

UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII LIBRARY

EDUCATING FOR GOOD JUDGMENT

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN

PHILOSOPHY

DECEMBER 2002

By
Thomas B. Yos

Dissertation Committee:

Eliot Deutsch, Chairperson
Thomas Jackson
J. E. Tiles
Tamara Albertini
B. Jeannie Lum

Copyright © 2002 by Thomas B. Yos

Acknowledgments

This work is, I hope, a fitting tribute to the many people whom have helped me along my way. First among others, I thank my father Jerrold, my mother Ann, my brothers David and Jamie, and my son Nicholas for helping me to become the person whom I am. I thank my professors, both at Colby College and at the University of Hawai'i, for their guidance. I thank Dr. Jackson and the Philosophy for Children 'ohana in Hawai'i for helping me to *understand what philosophy can be*. I thank the *many, many elementary school teachers* and students with whom I have worked for their inspiration. But most of all I am ever so grateful to my wife Beth for her love, encouragement, and abundant patience.

Abstract

What should be the primary aims of education? How might these aims be realized? These are foundational questions which Plato raised long ago in his Republic. The first of these questions is a normative, and profoundly philosophical, one which provides guidance to the whole endeavor of education. The second of these questions is a pedagogical one which informs educators as to how their work can be best conducted.

In this work I endeavor to answer these interlocking educational questions. I follow most closely in the footsteps of John Dewey. I believe that Dewey had it right when, decades ago, he argued that education ought to be concerned with the *cultivation of good judgment*.

But here a difficulty arises. For "good judgment" is a complex philosophical concept which spills over into considerations of thinking, knowing, deciding, and acting. Despite the efforts of philosophers such as Aristotle, Kant, and Dewey, there is a lack of agreement about the precise meaning of good judgment.

Before moving into matters of education, then, I first endeavor to vanquish this lack of conceptual clarity. What is good judgment? What are its elements? Can it, for that matter, even be cultivated?

Having gotten clear on what good judgment is, I turn to matters of education. First, I argue that a vital task of education is the cultivation of good judgment. I then turn to the practical matter of how one might go about cultivating good judgment. The community of inquiry approach employed by The Philosophy for Children Program, I contend, is an effective pedagogical means through which to cultivate good judgment.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments.....	ii
Abstract.....	v
Preface.....	x
Chapter 1: The Nature of Good Judgment.....	1
Two Questions.....	1
Good Judgment is a Character Trait.....	3
Judging Well, Good Judgments, and Having Good Judgment.....	6
Judging Well.....	8
Notes.....	18
Chapter 2: Good Thinking and Cognitive Moves.....	23
Cognitive Moves.....	23
Clarifying Matters.....	26
Seeking Justification.....	27
Working with Assumptions.....	29
Working with Inferences.....	31
Using Examples.....	33
Being Receptive.....	35
The Good Thinker and Cognitive Moves.....	40
Notes.....	42

Chapter 3: Good Thinking and Understanding Well.....	48
Reflective Thinking.....	48
Leaning Back on Understanding.....	50
Possessing Understanding.....	56
Gaining Understanding.....	66
The Disposition to Understand.....	69
The Ability to Understand.....	72
Notes.....	78
Chapter 4: Good Judgments: The Products of Good Thinking.....	86
Good Judgments.....	86
Good Thinking and Good Judgments.....	91
Leaning Back on Understanding and Good Judgments.....	93
The Power to Understand and Good Judgments.....	97
Cognitive Moves and Good Judgments.....	99
Consequences and Good Judgments.....	101
Judgments which Fail to Fit.....	109
Good Judgment Can Be Taught.....	113
Notes.....	117
Chapter 5: Cultivating Good Judgment.....	125
The Need for (and Lack of) Good Judgment.....	125
Education and Good Judgment.....	127
Moving Beyond the Obstacles.....	139
Notes.....	143

Chapter 6: Philosophy for Children.....	148
Matthew Lipman’s Discovery.....	148
The Characteristics of The Community of Inquiry.....	150
The Community of Inquiry in Action.....	155
The Aims of The Community of Inquiry.....	162
Notes.....	166
Chapter 7: Cultivating Cognitive Moves.....	171
P4C and The Cultivation of Good Thinking.....	171
P4C and The Cultivation of Cognitive Moves.....	172
P4C: A Proven Means by which to Cultivate Cognitive Moves.....	184
Notes.....	187
Chapter 8: Cultivating Understanding.....	191
P4C and Leaning Back on Understanding.....	191
P4C and Possessing Understanding.....	200
Notes.....	214
Chapter 9: Cultivating Respect and Caring.....	220
P4C and Character Education.....	220
P4C and The Cultivation of Respect and Caring.....	222
Evidence That P4C Cultivates Respect and Caring.....	233
Notes.....	236
Chapter 10: Cultivating The Power to Understand.....	241
P4C and The Power to Understand.....	241
P4C and The Disposition to Understand.....	242
P4C, The Ability to Understand, and Social Inquiry.....	249
P4C and The Cultivation of Social Behaviors.....	254
Notes.....	261

Chapter 11: Educating for Good Judgment.....	267
From Whence We Came.....	267
Where To Go.....	271
Conclusion: In Their Own Words.....	278
Notes.....	281
Bibliography.....	285

Preface

Philosophy for Children (P4C) is an educational program which was begun by Matthew Lipman more than thirty years ago. P4C aims to transform primary and secondary school classrooms into *communities of inquiry* and, by doing so, to help children to become more reasonable, critical, creative, and caring thinkers.

At the University of Hawai'i (Manoa), P4C is championed by Dr. Thomas Jackson. Jackson, the director of The Philosophy In The Schools Project, has introduced P4C to thousands of teachers and students over the course of the past two decades.

When I began this dissertation, I was a graduate student in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Hawai'i. I had, for a number of years, worked with Dr. Jackson and had facilitated countless P4C sessions in elementary school classrooms throughout Honolulu.

Given my experience, I was reasonably comfortable with my understanding of what P4C is and of how to effectively implement it. I was not, however, as satisfied with my understanding of the underlying issue of why P4C is important. What is the value of P4C? Why is it even worth doing? When teachers asked me such questions, I did my best to provide an answer. But I always felt that my answers lacked the needed authority and conviction.

Searching for an answer to this question, I returned to the literature of P4C. I read Lipman's Philosophy in the Classroom and Thinking in Education, Splitter and Sharp's Teaching For Better Thinking, numerous articles from Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children, and every other reference to P4C which I could find.

Within these works I found, to be sure, many good reasons for why our schools ought to embrace P4C. Indeed, I actually found *too many* reasons. P4C, I discovered, can be connected with many educational aims. There are so many different arguments which can be (and, in fact, have been) made for the value of P4C.

Overwhelmed by this abundance of arguments, I still did not have an answer to my question. I felt as if, to make use of an old expression, I could not see the forest through the trees. Where I was looking for a single comprehensive and coherent argument, I found a plethora of different arguments which were, at least to my mind, still too disconnected and underdeveloped. I was not satisfied. I felt like I needed to separate the chaff from the wheat; to distinguish that which was superfluous from that which was essential.

Naive to what I was getting myself into, I decided to take up the task of constructing the sort of comprehensive and coherent argument for the value of P4C which I had been unable to find. I struggled mightily. The matter was far more complex and difficult than I had imagined.

Constructing an adequate argument for the worth of P4C, I came to understand, unavoidably involved addressing two far-reaching educational questions. The first is a normative one: *What should be the primary aims of education?* The second is a pedagogical one: *How might these aims be realized?* In order to show why P4C is valuable, I realized, I would first have to make some statement about what the proper business of education should be. Then I would need to connect P4C with these identified aims.

It was only with time that an answer to the normative question which I posed began to emerge and, in the process, this dissertation began to take its current shape. Working full-time in an elementary school as a reading teacher, a special education teacher, a counselor, and a social worker, it became clear to me that (at least within my culture and epoch) schools ought to concern themselves, not exclusively but most vigorously, with the task of

cultivating good judgment. Schools must do more than inform our children and arm them with basic skills; they must prepare our children to live wisely and well.

The first half of this dissertation is devoted to supporting this normative claim. I first engage in the philosophical work of getting clear on what "good judgment" means. This philosophical work is the essential precursor to all that follows; one cannot, after all, effectively argue that schools ought to educate for good judgment if one is not even clear on what "good judgment" is. Having defined what I mean by good judgment, I then argue the normative point that schools ought to deliberately work to cultivate good judgment.

The subsequent half of this dissertation is devoted to the pedagogical problem of how to cultivate good judgment. Returning to the roots of my investigation, I argue that the community of inquiry approach of P4C is an especially effective means through which to cultivate good judgment.

I approach this dissertation both as an academic philosopher and as an elementary school educator. As a consequence, one will find within this work both the painstaking analysis of concepts and assumptions which is the hallmark of philosophical inquiry as well as the empirical research and pedagogical considerations with which educators are characteristically concerned. I have striven, and sometimes struggled, to craft a work which is both scholarly and of practical value to the teacher.

Crafting my dissertation in this fashion, I follow in the philosophical footsteps of John Dewey who believed that philosophy ought to concern itself with the practical "problems of men" (and, we add, women). The methods and fruits of philosophical inquiry need not be confined to the university. Philosophy can be (and, indeed, ought to be) put to work in a variety of contexts in order to benefit society.

Dewey's influence upon this work does not end here. This dissertation is imbued through and through with the thought of Dewey and, so too, William James. Indeed, the philosophical paradigm which animates this work is, by and large, American Pragmatism.

Dewey's and James' brand of Pragmatism is quite evident in the first, more theoretical, half of this dissertation. My analysis of the concept of "good judgment" involves a consideration of the complex philosophical problem of the relationship between thinking, knowing, and judging. My treatment of each of these three is heavily influenced by Pragmatist thought. A central thread which runs throughout the whole of this dissertation is, in fact, a commitment to a Pragmatic conception of truth and an accompanying embrace of a spirit of epistemological fallibilism and wonder.

The influence of Pragmatism is also evident in the second, more practical, half of this dissertation. Lipman was, in large part, inspired by Dewey. The pedagogy of P4C is guided by a Pragmatic commitment to inquiry and to the cultivation of the cognitive and social means through which inquiry best proceeds.

The Pragmatism of Dewey and James is not, to be sure, the only formative influence upon this dissertation. The thought of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Lipman, Jackson, Martha Nussbaum, Paulo Freire, Andrew Norman, and F. H. Low-Beer have also played a most prominent role in the shaping of this work. But the philosophical reader is well-oriented if she keeps in mind the notion that this dissertation is, at its heart, a Pragmatic inquiry into the meaning and educational significance of the concept of "good judgment."

Whether or not I have convincingly defended my two-part claim -- that schools ought to aim to cultivate good judgment and that P4C is valuable because it is an effective pedagogical means through which to realize this aim -- is, of course, left to the judgment of the individual reader. But it is, in any case, my hope that the reader will find this dissertation to be, if not compelling, at least thought-provoking. It is my hope that it will, if only in a small way, pave the way for further inquiry.

Chapter One

The Nature of Good Judgment

Two Questions

The "good and true guardian of the state," writes Plato in his Republic, must possess "the love of wisdom," "high spirit," "quickness," and "strength." "But," Plato continues, "the rearing of these men and their education, how shall we manage that?"¹

With these words Plato began one of the first, and still one of the most prominent, philosophical treatments of education. Plato raised and then tried to answer two interlocking educational questions which are of fundamental importance. First, Plato considered the normative question of what the primary tasks of education ought to be. Secondly, he considered the pedagogical question of how these tasks might be best realized. Stated simply, Plato asked: What, above all else, ought teachers and schools aim to do and how can they best achieve this aim?

Many have, since Plato, pondered over these same questions. Aristotle, Rousseau, Kant, Dewey, and Whitehead are just a few of the renowned philosophers who have taken up the challenge of identifying, and subsequently commenting upon, the fundamental business of education.

My intent in this work is to take up this same challenge. This work is a philosophical response to the fundamental questions of "what should be the primary aims of education" and "how might these aims be realized." I shall defend a normative claim about what the primary business of education ought to be. I shall also make a practical argument about how this business might fruitfully be conducted.

I follow, in this work, most closely in the footsteps of John Dewey. I believe that

Dewey had it right when, decades ago, he wrote the following words:

And if our schools turn out their pupils in that attitude of mind which is conducive to good judgment in any department of affairs in which the pupils are placed, they have done more than if they sent out their pupils possessed *merely* of vast stores of information or high degrees of skill in specialized branches.²

Education ought to be about more than, as is too often the case, the teacher making "deposits" of information "which students patiently receive, memorize, and repeat."³

Education ought to be concerned, first and foremost, with the *cultivation of good judgment*.

But here a difficulty arises. For "good judgment" is a complex philosophical concept which spills over into considerations of thinking, knowing, deciding, willing, and acting. Despite the best efforts of philosophers such as Aristotle, Kant, and Dewey, there is, at least within the field of education, still a distressing lack of clarity about the precise meaning of good judgment.

Before moving into matters of education and, indeed, before even making the normative argument that good judgment ought to be cultivated, we shall first have to vanquish this specter of conceptual confusion. What is good judgment? What are its elements? Can it, for that matter, even be cultivated? These are the questions which we shall endeavor to answer in the first four chapters.

Having gotten clear on what good judgment is, we shall, in the second half of this work, turn to matters of education. First, we shall attempt to make the case that the most important task of education is to cultivate good judgment. Given the moral climate of today's world and the inevitable unpredictability of life it is not, we shall argue, enough to fill the minds of our children with facts. One must, if one's want is for children to learn how to live wisely and well, purposefully work within schools to empower children to exercise good judgment.

We shall then, in the final chapters, turn to the practical matter of how one might go about cultivating good judgment. The community of inquiry approach employed by The Philosophy for Children Program, we shall argue, is an effective pedagogical means through which to cultivate good judgment. Within the community of inquiry children are gently encouraged to observe, practice, and reflect upon the modes of thinking, acting, and caring which are essential to the exercise of good judgment. So engaged, we conclude, children internalize these modes and so are prepared to consistently exercise good judgment.

Having laid out the task before us, we now jump head-long into the job at hand. We must get clear on the concept of good judgment itself. What is good judgment? And, of particular interest to us: Is it something which can be taught? Following the lead of F. H. Low-Beer, Douglas Lawson, and Andrew Norman, we shall argue that good judgment is best understood as a *character trait* which is comprised of a cluster of teachable abilities and dispositions.⁴

Good Judgment is a Character Trait

There are within the world both fools and wise people. Some people regularly make poor judgments while others frequently make good judgments. This qualitative consistency which characterizes the judging of both the foolish and the wise suggests that the worth of our judgments depends not merely on chance but on competency.⁵ The wise, we reason, do not characteristically make good judgments because they are lucky; they do so because they have some talent. Similarly, we conclude that the foolish make poor judgments because they lack some competency or power.⁶

From the reasonable assumption that there is some competency or talent which empowers one to make good judgments, however, it does not follow that there exists, as

Low-Beer puts it, some "mysterious faculty" of judgment.⁷ One need not, to use Norman's words, attribute the power to make good judgments to some "inscrutable quality."⁸

Indeed, as Lawson suggests, to make this move of attributing the power to make good judgments to a faculty is to fall into a linguistic trap. Though Lawson is speaking of

wisdom, he could just as well be speaking of good judgment when he writes:

...there is no Kantian *Ding an sich* within the meaning of the term wisdom. One does not *have* wisdom -- as if it were an entity. Rather, one acts wisely. To say that one has wisdom is, therefore, to use a figure of speech.⁹

The act of replacing "Socrates has some sort of talent which empowers him to consistently exercise good judgment" with "Socrates has good judgment" is, to be sure, a useful bit of linguistic short-hand. The problem with this short-hand, however, is that it tempts us to conclude unduly that "good judgment" is, like a shirt or a book, a thing which one can possess.

There is no reason to conclude that this power to make good judgments is the product of a single "discrete faculty" because there is a simpler, more easily confirmed possibility:¹⁰

I see no harm in rehabilitating the concept of faculty as a convenient label to designate a bundle of mental processes that at the level of common usage present a unitary face to the outside observer. In this sense intelligence, in the IQ sense, whatever its complex components, can usefully be referred to as a faculty. In the same sense I suggest it is useful to think of judgment as a faculty.¹¹

The power to make good judgments, Low-Beer contends, comes not from a single faculty but rather from a complex bundle of abilities. To *have* good judgment is not to *possess* some faculty of good judgment; it is to be *able* to perform well the moves through which good judgments are made.

Both Lawson and Norman would likely agree with Low-Beer that the possession of certain *abilities* is an essential ingredient of good judgment. One would not, after all, say

of a person that she has good judgment if she did not have the ability to make good judgments. As we argued earlier, good judgments are, like the fine work of a true craftsman, the products of skill and not merely of chance.

Lawson and Norman, however, both suggest that good judgment involves more than simply the *potential* to make good judgments. Essential to good judgment, as Norman writes, is the actual *exercise* of good judgment:

"Has sound judgment" is properly predicated only if the subject of predication exercises consistently sound judgment.¹²

To say of one that she has good judgment is not, to be sure, to say that she "*unfailingly*" makes good judgments; as Norman admits, "even the wise make mistakes."¹³ But it is to say that she does not merely exercise good judgment "*sporadically*."¹⁴ ("One who rendered judgments that were only occasionally found to be sound would not be termed wise."¹⁵) One who has good judgment is one who "*consistently*" makes good judgments.¹⁶

While Lawson and Norman would likely agree, then, that the possession of relevant abilities is a *necessary* condition for the predication of good judgment, they would not agree that it is a *sufficient* condition for such predication. "The trouble here," as Norman notes, "is that it is perfectly possible to have a capacity for sound judgment, yet fail to employ it."¹⁷ Possessing the *potential* to make good judgments does not ensure the actual *exercise* of good judgment. Good judgment must involve something more.

This something more, an examination of Dewey's writing suggests, is a *disposition*:

Knowledge of the methods alone will not suffice; there must be the desire, the will, to employ them. This desire is an affair of personal disposition. But on the other hand the disposition alone will not suffice. There must also be understanding of the forms and techniques that are the channels through which these attitudes operate to the best advantage.¹⁸

Having good judgment essentially involves, of course, having the ability or power to perform successfully the moves through which good judgments are made. But, as Dewey

suggests, it also essentially involves being disposed or inclined to make use of these moves. Those who have good judgment are both able and *ready* to make good judgments. They are in the *habit* of making good judgments.

Understood broadly, writes John Passmore, a "habit" can be taken to mean "a settled disposition to act in a certain way."¹⁹ In this sense a "habit" is not a blind or "automatic response" but rather, as Urmson and Ackrill put it, a "custom" or a tendency to act in a certain way.²⁰

One who is in the habit of judging well is one who has the tendency to perform consistently (but not necessarily invariably) those moves through which such judging is done. She has learned these moves, embraced them, internalized them, and, hence, has come to regularly (but not unthinkingly) perform them. She has, through her consistent action, made these moves a part of her *character*.

To say, then, that one is in the habit of making good judgments is to say, as Norman does, that one has the "character trait" of good judgment.²¹ A character trait, a habit, a disposition, an inclination; these terms, as we shall use them, are all place-holders. They communicate the notion that the actor has, *in addition to* the ability to perform some move, the desire or will to actually perform it consistently.²² One who possesses the character trait of good judgment is one who, on account of her particular bent and distinctive aptitudes, consistently exercises good judgment.

Judging Well, Good Judgments, and Having Good Judgment

The concept of judgment, Low-Beer argues, contains three related yet distinct elements:

Judgments are at once kinds of thought...and results of thought. Here the distinction is between judgment as a kind of decision and the judgmental function implied to have been performed in reaching

that decision...Lastly, judgment is thought of as a quality of mind, as a faculty responsible for the judgmental function.²³

One must, in dealing with the concept of judgment, distinguish between *judging*, *judgments*, and *having judgment*.²⁴ *Judging* is the process through which one arrives at judgments. *Judgments* are the products of the judging process. To *have judgment* is to have the power to judge and, thus, to produce judgments.

Following Low-Beer's lead one can similarly distinguish between judging well, good judgments, and having good judgment. *Judging well* is the process through which one characteristically arrives at good judgments. *Good judgments* are the characteristic outcomes of judging well. To *have good judgment* (or, as we have put it, to have the character trait of good judgment) is to possess the abilities and dispositions which empower one to judge well and to produce good judgments.

What sets the person who *has good judgment* apart from others, we argue, is precisely the quality of her *judging* and of her *judgments*. Whereas the judging processes of those who lack judgment are poor or, at the very least, unexceptional, those who have good judgment are disposed and able to *judge well*. Whereas the judgments of those who lack judgment are similarly poor or unexceptional, those who have good judgment consistently make *good judgments*.

That to have good judgment *is* to have the power to judge well and to make good judgments is a fairly obvious point. What is less obvious, however, is what precisely this means. One who has good judgment can judge well; but what is it to judge well? One who has good judgment can make good judgments; but what is it to make a good judgment?

In the following pages we shall endeavor to answer these questions and, in doing so, elucidate the defining features of good judgment. First, in the remainder of this chapter and the two chapters which follow, we shall examine the process of judging well. Then, in

Chapter Four, we shall turn our attention to the good judgments which are the outcomes of this judging process.

Judging Well

Judging is a form of thinking. It is that thinking which possesses each of the features which are common to (and definitive of) all thinking *plus an additional characteristic*. This additional characteristic is its work. *Judging is just that thinking which is employed in the work of aiming towards the end of producing a judgment.*

In order to support the preceding assertion -- and, in so doing, to begin to understand what it might mean to judge well -- it is instructive to briefly examine the features of thinking in general. Though a century old, William James' landmark treatise Principles of Psychology provides a treatment of thinking which is, for our purposes, useful. James begins with the simple observation that "thinking of some sort goes on."²⁵ "The only thing," James writes, "which psychology has a right to postulate at the outset is the fact of thinking itself."²⁶

By "thinking" James means the profusion of cognitive activity of which one can be aware; "I use the word thinking...for every form of consciousness indiscriminately."²⁷ Thinking, at this most basic level, is simply, as Dewey puts it, the "coursing of ideas through our heads."²⁸ Calculating, pondering, "reveries," "daydreams," and even "dreaming"; thinking is that which is "going through our heads."²⁹

Thinking goes on within our heads. But, "how," James asks, "does it go on?"³⁰ James identifies five important characteristics of the process of thinking.

(1) *"Every thought tends to be part of a personal consciousness."*³¹ While it is theoretically possible that there exists somewhere a thought "which is nobody's thought,"

James argues that thus far experience supports the position that "every thought is part of a personal consciousness."³²

In this room -- this lecture-room say -- there are a multitude of thoughts, yours and mine, some of which cohere mutually, and some not. They are as little each-for-itself and reciprocally independent as they are all-belonging-together. They are neither: no one of them is separate, but each belongs with certain others and with none beside. My thought belongs with my other thoughts, and your thought with your other thoughts...

Each of [our] minds keeps its own thoughts to itself. There is no giving or bartering between them. No thought even comes into direct *sight* of a thought in another personal consciousness than its own. Absolute insulation, irreducible pluralism, is the law. It seems as if the elementary psychic fact were not *thought* or *this thought* or *that thought*, but *my thought*, every thought being *owned*.³³

Thinking is a process which *belongs* to a subject.

(2) "*Within each personal consciousness thought is always changing.*"³⁴ James' contention that thought is always changing arises out of his belief that one's consciousness or "state of mind" both shapes and is shaped by one's experiences.³⁵

One's state of mind, to a large extent, determines how one thinks. Someone whose consciousness is suffused through and through with experiences u, v, and w, for instance, will, when confronted with sensation M, think something quite different than another person whose state of mind has been shaped by experiences x, y, and z. One's state of mind is the mental context which shapes how one thinks about and responds to one's world.

This mental context not only *shapes* how one thinks about the world, however. It itself is also *shaped by* one's world. New experiences do not simply enter into this mental context; they also modify this context. They, to a greater or lesser extent, teach one something new and so effect how one will, in the future think about and respond to one's world.

It is because one's experience in this manner shapes one's state of mind that James writes: "Experience is remoulding us every moment..."³⁶ One is, James here suggests, constantly being bombarded with new experiences. This being the case, one's conscious-

ness or state of mind is continually being modified. It is in a constant condition not of being but rather of *becoming*.

It is because this is the case, because "our state of mind is never precisely the same," that James concludes that, even if presented with an "identical fact," "we must think of it in a fresh manner" or "see it under a somewhat different angle."³⁷ One's thinking is in constant change (and, so, cannot help but be "a sequence of different") because one's consciousness is itself continually becoming.³⁸ One's thinking, like one's state of mind, like one's experience itself, is as a stream; it is ongoing but is never at any two moments identical.

(3) "*Within each personal consciousness thought is sensibly continuous.*"³⁹ There are, James notes, "interruptions" or "time-gaps" during which "consciousness [goes] out."⁴⁰ When one is in a deep sleep or under anesthesia, one might not be aware of one's own thinking. At some point, however, this interruption ceases and one once again realizes that one is thinking. James writes:

When Paul and Peter wake up in the same bed, and recognize that they have been asleep, each one of them mentally reaches back and makes connection with but one of the two streams of thought which were broken by the sleeping hours. As the current of an electrode buried in the ground unerringly finds its way to its own similarly buried mate, across no matter how much intervening earth; so Peter's present instantly finds out Peter's past, and never by mistake knits itself on to that of Paul. Paul's thought in turn is as little liable to go astray.⁴¹

Just like the thought of Peter or Paul, one's thinking forms a sensibly continuous stream. "Consciousness," writes James, "does not appear to itself chopped in bits...It is nothing jointed; it flows."⁴²

The stream of thinking, James contends, goes on. This is not to say, however, that this stream goes on with the same *quality*.⁴³ Just as a real stream has different qualities at different places and different times, so does the stream of thought. Sometimes the stream of thought runs swiftly ("the transitive parts") and sometimes it is deep and slow ("the

substantive parts").⁴⁴ These qualitative shifts are a natural part of the stream and are "no more a break in *thought* than a joint in a bamboo is a break in the wood."⁴⁵

(4) "[Thought] always appears to deal with objects independent of itself."⁴⁶

Thinking is a process which has an object; there is always something about which the thinking subject thinks. The objects of our thinking, James explains, commonly seem to draw upon more than mere subjective fancy. Rather, they appear to react to an "extra-mental" reality.⁴⁷ James argues:

The reason why we all believe that the objects of our thoughts have a duplicate existence outside, is that there are *many* human thoughts, each with the *same* objects, as we cannot help supposing. The judgment that *my* thought has the same object as *his* thought is what makes the psychologist call my thought cognitive of an outer reality. The judgment that my own past thought and my own present thought are of the same object is what makes *me* take the object out of either and project it by a sort of triangulation into an independent position, from which it may *appear* to both. *Sameness* in a multiplicity of objective appearances is thus the basis of our belief in realities outside of thought.⁴⁸

The object of thinking is its content. Much of this content, experience suggests to us, comes into being largely on account of one's interactions with a reality which is independent from oneself.

While thinking commonly involves the consideration of some extra-mental reality, it is important to note, James explains, that the object of one's thought is not "synonymous with" this reality.⁴⁹ Take for instance the thought "Columbus discovered America in 1492."⁵⁰ One might well be tempted to say that the object of this thought is simply the person "Columbus" or perhaps the place "America." To succumb to such temptation, however, is, James warns us, to fall into a grammatical trap. For, while both "Columbus" and "America" are "substantive kernel[s]" of this thought, neither is in and of itself the object of this thought.⁵¹

The object of the thought "Columbus discovered America in 1492," James contends, "is nothing short of the entire sentence, 'Columbus-discovered-America-in-

1492."⁵² The object or content of our thinking *is* the entirety of our thinking in its full richness. It is "its entire content or deliverance, neither more nor less."⁵³

(5) "[Thought] is always interested more in one part of its object than in another, and welcomes and rejects, or chooses, all the while it thinks."⁵⁴ One's thought, James writes, "depends on the things that [one] has experienced."⁵⁵ But one's experiences, James continues, are, in fact, shaped by one's thinking itself.

...the mind is at every stage a theatre of simultaneous possibilities. Consciousness consists in the comparison of these with each other, the selection of some, and the suppression of the rest by the reinforcing and inhibiting agency of attention. The highest and most elaborated mental products are filtered from the data chosen by the faculty next beneath, out of the mass offered by the faculty below that, which mass in turn was sifted from a still larger amount of yet simpler material, and so on. The mind, in short, works on the data it receives very much as a sculptor works on his block of stone. In a sense the statue stood there from eternity. But there were a thousand different ones beside it, and the sculptor alone is to thank for having extricated this one from the rest.⁵⁶

Guided by one's interests, one's thinking serves as a means through which one chooses from amongst the "mass of presented objects" which one encounters.⁵⁷ By emphasizing some things while ignoring others one's thinking itself helps to shape how one experiences the world.

Though much more could be said about thinking (and, indeed, James himself says much more about thinking), James' summary is a good one. Thinking, James tells us, belongs to a subject and deals with an object. Thinking is always changing but yet forms a sensibly continuous stream. Thinking itself shapes how one experiences one's world.

These features which James brings to light are features of thinking in general. They are also features of judging for, as we have argued, judging is a sub-class of thinking. About judging, then, we can now say a number of things:

(1) Judging, like all thinking, belongs to a subject. Judging is a process which is performed by some person.

(2) Judging, like all thinking, deals with an object. Judging is a process which has a content; when one judges one thinks about something.

(3) Judging, like all thinking, itself shapes how one experiences one's world. In judging one concentrates on certain things while ignoring others. This act of focusing influences how one perceives one's world.

(4) Judging is *part* of the sensibly continuous stream of thinking. It is not, however, the *whole* of this stream. If one wishes (as we do) to distinguish between thinking and judging, this is the most important point of all. It is a point which arises out of an observation which James makes (but does not here make enough out of); namely, that not all thinking is of the same quality.

James asserts that there are "*contrasts in the quality* of the successive segments of the stream of thought."⁵⁸ The quality of thinking, for instance, which occurs during "time-part" "1-2" might be quite different from the quality of the thinking which happens during "time-part" "2-3."⁵⁹ Thinking, James says, "is always changing."⁶⁰

Dewey shares James' view that instances of thinking are not all identical but are, in fact, qualitatively distinguishable from each other. In his How We Think Dewey writes that there are "various ways in which men *do* think."⁶¹ Dewey, however, does not stop here. He proceeds to make the additional point that some instances of thinking are not merely qualitatively *different* from other instances of thinking but are, in fact, qualitatively *better*. Dewey writes: "some of [the various] ways [of thinking] are better than others."⁶²

For Dewey the way of thinking which is qualitatively better than other ways of thinking is *reflective thinking*.

The better way of thinking that is to be considered in this book is called reflective thinking: the kind of thinking that consists in turning a subject over in the mind and giving it serious and consecutive consideration.⁶³

Unlike thinking which is merely a "random coursing of things through the mind," reflective thinking is comprised of "a train or chain" of connected "term[s] of thought" each of which

"leaves a deposit that is utilized in the next term."⁶⁴ It is inquisitive, deliberate, and intelligently directed thinking which aims to settle some "state of doubt" or solve some "perplexity."⁶⁵

Here Dewey asserts that thinking can be more than a haphazard "procession of mental states."⁶⁶ Thinking, he tells us, can be put to work. It can purposefully be applied to the task of solving some difficulty.

Making use of James' metaphor, one might say that Dewey's point is that the stream of thinking need not be left to meander here and there. Just as one might divert an actual stream in order to turn the wheels of a mill, one can purposefully direct the stream of thinking and make use of it in the doing of one's tasks.

Our contention is that judging, like Dewey's reflective thinking, is thinking which has been put to work. Judging is precisely that portion of the stream of thinking which has been applied to the task of making choices. It is that thinking through which one discerns and discriminates between alternatives and, hence, arrives at judgments. (This is not, however, to say that all judging actually arrives at a judgment; just as a life can be cut short, the process of judging can terminate without being completed.)

Judging, in other words, is choosing through thinking. It is a cognitive process through which one selects from amongst alternatives. This process of selection, it is important to stress, is *thoughtful*. Unreflective habits, reflexes, instincts, instances of operant conditioning, over-powering addictions, and non-cognitive procedures such as the flip of a coin; all of these are (unthinking) ways through which potential occurrences are rejected and embraced.⁶⁷ None of these ways, however, are instances of judging. To judge is not merely to winnow possibilities. Rather, it is to *decide upon* an alternative. It is to choose *through* thinking.

There are countless times during the course of the day when one is presented with an occasion to choose. Some of these occasions are relatively mundane: Should I ride my bicycle to the store or should I take the car? Some are more momentous: Should I take my friend up on his offer and try cocaine for the first time or should I decline my friend's offer? Whether the occasion is momentous or mundane, however, we note that one can only judge if one is confronted with a *real choice*. One can only choose through thinking if one actually has a choice between at least two *legitimate* alternatives.

An alternative is legitimate only if, to use William James' terms, it is a "live hypothesis." James writes:

A live hypothesis is one which appeals as a real possibility to him whom it is proposed. If I ask you to believe in the Mahdi, the notion makes no electric connection with your nature -- it refuses to scintillate with any credibility at all. As an hypothesis it is completely dead. To an Arab, however (even if he be not one of the Mahdi's followers), the hypothesis is among the mind's possibilities: it is alive.⁶⁸

To use my car is not a live alternative for me if my car does not even work. To use cocaine is not, for me, a live alternative if my firm convictions prevent me from even entertaining this possibility. An alternative is alive to one only if it has some pull on one. It is legitimate only if one has at least some cause to consider it.

If a choice does not present one with at least two legitimate alternatives it is not a real choice or, to again use James' words, a "live option."

A living option is one in which both hypotheses are live ones. If I say to you: "Be a theosophist or be a mahomedan," it is probably a dead option, because for you neither hypothesis is likely to be alive. But if I say "Be an agnostic or be a Christian," it is otherwise: trained as you are, each hypothesis makes some appeal, however small, to your belief.⁶⁹

Drive or ride your bike, start using cocaine or do not; choices such as these are only real choices only if they offer one a live option between at least two legitimate alternatives. Only then do they truly call for choice.

Judging is a process which begins only when there is real choice. Indeed, there cannot be judging without real choice for such choice is the work which is, in part,

definitive of judging. It is when there is this work to be done that thinking is put to work and, hence, is transformed from a cognitive process into a *cognitive means*.

Judging, then, is just that thinking which one employs in order to choose from among legitimate alternatives. But what is *judging well*? What does it mean when we say that one who has good judgment has the power not merely to judge but to judge well?

Dewey, we recall, asserts that some ways of thinking "are better than others."⁷⁰ What, one might ask, makes some ways of thinking better than others? Here Dewey suggests that better thinking is "more effective."⁷¹ It is that thinking which "[does] better the work that thinking can do..."⁷² Better thinking, then, is good not because it possesses an "inscrutable quality" of goodness.⁷³ It is better, Dewey tells us, because it is *good for* something.

One of the things which better thinking can be good for is judging. Some ways of thinking have proven to be especially well-suited to the cognitive work of judging. When employed during the work of judging they, as James might put it, tend to "help us to get into satisfactory relation with" our world.⁷⁴ They tend to help us to make good judgments.⁷⁵

Thinking which is good for judging -- *which, for the sake of convenience, we shall simply call "good thinking"* -- is the distinctive mark of judging well. Like all judging, judging well is a process of choosing which is performed through thinking. Unlike all judging, however, judging well is performed through thinking which is well-suited to the work of judging. It is choosing through *good* thinking.

The defining feature which differentiates the sub-class of judging well from judging, then, is that judging well, unlike the broader class of judging, draws upon good thinking. But what precisely is this good thinking? What are the characteristics which distinguish the thinking which tends to help one to make good judgments from the thinking which does not?

In the next two chapters we shall answer these questions. Good thinking, we shall assert, is thinking which: (1) is performed through the skillful exercise of a variety of appropriate cognitive moves, and (2) "leans back on" one's understanding.⁷⁶

Notes

¹Plato. The Republic, [376c].

²Dewey (1933), p. 120.

³Freire (1970), p. 53.

⁴Unfortunately, we cannot, given the limited scope of this work, provide a thorough historical account of the philosophical treatment of judgment. Philosophers such as Aristotle, Marcus Aurelius, Montaigne, Locke, Kant, and Dewey have all spoken of "judgment." Their understanding of this term, however, is sometimes quite different. For a historical account of the philosophical treatment of judgment see F. H. Low-Beer (1995), Chapter One.

⁵So too, our very intuition tells us that there must be some reason why a given judgment has the particular quality which it does. As Aristotle writes: "To entrust to chance what is greatest and most noble would be a very defective arrangement." The Nicomachean Ethics, [1099b].

⁶Throughout this work I use the term "power." I use this term merely as a variation of "ability"; to have the power to do something is to be able to do it.

⁷Low-Beer (1995), p. 26.

⁸Norman (1996), p. 260. The concern of both Norman and Lawson is not with the concept of good judgment but rather with the concept of wisdom. Both these individuals, however, equate wisdom with the exercise of good judgment. To be wise is to consistently judge well. Given this identification of wisdom with good judgment, what Norman and Lawson have to say about wisdom is relevant to our consideration of good judgment.

⁹Lawson (1961), p. 8.

¹⁰Low-Beer (1995), p. 167.

¹¹Low-Beer (1995), p. 167.

¹²Norman (1996), p. 260. See also Lawson (1961), p. 8.

¹³Norman (1996), p. 259.

¹⁴Norman (1996), p. 259.

¹⁵Norman (1996), p. 259.

¹⁶Norman (1996), pp. 259-260.

¹⁷Norman (1996), p. 259.

¹⁸Dewey (1933), p. 30.

¹⁹Passmore (1980), p. 120.

²⁰See J. L. Ackrill and J. O. Urmson's notes (p. xxvii.) on the revision of David Ross' translation of The Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980.

²¹Norman (1996), p. 259. To say that one has the "character trait" of performing some move is, as I am using the term, simply to say that this person is inclined to consistently perform this move. In using the term "character trait," then, I do *not* mean to suggest the presence of some natural, inborn quality.

²²What gives one the desire or will to perform these moves? The answer to this question is, for the most part, beyond the scope of this work. More will be said on this, however, in Chapter Eleven, Where to Go.

²³Low-Beer (1995), p. 40.

²⁴Dewey makes a similar distinction. See Dewey (1933), p. 120.

²⁵James (1890), p. 224.

²⁶James (1890), p. 224.

²⁷James (1890), p. 224.

²⁸Dewey (1933), p. 4.

²⁹Dewey (1933), p. 3.

³⁰James (1890), p. 225.

³¹James (1890), p. 225. James also writes:

Its ["personal consciousness"] meaning we know so long as no one asks us to define it, but to give an accurate account of it is the most difficult of philosophic tasks. (p. 225)

Dealing with matters of judgment unavoidably entangles one in a great number of thorny philosophical issues. I shall, in this work, endeavor to deal earnestly with those issues which are central to our task of understanding how to educate for judgment. There are some issues, however, which I shall pass over lightly. I do this not because I lack respect for the complexity of these issues but rather because to give these issues their due heed would lead us too far astray. The reader is, then, well-advised to keep James's cautionary words in mind:

[We shall have to use certain terms which we have not completely defined.]
But everyone knows what the terms mean in a rough way; and it is only in a
rough way that we are now to take them. (p. 225)

This work, like James', must at certain times be "like a painter's first charcoal sketch upon
his canvas, in which no niceties appear." (p. 225.)

³²James (1890), pp. 225-226.

³³James (1890), pp. 225-226.

³⁴James (1890), p. 225.

³⁵James (1890), p. 233.

³⁶James (1890), p. 234.

³⁷James (1890), p. 233.

³⁸James (1890), p. 230.

³⁹James (1890), p. 225.

⁴⁰James (1890), p. 237.

⁴¹James (1890), p. 238.

⁴²James (1890), p. 239.

⁴³James (1890), p. 239.

⁴⁴James (1890), p. 243.

⁴⁵James (1890), p. 240.

⁴⁶James (1890), p. 225.

⁴⁷James (1890), p. 272.

⁴⁸James (1890), pp. 271-272.

⁴⁹James (1890), p. 275.

⁵⁰James (1890), p. 275.

⁵¹James (1890), p. 275.

⁵²James (1890), p. 275.

⁵³James (1890), p. 275.

⁵⁴James (1890), p. 284.

⁵⁵James (1890), p. 286.

⁵⁶James (1890), p. 288.

⁵⁷James (1890), p. 287.

⁵⁸James (1890), p. 239.

⁵⁹James (1890), p. 279.

⁶⁰James (1890), p. 225.

⁶¹Dewey (1933), p. 3.

⁶²Dewey (1933), p. 3. Here I am contrasting Dewey's words only with James' brief consideration of thinking. My intent is not to suggest that James was unaware of the distinction which Dewey makes.

⁶³Dewey (1933), p. 3.

⁶⁴Dewey (1933), pp. 4-5.

⁶⁵Dewey (1933), p. 12.

⁶⁶Dewey (1933), p. 4.

⁶⁷The decision which one makes to choose through a toss of a coin is a product of thinking and, hence, a judgment. The actual fall of the coin which "selects" one option over another does not involve thinking, however, and, so, is not a product of judging.

⁶⁸James (1896), p. 458.

⁶⁹James (1896), p. 458.

⁷⁰Dewey (1933), p. 3.

⁷¹Dewey (1933), p. 3.

⁷²Dewey (1933), p. 3.

⁷³Norman (1996), p. 260.

⁷⁴James (1907), p. 30. See also Chapter Four.

⁷⁵We shall examine “good judgments” in detail in Chapter Four.

⁷⁶Dewey (1933), p. 4.

Chapter Two: Good Thinking and Cognitive Moves

Cognitive Moves

Good thinking is the substratum upon which judging well rests. Part of good thinking is the effective employment of a variety of *cognitive moves*. Just as a skilled craftsman can capably employ a variety of tools in the doing of his work, an individual who is skilled at thinking can adeptly make use of a number of cognitive moves in doing the work of judging. But what are cognitive moves?

Thinking, James writes, "goes on."¹ Thinking is the profusion of cognitive activity of which we are aware; "I use the word thinking," James writes, "for every form of consciousness indiscriminately."² Thinking, Dewey explains, it most simply the "coursing of ideas through our heads."³ It, like an "unbroken stream," is ongoing.⁴

While the stream of thinking is ongoing, it can, for purposes of examination, be severed into discernible portions. One can, by reflecting upon one's thinking, slice "cross-section[s]" from the stream of thinking.⁵ Cutting into one's thinking at moment X and again at moment Y, one introspectively lifts clear a temporally limited portion of thinking.

Focusing one's scrutiny upon this cross-section, one discovers that the quickly flowing stream of thinking is, in truth, comprised of countless temporally and functionally distinct movements. These movements are like the individual flaps of a hummingbird's wings. In normal time, at normal speed, they oftentimes go unnoticed. But if one slows things down, if one carefully examines the process of thinking, one finds that behind the smooth blur of movement lies an irregularly pitching series of distinct moves.⁶

Cognitive moves are these temporally and functionally distinct movements which, when viewed collectively, account for the ongoing flow of the process of thinking. Each cognitive move is, like the flap of a hummingbird's wing, a burst of energy through which thinking proceeds onwards.

Cognitive moves are not merely random discharges of mental energy. A cognitive move is a bundle of cognitive activity which, unlike a haphazard selection of such activity, *does something*. "Cognitive moves," as Matthew Lipman writes, "are psychological acts whereby certain cognitive operations are carried out."⁷ A cognitive move is a tool which serves some function. It is a means through which one attempts to get along within one's world.

An example of a cognitive move is the mental activity of seeking reasons. This cognitive move is distinguished from other cognitive activity by its function; when one seeks reasons, one endeavors to support a claim by linking it to a second "less controversial and more acceptable" claim.⁸ To seek reasons is to make a cognitive move through which the operation of supporting one's claims is done.

A great number of distinct cognitive moves have been identified by philosophers and psychologists. From a list compiled by Matthew Lipman and Ann Gazzard one might single out, to pick just a few, such moves as: "Distinction-making," "Connection-making," "Defining," "Perspective taking," and "Hypothetical reasoning."⁹ Among those moves which Laurance Splitter and Ann Sharp identify are: "Using analogies," "Analysing sentences and statements," "Identifying, questioning and justifying assumptions," "Taking all relevant considerations into account," "Anticipating, predicting and exploring consequences," "Detecting vagueness and ambiguity," and "Showing sensitivity to context."¹⁰

While a vast number of cognitive moves have been identified, not all of these moves are of help in the work of judging well. Some cognitive moves, in fact, have been shown to be an impediment to good judgment. In their discussion of logical fallacies,

Irving Copi and Carl Cohen recognize a number of moves which tend to lead one's judgments astray.¹¹ They speak, for instance, of the fallacy of appealing to an inappropriate authority ("argument ad Verecundiam"); one makes the move of justifying a judgment by appealing to parties which have "no legitimate claim to authority in the matter at hand."¹² So too, they recognize the fallacies of "accident" and "converse accident"; in the former one moves "too quickly *from* a generalization" and in the latter one moves "too quickly *to* a generalization."¹³

Some cognitive moves are not particularly good for judging. There are, however, many cognitive moves which have been proven to be especially useful in the work of judging well. They have been "proven" to be useful not by some certain, ahistorical god's-eye perspective but rather by the collective experience of humankind. Human beings have found that certain cognitive moves consistently conduce to judging well. Thus, we attribute to these particular cognitive moves the predicate "good for judging."

The determination that some cognitive moves beneficially contribute to the work of judging well, then, is neither arbitrary nor absolute. It is not the case that any cognitive move is just as good as any other for the work of judging well. Nor is it the case that cognitive moves are "not only useful" for this work but are in some way absolutely or finally correct for this work.¹⁴ Moving, as Richard Bernstein urges, beyond both absolutism and relativism, we follow James' lead.¹⁵ One should, we assert, act with a resolute conviction in the worth of those cognitive moves which have historically helped human beings to judge well while simultaneously remaining cognizant of the fact that further experience may tip the balance and compel one to reassess the worth of these moves.¹⁶

In the pages which follow we shall examine just a few of the many cognitive moves which have proven to be useful in the work of judging well: Clarifying Matters, Seeking Justification, Working with Assumptions, Working with Inferences, Using Examples, and

Being Receptive. The selection of these six moves is the product of a consideration of Thomas Jackson's "Good Thinker's Tool Kit."¹⁷

Jackson's kit consists of seven "cognitive skill[s]."¹⁸ These skills are represented by the letters "W" ("What do you mean by...? What is the problem? What is going on here? What have I forgotten to ask? What else do I need to know?"), "R" ("Are reasons being offered to support claims?"), "A" ("Are we aware of and identifying key assumptions being made?"), "I" ("Are we aware of inferences being made and possible implications of what is being said?"), "T" ("Is what is being said true? How could we find out?"), "E" ("Are EXAMPLES being given or is EVIDENCE being offered to support or illustrate claims?"), and "C" ("Are there any counter-examples to the claim being made?").¹⁹

Clarifying Matters

*"Clarifying Matters" is the cognitive move of teasing out the nuances of a term, concept, or situation.*²⁰ One way in which people express this move is by trying to come up with a definition for a term whose meaning is uncertain. For example:

I do not even know how one man becomes the friend of another...Answer me this. As soon as one man loves another, which of the two becomes the friend -- the lover of the loved, or the loved of the lover? Or does it make no difference?²¹

Here Plato makes the move of Clarifying Matters when he endeavors to distinguish between various shades of meaning. He questions, prods, and pokes; all the while trying to get clear on what, precisely, is meant by "friendship."

One also makes the move of Clarifying Matters when one works in order to tease out the relevant details of a situation and, thereby, come to more fully appreciate its distinctive quality or character. The children in the following transcript model this move:

Mr. Toby: OK, so let's say this is person number one -- or let's say that it's a group of people -- and they own the land. Then person number two -- or group of people number two -- come along and they steal the land. OK,

then the third group of people -- [and] let's say that...they weren't even here or not even born yet when the land got stolen -- they buy the land. So what's fair? They [group number three] bought it. But they [group number one] had it stolen from them. So who should get it then?

Naim: You know those two last people [or groups], are they dead?

Mr. Toby: Let's say...I don't know. Well tell me, what difference does it make?

Naim: If they're dead the last person shouldn't get it because the guy is already dead.

Trung: Yeah, but is all of them like in the same year? Or is that one older and this one is...

Mr. Toby: Let's say that these [the first group] are the Hawaiians. These [the second group] are the missionaries maybe. And these [the third group] are...that's you today.²²

Naim and Trung display a propensity to flesh out the nuances of the situation. Like Plato, they raise questions in order to get at what, precisely, are the relevant considerations which give this situation its distinctive shape and meaning.

Seeking Justification

*To make the move of "Seeking Justification" is: (1) To justify a claim in light of some other claim, happening, or belief, (2) to ask for such justification, or (3) to assess the worth of an attempt at justification.*²³

One Seeks Justification when one gives a reason in order to justify a claim. To give a reason is to attempt to support a claim by connecting it to a second "less controversial and more acceptable" claim.²⁴ This is what Matthew (a fourth grader) does:
...the Hawaiians claimed the land first before the missionaries did so I think that the Hawaiians should get back the land that they claimed.²⁵

Matthew tries to justify his claim (namely, that the Hawaiians should get back their land) by connecting it to a less controversial claim (namely, that the first one to claim a piece land is the rightful owner).²⁶

One also Seeks Justification by requesting a reason. One requests a reason because one is not satisfied with the support which has been offered for a claim. In the following example Allen makes this move:

Matthew, [? -- names a student in the class who has recently moved to Hawai'i] didn't do anything to them! He's Chinese and China didn't do anything to Hawaiians! I'm Japanese and I didn't do anything! So why should we suffer when we didn't do anything?!

At the end of this passage Allen asks for a reason. He wants Matthew to offer further justification for his claim that all people who live in Hawai'i and who are not of Hawaiian ancestry should give up their land.

A third way in which one Seeks Justification is by assessing the worth of a reason. One does this by considering whether or not a reason does, in fact, provide adequate support for a claim. This is something which Allen's statement also illustrates. Allen assesses the reason which Matthew provided. He determines that Matthew's reason does not apply to a large class of people who are living in today's Hawai'i (namely, all those people who are not descendants of those who tricked the Hawaiians and stole their land). Given this determination, Allen concludes that Matthew's reason does not adequately support his contention that all non-Hawaiians ought to give up their land.

One makes the move of Seeking Justification, then, when one provides, requests, and evaluates reasons. One also makes the move of Seeking Justification when one works with criteria.

"Criteria," writes Lipman, "form a subset of reasons..."²⁸ A criterion is "a reason (1) that is especially relevant to an ongoing inquiry, (2) that has a record of reliability, and (3) that is especially forceful..."²⁹

Whether or not a given reason meets these three metacriteria (relevance, reliability, and strength) and, hence, ought to be called a "criterion" can, of course, always be argued. Having made this cautionary point, however, we propose that in the following passage Sean makes the move of working with criteria by appealing to a criterion:

I would feel kind of angry [if I had to leave my home] but I would still do it because they came here first and they're the real claimers. So I would respect them.³⁰

In order to support the claim that non-Hawaiians ought to give up their land, Sean appeals to what he believes is an "eminently relevant, reliable, and forceful" reason (namely, that whoever gets to a place first has the right to claim it).³¹ In doing this, Sean is making the move of appealing to a criterion.

Another aspect of being able to utilize criteria is being sensitive to the worth of ostensible criteria. John Dye does this when he questions the appropriateness of Sean's criterion:

What I hear people assuming is that because the Hawaiians were here first they owned the land. Now is that a good assumption? I mean this is getting back to the question of what it means to own something. Do they own it because...Should they own it because they were here first?³²

Is "whoever gets there first" a reliable criterion to appeal to when addressing matters of ownership? By raising this question Dye makes the move of evaluating the worth criteria.

Working with Assumptions

*To make the move "Working with Assumptions" is: (1) To call into question the truth of a claim or belief, or (2) to make a claim or belief the antecedent of a conditional claim.*³³

One Works with Assumptions when one identifies a claim or belief which seems to be problematic and asks oneself or others whether or not it is true. For instance:

*Mr. Toby: ...it seems like we're assuming that the Hawaiians did own the land. And I guess what I'm wondering is what do you mean by "own?" We're assuming that you can own land. But can you own land?*³⁴

Here I raise a red flag of warning. I note that the truth of the claim "Hawaiians owned the land" is uncertain since the truth of the underlying claim "land can be owned" is similarly uncertain. To be skilled at this sort of thing, to be skilled at being able to take note of claims and underlying claims which are in need of further consideration and call them into question, is to be skilled at this first expression of Working with Assumptions.

A second and somewhat different expression of Working with Assumptions is the process of assuming something to be the case and then using this assumption as a starting point -- or a "perch" -- from which to reason hypothetically. This is what Allen does in the proceeding example,

I kind of disagree because they should give back some of the land. Because if we give back all of the land maybe they [the Hawaiians] might tell...all of the people who aren't Hawaiians [to] go to their own country and don't come back.³⁵

In order to assess the desirability of the claim "All of the land should be given back to the Hawaiians" Allen assumes the claim to be the case. He then makes the move of imagining what the likely consequences would be if this claim was actually the case. "If we were to give all the land back," he reasons, "then all non-Hawaiians might be kicked out of Hawai'i." Having drawn this implication which is (to him) undesirable, Allen then concludes that the land should not all be given back to the Hawaiians.³⁶

This is a complex move which begins with the posing of an assumption in response to what Dewey calls an "ambiguous" or "forked-road" situation, proceeds through a consideration of the possible implications of one's assumption, and then ends with an assessment of the initial assumption based upon the implications which have been drawn.³⁷ Since this complex move begins only when an individual assumes something to

be the case and then employs this assumption as a perch from which to reason we say that this move is a second expression of Working with Assumptions.³⁸

Working with Inferences

To make the move "Working with Inferences" is: (1) To make a connection (perhaps through a series of intermediary steps) between a starting point and an ending point, or (2) to assess the strength of such a connection.

"Inference," writes Lipman, "...is a cognitive move in which someone actually draws the conclusion from the premises."³⁹ The "process of arriving at an idea of what is absent on the basis of what is at hand," Dewey tells us, "is *inference*."⁴⁰ To make an inference, explains Jackson, is to move from a starting point (be it a belief, statement, or observation) to a conclusion.⁴¹ For instance, Jackson often continues, an individual might observe that a person is wearing a gold band on the ring finger on his left hand. From this initial observation (and from her background understanding of the culture) this individual moves to the conclusion that the person who is wearing the ring is married. To go through this sort of cognitive process is to draw an inference.

Drawing or making inferences is one expression of Working with Inferences. Sean makes this move when he responds to the question "What would you have to do to own land (in ancient Hawai'i)?"

I guess that you could just claim your land like that 'cause there were no laws and no government on the Hawaiian islands back then.⁴²

Sean makes the move of drawing the conclusion "you could just claim your land [in ancient Hawai'i]" from the starting point "there were no laws and no government on the Hawaiian islands back then."⁴³

There are other, more complex, examples of this move. Consider, for instance, the inference which third grader Jackie draws:

Jackie: But then it doesn't really have to be a relationship and a thing. It can be different things, like maybe say an ocean and the...and many things live in the ocean so they relate to each other.

Mr. Toby: Did everyone get that? OMT, one more time.⁴⁴

Jackie: OK, this is a big classroom and we fit inside it and we're relating to it 'cause we're inside. So I think a relationship is a big thing...like say...a pool can fit people inside it so they relate to each other...It's like a mother and a baby inside. So they relate to each other 'cause they're connected. They are a part of each other.⁴⁵

Jackie concludes that things can be inside things (and, so too, that it is not the case that things are only found inside of relationships). She draws this conclusion from her observation that within her world there are a number of instances where a thing is inside of another thing (namely, the ocean-dwellers who are inside the ocean, the people who are inside her classroom, the people who are inside a swimming pool, and the baby who is inside his or her mother).⁴⁶

An example of how an inference can be drawn through a number of intermediary steps is found in one of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's stories about Sherlock Holmes:

From long habit the train of thoughts ran so swiftly through my mind that I arrive at the conclusion without being conscious of intermediate steps. There were such steps, however. The train of reasoning ran: 'Here is a gentleman of the medical type, but with the air of a military man. Clearly an army doctor, then. He has just come from the tropics, for his face is dark, and that is not the natural tint of his skin, for his wrists are fair. He has undergone hardship and sickness, as his haggard face says clearly. Where in the tropics could an English army doctor have seen much hardship and got his arm wounded? Clearly in Afghanistan.' The whole train of thought did not occupy a second. I then remarked that you came from Afghanistan, and you were astonished.⁴⁷

Here Holmes first makes a number of inferences based upon his observations. Then the conclusions to these inferences become the starting point for the inference that Watson came from Afghanistan.

