

PEREIRO'S RECOLLECTIONS OF THE PONAPE UPRISING
AGAINST THE SPANISH, 1890-1891

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

IN PACIFIC ISLANDS STUDIES

AUGUST 1983

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would be very badly remiss if I did not acknowledge the people who encouraged me to complete this task. First, I should give my thanks to Dr. Robert Kiste, whose support, assistance, and friendship never wavered or failed. Then, I owe a considerable debt to Dr. Michael Hamnett who by believing in me and offering me his friendship and counsel kept me plodding on when my soul urged me to quit. Judy Hamnett deserves equal praise, both for never doubting that I would finish and for bravely facing the bureaucratic labyrinth of the Graduate School on my behalf when 5,000 miles of ocean kept me from doing so personally. Thanks should also go to Dr. E. Alison Kay, whose critique of this paper substantailly improved its quality, and to David Hanlon, whose knowledge of Ponape and willingness to share it proved invaluable. Finally, I want to thank my wife, whose love, understanding, and occasional help with Spanish grammar made this undertaking both possible and believable.

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PREFACE

My motive in translating A. Cabeza Pereiro was relatively simple. While at the University I discovered that only a limited number of Pacific scholars read Spanish. I thus thought it might be useful to translate something from the Pacific Collection's extensive Spanish language holdings and thereby make it available to a wider audience. I selected Cabeza for this project because, after examining a number of books and articles in Spanish, I became convinced that his history would be of great interest to both scholars and Ponapeans. I hope that time will prove my choice correct.

I should call attention to one or two peculiarities in Cabeza's history that made its translation somewhat frustrating. First, he was either indifferent to detail or very poorly edited by his publisher. Whatever the reason, the original work contains a number of small but irritating errors of fact. As the translator, I was faced with the problem of correcting these errors without unnecessarily disturbing the flow of Cabeza's narrative, which I believe should be read without interruption. My solution, the use of footnotes, will I hope preserve the literary merit of the work and, at the same time, make the document of more use to scholars. Where the error is clearly typographical, I have inserted a Translator's Note calling attention to the problem.

I will admit my failure in reaching a solution for the other serious problem I faced, Cabeza's rather casual approach to nouns, be they Spanish or Ponapean. To cite but one example, Cabeza introduced a Spanish officer by one name and then, a few pages later, quoted him at length under an entirely different one. With respect to Ponapean

nouns, Cabeza of necessity used phonetic spellings. Consequently, the spelling of a person's or place's name may vary slightly from paragraph to paragraph. Moreover, it is not clear that Cabeza realized when doing this that he was referring to the same person or place. To resolve the problem I have adopted the convention of using Cabeza's spelling of proper nouns throughout the translation.

I. INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY

The Historical Setting

Spain's decision to establish an administrative center on Ponape in 1886 was prompted by Germany's attempt one year earlier to assert its jurisdiction over the Caroline Islands.¹ The history of that episode had its roots in Spain's failure to exert control over its Micronesian possessions and in Bismarck's desire to expand German influence in the Pacific. While the Germans had been active in Eastern Micronesia since the 1850s,² it was not until the Franco-Prussian War led to the unification of Germany in 1871 that Berlin felt sufficiently secure to begin an active campaign for Pacific colonies.³

Germany's increasing activity in Eastern Micronesia in the early 1870s was viewed in Spain as a potential threat to its Philippine possessions. In 1873, this threat prompted Madrid's newly installed Republican Government to demand that all foreign flag merchant vessels bound for Micronesian ports call first at Manila to secure permission for the voyage and obtain the necessary permits and licenses.⁴ Germany at first chose to ignore the Spanish demand, but then joined with Her Majesty's Government in London to challenge Spain's claim to sovereignty over Micronesia. The Germans argued that Spain's failure to have effectively occupied its possessions in the Marshalls and the Carolines made void whatever claims it may have had in the region. Berlin also expressed the view that the provisions of the Spanish edict on merchant shipping were impossible to enforce and, therefore, would be ignored by island traders. With the restoration of the monarchy in 1876, a more

conservative government in Madrid decided not to enforce the 1873 edict, freedom of trade was restored, and the dispute temporarily came to an end.⁵

During the following decade, however, Germany continued to expand its influence in Eastern Micronesia and, towards the middle of the 1880s, began to push into the West. As German intentions became clear, Spain decided to take steps to occupy its possessions in the Carolines.⁶ Spanish plans were thwarted, however, when on August 26, 1885 the German warship Iltis (spelled Ihis by Cabeza) raised the Imperial flag over Yap and claimed the territory for the Kaiser. Within a matter of weeks, Germany went on to assert its claim to Truk, Ponape, Kusaie, and the Marshalls. The reaction in Spain to this unilateral action by Germany was an immediate outburst of national pride and indignation. While demands that Spain go to war were shunted aside, it was clear that the Government's future depended on a quick and satisfactory resolution of the crisis. Fortunately, Bismarck was equally anxious to find a solution to the problem and, in a gesture of goodwill and astute politics, suggested that Pope Leo XIII act as mediator in the dispute, sensing that no other figure of equal stature would have been acceptable to the proud and suspicious Spanish.⁷ Bismarck may have also appreciated the fact that the Pope would be likely to support Spanish-Catholic sovereignty in the Carolines while, at the same time, acknowledging German political and military strength by recognizing its right to have access to the region.

Pope Leo's opinion, issued in October 1888, is a monument to the art of compromise. It upheld Spain's claim to sovereignty over the Carolines but also recognized as legitimate Germany's commercial,

fishing, and navigation interests in the region. Furthermore, it gave Berlin the right to establish settlements and plantations in the islands and to maintain a naval coaling station in the Carolines.⁸ (The following year, as an act of good faith, Germany renounced its right to build such a station.)⁹ Thus, Germany secured for itself free access to the Carolines while Spain continued to have responsibility for administering the region. For Spain, a Pyrrhic victory at best. Germany's presence in the Carolines would continue to pose a threat to Spain's Philippine territories, Germany had obtained the coveted right to free trade in the region, it was not saddled with the costs of administering the Carolines as a colony, and its claim of sovereignty over the Marshalls had gone unchallenged. Spain, on the other hand, had its authority over the islands reconfirmed, but with the proviso that it begin to execute its administrative obligations in the territory and that it establish a military presence sufficient to maintain the peace and protect German interests.¹⁰

The history of Spain's attempt to exercise imperial authority in Ponape and hence over the Caroline Islands, which had been neglected by Madrid for nearly 350 years, is punctuated by bloody insurrections and personal disaster. Within four years of the arrival of the first Spanish official on Ponape in 1886, over 100 Spanish soldiers had lost their lives, a Royal Governor had been killed, a decorated field officer had committed suicide in despair, and the small reservoir of goodwill Spain may have carried into the adventure was lost forever. These disasters did not go unnoticed in Spain, and a reaction began to set in against further attempts to bring the Carolines under Madrid's control.

One voice in this reaction belonged to a middle-aged physician, Anacleto Cabeza Pereiro, who had served with the Spanish Army during its Ponape campaign of 1887-1891. Upon Cabeza's return to Spain in 1891, he wrote a short treatise on his experiences and observations in the Carolines entitled The Island of Ponape: Its Geography, Ethnography, and History. The book, published in Madrid in 1896, began with a foreword written by Lieutenant General Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau, Marques de Tenerife. Weyler himself had played an important role in Spain's effort to establish control over the Carolines when, as Captain-General of the Philippines from 1888 until 1891, he had borne ultimate responsibility for Spain's Pacific territories.¹¹

Weyler, who would later earn the sobriquet "Butcher of Havana" in the American press as the result of his stern approach to Cuban rebels just prior to the Spanish-American War, began his introduction by calling the reader's attention to the general lack of knowledge in Spain about its Pacific possessions and suggesting that such ignorance may have led the Spanish Government to adopt policies towards the region that were unrealistic and self-defeating. He then went on to refute, point by point, a number of arguments that had been made in favor of keeping the Carolines tied securely to Spain, ending with the flat assertion that colonization of the region was out of the question and that, to date, Spain's only return on its investment in the islands had been the "sacrifice of men and money"! The true patriot, Weyler claimed, would see that the only course open to Spain was to withdraw its claim over the territory. Otherwise, unless the Government agreed to commit greater resources to the defense of the Carolines than seemed likely,

Spain's military and political honor would be subject to further disgrace.

The extent to which Weyler used this opportunity to justify what he may have seen as his own failure as Captain-General to ensure that the Carolines were secure for Spain can only be guessed. However, his willingness to dismiss Micronesia's worth to Spain, coupled with his warning to the Government that without additional resources Spain's honor might be further disgraced, takes on a special significance when one considers the environment in which Weyler was writing. He had only recently returned from putting down the Philippine insurrection and would soon be ordered to Cuba to quell another insurgency. Relations with the United States were strained, Spain itself was still recovering from the Second Carlist War (1873-1876), and the restored Bourbon crown rested uneasily on the head of a child. The fact that Cabeza's manuscript had been approved for publication by the Spanish General Staff could suggest that senior Spanish military officers, including Weyler, hoped to use Cabeza's book as a vehicle for publicizing their views on Spain's colonial and foreign policies.

Cabeza appears to have been motivated by far less complex reasons. He had been in combat on Ponape and was clearly shaken by the experience. In his brief preface, he remarked that much of what he had read about Ponape was nonsense and that its authors probably could not even locate the island on a map. He continued by contrasting reports published in Manila just before the uprising on Ponape in June 1890 with the situation on the island as he found it upon his arrival, and he joined with Weyler in decrying the paucity of accurate information in Spain on conditions in the islands. Cabeza echoed General Weyler's concern that the

Government's course of action in the Carolines was fraught with danger and that, without a major change in its direction, the future would be simply a repetition of past disasters.

The History: A Commentary

Cabeza's narrative is neither a great work of literature nor an especially scholarly analysis of a segment of Ponape's history, and therein lies its charm, value, and limitations. This rather haphazard and often very personal account of Spain's ultimately unsuccessful attempt to exert control over Ponape provides a rare opportunity to examine the values, perceptions, and prejudices of what one may assume was a rather unremarkable, late-nineteenth century Spanish colonialist. While some of Cabeza's observations on his colleagues and on the people of Ponape may seem naive and quaint, they contain a quality of personal honesty and integrity that demands respect.

Cabeza began his short narrative with an introductory chapter that described in a rather straightforward if very pro-Spanish fashion the advent of Catholic and Protestant missions in Ponape. He immediately set the tone of what followed by focusing on the inroads made by Protestant missionaries in the three decades before the Capuchin Fathers arrived in Ponape in 1886, and on the meager support the Catholic missions subsequently received from Spain. Here, for the first time, is seen the brutal frankness with which Cabeza could treat his subject. Dismissing the influence of the Catholic missions as virtually "non-existent," he sharply criticized both the Church and the State for the "wretched and deplorable condition of our

institutions, which caused the Kanakas to say that Spain must be a poor and tiny nation" unworthy of their respect. In succeeding chapters, Cabeza returned to this dual theme of an entrenched Protestant influence and the failure of Spain, be it in the form of the Church or the State, to commit to Ponape the resources necessary to establish Spain's sovereignty. It should be noted here that throughout his history Cabeza refers to the Protestant missions as Methodist. In fact, they were Congregationalist.

Cabeza's preoccupation with the Protestant influence in Ponape is revealed in the opening chapter of the history, when he suggested that the American missions were established "in accord with the interests of their nation." A few pages later, Cabeza returned to this theme and asserted that the United States was a "nation desirous to extend its domain and anxious for colonies and faithful and submissive servants who can carry out its plans and designs." In Cabeza's mind, the mission schools seem to have been established for the sole purpose of providing those "faithful and submissive servants" who, when finally indoctrinated and returned to their home islands, would ensure American domination of the region.

For Cabeza, however, the American missionaries appear to have posed a much more direct threat to Spain's interests. He clearly saw these men and women as American agents actively engaged in the local insurgencies. Curiously, Cabeza relied on an American named Guifford to substantiate his charges of missionary involvement in the Ponapean uprisings. Guifford, who only appears once in the entire history, assured Cabeza that the Madolenihmw rebels were being encouraged and

supported by the American missionaries in Kiti, who had convinced the local population that it was under American protection and should be protected from Spanish incursions. It is interesting to note that Guifford went on to say that in his view the war was more religious than political in nature, an observation Cabeza let pass without comment.¹²

Cabeza's deep suspicion of the American presence in Ponape is somewhat surprising in that Spain had been forced into the Carolines by the expansionist policies of Imperial Germany, which one might assume would have been the principal focus of concern for a Spanish soldier. However, it is probably true that Cabeza assumed that American missionaries served the United States in much the same way the Capuchin Fathers served Spain--as instruments of policy. While a good argument can be made to support the contention that American policy makers of this period took full advantage of the presence of American missionaries abroad, and that many American missionaries of that era saw themselves as precursors of a grander version of Manifest Destiny, the actual link between the United States and its American missionaries was at best tenuous. To a nineteenth century Spaniard, however, the presence of American missionaries was probably regarded as prima facie evidence of an official American interest, just as the presence in Ponape of Capuchin missionaries was evidence of Spain's interest.

We must also remember that Spanish-American relations had deteriorated since the Ostend Manifesto of 1854, when the United States clumsily attempted to force Spain into accepting America's annexation of Cuba. Nor had relations between the two countries improved during

the Ten Years War in Cuba (1868-1878) when public opinion in the United States was vocal in support of the Cubans fighting for their independence. By 1891, when Cabeza set down to write his history, the United States was viewed in Spain as a potential enemy in the Caribbean, where another Cuban uprising was considered likely. Cabeza must have at least considered what role the United States may have played a few years earlier in Micronesia when he began to write.

Finally, Cabeza was probably correct that the Protestant missionaries opposed the arrival of the Spanish on an island they had made their private reserve for over three decades. They surely must have been alarmed at the efforts of their Catholic counterparts to win converts and may well have urged their flocks to oppose those efforts by any means available. Cabeza was equally suspicious of the motives of other, non-missionary Europeans, but he seldom provided any details as to why. Early in the narrative, for instance, Cabeza referred to a Spaniard named Torres, commenting that his "devious nature and lack of loyalty as an interpreter was one of the principal causes of the first insurrection . . ." Regrettably, Torres' name never appears again, nor are his activities described. In fact, Torres' duplicity in dealing with the Ponapeans as official translator for the Spanish probably was a major factor in their decision to take up arms in 1887. Cabeza does not mention this or the fact that Torres was one of the first victims of that uprising.¹³

With Chapter II, Cabeza plunged directly into the chaotic events of 1887, focusing on the fate of Governor Posadillo and the first attempt to establish a colonial foothold on Ponape. The chapter's opening

sentence provides a delightful insight into Cabeza's view of the islands, as he casually dismissed several thousand years of Micronesian history with the observation that "the history of Ponape did not truly begin until 1850" when the first European arrived on the island. This Euro-centric view is revealed again several pages later when Cabeza wrote of the Royal Governor confirming the chiefs of the island in their roles and providing them with a baton as a symbol of their office. What makes this remarkable is Cabeza's clear assumption that without such recognition by the Spanish Governor the traditional chiefs would have been without authority among their people.

Perhaps the best example of Cabeza's failure to appreciate the strength and resilience of Ponapean culture can be seen at the end of Chapter V, where having defeated the people of Madolenihmw in battle, the Spanish ordered the division of the district between its two neighbors. Later, reflecting on the efficacy of that order, Cabeza noted that it had been "without effect, for it [Madolenihmw] continued to function and was as autonomous as ever."

In describing the events of July 1-3 at Kolonia, Cabeza developed a new theme that he pursued doggedly throughout the rest of his journal --the incompetence of the men Spain sent to govern Ponape. Cabeza clearly held Governor Posadillo personally responsible for the disaster that overtook the colony in July 1887, and he pictured the Governor as an indecisive man of no sensitivity and little judgment. He was particularly critical of the Governor for failing to see the need to erect fortifications at Kolonia and for failing to successfully negotiate a peace after the initial confrontation. Relying on the

accounts of eyewitnesses, whom he quoted at length, Cabeza concluded that the Royal Governor had by the early morning hours of July 3 virtually abandoned hope and responsibility for the fate of his men. Cabeza, however, did not limit his criticism to the Governor, but spoke with equal scorn of the punitive expedition sent to relieve the colony. Convinced that to deter future uprisings the leaders of the July rebellion should be punished, Cabeza was amazed to learn that the punitive expedition had no intention of punishing anyone. This prompted Cabeza to write that "the natives continue to walk about the jungle unpunished for their crimes, carrying our weapons in their hands and encouraged by the easy success of their first revolution." In the closing pages of the second chapter one senses the frustration and anger Cabeza must have felt at the knowledge that the "murderers" of his friends and companions walked freely about the colony unpunished.

In Chapters III and IV Cabeza continued the theme of incompetent leadership in the colony. The six month period covered in these two chapters was a time of intense activity and despair as Spain's forces attempted with only moderate success to restore order to a colony wracked by rebellion. While Cabeza was critical of both the colony's civil and military leadership, he clearly found it easier to rationalize the failures of his comrades-in-arms than he did the shortcomings of the colony's civilian leaders. In fact, however, neither the Royal Governors nor their military commanders had any experience that might have prepared them for what they found in Ponape and, lacking such experience, they persisted with policies and plans wholly inappropriate to the environment in which they found themselves. The cost of that

persistence was high, not only in terms of the suffering it caused islander and colonist alike, but also in terms of the subtle psychological toll it took on the leaders themselves. It has already been pointed out that Cabeza felt Governor Posadillo had virtually abandoned hope when he faced the rebels in Kolonia. In Chapter III, Cabeza told of a newly arrived military commander who, realizing that his plan of battle could not succeed, committed suicide rather than face his men. Cabeza went on to plaintively ask how many more brave men would be lost in Ponape as a result of Spain's intransigence.


