Negotiating and Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control of the Indonesian Military

by Dewi Fortuna Anwar

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Negotiating and Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control of the Indonesian Military

by Dewi Fortuna Anwar

This policy paper is a product of the project, “The State and the Soldier in Asia: Investigating Change and Continuity in Civil-Military Relations.” The project attempts to answer the questions: What is the place of the military in the state? What are and what explains the cross-national similarities and differences in Asian states? What is the future of civil-military relations in Asia and what are the implications for domestic political change and for international politics in Asia?

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The democratization process in Indonesia has begun in earnest and has led to the formation of a democratically elected government supported by a genuinely open and pluralistic political system. Nonetheless, it is generally acknowledged that consolidating democracy will be a slow and painful process. Of the many challenges faced by the new Indonesia, the most difficult will surely be the reformation of the military from a long-term social-political force into a truly professional defense force under democratic civilian control. In this paper the author puts forward 10 steps that need to be taken to negotiate and consolidate democratic civilian control of the military, to ensure that the military is no longer used to prop up authoritarian regimes, and to transform the Indonesian military into a truly professional defense force.

This paper is divided into six main parts. The first part provides a brief history of the expansion of the role of the Indonesian military and its relationship with successive governments from independence to the establishment of Soeharto’s New Order. The second part looks at the military’s political dominance and economic activities under the New Order. The third examines the various steps and advances that have been made toward ending the military’s social-political role and special privileges. The fourth part outlines the many obstacles and challenges to imposing democratic civilian control over the military. The fifth provides policy recommendations and outlines practical measures that can be taken to consolidate democratic civilian control, including the possible role of the international community. The final part presents conclusions regarding the prospects for Indonesia’s democratic consolidation, and the efforts to end military intervention in politics once and for all.
INTRODUCTION

On May 21, 1998, President Soeharto dramatically resigned in the face of massive student demonstrations and public pressure galvanized by Indonesia’s deepening economic crises. The New Order political structure that once seemed invincible is now under siege. Political institutions and practices designed to uphold a small ruling elite dominated by President Soeharto and the military are being dismantled to make way for democracy and the rule of law. Central to this reform process is the redefinition of the military’s role, and of civil-military relations more broadly. The doctrines and practices that have maintained the military as the locus of power must be replaced by ones that will ensure democratic civilian control of the military.

The democratization process in Indonesia has begun in earnest and has led to the formation of a democratically elected government supported by a genuinely open and pluralistic political system. Nonetheless, it is generally acknowledged that consolidating democracy will be a slow and painful process. Of the many challenges faced by the new Indonesia, the most difficult will surely be the reformulation of the military from a long-term social-political force into a truly professional defense force under democratic civilian control. In the midst of an ongoing economic crisis and rising social tensions, the task for the new civilian leaders is made all the more daunting by the rising expectations of Indonesia’s huge and diverse population.

The military is at the moment badly discredited due to its role in propping up Soeharto’s repressive and rapacious regime. Yet it must be admitted that, except for a small group of intellectuals and prodemocracy activists, popular support for the current democratic system does not primarily reflect ideological commitment to democratic values as such. Instead, the majority base their enthusiasm for democracy on expectations that it will end the economic crisis, restore law and order, and provide them with a better opportunity to make a living. Given that people traded their political freedom for prosperity in the past, it is questionable whether they will now willingly trade their economic welfare for democracy. The civilian elite is therefore under great pressure to show that it can govern effectively; any shortcomings on their part will make it even more...
difficult to keep the military out of politics. A further complication is that the government remains fully dependent upon the military to maintain internal security in the face of various violent social conflicts and armed insurgencies. While it is currently difficult to envisage the full restoration of military control of the Indonesian political system, it seems highly unlikely that the military will be wholly confined to the barracks in the immediate future.

Over the past two years the military has increasingly been put on the defensive. A number of steps have already been taken to end the social-political role of the military and to bring those accused of human rights abuses to justice. The new election laws enjoin both the military and the civilian bureaucracy to remain strictly neutral in the general elections. Appointments of active military officers to government positions have also been stopped by new requirements that they resign their commissions before taking up such appointments. The military's allotted seats in parliament have been reduced from 75 to 38, and those will only last until the next general elections in 2004, after which every seat must be won. The military's role in internal security has also been reduced through its formal separation from the police and the emphasis on defending the country against external enemies. Symbolic civilian control of the military has been demonstrated with the appointment of a civilian as the minister of defense. Advances have also been made toward ending the military's immunity from prosecution for human rights crimes, particularly through the recent passage by parliament of a new Human Rights Law which says that past human rights violations can be tried by special ad hoc courts.

Despite these achievements, the road toward consolidating democratic civilian control of the military will be long and rocky. Obstacles along the way will include: Indonesia's inability to pay for a professional military or to keep the military from engaging in legal and illegal economic activities; continuing violence in various parts of the country; the overall weakness of the newly independent police force; and the lack of civilian expertise in military and defense-related affairs. Moreover, political opportunism is rife, and some civilian elites and political parties continue to accommodate and court the military in order to gain advantage over political opponents. Some military groups are resisting the new policies that will end military privileges.

In this paper the author puts forward 10 steps that need to be taken to negotiate and consolidate democratic civilian control of the military, to ensure that the military is no longer used to prop up authoritarian regimes, and to transform the Indonesian military into a truly professional defense force. These steps are: (1) strengthen the general consensus concerning democracy; (2) lay a constitutional
framework and safeguards for democracy; 3) ensure adequate funding for the military and end its involvement in business; 4) strengthen civilian police and limit the military’s role in internal security; 5) dissolve the military’s territorial command structure; 6) create civilian agencies and enhance civilian expertise to oversee military activities; 7) preserve military autonomy in internal matters; 8) reorient the military toward external defense; 9) end military immunity from civilian prosecution; and 10) ensure international sanctions and support.

This paper is divided into six main parts. The first part provides a brief history of the expansion of the role of the Indonesian military and its relationship with successive governments from independence to the establishment of Soeharto’s New Order. The second part looks at the military’s political dominance and economic activities under the New Order. The third examines the various steps and advances that have been made toward ending the military’s social-political role and special privileges. The fourth part outlines the many obstacles and challenges to imposing democratic civilian control over the military. The fifth provides policy recommendations and outlines practical measures that can be taken to consolidate democratic civilian control, including the possible role of the international community. The final part presents conclusions regarding the prospects for Indonesia’s democratic consolidation, and the efforts to end military intervention in politics once and for all.

**THE EMERGENCE OF INDONESIA’S POLITICIZED MILITARY**

The expanded role of the Indonesian military, which culminated in it becoming the dominant political force in the country during the New Order period (1966–1998), took place gradually, following and shaping Indonesia’s evolving political system. Precisely because this was not the result of a dramatic putsch, which would have put civilian and military elites into two opposing camps, civilian-military relations had never been clearly defined. The creeping politicization of the Indonesian military and the militarization of Indonesian politics each reinforced the other. This led to the general application of the dual-functions doctrine in which the military was regarded not only as a defense force, but also as a social-political force. This doctrine legally bestowed upon the military the right to become actively involved in almost all aspects of public life beyond its conventional duties of defending the homeland from external attacks.

The historiography on the birth of the military’s dual functions in Indonesia has naturally emphasized that, because of its history, the Indonesian military’s role in society is markedly different from counterparts in the West where the
military are purely defense forces under civilian control. Official writings on
the subject emphasize the selfless heroism of the military, particularly during the
struggle for independence, contrasting it unfavorably with the perceived pusilla-
nimity of civilian leaders. The military’s increasing intervention in Indonesian
politics in the years that followed is painted as having been politically necessary
to counter selfish and irresponsible politicians who put their narrow interests
before those of the country. Not surprisingly, the military is found blameless for
the many difficulties and crises that Indonesia encountered in its formative peri-
od. The realities of Indonesian history were much more complex than the black
and white propaganda taught as history in Indonesian schools. There, civilian
politicians are crudely presented as feckless, while military freedom fighters are
the true saviors of the nation. *

The evolution of the Indonesian military's involvement in politics can be
divided into four periods. During the revolutionary period (1945–1949) the mili-
tary staked its historical claim as a social-political force and as the true heroes of
the revolution. During the parliamentary period (1950–1958) the military accept-
ed the principle of civilian supremacy, yet rejected civilian control of internal
military affairs and acted to undermine the authority of civilian elites. The
Guided Democracy period (1959–1965) followed, during which the military
became a full partner in the political system through the formalization of its
social-political function. The New Order period (1966–1998) is when the military
marginalized political parties and popular participation and dominated almost all
aspects of public life. The military’s role during this New Order period can be
subdivided into two phases: The first two decades of the New Order saw a mili-
tary regime in which President Soeharto was only a primus inter pares among the
other senior generals who dominated national life. Then, with the demise of his
senior colleagues and rivals by the mid-1980s, Soeharto became supreme, and the
military was increasingly used as a tool for maintaining his personal rule and that
of his family.¹

The manner in which the Indonesian military came into being was not con-
ducive to the adoption of a professional ethos that would clearly distinguish its
military from its nonmilitary functions.² Indonesia unilaterally declared indepen-
dence on August 17, 1945, immediately after Japan’s surrender. The Netherlands,

*There have been numerous writings on the Indonesian army's involvement in politics by both Indonesian
and foreign scholars. These can be divided into three main categories: those critical of the army's political
domination, those that can be termed as apologists, and those that try to strike a more neutral course.
Among the more critical analyses is Crouch (1978). A work more sympathetic to the viewpoints of the
Indonesian military is Singh (1995).
however, regarded the archipelago as its colony and determined to reconquer it by force. Fighting units were formed that would later become the regular army, and in this way the military was from its inception closely related to the struggle for independence, with little distinction made between its military and political means and objectives. Moreover, many of the youth fighting units, or *lasykars*, which joined the *Badan Keamanan Rakyat* (People’s Security Body) on August 22, 1945, were affiliated with political parties that had played active roles in the nationalist movement.

The *Badan Keamanan Rakyat* was transformed into the *Tentara Keamanan Rakyat* (Army for People’s Security) on October 5, 1945, the official armed forces day, but the name was subsequently changed again to *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (TNI) or the Indonesian National Army on May 5, 1947, indicating a transformation into regular defense forces. Nevertheless, the majority of trained soldiers who formed the nucleus of the officer corps of the TNI came from Japanese-trained fighting units such as *Heiho* and *Peta*, which emphasized *semangat* or the fighting spirit, and the willingness to sacrifice military professionalism for it.* A small group of officers educated and trained by the Dutch maintained a more professional military ethos and had accepted the principle of civilian supremacy, but they were regarded with suspicion by the other freedom fighters because of their association with the colonial power. They could not prevail.