A second expression of Working with Inferences is assessing "when an inference is warranted and when [it is] not."⁴⁸ To make this move is first to identify an inference which has been made and then to consider whether or not (or with what strength) a conclusion follows from its starting point.⁴⁹

Using Examples

One makes an inductive inference when one makes the move of passing from specific instances to general claims. (This is what Jackie did when she stated that a thing can be inside a thing.) One can also make the move of passing from general claims to specific instances. One can do this either by providing an example which supports and/or illustrates the general claim or by providing an example which aims to counter or refute a general claim which has been made. *To do these things, to utilize examples and counter-examples in order to shuttle from a general claim to specific instances which support, illustrate, or refute this general claim is to make the cognitive move "Using Examples."*

It is often the case that one offers an example in order to support and/or illustrate a general claim which one has made. Plato does this in the following passage:

He and I have a notion that there is not one knowledge or science of the past, another of the present, a third of what may and will be best in the future, but that of all three there is one science only. For example, there is one science of medicine which is concerned with the superintendence of health equally in all times, present, past, and future, and one science of husbandry in like manner, which is concerned with the productions of the earth in all times.⁵⁰

Plato first states the general claim that "there is one science only" and then makes the move of providing examples (of the sciences of medicine and husbandry) which support and illustrate this general claim.

Ahn Thy, a third grader, also makes this move of offering an example during a elementary school philosophy session:

Ahn Thy: OK, I think I can explain what that mean. I think what it means is without a thing there will be no relationships.

Mrs. Yoshida: You're getting us to one of our next questions.

Ahn Thy: It's the one that Jackie said. It's just like earth. It is like there are people inside, and without them there would be no earth.

Mrs. Yoshida: So you're saying if you don't have things you can't have relationships?

Ahn Thy: Yeah, 'Cause things make a relationship. It's just like a mechanical pencil. They make lead, right? Without a mechanical pencil why should there be lead?⁵¹

In order to support and illustrate the general claim that there could be no relationships without things Ahn Thy offers examples. This move of providing examples, along with the move of asking others to provide examples which support and/or illustrate their claims, is a part of Using Examples.

"It is perhaps too easy to get enthusiastic about the truth of a claim," writes Jackson. "The search for counter-examples is an important check on such enthusiasm."⁵² Another way in which to work with examples is by using them in order to refute or test the limits of a general claim. Plato often does this:

Socrates: Then, according to you, only the wise endurance is courage?

Laches: It seems so.

Socrates: But as to the epithet 'wise' -- wise in what? In all things small as well as great? For example, if a man shows the quality of endurance in spending his money wisely, knowing that by spending he will acquire more in the end, do you call him courageous?

Laches: Assuredly not.⁵³

By making the move of identifying a specific instance in which Laches' general claim "wise endurance is courage" does not hold, Socrates shows that this claim is, at best, too sweeping or, at worst, simply inaccurate.

Brian makes this same move of employing a counter-example during a third grade philosophy session:

I want to refer to his question when he said you can do any old thing to find a relationship. I don't think so because if you do a shoe and a creature, it's like there is not even a relationship.⁵⁴

Brian moves from a general claim -- namely, "you can have a relationship between any two things" -- to an instance and, by means of his counter-example, shows that the general claim is not entirely accurate. This act of seeking out relevant counter-examples in order to check the accuracy of a claim is a second expression of the cognitive move Using Examples.

Being Receptive

Matthew Lipman proposes an axis which has at one end "manipulative thinking" and at the other end "assimilative thinking." "One way this axis can be understood," writes Lipman, "is in terms of a contrast between doing and undergoing or between being an agent and being a patient."⁵⁵

The cognitive moves which we have examined thus far all fall towards the manipulative or "doing" end of this axis. When one employs criteria, draws inferences, searches for counter-examples, or makes any of the other cognitive moves which we have already considered, one manipulates ideas. One takes ideas and does things to them: one rearranges them, adds to them, takes away from them, tests them, or actively tries to connect them with other ideas.

Being Receptive is a cognitive move which falls towards the assimilative end of the manipulative-assimilative axis. In contrast to manipulative moves, Being Receptive is characterized not by furious activity but rather by relative quiet and passivity. When one makes the move of Being Receptive one does not fiddle with cognitive connections.

Rather, one observes and opens up to one's surroundings and, in doing so, takes in the richness of these surroundings.

The stillness of Being Receptive, it is important to note, is relative rather than absolute. Being Receptive is not a non-move; it is not an instance of sitting idly by and doing nothing. Being Receptive demands, to use Dewey's words, a "going-out of energy."⁵⁶ If one withholds one's energy and withdraws from one's surroundings, one is not Being Receptive. In order to really Be Receptive, in order to really perceive or "take in" the quality of one's situation, one must "summon" the energy to open up to one's situation.⁵⁷

When one summons this energy, when one makes the move of Being Receptive, what one does is expand the sphere of one's sensitivity. One, to make use of the words of James and Dewey, moves beyond one's focus and gets at the fringe which lies just beyond this focus.⁵⁸

Everyone's conscious awareness, James and Dewey both note, has a focus. On account of one's own interests and concerns one's attention becomes fixed on particular objects, events, or problems. As Dewey puts it, the focus of one's awareness "corresponds to the point" which is "of imminent need" or "of urgency" to one.⁵⁹

This focus shapes one's perception of the world by limiting the sphere of one's awareness. Attending to those objects and events which are currently of most interest, one pays little or no heed to other things. By means of one's attention, one favors particular objects and events and, in so doing, isolates them from the broader contextual field of which they are a part.

This isolation of objects and events is a natural psychological consequence of human interest. It is not, however, an actual condition. "In actual experience," writes Dewey, "there is never any such isolated singular object or event, an object or event is

always a special part, phase, or aspect, of an environing experienced world -- a situation."⁶⁰ Events and objects are always constituent parts of a broader field of relations.

Because objects and events are, in actuality, inextricably woven into the fabric of a situation one's focus always has a "fringe."⁶¹ The fringe of one's focus is comprised of those objects, events, and relations which lie outside of one's focus but which are intimately connected to this focus. Like the moments which precede and follow a segment of a movie, this fringe is that which "colors" one's focus and "suffuses" it with meaning.⁶²

Being Receptive is a cognitive move through which one gets at this fringe. It is a cognitive move which gives one greater sensitivity; empowering one to perceive not only that which falls within the bright, oftentimes fixating, spotlight of one's focus but also the shadowy, outlying relations which are so essential to a deep and rich understanding.

How precisely does one make this move of Being Receptive? *One makes the move of Being Receptive by: (1) purposefully endeavoring to heighten one's attentiveness and, in so doing, expand the scope of one's perception, or (2) deliberately striving to reduce the psychological rigidity which limits the scope of one's perception.* Put more simply, Being Receptive is expressed through *being attentive* and *giving space*. We shall consider each of these two expressions of Being Receptive in turn.

One way to make the move of Being Receptive is simply by deliberately endeavoring to heighten one's awareness. One puts one's energy into being more attentive. One consciously strives to pay attention not only to that which is within one's focus but also to that which normally lies on the fringe of this focus. One endeavors, to put it differently, to expand one's field of perception.

A figure who oftentimes exemplifies this move of being attentive is Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's fictional detective Sherlock Holmes. While, to consider just one instance, Scotland Yard inspectors focused primarily on the body of a murder victim, Holmes was

equally attentive to the things which surrounded this body. Paying heed to the whole situation, being sensitive to the broader context, Holmes perceived a number of details which his less attentive colleagues overlooked; he noticed (among other things) the carriage tracks on the drive, the footprints in the dust, and the scratch in the plaster on the wall.⁶³ Making this move of being attentive to not only the focus but also the fringe, Holmes was better able to understand what had happened at the crime scene.

In his writings, Herbert Kohl provides a second, non-fictional, example of being especially attentive to the quality of one's situation. Kohl, at that time an elementary school teacher, tells of how he made the move of being attentive:

Stepping back momentarily from myself, forgetting my position and therefore my need to establish order, I observed the children and let them show me something of themselves. There were two clusters of boys and three of girls. There were also loners watching shyly or hovering eagerly about the peripheries of the groups. One boy sat quietly drawing, oblivious to the world. As children entered the room they would go straight to one group or another, hover, or walk over to the boy who was drawing and watch silently.⁶⁴

On account of his deliberate efforts, Kohl was able to take note of important details about his students which otherwise would have gone unnoticed. He was, on account of his attentiveness to his situation, able to perceive additional meaning-giving relations.

When one makes an effort, as Kohl and Holmes did, to be especially attentive, one puts oneself in the position to assimilate the relations and meanings which lie on the periphery of one's awareness. One makes the move of Being Receptive.

A second expression of Being Receptive is *giving space*. Whereas being attentive is making an effort to enhance one's sensitivity to one's situation by deliberately heightening one's awareness, giving space is making an effort to prevent one's preconceptions and habits from limiting one's receptivity to one's situation. Giving space is, to put it simply, endeavoring to keep an open mind.

Having an open mind or giving space is an important part of receptivity. One can be extremely observant, noting detail after detail, but yet still fail to be receptive because, as

Dewey suggests, one's thinking and one's beliefs are too rigid:

...it is possible to have the work of observation so controlled by a conceptual framework fixed in advance that the very things which are genuinely decisive in the problem in hand and its solution, are completely overlooked. Everything is forced into the predetermined conceptual and theoretical scheme.⁶⁵

Trying to fit everything under one's predetermined scheme, one precludes the possibility of perceiving the situation as it is. Like a person who claims to be listening but who, on account of his laziness, hubris, or disinterest, is not really hearing what the speaker has to say, one refuses to truly receive the quality of one's situation.

Putting the matter in a more metaphorical fashion (and drawing from Zen Buddhist sources), one might say that making the move of giving space is like making an effort to have an "empty cup:"

Nan-in, a Japanese master during the Meiji era (1868-1912), received a university professor who came to inquire about Zen.

Nan-in served tea. He poured his visitor's cup full, and then kept on pouring.

The professor watched the overflow until he no longer could restrain himself. "It is overfull. No more will go in!"

"Like this cup," Nan-in said, "you are full of your own opinions and speculations. How can I show you Zen unless you first empty your cup?"⁶⁶

Receptivity and sensitivity to one's situation require an "empty cup." They require one to make an effort to attend -- to *truly* attend -- to one's situation without trying to manipulate it and warp it to fit one's desires.

To make this effort to keep an open mind is to make the move of giving space. To make this move, it should be noted, is not to *entirely* set aside one's preconceptions or somehow to escape from oneself. (Indeed, it is impossible to do this, for human beings are always to some extent governed by their situations.⁶⁷) Rather, to make this move is to maintain an awareness of how one's beliefs and habits influence one and to be committed

to the possibility that these beliefs and habits might be mistaken. Armed with this awareness and this healthy dose of uncertainty, one is inclined to take one's situation seriously and be receptive to it.

The Good Thinker and Cognitive Moves

Being Receptive, Clarifying Matters, Seeking Justification, Working with Assumptions, Working with Inferences, and Using Examples; an essential part of the sort of thinking which is good for judging is the exercise of cognitive moves such as these. Good thinkers are those who: (1) have the ability to employ a *number* of such moves, (2) have the ability to *skillfully* employ such moves, and (3) have the *disposition* to employ such moves.

(1) A good thinker does not employ just a few cognitive moves. Rather, she employs a number of such moves. In this respect a good thinker is somewhat akin to a skilled craftsman.

A skilled craftsman possesses a repertoire of techniques which is larger than that which is possessed by a novice. For instance, the skilled woodworker can use her saw to make perfectly straight cuts, gently curving cuts, or sharp angular cuts. The novice, on the other hand, does not know how to do all these things. He can only cut in a straight line.

Like a skilled woodworker, one who is adept at the sort of thinking through which judging is best done has at her disposal a great number of (cognitive) moves. She is able to use criteria, draw inferences, engage in hypothetical reasoning, and make many other moves which help her to judge well. *She has the ability to employ a variety of cognitive moves.*

(2) The good thinker does not merely employ a number of cognitive moves. She also employs these moves effectively. Here too, she is somewhat like a skilled craftsman.

A skilled woodworker not only knows how to perform a number of woodworking techniques. She also knows how to perform these techniques well. Thus, while the novice's cut wavers from side to side, the skilled woodworker is able to make a cut which is almost perfectly straight. She, unlike the novice, is good at performing the task of making a straight cut.

Like a skilled woodworker, one who thinks well is skilled at making (cognitive) moves. She has, with practice, become good at doing such things as spotting assumptions, coming up with counter-examples, and detecting ambiguity. She can not only employ a number of cognitive moves. *She has the ability to employ cognitive moves well.*

(3) The good thinker is not only *able* to exercise particular cognitive moves. She is also *disposed* to do so. Having learned and embraced these moves, she is in the *habit* of using them. Though she may not employ these moves unfailingly, she does make use of them characteristically. She has developed the *character trait* of thinking and judging through the use of effective cognitive moves.⁶⁸

Having the ability and disposition to skillfully employ effective cognitive moves is, to be sure, a necessary ingredient of good thinking and, so too, of good judging. In and of itself, however, having this character trait does not ensure good thinking and good judging. One must, as we shall discover in the next chapter, also be ready and able to lean back upon one's understanding.

Notes

¹James (1890), p. 225. See also Chapter One, Judging Well.

²James (1890), p. 224.

³Dewey (1933), p. 4.

⁴James (1890), p. 282.

⁵James (1890), p. 282.

⁶See Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), pp. 13-14.

⁷Lipman (1991), p. 76.

⁸Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), p. 121. More will be said about this move in the pages which follow.

⁹Lipman and Gazzard. (1988a), p. iv.

¹⁰Splitter and Sharp (1995), pp. 9-10.

¹¹Copi and Cohen (1990), pp. 91-127.

¹²Copi and Cohen (1990), p. 95.

¹³Copi and Cohen (1990), p. 101.

¹⁴Rollins (1995), p. 32. Maughn Rollins discusses the confidence which "reasoned realists" have "in the process of reasoning" which they employ in order to find the truth. (p. 32)

¹⁵See Bernstein (1983).

¹⁶See James "The Will to Believe," (1896).

¹⁷See Jackson (1998), pp. 20-23.

¹⁸Jackson (1998), p. 20.

¹⁹Jackson (1998), pp. 20-22.

²⁰In his "Good Thinker's Tool Kit" Jackson gets at this move in the following way:

W: What do you mean by...? What is the problem? What is going on here? What have I forgotten to ask? What else do I need to know?

[W] is essentially meant to capture that aspect of thinking that involves sensitivity to complexity, possible ambiguity, and multiplicity of meanings both verbal and non-verbal and, hence, a readiness to seek clarification when needed.

Jackson (1998), p. 20.

²¹From the "Lysis." Plato [212a].

²²This is from a Philosophy for Children discussion which Susan Okano's fourth graders had on April 16, 1997. All colloquial expressions (even those which are grammatically improper) have been retained. I have edited my (Mr. Toby) initial contribution to make it more readable. I have also left out a minute or so of dialogue which occurred between the contributions of Naim and Trung. The question which the children asked and then considered was "Should the [native] Hawaiians be given the land [of Hawai'i] back?" All of the examples which follow and which are on this same topic are taken from this same discussion. Copies of the transcript from which this was drawn (and, so too, of the other transcriptions upon which we shall draw) can be obtained upon request.

²³In his Good Thinker's Tool Kit Jackson gets at this move with the letter "R" (which stands for "reason"). He writes:

[R] reflects that for a critical thinker it is not enough to simply offer an opinion. That opinion needs to be supported by reasons.

Jackson (1998), p. 21.

²⁴Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), p. 121.

²⁵From Susan Okano's fourth grade class (4/16/97).

²⁶Matthew later recognizes that there are legitimate manners in which to transfer land to another owner. But trickery, argues Matthew, is not one of them. Since the Hawaiians were tricked, since their land was stolen from them, contends Matthew, the Hawaiians are still the owners of the land and, thus, it ought to be returned to them.

²⁷From Susan Okano's fourth grade class (4/16/97).

²⁸Lipman (1991), p. 126.

²⁹Lipman (1991), p. 127. Lipman continues:

I am not alleging that these three metacriteria -- relevance, reliability, and strength -- are the only or even the best metacriteria for the selection of criteria that we are likely to be able to find. Perhaps others would do as well or better. I am merely remarking that these are metacriteria typical of normal rational practice. (p. 129)

³⁰From Susan Okano's fourth grade class (4/16/97).

³¹Lipman (1991), p. 127.

³²From Susan Okano's fourth grade class (4/16/97). At the time when this discussion took place John Dye was a graduate student in the philosophy department at the University of Hawai'i, Mānoa.

³³The first expression of Working with Assumptions links the "A" in Jackson's Good Thinker's Tool Kit with the "T." The second expression of Working with Assumptions links the "A" and the "T" to the "I" (specifically to "if...then's..." and implications). Jackson writes:

[A] recognizes that an important part of higher order thinking is becoming aware of and making explicit assumptions that underly a discussion, position, argument or presentation. It involves a growing ability to identify assumptions, to recognize how those assumptions are influencing what we are seeing and judging, and to identify other assumptions that might be made...

The [I] represents an important cluster of skills, "If...then's...", inferences, and implications. Part of becoming a better thinker involves the simple recognition of the potential power of "If...then..." thinking. IF, for example, we do, or don't pursue a particular line of action, THEN, what follows? What are the consequences? It involves the growing ability to recognize IMPLICATIONS of statements, assertions, courses of action, and so on...

[T] indicates that a major concern of a critical thinker is with the purported truth of what is being asserted. Is what is being asserted in fact true? How could we find out?

Jackson (1998), pp. 21-22.

³⁴From Susan Okano's fourth grade class (4/16/97).

³⁵From Susan Okano's fourth grade class (4/16/97).

³⁶Plato was fond of using a strategy which is quite similar to the one which Allen employed. Plato writes:

It frequently happens, then, that people are enemies to those who love them, and friends to those who hate them -- that is, are enemies to their friends, and friends to their enemies -- if it be true that the lover is the friend, but not the loved. But surely, my dear friend, it were grossly unreasonable, nay, rather, I think altogether impossible, for a man to be a friend to his enemy, and an enemy to his friend.

Yes, Socrates, it does seem impossible.

Well, then, if this be impossible, it must be the object of the love that is the friend to the lover.

From the "Lysis." Plato [213b].

Note that, while Allen rejected the assumption which he began with because his reasoning led him to conclude that it was an unwise course of action, Socrates discards his initial assumption because it leads to impossibility. Here we see two different criteria which one might employ in order to assess the worth of a claim.

³⁷Dewey (1933), p. 14.

³⁸One might, of course, call this complex move something else such as "Drawing Implications" or, highlighting the creative element inherent in this sort of hypothetical thinking, "Reasoning Imaginatively."

³⁹Lipman (1991), p. 75.

⁴⁰Dewey (1933), p. 95.

⁴¹Jackson is the director of The Philosophy in The Schools Project (which is the Hawai'i center for Philosophy for Children). Whenever, in the pages which follow, Jackson is cited but no reference is provided, the source is his spoken teachings (be they from workshops, classes, or meetings).

⁴²From Susan Okano's fourth grade class (4/16/97).

⁴³Does "ancient Hawai'i" refer to when Polynesians first stepped foot in Hawai'i or does it refer to the height of the Hawaiian monarchy? How one answers this question shapes one's assessment of the soundness of Sean's conclusion and, so too, the accuracy of his premise. It should be noted, in any case, that Hawai'i is a land which had rules, governance, and understandings about matters of ownership long before Europeans arrived.

⁴⁴"OMT" is an acronym which means "[say it] One More Time." More will be said on this acronym and other similar acronyms in Chapter Six, The Characteristics of The Community of Inquiry.

⁴⁵From Kathryn Yoshida's class (4/18/97). This is from a discussion on "What is a relationship?" I have deleted one of my contributions (where I was trying to understand what Jackie was saying) from this selection.

⁴⁶That Jackie did make this sort of move is, of course, my interpretation. The inference which I have attributed to Jackie is an example of what Lipman and his associates call an "inductive inference." Four types of inferences are identified during Lipman and his associates' treatment of the "good reasons approach" to logic: 1) Inductive inferences which are "passage(s) of thought from something specific to something more general." 2) Analogical inferences which "presuppose relevant similarities between two different types of things, and concludes to a further similarity." 3) Explanatory inferences which "reach answers to questions such as 'Why did that happen?' or 'Why does this take place?'" 4) Action-guiding inferences which "seek to justify what someone does." From Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), pp. 139-140.

⁴⁷Doyle (1887), p. 28.

⁴⁸Jackson (1998), p. 21.

⁴⁹Jackson (1998), p. 21.

⁵⁰From the "Laches." Plato [198d].

⁵¹From Kathryn Yoshida's class (4/18/97).

⁵²Jackson (1998), p. 22. Both examples ("E") and counter-examples ("C") are a part of Jackson's "Good Thinker's Tool Kit."

⁵³From the "Laches." Plato [192e].

⁵⁴From Kathryn Yoshida's third grade class (4/18/97).

⁵⁵Lipman (1991), p. 196.

⁵⁶Dewey (1934), p. 60.

⁵⁷Dewey (1934), pp. 59-60.

⁵⁸For James' and Dewey's treatment of the focus-fringe relationship see James (1890), pp. 257-259 (Chapter 9: The Stream of Thought); Dewey (1925), pp. 226-236 (Chapter 8: Existence, Ideas and Consciousness); and Dewey (1938b), pp. 72-76 (Chapter 4: Common Sense and Scientific Inquiry).

⁵⁹Dewey (1925), p. 235. See also Chapter One, Judging Well.

⁶⁰Dewey (1938b), p. 72.

⁶¹James (1890), p. 258. Dewey (1925), p. 231.

⁶²James (1890), p. 258. Dewey (1925), p. 231.

⁶³Doyle (1887), pp. 33-42.

⁶⁴Kohl (1967), p. 22. Kohl is a strong believer in the epistemological and pedagogical power of being attentive. Kohl writes:

I am convinced that the teacher must be an observer of his class as well as a member of it. He must look at the children, discover how they relate to each other and the room around them...

I went through a year of teacher training at Teachers College, Columbia, received a degree, and heard no mention of how to observe children, nor even a suggestion that it was of value. Without learning to observe children and thereby knowing something of the people one is living with five hours a day, the teacher resorts to routine and structure for protection.

Kohl (1967), p. 23.

⁶⁵Dewey (1938b), p. 76.

⁶⁶Reps and Senzaki (1998), p. 19.

⁶⁷More will be said about this in Chapter Three, The Disposition to Understand.

⁶⁸Norman (1996). See also Chapter One, Good Judgment is a Character Trait.

Chapter Three: Good Thinking and Understanding

Reflective Thinking

A second characteristic of good thinking, we shall argue in this chapter, is that it is a sub-class of "reflective" thinking.¹ More specifically, it is thinking which "leans back on" or "refers to" *understanding*.²

Thinking, Dewey explains, is too often no more than an "uncontrolled coursing of ideas through our heads."³ It is a "stream of consciousness" whose flow is "automatic and unregulated."⁴ It is a "random" succession of "mental states" through one's "mind."⁵

This "irregular sequence" of "something or other," Dewey continues, "does not suffice."⁶ Indeed, this sort of thinking is hardly even worth the penny which one might offer for it because, while pleasant, it "rarely leaves much that is worth while behind."⁷

A "better way of thinking," Dewey asserts, is "reflective thinking." Unlike undisciplined thinking, reflective thinking is orderly:

Reflection involves not simply a sequence of ideas, but a *con*-sequence -- a consecutive ordering in such a way that each determines the next as its proper outcome, while each outcome in turn leans back on, or refers to, its predecessors. The successive portions of a reflective thought grow out of one another and support one another; they do not come and go in a medley.⁸

Reflective thinking is neither aimless whim nor unintelligent "cut and try."⁹ Instead, it always involves the deliberate and purposeful appeal to one's prior thought. It "leans back on" or "refers to" one's *thought*.

Here, following James' lead, we use "thought" as a "general term by which to designate all states of consciousness merely as such..."¹⁰ "Thought" should be interpreted, for our purposes, as a broad and varied cognitive *fund* upon which reflective thinking draws. One's experiences, one's memories, one's ideas, one's knowledge, and the facts with which one is acquainted; these are all a part of this fund of thought which reflective thinking accesses and employs.¹¹

While it is convenient to say that reflective thinking is thinking which leans back on one's fund of thought, it is more accurate to say that reflective thinking is thinking which *is performed through* leaning back on one's fund of thought. For "leaning back" is not a product of reflective thinking but rather is that through which reflective thinking proceeds. "Leaning back" is a complex cognitive move which is the definitive element of reflective thinking. To engage in reflective thinking, we argue, *is* to make the move of leaning back.

Leaning back consists of both a forward-looking element and a backward-looking element. The backward-looking element is *reflection*. The forward-looking move is *self-correction*.¹²

Reflection is the move through which one *accesses* one's fund of thought. To reflect is to refer back to or, quite literally, to "re-call" or "re-collect" one's fund of thought.

Self-correction is the move through which one *employs* one's fund of thought. To self-correct is to advance from that to which one has referred back. It is to make use of one's reflected upon thought in order to direct the course of one's future thinking, judging, and acting.

To make use of an analogy, the complex cognitive move of leaning back on one's thought is like a hiker's act of using her compass to direct her journey. The hiker's initial act of pulling out and referring to her compass is like the backward-looking act of reflection. The hiker's consequent act of correcting her course of travel based upon the compass reading which she has taken is like the forward-looking act of self-correction. Like the

hiker, the reflective thinker refers back and then, with the results of this act of reference in mind, proceeds onwards.

Leaning Back On Understanding

Good thinking -- (by which we mean that thinking which is best suited for judging) -- is a sub-class of reflective thinking. Like all reflective thinking, good thinking essentially involves the skillful performance of the cognitive move of leaning back on one's thought. Unlike all reflective thinking, however, good thinking leans back especially upon a particular *quality* of thought.

The fund of thought upon which reflective thinking leans back is neither simple nor of uniform quality. Within this fund one finds both great ideas and half-baked opinions. One finds profound insights, trivial bits of data, sound knowledge, and even misunderstandings. While the ratio of useful content to useless clutter will vary from one individual's fund to another's, it is safe to say that each person's fund of thought contains both that which is worthwhile and that which is worthless (or, even worse, dangerously harmful).

Good thinking may reflect back upon both the worthless and the worthwhile but it tends to take its lead only from the latter. That is to say, good thinking tends not to be guided by shabby "knowledge" or intellectual garbage. Quite to the contrary, good thinking is in large part "good" precisely because it proceeds forwards from genuine knowledge. Good thinking looks back towards and arises out of understanding not "misunderstanding."¹³

We assert, then, that good thinking characteristically leans back not merely on thought but, indeed, on *understanding*. What precisely this means is, of course, still

unclear for, as John Passmore notes, there are many ways of understanding "understanding."

For Plato in the *Phaedo*, to understand something is to see its point; for German idealism to know what part it plays in the system; for some varieties of positivism to bring its behaviour under a law. More recently understanding has been identified with being able to bring under a rule or with mastering a technique.¹⁴

Given this work's aim, we cannot treat the concept of understanding with the sophistication which it deserves. Having made this caveat, we contend, however, that "understanding is," as Aristotle puts it, "identical with *goodness of understanding*."¹⁵ The sort of understanding upon which good thinking leans back is both (1) meaning-laden and (2) true.

(1) *Understanding and meaning*: Knowledge can vary with regards to its depth. Towards the nadir of this spectrum is a superficial acquaintance which Dewey, not even deeming it worthy of the name "knowledge," calls "information." *Information* or, as Richard Saul Wurman insists, "data" is an isolated "bare impression" which one "know[s] very little about."¹⁶ To "know" the stars only as specks of light in the sky, a person as only a cheerful coworker, or World War II as only a list of dates and battles is to possess information.

In contrast to information is *understanding*. Whereas information is a superficial acquaintance, understanding is a deeper, richer knowledge about "what makes [matters] what they are."¹⁷ One who understands something, as Dewey says, "comprehend[s]" it; she "grasp[s]" the "meaning" of it.¹⁸

"To grasp the meaning of a thing, an event, or a situation," Dewey continues, "is to see it in its *relations* to other things..."¹⁹ When one comes to understand some matter, one gains an enhanced awareness of the connections which bind a particular thing, event, or situation to the broader context of which it is a part. One comprehends, to a greater extent, how it is related to that which surrounds it.

The meaningful connection which one makes when one understands, James explains, is between that which one already understands and the "scheme of relations" which lies on the "fringe" of this current understanding.²⁰ As Laurance Splitter and Ann

Sharp put it:

...to find meaning in something...is to locate that item in a framework which is connected to something in our own experience, something which already makes sense to us. This process of connecting occurs, for example, when we seek to define a new word in terms of other words that are familiar to us, or when we analyse the details of a film which puzzles us, by linking its ingredients with aspects of our own lives.²¹

To know some matter, to discover its meaning, or to understand it -- all of these three, writes Dewey, are "synonymous expressions" -- is to "integrate" into one's understanding heretofore unappreciated relations.²²

In understanding, then, we do not, to employ the words of Richard Bernstein, "leap out of our own linguistic horizon, bracket all our preunderstandings, and enter into a radically different world." Rather we find "the resources within our own horizon, linguistic practices, and experience that can enable us to understand what confronts us as alien."²³ We grasp meaning by engaging ourselves in "a dialectical play between our own preunderstandings and the forms of life that we are seeking to understand."²⁴

This dialectical play is illustrated by the following dialogue. A class of third grade children endeavor to make sense of the relationship between the soul and the body:²⁵

Ahn Thy: I have a question for Brian S. He said like soul and mind work together right? But...he doesn't explain what soul mean and what mind mean. And how could they work together?

Brian S.: I'm saying like maybe you cannot see it but the mind [soul?] and brain works together by sending messages or something. 'Cause the brain sends message to the body to do something. But then the soul controls the arms. See its like the mind sends the message to the soul and then the soul does what the mind says.

Ahn Thy: I know but it doesn't explain what soul mean though.

Brian S.: Soul is like another person inside your body. But then its like a ghost. 'Cause its inside your body. And, oh yeah, I kind of a little bit disagree with myself. Maybe I know what mind and soul equals up to, but I'm not sure if I know what this equals up to: Mind plus soul, plus everything else inside your mind. What could that equal up to? Diane.

Diane: What do you mean by soul?

Brian S.: Its like a little...its like a ghost. Like that's something you see, but then if you go to it...but real small.

Ahn Thy: But why the brain send a message to the ghost?

Brian S.: Because they are friends...Oh wow that's [a really hard question].

Ahn Thy: I think we need a relationship. I think we need the mind and soul to relate together so that they can work together.

The children are first confronted with, as Dewey puts it, a "baffling" situation.²⁶ What is the relationship between the mind, the soul, and the body? Brian attempts to solve this perplexity by engaging in this dialectical play of endeavoring to make connections between the elements of this alien situation and his prior experience. The mind, he says, sends messages to its friend the soul (which is like a small ghost) which, in turn, tells the body what to do.

Unsure as to whether or not these connections make sense, Ahn Thy and Diane question Brian further. They try to figure out what precisely a soul is and call into question the idea that the matter can be answered simply by appealing to the relationship of friendship.

With each new connection that is made the children gain understanding. Elements which once stood unconsidered and unconnected on the periphery of their awareness become infused with meaning as the children learn of their significance. By thinking things through and "scratching beneath the surface" of matters the children transform that with which they were merely acquainted into an understanding which is their own.²⁷

(2) *Understanding and truth:* Just as knowledge can vary with regards to its depth, so too, it can vary with regards to its utility. Towards the nadir of this spectrum is "knowledge" which leads one astray. Such "knowledge" fails to provide one with reliable guidance because, as Dewey says, it "take[s]" things "amiss."²⁸ Such "knowledge" is the product of "mis-apprehension" or a "mis-taking."²⁹ It is "mis-understanding."³⁰

Understanding stands in contrast to misunderstanding. Understanding provides reliable guidance because it does not take things amiss. Understanding is *true* knowledge;

it is not the product of fanciful invention but rather of an accurate taking account of the relations which bind a thing, event, or situation to the fringe which surrounds it.

Here, it must be emphasized, our intention is *not* to assert that one can know, with final or absolute certainty, whether or not one's knowledge claim *really* agrees with the way things are. To make such an assertion we would have to accept a problematic contention to which we need not, for the purposes of this work, commit ourselves; namely, that it is possible for human beings to attain the sort of God's-eye perspective which would allow one to verify that an understanding is not simply *an* understanding but is, in fact, *the* correct understanding.³¹

Steering away from an absolutist conception of truth, we follow in the philosophical footsteps of the American Pragmatists. James writes:

When the first mathematical, logical and natural uniformities, the first *laws*, were discovered, men were so carried away by the clearness, beauty and simplification that resulted, that they believed themselves to have deciphered authentically the eternal thoughts of the Almighty....But as the sciences have developed farther, the notion has gained ground that most, perhaps all, of our laws are only approximations. The laws themselves, moreover, have grown so numerous that there is no counting them; and so many rival formulations are proposed in all the branches of science that investigators have become accustomed to the notion that no theory is absolutely a transcript of reality, but that any one of them may from some point of view be useful.³²

A true knowledge claim is not "a transcript of reality," but rather a hypothesis which makes one's relationships with and within one's world more serviceable and more satisfying. The measure of a knowledge claim's accuracy is the "work" which it does.³³ Does this knowledge claim adequately explain the situation to one? Does it provide one with reliable guidance? If the answers to these questions are affirmative, if the hypothesis is "verified" by experience, then we say it is "true."³⁴ If, however, a knowledge claim lacks (or loses) this explanatory and instrumental value, then we have no cause to attach the predicate "true."

In embracing this pragmatic notion of truth and steering away from the *Scylla* of absolutism our intention is not, of course, to be drawn into the *Charybdis* of relativism.

Indeed, James clearly rejects the relativistic position that all knowledge is equally true: Woe to him whose beliefs play fast and loose with the order which realities follow in his experience; they will lead him nowhere or else make false connexions.³⁵

From the fact that we cannot find some Archimedean point which guarantees (with finality and certainty) the accuracy of our knowledge claims, it does not follow that any knowledge claim is just as good as any other. Quite to the contrary, it *is* the case that some knowledge claims work better than others.

By employing a pragmatic criterion for truth, we avoid, then, what Bernstein refers to as the Cartesian either/or:

[The Cartesian either/or is the] belief that in the final analysis the only viable alternatives open to us are *either* some form of objectivism, foundationalism, ultimate grounding of knowledge, science, philosophy, and language *or* that we are ineluctably led to relativism, skepticism, historicism, and nihilism.³⁶

By judging the consequences which follow from our knowledge claims we can adjudicate amongst these claims without embracing the Cartesian either/or. We can, to borrow words from David Kalupahana, assess the accuracy of our knowledge claims by following a "middle path" which runs between the epistemological extremes of absolutism and relativism.³⁷

Truth and meaningfulness, then, are the characteristic marks of the sort of knowledge which guides good thinking. It is *understanding*, not information or misunderstanding, upon which good thinking leans back.

An example which illustrates how one's understanding can be used to guide one's judging is found in a brief consideration of the life of Leonard Woolf.³⁸ The life of Woolf, John Kekes explains, was "an endless succession of competing tasks."³⁹ Woolf "was an indefatigable committee-man" who was actively involved in politics.⁴⁰ He ran a

publishing house that published "important new voices."⁴¹ He himself "was at work on his *magnum opus*, *Principia Politica*."⁴² Finally, Leonard had to care for his wife Virginia who was "vulnerable and difficult" but yet who "promised greatness;" she had to be "guarded, cajoled, protected, and nursed when ill."⁴³

How was Leonard Woolf able "to thread his way through these problems" and decide what to do?⁴⁴ In large part, it was because Woolf leaned back on his understanding.⁴⁵ Woolf made use of his (good) understanding of when Virginia was "just in a bad mood" and when she was showing "the first sign of depression."⁴⁶ He employed his understanding of which "urgent meeting[s]" truly "signal[led] a political crisis" and which did not.⁴⁷ So too, he appealed to his understanding of which "manuscript from yet another unknown [was] a new *Ulysses*" and which was merely another "self-indulgent iconoclasm."⁴⁸ Reflecting back upon and proceeding forth from not just any thought but rather from these good understandings, Woolf was able to judge well.

One who can think and judge well is, as Woolf was, able to make this move of leaning back upon her understanding. She has the power to do so. She is also, like Woolf, inclined to make this move. She is disposed to do so. Leaning back upon one's understanding, then, is not merely an ability which the good thinker *can* exercise; it is an ability which she *does* exercise. It is a character trait which distinguishes her as a good thinker.⁴⁹

Possessing Understanding

A characteristic of good thinking is that it leans back on understanding. Implicit within this assertion is the assumption that there is, in fact, an understanding to which good thinking can appeal. To say, for instance, that Leonard Woolf drew upon his

understanding is to assume that he did, in fact, possess understanding. For one cannot appeal to one's understanding and employ it as a judgment-guiding criterion if one does not have understanding.

There is, then, more to our assertion than meets the eye. Good thinking involves not just the ability and disposition to lean back on one's understanding. It also involves possessing an understanding upon which to lean back. The good thinker not only thinks well; she also *possesses understanding*.

While all good thinkers possess at least some degree of understanding, the comprehensiveness of this understanding can vary. Near the zenith of the spectrum of understanding are wise individuals such as the Buddha. (His understanding was broad indeed; he discerned that the becoming of each worldly phenomenon is dependent upon the becoming of surrounding phenomena.⁵⁰) Closer to the nadir of this spectrum are those, such as many of the very young, whose experience is more limited. (The young, Aristotle explains, have little familiarity with "particulars" for they have "no experience."⁵¹)

As the comprehensiveness of understanding varies, so too does what Andrew Norman calls the "subject-matter" or "object-domain" of understanding.⁵² Einstein understood the relationship between motion, space, and time.⁵³ Thoreau understood the history, plants, and creatures of the New England woods.⁵⁴ Aristotle's people of practical wisdom understood "what is good for themselves and what is good for men in general."⁵⁵ There are many things which one might understand and many understandings upon which one might lean back.

Admitting that the object-domain of understanding is variable, we note, however, that those who consistently employ the sort of thinking which is good for judging tend to possess a *relevant* understanding. Their understanding is, at least to some extent, related to the decisions which they must make; it forms, to use Dewey's words, "a fund of relevant knowledge" upon which they can draw in confronting the perplexities of their lives.⁵⁶

The specific contour of this fund of relevant knowledge depends upon the situation within which one finds oneself. There are, however, certain broad areas of understanding upon which all good thinkers characteristically lean back. These areas are, as Kekes puts it, those "commonplaces" or general conditions which are a part of every person's situation.⁵⁷ All people, we assert, must contend with the world and with their own selves. So too, (practically) every person must deal with other individuals. (1) The world, (2) oneself, and (3) others; these are three areas about which good thinkers need to have some understanding.

(1) In asserting that good thinkers need to have an understanding of their "world" we are *not* using this term in its most general sense. Taken most broadly, one's "world" refers to the entirety of one's existence. It includes the physical environment within which one resides, the social environment which shapes one, and even the inner cognitive and emotional landscape with which one identifies.

By "world" we mean, more narrowly, the physical world. We mean the terra firma of cause and effect, chemical reactions, gravity, genetics, and the like. We mean the world of things, mechanisms, and physical relations which are the concern of naturalist, engineer, and mechanic alike.

Some people, like the Buddha and Einstein, have a grand and far-reaching understanding of the world. The understanding of the good thinker, however, need not be so comprehensive. Consider Norman's example of a "highly respected rural farmer."⁵⁸ This individual may well not have a global understanding of the principles of biology, physics, or chemistry. He does, however, understand such matters as how soil and weather effect the growth of crops, how fertilizer and crop rotation can lead to a more bountiful harvest, and how to best deal with pests. This understanding is enough for his thinking to lean back upon; it allows him to judge well within the confines of his situation.

What the good thinker needs is an understanding of *her* world. She needs to understand how things work within her particular environment. Like the respected farmer, the savvy individual who is said to have "street-smarts," or Aristotle's person of practical wisdom, she needs to have the know-how which will enable her to hit her mark.⁵⁹

(2) Just as essential to good thinking as having an understanding of one's world is having an understanding of oneself. This is a point which Plato suggests. Phaedrus asks Socrates if he believes in an old tale. Socrates replies:

I myself have certainly no time for the business [of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of such stories], and I'll tell you why, my friend. I can't as yet 'know myself,' as the inscription at Delphi enjoins, and so long as that ignorance remains it seems to me ridiculous to inquire into extraneous matters.⁶⁰

Self-understanding, Socrates believed, is among the most important of tasks.

Richard Taylor writes: "To have an identity is to know 'where you are coming from' when it comes to questions of value or issues of importance."⁶¹ It is this sort of understanding which we have in mind when we speak of self-understanding. To understand oneself is to have a deep understanding about what one believes in, what one stands for, and what one values. It is, as the Delphic oracle exhorted, to "know thyself."

Self-understanding involves, as Kekes says, an awareness of one's "own limitations and possibilities..."⁶² The good thinker has a realistic sense of her strengths and weaknesses and of what she can and cannot do within her situation.

Self-understanding also involves an awareness of one's dreams, aspirations, or, to use Dewey's words, "ends-in view."⁶³ The good thinker has, as Aristotle says, a vision of what is, for her, "best" and most noble.⁶⁴ This vision of what ought to be serves as a target towards which she aims; it serves as a mark which directs the course of her thinking, judging, and acting.

The good thinker's self-understanding is not fixed. One can, during the course of a lifetime, "lose" and then "find" oneself many times over. But the good thinker possesses

the ability and the tenacity to continually understand herself. Always engaged in the ongoing process of becoming clear on who she is and who she wants to become, the good thinker is prepared to judge well.

(3) A third understanding which a good thinker needs to have is an understanding of others. Essential to an understanding of others, we assert, is an ethical appreciation of them. One who truly understands others appreciates both the exceptional particularity of human subjects and the relatedness between these subjects and herself. Understanding others involves perceiving that, like oneself, others are precious individuals who are worthy of respect.

That each and every person ought to be understood as a valuable, special being is a belief which has a long and distinguished philosophical history. Among the most prominent of those who have made this contention is Immanuel Kant:

Now, I say, man and, in general, every rational being exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will. In all his actions, whether they are directed toward himself or toward other rational beings, he must always be regarded at the same time as an end.⁶⁵

People are not means of merely conditional value. They are, Kant declares, "persons" who possess absolute and intrinsic value.⁶⁶

Two millennia prior to Kant, Martha Nussbaum explains, the Stoics held that all people possess (and are united by) "the dignity of reason and moral choice."⁶⁷ This "reason and moral capacity" are the "fundamental ingredients" of the "humanity" which belongs to each and every person.⁶⁸ It is this inherent humanity which makes each and every individual valuable in and of herself.

More recently, Jean-Paul Sartre affirms the inordinate worth of each individual when he distinguishes between things and human subjects.⁶⁹ Things "simply are what they are."⁷⁰ (Their "essence...precedes [their] existence."⁷¹) The existence of human subjects, in contrast, precedes their essence; a human being has the freedom (and the

responsibility) to determine who she is.⁷² Because of this freedom and responsibility, Sartre continues, each and every person "has a greater dignity than a stone or a table."⁷³ Like oneself, every other person is an altogether special individual who has her own unique value.

Novelist Alan Moore eloquently expresses this same appreciation of the worth of each person. In the following dialogue two characters consider the concept of the "thermodynamic miracle":

"But...listen, you've just been saying life is meaningless, so how can...?"

"I changed my mind."

"But...why?"

"Thermodynamic miracles...events with odds against so astronomical they're effectively impossible, like oxygen spontaneously becoming gold. I long to observe such a thing. And yet, in each human coupling, a thousand million sperm vie for a single egg. Multiply those odds by countless generations, against the odds of your ancestors being alive; meeting; siring this precise son; that exact daughter...until your mother loves a man she has every reason to hate, and of that union, of the thousand million children competing for fertilization, it was you, only you, that emerged. To distill so specific a form from that chaos of improbability, like turning air to gold...that is the crowning unlikelihood. The thermodynamic miracle."

"But...if me, my birth, if that's a thermodynamic miracle...I mean, you could say that about anybody in the world!"

"Yes. Anybody in the world. But the world is so full of people, so crowded with these miracles that they become commonplace and we forget...I forgot. We gaze continually at the world and it grows dull in our perceptions. Yet seen from another's vantage point, as if new, it may still take the breath away. Come...dry your eyes, for you are life, rarer than a quark and unpredictable beyond the dreams of Heisenberg; the clay in which the forces that shape all things leave their fingerprints most clearly."⁷⁴

Part of truly understanding another is looking at that person anew. It is realizing that this person is not merely a commonplace occurrence but is instead a thermodynamic miracle. It is seeing that this person is rare and precious.

Like the notion that each individual is inherently worthy, the idea that there is a shared likeness which unites all human beings is supported by a rich philosophical history.

Martha Nussbaum writes:

Asked where he came from, the ancient Greek Cynic philosopher Diogenes replied, "I am a citizen of the world." He meant by this that he refused to be defined simply by his local origins and group memberships...he insisted on defining himself in terms of more universal aspirations and concerns. The Stoics who followed his lead developed his image of the *kosmopolitēs*, or world citizen, more fully, arguing that each of us dwells, in effect, in two communities -- the local community of our birth, and the community of human argument and aspiration that "is truly great and truly common."⁷⁵

All human beings, the Stoics maintained, are connected by the characteristic of humanity which is common to all; each is a citizen in the great nation of humanity.⁷⁶

That all people are in some way united is an understanding which ripples throughout major world religions. Christian thinkers proclaim that all people are the children of God.⁷⁷ Orthodox Indian thought declares, "Thou penetratest all and therefore Thou art all"; the individual *Ātman* is one with the universal *Brahman*.⁷⁸

Kant too recognizes the interconnection between human beings. He writes: For all rational beings stand under the law that each of them should treat himself and all others never merely as means, but in every case at the same time as an end in himself. Thus there arises a systematic union of rational beings through common objective laws. This is a realm which may be called a realm of ends...⁷⁹

All people belong to a common realm, a common kingdom, for they are united by the fact that they are all ends in themselves.

Good thinkers do not, to be sure, *always* understand others to be precious human subjects with whom they are akin. There is a qualitative spectrum of knowing others. Closer to the zenith of this spectrum is the deep appreciation of the humanity of others with which we have just been concerned. Near the nadir of this spectrum are perceptions of others which are perverse or superficial. Good thinkers tend to lean back on an understanding which lies closer to the zenith of this spectrum. There are times, however, when their understanding of others lies nearer to the nadir.

Among the poorest of "understandings" of others, to which good thinkers seldom fall, is not really an understanding at all. Rather, it is, as Dewey puts it, a

"misunderstanding" or a "taking of [others] amiss."⁸⁰ Sometimes people make the mistake which Sartre warns against. They perceive of people not as free human subjects but rather as mere objects.

There are all too many instances of this sort of misunderstanding. Consider the case of a soldier who perceives of his foes only as "the enemy." When this soldier pulls the trigger, he does not, in his mind, kill a person; instead he disposes of a dehumanized thing. Consider the case of bigots who mistreat others because they see them not as persons but only as objects which possess a particular ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, or social status. These bigots most opprobriously (*mis*)understand others not as living, feeling people but rather as inferior things.

A second, less faulty but yet still poor, way of understanding others is to perceive of them while failing to truly "see" them. When one understands others in this way one does not, unlike those who dehumanize others, see people as objects. But neither does one appreciate the subjectivity of others. While one may be courteous, one treats the other as if he were, to use Ralph Ellison's words, "as transparent as air."⁸¹ Not allowing the other "to be seen and heard, to be listened to and understood," not granting him the full measure of respect which is his due, one understands him, as Juan Carlos Lago puts it, to be "psychologically invisible."⁸²

Good thinkers tend not to have these sorts of superficial or perverse understandings. They are able to surpass such perspectives and appreciate more deeply the kinship and subjectivity of human beings. They are able to do this through the exercise of their good thinking.

Having examined the quality of understanding of others which good thinkers characteristically possess, it is left to consider the connection between this understanding and the affective states of respect and care. In her article "Why Don't Lovers of Wisdom

Dare to Love?" Vrinda Dalmiya does just this. She innovatively suggests that a distinct means through which one gains understanding of others is caring.⁸³ Caring is a "cognitive faculty" through which one gains "empathic knowledge" of others.⁸⁴

(Dalmiya is, I think, right when she says that caring is a means through which one can move towards understanding. I, however, would prefer to describe the means of caring in terms of the cognitive moves of which it is comprised. Dalmiya writes:

But in the caring attempt to "put myself in *your* shoes," the attentive process of concentrating on our similar points-of view while bracketing out my perspectives *not* held in common by you, I am able to ascribe states to you not completely similar to my own.⁸⁵

Caring is an act of "putting oneself in another's shoes" by attending to her and by bracketing out one's own presuppositions.⁸⁶ It is, to draw upon what was said previously, a particular application of the moves *being attentive* and *giving space*.⁸⁷)

While Dalmiya makes the point that caring is a means through which one understands, she does not make the converse claim -- namely, that understanding can lead to the development of, if not caring, at least a feeling of respect. This is the contention which we now make: understanding others to be precious human subjects with whom one is akin entails the development of feelings of caring or respect.⁸⁸ The good thinker tends not only to understand others; because she understands others she tends to care about and respect them.

That one's very understanding of the subjectivity of others ought to be enough to inspire respect is a point which Kant makes:

...rational beings, on the other hand, are designated "persons" because their nature indicates that they are ends in themselves (i.e., things which may not be used merely as means). Such a being is thus an object of respect...⁸⁹

Considering the Stoics and their influence on Kant, Nussbaum makes a similar point: One should always behave so as to treat with respect the dignity of reason and moral choice in every human being, no matter where that person was born, no matter what that person's rank or gender or status may be.⁹⁰

One's appreciation of another's subjectivity and one's perception that she is a "person"; this in itself ought to be enough to inspire respect. Sensing that the other is truly a thermodynamic miracle, one responds as one would respond when confronted with any miracle (be it the miraculous feats of a healer, the sweeping grandeur of a geological wonder, or the birth of a child); one is swept away by feelings of awe, and with it, respect.

If one's very appreciation of the humanity of others is not enough to inspire care or respect, one's awareness that this humanity is common to all (and that others, like oneself, are "citizens of the world") should inspire such emotions.⁹¹ This is a point which a number of philosophers have recognized.

Laurance Splitter and Ann Sharp support this view when, drawing upon the work of Peter Singer, they write:

As beings who are capable of reason, each of us is able to discern that she is 'just one being among others, with interests and desires like others'. This view leads, in turn, to a sense of interconnectedness which is incompatible with attitudes of prejudice, hatred and bigotry.⁹²

Centuries earlier Marcus Aurelius made a strikingly similar assertion:

...I...who know that the nature of the wrong-doer is of one kind with mine -- not indeed of the same blood or seed but sharing the same kind, the same portion of the divine...I cannot feel anger against him who is of my kin, nor hate him. We were born to labor together, like the feet, the hands, the eyes, and the rows of upper and lower teeth. To work against one another is therefore contrary to nature, and to be angry against a man or turn one's back on him is to work against him.⁹³

Like Singer, Marcus Aurelius makes the point that a more global perspective is incompatible with anger and hatred. Grasping one's connectedness with others, understanding that others are one's human kin, one comes to respect and care about them.

An understanding of others, then, calls forth a feeling of respect. It inspires one to *care about* others. It does not, however, require one to *care for* each and every individual.

This is a point which Nussbaum makes:

World citizenship does not, and should not, require that we suspend criticism towards other individuals and cultures. Marcus continues to refer to his enemies as "deceitful and antisocial," expressing strong criticism of their conduct. The world citizen may be very critical of unjust actions or

policies, and of the character of people who promote them. But at the same time Marcus refuses to think of the opponents as simply alien, as members of a different or inferior species. He refuses to criticize until he respects and understands.⁹⁴

One who understands others can find an individual to be arrogant, obnoxious, or mean. He can earnestly believe that an individual deserves imprisonment or, as punishment for his crimes, even death. In thinking these things, however, one who understands is still aware of the other's humanity and, as a consequence, views him with respect.

Gaining Understanding

A good thinker cannot, we have argued, lean back on her understanding if she does not have an understanding upon which to lean. The good thinker must possess at least some understanding of her world, herself, and others. But from where does this understanding come? How does the good thinker gain understanding?

Some, like E. D. Hirsch, suggest that understanding is something which is *given* to one.⁹⁵ One's teachers, parents, and other adults are, as Paulo Freire puts it, "the depositor[s]."⁹⁶ They make "deposits" of knowledge into the minds of the students who "patiently receive, memorize, and repeat" this knowledge.⁹⁷ One gains knowledge by, as Hirsch says, "piling up [the] specific, communally shared information" which is provided to one.⁹⁸

Hirsch is correct, I think, when he says that information can be given. Information is a "bare impression" which can be transmitted from one person to another.⁹⁹

Hirsch also gets it right when he says that there is a connection between the piling up of information and understanding. Information, either in the form of the facts which one is told or the impressions which one experiences, is an "indispensable resource" for understanding.¹⁰⁰ "There must," as Dewey says, "be data at command to supply the

considerations required in dealing with the specific difficulty which has presented itself."¹⁰¹ Information is, as Roszak puts it, the "raw material" of understanding.¹⁰²

From the fact that information is an essential ingredient for understanding, however, it does not follow that information *is* understanding. Indeed, as Dewey contends, "information" is not "understanding."¹⁰³ Information is a relatively superficial acquaintance with something. It is an "undigested burden."¹⁰⁴ Understanding, on the other hand, is an integrated, meaning-laden, useful knowledge about something.

Following from this mistaken identification of information with understanding is the false supposition that understanding, like information, can be *given*. Quite to the contrary, argue Lipman and his colleagues, understanding is not the sort of the thing which can be given:

Meanings cannot be dispensed. They cannot be given or handed out to children. Meanings must be acquired; they are *capta*, not data...Something must be done to enable children to acquire meaning for themselves. They will not acquire such meaning merely by learning the contents of adult knowledge.¹⁰⁵

One must, to be sure, have hold of some information. But this information, this raw material, this "working capital," only becomes understanding when it has, through one's thoughtful reflection, been refined.¹⁰⁶ One's "ideas," Roszak argues, serve as "integrating patterns."¹⁰⁷ Information is sifted through, "order[ed]," and, as a consequence, made sense of.¹⁰⁸ One makes a previously isolated fact one's own by "see[ing] it in its relations to other things."¹⁰⁹ Understanding, then, is not given to one; it is created by one.

From this it follows that the good thinker cannot merely *possess* understanding. Since understanding cannot be given to her, she must have something more. She must have at her disposal the means which enable her to create understanding. *She must have the power to understand.*

Here it is worth noting that even if, for the sake of argument, we reject the assertion that understanding can never be given, our conclusion still stands. Even if one

successfully argues that understanding can somehow be supplied to one, it still does not obviate our contention that the good thinker needs to have the power to understand. The good thinker still needs this power because, while one might admit that *some* of the needed understanding can be given to one, it can never be the case that *all* of the needed understanding can be given to one.

The good thinker cannot simply be given the whole of the understanding upon which she will, during the course of her life, lean back because, as Freire says, "reality is really a *process*, undergoing constant transformation," or, as the Buddha succinctly explains, everything is "becoming" (*bhava*).¹¹⁰ The world is always changing and becoming. A life inevitably takes unexpected and unpredictable twists and turns. Unless he or she possessed some divine vision, no parent or teacher could possibly instill *a priori* within an individual all that she will need to know. "The demands of life," as Einstein asserts, "are much to manifold."¹¹¹

Given the dynamic nature of the world and life, the notion that the good thinker's understanding can be "static" or reside in "cold-storage" is untenable.¹¹² If the good thinker's understanding is going to keep up with the times, if she is to have an understanding which is *consistently relevant* to her situation, then she must possess the means through which her understanding can, as Dewey puts it, be continually "revised" and "extended."¹¹³ Our argument, then, again leads us to the same conclusion: it is not enough to simply *possess* an understanding. The good thinker needs to have the *power* to continue to understand.

Of what is this power comprised? One who can continue to understand in the face of changing circumstance has, to be sure, an ability; she is able to employ the means through which one understands. But she also has a disposition; she is inclined to employ such means consistently. The power to understand, then, is, like good judgment itself, a character trait.¹¹⁴ The good thinker is one who is ready and able to pursue understanding.

The Disposition to Understand

"For it is owing to their wonder," Aristotle wrote, "that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize..."¹¹⁵ Wonder sparks people to think about their world. It goads them to examine things great and small.