These two chapters make clear that Cabeza considered Spain betrayed by its appointed leaders. He referred to unrealistically optimistic reports on the situation in Ponape sent by the Royal Governor to Manila and charged that they ". . . simply continued the farce perpetrated on the General [Weyler], the Government, and the Nation." In Cabeza's view, the Royal Governor was not only guilty of incompetence but also, it would seem, of something approaching treason. The Governor's warm welcome of an American warship in October 1890 equally offended Cabeza, who asked rhetorically, ". . . were there reasons for treating this vessel with such friendship? Was its presence or behavior so comforting? We thought just the opposite" One explanation for Cabeza's ire may be that the Governor was unable to convince the ship's commander, Captain Taylor, of the missionaries' role in provincial native unrest. While Captain Taylor agreed to remove the missionaries from Ponape, he carefully noted in a letter to the Governor that their removal was only temporary, until the "Spanish Government considers the island as pacified and the relationships have become such that the

missionaries are again permitted to enjoy their previous privileges." While Hambruch interprets this to mean that Captain Taylor accepted Spanish claims of missionary complicity, a more accurate reading would seem to be that Taylor rejected the claims and attempted to assert missionary rights on Ponape.¹⁴

In Chapter V, the last which Cabeza wrote based on firsthand knowledge, Spain won a temporary victory over the rebels in Madolenihmw and, as noted earlier, divided their land between neighboring districts. Cabeza's sometimes eloquent and often exciting account of the events leading up to this, the taking of the Madolenihmw stronghold at Ketam, could stand by itself as a testament to the agony and suffering of war. Cabeza himself was wounded in this action. In his description of the feelings of the wounded when it appeared as if they would be left behind, one senses the claustrophobic horror of men facing almost certain death in a jungle-green cage of palm and mangrove. Cabeza understandably did not make a point of the fact that the victory at Ketam was as much due to chance as design or that the attack barely avoided disaster. Consequently, Cabeza gave the taking of the stronghold more importance than it rightly deserved, for it failed either to permanently defeat the rebels or even lessen their resistance.

Cabeza used the final chapter of his history to review events in Ponape in the years immediately after his return to Spain. It appears to have been written sometime after the preceding chapters and may well have been completed at the suggestion of his publisher after the main body of his work was finished. In it Cabeza continued to speak harshly of Ponape's Royal Governors, though he singled out two of exceptional


merit for commendation. What is striking about this part of the account is the fact that in Cabeza's stern eyes Spain never had the benefit of two competent governors serving in succession. Rather, the good works of one seemed inevitably undone by the mistakes of his successor. Cabeza's closing paragraph suggests that, at heart, he doubted both the wisdom of Spain's efforts to subdue Ponape and the likelihood of any change in its policy towards that island.



Ponape and its five traditional divisions (After Riesenbergl), with approximate routes of major Spanish campaigns - 1890

Gutierrez y Soto - September 13 - 14
 Monasterio - October 13 - 16
 Serrano - November 20 - 27


Figure 1. Map of Ponape



Ponape and its five traditional divisions (After Riesenbergl), with approximate routes of major Spanish campaigns - 1890


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 Monasterio - October 13 - 16
 Serrano - November 20 - 27

Figure 1. Map of Ponape

II. TRANSLATION

Caroline Studies Series

THE ISLAND OF PONAPE

Its Geography, Ethnography, and History

by

A. Cabeza Pereiro

With an Introduction by

His Excellency, Lieutenant General Don Valeriano Weyler

* * * * *

Publication Authorized by

The General Staff

2nd Edition

FOREWORD

If the patriotism of our people, so obvious when it involves the independence and integrity of our Nation, was not in evidence in the streets of Madrid or echoing throughout Spain when Germany attempted to claim the Caroline Islands, it was because the majority of Spaniards were too busy asking themselves, "Where are these islands that are so important, islands that have twice witnessed the spilling of our soldiers' precious blood as victims of the treachery of the islands' savage inhabitants?" Today, even with these tragic events widely known, I do not consider it daring to suggest that there exists a great lack of knowledge about these islands, their importance to the Philippines, the benefits they produce and, finally, the advantages and disadvantages they offer Spain both for the present and for the future. It is unfortunate that this ignorance in Spain has created political pressures on the Government that guides our Nation's destiny, even on the Monarchy, which requires them to consider their overseas possessions as a point of honor. It is also sad that as a consequence of this these people and their political parties, so suspicious of the Government and King, did not consider themselves obligated to demonstrate their patriotism when the Treaty of Jolo was signed, depriving us of our rights to Borneo, an island located in the sea of the same name, and an extremely valuable possession because of its proximity to Jolo and Paragua. However, no one was concerned about that, nor has anyone attempted to remedy the potential damage to Spain that could result from not possessing such an important island.

Before continuing, I should make clear that the comments I have just made are in no way intended to criticize the Government, which entered into this Treaty convinced that extraordinary circumstances required that it do so, nor have I any other purpose than to underline the unfortunate fact I have already mentioned, that the general lack of knowledge about our possessions in the Philippines could have contributed to such a regrettable situation. For that reason, I have hoped to find a study of that vast country that would convince everyone of the value to Spain of the Carolines, of its importance to the Philippines, of its rich resources, and of its great future when the Panama Canal is opened. We would be suspicious of any further speculation, which could only be guesswork.

With the publication of this work, Dr Cabeza has attempted to fill the vacuum of information that has existed until now. With some hesitancy, I promised to write a foreword to this work despite my initial reply that writing forewords was not my business. In the foreword, I would hope to give special attention to the desire I have heard expressed repeatedly to have light thrown on the serious problems that arose when we first occupied those islands. The fact that I have never pretended to be other than a soldier, with all of the prejudices of that occupation to which I have devoted all of my energies, does not prompt me to ask the reader's indulgence. With that said, allow me to assure the reader that the work which follows my poor introduction contains important facts and information that were assembled personally by a well-informed and diligent observer, Dr Cabeza, who wrote from the depths of his very soul about the cost to Spain of those distant possessions.

For reasons already stated, this evidence has been hidden and, consequently, the reader's perceptions have been distorted. A sense of justice requires that I compensate for this to some degree, and I can find no better way than by substituting the niceties of style that one would use in private correspondence for a language that above all is natural and sincere, perhaps even exaggerated, an approach that has the virtue of clearly stating my concept of true patriotism, which is to demand the abandonment of those distant islands which were practically forgotten and whose possession was considered of so little value until the arrival of the Germans and their occupation of the area. Furthermore, the strategic value to Spain of these islands because of their proximity to the Gilberts and Marshalls can be disputed when one considers that those archipelagos were successfully governed by only a single resident official until recently.

For love of country, I would like to demonstrate the irrefutable logic and practicality of the idea I just put forward, the idea of abandoning these islands. But, as the nature of this work does not permit me that, I am reduced to calling the reader's attention to the brilliant description of those islands provided by the author, a description that makes clear the enormous distance that separates these islands from the Philippines, about equal to the distance that separates Puerto Rico from the Iberian peninsula, a voyage over vast uncharted waters filled with dangers; of the shoals that surround the islands; of the quality of their soil and topography, which lends itself only to the production of coconut and copra; of the absence of trees from which lumber can be produced for building; of the lack of pastureland for cattle; and, if that were not sufficient, of the large native

population whose physical condition is superior to that of even the Filipino. All of this prompts us to ask ourselves why we wanted to occupy these islands in the first place, and what rationale did we put forward when we did so. The development of commerce? Impossible, for nothing can be exported from these islands, nor can they produce anything, and the savage inhabitants live only by hunting and fishing and have no other needs. Cultivation is impossible, for in addition to the limits imposed by the condition of the soil, you are faced with luxuriant tropical vegetation impossible to control. Colonization is out of the question, for it is well known that such an undertaking would be profitable only for agricultural nations.

Lacking both good ports and anchorages, the islands' coasts are very dangerous for approaching vessels, and it is reasonable to suppose that not even the opening of the Panama Canal would make the islands a port-of-call for vessels seeking to obtain ships' stores, for such stores are not available now and will not be in the future. It is not possible to store coal on the islands, since we agreed not to do so under the Treaty of Jolo. We cannot impose customs duties without effectively controlling the islands, a circumstance that required us to deny permission to Japan to send colonists there. While I could describe many other outstanding examples of such empty benefits, I will mention only one. The single benefit we have received from the islands to date is the sacrifice of men and money!

Finally, I should say that at the present time our troops in the islands must be sent all of the provisions necessary for their survival, an undertaking which, with other forms of support required by the

occupation, has uselessly consumed a budget larger than that spent in the Philippines, where a great potential exists about which we do not seem sufficiently concerned.

Well, if the powerful influence of so sacred a virtue requires us to make such sacrifices, it is necessary that the Government do much better in supplying those possessions with all that is needed for their defense, since to do less would expose our military and political honor to repeated disaster, an outcome that must be avoided at all costs.

With this I shall end, hoping that Doctor Cabeza will see his efforts rewarded by public acclaim for his work, and aware that this foreword in no way corresponds to the excellence of the book itself.

Finally, I take great pleasure in mentioning that in recognition of his distinguished service, Dr Cabeza was awarded the White Cross of Military Merit, Second Class.

Valeriano Weyler

PREFACE

We all recall the cry of indignation and protest raised by the Spanish people when the Germans occupied Yap and asserted their control over the Caroline Islands.

Since then, I have heard a great deal of talk about these islands and have read nearly everything written about them. Despite that, however, my curiosity was never so great that I developed a desire to actually visit there. Nonetheless, recent events required that I travel to these islands and, once there, I began to appreciate how much that is said of them is nonsensical, how much nonsense is written about them by persons who have never even seen them on a map, and how misinformed is public opinion in Spain and the Philippine capital with regard to these islands, as we shall see.

Shortly before the June incidents occurred in Ponape, a Manila newspaper published a series of letters from an anonymous but widely recognized source that exaggerated, if not falsified, the islands' prosperity. They sang praise for the imagined progress of the colony, its commerce, and our control over it, despite the fact that these achievements simply never existed. When we arrived in Ponape we found no lodging, for none was to be built until after the massacre, lumber suitable for construction was abandoned, the colony's tools and equipment were lost, a Decauville steam engine was in ruin from neglect, desolation was everywhere, and there was no sign of the colony's defense works.

The anonymous correspondent mentioned above was not content with just those exaggerations, nor was he satisfied with telling us of the

splendid military highways described in his fourth letter published on May 9. He went on to proudly write that Mr Doane had died, that Mr Rand had fled, and that Methodist influence was just a myth.¹⁵ That these assertions were clearly without foundation was demonstrated by the insurrection and murders of June 25.

All of these reports, and the only news Manila received, unfortunately deceived both the Nation and Government, which came to view Ponape as economically advanced and in an excellent strategic and defense posture.

To read similar follies written in the same vein about a land in which so bloody a drama had been played out did not strike me as strange until the Spanish press began to write about the situation in the same misinformed manner, resulting from lack of knowledge as much as from lack of information, and reflecting the general paucity of knowledge in our country about anything to do with our colonies.

As I was interested in the operations that were going to be undertaken on the island of Ponape, in which I had a personal role because of my duties, from the time of our departure from Manila I began to keep simple notes whose only purpose was to remind me of the day's events, such as they were. These notes demonstrated to me the mistaken view held about our possessions in Micronesia.

I was motivated to write this small study by a desire to clarify errors and, through a general examination of the region's geography, ethnography, and history, to give a better understanding of the major and most important island in the Caroline Archipelago so that one can form a more complete picture and reach a sounder judgment as to its importance

or lack thereof. I was also motivated by my firm conviction that we must alter our plans and conduct in these countries if we are to achieve results other than the widespread massacres we have witnessed in the short space of three years.

With the exception of these motives, no other force guided my pen than love for my country and the memory of the soldiers I watched engage in a dauntless struggle in this vast land, some spilling their blood, others giving their lives in honor of their country and to revenge the treacherous murder of their comrades.

Madrid, November 1891

CHAPTER I

Summary

The Missions: Spanish Catholic and North American Methodist¹⁶

Spanish Catholic Missions

In order that the reader might understand Ponape fully, as well as to better comprehend recent events, I believe that it would be useful to record the recent history of our missions in Oceania and, at the same time, the history of the missions established by the North American Methodists.

When the Spanish Government decided to take physical possession of the Caroline Islands, a Royal Decree on March 15, 1886 directed the Capuchin Fathers to evangelize them. This Decree also gave responsibility for mission schools in the Carolines to the Capuchin monasteries at Pamplona and Fuenterrabia, the former of which served as headquarters for novitiates. The Director General of these missions has his official residence in Madrid.

The same Royal Decree authorized the Capuchin Procurator to establish missions of his Order at convenient sites in the Caroline and Palau Islands corresponding to the Eastern and Western districts of the Civil-Military governors. At the same time, the Decree fixed the number of priests that could staff each of the missions. In response to this order, six monks and six lay brothers departed for Manila on the steamship ISLA DE PANAY the following April 1.¹⁷

On June 15 of the same year, six monks under the authority of their immediate superior, Father Daniel de Abasequi, left Manila for Yap on the military transport MANILA to take charge of the mission for which they had been entrusted in the Western Carolines.

Another Royal Decree on October 17, 1886 authorized the establishment in Manila of a mission headquarters in order to have a centralized facility near the local authorities that could manage the affairs of the above mentioned missions, as well as serve as a supply base and guest house for the Order's missionaries. The priest and two lay brothers assigned to the headquarters at that time remain there to present. In order that the above mentioned mission headquarters might be established and that the missions in the Carolines and Palau might be promptly organized, this same Royal Decree granted the Capuchin Procurator, Father Joaquin de Llovaneras, and his secretary, Father Antonio de Valencia, permission to travel to Manila and the Carolines and to visit their missions. In light of this, the Procurator and his secretary, accompanied by the three monks assigned to the mission headquarters and a fourth monk assigned to replace a colleague who had died on an earlier voyage from Spain to the Philippines, departed for Manila on December 1, 1886.

On February 4, 1887 the Governor General arranged for the Procurator and his secretary to travel to Ponape aboard the MANILA, accompanied by six monks assigned there. On June 16, the Procurator and his secretary returned on the same ship after establishing the mission and then proceeded on to Spain.

Organization of the Caroline Missions

The missions established in these Spanish possessions are divided into two districts, East and West, both of which are the responsibility of the Capuchins described above.

In the Western Carolines two missions have been established, one in the city of San Cristina, the district capital of Yap, dedicated to the Virgin Mary, and the other in San Francisco de Coror, dedicated to Saint Francis of Assisi. A Superior and two lay brothers reside in San Cristina, while a priest and one brother live at San Francisco.

The Eastern Carolines also have two missions, both on Asension Island, or Ponape. The first is located in the district capital, Santiago de la Asension, and its patron is the Divine Pastor. Here work Father Saturino de Artajona, the Superior of the mission, Father Agustin de Arinez, and two lay brothers. The second mission, dedicated to San Felix de Canalicio, was established at Kiti where labor a priest and a brother.¹⁸

Each of these four missions has a church and a school under the direction of its priests.

At the time this is written, June 1891, no mission has yet been established in Palau, which falls under the jurisdiction of the Western Carolines. However, there should be no delay in establishing a mission as six priests have just arrived in Manila from Spain for that purpose.

To date, the results produced by these missions have been scanty or, better said, non-existent. This is not because of a lack of good intentions or zeal on the part of the priests, I must confess, but

because of the very unfavorable circumstances they have faced; the need to struggle with the Protestant mission, which had strengthened and consolidated its position over the course of the 40 years since it was first established in this country, and during which time it could be said had educated three generations of natives. Another very fundamental and important circumstance affecting dealings with these primitive races, perhaps more so than those already mentioned, and which had a powerful influence in diminishing our prestige with these natives, was the wretched and deplorable condition of our installations, which caused the Kanakas to say Spain must be a poor and tiny nation, a view we could not change and one which the North Americans encouraged with pleasure.

North American Methodist Missions

The first, and I believe only, mission that foreigners brought to the Carolines with the objective of evangelizing and giving instruction in accord with the interests of their nation, was the Methodist Mission of the United States, which recognized as its head a Mr Clark, President of Foreign Missions.¹⁹

The island of Kusaie, or Ualan, the most eastern of our group, appears to have been the focal point of missionary attention because of its beautiful setting, small population, well behaved people, fertile soil, abundant water, and protected harbors.²⁰ These very favorable conditions determined that a mission would be established here to serve as the center of operations in the Carolines, Marshalls, and Gilberts. For each of the latter two archipelagos, schools were

established south of the island's port to prepare native male and female teachers to serve, eventually, as teaching assistants in their home islands.

Each school was staffed by a male American missionary who taught boys, and a female American missionary who taught girls. In 1886, the Marshallese school was under the direction of a missionary doctor named Pease. The Gilbertese school was directed by a Mr Walhup and had 20 male and six female students.²¹

In 1883, a mission was established on Moen in the important Truk group under the direction of a Mr Logan, who lived there with his family and an assistant.²²

The establishment of the Methodist Mission on Ponape dates to the arrival in 1850 of a Mr George, an active, personable young man to whom the natives were attracted, and who quickly captured the friendship of everyone he encountered as he helped them along the road to civilization.²³ Shortly after Mr George took up residence on the island a Mr Doane arrived and, in 1880, took charge of the mission. Mr Doane's second in command, a Mr Rand, took charge of the mission upon Mr Doane's death during a visit to his native country in 1890.

