BIOGRAPHICAL SUMMARY: Chuck Mau

Chuck Mau was born in Honolulu, January 10, 1907, and grew up in Chinatown. He received a scholarship to Mills School, now the Mid-Pacific Institute, and continued his education at the University of Colorado, where he received his law degree.

When he returned to Hawai‘i, Mau worked as the law secretary to justices of the Hawai‘i Supreme Court from 1933 to 1936. In 1936, he became the first full-blooded Asian to serve as deputy territorial attorney general. He entered private practice in 1940.

A pioneer in the Democratic party, Mau began his political career when he was elected to the Honolulu Board of Supervisors, serving from 1940 to 1946, and from 1948 to 1950. He was a delegate to the Democratic National Convention in 1948 and Hawaii Constitutional Convention in 1950. He was chairman of the central committee for the Democratic Party of Hawai‘i in 1950.

Mau served as a judge for the Tax Appeal Court from 1948 to 1950. He then became a judge of the First Circuit Court, serving from 1950 to 1951.

Chuck Mau died in 1990.
Tape No. 17-8-1-88

ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW

with

Chuck Mau (CM)

April 6, 1988

Honolulu, O'ahu

BY: Chris Conybeare (CC) and Daniel W. Tuttle, Jr. (DT)

CC: It's April 6, about 10:30 in the morning, and we're interviewing Chuck Mau as part of our continuing effort to document some of Hawai'i's political history on videotape. I think we'd like to start where we have with everyone and if you could give a little bit of background about your parents and where you were born and a little bit about circumstances at home when you were a child, so we get some sense of people's origins and the community they grew up in.

CM: Yes.

CC: So if you could start there.

CM: I was born, of course, in Honolulu in the Pāwa'a district [January 10, 1907]. That is some—eighty or more years ago?

(Laughter)

CM: ... for five cents, and accumulated a little fund for myself. (Laughs)
CC: How many brothers and sisters did you have?

CM: I had two sisters and five brothers.

DT: Oh, big family.

CM: Yeah, big. In those days, most of the Oriental families were large families.

CC: And, obviously, you went on to law school and things, but was education important for your parents? Did they encourage the children to...

CM: No, they were so poor that they couldn't think of anything but survival. And education was not that important excepting that my father tried to teach me a little Chinese, [and] to say that he didn't have a chance to go to school, and he'd like to have his children do that if they could. But they had no means to support us for that purpose.

CC: So did you have to work even as a child?

CM: Yes. As early as the age of seven, I was selling newspapers on the streets of Honolulu and even getting up at four o'clock in the morning to pick up the [Honolulu] Advertiser to sell it. I had a place at the corner of Fort and Beretania Streets, and that was my station. Then in the afternoon, after school, I went to get the [Honolulu] Star-Bulletin and sold the Star-Bulletin at the same corner.

DT: Both newspapers, then.

CM: Both newspapers. (Chuckles)

CC: When did you... We can skip ahead a little bit here, but when did you first find you had an interest in things having to do with politics and government and that sort of thing? Was it later, or were you interested in those things even then?

CM: No, no. It wasn't until after I finished graduating from the University of Colorado [at Boulder in 1933] with two degrees, the B.A. and the law degree, which they allowed at that time [to be done in] a six-year period. Today you have to do it in seven years: four years of arts and then three years of law.

But it wasn't until after my service as a deputy attorney general [1936-40] that I thought, you know, I would run for public office. Not that I thought I would get elected. As a matter of fact, when I came back from law school, I went to see Roy [Royal A.] Vitousek, who was then speaker of the [territorial] house [of representatives] and chairman of the central Republican party of Hawai'i. And I had an interview with him, hoping that he would sign me up as a Republican because my older brother had worked for A&B, Alexander & Baldwin, as a bookkeeper. And [my brother] spent many, many hours every election helping Roy Vitousek because Roy Vitousek's firm [Stanley, Vitousek, Pratt, & Winn] was general counsel to Alexander & Baldwin. But Roy Vitousek, surprisingly, refused to sign me up. He said "The Republicans have controlled the government in Hawai'i since we became a territory, and we Republicans will control it for another 100 years." So he didn't sign me up.
So, I had served as law secretary at first to Mr. Justice James J. Banks of the supreme court [of Hawai‘i]. Judge Banks was a Southerner from Alabama, and you know how the Southerners are, they are quite conservative and biased in their opinions. I served with him for about three years [1933–36] and, later on, Chief Justice [James L.] Coke and Mr. Justice [Charles F.] Parsons had me act as their law secretary as well, which involved helping them to write opinions for the supreme court of Hawai‘i.

After 3½ years [working with the supreme court], Judge [Samuel B.] Kemp from Texas was the attorney general [later chief justice], and I applied for a deputyship with him. And through the help of Judge Banks, who knew Judge Kemp quite well, both being Southerners, Kemp appointed me as a third attorney general [in 1936]. And that was the first time in the history of Hawai‘i that a full-blooded Oriental had been appointed a deputy attorney general. Prior to that time, there were part-Hawaiian and part-Chinese who were appointed. As an example, Ernie Kai, Ernest Kai, who was a Yale law graduate, was at that time the first deputy—yes, he was the first deputy [attorney general] under Judge Kemp.

CC: Can I go back to one thing. When Mr. Vitousek turned you down as a Republican, did you immediately go out and try to join the Democratic party? Or did you . . .

CM: No, no. I stayed away until I left the attorney general’s office [in 1940], having served another 3½ years there. One of the Heen brothers, Ernest Heen, [Sr.], who was then the [county] clerk [1933–44]—he was the brother of Judge William [H.] Heen, the territorial senator [1926–57, who was] probably the most influential [Democratic] senator in a Republican administration and a Republican legislature. The reason for [Heen’s] influence was that he was quite conservative. He didn’t act like a Democrat. In all of his bills in the legislature, in all of his actions, he acted like a Republican. He followed the Republican role. And for that reason, he never even approached me, but his brother, Ernest Heen, came to me one time and said, “You know, we’d like to have you run for the [City and County of Honolulu] board of supervisors [predecessor to the current city council].”