The youth who flocked into the military recognized the authority and seniority of the long established civilian nationalist leaders such as President Soekarno, Vice President Hatta, and Prime Minister Sjahrir. However, their respect for these leaders and other civilian politicians was badly eroded by what they perceived as their indecisiveness and weakness in the face of Dutch aggression. The more educated and worldly political leaders understood that Indonesia needed to mobilize international support and sympathy in order to pressure the Netherlands into recognizing the country’s independence. These leaders therefore put considerable emphasis on diplomatic negotiations with the Dutch. Their seeming concessions and capitulations were in fact calculated attempts to impress the world, in particular the major Western powers, that the movement

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*The *Heiho* (Auxiliary Forces) was created as part of the Japanese army and navy in mid-1943. By the end of the war about 25,000 Indonesian youths were in *Heiho*. In October 1943 the Japanese created *Peta* (Pembela Tanah Air, protectors of the Fatherland). This was an Indonesian volunteer army intended as an auxiliary guerrilla force to resist Allied invasion. By the end of the war, *Peta* had 37,000 men in Java and 20,000 in Sumatra. There were by then over two million Indonesian youths belonging to various Japanese-created organizations which were given basic military training emphasizing intensive indoctrination and strict discipline. Ricklefs (1981: 192–195).*
was not a radical revolutionary one as the Dutch claimed. The leaders even allowed themselves to be captured by the Dutch on December 19, 1948, in the republican capital, Yogyakarta. While this might have seemed a military defeat, they hoped that the event would galvanize international sympathy for Indonesia and show the Netherlands in a poor light. It would become a diplomatic victory.\(^4\)

During this period the military hardly existed as a coherent force and did not have a united political perception. However, important elements in the military believed that Indonesia's independence could only be won through armed struggle. They regarded the political leaders' faith in a negotiated settlement as misplaced because the Dutch had repeatedly violated signed agreements.\(^5\) In particular, these groups considered the leaders' surrender to the Dutch in Yogyakarta as a cowardly act and utterly failed to appreciate its international impact. They considered the decision by General Sudirman, the charismatic commander of the army, to continue the independence struggle as the most important event which finally forced the Dutch government to transfer sovereignty to the Republic of Indonesia at the Round Table Conference in The Hague in December 1949. Many have seen Sudirman's decision as both demonstrating and setting precedent for military independence from civilian political control.\(^6\)

Although the military as a whole held a rather poor opinion of the civilian political leadership, the military leaders accepted the political system established after the conclusion of the Round Table Conference. While Soekarno and Hatta remained president and vice president respectively, Indonesia adopted a parliamentary liberal democratic system under a prime minister. The military accepted its subordination to the civilian leadership, although as we will see, only within certain limits. This was partly because the military leaders still lacked the political experience and stature of senior civilian leaders such as Soekarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir, and partly in recognition of the general democratic trend that prevailed after the Allied victory over fascist forces. Nevertheless, events throughout the 1950s increasingly discredited the civilian politicians and the parliamentary system of government and pushed the military onto the central political stage.\(^5\)

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\(^4\)The most detailed account of the revolutionary period can be found in Kahin (1970). Indonesia signed two cease-fire agreements with the Dutch, namely the Linggarjati Agreement on November 12, 1946, and the Renville Agreement in January 1948, both of which were broken by the Dutch who in fact intensified their attacks against the republican territories through “police action.”

\(^5\)The Indonesian military occupied Yogyakarta for six hours after the city was taken over by the Dutch, an operation that was led by Soeharto, who later claimed to have also planned the operation. The intent was to prove to the world that the republic still existed even after the government had been captured. This operation was used during the New Order period to glorify Soeharto’s role in the revolution. Soeharto’s claim was disputed by Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, who claimed that the idea to attack Yogyakarta was his.
Official Indonesian historiography usually presents the liberal democracy period as an unmitigated disaster, dominated by the narrow vested interests of political parties which polarized society and plunged the country into civil wars. To end the crisis President Soekarno, with the full support of the military, terminated the parliamentary system and restored the power of the executive presidency by returning to the 1945 constitution through a presidential decree in July 1959. As a matter of fact one could not blame all of the country’s problems on politicians and political parties; Soekarno and the military were partly responsible for the failure of the democratic experiment.

It must be stated at the outset that the foundation for liberal democracy during the early days of Indonesian independence was very weak. The parliamentary system was adopted for a number of tactical reasons, but from the beginning there were forces that wittingly or unwittingly worked to undermine it. Liberal democracy was adopted inter alia because that was the international trend after the victory of democratic forces against fascism in World War II, particularly since Indonesia needed international support for its economic development and to secure its claim over West Irian, which the Dutch refused to relinquish. The parliamentary system under a prime minister was adopted because President Soekarno and Vice President Hatta were regarded by the Allied powers as Japanese collaborators. Most Dutch-educated officers who commanded the military, such as A.H. Nasution and T.B. Simatupang, supported democratic principles, and those who did not had insufficient political clout to challenge the senior and established politicians. Last but not least, the military itself was badly fragmented between the professional and nonprofessional soldiers, and between the central and regional commands, as the result of the division and arrangement made during the revolutionary struggle for independence.

The political elites were sharply polarized over issues as fundamental as the ideological foundation of the state, and the relatively equal strength of factions led to political stalemates as governments rose and fell in rapid succession. However, this situation was undoubtedly exacerbated by the actions of Soekarno and the military. Soekarno never made a secret of his distaste for what he termed as “50+1 percent” democracy, which left him merely a figurehead president, and he never missed an opportunity to discredit the parliamentary democracy. At the same time, the divisions within the military worsened the already deep splits in the national leadership. Not only did politicians try to co-opt certain military factions to their sides, the divided military also tried to advance its respective interests by supporting one political group or another. Hence the move by the government and the central military command to rationalize and unify the armed
forces in the 1950s, which threatened the nonprofessional groups and the independent regional commanders, became a hotly contested political issue which willy-nilly plunged the military into the political arena. Disgruntled officers who opposed parliamentary intervention in military affairs staged a demonstration on October 17, 1952, pointing cannons at the presidential palace to force the president to dissolve the parliament. It must also be pointed out that the regional rebellions which broke out in parts of Sumatra and North Sulawesi in 1958 were as much driven by dissatisfied regional military commanders as by politicians from the Masyumi and Partai Sosialis Indonesia [Indonesian Socialist Party – PSI] parties, parties which had strongly opposed President Soekarno’s espousal of the Indonesian Communist Party [PKI].

The regional rebellions brought many political and economic benefits for the military as a whole. The imposition of martial law between 1958 and 1963 gave the military almost total political control in regions outside Java. This gave them near complete control of all economic assets, such as the plantations and mining companies, formerly belonging to the Dutch which the Indonesian government had nationalized in 1957. As a result of the regional rebellions, the military also became more unified. The central command was able to remove rebellious regional commanders and carry out the long-planned rationalization of the armed forces. With a more unified structure and command, the army was in a much better position to chart a more independent political stance and stake its political claims.

The army’s growing conviction that it must become actively involved in politics to safeguard national unity was reflected in the “middle way” doctrine introduced by General Nasution in 1958. This doctrine essentially argued that the army also had a social-political function, and was fully legitimized under the Guided Democracy system [1959–1965] which replaced parliamentary democracy. By returning to the 1945 constitution, power was again concentrated in the hands of the president while the military, which claimed to be a functional

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*Regional dissatisfaction at the political squabbling at the center were exacerbated by what was perceived as the central government’s exploitation of the region’s wealth with little regard for local needs and aspirations. At the same time, regional military commanders opposed the rationalization plan of the central military command, which threatened to curtail their independence. The regional feeling of being dominated by Java increased when the Sumatran-born Vice President Hatta resigned, while political leaders who opposed the increasing influence of the PKI were intimidated by goons and forced to flee to West Sumatra. The gathering of leading Masyumi and PSI politicians and regional military commanders led to the outbreak of the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia [Republic of Indonesia’s Revolutionary Government – PRRI]/Permesta rebellion in February 1958 which called for, among other things, the restoration of the Soekarno-Hatta duet and the banning of the PKI. See Leirissa (1991).
group like other forces in society such as farmers and labor, could formally be represented in the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), the highest decision-making body in the land. Nevertheless, the military's influence and involvement in politics were not primarily dependent on its MPR representation. Rather, after the dissolution of some political parties and weakening of the others except for the PKI, the army remained as the single most-powerful organization with a monopoly of coercive power. President Soekarno could not afford to ignore or offend them.

The military leadership professed loyalty to President Soekarno but made it very clear that they strongly objected to his increasing dependence on and support for the PKI, which the army had repeatedly sought to ban. Soekarno had, in fact, deliberately cultivated the PKI to counterbalance the army, whose antipathy toward the communists had begun in 1948 when the PKI launched a rebellion against the national leadership. The Guided Democracy period was, therefore, a highly unstable and tense triangular structure which was almost wholly dependent on Soekarno's ability to maintain the balance between the two deadly enemies. A tilt in the balance to the left would prove fatal to both President Soekarno and the PKI.

The failure of the constitutional democracy and the threats of territorial disintegration had provided the army with the momentum to present itself as both a defense force and a social-political force whose direct involvement in national politics was politically acceptable and constitutionally legitimate. It was seen as such by most of the anticommunist forces such as the Islamic groups and various student organizations. In 1965 the military used defense of the state ideology and the constitution to justify its removal of Soekarno from the presidency, its banning of the PKI, and the killing and imprisonment of PKI members and sympathizers. The army used *Pancasila* as an ideological weapon against the PKI, which was accused of being anti-*Pancasila* primarily on the basis of its professed atheism. The PKI was accused of masterminding an abortive coup in the late hours of September 30, 1965, in which six generals were brutally murdered. Under the commander of strategic reserves, then Lt. General Soeharto, the army launched an offensive to exterminate the PKI and its supporters. When Soekarno refused to denounce the PKI he was eased out of power in March 1966, opening the way for the army and Soeharto to dominate Indonesian life for the next 32 years.