In order to strengthen their influence, the missionaries on Ponape founded the schools we will now discuss. By the time of the tragic events of June 1890, the following schools had been established on Ponape: in the district or kingdom of Chocach, one; in the district of Net, one; in the district of Metalanin, two--one in Oa and one in Chapalap (Ketam); and in the district of Kiti, three--one in Kiti, one in Rontiki, and one in Alenian.

Oa also had a school operated by a Kanaka named Etker and an assistant, which accepted without distinction men and women students of all ages from throughout the island.²⁴

A large number of people responded when this school sounded its bell, on occasion as many as 200, who were divided into groups of 15 to 20, classified by age and sex. Each group had a director who was referred to as the deacon.

There also existed a kind of normal school for exceptional students between 15 and 20 years of age whom the missionaries had selected for a career of teaching. This school was under the personal direction of the chief of the mission, Mr Rand, who had as his deputy a man from Kiti named Nanepei.²⁵ At this time the school numbered 30 male students in residence. A similar school for women was directed by a Miss Palmer, a young North American woman who was assisted by a mature woman named Miss Cal.²⁶ At this time, the school had 40 women students in attendance, ranging in age from 12 to 20 years.

Because of the large number of islands that make up this group and the desire to send a missionary to each, the idea arose to establish two other normal schools, like those in Ualan, to prepare and instruct teachers of both sexes who would be natives of the islands to which they would ultimately return and teach what they had learned. Some of these youngsters already are acting as missionaries and representatives of a nation desirous to extend its domain and anxious for colonies and faithful and submissive servants who can carry out its plans and designs.

To help the mission meet its expenses as well as to provide a portion of the budget destined for its use, the Governor graciously allowed the missionaries to require contributions in kind from the natives, consisting of 20 coconuts for a marriage, five coconuts for a baptism, and one coconut for each day of instruction at the school.

The missions of this region have at their service the brigantine schooner MORNING STAR, which is equipped with an auxiliary engine for maintaining way in calms and for entering ports. This beautiful vessel of 400 tons travels between the different island groups picking up cargo that has been gathered according to a pre-arranged schedule, and carries it to San Francisco, California, on a regularly scheduled voyage every six months.

The missionaries did not limit themselves only to religious and intellectual education, but also implemented physical exercises, about which they were exceptionally keen, forming teams and dancing groups and teaching the men gymnastics and military exercises with and without arms.²⁷

The missionaries thought, perhaps mistakenly, that teaching the indigenes to read and write would, with the help of the Bible, ensure their domination.

CHAPTER II

Summary

Date on which the history of Ponape begins - Taking possession of the island - Arrival of the first Governor and all of the colony's personnel, declaration of our sovereignty; first construction at the installation - The corvette DOÑA MARIA DE MOLINA is disarmed and converted to a garrison ship - The Director of the Methodist Mission, Mr Doane, is taken to Manila as a prisoner - The Kanakas disappear from the colony and present themselves in rebellion - The murder of Second Lieutenant Martinez and 20 soldiers who accompanied him - The attack on the colony and the death of all its defenders - The arrival of the SAN QUINTIN returning Mr Doane; advising the Commander of the SAN QUINTIN of what had occurred in order to inform Manila - Arrival in Ponape of a military expedition and new Governor which, having done nothing, returns to Manila whence they came.

The history of Ponape did not truly begin until 1850 when the first Methodist missionary, Mr George, arrived on the island. The history of the natives is so scanty that apart from a confused idea they have of the arrival of some ships carrying white men, of a 50-year war between the kings of Kiti and Metalanin, and of the division of the Kingdom of Chocach, no one spoke to us of their past.

They say the missionary George arrived as a young man of perhaps 20 years. He gave the appearance of being an adventurer, though I have been unable to discover what he was in his own country. He first established himself in Ronkiti, valiantly trying to understand the native language with the help of a Zamboangueno (a person from the capital of Mindanao in the Philippines, Zamboanga).²⁸ This Filipino left his place of birth as a youth to sail on ships that plied the coasts of China and Japan, where he learned English. In the course of these travels, he was shipwrecked while navigating these islands and remained here until his death in 1886.

It is also said that Mr George was a lover of conversation, though he had an active and outgoing personality. He is credited with building everything in Oa, where he transferred his mission shortly after his arrival. In 1880 he returned to his homeland in ill-health and never returned, leaving Mr Doane, who had arrived just after George, as his successor.²⁹

In August 1885 the German gunboat IHIS took possession of Yap Island, provoking by this illegal act against the sovereignty of Spain the grave international conflict we all recall. As a consequence, the Government ordered the cruiser VELASCO and the transport MANILA to proceed and take possession of the Caroline Islands. This expedition, led by Don Luis Bayo, after reconnoitering all of the islands of the archipelago, anchored on July 25, 1886 in the Ponapean port of Jamestown, today called Asuncion. The expedition then circled the island conducting studies and, in the Port of Kiti, left nailed to a coconut palm a plaque painted in the colors of the national flag, to

which a group of indigenes who had come to receive the expedition rendered honors. This group formed a guard unit organized by Mr Doane for his personal services. From this day dates the sad history of our domination of Ponape.³⁰

The following day, July 27, the Spanish flag was raised with appropriate ceremonies near the residence of the district chief in the village of Net. Señor Bayo gave this chief responsibility for the flag, having concluded that he was a respected and honored elder among his people. This chief's outstanding qualities were soon made evident when he, in union with the chief of Chocach, instigated the first massacre of Spaniards. Despite the request of Manual Torres to be accorded this honor, Bayo decided against giving responsibility for the flag to this Spaniard because of his ambiguous position; he carried no documents attesting to his character. This proved to have been a sound judgment, for it ultimately became clear that Torres' devious nature and lack of loyalty as an interpreter was one of the principal causes of the first insurrection of the natives.

On August 4 the MANILA raised anchor and sailed for the islands in the east, but not before its Commander had adopted a number of useful measures designed to avoid the frictions and disputes that bad faith can produce. These measures proved to be of much help to the newly appointed Governor. First, the Commander obtained the permission of the natives to declare all fallow land, which meant most of the island, to be the property of the State. Secondly, he informed the Nanamarakis of this decision. This was intended to prevent resident foreigners from taking advantage of the absence of the Spanish authorities and

appropriating large tracts of land, as they had done earlier. The natives were therefore ordered neither to dispose of nor sell a single centimeter of land until the Governor arrived, an order which they were delighted to obey.

As the voyages of exploration and assertion of Spanish sovereignty were being carried out, the personnel and equipment that would ultimately establish our physical and spiritual dominion over these islands gradually began to arrive in Manila. The only explanation for the lack of a sense of urgency in this matter was the slovenliness and laziness that affects everything having to do with these countries.

Finally, on February 4, 1887 the transport MANILA, mentioned so many times already, weighed anchor and sailed from its namesake harbor under the command of Señor Bayo. On board the MANILA was the first Governor of the Eastern Carolines, Commander Don Isidor Posadillo, his secretary, Don Miguel Tur, the doctor of the Naval Squadron, Señor Jordana, Lieutenant Don Cendido Lozano, his wife, three children, and the twenty-five men making up the penal battalion he commanded. Infantry Lieutenant Don Diego Baena and Second Lieutenant Don Ricardo Martinez, with fifty Filipino soldiers, also sailed on the MANILA, along with three Capuchin priests and three lay brothers who were charged with establishing missions in the Carolines.

The ship anchored in Yap on the 18th and remained there until March 6, when it left for Ponape, arriving there on March 14. Two days later, formal possession of the island was taken. On April 16, 1887 on board the MANILA, Spain's sovereignty and the authority of her Governor over the indigenes was solemnly proclaimed in the presence of

the kings and chiefs of the various tribes and a large number of Carolinians. Present at this occasion were our officers and soldiers and the Provincial of the Spanish Capuchins and his missionaries. Immediately, the national flag was unfurled to shouts of acclamation, after which the indigenous chiefs made what appeared to be an oath to Spain.

The Governor confirmed the kings in their respective civil duties, under specific conditions, and gave them the title Gobernadorcillos, as is used in the Philippines, presenting each with a Spanish flag and a baton of authority as a sign of their new responsibilities.

On the same day, and at the end of this ceremony, a child of three years was baptized, the son of a Zamboangueno and a native woman. This child's god-parents were the Governor and Doña Rafaela Sotillo, the wife of the commander of the penal battalion.

A short while later, on April 24, the King of Kiti came to the colony with gifts for the missionaries and the request that they establish a mission in his district. The Provincial approved the request and created Mission San Felix de Kiti, staffed by a priest and lay brother.

Later, attracted by the novelty, the Kanakas attended our religious celebrations, demonstrating curiosity and great surprise at the elegance of the ceremonies. Their expressions of admiration indicated that they were trying to understand what they saw. These were the moments when it was possible to believe in their goodwill, seeing the extremes to which they would go to attend mass and bring flowers to adorn the altar.

On May 31, the corvette DOÑA MARIA DE MOLINA anchored in the colony's port after a three month voyage under sail from Cavite. She would remain in port to serve as a garrison ship.

Little had been done to prepare for the arrival and security of the personnel, to the point that a final decision had not been made on the precise site of the colony. This may seem strange to the reader who has not lived in our highly proclaimed eastern possessions. However, it is not unusual in a country in which officials look out for themselves in every possible way, where you see with unfortunate frequency gunboats and other vessels depart for unknown destinations and enemies, land an officer with 30-40 Filipino soldiers and then immediately set sail not to return for three or four months, leaving those unfortunates to survive on their own resources.

The primary task then was to decide on a site to establish and build the government offices. It was at this juncture that the fateful shadow of Mr Doane first cast itself over us. He suggested that the colony be built at a site which, in addition to not commanding the port, would have been hemmed in and without an exit in the event of an attack by the natives. The Governor, however, opted for a small, flat mesa situated almost in the port itself as the site of the new colony. At this time there were some twelve occupied homes in the immediate vicinity, among them the house of Mr Doane. Today, all have disappeared, their occupants having left to reside in other neighborhoods.

The colonists slowly and casually began work on the colony,* forgetting the fundamental rule that before everything else they should

*The troops slept in an unoccupied men's house, for materials were brought only to construct the homes of the Governor and missionaries.

provide themselves with a means of defense against attack. They were strangers in the country they were going to rule, they had only a small force, and they knew that the natives were numerous and possessed fire-arms. At the same time, they knew virtually nothing about the natives' intentions.

The Kanakas, in an apparent gesture of goodwill, provided workers to help build the colony, different tribes alternating in supplying men.³¹ Only the venerated chief of the Methodist Mission, whose considerable authority was already collapsing, put obstacles in front of the project. One could not so much as take a step without incurring his wrath or without stepping, according to him, on his land. An examination of the titles to the property proved his claims to be empty, however. This, combined with his haughty and disrespectful reply in a letter written to an officer who had ordered him to appear before the Governor, exhausted the latter's patience, who expected to be treated with dignity and respect. The Governor then arranged for Doane's arrest and transfer to Manila for disposition by the Governor General.³²

Doane's arrest hindered the completion of the church he had begun to build near that of the Capuchins, no doubt with the objective of preventing the Capuchins from instructing in the Catholic doctrine the families who occupied the houses mentioned earlier.

The remainder of the month passed without any incident to break the monotony of life in those parts. Absolute peace reigned and there were no signs that would have indicated the organization of a rebellion. The Kanakas appeared for each day's work without giving any appearance of unrest, and none of them expressed any complaint or made any demand.

After work on the afternoon of June 30 the natives, as usual, retired quietly to the houses they were accustomed to sleep in, without the slightest indication of what they had already plotted or of the plan they put into effect that very night.*

The following morning, July 1, there was not a Kanaka in sight, nor did one appear when the bell was rung signaling the beginning of the work day. During the night they had slipped away so stealthfully that no one noticed. Alarmed by their departure, and ignorant of the motives that had prompted such a move, the Governor sent his interpreter and the colony's overseer, Sergeant Garbalo, to see the King of Chocach, who told him that rather than die in the colony he preferred to die in his home.

Not satisfied with such an answer, the Governor ordered Second Lieutenant Martinez and twenty men to proceed to Chocach. Of these twenty, only one returned, and he wounded, bringing the deadly news that all the rest had been ambushed and killed by the Kanakas.³³ Things could not have been more clear, our loyal friends, who not two months earlier had sworn allegiance to Spain, were in open rebellion, not recognizing our authority and attempting from one moment to the next to overthrow the colony. Then, too late, it was decided to construct some kind of fortification to repulse an attack that could happen at any time. Thought was given to what type of fortifications would be easiest to build and, given the press of time, it was agreed that a

*That day the King of Kiti had appeared in the afternoon to talk with the Capuchins. He said that he would return the following day but, of course, did not.

wall would be erected around the penal battalion's barracks and the palm kiosk, forming a square. The wall was made with the lumber destined for the Governor's house and was, at its highest, no more than one meter tall.

But let us take a moment now to speak to three men who witnessed these events. We owe these men our complete thanks, not only because we know two of them personally and believe them to be honest and serious men, but also because in no other way can this simple narration confirm the events described above, which no one else witnessed.

"The first wounded man that came from Chocach did not need our assistance for he was not seriously wounded and, furthermore, he was sent to the garrison ship the same afternoon, July 1, together with the wife and children of Lieutenant Lozano.

"The night of the 1st and 2nd passed quietly, even though no one slept and everyone stood by his weapon. The sentries made their rounds of the barricade, continuously yelling 'Alert!'

"On the morning of July 2 the fortification of the Mission house began as it was the most advantageous point from which to control the beach and, by that, to ensure communication with the garrison ship. Unfortunately, at about seven o'clock in the morning, and well before the fortifications were finished, the Carolinians began shooting at us from Mr Doane's house. This not only required that the work stop but also that what had been done be dismantled to prevent it from serving as a cover for the enemy, who was assumed to be nearby and who was expected at any moment to throw himself frantically and barbarously on the colony.

"In view of this and the hail of bullets that rained down on us, we huddled together in the trench we had dug with with the Governor, his secretary, and the other armed men of the colony. Meanwhile, the

Governor had sent Macario (father of the child who had been baptized), a Zamboagueño, to identify who had fired the shots and see what had happened to them.³⁴ He returned shortly saying there was a body in the middle of the road. He was not able to say if it was a marine or a Kanaka, but it seemed likely that it was the former. Eight marines then departed with their leader, Benito de los Reyes, and the Governor's secretary, heading towards the source of the shots. Before they had advanced very far towards the dock they came under heavy enemy fire from in and around Mr Doane's house and from below the dock. We opened fire to cover their retreat, while they carried two wounded. The wounded were treated in the trench, along with another soldier who had been hit three times, once in the face, and was seriously wounded. These three men were taken to the garrison ship the following morning.

"The Carolinians continued firing towards the trench until about five o'clock in the afternoon of the second day, though we suffered no further casualties. At about five o'clock the hostilities broke off, permitting the Governor to send Macario to the King of Net, who was with the rebels in Doane's house, to seek an explanation of what had happened. There was no shooting the night of the 2nd and 3rd.

"On the morning of July 3 the Governor had regained enough confidence to make him think he could retreat with all of the colony to the garrison ship, and he resolved to do so. Accordingly, he and the Commander of the ship reached a mutual agreement that the hoisting of a white flag over the trench would be a signal that we were ready to move. The Commander would then send in a small boat to pick up the civilians, their chests of valuables and luggage, followed by one or two small boats to pick up the remainder of the colonists.

"For most of the morning and a large part of the afternoon the Governor conferred with the King of Net and the other ring leaders who were with him in Doane's house, first through Macario and then through his secretary. None of this produced a clear conclusion.

"It was ten o'clock in the morning when the Governor came to our hut to say that he did not believe it possible to escape. He said that he had absolutely no confidence in the guarantees of the Carolinians and that it was very likely that everyone would perish at the hands of the enemy. We told him that the salvation of the colony, the only salvation, depended on the garrison ship's cannon, which would be very effective against the enemy. He described this option as impossible, for the enemy was so close to our own position that we would be hit as well as the enemy. We replied that we did not see the situation as quite so grave and serious as did he, to which he said finally that it was still not a solution, for the garrison ship's Commander had given orders not to fire the cannon.

"At about three thirty or four in the afternoon, a white flag was hoisted over the trench and immediately a small boat headed for shore. The signal was given at a time designed to take advantage of those moments in which there was an apparent lull and in which we mixed with the Carolinians, who were strolling freely throughout the colony, though this inspired little confidence on our part.

"The Governor immediately sent us a message to prepare to proceed to the garrison ship in the boat that was already drawing near, as had been planned in advance, while the remainder of the people would depart on the second. The Kanakas had given their word not to open fire on

anyone. When the small boat approached the shore was filled with armed Carolinians. One of the chiefs, Nampen, who was according to some the nephew of the King of Net, ordered them to fall back. These same Kanakas then began to help us carry and load the chests, trunks, and private possessions of the soldiers, including two chests of valuables belonging to the Governor and the troops.

"The boat crew was made up of the sailors who, on the first day, had been ordered to the colony by the Governor to form an auxiliary force. We were still loading the boat when three or four Carolinians stationed themselves behind a tree and pointed their rifles at us. After the boat was fully loaded we had to wade into water up to our chests to launch it. The riflemen behind the tree then began to fire over the boat and the coxswain shouted, 'Kanakas, Maman! Maman! It's all right! Don't shoot!' At the same time he shouted encouragement to the sailors who were setting sail with all possible speed.

"We were only a few meters from the enemy when the boat went aground. The fire was increasing by the second and anyone who moved in the colony risked getting hit. The sailors dived into the water and for a long time hauled the boat over the shallows. The Kanakas were already prepared to seize the small boat with canoes and probably would have done so had not the garrison ship opportunely fired two or three cannon shots over the boat, at which point the canoes retreated. In the course of the engagement, however, a woman and two sailors were wounded. One of the sailors died shortly after reaching the garrison ship."

[TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Cabeza inexplicably stops using quotation marks here, though the following three paragraphs would seem to merit them as well.]

In the trench we had a battery of two cannons and a supply of shells. The powder was in jars, however, and Corporal Benito was required to make charges. When we were unable to rig a fuse for the cannon, the Governor ordered the pieces buried.

After the boat managed to get away, despite the breaking of the truce by the enemy, both sides continued to fire at one another until a Kanaka collapsed. The enemy did not want the Spanish to capture him and therefore he was carried to Doane's house accompanied by all of the rebels. In the trench, our people also gathered together. Shortly thereafter, just at dusk, a large group of perhaps 100-150 Kanakas was seen advancing and firing towards the trench. What is more the Governor, for some uncomprehensible reason, did not want to return the fire. The troops, driven no doubt by the sight of a superior force and the irresistible instinct of self-preservation, opened fire anyway and forced the Kanakas to retreat.

The night passed quietly, and plans were made to retreat to the garrison ship under the cover of darkness. At two o'clock in the morning the move towards the shallows began, with the hope of reaching the garrison ship. The Carolinians, however, were ready for us. Their guards knew our secret, which the aforementioned Macario was said to have revealed, and when the small handful of our men reached the beach they were attacked by the Carolinians, causing immense confusion in our ranks. Some defended themselves, others surrendered, and the Europeans, who could not have numbered more than twelve, heroically fought in hand-to-hand combat until they all fell, finding a glorious death on the beaches which three months earlier they had walked on for the first

time. Only four Filipino soldiers and a Spanish Corporal, José Martin, sometimes walking in water up to their necks and at other times swimming, reached the boat that was sent from the garrison ship in response to the cries for help. Those that remained on the beach were in the hands of the Kanakas who, as was their custom, had begun killing the sailors. Two were already dead.

With the sailing of the MANILA on June 16, which we described earlier, the colony lost all contact with the outside world. The few days of rebellion verified this isolation, for the world remained ignorant of the insurrection until the SAN QUINTIN arrived in Ponape on September 1. The presence of this ship filled the few survivors with joy, for they had been anxiously awaiting the arrival of a ship loaded with supplies, letters, and some relief for their desperate situation. The SAN QUINTIN also carried Mr Doane who, for diplomatic reasons, had been given his freedom.³⁵

The Kanakas were undoubtedly frightened by the infamous act they had committed, and some of the chiefs of the two rebellious kingdoms or districts, though not their kings, presented themselves to the Commander of this ship with clothes, personal effects, the two cannons, and some broken firearms they had captured, asking at the same time for pardon. Pardon was not given, for no one had the authority to do so. The Captain of the SAN QUINTIN concentrated his energies on providing supplies to the garrison ship and reinforcing its guard with 30 Europeans, while hurrying to prepare to raise anchor. After the SAN QUINTIN's departure the garrison ship was made ready to repel a possible attack by arranging the zinc gangways it carried in such a way as to shield

against and impede boarding the vessel. A force was put ashore at the same place the colony had been located to conduct a limited reconnaissance. No one was seen. A grenade was buried and a small flag placed over it on a pole to see if the enemy would attempt to dig it up, but the grenade exploded before anyone had time to approach it. The 50 Europeans who remained then began to build a stone fort under the direction of Lieutenant (j.g.) Don Jenaro Yaspe. Work on this project was suspended before its completion, however, because of the arrival of the punitive expedition.

Señor Patero, in view of the grave situation and after having organized the building of the fort, sailed on the SAN QUINTIN to inform Manila of what had transpired, leaving the garrison ship in command of Navy Lieutenant Concha rather than Senor Piñtado, whose wife had gone insane. Patero reached Manila on the 23rd.

The disastrous news brought by this ship produced a profound reaction in Manila's Spaniards, who immediately began to organize the punitive expedition that left for the island on October 18. The SAN QUINTIN and the MANILA reached Ponape on the 31st, followed shortly by the transport CEBU and the gunboat LEZO. The Captain of the LEZO, Señor Carballo, died at the end of November. The punitive expedition, led by Artillery Commander Señor Diaz Varela, was composed of two field artillery companies, a battery of four mountain pieces, two companies of Filipino infantry, and a section of engineers. The new Governor, Commander Cadalso, also arrived with the flotilla.³⁶

The expedition used a great deal of equipment but very little energy, and while its purpose was to make war it made peace instead.

No punishments were imposed: not one drop of blood avenged the shedding of blood by so many Spaniards. Only four or five men, accused of being the murderers of Posadillo and his men, remain in jail in Manila.³⁷ The rest of the natives continue to walk about the jungle unpunished for their crimes, carrying our weapons in their hands and encouraged by the easy success of their first revolution.

At this point it appeared as if an epoch of peace, if not rule, had begun on the island. The natives kept away from the center of the colonial establishment and maintained only a limited intercourse with us. Only rarely, and then out of a desire to meet their own small needs, did they overcome their laziness and enter the colony to sell birds, fish, and other staples.

In the meantime, the garrison's engineers devoted themselves to erecting a wall around the colony and building Fort Alfonso XIII, which was dedicated on New Year's Day. Work on the barracks also proceeded quickly. On January 1, 1888 the punitive expedition returned to Manila, leaving in Ponape the 3rd and 7th infantry companies, commanded by Captains Nouvilas and Pozo who themselves, on July 9 of the same year, sailed on the MANILA after being relieved by Captains Novo and Torrejón.

On December 22, the 3rd and 7th companies were relieved by a combat company, the 5th under the command of Captain Cortijo. The 5th Company arrived on the MANILA with the Commander of the General Staff, Major Moriano. On April 5, 1889, the late Lieutenant Porras arrived.

CHAPTER III

Summary

Construction of a road and establishment of a detachment and mission in Kiti - Discontent among the Kanakas - The ambush and death of the detachment and its leader, Lieutenant Porras - 50 soldiers proceed to Oa by launch and, in the early hours of the morning, the transport MANILA runs aground - The rescue of the Capuchin missionaries and some soldiers thought to be dead - The pilot boat FOWLER leaves for Manila to report the news of the massacre - Wreck of the English yacht NYANZA - Arrival of the MORNING STAR - Arrival of the squadron sent by Manila - Initial operations; suicide of the Colonel in charge - Squadron and forces depart for Oa - Bombardment, attack, and taking of that village.

The island was completely at peace. In order to extend our dominion throughout its territory, the Governor planned the construction of a road or trail from the port of Santiago to Kiti. Lieutenant Porras and 40 men undertook this task, which lasted from May 15 until June 30, when the project was finally completed after considerable effort.

On July 1, a detachment of troops and a religious mission were established in Kiti. While the inauguration ceremony included as much dignity as the circumstances permitted, it was viewed by the natives

with the indifference that characterizes their race. By the end of October the major work on the fort, church, and mission house had been completed.

On February 19, 1890 the MANILA arrived to relieve the VELASCO, carrying with it the 4th Company under the Command of Captain Rodriquez, who relieved Captain Cortijo.

Understanding the relative importance of possessing the port of Oa, where the American missions were established, and trusting too much in the long-standing peace given the small force at his command, the Governor planned and began to carry out the construction of a new road from Kiti to Oa. This commission was also entrusted to the untiring Porras, who completed the road on May 12. In Oa, Porras established temporary quarters for his 60 men in a poorly built palm hut while urgently undertaking the construction of a fort he wanted to inaugurate on July 24, Saint's Day of Her Majesty the Regent Queen. These works were disapproved by the Captain General, who had informed the Governor in Kiti that in view of his small force he saw more value in one secure garrison than in several questionable ones. With respect to the fort at Oa, the first the Captain General heard of it was in connection with the July massacre, the history of which we shall now relate.

Preliminaries

On May 21, 1890 Lieutenant Don Marcelo Porras completed construction of the road from Kiti to Oa, which he had undertaken with 54 men. [TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Neither the date nor the number of men involved correspond to the information given in the preceding paragraph.]

Upon his arrival at the latter port, it appeared as if one of the indigenous Methodist teachers did not accord him proper respect.

Señor Porras went to Kolonia on the 24th and informed the Governor of this fact, who ordered that the Methodist be brought to Kolonia as a prisoner. He also expressed to the Governor his desire to take a group of officers to Oa to determine if the site he had selected was suitable for the construction of the fort he had just been instructed to build. Because both of the engineering officers in Kolonia were ill, the Governor ordered Captain Rodriguez to join Porras. On May 26 these two officers departed for Oa, accompanied by Father Agustin, who went along with the hope of building a church along with the fort. "Upon our arrival," Captain San Martin said, "Lieutenant Porras informed the Methodist teacher that he should be ready to go to Kolonia the following day as a prisoner.

"The next day, the 27th, Porras went to see if some nipa palm branches had been placed on the guard house to protect it against rain while I remained with the interpreter, Corpsman Vincente Baguio, and a Spanish Corporal named Navarro, in the road leading from the beach to the village. Standing there, we saw the Kanaka Methodist teacher and some 80 men and women armed with knives coming towards us. The aforementioned teacher sat down on a rock while those who came with him demonstrated by their behavior and manner the savage contempt and outrage they felt our presence deserved. I recognized that the situation we were in was serious and attempted to remedy it by beginning a conversation with the chief of these people through the interpreter, trying to make him understand that he had misunderstood that he was going to be a

prisoner. Rather, he was only going to appear before the Governor, who wanted to talk with him. With this explanation the atmosphere grew calmer and I was able to forestall a potential revolt which, no doubt, would have seen me and my companions perish given our exposed position. When Porrás returned I informed him of what had taken place and, upon reaching Kolonia, gave a complete account to the Governor. The Governor replied that he had confidence in the tribe as it had given him guarantees of peace.

"I had done my duty, but I always thought, unfortunately, that time would bear me out."

The Massacre

At dawn on June 26, Lieutenant Porrás formed a company of 60 men which he divided into two work parties each headed by a corporal. He then scattered the work parties throughout the jungle with axes and machetes to cut wood and palm.³⁸ A corporal and two mess cooks remained in the barracks. Since the previous night, the Carolinians had been hidden in a house near the barracks that belonged to the Chauлик who would die in combat at Oa and whose skull has been preserved and photographed. No sooner had the soldiers disappeared in all directions to do their work than the Kanakas abandoned their hiding place and fell upon the barracks, killing the three men who remained there. The Kanakas then armed themselves with weapons and ammunition. Once well armed, they proceeded into the jungle to complete the massacre of whom-ever they could seize. Surprised by the shots, scattered and unarmed, our soldiers saw it was an unequal fight and recognized that their only

recourse was to escape, which they all tried to do. Lieutenant Porras, Corporal Navarro, and some soldiers were heading for the beach to seek refuge in Kiti when they ran across two Kanaka canoes from Matup. The occupants of these canoes tricked them by calling out "Maman - Maman" (It's all right) and, just when they thought they had seen their salvation, the Kanakas fell on them, knives in hand, and killed the Lieutenant and several soldiers. The Corporal and the others survived by hiding themselves among the mangroves. Navarro and two soldiers finally reached Kiti after 13 days of unbelievable suffering and deprivation. Others crossed the mountain between Oa and Net, reaching Kolonia a day later.

Father Agustin, a lay brother and a soldier were picked up by a student/tutor and taken to the girls' school. Corpsman Vincente Baguio saved himself by cautiously approaching some women and school girls in front of the boys' school and taking refuge with the wife of Nanenpei Kiti, an English-mestizo.³⁹ The natives were prevented from shooting at Baguio for fear of killing the women. He was then protected by standing between this woman and the widow of a King of Kiti, who took him to the former's home. The Carolinians killed 27 soldiers and the Lieutenant. Then, thinking that the others could not be pursued because of the dense underbrush, they assembled at the barracks to loot its rations and drink its wine.

Shortly thereafter, four school boys departed Pinglap Island on the orders of Nanpei to find the fugitives and help them escape.⁴⁰ These school boys returned with three soldiers and a corporal who had been hiding.

At nine o'clock in the morning, Nanpei saw that there were no Kanakas in the area. Aware that they knew he was hiding fugitives in his house, and afraid that he could not control the natives, Nanpei opened Mr Rand's house, who was absent, and cautiously led the fugitives there where they took shelter. He then closed the Rand house hoping thereby to deceive the rebels. Soon after he brought the fugitives some biscuits. Later, at about eleven o'clock, he took advantage of the opportunity presented by the Carolinians being occupied with drinking and looting to bring the fugitives out of hiding and to the girls' school, where they joined Father Agustin and the lay brother. Miss Palmer gave them all food, served by her and the school girls, though these wretches had little appetite and were choked with fear.

The Carolinians knew that the refugees could be found in the school and surrounded it to see who came in and went out. At one in the afternoon Etkar and Nanpei of Metalanin went out to see them, acting ignorant and unaware of what had occurred. Nanpei was then chief of Oa, named by the Governor at Porras' suggestion to replace Nalian.⁴¹ The unfortunates spent a quiet night, though they were constantly on guard lest the Kanakas rise up and kill them. That did not happen, thanks to the respect Nanpei commanded in Kiti. At about eleven o'clock, Father Agustin wrote a letter to the Governor in which he described what had happened and Nanpei found some students to carry it to Kolonia. The students left in a canoe and while enroute came across an American bound by boat for Langar Island. They entrusted the letter to him and he delivered it to the Governor. As the MANILA made ready to sail for Oa, the Governor arranged for 50 men under the orders of Second Lieutenant

Don Saturnino Serrano to immediately proceed ahead by launch. Command of this naval force was given to Ensign Don José Sumyer, assisted by the MANILA's doctor, Don Ambrosio Ambrós. The launches arrived at Oa at about one o'clock and moved as close to shore as their draft would permit before Serrano deployed his forces. The soldiers advanced towards land in water up to their waists under heavy and uninterrupted fire coming from the houses and underbrush where the natives, about 200 in number, had taken shelter. Completely exposed, our intrepid soldiers took cover by pressing themselves to the earth. The number of casualties soon began to mount and would have quickly included the entire company had Serrano not seen the futility of his effort and begun an orderly retreat to the colony. He returned with a loss of two men killed and ten wounded, including himself.

Before the return of these men, the MANILA had left for Oa, where she arrived at about five o'clock with the hope of protecting the landing. Without doubt, this ship had the worst artillery in the Spanish Navy. Her entire weapons complement consisted of two bronze cannon that have stamped on their breeches the symbol of their antiquity, the names Quevedo and Villar.⁴² It carried no rapid fire cannon, machine guns, or even one small calibre cannon to mount on its small boats. Given its condition, it was not the most appropriate vessel for the mission but, when there is only one to choose from, you cannot be picky. There is another enormous problem the MANILA had to deal with, a problem that can only be appreciated by one who knows the island, surrounded as we said in its description by a barrier reef broken only in six or seven places where channels are formed into the

ports. One of these breaks forms the entrance to the port of Oa. Aware of these facts, and of the need for the MANILA to enter the port if its cannon were to be of any use at all, the Governor recommended to Commander Regalado that he take two pilots with him, one Portuguese and the other a mestizo from Ponape, both of whom appeared committed to the cause of Spain.

Despite all the precautions taken, the MANILA went aground on the southern reefs when entering the port's tortuous channel. It is difficult to ascertain whether or not the pilots were responsible, though the escape of the Carolinians two or three days after the grounding makes one suspicious.

The survivors, who had been watching all of these operations from the house in which they had taken shelter, were filled with joy at the sight of the MANILA, believing themselves finally to be rescued. Soon, however, hope turned to despair as they saw what happened to Serrano and then the MANILA. Certainly, one could not imagine a more difficult situation than theirs.

On the morning of the 26th, the refugees were visited by the chiefs of the nearby districts, who hoped to trick the survivors with a promise to help them. The survivors did not accept their offer, however, because Nanpei had cautioned them to trust no one but Miss Palmer or Miss Poka, an employee of the mission.⁴³ In the afternoon of the same day the survivors began to plot their escape. Only two options seemed available, and both required taking advantage of the slackening of their captors' vigilance. One plan called for escaping into the forest while the other called for escaping along the beach and reefs to the

MANILA. Both means of escape were difficult and dangerous. When it grew dark, Brother Benito, noticing that no enemy was nearby, discreetly slipped away and began to dash quickly up the mountain. By the time the Kanakas saw him he was at some distance. They yelled "Maman! Maman! It's all right!" but Benito sped up and dove deep into the underbrush. The Kanakas would have followed him had they not decided that pursuit would be impossible. By chance, his flight brought Brother Benito near U, from where a Kanaka took him to Kolonia.

At midnight, after the moon had set, Nanpei inspected the surrounding area and saw no rebels nearby. He then cautiously led his charges out and guided them through the mangroves to the shore, where an Englishman waited for them with a canoe to take them to the MANILA. When he had said goodbye, shook their hands, and wished them a safe journey to the ship, Nanpei heard the sound of men and alerted his companions, who scattered themselves along the reefs. At daybreak, the MANILA's small boats picked up the survivors, snatching them from certain death.

The same day, a sergeant and four soldiers who were ignorant of what had happened and who had left Kiti in a canoe for Kolonia were murdered by the occupants of two canoes they met en route, lured to their deaths by an offer of bananas. News of this was brought by a Carolinian boy named Miguel, who was educated by the Capuchins and who had accompanied the sergeant to visit his family.

