer these questions, we must look within the societies that host U.S. military forces in the Asia Pacific region. Moreover, we need to view this not solely as an issue of global or regional strategy, but rather as those who host the presence should look at it—as an issue of national governance. The Shifting Terrain research project focused on the policy of hosting U.S. military forces in America’s three major allies in the Asia Pacific region: Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines (see box, page 6). For many, the question of whether the United States should maintain military forces in the region is one of strategic goals and objectives, and the decision making surrounding the transformation of American forces belongs at the highest level of government within the halls of the political leadership and national security bureaucracies. But time and again, potent domestic political challenge to national government decisions on the U.S. military presence has demonstrated the broader influences at work that shape the ability of the U.S. military to deploy and operate forces in these countries. The relationship with the United States has occupied a central place in the domestic political narratives in each of these societies, and the politics surrounding the U.S. military presence have often reflected deeper tensions and ambivalences regarding the influence of the United States over broader national goals. Moreover, all three of these societies have undergone significant democratic transitions over the past half century, although the trajectories of events and catalysts for change have differed considerably. Thus, to capture the domestic politics that surround this issue of an extended foreign troop presence, the Shifting Terrain project team took a step back from the strategic debates of the day, and instead framed the policy issue of the U.S. military presence as one of national governance.

Shifting Terrain also brought a cross-national perspective to the study of the U.S. military presence. Whereas much of the literature on these aspects of U.S. alliances in Asia has focused on the particular histories of the individual alliances, the Shifting Terrain project explored the experience of national governments, local host communities, and civil society actors that focus their attention on the impact of the American military presence. The depth of expertise of the international research team (see box, page 7) also facilitated a cross-national contrast of the domestic political institutions and processes that shape policymaking on U.S. forces in each of these three very diverse societies. Workshops and field studies in regions that host U.S. military forces in the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea allowed greater access to data on the impact of the U.S. military presence, as well as to the myriad voices and groups that have a stake in future policy decisions.

This cross-national study of the politics surrounding the U.S. military presence in each society reveals that there are common challenges shaping national policymaking: the need for greater accountability of both the U.S. and host governments and a more transparent set
THE SHIFTING TERRAIN PROJECT

PROJECT OBJECTIVES

Shifting Terrain is a multiyear (2004–2006) collaborative research project of the East-West Center, funded by the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership and the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission.

The United States and its Asia Pacific allies have renewed and readjusted their alliance since the end of the Cold War, but have not satisfied the desire of many citizens in the region to see the U.S. military presence in their communities reduced. Outside of government, and often far from the centers of national power, citizens increasingly view the U.S. military presence more in terms of its social costs than its strategic value.

The Shifting Terrain project highlights aspects of American troop presence that have received little sustained analytical attention. It offers a comparative cross-national study focusing on the U.S. presence as an issue of national governance, with a particular emphasis on citizens’ perspectives. The objective of Shifting Terrain is to examine how and why the presence of U.S. forces in Asia is affected by domestic political change and to suggest how alliance policies can better address citizen concerns.

Research workshops and field studies were conducted in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines—the United States’ three critical allies in the region with an extended history of hosting the U.S. military. Shifting Terrain’s multinational research team met with academic and policy researchers, government policymakers, nongovernmental organizations, and local citizen activists in Okinawa, Japan (April 2004); Seoul, Pyeongtaek, and Tongducheon, South Korea (November 2004); and in Mindanao and Manila, Philippines (April 2005).

In addition to this Special Report published by the East-West Center and a comprehensive website (www.shiftingterrain.com) the Shifting Terrain project will also produce other products, including an edited volume for academic press publication and a series of essays introducing local voices commenting on the U.S. military presence.
Each member of the research team has extensive fieldwork experience in at least one of the national cases. Collectively, the team brings together extensive research experience in international relations and security policy issues, as well as in the comparative study of politics and society in the Asia Pacific region.


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of policies regarding the decision making affecting the interaction between American soldiers and host-nation citizens. Moreover, the task of managing a foreign troop presence in democratic societies also calls for better integration of national and local policy management within host societies. Not only national security planning agencies, but local governments and citizens, as well, are asked to share a role in implementing the policies that affect local communities in their interactions with the U.S. military.

In Japan, the Shifting Terrain project team concentrated on Okinawa, which has been home to the bulk of U.S. military forces in the country since the mid-1970s. In South Korea, we visited Tongducheon, a city built around the U.S. Army presence established as a result of the Korean War in the early 1950s, and Pyeongtaek, site of a proposed government effort to expand and consolidate U.S. military forces in that country. And in the Philippines, we sought to understand the new dynamics that shape the citizen response to the 1999 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in Mindanao, where the longstanding tensions between Christian and Muslim communities have created waves of rebellion and terrorist violence.

In each location, we found similar actors engaged in the issue of the U.S. military presence. Local and national government representatives discussed the administrative procedures and practices that affected their effort to host a foreign troop presence. The nongovernmental interest groups active in this policy area—both those adamantly opposed to the U.S. presence and those whose interests are simply affected by the presence—were remarkably similar across the three national cases.

Our research team met with a range of citizen organizations. Some focused specifically on the base issue in their communities, while others had broader interests. We met with citizens openly and actively opposed to the U.S. military presence, yet not personally impacted, and with those whose lives are affected every day, including local economic and business leaders, women's groups (many but not all affiliated with religious organizations), and landowners. In some instances, these citizens were highly organized in their efforts to affect the policymaking process. It was also clear from our interviews at the local level, however, that many individuals were propelled into the public sphere as a result of their frustration with a seemingly indifferent national government. For these citizens, government attention to their problems was frustrated by the “diplomatic wall” of bilateral security treaties, and the mechanisms for mediating private interests and compensating losses associated with the U.S. military presence were widely viewed as inadequate.

Security cooperation with Washington remains high on the agenda of these governments, but the role of U.S. forces stationed in Japan and South Korea is changing. As the Japanese and South Korean militaries reorganize their own capabilities to cope with a markedly different regional environment, the Japanese and South Korean governments will need to clarify for their citizens the value of continuing to host U.S. forces in their societies and the role the U.S. military will play in meeting shared security concerns. The situation is similar today in the Philippines, despite the fact that there are no longer any American military bases there. The new U.S. mission of counterterrorism has many in the Philippines revisiting the question of just how much control their government has over U.S. forces within their nation.

Citizen concerns about the scale of U.S. forces, about their behavior and accountability within domestic societies, and ultimately, about the purpose of these forces in a volatile and rapidly changing regional and international environment, must be addressed by national leaders in Tokyo, Seoul, and Manila as they seek to continue their security cooperation with Washington.
Alliance Management and Domestic Protest

Even as the Cold War was ending, there were signs that public tolerance for U.S. military bases and forces was being tested, with public protests creating demands on national governments to reconsider how citizen interests are affected by the presence of U.S. forces in their countries. Indeed, public disgruntlement over these foreign troops has had a considerable impact on policy decisions within the three major U.S. alliances in Asia.

The most conspicuous example was the failure of the U.S. and Republic of the Philippines governments in the early 1990s to successfully renegotiate the terms of the U.S. military presence there. After months of often tense negotiations between the two governments, a new agreement was crafted to extend the United States’ ability to use its major Philippine bases. But there was considerable opposition to this in the Philippine legislature, and dissension even within President Corazon Aquino’s government. In the final days, she sought to rally public opinion in support of her government’s new treaty with Washington in the hope that popular affinity within the Philippines for the United States would outweigh the opposition of key national legislators. Despite Aquino’s appeals, the Philippine Senate rejected the treaty by a vote of 12–11.

Each senator who voted was required to state his or her reasons, and the halls of the Senate were charged with emotion regarding the meaning of the U.S. military presence for Philippine identity. It was also a moment of transformation for Philippine politics, as forces opposed to the dictatorship of former President Ferdinand Marcos sought to define the country’s future. Even Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, minister of defense under Marcos and a close “friend” of the U.S. military, voted against the treaty. Reflecting the complex emotions that framed the U.S. bases at that critical moment of political change, he proclaimed his opposition to allowing the U.S. bases to remain on Philippine soil:

I cannot live with a treaty that assumes that without some 8,000 servicemen and some passing warships we shall fall flat on our faces. I cannot believe that the vitality of this country will be extinguished when the last bar girl in Olongapo turns off the last light in the last cabaret…. I have a higher vision of this country’s importance than as a depot of diminishing importance of a foreign power.4

As a result, the U.S. Air Force and Navy were asked to abandon two of the largest U.S. military bases in the region, Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Facility. On November 24, 1992, the last U.S. naval ship left the Philippines. Support for a continued military presence in one of America’s longest, and in many ways closest, relationships in the Asia Pacific region had come to an end.
Thousands of South Koreans took to the streets of Seoul in 2002 to protest the U.S. military verdict that American troops would not be formally sanctioned for their involvement in an accident that killed two Korean schoolgirls.
Within years, crises erupted in the two other allied societies that host U.S. military forces. This time it was the behavior of U.S. military personnel that became the focal point of contention. In 1995, the Japanese government faced intense citizen criticism of its handling of the U.S. military presence when a 12-year-old schoolgirl was brutally raped in Okinawa Prefecture. Local residents took to the streets in protest, and then-Governor Masahide Ota called for a review of the Japanese government’s policy of hosting American forces in his constituency. Ota ultimately took his claims all the way to the Japanese Supreme Court, arguing that the national government was placing a disproportionate burden on the residents of Okinawa for the maintenance of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. Tolerance for the activities of U.S. military personnel stationed in Okinawa, as well as for the national government’s handling of problems associated with U.S. troops, had evaporated, and the protest that emerged in response to the rape called for a broad reassessment of the Japanese and U.S. governments’ handling of the American military bases in Okinawa, including demands for a withdrawal of U.S. forces from the island.

These claims from within Japanese society coincided with an effort by the two governments to revamp their alliance, and to redefine their military cooperation to meet the changes in regional security after the Cold War. The stakes for both Japanese and U.S. security planners were high, and the two governments began a policy review guided by the newly formed Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) to respond to criticisms from Okinawa Prefecture. Faced with 85,000 demonstrators in September 1995 in the streets of Naha, the capital of Okinawa, Japan’s national policy planners were quick to attempt to meet the demands of Okinawa’s governor for greater local voice in the policy of managing U.S. military forces at the local level, but they did not go so far as to ask for a reduction in U.S. forces nor did they attempt to move U.S. forces out of Okinawa Prefecture to other localities within Japan. A decade later, the two governments are still confronting the fact that the majority of U.S. military personnel stationed in Japan are located on this small island, and there has been little progress made regarding the Japanese government’s proposed solution of building a new base to consolidate forces within the prefecture.

While Japan’s national policymakers sought to portray the protest that came from Okinawa as a local problem, and to redefine their military cooperation to meet the changes in regional security after the Cold War. The stakes for both Japanese and U.S. military forces in South Korea had a decidedly national audience. Two young girls were killed in 2001 when a U.S. military armored personnel carrier on a civilian road struck them as they were walking home from school. The accident was widely publicized, and came at a time when the alliance relationship between the two countries was somewhat fragile as a result of differences over policy with North Korea. Moreover, a tumultuous presidential election was underway, and the candidate that eventually won the Blue House campaigned on the need to revisit the U.S.–South Korea alliance, especially the status of U.S. forces on Korean soil.

The announcement by U.S. officials that the driver and commander on the scene would suffer no sanction for the accident led to several large-scale but peaceful protest demonstrations in Seoul in 2002. For many, this outburst of anti-Americanism was attributed to generational change, and a decreasing belief among younger South Koreans in the necessity of the U.S.–South Korean alliance. Upon closer inspection, however, it is clear that these events represented a much broader set of transformations within South Korea. The American military’s place within South Korean society was at the vortex of a public questioning of national priorities, and indeed of national identity, as South Koreans sought to consolidate their democracy.
Newly elected President Moo Hyun Noh thus began his presidency with the task of renegotiating the size and location of the U.S. military in South Korea, and of reshaping the dynamics of his country’s security relationship with the United States.

Clearly, the domestic forces that affect decision making regarding the U.S. military presence in these allied societies are dynamic and complex. But the future of the U.S. military presence in Asia rests as much on the tolerance of these societies as it does on the effort to forge new strategic goals for the alliances with Washington. Periodic attempts to gauge public sentiment regarding the policy of alliance with the United States through opinion polling provide some sense of public support for or against the policy. But these polls do not translate into an understanding of the interplay of citizen concerns and government policy initiatives that shape the U.S. military presence. Past episodes of conflict, and the policy adjustments that have resulted, continue to inform efforts to gain citizen support for the continued presence of the U.S. military within these societies. To gain a better understanding of the reasons why citizens oppose or support the U.S. military presence, a more in-depth examination of the issues, actors, and policymaking initiatives surrounding the U.S. military is needed.

The defense treaties that created the legal foundation for the hosting of U.S. forces in the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea were negotiated during wartime, and came into force in the early years of the postwar recovery for all three societies.

In the Philippines, U.S. military presence had long been part of the national experience under U.S. colonial rule, but with calls for national independence in the 1930s, there was broad popular support for rejecting the idea of allowing the foreign troops to remain on Philippine soil. In light of this sentiment, the U.S. Congress passed the Philippine Independence Act of 1934 (the Tydings-McDuffie Act), offering to recognize Philippine independence by 1946 without retaining military bases.7 But World War II intervened, and when the U.S. Army returned to the Japanese-occupied Philippines in 1944, it returned with the anticipation that it could retain bases there once independence was granted. The Bases Agreement signed in 1947 became the foundation of a policy that lasted until 1991.

The security relationship between the United States and Japan was also embedded in the process of postwar recovery. Negotiated alongside the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the 1951 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty created the basis for retaining significant U.S. military facilities on Japanese soil even after Japan regained full sovereignty. After a seven-year occupation, the U.S. military maintained more than 300,000 troops in Japan, and the outbreak of the Korean War, while drawing off some of the major ground units, created the impetus for a series of facilities dedicated to rear-area support for combat operations. While U.S. military forces in Japan have been significantly reduced since then to around 45,000 personnel in the 1990s, the United States continues to have exclusive use rights over 76,692 acres of land, 56,845 acres of which are in Okinawa Prefecture.8 In fact, about 75 percent of the land used by U.S. forces in Japan is on the largest of Okinawa Prefecture’s 160 islands—one that comprises only 0.6 percent of Japan’s total land area.9 This geographical imbalance in the deployment of U.S. forces in Japan
has long been central to Okinawa’s claim that it bears a disproportionate share of the burden of Japan’s postwar alliance with the United States.