*Pancasila* literally means Five Principles, Indonesia's ideological foundation. These are: Belief in One God; Humanity; National Unity; Democracy; and Social Justice.
THE MILITARY UNDER THE NEW ORDER

From the Middle Way to Military Domination

The primary justification for the army's monopoly of power during the New Order period was that it was the only institution that had proven its loyalty and the capacity to defend the national unity, *Pancasila*, and the 1945 constitution. The concentration of power in a narrow ruling elite dominated by Soeharto and the military was made palatable for over three decades by the general acceptance of the developmentalist ideology. This ideology argued that an authoritarian political system was necessary to ensure political stability and allow mobilization of resources for economic development. The weaknesses of political parties and civil society as a whole made it much easier for the military to either co-opt them or push them aside. Under the New Order political structure Nasution's modest middle way doctrine, in which the army would take its place beside other political forces, was transformed into what was essentially a military dictatorship cloaked in various doctrines, political institutions, and practices. This came to be euphemistically known as *Pancasila* democracy.

The relative stability and success of the New Order government was due largely to the military's ability to consolidate its political control without having to rely too openly on naked force, and to the government's considerable economic achievements. Besides its monopoly of coercive force and territorial control, the military was able to penetrate and manipulate almost all public institutions and social organizations. It created a political system designed to maintain the status quo, and a social system which increased people's dependence on the government. Toward the end of his rule, however, Soeharto was able to dominate the military and use it to maintain his power, a fact which greatly undermined the military's credibility and its claim to be soldiers of the people.

The military's dual-functions doctrine had been the bedrock of the New Order political system. Criticisms of the military's involvement in politics during that period were regarded as unjustifiable and unacceptable attacks against the state system itself, which was designed to stand in perpetuity regardless of any changes in the domestic and international environments. This of course differs from many other countries where the military has forcibly taken power from civilian governments. Aware of their lack of legitimacy, such military regimes have usually proclaimed at the outset that their rule would be temporary and that in time they would hold elections and return power to elected civilian leaders. The Indonesian military's involvement in politics, by contrast, was presented as an inalienable right borne out of history. Of the many issues that must be
broached in negotiating and consolidating democratic civilian control of the military, among the most hotly contested will be interpretations of history, particularly of the respective role of civilian and military groups in key past events.

The military realized that it could not rule Indonesia by force alone, and that it had to appear faithful to *Pancasila*, to the 1945 constitution, and its call for democracy. This is why it did not abolish democratic civilian institutions such as political parties, general elections, or the legislative bodies. Instead, the New Order political structure maintained a facade of formal democracy while robbing it of its substance: providing people with real freedom to choose their leaders and express their aspirations. However, while the military dominated the New Order, it was by no means a military junta; rather, it was a sophisticated and integrated political structure that combined political penetration, manipulation, and co-optation with exclusion and repression. Here we will look at the key areas in which the military exercised dominant control or enjoyed privileged positions.

**Control of the Legislative Realm**
Throughout the New Order period the military dominated the Indonesian political system by controlling both the legislative and the executive bodies, and by subordinating the judiciary to the executive branch. The military controlled the MPR—the highest national institution which elects the president and the vice president—as well as the House of Representatives (DPR), and the provincial and district legislatures. It did so through both direct and indirect means. Direct control was achieved through reserved military seats at every legislative level. Until the 1997 general elections the military was allotted 100 out of 500 DPR seats as compensation for not being allowed to vote. The MPR comprises the DPR plus regional and functional representatives. Given that the military is also regarded as a functional group it is also awarded a number of seats in the MPR. Furthermore, until the 1999 general elections, most regional representatives were military and provincial government officials and their wives, while in many provinces the governors were army generals. Thus, throughout most of the New Order period about one-third of the MPR was controlled by unelected military delegates. This high level of direct military representation was justified on the grounds that it was necessary to prevent any attempts to amend or change the 1945 constitution, since any constitutional amendment required approval by two-thirds of the MPR.

The high number of military representatives in the legislatures was greatly disproportionate to the size of the military as a whole, yet Soeharto and the military did not want to risk losing control of the election of the president and vice
president, or of the legislative process as a whole.* They argued that political parties and unbridled political activities did nothing but harm the country, and a policy of depoliticization was pursued. This included restricting the number of political parties and closely circumscribing their activities, and implementing the so-called “floating mass policy” which banned the two recognized political parties from establishing themselves below the district level. These two parties were the United Development Party (PPP) which was formed out of several Islamic parties, and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), consisting of various nationalist and Christian parties. While the two parties were important for maintaining democratic appearances, they were not allowed to grow too strong or independent. The military was ready to intervene directly in their internal affairs when necessary, as demonstrated in the military-sponsored removal of Megawati Sukarnoputri as chairman of PDI in 1996 when she became too popular.*

To mobilize mass support and provide the government with political and constitutional legitimacy, the military created a vote-generating machine known as Golkar or functional group, made up of government employees and members of state-related organizations and enterprises. The families of military members also had to belong to Golkar and to various social and mass organizations established by the military to provide Golkar with a wider base. Until 1992 the chairman of Golkar was always from the military, and although active military personnel were not allowed to stand for election many Golkar legislators were retired military officers. To ensure that Golkar would always be victorious, civil servants and military personnel at every administrative level had to actively campaign for the party. Because Golkar was technically not regarded as a full-fledged political party but only a functional group, it was allowed to establish itself down to the village level. To be on the safe side, general elections were run at the

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*Over 120 million voters were represented by 400 elected members of the DPR, while 100 military delegates represented less than 500,000 combined military/police forces.

*The PDI was the smallest of the three sanctioned political parties, and was frequently wracked by internal wrangling due to its forced fusion and the government’s deliberate policy of divide and rule. Although Megawati’s election as chairman of the PDI in December 1994 was initially supported by the government, her increasing popularity alarmed Soeharto. He felt that her party might pose a real challenge to Golkar in the 1997 general elections, and that Megawati herself threatened his chances of being reelected president for a seventh term. The government, therefore, engineered Megawati’s removal from the PDI chairmanship by sponsoring a PDI congress in Medan which replaced Megawati with Soerjadi in early 1996. When Megawati and her supporters refused to recognize the legality of the Medan congress and continued to occupy the PDI headquarters in Jakarta, a group of thugs, clearly backed by security forces, attacked the premise on July 27, 1996, precipitating a major riot in the vicinity. Investigation of the incident is currently underway and clearly points to high-level military and government involvement.
national level by the minister of home affairs (always an army general), and at the provincial and district levels by governors or bupati (regents), many of whom were military officers. No independent observers were allowed. With these precautions in place, Golkar managed to win a majority in every election between 1971 and 1997. This ensured the renewal of President Soeharto’s mandate every five years, while the military and Golkar representatives together formed a rubber-stamp legislative body wholly dedicated to serving the executive branch.³

Control of the Executive Branch
The military’s domination of the executive branch was almost total during the early years of the New Order, although increasing need for specialization and a growing number of civilian professionals gradually led to a reduced military presence. Besides President Soeharto, who was a retired four-star general, three of Soeharto’s six vice presidents were also military men (though they had to retire on appointment to the vice presidency). The number of active military officers serving in the consecutive cabinets fluctuated, reaching as high as one-third of the total. The powerful positions of coordinating minister for political and security affairs, minister of home affairs, and minister of defense were always held by senior military officers.

Military officers also occupied important positions in various government departments as secretary generals, director generals, or inspector generals. The appointment of military officers was initially intended to purge the government of PKI members and sympathizers and also to provide managerial expertise. This practice ensured military oversight of all government activities and gave the military considerable control over resources. Similar or greater levels of military control were established in the regions where many provincial governors, regents, and mayors were from the military.

Besides placing personnel in important government positions, the military as an institution also exercised control over social and political activities through the office of chief for social-political affairs. At the same time, the minister for home affairs acted as a pembina or nurturer of social and political organizations, ensuring that they stayed in line. The persons responsible for overseeing political activities in the department of home affairs at various administrative levels were always from the military. Thus, the military’s chief for social-political affairs office and the corresponding office in the home ministry together ensured effective control of the entire political system by military personnel, even if their numbers were relatively small. While human rights abuses were common—particularly in the troubled outlying regions—and the government often took repressive
measures against its critics, the New Order authoritarianism was not so much dependent upon terror as upon fixing the system to favor the status quo.

The Territorial Command Structure
Even when the elected executives in the regional governments were not from the military, the military exercised effective political control through their territorial command structure, which paralleled the civilian administration. The military commanders were at times more influential than the governors or regents, particularly when the latter were civilians.

Immediately after the Indonesian declaration of independence a territorial structure was established in which the archipelago was divided into several autonomous regional commands for both security and financial purposes. By creating autonomous commands, each responsible for raising its own funding and troops, the beleaguered republic ensured that attacks against one part of the country would not affect the capacity of other parts to fight. This territorial structure was also envisaged as a nucleus for a total people’s defense against invasions.

In its development, however, the territorial structure had primarily been aimed at dealing with internal security problems and ensuring tight social-political control of society. Since independence, the Indonesian government has been preoccupied with internal security threats from various separatist and insurgency movements. It is still strongly believed that only through the territorial structure was the government/military able to maintain territorial control and internal security, as the military permanently occupied every part of the country. The territorial structure also played a crucial role in suppressing potential troubles and political opposition to the government, and Babinsa* or low-ranking military personnel were placed in villages to monitor and report on local activities.

The Internal Security Role
Besides controlling the executive and the legislative realms during the New Order period, the military imposed its domination directly through its role as an internal security force. There was no clear distinction between external and internal security duties, and the police were considered a branch of the armed forces and trained as such. Indeed, the police generally took a back seat to the army in internal security matters. Since armies are trained to fight and destroy enemies, it is not surprising that there was a tendency to take an excessive “security

*Babinsa is the acronym for bintara pembina desa which roughly translates to a soldier responsible for nurturing a village.
approach” even in law and order matters. Every criticism of the government was considered a hostile action against the state that had to be suppressed. Indonesia’s intelligence services were, and to this day remain, controlled and dominated by the military.

The Military’s Economic Involvement

In addition to dominating the political system, throughout the New Order period the military was heavily engaged in economic activities, both legal and illegal. This dated from the early days of the TNI’s existence. The newly established Indonesian Republic did not have funds to maintain a wholly professional standing army, and from the beginning commanders of semiautonomous fighting units throughout the archipelago were expected to raise their own funds both to purchase equipment and to support their families. Military commanders carried out trading, smuggling, and a myriad of other business activities either alone or in partnership with civilian entrepreneurs, mostly ethnic Chinese. During the 1950s regional commanders engaged in barter trading and smuggling with neighboring countries to support their troops and as a sign of dissatisfaction with the central government, which paid scant attention to their welfare.