I said, “Why? I’m nobody. I wouldn’t be able to catch but a few votes.”

He said “Well, we have to fill the ticket.”

The reason was that at that time, in 1940 or so, to become a Democrat was to become an unwanted figure in Hawai‘i. It was [a] disgrace to be a Democrat, the Democrats were so weak. So he said, “We’d like you to run and help fill up the ticket.” Because, you see, there were seven supervisors at that time. Today it’s the city council and they run from districts, but [then], we ran from the whole island [i.e., at-large].

I said “Let me think about it.” After thinking about it, I said “Gee, I’m going to put my license up as a lawyer [while campaigning]. I won’t get elected, but at least I can tell people that I’m a lawyer and maybe I can help my law business.”

(Laughter)

CM: So I consented to run. Everywhere I went—we used to go stumping place to place, and [campaigned on] a few radio programs if you had the money—and I told everybody I was a lawyer. And lo and behold, I got elected. It was surprising to everybody in 1940.
CC: Did it surprise you, too?

CM: Surprised me. I didn’t expect to get elected. All I wanted to do was tell people I was a lawyer and build up legal business. So it was really surprising that we won. I think I was sixth, just a little ahead of Milton [D.] Beamer, the Republican. I may be mistaken about that, I may have been last, but I think I was sixth, and Milton Beamer was the seventh. And later on, he and I worked together even though he was a Republican and I was a Democrat on the board of supervisors.

DT: Can we dip back just a little bit? We got in the political career very early here. How was it—you had impoverished circumstances—how was it you were able to go back to [the] University of Colorado and get established in a bachelor’s degree and a law degree? And where had you gone to grammar school here? You’d gone to grammar school . . .

CM: I had gone to, first, Pauoa School, little after kindergarten, I guess, first and second grades, third grade. Then we moved from Pauoa to School Street, a little west of Liliha, and then later on moved to Vineyard Street closer to Nu‘uanu Avenue. And I enrolled in Central Grammar School and stayed there until the seventh grade. Then, because we were living in the slum district where all the children had little chance to progress. . . . There was a doctor, Theodore Richards, he married an Atherton [Mary C. Atherton], and he was influential in the Kauluwela School and the church there and he used to come there to help the church and contribute monies to the church through his wife’s largess. He saw us, me and my brothers, and said, “How would you like to go to Mills School,” which now is Mid-Pacific Institute, just above the University [of Hawaiʻi].

We said, “Well we don’t have any money, don’t have any clothes or anything.”

So he sent a high school instructor fellow by the name of Wyman, W-Y-M-A-N, who was a graduate of Dartmouth [College]. He was teaching school at Mid-Pacific. He came and talked to us, and through contributions by Dr. Richards, he bought us some clothes, two pairs of pajamas each. We had to bring our own sheets (chuckles), you know, and do our own laundry while we were at school. Three of my brothers [and I] were taken through the auspices of Dr. Richards, through this man Wyman, to enroll at Mid-Pacific Institute. While we were there we went to school in the morning and worked in the farm in the afternoon, just like the [work-study program at] Antioch [College] in Ohio. The same type of thing. The scholarship that Dr. Richards provided was a munificent sum of fifty dollars a year. Well, at that time, the tuition was not too high. It was a boarding school, so we ate there.

Now, the school was poor, [although] it had sugar stocks given by the Cooke family to Mid-Pacific. The trustees of Punahou [School] felt that many of the Orientals could not get into Punahou because either [their] scholastic training was not good enough, and most importantly, they didn’t have the money. So Mills School was formed by the Damon forbear [Rev. Frank Damon]. But the school was right on Chaplain Lane, which is a lane between Fort Street and Nu‘uanu, for six Chinese students originally. The Damon family seemed to have had some missionary ties with China, therefore, they felt the children of Chinese ancestry should have an opportunity to go to school here. Of course, later on, Mills School became Mid-Pacific Institute, and there were so many children whose parents worked at the plantation, they finally opened it up to all, anybody, but mostly Orientals.
CC:  Okay. Let’s stop there, we’ve run out of tape.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

Joy Chong: Following is tape number two of the Chuck Mau interview.

DT:  Well, from Mid-Pacific is a long way to Boulder, Colorado, where you went to college and law school. How did that come about, that you were able to get all the way from Mills College, the forerunner of Mid-Pacific, to Boulder, Colorado?

CM:  Well, when I was selling newspapers in the afternoon, I used to sell a [Honolulu] Star-Bulletin every afternoon—except for Saturday and Sunday, of course—to James J. Banks, who was then assistant U.S. district attorney. He was located in the building, that stone building, at the makai-'Ewa corner of Fort and Beretania Streets. That was where the Justice Department was. I used to sell him a newspaper every day. So, after I was in Mid-Pacific Institute, we kept up the contact, I did, and finally when I became a senior, James J. Banks, then a justice of the supreme court [of Hawai‘i], wrote to President [George] Norlin of the University of Colorado, stating that—unbeknownst to me—stating that I would like to matriculate at the University of Colorado.

The president wrote back and said, “If he doesn’t have money to carry him through two quarters”—we used to be [on] the quarter system—“and he had to work his way, he would break down in health.”

Again, unbeknownst to me, the judge wrote to the president again and said, “Nevertheless, the young man wants to try.”

So through Judge Banks, President Norlin got me a job with a doctor and his wife, and I was a house boy, you know, doing all the chores, even doing the lawn and sweeping off the snow from the sidewalks and so forth, and so forth. So the reason why he [Judge Banks] chose the University of Colorado was that after he left Birmingham, Alabama, he settled in Denver and became an assistant U.S. district attorney there, and his son had graduated from the University of Colorado. The son later went back to Birmingham and became superintendent of public instruction. So it was through Judge Banks that I landed in Boulder, Colorado.

DT:  That’s a very interesting story. Now to jump back to your tenure on the board of supervisors, you did gradually ease your way into politics, obviously, after you graduated from law school. How did you find your experience as a member of the board of supervisors?