Likewise, a defense treaty with the United States, concluded in 1953, also accompanied the armistice signed at the end of the Korean War. Two years of war on the Korean peninsula left much of the country devastated, and the creation of a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) at the 38th parallel separated into two a country that had barely emerged from almost 30 years of occupation by Imperial Japan. U.S. forces in South Korea remained to defend the country under a United Nations Command formally established in the armistice agreement. Since then, the primary goal of the U.S. military in South Korea has been the defense of South Korea against the North. A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) concluded in 1966 gave the United States the right to operate bases in South Korea for an indefinite period. In 2000, there
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In each of these three societies, U.S. forces were on the ground prior to the full exercise of sovereign discretion of those governments, and the terms of the presence were negotiated at a moment when government was at its most fragile. Thus, U.S. military bases have always been associated with the terms of their origins, and the presence of U.S. forces on Japanese, South Korean, or Philippine soil prior to the exercise of formal sovereignty continues to be the foil against which the national narrative of sovereign discretion and independence is cast.

were some 37,000 U.S. forces stationed in South Korea, occupying approximately 73,000 acres of land. As a result of almost two years of negotiations, the U.S. and South Korean governments reached an agreement in 2004 to consolidate and relocate American forces there.

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RENegotiating the terms of U.S. military presence

Only Japan renegotiated the terms of its early post–World War II security bargain with the United States. Opposition to the terms of the original treaty was strongest in Japan, as opposition political parties openly challenged the conservative ruling party’s policy of alliance with the United States. The Liberal Democratic Party, as well as the diplomats who negotiated the details of a new security treaty, understood that the perception of compromised sovereignty in the original treaty would not be sustainable, and it initiated talks with Washington over treaty revision in the late 1950s. The new treaty that was ratified amid great domestic upheaval in 1960 still allowed the U.S. bases to remain. But an explicit American commitment to assist Japan in case of attack, as well as an accompanying note that provided for “prior consultation” with the government of Japan over the use of U.S. military forces stationed within the country, satisfied some critics that Japan’s own interests were met in the bilateral agreement.

Yet the American military continued to operate freely from Okinawa, which was still under U.S. administration. Another decade would pass before antagonism to the U.S. war in Vietnam and a rising movement within Okinawa for reversion to Japanese sovereignty convinced the Japanese government to call for an “end to the postwar” and for negotiations with Washington over the terms for regaining sovereign control over Okinawa. Twenty-seven years after Japan regained formal sovereignty, the United States and Japan concluded yet another agreement that returned Okinawa to Japan. But the Japanese government allowed the United States to retain most of its military facilities on the island despite strong sentiments within Okinawa for removing them. The Okinawa reversion agreement only exacerbated what many in Okinawa perceived as Tokyo’s discrimination against the prefecture and a betrayal of the principles laid out in the postwar Japanese constitution. Both Okinawa’s wartime experience as the only home-front battlefield of Japan and Tokyo’s agreement to the continued concentration of U.S. military forces on the island provide ample fodder for resentment and bitterness about the Japanese government’s handling of the U.S. military presence in this southernmost prefecture.

The defense treaties concluded by South Korea and the Philippines were not renegotiated, but the terms and conditions governing the U.S. military presence within these societies have been. The basing agreement between the United States and the Philippines was extended until the dramatic “people power” movement that removed Marcos from power in 1986 became the backdrop for questioning the previous government’s stance on the bases. Subsequent negotiations with the United States in the mid-1990s over a VFA that would allow U.S. forces to visit the Philippines to train and exercise with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) led to a new form of temporary and restricted access for U.S. forces. But, in keeping with the Constitution, this agreement was subjected to Senate review and approval. Opposition to the reintroduction of American forces on Philippine soil was intense, and negotiations between the executive and legislative branches of government were prolonged, and it was not until 1999 that the legislature approved an agreement allowing U.S. forces to visit again. The U.S. military has had annual training exercises (referred to as Balikatan exercises) with the AFP since 2000. 

While these exercises are held throughout the country, there has been a particular focus since 2001 on counterterrorism operations training in the southern Philippines.
In the U.S.–South Korea alliance, there has been a less dramatic but nonetheless significant effort to recalibrate the perception of compromised sovereignty that shapes public attitudes toward the U.S. military presence. Several aspects of the presence were controversial. The first was the subordinate role of the South Korean military to U.S. commanders in the unified United Nations (UN) Command structure. The second was the revision of the SOFA to make it more accountable to domestic law. Here human rights lawyers, as well as environmental activists, played a key role in identifying areas of the agreement that were incompatible with a changing South Korea. Finally, and most recently, in 2004 the South Korean and U.S. governments explored ways to consolidate and reorganize American military forces, agreeing finally to remove forces from Yongsan, the large and conspicuous base in metropolitan Seoul. Efforts in the early 1990s to remove this base, with all of its trappings of foreign power, from the heart of the capital made little progress, but a decade later the United States was anxious to reduce and reconfigure its forces on the Korean peninsula. Washington wanted to move U.S. forces south of the Han River to give them greater flexibility, thereby closing many of the camps near the DMZ. The agreement to relocate U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) was put before the South Korean National Assembly, giving the policy initiative more momentum and the legitimacy of legislative sanction.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND CHANGING NATIONAL DEFENSE NEEDS

It was not just the terms of the treaties and agreements that shaped public understanding of the U.S. military presence. The Cold War premise of security cooperation with the United States also affected public attitudes. In the early decades of the postwar period, the alliance with the United States was the primary vehicle for these governments’ efforts to acquire military capability, and strengthening relationships between national militaries and the U.S. military was part and parcel of the alliance project.

In Japan, for example, the postwar constitution, and especially the “no war clause” in Article 9, specifically outlined a national purpose that was seen by many government critics as antithetical to Cold War collaboration with the United States. For decades, the bone of contention between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its opposition in the national Diet was the cooperation between Japan’s postwar military, the Self Defense Force, and the U.S. military. Public fears that Japan would be dragged into a war as a result of its alliance with the United States acted as a brake on government efforts to formalize planning between the two militaries. Moreover, even after the prior consultation mechanism was put in place in 1960, the Japanese government’s ability to restrict the operations of the U.S. forces stationed on its soil was suspect.
Within a decade after the Cold War ended, however, the Japanese public was more concerned about whether or not its national defense provisions were sufficient. The U.S. and Japanese militaries had begun to conduct joint studies and exercises only in the last decade of the Cold War, and then only for very narrowly defined contingencies. But this changed in the 1990s, as Japan and the United States redefined their alliance to focus on potential regional crises and the need for regional stability. The 1993–1994 crisis prompted by North Korea’s announcement that it was no longer willing to participate in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty inspection regime suggested that Pyongyang was now intent on acquiring nuclear weapons. Moreover, the heightened tensions between Beijing and Taipei in 1996 led to another regional crisis and the potential for the use of force across the Taiwan Straits seemed more real than ever. Finally, the over flight of Japanese territory in 1998 by a North Korean intermediate range missile stirred up the public debate in Japan over the country’s vulnerability to missile threat. While the government continued to refine the procedures and processes for cooperation between the U.S. military and the Self Defense Force, the public debate in Japan intensified over the need to strengthen Japan’s own defense efforts.

In South Korea, the years after the Cold War ended witnessed a very different outcome in the debate over national interests and security. As the frontline of Cold War confrontation in Asia, that country was explicitly organized for war, and successive authoritarian regimes reminded South Koreans that they were still officially in a “state of war” with the North. While many South Koreans saw the alliance with the United States as necessary for their national defense, opposition to government security measures—including the U.S. military presence—was rarely countenanced. State surveillance and punishment of critics of the U.S. presence and of the alliance silenced most citizens, and the challenges posed to the alliance were more often from within the government as the relationship developed over time.

In 2002, American soldiers worked alongside the Armed Forces of the Philippines on Basilan Island in the Sulu Archipelago, home to the radical Abu Sayaff Group.
needs. He committed his government to a policy of dialogue and engagement with the North, referred to as the “sunshine policy,” that seeks a negotiated settlement to the divisions on the Korean peninsula. Since his historic summit with North Korean leader Jong Il Kim in 2000, public support for this new approach to relations with the North has been high, revealing a shift in perceptions about the utility of the alliance with the United States. Indeed, a deep ambivalence about the United States and its role in multilateral efforts to negotiate with North Korea has colored public opinion in South Korea over the alliance and its impact on Korean security ever since the “sunshine policy” toward the North was adopted. Public opinion polls reveal a considerable skepticism within South Korea about the United States, and divergent views on the U.S.–South Korean alliance.12

The external defense needs of the Philippines were perhaps the least pressing during the Cold War. Instead, U.S. government military assistance to Manila was often in the form of weapons sales and military training for the AFP that would help the government cope with internal challenges to the Marcos regime. Thus, it was the role of the United States in support of Marcos after martial law that turned national attention to the trade-offs involved in hosting the large U.S. military facilities based in that country. Before his assassination, Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., urged the United States to reconsider its policy of arming the government of the Philippines.13 At the time of the negotiations of a new basing agreement, there was less debate over the external security implications for Manila should the U.S. presence be removed than there was over the damage to national independence that these bases suggested. Rather than reflecting shared security concerns, the U.S. basing agreement was widely regarded as a rental agreement that critics argued compromised the development of the Philippines as a nation.

Thus, the security relationship between Washington and its allies in Asia was not defined solely in terms of the U.S. military presence. Throughout the Cold War, there was a strong U.S. policy emphasis on enhancing the national military capability of allied states. The national militaries of Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines had a close working relationship with their American counterparts. Defense assistance from Washington was the main source of weapons systems, and military training, both in-country and in the United States, was a valuable resource for these national forces. While not directly related to the U.S. military presence, defense assistance from Washington was a key aspect of security cooperation, and the relationships that developed between these militaries were a critical source of policy support for the continued presence of U.S. forces in these countries. On a more practical level, the day-to-day management of the American military facilities and bases was often solely the responsibility of the national defense bureaucracies in each country.

**EXERCISING POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY**

Perhaps the most striking change over time in each of these societies, however, has been the increasing attention to who has a legitimate right to influence policymaking over the U.S. military presence. Each of the societies that has hosted the U.S. military over time has undergone significant democratic transitions, albeit at different moments and through different processes in its postwar history. Japanese society was transformed in the wake of war and occupation, and the 1950s and 1960s were full of domestic clashes between progressive and conservative political leaders over the nature and the practice of democracy.

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*Each society that has hosted the U.S. military has undergone significant democratic transitions.*
New institutions of governance designed under occupation to create democracy were tested and refined in the early postwar years, as newly formed interests and political allegiances tested the scope of state power. The key challenge to the alliance relationship in postwar Japan was the clash between opposition and ruling political parties and their supporters over the ratification of a revised bilateral treaty with the United States in 1960. Parliamentary process came to a standstill, and demonstrators lined the streets in protest of the government’s attempt to force a vote on the treaty.

Likewise, the demonstration of “people power” in the Philippines, and the overthrow of the Marcos regime in the mid-1980s, led to the drafting of a new constitution that embodied a new compact between the state and the people of the Philippines. Article XVIII included a specific and pointed reference to the Bases Agreement, stipulating that it could not be extended and that any subsequent agreement to continue the U.S. military presence must be subjected to senate approval or be approved via national referendum. More recently, the South Korean democratization process brought to the fore a new agenda for social, political, and economic change that overturned authoritarian practices of government. Even the basic premise that South Korea was in a “state of war” that sustained the organization of state power for decades is being questioned today, as South Korea’s political leaders openly debate the need for a national security law.

For decades, in all three societies, the U.S. government negotiated its security interests with either a single political party, as in Japan and South Korea, or with a single individual, as in the case of Marcos. For obvious reasons, this made problem solving regarding the U.S. military presence more predictable and less subject to contention. By the late 1980s in the Philippines, however, the U.S. government had to contend with the pent-up frustrations with Marcos and, by association, had to defend its policy against charges that the United States had sustained his presidency in order to ensure the U.S. military presence on Philippine soil. Past U.S. government relations with successive authoritarian governments continue to be a source of contention in a democratizing South Korea. And in Japan, the long tenure in government by the conservative LDP has also meant that the alliance conversation was somewhat protected from the influence of changes of government. Since the breakup of the LDP in 1993, however, the possibility—if not, in fact, the reality—of a two-party competitive political system has infused national politics in Japan, making national policymaking on the alliance more susceptible to domestic coalition-building politics.

The process of decision making regarding the presence of U.S. forces was amended over time, enhancing the role of popularly elected representative bodies. No longer would security agreements with the United States be the exclusive domain of executive privilege. For the most part, the agreements negotiated by early postwar governments were perceived as compromised by the nature of the regime in power. But the broader thesis was that the people were the guardians of sovereignty, and even national security policy was to be held accountable to the claims for legislative oversight and accountability that were integral to the practice of democracy.

In all three democratic societies, there has been intense scrutiny of the national government’s policy of hosting foreign troops. As domestic institutions of governance became more responsive to citizen interests, the practices surrounding the maintenance of U.S. forces in these societies were also subjected to scrutiny as citizens began to call for greater transparency and accountability in national governance. Subjecting government
agreements with the United States regarding its forces to legislative oversight and approval was the most obvious change. But the policy of hosting foreign troops in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines did not end with the task of negotiating new treaties or agreements with the United States. Rather, the impact of these decisions regarding the hosting of U.S. forces raised a complex array of social, economic, and political challenges that affected multiple agencies and constituencies of these national governments.

The relationship between the U.S. military and host societies in Asia has not been consistently antagonistic, however. Nor have government policies surrounding the American military presence been static. To varying degrees, each of the governments that host U.S. military forces has renegotiated the terms and the scale of the troop presence in its country. When domestic pressures on host governments rise, the U.S. government, too, has sought to respond more visibly to host nation concerns about the practices that govern the management of U.S. forces in the region. The domestic politics of the U.S. military presence in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines suggest that there are two areas of public concern. The first encompasses the public sensitivities to sovereign control over these forces, and the question of whether or not they serve national goals. The second is the effectiveness and responsiveness of the national government to problems faced by communities that must manage the interactions between the U.S. military and local residents on a daily basis.