With this scrutiny, Stephen Paget suggests, comes understanding.¹¹⁶ Propelled by their wonder, people inquire into their situation and reflect upon it and, as a consequence, come to a deeper, richer, fuller understanding of it. How did the universe begin? How am I to live? Where did people come from? Responding to one's wonder, one poses and strives to answer questions like these and, through the process of doing so, comes to understand better.

Wonder, then, is not only the beginning of questioning and examining. Ultimately, it is the birthplace of understanding. It is, as Francis Bacon writes, "the seed of knowledge."¹¹⁷ If people did not wonder, if they were not intrigued by their situation, then they would have no reason to even begin the often-times difficult quest for understanding. The disposition to wonder is the spark which prompts us to strive towards understanding. It is, as Freire puts it, "the foundation stone" upon which our search for truth and meaning is based.¹¹⁸

To be *disposed to understand* is to be inclined to wonder. One who is continually working to revise and extend her understanding is one who has been infected with (or, perhaps more accurately, *remains* infected with) wonder.¹¹⁹ She is one who possesses, as Dewey puts it, a sort of "intellectual curiosity."¹²⁰

As opposed to the non-intellectual curiosity which is little more than "a vital overflow, an expression of an abundant organic energy," intellectual curiosity is an "interest in finding out for oneself the answers to questions that are aroused by contact with

persons and things."¹²¹ It is a motivating inclination which drives one, as Dewey says elsewhere, "to penetrate to deeper levels of meaning -- to go below the surface and find out the connections of any event or object, and to keep at it."¹²²

This spirit of curiosity or wonder can, as is the case with those who are scientifically disposed, manifest itself in an interest in understanding the natural world about one. Even more broadly, it is, as Plato tells us, expressed through one's ongoing quest to understand all of the facets of one's life:

If on the other hand I tell you that to let no day pass without discussing goodness and all the other subjects about which you hear me talking and examining both myself and others is really the very best thing that a man can do, and that life without this sort of examination is not worth living, you will be even less inclined to believe me.¹²³

Prodded by her wit and her wonder, one who is disposed to understand strives to live the examined life; she endeavors to take full stock of which ways of living and believing are most noble and which -- like mere shadows on a cave wall -- are base.

To examine one's life in this fashion does not, of course, involve somehow leaving one's life behind. Indeed, as Bernstein reminds us, it is impossible to escape from who we are:

Gadamer reminds us that we belong to tradition, history, and language before they belong to us. We cannot escape from the dynamic power of effective-history, which is always shaping what we are becoming. We become fools of history if we think that by an act of will we can escape the prejudgments, practices, and traditions that are constitutive of what we are...¹²⁴

Any human being born into a social world is unavoidably shaped by the grasp of nature, the push of history, and the pull of language and interpersonal relationships.

From the fact that being human necessarily entails being defined by these forces it does not follow, however, that one need embrace what Karl Popper calls the "Myth of the Framework."¹²⁵ It is not the case, says Popper, that "we are prisoners caught in the framework of our theories; our expectations; our past experiences; our language..."¹²⁶

While human beings cannot escape from the forces which define them, they can, to a greater or lesser extent, choose to subject these forces to scrutiny.

Engaging in such scrutiny is the characteristic mark of those who are disposed to wonder and, hence, to understand. Unlike those who, as Nussbaum says, are "living passive lives, lives in which, in the most important things, their actions and choices [are] dictated by conventional beliefs," one who pursues understanding "look[s] into" her beliefs and "ask[s] whether there [are] other ways of doing things."¹²⁷ She accepts "no belief as authoritative simply because it has been handed down by tradition or become familiar through habit" and, thus, endeavors to make her understanding "fully [her] own."¹²⁸

One of the most eloquent expressions of this disposition of intellectual curiosity and the accompanying spirit of Socratic irreverence is found within the life and writings of Henry David Thoreau:

It is remarkable how easily and insensibly we fall into a particular route, and make a beaten track for ourselves...The surface of the earth is soft and impressible by the feet of men; and so with the paths which the mind travels. How worn and dusty, then, must be the highways of the world, how deep the ruts of tradition and conformity! I did not wish to take a cabin passage, but rather to go before the mast and on the deck of the world, for there I could best see the moonlight amid the mountains. I do not wish to go below now.¹²⁹

One who has the disposition to understand does not "insensibly" follow in "the worn and dusty...ruts of...conformity."¹³⁰ For, as Dewey explains, her disposition "contrasts strongly with the disposition to pass judgment on the basis of mere custom, tradition, [and] prejudice."¹³¹ Examining her life, wondering about her world, one who is so disposed strives to understand matters for herself.

(Since thinking is the primary means through which understanding is pursued, one can aptly say that one who is disposed to understand is one who is inclined to "think for herself."¹³² She has, as Dewey says, a "readiness to consider in a thoughtful way the subjects that do come within the range of [her] experience."¹³³)

The Ability to Understand

In addition to being inclined to seek understanding one who has the power to understand also has the ability to make good on her inclination. She has the *ability to understand*. The essential ingredient of this ability is *thinking*.

"Thinking," Lipman writes, "is the skill *par excellence* that enables us to acquire meanings."¹³⁴ It is through one's thinking that one orders and refines one's experience and information. Grasping the relations which bind a particular thing, event, or situation to the broader context of which it is a part, one moves through thinking from a bare acquaintance to a rich, meaning-laden understanding.

The "unbroken stream" of thinking, we argued previously, is comprised of a number of functionally and temporally limited *cognitive moves*.¹³⁵ These cognitive moves are the motions through which the work of understanding is done.

There are at least dozens of identified cognitive moves which have been historically proven to be of use in the work of understanding.¹³⁶ To attempt to show that each of these is a means through which understanding can be gained is a task whose immensity far exceeds the ambitions of this work. This being the case, we shall limit our considerations to the sampling of prominent moves which we examined previously.¹³⁷ These cognitive moves, we shall endeavor to show, are tools which help the good thinker to understand.

(1) "Clarifying Matters" is the cognitive move of teasing out the nuances of a term, concept, or situation.¹³⁸ This move helps one to understand by sharpening one's conception. In this regard, its usefulness to the thinker is somewhat akin to the way in which eyeglasses help a person who has an astigmatism.

Without her glasses a person with a slight astigmatism has blurry vision; she can see but she cannot make out all the details. She can, for instance, see that there is a distant

crowd of people forming but she is not able to ascertain precisely what is happening. When she puts her glasses on, however, matters clear-up. Since her vision is no longer blurry she is able to perceive the details which give the situation meaning.

A person who has not yet made the move of Clarifying Matters is like the person who is not wearing her glasses. She has some understanding of the situation with which she is confronted but this understanding is not quite clear; it is confused and out of focus.

This confusion is, to at least some degree, mitigated, however, when she takes the metaphorical step of "putting on her glasses" by Clarifying Matters. She asks questions, explores distinctions, and probes into the nuances of the matter. In doing this she brings to light the meaning-laden details which allow her to understand in a richer, fuller, more accurate fashion.

(2) "Seeking Justification" is the cognitive move of justifying a claim in light of some other claim, asking for such justification, or assessing the worth of an attempt at justification.¹³⁹ This move helps one to understand by providing one with a means through which to check the veracity of knowledge claims. By appealing to, asking for, and evaluating the worth of reasons and criteria one is able to determine which claims are substantiated by other "less controversial and more acceptable" claims and which claims lack such support.¹⁴⁰ This determination guides one towards a better, more accurate understanding.

Seeking Justification also helps one to understand by revealing connections. Like a segment of a movie which is viewed in isolation, a belief, thing, or event makes relatively little sense when it is not connected to a broader context. To make the move of Seeking Justification *is* to make connections. It is to see how a belief is related to other beliefs. This very act of connecting provides understanding; one perceives the relations which bind a belief to its broader situation and, in so doing, comes to understand.

(3) "Working with Assumptions" is, first of all, the cognitive move of calling into question the truth of a claim or, secondly, the move of making a claim the antecedent of a conditional claim.¹⁴¹ The first expression of Working with Assumptions works somewhat like a stick of dynamite; it clears debris from the road of understanding.

When hiking through the mountains, one's path might be blocked by a rock slide. Similarly, when traveling towards understanding, one might find one's way blocked by a barrier of epistemological certainty. Confidence in the truth of a certain claim (such as "the earth is the center of the solar system") is so complete that even the very possibility of inquiry into alternative propositions (such as "the sun is the center of the solar system") is discounted. This over-confidence prematurely impedes inquiry; it limits what one might learn and hinders one from moving towards understanding.

Working with Assumptions is a sort of cognitive explosive through which one removes this epistemological impediment to further inquiry. By noting that a claim is not "for sure," by questioning its veracity, one clears a path towards understanding.

The second expression of Working with Assumptions is also a means through which the good thinker approaches understanding. Consider a modified version of an analogy which Dewey employs:

A [group of people are] traveling in an unfamiliar region [come] to a branching of the road. Having no sure knowledge to fall back upon, [they are] brought to a standstill of hesitation and suspense. Which road is right?¹⁴²

Needing to select which way to go and wanting to avoid committing the whole of the group to an unnecessarily dangerous path, the group decides to send out a scout. The scout's job is to explore ahead and to ascertain as best he can which route is more safe and more sure.

Sometimes, like the group of people, one arrives at a "forked-road situation."¹⁴³ One must, like the student about whom Sartre writes, make a decision. ("Should I," this student had to choose, "go to England and join the war effort or should I stay in France and

care for my mother?"¹⁴⁴) If one had the time, the resources, and the inclination one could perhaps journey down each "fork." One could attempt to test the consequences of each alternative in practice and endeavor to implement every idea (no matter how dangerous or hair-brained it seems). Sometimes, however, one cannot or does not wish to do this. This is when one is well-served by sending out an "intellectual scout."

Working with Assumptions is such a scout. When one thinks hypothetically, when one works through the implications of an assumption and then, based upon this work, assesses the worth of that assumption, one engages in intellectual scouting. By figuring out the connection between things one comes to understand which epistemic "paths" are sure and which are unworthy.

(4) "Working with Inferences" is the cognitive move of making a connection (perhaps through a series of intermediary steps) between a starting point and an ending point, or assessing the strength of such a connection.¹⁴⁵ Working with Inferences helps one to understand by expanding the scope of one's knowledge. Beginning at the starting point of what one knows or, as Dewey puts it, of "what is present," one "*carries or bears* the mind over to" that which was unknown or "absent."¹⁴⁶ This act of inferring "stretches" one's understanding beyond one's immediate experience.¹⁴⁷ It enables one to gain a broader, more far-reaching understanding.

Being adept at Working with Inferences also helps one to protect the integrity of one's understanding. Consider what Michelle, a sixth grader, writes:

For example if we were talking about people who go into liquor stores, you would assume that they drink liquor. But we wouldn't really think about all the different reasons the people would be there. Like maybe they work there or they're buying something for a friend.¹⁴⁸

It is easy to move from the starting point "she often goes into a liquor store" to the conclusion "she must drink liquor." As Michelle points out, however, such an inference might well be unwarranted. One who can skillfully Work with Inferences is able to guard against

such instances; she has the power to avoid incorporating faulty or dangerously unsubstantiated perspectives into her understanding.

(5) "Using Examples" is the cognitive move of utilizing examples and counter-examples in order to move from a general claim to specific instances which support, illustrate, or refute this general claim.¹⁴⁹ Using Examples is a means through which one assesses the accuracy of general claims. One employs examples to support and test the reasonableness of general claims. One uses counter-examples to invalidate general claims. Using Examples in such a fashion, one comes to understand which general claims serve one well and which are, at the very least, in need of modification.

(6) "Being Receptive" is the cognitive move of purposefully endeavoring to expand the scope of one's perception by heightening one's attentiveness, or of deliberately striving to reduce the psychological rigidity which limits the scope of one's perception.¹⁵⁰

Each person's perception has a focus. This focus, Dewey explains, "corresponds to the point" which is "of imminent need" or "of urgency" to one.¹⁵¹ This focus always has a "fringe."¹⁵² The fringe is comprised of that which is intimately connected to one's focus but is just outside of it.

Being Receptive is a cognitive move through which one enhances the scope of one's perception by getting at this fringe. It is a move through which one exercises greater sensitivity and thereby perceives not only that which falls within the bright, oftentimes fixating, spotlight of one's focus but also the shadowy, outlying relations of the fringe. Taking in more, perceiving meaning-laden relations which otherwise would have gone unnoticed, one who makes the move of Being Receptive understands more.

Being Receptive, Clarifying Matters, Seeking Justification, Working with Assumptions, Working with Inferences, and Using Examples are tools for understanding. They are the means which one applies to the "raw material" of experience in order to refine this "working capital" into understanding.¹⁵³ The ability to skillfully employ these means,

coupled with the disposition to do so, is what gives the good thinker the power to understand. The power to understand and, indeed, to even possess understanding, we have discovered, is underpinned by the character trait of thinking well.

Notes

- ¹Dewey (1933), p. 3.
- ²Dewey (1933), p. 4.
- ³Dewey (1933), p. 4. See also Chapter One, Judging Well.
- ⁴Dewey (1933), pp. 3-4. See also James (1890), p. 224.
- ⁵Dewey (1933), pp. 3-4. See also James (1890), p. 224.
- ⁶Dewey (1933), p. 4.
- ⁷Dewey (1933), p. 4.
- ⁸Dewey (1933), p. 4.
- ⁹Dewey (1916), p. 145.
- ¹⁰James (1890), pp. 185-186.
- ¹¹See also Roszak (1986), pp. 95-101.
- ¹²For more on reflection and self-correction see, for instance, Lipman (1991), pp. 150-152 and Splitter and Sharp (1995), pp. 90-92.
- ¹³Dewey (1933), p. 159.
- ¹⁴Passmore (1980), p. 210.
- ¹⁵Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics* [1143a]. (I have added the italics.)
- ¹⁶Wurman (1990), p. 38. James (1890), pp. 221 and 259.
- ¹⁷James (1890), p. 221.
- ¹⁸Dewey (1933), pp. 78 and 132.
- ¹⁹Dewey (1933), p. 137.
- ²⁰James (1890), p. 259.
- ²¹Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 71.

²²Dewey (1933), p. 137. Roszak (1986), p. 93.

²³Bernstein (1983), p. 173.

²⁴Bernstein (1983), p. 173.

²⁵This transcript was taken from Mrs. Yoshida's third Grade class. It has been slightly edited. I have left out the teachers' efforts to help the children clarify their ideas. Also it should be noted that only the most polished expressions of the children's contributions are presented here. The children were working hard to develop these ideas, often offering one or two tentative and incomplete expressions before being able to more clearly present their thoughts.

²⁶Dewey (1933), p. 132.

²⁷Jackson (1998), p. 18.

²⁸Dewey (1933), p. 159.

²⁹Dewey (1933), p. 159.

³⁰Dewey (1933), p. 159.

³¹See Rollins (1995).

³²James (1907), p. 29-30.

³³James (1907), p.30.

³⁴James (1907), p. 92.

³⁵James (1907), p. 94.

³⁶Bernstein (1983), pp. 2-3.

³⁷Gathered from Kalupahana's graduate seminars (1992-1994). See also Kalupahana (1994).

³⁸See Kekes (1983), pp. 283-285.

³⁹Kekes (1983), p. 284.

⁴⁰Kekes (1983), p. 284.

⁴¹Kekes (1983), p. 284.

⁴²Kekes (1983), p. 284.

⁴³Kekes (1983), p. 284.

⁴⁴Kekes (1983), p. 284.

⁴⁵Kekes does not make this point explicitly (though his words certainly do suggest it). He contends that Woolf's good judgment is made possible by his "self-direction," his "self-control," his "self-knowledge," his "constancy," and his "moral sensitivity." See Kekes (1983), p. 284.

⁴⁶Kekes (1983), p. 284.

⁴⁷Kekes (1983), p. 284.

⁴⁸Kekes (1983), p. 284.

⁴⁹See Chapter One, Good Judgment is a Character Trait.

⁵⁰For more on the theory of dependent arising (*paticcasamuppāda*) see Kalupahana (1992), pp. 53-59.

⁵¹Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics [1142a].

⁵²Norman (1996), pp. 253-254.

⁵³See "The Theory of Relativity (1949)." In Einstein (1956), pp. 39-46.

⁵⁴See, for instance, Thoreau (1854).

⁵⁵Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics [1140b].

⁵⁶Dewey (1933), p. 15.

⁵⁷Kekes (1983), p. 278.

⁵⁸Norman (1996), p. 257.

⁵⁹Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics [1140a-b].

⁶⁰From the "Phaedrus." Plato [230a].

⁶¹Taylor (1995), p. 58.

⁶²Kekes (1983), p. 285.

- ⁶³Dewey (1933), p. 17.
- ⁶⁴Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics [1141b].
- ⁶⁵Kant (1785), p. 45.
- ⁶⁶Kant (1785), p. 45.
- ⁶⁷Nussbaum (1997), p. 59.
- ⁶⁸Nussbaum (1997), pp. 58-59.
- ⁶⁹Sartre (1947), pp. 15-19.
- ⁷⁰Solomon (1984), p. 393.
- ⁷¹Sartre (1947), p. 16.
- ⁷²Sartre (1947), p. 18.
- ⁷³Sartre (1947), p. 19.
- ⁷⁴Moore and Gibbons (1987), Chapter IX, pp. 26-28.
- ⁷⁵Nussbaum (1997), p. 52.
- ⁷⁶The Stoic concept of the world citizen, Nussbaum continues, "deeply influenced the subsequent philosophical and political tradition...Stoic ideas influenced the American republic through the writings of Thomas Paine, and also through Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant, who themselves influenced the Founders. Later on Stoic thought was a major formative influence on both Emerson and Thoreau." Nussbaum (1997), pp. 52-53.
- ⁷⁷See, for instance, The Bible: Genesis (xxxi: 43), Matthew (v), Romans (viii: 14-17), and Galatians (iii: 26-28).
- ⁷⁸Deutsch (1968), p. 99.
- ⁷⁹Kant (1785), p. 50.
- ⁸⁰Dewey (1933), p. 159.
- ⁸¹Nussbaum (1997), p. 87.
- ⁸²Lago (1990), p. 13.
- ⁸³See Dalmiya (1996).

84Dalmiya (1996), p. 210.

85Dalmiya (1996), p. 214.

86Dalmiya (1996), pp. 209 and 214.

87See also See Chapter Eight, P4C and Possessing Understanding and Chapter Nine, P4C and The Cultivation of Respect and Caring.

88I will use both the term "respect" and the term "caring." While these two terms are similar in meaning, there is a slight difference. "Respect" is a prohibitive term; to respect another is to refrain from treating her as an object. "Caring" is a term which "emphasizes our positive obligations" towards others; to care for another is to express one's fondness for her. Here I follow the lead of Thomas Lickona (1991, pp. 43-45) who distinguishes between "respect" and "responsibility."

89Kant (1785), p. 45.

90Nussbaum (1997), p. 59.

91See Nussbaum (1997), Chapter Two.

92Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 166. Splitter and Sharp cite p. 228 of:
Singer, Peter. How are we to Live? Ethics in an Age of Self-Interest.
Melbourne, Australia: The Text Publishing Company, 1993.

93Nussbaum (1997), p. 64. Nussbaum cites Marcus Aurelius' *Meditations* (2.1).

94Nussbaum (1997), p. 65.

95Hirsch (1987), p. xvi.

96Freire (1970), p. 53.

97Freire (1970), p. 53.

98Hirsch (1987), p. xv.

99James (1890), p. 259.

100Dewey (1916), p. 158.

101Dewey (1916), p. 156.

102Roszak (1986), p. 95.

- 103 Dewey (1933), p. 78.
- 104 Dewey (1933), p. 78.
- 105 Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), p. 13.
- 106 Dewey (1916), p. 158.
- 107 Roszak (1986), p. 90.
- 108 Roszak (1986), p. 90.
- 109 Dewey (1933), p. 137.
- 110 Freire (1970), p. 56. See the *Kaccāyanagotta-sutta*. In Kalupahana (1992), p. 58.
- 111 Einstein (1956), p. 34. Reprinted in Lipman (1993a), p. 726. Both Einstein and Freire also have ethical objections to the notion that the primary function of schools ought to be to impart information to its pupils. Einstein writes:
 Apart from that, it seems to me, moreover, objectionable to treat the individual like a dead tool. The school should always have as its aims that the young man leave it as a harmonious personality, not as a specialist.
 Einstein (1956), p. 34.
- Freire expresses similar sentiments:
 Narration (with the teacher as narrator) leads the students to memorize mechanically the narrated content. Worse yet, it turns them into "containers," into "receptacles" to be "filled" by the teacher.
 Freire (1970), p. 53.
- Both of these men are objecting to an understanding of others which fails to pay due heed to the others' humanity.
- 112 Dewey (1916), p. 158.
- 113 Dewey (1916), p. 295.
- 114 See Chapter One, Good Judgment is a Character Trait.
- 115 Aristotle. *Metaphysics*, [982b, lines 12-27].
- 116 Paget (1993) writes: "...the only way to wisdom is that which begins at the gate of Surprise, and goes along the dim groves of Bewilderment." In Lipman (1993a), p. 116.
- 117 Bacon (1605), p. 8.
- 118 Freire (1998), p. 19.

- 119For more on this point see Chapter Ten, P4C and The Disposition to Understand.
- 120Dewey (1933), pp. 38-39.
- 121Dewey (1933), pp. 37-39.
- 122Dewey (1916), p. 326. Here Dewey is speaking of the "philosophic disposition."
- 123Plato. The Apology [38a].
- 124Bernstein (1983), p. 167.
- 125Bernstein (1983), p. 84. Bernstein cites Popper's "Normal Science and Its Dangers" (p. 56).
- 126Bernstein (1983), p. 84. Bernstein cites Popper's "Normal Science and Its Dangers" (p. 56).
- 127Nussbaum (1997), p. 21.
- 128Nussbaum (1997), pp. 9 and 21.
- 129Thoreau (1854), p. 259.
- 130Thoreau (1854), p. 259.
- 131Dewey (1933), p. 34.
- 132See Splitter and Sharp (1995), pp. 15-17.
- 133Dewey (1933), p. 34.
- 134Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), p. 13.
- 135James (1890), p. 282. See Chapter Two, Cognitive Moves.
- 136See, for instance, Lipman and Gazzard (1988a), p. iv and Splitter and Sharp (1995), pp. 9-10.
- 137See Chapter Two.
- 138See Chapter Two, Clarifying Matters.
- 139See Chapter Two, Seeking Justification.
- 140Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), p. 121.

¹⁴¹See Chapter Two, Working with Assumptions.

¹⁴²Dewey (1933), p. 13. There is one person (rather than a group of people) in Dewey's analogy.

¹⁴³Dewey (1933), p. 14.

¹⁴⁴Sartre (1947), pp. 28-30.

¹⁴⁵See Chapter Two, Working with Inferences.

¹⁴⁶Dewey (1933), p. 95.

¹⁴⁷Dewey (1925), p. 13.

¹⁴⁸From a year-end evaluation of The Philosophy In The Schools Project; Beth Ajifu's sixth grade class (1996-1997), Pearl Harbor Elementary School, Hawai'i.

¹⁴⁹See Chapter Two, Using Examples.

¹⁵⁰See Chapter Two, Being Receptive.

¹⁵¹Dewey (1925), p. 235.

¹⁵²James (1890), p. 258. Dewey (1925), p. 231.

¹⁵³Roszak (1986), p. 95. Dewey (1916), p. 158.

Chapter Four: Good Judgments: The Products of Good Thinking

Good Judgments

To have good judgment, we argued in the first chapter, is to have the power and the *inclination to judge well* and to make good judgments. But what, we asked, does it mean to judge well and what does it mean to make good judgments?

Having argued that judging well is judging which is performed through the skillful exercise of appropriate cognitive moves and is guided by understanding, we now turn our attention to good judgments. Good judgments, we shall now argue, fit with one's situation, are the characteristic outcomes of judging well, and lead to satisfying consequences.

What are good judgments? Good judgments are, first of all, a sub-class of judgments. *Judgments* are the outcomes towards which the judging process aims. A judgment is, as Plato puts it, "the conclusion of thinking."¹ It is, as Dewey says, "a *decision*" which "closes, or concludes, the question at issue."² It is a resolution or a psychological commitment to a particular alternative. One makes a judgment when one determines something with a certain degree of firmness or decides something with considerable resolve.

In arguing that a judgment is a commitment to an alternative we are following the lead of Low-Beer and departing from those who equate judgments with assertions.³ Low-Beer writes:

So we would not call a statement that five and eight are thirteen a judgment. Nor would we call such statements as "I am sitting on a chair" or "I adore

chocolate fudge" judgments. Similarly, it is misleading to call statements such as "I see three chairs in the room" *perceptual judgments*.⁴

A judgment is not simply a statement of some fact; it is a psychological commitment which one makes in response to a "live option."⁵ It is one's decision to favor one "live hypothesis" over another.⁶

In arguing that a judgment is a *psychological* commitment (or, as Splitter and Sharp put it, an "act of thought"⁷) we are similarly departing from those -- such as Matthew Lipman and Justus Buchler -- who believe that "judgment" should be construed much more broadly. Lipman writes:

A judgment, then, is a determination -- of thinking, of speech, of action, or of creation.⁸

Here Lipman appears to be following the lead of Buchler:

By a product I understand anything at all (any instance of making, doing, or saying) that issues from human life or human relationship, and I conceive of every product as a judgment...⁹

Low-Beer is right, I think, in his contention that by "expand[ing] the concept of judgment to embrace all aspects of human activity" one loses its "precise meaning."¹⁰ Rather than saying, as Lipman and Buchler do, that to make a judgment *is* to engage in an instance of "making, doing, or saying," it is better to say that to make a judgment is to *make a promise* to engage in some future "making, doing, or saying."

By arguing that a judgment is a *promise* we endeavor to preserve the important connection, which Lipman and Buchler rightly emphasize, between judgment and action. (Here we use "action" broadly to mean any overt making, doing, or saying.¹¹) One does not make a judgment simply for the sake of making a judgment. No; as a psychological commitment, one's judgment is a means which leads one towards action. It is an intermediate step of extraordinary importance whose promise is realized only when it is fulfilled through the action which is its aim.¹²

To say, then, that good judgments are kinds of judgments is to say that a good judgment is at one and the same time the settlement of some uncertainty, the affirmation of an alternative, the product of one's thought, the proclamation of one's resolve, and a promise of future action. Such are the ways in which good judgments are akin to all judgments.

But what is the differentia which distinguishes good judgments from other judgments? Good judgments, we contend, have done something which others judgments have not. They have *fit with* one's situation.

That one's situation unavoidably has a particular constitution which one cannot help but confront is a point which Martin Heidegger raises when he argues that human beings are thrown into the world.¹³ Every human being must, as a consequence of her very birth, contend with such things as the pull of gravity and the need for food. So too, if she is born into a social world, every human being must deal with matters such as the influence of language and the expectations of other people.

In judging, one sometimes discounts these conditions: one chooses not to eat, leaps recklessly from a tall tree, or disregards the sensitivities of others. But judgments such as these which "play fast and loose with the order which realities follow in [one's] experience" are oftentimes perilous.¹⁴ One soon finds that the conditions which govern one have teeth; if they are not given their due heed, they bite back.

In contrast to judgments which ignore these conditions, good judgments respect the governance of one's situation. They respect one's situation, as Low-Beer expressively states, by "taking the outside world seriously" and "staring reality in the face."¹⁵ Good judgments do not discount one's situation; they take it into account.

Because good judgments take one's world into account they have a certain air of rightness about them. They are, given the conditions which surround them, appropriate.

Like a note that harmonizes with a melody, an ingredient which exquisitely completes a dish, or a husband who is perfect for his wife, they *fit*.

Fit is a defining characteristic of good judgments. It is also, it is important to emphasize, "a *two-place* predicate."¹⁶ A judgment never simply *fits*; it always *fits with* a particular situation. This being the case, one cannot say that a judgment is, in and of itself, "good." Rather, it is good only with reference to a particular context. It is good for some person because it fits within her situation.

Situations, of course, vary. The contour of one person's situation is always somewhat different -- and oftentimes dramatically different -- from the contour of another person's situation. While situations differ from person to person (and, so too, from time to time), there are "commonplaces" or general conditions which are a part of most everybody's situation.¹⁷ Practically everyone must contend with the (physical) world, oneself, and others.

Ideally, a good judgment fits with one's world, oneself, and others. It is possible, however, for a judgment to fit with only some of these three areas (and, so, to be good in only some regards). Given this possibility, it is useful to specify sub-classes of fit. Judgments which are true to the world, judgments which are true to oneself, and judgments which are true to others are such sub-classes.

Serviceable judgments are judgments which are true to the world. They are judgments which arise out of and reflect one's understanding of the physical conditions which confront one. Emanating from hypotheses which "work," serviceable judgments do not run amiss of the governance of one's situation.¹⁸ Rather, they enable one to get into "satisfactory relation" with this situation.¹⁹

Authentic judgments are judgments which are true to oneself. They are judgments which arise out of and reflect one's understanding both of one's "ideals" and of one's "own limitations and possibilities."²⁰ Authentic judgments do not mask who one is. Nor

do they compromise one's values or betray one's hopes. They are, rather, judgments which affirm who one is and embody who one dreams of becoming.

Ethical judgments are judgments which are true to others. They are judgments which arise out of and reflect the understanding that others are precious human subjects who, like oneself, are "citizens of the world."²¹ Reflecting this understanding, ethical judgments embody a sense of respect. They are caring judgments through which others are taken seriously and are treated not as means or objects but rather as "persons" who are "ends in themselves."²²

A good judgment is not necessarily serviceable, authentic, *and* ethical. Indeed, sometimes it is impossible for a judgment to fit in every way. There are times when making a judgment fit with some part of one's situation requires one to flout another part of one's situation. Consider, for instance, the case of a soldier who must make the decidedly unserviceable judgment of jumping on a grenade in making the ethical judgment of saving his friends. Or consider the case of a person who is arrested because she stands up for her convictions. Making judgments which fit, unfortunately, can sometimes bring conflict and grief.

A good judgment, then, need not fit with one's situation in every way. But it must, if we are to call it "good," fit in some way. Whether or not we attribute the adjective "good" to a judgment which fits in some ways but not in others depends ultimately upon our estimations of importance. A good judgment, if it cannot be true to the whole of one's situation, is one which disregards only that which matters least and is true to that which matters most.

Good Thinking and Good Judgments

Having, for clarity's sake, defined a good judgment as a judgment which in some way fits within a situation, it is left to examine good judgments more closely. A most prominent feature of good judgments, we argue, is that they characteristically are the products of good thinking.

The existence of this connection between good judgments and good thinking is a point which Lipman raises:

[Judgments] are likely to be *good* judgments if they are the products of *skillfully performed* acts guided or facilitated by appropriate instruments and procedures.²³

Good judgments, unlike other judgments, tend to be products of a thinking process which is qualitatively better. They are likely to be well-made judgments.

To say that good judgments are *characteristically* or *likely* the products of good thinking is to assert that they are not invariably such products. As Lipman writes, "we are in the area of likelihood here, not necessity."²⁴ Not all judgments which fit are products of good thinking. Nor is good thinking always fulfilled in a judgment which fits.

A consideration of the features of good thinking suggests that there are at least two reasons why good thinking sometimes fails to lead to a good judgment. One reason is because one's application of cognitive moves can be flawed. One's reasoning might, for the most part, be quite good but still not perfect. An overlooked assumption here or a mistaken inference there can be all that it takes for one's thinking to lead one astray. That good thinking is, in this manner, compatible with error is a point which Norman suggests when he writes: "Even the wise make mistakes."²⁵

A second reason why good thinking can fail to arrive at a good judgment is because it can draw upon an understanding which is inaccurate or incomplete. Such an instance was Oedipus' decision to marry and bear children by Jocasta only to later find that this

woman was in fact his mother.²⁶ The thinking through which Oedipus arrived at his judgment, we shall assume, was valid enough. His understanding of his situation was, however, tragically incomplete. On account of his errant understanding, Oedipus made an unsound judgment which did not fit with his situation.²⁷

There is, then, reason why good thinking and good judgments do not invariably accompany one another. This absence of necessity, however, ought not diminish one's appreciation of the strength of the relationship between good thinking and good judgments. Most of the time good thinking and good judgments come together; judgments which fit consistently follow from good thinking and good thinking consistently leads to judgments which fit.

Indeed, the frequency with which these two accompany each other is so great that it is tempting to define good judgments not as judgments which fit but rather as those judgments which are the products of good thinking. We shall, however, resist this temptation; let us refer to judgments which are the products of good thinking but yet fail to fit as "well-made" or "well-crafted" judgments.

This, not necessary, but *productive* relationship is the bond which connects good judgment as process to good judgment as product. Judging well *is* that process which characteristically produces good judgments. Good judgments *are* those products which are characteristic outcomes of judging well. Through one's good thinking one tends to produce judgments which fit.

Why is the sort of thinking through which the process of judging is best performed characteristically fulfilled in judgments which fit? The next three sections take up this question. The sort of good thinking which is skillfully performed through a variety of appropriate cognitive moves and which leans back on one's understanding, we shall argue, is an excellent means through which to produce good judgments.

Leaning Back On Understanding and Good Judgments

Essential to good thinking, we have argued, is one's ability to lean back on one's understanding of one's world, oneself, and others.²⁸ Since this ability presupposes the possession of an understanding (for one cannot lean back upon that which is not there) we argued further that the epistemic state of understanding is intimately bound up with the process of good thinking.²⁹

As the possession of understanding is bound up with good thinking, so too is it essentially connected with the making of judgments which fit. That there is indeed such a connection between the possession of understanding and making good judgments has been suggested by scores of thinkers throughout the preceding millennia.

Norman is one such thinker. While examining the concept of wisdom, Norman writes:

...knowledge or understanding of how to live well is a very good thing, and will *promote*, or *have a tendency to result in*, the exercise of sound judgment...³⁰

Here Norman makes explicit a point which is implicit within much of the conversation pertaining to wisdom; the good judgments of the wise person are, to a greater or lesser extent, related to the quality of his or her understanding.

(This connection between understanding and wisdom, to employ a distinction which Kekes draws, is made within the thought both of those who concern themselves with a "metaphysical" knowledge about the "fundamental truths about reality" as well as those who are more interested with a "humanistic" knowledge about the "means to ends."³¹ The authors of the Bhagavadgita,³² the Buddha,³³ certain Christian authors,³⁴ and Descartes³⁵ are thinkers who fall into the former group. Aristotle,³⁶ Kekes,³⁷ and Norman³⁸ can be put into the latter group.)

An awareness of this connection between understanding and making good judgments is also present, even if only tacitly, within much of the conversation pertaining to matters of education. Within the writing of those who speak of the need to educate for judging (such as Dewey³⁹ and Norman⁴⁰) there is oftentimes an explicit recognition of this connection. Those who primarily value the transmission of information also recognize this connection. Hirsch, for instance, contends that the "piling up [of] specific, communally shared information" is a means which will enable people "to decide all important matters for themselves."⁴¹

This contention that judgments which arise out of understanding are likely to be good judgments is also implicit within Francis Bacon's famous maxim "knowledge is power."⁴² Dewey argues that Bacon's statement implies that instrumental power ought to be taken as a criterion for knowledge.⁴³ If knowledge is truly knowledge (and not "pseudo- and pretentious-knowledge" or, more simply, "*not-knowledge*"), it will lead to power.⁴⁴ Only those insights which lead to power, then, are worthy of the name "knowledge."

In formulating this criterion for discriminating between knowledge and non-knowledge, Dewey establishes an exclusive link between knowledge and power. It is not the case that *any* "knowledge" (regardless of its quality) gives one power. Rather, it is only a particular quality of knowledge: namely, "true" or "genuine" knowledge.

"Genuine" knowledge, we argue, is an *understanding* whose accuracy is attested to by the fact that it "works."⁴⁵ Power is the ability "to get into satisfactory relation" with one's situation; it is the ability to make *good judgments* and, hence, enjoy satisfying consequences.⁴⁶ To say, then, that "genuine" knowledge leads to power is to suggest that understanding is a seed from whence good judgments grow.

Good judgments, however, do not grow from the *possession* of understanding alone. Possessing a good understanding is essentially related to the work of making good

judgments but there is more to making good judgments than possessing a good understanding. As Norman puts it, "no amount of knowledge, of whatever kind, can ensure [the exercise of sound judgment]."47

The reason why the possession of understanding is not, in and of itself, a sufficient condition for the making of good judgments is because, as Norman tells us, it is possible for one to fail to put one's understanding to use:

...imagine someone with (virtually) unlimited knowledge of how to live well...Now nothing in this description rules out the possibility that he will exercise decidedly poor judgment. It is perfectly conceivable, for example, that he possess all this knowledge, yet not *apply* it in the conduct of his life.⁴⁸

No matter how good one's understanding is, it is possible, to make use of a phrase of Dewey's, for it to reside in "cold-storage."⁴⁹ Residing thusly, one's understanding is of no use in the work of making good judgments; it vacates its directorial role in the play of judgment.

For one's understanding to be of any use in the work of making good judgments one must make use of it. The means through which understanding is put to work, we argued, is the complex cognitive move of leaning back.⁵⁰ Leaning back involves, firstly, the reflective act of drawing upon one's prior thought. Secondly, it involves the corrective act of using one's reflected upon thought to direct the course of one's judging.

Through the move of leaning back one imbues one's judgments (and, ultimately, one's actions) with the quality of one's thought. Reflecting back, one gains access to one's fund of thought. Then, performing the subsequent forward-looking move of making use of this thought, one embeds the quality of one's thought within one's very judgment. Somewhat like the way in which one infuses the flavor of an ingredient into a meal, one transfers (but does not withdraw) one's intellectual "working capital" into one's judgment.

The quality of the thought which one transfers has much to do with the fit of one's judgment. A judgment which is informed by a meaning-laden and accurate understanding

is less likely to lead one afoul of one's situation. The judgment is likely to fit because one's understanding "works" and, hence, provides one with good guidance.⁵¹ A judgment which is informed (or, more accurately, under-informed or misinformed) primarily by superficial information or, even worse, misunderstanding is, on the other hand, more likely to create dissonance between oneself and one's situation. In this case one's judgment will likely fail to fit because one's understanding does not work and, hence, provides one with poor guidance.

Good judgments, then, are good largely because they are the carefully and reflectively crafted products of understanding minds. Their fit is a reflection of the understanding which has been infused into them through the move of leaning back, not just upon thought, but upon *understanding*. Inherent within their very character are their producers' good understandings.

That (good) understanding does indeed characteristically bear fruit in good judgments is supported by much of our daily experience. A young boy, for instance, who mistakes a glowing, red-hot, electric burner of a stove for a toy is likely to make the poor judgment of touching the burner and, hence, get burned. If, on the other hand, the boy judges based upon an (accurate) understanding of the meaning of the glowing burner, he is likely to make the good judgment of keeping clear from the stove and, so, enjoy continued health.

That which is the case in this example, experience tells us, commonly holds true. A judgment which reflects the navigator's accurate understanding of the stars and the currents is more likely to be serviceable. A judgment which leans back on a girl's genuine understanding of her aspirations and limitations is more likely to be authentic. A judgment which appeals to a business person's heart-felt understanding of the interests of his client is more likely to be ethical. Time and time again, our hypothesis is confirmed: quality judgments arise out of a quality understanding. Appealing to an understanding that is true to one's

situation does not ensure that one's judgment will be a good one. It does, however, make it more likely.

The Power to Understand and Good Judgments

The ability and disposition to lean back on a useful and meaning-laden understanding is, like the very possession of such an understanding, essentially connected to the work of making good judgments. While this character trait helps one to make good judgments, it still does not sufficiently empower one to *continue* to make such judgments.

Imagine a business person who appeals to his understanding of the business world and, as a consequence, consistently makes sound business judgments. But then the landscape changes; E-commerce, globalization, and the like change the way business is done. Not understanding this new situation, trying to play by an outdated set of rules, this person now consistently makes poor judgments.

This person no longer made good judgments because his understanding did not keep pace with his situation. One's situation is always becoming; "Reality," as Freire contends, "is really a *process*, undergoing constant transformation."⁵² One's understanding of one's situation, however, is not necessarily as fluid. An understanding which accurately reflects one's situation can also be fixed or rigid.⁵³ In such a case, one's understanding does not evolve along with one's situation and, hence, with time ceases to fit. What was once a good understanding becomes a misunderstanding and, as a consequence, leads one's judging astray.

The *continued* making of good judgments, then, requires something which the temporary exercise of good judgment does not. One must, if one is to consistently make good judgments over a period of time, lean back on an understanding which, in addition to being respectful of one's current situation, is also responsive to the future adaptations of

one's situation. One must appeal to an understanding which can travel or, to borrow a term from Dewey, has "plasticity."⁵⁴

Such an understanding cannot be *given* to one. It "emerges," Freire suggests, "only through invention and re-invention."⁵⁵ It is the product of that power which comes when one possesses both (1) the *disposition* and (2) the *ability* to understand.⁵⁶

(1) One who has the *disposition to understand* is driven by an "intellectual curiosity" to relentlessly pursue understanding.⁵⁷ To have this disposition is to strive, as Socrates puts it, to live the examined life.⁵⁸ It is, put most simply, to be prone to *wonder*.

"Wonder," writes Bacon, "is the seed of knowledge;" wonder brings with it an ongoing advancement of understanding.⁵⁹ Repeatedly subjecting their world and beliefs to scrutiny, those who wonder regularly improve upon their understandings. New understandings are formed, outdated understandings are revised, and faulty understandings are eliminated.

This continuing "invention and re-invention" of understanding contributes greatly to the continued crafting of good judgments.⁶⁰ One's judging does not need to draw upon an outdated or ill-functioning misunderstanding; it has as its resource an understanding which is constantly being remade so as to work. Resting upon a solid understanding, one's judgments tend to rise up sure and true.

(2) One who has the *ability to understand* is adept at employing a number of appropriate cognitive moves. Cognitive moves are means through which understanding is crafted and recrafted.⁶¹ Through her good thinking, one who skillfully employs cognitive moves is able to continue to craft the sort of sound understanding from which good judgments characteristically arise. (More will be said on this in the following section.)

Cognitive Moves and Good Judgments

In Cultural Literacy Hirsch argues that Dewey "mistook a half-truth for the whole."⁶² Hirsch continues:

[Dewey] placed too much faith in children's ability to learn general skills from a few typical experiences and too hastily rejected "the piling up of information."⁶³

In order to compensate for Dewey's far-reaching error Hirsch promotes "a countervailing theory of education that once again stresses the importance of specific information..."⁶⁴

Hirsch is right to warn of the dangers of ignoring the need for the transmission of information. (Information is, as Dewey himself argues, an indispensable resource for further inquiry.⁶⁵ Information is, as Lipman tells us, "indispensable for the fostering of good judgment."⁶⁶) In his zest to champion the efficacy of the "piling up of information," however, Hirsch promotes (even if not deliberately) a converse half-truth; namely, that the mere transmission of information is an end in itself which sufficiently prepares students for life.⁶⁷

That the influence of this latter half-truth is wide-spread is recognized by Freire when he notes: "Education is suffering from narration sickness."⁶⁸ Historically, the notion that the reception of some epistemic content -- be it information or, more substantially, knowledge -- is in and of itself sufficient has been (and continues to be) frequently and fervently embraced. Hirsch is just one of those who accept the same basic notion; knowledge alone is enough.

While knowledge alone might be enough for some ends, "no amount of knowledge," as Norman declares, "can ensure [the exercise of sound judgment]."⁶⁹ Even if one possesses an understanding which has "plasticity," even if one is able to continue to extend and revise one's understanding, it is, we contend, still not enough.⁷⁰ Understanding, leaning back on one's understanding, and having the power to understand

are, to be sure, all essentially connected to the work of making good judgments. But all of these are under-girded by an even more fundamental, and oftentimes unnoticed, substratum: the skillful use of appropriate cognitive moves.

Cognitive moves, are the very means through which one's judgments are made. As an artist cannot paint without his paints, brushes, and paper; as a mechanic cannot fix a car without wrenches, screwdrivers and spare parts; one cannot make good judgments without the appropriate cognitive moves. These cognitive moves are the instruments of the judging trade; they comprise, as Jackson says, the "good thinker's tool kit."⁷¹

That the use of certain cognitive moves is, in fact, essentially connected to the making of good judgments is an assertion which Lipman makes. He writes: "...good judgment cannot be operative unless it rests upon proficient reasoning skills..."⁷² This assertion is also supported by examples.

Consider the case of two young women. Each of these women has to make an identical judgment: Should I join a street gang? These women, however, are not identically equipped to make this decision. The first woman, we shall assume, is able and disposed to make cognitive moves skillfully. The second woman, on the other hand, does not have this power.

When confronted with her decision the first woman adeptly performs a number of cognitive moves. "If I join the gang," she thinks, "then I will enjoy a sense of comradeship and belonging. But, on the other hand, I will also run the risk of getting in trouble with the law and perhaps even of suffering a violent and untimely death." She wonders "What are the reasons which support each choice?" and "Which of these reasons are most worthy?" She also asks herself "Are the claims with which I am confronted true?"⁷³ Through the use of these moves the first woman makes her choice.

Unlike the first woman, the second woman makes little use of these cognitive moves in making her decision. Because she is not skilled at hypothetical thinking she does

not consider the implications of her judgments. Because she is not in the habit of appealing to reasons she does not weigh the relative worth of her options. Because she is not disposed to question she accepts all that she is told at face value. In making her judgment she draws upon little more than hearsay and whim.

One cannot, of course, say for certain whose judgment will fit best; "we are in the area of likelihood here, not necessity."⁷⁴ But we note that the first woman's judgment is made more thoughtfully. She better perceives the connections between the choice which confronts her and the broader field of her concerns, hopes, and circumstances. She alone "scratches beneath the surface" of matters and, so, gains a deeper, more accurate understanding of the situation.⁷⁵ She, unlike the other woman, judges through the careful, reasoned use of historically-proven cognitive tools.⁷⁶ For these reasons it is more likely that the first woman's judgment will fit.

This example corroborates both Lipman's claim and our own experience: cognitive moves are essentially related to the making of good judgments. Judgments which are made through good thinking, like judgments which arise out of a good understanding, are more likely be good.

Consequences and Good Judgments

There is, we argue, one final, and by no means dispensable, characteristic of good judgments. Good judgments -- by which we mean judgments which fit with one's situation -- lead to *satisfying consequences*.

Construed most broadly, *consequences* are the "future events" which follow from some happening.⁷⁷ They are outcomes which happen as a result of that which precedes them.

Judgments themselves are consequences. They are outcomes which follow from the judging process. So too, the actions through which one fulfills one's judgments are also consequences. They are instances of "making, doing, or saying" which come into being as a consequence of one's having made one's judgment (and, more distantly, of one's having engaged in the process of judging).⁷⁸

Actions themselves also have consequences.⁷⁹ The action of "throwing a stone," for instance, can be distinguished from the consequence of the stone "hit[ting] a child or a window."⁸⁰ "The consequences of an action," as Lipman and Sharp write, "are the events that follow from that action and have been caused directly or indirectly by that action."⁸¹ They are, as Peter Phillips Simpson puts it, "the states of affairs that acts produce."⁸²

Our concern here is with the *consequences of actions*. When we assert that judgments which fit lead to *satisfying consequences* what we mean is that such judgments, once fulfilled, culminate in *satisfying consequences of actions*. By "consequences," then, we mean hereafter "consequences of actions."

In arguing, as we do, that good judgments lead not merely to consequences but to *satisfying* consequences we may arouse, as John Stuart Mill put it, "inveterate dislike."⁸³ For a ready misinterpretation of our assertion is "judgments are good only if they lead to pleasing consequences." As a point of caution, then, we note at the outset: our intent is *not* to argue that the quality of a judgment's consequences ought to be the sole criterion for the predication of the superlative "good" to that judgment *nor* is it to identify a satisfying consequence as merely a pleasurable one.

Satisfying consequences are, we argue, consequences which are satisfying in two ways. (1) Satisfying consequences are empirically satisfying to the judgment itself insofar as they *perform a verifying function*. (2) Satisfying consequences are, in addition, also psychologically satisfying to the agent who fulfilled the judgment insofar as they are *accompanied by happiness*. We shall consider each of these sorts of satisfaction in turn.

(1) The verifying function of consequences which empirically satisfy judgments is concomitant with these judgment's *fit*. A judgment which fits with one's situation, it will be recalled, is a judgment which has proven to be respectful of the governance of one's situation.⁸⁴ Guided by a meaning-laden and useful understanding, a judgment which fits has correctly taken one's situation into account

Here, speaking carefully, we say not that a judgment which fits *takes* one's situation into account but rather that a judgment which fits *has taken* one's situation into account. That is because fitting within a situation is not a quality which a judgment *has*. It is an honorarium which it *earns*. There is, to recall Lawson's words, no "*Ding an sich*," no entity of "fit" within a judgment.⁸⁵ Rather, we say of a judgment that it fits only because it does, in fact, fit with one's situation.

To attribute the predicate "fit" to a judgment before it actually fits is, then, to employ a convenient figure of speech. It is to say in a short-hand way that we, for a number of reasons, are confident that this judgment *will* fit. It is to propose a hypothesis.

This hypothesis, to be sure, may be well founded. If one is confident of the value of the understanding which informs this judgment, if one is sure of the soundness of the thinking through which it has been formed, then one can reasonably induce that this judgment will fit. And if the strength of this induction is strong enough then one can, and *should*, with good reason act upon this judgment.⁸⁶

The fit of a judgment, then, like the truth of the understanding which is embedded within the judgment, is something which "happens."⁸⁷ Indeed, the fit of a judgment is, a reflection of the truth of the understanding which informs it. As the understanding which is embedded within the judgment "*becomes* true" the judgment itself *becomes* well-fitting.⁸⁸ As the understanding "*is made* true by events" the judgment is *made* well-fitting by events.⁸⁹ A judgment *comes to* fit within one's situation precisely because the understanding which counsels it *comes to* "work."⁹⁰

The measure of a judgment's fit (and, so too, an understanding's truth) is the consequences which follow from this judgment. Judgments come to fit and understandings come to work precisely as they are "verified" or borne out by the consequences which follow from them.⁹¹ The consequences prove the fit of the judgment (and the truth of the embedded understanding) by *satisfying* the judgment's aim.

Consequences which are satisfying in this sense are *empirically* satisfying. They verify or satisfy the judgment itself. Because these consequences are compatible with the judgment's aim, because they do not "entangle [one's] progress in frustration," they verify the soundness of the judgment itself and, so too, affirm the reliability of the understanding embedded within the judgment.⁹²

(2) Satisfying consequences are not, however, merely empirically satisfying to the judgment itself. Satisfying consequences are, additionally, *psychologically* satisfying to the agent who fulfilled the judgment. They are consequences which are accompanied by the agent's experience of satisfaction or *happiness*.

"By happiness" we mean, as Mill did, "pleasure and the absence of pain."⁹³ There is, we contend, a qualitative range of happiness. Near the nadir of this range is the sort of dull contentment which one experiences when there is an absence of pain. One is not particularly pleased or excited about anything but neither does one feel badly. Towards the zenith of this range is the experience of ebullience which one has when one is tremendously pleased.

The happiness which one experiences when one's judgment is satisfied by consequences is of two sorts. The first sort is well near to the nadir of the qualitative range of happiness. We shall call it the experience of *ease*. The second sort of happiness is nearer to the zenith of this range of happiness. We shall call it the experience of *being pleased*. Of these two sorts of happiness, we shall argue, only the former is essentially related to

judgments which fit. Good judgments necessarily lead to an experience of ease. But they only characteristically lead to the experience of being pleased.

The experience of ease is a psychological byproduct of the verification of one's judgment. It is best described not as a pleasurable feeling but rather as a sense of calm. It is, as the word "ease" suggests, an experience of comfort which one enjoys when one is free from pain, trouble, annoyance, or, as James says, "frustration."⁹⁴

The connection between this experience of ease and good judgments is suggested by a consideration of the Sanskrit word *sukha*. The origin of this word is (arguably) from the elements *su* (meaning "good") and the verbal root *stha* (meaning "to stand or abide").⁹⁵ The more common translation of *sukha* is "agreeable," "comfortable," or, most often, "happy."⁹⁶ A less common and more literal translation of this term is "having a good axle-hole."⁹⁷

Though seemingly disparate, these two definitions, David Kalupahana explains, are connected.⁹⁸ To say that a cart has a good axle-hole is to suggest that the body of the cart smoothly embraces the cart's axle. Because the axle fits nicely into the body of the cart it does not bump or rub against the cart. This absence of friction allows for a clear and jolt-free ride. Enjoying such a peaceful, unperturbing ride, the riders in the cart experience the psychological consequence of comfort or happiness.

A judgment which fits, like a well-fitting axle, produces a minimum of jolt. It does not create dissonance or run one afoul of one's situation. Rather, reflecting the good understanding infused within it, it leads "straight up" to consequences which validate it and uphold its aim.⁹⁹

Like the rider on a smooth-running cart, we contend, the agent who fulfills a judgment which fits enjoys her unperturbing ride. She experiences the oftentimes faint feeling of *ease* which accompanies the absence of frustration. The consequences of her good judgment *satisfy* her in this modest yet none the less comforting way.

The experience of ease is one sort of psychological satisfaction. A second sort of psychological satisfaction is the experience of *being pleased*. Like the experience of ease, being pleased is a feeling of psychological satisfaction which accompanies consequences which verify judgments. Unlike the experience of ease, however, being pleased is qualitatively more intense.

Whereas the experience of ease is best explained by the absence of pain, being pleased is best described as a presence of pleasure. Here we use the word "pleasure" not as Aristotle did; being pleased ought not be identified merely with "the life of enjoyment" which people of "the most vulgar type" pursue.¹⁰⁰ Rather, being pleased includes, following Mill's lead, both "mental" and "bodily pleasures."¹⁰¹ Being pleased, broadly defined, is the psychological experience of gladness which accompanies some beneficial happening.

This experience of being pleased, unlike the experience of ease, does *not* accompany all good judgments. All (good) judgments which are verified (and, thus, do not lead to frustration) produce a modest feeling of ease. But only those judgments which, in addition to being verified, *aim towards that which is pleasing to one* produce the experience of being pleased.

All judgments have an aim. Affirming one "live hypothesis" over another, a judgment aims to bring into being one particular set of consequences rather than another.¹⁰² Many, but not all, judgments aim towards that which is pleasing to one. I resolve, for instance, to eat a slice of cake or listen to a beautiful piece of music because the consequences of these acts are, to me, pleasing.

The experience of being pleased is an outcome of the verification of those judgments which aim towards that which is pleasing to one. It is the psychological manifestation of these aims brought about by the verification through consequences of the judgment.

The verification of a judgment is a happening which makes the aim of the judgment manifest. It is the actualization through consequences of "the states of affairs" which the judgment aimed to produce.¹⁰³ If a judgment's aim is to bring into being that which is pleasing, then verification is a happening which does, in fact, bring into being that which is pleasing. The experience of being pleased is the psychological expression of this bringing into being. It is the sense of psychological satisfaction which accompanies the empirical satisfaction of some judgments (namely, those which aim towards that which is pleasing).

It is because only some judgments aim towards that which is pleasing that being pleased only *characteristically* accompanies the verification of judgments. Verification cannot make manifest that which is not there; a judgment which does not aim towards that which is pleasing will, when realized, be accompanied by an experience of ease but it will not be accompanied by the experience of being pleased.

That a judgment would, in fact, fail to aim towards that which is pleasing to one is a consequence of the previously mentioned fact that there are times when making a judgment fit with some part of one's situation requires one to flout another part of one's situation.¹⁰⁴ To get into "satisfactory relation with" one part of one's experience one sometimes must defy another part of one's experience.¹⁰⁵

Consider, for instance, the case of a civil rights protester who makes the judgment to participate in a march. He makes this judgment not because he believes that it will bring him a strong feeling of gladness or pleasure. Indeed, he fears that his judgment will bring him tremendous grief, but he is also firmly convinced that, in order to get be true to himself and to others, he must make good on this judgment.

The judgment is fulfilled and, through its consequences, verified. The protester feels a measure of satisfaction because his judgment has been proven to fit. By marching he has fulfilled his aim of being true to himself and others. About this he feels good; his judgment has put him in a satisfactory relation with this portion of his experience.

But the protester also feels something else; he feels tremendous pain. Being true to himself and to others put him at odds with the authorities and, as a consequence, he received a painful beating. "With this corner of my experience," the man laments as he suffers the agony of his injuries, "I certainly do not have a satisfactory relation." "As I expected, this certainly is not," he reflects, "a pleasurable experience."

Doing what is right, fair, or authentic sometimes requires one to aim away from that which is pleasing and towards that which is, while in some respects satisfying, largely regrettable. Sometimes the cost to one of satisfying one part of one's experience is to be beaten down by another part of one's experience. In life such conflict is unavoidable and, thus, we contend that it is *many* but *not all* good judgments which are accompanied by the experience of being pleased.