CM:  Well, it helped my legal career because our names were constantly in the newspaper. I thought that the arena was too small and I wanted to broaden out and become a legislator. Having served four consecutive terms [1941–50], I decided to run for the [territorial] senate [in 1946. CM was not required to resign his supervisor seat to run for the senate]. Roy Vitousek, who was the one that refused to sign me up as a Republican, found out that I was too popular. He felt that because of the huge Japanese voting population, he would run a Japanese against me and he chose [Wilfred C.] Tsukiyama. Tsukiyama was a very fluent speaker, was a lawyer himself. And sure enough, Tsukiyama beat me by, I forget how many votes, between 3,000–7,000 votes. He made a very good senator, you know, on the Republican side, and finally became president of the senate [1949–54].
And actually he ran for Congress, actually went to Congress. [Tsukiyama in 1959 ran for a U.S. Senate seat but was defeated by Oren E. Long.]

Then, I went back and ran again for supervisor and was elected again in 1950. And then, of course, during my term there, President [Harry S.] Truman appointed me a judge of the circuit court, the first time in the history of the United States that a president of the United States had ever appointed a full-blooded Oriental to an American bench. As I said, prior to that time, there were other part-Hawaiian, part-Chinese. There was one on Kaua‘i, a fellow by the name of [William C.] Achi, [Jr.], A-C-H-I, who was a [circuit court] judge on Kaua‘i, and appointed by the president of the United States.

But then it became somewhat controversial. Wasn’t that—this appointment was in 1950, was it?

Yes, 1950.

Yeah, by then there had become something, a bit of controversy there, about communism coming into this or not?

Yes, yes, that’s right. As a matter of fact, Tavares, [Cyrus] Nils Tavares . . .

Oh, yes.

. . . who had been attorney general [1927–47] under the Republican administration, when he left there [in 1947], he joined Roy Vitousek’s law firm. He was a very good friend and classmate of United States Senator [Homer] Ferguson [R-Michigan]. He got to Ferguson and Ferguson got to the Nevada senator—I’m trying to think of his name now—[Patrick A.] McCarran [D-Nevada]. The airport in Nevada is named after him, United States Senator [Patrick A.] McCarran. Ferguson got to McCarran, and they agreed to bottle up my confirmation on the basis that I had flirted with the Communists.

At that time, Jack [H.] Kawano [president of the ILWU, the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union] was one of the five of us who tried to build the Democratic party up. None of the four of us knew that he was a Communist. It wasn’t until he was subpoenaed by the House Un-American Activities Committee [in 1950] that he came to me on a Sunday evening at nine o’clock and we talked until four o’clock in the morning. And I finally said, “Jack, you’re going [to] have to tell the truth. Perjury is ten years in jail. Go ahead and admit that you had been a Communist but you are no longer a Communist.”

The reason we conferred for such a long period of time was that he didn’t know what to do, and he still wanted influence in [the] ILWU, in the union, and he wanted to keep that influence so as to help form their policies. Finally, at three or four o’clock in the morning, he agreed to say that “I am not now a Communist” and that’s all he would say. So when the hearings came up the next morning, [Harriet] Bouslog [attorney for the ILWU], Jack Hall [regional director of the ILWU], and all of the pro-Communists in the ILWU were in the hall. When Jack [Kawano] was called and sworn in and started to testify just this one sentence, “I am no longer a Communist,” Bouslog, Jack Hall, and all the ILWU boys got up. They were afraid he was going to spill the beans and name names. Well, he didn’t do that, and then they all sat down. And that’s all. And he refused to testify any further. So he became one of the
thirty-nine reluctant witnesses [i.e., "Reluctant thirty-nine"].

CC: Before that though, something happened in the Democratic party that I think we need to try—because I was just trying to read back in history and it was a little confusing in terms of the different factions within the Democratic party. I think it started back as far as 1948, if I'm not mistaken.

DT: Right.

CM: Yeah.

CC: Maybe you could help us understand what was happening in your own party in terms of—there was a faction that walked out of things and all of that. Maybe you could help us understand what that was all about.

CM: Yeah, that happened when I was in Chicago, in 1948, after the [Democratic national] convention in Philadelphia. I got a long distance call from Mitsuyuki Kido saying that there had been a walkout and so forth, and so forth.

CC: This was a walkout of the [Democratic] central committee—this was a party central committee meeting?

CM: Yeah, yeah. Right.

CC: I just want to . . .

DT: Was it at the state convention now? Was it at the . . .

CM: Yeah, right.

DT: At the convention or at just the central committee meeting?

CM: At the convention.

DT: At the convention.

CC: At the convention, okay.

CM: See, [one of] the Democratic party leaders was Judge William [H.] Heen, who was very, very passive. He never helped to build the party. He only helped to build himself, that's why he was elected and re-elected so many times and became a powerhouse in the senate despite the fact that the senate was ruled by the Republicans, and so was the house. The party was also controlled by the Rice brothers, Philip [L.] Rice of Kaua'i and Harold [W.] Rice of Maui. Harold Rice and Phil Rice were old-time Republicans. They had the falling out with [Royal A.] Vitousek and the other leaders of the Republican party and finally joined the Democratic party. There they knew, because of their influence and standing in the territory and the money that they had, they could rule the Democratic party, and which they did. They were the kingpins at that time together with Johnny [John H.] Wilson [mayor of Honolulu] and Judge Heen. The four of them were the top leaders of the Democratic party and they ruled the
roost. They dictated everything: policy, who was to run for office, who was to get this office and that office. They controlled the whole Democratic party.

So when I got the call from Kido about the walkout, they [the standpat faction] said, “We had selected you as chairman of the central committee of the Democratic party, will you accept?”

I said, “Well, in order to build a Democratic party up, if you need my services, certainly I would.” So I accepted.

And when I came home, the five of us got together to try to rehabilitate and build up the Democratic party. The five being Mitsuyuki Kido, John [A.] Burns [later governor of Hawai‘i], Dr. Ernest [I.] Murai, and Jack [H.] Kawano. And at that time, we didn’t know Kawano was a Communist.

CC: Now, who walked out? The old guard.

CM: Rice, the Rice group, and the Wilson group, and the Heen group, including Ernest Heen and his brother. They were conservatives. They had very little of the liberal tendency or influence. They were real conservatives, just as conservative as the Republicans were at that time.