**National Policy with Local Impact**

The U.S. military presence in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines engages policymakers at the highest levels of government. But the most pronounced impact of these forces on Asian soil is local. U.S. military bases have been a central part of the landscape of towns and villages, and these “little Americas” have affected the lives of local citizens in a variety of ways.

In contrast to their counterparts in Europe, the majority of U.S. military personnel stationed in Asia live apart from their hosts. American military bases have always been separate enclaves, with their own legal, social, and economic governance structures. Most of these bases were constructed in remote and once peripheral regions, giving the towns that grew up around them an identity apart. Arriving in Japan as occupation forces, the U.S. military took over the facilities used by the former Imperial Japanese Navy and Army, including the key ports of Yokosuka and Sasebo as well as airfields used by both prewar services along the Pacific coast. The defeat of the Japanese military on Okinawa in 1945 created the first opportunity for U.S. forces to be based on Japanese soil, and then the
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 was the impetus for an expansion of U.S. bases on
the island, including the two major airfields of Futenma and Kadena. Unlike on the main
islands of Japan, where the land belonged to the Japanese state, most of the land used today
by the U.S. military was forcibly expropriated from private landowners who were held in
relocation camps after the war. Returning to find their fields had been turned into runways,
most local residents began to rebuild their communities alongside these bases, and today
densely populated urban cities and towns surround the U.S. military facilities in Okinawa.
Moreover, these bases occupy privately owned land rented by the Japanese government on
behalf of the U.S. military.

In South Korea, U.S. Army camps along the DMZ were on predominantly rural land,
and the towns and villages that grew up alongside were often built to service the needs of the
troops. Pejoratively dubbed *kijich'on*—camp towns—by South Koreans, these areas continue
to be seen as places characterized by illegal and immoral activities, and are avoided by most
local residents. Today, metropolitan Seoul has expanded to meet these camp towns, which
now sit on the fringe of the capital, on crowded congested highways lined with high-rise
apartment buildings. The consolidation of numerous small facilities in the Uijongbu-
Tongducheon area releases land for development north of Seoul, but it is the longer-run
prospect of moving the entire U.S. Army's Second Infantry Division to Pyeongtaek, south of
the Han River, that raises significant questions about the future of towns the United States
will leave behind. Alternative sources of revenue will be needed, and the relocation of 4,000
troops to Iraq has already impacted many small businesses, such as bars and clubs that catered
to the servicemen, shops selling English language T-shirts, and restaurants serving American-
style food. Some have closed, but others are moving to Pyeongtaek in anticipation of the
government's relocation plan.

In the Philippines, the U.S. military presence dates from the defeat of the Spanish there
in 1898 and the ensuing Philippine-American War (1899–1913). In 1900, the U.S. Navy
chose Subic Bay, the former base of the Spanish naval and army forces, as a repair and supply
base for their operations in the Philippines. Three years later, President Theodore Roosevelt
claimed Subic Bay and 175,000 acres of adjacent land as an “American military reservation.”
It fell under Japanese control during World War II, only to return to the United States in 1945.
Despite Philippine independence in 1946, Olongapo remained under the administration of
the U.S. Naval Reservation, and an air station with an 8,000-foot runway was built in the
mid-1950s. It was only in 1959 that Olongapo was returned to Philippine government
control and became a municipality. When the basing agreement with the Philippines ended
in 1992, Subic Bay Freeport was created and a new era began for the people of Olongapo.
With over US$2 billion of investments in its first four years, the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA) was seen as a model for U.S. base conversion throughout the region. In
1996, Subic hosted the Asia Pacific Economic Conference and by 1999, exports from the
SBMA exceeded US$1 billion. By 2000, 34,372 Filipinos were working at Subic, surpassing
the peak level of employment under the U.S. Navy.15

Today, most U.S. military facilities and operations take place in peripheral regions, and
thus seem far from the experiences of the metropolitan elites. But it is important to remember
that at one time the U.S. military was a conspicuous and highly controversial presence in all
three national capitals. It arrived in the Philippines as a colonial force, at war with those
Filipinos who sought to gain independence at the turn of the twentieth century, and

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15 The U.S. military presence engages policymakers at the highest levels of government, but the most pronounced impact is local.
remained there for almost a century. General Douglas MacArthur led the U.S. military to Tokyo in 1945 in response to Japan’s surrender. In 1952, when the American occupation ended, the U.S. Army vacated its headquarters across from the Imperial Palace, but the United States maintained its facilities and bases in and around metropolitan Tokyo until the 1970s when land prices increased and growing public sensitivity to the U.S. military’s use of valuable Tokyo property grew.

In South Korea, U.S. troops arrived to halt a southern advance by North Koreans in 1950, but a UN armistice between the two Koreas provided the framework for the U.S. military command of UN headquarters in Seoul. South Korean sensitivities to the U.S. military presence in the capital city have led to the removal of American troops from Seoul. The UN Command and the USFK headquarters were housed in the buildings used by Japanese occupation forces prior to World War II, making Yongsan Base not only an impediment to urban development but also a painful reminder of Korea’s past. Just as in Japan and the Philippines, the history of the U.S. military presence continues to infuse contemporary discussions about its role in South Korea.

**TWO VISIONS OF AMERICA**

Today, two rather different types of U.S. military communities exist in these Asian societies. There are bases where U.S. military personnel live with their families. These installations tend to be large, and offer much the same amenities as are available in the United States. In Okinawa, 23,000 Americans live and work on Kadena Air Force Base, the largest air base in the Pacific Command. The Fifth Air Force, with approximately 7,000 airmen, is the only American air wing that has never been deployed in the United States. Its F-15 fighters train and operate throughout the Asia Pacific region. Kadena also is responsible for U.S. surveillance activities along the coast of the Asian continent, including North Korea. Covering 12,000 acres, Kadena is a small city, with churches, schools, PXs and commissaries, bowling alleys, golf courses, movie theaters, and extensive housing for military families. Some 3,300 Japanese citizens work on Kadena on a regular basis, and another 1,000 or more are hired for part-time or temporary contract work. In 1999, the U.S. Air Force operations budget for managing Kadena was estimated at US$1.45 billion, a figure higher than the annual city and county budget of Honolulu, Hawai’i.\(^{16}\)

Like most base communities, however, the off-base environs around Kadena provide numerous local enterprises that cater to U.S. military personnel. Local businesses offer a variety of services, from the basic provision of food, electricity, and water to specialized contract services including landscaping, construction, and language interpretation. Members of the U.S. military also work with host community leaders to support various community goals, such as fund-raising efforts for local schools, churches, and sports leagues.\(^{17}\) The base command also works with the local fire department and hospitals to enhance emergency service provisions.\(^{18}\)

Other U.S. bases, however, are reminiscent of a wartime economy, and evocative of an earlier, more painful era when the balance of power between the United States and host societies gave local citizens little or no voice in the relationship with American soldiers. Because war was deemed potentially imminent throughout much of the Cold War, U.S. Army bases near the DMZ in South Korea were established for combat troops only. Most Koreans still see the small camp towns dotting the countryside near the DMZ as a nether
land of crime, prostitution, and “foreign” influence. U.S. Marine Corps bases in Okinawa, such as Camp Hansen, similarly house infantry units that deploy on short rotations and without their families. In Okinawa, there is less stigma attached to the local towns alongside these facilities, yet directly across from the base gates is a small red light district, where bars and clubs cater to the 18- to 24-year-old troops that make up the majority of U.S. Marine Corps personnel. American naval facilities, such as the former Subic naval base in the Philippines, are also famous for their designation as “rest and relaxation” stops for visiting warships. Outside all of these camps and ports are a host of bars and entertainment districts that cater to the predominantly male U.S. military personnel. For decades, arrangements were made between the U.S. military and local political leaders for “entertaining” the troops with formally sanctioned clubs and networks of prostitution exclusively for American military patronage.

Beyond the social stigma of the red-light districts, however, all of these bases represent a new post–World War II form of extraterritoriality that is uncomfortable for most citizens. To local residents, the barbed wire fences and imposing gates with armed guards and U.S. flags suggest a world unto itself, separate from and unaccountable to, the norms and practices that govern their communities. The U.S. military governs its own territory, with the SOFA offering limited sovereignty for Americans living on these facilities. Access to bases is off-limits to Japanese and South Korean citizens, unless they have the approval of U.S. military authorities. Access to the civilian communities that host these facilities is not restricted for U.S. military personnel and their families, revealing another inequality at the community level that is seldom appreciated by national policymakers. In legal terms, it is the SOFA that outlines the terms and conditions regarding how U.S. military personnel and their dependents interact with their hosts, but there are also many interactions that are managed by local U.S. military commanders, mayors, and other community leaders.
Both local governments and local citizens are affected by the U.S. military presence. Masao Arime and Shuden Teruya (above), two leading members of Okinawa’s Anti-war Landowners discuss the U.S. confiscation of their land. Ginowan City Mayor Yoichi Iha (below), discusses pressures created by Futenma Marine Air Station and the challenges of urban planning for base land returned to civilian use.

AVENUES OF ACCESS TO NATIONAL POLICYMAKING

Local governments, while bearing the bulk of the day-to-day management of the presence, have had little input into policymaking surrounding the U.S. forces and bases. This disjuncture between those who make policy and those who have to implement it has increasingly become a source of contention between local and national governments. In Japan, local governments have long been assigned a key role in carrying out a variety of social policies, including the national policy of hosting U.S. military forces. But the role of these governments in establishing policy, setting an agenda, and defining goals remains weak.

Citizens direct their concerns toward local politicians, and the ability of the local mayor or governor to address these directly with the U.S. military can be limited. For some issues, local base commanders and the mayors of the cities and towns that host them can often find resolutions to day-to-day frictions. In other instances, however, the solutions are simply beyond the capacity or authority of local politicians.

Local politicians must then summon the assistance of the national government. In some cases, this translates into appeals to national politicians. But for most issues, local politicians turn to the national bureaucrats charged with implementing the basing agreements. In the case of the facilities themselves, this is most often the national defense agency or military. When transgressions of a SOFA occur, the ministry of foreign affairs becomes involved. The process of dispute resolution for issues related to the U.S. military presence, therefore, often pits local politicians against the security policy bureaucrats from the national government. Frustrations percolate in communities where the problems associated with the bases seem intractable, while national bureaucrats must act as emissaries between the U.S. military and local political leaders.

This tension at the local level was most obviously revealed in Okinawa after the 1995 rape, and the frustrations over the national government’s handling of the U.S. forces ultimately led the governor at the time to align with citizen activists against the central government. Pitting himself against the bureaucrats in Tokyo who responded weakly and belatedly to the rising discontent in Okinawa, then-Governor Ota took issue with the lack of attention given to his constituents. To get the government’s attention, the governor declared he would no longer participate in the legal process that granted the U.S. military use of Okinawa’s land. He became the first Japanese prefecture governor to refuse to participate in government land expropriation procedures, siding with anti-war landowners who had long protested the use of their land by the U.S. military. It was a bold step, and one that in the end brought him to Japan’s Supreme Court to confront the national government’s policy agenda. In his statement to the court, Ota claimed that as an elected official it was his duty to represent the interests of his constituents against Tokyo’s policies. In the end, the Japanese Supreme Court ruled that the public interest of maintaining the U.S.-Japan
security treaty superseded the rights of individual Okinawan landowners, but the argument brought into focus the role of locally elected politicians in establishing contested policies decided often by bureaucrats in the national government.

Local governments continue to ask for a more significant and formalized voice in the management of base issues. Today, the Okinawa Prefecture government, under the leadership of Governor Keiichi Inamine, continues to see its role as the advocate of change in the existing policies surrounding the U.S. presence in Okinawa, including a revision of the SOFA. Thus, political leaders in Okinawa often find themselves walking with civil society activists, showcasing their positions in the media, traveling to Washington, D.C., and strategizing in much the same way as actors outside of government seek to make their voices heard.

In South Korea, where local political leaders are taking the same tack regarding USFK relocation issues, local governments are only just beginning to be assigned formal positions in the management of U.S. military bases. Lack of institutionalized local government roles in policy implementation is, in large part, due to the legacy of authoritarian government, and the lack of attention to citizen needs and concerns at the local level. In preparation for the task of relocating U.S. military bases in and around the Seoul metropolitan area, the role of local governments has become that of coordinator of local interests, and to a certain extent, mediator in the national effort to craft policies that will support the agreement by Seoul and Washington to relocate and reduce U.S. forces.

In the prime minister’s office, the recently created Commission for the USFK Relocation has the express task of creating the institutional and administrative linkages between the national government and local governments necessary for carrying out the 2004 U.S.–South Korean agreement. Unlike in Japan, there are no formal mechanisms for integrating local governmental policy concerns with national bureaucracies responsible for U.S. military basing policy. Roughly 65 percent of U.S. military bases in South Korea are located within Kyeonggi Province, and yet the provincial government has only recently established a special task force responsible for overseeing the relocation-related issues concerning its constituents. Both the municipalities in the north that will lose the bases and those in the south where existing bases will be expanded are under the jurisdiction of Kyeonggi province. And, it will be the municipal governments that bear the brunt of the national policy of relocating U.S. military forces. Under a national government initiative, special legislation in support of the U.S.–South Korean relocation agreement began early for the Pyeongtaek area, where new land will be purchased for the relocation of U.S. forces. But there are many municipalities in South Korea that have already begun to feel the impact of this consolidation of U.S. forces, as bases close and land is returned to civilian use.

The impact of this lack of institutionalized policy coordination between local and national government in South Korea goes beyond the issue of USFK base relocation. Without a local window of government where citizens can go if they have trouble with U.S. forces, there has been little development of policy that can meet the needs and expectations
of South Koreans regarding their daily experience with these foreign troops. Especially sensitive has been the incidence of crimes and accidents, where local citizens have had little government support for their claims for prosecution and compensation. Instead, citizens turn to local citizen activists, often with links to national nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) based in Seoul, as well as to the national media to gain attention and apply pressure upon national governments. For example, it was only in 1992, after the brutal murder of a club worker, Geumi Yun, that the violence in Korean camp towns by U.S. military personnel was brought to public attention through the combined efforts of the locally based Tongducheon Democratic Citizen’s League and the newly formed NGO, the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crime by U.S. Troops in Korea.24 Local activists have gathered information from citizens, and created complaint documentation processes, thereby offering local residents who have insufficient redress by government a means to lodge their complaints against U.S. military personnel.