By asserting that good judgments are those judgments which lead to satisfying consequences we ought not, then, inspire "inveterate dislike."¹⁰⁶ Our intent is not to identify a satisfying consequence as merely a pleasurable one. To say that good judgments lead to satisfying consequences is to say that a judgment which fits is: (1) verified or proven by its consequences, (2) accompanied by the experience of ease which comes when a judgment leads "straight up" to consequences which are in harmony with the judgment's aim, and (3) characteristically (but not always) accompanied by an experience of being pleased.¹⁰⁷

Ultimately, it is the quality of these satisfying consequences which recommends the making of good judgments. Good judgments are good to make precisely because they are empirically satisfied and, so, psychologically satisfying. They are good because "they help us to get into satisfactory relation with" our experience.¹⁰⁸

So too, it is ultimately the consequences which follow from one's judgments which recommend to us particular modes of judging, thinking, and understanding. The worth which we assign to these modes is a product of our historical awareness that they too have

worked well for us.¹⁰⁹ We call these modes "good" precisely because they have proven, through the consequences which follow from our good judgments, to have "cash-value."¹¹⁰ We continue to call these modes "good" because we rightly anticipate that they shall continue to have such value. Consequences are, then, the touchstone to which one must eventually return.

Judgments which Fail to Fit

A good judgment is "good" precisely because it proves, through the work which it does within the world, that it has cash-value. This does not mean, however, that one cannot properly call "good" a judgment which has not been verified. It is, we argue, altogether appropriate to attribute the superlative "good" to a judgment based upon one's well-founded hypothesis that, if properly enacted, this judgment will (or would have) fit.

Oftentimes when a judgment fails to fit it is because there is a flaw in the judgment itself. The judgment may be the product of shoddy reasoning. Or, as in the case of Oedipus' judgment, it may be informed by an inaccurate or incomplete understanding.¹¹¹ In such cases the judgment is a poorly formed product and, as a consequence, runs afoul of one's situation.

There are other times, however, when a judgment which fails to fit seems, even in retrospect, to have the same air of rightness about it as judgments which go on to fit. These judgments, like their more successful cousins, seem to be the products of sound thinking and good judging. So too, they seem to reflect a good understanding of the situation. Yet, even though they are well-crafted and well-informed, these judgments do not prove their fit.

This admission that a judgment could, in this fashion, possess an air of rightness but still fail to fit is largely a consequence of our definition of "a judgment." We have argued that, contrary to what Buchler and Lipman contend, a judgment is not an action.¹¹² It is not an actual "making, doing, or saying" which occurs and is observable within the world.¹¹³ Rather, following the lead of Low-Beer and of Splitter and Sharp, we have argued that a judgment is a *psychological commitment* or "act of thought."¹¹⁴ It is not an instance of making, doing, or saying but instead a *promise* to engage in some future making, doing, or saying.

Promises are potentially of enormous value but are, until they are made good on, of little practical worth. This too is the case with judgments. As resolutions, judgments are of vital importance; they are intermediary steps which govern one's actions and, ultimately, shape the very quality of one's life. But, while judgments are of great potential importance, they are, as merely unfulfilled resolutions, of little practical worth. It is not the judgments themselves which make a discernible difference within the world but rather the actions which follow from these judgments.

Judgments, then, must be fulfilled through action if they are to do any useful work within the world. But here is where the difficulty lies. For there is a gap between judgments and actions; there is nothing which necessitates the fulfillment of judgments through action. A judgment can be as good as it gets. It can be well-constructed, well-informed, and have the potential to mesh harmoniously with the whole of one's situation but yet, due to no flaw in the judgment itself, never be appropriately fulfilled.

There are, we contend, two reasons why even well-crafted judgments may fail to be fulfilled appropriately and, hence, never be given the chance to prove their fit. Judgments may never get this chance because (1) they are never acted upon, or (2) they are enacted poorly.

(1) Quite obviously a judgment, no matter how good, will make no difference if it is never fulfilled through action. One can resolve to follow a course of action and yet, when the time comes to make good on one's commitment, fail to follow through. A young man, for instance, might resolve not to try illegal drugs but yet, when confronted with his friend's exhortations, fail to make good on his commitment.

One reason why a judgment is not fulfilled is because, as is the case with the young man in our example, the agent "does not abide by the conclusions of his deliberations."¹¹⁵ In such a case the agent, as Aristotle puts it, "is like a city which passes all the right decrees and has good laws, but makes no use of them."¹¹⁶ "Through cowardice and laziness, [he] shrink[s] from doing what [he] think[s] best..."¹¹⁷

Aristotle is perhaps unduly harsh here in attributing this sort of "incontinence" (*akrasia*) or "weakness" of will only to cowardice and laziness.¹¹⁸ But whatever the causes of such incontinence, we note that it does exist and does prevent potentially good judgments from being verified.¹¹⁹

A second reason why a judgment may never be fulfilled through action is not because of the agent's incontinence but rather because his efforts to act upon his judgment are thwarted by his circumstances. Consider, for instance, if Sartre's student had decided to go to England and join the war effort but was, despite his best efforts, unable to secure transportation out of town.¹²⁰ This young man's resolution to join the war effort went unfulfilled not because of cowardice or laziness on his part but rather because of the existence of unfavorable circumstances.

(2) Another cause for potentially good judgments to go unverified is a lack not of action but of *skillful* action.¹²¹ Many judgments can be fulfilled only through the exercise of skillful action. Sometimes, however, this skillful action does not occur; a single mistake is all that it takes for a seemingly good judgment to go astray. The judgment fails to work but the flaw is in the action not in the judgment.

Consider the case of a doctor who makes the judgment to perform a delicate surgery. The doctor, we will assume, has the talent to perform the surgery and is right in his determination that the surgery ought to be done. But, despite the fact that his judgment to perform the surgery has the potential to fit, it fails to do so. The patient dies on the operating table.

The doctor's judgment did not lead to satisfying consequences because, at the most crucial moment, the doctor's hand slipped and caused irreparable damage to the patient's heart. The slip-up was caused not by a lack of talent. (If this were the cause, we would be inclined to say that the judgment did not really have the potential to fit because it was based on a faulty appraisal of the doctor's talent.) Rather, it was caused by an utterly unusual and involuntary muscle twitch. Or perhaps it was caused by an equally unforeseeable failure of the equipment. In either case the fault lies not in the judgment but in the performance of the action. The judgment proved not to fit only because the action did not work.

The fit of a judgment, then, is thoroughly dependent upon the skillful performance of the action through which the judgment is fulfilled. No matter how much potential a judgment has it must, in asserting its worth, be ratified by action.

Even this, however, is not the end of the matter. For even if a judgment is well-crafted, well-informed, and fulfilled through a skillfully performed action, it is still not necessarily the case that the judgment will be verified by satisfying consequences. Just as there is a gap between a judgment and an action, there is, we contend, a gap between an action and its consequences. A skillfully performed action can fail to lead to its proper consequences simply because, as Aristotle puts it, "many events happen by chance."¹²²

Consider again the case of the doctor. Let us assume this time, however, that the doctor's judgment is fulfilled through his skillful action. The surgery is a success.

But then, subsequent to the doctor's skillful action, something bad happens. As the patient is being wheeled back to her room she inexplicably catches some rogue virus and,

as a consequence, soon after dies. Despite all that it had going for it, this judgment to bring the patient to the hospital and operate on her still fails to fit. It does not even come close to meeting its aim of improving her health. Derailed by the vicissitudes of chance, this judgment runs afoul of the situation.

What this brief examination of judgments which fail to fit suggests is that, while it is useful to define good judgments as judgments which fit, one ought not be too stingy when appraising the worth of a particular judgment. There are many judgments which are not borne out by their consequences but which, nonetheless, are still worthy of praise. Though it would perhaps be better to be more precise, it is altogether appropriate to speak of such judgments as "good judgments." For, indeed, while these poor cousins are not good with regard to their consequences, they are certainly good in other ways.

Good Judgment Can Be Taught

Good judgment, Low-Beer contends, has oftentimes been treated as a faculty or as natural capacity.¹²³ It is assumed that, to use Kant's words, good judgment is "a peculiar talent," "a natural gift," or a "natural power" which one either has or is lacking from the time of birth.¹²⁴

If good judgment is indeed a natural gift, then it follows, as Kant suggests, that there is nothing which can be done to improve someone's judgment:

Deficiency in judgment is just what is ordinarily called stupidity, and for such a failing there is no remedy...it is not unusual to meet learned men who in the application of their scientific knowledge betray that original want, which can never be made good.¹²⁵

There is no question as to how one might educate for good judgment, then, for one cannot educate for good judgment. Good judgment "is the specific quality of so-called mother-wit; and its lack no school can make good."¹²⁶

Following the lead of Low-Beer, Norman, and Lawson, we have, in the preceding chapters, rejected the view that good judgment is a "mysterious faculty" or an "inscrutable quality."¹²⁷ Rather, we have argued that to have good judgment is to possess a "character trait."¹²⁸ It is to be both disposed and able to "consistently" exercise the quality of judging which leads to good judgments.¹²⁹ It is to have the power and inclination to judge well and, so, to make good judgments.

This power, we have further argued, comes from one's thinking.¹³⁰ One who has the power to judge well has the both the ability and the disposition to engage in the sort of thinking which has been proven to be good for the work of judging. She is characteristically ready and able to engage in *good thinking*.

Good thinking involves, first and foremost, the skillful exercise of a variety of appropriate cognitive moves. *Clarifying Matters, Seeking Justification, Working with Assumptions, Working with Inferences, Using Examples, and Being Receptive*; these are but a few of the moves through which the work of judging well is done.¹³¹

Good thinking also "leans back on" one's understanding.¹³² This understanding is not mere "information."¹³³ Rather, it is a meaning-laden, useful, knowledge-about one's world, oneself, and others. This understanding arises both out of one's disposition to wonder as well as out of one's ability to employ the cognitive moves through which understanding is gained.¹³⁴

The ability and disposition to skillfully employ cognitive moves, the ability and disposition to appeal to one's understanding, the ability and disposition to gain a deep understanding of one's situation; these are the essential ingredients of good judgment. To possess the power to judge well and, so, to consistently make good judgments -- or, to employ a figure of speech, to *have* good judgment -- is to have made these abilities and dispositions one's own. It is to consistently and skillfully perform the moves through which good judgments are made.

Having gotten clear on what good judgment is, it becomes evident that, despite what some might say, good judgment can be taught. For, while there may be no educational remedy for a lack of "so-called mother-wit," abilities and dispositions are the sorts of things which can be purposefully cultivated.

That abilities can be taught is obvious. To have an ability (or, put differently, a skill) is to have the power or potential to perform some move (or combination of moves). To teach someone an ability is to empower them to perform this move. One empowers others with abilities when one teaches them to read, to write, to engage in computation, to throw a ball, or to drive a car.

So too, the abilities through which good judgments are made can be taught. One can, as the rise of the critical thinking movement attests to, teach children to make cognitive moves better.¹³⁵ One can empower them to do such things as give reasons, spot assumptions, provide examples, and, as we shall argue later, listen well.¹³⁶

Matters are somewhat more complex when it comes to dispositions. Possessing a disposition (or, put differently, a character trait or an inclination) involves having the ability or potential to perform some move. But it also involves the consistent exercise of this move. To be disposed to make some move is to actualize one's potential to make this move. It is to exercise this move consistently or characteristically (but, as Norman argues, not necessarily invariably).¹³⁷

Though the pedagogical problem of *how* to cultivate dispositions is a thorny one, it seems clear that, like abilities, dispositions can be cultivated.¹³⁸ This is a point which Dewey makes.¹³⁹ It is also a contention which current proponents of "values education" make. Thomas Lickona, for instance, asserts that efforts in values education have instilled within children dispositions to be respectful, courteous, and responsible.¹⁴⁰

Dispositions which are essential to making good judgments can also be cultivated. One can, we shall argue, inspire children to wonder, to be respectful, to be reflective, and

to be self-corrective. So too, one can cultivate within children an inclination to perform certain cognitive moves and, as we shall argue later, social behaviors.¹⁴¹

Just like other abilities and dispositions, then, the abilities and dispositions through which good judgment is exercised can be cultivated. Our schools *can* educate for good judgment. And indeed, as we shall soon argue, they *ought to* educate for good judgment.

Notes

¹Plato. *Sophist*, [264b].

²Dewey (1933), p. 126.

³Low-Beer (1995), pp. 40-43.

⁴Low-Beer (1995), p. 42.

⁵James (1896), p. 458. See also Chapter One, Judging Well.

⁶James (1896), p. 458.

⁷Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 13.

⁸Lipman (1991), p. 116.

⁹Buchler (1951), p. viii. On p. 48 Buchler more precisely identifies these instances of "making, doing, or saying" as "exhibitive," "active," and "assertive" judgments.

¹⁰Low-Beer (1995), p. 31.

¹¹Here we follow the lead of Macmurray: An action is "the *making* of a change in the external world, the *doing* of a deed." See Prichard (1949), p. 188.

¹²For more on the relationship between judgment and action see Chapter Eleven.

¹³Heidegger (1927).

¹⁴James (1907), p. 94.

¹⁵Low-Beer (1995), p. 53. More will be said about this in the pages which follow.

¹⁶See Bergman, Moor, and Nelson (1990), p. 238.

¹⁷Kekes (1983), p. 278.

¹⁸James (1907), p. 30.

¹⁹James (1907), p. 30.

²⁰Kekes (1983), p. 285.

²¹See Nussbaum (1997), Chapter Two.

²²Kant (1785), p. 45.

²³Lipman (1991), p. 116.

²⁴Lipman (1991), p. 160. Here Lipman is speaking of the connection between good judgments and good actions. What he says, however, also holds true for the connection between good thinking and good judgments.

²⁵Norman (1996), p. 259.

²⁶See Sophocles' Oedipus The King.

²⁷For more on the relationship between ignorance, undesirable consequences, and moral culpability see Deutsch (1992), p. 190.

²⁸See Chapter Three, Leaning Back On Understanding.

²⁹See Chapter Three, Possessing Understanding.

³⁰Norman (1996), p. 258.

³¹Kekes (1983), pp. 282-283.

³²Arjuna acquires wisdom only after his "delusion is destroyed" by the understanding which he gains through the grace of Krishna. From The Bhagavad Gita, 18:73.

³³For the Buddha wisdom and enlightenment came only after he gained a deep and clear understanding of the world. In his First Sermon (*The Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta*) the Buddha writes:

As long as my vision of true knowledge was not fully clear..., I did not claim to have realized the perfect Enlightenment...But when my vision of true knowledge was fully clear..., then I claimed to have realized the perfect Enlightenment...³³

From Rahula (1974), p. 94.

³⁴Discussing Christianity and the concept of wisdom, Daniel Robinson explains that Christian thinkers associated wisdom with knowledge of the truth:

As with the Socratics, Christian teachers have agreed that the truth is absolute and universal and that next to truth all else pales. To be wise is to be touched by the divine wisdom that conveys timeless and boundless verities.³⁴

Robinson (1990), p. 20.

³⁵Descartes also associates wisdom with a knowledge of a higher truth:

It is really only God alone who has perfect wisdom, that is to say, who has a complete knowledge of the truth of all things; but it may be said that men

have more wisdom or less according as they have more or less knowledge of the most important truths.

From Collins (1962). Collins cites The Principles of Philosophy in The Philosophical Works of Descartes. Translated by E. S. Haldane and G. R. Ross. Cambridge: The University Press, 1931. Volume I, pp. 203-204.

³⁶In The Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle writes:

...Pericles and men like him have practical wisdom, viz. because they can see what is good for themselves and what is good for men in general.
[1140b]

While Aristotle's consideration of practical wisdom provides considerable insight into the connection between "humanistic" knowledge and wisdom, he also reflected upon the connection between theoretical knowledge and (philosophical) wisdom:

...the wise man must not only know what follows from the first principles, but must also possess truth about the first principles.

From The Nicomachean Ethics [1141a]

For more on this see Robinson (1990), pp. 15-18.

³⁷Kekes asserts "that wisdom involves knowledge of good [human] ends, not merely of means." From Kekes (1983), p. 281.

³⁸See Norman (1996), p. 258.

³⁹Dewey explains that knowledge is among "the indispensable resources" for resolving difficulties. See Dewey (1916), pp. 157-158.

⁴⁰Norman writes:

The transfer of information can no doubt contribute to the formation of a person's character, but by itself, informational knowledge cannot begin to ensure that the character trait of sound judgment will develop.

Norman (1996), p. 262.

⁴¹Hirsch (1987), pp. xv and 12.

⁴²James Spedding's translation of Bacon's words In Meditationes Sacrae (1597) is as follows: "...knowledge itself is power..." (In "Of Heresies," p. 253.). See also Bacon's Novum Organum (1620): "Truth therefore and utility are here the very same things..." (Aphorism CXXIV, p. 110.). For more on Bacon's treatment of knowledge see Coquillette (1992), pp. 81-82.

⁴³Dewey (1948), p. 29.

⁴⁴Dewey (1948), p. 29.

⁴⁵James (1907), p. 30.

⁴⁶James (1907), p. 30. More will be said later in this chapter about the connection between good judgments and satisfying consequences.

⁴⁷Norman (1986), p. 258.

⁴⁸Norman (1996), p. 258.

⁴⁹Dewey (1916), p. 158.

⁵⁰See Chapter Three, *Leaning Back On Understanding*.

⁵¹See James (1907), p.30.

⁵²Freire (1970), p. 56. See also Chapter Three, *Gaining Understanding*.

⁵³That understanding not only can but, in fact, is prone to become fixed is suggested by Dewey:

There can be no doubt of the tendency of organic plasticity, of the physiological basis, to lessen with growing years. The instinctively mobile and eagerly varying action of childhood, the love of new stimuli and new developments, too easily passes into a "settling down," which means aversion to change and a resting on past achievements.

Dewey (1916), p. 49.

⁵⁴Dewey (1916), p. 44.

⁵⁵Freire (1970), p. 53.

⁵⁶See Chapter Three, *Gaining Understanding*.

⁵⁷Dewey (1933), pp. 38-39. See Chapter Three, *The Disposition to Understand*.

⁵⁸Plato. *The Apology* [38a].

⁵⁹Bacon (1605), p. 8.

⁶⁰Freire (1970), p. 53.

⁶¹See Chapter Three, *The Ability to Understand*.

⁶²Hirsch (1987), p. xv.

⁶³Hirsch (1987), p. xv.

⁶⁴Hirsch (1987), p. xv.

⁶⁵Dewey (1916), p. 158. See Chapter Three, *Gaining Understanding*.

⁶⁶Lipman (1991), p. 145.

⁶⁷Hirsch (1987), p. xv.

⁶⁸Freire (1970), p. 52.

⁶⁹Norman (1986), p. 258.

⁷⁰Dewey (1916), p. 44.

⁷¹See Jackson (1998), p. 25.

⁷²Lipman (1991), p. 124.

⁷³For more on these cognitive moves see Chapter Two, Working with Assumptions and Seeking Justification.

⁷⁴Lipman (1991), p. 160.

⁷⁵See Jackson (1998), p. 18.

⁷⁶See Chapter Two, Cognitive Moves.

⁷⁷Low-Beer (1995), p. 49.

⁷⁸Buchler (1951), p. viii.

⁷⁹In defining "action," it will be recalled, we follow the lead of Macmurray: An action is "the *making* of a change in the external world, the *doing* of a deed." See Prichard (1949), p. 188. See also Chapter Four, Good Judgments.

⁸⁰Lipman and Sharp (1985), p. 169.

⁸¹Lipman and Sharp (1985), p. 169.

⁸²Simpson (2001), p. 87.

⁸³Mill (1861), p. 7.

⁸⁴See Chapter Four, Good Judgments.

⁸⁵Lawson (1961), p. 8.

⁸⁶See James (1896).

⁸⁷James (1907), p. 92.

- 88 James (1907), p. 92.
- 89 James (1907), p. 92.
- 90 James (1907), p. 94.
- 91 James (1907), p. 92. The link between judgment and action is an important one. More will be said about this link in Chapter Eleven, *Where to Go*.
- 92 James (1907), p. 97.
- 93 Mill (1861), p. 7.
- 94 James (1907), p. 97.
- 95 Monier-Williams (1899), pp. 1220-1221.
- 96 Monier-Williams (1899), pp. 1220-1221.
- 97 Monier-Williams (1899), pp. 1220-1221.
- 98 See Kalupahana (1992), p. 95. Kalupahana made this point during his lectures in graduate seminars (1992-1994).
- 99 James (1907), p. 96.
- 100 Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics, [1095b-1096a]. See also [1172a-1178a].
- 101 Mill (1861), p. 8.
- 102 James (1896), p. 458.
- 103 Simpson (2001), p. 87.
- 104 See Chapter Four, *Good Judgments*.
- 105 James (1907), p. 30.
- 106 Mill (1861), p. 7.
- 107 James (1907), p. 96.
- 108 James (1907), p. 30.
- 109 See Low-Bear (1995), p. 49.

- 110James (1907), p. 92.
- 111See Sophocles' Oedipus The King. See also Chapter Four, Good Thinking and Good Judgments.
- 112See Buchler (1951), p. viii. See Lipman (1991), p. 116.
- 113Buchler (1951), p. viii.
- 114Low-Beer (1995), p. 31. Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 13.
- 115Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics, [1152a].
- 116Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics, [1152a].
- 117Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics, [1166b].
- 118See J. L. Ackrill and J. O. Urmson's notes (p. xxvii.) on the revision of David Ross' translation of The Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980.
- 119More will be said on the causes of such incontinence in Chapter Eleven.
- 120Sartre (1947), pp. 28-30.
- 121Here we draw upon (and modify) Lipman's assertion: "[Judgments] are likely to be *good* judgments if they are the products of *skillfully* performed acts..." (Lipman 1991, p. 116).
- 122Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics, [1100b].
- 123Low-Beer (1995), p. 167.
- 124Kant (1787), pp. 177-178.
- 125Kant (1787), p. 178.
- 126Kant (1787), p. 177. Kant is speaking here not of "good judgment" but of "judgment." What Kant means by "judgment" -- it is "the faculty of subsuming under rules; that is, of distinguishing whether something does or does not stand under a given rule" (1787, p. 177) -- and what we mean by "good judgment" is not the same. Regardless of Kant's intended meaning, however, his words, at least in these pages, clearly communicate the idea that a well-functioning (and, indeed, even "learned") human being has, from the time of birth, either good judgment or deficient judgment. It is this point, not Kant's complex treatment of judgment, which we address. For an examination of Kant's treatment of judgment see, for instance, Deleuze (1963) or Low-Beer (1995).

- ¹²⁷Low-Beer (1995), p. 26. Norman (1996), p. 260.
- ¹²⁸Norman (1996), p. 259. See Chapter One, Good Judgment is a Character Trait.
- ¹²⁹Norman (1996), pp. 259-260.
- ¹³⁰Chapter One, Judging Well.
- ¹³¹See Chapter Two.
- ¹³²Dewey (1933), p. 4. See also Chapter Three, Leaning Back on Understanding.
- ¹³³Dewey (1933), pp. 78.
- ¹³⁴See Chapter Three, The Disposition to Understand and The Ability to Understand.
- ¹³⁵See Lipman (1991), pp. 101-113 for a historical account of the critical thinking movement.
- ¹³⁶See Chapter Seven for more on empowering children to make cognitive moves. See Chapter Ten for more on empowering children to make the social moves which, we shall argue, are also related to good judgment.
- ¹³⁷Norman (1996), pp. 259-260. See Chapter One, Good Judgment is a Character Trait.
- ¹³⁸More will be said on this pedagogical problem in Chapters Seven through Eleven.
- ¹³⁹Dewey (1916), p. 11.
- ¹⁴⁰See Lickona (1991), pp. 27-28.
- ¹⁴¹See Chapters Seven through Ten.

Chapter Five: Cultivating Good Judgment

The Need for (and Lack of) Good Judgment

Good judgment, unlike the current fashion or the latest trend, is something that human beings can never do without. Good judgment empowers us to act effectively within our world while paying due deference to this world. Good judgment enables us to dwell together harmoniously and to govern ourselves judiciously. Good judgment helps us to be true to ourselves and, so, to lead lives which are rich, worthy, and fulfilling.

While good judgment is something which people have always needed, current circumstances now make the need for good judgment especially acute. In the past century the technological prowess of human beings has advanced at an extraordinary pace. With this gain in power there has come, to be sure, opportunity for unprecedented progress and prosperity. But, so too, with this power there has come, as Albert Einstein fearfully noted, potential for "unparalleled catastrophe."¹

Human beings now have the power to map and to manipulate human DNA. Will this knowledge benefit the whole of humankind? Or will it merely serve to exacerbate the problem of global overpopulation which has already condemned so many to an existence of hunger and want? Or, more sinisterly, will this knowledge lead to some sort of twisted eugenically engineered future where all "inferior" types of human beings have been purged?

Human beings now have the power to extract fossil fuels from the very depths of the earth, clear away vast tracts of forest, and split the atom itself. Will these powers

continually advance human civilization? Or will they instead ultimately lead to the destruction of our earth?

Human beings now have the power to fly to all ends of the earth and to instantaneously transmit information around the world. Will this further our appreciation and respect for one another? Or will this increased contact merely serve to heighten existing tensions and conflicts?

Human beings have now developed countless time-saving gadgets, conveniences, and sources of amusement. Will these things help people to lead better lives? Or will they merely distract people from that which makes their lives meaningful and fulfilling?

Our ever-increasing power to act within and upon our world could serve as a boon. But just as surely it seems at times as if, as William James puts it, we will "drown in [our technological] wealth like a child in a bath-tub, who has turned on the water and who can not turn it off."² Whether our power will be a boon or a curse depends, in very large part, upon our judgment. In order to harness our great power wisely we need to exercise good judgment. We must, if we are to survive (let alone flourish), base our decisions upon a good understanding and choose through sound thinking.

Good judgment is what humankind undeniably needs. Unfortunately, however, good judgment is precisely what is oftentimes lacking in today's world. This is made evident in the news headlines of terrorist attacks and corporate collapses. But such dramatic instances are only the tip of the iceberg. The extent of the problem only becomes clear when one goes beyond the headlines and finds, in the back pages and small print, a staggering overabundance of examples of decidedly poor judgment. In a single day's paper, for instance, one reads of the massacre of thirty-four people, tobacco companies which put profit before public health, ocean species that have been driven to the brink of extinction, an archbishop who is on trial for loan-sharking and misappropriating church

funds, and individuals who deliberately endeavor to contract the HIV virus in order to gain kinship, respect, and notoriety.³

There is, accounts like this scream out, currently a dearth of good judgment. Too many of people's decisions are rash or confused. Too many of their actions are ineffective, unethical, or inauthentic. Too often that which human beings say, do, and create is marked not by good judgment, but rather by ignorance and imprudence. The conclusion is practically unavoidable: In the world today there is a precipitous lack of good judgment.

Education and Good Judgment

How should we respond to this shortage of good judgment? We cannot flee from our power for, like a modern day Pandora's Box, the knowledge of how to split the atom, clone a cell, or create a computer chip cannot be simply closed-up and forgotten. Nor would such a course of action even be desirable since technology can be a boon as well as a curse.

Given the untenability of escapism, the only other response is, as Einstein suggests, to change our "modes of thinking."⁴ We must, if we are to survive and flourish, address the current dearth of good judgment by purposefully endeavoring to improve people's thinking, understanding, and choosing. We must take up in earnest the work of cultivating good judgment.

There are, of course, a variety of social mediums within which one can work in cultivating good judgment. The family, schools, the job site, religious institutions, political organizations, and clubs; these are just some of the places where one can (and should) foster good judgment.

Among the spheres within which one can work in cultivating judgment of particular importance are a society's schools of formal education. Unlike other social environments,

schools are "framed with express reference to influencing the mental and moral disposition of their members."⁵ The very function of schools is to do the work of shaping children into the sorts of citizens whom society values. Given this mission, schools can potentially be ideal venues for fostering good judgment. They, more than any other social environment, can be deliberately structured and purposefully equipped for the work of cultivating good judgment.

While schools have the potential to be ideal venues within which to cultivate good judgment, they have, by and large, failed to live up to this potential. This, of course, is not to say that every school -- let alone every classroom -- fails to do enough to foster good judgment. (I have met teachers who do a very good job of educating for good judgment.) Our contention, rather, is that, because the attention and energies of administrators and educators are occupied by other matters, schools do not do as much as they should to foster good judgment.⁶

What distracts schools from the task of cultivating good judgment? First and foremost it is (as Freire, Lipman, and Dewey, have all argued) an obsession with teaching children *facts*.⁷ Schools, Lipman argues, "neglect the process and fixate upon the product."⁸ They assume that the "royal road to learning" is providing students with the epistemologically settled bits of information (or *facts*) which are the products of previous human thought.⁹

These facts are most commonly provided to students by means of what Freire calls the "banking" model of education:

Education thus becomes an act of depositing, in which the students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor. Instead of communicating, the teacher issues communiqués and makes deposits which the students patiently receive, memorize, and repeat. This is the "banking" concept of education, in which the scope of action allowed to the students extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits.¹⁰

This sort educating does not, as Thomas C. O'Brien puts it, prompt children to do their own thinking. Rather, it requires that children serve as "storage bins for thinking done by others."¹¹

The banking approach to education cuts across the curriculum. In social studies children are told about historical facts such as the "Battle of Concord" and geographical facts such as the "Amazon River."¹² In science they are told about scientific facts such as "amino acids."¹³ In math they are "force-[fed]...computational procedures," learning what O'Brien calls "parrot math."¹⁴ In writing children learn rote formulae for diagramming sentences.

While the specific facts or formulae which children are taught vary, the two defining features of educational banking which remain constant are the role which the children play and the quality of their "learning." (1) The task of children who are the objects of educational banking is to passively receive the transmissions of others. (2) The "knowledge" which children gain from educational banking is not deep and meaning-laden. Rather, it is, as Hirsch admits, "vague" and "limited."¹⁵

Educational banking is a paradigm which is firmly entrenched within our schools. This is a point which O'Brien raises in his criticism of those champions of educational banking who demand that schools go "back-to-basics."

We cannot go back to basics as the critics demand. We've been there all along.¹⁶ The back-to-basics approach to learning has been dominant in U.S. math classrooms throughout this century...[This] view of math as isolated bits of information to be transmitted to passive receptors continues to be dominant in America's schools.¹⁷

O'Brien supports his contention with a survey of "education and publishing experts" and "veteran teachers."¹⁸ These surveys corroborate his position; educational banking (manifested in the form of "parrot math") has been, and continues to be, predominant.

The predominance of educational banking is also attested to by a review of many student text books. Consider, for instance, an excerpt from a history text:

Then came the lawsuit known as *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas*...In 1954 the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a unanimous decision that was to reverberate through U.S. life for years to come. The Court ruled that racially segregated schools were unconstitutional...

President Eisenhower, too, did not agree with the Court, although he disapproved of segregation. In private the President would later remark: "I am convinced that the Supreme Court decision set back progress in the South at least 15 years...The fellow who tries to tell me that you can do these things by force is just plain nuts." In public, however, he declared: "The Supreme Court has spoken and I am sworn to uphold the constitutional process in this country; and I will obey."¹⁹

At the end of this section of text the following questions are posed:

What was the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the case *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas*? What were the President's private and public reactions to the decision?²⁰

These text book questions require that students regurgitate spoon-fed bits of information.

They exemplify and are indicative of the widespread acceptance of educational banking.

It would be unfair to assert that the transmission of facts is entirely without value. Hirsch is right to say that "shared information" is essential to "effective communications" and "national community."²¹ So too, as Dewey contends, information is an "indispensable resource" upon which "further inquiry" must draw.²²

While the transmission of facts is not valueless, it by no means, however, ensures the cultivation of good judgment. Indeed, excessive preoccupation with the transmission of facts is likely to contribute significantly to a *failure* to foster good judgment. This is a point which Freire suggests when he writes:

Verbalistic lessons, reading requirements, the methods for evaluating "knowledge," the distance between the teacher and the taught, the criteria for promotion: everything in this ready-to-wear [banking] approach serves to obviate thinking.²³

The exercise of good judgment depends, above all else, upon the cultivation of good thinking. It is, however, precisely the cultivation of good thinking which educational banking shortchanges. Preoccupied with teaching students *what* to think, those who embrace this banking paradigm are oftentimes distracted from the essential task of teaching students *how* to think well.

The popularity of this banking model of education factors most prominently into the failure of schools to adequately educate for judgment. But there are also other forces, other concerns, which can take valuable time, energy, and resources away from the work of cultivating good judgment. (1) The increasing importance afforded to standardized testing, (2) "standards" initiatives, (3) the fashionableness of teaching computing, (4) calls for "character education," and (5) the very environment and culture within which educators must work; these are among the things which can distract our schools from the work of cultivating good judgment.

(1) Increasing value is being placed on high-stakes standardized achievement tests; indeed, in "about half of the states" in the United States success on such tests is the "single measure" which "decide[s] a student's academic fate."²⁴ Because of this, schools are "under intense pressure to show better test results."²⁵ Teachers are forced, as Alfie Kohn puts it, "to cannibalize the curriculum" and teach to the test.²⁶ "Much of the curriculum in American elementary and secondary education," Alan Stoskopf writes, "has been reverse-engineered to raise SAT scores."²⁷

There is, to be fair, some value in standardized tests. They "do a great job," W. James Popham explains, "of providing relative comparisons of a student's content mastery with that of students nationwide."²⁸ (They also, Kohn derisively observes, "offer a remarkably precise method for gauging the size of the houses near the school where the test was administered."²⁹)

But whatever their strengths, these tests do not, Popham emphasizes, measure the quality of a student's education. They are, in fact, "deliberately" designed to "avoid important content."³⁰ Test designers include questions in tests not because these questions test what is important but rather because they "do the best job of discriminating between students."³¹

Unlike standardized tests, the task of cultivating good judgment has little to do with learning unimportant content. Educating for good judgment involves, first and foremost, the cultivation of complex thinking. This is not something which most standardized tests are designed to assess; there is, in fact, "a statistical association between high scores on standardized tests and relatively shallow thinking."³² "Better standardized exam results are more likely to go hand-in-hand with a shallow approach to learning than with deep understanding."³³

Given this association between standardized tests and shallow thinking, and given the "dumbing-down" of the curriculum which occurs as teachers ready their students for such tests, the current concern with preparing students for high-stakes standardized tests is worse than no help at all for those who care about the work of cultivating good judgment.³⁴ The task of cultivating good judgment, like many other educational initiatives, is "gravely threatened by the top-down, heavy-handed, corporate-style, standardized version of school reform that is driven by testing."³⁵

(2) Currently there is much talk about standards-based reform. The authors of the state of Hawai'i's booklet Making Sense of Standards write:

Standards-based reform grew from the common sense notion that student effort and achievement are directly affected by the expectations we (teachers, parents, the community at large) have of them. Research and experience show us that raising expectations -- setting high standards -- helps our children learn more.³⁶

High standards must be set, proponents of standards-based reform declare, and these standards must be placed "at the core of our schools' efforts."³⁷ "Curriculum, instruction, assessment [and] accountability, and staff development"; all of these should be aligned with the standards.³⁸

Given that there is currently a broad "public dissatisfaction with student achievement," few would disagree with the assertion that "educators [must] raise standards and make sure that all students achieve more."³⁹ It is indeed important for our schools to not

"expect too little from their students."⁴⁰ It is indeed important for our educators to base their policies upon an intelligently formulated set of goals.

Standards-based initiatives seem, in some respects, to be quite compatible with the work of cultivating good judgment. In Making Sense of Standards, for instance, the assertion is made that Hawai'i's schools should endeavor to empower students "to think complexly, to problem solve effectively, to work collaboratively, to take responsibility for one's own actions, and to evaluate one's own performance and products."⁴¹ These broad "general learner outcomes" fit nicely with the task of cultivating good judgment.⁴²

The problem, however, is that, while the lofty aims of many standards-based initiatives may be compatible with the task of cultivating good judgment, these initiatives are, as Marion Brady argues, infected through and through by the traditional banking notion of education.⁴³ If one examines content and performance standards themselves, one finds, as Brady suggests, that these standards are deeply imbued by the belief that an educator's time is best spent "bombarding students with information."⁴⁴ This fact, coupled with many teachers' tacit embrace of this banking model, make it likely that the practical impact of standards-based initiatives will not be to cultivate better thinking and judging but merely to codify a body of (increasingly irrelevant) facts.⁴⁵

The problem does not even end with this frequent incongruity between standards-based initiatives and the work of cultivating good judgment. Even if a school's standards are compatible with the aim of educating for judgment, there is still no guarantee that this school's standards-based initiative will actually contribute to the work of cultivating good judgment.

There are, as Alan C. Jones argues, just too many obstacles which prevent the effective implementation of any state mandated standards-based reform initiative.⁴⁶ Teachers have "too many demands on their time," administrators are more worried "about

students who could bring a gun to school," and many educators do not even understand the standards; in such an environment standards-based reform initiatives are unlikely to effect real change.⁴⁷ Largely ineffectual, these initiatives do not help in the actual work of cultivating good judgment and may, in fact, distract from it.

(3) Computers, many people currently believe, are "a magic bullet" which will fix educational woes.⁴⁸ Computer education, educational psychologist and former principal Jane M. Healy asserts, "is well financed and enthusiastically supported by major corporations, the public at large, and government officials around the world."⁴⁹

Evidence confirming the veracity of Healy's claim abounds. The American federal government has declared the need "to wire all schools for communications" and, in pursuit of this goal, has spent "up to \$20 billion a year to fill schools with computers."⁵⁰ Computer skills were deemed among the most important of skills for the twenty-first century in a survey of teachers, parents, leaders, and other community members.⁵¹ "Ninety percent of voters in the United States" believe "that schools with computers can do a better job of education" and sixty-one percent of voters feel so strongly about this that they "would support a federal tax increase to speed the introduction of technology into the schools."⁵²

This enthusiasm over computers is not entirely unfounded. "Some very exciting and potentially valuable things are happening between children and computers," Healy tells us.⁵³ Students have used computers to build working models that put scientific concepts into practice, to create a web site about Shakespeare, and to follow along with ocean voyagers.⁵⁴ So too, "computerized interventions have repeatedly shown their value in helping the learning disabled and physically handicapped bypass difficulties and exercise their true intelligence."⁵⁵

While there are examples of the proper and positive use of computers in schools, these positive examples are unfortunately "far outnumbered by the bad ones."⁵⁶ Healy writes:

...research...demonstrates [that] computer "learning" for young children is far less brain-building than even such simple activities as spontaneous play or playing board games with an adult or older child. "Connecting" alone has yet to demonstrate academic value, and some of the most popular "education" software may even be damaging to creativity, attention, and motivation.⁵⁷

Computer usage, Healy continues, is "a form of brain-training that we don't understand."⁵⁸ "If computer time subtracts from talking, socializing, playing, imagining, or learning to focus the mind internally, the lost ground may be hard or impossible to regain."⁵⁹ Used inappropriately, computers may "build...habits that interfere with academic learning."⁶⁰

Given the unknown -- and quite possibly undesirable -- effects of the union between children and computers, Healy suggests that it is unwise to take away from "developmentally important areas such as physical education, art, music, drama, traditional library resources, and textbook purchases" in our haste to embrace computer education.⁶¹ "Digital intellect," she concludes, "is a mentally impoverished companion for human dreams, emotions, and imagination."⁶²

Those who aim to cultivate good judgment are likely to agree with Healy's assessment. At best, the near fanatical obsession of many with computer education detracts from the work of cultivating good judgment by tying up limited energy and resources. At worst, computer education may actually do harm to efforts to cultivate good judgment by stunting intellectual and emotional development. In either case, it seems clear that computer education, if it is pursued with excessive zeal, is an impediment to educating for good judgment.

(4) Recently there has been an increasingly loud call for "character education."

Thomas Lickona speaks for many when he asserts that schools must work diligently in order to imbue our children with good character:

Escalating moral problems in society -- ranging from greed and dishonesty to violent crime to self-destructive behaviors such as drug abuse and suicide -- are bringing about a new consensus. Now, from all across the country, from private citizens and public organizations, from liberals and conservatives alike, comes a summons to the schools: Take up the role of moral teachers of our children.⁶³

Schools must not only "help young people become smart," Lickona declares, they must also "help them to become good."⁶⁴

"It would," writes Lipman, "be difficult to find anyone who would wish to take a public position against character-building."⁶⁵ Most people would agree that, as Lickona says, "there is a clear and urgent need" for character education.⁶⁶ Violence, disrespect, cruelty, bigotry, abuse, and a lack of civic responsibility abound; all of this points to the need for, and value of, some sort of moral education.⁶⁷

Character education *can* be compatible with the work of educating for judgment. For Lipman character-building and cultivating good judgment go hand in hand. Lipman's philosophical pedagogy of "ethical inquiry" gives children "opportunities to discover of their own accord the same values we in the older generation have discovered" while simultaneously cultivating the higher-order thinking which is essential to good judgment.⁶⁸

Character education initiatives, however, are not *necessarily* in harmony with the aim of fostering good judgment. Indeed, as Lipman suggests, it is oftentimes the case that, in practice, educating for character is largely at odds with educating for good judgment:

The traditional method (still favored by virtually the whole character-education movement) is through didactic instruction illustrated by stories. The children are expected to read, listen and agree. Indeed, they are expected to do as they are told, whether they agree or not.⁶⁹

This most popular form of character education is yet another expression of the banking model of education and, as such, distracts schools from the work of cultivating good

judgment. Children are merely told what to do; they are not given the opportunity to judge, to think, and, so, to learn how to choose wisely.

(5) Teaching children the facts, promoting competency in computing, preparing children for standardized tests, developing character, and meeting high standards; each of these things can (and oftentimes does) distract teachers from the task of cultivating good judgment. This is not the worst of it, however. Even worse news is the fact that the teachers at many schools have to concern themselves with *all* of these things and, so too, with much more.

There is too much to cover. Today's curriculum consists of far more than reading, writing, and math. At Hawai'i's Ala Wai Elementary School, for instance, periods are also devoted to science, social studies, art, health, social skills, library, computer, physical education, Hawaiian, Japanese, character education, DARE (Drug Abuse Resistance Education), and (in some classes) philosophy. Many students also go to Special Education or English as a Second Language classes. Additionally, there are assemblies to go to, special events and emergencies to attend to, standardized tests to prepare for, extracurricular activities to account for (such as Junior Police Officers, Hawaiian Club, peer mediators, basketball, chorus, and student council), and occasional trips to the health room to check for head lice.

Given all that there is to do, it is not surprising that many teachers echo the words of former teacher Laraine K. Hong. Hong writes:

...many of us [teachers] worried constantly about whether we were "covering" everything we needed to. Our most frequent lament seemed to be, "I just can't squeeze everything in."⁷⁰

The curriculum, it seems, is full to bursting.

There are too many students. "Although overall class sizes have declined in the last five years," writes Jones, "the reductions have not compensated for the increase in the diversity of students entering most classrooms in America."⁷¹ "Teachers just have too

many students..."⁷² In Hawai'i even at the elementary school level class counts are high. Most every teacher must contend with a class count in at least the mid twenties. Some elementary school teachers have as many as thirty-five students.⁷³ That many students, particularly if these students have diverse and special needs, can drain the time and creative juices from even the most experienced of teachers.

There are too many needs to address. "Our urban schools," writes Emerald A. Crosby, "were not designed for their present clients."⁷⁴ Special education, Crosby continues, is the "fastest-growing element" in many schools.⁷⁵ "The kids don't speak English," notes Jones.⁷⁶ Among the children who come to school are those who are homeless, those who do not have enough food, those who are beaten or sexually abused, those who mutilate themselves, those who suffer from mental illness, those who are violent, and those who are the children of drug addicts and incarcerated felons.⁷⁷ In many schools teaching itself is oftentimes of secondary concern; classrooms are full of children who are not even ready to learn because their most basic needs are not being met.

There are too many other commitments. Teachers, Crosby observes, "are doing the work of security personnel."⁷⁸

Put teachers on hall duty. Put teachers in the lunchroom. Then, when they have expended enough psychic energy to exhaust themselves, send them back to the classroom...It never did work, and isn't working today. It takes away from the teacher preparation time and refueling time.⁷⁹

In addition to hall duty, lunchroom duty, and yard duty, teachers and staff are asked to attend countless hours of meetings, to plan school-wide events, to comprehend and implement standards, to cope with vandalism and burglaries, to deal with irate and irrational parents, to testify in court, and even to write grants. The old myth that teaching is just an 8:00 to 2:00 job with summers off has never been less true.

The "plates" of those who work at schools, in short, are already full; there is too much to do and too little time in which to do it. Given this environment, it is no wonder

that progress in cultivating good judgment has been slow. For, as Jackson points out, fostering higher-order thinking and cultivating judgment takes time; "We aren't in a rush to get anywhere," explains Jackson.⁸⁰ ("Which is not the same as *getting nowhere*."⁸¹) Indeed, the development of good judgment and good thinking cannot be rushed. In order to empower children to think well and judge well one must give them (and their teachers) the time to think, to judge, and to "follow the argument where it leads."⁸²

Unfortunately, in a place where the days "move at the pace of fast-food eateries rather than four-star restaurants" and where teachers must act as "short-order cooks" rather than "professional educators" there is little space for the sort of measured thought and careful reflection which are the hallmarks of good judgment.⁸³ There is scarcely enough time for teachers and staff to even slow-down and consider the worth of educating for good judgment, let alone to implement measures which will cultivate such judgment. This culture of busyness is a formidable impediment to the work of cultivating good judgment.

Moving Beyond the Obstacles

There are, to be sure, considerable obstacles which stand in the way of the work of cultivating good judgment within our schools. These obstacles are not, however, insurmountable. There are a number of things which can be done in order to make schools better places for educating for judgment.

(1) *Treat narration sickness*: Freire maintains that educational "banking" is an illness:

[The teacher-student] relationship involves a narrating Subject (the teacher) and patient, listening objects (the students). The contents, whether values or empirical dimensions of reality, tend in the process of being narrated to become lifeless and petrified. Education is suffering from narration sickness.⁸⁴

Those who wish to educate for judgment are well-advised to treat this sickness. By encouraging teachers to focus on inquiry in addition to product; by helping children to learn *how* to think well rather than simply telling them *what* to think; one helps to create a healthier educational environment which is more conducive to the work of cultivating good judgment.

(2) *Fight the tests*: "We must," argues Kohn, "make the fight against standardized tests our top priority because, until we have chased this monster from the schools, it will be difficult, perhaps even impossible, to pursue the kinds of reforms that can truly improve teaching and learning."⁸⁵ So long as teachers are pressured to teach to tests which place a premium on "shallow thinking" and unimportant content it will be difficult to motivate them to take the time to foster the sort of complex thinking which is essential to good judgment.⁸⁶ By following some of Kohn's practical suggestions for fighting these tests, one helps to make space for the cultivation of good judgment.⁸⁷

(3) *Abandon standards based reform initiatives*: There are some good things about standards initiatives. But, unfortunately, it is characteristically the case that these initiatives are, in addition to being riddled through and through with an undue reverence for facts, "profoundly undemocratic."⁸⁸ Standards are, as Kohn argues, "one-size-fits-all" sets which are "handed down from the state capital and imposed with the force of law."⁸⁹ Teachers are denied the "freedom to select or modify the standards."⁹⁰

Told that they must follow the standards but denied, for the most part, any meaningful role in crafting these standards, many teachers are likely to greet standards initiatives with a quiet (yet resolute) resistance. Even those teachers who embrace standards initiatives are, given all the other demands which are heaped upon them, unlikely to find the necessary time and energy to decipher and properly implement these initiatives. Given this state of affairs, it seems quite likely that, as Jones argues, standards initiatives

"will not work."⁹¹ It is perhaps best, on account of this likelihood of futility, to abandon sweeping, state-wide standards based reform initiatives.

(4) *Take a hard look at computers:* The current enthusiasm surrounding computers in the schools, Healy suggests, should be tempered by reflection:
...what we really need to think about is how to prepare our children for life in an information-loaded but depersonalized landscape. Is it by connecting them to computers, or by spending comparable time on giving them an early grounding in humanity? As one thoughtful scientist and father mused, "Should I spend the money on cello lessons or video games?" Not enough people are asking these questions.⁹²

The work of cultivating good judgment by no means necessitates the jettisoning of computers. But efforts to educate for judgment would be helped by a thoughtful and thorough consideration of the proper place of computers in the schools. By asking the hard questions about computer education one can ascertain whether or not computers are worth such a substantial investment.

(5) *Avoid indoctrination:* In his critique of common approaches to character-building Lipman writes:

The pedagogical approach of the character-education movement, by and large, has been to stress the obviousness of the virtues. The time that might be spent in discussing them is thought to be better spent in persuading, urging and exhorting those children who still might have questions on their lips. There is little sense in denying that this is indoctrination, and while indoctrination always seems the easy route to take, in the long run it is generally counterproductive.⁹³

Indoctrination is not conducive to the task of cultivating good judgment. In indoctrinating one does not provide children with the opportunity to improve their thinking and judging. Rather, one merely teaches them to acquiesce. Character education, if it is to be compatible with the work of cultivating good judgment, must allow for the sort of "gut-wrenching" "deliberative discussion" which will enable students to make values their own.⁹⁴

(6) *Slow things down:* "When I come to school in the morning," a teacher once said, "I feel like I'm going about thirty miles per hour. By the end of the day I feel like I'm going a hundred miles per hour."⁹⁵ So long as teachers are feeling like this, so long as

they are overwhelmed with meetings, extra duties, and an overwhelming multitude of needy students, the task of cultivating good judgment will be far down on most teachers' lists. The cause of educating for judgment would be helped considerably if class size were lowered, more resources were made available, or if curriculum expectations were made more reasonable. Their burden lightened, teachers would be better able to find the energy to reflect upon the value of cultivating good judgment and the time to actually educate for good judgment.

(7) *Cultivate good judgment*: Even if one does not have the power to actualize any of the preceding six suggestions, one can still try to educate for good judgment. One can optimistically endeavor to carve out space in the school day and, despite the oftentimes crushing weight of the school environment, take up the work of cultivating good judgment.

But how does one educate for good judgment? In the remaining chapters we shall consider in detail one way in which one might educate for good judgment. We shall examine the pedagogy of *The Philosophy for Children Program* and argue that this educational initiative offers a means through which one can perform the work of cultivating good judgment.⁹⁶

Notes

¹Einstein (1946) writes:

The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.

²James (1907), p. 85.

³The Boston Globe; June 18, 2000. For more examples of poor judgment see, for instance, Lickona (1991), pp. 3-5.

⁴Einstein (1946).

⁵Dewey (1916), p. 19.

⁶When I speak of schools I primarily have in mind the schools of The United States of America. Much of what I say, however, applies to other schools world-wide.

⁷See Freire (1970), pp. 52-53. See also Dewey (1916), pp. 220-221 and Lipman (1991), p. 15.

⁸Lipman (1991), p. 15.

⁹Dewey (1916), p. 220.

¹⁰Freire (1970), p. 53.

¹¹O'Brien (1999), p. 434.

¹² These examples are taken from E. D. Hirsch's list of "What Literate Americans Know." See Hirsch (1987), pp. 146-215.

¹³ This example is also taken from E. D. Hirsch's list of "What Literate Americans Know." See Hirsch (1987), pp. 146-215.

¹⁴O'Brien (1999), p. 434.

¹⁵Hirsch (1987), p. 26. Hirsch argues that cultural literacy requires simple awareness rather than in depth understanding. Those who are culturally literate, for instance, "know what Mein Kampf is, but they haven't read it." (p. 147)

¹⁶O'Brien (1999), p. 436.

¹⁷O'Brien (1999), p. 435.

¹⁸O'Brien (1999), pp. 435-436.

- ¹⁹Davis and Lunger (1987), pp. 95-96.
- ²⁰Davis and Lunger (1987), p. 97.
- ²¹Hirsch (1987), p. xvii.
- ²²Dewey (1916), p. 158. See also Passmore (1980), p. 118.
- ²³Freire (1970), p. 57.
- ²⁴Kohn (2001), p. 352.
- ²⁵Kohn (2001), p. 350.
- ²⁶Kohn (2001), p. 350.
- ²⁷Stoskopf (2000), p. 21. Stoskopf is quoting from p. 273 of Lemann, Nicholas. The Big Test: The Secret History of the American Meritocracy. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1999.
- ²⁸Popham (1999), p. 10.
- ²⁹Kohn (2001), p. 349. Kohn continues:
Every empirical investigation of this question has found that socioeconomic status (SES) in all its particulars accounts for an overwhelming proportion of the variance in test scores when different schools, towns, or states are compared.
- ³⁰Popham (1999), p. 12.
- ³¹Popham (1999), p. 9.
- ³²Kohn (2001), p. 349.
- ³³Kohn (2001), p. 350.
- ³⁴Kohn (2001), p. 350.
- ³⁵Kohn (2001), p. 350.
- ³⁶State of Hawai'i Department of Education (1999), p. 1.
- ³⁷State of Hawai'i Department of Education (1999), p. 6.
- ³⁸State of Hawai'i Department of Education (1999), p. 6.

- ³⁹State of Hawai'i Department of Education (1999), p. 1.
- ⁴⁰State of Hawai'i Department of Education (1999), p. 1.
- ⁴¹State of Hawai'i Department of Education (1999), p. 1.
- ⁴²State of Hawai'i Department of Education (1999), p. 1.
- ⁴³Brady (2000), p. 649. The use of Freire's term "banking" is mine not Brady's.
- ⁴⁴Brady (2000), p. 650.
- ⁴⁵See Brady (2000), pp. 649-650.
- ⁴⁶Jones (2001), pp. 462-464.
- ⁴⁷Jones (2001), p. 463.
- ⁴⁸Healy (1998), p. 18. See also Ratmesar (1998).
- ⁴⁹Healy (1998), p. 17.
- ⁵⁰Healy (1998), p. 19.
- ⁵¹Healy (1998), p. 20. Computing skills were ranked third; higher than such things as "values," "good citizenship," "curiosity and love of learning," "knowledge of history and geography," and "classic works (e.g., Shakespeare, Plato)." Healy cites "Special Report: What students must know to succeed in the 21st century." Bethesda, MD: World Future Society, 1996.
- ⁵²Healy (1998), p. 20. Healy cites S. G. Sava, "Electronic genie." An address delivered at NAESP State Leaders Conference, Arlington, VA, July 25, 1997.
- ⁵³Healy (1998), p. 18. It must be noted, however, that Healy continues: "...we are currently spending far too much money [on computers] with too little thought. It is past time to pause, reflect, and ask some probing questions." (p. 18)
- ⁵⁴Healy (1998), pp. 275-277.
- ⁵⁵Healy (1998), p. 34.
- ⁵⁶Healy (1998), p. 78.
- ⁵⁷Healy (1998), p. 20.

- 58Healy (1998), p. 137.
- 59Healy (1998), p. 134.
- 60Healy (1998), p. 133.
- 61Healy (1998), p. 22.
- 62Healy (1998), p. 318.
- 63Lickona (1991), pp. 3-4.
- 64Lickona (1991), p. 6.
- 65Lipman (1996c), p. i.
- 66Lickona (1991), p. 20.
- 67Lickona (1991), pp. 13-19.
- 68Lipman (1996c), p. i.
- 69Lipman (1996c), p. i.
- 70Hong (2001), p. 713.
- 71Jones (2001), p. 463.
- 72Jones (2001), p. 463.
- 73Here I have in mind General Education classes in Hawai'i. Special Education classes have a lower count; they commonly have 10-15 students (many of whom are extremely disruptive and all of whom need individualized educational plans).
- 74Crosby (1999), p. 300.
- 75Crosby (1999), p. 300.
- 76Jones (2001), p. 463.
- 77This is not a random list. These are just some of the situations with which I was confronted during the course of a single elementary school-year.
- 78Crosby (1999), p. 301.
- 79Crosby (1999), p. 301.

- ⁸⁰Jackson (1998), p. 12.
- ⁸¹Jackson (1998), p. 12.
- ⁸²Lipman (1991), p. 230. Here Lipman is drawing upon Plato and George Herbert Mead.
- ⁸³Hong (2001), p. 714.
- ⁸⁴Freire (1970), p. 52.
- ⁸⁵Kohn (2001), p. 350.
- ⁸⁶Kohn (2001), p. 349. Popham (1999), p. 12.
- ⁸⁷Kohn (2001), pp. 353-354.
- ⁸⁸Kohn (2001), p. 355.
- ⁸⁹Kohn (2001), p. 355.
- ⁹⁰Jones (2001), p. 463.
- ⁹¹Jones (2001), p. 463.
- ⁹²Healy (1998), p. 30.
- ⁹³Lipman (1996c), p. i.
- ⁹⁴Lipman (1996c), p. i.
- ⁹⁵Jackson shared this anecdote with me.
- ⁹⁶See Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980).