DT: So you were really then at about the same time the ILWU was trying to take over the—or allegedly was trying to take over the Democratic party.

CM: Right.

DT: Did you find yourself sort of caught in the middle? Here you were in the group that was associated with the ILWU, but they were trying to take over the party.

CM: Right. So I met with the other four and said, “Look, we can’t allow the ILWU to take over the Democratic party. They are a tool of Russia. They always do Russia’s bidding. They pass resolutions when Russia attacked Germany, and after there was an alliance they passed another resolution praising the alliance.” I said, “They followed everything that Russia wants.” I said, “The Democratic party is an American political party. We should not be beholden to a foreign government, particularly Russia.”

And they said to me, particularly Kido, who was running for the legislature, he said, “But we need the votes of the ILWU.”

I said, “Between that and defeat, I’d rather get defeated than to be supported by the pro-Communists of Hawai‘i.” And in that respect, we started to split.

DT: The five of you?

CM: The five of us. The other four went their way, and I went mine to a large extent, although there was not an open break until later.

DT: You remained as chairman of the central committee during that period there even after you’d broken with these four?
CM: No. That was before.

DT: Oh, that was before?

CM: That [the chairmanship] was before [the breakup].

DT: Before '48 then?

CM: Yeah.

DT: When did you become chairman of the central committee?

CM: Ah, in '48 when Kido called me long distance and said they had elected me.

DT: So when did the break occur within your own group, this informal break?

CM: It came after that because I was trying to tell them that the Democratic party shouldn’t be the tail (chuckles) to the ILWU, that they [the ILWU] would control everything, and they wanted to control the Democratic party.

DT: But Burns and Kido and Murai stayed with the ILWU?

CM: Stayed with Jack Hall . . .

DT: Stayed with Jack Hall and the party.

CM: . . . because they needed the votes. That’s because Kido needed the votes of the ILWU to get elected.

DT: So in '52 when the party was put back together again at the convention of '52, Jack Burns was not really a neutral when he became chairman of the central committee, was he?

CM: Yeah.

DT: He was really [in the] ILWU faction.

CM: Right.

DT: But something happened. The ILWU did back off from trying directly to take over the party, didn’t they?

CM: Right.

DT: Can you talk about that?

CM: Yeah. Well, I said to Jack Burns, “Jack, we can’t lie in bed with ILWU because they are too, too much pro-Communist.”

After a while, couple years later I think, he told me, “Jack Hall is no longer a Communist.”
I said, “How do you know?”

He said, “He told me.”

I said, “Communists lie (chuckles) through their teeth.” I said, “I wouldn’t believe him.”

Well, the reason why Jack Hall left the Communist party was because of the labor law, I forget what law that was, that said no Communist or anyone affiliated with the Communist party shall hold union office. It was . . .

CC: Taft-Hartley [Act]?

CM: Taft-Hartley [1947].

DT: Taft-Hartley, mm hmm.

CM: And because of that, he resigned from the Communist party, but his mind and heart was still with the Communist party. He did it to take care of himself. He wanted to remain a union official.

DT: Alrighty, I guess we’ll have to stop there just a moment and change tape, then we’ll pick it up from that point.

CM: Okay.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: This is tape number three, continuation of [the] interview with Chuck Mau.

DT: Alrighty, we had five people who were trying to rejuvenate the Democratic party in 1948: Burns, Kido, Kawano, Murai, and yourself, Chuck Mau. Judge, can you tell us, what—you had a split which you’ve already indicated—what was the role of each of these individuals afterwards? John A. Burns obviously became quite a politician after that time; the others not quite so much. It must have been embarrassing, for example, to have Kawano come in and tell you he was a member of the Communist party.

CM: Yes. As a matter of fact, I told him, “The four of us, not knowing that you belonged to the party, will be embarrassed publicly.” And probably could never win elective office in the state.

He said he was very, very sorry, but that he hoped he could continue his influence in the ILWU to help support Kido and Burns who had political ambitions from way back. As you recall, Burns ran several times for the board of supervisors, never successful.

DT: He also ran for delegate to Congress, I believe, in ’48. [Burns lost that election to Joseph R. Farrington.]

CM: Yeah, yeah. And we didn’t think he had the charisma to become an elective office[holder], particularly as governor. He proved us so wrong because he became a pretty good governor,
which was amazing with his background.

CC: Just to go back, do you remember when Jack Burns first started getting involved, after the war, with the Democratic party? Do you remember how he got brought into the party or did—how did it happen?

CM: There was a committee during the war to try to defuse the criticism against the Japanese boys. That committee, I forget the name of it [Emergency Service Committee]. Dr. [Ernest I.] Murai, was chairman. Burns was a member because he [was] a police officer and he had worked on some of these things with the FBI on disloyalty concerning certain segments of our population. And he worked with the Japanese. And when he left the police force, I didn't realize that he was so overly ambitious to become a politician and an elected official of the county or the state. And we didn't think that he was polished enough to hold office and become a credit to the Democratic party. Because his father came here as a soldier, ordinary soldier, stationed at Schofield Barracks, where I think he [Burns] met his wife, Beatrice. She was a nurse and then they got married. But he was quite persistent. Very, very much so. Never saw a man so stubbornly adhering to the goal that he had set for himself. As I said, he ran many times and never got elected, you know, and still kept on.

DT: Well, Mits Kido continued on in politics and he got elected quite a few times thereafter, didn't he?

CM: Right.

DT: But Murai didn't run.

CM: No.

DT: What [were] other names in this period that figured in? What about Dave [David A.] Benz? Wasn't he involved in some way with the fortunes of the Democratic party?

CM: He was. He worked within the...

JC: We had a momentary technical problem right there, so we're going to continue the interview.

DT: We're talking about the role of Dave Benz in the party politics at the time.

CM: Yeah.

DT: Mm hmm. Can you pick that up and tell us about Dave Benz's role in the party?

CM: Well, Dave, at that time, was working in a printing office owned by Tongg [Tongg Publishing Company], I forget his first...

DT: Ruddy Tongg.