The military’s involvement in the economic sector became even more entrenched after military officials were put in charge of nationalized Dutch assets such as oil and mining companies, and plantations, mostly outside of Java. After the establishment of the New Order and the purge against the communists, military officers became managers of government departments and state enterprises. A state-led capitalism model was adopted that gave government officials full control over economic transactions, such as the granting of licenses, as well as over the rapid expansion of the economy. This gave the power holders of the New Order opportunities to engage in rent-seeking activities both at the institutional and individual levels. Every branch of the armed forces established foundations which formed holding companies that engaged in all manner of economic activities, including construction, transportation, hotels, and retailing. All of this took place despite laws in place barring members of the armed forces from engaging in business activities.

In the mid-1980s the Indonesian economy began to be liberalized, but there was no concurrent liberalization of the political system. Families of high-ranking military officers, together with their predominantly ethnic Chinese partners, were able to take advantage of the privatization process to gain monopolistic control of the Indonesian economy. This went well beyond their rent-seeking activities of the earlier period. At the same time, members of the military had long
been engaged in illegal activities such as protecting gambling or prostitution rackets, acting as debt collectors, and smuggling wood and other protected commodities. The military and the police were also often employed by developers to force recalcitrant people off of their land.*

During most of the New Order period the military’s involvement in business went far beyond raising funds to augment low official budgets—business had become a major preoccupation of military personnel seeking material gains for themselves, their families, and their cronies. Military business activity became a major factor in the running of the New Order. Business not only allowed them to enrich themselves, but also served as a social-political tool to limit and control access to power and wealth. It was no accident that the military from the very beginning employed ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs as their economic operatives; besides their industriousness, skills, and overseas networks, the Indonesian Chinese were a minority group with little political power. They were wholly dependent upon the military to protect them from the rest of the population who envied their wealth. Anyone wishing to take part in the wealth-creating activities of the New Order had to be totally loyal to the Soeharto regime and avoid involvement in political parties outside Golkar.

**Steps Taken to Bring the Military Under Democratic Civilian Control**

**Political Reforms**

After the fall of President Soeharto and the popular attacks against almost everything associated with the New Order government, the military has increasingly been put on the defensive. Two items at the top of the reform agenda are to end the military’s dual functions and to bring those implicated in human rights abuses to justice. The military has been forced to relinquish its political domination by the sheer force of public pressure to open up the political system, the continuing economic crisis, the need for international approval and support, and the realization that it cannot afford to alienate the people further.

In the past two years a number of new laws and regulations have been passed which have effectively ended the military’s stranglehold on the political system. Backed by popular pressure, the parliament was able to pass new political

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*In order to avoid institutional responsibility, the government and military usually blamed *oknum* or individuals in a pejorative sense, whenever members of the military broke the laws, even if the prevalence of such occurrences pointed to more systematic and condoned practices.*
and electoral laws in February 1999 which made it possible to hold fair, transparent, and truly competitive general elections. Key here are laws that enforce the strict political neutrality of the military and the civil service by banning military, police, and government personnel from joining or actively supporting political parties. Those wishing to do so must resign from government services. The new political laws have also lifted the ban on establishing new political parties, leading to the emergence of about 140 parties in the first six months of the reformasi period, 48 of which were eligible to contest the election. An independent election commission was established to conduct the elections and is made up of representatives of all of the contesting political parties. Also, independent monitors keep a close watch for irregularities. The government, which in the past had kept a tight rein on the electoral process, now had to remain strictly neutral. The result was the first truly democratic general election that Indonesia has enjoyed since 1955. Golkar lost its voting monopoly to opposition parties and the New Order power structure collapsed.

Besides losing control of the legislative recruitment process, the military also lost the majority of its allocated seats in the parliament and regional legislatures. In 1997 the military's quota in the DPR was reduced from 100 to 75 seats. After the June 1999 elections the military, together with the now independent police force, were only allocated 38 DPR seats, while in the regional legislatures their percentage was reduced from 20 percent to 10 percent. Most of the political parties have already agreed that in the next general elections in 2004 every member of parliament must be elected, which means that the military will no longer be allocated seats. The military also lost the extra seats it once held through the regional representatives since the current regional delegates are now selected by regional legislatures rather than appointed by the executive branch from its own rank. In August 2000 the MPR decided to allow the military's representation as a functional group in the MPR until 2009 at the latest, though the date may be brought forward because this decision was very unpopular among the democracy activists.

When the military lost control of the legislative bodies it also lost control of the government since the newly independent MPR/DPR and regional legislatures tend to select nonmilitary candidates for public offices, as demonstrated in the elections of the president and vice president. Many of the serving governors and regents who were elected during the New Order period have faced mounting opposition and threats of impeachment by the newly elected legislatures. The practice of kekaryaan or appointing active military personnel to government positions has also come to an end. The many military personnel serving in the
government as cabinet ministers, secretaries, governors, regents, and even village chiefs now must decide between retaining their civilian positions or continuing their military service.* Members of the military wishing to enter races for governors, regents, or mayors must first resign their commissions, a risky gamble since there is no guarantee that they will be elected.

**Ending the Military’s Role in Internal Security**

In response to the popular demands for clear differentiation between the roles of the military and the police, there has been a move to separate the two forces. Henceforth the military will be primarily responsible for external defense, while the maintenance of law and order will be left to the police as a civilian institution except in extreme cases where the police cannot cope. As of April 1999, the police are no longer part of the armed forces under the commander of the armed forces. They were temporarily placed under the minister of defense, but since January 2000 the Indonesian Police Force has existed as an independent institution directly under the president.† Consequently, the Department of Defense and Security is now simply the Department of Defense, while the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI)—closely identified in the popular mind with the military’s dual functions and human rights abuses—has been replaced with TNI, a name intended to evoke historical memories of the military’s great service to the republic. Symbolic advances in democratic civilian control of the military have also been made with the appointment of the first civilian minister of defense since the 1950s.

**Investigation of Human Rights Abuses**

The most important indication of democratic consolidation, and that which has created the greatest tensions between the military on the one hand and government and civil society on the other, has been the investigations now underway into cases of human rights abuses, particularly abuses in East Timor, Aceh,‡ and

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*At the beginning of 1999, an estimated 4,000 active military officers were serving as cabinet ministers, regional governors, local district heads, officials in various ministries and in local government, and ambassadors.
†The police lobbied hard to be recognized as an independent institution directly under the president, just like the Office of the Attorney General, while others suggested that the police force should be under the minister of home affairs or the minister of justice.
‡To crush the insurgency movement which again broke out in Aceh in 1989–1990, the government made Aceh into a military operation area—Daerah Operasi Militer (DOM)—from 1990 until President B.J. Habibie lifted it in late 1998. During the DOM period many people were killed, raped, or went missing. Demands for justice and an end to human rights abuses and economic exploitation have recently escalated into open armed insurgency and calls for Acehnese independence.
the 1984 Tanjung Priok incident when soldiers fired on demonstrators. Strong pressures from victims’ families have led the National Commission for Human Rights to set up special investigating commissions for the Aceh and the Tanjung Priok cases. At the same time, the police have opened the case of a July 27, 1996 attack against the PDI headquarters and have questioned a number of retired high-ranking generals who likely knew about the incident. This move clearly demonstrates the newfound independence and greater self-confidence of the police vis-à-vis the military.

Simultaneously, the Indonesian government is under considerable international pressure to bring to justice those responsible for perpetrating the destruction of East Timor in 1999 after the East Timorese voted overwhelmingly against integration with Indonesia. To prevent the establishment of an international tribunal, the Indonesian National Commission for Human Rights formed a special commission to investigate the case. Several high-ranking military officers have been implicated including General Wiranto, who was the commander of the armed forces and the minister of defense when the ballot took place. President Abdurrahman Wahid had appointed Wiranto to be the coordinating minister for political and security affairs. To facilitate the investigation, the president succeeded in suspending Wiranto from this cabinet post despite his strong resistance and open opposition from a number of officers loyal to him. This was considered a major victory for democratic civilian control.*

The most important move in dealing with past human rights abuses has been the passage by parliament of a new law on human rights which allows trials concerning past crimes in a special ad hoc court. At first, there was considerable

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*Although most supported Wiranto’s suspension when he was named in the East Timor investigative report, the manner in which President Wahid went about it drew much criticism. Instead of speaking directly to Wiranto, Wahid announced from Davos, Switzerland, that he wished Wiranto to withdraw from the cabinet without first telling Wiranto personally. This was seen as a sign that Wahid lacked the courage to confront Wiranto directly. Wahid probably deliberately announced his desire to suspend Wiranto from overseas to obtain international support and to avoid face-to-face confrontation. But while he achieved his objective, Wahid’s style also created controversy. The situation became unnecessarily complicated and confusing when Wahid immediately retracted his call for Wiranto to resign the moment the two men met upon the president’s return from overseas on Sunday, February 13, 2000, which led to speculations that the president was not really in charge of the government. Yet, soon after promising Wiranto that he would be retained, President Wahid called the daily newspaper Kompas late in the evening of the same day to announce that Wiranto was going to be suspended and that his cabinet position would be temporarily filled by the Minister of Home Affairs Surjadi Soedirdja. Wiranto, therefore, only found out about his fate from Kompas on Monday morning (February 14) while all of the other morning papers on that day announced that Wiranto was being retained as minister. During his questioning by the special investigation commission on East Timor on May 16, 2000, Wiranto announced that he was formally resigning from his position as coordinating minister for social and political affairs after being suspended for four months.
doubt about Indonesia's seriousness and ability to try past human rights crimes because of an article on non-retroactivity contained in the newly amended Constitution. The new human rights law, however, stipulates that this article does not apply to crimes against humanity, so that in theory all such past crimes can be brought to court without regard to time limitations. The parliament must decide which cases can be brought to trial and establish the necessary ad hoc court. New human rights crimes will be tried in a regular human rights court that will soon be established.

Initial Ascendancy of President Abdurrahman Wahid Over the Military Leadership

President Wahid's success in forcing General Wiranto out of his cabinet was cited by observers as one of the most significant achievements of the current political leadership. The president also removed the officers who openly criticized his treatment of Wiranto and replaced them with ones whom he considers to be more loyal to him.* Lt. General Agus Wirahadikusumah, who had openly criticized Wiranto and thus drawn the ire of his senior and fellow officers, was appointed commander of Kostrad, the powerful Strategic Reserves Command.

Despite the controversies surrounding Wiranto's suspension, and Wahid's replacement of senior military officers, analysts argued that the president had gotten the upper hand over the military. While some expressed fears that Wahid might actually provoke a military backlash, subsequent events indicate that the military accepted these presidential decisions quite meekly. This may reflect that the military has been demoralized by all of the criticisms leveled against it, and are now unsure of its proper role. Senior military officers have openly stated their support for the rule of law, though they have expressed concerns that some of the human rights investigations may be politically motivated and display a tendency toward a trial by the press.