The shift to a democratizing society thus brings with it new obligations for governance, and where policies regarding the U.S. military presence are concerned, local governments increasingly are expected to implement national policy and advocate constituent interests, even when they differ from those of the national government.

**Social Change and New Citizen Voices**

Just as government policy institutions are being transformed to accommodate democratic transitions, citizen groups are also learning new approaches and strategies for shaping public attitudes regarding the U.S. military. Such groups have long populated the public debate at the local level, but more often than not they have had limited organizational capacity, and perhaps narrowly defined constituencies. In Okinawa, for example, only at points of considerable tension, such as the reversion movement or the movement that arose in protest of the 1995 rape, has the prefecture spoken with one voice. And in South Korea, local citizen groups saw their cause taken up by national NGOs in the 1990s as civil society groups seized the opportunity for political action afforded by the democratization process.25

When policy solutions are sought, players at the local level often diverge. Economic and social interests can conflict, and municipalities that host U.S. forces often compete with others for the economic benefits that accrue from the presence of facilities and bases despite concerns over the social costs for some in the community. Those with the most to gain economically from basing policy often seek to pursue their interests through quiet negotiations with the state, either locally or through the representatives of the defense establishment. Those who bear the brunt of the social costs or dislocations are often at the forefront of protest activities, aided by larger political agents such as political parties or NGOs with greater national visibility.

**From Periphery to Center**

Broader social changes have affected the debate within these societies over the U.S. military presence. Many American bases are located in communities that have been peripheral to national power. Okinawa has long been distant from the national consciousness, not only...
U.S. forces now assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines in efforts to contend with Muslim insurgent groups in the southern Philippines.

geographically but also in the imagination of contemporary Japan. It was the place of defeat and devastation as the only homeland battle fought by Japanese soldiers in the closing months of World War II. More than half of the 200,000 individuals who died in the Battle of Okinawa were civilians. The ensuing U.S. military effort to construct bases for a potential invasion of the main islands of Japan meant that many survivors who had lost their homes were held in settlement camps. The Korean War only expanded the U.S. military base construction effort, and postponed the return of displaced Okinawans to their home villages. Okinawa continued to be a place apart, occupied by the United States and its military long after Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952.26 Only in the 1980s, with the Japanese economic boom and the expansion of tropical tourist resorts in Okinawa, did the island begin to shed its image as a base island where residents lived in the shadow of the American military.

In the Philippines, too, U.S. forces now operate far from Manila in the rebellious southern island of Mindanao. Muslim Mindanao has always had an identity separate from the Philippine national consciousness. Mindanao is home to the majority of the eight million Muslim Filipinos who live alongside Christian residents, many of whom are descendants of settlers from the north who came to the island in the early 1900s. The island has a long history of
rebellion against central authority, dating back to the colonial era. More recently, Muslim groups—first the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), then the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)—have called for autonomy from the Philippine state, and have violently challenged the state’s ability to control Muslim areas under their control. After two decades of conflict, the MNLF agreed to negotiations with the Philippine government and in 1996 signed a formal treaty granting it autonomy over the area comprising the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in exchange for laying down its arms.

Violence continues in the southern Philippines, however. The MILF, organized by those who disagreed with the peace formula negotiated by the MNLF, continues to occupy and control territories beyond the reach of the Philippine army and state. Moreover, in the Sulu archipelago off the coast of Mindanao, the more militant Abu Sayaff Group (ASG) has operated freely from the small islands they control, kidnapping for ransom and undermining local stability. The MILF and ASG continue to rebel against central authority, and in the aftermath of September 11, the United States joined with the Philippine government to identify these organizations’ links with other terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia. U.S. forces are sent to Mindanao to assist the AFP in countering rebels who challenge the authority of the central government. Cooperation with the United States government in counterterrorism, and the suspected links between local armed insurgents and al Qaeda-linked terrorist groups in Southeast Asia, have made the southern Philippines a central priority in Philippine foreign and security planning.

Physical distance from Tokyo and Manila is not the sole factor that defines Okinawa and Mindanao as peripheral regions. Historically, these two regions share another common feature. They are also areas with ethnic and religious identities separate from those of the majority of Japanese and Filipinos, respectively. As regions, they have had long traditions of political resistance to the authority of the central state. Thus, their ability to draw upon that historical identity of difference in the politics over the U.S. military presence has been a powerful tool for local political elites.

Discrimination also plays a role in the politics of U.S. bases in South Korea. A history of discrimination pervades discussions by those who live in South Korean camp towns. The distance of these camp towns from the residents of metropolitan Seoul is not in fact geographic, ethnic, or religious. Rather, it is socioeconomic and class-based. Despite the fact that Tongducheon is only 37 miles north of Seoul, its political leaders as well as citizen activists are very conscious of their town’s status as a “lesser” locality in the new democratic politics of South Korea. Many of these towns grew up alongside the U.S. Army in the years after the end of the Korean War, and their association for decades with the U.S. military has led many in South
Korea to associate these towns with prostitution, drugs, and other criminal activities. In the rapid wave of transformation that accompanied South Korea’s postwar economic growth, the socioeconomic place of these towns today is much different than in decades past. Still, there remains a certain stigma that local leaders refer to when discussing why greater national attention is not dedicated to their communities.

**THE RISING VOICE OF WOMEN AND THEIR TRANSNATIONAL CONNECTIONS**

One of the most articulate voices in the politics of the U.S. bases is that of women. In base communities in each of these Asian societies, women activists have worked to draw attention to the impact on women of an extended foreign troop presence. Many of these groups are documenting local women’s experiences with violent crime, prostitution, and economic deprivation as a result of the U.S. presence. In Okinawa and South Korea the testimony of women who have suffered from violence and rape by U.S. military personnel is being compiled via oral histories and other means to chronicle the incidents that went unpunished in the past. Suzuyo Takazato of the Naha City Assembly writes:

> We are engaged in research to ascertain the reality and full extent of military violence against women and the way that cases have been handled. Starting in 1945, we have details of 92 incidents so far, taken from historical records, police reports, newspaper articles, and individual testimony.

The National Campaign for the Eradication of U.S. Military Crimes, formed in 1992 after the brutal murder of a Korean bar worker by an American serviceman, also maintains a list of criminal claims against U.S. forces in South Korea, including court case references and descriptions of the crimes.

These women’s groups have created networks of communication and information that reach beyond national boundaries. In September 1995, 71 Okinawan women traveled to China to attend the Beijing Women’s Conference to testify to the conditions faced by women in their communities. They arrived home to news of the rape, and immediately began to work toward the broad mobilization of citizens who turned out in an island-wide protest the following month. In November, the women announced the establishment of Okinawa Women Act against Military Violence. In February of the following year, the group began its American Peace Caravan, an extended sojourn around the United States visiting universities, local women’s groups, and Washington, D.C., to speak out about the rape and the problems faced by Okinawa as a result of the U.S. military presence.

But their key challenge is in articulating women’s interests within domestic politics at home. Okinawan women worked within their community with local political leaders to stop the construction of a new military base. When the Japanese government sought to consolidate U.S. military bases on Okinawa after the rape, women at the municipal level began to take a more active role in the effort to oppose the government plan. Leaders of the Women Act against Military Violence worked with Ota and other prefecture leaders to increase awareness of the problems faced by Okinawan women. And when local women in Nago City, where the new base was to be built, began to organize themselves, they sought advice and support from those who had organized the Women Act against Military Violence.
Today, Okinawan women communicate regularly with women’s groups in the United States, South Korea, and the Philippines about women’s issues in U.S. military base communities. And they continue to speak out on issues related to violence against women. Takazato, now an elected representative in the Naha City Assembly, has worked to gain greater awareness among local police and prosecutors of the need for counseling for rape victims, and for a better representation of victims’ interests in the investigation and prosecution of rape. Moreover, she and other women established a nonprofit center offering counseling to victims of rape, and they continue to monitor and report on individual trials where U.S. military personnel are charged with the crime. They have also been instrumental in gaining public attention and policy change within Okinawa for rape victims.

In South Korea and the Philippines, local women’s groups have focused on providing assistance and services to indigent women working in the bars and clubs in U.S. base communities. The first counseling center for these camp town women in South Korea was Duraebang (My Sister’s Place) in Uijongbu, near Camp Stanley Army Base, which was established in 1986 as an outreach effort by the Korea Presbyterian Church. According to Young Nim Yu, the current director, the main goal of Duraebang is to provide counseling services, education, and shelter for the women working in bars, as prostitutes, and, in some instances, for those married to U.S. servicemen. Increasingly, these women are non-Koreans brought in to work in clubs under false pretenses. Begun in 1996, Saewoomtuh became the second organization dedicated to these women; it now has centers in Tongducheon and Pyeongtaek. According to director Hyun Sun Kim in Pyeongtaek, Saewoomtuh also seeks to organize support for the children of these women by offering childcare and assisting in finding nontargeting educational environments for their Amerasian children who are often rejected by mainstream Korean society. In Tongducheon, Myung Bun Kim counsels women on finding alternative sources of livelihood. Both Duraebang and Saewoomtuh have helped women develop new skills to sustain themselves. Duraebang helped establish a bakery run by older women, and Saewoomtuh began a women’s center, a cooperative where women grow and sell plants and herbs and make potpourri, cards, and other craft products.

Although the American bases are gone from Olongapo City and Angeles City, women’s groups continue to work at the grassroots level in both municipalities monitoring the continued visits by U.S. naval ships and other forces. The Buklod Center is a cooperative project of the National Council of Churches of the Philippines and GABRIELA, a progressive women’s organization, in Olongapo. The center was founded by Alma Bulawan, a “survivor” of prostitution in the “A Bars” (bars designated for U.S. military personnel) when the Subic naval facility was still open, and Brenda Stoltzfus, a volunteer from the Mennonite Church. Opened in 1987, the center serves as a drop-in site for women in prostitution and mixed-race children fathered by U.S. military personnel. Since Subic closed, the center has worked with women to find alternative livelihoods, and to provide job skills training. Another organization, the Women’s Education, Development, and Productivity, Research, and Advocacy Organization (WEDPRO), works to support women in the Philippines who have served (and some who continue to serve) U.S. personnel. It also provides assistance to the Amerasian children of these women. It began in 1989 with a clear mandate founded on issues related to violence against women and children, and framed its grassroots work as well as its national legislative advocacy on gender and rights issues. WEDPRO has also conducted a study on a comprehensive base conversion
program that outlines alternative visions for employment for women in prostitution in Angeles City and Olongapo City, and has opened NAGKA (the United Women of Angeles City), a multipurpose cooperative for women in prostitution and survivors of prostitution. Moreover, WEDPRO leaders have worked on the anti-prostitution bill currently under consideration in the Philippine Congress, arguing for the need to see prostitution as a human rights issue.

These small women’s centers are also beginning to work together to help women who want to return to their home countries. In many of the remaining base communities in South Korea and Japan, Filipina and other foreign nationals are increasingly recruited to work in bars and as prostitutes in establishments that cater to the U.S. military. Local women’s centers in South Korea and Okinawa have therefore begun to reach out to women’s groups in the Philippines for assistance in securing the return of women (and, in many cases, their children) who have been trafficked, who have suffered from violence, or who have been abandoned by their husbands.

These women’s groups, along with a growing number of scholars, have shed light on what was the dark underside of the U.S. military presence in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Prostituted women, bar workers, and, in some cases, even those who married U.S. servicemen were abandoned by mainstream society and have been portrayed as women unworthy of the protection and advocacy of the state. With changing norms regarding women’s rights in each of these societies, there is greater interest in providing relief for the victims of violence and in economically empowering women. Both of these goals play a significant role in highlighting the particular experiences of the women that have lived alongside the U.S. military.

Today, there is a much wider and more receptive audience for the ideas and the goals advocated by these women’s groups, and the transnational connections between them have become a source of resources as well as learning. They have raised the consciousness of national and international audiences regarding the less visible and underappreciated consequences of a sustained foreign troop presence on the human rights of women. In terms of the policy debate over U.S. military bases, it is clear that the past government practice of sanctioning networks of “entertainment” and prostitution in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines is increasingly problematic. In South Korea, for example, prostitution is now against the law. International efforts, including U.S. government efforts, to curb trafficking in persons, have also put pressure on these governments to develop laws and impose sanctions on trafficking. This puts pressure on the networks of prostitution in these countries. Again, South Korea was the first of the three societies hosting U.S. forces to pass an anti-trafficking law, and there is intense pressure from the U.S. government for Japan to do the same. Pressure on national governments to address women’s rights and security concerns within base communities, therefore, is coming from two directions: from grassroots activism of women’s centers in the base communities and

Activism for women in U.S. base towns includes grassroots efforts to improve the lives of women working in the clubs that cater to Americans. Today, women’s centers such as My Sister’s Place in Uijonbu and Saewoomtuh in Tongducheon and Pyeongtaek, South Korea, continue to offer shelter to victims of violence, assistance in education for Amerasian children, and job training clinics for camp-town women.
from transnational efforts to address the exploitation of women as part of a human rights agenda.

Broader currents of social and economic change are exposing the concerns of those who live in proximity to U.S. bases. Civil society activism has played a central role in recasting the national debate on issues such as discrimination and human rights, and this has implications for the way in which local community relations with the U.S. military are being viewed. In each of the three countries, the circumstances of local communities were for decades far removed from the day-to-day experiences of urban residents. But today, these once peripheral areas and the experiences of their residents are as accessible to national audiences as events in Tokyo, Seoul, or Manila. Media coverage, civil society activism, and a greater interest in seeing what happens to any citizens in their interactions with the U.S. military as a national experience suggests that local communities may no longer be as isolated as they once were.

Asia’s Citizens and America’s Soldiers: Policy Intersections on the Ground

The impact of the U.S. military presence is often seen in the specific interests of host communities, or in the broader assessment of the debate over government accountability and protection of citizen rights. Several policy issues in particular illustrate the strains between local and national governments, as well as the contest over rights and obligations between citizens and state that are codified and renegotiated through legislation and law. For national governments, the policy of hosting U.S. military forces in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines involves an array of national policies—从 criminal prosecution to urban development planning to the complex task of conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. These intersections with domestic governance institutions and practices can best be seen in three very different dimensions of the U.S. presence.