CM: Ruddy, yeah. Ruddy Tongg. He [Benz] started to take an interest in the Democratic party. He wanted to work from the outside to have his influence felt. And he did. He contacted Burns and Kido and worked with other party leaders. He was not within the circle of the Heens or
Rices, but he was a pretty good thinker and because of that, he was accepted by Kido and Burns and [they] took his advice in many instances. So he had quite an influence on party politics.

DT: So he ended up working with the Burns faction, did he?

CM: Yes.

DT: But then something happened. He departed from their midst . . .

CM: Yeah.

DT: . . . in the early [19]50s, why?

CM: Again, the taint of communism was involved. He fell out because they decided that some of his ideas were not acceptable and refused to adhere to his advice.

DT: So he was somewhat cast in the same role as yourself, wasn't he? He was sort of an outcast so far as the Burns, Kawano, Kido affair.

CM: Right.

DT: Now Kawano went on and he was—was he able to stay in the ILWU and work?

CM: No. His influence—after he said he was no longer a Communist—his influence fell. And in order to try to build him up again, I talked to Ben [Benjamin F.] Dillingham [II]. I said, "This man should be helped because he recanted his Communist connections. And I'd like to set him up in business so that he had a place to which the ILWU members could come and talk with him." So, Ben gave us $6,000 and I opened up a liquor store, a little—small grocery store, liquor store—on Kukui Street just a little east of River Street. There he held forth. And [Joseph] Atherton Richards, a Republican, hearing that this man who had helped his country by confessing to his past, bad associations, went over there monthly to buy a case of liquor from him just so that he could make some money. (Chuckles) But, that failed. The ILWU members, except for a few Hawaiian boys—tough, big six-foot, six Hawaiian boys [who] used to be his right-hand men at the waterfront to keep the union boys in line—just two or three of those used to go and visit him and talk to him. But his influence then dwindled until there was none, nothing left. He had no influence with the ILWU members.

DT: So only the Burns, Kido, Murai faction really survived this whole bloodletting, shall we say?

CM: Right.

DT: Dave Benz disappeared from the party scene, as I recall.

CM: Yeah, yeah.

DT: And you disappeared, too. Now this, obviously, with all these things are happening, this really messed up your judgeship, didn't it?
CM: Yes.

DT: So you'd better, we'll pick it up there. You became a [circuit court] judge on an interim appointment basis [in 1950]. What happened thereafter?

CM: Then there was a public relations man, I'm trying to remember his name. Gosh, I can't remember his name. His partner was Craig, C-R-A-I-G.

DT: Oh, Bob Craig, yes. Bob Craig did . . .

CM: And the other fellow was the dominant partner in a PR, they had a PR firm. I conferred with him. I said, "You know, they're bottling up the confirmation in the [U.S.] Senate." We didn't know at that time [C. Nils] Tavares had influence with Senator [Homer] Ferguson of Michigan, and Ferguson and [Senator Patrick A.] McCarran, a Democrat who was chairman of the judiciary committee, would stop my confirmation. So I conferred with him. I said, "You know it will hurt the judiciary if I try to hang on in view of what is happening." So I said, "I think I should resign and write a letter to President Truman to say that I did not want to hurt the judiciary, and therefore to withdraw my nomination." So he composed a beautiful letter to the president for me, you know, and I signed it. And I think the letter was published, I'm not sure whether it was in full, published in the [Honolulu] Advertiser. But the Advertiser wrote a nice editorial saying that I wanted the judiciary to be clear so that they could function effectively and not have this kind of trouble before it, and the editorial was very, very complimentary.

DT: This must have been very difficult to do because here you'd been, even though you were in the "standpat" group of the Democratic party, you had not gone along with the Communist influence, we'll call it that.

CM: Yeah.

CC: And yet, when you became a judge, why, that thing cost you your judgeship, didn't it?

CM: Right. Because fellows like Tavares, you know. Later on [Joseph] Garner Anthony and [Julius] Russell Cades who had originally—they were two most prominent lawyers in the city—they were opposed. But after I had served less than a year, they both wrote to the American Bar Association asking them to push my nomination through in the [U.S.] Senate. But to no avail, because the deal had been struck already.

CC: Weren't you assured that the president would appoint you again on an interim basis if you so desired? I mean, you resigned in the face of knowing that you probably could get reappointed and try for it again? Was that—is that true? I mean it seemed to be . . .

CM: No, I didn't have that in mind at all. As a matter of fact, the secretary of interior [Oscar L. Chapman], who was a Coloradoan, told me to hang on and that eventually he would try to see what he could do for a confirmation. I said, "No, I better not do that because it's hurting the judiciary. You'll put a cloud on the ability of the courts to function properly," and I said, "I'd better get out." So he finally agreed with me. I forget his name, he was a strong supporter of statehood.
DT: This wasn't [Douglas J.] McKay, was it?

CM: No. Not McKay. [It was Oscar L. Chapman, McKay's predecessor.]

DT: Not McKay. I'm trying to think of former secretaries of interior.

CM: Yeah.

CC: Who was this character that evidently wrote a letter alleging your Communist sympathies? His name was [Louis C.] Silva or something?

CM: Yeah.

CC: Who was that guy?

CM: He's a Portuguese boy, worked for the state department. I mean, the territorial department, in the tax office. And his name was Silva, I think. I think it's Silva. He wrote a very nasty letter. And I challenged him publicly to put that in writing in public so that I could sue him (chuckles) for libel, see. He didn't do it, he backed off. But he had written the poison letter already.

DT: Mm hmm. So the damage was done.

CM: Damage was done already.

DT: Sort of apropos and related to this, who recruited Jack Burns into the Democratic party? He's labeled as really the builder of the Democratic party, and yet there was a Democratic party here before Jack Burns. How did he get involved in the party in the first place? Do you have any knowledge of that or was that something you don't know?