President Wahid's action, however, also drew criticism from both military and civilian people worried that he was behaving like Soeharto by trying to control the military through direct intervention over key appointments. There

*Wahid's treatment of Wiranto created divisions within the military. Maj. General Agus Wirahadikusumah, usually seen as a reformist figure in the military, openly criticized Wiranto for not promptly responding to the president's call. This was considered a breach of military conduct on the part of Wirahadikusumah by Wiranto and the other senior officers, including retired ones, since a junior officer had dared to comment on a superior officer, and on such politically charged issues. On the other hand, two other officers, Commander of Kostrad-Strategic Reserves Command Lt. General Djadja Suparman and Chief of Military Information Maj. General Sudrajat, criticized the president. These two offending generals were promptly removed from their positions by the president while Wirahadikusumah was promoted as the new commander of Kostrad.
remains a deep seated fear that during this democratic transition, when the political situation remains so fluid and the elites are so polarized, the military may once again be used as an instrument of power. This is particularly worrisome as the government comes under increasing political attacks for its failure to address the fundamental problems facing the country.* Both civilian and military experts also argue that the president should not become involved directly in internal military affairs, including appointments below the positions of chiefs of staff. They assert that appointments should be based on objective criteria and merits rather than the president’s likes or dislikes. It is also feared that ambitious officers may try to curry favor with politicians, thereby endangering once again the unity and professionalism of the military. Finally, historical experience shows us that the military deeply resents politicians intruding into its internal affairs.

President Wahid’s ascendancy over the military leadership has recently suffered major reverses. Agus Wirahadikusumah’s vocal criticism of past military practices and a perception that his ambitions led him to court political support from the president, earned him the enmity of the army officer corp. He was soon removed from his Kostrad position, and his close associate Maj. General Saurip Kadi was removed from his position as assistant for territorial affairs for the army chief of staff. When President Wahid wished to appoint Agus Wirahadikusumah to the powerful position of army chief of staff in early October 2000, 45 generals

*The government’s failure to address the economic crisis and stop the incidence of violence in various parts of the country, as well as President Wahid’s penchant for making controversial statements and for flip-flopping on policy, have led to increasing dissatisfaction toward the government. There have been several large demonstrations calling for Wahid to resign. Wahid is also currently under parliamentary investigation for alleged involvement in two major corruption scandals. If found guilty, he can be impeached by the MPR. Before the August 2000 annual session of the MPR to hear the president’s progress report, Wahid’s position had seemed to be very precarious. On April 17, 2000, when giving a presentation at a traditional religious school Pondok Pesantren Al Hilal in Malang, East Java, Army Chief of Staff General Tyasno Sudarto declared that the military [TNI] will not tolerate any unconstitutional move against the legitimate president. The pesantren (a traditional Islamic boarding school) is closely associated with Nahdhatul Ulama [NU], the mass Islamic organization that Wahid used to lead. Because of the forum in which the statement was made and the timing, Tyasno Sudarto’s remarks sparked criticisms that the army chief was again pushing the military into the realm of practical politics as the defender of President Wahid. As critics pointed out, while the military must be loyal to the government and support its policy, it should refrain from getting involved in the political debates between the president and his critics in parliament, which is part of the democratic process. It was also pointed out that electing and dismissing presidents is part of the MPR’s constitutional duties. The commander of TNI, Admiral Widodo AS denied that General Tyasno Sudarto’s statement indicated that the military was again entering the political domain, arguing that it was merely a normative statement about the military’s duty to defend the legitimate government against illegal attempts to topple it. This debate is an important indication of the current state of civil-military relations in Indonesia and shows a growing courage and determination among members of civil society to resist military intervention in politics which has forced the military into the defensive. See Republika, April 19 and 20, 2000, and Kompas, April 22, 2000.
reportedly threatened to resign, and a number visited Vice President Megawati to ask her to block the appointment. Not only has President Wahid failed to get his way here but, even more tellingly, both Agus Wirahadikusumah and Saurip Kadi have been accused of violating the officers’ code of ethics and are to be investigated by the Officers’ Honorary Council. In an extreme case this could lead to their dismissal from the military.

**Internal Military Reforms**

The military has also carried out internal adjustments to accommodate itself to the new social and political environments, albeit incrementally. To mark the 53rd anniversary of the armed forces on October 5, 1998, the military headquarters issued a book titled *ABRI Abad 21* (ABRI in the Twenty-First Century), subsequently reprinted as *TNI Abad 21: Redefinisi, Reposisi, dan Reaktualisasi Peran TNI dalam Kehidupan Bangsa*. The book attempts to present the redefinition, reposition, and the reactualization of the TNI in national life. The new paradigm underlying the military's social-political role consisted of four main points: to change the military's position and method so that the TNI does not always have to take the lead; to move away from the strategy of occupying (civilian positions) toward that of influencing decision-making; to shift from direct to indirect influence strategies; and to work with other national entities in making important national decisions. This new paradigm was considered to be a major shift in the TNI’s social-political outlook, but clearly it was still a long way from ending the military’s social-political role or its dual functions. The new paradigm recognized that the military could no longer dominate the social-political system, but it still envisaged an active and influential political role for the military in concert with civilian elements.

A more substantial change toward ending the social-political role of the military, and a clearer assertion of the TNI’s primary function as a defense force, came out of a two-day meeting of military leaders (*Rapim TNI*) held in Jakarta on April 18–19, 2000. The results of the meeting, which consisted of seven main points, were later reported by Admiral Widodo AS, commander of TNI, to President Abdurrahman Wahid. Among the most important decisions adopted were that the TNI will always place itself as a part of the national system whose primary duty is only to provide national defense. The TNI will no longer be mainly accountable for internal security, which is the responsibility of the police. It is explicitly stated for the first time that the TNI will no longer play a social-political role. There were also decisions to carry out the internal reforms of the TNI including changing defense laws and doctrines, adjusting military organization
and structure, and teaching soldiers to uphold the rule of law and human rights values. The TNI affirmed its commitment to support the police in its security functions in accordance with existing laws and regulations. The meeting also affirmed that as a state institution the TNI is constitutionally directed to carry out and protect the policy of the legitimate government.

**MAJOR CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY**

There is no doubt that during the past two years major changes have occurred in Indonesian civil-military relations which have increasingly tilted the balance in favor of civilians. Not only has the civilian-led government seen success in subordinating the military leadership, but the military leaders themselves have affirmed their commitment to withdraw from politics and basically confine themselves to being a professional defense force. Yet there are still many challenges ahead which may jeopardize Indonesia’s ability to consolidate its nascent democracy. Most analysts agree that in the short term the military is unlikely to pose a political threat to the democratically elected civilian government, but the long-term prospects for civil-military relations remain uncertain and the possibility of the military returning to the political stage cannot be ruled out.

Challenges to democratization and to the TNI’s drive toward becoming a truly professional defense force come from many quarters, both internal and external to the military. Internal challenges include the military’s deeply entrenched involvement in legal and illegal economic activities, the existence of the territorial command structure, and the military’s continuing perception that it has special prerogatives and a unique responsibility to the nation. External factors include the prevalence of internal threats to security, the shortcomings of the police, the lack of civilian expertise in government (particularly in matters relating to military affairs), and a financial inability to support a modern, professional defense force. These internal and external factors are inextricably intertwined, complicating matters further.

*See Republika, Wednesday, April 26, 2000. Other decisions reached at the military leaders’ meeting were: depending on the financial capability of the state, the TNI will prioritize the improvement of its professionalism and system to make it operationally ready; internal development is geared to making the TNI into a professional, effective, efficient, and modern force based on a high spirit, struggle, and motivation; and all members of the TNI must play a role in improving the TNI’s public image, both at home and abroad.*
Difficulties in Ending the Military’s Economic Involvement

With the fall of the Soeharto regime and the drive for a good and clean governance, rent-seeking activities by public officials have come under increasing scrutiny and attacks. The economic crises plus the introduction of an antitrust law have led to the dismantling of many conglomerations, while many contracts awarded through corruption, collusion, and nepotism (Indonesian Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme – KKN) have been revoked. Yet it is not easy to put an end completely to military business involvement. It is recognized that the government is still unable to provide an adequate budget for the military, so that the various military foundations are still performing important functions to improve the welfare of soldiers and their families. At the same time the military’s involvement in various illegal economic activities seems to have continued unabated. The discovery of illegal stockpiling of gasoline on a large scale, some of which was smuggled abroad in full view of authorities, has raised suspicions that semiofficial military involvement on a high level rendered the police impotent to prevent it. Further, several active and retired military officers have recently been arrested for counterfeiting Rp. 50,000 banknotes.

Continuation of Territorial Command Structure

The continuing presence of the army’s territorial command structure also poses a major problem for current attempts to consolidate democratic civilian control of the military. As Indonesia begins its transition to democracy, many civilian leaders and democracy activists have called for the dismantling of this structure. These calls seem to have found receptive ears among a number of high-ranking officers. Two leading generals, Chief of TNI Territorial Affairs Lt. General Agus Wijoyo, and former Commander of Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad) Lt. General Agus Wirahadikusumah, have on several occasions openly expressed their support for a dismantling of the territorial commands. As a beginning, the Babinsa have been experimentally withdrawn from big cities like Jakarta and Surabaya. The notion that the military has the function of nurturing the territory (membina teritori), which refers to the political guidance it provided in the past, has also been abandoned.

Yet it is unlikely that the territorial structure can be dismantled quickly since many in the TNI resist the idea. The territorial structure has not only provided strategic employment to thousands of TNI (predominantly army) personnel, but it has also given them access to political power and economic gains. Besides exercising direct influence through their military positions, many regional and district military commanders used these positions to launch political
careers as governors, regents, or mayors. Local military commanders have also become deeply entrenched in various business activities in their areas of control. The problems involved in redeploying thousands of soldiers at a time of economic crises are another obstacle to the quick dissolution of the territorial structure. Moreover, while certain military leaders support the disbanding of the territorial structure others want to adapt it to changing circumstances without giving up the military’s political influence entirely. In a paper prepared by Maj. General Saurip Kadi, then assistant for territorial affairs of the army chief, he argued that the TNI should be an “agent of reformation,” “agent of modernization,” and “agent of change.” He asserted that the TNI, through the territorial structure, should strive to become social or local elites so that the military can influence, shape, and push the people toward an awareness of the needs of the nation-state. Finally and of equal importance, there is still a strongly held belief in most military quarters and among important civilian elements that the territorial command structure is critical for keeping the country united, particularly in the face of mounting separatist insurgencies and regional conflicts.