Because the MANILA had been proceeding very slowly when she struck the reef she was not hard aground. However, even with the equipment for hauling her free working properly, the first efforts to put her afloat

were futile, and each time she was floated free the surf would wash her aground again. This constant pounding caused fear that she would break up on the reef. At this critical juncture, the MANILA lacked small boats with sufficient power to stretch out an anchor and chain. Furthermore, there were only a handful of men available for this task. Her already small crew had been further reduced by the 16 men who had remained to defend Kolonia and by the men assigned to man the launches of Captain Serrano. At nine o'clock in the evening the MANILA's commander, sensing that the situation was desperate, dispatched an officer and four armed men in a canoe to the port of Santiago to bring back the men and boats stationed there and to seek whatever assistance the garrison ship DOÑA MARIA DE MOLINA could offer.

Meanwhile, with a great deal of effort and at considerable risk, it was possible for two small boats to stretch out a second anchor. A single anchor was not sufficient to prevent the ship from being pounded against the reef by the surf. These efforts were quickly rewarded and the ship was made safe from the sea's crushing blows, blows that made its destruction seem inevitable and imminent. This could not have been accomplished without the truly extraordinary efforts of the crew, who in the four days since the grounding had neither slept nor rested. They worked untiringly and without stop at their tasks of dumping ballast and attempting to refloat the vessel while, at the same time, maintaining a careful watch for fear the natives would approach the ship and cut the hawsers that held it secure.

The heroic efforts of the crew were not in vain. The weather favored them and remained calm throughout the time they were grounded, a fact to which the ship owes its rescue. At eleven o'clock on the

evening of the 29th the ship was refloated. She was now in even greater danger, for she was required to abandon her anchors and make directly for the open sea without picking up the small boats she had left anchored near the reef. At dawn the next day a large number of natives could be seen on the reefs outside the port, three of whom seized one of the MANILA's small boats and took it into port.

The astonishing power of the artillery the MANILA mounted will now become apparent. Considering that the cannon were loaded and ready, there were numerous problems to overcome before they could be put into battery. Mounts for the wooden gun carriages had to be precisely assembled and installed before the cannon could be accurately fired. This was a risky and time-consuming business to be undertaken while maneuvering near the reefs. As a consequence, by the time the cannon were ready to fire, the Carolinians, who were already suspicious, had moved the boat they had craftily stolen a considerable distance beyond the range of the ship's cannon. Finally, in the process of eventually firing two volleys, one of the cannon's firing pins jammed and a gun carriage mount was broken. In view of the great risk associated with attempting to enter the port without having a single anchor to deploy, and aware that the artillery was useless under those conditions, the ship sailed for Santiago. There was an urgent need to repair the damage the boilers and machinery had suffered, and the hull had begun to leak as well. The MANILA anchored at Santiago on the 30th after five continuous days of work and privation for her crew. Nonetheless, the ship, which could have been a magnificent prize for the natives, was safe.

Although already having done its share, the MANILA after repairing some of its damage sailed again for Oa to recover the anchors it had

abandoned. It also carried provisions to the detachment at Kiti, where nothing had transpired.

The few measures that were taken, I am ashamed to say, were necessarily limited to the defense of Kolonia, and did not permit retribution until the arrival of reinforcements from Manila. Still, the situation in Kolonia at this time was quiet. Daily, the kings of the many tribes came to hypocritically proclaim their allegiance to Spain, arguing that what had occurred was the work of only some 200 rebels who could not be restrained and whom they believed had acted without reason. They also returned the MANILA's launch and a few broken weapons.

From the departure from Santiago of the American pilot boat FOWLER on July 15, chartered for 2,000 pesos by the Governor to carry Ensign José Moreno Eliza and a petty officer to Manila, nothing changed in the situation at Kolonia. It was difficult to predict when the ships of the relief expedition would arrive and it was possible that we would have to wait until November or December. However, according to the calculations of some, the steam-powered mail ship DON JUAN would call in the Marianas on July 23 and it was just possible for the pilot boat to arrive in those islands on the same day and put Ensign Moreno on her. The FOWLER, a small vessel of 35 tons, would require some two to three months to make the voyage to Manila. During that time, it would be necessary to wait patiently while at the same time strengthening the defensive posture of Kolonia and Fort Alfonso XIII. In the first days after the FOWLER's departure there was considerable fear of another attack. In view of the disastrous condition of our few soldiers, who

were poorly dressed, poorly fed, and demoralized and ill because of the rigors of the climate and their earlier campaigns on Mindanao, another attack could have been successful. Eventually, the friendly attitudes of everyone except the Metalanin, who were part of the village of Oa and who continued in a state of rebellion, calmed the atmosphere which eventually returned to its earlier state of complete tranquility, even though more than ever the colonists were confined to the small expanse of land occupied by Kolonia.⁴⁴ The colonists, of necessity, remained alert and constantly on guard.

An unfortunate accident, the natural result of the abominable conditions the island offers navigators, then broke the monotony of the colony's life. On the morning of July 29 a paddle steamer entered the port of Santiago to inform the colony that the English pleasure yacht NYANZA had run aground on the reefs of Mantas Island. The paddle steamer was carrying the wife of the Yacht's owner, Mr J. C. Dewar, a captain in the English cavalry, and the vessel's Captain, Garrington, who had come to seek assistance in saving the ship. The transport MANILA and the garrison ship DOÑA MARIA DE MOLINA were directed to proceed immediately to the site of the disaster. Their crews were well armed because Mantas lay only six miles from Oa, still considered to be in open rebellion. It was impossible to save the yacht, which was breaking up, and only with great effort was it possible to save some personal effects, which the sailors carried on their shoulders over some 1,000 meters of coral reef. Among the most important effects saved were several rifles that belonged to the yacht's crew. The precaution was also taken to disable the Nordenfelt machine guns mounted on the yacht before it was abandoned by its crew in the afternoon.

However, considering that it was still possible to save some cargo, including the machine guns and ammunition, the two vessels mentioned above returned the following day, only to discover some 80 natives on the reef, who were assumed to be hostile, given the proximity of Oa. To drive them off, the MOLINA fired its cannon from 1,000 meters off shore, only to watch the shell drop some 800 meters short of its target, reconfirming the value of our artillery. This came as no surprise, as we are unfortunately accustomed to such failures. Our sailors then entered the water and made their way towards the reef and the stranded yacht. Fortunately, the natives first thought to be hostile turned out to be unarmed and from the tribe of U, though undoubtedly there were some Metalanin among them.

With the help of these natives and a great deal of effort by the sailors, who were required not only to carry the effects but also to watch the Carolinians, whose desire for plunder was not concealed, a number of objects were salvaged, including the machine guns and ammunition. The Governor acquired one of the machine guns for the State at a very reasonable price. The rescue effort required three more days, despite the fact that a good deal of the cargo had already been lost or stolen by the natives. Nonetheless, quite a few things were recovered and the crew was rescued and given accommodations on the MANILA and the DOÑA DE MOLINA.

On August 21 the MORNING STAR, a steam ship rigged with sail, arrived in Santiago. This ship belonged to the American missionaries and was carrying several of them to the island, including Mr Rand, who had succeeded the recently deceased Doane. Mr Rand was already resident

on the island when the events of '87 occurred, events in which it is said with good cause the missionaries played an important role. That, of course, could not be proven or, were it known, did anyone want it proved. The fact that the MORNING STAR anchored outside the port and maintained a constant contact with Oa, which was still in a state of rebellion, greatly interested the inhabitants of this colony.⁴⁵

It is difficult to describe the surprise and joy produced in Kolonia by the sight of the pilot boat FOWLER on the morning of August 27. Hope had been lost that the ship would have been able to rendezvous with the mail ship in the Marianas, which explains the indescribable enthusiasm with which the news was received that a delay of the mail ship by bad weather had permitted what was thought to be impossible. Señor Moreno was continuing his trip to Manila on the steamship DON JUAN where, as it happened, he arrived on about August 11.

While nothing could have delayed the ships of the expedition, no one expected them to arrive so quickly--on September 1 the cruisers VELASCO and ULLOA entered the harbor after having departed Cavite on August 11.

This gave proof that the expedition had been organized with a dispatch worthy of applause, a dispatch in which was evident the firm and decisive hand of the Honorable General Weyler. These ships carried 500 marines, composed of both artillery and foot, under the command of Colonel Don Isidro Gutierrez Soto, a man whose military reputation had been won in the campaigns of Cuba and Jolo.⁴⁶ On September 5 at six o'clock in the afternoon the steam powered merchantman SALVADORA entered the harbor as well, carrying a commander, two doctors, an infantry captain and an officer in military administration. She was also loaded

with coal, food, ammunition, and medical supplies. The SALVADORA had left Manila on the 20th, taken on 200 tons of coal at Isabela on the 25th and then, at two o'clock in the afternoon, had sailed directly for Ponape.

As the SALVADORA was being unloaded, the warships took on the coal they needed and the troops were organized for the expedition. The transport MANILA departed for the port of Mutok, carrying some soldiers under the command of an officer to reinforce the garrison at Kiti. Its kings and principal chiefs had come aboard immediately upon the MANILA's arrival to express their allegiance to Spain. The MANILA reported, however, that while these kings were practicing their deceitful ways with us, the natives were unanimously behind Metalanin.

The plan of attack was a matter of extreme secrecy, giving proof of the caution that everyone exercised. On the 12th, no one would have guessed that on the following day, while the cruisers VELASCO and ULLOA left for the port of Metalanin, the ground forces would embark on an overland march. This news shocked everyone who knew something of the island or who had spent any time on it. Even those who were here for the first time were surprised, for they quickly discovered the difficulties the jungle and, even more, the underbrush, would pose to a column of soldiers.

Colonel Gutierrez Soto had conceived a plan to capture Oa by attacking the enemy from the sea while ground troops, coming secretly by land would attack from the rear and catch the enemy in a closing vice. This plan was put before the council of war, made up of the commanders of the ULLOA, the VELASCO, and the MANILA, the Governor, and

Gutierrez Soto's second in command. The plan was approved almost without dissent. The Captain of the MANILA, Señor Regalado, however, and his executive officer, Señor Nuñez, tenaciously opposed the plan as unworkable, and predicted that the ground troops would return with a considerable number of casualties, if not from combat with the natives who would not hesitate to attack in the jungle, then from injuries sustained on an extremely difficult march through virgin jungle. They pointed out that the jungle terrain consisted of large boulders covered with creeping vines, which made walking difficult, and enormous caverns hidden by the underbrush into which soldiers could easily fall.

Under these conditions, and in one of the heavy rainstorms that frequent this island, the soldiers began their march in the early morning hours of the 13th. On the same day the cruisers VELASCO and ULLOA entered Metalanin and, after bombarding the port, landed their company on the island of Tauche, the usual residence of the tribe's king. Fortunately for the crews of those ships, they not only met with no resistance but were able to march straight from the ship to the village, which they found abandoned. They immediately commenced burning the houses in the village while awaiting the arrival of the ground forces. Though we have already indicated the difficulties this march would encounter, no one believed the conditions would be as bad as they actually were. Beginning without guides at five o'clock in the morning, we marched for ten hellish hours on a punishing trail, now cutting our feet, now in mangrove swamps up to our knees, now in water up to our waists in the river which at times served as our path, and for nine of those hours a constant torrential rain poured down, making

our teeth chatter, soaking us to the bone, and spoiling our rations.

At three in the afternoon we rested in the jungle, half-way up the side of Mount Telemir, eating for the first time since our departure what could be salvaged from the spoiled food and preparing to bivouac for the night. Captain Monasterio and Lieutenant Fandos took four men and climbed to the summit in hopes of orienting themselves and determining our position. The results of their observations were not encouraging; we had at least three more days of marching if we were to cross the two ridges that lay ahead of us. In view of this and the fact that we were without food, that our ammunition was wet, that we lacked any form of transportation, and that a day had already been lost, the Colonel very wisely ordered our return to Kolonia, which we reached on the 14th at eleven o'clock in the morning. We were surprised upon our return to Kolonia to see the merchant steamship ANTONIO MUÑOZ anchored in the harbor, carrying supplies, coal, and reinforcements in the form of three officers and 50 artillerymen.

A new war council was held at which it was decided to land at Metalanin, where the cruisers remained, defeat the local population, and proceed by land to Oa, with the objective of attacking from the rear, an idea constantly pursued by the Colonel. Meanwhile, the ships would make a frontal attack. The troops boarded the MANILA and the ANTONIO MUÑOZ and were taken to Palitipon, where they landed on the 16th without opposition. The column passed the night without incident, camped in the jungle, and in the early morning hours of the following day we began the march to Oa.

The fateful day of the expedition dawned. The Colonel, his aide, his second in command, the Capuchin priest who served as our chaplain, a companion, and I had peacefully eaten dinner and then talked a bit about our separate responsibilities on the march and the activities of the day ahead. The Colonel then gave the necessary orders for the following day and we made what arrangements we could to pass the night comfortably in the only building available, a men's house. We slept like saints!

At dawn we got up as usual and went out to wash and have coffee. The troops had already had breakfast and everyone was ready to depart. We were surprised that the Colonel was still asleep and it was finally decided to wake him. Seeing that he did not respond to his aide's call, we hastily went to his quarters where, to our astonishment, we saw him immobile, splattered with blood, a revolver with an empty chamber clutched in his right hand, and its barrel near his mouth! He had committed suicide during the night by shooting himself in the mouth and not one of us had noticed!⁴⁷ A few had heard a small noise, which sounded more as if it had come from the cliffs near the sea than from his quarters. The unfortunate Colonel was laying on his left side on the campaign cot that had served as his bed, with the blanket thrown up to cover a part of his face, the position in which he usually slept. Only a slight movement had been necessary for him to leave this existence.

No one could understand what had prompted him to take this desperate step. Since he had seen the need to retreat to Kolonia he appeared to be slightly preoccupied, and more so after returning from

the reconnaissance he made with the artillery forces as soon as he had landed. Perhaps the bad condition of the terrain offered little hope of success, and he considered a second retreat in front of his colleagues, who with rare exception did not know the island, as a blot on his unsullied reputation. His body was taken to Kolonia the same afternoon on the transport MANILA.

Rest in peace, honorable and unfortunate Colonel, the latest victim of this island. How much this is costing us!

At this tragic moment, the Governor gave command of the expedition to Artillery Captain Don Victor Diaz, who commanded the ground forces, and named Commander José Paredes, Captain of the cruiser VELASCO, Commander-in-Chief of all forces. Before the troops had recovered from the shock the death of their leader had produced, six or eight Kanakas hidden in the jungle began attacking the outpost, seriously wounding one Filipino soldier and killing a European marine sergeant. Unable to even see the enemy we nonetheless made an effort to return his fire.

On the 18th, having decided to attack Oa by sea, the troops re-boarded the MANILA as soon as it returned from Kolonia. They had spent a horrendous night with everyone frightened and exposed to a constant rain. The embarkation was carried out in an orderly way and at dawn on the 19th the squadron departed under the command of Señor Paredes. The squadron was made of the Paredes' cruiser VELESCO, the cruiser ULLOA under Commander José Ferrer, and the transport MANILA under Lieutenant Dimas Regalado. The merchant steamer ANTONIO MUÑOZ also joined the squadron. Its Captain, Don Ramón Osorio, was always ready to cooperate in any task, including something as dangerous as attempting to enter the port of Oa.

Without having seen it one cannot form a proper idea of the dangers this port offers. The entrance is narrow and tortuous, demanding that vessels make a series of rapid course changes covering twelve points of the compass, and it is strewn with shallows and shoals. Only shallow draft vessels that handle well, with crews that have an exact knowledge of the area, should attempt to enter this port, and even then they risk serious accident. Nonetheless, the necessities of the situation and the dignity of the Nation required that we attempt to do so and, despite the unfavorable conditions our vessels began to enter the port, piloted by the Polish-German national Mister Narhun, who throughout this period gave outstanding service to Spain.

The squadron's approach was brilliant and without greater incident than that the ULLOA was obligated to anchor because she was not able to come about to port as rapidly as was necessary. The vessels anchored off the village of Oa, which was defended by a trench more than 500 meters long, protecting the entire stretch of beach on which we intended to land. From the moment the ships anchored their cannon began firing on the village. The firing continued into the early evening, lighted by electric spot lights on the ULLOA. At dawn on the 30th [TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This appears to be an error; the correct date is obviously September 20th] a constant and sustained shelling of the houses and trenches began anew, while the forces assigned to take the village landed and began their advance.

At about six o'clock the forces on the ANTONIO MUÑOZ began disembarking. In the three large launches that formed the vanguard were the 2nd, 4th, and 5th Platoons under the respective commands of their

officers Fando, Panfil, and Terrazas. Captain Monasterio was in the center. Thus began the attack, defended on its flanks by two armed steam launches, and followed by other launches carrying the company's two other platoons, commanded by the officers Cebrian and Sergio, following in line behind the first three. The launches were beached some 300 meters offshore and the men jumped into the water and immediately formed into battle ranks, the 1st, 4th, and 5th facing towards the land with the 2nd and 3rd on their right, forming an angle with them. The object of this was to hit the trenches on the right that flanked the spot towards which we were advancing and in which the enemy had fortified himself. The 71st Company formed the reserve. In a few moments the enemy began a heavy barrage of rifle fire, and occasionally fired the cannon located in the trenches on our right. This only spurred on our attack and made us move as rapidly as possible towards Point Oa, where we took a position that dominated the trenches and allowed our forces to cut the enemy line in two. It was a wonderful sight to see the line of our soldiers advancing without breaking rank, the platoons firing at the command of their officers, and the soldiers overcoming the difficulties that hindered their advance. They were in water up to the waist and had to walk on an uneven bottom, either of which could have produced a disaster. Two artillerymen fell into a trough, losing their rifles as they fell. With these difficulties, and under enemy fire, the artillery company kept advancing towards the shore, with the goal of immediately seizing the high ground where the fort was being built and which was, for the moment, the primary objective of our attack.