Chapter Six: Philosophy for Children

Matthew Lipman's Discovery

Philosophy for Children (P4C) was founded by Matthew Lipman. In the late 1960's Lipman was a professor of philosophy at Columbia University.¹ During these tumultuous times he began to entertain "serious concerns" about whether or not the introductory logic class which he taught actually improved the thinking of his pupils:²

Did [the university students] actually reason any better as a result of studying logic? Were not their linguistic and psychological habits already so firmly established that *any* sort of practice or instruction in reasoning would come too late?³

Lipman concluded that if one really wanted to cultivate the sophistication of reasoning and judgment which was so desperately needed, one had to begin sooner than the students' university years. One had to turn to the elementary and secondary schools and "do a better job of teaching children to reason."⁴

But how does one go about teaching reasoning to children? Lipman "didn't want to teach children logic in the [same] way" in which professors "taught (or pretend to teach) college students logic."⁵ "The children," Lipman continues, "would certainly object to having one more nauseating subject crammed down their throats -- and they'd have been right."⁶

Taking from Dewey and George Herbert Mead the idea "that the school had to harness and put to work the social impulses of the child," and inspired by Dewey's and Lev Vygotsky's "insistence on the primacy of thinking rather than of knowledge in

education," Lipman created an educational model which differed significantly from the traditional banking paradigm.⁷ Borrowing a phrase from C. S. Peirce, Lipman proposed that elementary and secondary school classrooms be transformed into "communities of inquiry" where children themselves would inquire together into their world.⁸

That students should "investigate the problems and engage in inquiry for themselves" rather than merely "learn the solutions" was not, in and of itself, a novel idea.⁹ Before Lipman, Dewey had already "proposed...that the educational process in the classroom should take as its model the process of scientific inquiry."¹⁰ But what Lipman realized was that it was *philosophical* inquiry, not *scientific* inquiry, which was best suited for the task of cultivating thinking and judging within the classroom.¹¹ "I saw philosophy," Lipman writes, "as the discipline par excellence for making sense of things and for preparing students to think in the more specific disciplines."¹²

While Lipman recognized that "philosophy might be indispensable for the redesign of education," he also realized that philosophy itself would "have to be redesigned."¹³ For many people, including many teachers, the "traditional, academic philosophy had been anything but satisfactory."¹⁴ Philosophy had too often been infected by the very same "narration sickness" which infects the primary schools; it too often, to make use of a distinction which Jackson makes, had been presented merely as the philosophical *content* which is the end product of the thought of famous philosophers and not as the philosophical *activity* of "philosophizing."¹⁵

Lipman's idea, then, was not to teach children about "the schools and star performers of the [philosophical] tradition."¹⁶ (This is not to say, however, that there is no place for traditional philosophical content in the community of inquiry; as Sharp and Reed suggest, "insight into the rich tradition" of philosophy can only serve to enrich philosophical inquiry.¹⁷) Rather, Lipman's idea was to empower children to engage in the activity

of philosophizing. His idea was to provide children with an opportunity to think, to judge, to discuss, and to create for themselves.

The Characteristics of The Community of Inquiry

What is the community of philosophical inquiry? Most simply, the community of inquiry can be described as a *gathering* where people come together to *talk over, think through, and inquire* into matters which are important to them. It is (1) an "intellectually safe place" where people (2) engage in dialogue. It is (3) self-governing, (4) reflective, and (5) self-correcting. In it people (6) wonder, and practice certain (7) social behaviors and (8) cognitive moves.

(1) The community of inquiry is, as Jackson emphasizes, an "*intellectually safe place*."¹⁸ Jackson writes:

In a safe place people are kind. Sarcasm, fighting, backbiting and name-calling are exceptions. Kindness, consideration and forgiveness are the usual way of life.

In a safe place there is laughter, not just the canned laughter of television, but real laughter that comes from sharing meaningful work and play.

In a safe place there are rules. The rules are few and fair and are made by the people who live and work there, including the children.

In a safe place people listen to one another. They care about one another and show that they do.¹⁹

In the community of inquiry the "operant principle of respect for persons is honored."²⁰

(2) The community of inquiry proceeds through *dialogue*. "Dialogue" is not, as Splitter and Sharp point out, "ordinary conversation."²¹ Rather, it is talk which has been subjected to the governance of courtesy, consideration, and intellectual rigor and, as a consequence, has been transformed into what J. E. Tiles calls "disciplined conversation."²²

Disciplined conversation is not petty, unkind, demeaning, combative, or harsh. It is not, as Tiles puts it, "parliamentary sparing."²³ Instead, it is talk which is governed by a basic "respect for persons" and, so, is imbued with courtesy and consideration.²⁴

Neither is disciplined conversation meandering chatter or, as Tiles puts it, "small-talk."²⁵ Quite to the contrary, it is dialogue which is animated by a spirit of curiosity and intellectual rigor. It is talk which, to use Jackson's criteria, is "focused" and which aims to "scratch beneath the surface" matters.²⁶

(3) The community of inquiry is *self-governing*. A traditional "banking" classroom is a benevolent dictatorship; it is the teacher alone who determines the content and fashion of study. A community of inquiry, in contrast, is a microcosmic democracy.²⁷ It affords *all* of its members -- students as well as teachers -- the opportunity to partake in the determination of substantive as well as procedural matters.²⁸

While there are occasions when the teacher will introduce "topics, skills, exercises, [or] discussion plans" to the community, it is normally the case that the students themselves determine the substantive dimension of the inquiry.²⁹ "The agenda," as Lipman puts it, is "a collaborative work of the community."³⁰ The members of the community choose the topic of discussion and then, through their own inquiry, direct the course of this discussion.

The members of the community also share responsibility for the procedural dimension of their inquiry. It is, particularly as the community matures, the students who call on one another rather than the teacher.³¹ It is the students who make note of when they are getting off subject, determine when it is time to move on to a new question, and call for clarification.³² The students, along with the teacher (who still must be "pedagogically strong"), shape the rules which govern their community and employ criteria in assessing their inquiry.³³

(One way in which Jackson has helped students to govern the procedural dimension of their inquiries is by teaching them a number of acronyms or "magic words."³⁴ Because these words are simple, non-threatening, and fun to use, children readily embrace them and, as a consequence, quickly take responsibility for the governance of their inquiry. Among the words which Jackson, teachers, and students have developed are the following:

SPLAT -- A little louder, please. One says this when one wants the speaker to speak louder.

IDUS -- I Don't Understand. One says this when one wants the speaker to clarify what he or she means.

POPAAT -- Please One Person At A Time. This is said when too many people are talking at once. It is a request for those who have not been recognized as the speaker to stop talking.

OMT -- One More Time. One says this when one wants the speaker to repeat what he or she has just said.

NQP -- Next Question Please. One says this when one wants the community to discuss a new question.

LMO -- Let's Move On. One says this when one wants the community to move on to another point or question.

LMB -- Let's Move Back. One says this when one wants the community to return to a previously discussed point.

POC -- Point Of Clarification. One says this either when one wants to oneself raise a point of clarification or when one wants the speaker to clarify some point.

GOS -- Getting Off Subject. One says this when one feels that the discussion is losing focus and straying from the question which is currently under consideration.³⁵⁾

(4) The community of inquiry is *reflective*. In the community of inquiry people reflect upon or lean back on both a *substantive* understanding of what is being discussed as

well as a *procedural* understanding of the methodology through which this discussion operates. There is, to use Lipman's words, a "constant acknowledgment of the primacy of the methodology of [deliberative] inquiry all the while that matters of substance are being discussed."³⁶

The community demonstrates its substantive reflection when the community members "build on one another's ideas."³⁷ A student declares that she agrees (or disagrees) with what another student (or she herself) said previously.³⁸ A student says, "It's like what Tianya said..." or "I'd like to go back to the point Daryl made..."³⁹ The community also demonstrates this sort of reflection when community members draw upon their experience in order to contribute to the discussion. (For instance, "I remember just last week my big sister did something nice for me; so I don't think it's true that all big sisters are mean.")

The community also reflects upon its procedures. The members of the community are "explicitly aware of the standards and criteria that are at work in the community."⁴⁰ They think about their very thinking. (They might consider, for instance, "what counts as a good reason."⁴¹) They also reflect upon the aims and expectations of their community.⁴² (They do this, for instance, when they repeatedly recall and deliberately employ "criteria to evaluate the...discussion..."⁴³)

(Jackson suggests that the community end each session by reflecting upon a number of questions: "Was I listening to others?" "Were others listening to me?" "Did most people participate rather than just a few who dominated?" "Was it a SAFE environment?" "Did we maintain a focus?" "Did our discussion 'scratch beneath the surface' or 'open up the topic,' make some progress?" "Did I learn something new?" "Did I challenge my own thinking or 'work hard' at it?" "Was it interesting?"⁴⁴ By continually returning to these questions the children gradually construct their own understanding of the aims and expectations of their community.)

(5) The community of inquiry is *self-correcting*. In reflecting, the members of the community of inquiry *refer back* to their prior understandings. In self-correcting, these members *advance from* these understandings. They *make use* of these understandings in order to direct the course of their present inquiry.⁴⁵

Drawing upon C. S. Peirce, Lipman asserts that "self-correcting" inquiry characteristically "aims to discover its own weaknesses and rectify what is at fault in its own procedures."⁴⁶ The community of inquiry, he continues, is self-correcting insofar as "the members of the community begin looking for and correcting each other's methods and procedures."⁴⁷ Among the self-corrective behaviors which members of the community perform are: "Point[ing] out errors in each other's thinking," "acknowledg[ing] errors in their own thinking," "clarify[ing] vague expressions in texts," "demand[ing] reasons and criteria where none have been provided," "identify[ing] inconsistencies in discussions," and "question[ing] whether inquiry procedures have been correctly applied."⁴⁸

(6) The gatherings of the community of inquiry are a time for *wonder*. There is "wondering at" the world; the members of the community "[appreciate each thing] for what it is...and [marvel] that it should be there are all."⁴⁹ They find that, to make use of the words of Stephen Paget, "all facts, from stars to blades of grass, from the death of Caesar to the death of a mouse, are for wonder, and thereby for thought..."⁵⁰

There is also "wondering about" the world; the members of the community wonder why the world is as it is, how things got to be the way they are, whether matters might be otherwise, and which course of action is best.⁵¹ Wondering thusly, the members of the community pose many *questions*. "What is death like?" "Will cars fly in the future?" "Who made God and who made [the maker of God]?"⁵² These are just a few of the manifold questions which a community of inquiry might consider.

(7) The community of inquiry is a place where certain "*social behaviors*" are displayed.⁵³ In the community of inquiry people "listen to one another with respect,"

"build on one another's ideas," and "[take] one another's ideas seriously by responding and encouraging each other to voice their views."⁵⁴ So too, the members of the community speak-up with clarity and confidence, disagree respectfully, cooperatively work together, and display patience. These sorts of behaviors are manifestations of the spirit of respect which imbues the proceedings of the community and are essential pre-conditions which make disciplined conversation possible.⁵⁵

(8) The community of inquiry is a place where certain *cognitive moves* are displayed. If they are displayed through speech, cognitive moves are, as Sharp rightly assumes, also social behaviors.⁵⁶ We distinguish cognitive moves from other social behaviors, however, because, unlike other social behaviors (such as listening) which may *aid in* the work of thinking, cognitive moves are the very *means through which* the work of thinking is done.⁵⁷

The members of the community employ cognitive moves when they "challenge one another to supply reasons for otherwise unsupported opinions, assist each other in drawing inferences from what has been said, and seek to identify one another's assumptions."⁵⁸ They also utilize cognitive moves by doing such things as seeking clarification, providing examples and counter-examples, and questioning the truth of claims.⁵⁹

The Community of Inquiry in Action

The dialogue of the community of inquiry, Ron Reed suggests, has an aesthetic element.⁶⁰ The interweaving of the children's contributions, the air of wonder, the unpredictable and irreproducible texture of the dialogue, the look of delight mixed with rapt attention which appears on young faces, and the excitement of discovery; these things, like the movements of a dance or the notes of a piece of music, commingle to create an experience which has its own distinctive beauty.

The beauty of this experience, like the beauty of a work of art, is difficult to capture in words. Just as one can try to communicate the vibrant colors of a painting or attempt to express the feeling of exaltation which comes with listening to a soaring sonata, one can endeavor to describe the richness of the dialogue of a community of inquiry. Just as is the case with portrayals of works of art, however, one's description is likely to fall short. It is well near impossible to convey fully through mere description the complexity, the richness, and the very feel of a philosophical inquiry.

Given that, in many ways, the proceedings of the community of inquiry defy verbal explanation, we shall supplement the description which we provided in the previous section with a taste of what the dialogue of the community of inquiry is like. The following transcription is, to be sure, a poor substitute for the original, but it will provide a richer picture of what occurs within the community of inquiry.

First we shall set the stage: As one enters the room at beginning of "Philosophy-time" one sees the class (the teacher as well as the children) seated together in a circle. Having already read a philosophical novel, raised questions, and selected a topic for discussion, the members of the community are discussing matters which are of interest to them.⁶¹

Though there may be occasional outbursts of excited chatter as the children all try to talk at once, for the most part the members of this classroom community of inquiry take turns speaking. When they are not speaking the children are listening to their peers respectfully. One can tell that the children are truly listening not only by their body language, but also because each child's comments build upon the preceding contributions.

The teacher who facilitates this inquiry is "pedagogically strong"; she ensures that the community is an intellectually safe place by justly enforcing the agreed upon rules and procedures.⁶² She is also "philosophically self-effacing"; while she enriches the inquiry by helping the children to think deeply, she does not impose her intellectual perspective

upon the children. She prefers instead to let the children learn by doing their own thinking.⁶³

The following is a transcription of part of a discussion on relationships by a class of third graders (who are eight to nine years old).⁶⁴ The group is culturally diverse. A number of the children are recent immigrants to Hawai'i and have little proficiency in spoken English. Most of the children are from low income families. It would be misleading to say that this is a "typical" P4C discussion, for every community and, indeed, every session, has its own unique dynamic. It is fair to say, however, that many of the happenings which are on display in this transcript also occur in other (mature) communities of inquiry.

5 *Mr. Toby:* You know I kind of want to LMB -- move back to what Ahn Thy says 'cause [because] the more I listen the more confused I'm getting about what a relationship is. Is it just any two things that have something in common? I thought I understood, but now when I think about it more I'm not so sure what a relationship is. Brian [Mr. Toby passes the community ball to Brian].⁶⁵

10 *Brian C.:* They're different things, but they're the same thing; like ice and steam are made from water, and chocolate and vanilla [ice cream] are [both] made from ice cream. They are different *things*, but they're the same family.

Mr. Toby: OK, you've got to have two different things and they have got to be in the same family?

Brian C.: Yeah, something like the same family. Joseph.

Joseph: What did you say Mr. Toby?

15 *Mr. Toby:* I'm trying to figure out what a relationship is. What do we mean by relationship?

20 *Joseph:* A relationship could be two things that are alike but looking different. Like water it has three different types of forms. It could be a solid, it could be a gas, and then...well I forget the third one. They are both alike 'cause they're both water, but then they're both in different forms. So it would be sort of like something alike and it could be in a different form. Nani.

25 *Nani:* I agree with Joseph that we can have two or more things and you see what's the connection -- what they're like. They can be like steam and ice; they're both made of water. So that's one reason why they're alike. And like the last time we had philosophy it was a cottage and a castle. We agreed that people can live in a cottage and a castle. That's how they were alike. So a relationship is two or more things that have something in common, or a connection. They're alike. Jason.

30 *Jason:* Steam and ice. Steam can just melt the ice and the steam is more hot than the ice. It is made of water. So the water is more hot so the steam comes out. The steam goes out 'cause the ice is made of water so the steam is made hot and so....Jackie.

Jackie: I think what a relationship is is different groups but same things. Like maybe say...a clock. It has a group of its own. There are different kinds of clocks: Round clocks like that one [points to the clock on the wall], and electric alarm clocks, and the clocks that can stand up. But they are all the same because they are all clocks. But they are all different. Thomas.

40 *Thomas:* Can we LMO [move on to another question]? I think...
Mrs. Yoshida: Let's move on? And then what were you going to say? "I think" what?
Thomas: I think that steam and ice have a relationship. And I agree with Leigh because they are both water and when water evaporates it becomes steam. And ice is like steam 'cause they're both water.

45 *Mrs. Yoshida:* Oh, JAMP [someone is holding up a JAMP card which means "Just A Minute Please"].
Thomas: Nani.
Nani: I want to know if Mr. Toby knows what "relationship" means before we move on to the next question.

50 *Mrs. Yoshida:* Very considerate of you.
Mr. Toby: I think I understand it. Maybe new examples will come up and I'll realize that I don't understand it, but for now I'm happy. OK, how many people want to NQP [move on] to the next question? [the class counts votes] What's the JAMP?

55 *Brian S.:* I want to refer to his question when he said you can do any old thing to find a relationship. I don't think so because if you do a shoe and a creature, its like there is not even a relationship. So I think you have to pick something [else] first -- like a shoe and a boot.

60 *Mrs. Yoshida:* I think right now we called for NQP. The majority voted so you can pass [the ball] to Joseph. Maybe now that we've talked about some things and their relationship maybe you're ready for some more scratching [beneath the surface of the topic]. Let's see how we do with these questions.

65 *Joseph:* [reading the question which Mrs. Yoshida has written on an index card] "How are relationships like things?"
Class: Huh...I don't get it...what?
Mrs. Yoshida: How are relationships like things and the contrary question, "How are relationships different from things?" Can you separate the two? Are they alike?

70 *Joseph:* I think relationships and things are alike because you can use a relationship on two things or more. Like Nani said. You could have a clock that could hang. And then both clocks used to do the same thing. Or a relationship and a clock. In fact, I think relationship will go with any two things that are like...Kacey.

75 *Kacey:* But [if we accept what you say] then I think relationship is a thing, you know, like a clock. So how can it be a relationship? I think its just a word. But it means something.
Mr. Toby: So Kacey, you're saying that a thing and a relationship are not the same. They're different. Is that what you said?

80

Kacey: Well mostly. Kind of.
Mrs. Yoshida: You said that a relationship is just a word?
Kacey: Yeah.
Mrs. Yoshida: She said relationship is a word and a thing is like a
85 thing, like a creature, or like an item or an object.
Mr. Toby: So here's a thing [holds out a pen]. Right? And a
relationship...
Kacey: ...is a word.
Mrs. Yoshida: Can you see a relationship then? If its a word you
90 can't see it. Where does it exist? Where is it?
Kacey: I don't know, but I have one more question.
Mrs. Yoshida: Where do we get the relationship? I'm sorry, go
ahead. What was your question?
Kacey: You just took my question.
95 *Mr. Toby:* Say the question Kacey.
Kacey: Where does the relationship...
Mrs. Yoshida: Where does the relationship come from?
Jackie: Maybe the thing is inside the relationship.
Ahn Thy: IDUS, IDUS, I don't understand.
100 *Mr. Toby:* OK...[draws a diagram; the relationship is represented
by a circle and the thing is represented by a point within this circle]. Like
that [shows diagram]? So the thing is inside the relationship? Is that the
way you'd draw the picture?
Jackie: [nods "yes"] All the different kinds of things...they relate
105 so they're inside of the relationship.
Nani: I agree with Jackie 'cause if you like to see what a ship and a
submarine are like. The relationship would be around both of them because
you're trying to see what's the relationship around them, the connection, or
what they're like. So there would be a big circle or relationship and then
110 there's the things that you're comparing -- I mean, that you're trying to see
what's the connection. They would be inside the relationship. And so
every time you're trying to see what other things are like [the] relationship
would be around it. 'Cause that's what you connected.
Mrs. Yoshida: Would you be drawing a line between those things?
115 Would the lines be the connection? Or would they just exist inside that
circle?
Nani: They would just be inside the circle.
Jackie: But then it doesn't really have to be a relationship and a
thing. It can be different things, like maybe say an ocean and the...and
120 many things live in the ocean so they relate to each other.
Mr. Toby: Did everyone get that? OMT, one more time.
Jackie: OK, this is a big classroom and we fit inside it and we're
relating to it 'cause we're inside. So I think a relationship is a big
thing...like say...a pool can fit people inside it so they relate to each other.
125 *Mr. Toby:* I think maybe you've just found a kind of relationship --
a part to wholes. Like the whole is the ocean and then the parts...or maybe
that's not right. A big thing and a little...Or an outside...I don't know what
to call it.
Jackie: It's like a mother and a baby inside. So they relate to each
130 other 'cause they're connected. They are a part of each other. Brian C.

Brian C.: I think the relationship and...they're both noun. 'Cause most people is talking about things and person that belong to the noun. So I wonder if a noun could be a relationship. Ahn Thy.

135 *Ahn Thy:* OK, I think I can explain what that mean. I think what it means is without a thing there will be no relationships.

Mrs. Yoshida: You're getting us to one of our next questions.

Ahn Thy: It's the one that Jackie said. It's just like earth. It is like there are people inside, and without them there would be no earth.

140 *Mrs. Yoshida:* So you're saying if you don't have things you can't have relationships?

Ahn Thy: Yeah, 'Cause things make a relationship. It's just like a mechanical pencil. They make lead, right? Without a mechanical pencil why should there be lead?

145 *Mrs. Yoshida:* You know we're getting tight for time and...conversely Jackie you said: "A thing is inside a relationship." Well, what if we throw this question out? Joseph.

Joseph: [reading] "Can a thing have relationships within it? Can you give an example?"

150 *Mrs. Yoshida:* Jackie, I believe you said a thing is inside a relationship and Nani you agreed. But can you have the opposite? Can you have a relationship within a thing? Joseph do you want to comment about that before we go on? Or you can recognize someone.

160 *Joseph:* Maybe a thing inside of something can have a relationship. Like maybe your arm and your blood -- inside, the fluid. Its inside your arm or your skin or something, and they're both a body part or something. Actually, we're off the subject. Kacey.

Kacey: Are you saying that we are made of relationships?

Joseph: Sort of.

165 *Kacey:* The circle right now and then all the things around us in the classroom. I mean like if we're the whole relationship, right? And then the classroom is a thing 'cause all around us is things in this room. So is that what the question is?

Mrs. Yoshida: What do you people think? Oh, I see some new hands. Maybe recognize some of our new participants.

170 *Kacey:* Max.

Max: Probably like us and this ball -- the community ball. Like our care is in the philosophy ball. Something like that?

175 *Mrs. Yoshida:* Oh, so the philosophy ball is a thing and the relationships are in it. That's a good example. What do you people think? Let's get some other viewpoints. Some new people here. Quickly, so we can give you a chance to participate.

Max: Vanessa.

180 *Vanessa:* I agree with Max because its like our relationships are inside the ball. Its like that picture [points to the diagram which was made earlier]. Its like the ball is a thing and a relationship is the hair [care?] of the ball.

Mrs. Yoshida: OK, so you agree with what Max said. Anybody have something new, something different to add? Just want to share, disagree or agree?

In this case the members of the community did not, for the most part, arrive at conclusive answers to their questions. But this does not mean that they did not make progress in their inquiry. They came to better appreciate the complexity of the issue. They also began to make connections with their experiences and to perceive new connections. These, Jackson argues, are forms of philosophical progress.⁶⁶

Regardless of whether or not the children made progress, however, of note is the sophistication of the dialogue. One sees on display many of the qualities which the community of inquiry aims to cultivate.

The children make a number of cognitive moves. They give reasons (for instance on lines 25, 44, 130). They provide examples (8, 36, 119, 129) and counter-examples (58). They employ analogies (142) and ask for clarification (99, 162). They draw implications (76) and question the truth of statements (57, 77).

The community is self-governing. The children make note of when they are getting off subject (161). They call on one another without the direction of a teacher (13, 22, 29). They ask for a question to be repeated (14). They themselves determine when to move on to another question (40) or when to slow down the pace of the discussion (46, 55).

This community of inquiry is an "intellectually safe place." The members of the community exhibit caring for one another; asking others if their concerns have been met (49) and acting so as to encourage a classmate to voice his thoughts for the first time (30).

The community is reflective. The children endeavor to connect their ideas to those of their classmates (23, 43, 56, 72, 106, 178) and refer back to prior discussions (26). So too, the community is self-correcting. The children respectfully disagree with one another (57, 77) and otherwise endeavor to correct the course of the inquiry (118).

The children also display a number of other desirable social behaviors. They wonder aloud (132) and ask questions (77, 96, 162). They voice their ideas clearly and confidently (23-29, 34-39) and they patiently wait their turn (throughout).

The Aims of The Community of Inquiry

Drawing upon Dewey, Lipman makes a distinction between *consummatory* value and *instrumental* value.⁶⁷ Something which has consummatory value "is satisfying for its own sake."⁶⁸ That which has instrumental value has worth "insofar as it serves as a means to some desirable experiential consequence..."⁶⁹

The community of inquiry, as Lipman and Gazzard note, aims towards both of these sorts of value.⁷⁰ (1) The community of inquiry aims towards consummatory value; the very proceedings of the community are intended to be satisfying to its members. (2) The community of inquiry also aims towards instrumental value; the community is intended to be a means through which to educate students.

(1) *The community of inquiry has consummatory value.* The activity of philosophizing -- of wondering about one's life and discovering meaning in it -- is, Aristotle contends, a most pleasant endeavor:

...the activity of philosophic wisdom is admittedly the pleasantest of virtuous activities...And this activity alone would seem to be loved for its own sake...⁷¹

Not everyone, to be sure, will agree with Aristotle's contention that philosophizing has the greatest consummatory value. Countless people throughout the ages, however, have agreed with Aristotle's conclusion that philosophizing is a richly satisfying experience.

Given this recognition within the philosophical tradition of the great consummatory value of philosophizing, it is somewhat surprising to find that relatively little attention has been paid to the consummatory value of the proceedings of the community of inquiry. Splitter and Sharp argue that the community of inquiry is an instrument which can improve thinking and strengthen judgment.⁷² Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan assert that *Philosophy for Children* enhances reasoning ability and promotes ethical understanding.⁷³ These

authors, however, make relatively scant mention of the fact that the proceedings of the community of inquiry can be satisfying in and of themselves.⁷⁴

While the adult authors who write about Philosophy for Children do not emphasize the community of inquiry's consummatory value, the children who participate in the proceedings of the community of inquiry frequently make mention of it. These children oftentimes indicate that the proceedings of the community are "fun."⁷⁵

I think that philosophy is a good thing for kids because its fun...
(Thomas, third grade)

I think philosophy is a good thing for us because it is a good stuff.
(Rocky, third grade)

Philosophy is very interesting because the topic we chose is a very good topic! When I subject on a topic I really dig deep [be]cause I'm so interested. My brains go lulu some times because if I get so interested and excited my brain goes lulu!

(April, fourth grade)⁷⁶

For these children the community of inquiry is valuable not because it prepares them to do great things in the future but rather because it is, in and of itself, satisfying.

Jackson sometimes refers to the activity of philosophizing within the community of inquiry as a metaphorical place. It is a "place" where people can go to in order to wonder, to listen, to be heard, and to come to understand. This place, many members of the community of inquiry discover, is a beautiful one:

My answer is yes. I think philosophy is a good thing for kids because they can talk and forget about all the bad things that are happening in their lives. Philosophy can help kids calm down. Not only does philosophy help kids calm down, but it also help make it safe for them to talk.

(Dustin, fifth grade)

The community of inquiry is a place of beauty. It is a place that can salve one's heart, lift one's spirits, and inspire one's mind. It is a place which, regardless of what it does or fails to do, has its own value.

(That the community of inquiry has this consummatory value, it is worth noting, is of pedagogical significance. As Plato argued, an educational approach which is enjoyable is more likely to be effective:

Because, said I, a free soul ought not to pursue any study slavishly, for while bodily labors performed under constraint do not harm the body, nothing that is learned under compulsion stays with the mind...Do not, then, my friend, keep children to their studies by compulsion but by play.⁷⁷

If an educational approach is satisfying, Plato suggests, its effectiveness is enhanced.)

(2) *The community of inquiry has instrumental value.* The community of inquiry also has value because it is an effective educational means through which to foster good thinking and to encourage certain other social behaviors.⁷⁸ Children can be both empowered and disposed to think and to act well, proponents of Philosophy for Children contend, by engaging in the proceedings of the community of inquiry.

This pedagogical contention is supported by the work of the Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky. Vygotsky believed that there was, as Lipman writes, an "intrapsychical reproduction of the interpsychical."⁷⁹ Based on his research, Vygotsky concluded that it is not the case that thinking develops independently from one's social environment but rather that one's environment to a large extent determines how it is that one thinks.

Vygotsky noted that when mentally retarded children were placed in an environment in which "all teaching...[was] based on the use of concrete, look and do methods" their ability to think abstractly was handicapped even further.⁸⁰ Because these children were never given the opportunity to observe or to engage in abstract thinking they never developed such thinking. This observation supported Vygotsky's belief that social modeling precedes the development of thinking. Children learn to think by *internalizing* the thinking of others as it is expressed through utterances.⁸¹

Drawing upon Vygotsky's thought, proponents of Philosophy for Children endeavor to create a particular sort of environment. Their aim is to transform the classroom

into a community of inquiry where children engage in, and thereby model, particular cognitive moves and certain other social behaviors. The members of the community give reasons, draw inferences, provide counter-examples, and question the veracity of claims. So too, they listen attentively, display patience, build upon previous statements, and reflect upon their inquiry. With due time, proponents of Philosophy for Children contend, the members of the community will come to internalize these sorts of behaviors. The "interpersonal process" of dialogue will be "transformed into an intrapersonal" process of thinking.⁸² Desirable behaviors will be "caught"; children will gain not only the ability to think well but also the disposition to do so.⁸³

Notes

- ¹Lipman (1992), p. 3.
- ²Lipman (1992), p. 3.
- ³Lipman (1992), p. 3.
- ⁴Lipman (1982b), p. 35.
- ⁵Lipman (1982b), p. 35.
- ⁶Lipman (1982b), p. 35.
- ⁷Lipman (1996a), p. xv.
- ⁸Lipman (1991), p. 15.
- ⁹Lipman (1991), p. 15.
- ¹⁰Lipman (1991), p. 15.
- ¹¹Lipman (1996a), p. xv.
- ¹²Lipman (1996a), p. xv.
- ¹³Lipman (1996a), p. xv.
- ¹⁴Lipman (1996a), p. xv.
- ¹⁵Freire (1970), p. 52.
- ¹⁶Lipman (1992), p. 6.
- ¹⁷Sharp and Reed (1992), p. xv.
- ¹⁸Jackson (1998), p. 3.
- ¹⁹Jackson (1998), p. 4.
- ²⁰Jackson (1998), p. 3.
- ²¹Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 34.
- ²²Tiles (1995), p. 93.

²³Tiles (1995), p. 100.

²⁴Jackson (1998), p. 7.

²⁵Tiles (1995), p. 100.

²⁶Jackson (1998), p. 22.

²⁷Lipman (1991), p. 258. An adequate consideration of the connection between Philosophy for Children and democracy is beyond the scope of this work. We note, however, that there is a strong connection between the two. P4C is, in fact, referred to as "education for democracy" in some parts of the world.

The fact that the community of inquiry is itself a democratic community is, Lipman (1991, p. 258) explains, of the utmost importance. Considering the thought of Dewey, Lipman writes:

...for Dewey the classroom is to be a microcosm of the Great Community, and if we are ever to get that Great Community, we must first have those microcosms in place. The schools of the present will breed the society of the future.

By learning within the community of inquiry those skills and dispositions which are essential to being a democratic citizen the children of today are readied to effectively partake in (and advance the cause of) tomorrow's democratic society.

Being able to think clearly and make good judgments are, quite obviously, capabilities which a citizen in a democratic society ought to have. So too, as Tiles (1995, p. 267) notes, they need certain "oral" and "aural" skills:

That there might be a basic skill (or family of skills) comparable to literacy or numeracy which is needed to equip pupils to participate in a democratic culture is by no means widely recognized. Nevertheless, as we have observed, people who cannot listen to one another, contribute to the refinement of one another's opinions, and participate in the formation of consensus, are not equipped for a democratic culture. Literacy and numeracy are assumed to be skills which schools should develop in everyone. At most extra-curricular provision is made for some specialized oral skills such as public speaking and debate. What is not sufficiently recognized is that everyone needs oral (and aural) skills (or at the very least refined and disciplined habits) to participate in discussion, in a 'community of inquiry' -- and needs these skills as much as he or she needs to be able to read, write and calculate.

²⁸Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 149.

²⁹Jackson (1998), p. 19.

³⁰Lipman (1996a), p. 11.

³¹Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 149.

- ³²See Jackson (1998), p. 25.
- ³³Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 149. See Jackson (1998), pp. 4 and 14-18.
- ³⁴Jackson (1998), p. 25.
- ³⁵See Jackson (1998), p. 25.
- ³⁶Lipman (1991), p. 24. Here Lipman is not talking about the community of inquiry but is defining complex thinking.
- ³⁷Lipman (1991), p. 15. Sharp (1991), p. 338.
- ³⁸Jackson (1998), p. 13.
- ³⁹Jackson (1998), p. 16.
- ⁴⁰Jackson (1998), p. 4.
- ⁴¹Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 90.
- ⁴²Jackson (1998), p. 14.
- ⁴³Jackson (1998), pp. 4.
- ⁴⁴Jackson (1998), pp. 15-18.
- ⁴⁵See Chapter Three, *Leaning Back on Understanding*.
- ⁴⁶Lipman (1991), p. 121. Lipman cites Peirce's "Ideals of Conduct."
- ⁴⁷Lipman (1991), p. 121.
- ⁴⁸Lipman (1991), p. 150.
- ⁴⁹Lipman and Sharp (1986), p. 250. Lipman and Sharp make the distinction between "wondering at" and "wondering about."
- ⁵⁰From Stephen Paget, "The Way of Wonder." In Lipman (1993a), p. 116.
- ⁵¹Lipman and Sharp (1986), p. 250.
- ⁵²"What do you wonder about?" These were some of the responses to this question from the students in Lori Maihui's fifth grade class (1997-1998).
- ⁵³Sharp (1991), p. 338.

⁵⁴Lipman (1991), p. 15. Sharp (1991), p. 338.

⁵⁵For more on this see Chapter Ten, P4C, The Ability to Understand, and Social Inquiry.

⁵⁶Sharp (1991), p. 338.

⁵⁷See Chapter Two, Cognitive Moves. See also Chapter Ten.

⁵⁸Lipman (1991), p. 15.

⁵⁹See Jackson (1998), pp. 20-23.

⁶⁰Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 39.

⁶¹Lipman has written a number of novels which are intended "to be springboards for philosophical dialogue." (Lipman 1996a, p. 79.) The basic, "plain vanilla," strategy for starting discussion is to read from one of these novels, ask questions about them, and then select one of these questions for discussion. (See Jackson, p. 6.)

⁶²Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 149.

⁶³Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 149.

⁶⁴This transcript is from Kathryn Yoshida's class (4/18/97). I have edited this transcript slightly in order to make it more readable. The only time I have deleted entire contributions is in the case when a teacher spoke with the sole intention of repeating what a child said. Changes made within an individual contribution are limited to the elimination of repetitious or unnecessary words. For example, "Like...I think that...maybe...like...families are relationships" would be edited down to "I think that families are relationships." Copies of this tape (and other tapes from which transcripts are drawn) can be obtained upon request.

⁶⁵A ball is often used during Hawai'i P4C sessions in order to identify the speaker. Whoever holds the ball is recognized as the speaker. When a speaker finishes talking, she then passes the ball to another member of the community. This person then becomes the speaker. This procedure helps the children to govern their own inquiry.

A "community ball" is a multi-colored yarn ball which is used in the manner described above and which is constructed by the members of a community of inquiry. Jackson and Oho (1993, p. 12) explain the symbolic significance of this ball:

[The children] recognized their colors in the community ball which gave them a sense of ownership and belonging. The children stressed the need to take care of their community ball, to have respect for this new property and not to pull on the yarn as each color represented one of their classmates. The idea of a community symbolized in this yarn further created the unity, respect and safety needed in a reflective community of inquirers.

⁶⁶Jackson (1998), p. 18.

- ⁶⁷Lipman (1991), p. 155. See also Dewey (1916), pp. 238-243 and Aristotle The Nicomachean Ethics [1097a].
- ⁶⁸Lipman (1991), p. 155.
- ⁶⁹Lipman (1991), p. 155.
- ⁷⁰See Lipman and Gazzard (1988a), p. v.
- ⁷¹Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. [1177a-b].
- ⁷²Splitter and Sharp (1995), Chapter One.
- ⁷³Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), Chapter Five.
- ⁷⁴This, however, is not to say that there is no mention whatsoever of the consummatory value of the proceedings of the community of inquiry. See, for instance, Lipman and Gazzard (1988a), p. v or Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), p. 44.
- ⁷⁵Jackson also makes this point. He asserts that in the community of inquiry there is "Higher Order Fun." See Jackson (1998), p. 2.
- ⁷⁶These are student responses to an evaluation question given at the end of the school year: "Is philosophy a good thing for kids?" These evaluations can be viewed upon request.
- ⁷⁷Plato, The Republic, 536e.
- ⁷⁸See, for instance, Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 2 and Lipman (1996a), pp. 104-105. More will be said on this in the chapters to come.
- ⁷⁹Lipman (1996a), p. 12. See also Vygotsky (1978), p. 57.
- ⁸⁰Vygotsky (1978), p. 89.
- ⁸¹Vygotsky (1978), pp. 56-57. Lipman (1996a, p. 101) writes:
...when Durkheim and Weber talk about 'internalization,' they generally mean just the internalization of *authority*, the internalization of *controls*. When Mead and Vygotsky and Piaget use the word, they mean the conversion of the external behavioral process into an internal thinking process.
- ⁸²Vygotsky (1978), p. 57. See also Lipman (1996a), pp. 104-105.
- ⁸³Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 179. Do children in fact internalize the cognitive moves and social behaviors which are displayed within of the community of inquiry? More will be said about this in Chapter Seven, P4C: A proven means by which to Cultivate Cognitive Moves and in Chapter Ten, P4C and The Cultivation of Social Behaviors.

Chapter Seven: Cultivating Cognitive Moves

P4C and The Cultivation of Good Thinking

To have good judgment, we argued, is not to possess some "inscrutable quality."¹ It is, rather, to have a character trait.² Those who have good judgment are those who are armed with the abilities and dispositions which empower them to consistently judge well and, so, to consistently make good judgments.

Like all judging, judging well is choosing through thinking. Unlike all judging, however, judging well is choosing through effective thinking which "[does] better the work that thinking can do..."³ It is choosing through thinking which is especially well-suited for the work of making good judgments. It is choosing through *good thinking*.⁴

Good thinking involves, first and foremost, the use of cognitive moves. One who has the power to think well, we argued, has both the ability and the disposition to skillfully employ a variety of cognitive moves.⁵ A second defining characteristic of good thinking is that it "leans back on" one's understanding.⁶ One who can think well has the power to understand her world and is disposed and able to refer back to this understanding.

Essential to educating for good judgment, then, is the cultivation of good thinking. Are one's students ready and able to use cognitive moves? Do one's students have the power to understand and the ability and disposition to employ this understanding as a criterion? If the answers to these questions are "yes," then one has, to a significant extent, prepared one's students to judge well.

But how does one help children to internalize cognitive moves? So too, how does one prepare children to lean back on their understandings? One way, we shall argue in the next four chapters, is through the community of inquiry approach of Philosophy for Children (P4C). The classroom community of philosophical inquiry is an excellent means through which one can empower and inspire children to make use of cognitive moves and their understandings and, hence, to prepare them to make good judgments.

P4C and The Cultivation of Cognitive Moves

"Good judgment," Lipman writes, "cannot be operative unless it rests upon proficient reasoning skills..."⁷ Cognitive moves are, as we argued previously, the instruments of the judging trade.⁸ Like an artist who must employ his painting supplies in order to create a work of art, or a mechanic who must utilize his tools in order to repair a car, the good thinker must make use of cognitive moves in doing the work of making good judgments. Cognitive moves are the indispensable means through which good judgments are made.

There are a number of ways in which the community of inquiry approach fosters the development of the child's ability and disposition to skillfully employ cognitive moves. The community of inquiry approach cultivates the development of cognitive moves by: (1) allowing for the modeling of these moves, (2) encouraging children to practice these moves, (3) asking children to reflect upon these moves, and (4) creating the social conditions which make the exercise of these moves possible.

(1) *Within the community of inquiry cognitive moves are modeled.* "In a community of inquiry," writes Lipman, "children will use other children's behavior as models for their own."⁹ "If," for example, "one child asks a question, the others may again do likewise."¹⁰ There is, as Vygotsky puts it, an "intrapyschical reproduction of the

interpsychical"; children internalize the cognitive moves which are expressed through the utterances of their classmates.¹¹ They, as we argued previously, become able and disposed to think well by emulating the good thinking of their peers.¹²

One repeatedly sees on display within the community of inquiry the sort of modeling of which Lipman speaks. Consider, for instance, the transcript of the dialogue between third graders which we examined in the previous chapter. This transcript shows that these children frequently employ cognitive moves.¹³ On lines 99 and 162 they make the move of Clarifying Matters.¹⁴ On lines 25, 44, and 130 they support their positions with reasons. They wonder if "what is being said [is] true" (lines 57 and 77) and draw implications (76).¹⁵ They "support or illustrate claims" with examples (8, 36, 119, and 129) and search for counter-examples (58) in order "to test the limits of claims."¹⁶

The exercise of cognitive moves by the children who are members of the community of inquiry is a vital source of the modeling of these moves. It is not, however, the only source. There are, Lipman asserts, "a number of different kinds of modeling" which occur within the community of inquiry.¹⁷ Another source of modeling is the teacher who serves both as a "facilitator" and a "co-inquirer."¹⁸ The teacher can, by herself employing cognitive moves, model these moves for her students.

Sometimes a teacher may choose to make her use of a cognitive move quite explicit. Consider, for instance, the following bit of dialogue. Here I deliberately choose wording which makes it clear that I am employing cognitive moves. I reinforce my message further by physically indicating which move I am making:

...I guess what I'm wondering is *what do you mean by* [I place a chip on the "What do we mean by..." card] "own." We're *assuming* [I place a chip on the "Assumption" card] that you can own land. But *can you own land* [I place a chip on the "True" card]? I don't know. So...let's say for *example* [I place a chip on the "Example" card], I go outside and I take a piece of rope and stake off a little square of land out in front of your room and say, "I own this."¹⁹

In doing this I am "bringing tacit skills to consciousness"; I demonstrate to the students how cognitive moves are properly used.²⁰

At other times a teacher may demonstrate cognitive moves in a more subtle, more natural way. Susan Okano does this by performing the moves of Clarifying Matters and

Using Examples when raising her point:

But what about like on the mainland where the Indians were using the land for food and whatever. They always stayed in that area and then some pioneer comes and says, "This is mine now. I'm going to build my house. This is my land." Now is that stealing?²¹

Simply by inquiring with her students, Okano models cognitive moves for her students.

The role of the teacher in modeling cognitive moves ought not be under-estimated. There is, as Lipman points out, "little evidence to support" the claim that one can "establish a free and benign environment, and children will naturally engage in higher-order thinking."²² Children "need as many models as they can get."²³

This being said, care should be taken, however, not to over-estimate the importance of the teacher's modeling. As Lipman rightly says:

We should be wary of ascribing all the modeling for higher-order thinking to the teacher, as if the student were some kind of Clever Hans, the horse who could pick up subliminal cues from its trainer.²⁴

The teacher is one important source for the modeling of cognitive moves from among several.²⁵

Another resource used by the community of inquiry approach to model cognitive moves are the texts which the community oftentimes reads together. These texts are "philosophical novel[s]" written by Lipman.²⁶ The novels, which form the core of the P4C curriculum, are deliberately crafted so as to "portray students engaged in higher-order thinking."²⁷ Characters are distinguished from one another by "their styles of thinking"; each character thinks in certain ways and characteristically employs particular cognitive moves.²⁸

The characters of these novels, Lipman argues, model cognitive moves for the members of the community of inquiry. There is a "gradual internalization of the thinking behaviors of the fictional characters"; "the live students in the classroom take the behavior of these fictional characters as models of how to behave."²⁹ Lipman provides an example of this intrapsychical reproduction of the narrative: "reading how a fictional character asks a question may lead a real child to ask such a question in class."³⁰

If one examines the P4C curriculum, one finds that, indeed, the fictional characters in the novels do model cognitive moves. In this passage the character Pixie makes the move of asking for an example:

Brian: Okay! Before the story, wasn't your mind just a blob, but then the story put it in order?

Pixie: You mean that's what the ideas did -- gave shape to things and put them in order? Give me a for instance.³¹

In another passage Pixie engages in the sort of hypothetical thinking which is an expression of *Working with Assumptions*:³²

But you see, that's what puzzles me. Either my body and I are the same, or they're not the same.

If my body and I are the same, then *it* can't belong to *me*.

And if my body and I are different, then who am *I*?³³

A third example of a move modeled within one of Lipman's novels is the drawing of (analogical) inferences:

"And do relationships like *before* and *after* make up time?"

"In a way," said Mr. Mulligan.

I was beginning to see what I wanted to get at, and I wouldn't give up. So I said, "And do relationships like *far* and *near* make up space?"

He shook his head, to mean yes. Brian stared at me.

"Well," I said, "isn't it possible that, in the same way that space and time are made up of relationships, so our minds are made up of the words and ideas that *stand for* those relationships?"³⁴

Making cognitive moves such as these along with the characters whom they read about, Lipman theorizes, the members of the community of inquiry will themselves learn how to perform these moves and, hence, will become better prepared to judge.

(2) *Within the community of inquiry children practice making cognitive moves.*

Cognitive moves are skills. They are movements which one makes; performances which one does. One of the best ways, if not *the* best way, in which we learn how to perform a skill is simply "by going out and doing it."³⁵ "This is the way we learn to swim, dance, and skate."³⁶ So too, we learn how to perform cognitive moves by making cognitive moves. We get better at them by *practicing* them.

There are two basic ways in which to practice cognitive moves. One way is to "give students lots of drill in performing specific thinking operations."³⁷ Similar to "the way 'body builders' exercise and strengthen each and every muscle in their bodies," particular skills are focused on and strengthened through deliberately designed "exercises."³⁸ A second way of having children practice thinking skills is by having them simply engage in dialogue. As when one tries to teach a child to walk, Lipman explains, one "attempt[s] to assist the whole process."³⁹ "Skillful thinking," he asserts, "will naturally emanate from skillful discussions."⁴⁰

Which of these two approaches ought to be employed is a matter of some contention. Lipman gives voice to the opposing sides of this debate in his book Natasha:

Vygotskian Dialogues:

Maxim frowns. "Every art and every craft is composed of skills -- technical skills. And one acquires those skills by study and practice. It's not true that you learn to dance by dancing and you learn to sing by singing: You've got to study and practice the moves that dancing and singing incorporate."

Natasha's eyes flash. "But when we disagree, as we do now, we say *why* we disagree: We give reasons and criteria, we argue and make judgments. It's just as he says: Skillful interpersonal dialogue gives rise to skillful intrapersonal reflection. You don't need to study the skills *separately or practice them separately*. It's the same way you learned to speak as a child: not by being assigned exercises in language-building skills or thinking skills, but by listening to and participating in discussions around the kitchen table."⁴¹

Are cognitive moves best learned, as Maxim and proponents of "thinking skills" programs maintain, by being exercised individually? Or is it better, as Natasha argues, to learn to make cognitive moves by simply performing them during the course of discussion?

Given his belief that there is, with sufficient exposure, an "intrapyschical reproduction of the interpsychical," Lipman sides with Natasha.⁴²

To read literature or to engage in dialogue is to call into play vast numbers of mental acts. The mind springs to life. I'm not denying that exercises dealing with particular skills can be useful. But I still maintain that the best way of promoting excellent thinking is by promoting excellent discussion that involves a huge range of thinking skills and mental acts.⁴³

Lipman concludes that, while exercises have value, immersing the child in dialogue is the best way to allow for the practice of cognitive moves.

The community of inquiry approach is an educational means which provides children with precisely this opportunity for practice. In the community of inquiry children are given the chance to engage in dialogue or, as Tiles puts it, "disciplined conversation."⁴⁴ During the course of this dialogue, they are allowed and, indeed, *encouraged* to perform (and, hence, practice making) cognitive moves.

The encouragement which the children receive to perform cognitive moves is, to a large extent, tacit. Observing their peers making cognitive moves, the children are inspired to perform these moves themselves. Also, the momentum of the inquiry itself encourages the practice of cognitive moves; if the members of the community want to further the inquiry and "scratch beneath the surface" of matters, they need to perform cognitive moves.⁴⁵

Children also receive more explicit encouragement to perform cognitive moves. Consider the words of the teacher in this transcript which "is based on a classroom conversation with children in a combined grade 5-6 class."⁴⁶

Megan: Yeah, I agree with Brett. My cat meows and I'm sure it's trying to tell me something. When it meows to other cats, they can understand each other.

Teacher: How can you tell?

Megan: Sometimes she wants to tell other cats to keep away, so she meows at them; and they understand because they sometimes meow back, then they go away.

Teacher: Does anyone else have any examples they would like to share with us?⁴⁷

First, the teacher asks Megan to give a reason. Then the teacher encourages the rest of the class to make the move of providing an example. Serving in the role of, as Jackson puts it, "facilitat[or] [of] the discussion," the teacher explicitly calls for the children to make cognitive moves.⁴⁸

Within the community of inquiry, then, children practice their performance of cognitive moves simply "by going out and doing it" during the course of dialogue.⁴⁹ They also, however, engage in exercises which give them practice making these moves.

Exercises are not, in and of themselves, the best means through which to teach a child cognitive moves. (Unlike "excellent discussion," exercises separate the cognitive moves from the context which defines their worth.⁵⁰) From this, however, it does not follow that there is no value in such exercises. Lipman writes:

The teacher preparing to teach *Elfie* must keep in mind that the many exercises devoted to logic in the manual are not there to teach children reasoning skills which they presently lack, but to give a bit more practice in skills they already have.⁵¹

Exercises, Lipman concludes, are not a good way to *teach* cognitive moves, but they can still be used to *strengthen* a child's ability to perform cognitive moves. Exercises can help children to perform cognitive moves *better*. There is, then, no dichotomy between, on the one hand, exercises and, on the other hand, an integrated doing; each has its place.

There are, within the P4C curriculum, a number of exercises which are designed to strengthen particular cognitive moves. In Hawai'i, Jackson has developed a variation on Lipman and Sharp's "teakettle" exercise.⁵² In the "Kiss Game" children practice making the move of Clarifying Matters when, in response to the question "Would you like a kiss?", they ask "What do you mean by kiss?" (It could mean either a Hershey's chocolate kiss or

a kiss with the lips.) The children then must themselves think of an ambiguous word, put that word in sentences, replace that ambiguous word with the word "kiss," and then figure out what the (now mysterious) ambiguous word is.⁵³

Jackson also suggests that each child engage in the exercise of making her own set of "Good Thinker's Tool Kit" cards.

In the initial presentation of the "Kit," each student is given seven cards, one for each letter. As each letter is introduced, students print that letter on a card...On the back of the card, they may put whatever clarifying notes they wish to help remember the significance of each letter.⁵⁴

The making of these cards helps children to gain a better understanding of the cognitive moves which comprise the tool kit. (These cards can also subsequently be used by the community. Kathryn Yoshida, for instance, has her students use their cards during inquiry sessions to explicitly indicate when they are using these cognitive moves. Using these cards, the children explicitly model for their classmates the making of cognitive moves.)

Another exercise developed in Hawai'i is Andrew Colvin's Good Thinker's Tool Kit Game.⁵⁵ This game is similar to the television program *Jeopardy* except each category is a tool from Jackson's Good Thinker's Tool Kit.⁵⁶ The children must choose a question from among the categories: "What do you mean by...?" "Can you give a reason?" "Can you give an example or counterexample?" "What can we infer?" "Does it follow?" Or, "Is something being assumed?"⁵⁷

An example of a question from the "reason" category is as follows: "A pound of feathers is lighter than a pound of lead."⁵⁸ Students must first say whether the statement is true or false and then, in order to earn a point, provide a reason which supports their answer.

Within the instructional manuals which accompany Lipman's novels there are also a great number of exercises which aim to strengthen particular cognitive moves. For instance:

Exercise: Examples

Can you give us some different examples of the following?

1. Brightly colored things
2. Clear, glassy things
3. Sparkling things
4. Calm, quiet things
5. Cool, dark things
6. Watery things
7. White things
8. Slimy things
9. Tall, straight things
10. Useful things⁵⁹

Exercise: Ambiguities

In each of the following sentences, a word could mean two different things.

What are the different meanings:

1. The teacher says that Jody is very good in school.
2. The girl tried to cut the loaf of bread but it was hard.
3. The cow wouldn't get off the road so the driver touched her horn.
4. He liked the way the river looked from the bank.
5. (You make one up.)⁶⁰

Exercises like these are effective complementary practices through which the community of inquiry strengthens the cognitive moves through which the work of judging is done.

(3) Within the community of inquiry children are given the opportunity to reflect upon cognitive moves. Jackson writes:

[Philosophy] Sessions can profitably be devoted to an examination of reasons and reason-giving, the distinguishing of "reasons" from "causes," criteria to be employed in distinguishing "good" from "bad" reasons, and so on. A full exploration of assumptions, presuppositions, inferences and implications is also of key importance...⁶¹

The members of the community of inquiry can turn their thinking upon this thinking itself. They can reflect upon the cognitive moves through which they inquire; thinking together about what cognitive moves are, how these moves are best used, and how effectively they themselves have been using these moves.

It is pedagogically efficacious to provide children with the opportunity to reflect upon cognitive moves. Reflecting upon cognitive moves is, as Splitter and Sharp suggest, a "step towards [the] internalising" of these moves.⁶² If children are not provided with "opportunities to discover of their own accord" the worth of cognitive moves, if they are

not helped to "feel [that] they share in responsibility" for their thinking, then they may well resist our efforts to cultivate these moves.⁶³ Enlisting the children's aid in examining cognitive moves, one helps them to "catch" these moves.⁶⁴ As the children make these moves their own, they become more *disposed* to employ them.

Not only does this opportunity for reflection make children more disposed to employ cognitive moves. It also prepares them to make better use of these moves; it empowers them with the *ability* to use these moves more skillfully. As is the case with any tool, if one does not fully understand what a particular cognitive move is or how it works, then one is not fully prepared to use it effectively. Splitter and Sharp get at this point:
The skills of giving reasons and formulating criteria are of little value if those utilising them cannot at the same time inquire whether the reasons given or the criteria formulated are good ones.⁶⁵

If one has never reflected upon the difference between good reasons and bad reasons, then one's ability to work with reasons is compromised. Similarly, if one is not even sure what an assumption is, then one's ability to Work with Assumptions is compromised. Reflection upon cognitive moves not only encourages the *doing* of cognitive moves; it also helps children to know *what they are doing*.

The community of inquiry approach fosters a more reflective understanding of cognitive moves by encouraging children to *think about* these moves. Consider this portion of a discussion plan:

Discussion Plan: Reasons and good reasons.

I. For each of the following, choose the statement which is a good reason for the opinion.

II. Explain how the statements chosen in Part I are good reasons, using the characteristics listed on the preceding page. [Good reasons are: Factual, relevant, known to the listener, and provide understanding.] Can you add to the list of characteristics of good reasons?

III. Choose one of the statements that you did *not* list as a good reason in Part I. Can you imagine a situation where that statement *would* be a good reason? Explain.

1. Opinion: I'd better wear a raincoat today.

Statements:

A. The sun was shining yesterday, and it always rains after the sun shines.

- B. I like rain; if I wear my raincoat maybe it'll rain.
- C. The weatherman says there's a 90% chance of rain today.⁶⁶

By thinking about cognitive moves the children come to better understand these moves and how to work with them.

The community of inquiry approach also fosters a more reflective understanding of cognitive moves by encouraging children to *evaluate* their own performances of these moves. Evaluation, as Jackson notes, is "essential."⁶⁷ One can improve one's golf swing by evaluating one's current swing. So too, one can improve one's writing by evaluating a piece of one's writing. Similarly, one can improve one's future performance of cognitive moves by reflecting upon one's current performance of them. Examining how cognitive moves are performed, one learns to employ them better.

The evaluation of cognitive moves can take the form of an *impromptu appraisal* initiated by one of the community members during the course of inquiry. For instance, an individual might ask whether the community's inferences are warranted or its reasons sound.