Criminal Jurisdiction and the Status of Forces Agreements

The first and most obvious arena is in the implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that details terms of the U.S. military presence. Each country that hosts U.S. forces as part of bilateral defense treaty arrangements has such an agreement, and there is a basic model fashioned in the early years of the Cold War that provides a framework. Broadly speaking, the SOFA covers such topics as responsibilities for the maintenance and provision of facilities to house American troops, customs and immigration practices for military personnel, and judicial jurisdiction in the event of accidents or crimes. While this agreement sets forth an administrative sharing of responsibilities for the management of U.S. forces in the host country, the marriage between U.S. operational needs and domestic law is often an uncomfortable one. In many cases, government and military officials of both the U.S. and host governments must negotiate the details of how to handle these issues on a case-by-case basis. A joint military committee brings together local commanders, embassy representatives, and national host government officials from the defense and foreign affairs bureaucracies to iron out problems on a regular basis.
The most sensitive aspect of the SOFA has been the issue of criminal jurisdiction and host government responsibility for the arrest and custody of suspected criminals. As noted earlier, both the island-wide protest in Okinawa in 1995 and the national protests in Seoul in 2002 were triggered by public empathy for the victims of violence by U.S. military personnel, but it was also the process of determining judicial responsibility under the terms of the SOFA that motivated the mass demonstrations. In Okinawa, a schoolgirl was brutally raped by three military personnel, and in the latter, a U.S. military vehicle on a civilian road accidentally killed two young Korean girls. Despite the fact that one was a premeditated crime and the other an accident, the issue for citizens in Okinawa and South Korea was the same: the equal treatment and accountability of those responsible for accidents and crimes that resulted in civilian injury and loss of life.

In the former case, the U.S. and Japanese governments jointly sought to manage the investigation and indictment of the three men suspected in the rape. Since this was a crime committed while the suspects were off duty, the Japanese government could claim the right to prosecute in Japanese courts. Past practice in the U.S.-Japan alliance was to transfer custody of military personnel or their dependents at the point of indictment, when both governments deemed there was sufficient evidence against the suspect to warrant trial. But as public outrage grew in Okinawa in 1995, tensions also rose regarding the transfer of custody of these suspects, enhancing the impression that these suspects were unaccountable to the laws of Japan. The three suspects were ultimately transferred to Japanese custody for trial. In the months that followed, the U.S. and Japanese national governments agreed on a new principle for the transfer of custody prior to indictment in cases of “heinous crimes” when both governments agreed the evidence warranted indictment. This principle was then adopted in subsequent cases of alleged criminal behavior by U.S. forces.

In the case of the deaths of the two Korean girls, however, the SOFA outlines a different process. Any U.S. service member charged with a crime, including negligence, while on duty remains under the jurisdiction of the U.S. military. In fact, the treatment of on-duty crimes and accidents is specifically the domain of U.S. military law, and there are special procedures involved in the prosecution of that law. Despite the fact that the accident happened on a civilian road in South Korea, the terms of the SOFA precluded any accountability by the driver or his commander under Korean law. U.S. military court hearings are not open to the public, and the victims’ families were not given access to the proceedings. This separate process of military justice governing American military personnel creates additional pressures on an already sensitive political process. The U.S. government argues that its military personnel must be subject to military law, and thus must be judged by members of the U.S. military. The lack of transparency for South Korean or Japanese citizens is even greater as there is little public access to or understanding of the processes and procedures for handling an investigation and prosecution under U.S. military law even in the United States. In 2002, when the hearings on the accident that resulted in the deaths of the two girls produced a not-guilty verdict on the charge of negligence for the U.S. soldiers in charge of the vehicle, there was widespread disbelief and shock among the Korean public that no one was held accountable for the deaths.

Criminal jurisdiction issues involve a complex web of interpretation of judicial practices and protections, and in the laws of many host countries there are significant differences compared with U.S. law. For example, in Japan, suspects are not allowed to have lawyers...
present during interrogation, and this has been a major sticking point in the discussions on how to facilitate speedier and more cooperative investigations into criminal allegations. In 2004, the two governments reached a compromise allowing a U.S. military representative to attend any interrogations of SOFA-related suspects while in Japanese police custody. But even this presents problems. According to Kanetoshi Yoseda, president of the Okinawa Bar Association, this creates a double standard in the practice of Japanese law. By giving this special treatment to U.S. military personnel and their families, it violates the Japanese constitutional provision that all must be “equal under the law.”

**BASE CONSOLIDATION AND RELOCATION**

A second set of issues engages local and national policymakers in the host countries, and reveals the multiple and often conflicting economic and social interests at stake over the presence of U.S. forces. Local communities in the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan have all faced the need to accommodate national government decisions regarding the relocation of U.S. forces. The impact on local communities continues long after the American troops have left. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority was created to organize the former U.S. naval base in the Philippines into an industrial complex that could sustain the livelihoods of many residents of Olongapo City that depended so heavily on the U.S. military in the Philippines. Towns and cities throughout South Korea are just beginning to consider how to regroup as the U.S. Army closes significant facilities in the area near the DMZ. And, in Japan, the mayor of Ginowan City began a community-level planning process in anticipation of the return of Futenma Marine Corps Air Station to civilian use.

*The anticipated closure of Futenma Marine Air Station in Ginowan City has instigated complex negotiations within the community and between city and national governments on a development plan that will transform this 1,200-acre military facility in the city’s center.*
Often the terms of base closure involve finding alternative sites. Okinawa continues to confront this approach for closing Futenma Marine Corps Air Station, a controversial base situated in the midst of a residential area. In 1996, the U.S.-Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) announced it would return 12,360 acres of land used by the U.S. military, roughly one-fifth of the total acreage on Okinawa. The centerpiece of the SACO initiative was the return of Futenma Marine Corps Air Station in Ginowan City. With a 2,800-meter runway at its core, Futenma occupies around 1,200 acres in the center of the city. But this plan was contingent on finding another site to house the U.S. Marine Corps on the island, and the Japanese government set out to convince Okinawans to accept a new base in Nago, a municipality in the less populated northern region.

Local opposition to building new bases or accepting large numbers of new forces can almost be guaranteed, but the lure of national government economic incentives can also be persuasive. In the Okinawa case, the Japanese government offered considerable incentives to Nago residents, including tax breaks, economic investment in infrastructure, and subsidies, to offset the impact of the new base. Yet no clear endorsement of the national government’s initiative emerged. In 1997, a local referendum movement developed in response that narrowly rejected the new base proposal for Nago City. The referendum was not binding under Japanese law, leaving the ultimate decision in the hands of local politicians. In an election weeks later, the residents of Nago elected a new mayor, defeating the man who had sought to find a compromise solution in the base talks, and the new mayor deferred to Okinawa’s Governor Ota. In early 1998, Ota decided in favor of the referendum outcome, and refused to approve Tokyo’s base construction plan. A stalemate resulted in negotiations between Okinawa and Tokyo, and the promised economic assistance to the prefecture evaporated. Ota was then defeated in the gubernatorial election later that fall, and the new governor, Keiichi Inamine, argued for a more pragmatic stance on base relocation. Thus, local political change signaled another opportunity for the national government to persuade Okinawa’s political leaders to accept their offer to construct a new facility for the U.S. Marine Corps. Even now, Tokyo is still trying to convince Okinawans to accept this relocation plan.

Relocation has also stirred considerable opposition in South Korea. The closure of Yongsan in Seoul means the relocation of USFK command to Camp Humphreys, an Army facility to the south. The government of South Korea has promised to purchase about 2,000 acres of land in and around Pyeongtaek City, and is offering local landowners considerable economic incentives to sell. But it, too, is encountering opposition locally, as farmers teamed up with other activists, including student groups, environmental NGOs and others to demonstrate their opposition to U.S. base expansion. The national government’s draft legislation, the Special Law for Economic Development of Pyeongtaek, is designed to help the city government plan for the relocation effort. Again, as in the Japanese case, the national government is offering the Pyeongtaek government considerable subsidies for urban development, special legislative exemptions for community facilities, and tax exemptions. But unlike Japan, the South Korean government has the legal authority to initiate procedures for the expropriation of land. For the moment, however, there are few national policymakers in favor of this option. The political costs of forcing residents to leave their homes would be high. Government incentives to local communities to accept U.S. force relocation projects are often directed at individual landowners, local governments, and businesses, and the potential for opposition protest and legal challenge is high where there is no community opposition.
The more complex challenge for local governments is the conversion of former U.S. military bases to civilian use. Economic incentives offered by national governments, however, privilege some residents over others, and thus very few communities speak with one voice on the issue of accepting new U.S. forces. Whether the national governments of Japan and South Korea will be able to realize their plans for U.S. force consolidations remains to be seen.

The larger and more complex challenge for local governments is the conversion of former U.S. military bases to civilian use. Economic loss for these communities can be high, especially in communities that have no readily available alternative sources of revenue. In Okinawa, the rents paid by the Japanese government for base land are considerable (see Table 1), and thus for individual landowners the return of base land can mean a significant drop in household income. More than 32,000 Okinawans have property claims on U.S. military base land. Since 1972, rents have been periodically renegotiated as urbanization has increased the market price for land. Today, the Japanese government pays over US$290 million a year for Kadena Air Base, the largest and most strategically valuable U.S. military base on the island. Moreover, since the U.S. and Japanese governments agreed to relocate Futenma Marine Corps Air Station in 1996, the Japanese government has continued to pay over US$50 million a year for the land while trying to find an alternative site for the U.S. Marines.

Table 1: Japanese Government Compensation to Landowners for the Largest U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camp Schwab</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Hansen</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadena Ammunition Storage Area</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>85.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kadena Air Base</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>225.6</td>
<td>220.6</td>
<td>206.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Zukeran</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>70.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Futenma Air Station</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
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All U.S. Bases in Okinawa 41.0 87.7 143.1 154.3 293.2 711.7 692.2 640.2


In South Korea, U.S. base land has been claimed as national land, and in communities vacated by American forces the land will be sold to municipalities. While it is too early to judge whether this formula will be acceptable to local residents, there are already signs that municipal governments will seek to challenge the idea that they should pay the national government for this land. Moreover, in some areas, individuals whose families once resided on the land expropriated for these bases are already beginning to develop the case for a return of their property.

The burden on each locality to attract an equally lucrative private investor is high. Host communities rely most heavily on government transfer payments associated with the military
presence, as well as the business revenue generated by the troops themselves. Tongducheon, South Korea, has long been home to the U.S. Army, and with a reduction of several thousand American troops reassigned to Iraq, local businesses have already felt the economic impact, with many closing up shop. As larger numbers of U.S. troops leave South Korea, Tongducheon will be even harder hit. Local concerns can only be addressed by changes in national law. Specifically, these revisions must relax industrial development restrictions and allocate funds necessary for new economic initiatives that will generate replacements for the jobs being lost with the U.S. military departure. Without regulatory and fiscal assistance from the South Korean government, Tongducheon will be hard pressed to find ways to make up the difference on its own.

Like many local political leaders in Okinawa, Korea’s local politicians are beginning to understand that they need to behave more like activists than civil servants. Soo Ho Park has become a new face in local policy advocacy for Tongducheon. He is a former city council member who now chairs the city’s USFK Relocation Policy Response Committee. He has organized local residents, raised money, and worked on drafting legislation that will help Tongducheon gain more national government attention. With few allies in the National Assembly to take up Tongducheon’s cause, local leaders like Park began to draw media attention to the impact of relocation planning on his city. Raising money and recruiting supporters, he walked the long road to Seoul where he shaved his head in front of the Blue House and called attention to the plight of his city.

There are other, longer-term obstacles to turning bases into towns and cities. In many Okinawan and South Korean communities, local and national governments must also address the need for environmental assessment and cleanup before the land can be deemed safe for civilian use. Toxic chemicals, fuel runoff from airfields, and other sorts of problems associated with more than a half-century of use by the U.S. military require careful evaluation for their potential impact on public health.

For many, the closure of U.S. bases opens up new prospects for urban development and economic growth. The closure of Futenma, for example, is widely seen as a positive development, and one that can only benefit the community. First and foremost, residents will be relieved of the noise pollution and the fear of accidents in this highly populated residential community. Helicopters fly day and night over schools, hospitals, and other community facilities in Ginowan. In August 2004, a U.S. Marine helicopter crashed off base, landing on the grounds of a local university. There were no civilian casualties, but this latest accident raised considerable fears about the safety of operating a military base in the midst of a city. Second, with the return of the base, Ginowan’s 88,000 residents will be able to take full advantage of the land in the center of the city—25 percent of which is now part of Futenma Air Station. The final plan for Ginowan’s new urban concept is to be announced in March 2006.

LOCAL PEACE AND STABILITY: POST-9/11 MILITARY COOPERATION IN MINDANAO

Citizen contact with the U.S. military has lessened considerably in the Philippines since the United States was asked to close its bases there in the early 1990s. While the U.S. bases at Clark and Subic were operational, up to roughly 20,000 American military personnel were on the ground in the Philippines with about 8,000 of those deployed in naval vessels visiting Subic naval base. Today, U.S. troops visit the Philippines under the terms of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), and are only in-country temporarily under restricted terms of
refugee agreed to by the U.S. and Philippine governments. Moreover, they are “guests” of the Philippine military, and thus reside on bases and facilities managed by the AFP.

Originally intended as a mechanism for peacetime training and exercises, the VFA today is the key instrument guiding U.S.-Philippine military cooperation in counterterrorism in the southern Philippines. After the September 11 attacks, President George W. Bush and President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo met to announce their agreement on common counterterrorism goals in 2002. Shortly thereafter, U.S. forces joined the AFP for a bilateral exercise on Basilan Island, a small island off the coast of Mindanao known to be a base of operations for the Abu Sayaff Group (ASG). Washington and Manila agreed to very specific terms of reference for the Basilan-based Balikatan exercise, allowing 660 U.S. personnel and 3,800 AFP forces to work together for up to six months in a “mutual counter-terrorism advising, assisting and training exercise relative to Philippine efforts against the ASG.” However, only 160 U.S. troops, organized in 12-man special forces teams, were to be deployed with AFP field commanders. U.S. participants were not to engage in combat nor were they to operate at any time independently within Philippine territory.

The Basilan Balikatan exercise was deemed an overwhelming success by the two governments and by local residents, prompting calls by many within Mindanao for similar exercises in other localities. The combined operation was successful in ridding the island of the ASG, but it also became a showcase for the new potential for American military forces to work alongside their AFP counterparts in civic development projects. During their six-month stay on the island, American forces helped construct a perimeter road around the island and develop water and electricity supplies, and carried out other projects that were possible with U.S. economic aid. The behavior of the forces was widely praised. And the job opportunities for local residents offered considerable income to a small island that had experienced little real stability or economic opportunity for decades.