Perceiving our intentions, the enemy sent a large number of Carolinians from the trenches towards the high ground which we were trying to take. Captain Monasterio saw what was happening and immediately prepared to take it with all haste, using the 1st, 4th, and 5th Platoons. He ordered the 2nd to remain at a height from which they could fire into the trenches and, in order to maintain communication with the sea, the 3rd was ordered to continue firing from the beach until such time as all the forces had disembarked.

Each platoon carried out its orders so expeditiously that upon reaching the highest point, the advancing enemy was only some 40 meters from our lines. They began firing volleys under the cover of which they continued to advance until some were located only a few paces from our lines. "Return the enemy fire," came the voice of the Captain, and sensing that it was no longer possible to advance, the enemy entrenched themselves in the Methodist church, from which they tore the white flag, and some houses about 100 meters distant, from where they attacked us protected by trees. The 71st Company continued the movement and occupied the artillerymen's left flank. About a half-hour after the vanguard and head of the column were disembarked, the remainder of the forces arrived, made up of the 68th, which covered the right to the sea and then fell back to join up with the 2nd and 3rd artillery platoons. The 74th arrived on the right to take the flank and dislodge the enemy from the trenches, seizing an iron cannon in the process. The third boat-load arrived carrying Marines, part of whom moved into the trenches on the right and part of whom moved into the trenches on the left, occupying the ends of the line.

At the end of the first phase of the attack, the vanguard had 30 disabled rifles. This, however, did not cause the troops to stop fighting; those without rifles volunteered to carry the wounded or ammunition. With all of the forces landed and the line resupplied with ammunition, the ringing of bells and a loud shouting was heard at about 11:30. Fearing an attack we began to direct heavy fire in the direction of the shouting. At the same time, the Commander ordered an advance to the right, pivoting around the position held by the artillery company, which had to support the movement. The manoeuver was carried out by the men of the 68th and 74th, who took with bayonets the village in which the enemy was entrenched. They then burned all of its buildings. The enemy was driven into the bush and pursued for a good distance. At the end of this operation the forces that had been ordered to hold the primary line returned, and between three-thirty and four the reloading began without harassment. By six in the afternoon all of the forces were on board and, for the first time that day, had time to eat.

It is not easy to calculate the number of natives that defended the village, for at first they were hidden in the trenches, then in the houses, and eventually in the jungle. One can only say that judging by the heavy fire, there must have been some 400 or 500, the number that would have been necessary to man the trenches. The trenches were expertly made, containing defensive moats and gun turrets arranged according to the basic principles of fortification, clearly suggesting that their construction was not directed by a native but rather by Europeans.

There remained one other problem to overcome, the departure of the squadron from the port of Oa. This was accomplished with great skill the following morning and the squadron proceeded to Santiago, where it arrived the same day. The MANILA had been converted into a hospital ship and carried 25 wounded, among whom was the aide to Colonel Louis Beltran de Lis, suffering from a serious chest wound. In total, there were three dead and 30 wounded in our attack on Oa. With regard the natives, who take special care to remove their fallen, it appeared that there were thirteen dead and twenty or so wounded. We only discovered three bodies in the field, including that of one of the leaders of the rebellion, Chaulik of Oa, whose skull is today resting in the museum of the University of Santiago.

The taking of Oa was a genuine triumph and a complete victory. Our soldiers performed valiantly and upheld the name of our Nation in a campaign that little concerned most Spaniards, who thought it to be of little or no importance, a view which perhaps the ill-fated Colonel held and which led to his becoming its first victim.

With this we accomplished two goals the Kanakas deemed impossible; the entry of the ships into the port and the capture of the trenches.

CHAPTER IV

Summary

Return of the troops to Kolonia - Our situation - The departure of the steamships SALVADORA and ANTONIO MUÑOZ for Manila, with the latter carrying the sick and wounded - Building our defensive works - A column is ordered to depart - Negotiations with the Kanakas - Bombardment of Metalanin - An expedition and its results - Arrival of the American corvette ALLIANCE and an exchange of notes between its Captain and the Governor - Move to Ualan by the entire American mission onboard the ALLIANCE.

We re-boarded the following day, the 21st, and returned to Kolonia, where we told what had happened in order to record precisely the great events that had taken place. Kolonia, or correctly Santiago de la Asuncion, is the residence of the Governor, and no Kanakas reside there or in its suburbs. The village consists of the Governor's house, a small barracks, a fort, an infirmary, the residence and headquarters of the Capuchin Order, housing for the officers of the guard, the interpreter, the doctor, and the secretary to the Governor, plus three other houses belonging to some foreigners.

October 1: In this tiny village, which lacked even rudimentary shelter for the troops, we waited for General Weyler's orders.⁴⁸ Few ~~resources remained~~ and the infirmary had been completely denuded. With considerable difficulty we threw the officers and men out of the

infirmary's beds, which were just sufficient for the wounded. There was no medicine.

Our sick and wounded could not be treated as required, for the infirmary lacked even the basic necessities. To overcome this, we converted our campaign ambulance into a field hospital, which meant that we had to quickly acquire a few things for a kitchen, some plates and glasses for the sick, some pitchers, candles, bedding and, to make everything perfect, pillows and mattresses. Doctor Topete provided the latter, made out of empty rice sacks.

However, it was not only resources that were lacking, but room as well, for the infirmary was designed to provide health care to only 150 men. As a consequence, it had only 24 beds, and we already had 26 wounded and a number of others ill.⁴⁹ There was no doubt that there had been a disgraceful dereliction of duty on the part of someone, especially in regard to the care of our soldiers. When Manila was informed of what had taken place, it should have been made absolutely clear that the expedition would arrive to find that it was impossible to obtain any resources in the islands. Therefore, it should have been provided with everything necessary to support its operations. This was not done because no one wanted to reveal the true situation to General Weyler and, through him, to the Nation after having consistently described the islands as a veritable paradise.

Recourse had to be made to the campaign medicine chest and the medicines intended to treat the wounded in the field. At the rate we were using the medicines brought by the expeditionary force for the campaign they would be exhausted in the space of one month. The arrival of supplies from Manila could be delayed no longer.

It was, for reasons already explained, absolutely necessary to dismantle the campaign ambulance. It was therefore a considerable relief when the steamship ANTONIO MUÑOZ took on board Dr Cantero, the MANILA's doctor, and 12 wounded men who were in a condition to be moved. She also took 17 other soldiers who on shore only got in the way and ate our scarce rations. Some of these men were no longer fit for service and others suffered from serious skin ulcerations. Supplied with the necessary medicines and a medical assistant to help the doctor, the ANTONIO MUÑOZ left for Manila at two o'clock on the afternoon of October 1. The departure of this ship was an emotional moment for the men. She carried the latest information on what had happened, information that would be used in Manila to determine our fate, which up to now had been generally bad. Our food was exhausted, our uniforms were in rags, bad weather had arrived, and no one in Manila knew or, indeed, could do anything about our plight for at least a month and a half.

By unanimous consent it was agreed no new military operations would be undertaken. The Governor, with the support of the Commanders of the naval and land forces, saw no reason to risk the men further, leaving the solution for the problem to Manila. Official reports sent to Manila had described the conflict as almost at an end, and pictured the rebels in a desperate situation, pleading for pardon while the other tribes unselfishly offered us valuable aid. With such information, Manila had arrived at a mistaken conclusion regarding our actual situation and the most appropriate means of punishing the rebels and securing the longed for peace. Because of this, the expeditionary force proved ineffectual and simply continued the farce perpetrated on the General, the Government,

and the Nation. Other reports, some of which were official, attempted to counter this optimism, as did the private correspondence that was written from Ponape.

Totally convinced, after two massacres, that the Kanakas were neither as innocent nor as friendly as they had first appeared, attention turned to the much neglected fortifications at Kolonia. A committee was formed to carry out this most urgent task, made up of Artillery Captain Monastario, Artillery Lieutenant Terraza, Becerril from the Infantry, and Caraballo from the Marines. These men designed and directed the construction of the works, consisting of stone parapets extending from either side of the fort and circling around the colony to the beach, where block-houses protected the flanks. Half way between the fort and each block-house, a watch tower was incorporated in the parapet, while a deep, wide moat surrounded the entire enclosure.

Work on the project began October 3. The remains of a Decauville steam engine that had been abandoned, as well as other unusable metal tools, were transformed by the hard work and skill of the artillerymen into useful implements. Each day, half of the force worked from 6 to 11 in the morning and from 2 to 5 in the afternoon under a scorching sun and in suffocating heat. These hours had to be reduced, at my insistence, because the soldiers, especially the Europeans, could not tolerate long exposure to the sun given the meager portion of food that was their daily ration. In addition to medical and humanitarian reasons, it was also a matter of economics for, as it happened, such a work schedule made the men sick and delayed the project.

On October 13, Artillery Captain Monasterio was ordered to lead a column of 250 men the following day to Port Lot in Metalanin on a reconnaissance of the Kiti tribe. The column was to consist of the field artillery company, the European section of the Marines, and the Filipino company of 71 men, whose numbers were now reduced by half.

Since the brilliant taking of Oa, we had retired to the colony and thought only of the work on the fortifications. To many, however, this inaction in the face of the enemy seemed unwise, for the enemy could view it as a judicious retreat, and even though they had been dislodged from their lands, they would be emboldened by our inactivity. At that time we did not know how the tribes viewed our situation, though some guessed what their view might be, regardless of the Governor's assurances and frequent statements about the good intentions of the Kanakas. The proof that the natives had not been conquered was made clear when despite an edict ordering all of the chiefs to turn in their arms, only those living nearest Chocach and Net did so, surrendering 33 muskets and two broken Remington rifles. The chiefs of Kiti surrendered nothing. Furthermore, they ignored the repeated warnings of the Governor to do so and explained that illness prevented them from complying with the order.

It was necessary, therefore, to do something to show that we were capable of action. The Governor, without consulting the Commander of the column, saw no better course of action than that just described, having been assured that the road between Kolonia and Lot would permit the column to complete its journey in 7 or 8 hours, including time for rest.

The following morning at six o'clock sharp the column moved out in the direction of Kiti, carrying rations for two days. We then waited to see the results of this frivolous order to pass over our much praised road.

The Governor did not stop there, however, but sent emissaries and dispatches to the rebellious chief, who replied very politely that he feared being deceived. However, because he had been given the Governor's word of honor that his freedom would not be abused, it would not be inconvenient for him to meet with the Governor.

Three days before the expedition's departure, the Chief of Chocach left in a canoe with another letter to the Chief of Metalanin, representing the Governor's last effort to obtain the surrender of his arms. The Chief of Chocach's task was to convince the rebel chief to give up his weapons. Immediately thereafter the cruiser ULLOA departed to blockade and bombard the coast of the rebellious district. Its mission was to disrupt fishing, to gather whatever spoils could be found along the coast, to leave no home occupiable, and to shell the jungle within the range of its cannon.

When the ULLOA anchored, the Chief of Chocach approached the vessel in his canoe carrying the reply of the rebel chief. This reply repeated, for the hundredth time, that the King had not complied with the Governor's order for fear of his life. At the same time, the bearer of this missive said that neither he nor anyone else was prepared to carry further letters from the Governor because the rebel chief was not inclined to receive them and had said that he would shoot whomever bore them. He also said that if the Spanish wanted the weapons they

should go ashore and look for them. After relating this statement of "affection" our Kanaka diplomat, who was to board the ship, decided to stay where he was.

Thus, the bombardment of the coast was begun. The cruiser then sailed for the port of Lot where, according to the plan, the column would have arrived. An American citizen, Guifford, was in Lot as was one of the most important of the Kanakas, whom the rebels called David.⁵⁰ Together, these men had retreated over Machichao Mountain to Ketam and Haticlon after the taking of Oa, and eventually to a small hamlet on the right bank of the Metalanin River, near its mouth. They said that the rebels, some 600 men from all of the tribes, had gathered in a fort with the intention of ambushing us in the jungle where we could be surrounded with a circle of weapons fire while they remained unseen. They also said that the rebels were led by a Kanaka named Henry and that they were receiving encouragement and cooperation from the American Mission in Kiti. Guifford and David thought that the war was more religious than political in nature and warned us to be constantly on guard against the Methodists. Guifford was certain that the Methodists had convinced the Kanakas that Oa was American territory that should be denied to the Spanish.

The March: We have already mentioned that on the 14th the column had begun its march carrying meat for the first day and campaign rations for the second, should the country's torrential and continuous rains have required it to spend the night in Ronkiti. The so-called road began at the fort, where it was 5-6 meters wide. After about 100 meters, however, it became a simple path that continued until it reached a large

meadow, through which it passed. After leaving the meadow it became increasingly uneven, for a series of steep ravines poured water onto the trail. These ravines joined together at the foot of the peaks, forming a treacherous terrain without even the smallest level place. This constant up and down made it very difficult for the troops and caused a number of delays. There were many difficult sections like this, and each had to be scaled in order to keep the column together. The jungle formed a thick canopy over the path which made it especially dangerous as it allowed the enemy to approach unseen to within 6-8 meters of the column.

At eight o'clock the column reached the first village, Nalpomual, part of the Chocach tribe, made up of four houses and some 20 inhabitants. Immediately after passing through this hamlet, the column encountered a fairly deep ravine with very steep slopes. The descent into this ravine was hard work and in places required clinging to the vines to keep from falling. A stream ran at the bottom of the ravine and the men rested on its highest bank. At nine-thirty the march was resumed. After crossing several other ravines the road became somewhat more passable, running along the crests of the mountains, some of which were barren and formed large meadows. One of these meadows was located on the border of Chocach and Kiti. It was quite large and, at eleven-thirty, the column stopped for one hour to eat its ration of meat. The road became very difficult after leaving this meadow and, in addition to the ravines, it was necessary to pass through mangrove swamps 200-300 meters wide. The soldiers were required to wade in water up to their knees and, in some places, to climb through the

mangrove roots themselves. These crossings are extremely dangerous because the soldiers must give all of their attention to staying on their feet and, in the event of an attack, defense would be almost impossible. At three o'clock the troops were given a 45 minute rest, after which they continued to march over the same kind of terrain until six o'clock when they reached the Palenque River. They forded this river in water up to their chests, carrying their weapons and ammunition above their heads to prevent them from getting wet. Camp was set up for the night in the village of Palang on the far bank, making use of the houses along the bank. Guards were posted to prevent a surprise attack. The day's march had been extremely punishing, and the men were completely exhausted.

Reveille was sounded at six o'clock on the 15th, the camp was quickly broken and the march resumed. Very quickly it was necessary to cross a marsh, a very dangerous undertaking. The crossing was made on the trunks of coconut palms, and the men had to balance carefully or risk slipping and becoming stuck in the mire. Tall reeds completely surrounded the troops and produced a sense of claustrophobia, in addition to making it impossible to either move off the path or to keep on alert against the enemy. An attack at this point would have been fatal. The column proceeded along a path at least as bad as that just described, with delays at every step caused as much by soldiers who had become ill as by the need to climb around the ravines, keep the troops together, and recuperate from fatigue. The column then crossed the Ronkiti River, the largest in Kiti province and, after climbing a low ridge, left the sick to rest, protected by two sections of

artillery. The rest of the column continued on towards Ronkiti, about a kilometer away, reaching it at two in the afternoon. The sick who had been left to rest after crossing the river arrived at four o'clock. As it was already late, and because the men were exhausted and the sick unable to continue, it was decided to spend the night at Ronkiti. Just before reaching the village the path took a wide detour, first going north and then for a long stretch east. While this added considerably to the length of the march, it appeared to be necessary to pass around an enormous mangrove swamp.

During this day's journey the column had passed through the following hamlets: Tomaron at nine o'clock; Haran at nine-thirty; Ham at ten-thirty; Chanicho at ten-forty; Macapac at eleven; and Monc at one-fifteen.

At dawn on the 16th the column left Ronkiti. The trail from there to the fort at Alienan is fairly good and, in fact, has only two different sections, a small bog near its beginning and a steep cliff at its end. The column passed through Poc at seven-forty-five and then reached Anepen Two, Anepen One and Motok. The column reached the fort at twelve-thirty, completely exhausted. The troops were shattered by the experience and more than 70 of the Europeans had destroyed their boots on the journey, suggesting the impossibility of the order to march to Lot.

The troops rested for two days and, on the 20th, received orders from the Governor to board the transport MANILA and return to Kolonia. The MANILA had left Kolonia for Kiti on the same day the column departed on its march, carrying rations and clothing for the troops.

We will now hear a summary of the views of the Commander of the column, Captain Monasterio: The road was extremely bad and had many dangerous parts; it is impossible to deploy scouts because the jungle is impenetrable and surrounds you on all sides; it is equally impossible to receive support from the sea because the banks of the rivers form a continuous belt of mangrove swamps that prevent any communication. With the tribes in armed rebellion, this so-called road simply does not exist, and a column of troops should not risk using it.

The fort at Alienan is located in the village's port and, while solidly built, lacks water and has no cistern.⁵¹ Its outer wall forms an octagon made of large diameter posts securely joined together in such a manner as to leave a line of gun ports. The wall is surrounded by a deep moat over which a draw bridge has been thrown to give entrance to the fort. The entrance is located on the side facing the village, and has four gun ports with their corresponding glacis for the fort's two field cannon. Billeting for the officers and men is in the center of the fort in a spacious and well built house. However, it has the disadvantage of being made of nipa palm and, as a result, is vulnerable to fire. This is particularly dangerous as the building also houses the munitions. Outposts at some distance from the fort are designed to prevent a surprise attack.

The fort's design is bad, and it has the grave defect of lacking a means of retreat, for the path from it to the beach requires crossing a long canal some 20 meters wide that cuts through the mangrove trees. Likewise, providing assistance to the fort would be very difficult. To reach it, frankly, would cost the lives of a good number of men.