The evaluation of cognitive moves can also occur at the end of an inquiry session. "An essential part of developing a reflective community of inquiry that is self-correcting," writes Jackson, "is achieved by the participants *evaluating their discussions...*"⁶⁸ A part of this session-ending evaluation can be the community members' assessment of the effectiveness and frequency with which they performed cognitive moves. "How many times did we make the move of *Clarifying Matters*?" "Did we employ this move well?" Asking these sorts of questions of themselves, the members of the community come to better understand (and better appreciate) cognitive moves and improve their performance of these moves.

(4) *Within the community of inquiry children learn the social behaviors which make the practice and modeling of cognitive moves possible.* Examining a transcript of a classroom inquiry, we learned that a number of social behaviors are characteristically displayed within the community of inquiry.⁶⁹ The children *listen* to one another. (This is indicated by the way in which the children connect their ideas to those of their classmates -- see lines 23, 43, 56, 72, 106, 178.) They exhibit *caring* for one another (49). They *encourage each other to speak* (30). When they disagree with each other, it is with *respect* (57, 77). They *speak-up* with clarity and confidence (23-29, 34-39). They display *patience* (throughout the transcript).

That these behaviors are characteristically displayed within the community of inquiry is a consequence of the teacher's and the children's deliberate attempt to create an environment which is "an intellectually safe place."⁷⁰ By kindly, firmly, and consistently directing the community members to be respectful of one another and by themselves modeling the desired social behaviors, the members of the community of inquiry strive to create this "safe place" where people can engage in genuine inquiry together.⁷¹

These social behaviors are important because they are *essential preconditions* to the "disciplined conversation" through which the inquiry of the community proceeds.⁷² If these social behaviors are not practiced, if children do not listen to one another, are unkind or impatient, or engage in disruptive behaviors, then disciplined conversation will not happen. Distracted by the bad behavior of their classmates, children do not attend to the inquiry. Her energies consumed with trying to *manage the behaviors* of the class, the teacher cannot focus on furthering the inquiry.

(I make this claim that social behaviors which contribute to "intellectual safety" are essential pre-conditions to disciplined conversation on the basis of my own experiences. I have tried to implement philosophical inquiry in classrooms where children did not like one another, where they did not listen to one another, where they all tried to talk at once, where

they shouted one another down, where they insulted one another, where they poked and prodded at one another, and where they played around and crawled under desks; until these conditions were corrected productive inquiry was impossible.⁷³⁾

The absence of the social preconditions to good inquiry, and with it the absence of good inquiry itself, bears upon the cultivation of cognitive moves because, as Lipman argues, "skillful interpersonal dialogue" is the best means for cultivating cognitive moves.⁷⁴ It is through the "disciplined conversation" of inquiry that cognitive moves are practiced and modeled.⁷⁵ Where there is, on account of a lack of the appropriate social prerequisites, a break-down in disciplined conversation there is a corresponding break-down in inquiry and the cultivation of cognitive moves. Modeling is ignored as students are distracted by disruptive classmates. Practice does not occur as non-productive behaviors prevail.

Another way in which the community of inquiry approach helps in the task of fostering proficiency in the exercise of cognitive moves, then, is by creating an environment within which cognitive moves can be learned. Furthering the development of the social behaviors which make inquiry through disciplined conversation possible, the community of inquiry approach encourages the cultivation of cognitive moves.

P4C: A Proven Means by which to Cultivate Cognitive Moves

There have been a number of studies whose results support our contention that the community of philosophical inquiry is an effective means through which to empower students to skillfully employ cognitive moves. These studies have been conducted in a number of countries and have evaluated the effectiveness of P4C within varying cultural and socioeconomic groups.⁷⁶ Both quantitative and qualitative instruments have been employed. The conclusion of these studies have been impressively consistent; the

community of inquiry approach of Philosophy for Children *does* improve the thinking of children.

(For an in depth analysis of the first formal assessments of P4C see Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980) and Lipman (1982b). See Lipman and Gazzard (1986) and (1988b) for a summary of formal assessments of P4C conducted during the 1970's and 1980's. Lipman and Gazzard report that among the quantitative studies which have shown a positive correlation between the implementation of P4C and the improvement of children's thinking are: Lipman: 1970, Haas: 1975, Shipman: 1978, Karras: 1979, Cummings: 1979, Higa: 1980, Cinquino: 1981, Reed and Henderson: 1981, Shipman: 1982, Shipman: 1983, Iorio, Weinstein, and Martin: 1984, Strohecker: 1985, Schleifer, Lubuis, and Caron: 1987, Jackson and Deutsch: 1987, and Allen: 1988.)

The conclusion that the community of inquiry approach is a useful means through which to cultivate cognitive moves is consistent with the findings of my own observations of a class of first graders in 1993. "For a period of roughly three months" I observed the behavior of the students in Elaine Tsuchiyama's class at Ka'ala Elementary School in Wahiawa, Hawai'i.⁷⁷ I visited this class once a week. "Each day, I arrived in the classroom at the beginning of the Philosophy for Children period and remained there for an additional 2-3 hours as the children continued with the normal routine of their school day."⁷⁸

One of my objectives was "to learn whether or not the children's exposure to the methods and principles of the Philosophy for Children project...makes any real difference in the way that they think."⁷⁹ Among my observations were the following:

March 2, 1993: Three children were sitting at a table, each doing their own [art] project...the children had begun discussing the time at which the sun sets. One student stated that the sun sets at a particular time. Then another student replied, "No it doesn't, it sets at six, [because] I've seen it set then." Then the first student responded with a counter example and said "Well, then why is it dark at four?"...[these] children were carrying on an argument and were doing so by the use of examples and counter-examples based on their observations. They were not only stating their positions, but

they were attempting to support their positions with reasons. Additionally, this conversation was not being carried out in a confrontational or antagonistic manner but rather as a genuine discussion. That the children would have a discussion like this by themselves is, I think, the most compelling evidence I have observed to date that the Philosophy for Children program does indeed have a measurable carry-over into the children's daily lives.⁸⁰

April 26, 1993: ...Jayson is rarely interested in the goings-on in class and is never a participant in the P4C sessions. He just squirms around on the floor with a distant look on his face...[At lunch today] I asked him which [video] game he liked the best. He responded. "I like.....the best because....." That "because" caught my attention. Not only had he, without prompting, given a reason for why he liked the game, but also the reason that he gave for his statement was connected to the statement itself...I continued to ask him questions about the game. Jayson continued to give me really good explanations about why he liked the game. He always supported what he said with reasons and clearly defined what he meant by certain terms. He was not only making statements, he was also thinking about them. His statements revealed the very sort of critical analysis that P4C tries to develop...here is a kid who never seems to be paying attention to what is going on, is never involved in the class, and yet who displays the very same qualities that the classroom [P4C] activities are trying to develop. The implications of this are, I think, significant. They point to the positive impact that the mere exposure to...a philosophically rich environment can have on a child.⁸¹

These observations provide support for our contention that the community of inquiry approach empowers and disposes children to effectively employ the cognitive moves through which good judgments are made.⁸²

Notes

- ¹Norman (1996), p. 260. See Chapter One, Good Judgment is a Character Trait.
- ²Norman (1996), p. 259.
- ³Dewey (1933), p. 3.
- ⁴See Chapter One, Judging Well.
- ⁵See Chapter Two, The Good Thinker and Cognitive Moves.
- ⁶Dewey (1933), p. 4. See Chapter Three, Leaning Back on Understanding.
- ⁷Lipman (1991), p. 124.
- ⁸See Chapter Four, Cognitive Moves and Good Judgments.
- ⁹Lipman (1991), p. 219.
- ¹⁰Lipman (1991), p. 219.
- ¹¹Lipman (1996a), p. 12. See also Vygotsky (1978), p. 57.
- ¹²See Chapter Six, The Aims of The Community of Inquiry.
- ¹³See Chapter Six, The Community of Inquiry in Action.
- ¹⁴For more on "Clarifying Matters" and other cognitive moves see Chapter Two.
- ¹⁵Jackson (1998), p. 22.
- ¹⁶Jackson (1998), p. 21.
- ¹⁷Lipman (1991), p. 219.
- ¹⁸Splitter and Sharp (1995), pp. 148-149.
- ¹⁹From Susan Okano's class (4/16/97).
- ²⁰Lipman (1991), p. 223. Here Lipman is discussing "cognitive apprenticeship."
- ²¹From Susan Okano's class (4/16/97).
- ²²Lipman (1991), pp. 218-219.

²³Lipman (1991), p. 219.

²⁴Lipman (1991), p. 219.

²⁵For more on "The Teacher as the Child's Model" see Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1984), pp. 100-101.

²⁶Sharp and Reed (1992), p. xiii. The philosophical novels which Lipman has written are: Elfie, Pixie, Kio & Gus, Nous, Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery, Lisa, Suki, and Mark. Phillip Cam has also edited two volumes of philosophical short stories. See Cam (1993a) and (1994a).

²⁷Lipman (1991), p. 219.

²⁸Lipman (1992), p. 4.

²⁹Lipman (1996a), p. 11. Lipman (1991), p. 219.

³⁰Lipman (1996a), p. 11.

³¹Lipman (1981), p. 93.

³²See Chapter Two, Working with Assumptions.

³³Lipman (1981), pp. 5-6.

³⁴Lipman (1981), pp. 34-35.

³⁵Lipman (1991), p. 187.

³⁶Lipman (1991), p. 187.

³⁷Lipman (1991), p. 187.

³⁸Lipman and Gazzard (1988a), p. xii. For an example of a thinking skills exercise see Lipman (1996c), p. 118.

³⁹Lipman and Gazzard (1988a), p. xii.

⁴⁰Lipman (1996a), p. 104.

⁴¹Lipman (1996a), pp. 104-105.

⁴²Lipman (1996a), p. 12. See also Vygotsky (1978), p. 57.

- ⁴³Lipman (1996a), p. 105.
- ⁴⁴Tiles (1995), p. 93.
- ⁴⁵Jackson (1998), p. 22.
- ⁴⁶Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 120.
- ⁴⁷Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 121.
- ⁴⁸Jackson (1998), p. 13.
- ⁴⁹Lipman (1991), p. 187.
- ⁵⁰Lipman (1996a), p. 105.
- ⁵¹Lipman and Gazzard (1988a), p. xii.
- ⁵²Lipman and Sharp (1984), p. 9.
- ⁵³Jackson (1998), p. 24.
- ⁵⁴Jackson (1998), p. 20.
- ⁵⁵Colvin (1995).
- ⁵⁶Jackson (1998), pp. 20-23.
- ⁵⁷Colvin (1995), pp. 1-2.
- ⁵⁸Colvin (1995).
- ⁵⁹Lipman and Gazzard (1988a), p. 389.
- ⁶⁰Lipman and Gazzard (1988a), p. 537.
- ⁶¹Jackson (1998), p. 23.
- ⁶²Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 90.
- ⁶³Lipman (1996c), p. i. Here Lipman is writing about moral education. For more on this line of argument see Chapter Nine, P4C and Character Education.
- ⁶⁴See Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 179.
- ⁶⁵Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 129.

⁶⁶Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1984), pp. 253-254.

⁶⁷Jackson (1998), p. 14.

⁶⁸Jackson (1998), p. 14.

⁶⁹See Chapter Six, The Community of Inquiry in Action.

⁷⁰Jackson (1998), p. 3.

⁷¹For more on this point see Chapter Ten, P4C and The Cultivation of Social Behaviors.

⁷²Tiles (1995), p. 93. For more on this see Chapter Ten, P4C and The Cultivation of Social Behaviors.

⁷³For more on practical strategies to remedy these behavior problems see Whalley (1993), Kyle (1993), and Silver (1993) in Lipman (1993a), pp. 491-509.

⁷⁴Lipman, (1996a) pp. 104-105.

⁷⁵Tiles (1995), p. 93.

⁷⁶Among the American States in which studies have been conducted are: New Jersey, Massachusetts, Texas, Hawai'i, Minnesota, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New York. Among the countries in which studies have been conducted are: Canada, Austria, Sweden, Iceland, and Australia.

⁷⁷See Yos (1993).

⁷⁸Yos (1993), p. 1.

⁷⁹Yos (1993), p. 1.

⁸⁰Yos (1993), p. 8.

⁸¹Yos (1993), pp. 35-36.

⁸²While these observations support our contention, they do not conclusively prove it. See Chapter Eleven, Where To Go for more on assessment and P4C.

Chapter Eight: Cultivating Understanding

P4C and Leaning Back on Understanding

Judging well, we have argued, is a process which proceeds through the complex cognitive move of leaning back, not just on one's fund of thought, but on one's *understanding*.¹ This move consists of two elements: *reflection* and *self-correction*. Reflection is the move through which one *accesses* one's understanding. Self-correction is the subsequent move through which one *uses* one's understanding to direct the course of one's judging.²

Reflection and self-correction are essentially related to the work of making good judgments for they are the links which connect understanding to judgment.³ Without these links understanding and judgment each stand alone. One is left with, on the one hand, an understanding which resides only in "cold-storage" and, hence, is of little practical use.⁴ One must settle for, on the other hand, uninformed and aimless judgments which are little more than expressions of "cut and try."⁵

Reflection and self-correction bring together understanding and judging. One's understanding is made use of and put at the service of one's judging. Serviced thusly, one's judging gains power. No longer is judging a haphazard process of trial and error. Guided by one's deliberate appeal to one's understanding, one's judging becomes more intelligent. One's judgments become informed hypotheses which embody one's understanding of one's world, oneself, and others.

The classroom community of philosophical inquiry, we contend, is an excellent means through which to foster this sort of reflection and self-correction which so significantly contribute to good judging. Within the community of inquiry children learn to make the move of leaning back upon one's understanding because: (1) they witness the repeated modeling of this move, (2) they themselves are encouraged to practice this move, and (3) they are given the opportunity to think about this move and evaluate their use of it.

(1) Within the community of inquiry reflection and self-correction are modeled.

Taking part in the proceedings of the community of inquiry, children commonly witness behaviors which are external manifestations of the internal cognitive act of leaning back. They see people reflecting back upon their understandings of their world, of themselves, of others, of what has been said, and of the very procedures of thought and inquiry. They also see people making use of these reflections; they observe people correcting their thinking based upon their reference to their reflected upon thought.

That children witness behaviors which express the act of leaning back upon one's understanding is, as Lipman suggests, significant:

One of the most important advantages of converting the classroom into a community of inquiry...is that the members of the community begin looking for and correcting each other's methods and procedures. Consequently, insofar as each participant is able to internalize the methodology of the community as a whole, each is able to become self-correcting in his or her own thinking.⁶

The self-correcting and, we add, reflective behavior which is displayed within the community of inquiry is not merely *expressed*. It is also *modeled*. Observing others reflect back upon their understandings and then correct their thinking in light of this act of reference, the children themselves become adept at leaning back on and making use of their understandings. There is an "intrapsychical reproduction of the interpsychical"; the children become more reflective and more self-corrective.⁷

There are, Lipman tells us, "a number of different kinds of modeling" which occur within the community of inquiry.⁸ The "other students," "the teacher," and "the text" used by the community are all potential sources for the modeling of reflection and self-correction.⁹

Other students model reflection and self-correction: During the course of inquiry, the members of the community model in a variety of ways the backward-looking move of referring to one's prior understanding. They model this move by reflecting back upon their understanding of what has transpired thus far in the inquiry. (They do this when they "build on one another's ideas" as the children do on lines 23, 43, 56, 72, 106, and 178 of the transcript which we considered previously.)¹⁰ They model this move by reflecting back upon their understandings of prior discussions (on line 26). So too, they model this move by reflecting back upon their prior understandings of their world, themselves, and others (35-37, 118-124, 141-143, and 159-160).

The students also model this backward-looking move by reflecting upon the very procedures through which their inquiry progresses. They do this at the end of every inquiry session when they evaluate how their inquiry went.¹¹ They also do this when they make the subject of their inquiry the very procedures through which this inquiry proceeds. (The community does this when, for instance, it dedicates its inquiry to distinguishing between "thinking and thinking better" or to assessing the worth of the community itself.¹²)

During the course of inquiry, the children also model the forward-looking move of correcting one's thought as a consequence of one's reflection. They model this move when they respectfully disagree with one another (57, 77) and when they endeavor to correct the course of their inquiry (118). They model this move when they "point out errors in each other's thinking," "identify inconsistencies in discussions," and "question whether inquiry procedures have been correctly applied."¹³ They also model this move when, as a

consequence of their evaluation, they aim to "rectify what is at fault in [their] own procedures."¹⁴

The teacher models reflection and self-correction: While the modeling of other students is invaluable, it is also important for the teacher to model the move of leaning back upon one's understanding for the children. The modeling of this move by the teacher is of particular importance in the "early" stages of the development of a community of inquiry when the children have not yet begun to consistently exercise this move themselves.¹⁵ The students are readied to model this move for their peers by observing the practice of their teacher.

A previously considered transcript of a portion of a fourth grade classroom discussion illustrates how a teacher can model the move of leaning back upon one's understanding.¹⁶ Teacher Susan Okano says:

But what about like on the mainland where the Indians were using the land for food and whatever. They always stayed in that area and then some pioneer comes and says: "This is mine now. I'm going to build my house. This is my land." Now is that stealing?¹⁷

Okano first models for the students the act of referring back to her understanding of the situation of Native Americans. Having performed this backward-looking act of reflection, Okano then models the forward-looking move of correcting the course of inquiry as a consequence of one's reflection. Proceeding from her reflection, she suggests to the members of the community that their concepts of ownership and theft may need to be revised.

(An effective way for the teacher to model reflective and self-corrective behavior is by disagreeing with herself. By saying "After listening to what other people have said and thinking about it further, I disagree with what I said earlier," the teacher explicitly models for students the move of purposefully modifying one's thought as a consequence of one's reflection. One also models for them a spirit of open-mindedness and shows them that

disagreeing with an idea is different from bearing ill-will towards the person who expressed the idea.¹⁸⁾

The texts used by the community model reflection and self-correction: Just as the "philosophical novel[s]" written by Lipman model other cognitive moves, they also model the moves of reflection and self-correction.¹⁹ The fictional characters in Lipman's novels practice reflection and self-correction and, in doing so, model these moves for the members of the community of inquiry. There is an intrapsychical reproduction of the narrative; "the live students in the classroom take the [reflective and self-corrective] behavior of these fictional characters as models of how to behave."²⁰

Among the many passages within Lipman's corpus of novels which models the use of the paired moves of reflection and self-correction is the following one. In this selection from Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery the children in Harry's class are inquiring into the justness of Dale's refusal to salute the American flag:

Suki Tong said she thought Dale should be made to stand up, because "rules are rules."

Again Mrs. Halsey had to pause and reflect before responding. Then she said, "Suki, I'm going to accept that, even though technically it's wrong. What I mean is that a statement like 'rules are rules' ordinarily doesn't mean very much. It's like saying 'wallpaper is wallpaper' or 'stones are stones.' But sometimes it's become a familiar expression or idiom with a definite meaning that everyone understands, like 'business is business.' In this case, I suppose that what you mean is that if we make rules, we should keep them. So I'd say okay."

Now Mickey's hand was up. "No," he insisted, "rules are made to be broken. Don't you know the expression, 'every rule has an exception'? Well, Dale's case is the exception! That's why I think Dale doesn't have to stand if he doesn't want to."

Mrs. Halsey looked somewhat pained, but she said, "All right, Mickey, I suppose that if I allowed Suki to use an idiomatic expression as a reason, I'll have to allow you to do the same..."

...Tony wanted to be heard. "Mrs. Halsey, maybe Mickey didn't say it so well, but I don't think what he said was as bad as you made it out to be."

"How do you mean, Tony?" asked Mrs. Halsey.

"Well, lots of times we'll say that something or other is always true, and we know it really isn't. I mean, we know there are exceptions, but we still talk as if there weren't any. For example, I'll say something like 'all wood floats.' And yet I know that ebony doesn't."²¹

There are within this portion of text multiple examples of reflective behavior. Suki and Mickey draw upon their understandings of idiomatic expressions in appraising Dale's actions. Mrs. Halsey makes use of her understanding of the difference between ordinary statements and idiomatic expressions in assessing the thinking of Suki and Mickey. Tony refers back to his understanding of Mickey's words as well as to his understandings of the characteristic use of speech and the properties of wood.

There are also multiple examples of self-corrective behavior. Suki, Mickey, and Tony all make use of their understandings in order to correct the course of the inquiry. They do not simply look back at their understandings; instead they purposefully employ their understandings as judging instruments. Engaging in self-correction as a consequence of reflection, these fictional characters model the move of leaning back upon one's understanding for the real-life members of the classroom community of inquiry.

(2) Within the community of inquiry children can practice reflection and self-correction. Like other cognitive moves, reflection and self-correction are skills which are improved through practice.²² There are, within the community of inquiry, two ways in which children practice (and hence improve) reflection and self-correction. The first way is simply through the children's use of these skills during the course of "disciplined conversation"; "skillful thinking," it is assumed, "will naturally emanate from skillful discussions."²³ The second way is through specifically targeted exercises which work out these skills in "the way 'body builders' exercise and strengthen" the "muscle[s] in their bodies."²⁴

During disciplined conversation children are encouraged to make the moves of reflection and self-correction. One form of encouragement is *tacit*. Seeing their classmates lean back upon their understandings, students are encouraged to do likewise. Wanting their inquiry to progress as it might, students are encouraged to draw upon and proceed from their understandings.

Reflection and self-correction can also be encouraged more explicitly. Susan Okano does this when she asks her students to refer back to what they have previously learned:

Lance and the others, remember in the Hawaiian civil book they talked about who the land actually belonged to. It wasn't the farmers, right?²⁵

Reminding her students of something they learned previously, Okano prompts them to lean back upon their understanding.

A teacher can also encourage her students to practice reflection and self-correction through her choice of lessons. Consider this portion of a P4C discussion plan:

Discussion Plan: Discussing discussing

1. What are your chief criticisms of the discussions which you have had in class this year?
2. What explanation can you offer for the way these discussions have taken place?
3. What suggestions do you have for avoiding the mistakes that may have been made this past year?
4. What do you think were the most positive features of this year's discussions, and how might they be further strengthened in the future?²⁶

By asking her students questions such as these the teacher prompts them to practice reflecting back upon their thought and, so too, to practice using these reflections in order to guide their thinking.

Another, less discreet, way of helping children to practice reflection and self-correction is by giving them exercises which target these skills. For instance, after having the community formulate criteria by which works of art can be judged, I ask the children to engage in the exercise of applying their criteria in order to evaluate paintings. By engaging, again and again, in the act of reflecting back upon their criteria the children are given valuable practice in the move of referring back to and making use of one's understanding when judging.

The P4C curriculum contains other exercises which afford students the opportunity to practice these reflective and self-corrective moves:

Exercise: Criticism

...In the following instances, indicate (a) whether you would criticize the view expressed, (b) why you think the view should be criticized, and (c) how you would offer this criticism constructively.

1. "I don't want to take economics next year. I don't like the teacher's personality."
2. "I'm going to stop coming to this class. We never seem to come up with a definite answer."²⁷

This exercise provides children with the opportunity to practice the move of correcting understandings. It also gives them a chance to practice referring back to their understandings (for, in justifying their claims students must refer back to their understandings). Though exercises such as these may not, in and of themselves, be enough to cultivate proficiency in reflection and self-correction, they are effective complementary practices through which the skill of "leaning back" is strengthened.

(3) Within the community of inquiry children are given the opportunity to think about reflection and self-correction and to evaluate their use of these moves. Just as it is efficacious to provide children with the opportunity to reflect upon other cognitive moves, so too, it is efficacious to allow children the chance to reflect upon the moves of reflection and self-correction.²⁸ One helps to improve children's skill at leaning back upon their understandings by encouraging them to think about the moves of reflection and self-correction and by encouraging them to evaluate their own performances of these moves.

Philosophy sessions, Jackson writes, "can profitably be devoted to an examination of" cognitive moves such as "reason-giving"²⁹ So too, P4C sessions can profitably be devoted to an examination of reflection and self-correction. Children can be asked to think about what it means to correct the course of one's thinking and why it is of importance to engage in such correction. They can also be prompted, through the introduction of discussion plans such as the following, to reflect upon reflection itself:

Discussion Plan: Reflection

1. Is it possible to learn something new and to think it over at the same time?

2. Is it possible to be a part of your family and at the same time reflect on being a part of your family?
3. Many people are wrongdoers and seldom reflect. Would they be less likely to do wrong if they reflected more frequently?
4. When you reflect, do you most often reflect on what you've been doing, what you're doing now, or what you're going to do?
5. Are you more likely to see things in terms of their true importance if you think them over or if you don't think them over?³⁰

Thinking for themselves about what it means to make the moves of reflection and self-correction, children become more ready and better prepared to lean back upon their understandings.

Another way in which to empower children to lean back on their understandings is by encouraging them to evaluate their own performances of this move. The members of the community can, during the course of inquiry, be asked to think about whether or not they themselves have been reflecting back upon their understandings and how well they have been using these reflections in the crafting of their inquiry.

Asking children to assess their performance of reflective and corrective moves can also be made a part of the community's session-ending evaluation. "Did we maintain a focus?"³¹ This evaluation question suggested by Jackson, for instance, provides children with an opportunity to consider how well they have done the work of leaning back upon their understandings. (A well-focused discussion is one in which this move is made. The inquiry is steadfastly guided by a string of connected contributions; each contribution refers back to the contributions which preceded it.)

Does the modeling, practice, and reflection which takes place within the community of inquiry actually contribute to the cultivation of reflection and self-correction? Are children, as a consequence of the time which they spend within the community of inquiry, more ready and better able to lean back on their understandings?

That the community of inquiry approach does indeed contribute to the cultivation of the skills of reflection and self-correction is supported by observations of children who

have taken part in a community of inquiry. Consider, for instance, the discussion between first graders which we examined in the previous chapter:³²

...the children had begun discussing the time at which the sun sets. One student stated that the sun sets at a particular time. Then another student replied, "No it doesn't, it sets at six, [because] I've seen it set then." Then the first student responded with a counter example and said "Well, then why is it dark at four?"...³³

These children, without prompting, themselves make the move of leaning back. They reflect back upon their thought and then use these reflections in order to correct their thinking.³⁴

P4C and Possessing Understanding

Judging well, like all judging which proceeds through reflective thinking, leans back on one's fund of thought. Unlike all judging, however, judging well characteristically takes its lead not from shallow or mistaken thought but rather from a useful and meaning-laden and *understanding*.³⁵

Implicit within this contention that one must, in producing good judgments, lean back on understanding is, we argued further, the assumption that there is an understanding to which one's judging can appeal. One cannot, quite obviously, reflect back on and make use of that which is not there. Crafting good judgments requires, in addition to the power to lean back on one's understanding, the *possession* of understanding.

The community of inquiry approach, we now argue, is an effective means through which to provide children with understanding. This pedagogical approach helps children to gain the quality understanding from which good judgments arise.

The community of inquiry approach helps children to understand not by *giving* understanding to them. Indeed, because understanding is a refined outcome, because it is

the "ordered" and "integrated" product of one's reflective thought, it, unlike mere information, can never be given.³⁶ It must be created.

Rather, the community of inquiry approach helps children to understand, first and foremost, by empowering them with the *means* by which to craft understanding. Within the community of inquiry children learn how to skillfully wield a variety of useful cognitive moves and, so too, are encouraged to continue to wonder.³⁷ Gaining these abilities and dispositions, children gain the power to transform the "raw material" of their experience into understanding.³⁸ Even more importantly, they gain the power to continue to author such transformation.

This power, it is important to note, is not cultivated at the expense of the aim of providing children with information. Yes; "Philosophy for Children emphasizes the doing," as Lipman writes, "but that doesn't mean no learning takes place."³⁹

In supposing that the community of inquiry approach shirks the "duty to teach shared content" simply because it aims to empower children to understand by teaching them to think well, Dewey's writing suggests, one posits a dichotomy between "method" and "subject matter."⁴⁰ One assumes that the process of thinking can somehow be cleaved from the content of thought and that children do not learn content even as they learn how to think well.

But this dichotomy, Dewey argues, is a false one for the "*how*" of "*experiencing*" is always accompanied by the "*what*" which is "*experienced*."⁴¹ Just as one cannot "eat without eating something," one cannot think without thinking about something.⁴² Learning how to think well necessitates thinking about some content. Students *must*, if they are to practice the good thinking which will empower them to understand, be simultaneously informed about their world.

The community of inquiry approach, then, helps children to gain understanding not only by empowering them with the means through which understanding is created. It also

helps them by providing them with the *materials* from which understanding is created. Children gain the information which, when integrated through thinking, will be refined into understanding.

A third way in which the community of inquiry approach helps children to gain understanding is by providing the *opportunity* for this process of refinement to take place. In the community of inquiry information is not merely transmitted. Rather, it is thought about, mulled over, reflected upon, and, hence, made sense of and refined into understanding. Philosophy-time, then, is a time when understanding is created. Having the opportunity to engage in the reflective process of meaning-making, children commonly take away from an inquiry session not just information but, indeed, understanding.

What precisely the children come to understand as a consequence of their participation in an inquiry session depends, of course, upon the topic of discussion. Among the things that they commonly do come to understand, however, are the "commonplaces" about which every person should know.⁴³ (1) One's world, (2) oneself, and (3) others; these are the three broad "object-domains" about which one must know if one is to be prepared to judge well.⁴⁴ Children, we now contend, gain a better understanding of each of these three object-domains as a consequence of their participation in the reflective discussions of the community of inquiry.

(1) Within the community of inquiry children come to understand their world. In considering the value of philosophy Bertrand Russell writes:

...many men, under the influence of science or of practical affairs, are inclined to doubt whether philosophy is anything better than innocent but useless trifling, hair-splitting distinctions, and controversies on matters concerning which knowledge is impossible.⁴⁵

Those who perceive of philosophy in this fashion would likely conclude that the scope of the understanding which children gain as a consequence of their dealings within the

community of (philosophical) inquiry is narrow indeed. They would suppose that children learn only of some abstract, esoteric, or, as Russell says, "useless" philosophical content.

This belief is mistaken. It arises out of a misunderstanding of philosophy. The sort of question with which philosophy is concerned is not, Lipman and Sharp argue, an "empirical question," a "psychological question," a "scientific question," or a "formal question."⁴⁶ A philosophical question, rather, is a question which "we do not yet know the answers to" and for which "we can not even conceive of a procedure by which the question could be decided once and for all."⁴⁷

Going by this definition, the range of possible topics with which the community of inquiry might be concerned is considerably broader than Russell's common man would imagine. The matters which the community of inquiry considers need not be "useless" or "trifling." "Do doctors have the right to assist terminally ill patients to commit suicide?" "Which educational aims are most worthy?" These are the sorts of questions which, by Lipman and Sharp's definition, are decidedly philosophical.⁴⁸

While I agree with Lipman and Sharp, I would go even further than them. The inquiry of a philosophical community, I assert, can properly address virtually any question whatsoever. Be it trivial or momentous, be it mundane or extraordinary, be it philosophical, scientific, or empirical; any question is fair game for the community of inquiry.

Of primary importance is not that the community of inquiry considers *philosophical questions* but that it *treats questions philosophically*. The members of the community need not discuss a particular domain of questions. They do, however, need to discuss these questions in a philosophical fashion; they need to go beyond quick and superficial responses and open up the questions.

Jackson provides an example which illustrates how even an unphilosophical question could be treated philosophically. "Is [the fictional character] Pixie a boy or a girl?"⁴⁹ This is not, by Lipman and Sharp's criterion, a philosophical question. There

exists a clear procedure by which the question can be "decided once and for all."⁵⁰ One could continue reading the book until one finds the answer.

This question can, however, be treated philosophically. Jackson explains that a philosophical response to this question would be to ask "Why do you think Pixie is a girl/boy."⁵¹ Or "Is it true that Pixie is a boy or girl?"⁵² Are we assuming "that Pixie is human?"⁵³ There are any number of ways in which to open this question up and, by skillfully employing cognitive moves, to "scratch beneath the surface" of matters.⁵⁴ As Jackson sometimes says, the challenge with even unphilosophical questions such as this one is not that there is *too little* space within which to explore; it is that there are *too many* possible directions in which to go.

There are, to be sure, some questions which are more fertile than others. But that does not nullify the fact that there is a whole universe of questions which a community of inquiry can potentially explore. What is culture?⁵⁵ How are human beings similar to other living beings?⁵⁶ What does "smart" mean?⁵⁷ Would you like to turn into a whale?⁵⁸ Could nature be happy about a hurricane?⁵⁹ Which came first the alphabet or language?⁶⁰ Is it bad to move graves in order to do construction?⁶¹ Why do some teenagers want to get pregnant at an early age?⁶² These are but a few of the questions which communities of inquiry have considered.

With a whole universe of questions which can potentially be explored comes a universe of possible understanding. The members of the community of inquiry can learn about and come to a better understanding of practically any facet of their world because, indeed, they can inquire together into just about anything. Inquiring into their world within the community of inquiry, children not only get to learn the cognitive skills which are essential to good judgment. They also get to develop a richer, fuller understanding of their world.

That children do, in fact, learn more about and come to understand their world by partaking in the proceedings of the community of inquiry is attested to by children who have had P4C. Yukari, a second grader, writes:

Yes Fee-Lah-So-Fee is good for kids because we could learned many things like wizard and about waters.

Sixth grader Kirby expresses similar sentiments:

Yes [P4C is] a good thing for kids because they can learn more about the words that they don't know and they can also learn more about all the things that they don't know like culture, jobs, and many more...Philosophy is important because you can learn more about the knowledge that you don't know or so that you can be ready for what's gonna happen to your life...⁶³

Yukari and Kirby, like many others who have been participants within a community of inquiry, recognize that -- in addition to whatever else it might be -- the community of inquiry is a place where one learns about one's world.

(2) Within the community of inquiry children come to understand themselves.

Essential to good judgment, we argued previously, is the possession of self-understanding.⁶⁴ In order to discern which judgments are right for oneself one must have an understanding of what one believes in, what one stands for, and what one values. One must "know thyself" and have a vision of who one is and of who one wants to become.⁶⁵

Participating in the proceedings of the community of inquiry helps children to understand themselves. They, as Michael Pritchard puts it, "become more aware of what they believe, why they believe what they do, and what the limitations of their beliefs are."⁶⁶

One way in which the community of inquiry helps children to understand themselves is by providing them with, to use Nussbaum's words, an "awareness that life contains other possibilities."⁶⁷ From the community's inquiries children learn more about the cultures and experiences of others. They learn that, as fourth grader Daniel puts it, "everybody has [a] different point of view."⁶⁸ Gaining insight into the thoughts and experiences of others, the members of the community of inquiry gain perspective upon

their own lives. Like travelers who journey to a distant land, they are able to look back upon themselves and, seeing now that things might be otherwise, more clearly understand who they are and why they are as they are.⁶⁹

A second reason why children characteristically come to better understand themselves on account of their participation in the proceedings of the community of inquiry is because, as Splitter and Sharp explain, the dialogue of the community provides children with ample opportunity to reflect upon and talk together about what it is to be human: ...the community will return, again and again, to questions and puzzles relating to personhood and personal identity...⁷⁰

Whatever the topic, it is generally the case that one learns more about it by inquiring into it. Inquiring into their own lives and what it is to be human, children come to better understand themselves.

That the dialogue of the community of inquiry provides children with the opportunity to reflect upon themselves is, in part, a product of the tradition of philosophy itself. Going all the way back to the time of Socrates (who emphasized the importance of knowing oneself), philosophy has been interested in questions of humanity and personhood.⁷¹ This interest is mirrored in the Philosophy for Children curriculum materials which oftentimes serve as the basis for classroom discussion.⁷² Consider, for instance, the following discussion plans:

Discussion Plan: What is it that makes you you?

Would you still be you if

- a. you had a different name?
- b. you had a different face?
- c. you had a different body?
- d. you had a different mind?
- e. you had different fingerprints?
- f. you had different parents?
- g. you had different grandparents?
- h. you were born and raised in China?
- i. everyone in the world thought you were someone else?⁷³

Discussion Plan: How are we to live?

1. What are the things you like doing most?
2. What are the things that matter most to you in your

- life?
3. When you grow up, will you still like doing the same things?
 4. When you grow up, will the same things seem important to you?
 5. Are you happy?
 6. Would you like to be happy when you grow up?
 7. Are there things that matter more to you than happiness?
 8. Is it possible to be perfectly happy?
 9. Could you be perfectly happy in a world where everyone else was suffering?
 10. Could you be happy, even though you did things that caused innocent creatures to suffer?
 11. Would you rather do things that caused other people pleasure, or things that relieved other people's pain?
 12. Would you like to live in a way that would help make the world better?
 13. Could you be happy if you didn't have a single friend?
 14. Could you be happy if everything around you was ugly?
 15. Could you be happy if everyone you knew constantly lied and tried to deceive each other?
 16. Could you be happy if you couldn't understand anything that happened to you?
 17. Would you mind living in a way that seemed right to everyone else, but which seemed wrong to you?
 18. Would you mind living in a way that seemed wrong to everyone else, but which seemed right to you?⁷⁴

Curriculum materials such as these prompt children to reflect upon themselves and, thus, provide them with the opportunity to understand themselves better.

Even without these curriculum materials, however, the community of inquiry still is likely to provide its members with ample opportunity to reflect upon themselves. This is partly due to the pedagogical point that the inquiry of the community characteristically proceeds from the interests of its members. It is also partly due to the fact that most people have an "intense interest" in questions which probe into our humanity.⁷⁵ Proceeding from the interests of the community, the inquiry of the community regularly delves into that which is most interesting to its members; "what is worthwhile in life?"⁷⁶

Evidence that children actually do gain self-understanding on account of their participation in the community of inquiry is found in the comments of those children and teachers who have been a part of a community of inquiry:

P4C helps [my students] to more clearly understand who they are and how they fit into the world around them.

Robynne Wise (second grade teacher)

Yes I think Fee-Lah-So-Fee is a good thing for children because it will help them know what they want to become...

Marshall (fifth grade)

Yes, Philosophy is a good thing for kids to do because a lot of kids learn about things and they'll be more understanding of themselves...

Kimina (fifth grade)⁷⁷

Perhaps not even realizing that their P4C sessions have empowered them to understand, these individuals appreciate that they have, through their participation in the community of inquiry, come to better understand themselves.

(3) Within the community of inquiry children come to understand others. An understanding of others, we argued previously, includes both an appreciation of the exceptional particularity of human subjects and a discernment of the relatedness between these subjects and oneself.⁷⁸ It involves, in other words, perceiving that others are precious individuals with whom one is akin. Armed with such an understanding of others, one is made more ready to make good judgments which are not only serviceable but also ethical.⁷⁹

From their dealings within the community of inquiry children come to understand the other members of the community. The experience of participating in the community of inquiry, as Wise puts it, "tells [one] so much more about [who the other members of the community] are."⁸⁰

The reason why participation within the community of inquiry enhances one's understanding of the other community members is because it provides one with the

opportunity to truly hear the others. One hears of their experiences and learns of their ideas and beliefs. One listens to their fears and their hopes.⁸¹ Hearing this, one comes to understand in a far deeper way that the people with whom one is talking are not merely objects; they are precious human subjects with whom one shares much in common.

This sort of understanding-inducing exchange which takes place within the community of inquiry is, in large part, a product of the classroom environment. The community of inquiry is an "intellectually safe place" where people listen and are listened to.⁸² Because the children, with the help of the teacher, honor "the operant principle of respect for persons" they feel secure enough, as Wise explains, "to express their feelings -- not only happy -- but anxious and uncertain ones as well."⁸³ Free of the "fear of being embarrassed, being laughed at, [or] being in [bitter] disagreement with peers," the members of the community reveal more about themselves and, hearing others speak in a similar manner, learn more about one another.⁸⁴

This sort of meaningful exchange is also prompted by the very process of inquiry itself. The philosophical dialogue through which inquiry proceeds, it will be recalled, is not "ordinary conversation."⁸⁵ Nor is it "parliamentary sparring" or "small-talk."⁸⁶ Rather, this dialogue proceeds through "disciplined conversation" which aims to "scratch beneath the surface" of matters and move towards a deeper understanding.⁸⁷

The very act of taking part in disciplined conversation demands of the community members that they make use of their experiences and thoughts. In order to support her position a person provides an example from her life. In offering a counter-example another person draws upon his experience. Sharing her heart-felt beliefs, a third person raises a previously overlooked point. Because the quest for understanding calls for it, the members of the community divulge things which they would not reveal in ordinary conversation. Expressing themselves thusly, and hearing others express themselves thusly, the members of the community come to better understand one another.

Transcripts of P4C inquiries illustrate the sort of personal exchange which fosters understanding among community members. Consider, for instance, an exchange between two sixth graders who are trying to determine whether it is better to be with one's friends or with one's boyfriend/girlfriend:

Girl: If I had to choose between them two, I would choose my friend because there is more problems with boyfriend and girlfriend than there is with friends because there is like abusive relationships and stuff. And you can't be abusive, like you can't fight and stuff with your friends that much because you guys can...I don't know...you guys can break-up.

Boy: I agree with her. 'Cause if you have a girlfriend they get you in trouble -- big trouble. When a boy calls her a name, then she's going to...yeah...they start a fight.⁸⁸

This girl was herself the victim of abuse and molestation. This boy had just gotten in trouble for fighting with another boy at his girlfriend's bequest. Hearing the earnestness and emotion in these children's words, one appreciates them in a far deeper way. These children are, one comes to understand more deeply as a consequence of the proceedings of the community of inquiry, altogether special human beings who, like oneself, have their own sets of problems and experiences.

(The community which these two children were a part of was an extremely safe place and, perhaps as a consequence, the inquiry of this class elicited some very personal responses. For example, another girl once shared:

...my mom's dad did something bad to my mom's sister and she ended up having a baby.⁸⁹

Personal responses such as these bring with them understanding, but care must be taken. As Splitter and Sharp say, the community of inquiry should be "personal, but not too personal."⁹⁰ The community of inquiry is, as Jackson contends, certainly therapeutic but it ought not to be seen as "a form of therapy"; there must be "a sense of respect and personal privacy, beyond which the community should not intrude."⁹¹)

The community of inquiry members whom one comes to understand better as a consequence of the proceedings of the community are relatively near to one. These others

are ones with whom one is personally acquainted. They are individuals whom one has met. The community of inquiry, however, also provides one with an opportunity to come to understand others whom are more distant from one. It helps one to understand even those whom one has not met.

Through their inquiry the members of the community are oftentimes given the opportunity to reflect upon what it would be like to be someone else. How would you feel if you were a Hawaiian who had lost his land?⁹² Why do teen-agers get pregnant?⁹³ What would it be like to be an adult?⁹⁴ How would you feel if you were caught in a hurricane?⁹⁵ Would you like to be a whale?⁹⁶ These are examples of some inquiry questions which require of one the act of "putting oneself in another's shoes."⁹⁷

In arguing for the importance of literature Nussbaum speaks of this reflective act of imagining what it would be like to be someone else:

It is the political promise of literature that it can transport us, while remaining ourselves, into the life of another, revealing similarities but also profound differences between the life and thought of that other and myself and making them comprehensible, or at least more nearly comprehensible.⁹⁸

By reflectively reading literature, Nussbaum argues, one can "cross group boundaries in imagination."⁹⁹ One does not actually meet the others, but one does, through the exercise of one's "narrative imagination," nonetheless come to understand them better.¹⁰⁰

Like the narrative structure of literature, the philosophical dialogue of the community inquiry can "transport" one "into the life of another." By thinking and talking about such things as what it would be like to be an adult or why it is that teen-agers get pregnant, the members of the community of inquiry gain insight into the life of others. They come to better understand not only those who are near to them but also those who are apart from them.¹⁰¹

That through their dealings within the community of inquiry students do, in fact, come to understand better both those near to them and those farther from them is supported

by year-end evaluations. Sixth grader Marvin suggests that the community of inquiry approach helped him to learn more about his classmates:

The other time I learn that other people that I don't really know knows a lot of different things that I want to know.¹⁰²

Second grade teacher Robynne Wise expresses similar sentiments:

P4C helps me to know my children better. It gives me a more complete picture -- academics are what teachers usually see -- can they read, add, subtract. P4C explores their thought process, how they are feeling, how they express themselves, how they react to situations. This tells me so much more about the person[s] they are.¹⁰³

The community of inquiry approach, both student and teacher tell us, helps one to understand better those whom one meets within the community.

Michelle, a sixth grader, raises the point that the community of inquiry can also give one a better understanding of groups and individuals who are more distant. Hinting at the use the imaginative move which empowers one to "transport" oneself "into the life of another," Michelle writes that P4C allows one "to see things from a different point of view."¹⁰⁴

Sara, another sixth grader, demonstrates a similar awareness of this imaginative move when, during the course of an inquiry, she says:

To make [teen-agers] know the responsibility [of having a baby] I think they should be in somebody else's place to know how hard it is to take care of baby.¹⁰⁵

To be sure, Sara's awareness of the value of "putting oneself in another's shoes" does not prove that she has, during her time within the community of inquiry, gained a better understandings of others; it does, however, suggest that she might well have.¹⁰⁶

Another point which Sara's explicit reference to the move of putting oneself in another's shoes suggests is that Sara might have gained from her dealings within the community of inquiry not just a better understanding of others but a better understanding of *how to* understand others. She might have learned how to make the very move of putting

oneself in another's shoes. Having learned this move through which one understands others, she gains more than just understanding; she gains *the power to understand*.

Ultimately, it is the community of inquiry approach's ability to cultivate this power to understand which sets it apart from other pedagogical strategies and which makes it so well suited for the task of educating for good judgment. Yes, it is important that the community of inquiry approach provides children with an opportunity to reflect upon (and, hence, come to better understand) their world, themselves, and others. And yes, it is important that the community of inquiry approach helps children to gain understanding and, so too, the information which is an "indispensable resource" for "further inquiry."¹⁰⁷ But of even greater importance is that this approach arms children with the cognitive and social means which will empower them to continue to understand and to judge well throughout the course of their lives.¹⁰⁸

Notes

- ¹See Chapter Three, *Leaning Back on Understanding*.
- ²See Chapter Three, *Reflective Thinking*.
- ³See Chapter Four, *Leaning Back on Understanding and Good Judgments*.
- ⁴Dewey (1916), p. 158.
- ⁵Dewey (1916), p. 145.
- ⁶Lipman (1991), p. 121.
- ⁷Lipman (1996a), p. 12. See also Vygotsky (1978), p. 57.
- ⁸Lipman (1991), p. 219.
- ⁹Lipman (1991), p. 219.
- ¹⁰Lipman (1991), p. 15. See Chapter Six, *The Community of Inquiry in Action*.
- ¹¹See Jackson (1998), pp. 14-18. See also Chapter Six, *The Characteristics of The Community of Inquiry*.
- ¹²See Lipman and Gazzard (1988a), p. 482. Robynne Wise's class of second graders took up this latter task on 5/28/97.
- ¹³Lipman (1991), p. 150. See Chapter Six, *The Characteristics of The Community of Inquiry*.
- ¹⁴Lipman (1991), p. 121.
- ¹⁵Splitter and Sharp (1995), pp. 148-149. Splitter and Sharp compare the "early" and "mature" stages of a community's development.
- ¹⁶See Chapter Seven, *Cultivating Cognitive Moves*.
- ¹⁷From Susan Okano's class (4/16/97).
- ¹⁸For an example of a child making this move see the transcript in Chapter Three, *Leaning Back on Understanding*.
- ¹⁹Sharp and Reed (1992), p. xiii.

- ²⁰Lipman (1991), p. 219.
- ²¹Lipman (1982a), p. 50.
- ²²See Chapter Seven, P4C and The Cultivation of Cognitive Moves.
- ²³Tiles (1995), p. 93. Lipman (1996a), p. 104.
- ²⁴Lipman and Gazzard (1988a), p. xii.
- ²⁵From Susan Okano's class (4/16/97).
- ²⁶Lipman and Sharp (1985), p. 398.
- ²⁷Lipman and Sharp (1985), p. 83.
- ²⁸See Chapter Seven, P4C and The Cultivation of Cognitive Moves.
- ²⁹Jackson (1998), p. 23.
- ³⁰Lipman (1996c), p. 148.
- ³¹Jackson (1998), p. 15.
- ³²See Chapter Seven, P4C: A Proven Means by which to Cultivate Cognitive Moves.
- ³³Yos (1993), p. 8.
- ³⁴While these observations support our contention, they do not conclusively prove it. See Chapter Eleven, Where To Go for more on assessment and P4C.
- ³⁵See Chapter Three, Leaning Back on Understanding.
- ³⁶Roszak (1986), p. 90. See Chapter Three, Gaining Understanding.
- ³⁷For more on the community of inquiry and cognitive moves see Chapter Seven. For more on the community of inquiry and wonder see Chapter Ten, P4C and The Disposition to Understand.
- ³⁸Roszak (1986), p. 95.
- ³⁹Lipman (1996a), p. 104.
- ⁴⁰Hirsch (1987), p. 25. Dewey (1916), p. 164.
- ⁴¹Dewey (1916), pp. 166-167.

- ⁴²Dewey (1916), p. 167.
- ⁴³Kekes (1983), p. 278.
- ⁴⁴Norman (1996), pp. 253-254. See Chapter Three, Possessing Understanding.
- ⁴⁵Russell (1912), p. 153.
- ⁴⁶Lipman and Sharp (1985), p. 160.
- ⁴⁷Lipman and Sharp (1985), p. 160.
- ⁴⁸For a more in depth examination of the relationship between questions and the community of inquiry see Splitter and Sharp (1995), pp. 48-59.
- ⁴⁹Jackson (1998), p. 13. Pixie is a character from Lipman's novel Pixie (1981).
- ⁵⁰Lipman and Sharp (1985), p. 160.
- ⁵¹Jackson (1998), p. 13.
- ⁵²Jackson (1998), p. 13.
- ⁵³Jackson (1998), p. 13.
- ⁵⁴Jackson (1998), p. 18.
- ⁵⁵From Beth Ajifu's class (5/1/97).
- ⁵⁶From Kathryn Yoshida's class (2/21/97).
- ⁵⁷From Kathryn Yoshida's class (2/18/97)
- ⁵⁸From Robynne Wise's class (4/14/97).
- ⁵⁹From Susan Okano's class (2/26/97).
- ⁶⁰From Susan Okano's class (4/28/97).
- ⁶¹From Susan Okano's class (4/23/97).
- ⁶²From Beth Ajifu's class (5/15/97).
- ⁶³These quotations were taken from student year-end evaluations of Philosophy for Children. The children answered the following question: "Is Philosophy a good thing for

kids to do?" Responses from second grade students are from Robynne Wise's class (1996-1997). Third grade replies are from Kathryn Yoshida's class (1996-1997), fourth grade replies are from Susan Okano's class (1996-1997), fifth grade comments are from Jean Matsumoto's class (1997-1998), and sixth grade responses are from Beth Ajifu's class (1996-1997). Copies of these evaluations can be made available upon request.

⁶⁴See Chapter Three, Possessing Understanding.

⁶⁵See Plato, the "Phaedrus" [230a].

⁶⁶Pritchard (1993), p. 730.

⁶⁷Nussbaum (1997), p. 54.

⁶⁸Taken from the year-end evaluation of one of the students in Susan Okano's 1996-1997 class.

⁶⁹Jackson sometimes makes use of a cartoon which nicely expresses this point. The cartoon shows a fish who comes to understand that she is a being who lives in water only after she is able to climb out of her fish bowl and view it from afar.

⁷⁰Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 168.

⁷¹See the "Phaedrus," Plato [230a].

⁷²See Lipman (1980), (1981), (1982a), (1985), (1986), (1987), (1988), (1996b), (1996c), Lipman and Gazzard (1988a), Lipman and Sharp (1980a), (1980b), (1984), (1985), (1986), and Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1984).

⁷³Lipman and Sharp (1984), p. 23.

⁷⁴Lipman (1996c), p. 43.

⁷⁵Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), p. xiv.

⁷⁶Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), p. xiv.

⁷⁷These quotations were taken from year-end evaluations of Philosophy for Children. Wise's response is to the question (1996-1997) "In what ways do your students benefit from doing p4c?" Marshall and Kimina were students in Jean Matsumoto's class (1997-1998).

⁷⁸See Chapter Three, Possessing Understanding.

⁷⁹See Chapter Four, Leaning Back on Understanding and Good Judgments.

- ⁸⁰Wise's response is to the year-end evaluation question (1996-1997) "In what ways do you benefit from doing p4c?"
- ⁸¹See Jackson (1998), p. 20. Jackson considers the connection between listening and being human.
- ⁸²Jackson (1998), p. 3.
- ⁸³Jackson (1998), p. 3. From second grade teacher Robynne Wise's response to the year-end evaluation question "In what ways do your students benefit from doing P4C?"
- ⁸⁴Jackson (1998), p. 17.
- ⁸⁵Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 34. See Chapter Six, The Characteristics of The Community of Inquiry.
- ⁸⁶Tiles (1995), p. 100.
- ⁸⁷Tiles (1995), p. 93. Jackson (1998), p. 22.
- ⁸⁸From Beth Ajifu's sixth grade class (5/8/97).
- ⁸⁹From Beth Ajifu's sixth grade class (5/15/97).
- ⁹⁰Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 181.
- ⁹¹Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 181.
- ⁹²From Susan Okano's fourth grade class (4/9/97).
- ⁹³From Beth Ajifu's sixth grade class (5/15/97).
- ⁹⁴From Robynne Wise's second grade class (3/5/97).
- ⁹⁵From Susan Okano's fourth grade class (2/26/97).
- ⁹⁶From Robynne Wise's second grade class (3/5/97).
- ⁹⁷Dalmiya (1996), pp. 209 and 214.
- ⁹⁸Nussbaum (1997), p. 111.
- ⁹⁹Nussbaum (1997), p. 111.
- ¹⁰⁰See Nussbaum (1997), pp. 85-112.

¹⁰¹For more on moral imagination see Chapter Nine, P4C and The Cultivation of Respect and Caring.

¹⁰²Marvin, a student in Beth Ajifu's class (1996-1997), is responding to the question "Is philosophy a good thing for kids?"

¹⁰³From second grade teacher Robynne Wise's response to the year-end evaluation question "In what ways do you benefit from doing P4C?"

¹⁰⁴Nussbaum (1997), p. 111. Michelle, a student in Beth Ajifu's class (1996-1997), is responding to the question "Is philosophy a good thing for kids?"

¹⁰⁵From Beth Ajifu's class (5/15/97).

¹⁰⁶Dalmiya (1996), pp. 209 and 214.

¹⁰⁷Dewey (1916), p. 158.

¹⁰⁸For more on P4C and the power to understand see Chapter Ten.

Chapter Nine: Cultivating Respect and Caring

P4C and Character Education

In his book Educating for Character Thomas Lickona relates the following story from the *New York Post*:

In Brooklyn, three teenage boys, described by neighbors as "nice kids," were arrested for dousing sleeping homeless men with gasoline and setting fire to them. As the youths were booked at the police station, one of them said, "We just like to harass the bums."¹

Although horrible, cases such as these, Lickona suggests, are only the tip of the iceberg. Crime statistics, student surveys, and numerous observations reveal that there are "escalating moral problems in society -- ranging from greed and dishonesty to violent crime to self-destructive behaviors such as drug abuse and suicide."²

While schools cannot by themselves solve all the ills of society, "schools," Lickona argues, "cannot be ethical bystanders at a time when our society is in deep moral trouble."³ "Rather, schools must do what they can to contribute to the character of the young and the moral health of the nation."⁴ "Schools should," Lickona concludes, "teach children values."⁵

"It would be difficult," writes Lipman, "to find anyone who would wish to take a public position against character-building."⁶ In the aftermath of the school shootings of the late 1990's and, even more recently, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 it is even more clear today than it was when Lickona wrote his book that schools must help children

to become more respectful and more caring. Schools must, as Lickona puts it, not only help to make children "smart" but also help to make them "good."⁷

But how, asks Lipman, are "the virtues to be taught so as to assure the improvement of the child's moral character?"⁸ "The traditional method (still favored by virtually the whole character-education movement)," Lipman maintains, "is through didactic instruction illustrated by stories."⁹ Children are told that they ought to be kind, honest, and compassionate. They are told that they should just say "no" to drugs and gangs. If one's exhortations are frequent enough and one's urgings passionate enough, it is assumed, children will do as they are told and become good people.

This assumption, Dewey noted, is a false one. "There is," he wrote, "nothing in the nature of ideas *about* morality, or information *about* honesty or purity or kindness which automatically transmutes such ideas into good character or good conduct."¹⁰ Merely telling children to be good people will not make them good people.