CM: The five of us. . . . None of the other four realized that John Burns was politically motivated. He had made friends with the leading Japanese boys, particularly those that came back from the war, the 442 [442nd Regimental Combat Team] and the 100th [Infantry] Battalion. And he felt that with their support, he could win office. And it proved to be true in later years. Now, we, when we got together, the five of us wanted to take the power away from the Rices and the Heens and the Johnny Wilsons and that group. They were too conservative. We had more liberal ideas. We were in favor of helping the unions. We were in favor of higher wages for the working people. We were in favor of housing and things like that to help the poor. And without our voices, nobody would speak for them. So the five of us got together on the liberal side, facing the conservative Democrats in the party. And we got together and met at least once a week. I would, because they had no money—Kido was a schoolteacher that retired, Ernie Murai's [dental] practice had gone to pot because he had spent so much time in politics, and Burns had no money, and Kawano, naturally, had no money. So once a week we'd go to a teahouse, we all liked Japanese food, and I would pick up the tab. And we did that over eighteen months.

CC: This was during what time period?
CM: That was from ’48, actually from ’46 when we started, on through. And then sometimes we would have dinner at my house. I had a house in Nu’uanu, at Old Pali Road. And my wife [Karen Chun-Hoon Mau] would fix dinner and after dessert, she would go upstairs and leave us to our own (chuckles) discussions.

DT: Burns sort of volunteered his way into the party then you might say. Or you think maybe Mits [Mitsuyuki] Kido maybe recruited him?

CM: Actually, he [Burns] was very influential in getting us together because he was politically ambitious. So he was the one that got . . .

DT: So he got the group of five together . . .

CM: Well . . .

DT: . . . and met at your house?

CM: At least, he got Kido and Murai, because Murai was his very good friend.

DT: So in that sense, he was sort of an early organizer of this group?

CM: Yeah. Oh, yeah.

DT: . . . of this particular group in the party?

CM: Yeah, yeah. Because, you see, he had political ambitions.

DT: Alrighty, we’ll pick it up after we change tape.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: The following is tape number four of the Chuck Mau interview.

CC: Okay, go ahead.

DT: Related to all these events, there were a couple of things that we sort of bypassed here. One, in 1948, I believe, you were elected out of the Democratic party as a delegate to the Democratic National Convention. And I believe something significant happened here with respect to statehood, so you might want to talk about that for a while.

CM: Yes. The group of the five of us had at that time quite an influence in the central committee of the Democratic party. So, in their convention, Kido led the fight to have me appointed to the platform and resolutions committee of the national Democratic party convention in 1948. My mission was to try to get a plank in the platform of the Democratic party calling for immediate statehood for Hawai‘i. Ever since we had become a territory, both the Republican and Democratic parties could only achieve this type of plank in their respective party platform: We pledged eventual statehood for Hawai‘i. My mission was to try to get a plank calling for immediate statehood for Hawai‘i. Nobody paid my way; the Democratic party was poor. I paid my own way to Philadelphia and, naturally, for my own expenses—hotel room,
and meals, and so forth, taxi fares. I scrounged around prior to the meetings of the
convention and found out that United States Senator [Francis J.] Myers, I think was his name
from Pennsylvania, was chairman of the platform and resolutions committee. So I went to his
office and his secretary greeted me and I said, “I want to see Senator Myers.”

She said, “Everybody wants to see him. He doesn’t have time for anybody.”

And I said to the secretary, “You know, I traveled 6,000 miles just to have a few words with
the senator.”

She says, “Where are you from?”

I said, “Hawai‘i.”

“Oh!” she says, “I tell you what. Tomorrow morning at nine o’clock, he will leave his office
through the side door. Why don’t you wait there and try to buttonhole him?”

So the next morning I got up at seven o’clock, had a cup of coffee, and eight o’clock I was
waiting for him, and nine o’clock he came out exactly at nine o’clock. I grabbed him by the
sleeve and I said, “Senator, my name is Mau, Chuck Mau from Hawai‘i. I’d like to have a
plank in the party platform calling for immediate statehood for Hawai‘i.”

He looked at me, “From Hawai‘i?”

I said, “Yes.”

He said, “Okay, see my aide right there.” I forget his name. And he walked ahead and the
aide and I walked together, and I told him, I said, “I have one little sentence I’d like to get
into the platform. And I read it. It said, “We urge immediate statehood for Hawai‘i.” And we
talked for a while and I said, “I’d like to have some time to talk about this plank.”

And we became friends so he says, “I’ll try to arrange for you to speak on it.” And he says,
“I will take this plank and try to get it into the platform.” So they [the platform and
resolutions committee] had four meetings, all nine o’clock until about two, three o’clock in
the morning, every day, four days. I waited a long time and many times I didn’t even want to
go to the lavatory because I was afraid I might be called. So finally on Thursday night at two
o’clock in the morning, Sena . . .

END OF SIDE ONE

SIDE TWO

JC: This is still tape number four. Continuation of Chuck Mau interview. Slight overlap.

CM: So finally on Thursday night at two o’clock in the morning, Senator—I think it was a Senator
Green from Connecticut or Rhode Island [Senator Theodore Francis Green of Rhode Island], I
think, called on me. And I gave a twenty-minute spiel and I referred to Governor Dan Moody
of Texas. I reminded him that the 442 had rescued the Texas battalion that was holed up and
would be slaughtered by the Germans. And Governor Moody stood up and the attorney
general from Texas stood up. (Pause) And said, "We will support you 100 percent. We will
try to get the Southerners [i.e., Senators from Southern states] to back off from fighting
statehood for Hawai'i because of its [large] Japanese population."

DT: So that was really sort of a high point of your political career, wasn't it?

CM: It is. Of all the things I've done in politics, and also in appointive office, I consider that to be
the highlight of my life.

DT: You got that plank calling for immediate statehood at a time when Hawai'i had never voted
any way except Republican, and yet you did this in a Democratic National Convention.

CM: Right. I told them that if they wanted to help build the Democratic party up in Hawai'i, so
that we could nullify the great influence of the Republicans and the businessmen in Hawai'i,
who were very, very conservative, and were against unions, against high wages, against
housing for the poor. I said if they wanted us to help build the party, they should give it
[statehood] to us.

DT: And so they did [in 1959].

CM: And they agreed. They agreed.