Furthermore, such assistance is impossible given the resources available to the colony, and even with all the troops at present on the island it would be a hazardous operation.

The Chief of Kiti, at the request of the Governor, had ordered his subjects to provide the column with whatever assistance it might require. This was the first time that European troops had passed through this area. The Europeans were feared and considered very superior, at least in the hamlets through which they passed, and at first were viewed with fear and suspicion. Eventually, this suspicion was transformed into total confidence, as the villagers saw the peaceful and correct behavior of our soldiers who religiously paid for whatever native produce they required.

At the approach of the column to Ronkiti, the Methodist missionaries, who were on the veranda of their house, ignored its Commander and lacked even the common decency to greet a stranger. After a wait of at least an hour they finally offered the officers chairs so they could sit. When the officers asked the natives the price of food, the latter appeared to consult with the missionaries, and only the passage of time, the patience of the officers, and the payment of cash could get them to sell pigs and bananas to the troops, who were without rations. A canoe was also purchased to carry the sick to the MANILA.

It is interesting to contrast the friendly and open attitude of the hamlets the column passed through with the defiant attitudes of this village. The phenomena can be explained in terms of the intrigues of the American missionaries, who had taken refuge here shortly before the taking of Oa, where they had resided, making these two villages the center of absolute Methodist influence.

When the column reached Alienan, residence of the Nanamaraki of Kiti, all of the tribe's chiefs appeared to welcome the Commander of the troops except Nancpei, King of the village, who had left shortly before the arrival of the column. On the 17th, at the Governor's request, a campaign mass was celebrated with nearly all of the villagers and their chiefs in attendance. At the end of the mass, the European artillery company performed some maneuvers on the same site, much to the delight of the natives, who gave the impression that they had been well satisfied with the spectacle. The maneuvers ended and at the order, "Dismissed!" the natives mixed together with the soldiers with great friendliness, their participation in the day's activities having won their confidence.

In describing the battle at Oa we gave count of the casualties our troops suffered but made no mention of those suffered by the enemy, about which we were totally ignorant. This is because the crafty Kanakas are extremely guarded in their relationships with us. And, despite the frequency with which the chiefs and sub-chiefs see the Governor, we are unable to glean even a hint of knowledge that would cast light on our nearly total ignorance of them. As for their constant protestations of friendship, we have been deceived by these in the past. The trip to Kiti served to determine with some certainty, based on a number of sources, that in the action at Oa the enemy had thirteen killed and fifty-four wounded. The majority of these casualties were from Kiti and, even though our friend, the Chief, constantly denied it, there was little doubt as to the truth of this intelligence. The fort's medical corpsman had refused an offer of

money to treat the wounded, saying that he could not leave the barracks without an explanation. The fort's commander, upon learning of this, ordered the corpsman to visit those in the immediate vicinity, after which the Kanakas threatened him with death should he reveal what he had learned.

Another important bit of intelligence was acquired from an American citizen in Patoy by the Commander of the column. This American, named Albert Guse, had arrived on the island February 18.⁵¹ He said that the Methodist missionaries had taken an active part in the disgraceful events at Oa, adding that the native Panen Mar of Tiati could give us a more detailed account.

The very personable character of Captain Monasterio, Commander of the column, and his undisputable talents made a favorable impression on the suspicious chiefs of this tribe, prompting them to join with the column and return to Kolonia to meet with the Governor. This was an unprecedented act, despite the fact that their loyalty to Spain had never been questioned. Indeed, they had tenaciously opposed the rebels from their tribe who attacked the fort located in their domain.

With the return of the force to Kolonia, work resumed on the fortifications. The men, however, were already quite ill, and the number of men in the hospital rose to 47, with 140 others on sick call. As for the remainder, though many did not appear to be sick, they were certain to fall ill if things continued as they were, for the majority would not eat but contended themselves with drinking the broth that was given to those on sick call. Therefore, I again requested that the hours of work be reduced to three days a week and

concentrated in the coolest times of the day, 7-10 in the morning and 4-5:30 in the afternoon. Meat was also provided more often--it had been available only once a week and the health of the men improved noticeably.

Two days after the column departed, the American corvette ALLIANCE anchored off Kolonia. The ALLIANCE was commanded by Commander H. C. Taylor and was part of the American squadron stationed in Japan. According to the Captain, he had come on instructions of his Admiral to unconditionally place himself at the disposal of the Governor, as reflected in the telegraphic orders he had received from his Government. In fact, he had come to ascertain exactly what had occurred here and to provide protection for American citizens, as had happened earlier in 1887, when another ship had been sent to protect the mission.⁵² Observing the protocol required in such cases, the Governor and his family, as well as the commanders and officers of the naval and ground forces, hurried to visit the foreign vessel, which received throughout its stay in port constant attention to its needs. At the first mention by the Commander of the need, 50 tons of coal we could hardly spare were made available to the ALLIANCE. The Governor also ordered our boats to carry the coal to the ship in order to prevent its boats from becoming dirty.

In addition to these expressions of concern and friendship, a banquet in honor of the ALLIANCE was hosted by the Governor in an atmosphere of great cordiality. The dining room was adorned with Spanish and American flags, linked together in friendship. At the end, toasts were offered, some quite tactful and others, if less so, at least patriotic. So were there reasons for treating this vessel with such

friendship? Was its presence or behavior so comforting? We thought just the opposite and were genuinely indignant when we watched the natives ignore our existence and, under our very noses, travel by canoe in great numbers to the ALLIANCE--those assassins of Porras and his soldiers!--explaining their behavior as merely being friendly to strangers!

Negotiations between the Commander of the corvette and the Governor took place in which a number of matters were considered. One of these concerned the claims of the missionaries relative to the burning of their church and houses. However, it was not difficult for the Governor to prove (for he was not ignorant of the facts thanks to his own investigations) that the instigators of the insurrection were the Methodists and their companions, whose respect for our laws was such that, despite the fact that a state of siege had been declared on the island and public meetings had been banned, the Methodists had held meetings in Ronkiti at which the sect's leader, Mr Rand, a mere cobbler in his own country, spoke out against our rule.

We still do not know how these negotiations will turn out, despite the thousands of statements that have been made on the subject. However, I can tell you that it was never a secret to us, thanks to the confidences of the Commander of the column and the Captain of the ULLOA, as well as to statements by Kanaka and American witnesses alike, that the missionaries were the organizers of the revolt and that Mr Rand, the mission chief, was its instigator. Mr Rand's imprisonment was well deserved, and he was released for frivolous reasons and given protection on the corvette, where he was quartered from the moment of its arrival.

On November 2 the ALLIANCE departed, carrying Mr Rand and all the mission's personnel to the island of Kusaie or Ualan, also our possession and the most eastern of the Carolines. This evacuation was viewed by the Governor as a triumph of his diplomacy. Everyone else thought the triumph was Mr Rand's and Captain Taylor's. The former was out of harm's way and the latter was relieved of the great responsibility placed on him by his Government to rescue the missionaries, regardless of the grave charges that had been placed against them.

Ten days after the ALLIANCE sailed with Mr Rand and the mission personnel, the pilot boat EDON arrived at the colony with the King of Kusaie, Telemar Tocora, two Englishmen, and two Americans. The Englishmen and Americans had come to bring charges against Mr Rand for demanding contributions from them, while the King wanted to beg for Spain's protection to preserve his rights on Kusaie.

CHAPTER V

Summary

Appearance of the war transport CEBU towing the bark NERVION - Arrival of the steamship URANUS, carrying the new Commander of the Expedition Colonel Serrano, with reinforcements and supplies - Plan of Operations - Attack and taking of Ketam - End of the campaign - Division of the rebellious district of Metalanin between its neighbors, Kiti and Uh, and the approval of this by the chiefs.

It was around two in the afternoon on November 14 when the telltale plumes of smoke that announce the presence of a steamship appeared on the horizon. This news spread through the colony like wildfire, and all of us immediately ran, binoculars in hand, to those points from which we could best make out the vessel for which we had waited so impatiently. Little by little, as the distance shortened, we could make out the masts of two ships. Because of their nearness to one another and the station they were keeping, it appeared as if one of the two was being towed. As these vessels approached near enough to almost be recognized, the silhouette of another steamship appeared in the distance, also bound for our island.

The first two ships that appeared were the war transport CEBU and, in tow, the bark NERVION. Both showed signs of having had a rough passage and, in fact, their voyage had taken 53 days. As these ships anchored, the steamship URANUS did likewise after completing a passage

of ten days. The URANUS was the most beautiful coastal trader in the Archipelago, capable of cruising at a constant speed of thirteen knots. She carried the Commander of the new Expedition, Colonel Don Manuel Serrano, the 73rd Indigenous Company, fifty artillerymen and their three officers, and the Commander of the Army, Artillery Captain Don Antonio Rivera, who was to relieve his predecessor as second in command of all forces.

The sending of reinforcements of men, supplies, and ammunition indicated that the General understandably did not consider what had been done as sufficient and wanted to proceed with more vigor and energy, having already manifest his displeasure with the job done by the first officers on the island.

The arrival of these vessels put an end to a lull of nearly two months, during which the inactivity of the ground forces and four warships cost us dearly by permitting the Kanakas to do what they pleased and to prepare their defenses.

As the supplies, ammunition, and coal were being discharged, the 73rd Company, made up of conscripts with virtually no experience, was given training on board the garrison ship, which for lack of room in the colony served as a barracks.

The Army was divided into two independent columns as follows:

Column One

Commander, Colonel Serrano

Aide, Captain Rivera; Medical Officer, Dr Ruiz Castillo;
Chaplain, Father Agustin, Capuchin; Artillery, 5th Company
of the 1st Battalion, Captain Aguada, Lieutenants Terraza,

Panfil, Sequera; Filipinos, one Company from the 73rd, Captain Martinez, Lieutenants Rogi and Dionisio; Filipinos, 6th Company from the 74th, Captain Romerales, Lieutenants Becerril and Olalla; Marines, Captain Buitrago, Lieutenant Caraballo, sub-Lieutenant Bernal.

Total Force - 250 men

Column Two

Commander, Commander of the Army, Captain Diaz de Rivera
 Medical Officer, Dr Cabeza Pereiro; Artillery, 1st Company from 2nd Battalion, Captain Monasterio, Lieutenants Fandos and Sergio; Filipinos, 5th Company from the 68th, Captain Cebrian, Lieutenants Melgan and Becerril; Filipinos, 5th Company from the 71st, Captain Velches, Lieutenants Castorino and Serrano.

Total Force - 251 men

The second column was to proceed by road and the first column was to go up the Pallapletas River on the opposite bank. The Marines would also take part in the struggle, going up the river in boats outfitted for assault and with two or three of them armed with cannon and machine guns. The plan appeared to us as excellent, practical, realizable, and well thought out. Of course, unexpected complications affected its execution, as had been anticipated.

The plan called for the forces of the second column, transported on the CEBU, to land at Oa, while those of the first column, which had sailed on the MANILA under escort of the VELASCO and ULLOA, would land

at Metalanin, where the squadron would anchor and await verification of the landing of the second column. The troops would then pass the night on shore and on the following morning fire three volleys to indicate to the second column that the first was ashore and that it should begin its advance. Thus, both columns would fall together on Ketam. If in the following 24 hours nothing unusual occurred, the CEBU would leave Oa to rejoin the squadron at Metalanin.

Given the orders in advance and with everything ready, the entire force boarded the ships under cover of darkness on November 20 and spent the night at anchor. At sunrise the following day, the cruisers VELASCO and ULLOA and the transports MANILA and CEBU raised anchor and left the port, sailing in convoy to the latitude of Oa, where the CEBU made a course for the port while the remainder of the squadron proceeded to Metalanin. Once off Oa, at about two in the afternoon, small boats were lowered into the water and the landing of Rivera's column began. The landing was carried out with extreme caution as if in the presence of an enemy. This was necessary because this site had been uninhabited since we burned it down in our attack of September 20 and we were not absolutely certain that we would not encounter opposition.

To reach the land we had to wade across some 500 meters of reef flat, for the small boats could not cross the barrier reefs. We advanced cautiously in broken ranks and reached land without hearing a single shot. The only sound that reached us were some shouts of alarm that the Kanakas guarding the coast used to announce our presence. Once ashore a short reconnaissance of the area was made and, finding no enemy, we prepared to pass the night in the best way we could, with one company occupying the high ground that was the objective of our recent

attack on Oa. The rest of the force took shelter in the burned out remains of the Methodist church, of which only part of the walls remained, the highest being just over one meter. As we made ready to spend the night, we fired two shots but hit no one. Few of us could sleep because a light rain fell almost all night, soaking us to the bone.

At sunrise on the 22nd, after we were ready to proceed, we were informed by the men on the high ground that they could see a group of 20-30 armed Kanakas heading for the road we would have to follow. A short time later we heard the three expected volleys and began our march, guided by Christian, a black Portuguese citizen from Cape Verde.⁵³ He was a man of Herculean strength and proven valor whom the natives feared. He was accompanied by his three Carolinian women, a servant, and his companion Juan, of the same nationality and origin. In the extreme vanguard of the column was a section made up of a sergeant and ten hand-picked artillerymen, followed by the 71st Company. The artillery company formed the center and the 68th covered the rear.

Just after reaching the trail we passed by some houses from which a few men fled, but we were unable to fire at them because of the speed with which they entered the jungle. We marched on without encountering obstacles worthy of mention until eleven o'clock, when our unmolested progress was disturbed by a volley fired from our right. We were faced with a stone wall 1.5 meters high descending from the summit of Mount Machichao and cutting off the trail. The vanguard attacked with great daring and threw itself forward while the rest of the column attacked the left flank. As we grew near, the enemy unexpectedly abandoned its very secure position, from which 30 men could have easily made

it impossible for us to continue. In recovering our fallen we found three dead soldiers and eleven wounded, among whom were Captain Velches, hit in the arm and chest, and Licanot, one of our guide's women, who had been hit in the knee. When the wounded were treated and the dead buried, we continued the march. Our progress was now made extremely difficult not only because of the inconvenience we caused the wounded, whose transport required half of a company, but also because of the trail. And, as if this were not enough, in a very short time the enemy began to harass our rear guard, hitting two more men, a sergeant and an enlisted man.

At about four in the afternoon, the hour we expected to be near the rendezvous point, a volley of fire from some houses on our right left eight men on the ground. The vanguard attacked with bayonets but, just as it was about to take the hillock on which the houses were located, it came under a terrible barrage of fire from a well fortified stockade some three meters high in which more than 500 men were hidden. The vanguard's advance was halted. The artillery then threw itself into the fray with great bravery, shattering itself against the wall of fire that swept everything before it, and eventually forcing us to take cover on the ground. The Commander then ordered the other company to advance up the road, with the European detachment at its head. No sooner had it appeared in view, however, than two sergeants and three corporals were knocked to the ground. This handful of men--there were only 251--fought like lions, returning again and again to the attack. A shower of every kind of known projectile, from rocks to cannon balls, rained down on us and, blind and suffocating, we had to retreat a second time.

Throughout the evening we took this punishment. Finally, because the number of dead and wounded was so great, the Commander agreed that we would fall back to an arroyo 40-50 meters away, from which we fired continuously to prevent the Kanakas from firing at us. The force was badly mauled. Two other officers had suffered concussions.

The column had been badly cut up, with 21 dead and 53 wounded. The heavily fortified stockade, the trenches, and the five cannon that defended Ketam made it impossible for us to take the city. For lack of guides who were familiar with the terrain, we had not surprisingly marched directly into one of the two flanks of the enemy's fortifications and, despite heroic efforts that brought us to within twenty paces of its walls, casualties and the fort's strength forced us to retreat. Had we been only thirty paces to the right we would have been in a strong position, for the stockade ended there and it would have been easy to storm. The defenses lacked flanking walls.

Lieutenant Castorino was selected to search for a defensible fall back position, and he had the good fortune to quickly locate a hillock some one hundred paces from us to which we began moving our wounded under the cover of darkness. When the wounded were all relocated to the selected site, and after recovering the weapons and ammunition of the killed and wounded, we fired a few shots to cover our retreat and then secretly withdrew to the hillock where the others waited. The column formed a square around the wounded, and from this position we prepared to ambush the Kanakas should they have intended to take advantage of the darkness and their knowledge of the terrain and attempted an attack.

We took our positions in absolute silence and would have surprised the Kanakas had they not quickly noticed that we were not returning their fire. They then began to shoot in all directions with rifles and cannon in hope of locating us. This shooting went on all night, sending bullets whistling over our heads and sometimes falling inside our tiny camp. Nonetheless, we did not return the fire. We kept so absolutely still that even coughing was not permitted, lest we be found out. Furthermore, the order was given not to fire except in case of an assault, and then only at point blank range, followed immediately by a bayonet charge.

Our situation was remarkably desperate; in front of us was an impregnable position impossible to take with so few men; we did not know where we were, nor the distance to the coast, nor the direction we should go to reach the coast to come under the protection of the squadron's guns. Returning to Oa was unimaginable: With the men left we could not carry the wounded on a journey through the jungle over so bad a road. We lacked food and our ammunition was almost exhausted. Unless the enemy showed himself we would be hunted down like animals before the end came. On top of all this, we were totally ignorant of what had become of the Colonel's column.

This sad and desperate situation gave the moaning voices of our wounded, pleading for water, the harsh sound of the trumpet or bugle echoing mournfully in the silence of the night, announcing our position and inviting our enemies. The troops were frightened, almost without ammunition, overcome with hunger and fatigue, and constantly on guard against attack. Thus we passed the night of the 22nd, the most horrible

night one could imagine, and a night that will never be erased from our memories.