Regional Conflicts and Police Inadequacy
Although the police are now separated from the military and the responsibility for maintaining internal security is now in its hands, it must be recognized that in both size and capability the police remain woefully inadequate. The police force currently numbers only about 180,000 men and women, in a population of over 210 million people. Thus the ratio is one policeman for over 1,200 people, while in developed countries the ratio is, at a minimum, one for every 500 people. Even when carrying out their regular law enforcement duties, including dealing with many, often violent student demonstrations, the police are frequently caught unprepared. This is not surprising because in the past the police usually left such tasks to the military, who dealt ruthlessly with such actions. If the police continue to be derelict in their duties, allowing violence and general crime to increase, it will not be long before the public begins to demand that the military actively assist in law enforcement. Important here is that the growing lawlessness is seen as a major obstacle to the return of badly needed foreign investment.*

*In May alone two violent incidents took place in Jakarta which clearly demonstrate the shortcomings of the police. The first was rioting in Glodok, the predominantly Chinese central business district which bore the brunt of violence from earlier riots of May 13–15, 1998. Oblivious to the significance of the date, police from the general headquarters raided hawkers of pirated CDs and video CDs in the Glodok area, apparently without coordination with the Metropolitan police force on May 23, 2000. In no time at all shops in the Glodok area were burnt down by the resisting hawkers and large crowds of people from the neighboring
Conflicts and violence continue in other parts of the country, such as the insurgency movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya, and the drawn-out religious conflicts in Ambon and the other Maluku areas which now appear to have spread to South Sulawesi. These have made it unrealistic for the time being for the military to withdraw completely from internal security duties, particularly since the police are not trained for counterinsurgency. It must be admitted that Indonesia is prone to SARA-based conflicts, particularly during this time of economic hardship and tremendous social and political uncertainty. SARA is an Indonesian acronym for ethnicity, religion, race, and class. A committed and professional military is recognized as indispensable in maintaining Indonesian national unity, both in the territorial and social sense, notwithstanding that the military is supposed to be primarily responsible for external defense only.

Suspicious of Military Involvement in Prolonging Conflicts
The difficulties of bringing these various conflicts to an end may not only be due to the intractability of the problems and the inadequacy of the police; members of the military are suspected to be behind some of the violence taking place in such areas as Aceh and Ambon. Military-issued weapons were discovered in large quantities in Ambon, and there have been frequent outbreaks of conflict even after several peace talks between the warring Muslim and Christian groups brokered by Vice President Megawati. These fueled suspicions that these religious conflicts between formerly harmonious groups were being deliberately engineered by certain elements in the military. Analysts have suggested that by fomenting violent conflicts which are beyond the capacity of the police to overcome, the military hopes the civilian government will be forced to continue to rely on them, thus assuring that they will not be sidelined in the new democratic Indonesia.+

+Research carried out by Pusat Studi Pembangunan Kawasan (PSPK) or Center for Regional Development Studies, under Director Laode Ida, clearly points to the involvement of the military in Ambon. See the report in Republika titled “Penelitian PSPK Indikasikan TNI Terlibat dalam Kerusuhan Ambon,” May 27, 2000. As for the continuing conflict in Aceh, President Abdurrahman Wahid himself openly stated that elements from the military are involved in the various violent actions there which have complicated the government’s efforts to reach a negotiated settlement with the rebels. See “Oknum TNI bermain di Aceh.” satunet.com. May 6, 2000.
Lack of Civilian Expertise
The relative inexperience of civilian elites in governance also poses a major obstacle to democratic consolidation, and particularly to ensuring civilian oversight of military affairs. As mentioned earlier, newly elected civilian leaders are under tremendous pressure to succeed in overcoming the multidimensional crisis that now besets Indonesia. These include restoring the health of the economy, maintaining law and order, and sustaining national unity. While the military has been content to support the current leadership, it is widely understood that the fate of Indonesia’s democratization largely depends on the performance of the civilian politicians. While he was minister of defense, Juwono Sudarsono, a civilian and a prominent political scientist, frequently sounded a warning that Indonesia’s democratic experiment could disappear again—as did Pakistan’s—if politicians fail to deliver desired results. Similar warnings have been made by Lt. General Agus Wijoyo, TNI’s chief of territorial affairs, on a number of occasions. There appears to be a continuing unquestioned presumption that the military has a special prerogative to intervene in politics if the civilian government, notwithstanding its legitimacy, fails in its tasks.*

Lack of civilian expertise in military affairs has meant that the current civilian control of the military is largely symbolic. At the same time, the current defense organizational structure has left the Ministry of Defense little more than a minor branch of the TNI general headquarters. During much of the New Order period and throughout the Habibie administration, the post of the minister of defense was concurrently held by the commander of the armed forces, and there was little doubt which function was the more powerful. Although the Ministry of Defense is now separated from the TNI headquarters, it remains a predominantly military institution since its senior officials come almost exclusively from the military. The minister of defense is supposed to have control over defense policy and military budgets, but organizationally the TNI commander does not

*Despite his formerly liberal outlook, the political scientist Juwono Sudarsono caused a controversy in 1997 when he stated that Indonesia was not yet ready for a civilian president. This was probably why he was acceptable to the military. He was soon appointed to be the vice governor of Lemhanas (National Resilience Institute) and he was the first civilian minister of defense since the 1950s, having been appointed to that position by President Abdurrahman Wahid until he was replaced by another civilian in the cabinet reshuffle of September 2000. It is interesting to note that among those critical of Juwono Sudarsono’s promilitary stance was Habibie who was in 1997 being mentioned as a strong contender for vice president and a possible successor to Soeharto. Habibie argued that it was best to select possible leaders from all available groups in society rather than simply confining one’s choices to one particular group. See Republika, September 15, 1997. Despite these differences, Habibie appointed Juwono Sudarsono to his cabinet as minister of education and had planned to make the him minister of defense if reelected as president.
report to the minister but rather directly to the president. At the same time the increasingly powerful parliament does not have a sufficient number of legislators who are expert in defense-related affairs. This makes it difficult for the DPR to exercise effective parliamentary oversight of the military in such areas as procurement or military organizations and deployment. It must be remembered too that the military guards its autonomy jealously and resents any civilian interference in what it regards as its internal affairs, such as appointments and promotions. Equally important, the military continues to dominate Indonesia’s intelligence services, including the powerful National Agency for Intelligence Coordination (BAKIN),* which in the past played a crucial role in monitoring political activities of the general public. It will not be easy for civilians to assume control of the intelligence services; besides resistance from the military it must be acknowledged that few civilians are trained for such work.

Difficulties in Taking Past Military Abuses to Account

Despite the government’s seriousness in promoting the rule of law and the rhetoric that everyone is equal under the law, we cannot ignore that high-ranking military officers continue to enjoy considerable impunity and immunity from the law. Thus, while the special investigating committee on East Timor has succeeded in questioning a number of senior generals, including General Wiranto, it is doubtful whether they will ever be directly implicated. It is more than likely that responsibility for the chaos there will be laid at the feet of lower ranking officers and soldiers. Even if he were to be charged, Wiranto has already been promised a pardon by President Abdurrahman Wahid. A similar case is found in the investigation of human rights crimes in Aceh. The trial has proceeded without the presence of the highest-ranking officer, Lt. Colonel Sujono, who ordered the shooting of unarmed men held in military custody. Sujono has disappeared since the case emerged, fueling rumors that he has been hidden to prevent his revealing involvement by more senior officers. In the case of the storming of the PDI headquarters, only civilians have been arrested. While the police have called in solely former high-ranking military officers as witnesses, just a few have been designated as suspects. Not surprisingly, none of the officers has admitted any knowledge of the incident, and in any case the police have no authority to charge anyone from the military since they can only be charged by a military tribunal. The exception is in cases of gross violations of human rights which in the future

*BAKIN was recently renamed BIN or National Intelligence Agency.
will be tried in a yet-to-be-established human rights court for new crimes, and in a specially created ad hoc court for past crimes.

Opportunism and Complicity of Civilian Elites in Prolonging the Military’s Political Role

The author participated in a recent study carried out by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) on the political role of the TNI during this transition period. The study highlighted a tendency among the civilian political leaders and parties to make deals with the military in their mutual pursuit for power. The politicians’ earlier calls for ending the military’s political role have become muted as each political party tries to win the support of the military which, despite its present state of demoralization, is still recognized as the most powerful force in Indonesia.

Megawati was badly treated by the military when she was chairman of the PDI, culminating in her orchestrated removal from her position and the storming of the PDI headquarters. The same military removed her father from power. Yet Megawati is now being drawn increasingly close to the military. She supported the generals’ opposition to the appointment of Agus Wirahadikusumah as army chief of staff, and she and her party no longer demand justice for the 1996 storming of the PDI office as vigorously as before. In a number of cases where Megawati’s party, the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle – PDI-P), has a majority of legislative seats, candidates from the military faction have won chairmanships of regional legislative bodies. All of these are clearly related to Megawati’s desire to secure military support in her bid for the presidency. President Abdurrahman Wahid’s patronage of Agus Wirahadikusumah is also seen as an attempt to bring the military under his control for personal political purposes, as discussed earlier. Before the August 2000 annual MPR meeting, which at the time looked as if it might become a special session to impeach the president, then Army Chief of Staff General Tyasno Sudarto was invited by a group of Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) leaders to make a presentation. In it he asserted that the military would not tolerate any unconstitutional attempt to remove the president from power. Given the occasion and the place, Tyasno Sudarto’s statement invited criticism from political analysts and critical politicians for once again dragging the military into the political domain. Although Commander of TNI Admiral Widodo AS later argued that General Tyasno Sudarto was simply making a general observation about the duty of the military to protect the legitimate government against unconstitutional attacks, critics pointed out that Tyasno Sudarto’s statement was reminiscent of
past military actions to prop up the Soeharto regime. They argued that the military should not get politically involved even if the president is being undermined by his opponents.

The most serious setback in the effort to end military involvement in politics has been the decision by the MPR in August 2000 to allow the military reserved seats in the MPR until 2009, a move which surprised and disappointed the prodemocracy forces. This clearly reflected the continuing influence of the military, which had been lobbying hard to maintain its allocated seats in the MPR. It also revealed the reluctance of most politicians to be seen as opposed to military interests. In their competition, politicians and political parties still try to use the military to their own advantage, and this makes it all the more difficult to end the military’s political involvements.