CC: I think that's wonderful. And something else that you did on behalf of statehood, sort of
blends into this experience you had in 1948, was the fact that you got elected to the
constitutional convention of 1950 which granted what we then called the "Hope Chest
Constitution." Do you have any recollections of that?

CM: Oh, yes. It [the 1950 Con-con] was controlled by the Republicans because the Democrats still
was not a party in influence until 1954. Sam [Samuel Wilder] King, a longtime Republican
and former governor of the territory, was the chairman of the convention. Bill [William H.]
Heen, the one I mentioned before, was also a delegate. [J.] Garner Anthony, who won the
biggest vote in the fourth district even though he was a Haole, because he was quite
influential—he was one of the most prominent lawyers in Hawai'i—he got the biggest vote in
the fourth district in that delegateship race. He and Heen made a team and they worked
together with the Republicans. And I asked to be put on the labor committee, I wanted a new
labor law to try to help the working people. There was a man by the name of [Frank G.]
Silva, I think, from Kaua'i. He was accused of being a Communist. And Randy [Randolph]
Crossley, Crossley?

DT: Mm hmm.

CM: ... was also a delegate.

CC: From Kaua'i?

CM: From Kaua'i. And he opposed this man because he's a Communist. [Frank G. Silva was
accused in House Un-American Activities committee investigations of being a member of the
Communist party. Silva was a member of the "Reluctant thirty-nine". They wanted to kick him out. So I came to the defense of Silva and they finally let him stay in, but he later resigned. I don't know what reason it was, he got out. [Silva was expelled from the Constitutional Convention, by a vote of fifty-three to seven.] But we had a big fight. Crossley playing the conservative role, anti-Communist role, and I fighting him on the debate, and we almost came to blows. Naturally, Heen and Anthony, being of a conservative mode, worked with the Republicans very closely, so they bottled me up in the labor committee. They put me on and I was chairman of that but I couldn't get my bill (chuckles), my plank in the constitution. So I had a hard time, you know, I was in the minority. But they knew, they considered me a radical, you know. (Chuckles) Even though I didn't get anywhere, I kept on fighting, you know, through speeches, throughout the convention and in the committees.

DT: Well, at any rate, it ultimately became the constitution of Hawai'i, as a hope chest, so the things you worked for in '48 and what you worked for in '50 ultimately came about in 1959.

CM: Right.

DT: In 1954, even though you'd sort of dropped out of politics in '52, right?

CM: Right.

DT: I don't think you've ever ran for office after '52, did you?

CM: No. No.

DT: You dropped out, went into private practice in law. In 1954, suddenly and seemingly without warning, the Democrats swept the '54 election. How did you feel in those days?

CM: Well, I felt that the background that we had started in 1946 had a lot to do with that victory. If we didn't have a start, it couldn't have happened. The background had to be laid for that event to happen.

DT: And the people that laid the background for that would be primarily who then? The five members of your group?

CM: The five.

DT: Anybody else that would be involved with the Democratic—mostly those five people then?

CM: Mostly the five people.

DT: Burns, Kido, Kawano, Murai, and yourself?

CM: Yeah.

DT: So you felt elated I guess, as [a] result of the '54 election?

CM: Actually achieved—the goal that we wanted to achieve had come about.
DT: And you had really turned, you pushed the crowd away. I think they wanted to make you, give you some role in the central committee after '52...

CM: Yeah.

DT: ... and you turned it down?

CM: Yes, I turned it down because, see, I had two children going to Punahou and I had to earn enough money to pay their tuition. (Chuckles)

CC: You paid your own expenses going back to the convention and . . .

CM: All the time.

CC: . . . national meetings.

CM: All the time.

CC: Whereas Jack Burns apparently didn't have the money to do this.

CM: No.

CC: I know he was borrowing money . . .

CM: Yeah.

DT: . . . or asking for money from all sorts of sources.

CM: Yeah. Right.

DT: So really after 1954, you were no longer a primary political actor, were you?

CM: Right.

DT: Or after '52 for that matter.

CM: That's right.

DT: Because you had really virtually nothing to do with '54. How would you equate the role of Jack Burns in this whole milieu? Was he the right person at the right time and things just broke right for him or how would you describe this?

CM: Well, when he finally became successful and was elected governor [in 1962] . . .

DT: He was elected delegate to Congress first.

CM: Yeah, yeah.

CC: Delegate in 1956.
His persistence and his political know-how, he had learned it as he got along, proved successful. And I didn't think he had it in him to make a good delegate, but I went to Washington with him and I said, “John, we should see Hubert Humphrey.” He was a first-time senator [later vice president of the United States]. He had been mayor of Minneapolis. And he and I went to see Humphrey. We said, “Mr. Burns is just a delegate, doesn't have any vote. He can speak, we need your help, what can we do?” So Humphrey gave us very good advice which I had already given to Burns. I said, “John, you have to get on the good side of Speaker [Sam] Rayburn from Texas and [Senator] Lyndon [B.] Johnson.” And I said, “Then the South won't fight us.” Particularly if you have Rayburn. Rayburn was so powerful in the House of Representatives. So sure enough—oh, and then we went to see—is it [Arthur J.] Goldberg who later became a Supreme Court justice?

He was a labor lawyer. Goldberg, I think his name.

So we went to see him, knowing that he was a liberal, and told him what we had in mind for Hawai‘i, eventual statehood, and he was very sympathetic. He wanted to help us. He gave us names to see, people in Washington. And John Burns took the advice, made friends with the Southerners and gained influence in that way. He gained the help of the Southerners to help with statehood.

So you would give Jack Burns considerable credit, then, for statehood? Do you think he was really for statehood? There's some feeling that maybe he may have been sort of hedging his bets and maybe been willing to settle for electing our own governor?

That might be true, but he never expressed that to me face to face. And I said, “Jack, since you want to become a known political figure and to help control the Democratic party, I think you had better think of our people in Hawai‘i and just forget everything but fight for our statehood for Hawai‘i.” So he gave up any ideas, you know, of doing things as you had suggested. He would be helpful to the people of Hawai‘i if he could get immediate statehood for Hawai‘i. That would become a bonanza for us once we become a state because the money changers in New York didn't want to put too much money in Hawai‘i because we were under the jurisdiction of Congress. Congress could take away our territorialship, could do anything they wanted to Hawai‘i, and they didn't want to put any monies into Hawai‘i. And therefore we were stagnated economically. [The] only basis for [our] economy was the sugar and pineapple plantations.