Picking up where Dewey left off, Lipman argues that this traditional method of "indoctrination" simply "does not work."¹¹ It does not work, Lipman continues, because it "fails to involve" children in "their own moral education" and, hence, is "ignored" by the children.¹² It also does not work because it "weaken[s], rather than strengthen[s], [children's] moral reasoning and judgment."¹³

Rejecting traditional didactic methods of character education, Lipman advocates the community of inquiry approach. "The approach to moral education taken by *Philosophy for Children*," Lipman writes, can be called "deliberative discussion," "ethical inquiry," or "moral reasoning."¹⁴ This approach "recognizes the children's need to examine and discuss the problematical materials we present to them."¹⁵ It provides children with "opportunities to discover of their own accord the same values we in the older generations have discovered"; it gives them a chance, through the inquiry of the community, to make these values their own.¹⁶

P4C and The Cultivation of Respect and Caring

There are, Lickona writes, "two great moral values: respect and responsibility."¹⁷ "Respect means showing regard for the worth of someone or something."¹⁸ It is an awareness of the "inherent value" of "all forms of life and the environment that sustains them."¹⁹ "Responsibility is an extension of respect."²⁰ It "emphasizes our positive obligations to care for each other."²¹

There are, we assert, a number of ways in which the P4C community of inquiry approach cultivates the sort of caring and respect of which Lickona speaks. The community of inquiry approach cultivates these virtues by: (1) helping children to understand and appreciate others, (2) allowing for the modeling of respectful and caring behaviors, (3) encouraging children to practice respectful and caring behaviors, (4) asking children to reflect upon being respectful and caring.

(1) Within the community of inquiry children come to understand and appreciate others. There is, we argued previously, a connection between gaining a deeper understanding of others and coming to respect and care for others.²² An awareness, as Kant maintains, that others are special "persons" or "ends in themselves" prompts "respect."²³ A recognition, as Marcus Aurelius contends, that "the nature" of others is "of one kind with" one's own discourages hatred and inspires care.²⁴ Coming to see, as Aristotle puts it, "how closely bound every human being is to every other, and how dear," one sees others not as objects but rather as precious human subjects who, as such, are worthy of respect.²⁵

This connection between coming to understand others and coming to respect and care for others is pedagogically significant. An implication is that one can inspire children to be more respectful and more caring by helping them to gain a deeper understanding of

others. Helping children to appreciate that others are precious subjects with whom they are akin, one also helps to cultivate respect and caring.

The community of inquiry approach, we argued, is a means through which to provide children with a deeper understanding of others.²⁶ Given the connection between understanding others and respecting and caring for others, we now argue that the community of inquiry approach is also a means through which to cultivate respect and caring.

Michael Pritchard makes this point:

...participants [within the community of inquiry] become clearer about the beliefs of *others*, thus enabling them to see that there may be more to another person's perspective than "meets the eye"...This encourages a kind of mutual respect and care that is based on better understanding of the perspectives of others...²⁷

Within the community of inquiry people come to understand others better and, as a consequence, come to respect and to care for them more.

The understanding which children gain within the community of inquiry, we also argued, is both of those near to them and of those farther from them.²⁸ So too, children, as a result of their enhanced understanding, come to respect and care more for both those who are near to them and those who are farther from them. They become more respectful and more caring towards both those individuals whom they meet within the community and those whom are not a part of this community.

Children gain respect and come to care for the other members of the community of inquiry because they get the opportunity to listen to these others. They share in the experiences of these others. They hear the earnestness and emotion in the voices of their peers as they share their fears and hopes.²⁹ Listening thusly, the children grasp more deeply the humanity of the other community members and come to respect them as altogether special human beings who, like themselves, have their own lives, troubles, and ambitions.

Children also gain respect and come to care for people whom they do not meet within the community of inquiry. During the course of their inquiry, the children get an

opportunity to reflect upon what it might be like to be another person or a member of some other group. They get the chance to make the imaginative move of "putting oneself in another's shoes" and, as a consequence, become more appreciative of those who are farther from them.³⁰ "Cross[ing] group boundaries in imagination," the children come to understand others better and are inspired to respect and care for them more.³¹

The community of inquiry approach cultivates respect and caring not merely by *allowing* children to make this move of "putting oneself in another's shoes."³² More importantly, this approach cultivates respect and caring by *empowering* children to make this move. As a result of the *modeling* which they observe, the *practice* which they get, and the *reflection* which they engage in, children who belong to the community of inquiry get better at making this move which Lipman calls "moral imagination."³³

Moral Imagination is modeled: students, teachers, and texts all model acts of moral imagination for the members of the community of inquiry. This teacher models moral imagination when he says:

Just suppose you weren't Hawaiian and someone came and said this is my house and said "you have to move." How would you feel?³⁴

The characters in Lipman's texts also serve as models:

"There's something we're leaving out," I say. "I'll bet that high school guy helped Neil because he could put himself in Neil's place and feel what it would be like to be beaten up for no reason. And I'll bet if Geraldo and Tommy had put themselves in the place of the man they took the money from, they would have given it back to him."³⁵

So too, students model this move. Sixth grader Sara does this when she argues that teenagers who want to become pregnant ought to put themselves in the shoes of a parent who has the responsibility of caring for a baby.³⁶

Moral imagination is practiced: Children practice making this move when the community engages in exercises which "work out" one's moral imagination:

Exercise: Putting oneself in another's place

...In the following cases, each individual claims to have put himself or herself in another person's place. You are asked if you agree or disagree, and why.

1. Sonya: "Since Margaret and I swapped seats in class, I understand perfectly how she feels about arithmetic..."
6. Laurie: "I once saw Jordan make fun of the way Phyllis dresses, and I felt so badly for Phyllis, because he could just as easily have made fun of any of us."³⁷

Children also practice this move, as Sara did, simply "by going out and doing it."³⁸

Moral imagination is reflected upon: Within the community of inquiry children get the chance to reflect upon this move of putting oneself in another's shoes. In Lipman's instructional manual Deciding What to Do, for instance, there is a discussion plan ("Moral Imagination") which prompts children to reflect upon the very concept of moral imagination.³⁹ Engaging in such thought, children come to better understand and appreciate the value of this imaginative move. This, in turn, empowers them to use this move more effectively, come to better understand those who are farther from them, and, as a consequence, come to be more appreciative of and respectful towards others.

(2) Within the community of inquiry respectful and caring behaviors are modeled.

Splitter and Sharp, like Lipman, emphasize that it is not enough to simply tell children about virtues:

...values and virtues must be both 'taught' and 'caught': they can be discussed, analysed and explored, but ultimately they must be practised, embodied and lived.⁴⁰

While it is important to "teach" children about respect and caring, it is even more vital to place them within an environment where they can "catch" this ethical disposition.

"The community [of inquiry]," Splitter and Sharp continue, is "the appropriate environment for 'catching' [virtues such as respect and caring]."⁴¹ Within the community of inquiry respectful and caring behaviors are consistently exercised and, hence, repeatedly modeled for the children. Other students, the teacher, and the text which the children read; all of these are sources for the modeling of respectful and caring behaviors.

Regularly witnessing such behaviors, the members of the community come to "catch" or, to use Vygotsky's term, "internalize" these behaviors.⁴² There is an

"intrapyschical reproduction of the interpsychical" as the caring and respectful behaviors which are modeled within the community are transformed into an attitude of respect and caring.⁴³

One important source for the modeling of respectful and caring behavior is the students themselves; as Lipman writes, "children will use other children's behavior as models for their own."⁴⁴ Further scrutiny of the transcript which we examined previously reveals a number of ways in which the children themselves model respectful and caring behavior.⁴⁵

There are, within the transcript, multiple examples of occasions (on lines 23, 43, 56, 72, 106, 178) when children "build on one another's ideas."⁴⁶ This behavior, like the behaviors of raising a question about what someone says (162) or asking her to clarify her point (14, 99), is a behavior which expresses respect. It is a behavior which shows that one has enough regard for the other person to listen to her carefully and to take her thoughts seriously.

Respectful and caring behavior is also modeled in other ways by the students. Nani shows that she cares about the feelings and needs of others when she asks another community member if his concerns have been met (49). She also demonstrates respect when she purposefully asks a child who seldom speaks to share his thoughts (29). Brian and Kacey similarly model a respectful attitude when, in disagreeing with what has been said, they do so with civility and caring (57, 77).

Another source for the modeling of respectful and caring behaviors are the teachers who facilitate the inquiry sessions. It is particularly important for the teacher to model such behaviors when the community is in its "early stage" of maturation.⁴⁷ Children do not always know to be kind; by herself being respectful and caring the teacher demonstrates for the students what is expected of them.

The primary way in which teachers show their respect and caring for others is by taking their students seriously. They demonstrate through their behavior that they value what their students have to say and that they are "ready always to learn from [their students]."48 In treating her students as human subjects whose "opinions," "needs," and "interests" have worth; in refusing to treat her students merely as "containers" or "receptacles" which need only "be filled"; the teacher models a basic "respect for persons."⁴⁹

Teachers show that they take their students seriously when they listen to them. This good listening is evident when teachers ask questions about what the children have said (on lines 79 and 139).⁵⁰ Teachers also demonstrate that they are listening by building upon what their students have said (125).

Teachers show that they take their students seriously by letting them govern the course of their inquiry. The teacher does this when she allows the students themselves to construct "the agenda" which the community will follow.⁵¹ So too, she does this when she lets the students decide for themselves whether or not they want to move on to a new question (54, 60).⁵²

Another way in which teachers model respectful and caring behavior is by offering quiet children "invitations to speak" (169, 182).⁵³ Deliberately seeking out voices which have not yet been heard, the teacher demonstrates that she cares about her students and what they have to say. Teachers also convey this caring by praising their students (51, 174). Complimenting her students on their behaviors and their ideas, the teacher shows her students how they can be respectful towards others.

A third source of modeling for the members of the community of inquiry are the "philosophical novel[s]" which they read together.⁵⁴ "The text," writes Arkady Margolis, is "a model community of inquiry."⁵⁵ The characters in the novel, like the participants in a mature community, inquire together. They also, like the participants in a mature

community, interact with one another in caring, respectful ways. Reading the pages of these novels, children bear witness to how one might respectfully be with others.

Within the pages of Lipman's novel Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery one reads of many of the same respectful and caring behaviors which are practiced and modeled within a mature community of inquiry. The members of Lipman's fictional community listen to one another and build upon each others' contributions.⁵⁶ They respect each others' opinions and disagree with one another with civility and care.⁵⁷ They express their appreciation for one other and invite others to speak.⁵⁸ So too, they correct uncaring behaviors.⁵⁹ In these and many other ways the characters in the texts which the children read model for the children the virtues of respect and caring.

(3) Within the community of inquiry children are encouraged to practice being respectful and caring. "The only way to prepare for social life," Dewey wrote, "is to engage in social life."⁶⁰ It is all well and good to be instructed in how to behave or to witness the behavior of others but, ultimately, one fully learns how to behave socially only by oneself engaging in social life. A respect and care for others, to recall the words of Splitter and Sharp, is only "caught" when it is "practised, embodied and lived."⁶¹

One way in which the community of inquiry approach helps children to practice being respectful and caring is simply by encouraging such behavior. Here, particularly during the early stages of a community of inquiry's development, the teacher plays a particularly important role.⁶² "While empowering children" to engage in inquiry, Jackson and Oho write:

the teacher is *still* the facilitator and must set parameters within which this inquiry takes place. If this is not done, some students may take this opportunity to "run" the class at the expense of the safety of the other students.⁶³

It is naive to imagine that a safe, respectful community will simply come into being on its own. The teacher must work to establish an environment where caring and respectful behavior is the norm.

One way in which the teacher can establish this safe environment is by establishing classroom procedures which are consistent with "the operant principle of respect for persons."⁶⁴ A classroom "procedure," write Wong and Wong, "is simply a method or process for how things are to be done in a classroom."⁶⁵ A procedure is an agreed upon norm which regulates the flow of some aspect of classroom activity.

Prominent among the procedures which practitioners of P4C have established are those which regulate the flow of discussion. Jackson and Oho, for instance, recommend using a "community ball" to "insure that one person has the floor and others [are] listening."⁶⁶ Only the person who is holding the community ball is recognized as the speaker. If someone else wishes to speak, she must raise her hand and wait for the ball to be passed to her. This procedure promotes the respectful behavior of listening to others and discourages disrespectful behaviors such as interrupting others or shouting others down.

Ruth Silver recommends that, in classes where certain students dominate the discussion, students not be given a second chance to speak "until everyone who wants one has had a first" chance.⁶⁷ Jackson recommends that teachers "be alert to opportunities to offer 'invitations to speak' to those who are otherwise not being heard."⁶⁸ (One can do this, Jackson continues, by asking quieter children if they would like to read aloud from the novel, share their questions, or repeat what has been said.⁶⁹) Procedures such as these promote the respectful behavior of demonstrating that one cares about what each person has to say.

Another way in which a teacher can establish an intellectually safe classroom environment is by consistently enforcing a clearly articulated set of rules. Different rules are operative within different communities of inquiry. Rules are sometimes set by the teacher alone or, as Jackson suggests, by both teacher and students.⁷⁰ Rules such as "Only the person who has the ball may talk," "Keep your hands and feet to yourself," or,

more generally, "Be kind to others" characteristically help the members of the community of inquiry to govern themselves.

As rules vary, so do consequences. Compliance with rules is oftentimes rewarded with verbal praise. The teacher, for instance, might say "I like the way Ha'aheo is waiting for her turn." Non-compliance with rules can be met with consequences which range from an icy stare, a verbal rebuke, or, in extreme cases, temporary expulsion from the community.

Yet another, somewhat different, way in which the teacher helps the children to be respectful and caring is by bringing appropriate exercises to the community. Exercises by themselves are likely not enough to dispose children to behave in respectful and caring ways. They are, however, useful supplements. Exercises which deliberately target a particular behavior can be used to "work out" and strengthen that behavior.⁷¹

One example of such an exercise is a lesson which Jackson sometimes employs in order to improve the listening of the community members. Jackson hides a dollar bill somewhere in the classroom. The task of the children is to find this bill by asking questions of Jackson. In order to succeed at their task it is imperative for the children to listen to one another; for it is only by listening carefully to one another that the children hear the clues which disclose the location of the dollar.

Jackson's exercise inspires children to practice the respectful behavior of listening to others. By providing this opportunity to practice listening, and by offering other exercises which provide the opportunity to practice other respectful and caring behaviors, the *community of inquiry* approach helps children to "catch" a spirit of respect and care for persons.

(4) Within the community of inquiry children are given the opportunity to reflect upon being respectful. One does not have to be respectful and caring; one ought to be respectful and caring. Being respectful and caring are not modes of action which are

demanding by necessity. They are, as Lipman suggests, virtues which are recommended by good reasons.⁷²

Historically, proponents of character education have paid relatively little attention to the reasons which lie behind virtues. Their approach "has been to stress the obviousness of the virtues" and to spend their time "persuading, urging and exhorting" children to embrace these virtues.⁷³ Rather than explore with children *why* one ought to be virtuous, these proponents have been content with telling children to *be* virtuous.

Lipman argues that this traditional approach "does not work."⁷⁴ It succeeds only in fostering, on the one hand, students who (rightly) resist our efforts to cultivate virtue because we have given them no reason to heed us and, on the other hand, students who develop the undesirable habit of unthinking compliance. Students do not have to be virtuous; why would one expect them to choose to be virtuous if one conceals from them the very reasons which recommend our virtues?

The community of inquiry approach endeavors to cultivate virtues such as respect for persons and caring by providing children with the opportunity to think for themselves about the reasons which recommend these virtues. If children are given the chance to reflect upon our virtues, they are, Lipman reasons, more likely to come to appreciate the value of these virtues.⁷⁵ Rather than simply being told to be virtuous they will gain a deeper, more meaning-laden, and more compelling understanding of why these virtues are worthy of their allegiance.

One way in which the community of inquiry approach encourages children to reflect upon the virtues of respecting and caring for others is by asking them to *think about* these virtues. Children are given the opportunity to inquire together into questions such as what it means to be respectful or why it is that one ought to be caring.⁷⁶ Inquiring thusly, the students can discover for themselves the reasons which recommend these virtues.

In the P4C curriculum one finds a number of discussion plans which afford children with this opportunity to think for themselves about the worth of being respectful and caring:

Is caring an ordinary virtue or a master virtue?

1. Can there be friendship without caring?
Can there be caring without friendship?
2. Can there be citizenship without caring?
Can there be caring without citizenship?
3. Can there fairness without caring?
Can there be caring without fairness?
4. Can there be respect, responsibility, and trustworthiness without caring?
Can there be caring without respect, responsibility, and trustworthiness?
5. What do you conclude about the relationship between caring and these other virtues?⁷⁷

Discussion Plan: Treating others as persons

1. How do you treat a person as a person? Name as many ways as you can think of.
2. Are there any things besides people that you treat as a person.
3. Should you treat all people as persons? What if they were cruel to you?
4. What do people do that makes you feel like you're being treated as a person?
5. When you're being treated as a person, how do you feel?⁷⁸

The members of the community of inquiry who are given the opportunity to inquire into questions such as these get the chance to go beyond mere "indoctrination" and "to discover of their own accord" the merits of respect and caring.⁷⁹

Another way in which the community of inquiry approach encourages children to reflect upon the virtues of respecting and caring for others is by providing them with a chance to *evaluate* their own behavior. The members of the community are asked to think about whether or not they themselves have behaved in a respectful and caring fashion. Reflecting thusly, the community members gain insight which empowers them to correct their own behaviors. So too, they gain a first-hand understanding into what it means to be respectful and caring.

While an impromptu appraisal of the community members' behaviors can be initiated at any point during the course of an inquiry session, Jackson recommends that time should be set aside at the end of each session for an evaluation of how the children did "as a community."⁸⁰ Community members are asked:

Was I listening to others? (and) Were others listening to me?
Did most people participate rather than just a few who dominated?
Was it a *safe* environment?⁸¹

Older children respond to each of these questions by providing a rating (usually from one to five). Younger children simply indicate whether they felt the community did well ("thumbs up"), average ("thumbs horizontal"), or poorly ("thumbs down") with regards to each of these three criteria.⁸²

Through these evaluation questions the teacher communicates her values to her students. Asked time and again to measure their behaviors against the standards of "listening," "participation," and "safety," the children come to understand that they are expected to treat others with respect and care.

Through these evaluation questions the students are, however, also provided with a chance to make these values their own. By talking about *why* they voted as they did the members of the community gradually craft their own understanding of the criteria of "listening," "participation," and "safety."⁸³ They come to understand for themselves what it means to be respectful and caring and why it is that these modes of behaving are worthy.

Evidence that P4C Cultivates Respect and Caring

There is a need for more empirical research which examines the question of whether or not the community of inquiry approach is an effective means through which to cultivate good character.⁸⁴ While there is not enough data to verify, in a thoroughly convincing fashion, the hypothesis that the community of inquiry approach is an effective means

through which to cultivate the virtues of caring and respect for persons, there is evidence which supports this contention.

The transcript which we examined in Chapter Six shows that, at least within the community of inquiry, children treat others with respect and care. Children respect others by listening to them and by taking their ideas seriously (on lines 14, 23, 43, 56, 72, 99, 106, 162, 178). They also demonstrate, in other very clear ways, that they care for the other members of the community (30, 49, 57, 77).

This respect and care which is demonstrated within the community is also expressed in the written comments of children who have been a part of a community of inquiry. Michael, a sixth grader, writes:

[The community of inquiry] is like a big family. For example we stay in a circle and we talk about things like a family and we can say anything because its a safe place.⁸⁵

The scope of Michael's caring has, as a consequence of his dealings with the community of inquiry, expanded outwards. He now cares for and respects his classmates like they were family.

The behaviors of the children while within the community of inquiry as well as the words of Michael suggest that, as a consequence of their dealings within the community, children come to care more for and be more respectful towards the other members of the community. This, in and of itself, is significant. If one can, through P4C, convert classrooms into safe, respectful communities, then one will have already done much to improve the climate for learning.

Ultimately, however, the worth of the community of inquiry approach as a form of character education must be measured not only by whether or not it can inspire children to care for and respect *certain* others. It also must be measured by whether or not it can prompt children to internalize the disposition and ability to continue to care for and respect *all* others.

The words of Marvin, a classmate of Michael's, suggest that the community of inquiry approach *does* empower children to care for and respect others:

One time I learned how to cooperate and talk to people that I don't usually talk to.⁸⁶

Cooperating involves being respectful and caring; to cooperate one must, at the very least, take others seriously and treat them with dignity.

Here Marvin does not say simply that he cooperated with others. More significantly, he writes that he *learned how* to cooperate with others. To learn how to do something is to gain the power to continue to do it. Marvin's words, then, suggest that he has gained a disposition and ability which will enable him to continue to behave respectfully with (all) others. From his dealings within the community of inquiry, we hypothesize, Marvin has internalized a respect for persons.

Notes

- ¹From *New York Post* (August 28, 1987), p. 4. In Lickona (1991), p. 4.
- ²Lickona (1991), pp. 3-4.
- ³Lickona (1991), p. 5.
- ⁴Lickona (1991), p. 5.
- ⁵Lickona (1991), p. 3.
- ⁶Lipman (1996c), p. i.
- ⁷Lickona (1991), p. 6.
- ⁸Lipman (1996c), p. i.
- ⁹Lipman (1996c), p. i.
- ¹⁰Dewey (1909), p. 1.
- ¹¹Lipman (1996c), p. i.
- ¹²Lipman (1996c), p. i.
- ¹³Lipman (1996c), p. i.
- ¹⁴Lipman (1996c), pp. i-ii.
- ¹⁵Lipman (1996c), p. i.
- ¹⁶Lipman (1996c), p. i.
- ¹⁷Lickona (1991), p. 43.
- ¹⁸Lickona (1991), p. 43.
- ¹⁹Lickona (1991), p. 43.
- ²⁰Lickona (1991), p. 44.
- ²¹Lickona (1991), p. 44.

- ²²See Chapter Eight, P4C and Possessing Understanding.
- ²³Kant (1785), p. 45.
- ²⁴Nussbaum (1997), p. 64. Nussbaum cites Marcus Aurelius' *Meditations* (2.1).
- ²⁵Aristotle. Politics, [1155a21-2].
- ²⁶See Chapter Eight, P4C and Possessing Understanding.
- ²⁷Pritchard (1993), p. 730.
- ²⁸See Chapter Eight, P4C and Possessing Understanding.
- ²⁹See Chapter Eight, P4C and Possessing Understanding.
- ³⁰Dalmiya (1996), pp. 209 and 214. See Chapter Eight, P4C and Possessing Understanding. See also Chapter Three, Possessing Understanding.
- ³¹Nussbaum (1997), p. 111.
- ³²Dalmiya (1996), pp. 209 and 214. See also Chapter Eight, P4C and Possessing Understanding.
- ³³Lipman (1996c), p. 68.
- ³⁴From Susan Okano's class (4/16/97).
- ³⁵Lipman (1996b), p. 26.
- ³⁶From Beth Ajifu's class (5/15/97). See Chapter Eight, P4C and Possessing Understanding.
- ³⁷Lipman (1996c), p. 70.
- ³⁸Lipman (1991), p. 187.
- ³⁹Lipman (1996c), p. 127.
- ⁴⁰Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 179.
- ⁴¹Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 180.
- ⁴²Vygotsky (1978), pp. 56-57. See also Lipman (1996a), p. 101.
- ⁴³Lipman (1996a), p. 12. See also Vygotsky (1978), p. 57.

⁴⁴Lipman (1991), p. 219.

⁴⁵See Chapter Six, *The Community of Inquiry in Action*.

⁴⁶Lipman (1991), p. 15. See Chapter Six, *The Community of Inquiry in Action*.

⁴⁷Splitter and Sharp (1995), pp. 148-149.

⁴⁸Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), p. 89.

⁴⁹Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), p. 89. Freire (1970), p. 53. Jackson (1998), p. 5.

⁵⁰See Chapter Six, *The Community of Inquiry in Action*.

⁵¹Lipman (1991), p. 242.

⁵²See Jackson (1998), p. 25.

⁵³Jackson (1998), p. 16.

⁵⁴Sharp and Reed (1992), p. xiii. The philosophical novels which Lipman has written are: Elfie, Pixie, Kio & Gus, Nous, Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery, Lisa, Suki, and Mark.

⁵⁵Margolis (1996), p. 124..

⁵⁶Lipman (1982a), p. 46: 20, 47:5, 49:10, 50:20, and 51:10.

⁵⁷Lipman (1982a), p. 47, 10 and 45:29 through 46:5.

⁵⁸Lipman (1982a), p. 48, 15, 51:18, 52:13, and 44:16.

⁵⁹Lipman (1982a), p. 51, 9.

⁶⁰Dewey (1909), p. 14.

⁶¹Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 179.

⁶²See Splitter and Sharp (1995), pp. 148-149.

⁶³Jackson and Oho (1993), p. 7.

⁶⁴Jackson (1998), p. 3.

⁶⁵See Wong and Wong (1991), p. 172.

⁶⁶Jackson and Oho (1993), p. 8. See also Chapter Six, *The Community of Inquiry in Action*.

⁶⁷Silver (1993), p. 506.

⁶⁸Jackson (1998), pp. 16.

⁶⁹Jackson (1998), pp. 16-17.

⁷⁰Jackson (1998), p. 4.

⁷¹See Lipman and Gazzard (1988a), p. xii.

⁷²See Lipman (1996c), p. ii.

⁷³Lipman (1996c), p. i.

⁷⁴Lipman (1996c), p. i.

⁷⁵See Lipman (1996c), p. ii.

⁷⁶When asked to explain what it means to "respect a person," Reid Kuba's class of fifth graders (Ala Wai Elementary School, 1997-1998) said that one is respecting a person when one is "being kind" to her, "listening" to her, "looking up to" or "honoring" her, "caring about her," and "treating her like you want to be treated."

⁷⁷Lipman (1996c), p. 154.

⁷⁸Lipman (1996c), p. 19.

⁷⁹Lipman (1996c), p. i.

⁸⁰Jackson (1998), p. 14.

⁸¹Jackson (1998), p. 14.

⁸²Jackson (1998), p. 14.

⁸³See Jackson (1998), p. 14.

⁸⁴See Chapter Eleven, *Where to Go*.

⁸⁵Year-end student evaluation from Beth Ajifu's class (1996-1997). Michael is responding to the question "Is philosophy a good thing for kids?"

86Year-end student evaluation from Beth Ajifu's class (1996-1997).

Chapter Ten: Cultivating The Power to Understand

P4C and The Power to Understand

The possession of a good understanding is essentially connected with the work of making good judgments. One's understanding is, to borrow a phrase from Dewey, "the working capital" upon which one must draw in crafting good judgments.¹

No matter how good one's understanding is, however, the mere possession of understanding cannot ensure that one will continue to make good judgments.² "Reality," Freire writes, "is really a *process*, undergoing constant transformation."³ Times change and with this change much of one's understanding becomes outdated; it gradually ceases to work. One must, if one is going to *continue* to make good judgments, have at one's disposal means which will allow for one's understanding to be "revised" and "extended."⁴ One must be armed with a *power* which will give one's understanding "plasticity."⁵

The power to understand, we argued, is comprised of both a disposition and an ability.⁶ The *disposition to understand* is an "intellectual curiosity" which drives one to live the examined life and to relentlessly pursue understanding.⁷ To be disposed to pursue understanding in this fashion is to be prone to wonder. The *ability to understand* is a deftness at wielding the means through which understanding is gained. Being able to understand involves being adept at performing certain cognitive moves.⁸ (It also can involve, we shall soon argue, being able to skillfully perform particular social behaviors.⁹)

The community of inquiry approach, we now assert, is an effective means through which to cultivate both the disposition and the ability to understand. Empowering children

to understand, the community of inquiry approach prepares children to continue to judge well.

P4C and The Disposition to Understand

"Wonder," writes Bacon, "is the seed of knowledge."¹⁰ The depth of one's understanding of one's world is an outgrowth of the extent to which one is willing to inquire into one's world. Sparked by one's wonder, one examines one's world more closely and, hence, comes to understand better.

This spark of wonder burns brightly during childhood. Children, Lipman and his colleagues assert, have a "perpetual curiosity."¹¹

Children look at their fingernails, and wonder where they came from. How does something like a fingernail grow out from one's body? But then, everything about their body seems fascinating to them.

Likewise, a snail is fascinating to them -- or a mud puddle -- or the dark spots on the face of the moon.¹²

Children wonder about most everything. They are "capable of wondering at things adults take for granted."¹³

In this respect, Lipman and Sharp continue, "the child has much to teach us [adults]."¹⁴ For, with time, our childhood wonder is lost:

It is only gradually that a crust or scale will grow over [children's] minds, and they will take these things more and more for granted, until from marvelling at everything, they marvel at nothing.¹⁵

By the time a child grows into an adult she wonders relatively little:

As adults, we have learned to accept the perplexities that emerge from our daily experience, and to take them pretty much for granted. Many of us no longer wonder why things are the way they are.¹⁶

Perhaps "because they feel that there is not time for wondering, or because they have come to the conclusion that it is simply unprofitable and unproductive to engage" in wonder, many adults come to wonder less.¹⁷

With the loss of wonder comes the affliction of "unquestioning acceptance."¹⁸ Ceasing to wonder, one no longer strives to revise and extend one's understanding. Instead one is satisfied; one contentedly bases one's judgments upon an understanding which is inferior or outdated.

This affliction of unquestioning acceptance, as Lipman and his colleagues explain, is a contagious one:

...having ceased to question and to reach for the meanings of their experience, [many adults] eventually become examples of passive acceptance that children take to be models for their own conduct.¹⁹

Internalizing the behaviors of today's adults, the children who will become tomorrow's adults similarly cease to wonder. "Thus the prohibition against wonder is transmitted from generation to generation."²⁰

To cultivate good judgment one must suppress this contagion. By working to "preserve" children's "natural sense of wonder" one fosters the quality of understanding upon which good judgment rests.²¹ One sustains and strengthens a disposition which empowers children to judge well.

One means through which to sustain wonder (and, hence, to cultivate good judgment) is, we maintain, the community of inquiry approach employed by P4C. The community of inquiry approach sustains wonder by: (1) allowing for the modeling of wonder, (2) encouraging children to wonder, and (3) asking children to reflect upon wonder.

(1) Within the community of inquiry wonder is modeled. Raising questions and marveling at one's world are behaviors which express wonder.²² These wondering behaviors are commonly practiced within the community of inquiry. They are practiced by children, by teachers, and by the fictional characters in the novels which the members of the community read.

This ongoing practice of wondering behaviors encourages the children's disposition to wonder. Repeatedly observing others wonder, children are prompted to wonder themselves. There is an "intrapyschical reproduction of the interpsychical"; the children themselves come to more firmly embrace the spirit of wonder which is modeled for them *within the community of inquiry*.²³

Of the three sources of modeling which are present in the community of inquiry the peer modeling of other children is perhaps the most influential. "Children," as Lipman puts it, "will use other children's behavior as models for their own."²⁴ Seeing their classmates display "a readiness to look for meaning" and a "hunger to understand," the children themselves embrace such dispositions.²⁵

The previously considered transcript of the proceedings of a community of inquiry illustrates the frequency with which children model wonder:²⁶

I think the relationship and...they're both noun. 'Cause most people is talking about things and person that belong to the noun. So I wonder if a noun could be a relationship.

Brian C. (lines 131-133)

But [if we accept what you say] then I think relationship is a thing, you know, like a clock. So how can it be a relationship?

Kacey (76-77)

I don't know, but I have one more question...Where does the relationship [come from]?

Kacey (91-97)

Are you saying that we are made of relationships?

Kacey (162)

Bearing witness time and again to wondering behaviors like those practiced by Brian and Kacey, the children themselves begin to wonder more.

The teacher is a second source of modeling which is of particular importance in communities comprised of older students who have already begun to internalize the societal "prohibition against wonder."²⁷ In this excerpt from a fourth grade discussion the teacher models wondering behaviors for the children:²⁸

I'm wondering...I'm not sure if this is what happened with the Hawaiians, but like with [some of] the Native Americans on the mainland...You have two groups of people. If you ask [the first group] "do you own the land?", they would say "no" because they don't think that you can own land. They assume that there is no way that a person can own the land...Then you have this [second] group [of people] coming in and they think that you can own land. So what happens? I don't know; I guess I'm just wondering what happens then.

Here the teacher displays what Splitter and Sharp call "scholarly ignorance."²⁹ He models "genuine curiosity and puzzlement" and, in doing so, deliberately chooses not to convey to the children the message that he knows all the answers or is always "right."³⁰

A final source of modeling are the characters in the novels which the community members read. Consider the following instances of wondering in Lipman's Kio and Gus:

I can't help wondering what it must be like to be Leviathan. Or to be Kio's grandfather.

I even wonder if anyone has ever wondered what it would be like to understand everything. I know *I* wouldn't like it. What would there be left to wonder about?³¹

Grandpa just couldn't *believe* the way I put ketchup all over my french fries. The things he wonders at! I wonder if all grownups are like that -- puzzled by just the things any kid would take for granted.³²

"The sky," Gus says, "I wonder about it a lot. I think of it as a big, round roof with lots of little holes, and behind the roof is a fire that makes the light shine through."³³

Seeing the characters in the books they read wonder, the members of the community of inquiry are encouraged to wonder themselves. There is an intrapsychical reproduction of the narrative; "the live students in the classroom," as Lipman explains, "take the behavior of [the] fictional characters as models of how to behave."³⁴

(2) *Within the community of inquiry wonder is practiced.* One way in which to sustain and encourage a child's spirit of wonder is by allowing her to witness the wondering of others. A second way is by encouraging her to wonder herself. Children become more proficient at wondering, as Lipman puts it, simply "by going out and doing it."³⁵

By repeatedly prompting the child to raise questions, to delve into assumptions, and to examine matters carefully one helps to nurture a proficiency in wondering. Just as one gets better at hitting a ball by practicing the relevant skills, one gets better at wondering by practicing the moves through which wondering is done.

Repeated wondering also cultivates a disposition to wonder. James theorizes that "our nervous system grows to the modes in which it has been exercised."³⁶ By repeatedly wondering children get in the habit of wondering. The "tendency" to wonder "becomes effectively ingrained in [them] in proportion to the uninterrupted frequency with which" they engage in the practice of wondering.³⁷

The community of inquiry approach provides children with numerous opportunities to practice wondering. One such opportunity comes when the community sets the agenda for discussion.³⁸ After reading together, the members of the community are asked to wonder. They are, Jackson writes, asked to come up with questions "about something they found interesting or puzzling" in the text or "something they are wondering about."³⁹

Children are asked to formulate their own questions, in part, in order to ensure that the subsequent discussion will be of interest to the community. Another reason why so much time is devoted to having children ask questions, however, is to provide the children with an opportunity to practice questioning. Jackson writes:
Over time asking the students to continually come up with a question connected to what they have read creates a disposition to approach whatever they read with a more active, question-posing attitude.⁴⁰

The practice of repeated questioning, it is assumed, prepares children to continue to question.

Additional practice in questioning is sometimes provided to the children by their teacher. The teacher can introduce exercises which aim to enhance the children's readiness to question. For instance, in Diane Arakawa's kindergarten class children are taught to use "question words" such as "why," "how," and "what."⁴¹ One child plays the role of some

person, animal, or thing and the other children are instructed to ask this child questions using their "question words." Engaging in this exercise, the students learn how to ask questions and how to better express their wonder.

Other exercises which aim to foster a child's wonder are found in the P4C curriculum materials:

Exercise: Wondering

1. Think of something that always make[s] you wonder.
2. Make up a story in which you tell about your wondering.
3. Make up your story so that, when we listen to it, we'll begin to wonder too.⁴²

Exercise: Things I wonder at

Here is a chance for each person in the class to make up a sentence or two on the topic, "Things I wonder at." (If you can tell about *just one* thing you wonder at, that would be enough.)⁴³

Through exercises like these, through the process of formulating the agenda for discussion, and, so too, through the dialogue of these discussions themselves, the members of the community of inquiry practice and, hence, cultivate wonder.

(3) Within the community of inquiry children reflect upon wonder. A third way in which the practices of P4C help to nurture wonder is by giving children a chance to reflect upon wonder. As is the case with ethical dispositions, it is important to provide children with "opportunities to discover of their own accord" the meaning and value of wondering.⁴⁴ Discovering this, they will be better prepared to wonder. They will also be more disposed to embrace wonder; for, instead of just being told by others that it is good to wonder, they themselves will now have an appreciation of wonder's worth.

The community of inquiry approach allows children to reflect upon wonder by giving them the opportunity to think about the concept of wonder. Discussion plans encourage children to inquire into the meaning and value of wonder:

Discussion Plan: Wondering

1. If you don't understand something, do you wonder about it?
2. If you do understand about something, do you wonder about it?
3. If you have a cat, do you wonder what it thinks?
4. If you don't have a cat, do you wonder what it thinks?

5. Do you wonder what other people think?
6. Do you wonder what you think?
7. Do you wonder how you think?
8. Do you wonder why you think?
9. Do you wonder why you wonder?
10. Does anyone else know how much you wonder?⁴⁵

Thinking through discussion plans such as these, children become more aware of the place of wonder. They gain an awareness both of what wonder is and of why wondering is valuable.

The community of inquiry approach also provides children with an opportunity to reflect upon wonder by giving them the chance to evaluate their own wondering. By appraising the quality of their questions or reflecting upon whether or not they have "scratched beneath the surface" or inquired deeply the children come to a better understanding of how they wonder.⁴⁶ They come to see that they themselves can control how much (and how well) they wonder.

The community of inquiry approach is, we have argued, one means through which to sustain a healthy disposition to wonder. That this approach does, in fact, cultivate wonder is attested to by children who have belonged to a community of inquiry:

Also philosophy can give you the habit of asking a lot of questions. It makes you curious and helps you stop and think.

Michelle (sixth grade)

The questions [which are talked about during philosophy-time] are excellent! They kind of make some children very curious. Like me!

April (fourth grade)⁴⁷

Through modeling, through practice, and through reflection the community of inquiry inspires children like Michelle and April to wonder. This is of great importance for from wonder springs understanding and, ultimately, the power to judge well.

P4C, The Ability to Understand, and Social Inquiry

The community of inquiry approach employed by Philosophy for Children empowers children to understand, in part, by inspiring them to wonder and to relentlessly pursue understanding. This approach also empowers children to understand by cultivating within them the *ability* to understand.

The primary ingredient of this ability to understand, we argued, is *thinking*.⁴⁸ "Thinking," as Lipman writes, "is the skill *par excellence* that enables us to acquire meanings."⁴⁹ Through the skillful use of cognitive moves one orders and refines one's experience and information. Grasping the relations which bind a particular thing, event, or situation to the broader context of which it is a part, one moves through one's thinking from a relatively superficial acquaintance to a more meaning-laden, useful understanding.

The community of inquiry approach, we have already argued, is an effective pedagogical means through which one can improve the thinking of children.⁵⁰ Encouraged to observe, practice, and reflect upon the use of cognitive moves, the children who participate in the proceedings of the community of inquiry gradually become skilled in the use of these moves.

Having thusly examined the relationship between the *primary* element of the ability to understand and the community of inquiry approach, it is left to consider the connection between this educational approach and an *auxiliary* element of the ability to understand. *P4C, we shall argue, empowers children to understand better by helping them to learn the social behaviors which are essential to disciplined conversation.*

In making this argument we will contend that: (1) disciplined conversation is an effective means through which one can gain understanding, (2) the practice of certain social behaviors is an essential pre-condition to the practice of disciplined conversation, and,

given the first two points, (3) being ready and able to practice certain social behaviors adds to one's ability to understand.

(1) *Disciplined conversation is an effective means through which one can gain understanding.* "Disciplined conversation," it will be recalled, is not "ordinary conversation."⁵¹ Imbued with courtesy and consideration, animated by a spirit of curiosity and intellectual rigor, it is, rather, talk which has been transformed into "dialogue."⁵²

Disciplined conversation, then, is not just pointless verbal play. It is not something which is merely "satisfying for its own sake."⁵³ In addition to whatever consummatory value it has, disciplined conversation also has instrumental value. It has, as Lipman puts it, worth "insofar as it serves as a means to some desirable experiential consequence..."⁵⁴ "It is a process that aims at producing a product..."⁵⁵

A product which disciplined conversation aims to produce is *understanding*. Disciplined conversation is an instrument through which knowledge is sought. Put differently, it is a means of *inquiry*. As a form of inquiry, it is, to use Lipman's words, "a self-corrective practice in which a subject matter is investigated with the aim of discovering or inventing ways of dealing with what is problematic."⁵⁶ It is, as Splitter and Sharp put it, "a form of self-correcting practice driven by the need to transform that which is intriguing, problematic, confused, ambiguous, or fragmentary into some kind of unifying whole..."⁵⁷

In so far as disciplined conversation aims towards (and is regulated by) the end of understanding it is like all types of inquiry. Unlike all types of inquiry, however, disciplined conversation is *social* inquiry.

Inquiry is, as Splitter and Sharp suggest, not necessarily social.⁵⁸ One can, for instance, work through the scientific method by oneself. One can, on one's own, observe some problem, formulate a tentative solution to this problem, carefully survey the situation, revise one's hypothesis in light of one's observations, and then test one's hypothesis

through experiment.⁵⁹ There is nothing in this simple conception of scientific inquiry which requires one to collaborate with others.⁶⁰

Disciplined conversation, however, is by definition social. It is a method of conversing, of associating, with others.⁶¹ Inquiry proceeds through the collaborative (and respectful) exchange of ideas.⁶² Consider, for instance, this exchange:

Joseph: I think relationships and things are alike because you can use a relationship on two things or more. Like Nani said. You could have a clock that could hang. And then both clocks used to do the same thing. Or a relationship and a clock. In fact, I think relationship will go with any two things that are like...Kacey.

Kacey: But [if we accept what you say] then I think relationship is a thing, you know, like a clock. So how can it be a relationship? I think its just a word. But it means something.⁶³

Nani raises a point. This sparks an idea in Joseph. But Joseph's idea prompts an objection from Kacey. And so the inquiry proceeds; each shared thought inspires further thoughts, each contribution elicits additional contributions.

It is through this meeting of ideas and the exchange of experiences that forms of social inquiry such as disciplined conversation progress towards understanding. This progress, however, oftentimes is not just *ordinary* progress. Rather, as Aristotle hinted at long ago, it is frequently *exceptional* progress. Aristotle writes:

...the philosopher, even when by himself, can contemplate truth, and the better the wiser he is; he can perhaps do so better if he has fellow workers, but still he is the most self-sufficient.⁶⁴

One can inquire by oneself, but one "*can perhaps [inquire] better if [one] has fellow workers.*" Aristotle's words get to the heart of the matter; social inquiry is not just a kind of inquiry, it is frequently a *better* kind of inquiry.

Why are disciplined conversation and other forms of social inquiry so effective? It is, in large part, because they draw upon a great variety of intellectual resources.

Everyone, our examination of Dewey's writings suggested, possesses certain intellectual resources.⁶⁵ One's way of thinking, one's experiences, and one's understanding;

these are the "working capital" which every person makes use of in order to tackle problems.⁶⁶

While every person possesses *some* sort of intellectual capital, it is not the case that each person possesses the *same* capital. Indeed, one might well argue that the intellectual capital of each and every individual is unique. Because each person has her own set of experiences; because each person has, on account of things like her culture and her upbringing, her own understanding of the world; because each person has, as Lipman argues, her own particular thinking style; there exists within the world a superabundant diversity of intellectual resources.⁶⁷

Biological diversity, scientists have argued, is valuable because with a diverse pool of genetic resources comes improved odds for survival. Similarly, this sort of "intellectual diversity" is valuable because with a diverse collection of intellectual resources comes improved odds for intellectual progress.

A solitary thinker faced with a difficult problem might well find that the intellectual resources which he can bring to bear are too limited. His experience is too narrow, his understanding is too shallow, and his intellectual approach is too set. As a consequence, he is unlikely to achieve intellectual success.

But bring a number of co-inquirers into the mix and matters improve. These co-inquirers bring with them a fresh set of experiences, understandings, and cognitive approaches. Now the problem need not be considered from a single perspective. Nor must it be attacked in a single way. More intellectual resources are now in play.

The outcome of this act of enlisting more intellectual resources into the inquiry is an increased likelihood of intellectual progress. It becomes more likely, to make use of an analogy provided by Maughn Rollins, that the epistemological "darkness" will be illuminated:

Imagine being led into a completely dark room. Suddenly a window is opened and you can make out the contours of the room and the other people

in it. Then a window is opened on the opposite side of the room, the added light making further distinctions possible. Then another window is opened, and so on, the light from each illuminating more detail.⁶⁸

Each person's intellectual capital provides, if you will, a window through which to understand the world. By opening up more windows, by drawing upon the talents and experiences of more people, one is able to let in more light and perceive the world more clearly.

Forms of social inquiry such as disciplined conversation are means which let in more light. Because these methodologies of inquiry draw upon a broad pool of intellectual resources they can stretch beyond the limitations and, as Karl Popper notes, the "prejudices" which restrict the solitary thinker.⁶⁹ As a consequence of this, forms of social inquiry such as disciplined conversation are especially effective means through which to gain understanding.

(2) The practice of certain social behaviors is an essential pre-condition to the practice of disciplined conversation. Within the community of inquiry children practice a number of desirable social behaviors. The members of the community listen carefully, voice their ideas clearly, treat one another with civility, and patiently wait their turn.⁷⁰

These social behaviors are, as Jackson asserts, "necessary for inquiry."⁷¹ More precisely, they are necessary for the sort of "disciplined conversation" through which the social inquiry of the community proceeds.⁷²

That certain social behaviors are essential pre-conditions to the practice of disciplined conversation is a point which Tiles raises:

...people who cannot listen to one another, contribute to the refinement of one another's opinions, and participate in the formation of consensus, are not equipped for a democratic culture...everyone needs oral (and aural) skills (or at the very least refined and disciplined habits) to participate in discussion, in a 'community of inquiry'...⁷³

People cannot come together in genuine dialogue if they are not first able to listen to one another, express themselves, be civil, and display patience. (This point can be attested to

by practitioners of P4C who have tried to facilitate inquiry within a classroom where these social pre-conditions were not in place.)

(3) Being ready and able to practice certain social behaviors adds to one's ability to understand. We have now argued: (1) disciplined conversation is an especially effective means through which to gain understanding, and (2) the skillful practice of certain social behaviors (such as listening well and being able to clearly express oneself) is a prerequisite to the practice of disciplined conversation.

Disciplined conversation is, then, the middle term which connects these social behaviors and the ability to understand. By equipping children with these social behaviors one readies them to engage in disciplined conversation and, hence, empowers them to understand better. Being ready and able to practice these social behaviors is not only a prerequisite to the practice of disciplined conversation; it also *contributes to* (but is not essential to) the ability to understand.

P4C and The Cultivation of Social Behaviors

How can one cultivate the social behaviors which are essential to the practice of disciplined conversation and, hence, enhance one's ability to understand? One way, Jackson suggests, is by having children participate in the proceedings of the community of inquiry:

It is the community aspect of the community of inquiry that provides the context for learning the social skills necessary for inquiry...⁷⁴

The community of inquiry approach, we argue, cultivates social behaviors by: (1) allowing for the modeling of these behaviors, (2) encouraging children to practice these behaviors, and (3) asking children to reflect upon these behaviors.

(1) *Within the community of inquiry these social behaviors are modeled.* One of the ways in which children learn these social moves is through the modeling of these behaviors by their peers, their teachers, and the fictional characters in Lipman's philosophical novels. Placed within an environment where behaviors such as listening and working cooperatively are the norm, the children come to "internalize" these behaviors.⁷⁵

There are, within the transcript which we examined previously, multiple examples of children modeling the sorts of social behaviors which underlie disciplined conversation.⁷⁶ The children demonstrate that they are listening to one another (lines 23, 26, 43, 56, 72, 106, 178). They voice their ideas clearly and confidently (23-29, 34-39). They patiently wait their turn (throughout).

Teachers also model the sorts of "oral (and aural) skills" which are needed to "participate in discussion..."⁷⁷ They listen to the other members of the community (82, 139, 149) and articulate ideas clearly (100).

A third source of modeling are characters in the novels which the students read. In the following excerpt from Lipman's *Nous* the characters display a number of desirable social behaviors:

Brian says, "A decision is one kind of judgment, just as a statement or a question are kinds of sentences. When we make a judgment, we try to take circumstances -- everything that is relevant -- into account. Lots of times, judgments are guided by rules that we think have something to do with the case we are dealing with."

Kate objects: "Brian, can't you be clearer than that! What sorts of rules are you talking about?"

Brian looks surprised by Kate's objection, but he turns to the class and asks, "Can you help Kate? She wants to know what sorts of rules or principles people guide themselves by as they try to decide what to do."

Geraldo says: "Many people use the rule, 'an eye for an eye.'"

Isabel replies: "Yes, but others say, 'Treat others the way you'd like them to treat you.'"

Robert says, "Treat similar cases similarly and different cases differently."⁷⁸

These characters engage in a number of the behaviors which make disciplined conversation possible. Brian expresses himself with confidence and clarity. Kate demonstrates that she

was listening to Brian and was trying to understand what he was saying. Geraldo, Isabel, and Robert wait for their turn rather than just blurting their ideas out. Isabel listens to Geraldo and then disagrees with civility.

(2) *Within the community of inquiry these social behaviors are practiced.* The community of inquiry approach empowers children with these social behaviors by encouraging them to practice these behaviors. Here the community of inquiry approach heeds the advice of Dewey who noted: "The only way to prepare for social life is to engage in social life."⁷⁹ The children learn to engage in these modes of social behavior because they are, in fact, given the opportunity to act in these ways.

In a community of inquiry which is in its "mature stage," Splitter and Sharp explain, "procedural responsibility" is "more evenly shared" between the teacher and the students.⁸⁰ The teacher does not need to do as much in order get the children to practice the social behaviors which underlie disciplined conversation, for, the students are already prepared and willing to engage in these behaviors. Left to inquire, the students will, for the most part, engage in these behaviors on their own accord.

In a community which is not as mature, however, the teacher must play a more active role. Since the students have not yet learned these modes of behavior (or are not yet willing to practice these modes of behavior) the teacher must be "pedagogically strong."⁸¹ She must employ her "management" skills in order to encourage the children to practice these modes of social behavior.⁸²

One way in which the teacher can encourage these behaviors is through her selection of "classroom procedures."⁸³ For instance, a procedure such as using a "community ball" to designate the speaker encourages the children to practice the behavior of taking turns.⁸⁴ Similarly, by implementing the procedure of offering quieter children non-threatening "invitations to speak" (such as reading a question off of an index card) the teacher helps these children to practice their oral skills.⁸⁵

Another way in which the teacher can encourage the development of these social behaviors is by consistently reminding the children that they are expected to practice these behaviors.⁸⁶ The teacher can, for instance, firmly and fairly enforce the expectation that, rather than playing or whispering to a neighbor, the children listen to the speaker. She can also encourage the children to wait for their turn to speak rather than all blurting out their ideas at once.

Apart from her management of the classroom, the teacher can also cultivate these social behaviors by introducing exercises which aim to strengthen a particular behavior.

Jackson suggests the following exercise to improve listening:

...once a question is read, before proceeding further, ask someone to repeat the question. The "Kiss Game" [the children are given a Hershey's chocolate Kiss if they are successful in repeating what has been said] helps make this a fun activity...This has proved a valuable strategy for developing listening skills.⁸⁷

Like the previously mentioned exercise of having the children guess where the dollar bill is hidden, this exercise encourages the children to practice the essential behavior of listening.⁸⁸

(3) Within the community of inquiry children reflect upon these social behaviors. A third way in which the community of inquiry approach helps to nurture these social behaviors is by giving children a chance to reflect upon them. Affording the children themselves the opportunity to reflect upon these behaviors, one avoids "indoctrination" and allows children to take greater responsibility for their own behavior.⁸⁹ One gives them the chance to see for themselves the worth of these behaviors.

A teacher can encourage her students to think about these behaviors by introducing relevant discussion plans. Consider, for instance, these lesson plans from the P4C curriculum:

EXERCISE: Differences

What is the difference between:

1. Listening and hearing
2. Listening and overhearing

3. Listening and paying attention
4. Listening and looking

EXERCISE: Similarities

How are these alike:

1. Listening and eating
2. Listening and seeing
3. Listening and tuning in
4. Listening and reading¹

Thinking about questions such as these, the children can come to their own understanding of what it means to listen and whether or not listening is important.

Another lesson from the P4C curriculum gives children a chance to think about the

behavior of taking turns:

Exercise: When is it appropriate to take turns?

	<u>Appropriate</u>	<u>Not Appropriate</u>	?
1. Pam: "Louise, let's take turns riding your bike. I'll ride it Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, and you ride it Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays."	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Gary: "Burt, let's take turns taking Louise to the movies. I'll take her the first and third Saturday of every month, and you take her the second and fourth Saturday."	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Jack: "Louise, let's take turns doing the dishes. You wash and I'll dry."	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Chris: "Okay, Louise, let's take turns with the TV. You choose a half-hour program, then I'll choose one."	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Melissa: "Louise, what do you say we take turns doing our homework? Tonight I'll do yours and mine and tomorrow you can do mine and yours."	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. Hank: "Louise, I hate to see you struggle to school each day, carrying those heavy books! Let me carry yours and mine today, and you can carry yours and mine tomorrow." ²	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

By allowing the children to probe the notion of turn taking and to explore when it is and is not appropriate to take turns, the teacher helps the children to discover for themselves the value and limitations of this form of behavior.

Teachers can also give children the opportunity to reflect upon these social behaviors by asking them to evaluate their own performance of these behaviors. Jackson, for example, urges that community members appraise the quality of their listening at the end of each inquiry session.⁹² The children rate their listening from poor to excellent and then, significantly, talk about why they gave the rating which they did.

Reflecting thusly upon their behavior, the children come to see that, ultimately, it is they themselves who bear responsibility for their behavior. With this realization the locus of authority shifts. No longer must desirable behavior be imposed upon the community from without; now such behavior is motivated by an internal will to behave well. The members of the community take these behaviors as their own.

There are, we have now argued, a number of ways in which the community of inquiry approach fosters the practice of the social behaviors which contribute to understanding. But are our arguments sound ones? Does P4C, in fact, prompt children to practice these social behaviors?

Evidence that the community of inquiry approach employed by P4C does help to cultivate these social behaviors is found, in ample supply, in the writings of children who have taken part in the proceedings of a community of inquiry.⁹³

Yes Philosophy is good for kids because it helps them to pay attention to who is speaking to them.

Elon (second grade)

[Philosophy for Children is] also a good thing for kids because it helps them become more patient like when your waiting for your turn, another reason it's good is that it makes you talk more than just being quiet all the time... [It] help[s] you to be less shy and to talk in front of a lot of people with out being scared.

Heidi (sixth grade)

I think philosophy is good thing for kids to do because if we didn't have philosophy I might not talk that much like in the begining of the year.

Nana (sixth grade)

I think [P4C] will help the adults much better because they want to express them self but they can't, it'll help us too but we still have alots of time but the grown ups don't! (Not saying anything bad but just saying!).

Sara (sixth grade)

One time [during P4C] I learned how to cooperate and talk to people that I don't usually talk to.

Marvin (sixth grade)

Sometimes I think [P4C] would let kids get into talking like disagreeing or agreeing with each other.

Gretchen (sixth grade)

Listening, speaking, cooperating, paying attention, taking turns; these are among the social behaviors which children attest to having learned from the community of inquiry approach.

That the members of the community of inquiry do internalize these social behaviors is important. For, it is this which makes the practice of disciplined conversation a continuing possibility. Empowered to govern their own behavior, the children are, whatever the time or place, ready to engage in the sort of disciplined conversation which is, as Tiles argues, "essential to the growth and maintenance of [democratic] culture."⁹⁴ Prepared to partake in this conversation, they are also epistemologically empowered; being able to understand better is a reward which comes with being adept at inquiring together. Able to interact better, the children are able to inquire effectively, understand more, and, ultimately, make better judgments and do better things.

Notes

- ¹Dewey (1916), p. 158. See Chapter Three, *Gaining Understanding*.
- ²See Chapter Four, *The Power to Understand and Good Judgments*.
- ³Freire (1970), p. 56.
- ⁴Dewey (1916), p. 295.
- ⁵Dewey (1916), p. 44.
- ⁶See Chapter Three, *Gaining Understanding*.
- ⁷Dewey (1933), pp. 38-39. See Chapter Three, *The Disposition to Understand*.
- ⁸See Chapter Two.
- ⁹See Chapter Ten, P4C, *The Ability to Understand, and Social Inquiry*.
- ¹⁰Bacon (1605), p. 8. See Chapter Three, *The Disposition to Understand*.
- ¹¹Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), p. 32.
- ¹²Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), p. 32.
- ¹³Lipman and Sharp (1986), p. 250.
- ¹⁴Lipman and Sharp (1986), p. 250.
- ¹⁵Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), p. 32.
- ¹⁶Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), p. 31.
- ¹⁷Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), p. 31. See also Dewey (1933), pp. 39-40.
- ¹⁸Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), p. 31.
- ¹⁹Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), p. 31.
- ²⁰Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), p. 31.
- ²¹Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), p. 31.