Marites Danguilan Vitug, a leading Manila-based journalist and long-time analyst of the internal conflict in Mindanao, observed that the success of the Balikatan exercise in Basilan had a “demonstration effect” on other communities plagued by violence. Vitug pointed out that it was not long before other Mindanao localities ridden with conflict began to consider the possible benefits of U.S. assistance. In fact, almost immediately there was speculation that a similar type of Balikatan exercise was being considered for Sulu Province, another infamous ASG stronghold. Governor Parouk Hussin of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao reportedly asked the Philippine defense secretary to consider Sulu as the next site for a Balikatan.

Sulu Province remains a challenge. Unlike on Basilan, an island where there are divisions between Christians and Muslims, the Tausug people of Sulu are famous for their unity against outsiders. Not only does Sulu have much more difficult terrain for a combined exercise, but there was also a sense that the United States would need to be directly involved in fighting there because of the hostile environment. In February 2003, the Pentagon announced that it was sending 1,700 troops to Sulu in combat operations to “disrupt and destroy” the ASG, catching national policymakers in Manila as well as local leaders in Mindanao by surprise. The effort to consider and plan for a possible Sulu Balikatan had to be postponed because of the political fallout within the Philippines, and while the possibility for a combined U.S.-AFP Balikatan remains, the two governments have had to take a very different approach to gaining local support.
Since then, U.S. economic assistance to Sulu has been increasingly visible. Philippine defense officials have suggested the idea of front-loading civic, humanitarian, and socioeconomic assistance to Sulu before moving forward on military training and operations there. A variety of assistance programs there, including the electrification of villages, road building, water improvement projects, and educational assistance for local schools, have proceeded. Governor Benjamin Loong, elected in 2004, is also committed to the humanitarian and civic improvement approach in thinking of U.S. involvement in his province, but he is adamant that any American military role must be clearly defined and have the support of his community. In April 2005, U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Francis Riccardione made his second trip to the province, visiting schools and other community centers that have benefited from this assistance. But the task of ending the violence remains, and the presence of several key U.S. Pacific Command officers as well as the AFP southern commander in the ambassador’s entourage indicated a Sulu Balikatan might not be far behind.

Sulu is not the only area interested in hosting the U.S. military. In Cotabato Province in Central Mindanao, home to some of the fiercest fighting between the AFP and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Governor Emmanuel “Manny” Piñol, in consultation with his local Peace and Order Council and other local leaders, petitioned President Arroyo to hold a Balikatan exercise in his province. In many ways, Central Mindanao is more politically sensitive for the Philippine government than the more remote and hostile islands off the western coast of Mindanao. The MILF has long had camps there, and the AFP’s effort to close these camps has been criticized as ineffectual by local leaders, including Piñol. Arroyo has committed her government to peace talks with the MILF, and a ceasefire has been in effect since 2003. Although there is some operational cooperation between the United States and the AFP in Central Mindanao, it is very small-scale, and more focused on implementing intelligence-sharing initiatives that will assist the AFP in monitoring activities by the MILF and other groups identified as being in the area.

Domestic criticism of the U.S. military presence in the Philippines is more muted now, in part because there is no large-scale permanent presence in the country and in part because
there are now mechanisms in place that ensure transparency and accountability regarding the terms for U.S. military visits. In negotiations between the United States and the Philippines, the terms of reference for each exercise provides, in theory, greater latitude to Manila for setting the terms of the U.S. presence. But just as important are the two independent commissions that oversee implementation of the VFA. The first is under the office of the president, and the second is housed within the legislature.

There remains great sensitivity to the role of U.S. forces on the ground. Many in the southern Philippines welcome the Arroyo government’s emphasis on working with the United States to gain access to economic development resources and to end the violence. But the U.S. “war on terror,” and in particular the targeting of Muslims, have many in Mindanao worried about the role of U.S. forces. While the government has been very careful to ensure that there is no operational role for U.S. forces independent of their AFP hosts, questions still remain about command and control issues and the actual oversight when U.S. Special Forces are on the ground. In February 2005, Riccardione told Mindanao News, an Internet-based publication about Mindanao, that there are “about 70 soldiers temporarily [stationed] in Zamboanga,” an AFP military facility at the southwestern tip of the island. Riccardione identified their mission as “Ops-Intel fusion,” or operations and intelligence fusion with the AFP. This new aspect of U.S.-Philippine military cooperation is directly linked to the global war on terrorism, and connects sophisticated U.S. global and regional intelligence-gathering capabilities with local AFP intelligence-gathering activities.50

Yet in Mindanao, where violence and poverty afflict a large proportion of the Muslim population, there has been considerable support for this new form of cooperation between the U.S. military and the AFP. While political leaders welcome any effort that will alleviate poverty and stabilize their communities, the idea that the U.S. military, like its AFP counterparts, can or should be embraced as an agent of development remains suspect. In the areas that comprise the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, there are still divided views on accepting U.S. military help. The overlap of the U.S. “war on terror” in Southeast Asia has many Muslims nervous about the ultimate aims of the American military in their region. There are also concerns about the social impact of more U.S. troops on the ground. Wahida Abtahi, executive director of the Federation of United Mindanawan Bangsamoro Women, put it succinctly when she told the Shifting Terrain project team that more U.S. soldiers would be “morally damaging” to the Muslim communities:

American soldiers are not sensitive to the culture of Moros. They are fun driven, drink liquor, and consider women as recreation. Their presence will only increase prostitution and endanger the lives of women.51
Clearly, the U.S. military’s reputation has been established by the troops’ social impact in former base towns such as Olongapo and Angeles City. Despite widespread desire for an end to the violence, there is concern still within most communities in the southern Philippines at the prospect of having U.S. forces introduced on the ground. Questions remain about the Philippine government’s ability to control the behavior of the American military.

Japanese, South Korean, and Philippine citizens are demanding increased scrutiny of the privileges afforded the U.S. military. Government handling of crimes and accidents by U.S. forces continues to be a sensitive issue, as are plans for U.S. force restructuring and base consolidation. The impact of these policies falls directly on the communities that host the U.S. military. And the task of implementing policy falls most often on local governments that must mediate with the variety of citizen interests engaged directly in the task of living alongside a foreign military presence. Citizen concerns range from enhancing the transparency and accountability of the SOFA to the economic and social impact of base closings. In some cases, such as in the southern Philippines, concerns focus on the U.S. role in conflict reduction and post-conflict reconstruction in local communities.

Domestic legal and administrative practices now also have a considerable bearing on the implementation of U.S. force relocation plans. National governments must conform to national land expropriation procedures, environmental law, and changes in local autonomy provisions that govern urban development. Localities need both the fiscal and regulatory assistance of the national government to transform themselves from U.S. military base communities or camp towns into viable, self-reliant civilian communities. For the national governments of Japan and South Korea, in particular, the policy of hosting foreign troops is not simply a security policy decision, but continues to be a complex set of policies that reflect the growing expectations of citizens for equity and compensation for those who bear a particular burden on behalf of the state.

Looking Ahead

Since the end of the Cold War, much of the security policy debate regarding the Asia Pacific region has focused on the need to redefine the major U.S. alliances in the region in order to cope with a rapidly changing regional and international security environment. The premise of continued U.S. military presence in, and security cooperation with, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines that shaped the U.S. approach to the security equation in Asia has been relatively unquestioned.

Domestic politics matter today more than ever. The governments of Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines must consider carefully the impact of the U.S. military on their societies. Not only are citizens giving these policies more scrutiny, but also governments are finding it more difficult to justify the need for a U.S. military presence in their countries. Furthermore, the policy of hosting American forces in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines engages domestic interests in ways that are not immediately transparent, and the complexities of managing a foreign military on national soil extend far beyond the terms of the various treaties and agreements negotiated with the United States.
U.S. STRATEGIC REALIGNMENT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ALLIES IN ASIA

The United States is in the midst of reorganizing its military, and this will have important consequences for its allies in Asia. In 2004, the Department of Defense (DOD) began a three-year effort to revamp American military forces in a process referred to as the Global Posture Review. This overhaul of military strategy is designed to increase the mobility and flexibility of U.S. forces, enabling the United States to respond to new threats, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. No longer will U.S. forces be dedicated to fixed contingencies such as the defense of specific countries. Rather, the United States aims to achieve greater strategic flexibility so it can respond to potential conflicts around the globe. The Cold War design that organized U.S. military deployments around the globe for the past half-century has been discarded, and the alliances that formed the core of U.S. strategy are also being transformed. In addition, the U.S. military’s combat and post-conflict missions in Afghanistan and Iraq have accelerated a process of transformation that is shaping U.S. basing decisions at home and abroad.

The United States plans to have fewer military forces deployed abroad, and they will be deployed differently. Today, the total number of U.S. troops is more than 1.3 million, with over 280,000 deployed outside the United States. In addition, another 180,000 American forces are engaged in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Beyond the ongoing military deployments in the Middle East there are changes afoot in the U.S. basing of forces in Europe and East Asia. In 2005, Europe continued to host almost half of these forces, and the Asia Pacific region hosted 82,742, a reduction of more than 25,000 since 2000 (see Table 2). In the summer of 2004, President Bush announced that in the coming years, the United States would bring some 70,000 military personnel back to the United States, the bulk of these from Europe. In addition, family members and civilians (another 100,000 Americans) would also return.

U.S. allies in Asia have already begun to feel the impact of this reorganization of U.S. forces. More than 7,000 American military troops stationed in Japan and South Korea have been redeployed to the Middle East, and the majority of these will likely not return to East Asia. Bilateral negotiations between Washington and Seoul, and more recently between Washington and Tokyo, have produced agreements on U.S. force transformations within these two allied nations. The United States plans to withdraw 12,500 Army troops from South Korea, and up to 7,000 Marines from Okinawa (see Table 3).

These talks have been driven mainly by U.S. strategic goals, but they also reflect growing calls for fewer U.S. forces within these societies. Seoul’s concerns about the impact of bases on an increasingly urbanized metropolitan area were also addressed in the bilateral Future of the Alliance Talks that produced the 2004 relocation agreement. The controversial Yongsan base in Seoul will finally be closed. Korea’s own defenses will also be strengthened. The United States agreed to spend US$11 billion to upgrade the capabilities of its forces remaining in South Korea, and the South Korean military would take over 10 key missions from USFK for defense of the South. But there is considerable concern within South Korea that Washington’s interests will determine the transformation of the alliance. In June 2004, the U.S. government informed South Korea that 12,500 troops—one-third of the U.S. military forces in that country—would be gone by December 2005. The quick pace of proposed U.S. troop cuts took many in South Korea by surprise. Public speculation there was that the
Table 2: U.S. Military Forces Deployed in East Asia and the Pacific, 2000–2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total East Asia and Pacific</th>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>108,774</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>82,742</td>
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</table>

Table 3: U.S. Military Forces Deployed in Japan and South Korea, 2000–2005

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Korea</th>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>40,258</td>
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Note: All figures are for March except for 2002, in which September figures were used due to the lack of availability of March figures.
United States was punishing South Korea for the anti-American demonstrations in 2002. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s public comment that the United States would not maintain forces in a country where they were not wanted only enhanced this sense that the decision was driven by political difficulties in the relationship. In July 2004, the United States announced that in response to South Korean concerns it would draw out the timetable for force reductions to 2008 in order to give Seoul time to adjust to the changes.

Japan is also affected by the U.S. strategic realignment, but there will be less of an impact on the overall scale of American forces stationed in Japan. Resolving the ongoing difficulties associated with U.S. military bases on Okinawa was a key Japanese goal in the talks. Elections in both countries in 2004—the Upper House elections in Japan during the summer and the presidential elections in the United States in the fall—hampered working level efforts to craft a relocation plan. More broadly, however, the two governments were on a better footing when it came to the overall strategic goals for the alliance. In the wake of September 11 and Japanese participation in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Japanese government also undertook a review of its national defense strategy. In December 2004, the National Defense Program Outline—only the third such strategic review in Japan’s postwar history—announced the reorganization of Japan’s military capabilities and deployments over the next decade. In February 2005, the United States and Japan announced the blueprint of their common strategic objectives, including the concepts of interoperability and joint basing that would provide the framework for considering U.S. proposals for relocating its forces stationed in Japan. In late October, the two governments announced details of their agreement, a broad statement of the reorganization of capabilities for both the U.S. and Japanese militaries that also includes significant changes to U.S. bases in Okinawa.

There are no more U.S. military bases on Philippine soil. But this has not kept the two countries from close military cooperation, particularly since September 11. The focus of security cooperation between Washington and Manila has shifted to the “war on terror,” and Manila’s role is the containment of terrorism within the country. When President Arroyo visited the White House in May 2003, she left with a long list of economic and military assistance programs for the Republic of the Philippines. Most of these programs were dedicated to supporting the Philippine president’s efforts to counter terrorism and to end violence in Mindanao. The U.S. military pledged to help the AFP in operations against the Abu Sayaff Group—training and equipment would be provided for countering terrorist groups within the Philippines, and there would also be development assistance to conflict areas (US$30 million for Mindanao and support for the peace process with the MILF).

DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE TERMS OF A FUTURE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE

The domestic political influences on the basing of U.S. forces in Asia have changed significantly. The long history of a foreign troop presence and the usually less-than-transparent process of managing citizen complaints regarding the presence continue to color contemporary public attitudes in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. In addition, the changing relationship between national and local governments, and their respective roles in the policymaking process, also complicates what for many decades was almost exclusively the task of national security planning agencies. Outside of government, new social forces
and new norms of democratic practice have helped bring a multitude of voices to the debate. The U.S. military must now contend with changing domestic laws on preserving the environment, the growing demand within these societies for public policy attention to the needs of, and protections for, women, and the ongoing competition between localities for the economic and regulatory attention of the central government.

Intense moments of protest against the U.S. military in all three countries suggest deep cleavages within national politics over the influence of the United States. But the politics surrounding the U.S. military presence today cannot be understood simply in terms of pro-versus anti-American sentiment or ideology, although these certainly exist within Philippine, South Korean, and Japanese societies. Moreover, in each of these societies, there has been intense and often elite-led activism from within civil society against the U.S. military bases and the social problems associated with them. Mass peaceful protests have occurred in Okinawa and Seoul, organized and led by civil society groups. In response, politicians have taken up the cause of the citizen against the U.S. bases. But again, it is a mistake to consider these moments of protest, often deeply infused with the rhetoric of identity politics, as simply evidence of political posturing unrepresentative of mass public sentiments.