Very good. So, your feeling was, to sum it up, that Burns was really, for the most part, in favor of statehood.

Yes.

Did you—one question I'll pose and then we'll pick it up, I guess, after we've changed tapes. Didn't you feel left out by the Burns administration? Here you were, you'd been active in all these formative years and yet when Burns became governor, no one really heard of a Judge Mau any longer. So we'll pick that up . . .
CC: No, let him. Go ahead and finish.

DT: Oh, you have time? Okay, you can answer right now.

CM: Well, probably the reason was my fault. I didn't think I wanted anything, you know, from the Burns group or anybody else. I felt that I was successful in my legal business, I didn't need any help from anybody, I wasn't interested in getting any position of any kind. And so actually it was my distance, proving my distance between myself and the Burns group, and actually it may have been my fault for doing that. Because I'm sure because of our prior connections and working together for one goal, I know if I wanted something from them, they probably would give me some consideration.

CC: You didn't feel left out then because you hadn't gone along with their ILWU stance in the Democratic party?

CM: No. Well, that was one thing [where] I disagreed with him. And the reason why Burns stuck to the ILWU is because later on he came to believe that Jack Hall was sincere in resigning from the Communist party, although I told him that it was for union reasons he did it. Under Taft-Hartley Act he couldn't become a union [official] if he was a Communist.

DT: So the jury is sort of still out in your mind about really how much tied together they were then, the Communist party and the ILWU at the time?

CM: Yeah. Well, Burns later became very good friends with Jack Hall. He praised Jack Hall publicly, excused him for his transgressions in the past, and felt that he was good for the territory.

CC: Jack could count votes too, huh?

CM: Oh, yes.

(Laughter)

CM: That's the reason why he stuck to him.

DT: Alrighty, we'll pause there.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: The following is tape number five, continuation of [the] interview with Chuck Mau. This is the last tape.

DT: Okay Judge, we've had a long session here and I know we're all getting a little weary of chatting about these things, but if I may, I'd like to give you several names and get your brief reactions to them. For example, one who figured in the so-called "Settlement of 1952," was a young man by the name of Frank [F.] Fasi [later Republican mayor of Honolulu] who probably belonged to a more conservative wing, but I don't think he'd ever walked out of the party, he was too new. What's your reaction to Frank Fasi as you think of him back in those days and as you think of him today?
Well, Frank also was an ambitious young man. He had been successful in the lumber business and junk business.

Right.

And he ran first for the... He talked to me about running for office and I said, "Well, you test your wings and run for the constitutional convention, too [in 1950]." He didn't quite make it but he was very, very persistent, and he was a pretty good speaker. Very literate and knew his way around and finally made friends amongst the Japanese and the Filipino voters. And today [as mayor of Honolulu] his greatest support is from the Filipino community because they all perceive him [as] the one person in Hawai'i who works for the downtrodden and the poor; he has that reputation. But his handling of matters in the mayor's office is fairly commendable in most instances. I think he's made a pretty good mayor.

You feel that way, in spite of the fact that he deserted the Democratic party ultimately and joined up with the Republicans.

Yes, yes.

Okay, what about Ariyoshi, George Ariyoshi, Governor Ariyoshi?

George, even though he belonged to the Democratic party, was of the conservative bent. He was pro-business and yet also favored the unions as well, and proper wages for the working people. So he made a pretty good blend of the two, and I thought that his term of office—and he served as governor as long as anybody [1974–87]—was quite successful.

And [John D.] Waihee, our present governor?

Waihee has proved to be quite a surprise. Because of his background, it's amazing that he has taken hold of the state government in such a good fashion, and I think he, too, will make a very good governor.

Alrighty. Well, the jury will still be out on that one, because he still has some time to serve. One final question, what's your reaction to the Grand Old Party, the Republican party? Now, when you first started in politics, the Republican party was the king of the hill; the members of that party were the kings of the hill, the Democrats had not won an election, a significant election, in the history of the territory. Today you find just the reverse case. The Democrats have been in office solidly since really, 1954 and the Republican party has almost passed out of existence, it seems, except for an occasional squabble in our conventions. In terms of elected officials, very few of them around. What's your feeling about all this? Is that the way it should be in Hawai'i?

No. In order to have good government, you have to have two strong political parties. The Republicans being as weak as they are, the Democrats could do anything they want without any kind of opposition. It is unfortunate that the Republican party became so weak and their failure was because of people like Roy Vitousek. The Haole group controlled the Republican party and the image throughout the state is that the Republicans are pro-Haole and pro-business and they don't care about anybody else. And because of that image, they cannot build themselves up. I wish they could, because as I said at the outset, in order to have good
government, you have to have two strong parties. One to balance [the] other.

DT: We can't perceive the future but would you expect that situation to change?

CM: The Republicans, somehow, are not doing enough to work in the grassroots. They tried to change the image by appointing this man [Howard] Chong, who was of Chinese ancestry, to head the party. But that little thing is not enough. They have to work in the grassroots, they have to send people out just like the ILWU and the Democrats used to send people out house to house, campaigning for the party. The Republicans are too lazy. They don't do anything like that. Either they want to just make money, [or] fail to think that good government requires that they become a strong party.

DT: Well, we'll see what happens in the future. They still have the opportunity to perhaps change the situation and maybe Hawai'i will ultimately end up not with domination by one party or the other, but with a competitive two-party system.

CM: Yes.

CC: At any rate, we appreciate all your years of public service here in Hawai'i and we most appreciate the fact that you've been willing to spend this time here with us today. We thank you very much, Judge.

CM: Well, thank you for giving me the opportunity to voice my feelings about matters in Hawai'i.

CC: Thank you very much. Aloha.

DT: Thank you.

CM: Yeah.

JC: That's the end of the Chuck Mau interview.

END OF INTERVIEW