- ²²See Lipman and Sharp (1986), p. 250. Lipman and Sharp make a distinction between *wondering about* (raising questions about something) and *wondering at* (marveling that something is at all). See Chapter Three, The Disposition to Understand.
- ²³Lipman (1996a), p. 12. See also Vygotsky (1978), p. 57.
- ²⁴Lipman (1991), p. 219.
- ²⁵Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), p. 31.
- ²⁶See Chapter Six, The Community of Inquiry In Action. The children are members of Kathryn Yoshida's Third Grade class (4/18/97).
- ²⁷Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), p. 31.
- ²⁸From Susan Okano's class (4/16/97). This section has been edited slightly to make it more readable.
- ²⁹Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 140. Here Splitter and Sharp follow the lead of Whitehead and Ron Reed.
- ³⁰Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 140.
- ³¹Lipman (1986), p. 2.
- ³²Lipman (1986), p. 32.
- ³³Lipman (1986), p. 60.
- ³⁴Lipman (1991), p. 219.
- ³⁵Lipman (1991), p. 187.
- ³⁶James (1890), p. 112.
- ³⁷James (1890), p. 125.
- ³⁸See Lipman (1981), 242.
- ³⁹Jackson (1998), p. 7. Raising questions about the text is the second step of Jackson's standard ("plain vanilla") pedagogy.
- ⁴⁰Jackson (1998), p. 12.
- ⁴¹Diane Arakawa's 2001-2002 class; Ala Wai Elementary School, Honolulu, Hawai'i.

⁴²Lipman and Sharp (1986), p. 251.

⁴³Lipman and Gazzard (1988a), p. 253.

⁴⁴Lipman (1996c), p. i. Here Lipman is writing about moral education.

⁴⁵Lipman and Gazzard (1988a), p. 253.

⁴⁶Jackson (1998), p. 18.

⁴⁷Michelle, a student in Beth Ajifu's class (1996-1997), and April, a student in Susan Okano's class (1996-1997), are responding to the question "Is philosophy a good thing for kids?"

⁴⁸See Chapter Three, The Ability to Understand.

⁴⁹Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), p. 13.

⁵⁰See Chapter Seven.

⁵¹Tiles (1995), p. 93. Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 34. See also Chapter Six, The Characteristics of The Community of Inquiry.

⁵²Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 34.

⁵³Lipman (1991), p. 155.

⁵⁴Lipman (1991), p. 155.

⁵⁵Lipman (1991), p. 229.

⁵⁶Lipman (1991), p. 45.

⁵⁷Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 18. Splitter and Sharp (and I suspect Lipman as well) draw on Dewey (1938b), p. 108. Dewey writes:

Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole.

⁵⁸Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 18.

⁵⁹See Dewey (1938b), pp. 105-122 and Dewey (1916), p. 150.

⁶⁰Some, however, would find a conception of the scientific method which neglected the role of the social to be deficient. Popper, for instance, writes:

There is an element of scientific method missing...[if] there is nobody but himself to check his results; nobody but himself to correct those prejudices which are the unavoidable consequence of his peculiar mental history...what we call 'scientific objectivity' is not a product of the individual scientist's impartiality, but a product of the social or public character of scientific method; and the individual scientist's impartiality is, so far as it exists, not the source but rather the result of this socially or institutionally organised objectivity of science.

Cited in Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 17.

⁶¹For more on the relationship between conversation, dialogue, and the community of inquiry see Lipman (1991), pp. 232-237 and Splitter and Sharp (1995), pp. 34-40.

⁶²Disciplined conversation is a form of inquiry which is governed by "the operant principle of respect for persons." See Jackson (1998), p. 3. See also Chapter Six, The Characteristics of The Community of Inquiry.

⁶³Kathryn Yoshida's class of third graders (4/18/97). See also Chapter Six, The Community of Inquiry in Action.

⁶⁴The Nicomachean Ethics [1177a].

⁶⁵See Chapter Three, Gaining Understanding.

⁶⁶Dewey (1916), p. 158.

⁶⁷Lipman (1992), p. 4. See also Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), p. 147.

⁶⁸Rollins (1995), p. 33.

⁶⁹Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 17.

⁷⁰See Chapter Six, The Community of Inquiry in Action. See also Chapter Ten, P4C and The Cultivation of Cognitive Moves.

⁷¹Jackson (1998), p. 3.

⁷²Tiles (1995), p. 93. See also Chapter Seven, P4C and The Cultivation of Cognitive Moves.

⁷³Tiles (1995), p. 99.

⁷⁴Jackson (1998), p. 7.

⁷⁵See Vygotsky (1978), pp. 56-57 and Lipman (1996a), p. 101.

⁷⁶See Chapter Six, The Community of Inquiry in Action.

⁷⁷Tiles (1995), p. 99.

⁷⁸Lipman (1996b), p. 62.

⁷⁹Dewey (1909), p. 14.

⁸⁰Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 149.

⁸¹Splitter and Sharp (1995), p. 149.

⁸²See Wong and Wong (1991), pp. 83-90. See also Chapter Nine, Cultivating Respect and Care.

⁸³Wong and Wong (1991), p. 81.

⁸⁴See Jackson and Oho (1993), pp. 11 and 38. The community ball is a yarn ball which the children make together. Its value is both symbolic (it is made only through the efforts of each member of the community) and practical (it is used in order to identify the speaker and to empower the children to call on one another). See also Chapter Six, The Community of Inquiry in Action and Chapter Nine, P4C and The Cultivation of Respect and Caring.

⁸⁵Jackson (1998), pp. 16-17.

⁸⁶See Wong and Wong (1991), pp. 141-152. See also Chapter Nine, P4C and The Cultivation of Respect and Caring.

⁸⁷Jackson, p. 15. This passage is from an earlier manuscript. For a revised account of the Kiss Game see Jackson (1998), p. 24.

⁸⁸See Chapter Nine, Cultivating Respect and Caring.

⁸⁹See Lipman (1996c), p. i.

⁹⁰Lipman and Gazzard (1988a), p. 464.

⁹¹Lipman (1996c), p. 110.

⁹²Jackson (1998), pp. 14-16.

⁹³All of these writings are in response to the 1997 year-end evaluation question "Is philosophy a good thing for kids to do?" The Second Grade response is from Robynne Wise's class at Ala Wai Elementary School. The Sixth Grade responses are from Beth Ajifu's class at Pearl Harbor Elementary School. Copies of student assessment pieces are available upon request.

⁹⁴Tiles (1995), p. 101.

Chapter Eleven: Educating for Good Judgment

From Whence We Came

What should be the primary aims of education? How might these aims be realized? These are the foundational questions which Plato raised so long ago in his Republic.¹ The first of these questions is a normative and profoundly philosophical one which provides guidance to the whole endeavor of education. The second of these questions is a pedagogical one which tells us what our schools might do.

We have, in this work, addressed and answered these two interlocking educational questions. Drawing heavily upon the thought of Dewey, James, Aristotle, Lipman, and Jackson and upon empirical data from Hawai'i's classrooms, we have argued that a primary aim of education ought to be to cultivate good judgment. We have argued further that an effective means through which to move towards this aim is by employing the community of inquiry approach of The Philosophy for Children Program in order to cultivate excellence in thinking and understanding.

Answering these questions required us to reflect deeply upon the very meaning of "good judgment." One cannot, after all, very well educate for good judgment if one does not even know what it is. And, at least within educational circles, there has been and continues to be a distressing lack of clarity about what, precisely, "good judgment" means. Though the tentacles of good judgment reach far, the heart of the concept lays quietly obscured.²

Good judgment, we argued, is neither a "mysterious faculty" nor an "inscrutable quality."³ It is not a "quality of so-called mother-wit" whose "lack no school can make good."⁴ Rather, following the lead of Low-Beer, Norman, and Lawson, we argued that good judgment is a "character trait" which is comprised of a "bundle" of abilities and dispositions.⁵ To say that someone *has* good judgment "is merely to employ a figure of speech."⁶ It is to say that she has the power to "consistently" exercise good judgment.

To have this power is to be ready and able to engage in the process of *judging well*. Judging well, like all judging, is a process of deciding from among "live hypotheses" through *thinking*.⁷ Unlike all judging, however, judging well is performed through thinking which is particularly well-suited to the work of judging. It is, we argued, deciding through *good thinking*.⁸

Good thinking is, first of all, thinking which is performed through the skillful exercise of a variety of appropriate *cognitive moves*. Cognitive moves are functionally distinct mental movements which, when viewed collectively, account for the ongoing flow of thinking. Some cognitive moves have been historically proven to be especially useful in the work of judging well. Reflecting upon Jackson's "Good Thinker's Tool Kit," we argued that among these useful moves are Clarifying Matters, Seeking Justification, Working with Assumptions, Working with Inferences, Using Examples, and Being Receptive.⁹ Good thinking, we contended, proceeds through the skillful use of such moves.¹⁰

Good thinking is also "reflective thinking."¹¹ It is performed through the complex cognitive act of *leaning back upon* one's fund of "thought."¹² This complex move is comprised of an initial *reflective* move through which one accesses one's fund of thought and then a subsequent *self-corrective* move through which one employs the reflected upon thought in order to direct the course of one's thinking and judging.¹³

While good thinking may reflect back on thought which is both worthless and worthwhile, we argued, it tends to take its lead only from the latter. Good thinking is directed by not just any thought but rather by a qualitatively rich, meaning-laden, and pragmatically useful *understanding* of one's world, oneself, and others.¹⁴

Such an understanding, unlike information (whose value is as the "raw material" of understanding) cannot be "dispensed" to one.¹⁵ It must be created by one. The *possession of an understanding* upon which to lean back, then, entails having *the power to understand*.¹⁶

To have this power to understand is to possess both the *ability to understand* and the *disposition to understand*. To have the ability to understand is to be able to skillfully employ the cognitive moves through which understanding is made.¹⁷ To have the disposition to understand is to be infected with a sense of wonder or "intellectual curiosity" which goads one to live the examined life and relentlessly pursue understanding.¹⁸

The characteristic outcomes of the sort of good thinking which is imbued with all of these qualities are *good judgments*.¹⁹ Good judgments, like all judgments, are at one and the same time the settlement of some uncertainty, the affirmation of an alternative, the product of one's thought, the proclamation of one's resolve, and a promise of future action. Unlike all judgments, however, good judgments are *judgments which fit with one's situation*.²⁰

Imbued with a good understanding and arrived at through sound thinking, judgments which fit respect the governance of one's situation and, thus, do not run afoul of this situation.²¹ They are true to one's world, oneself, and others and, because of this, lead to consequences which are, we asserted, both *empirically satisfying* (they verify the judgment) and *psychologically satisfying* (they are accompanied by the agent's experience of ease and, sometimes, being pleased).²²

Having chased the concept of good judgment from the shadows, it became clear that good judgment can be cultivated. To cultivate good judgment one need only cultivate the abilities and dispositions which make good thinking distinct. Abilities and dispositions, we argued, are things which can be cultivated. One can enable people to employ certain cognitive moves and to lean back on their understandings. One can also make them disposed to employ cognitive moves, to make use of their understandings, to respect others, and to continue to wonder.²³

Not only *can* good judgment be cultivated but, indeed, it *ought* to be cultivated. Turning to the normative question of what the primary tasks of education ought to be, we argued that because our schools have been distracted by other matters they have paid too little heed to the vital task of cultivating good judgment.²⁴ This, we asserted, is most unfortunate for, given the fact that our wisdom has not kept pace with our technological prowess, it certainly seems that now, more than ever, our world is in desperate need of good judgment.²⁵

But how can one actually go about cultivating good judgment? In answering this second foundational question we examined the community of inquiry approach of The Philosophy for Children Program (P4C). This approach -- characterized by "intellectual safety," "disciplined conversation," self-governance, reflection, self-correction, wonder, and the practice of certain social behaviors and cognitive moves -- is, we argued, an exceptionally effective means through which to cultivate good judgment.²⁶

Within the community of inquiry children are gently encouraged to *observe*, to *practice*, and to *reflect upon* the modes of thinking and acting which are essential to the exercise of good judgment. So engaged, the children come to *internalize* these modes of thinking and acting. They become ready and able to skillfully employ cognitive moves, to wonder, to engage in social behaviors which add to one's ability to understand, and to lean back upon their meaning-laden and useful understandings of their world, themselves and

others. Thusly prepared, children become empowered to judge well and, so, to make good judgments.²⁷

Where To Go

Having gone back over the terrain which has been covered, it is left to hint at the terrain which has yet to be covered. The challenge raised by philosophical examinations is not, as Jackson says, that there is *too little* space within which to explore. It is that there are *too many* possible directions in which to go.²⁸ Far from concluding matters, this work has suggested numerous tantalizing avenues for further inquiry.

To travel for any length down any of these avenues is beyond the scope of this work. This being said, we shall, however, give brief heed to two tasks which, to my mind, are richly deserving of future exploration. The first task is an empirical one: more assessment of Philosophy for Children must be done. The second task is a philosophical one: more attention must be given to the link between judgment and action.

(1) In keeping with the spirit of fallibilism which permeates this work it must be admitted that our claim that P4C's community of inquiry approach is an effective means through which to cultivate good judgment is a hypothesis. It is a hypothesis in which I have confidence for it is by no means unfounded. But, nonetheless, I believe that this hypothesis could be and, indeed, should be better supported.

There has been quite a bit of empirical research done on the connection between P4C and thinking skills.²⁹ There has not been enough research done, however, on the connection between P4C and some of the other elements of good judgment. Does P4C empower children to be more reflective and self-corrective? Does P4C inspire children to wonder? Does P4C arm children with the social behaviors which are prerequisites to disciplined conversation? Does P4C help children to become more empathetic, respectful,

and caring? Our case would be bolstered and made more convincing if these research questions were addressed. Studies need to be done in order to show that P4C not only empowers children with a wide range of abilities but also cultivates within them lasting dispositions.

(2) Previously we argued that a judgment can be as good as it gets but still not be verified by its consequences.³⁰ A judgment may be informed by a good understanding, crafted through good thinking, and even have an air of rightness about it but yet still fail to fit.

One reason why potentially good judgments never go on to be proven, we further argued, is because they are never fulfilled through action.³¹ A judgment, as we have defined it, is not a physical "making, doing, or saying" which occurs within the world.³² Rather, it is a *promise* to engage in some future making, doing, or saying which may or may not be fulfilled through action.

Judgments sometimes go unfulfilled because, as Aristotle notes, the agent who makes the judgment "does not abide by the conclusions of his deliberations."³³ Consider, for instance, the case of a young man who resolves not to try illegal drugs but yet, when confronted with his friend's exhortations, fails to make good on his commitment. This young man, to again use Aristotle's words, "is like a city which passes all the right decrees and has good laws, but makes no use of them."³⁴

That one can, of one's own accord, fail to make good on one's judgments is of great educational significance for the "cash-value" of any judgment ultimately lies not in its making but rather in the consequences of the actions which fulfill it.³⁵ An unfulfilled judgment, like a broken promise, has slight worth. The work of cultivating good judgment makes little practical difference if the children do not, in addition to thinking good thoughts, perform good deeds.

It is not enough, then, to ask only how one might cultivate good judgment. One must also ask what, if anything, can be done to dispose children to fulfill their good judgments through action.

The answer to this educational question depends upon the answer to an underlying question: Why does the fulfillment of judgments through action happen (or fail to happen)? What are the factors which make this happening more or less likely?

Seeking an answer to this question would involve considering psychological research on *habit, motivation* and, I suspect, *self-esteem, self-confidence, self-understanding, and resiliency theory*.³⁶ Even more fundamentally, it would involve a thorough philosophical examination of the relationship between judgment and action. One would have to clarify and explore the connection between such concepts as *action, desire, intention, volition, courage*, and, perhaps most importantly, *will*.³⁷

Such a painstaking examination is, unfortunately, well beyond the scope of this work. I do, however, want to propose, in the few pages which follow, a tentative hypothesis. This hypothesis is, to be sure, an almost bare skeleton; it still needs to be nourished by the fruits of philosophical reflection and empirical research. But it is worth considering both because it paves the way for future inquiry and because it is unsatisfying to end this work without saying something about how one might empower children to not only *make* good judgments but, indeed, to *make use* of such judgments.

Our hypothesis is as follows: P4C is an educational approach which makes children more disposed to fulfill their judgments because it enhances their self-confidence. There is, we shall argue, a link between being disposed to act upon one's judgments and possessing self-confidence and, so too, between gaining self-confidence and the community of inquiry approach of Philosophy for Children.

We begin by admitting that, lacking the fruits of much careful philosophical study, we cannot say precisely why judgments are (or are not) fulfilled through action. We can

fairly observe, however, that the fulfillment of a judgment through action is an event which either happens or does not happen. The fulfillment of a judgment is, at the most basic phenomenological level, a *happening*.

One factor, among however many such factors as there may be, which makes this happening more likely is, we assert, *self-confidence*. If someone is confident in herself, then, when it comes time to act, she is less likely to waiver.

That the presence of self-confidence increases the likelihood of action is a point which is implicit within Aristotle's consideration of courage:

[The coward] is lacking also in confidence; but he is more conspicuous for his excess of fear in painful situations. The coward, then, is a despairing sort of person; for he fears everything. The brave man, on the other hand, has the opposite disposition; for confidence is the mark of a hopeful disposition.³⁸

"The brave man is as dauntless as man may be."³⁹ Even in the face of what is fearful the brave man still stands true to his judgment of what ought to be done. Why does he, unlike the coward, act? Because, Aristotle suggests, unlike the coward the brave man has confidence in himself.

P4C, we propose, is an educational means which increases children's self-confidence and, hence, makes it more likely that they will act upon their judgments. P4C increases children's self-confidence by (1) arming them with self-understanding, (2) providing them with care, and (3) providing them with an opportunity to succeed.

P4C increases children's self-confidence by arming them with self-understanding. In the community of inquiry, we have argued, children are given the opportunity to reflect upon their own lives and learn about the lives of others.⁴⁰ This helps them to gain self-understanding. This self-understanding, Don Hamachek argues, "promotes a sense of control and confidence in oneself."⁴¹ If one knows oneself well, then one can, when deciding between live hypotheses, better appraise which alternative is best for one. More confident in the authenticity of one's judgment, one holds one's judgment with more

conviction and, as a consequence, is less likely to waiver when the time comes to act upon one's judgment.

P4C increases children's self-confidence by providing them with care. Proponents of resiliency theory argue that the experience of being cared for is a vital "protective factor" which helps children to overcome obstacles and to grow into "competent, confident, and caring" adults.⁴² While the research data does not tell *why* "the level of caring" is "a powerful indicator of positive outcomes," Joanne Joseph suggests that knowing that someone else believes in one and that someone will still care for one regardless of one's successes or failures makes it less likely that one will be timid on account of a "fear [of] negative evaluations or mistakes" and more likely that one will have the confidence "to take advantage of new opportunities."⁴³

The community of inquiry, Jackson explains, is a "safe place" where children "care about one another and show that they do."⁴⁴ It is, as sixth grader Michael puts it, "like a big family" where children can talk, be listened to, be taken seriously, and, as fifth grader Dustin says, "forget about all the bad things that are happening in their lives."⁴⁵

Not all children, thankfully, are in need of the care which the community of inquiry provides; many children get ample love from their family and friends. There are, however, other children who are not loved enough. I have, during my years of teaching and counseling, seen all too many of these children. Children who are abused. Children who are neglected. Children who whimper in hunger while their parents get high on drugs. Children who, no matter how hard they try, can never please their always-working parents. These children cry out for caring. Though the community of inquiry likely will not by itself be enough to compensate for this dearth of caring, it can help. The community of inquiry can be a lifeline; it can be a place from whence children draw strength and confidence and, so too, learn that they matter.

P4C increases children's self-confidence by providing them with an opportunity to succeed. "With each accomplishment students gain self-confidence."⁴⁶ Success, James McGerald and John A. Nidds emphasize, breeds self-confidence.

The child who masters a difficult problem not only feels good but develops something more powerful -- confidence!⁴⁷

By establishing a "success record" for a child, by helping her to see that she can succeed, one inspires within her the confidence to continue to succeed.⁴⁸

For some children success at school comes easily. There are other children, however, who have difficulty in traditional academic disciplines. Perhaps they have learning disabilities or, due to turbulent home lives, cannot properly attend to their studies. For these children school does not bring with it confidence-boosting success. Quite to the contrary, school repeatedly deals them confidence-sapping blows.

For such children it is imperative, as Jackson puts it, to "reshuffle the deck." One can help these children to gain confidence by putting them within alternative environments where they are more likely to be successful. "Enrichment" activities like art, music, and athletics all draw upon "intelligences" other than those which are tapped by traditional academic subjects.⁴⁹ By including activities such as these in the curriculum one can help frequently unsuccessful children to be successful.

The community of philosophical inquiry is another alternative forum within which these children can excel and gain confidence. Philosophy, like art or music, calls forth and values talents which are not always appreciated during the rest of the school day. During philosophy-time one is judged not by the neatness of one's writing or one's skill at taking tests. Rather, one's measure is taken by the depth of one's thinking, the earnestness of one's wonder, and the steadfastness of one's care.

That P4C does, in fact, "reshuffle the deck" and, as consequence, can have a tremendously beneficial effect upon the confidence (and, indeed, the lives) of children is

illustrated by the story of Andrew. Andrew was a fourth grader in Australia whose life, as Lyn English and Karen McIntosh report, "changed for the better" "during the course of eight months" spent doing philosophy.⁵⁰

Before beginning *Philosophy for Children*, English and McIntosh report, Andrew did not feel good about himself:

Andrew was a year older than his peers, having repeated second grade. Both his social and academic skills were poor, with the result that his self-esteem and self-confidence suffered greatly. On one occasion when Andrew was looking particularly miserable, he was taken aside and encouraged to express his feelings. After some time he revealed that he felt nobody liked him, not even his parents. Most of all, Andrew hated himself. The distress Andrew was feeling was evident in his sobbing as he related his concerns to his teacher. He clearly felt a failure.⁵¹

Andrew had little self-confidence, in large part, because he had no record of accomplishment upon which to draw. Finding nothing that he was good at, Andrew came to believe that he was no good.

But there was, Andrew and his classmates discovered when they began their P4C sessions, something at which Andrew was good. Andrew was good at "thinking."⁵² I am good at thinking, Andrew reported, "because I'm always thinking about things..."⁵³

Andrew's success brought with it, as English and McIntosh report, "a noticeable change in Andrew's attitude towards school and life in general." Andrew was "transformed from a shy, introverted youngster to a happy, outgoing personality."⁵⁴ "By the end of the school year, Andrew had made significant gains in all subject areas and had shown the greatest improvement of all the children in his class."⁵⁵

P4C provided Andrew with "the opportunity to display his talents."⁵⁶ It "reshuffled the deck"; giving Andrew the opportunity to succeed and to be recognized for his achievement. This experience of success, in turn, boosted Andrew's confidence.

The *community of inquiry's* potential to foster self-confidence is also illustrated by the case of another child. Heidi, a sixth grader in Hawai'i, was a student in Beth Ajifu's

class.⁵⁷ Heidi was, Ajifu explained, awkward and unsure of herself. She was an extremely quiet girl who, as Heidi herself later said, would "never talk and was always shy and was afraid to do anything."⁵⁸ She was, said Ajifu, "on the periphery of the class" and was not "valued by her classmates."⁵⁹

As the year progressed, however, Heidi "blossomed as an individual." She became more courageous. Not only did she start to talk during class but, with time, became a leader who was respected and "very sought after" by her peers. Heidi, explains Ajifu, "became the center of the class."

Heidi's transformation, Heidi's own writing suggests, was intimately related to her class' practice of P4C:

[Philosophy] is also a good thing for kids because it...makes you talk more than just being quiet all the time. For example: Me I used to never talk and was always shy and was afraid to do anything but now I'm arguing with Sara about things in philosophy circle and I'm not letting anyone boss me around and I'm standing up for my rights and things I believe in.⁶⁰

During philosophy-time, Ajifu explains, Heidi "learned that what she said could influence what others thought." She learned that "she could say thought provoking things." With these discoveries Heidi's self-confidence grew. Like Andrew, Heidi came to believe that she could be successful and, emboldened by this belief, began to pursue success. Her achievements within the community of inquiry gave her a confidence which, as Ajifu puts it, "spread out into" the rest of her life.

Conclusion: In Their Own Words

A newspaper article tells the story about how a nineteen year old beat his best friend to death. Why did the young man kill his friend? It was not because he harbored ill feelings against his friend but rather because he was zealously following his gang's code of

conduct. "I was listening to what they were saying," he said, "trying to impress everybody, trying to look hard."⁶¹

As I read this story my mind travels back to a conversation which I had with former fifth grade teacher Jean Matsumoto. Matsumoto, by any measure a truly outstanding teacher, was retiring after some forty years in the classroom. As she packed the last of her classroom items into her car she reflected upon her many years of teaching. Traditional academic subjects, she said, were never the most important thing to her. What she always aimed to do, above all else, was to help her students to become *good people*.

Matsumoto, like Dewey, has gotten it right.⁶² It is not enough in today's world to teach children how to read, write, and calculate. It is not enough to fill their minds with facts, to arm them with dazzling computer skills, or to prepare them for tests. Though these things may be important, we must do more.

If we want our children and, with them, our society to flourish, we need to prepare them to live wisely and well. We must empower them to judge well, to think well, and to understand deeply. Just as importantly we must help them to know themselves and, so too, to care for others. We must arm them with the interpersonal talents which will enable them to successfully interact within their society and, finally, enrich them with a spirit of wonder.

Philosophy for Children is most commonly presented as a "thinking skills" program. Indeed, it is. But it is also much more. The community of inquiry is, as Jackson notes, a place of laughter and joy.⁶³ It is a safe place where children come together in fellowship and proceed forwards with wonder and care. It is a place where children and, so too, their teachers are granted permission to slow down, to reflect deeply, and to think for themselves about the things which matter most. It is, put most simply, a place where good judgment is cultivated. It is a place where children are empowered and disposed to live not just smartly and successfully but, more importantly, wisely and well.

We conclude by returning, as all matters concerned with education ultimately ought to do, to the classroom. Michelle and Heidi were sixth graders who belonged (and, to my mind, will forever belong) to a classroom community of philosophical inquiry. Their writing is imbued with a sincerity and a clarity of insight which admirably conveys the richness and worth of the community of inquiry approach. In their words one finds justification and, indeed, inspiration for the work of cultivating good judgment.

Yes, I think philosophy is a good thing for kids. Because they can learn a lot of things from it and they can learn different ways of thinking. Meaning that they would be able to see things from a different point of view. By scratching beneath the surface, kids can understand things that they never thought about before.

For example if we were talking about people who go into liquor stores, you would assume that they drink liquor. But we wouldn't really think about all the different reasons the people would be there. Like maybe they work there or they're buying something for a friend. So with philosophy you would think harder and scratch beneath the surface.

Also philosophy can give you the habit of asking a lot of questions. It makes you curious and helps you stop and think.

Michelle

I think that philosophy is a good thing for kids because it gives kids a better understanding about subjects, for example: the subject about culture we talked about the different cultures and the different things that those cultures do and eat and what religion they have. It's also fun like the kiss game we did a long time ago or throwing the ball and everyone has to raise their hands and we have to get the ball to everyone in a fast time. It's also a good thing for kids because it helps them become more patient like when your waiting for your turn, another reason it's good is that it makes you talk more than just being quiet all the time. For example: Me I used to never talk and was always shy and was afraid to do anything but now I'm arguing with Sara about things in philosophy circle and I'm not letting anyone boss me around and I'm standing up for my rights and things I believe in. That's what philosophy can help you out with and help you to be less shy and to talk in front of a lot of people with out being scared. It can also help you make new friends like when you agree with them in a certain subject. You can also think more and learn more like from a topic your not really familiar with, for example: if you were talking about coin collecting you could here other peoples opinions and feelings about collecting coins. I think philosophy is a very good thing for kids to have these days.

Heidi⁶⁴

Notes

- ¹See Plato, *The Republic*, [376c]. See Chapter One, Two Questions.
- ²See Chapter One, Two Questions.
- ³Low-Beer (1995), p. 26. Norman (1996), p. 260. See Chapter Three, Good Judgment is a Character Trait.
- ⁴Kant (1787), p. 177. See Chapter Four, Good Judgment Can Be Taught.
- ⁵Norman (1996), p. 259. Low-Beer (1995), p. 167.
- ⁶Lawson (1961), p. 8.
- ⁷James (1896), p. 458.
- ⁸See Chapter One, Judging Well.
- ⁹See Jackson (1998), pp. 20-23.
- ¹⁰See Chapter Two.
- ¹¹Dewey (1933), p. 3.
- ¹²Dewey (1933), p. 4. James (1890), pp. 185-186.
- ¹³See Chapter Three, Reflective Thinking.
- ¹⁴See Chapter Three, Leaning Back on Understanding and Gaining Understanding.
- ¹⁵Roszak (1986), p. 95. Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980), p. 13.
- ¹⁶See Chapter Three, Gaining Understanding.
- ¹⁷See Chapter Three, The Ability to Understand.
- ¹⁸Dewey (1933), pp. 38-39. See Chapter Three, The Disposition to Understand.
- ¹⁹See Chapter Four, Good Thinking and Good Judgments.
- ²⁰See Chapter Four, Good Judgments.
- ²¹See Chapter Four, Leaning Back on Understanding and Good Judgments, The Power to Understand and Good Judgments, and Cognitive Moves and Good Judgments.

- ²²See Chapter Four, Consequences and Good Judgments.
- ²³See Chapter Four, Good Judgment Can Be Taught.
- ²⁴See Chapter Five, Education and Good Judgment.
- ²⁵See Chapter Five, The Need for (and Lack of) Good Judgment.
- ²⁶Jackson (1998), p. 3. Tiles (1995), p. 93. See Chapter Six, The Characteristics of The Community of Inquiry.
- ²⁷See Chapters Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten.
- ²⁸See Chapter Eight, P4C and Possessing Understanding.
- ²⁹See Chapter Seven, P4C: A Proven Means by which to Cultivate Cognitive Moves.
- ³⁰See Chapter Four, Judgments which Fail to Fit.
- ³¹See Chapter Four, Judgments which Fail to Fit.
- ³²Buchler (1951), p. viii.
- ³³Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics, [1152a].
- ³⁴Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics, [1152a].
- ³⁵James (1907), p. 92. See Chapter Four, Consequences and Good Judgments.
- ³⁶See, for instance, Joseph (1994), Benard (1993), Krovetz (1999), Sagor (1996), Hamachek (2000), and McGerald and Nidds (1996).
- ³⁷See, for instance, "The Psychology of Willing" and "Acting, Willing, Desiring" in Prichard (1949). See also Dewey (1916), pp. 128 and 137 and Giroux (1988), p. 136.
- ³⁸Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics, [1115b-1116a].
- ³⁹Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics, [1115b].
- ⁴⁰See Chapter Eight, P4C and Possessing Understanding.
- ⁴¹Hamachek (2000), pp. 236-237.
- ⁴²Krovetz (1999), pp. 8-10. "The foundation for resiliency theory," writes Martin Krovetz, is the "definitive research" of Emmy Werner and Ruth Smith. (Krovetz 1999, p.

7.) Werner and Smith conducted a longitudinal study of the lives of "614 eight-year-olds, all born in 1955 on the island of Kauai." (Krovetz 1999, p. 8.) Despite their exposure to many risk-factors, Werner and Smith found that many of these children grew up to be "competent, confident, and caring" adults. (Krovetz 1999, p. 8.) Having discovered that, given the same risk-factors, some children thrive while others fail, social scientists endeavored to identify the "environmental characteristics" which set the "resilient" child apart from her less-successful peers. (Benard 1993, p. 45 and Krovetz 1999, p. 7.)

⁴³Benard (1993), p. 44. Joseph (1994), p. 7. Our contention that simply knowing that someone else cares for and believes in one will make one more confident in oneself is inspired by C. H. Cooley's theory of the "looking glass self." The contention that one will be more confident in oneself on account of one's perception that one will be cared for regardless of one's success or failures is inspired by Carl Rogers' concept of "unconditional positive regard." See Joseph (1994), pp. 5-7.

⁴⁴Jackson (1998), pp. 3-4.

⁴⁵Taken from student year-end evaluations of Philosophy for Children. Michael was a student in Beth Ajifu's class (1996-1997).

⁴⁶McGerald and Nidds (1996), p. 55. McGerald and Nidds are quoting "inner-city math teacher" Jaime Escalante.

⁴⁷McGerald and Nidds (1996), p. 55. McGerald and Nidds are quoting "inner-city math teacher" Jaime Escalante.

⁴⁸Joseph (1994), p. 9.

⁴⁹See Gardner (1983).

⁵⁰English and McIntosh (1991), p. 37.

⁵¹English and McIntosh (1991), p. 37.

⁵²English and McIntosh (1991), p. 38.

⁵³English and McIntosh (1991), p. 38.

⁵⁴English and McIntosh (1991), p. 37.

⁵⁵English and McIntosh (1991), p. 38.

⁵⁶English and McIntosh (1991), p. 38.

⁵⁷Pearl Harbor Elementary School, 1996-1997.

⁵⁸From Heidi's year-end assessment of P4C: May, 1997.

⁵⁹The quotations of Ajifu are gathered from a 1998 interview with her.

⁶⁰From Heidi's year-end assessment of P4C: May, 1997.

⁶¹Honolulu Advertiser: June 28, 1986 (p. A1).

⁶²Dewey (1933), p. 120.

⁶³Jackson (1998), pp. 3-4.

⁶⁴These are Michelle's and Heidi's year-end evaluations of Philosophy for Children in their entirety. Michelle and Heidi were students in Beth Ajifu's 1996-1997 sixth grade class at Pearl Harbor Elementary School.

Bibliography

- Abernathy, Charles M. and Hamm, Robert M. (1995) Surgical Intuition: What It Is And How To Get It. Philadelphia: Hanley & Belfus, 1995.
- Adler, Mortimer J. (1982). The Paideia Proposal. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1982.
- Aristotle. Metaphysics. In The Works of Aristotle: Volume VIII. Translated by W. D. Ross. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1928.
- Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by David Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980.
- Aristotle. The Politics. Translated by T. A. Sinclair. New York: Penguin Books, 1981.
- Bacon, Francis. (1597) Meditationes Sacrae. In The Works of Francis Bacon: Volume VII. Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath. New York: Garrett Press, Inc., 1968.
- Bacon, Francis. (1605) The Advancement of Learning. Edited by William Aldis Wright. Oxford; The Clarendon Press, 1900.
- Bacon, Francis. (1620) Novum Organum. In The Works of Francis Bacon: Volume IV. Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath. New York: Garrett Press, Inc., 1968.
- Benard, Bonnie. (1993), "Fostering Resiliency in Kids." In Educational Leadership. Vol. 51, no. 3, pp. 44-48.
- Bergman, Merrie, and Moor, James, and Nelson, Jack. (1990) The Logic Book: Second Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1990.
- Bernstein, Richard J. (1983) Beyond Objectivism and Relativism. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983.
- Brady, Marion. (2000). "The Standards Juggernaut." In Phi Delta Kappan. Vol. 81, no. 9, pp. 649-651.
- Buchler, Justus. (1951) Toward a General Theory of Human Judgment. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951.
- Buchler, Justus. (1955) Nature and Judgment. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955.

- Cam, Philip (editor). (1993a) Thinking Stories I: Philosophical Inquiry for Children. Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1993.
- Cam, Philip (editor). (1993b) Thinking Stories I: Teacher Resource/Activity Book: Philosophical Inquiry for Children. Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1993.
- Cam, Philip (editor). (1994a) Thinking Stories II: Philosophical Inquiry for Children. Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1993.
- Cam, Philip (editor). (1994b) Thinking Stories II: Teacher Resource/Activity Book: Philosophical Inquiry for Children. Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1993.
- Cam, Philip. (1994c) "Thinking Across The Curriculum." In Improving the Quality of Thinking in a Changing World: The Sixth International Conference on Thinking (Massachusetts Institute of Technology: July 17-22, 1994). Front Royal, Virginia: National Cassette Services, Inc., 1994.
- Collins, James D. (1962) The Lure of Wisdom. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1962.
- Colvin, Andrew (1995), The Good Thinker's Tool Kit Game. Unpublished Manuscript.
- Copi, Irving M. and Cohen, Carl. (1990) Introduction to Logic: Eighth Edition. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990.
- Coquillette, Daniel R. (1992) Francis Bacon. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1992.
- Crosby, Emeral A. (1999). "Urban Schools: Forced to Fail." In Phi Delta Kappan. Vol. 81, no. 4, pp. 298-303.
- Dalmiya, Vrinda (1996) "Why Don't Lovers of Wisdom Dare to Love." In Knowledge, Teaching and Wisdom. Edited by Keith Lehrer, B. Jeannie Lum, Beverly A. Slichta, Nicholas D. Smith. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996.
- Davis, Daniel F. and Lunger, Norman. (1987) A History of the United States Since 1945. United States of America: Scholastic Inc., 1987.
- Deleuze, Giles. (1963) Kant's Critical Philosophy. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.
- de Puig, Irene. (1994) "Beyond Knowledge, Wisdom: A revindication of the Practical Character of Philosophy." In Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children. Vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 22-24.
- Deutsch, Eliot. (1968) The Bhagavad Gita. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968.
- Deutsch, Eliot. (1979) On Truth: An Ontological Theory. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1979.

- Deutsch, Eliot. (1992) Creative Being: The Crafting of Person and World. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992.
- Dewey, John. (1900) The School and Society and The Child and The Curriculum. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990.
- Dewey, John. (1909) Moral Principles in Education. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1975.
- Dewey, John. (1916) Democracy and Education. New York: The Free Press, 1966.
- Dewey, John. (1925) Experience and Nature. In John Dewey: The Later Works: volume 1. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981.
- Dewey, John. (1926) The Public and Its Problems. Denver: Alan Swallow, 1954.
- Dewey, John. (1933) How We Think. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1933.
- Dewey, John. (1934) Art as Experience. In John Dewey: The Later Works: volume 10. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987.
- Dewey, John. (1938a) Experience and Education. New York: Collier Books, 1963.
- Dewey, John. (1938b) Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. In John Dewey: The Later Works: volume 12. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986.
- Dewey, John. (1948) Reconstruction in Philosophy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957.
- Doyle, Sir Arthur Conan. (1887) A Study in Scarlet. Pleasantville, New York: The Reader's Digest Association, Inc., 1986.
- Einstein, Albert. (1946) "Telegram to Prominent Americans." In The New York Times. May 25, 1946.
- Einstein, Albert. (1956) Out of My Later Years. New Jersey: Wings Books, 1993.
- English, Lyn and McIntosh, Karen. (1991). "'Now It's My Turn': Andrew's encounter with the *Pixie* Program." In Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children. Vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 37-38.
- Freire, Paulo. (1970) Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Translated by Myra Bergman Ramos. New York: The Continuum Publishing Company, 1993.
- Freire, Paulo. (1992) Pedagogy of Hope. Translated by Robert R. Barr. New York: The Continuum Publishing Company, 1994.

- Freire, Paulo. (1998) Pedagogy of Freedom. Translated by Patrick Clarke. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998.
- Gardner, Howard. (1983) Frames of Mind. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1983.
- Garza, Teresa de la. (1994) "Teaching for Thinking by means of the Community of Inquiry." In Improving the Quality of Thinking in a Changing World: The Sixth International Conference on Thinking (Massachusetts Institute of Technology: July 17-22, 1994). Front Royal, Virginia: National Cassette Services, Inc., 1994.
- Gazzard, Ann. (1990) "Some More Ideas About The Relation Between Philosophy for Children and Self-Esteem." In Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children. Vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 17-20.
- Giroux, Henry A. (1988) Teachers as Intellectuals: Towards A Critical Pedagogy Of Learning. Massachusetts: Bergin & Garvey Publishers, Inc., 1988.
- Godlovitch, S. (1994) "On Wisdom." In Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children. Vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 14-21.
- Graham, A. C. (translator) (1981) Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters. London: Mandala, 1986.
- Habermas, Jurgen. (1968) Knowledge and Human Interests. Translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.
- Hamcheck, Don. (2000) "Dynamics of Self-Understanding and Self-Knowledge: Acquisition, Advantages, and Relation to Emotional Intelligence." In Journal of Humanistic Counseling, Education and Development. Vol. 38, June 2000, pp. 230-242.
- Healy, Jane M. (1998) Failure to Connect: How Computers Affect Our Children's Minds -- for Better and Worse. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998.
- Heidegger, Martin (1927) Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. San Francisco: Harper & Row Publishers, 1962.
- Heinegg, James (1994) "Computers and Education for Thinking." In Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children. Vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 45-46.
- Hickman, Larry A. and Alexander, Thomas M. (editors). (1998) The Essential Dewey, Volume 2: Ethics, Logic, Psychology. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998.
- Hirsch, E. D. (1987) Cultural Literacy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1987.
- Hong, Laraine K. (2001). "Too Many Intrusions On Instructional Time." In Phi Delta Kappan. Vol. 82, no. 9, pp. 712-714.

- Jackson, Thomas. (1993) "1990-1991 Evaluation Report of Philosophy for Children in Hawaii." In Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children. Vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 36-42.
- Jackson, Thomas. (1998) Philosophy in the Schools Project: A Guide for Teachers. Unpublished Manuscript.
- Jackson, Thomas and Oho, Linda E. (1993). Getting Started in Philosophy: A Start-Up Kit for K-1. Unpublished Manuscript.
- James, William. (1890) The Principles of Psychology: Volume I. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1923.
- James, William. (1896) The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. In William James: Writings 1878-1899. Edited by Gerald E. Myers. New York: Literary Classics of the United States, Inc., 1992.
- James, William. (1907) Pragmatism. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1981.
- Johnson, Tony W. (1995) Discipleship or Pilgrimage? The Educator's Quest for Philosophy. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1995.
- Jones, Alan C. (2001). "Welcome to Standardville." In Phi Delta Kappan. Vol. 82, no. 6, pp. 462-464.
- Joseph, Joanne M. (1994). The Resilient Child. New York: Plenum Press, 1994.
- Kalupahana, David J. (1992) A History of Buddhist Philosophy. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992.
- Kalupahana, David J. (1994) The Buddha's Philosophy of Language. Unpublished manuscript.
- Kant, Immanuel. (1785) Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Lewis White Beck. New York: Macmillian Publishing Company, 1984.
- Kant, Immanuel. (1787) Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965.
- Kant, Immanuel. (1790) Critique of Judgment. Translated by J. H. Bernard. New York: Hafner Press, 1951.
- Kant, Immanuel. Education. United States of America: The University of Michigan Press, 1960.
- Kekes, John. (1983) "Wisdom." In American Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 277-286.
- Kohl, Herbert. (1967). 36 Children. New York: Plume/Penguin, 1988.

- Kohn, Alfie. (2001). "Fighting the Tests: A Practical Guide to Rescuing Our Schools." In Phi Delta Kappan. Vol. 82, no. 5, pp. 349-357.
- Krovetz, Martin L. (1999). Fostering Resiliency. Thousand Oaks, California: Corwin Press, 1999.
- Kyle, Judy A. (1993) "Managing Philosophical Discussions Using Self-Corrective 'Name-Recorder' Procedures." In Thinking Children and Education. Edited by Matthew Lipman. Duboque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1993, pp. 495-502.
- Lago, Juan Carlos. (1990) "The Community of Inquiry and the Development of Self-Esteem." In Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children. Vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 12-16.
- Lawson, Douglas E. (1961) Wisdom and Education. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1961.
- Lehrer, Keith, and Lum, B. Jeannie, and Slichta, Beverly A., and Smith, Nicholas D. (editors). (1996) Knowledge, Teaching and Wisdom. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996.
- Lickona, Thomas. (1991) Educating for Character. New York: Bantam Books, 1991.
- Lipman, Matthew. (1980) Mark. Montclair, New Jersey: Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, 1980.
- Lipman, Matthew. (1981) Pixie. Montclair, New Jersey: Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, 1981.
- Lipman, Matthew. (1982a) Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery. Montclair, New Jersey: Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, 1982.
- Lipman, Matthew. (1982b) "Philosophy for Children." In Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children. Vol. 3, no. 3&4, pp. 35-44.
- Lipman, Matthew. (1982c) "Why Aren't Reasoning Skills Being Taught?" In Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children. Vol. 3, no. 3&4, pp. 45-46.
- Lipman, Matthew. (1985) Lisa. Montclair, New Jersey: Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, 1985.
- Lipman, Matthew. (1986) Kio and Gus. Montclair, New Jersey: Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, 1986.
- Lipman, Matthew. (1987) Suki. Montclair, New Jersey: Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, 1987.
- Lipman, Matthew. (1988) Elfie. Montclair, New Jersey: Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, 1988.

- Lipman, Matthew. (1991) Thinking in Education. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Lipman, Matthew. (1992) "On Writing a Philosophical Novel." In Studies in Philosophy for Children: Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery. Edited by Ann Margaret Sharp and Ronald F. Reed. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992.
- Lipman, Matthew (editor). (1993a) Thinking Children and Education. Duboque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1993.
- Lipman, Matthew. (1993b) "Philosophy for Children and Critical Thinking." In Thinking Children and Education. Edited by Matthew Lipman. Duboque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1993, pp. 682-684.
- Lipman, Matthew. (1993c) "Promoting Better Classroom Thinking." In Educational Psychology. Vol. 13, no. 3&4, pp. 291-304.
- Lipman, Matthew. (1994) "Caring as Thinking." In Improving the Quality of Thinking in a Changing World: The Sixth International Conference on Thinking (Massachusetts Institute of Technology: July 17-22, 1994). Front Royal, Virginia: National Cassette Services, Inc., 1994.
- Lipman, Matthew. (1996a) Natasha: Vygotskian Dialogues. New York: Teachers College Press, 1996.
- Lipman, Matthew. (1996b) Nous. Montclair, New Jersey: Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, 1996.
- Lipman, Matthew. (1996c) Deciding What to Do: Instructional Manual to Accompany Nous. Montclair, New Jersey: Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, 1996.
- Lipman, Matthew and Gazzard, Ann. (1986) "Where we are now. Supplement no. 1." In Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children. Vol. 6, no. 4, pp. S1-S12.
- Lipman, Matthew and Gazzard, Ann. (1988a) Getting Our Thoughts Together: Instructional Manual to Accompany Elfie. Montclair, New Jersey: The Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, 1988.
- Lipman, Matthew and Gazzard, Ann. (1988b) "Where are we now. Supplement no. 2." In Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children. Vol. 7, no. 4, pp. S1-S20.
- Lipman, Matthew with Sharp, Ann Margaret. (1980a) Writing: How and Why: Instructional Manual to Accompany Suki. Montclair, New Jersey: The Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, 1980.
- Lipman, Matthew with Sharp, Ann Margaret. (1980b) Social Inquiry: Instructional Manual to Accompany Suki. Montclair, New Jersey: The Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, 1980.

- Lipman, Matthew and Sharp, Ann Margaret. (1984) Looking for Meaning: Instructional Manual to Accompany Pixie. Montclair, New Jersey: The Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children (with University Press of America), 1984.
- Lipman, Matthew and Sharp, Ann Margaret. (1985) Ethical Inquiry: Instructional Manual to Accompany Lisa. Montclair, New Jersey: The Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children (with University Press of America), 1985.
- Lipman, Matthew and Sharp, Ann Margaret. (1986) Wondering at the World: Instructional Manual to Accompany Kio and Gus. Montclair, New Jersey: The Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children (with University Press of America), 1986.
- Lipman, Matthew, Sharp, Ann Margaret, and Oscanyan, Frederick S. (1980) Philosophy in the Classroom. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980.
- Lipman, Matthew, and Sharp, Ann Margaret, and Oscanyan, Frederick S. (1984) Philosophical Inquiry: An Instructional Manual to Accompany Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery (Second Edition). Montclair, New Jersey: The Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children (with University Press of America), 1984.
- Locke, John (1689) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. New York: Collier Books, 1965.
- Low-Beer, F. H. (1995) Questions of Judgment. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1995.
- Lum, B. Jeannie (1996) "The Teaching of Wisdom: The Platonic Model of Teacher as Learner & Teaching as Inquiry." In Knowledge, Teaching and Wisdom. Edited by Keith Lehrer, B. Jeannie Lum, Beverly A. Slichta, Nicholas D. Smith. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996.
- Margolis, Arkady A. (1996) "A Comparison Between the Philosophy for Children Approach and the Cultural-Historical and Activity Approaches: Psychological and Educational Foundations." In Lipman, Matthew: Natasha: Vygotskian Dialogues. New York: Teachers College Press, 1996.
- Matthews, Gareth B. (1984) Dialogues with Children. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984.
- McGerald, James and Nidds, John A. (1996) "Self-Esteem or Self-Confidence?" In Principal. Vol. 76, no. 1, p. 55.
- Mead, George Herbert. (1910) "Language as Thinking." In Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children. Vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 23-26.
- Metzger, Bruce M. and Murphy, Roland E. (editors). The New Oxford Annotated Bible. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

- Mill, John Stuart. (1861) Utilitarianism. Edited by George Sher. United States of America: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1971.
- Monier-Williams, Sir Monier. (1899) Sanskrit-English Dictionary. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1988.
- Moore, Alan and Gibbons, Dave. (1987) Watchmen. Canada: DC Comics Inc., 1986-1987.
- Norman, Andrew P. (1996) "Teaching Wisdom." In Knowledge, Teaching and Wisdom. Edited by Keith Lehrer, B. Jeannie Lum, Beverly A. Slichta, Nicholas D. Smith. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996.
- Noddings, Nel. (1984) Caring, A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.
- Nussbaum, Martha C. (1997) Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997.
- O'Brien, Thomas C. (1999). "Parrot Math." In Phi Delta Kappan. Vol. 80, no. 6, pp. 434-438.
- Paget, Stephen. (1993) "The Way of Wonder." In Thinking Children and Education. Edited by Matthew Lipman. Duboque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1993, pp. 115-118.
- Passmore, John. (1967) "On Teaching to Be Critical." In The Concept of Education. Edited by R. S. Peters. New York: The Humanities Press, 1967.
- Passmore, John. (1980) The Philosophy of Teaching. London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1980.
- Peirce, C. S. (1877) "The Fixation of Belief." In Philosophical Writings of Peirce. Edited by Justus Buchler. New York: Dover, 1955.
- Perkins, David N., and Schwartz, Judah L., and West, Mary Maxwell, and Wiske, Martha Stone. (1995) Software Goes to School: Teaching for Understanding with New Technologies. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Piaget, Jean. (1968) Genetic Epistemology. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970.
- Plato. The Collected Dialogues of Plato. Edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961.
- Popham, W. James. (1999) "Why Standardized Tests Don't Measure Educational Quality." In Educational Leadership. Vol. 56, no. 6, pp. 8-15.
- Prichard, H. A. (1949) Moral Obligation. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1949.

- Pritchard, Michael S. (1993) "On Becoming a Moral Agent: From Aristotle to Harry Stottlemeier." In Thinking Children and Education. Edited by Matthew Lipman. Duboq, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1993, pp. 719-731.
- Rahula, Walpola. What the Buddha Taught. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1974.
- Ratmesar, Romesh. (1998) "Learning by Laptop." In Time. March 2, 1998, pp. 63-64.
- Reid, Ronald. (1994) "The Facilitation of Inquiry Through Conversation and Dialogue." In Improving the Quality of Thinking in a Changing World: The Sixth International Conference on Thinking (Massachusetts Institute of Technology: July 17-22, 1994). Front Royal, Virginia: National Cassette Services, Inc., 1994.
- Reps, Paul and Senzaki, Nyogen. (1998) Zen Flesh, Zen Bones: A Collection of Zen and Pre-Zen Writings. Boston: Tuttle Publishing, 1998.
- Robinson, Daniel N. (1990) "Wisdom Through the Ages." In Wisdom: Its Nature, Origins, and Development. Edited by Robert J. Sternberg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Rollins, Maughn. (1995) "Epistemological Considerations for the Community of Inquiry." In Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children. Vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 31-40.
- Roszak, Theodore. (1986) The Cult of Information. Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1994.
- Rousseau, Jean Jacques. (1762) Emile. In Jean Jacques Rousseau, his educational theories selected from Emile, Julie and Other Writings. Edited by R. L. Archer. New York: Barron's Educational Series, Inc. 1964.
- Russell, Bertrand. (1912) The Problems of Philosophy. London: Oxford University Press, 1959.
- Russell, Bertrand. (1954) "Knowledge and Wisdom." In The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell: Volume 11. Edited by John G. Slater with the assistance of Peter Köllner. London: Routledge, 1997.
- Sagor, Richard. (1996) "Building Resiliency in Students." In Educational Leadership. Vol. 54, no. 1, pp. 38-43.
- Sartre, Jean Paul. (1943) "The Flies." In No Exit and Three Other Plays. New York: Vintage Books, 1989.
- Sartre, Jean Paul. (1947) Existentialism. Translated by Bernard Frechtman. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1947.
- Sasseville, Michel. (1994) "Self-Esteem, Logical Skills and Philosophy for Children." In Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children. Vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 30-32.
- Sharp, Ann Margaret. (1991) "The Community of Inquiry: Education for Democracy." In Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children. Vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 31-37.

- Sharp, Ann Margaret and Reed, Ronald F. (editors) (1992) Studies in Philosophy for Children: Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992.
- Shor, Ira and Freire, Paulo. (1987) A Pedagogy for Liberation. New York: Bergin & Garvey Publishers, Inc., 1987.
- Silver, Ruth E. (1993) "Controlling the Classroom Clamor: A Few Techniques to Facilitate Philosophical Discourse." In Thinking Children and Education. Edited by Matthew Lipman. Duboque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1993, pp. 503-509.
- Simpson, Peter Phillips. (2001) Vices, Virtues, and Consequences: Essays in Moral and Political Philosophy. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2001.
- Skinner, B. F. (1971) Beyond Freedom and Dignity. New York: Bantam Books, 1971.
- Solomon, Robert C. (1984) Morality and The Good Life: An Introduction to Ethics Through Classical Sources. United States of America; McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1984.
- Sophocles. The Complete Greek Tragedies: Sophocles I. Edited by David Greene and Richmond Lattimore. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954.
- Splitter, Laurance J. (1986). "On Thinking for Yourself." In Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children. Vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 23-4.
- Splitter, Laurance J. and Sharp, Ann M. (1995) Teaching For Better Thinking: The Classroom Community of Inquiry. Melbourne, Australia: The Australian Council for Educational Research Ltd., 1995.
- State of Hawai'i Department of Education: Office of Accountability and School Instructional Support/School Renewal Group. (1999) Making Sense of Standards (Draft). Honolulu: State of Hawai'i, July 1999.
- Sternberg, Robert J. (editor). (1990) Wisdom: Its Nature, Origins, and Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Stoskopf, Alan. (2000) "SAT + ETS = \$\$\$." In Rethinking Schools. Vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 20-21.
- Stuhr, John J. (editor). (1987) Classical American Philosophy: Essential Readings and Interpretive Essays. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- Taylor, Richard. (1995) "The Dialogical Self." In Rethinking Knowledge. Edited by Robert F. Goodman and Walter R. Fisher. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1995.
- Thoreau, Henry David. (1854) Walden. New York: Vintage Books/The Library of America, 1991.

- Tiles, J. E. (1988) Dewey. London: Routledge, 1988.
- Tiles, J. E. (1995) "Education for Democracy." In Studies in Philosophy and Education. Vol. 13, 1994/1995, pp. 261-271.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1962) Thought and Language. Translated by Alex Kozulin. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1962.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1978) Mind in Society. Edited by M. Cole, V. John-Steiner, S. Scribner, and E. Souberman. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978.
- Weerasinghe, Henry. (1992) Education for Peace: The Buddha's Way. Sri Lanka: Sarvodaya Book Publishing Services, 1992.
- Whalley, Michael J. (1993) "The Practice of Philosophy in the Elementary School Classroom." In Thinking Children and Education. Edited by Matthew Lipman. Duboq, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1993, pp. 719-731.
- Whitehead, Alfred North. (1929) The Aims of Education and Other Essays. New York: The Free Press, 1967.
- Williams, Bernard. (1981) Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- Wong, Harry K. and Wong Rosemary Tripi. (1991). The First Days of School. Sunnyvale, California: Harry K. Wong Publications, 1991.
- Wurman, Richard Saul. (1989) Information Anxiety. New York: Bantam Books, 1990.
- Yos, Thomas B. (1993). Philosophy for Children: Weekly Observations of Elaine Tsuchiyama's Class; Ka'ala Elementary School, Wahiawa, Hawai'i, Spring 1993. Unpublished Paper.