There is another layer of politics that shapes the U.S. military presence in these societies, and that is at the level of its impact on the daily lives and interests of citizens. There are significant bottlenecks that afflict the process of implementing policy, and the full range of impacts on local communities is coming to light more frequently and in greater detail than ever before. The costs associated with the U.S. presence—political, social, and economic—are becoming increasingly evident, at a time when the future goals of the U.S. military and the value of its contribution to Japanese, South Korean, and Philippine national priorities are being reconsidered. It is the combination of these varied, and often intersecting, forces within the societies that host American military forces that has produced the greatest impact on alliance management in Asia.

Comparison of three very different societies in Asia reveals that there is increasing concern within these countries about the role and the impact of U.S. troops within their borders. As the United States seeks to transform its military, and looks for greater cooperation from its allies on security goals, it will be more difficult to devise policies with host governments regarding the management of the long-term presence of U.S. forces. Several changes are already apparent.

First, it will be very difficult to move forward with force transformation goals in the absence of broad public support for a shared security agenda. This is clearly what is at stake in the difficulties between the United States and South Korea. Despite a common interest in resolving the North Korean nuclear problem, there is still tension between the two countries on how to develop a common security agenda. Many analysts warn that the alliance is deeply troubled, and that force relocation issues are only bringing to the surface deeper changes within South Korea regarding the United States. Korean attitudes toward the United States are deeply ambivalent. As the Pew study of world opinion in 2002 reported, “In Asia, there is strong support for the United States in Japan and the Philippines, both long-time allies. Yet South Koreans are much more skeptical despite that country’s close military and economic ties with the U.S. More than four in ten South Koreans (44%) have an unfavorable opinion of the U.S.” President Noh’s vision of a neutral South Korea, balancing between the United States and China, has generated enthusiasm within South

The costs associated with the U.S. presence—political, social, and economic—are becoming increasingly evident.
Admiral James Kelly, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan, and his senior officers attend the January 2006 funeral of a 56-year-old woman found beaten to death, allegedly by a U.S. sailor, in Yokosuka, Japan. The U.S. government has become increasingly sensitive to the impact of accidents and crimes on the reputation of the U.S. military within Asian societies.

Korea. But this view obviously troubles Washington. Divided views within South Korea about the nation’s foreign policy priorities and its future place in Asia suggest that the debate among the Korean people about the value of the U.S.–South Korean alliance has yet to reach a conclusion.

In contrast, the governments of the Philippines and Japan have articulated common security goals with Washington, and President Arroyo and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi have both argued the need for continued and even expanded security cooperation with the United States. Yet the U.S. decision to go to war in Iraq was roundly criticized in both societies, and the dispatch of Japanese and Philippine troops drew particular fire. The decision by Arroyo to remove the small contingent of Philippine troops after the kidnapping of a Filipino in Iraq revealed just how compelling domestic politics can be despite a common security policy agenda.

In all three alliances, the role of the U.S. military in bilateral security cooperation is changing. In the Philippines, counterterrorism and cooperation against the spread of terrorism throughout Southeast Asia is now the goal of U.S. forces. This creates some sensitivity within the Philippines, since the American troops in Zamboanga and other parts of the southern Philippines are involved in assisting the Philippine army deal with what is typically seen as an internal insurgency. The role of U.S. forces in South Korea is also undergoing change, and the United States’ idea to consolidate its forces in the country so as to achieve optimum strategic flexibility is unsettling to many. In the U.S.-Japan alliance, it is clear that the Japanese government is more willing to embrace a reordering of Washington’s strategic priorities. American forces will increasingly be based alongside Japan’s own Self Defense Force, suggesting that the relocation of U.S. forces within Japan will also achieve Tokyo’s own defense priorities.

Despite Washington’s efforts to reach agreement with all three allied governments regarding the future role and deployment patterns for U.S. forces in the Asia Pacific region, the implementation of these plans will be cause for considerable challenge domestically. In each country there will be leadership changes in the years ahead as the United States seeks to implement its global military transformation. Local and national elections in all three countries will test the national governments of Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Koizumi will leave office in 2006, and while the implementation of the U.S.-Japan understanding on force transformation in Japan may be resolved before then, his successors will continue to oversee a process of force reductions in Okinawa that could take a decade or more to complete. Arroyo, elected in 2004 for a six-year term, has come under intense domestic political pressure for electoral fraud. Her critics are watching the government’s management of an alleged rape by U.S. Marines reported in November 2005 with great interest as this case represents the first real test of the terms of the Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States. As such, it has stimulated a contentious debate in Manila over the
costs and benefits of military cooperation with U.S. forces. In South Korea, Noh’s term ends in 2008, and the presidential election promises yet again to be hotly contested. Given the volatility of South Korean politics of late, U.S. troop relocation plans and the future of the U.S.–South Korean alliance could very easily become yet again an issue in the campaign.

A second common theme across all three societies is the need for greater national policy attention to the local impacts of U.S. forces. Local political leaders are increasingly sensitive to their role—and in some cases, the lack of a role—in U.S. basing policies. In the past, the defense bureaucracies in each country played the key role in mediating between local citizens and the U.S. military, but today elected politicians are increasingly playing pivotal roles. But so too are citizen groups. While decisions are made between national leaders in all three countries, local communities are where implementation gets thwarted.

In the U.S.-Japan and U.S.–South Korean relocation efforts, the key to the success of the plans lies with local communities. The reorganization of U.S. forces in South Korea and Japan will take several years, and the ability of the Korean and Japanese governments to implement their agreements with Washington will depend heavily on local political support in the base communities. In Okinawa, for example, despite an agreement to move the U.S. Marines to the northern part of the island in 1996, local opposition has stalled government efforts to construct a new facility. An anti-base sit-in, organized by local activists at the proposed construction site, slowed efforts to conduct environmental assessment tests and has continued to ensure that government efforts to move forward with the base receive media attention. More recently, citizen activists have sought to halt the new base by filing suit against the DOD in U.S. courts. The lawsuit calls for the DOD to comply with the U.S. National Historic Preservation Act by conducting a complete public assessment of the impacts of the proposed project on the Okinawa dugong, an endangered mammal species related to the manatee. Soon after the United States and Japan announced plans for the “transformation and realignment” of their military alliance on October 29, 2005, there were signs that many Okinawans continued to oppose the construction of a new base for the U.S. Marines.

Likewise, in Pyeongtaek, the South Korean government’s attempt to expand Camp Humphreys by purchasing farmland has run into difficulties from area residents. Local farmers are refusing to sell land, and more organized activists from Seoul have joined the coalition to step up pressure on the South Korean government. In July 2005, a clash between protestors and the South Korean police surrounding the U.S. base erupted in violence, with over 200 injuries. While it appears that some activists initiated the violence by taunting the police, the police reaction was widely seen as an overreaction. The South Korean government had hoped to complete purchase of all land needed for the Pyeongtaek facility by the end of 2005, but residents continue to resist. The use of national authority without a local consensus of support will more than likely hinder efforts to consolidate U.S. forces, and could create the opportunity for more intense protest.

The legacy of the American military presence will also affect local communities, and national governments and U.S. military planners will need to consider the residual impacts after U.S. forces are gone. These include the transformation of military bases into civilian space. Significant private sector and government investment will be needed to transform the larger bases, such as Futenma Marine Corps Air Station in Okinawa and the USFK Headquarters at Yongsan in Seoul, into civilian communities. Private investors and developers will be interested in those areas close to or in the midst of urban areas, but
the communities in more isolated or rural areas will need national assistance in their own transformations.

But the impacts are greater than those simply related to the infrastructure. In many communities, the impact on human lives will continue for generations. National policy attention will be needed to transform the shattered lives of those who have lived in the shadow of the U.S. military. Although small women’s centers will continue to try to assist the women and children of Olongapo, Tongducheon, Kin, and other U.S. military towns like them, the stigma and isolation of their previous association with the U.S. military will continue to impinge upon their ability to transform their lives. In particular, the Amerasian children that continue to live in the margins of Korean and Philippine society reveal the real human costs of the discrimination associated with those who catered to the U.S. military. If left unattended, the legacy of the U.S. presence will be that of abandoned facilities and a substandard quality of life for those who lived alongside the American bases.

National policy attention will also be needed for training U.S. military personnel sent to these societies. Tolerance for crimes and accidents caused by American troops in these societies is diminishing, and while reporting on many incidents may have been confined to a local community in the past, today these incidents receive national attention. The U.S. military has become particularly sensitive to the damage to its reputation. American military personnel deployed to South Korea and Japan receive limited cultural training about their host societies. In Japan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has begun to offer cultural training for unit commanders in an effort to impress upon them the need for greater sensitivity to the concerns of local residents. Commands have become much stricter about the use of alcohol, about the issuance of driver’s permits for off-base use, and about the accountability of American personnel who witness unacceptable or unlawful behavior by their peers. At the highest level of command, there has also been more attention to the tolerance for sexual misconduct within the military. In September 2005, the DOD presented an amendment to the manual on courts-martial that would make it an offense for U.S. troops to use the services of prostitutes. In addition, DOD officials have developed a training program for troops and contractors that explains human trafficking, the department’s policy, and possible legal action against those who violate this policy.64

Finally, as with any other government policy, the process and procedures for decision making regarding the U.S. military presence and its daily management will need to conform to domestic law and democratic practice. The terms of the U.S. military presence are increasingly influenced by citizen demand for greater transparency in the activities of the U.S. military and for greater accountability of their own governments in oversight and control of the U.S. forces. Nowhere is the frustration of host societies more evident than in the implementation of the agreements that set forth the terms of the presence. In Japan as well as South Korea, despite efforts to respond to domestic criticism, there is still a strong aura of extraterritoriality that surrounds the treatment of the U.S. military.

American personnel appear to be above the law and protected by forces beyond the control of national judicial processes. South Korea has successfully renegotiated the terms of the U.S. presence there in concert with growing demands within South Korea for a more democratic society. Over time, amendments negotiated in the terms of the U.S. presence regarding the handling of sensitive issues have revolved around the need to create greater accountability of host governments to their citizens. Pressures have been growing within
these societies for assurances from national governments that citizen interests will receive equal treatment under the law, and this suggests the continuing perception that the Status of Forces Agreements prevent host governments from tending to citizen grievances. To date, the U.S. and Japanese governments have reached informal agreements on such issues as when to hand over a member of the U.S. military accused of a crime. In other words, citizen complaints about the handling of American troops accused of crimes have resulted in a change in government practices over time, as opposed to a change in the actual SOFA itself.

These new government policies for coping with the impact of domestic reaction in cases where U.S. forces are involved in crimes will not necessarily forestall public protest. The revision of the U.S.–South Korean SOFA in 2000 did not mitigate the impact of citizen reaction to the deaths of the two girls, nor did it prevent the intense politicization of the USFK presence in the presidential election that followed. The Japanese government continues to prefer to address these issues in procedural terms, adapting the practices within the alliance over the custody of suspects. When an American sailor was arrested for the murder of a 56-year-old woman in January 2006, the changes negotiated in the wake of the rape in Okinawa in 1995 were in place. The accused individual was interviewed by Japanese police and transferred to custody a week later once it was clear that there was sufficient evidence for indictment.

Sensitivities within the U.S. government to the potential impact this crime might have on Japanese public support for the alliance and for the newly agreed upon plan to realign American forces there led to quickly issued apologies to the Japanese public. Perhaps the most perceptive statement came from the commander of U.S. Naval Forces, Japan, Admiral James Kelly. After expressing his regret and his commitment to fulfilling his responsibility in cooperating with Japanese authorities, he sought to assure the residents of Yokosuka that the members of the U.S. Navy are “all members of the Yokosuka community and are deeply affected by this tragedy.” Similar to the American military’s policy response after the 1995 rape in Okinawa, the U.S. Navy commander issued new initiatives to improve discipline and behavior by U.S. personnel. These directives of January 19, 2006, included curfews and prohibitions on the consumption of alcohol both off- and on-base. Kelly reminded those under his command that, “Every person representing the U.S. Navy in Japan must realize that behavior is a strategic issue, and that poor conduct can have a significant and lasting affect on the alliance and our continued presence here. Our goal is, and will continue to be, zero incidents.”

The audience for these crimes and incidents extends beyond national borders. In the Philippines, where four U.S. Marines await trial for allegedly raping a Filipina, the media was quick to seize on the Japanese government’s handling of the Yokosuka murder, arguing that it demonstrates the Philippine government’s weakness in standing up to the U.S. government. Public ire over the U.S. refusal to hand over the suspects to the Philippine government while they await trial is casting new light on the sovereignty issue in Manila, and the contrast with the Japan case only exacerbates the outrage of Filipinos who are critical of the Philippine government’s handling of the U.S. troop presence.
But frustration with the terms of the U.S. presence can come from governments as well as from citizens. In talks over the implementation of the transfer of custody of suspects, the U.S. lawyers involved implied that Japan’s prosecutors and police were not sufficiently respectful of a suspect’s rights, angering Japanese government officials. After the Marine helicopter crash in the summer of 2004 in Okinawa, it was the director general of Japan’s defense agency who suggested publicly that the SOFA might need to be revised. His comment was prompted by the U.S. military’s initial refusal to allow Japanese police to enter the crash site. Only then did the two governments negotiate an agreement governing access by the Japanese government in case of an accident involving a U.S. military aircraft.66 Because of the concentration of American forces in Okinawa, the Japanese government continues to be vulnerable to criticism that its policies privilege the U.S. military over the residents of Okinawa. As the two governments fundamentally reconsider their alliance goals and the future role of the U.S. military in Japan, it will become increasingly necessary to consider how to revise the SOFA so that the terms of the presence are clearly articulated to, and supported by, the public.