Of even greater concern is a growing trend of civilian militarism in which political parties maintain paramilitary units, not only to safeguard their activities but, increasingly, to intimidate their opponents. Both Megawati’s PDI-P and Abdurrahman Wahid’s Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party – PKB) have such militia organizations who display fanatical support for their leaders. Despite the growing calls for these organizations to be dismantled or at least brought under control, no serious moves have been taken in this direction, and the top national leadership fully supports the presence of these militias. Indeed, in some areas the military has trained them, such as in East Kalimantan where the military trained Banser, the militia attached to Nahdhatul Ulama.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Much has been achieved in redressing the balance in civil-military relations in Indonesia in the past two years. One of the key goals of the reform movement continues to be the ending of the military’s social-political role, and its dual functions which until recently made it the dominant political force in Indonesia. Current civil-military relations in Indonesia are characterized by ever more confident civilian politicians on the one hand and an equally defensive and apologetic military on the other. Indonesia’s increasingly vibrant civil society and pluralistic polity seems to augur well for its efforts to consolidate and institutionalize its nascent democracy. Nevertheless, many challenges lie ahead, and ensuring democratic civilian control of the military remains a long-term goal.

In his work Ensuring Democratic Civilian Control of the Armed Forces in Asia, Harold A. Trinkunas (1999) argued that civilian leaders can maximize their leverage over the military through a host of strategies ranging from appeasement
to divide and rule to sanctioning. According to Trinkunas, the weakest strategy, appeasement, relies on a government adopting policies and budgets that satisfy the interests of the officer corps in hopes of discouraging military intervention in politics. This was the policy pursued by Thailand during its period of high economic growth in the 1990s. Divide-and-rule strategies seek to exploit cleavages within the military ranks, including by forming counterbalancing security forces, thereby creating a deterrence within the armed forces. Finally, sanctioning strategies use the fear of punishment to induce military cooperation with a democratic regime. Officers who cooperate with the new regime are rewarded with advancement while rebellious ones are severely punished.

Trinkunas’s three strategies of enhancing civilian leverage over the military may have some relevance for Indonesia, but they also pose certain problems. The appeasement strategy is currently difficult for Indonesia to employ given its economic predicament. However, it is the low official budgets traditionally given to the military that have forced it to engage in fundraising activities, and thus become deeply entrenched in business to the detriment of its professionalism. Therefore it is imperative that Indonesia must strive to provide adequate funding for the military. This should not be seen as appeasement or as buying off the military, but rather as a necessary step to wean the military away from business and politics so they can concentrate on their primary task of defending the country against external attacks.

Indonesia has had unhappy experiences with military cleavages and with the deliberate divide-and-rule policy carried out by civilian political leaders in the 1950s and early 1960s. These polarized society even further and plunged the country into civil wars. Given this history, the second strategy suggested by Trinkunas is extremely dangerous for Indonesia. Trinkunas assumes that the civilian leadership is a monolithic entity that would not themselves be affected by military cleavages or by interservice or even intraservice rivalry. But the situation in Indonesia is the reverse of this; not only is Indonesian society extremely pluralistic but the civilian leadership has traditionally been divided along deeply rooted primordial lines. So much so that for much of Indonesian history the military has been regarded as the only truly national organization. In fact, it has been the military that has been able to exploit the divisions among the civilian elites to its own advantage. Despite its current factionalism, as the discussion above shows, the military has tended to close ranks against any civilian attempts to manipulate it. Even more dangerous is that civilian opportunism could lead certain politicians to ally themselves with certain military groups in their political competition against each other, which would clearly be detrimental to the whole
democratization process. If Indonesia is to consolidate its democracy, one of the prerequisites will be an armed forces that is fully unified in its loyalty to the state and democratic institutions.

Sanctioning strategies which punish rebellious military officers and reward those who cooperate with the democratic civilian government can be effective in ensuring civilian control of the military. Undisciplined officers must clearly be punished to show the error of their ways and discourage others from following in their path, while those promoted to higher positions must clearly demonstrate their support for democratic ideals. Nevertheless, sanctioning strategies must be absolutely transparent, and punishments should only be meted out to those who have unambiguously demonstrated their rebelliousness. Any suspicions of discrimination or favoritism based on likes or dislikes of the president, or promotions based on personal loyalty to the top leadership, will be detrimental to the professional development of the military. Again, it will encourage officers to curry favor with politicians, who may in turn exploit their links with particular officers to gain control of the military for their own immediate political interests. It must be noted that the major obstacle to democratic government in Indonesia has been not simply the dominant role of the military per se, but rather the use of the military as a tool for personal rule by an all-powerful executive. Therefore, it will be extremely risky for Indonesia’s democratic process if civilian control of the military is simplified to mean control by a civilian president over the military. The experiences of several countries have shown that even democratically elected civilian leaders can become dictators through their ability to subjectively control the military.

Ensuring democratic civilian control of the military is only one aspect, albeit one of the most important ones, of democratic consolidation and institutionalization in Indonesia. Attempts to make the military into a truly professional force divorced from direct involvement in political, social, or economic affairs must begin with a broad reformation of the Indonesian political system, not simply the introduction of specific measures to deal with civil-military relations. In what follows a number of measures are summarized that must be carried out to achieve these objectives.

**Strengthen the General Consensus on Democracy**

Trinkunas points out that “a strong civilian consensus on democratization is one of the most important elements for preventing military interventions in politics. Armed forces rarely act alone in politics, and military intervention is difficult without the open support of powerful civilian interests.” It is clearly important
to have an agreement among civilian forces that delegitimizes military intervention in politics, whatever the provocation, once and for all. A strong civil society and pluralistic democratic institutions are primary prerequisites for ensuring civilian supremacy over the military. It is not only the civilians, however, who must be in total agreement about the need to uphold democratic values. It is equally important that the military also be convinced that promoting and protecting democracy are national goals which it is their duty to support. It is important to ensure from the very beginning that democratization is seen by all forces in society as a common national project that engages everyone. This will help avoid a civilian-military dichotomy or even confrontation that will hamper the process. Democracy should not be seen as a zero-sum game in which the civilians win and the military loses, because the consolidation of democracy requires the total cooperation and support of the military. This is particularly so when Indonesia faces so many security challenges that threaten its political stability and territorial integrity. If military personnel see themselves as democracy’s victims, then they will become democracy’s enemies and work actively to undermine the democratic processes.

Establish the Constitutional Framework and Safeguards for Democracy

Strengthening the general consensus on the importance of promoting and protecting democratic values must be accompanied by laying constitutional and legal frameworks for democracy to grow. Experience has shown that democratic idealism has often been pushed aside during emergencies and for political expediency, even though the founding fathers of the republic envisioned a modern and democratic Indonesia. An underlying problem is that Indonesia’s 1945 constitution was drafted in a hurry and consists of many loopholes which both President Soekarno and President Soeharto exploited to concentrate power in the hands of the executive. The constitution also provides a clause which legitimizes the formal representation and direct involvement of the military in politics as a functional group, and this was later reinforced with the institution of the military’s dual-function doctrine. Constitutional amendments are clearly needed to reduce the power of the executive by enforcing a clear separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches, and ensuring a proper system of checks and balances. The proper place and role of the military and the police must also be clearly spelled out in the constitution, closing all loopholes for future misinterpretation and misuse. The potential abuse of power by presidents deploying the military, the police, or even paramilitary forces for their own political objectives must be forestalled through clear constitutional and other legal
safeguards. Such safeguards are also important because there may be occasions when the government is forced to declare a civilian or even a military emergency over certain areas, or even over the nation as a whole, due to escalating internal conflicts or external attacks. It is imperative that should a military emergency arise it does not again pave the way for a takeover by an authoritarian regime.* More specifically, all laws and regulations which legitimize the military’s political role or its dual-function doctrine must be revoked or revised.

Ensure Adequate Military Funding and End Military Involvement in Business

Insufficient government funding and the resulting need for military commanders to raise their own funds to pay their troops and even to buy weapons has, since the early days of Indonesian independence, been a key obstacle to developing a truly professional armed forces in Indonesia. Even more damaging has been the military’s involvement in business, both legal and illegal, because it has greatly contributed to the massive corruption and inefficiency in the Indonesian economy. Continuing reliance on off-budget funds will not only make it more difficult for the government to control the military, it will also hinder development of good, clean governance since such funds are not accountable to the public. Although this may seem at first glance to be contrary to the democratic needs of reducing military privileges, it is clearly necessary for Indonesia to increase its defense budgets. This will both improve the welfare of military personnel and their families and, by providing them with better training and technology, will also enhance their professional capacity. An increase in official spending on the military should not be seen as an attempt to appease the military, but rather as a response to a real need to develop a professional military, without which it is will be impossible for Indonesia’s democratic transition to be consolidated. The problem is that during this time of economic crisis Indonesia does not have the financial capacity to increase its defense budget. This means that, for the intermediate term at least, the government has little choice but to allow the military to continue in its various economic enterprises. In the future, however, ending

*President Habibie was under a lot of pressure from the military to declare civilian emergencies in various areas wracked by violence, such as in Maluku. Habibie refused, fearing that such an emergency could easily escalate to a military emergency in various parts of the country which would effectively put the military in control of the country. The continuing violence in Maluku, however, had forced President Abdurrahman Wahid to declare a civilian emergency to stop it. While this move has received widespread support, there are strong calls for parliament and civil society as a whole to monitor the situation closely to prevent further human rights abuses. There seems to be no concern about the possibility of the Maluku emergency being used by the military to strengthen its political position, indicating a growing self-confidence of the civilian leadership of its ability to control the military.
the military’s involvement in business should be as much a priority as ending its political participation. The military’s involvement in illegal economic activities, on the other hand, should be stopped immediately. This is necessary not only to enforce law and order but also to prevent further erosion of the military’s reputation and credibility.

**Strengthen Civilian Police and Limit the Military’s Role in Internal Security**

Since January 2000 the police have become an independent institution directly under the president. They, not the military, are now responsible for internal security. The military, however, will come to their assistance if the situation requires it. Placing the police under the president opens the possibility of political misuse of the police by the executive, and such an eventuality must be rigorously forestalled. On the other hand, by placing the police under the president it is hoped that the police will obtain sufficient power, prestige, and self-confidence to carry out its law enforcement duties. It is no secret that during this transition period, when internal security had no longer been the responsibility of the military, the police have demonstrated their inability to enforce law and order. This has resulted in general lawlessness and escalating violence in many parts of the country, and in certain cases this has involved rogue military elements. The police played a secondary role to the military for too long, and it will take some time before they are able to carry out their responsibilities effectively. In the meantime, the military can still be called upon to deal with internal security problems, such as in Maluku, albeit formally acting as a support force for the police under a civilian emergency. Despite calls for the military to limit its internal security functions, however, the public also criticizes the military for failing to end various raging conflicts in the archipelago. Nonetheless, the military has shown a willingness to step back and defer to the police, and the challenge is to create a civilian police force sufficiently large and well trained that it can carry out its law enforcement duties effectively and in accordance with the values of democracy and human rights. In the final analysis, however, political stability and social harmony do not depend only on the capacity of the police to maintain law and order, but also on the ability of the government to meet the aspirations of and provide justice for the people.