As with the United States, the national governments in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines are reassessing the costs and benefits associated with maintaining a foreign military presence. Democratic consolidation in these countries has also progressed sufficiently to introduce into national security and foreign policy debates new demands for strengthening democratic practice and diversifying policy choices in ways that were unthinkable in the mid-twentieth century. As a result, policymaking surrounding the U.S. military presence is more complex and less predictable. Governments must contend with new influences on policymaking. Domestic political dynamics and discourse surrounding the presence of foreign troops in Asia continue to be infused with broader debates over national identity and the role of U.S. power in a fluid international order.
ENDNOTES

1 The strategic review of U.S. forces and its impact on U.S. force posture is referred to as the Global Posture Review. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and U.S. military commanders testified to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services on September 23, 2004, regarding conclusions reached during this Review. See statements presented at the hearing at armed-services.senate.gov/e_witnesslist.cfm?id=1313 (accessed January 11, 2006). The configuration of U.S. military forces was also being considered under the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) process, initiated in 1995 to review the utility and need for bases within the United States. In 2005, the Commission made its recommendations to the secretary of defense, including its assessment of overseas bases and the newly emerging transformation goals for the future of the U.S. military. These findings are available at www.brac.gov/finalreport.asp (accessed January 11, 2006). The Department of Defense (DOD) will submit to Congress in 2006 the first Quadrennial Defense Review to incorporate the goals of the Global Posture Review. For an overview of DOD efforts to transform the U.S. military, see Facing the Future: Meeting the Threats and Challenges of the 21st Century, produced by the DOD Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, February 2005. Available at www.defenselink.mil/transformation/features/Facing_the_Future (accessed January 11, 2006).


3 Under the 1987 Constitution, the Senate was required to ratify the new agreement, and under Senate rules 16 Senators would have had to approve the treaty in order for it to pass. For a view from within the Senate, see Jovita Salonga, The Senate that Said No (Quezon City: Center for Leadership, Citizenship and Democracy, National College of Public Administration and Governance, University of the Philippines and Regina Publishing, 2001), 445-473.


7 The language of the Tydings-McDuffie Act was so attractive that it was made part of the 1935 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.

8 As of 2004, the U.S. military has access to a total of 172,503 acres of land in Japan. Under the SACO Agreement, the United States has agreed to return 12,360 acres of land in Okinawa, subject to finding alternative arrangements for consolidating and relocating forces.

9 The U.S. military also has access to “joint use” facilities, either with the Japanese Self Defense Force or with other civilian agencies. If all land made available to the United States (either exclusively or on a joint use basis) in Japan is tallied, 23.4 percent of that is in Okinawa. Briefing materials compiled by the Military Affairs Office, Office of the Governor, Okinawa Prefecture, October 2004, for use by Governor Keiichi Inamine in meetings with U.S. officials in Washington, D.C.
The Balikatan exercises between U.S. military troops and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) recommenced after the two governments concluded the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 1999. Since 2000, the military exercises have been held in Luzon, Palawan, and Mindanao. The scale and operational focus of the exercises vary over time, with participating American forces ranging from 300 to 2,600, depending on the annual negotiations between the U.S. and Philippine militaries. Balikatan exercises tend to last for a month or so, with the notable exception of the six-month Balikatan in early 2002 on the island of Basilan. Bilateral cooperation in counterterrorism in the southern Philippines has also occurred through the placement of U.S. military personnel with AFP units in Mindanao, and has primarily been in the form of “intel-fusion”—the integration of intelligence-gathering activities. For information on the current U.S. exercises with the Philippines, see www.pacom.mil.gov.

The bilateral negotiations on the relocation of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) were held in the Future of the Alliance Talks (FOTA). The Land Partnership Plan is an ongoing framework that governs the use, costs, and management of land used by USFK. It is managed by the Ministry of National Defense. See www.korea.army.mil/LLP/index.asp (accessed December 11, 2005).


In June 1983, Senator Aquino testified before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. He openly challenged the policy of maintaining U.S. bases in the Philippines, stating, “All the weapons that the Marcos regime is acquiring will never be pointed at a foreign invader but will be used against Filipino freedom fighters struggling against dictatorship…Why then should American taxpayer’s money be spent to purchase weapons that would be used against Filipinos opposed to the Marcos dictatorship?” From Roland G. Simbulan, The Bases of Our Insecurity (Manila: BALAI Fellowship, 1985).

Article XVIII, Section 25, of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines states: “After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning military bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”

This annual operating budget covers direct costs incurred by the U.S. Air Force and does not include the budget also provided indirectly for Kadena’s operations by the Japanese government. The overall operating value of Kadena was estimated at US$6 billion: US$4 billion in weapons, US$1 billion in capital assets, and US$1 billion in equipment and contracts. Briefing to Shifting Terrain research team by Lt. Col. Kevin Krejcarek, Chief, 18th Wing Public Affairs, Kadena Air Force Base, Okinawa, Japan, April 2004.

In 2001, the U.S. Marine Corps began publishing a bilingual magazine OkinaWa/The Big Circle highlighting the various activities and events that brought U.S. Marine Corps personnel and their families in greater contact with local communities. See www.okinawa.usmc.mil/Okinawa_ wa/OkinWa.html (accessed December 11, 2005).
18 Briefing to Shifting Terrain research team by Lt. Col. Kevin Krejcarek, Chief, 18th Wing Public Affairs, Kadena Air Force Base, Okinawa, Japan, April 2004.


21 The tradition of going to Washington, D.C., to advocate Okinawan interests began under U.S. occupation during World War II. Taking their municipality’s case to the halls of Congress, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense has been the practice of local mayors ever since. Most recently, Mayor Iha of Ginowan City has been urging U.S. policymakers to return Futenma Marine Corps Air Station. His recent visits are chronicled on the city’s website, www.city.ginowan.okinawa.jp (in Japanese) (accessed December 11, 2005).

22 See Special Commission on USFK Affairs, Office of the Prime Minister, Government of the Republic of Korea at www.cua.go.kr (in Korean) (accessed December 11, 2005). The Commission is headed by two commissioners—one is the deputy minister of defense, the other a representative from the prime minister’s office. There are four basic areas of policy responsibility: the planning oversight department (laws and regulations, public relations, and policy oversight); project support department (base vicinity, land development, and Yongsan land usage); policy coordination department (population relocation and USFK base conditions); and the regional cooperation department (window for local grievances and cooperation with local governments).

23 Special Law for Economic Vitalization of Pyeongtaek (translation from Korean), drafted by the Special Commission on USFK Activities, Prime Minister’s Office, South Korea.

24 Interview by Shifting Terrain research team with Wan Su Han, Hong Gu Kang, and Tang Yong Shim—representatives of the Democratic Citizen’s League—in Tongducheon, South Korea, November 2004.


29 For an in-depth treatment of the discrimination experienced by camp towns and of Korean and U.S. government efforts to “clean up” these areas, see Katharine H.S. Moon, Sex Among Allies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 57-83.

30 One of the most compelling chronicles of the interactions between the U.S. military and prostitution in Asia are the first-person accounts of the women who work in Olongapo (Philippines), Tongducheon (South Korea), and Kin (Okinawa, Japan). These are found in Saundra Pollock Sturdevant and Brenda Stoltzfus, Let the Good Times Roll: Prostitution and the U.S. Military in Asia (New York: The New Press, 1992).

32 See www.usacrime.or.kr for an accounting of crimes by U.S. military personnel in South Korea (accessed December 11, 2005).

33 In the Okinawa Women Act against Military Violence brochure, they outlined their position as follows: “We base our position on the section of the Platform of Action approved by the Beijing Women's Conference that clearly states: ‘Rape that takes place in a situation of armed conflict constitutes both a war crime and a crime against humanity.’ We are proceeding on the premise that the same holds true for Okinawa, which has long suffered a foreign military presence. Okinawan women have resolved that we will no longer tolerate this violence and violation of human rights, and have petitioned the Japanese government to consolidate the U.S. bases and withdraw U.S. military personnel, review the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Status of Forces Agreement, and award full compensation to all victims.”

34 Interview by Shifting Terrain research team with Tomi Mashiki, a local activist in the effort to oppose the construction of a new base for the U.S. military in Nago City, April 2004.


36 Interview by Shifting Terrain research team with Hyun Sun Kim, director of Saewoomtuh, in Pyeongtaek, November 2004. For an account of the conditions facing prostitutes in the kijich'on (camp towns) in South Korea, see Saewoomtuh’s English-language publication, Lives in Kijich'on, published May 5, 1999.

37 Interview by Shifting Terrain research team with the staff and clients of the Saewoomtuh counseling centers in Pyeongtaek and Tongducheon, South Korea, November 2004.

38 This was one of the key criticisms of the handling of the sinking of the Japanese high school training vessel Ehime Maru after it was accidentally struck by a surfacing U.S. nuclear attack submarine off the coast of Hawai’i in 2001. See Sheila A. Smith, “Japan’s Uneasy Citizens and the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” AsiaPacific Issues, No. 54, September 2001. See http://EastWestCenter.org/res-rp-publicationdetails.asp?pub_ID=1186 (accessed February 14, 2006).

39 Interview with Kanetoshi Yoseda, chairman of the Okinawa Bar Association, via correspondence with Sheila A. Smith, summer 2004.

40 Interview with Chong Sang Yu, deputy minister, Special Commission on USFK Affairs, Office of the Prime Minister, South Korea, November 2004.

41 This amount is the total paid for the Kadena Air Base and the Kadena Ammunition Storage Area.

42 Based on data from the Naha Defense Facilities Administration Agency, compiled by the Military Affairs Office of the Okinawa Prefecture Government. Facilities owned by the Japanese government are excluded from these calculations, as are rental fees paid for base land jointly used by the Japanese Self Defense Force (SDF). The rents paid are calculated in Japanese yen but converted to U.S. dollars for illustrative purpose in this publication. For a more accurate accounting of change over time, the original data should be consulted. Yen-dollar conversions are based on exchange rates as of June 30 each year. Okinawa no Beigun oyobi Jieitai Kichi (Toukei Shiryoshuu), Heisei 17-nen 3-gatsu (U.S. and SDF Military Bases in Okinawa [Statistics], March 2005), 12-15, from the Military Affairs Office of the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture.
The Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND) has experienced some difficulty in its attempt to gain local citizen support for some of its policies. For example, in September 2005, a town hall meeting organized to explain the MND’s decision to deploy Patriot missiles near the Kwangju Airport (in South Cholla Province) was interrupted by protestors calling themselves the Kwangju-South Cholla Common Response Committee (Kwangju-Junnam-Gongdong-Daechek-Wewonhweh). Soon thereafter the Kwangju City Council also declared its opposition to having Patriots there.

Likewise, in a town hall meeting organized to explain the USFK relocation plan in Pyeongtaek, representatives from the prime minister’s office and the MND encountered vocal and organized opposition to their efforts to explain policy decisions. Interview by Shifting Terrain research team with Chong Sang Yu, deputy minister, Special Commission on USFK Affairs, Office of the Prime Minister, Seoul, South Korea, November 2004.


The governor was also the head of the Moro National Liberation Front, making him a doubly powerful voice in the Muslim community. The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was established in 1990 to create self-government and development for the Muslim communities in Mindanao. ARMM at present includes the four provinces of Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao, and Lanao del Sur.

Central Mindanao was in fact home to the Mindanao Independence Movement in the 1960s, and some leading Moros from that area joined the Moro National Liberation Front. One of the first clashes in the war that erupted in the 1970s was in Cotabato and surrounding areas. Two major MILF camps were located in Central Mindanao: Camp Rajah Muda in Cotabato and Camp Abubakar in Maguindanao. Presentation by North Cotabato Governor Emmanuel Piñol at the East-West Center Shifting Terrain Workshop, Bohol Island, Philippines, April 2005.


Presentation to the East-West Center Shifting Terrain Workshop, Bohol Island, Philippines, by Wãhida Abtahi, April 2005. Abtahi is the executive director of the Federation of United Mindanawan Bangsamoro Women, a grassroots women’s organization founded in 1997, operating within Muslim communities across Mindanao.


In the 1990s, policymakers in Tokyo and Washington had extensive discussions over the redefinition of their alliance in post–Cold War Asia, and as a result went on to develop new guidelines for U.S.-Japan defense cooperation that were adopted in Japan in the late 1990s. Details on these policies and their implementation can be found in the annual English-language summary of Japan’s annual *Defense White Paper* available at www.jda.go.jp/e/index_.htm (accessed January 11, 2006). The full Japanese-language report, *Boei Hakusho*, can be found at www.jda.go.jp/j/library/wp/index.html (accessed January 11, 2006).


In return, the United States committed itself to assist in Philippine defense reform. The United States agreed to continue to help the AFP more broadly, including with its military modernization and reform efforts. President Bush also agreed to designate the Philippines as a Major Non-NATO Ally, which allows greater access to U.S. military weapons purchases and research and development. The White House announced this designation on October 6, 2003. See “Pres. Bush Designates RP as Major Non-NATO Ally,” news release, October 10, 2003, manila.usembassy.gov/wwwhr118.html (accessed January 11, 2006).


U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki Moon began talks on a new strategic partnership in January 2006. Regarding the future role of USFK, Moon agreed to the premise of “strategic flexibility” for U.S. troops in his country, in principle agreeing that American forces might be used for areas of conflict outside South Korea. In return, the joint statement acknowledged Korean concerns, stating that, “in the implementation of strategic flexibility, the U.S. respects the [South Korean] position that it shall not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people.” The statement is available at http://seoul.usembassy.gov/wwwhr41hf.html (accessed January 31, 2006).


The incident received very little coverage in national newspapers, but a heated and extensive debate on a variety of Internet news sites erupted after amateur video of the event was broadcast online. Reports such as the following appeared: “Jeoldaero ittangeul tteonaji anggesstta” (“We will never leave this land”), Ohmynews, July 10, 2005, www.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?at_code=267242 (in Korean) (accessed February 2, 2006).


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The United States has maintained military forces in the Asia Pacific region since the end of World War II and its alliances with key countries in the region continue today to be seen as critical to regional peace and stability. Academic and policy attention has focused on the shifting regional balance of power or the new sources of instability in the region, yet a parallel story has gone largely untold. Complex social and political changes in the countries that have hosted U.S. forces are changing the way governments in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines manage the American troops stationed in their countries.

As the U.S. government seeks to transform its global military presence, and as the process of realigning America’s overseas military forces proceeds, Washington must consider these new domestic influences on governments that host U.S. forces. Broad public support in these societies for a shared security agenda will be the foundation for future alliance cooperation. But Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, and Manila must give greater attention to the local impacts of U.S. forces and develop policies that mitigate the pressures on local residents. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, to be successful new initiatives for managing the presence of American forces in each of these societies will need to conform to domestic law and meet public expectations for government accountability. National governments in Asia’s democracies must balance their national security goals with these new norms of democratic practice.

Shifting Terrain
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