**End the Military Territorial Command Structure**

It has come to be recognized, even by the current military elites, that the continuing existence of the military territorial command structure inhibits democratic development at the regional level. Although at the national level the military's
political participation has been reduced substantially, little has changed at the
provincial and district levels. Parallel military structures continue to exercise
political influence at the regional level. Attempts to decentralize power through
the development of regional autonomy at the district level will be counteracted
by the existence of centralized military commands at the provincial level. End-
ing the territorial structure is clearly important to the efforts to end military
intervention in politics, and to ensure civilian supremacy over the military.

Create Civilian Agencies and Enhance Civilian Expertise to Oversee Military
Activities
Civilian supremacy over the military basically means that elected civilian politi-
cians have ultimate jurisdiction over military affairs, including military mis-
sions, budgets, procurements, promotions, and appointments. Yet as pointed out
earlier, such authority should not be personalized but institutionalized, both to
avoid executive abuses of power and to ensure the continuity and quality of civil-
ian oversight. At the same time, it must be admitted that elected politicians
rarely have the opportunity to develop expertise on such technical matters as mil-
itary-related affairs. Indonesia needs to develop the civilian agencies and civilian
expertise necessary to effectively oversee military activities, and to do so in a way
that will avoid undue friction with a military that may not take kindly to being
controlled by people they see as incompetent civilians. Furthermore, oversight
must come not only from government but also from within civil society. One of
the most important measures to be undertaken is the transformation of the
Ministry of Defense into a civilian agency which oversees military activities
under the executive branch. Besides appointing a civilian minister of defense,
there is a need to appoint civilian experts on security and military affairs to the
ministry to prevent it from being dominated by the military. Within the legisla-
tive branch there must be a special commission, consisting of elected members
of parliament, which oversees military affairs. The commission must be fully
supported by a permanent committee staffed with experts and specialists on mil-
itary matters. Without such a permanent committee it will be difficult to build
cumulative expertise and continuity of oversight as politicians come and go with
only short-term perspectives.

Total reliance on the military for intelligence gathering has also skewed the
Indonesian government’s security perspectives toward the military. It is impor-
tant that the National Intelligence Agency (BIN), formerly BAKIN, which is
notionally a civilian agency directly under the president, be removed from mili-
tary control and placed under civilian directorship. For that to happen it will be
necessary to train civilians in the necessary intelligence gathering and analytical skills. Civil society must develop an interest and awareness of security issues to prevent such matters from being seen as the exclusive domain of the military. This can be accomplished through the development of think tanks and academic courses, as well as through informed reporting by the mass media.

**Preserve Military Autonomy in Internal Matters**

Although this may seem to contradict the concept of civilian supremacy and ultimate civilian oversight of military activities, it is nevertheless important that the military preserve a certain degree of autonomy in its internal matters. Civilian supremacy should not lead to the civilianization of the military establishment since that would damage the development of military professionalism. The military as a war machine has a very different structure and culture from civil society, and must remain true if they are to be effective in their mission. Democratic principles such as pluralism and individualism that apply in society at large cannot be applied in the rigidly hierarchical, disciplined, and group-oriented military establishment. Thus, to a certain extent, the military should be insulated from societal values.

It is equally important that political oversight over promotions and appointments is limited to the very top echelons, namely to the appointments of commander of TNI and the chiefs of staff of the three services. In the past such appointments were wholly at the discretion of the president, which often led to favoritism and undermined meritocracy, but in the future these strategic appointments should pass through a parliamentary confirmation process. The political leadership and parliament should refrain from interfering in other appointments and promotions to avoid the politicization of these processes, and to allow military leaders and civilian experts in the Ministry of Defense to decide these matters based on objective technical needs and criteria.

**Reorient the Military Toward External Defense**

Indonesia's inward-looking strategic doctrine, which once led the armed forces to pay more attention to internal security than to external defense, was brought about mostly by necessity. First, the reality was that most of the country's security threats came from within and second, Indonesia did not have the financial capacity to build a professional military with a credible conventional defense capability. Today the military accepts that its mission must now be directed toward the external defense of the country. Such a shift must clearly be integrated into military doctrine and into all of the laws and regulations governing the military. It must be realized, however, that a focus on external defense will
separate the military from lucrative sources of power and revenue which it has hitherto enjoyed. To compensate for this, again, the military must be allocated a sufficient budget. Equally important, however, the military must be convinced not only of the strategic importance of its new mission focus, but also of its prestige. In the past military officers often measured their success through their ability to occupy important nonmilitary positions, but in the future the Indonesian military must judge its capability and prestige vis-à-vis the capability of the militaries in other countries.

A reorientation of Indonesia’s strategic doctrine is also needed from one that is inward looking to one that is outward looking—to a doctrine that pays more attention to the challenges and threats faced by Indonesia from its strategic environment. As an archipelago it must ensure the security of its maritime boundaries, maritime resources, and the security of sea lanes. The country should not focus its military capabilities on land defense alone. Instead, Indonesia must develop a structure that better balances the army, navy, and air force.

End Military Immunity from Civilian Prosecution

In the past, the military carried out repressive measures and committed gross violations of human rights with impunity in the name of national interests. In the rare event of military personnel being held accountable for committing general crimes, they could not be charged in civilian courts. But military tribunals lack transparency and usually only mete out administrative sanctions such as demotion or dismissal. Of even greater importance, in the past higher-ranking officers could never be held accountable for transgressions carried out by the rank and file, even when it was obvious that the transgressions had been ordered or officially condoned by higher authorities. Such impunity and military privileges clearly cannot be allowed to continue in the new Indonesia which adheres to democratic principles, the basic values of human rights, and the equal treatment of everyone under the law. Except for internal problems of discipline which can be tried in military tribunals, military personnel committing criminal acts should be tried in common courts and given sentences like any other criminal. It has already been decided that human rights abuse cases will in the future be handled by a special human rights court. Clear guidelines and rules of engagement must be provided to both the military and the police with particular attention to human rights; they must know exactly what they can and cannot do in the line of duty, and who will be held accountable for transgressions.
Ensure Both International Sanctions and Support
The current transition to democracy in Indonesia, with its phasing out of military participation in politics, has been made possible largely by the changing international environment. It is part of a global trend toward democratization and an increase in international pressures against military regimes and abuses. International sanctions against authoritarian practices are important in nurturing democratic forces and discouraging antidemocratic elements. At the same time, democratic consolidation in Indonesia cannot take place without substantial military and police reforms. Such reforms will not take place on their own accord but will require substantial changes, many of which can only come with help from the outside. Making both the military and the police into professional and effective forces at the very least will require education, training, and also new technology. The new civilian masters, too, must be inducted into their new responsibilities of overseeing the military for the larger national interests. The international community, particularly the established democracies, can play an important role in assisting Indonesia to achieve these objectives. The formal separation of the police from the military will not improve human rights conditions in Indonesia if the police force itself is not transformed into a civilian force fully aware of its responsibilities and the appropriate means of executing them within the new democratic framework. For this, the police need to learn from the experience of other countries. The military too cannot be shunted aside by the international community, for that will only be counterproductive for the reform process. It should, of course, be made clear that repressive behavior by the security forces will meet international disapproval. But it is hoped that the international community will also actively support efforts made to transform the military and police forces into professional and effective instruments of the Indonesian state, in accordance with universal democratic and human rights norms.

CONCLUSION

Systematic efforts to end the military’s social-political role began immediately after the fall of Soeharto. After all, ending the army’s dual functions had been one of the top demands of the reform movement. Yet what has been achieved so far, while unthinkable only two years ago, has merely scratched the surface. Much still needs to be done to uproot the military’s well-entrenched social-political position, and the military continues to be a potent political force that needs careful handling.
The military currently faces many problems including low credibility, public humiliation, internal divisions, demoralization, and confusion about its proper role. It also knows that the domestic and international environments are hostile toward any military takeover. Thus it is unlikely that the Indonesian military will move against a democratically elected government. It is also important to remember that the Indonesian military has historically avoided staging any coup d’état for fear of creating a precedent; they rather see themselves as guardians of the constitution.

Nevertheless, Indonesia’s democratization is still fragile. The myriad problems that the country continues to face, including threats of territorial disintegration, prolonged economic crisis, lawlessness, and poor governance, all threaten democratic consolidation. Although the present government was democratically elected and enjoys a high degree of political legitimacy, it has been unable to make much headway in tackling the country’s major problems. At the same time, there are new accusations of new forms of corruption, collusion, and nepotism (KKN), and these have greatly weakened President Abdurrahman Wahid. In such a situation there is a continuing danger that the military might again be dragged into politics, not necessarily by its own design but because various political parties and politicians are still trying to use the military to strengthen their respective positions.

The failure of the democratic system to deliver the goods and a worsening security situation may lead to public disillusionment with civilian politicians and to turning again to the military for alternatives. Nevertheless, this danger is currently only a remote possibility given the general trauma of the New Order experience and the vibrant civil society that has emerged in the past two years. More than anything else, Indonesians need to strengthen their common commitment to establish a lasting democracy so that any failure of an elected government is not regarded as the failure of the democratic system as a whole. It is hoped that, despite some signs of political shortsightedness and opportunism among certain politicians, the popular will to democratize the political system can act as a constant pressure on policymakers not to depart from the reform path. In this respect the role of civil society forces—such as the media, non-governmental organizations, student organizations, and think tanks—will be critical.
ENDNOTES

1 For a good introduction to Indonesian history see Ricklefs [1981].
2 Crouch [1978: 26–42].
3 Bhakti et al. [1999: 57–59].
4 For an account of Indonesia’s diplomatic struggle to gain independence, see Agung (1973).
5 The best account for this period is Feith (1962).
7 For a good discussion on the New Order political format, see Haris and Sihbudi (1995).
8 Samego et al. [1998a].
9 See Robison [1987], and Samego et al. [1998b].
10 TNI Headquarters [1999: 22–24].
11 Crouch [2000].
13 Cahyono et al. [2000].
14 Cahyono et al. [2000: 24].
15 Collier [1999: 17].
16 Cohen [1999].

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