The entire night was spent in discussion and, at about three in the morning, it was agreed to build a small fort with three trunks. The wounded would be placed in the fort, defended by 30 men under the command of an officer, while the rest of the column would go in search of the Colonel. If he could be reached he would be told of the attack and the bad luck we had suffered; if he could not be found the column would find the beach and ask the squadron for help. This agreement did not at all please the wounded, who wanted to share the column's fate and, should it perish, die with it. Being left behind meant sure death, a death completely without glory. Just at daybreak when the first stakes had been driven into the ground we heard reveille playing in the distance. It was decided to answer with a call to arms and the counter sign, but our call was not answered. After repeating the call several times with the same result, we concluded that the first call had come from the squadron. The anxiety lasted about half an hour, at the end of which we heard the continuous fire of rifles, telling us that the Colonel had attacked. With this we decided to advance and create an attack from two sides. When we arrived close enough to make out the stockade, the first column was already inside and the enemy had escaped into the jungle. Needless to say, we were absolutely delighted to find ourselves still alive after the sentence of death that had hung over our heads.

Operations of the First Column

With the firing of three cannon volleys as the signal for both columns to begin their march, the column of Colonel Serrano began to land in small boats, canoes, and launches from the steamship, the cruisers ULLOA and VELASCO, and the transport MANILA. This operation was directed by the second in command of the ULLOA, Señor Rodriguez Trujillo, aided by junior officers and Marines. The column should have landed near the mouth of the Pellapletao River on the right bank while, at the same time, the squadron of boats with assault troops went up the river, the two forces giving one another protection. However, after attempting unsuccessfully to land several times and losing two precious hours, and still in water too deep to permit landing the troops, the Colonel decided to land on King or Tamuan Island, understanding the importance of timing and not wanting to miss the rendezvous or leave the other column stranded. From there he marched through the lowlands to the coast, using as a guide the Kanaka prisoner Etker, to whom the column was extremely grateful. This unexpected setback, causing a considerable delay on the one hand, and lengthening the distance of the march on the other, prompted the Colonel to cross several rivers in order to take the most direct, if also the worst, route to the rendezvous, despite the column's lack of rest for even a moment. It became necessary to stop at five in the afternoon on the 22nd in Alialup, after capturing the trenches that opposed the column's passage.

Taking into account that they were three hours from Ketam and that marching and attacking by night was impossible, the Colonel decided to break the march and make camp in the conquered positions near

Chocorroirian, beginning the march again at sunrise. At dawn of the next day after reveille, the column moved out. As it approached Ketam it came under enemy fire that grew much heavier as it forded the Pellapletao River, which was protected by fortifications. The column held its fire and took the stockade with bayonets. Romerales' company in the vanguard moved to its left, or towards the extreme flank of the stockade, and entered around its walls. The artillery company attacked from the west, the first attackers going over the walls and the rest entering between gaps in the wall. The firing of the Kanakas from the houses diminished rapidly. At the sight of the artillerymen the Kanakas began running down the trench paralleling the inside of the walls and finally fled into the jungle, leaving in our possession five mortars and some ammunition.

After taking Ketam, one could see that the Kanakas expected the main attack to come from the river, for in addition to the stockade they had trenches and, in the center, the most powerful cannon in the fort.

The squadron of boats arrived at the same time as the first column, contributing to the excellent success of this operation.

With all of the forces at last united, the doctors got off the boats and, with the first column's doctor, Señor Ruiz, treated the wounded while others buried the dead. The wounded were then taken by river to a field hospital set up on the MANILA, which left the next day for Kolonia.

The column remained camped in the stockade and on the 24th tore down its fortifications. On the 25th it burned the buildings, after which it undertook an overland march to Tiati Island while two

companies came down the river in the boats of the Marines. The troops re-boarded their ships on the 26th, and the squadron raised anchor and sailed for Kolonia, landing the force on the 27th for billeting.

The forces then occupied themselves with finishing the fortifications, which had been so neglected that the only building standing had to be torn down. The detachment at Kiti was withdrawn and its fort, whose wooden stockade as we said earlier posed a constant danger to the munitions, was dismantled.

Meanwhile, Colonel Serrano, making use of his excellent diplomatic skills, met with the chiefs of the two tribes neighboring the rebels and, in negotiations with them, agreed to split the district of Metalanin in two and divide it between them. This decision was accepted by the Chiefs of Uh and Kiti, as is shown in the Acts of Partition that abolished the Kingdom of Metalanin.

With the signing of the Acts and the completion of the force's mission, the troops departed on October 26 [TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This is an apparent typographical error, the troops must have departed on December 26] for Manila on the transport of the same name and on the cruiser ULLOA, reaching their destination on January 16.

The expedition had been organized quickly and in secrecy, and when the preparations for the war were fully complete the troops departed without the fanfare that had characterized the departure of earlier expeditions. The expedition sailed without anyone's knowledge, and its return was carried out at night with the same simplicity. This is not strange: General Weyler organized it and he is an enemy of publicity.

Act Number One

Having come together this day at the invitation of Colonel Don Manuel Serrano Ruiz, Commander of the Expeditionary Force to the Caroline Islands, in the presence of Commander Don Luis Cadarso, Governor of the Archipelago, Commander Don José de Paredes y Chacon and Commander Don José Ferrer Perez de las Cuevas, captains respectively of the cruisers VELASCO and ULLOA, Captain Don Antonio Diaz de Rivera, Commander of the Artillery and second in command of the Force: Nanamaraki (Chief) Rocha of Kiti and those individuals named Uachay, Nanekan, Nancropontake, Toch, Noch, Chauene, Nanchao, Rinin, and Namoto of Palang, who have duties and responsibilities therein. Colonel Serrano informed those present that the Metalanin tribe had been vanquished as a result of the recent war, its villages burned and its people dispersed, and he proposed to cede to Kiti sovereignty over a part of the Metalanin tribe's territory in appreciation for its constant loyalty to the Spanish flag, a loyalty worthy of reward. He indicated also that the part of the former Metalanin territory to be ceded was made up of that land stretching from what had been its southern border to the left bank of the aforementioned Pallapletao River in the north, with the understanding that the left bank of this River extends to the left along the barrier reefs of the port to its mouth end, by that includes as a part of the ceded territory all of the islands of the bay. Finally, Colonel Serrano indicated that it was understood that this sovereignty had the same limitations with respect to foreigners as did their own and that the Government maintained the same rights in the ceded lands as it did in the other lands of the

islands and that it reserved to itself final authority. The Nanamaraki and the other dignitaries mentioned earlier unanimously accepted the cession of land that had been made and took the occasion to pledge their continued loyalty. Then, the one called Nanchao requested the grant of personal property on Nakap Island, which the Governor granted using the powers of his office. To record what had occurred the Colonel drew up this act, signed by those present at Santiago de la Ascension on the ninth of December, eighteen hundred and ninety.

12 - the mark of Nalib; 11 - Nojen Kiti (illiterate); 10 - the mark of Nomoto; 9 - Nanhicrocham of Pontake; 8 - the mark of Chonkiti; 7 - Nanjao Kirin; 6 - the mark of Chauene; 5 - the mark of Naneken; 4 - the mark of Toch; 3 - the mark of Uajay; 2 - Nanpei of Kiti; 1 - the mark of the Nanamaraki; Antonio Diaz de Rivera, signature; José Ferrer, signature; Luis Cadarso, signature, José de Paredes y Chacon, signature; Manuel Serrano, signature.

Note - The Original done in Spanish and Kanaka.

Act Number Two

Having assembled this day at the invitation of Colonel Don Manuel Serrano y Ruiz, Commander of the Expeditionary Force to the Caroline Islands, in the presence of Commander Don Luis Cadarso, Governor of the Archipelago, Commander Don José de Paredes y Chacon and Commander Don José Ferrer Perez de las Cuevas, captains respectively of the cruisers VELASCO and ULLOA, Captain Don Antonio Diaz de Rivera, Commander of the Artillery and second in command of the Force: Nanamaraki (Chief) of

the Uh Tribe and individuals named Uachay Nancro of Uh, Naneken, Tok, Nanlen Noch, Nanana, and Nanepey, who have duties and responsibilities therein. Colonel Serrano informed those present that the Metalanin tribe had been vanquished as a result of the recent war, its villages burned and its people dispersed, and he proposed to cede to Uh sovereignty over a part of the Metalanin tribe's territory in appreciation for its constant loyalty to the Spanish flag, a loyalty worthy of reward. He indicated also that the part of the former Metalanin territory thus ceded consisted of all land between its former northern boundary and the left bank of the Pallapletao River, understanding that this river bank extended to the barrier reefs to the left including the mouth of the port and, by that, all of the islands of the bay fell within the part ceded to Kiti. Finally, Colonel Serrano indicated that it was understood that this sovereignty had the same limitations with respect to foreigners as did their own and that the Government maintained the same rights in the ceded lands as it did in the other lands of the island and that it reserved to itself final authority. The Nanamarki and the other dignitaries mentioned earlier unanimously accepted the cession of land that had been made and with that took the occasion to pledge their continued loyalty. To record what had occurred the Colonel drew up this act signed by those present at Santiago de la Ascension on the thirteenth day of December, eighteen hundred and ninety.

Naamaraki, his mark; Uachay, his mark; Naneken, his mark;
Nanana, his mark; Nanepey, his mark; Antonio Diaz de Rivera,
signature; José Ferrer, signature; Luis Caderoso, signature;

José de Paredes y Chacon, signature; Manuel Serrano,
signature.

Note - The Original done in Spanish and English.

CHAPTER VI

Events Following My Departure from Ponape

1891

On February 15 of this year a new Governor arrived in Ponape, Commander Don Julio Meras. Immediately upon assuming his duties he issued a communique to the Kanakas, translated into their language by Father Luis de Valencia, expressing his desire for peace, his affection for the islands, and his hope that his rule would be beneficial. And, in fact, he proceeded to govern as if that is exactly what he meant! Throughout his year-long reign the royal residence was always open to the natives who, for their part, appreciated Señor Meras' kindnesses and took advantage of this new atmosphere to enjoy whatever attractions the colony could offer. There were no attempts at rebellion anywhere on the island during this period and, when Señor Meras was preparing to leave, the Kanakas openly expressed their appreciation to him. A large group of natives came to the steamship to bid him farewell and to demonstrate their sorrow at his departure.

During Meras' governorship the withdrawal of the extremely vulnerable detachment from Kiti was completed in order to concentrate all of the forces in a single place in the event of an attack by the rebels. The mission remained, however, for when the plan of withdrawal was announced the King and leaders of Kiti, among whom was Nanpey, expressed their total opposition to it because it called for the missionaries to accompany the soldiers. The leaders of Kiti asserted that those who were leaving would be wholly responsible for whatever consequences befell the

people of Kiti as a result of the aggression of their enemies. Father Agustin communicated this to the Governor and his Superior, who agreed to let the mission remain in Kiti, provided Kiti would make available to the mission whatever security and services it could. The people of Kiti scrupulously lived up to this agreement and were completely devoted to the Catholic missionaries and absolutely loyal to Spain.

On September 9 it was unanimously agreed to establish a public primary school in the colony under the direction of the priests in order to provide the benefits of civilization to the natives who frequented the capital. The schoolbuilding was not completed until February 10 of the following year when it was opened with proper ceremony. The division of the rebellious Metalanin tribe, described earlier, was without effect, for it continued to function and was as autonomous as ever.

1892

On February 28 Don José Padrinnan took possession of the vacant governorship. He promised to continue the policies of his predecessor Señor Meras, with which he expressed full agreement. However, either he did not perceive it wise to actually do so or he had secret orders to the contrary, for from the day of his arrival he pursued a policy diametrically opposed to that of his predecessor. While he was very correct and polite with every one in the colony, where he commanded universal respect, he treated the natives with an aloofness they resented and which caused them to return to their tribes.

On April 3 four Filipino soldiers on patrol near the colony became engaged in a heated dispute with one of the principal leaders

of the Net tribe, the Nancro, and killed him. This further exacerbated the ill-feelings harbored by the natives who, at that time, were in large numbers in the colony. They asked the Governor to immediately revenge the death of their friend by having those responsible shot. Acting completely reasonably under the circumstances, the Governor informed them that it was not possible to accommodate their request, for the laws of Spain did not permit a person's execution without first having had a sentence of death passed by a court of law. This reply did not satisfy the natives, who took justice into their own hands the following May when they murdered in cold blood a poor foreigner they encountered, afterwards bragging openly of their heroic deed.

On April 25, Señor Padrinnan left on the mail ship VENUS, leaving Captain Don Bienvenido Flandes, commander of the garrison, as acting-Governor. During his tenure, which lasted until May 1, 1893 Captain Flandes made some improvements in the capital's fortifications and also continued to maintain relatively friendly relations with the natives. For their part, however, the natives did not completely forget the killing of the Nancro and, on December 3, murdered two laundrymen from the cruiser DON JUAN DE AUSTRIA, unarmed civilians who had only just arrived from Manila. This crime, like the earlier one, went unpunished.

1893

On January 5, 1893 the American Methodist's ship MORNING STAR arrived in Ponape and requested permission for the missionaries to return to the island, a request they had made several other times since

their expulsion. This latest request was rejected outright by the Governor on the grounds that he had no authority to revoke the order of their expulsion.

Don Fernando Claudin assumed the duties of Governor on May 19, 1893. His arrival in the capital was accompanied by all of the pomp and ceremony that the nascent capital was able to muster and the island immediately began to feel the salubrious affects of his talents and leadership. Claudin was a man of great personal integrity who very quickly began to put a halt to the abuses that existed in the colony and to set an example of personal virtue so necessary for the tribes. In the beginning, the Kanakas were not overly pleased with Governor Claudin's rigid principles but, eventually, they and the Europeans came to appreciate his impartial and disinterested patriotism. It was a great misfortune that Claudin's governorship was so short, for he was on the island only some six months when he was taken ill and became unable to perform his duties. He returned to Manila for treatment on the mail ship in January 1894 but his condition worsened daily and after only a few months he was dead, causing widespread sorrow.

During his short tenure as Governor of Ponape, Claudin accomplished several interesting things that have had an excellent impact on the pacification of the island. While Governor, Claudin completely reorganized the primary schools that had been under the control of native teachers, including two who had been trained by the Methodists. These schools were turned over to our missionaries who, since then, have begun to acquire considerable influence with the inhabitants of the villages. Even today, these villages remain at peace or, at least,

show indifference to Spanish domination. A mission with a church and school was also established in the village of Chocas under the direction of Father Luis de Valencia and one lay brother. Each Sunday, as in the capital and in Kiti, the native teachers referred to above, at the head of the children who attend their school in the hamlets distant from the mission, gather in the mission school after mass and practice various exercises. Furthermore, the intelligence and moral progress of these disciples is clearly evident.

Señor Claudin also wanted to intensify the Kanakas' loyalty to Spain and to reinvigorate their ties to His Majesty's government by providing a reasonable allowance to each of the four kingdoms loyal to Spain and to, of course, Nanpei. This was easily accomplished and the Government agreed to pay each of the titled kings 20 pesos per month and Nanpei 1,000 pesos per year.⁵⁴

1894-1985

A hopeful sign that appeared in Ponape at the end of last year and which continues to be evident in the first two months of this year offers the prospect of complete peace for the island. This sign is the suggestion that in the not too distant future a total understanding can be reached with the Metalanin tribe, which observers believe is favorably disposed to recognize and submit to the flag of Spain. However, with the arrival March 1 on the mail ship VENUS of the interim Governor Don Juan de Concha, the picture has changed completely. De Concha began by announcing that he was determined to permit the return of the Methodists, whom he believed were innocent of the charges brought against them.⁵⁵

Such an unexpected announcement could not help but dishearten Spaniards who, since then, have feared other equally unexpected and unwelcome pronouncements. The novice Governor thought, no doubt in good faith, that the prospect of the return of the Yankees would bring the rebels of Metalanin into the open. His plan failed to materialize, however, because the rebels suspected that he wanted to trick them into again taking up their arms in rebellion. With the failure of his first effort, the Governor conceived of a new plan of conquest that greatly disturbed the still fragile peace of the island. He decided, without taking into account the multitude of insuperable difficulties to be overcome, to make a wide road through the jungle from the capital to the village of Kiti. Unfortunately, as often happens, there was no lack of weak souls who, despite knowing perfectly well the tenacious resistance the Kanakas would mount in opposition to this project, encouraged the Governor to move quickly ahead with the plan.

To this end the four kings who passed for loyal were summoned to Kolonia where they unanimously voiced their dislike for the project and urged that it would be abandoned, expressing the view that it would be impossible to open such a road. These protestations, however, were motivated by the desire to obtain from the Governor the personnel and resources necessary to undertake and carry out the project.

On April 9 the King of U sent the Governor a message advising him that the people of Metalanin were hiding in the jungle and planned to attack the soldiers who would be working on the road. The Governor considered this to be an insult to his honor and immediately convened a conference of his officers, where he laid out the position of the

Metalanin and what he proposed to do to punish such insulting audacity. Everyone was convinced, in effect, that it was necessary to accept this challenge from the rebels to save the greatly offended honor of Spain, but left the means of doing so to the highest authority on the island, the Governor. Without losing a second, the Governor ordered the cruiser ULLOA to fire her boilers and sail for Metalanin, where she would offer protection to a party of thirteen soldiers who would secretly march into the jungle (which fifty men had earlier been unable to penetrate) and launch a surprise attack on the rebels who, in large numbers, had manned the barricades at Chapalap. This surprise attack would result in the killing of the majority of the rebels, while those who remained, along with the rest of their tribe, would be thrown into confusion, disorder, and fear and be taken care of by the accurate firing of ULLOA cannon. With this, the victory would be complete!

In order to carry out this plan, it was imperative that everything remain a total and absolute secret. But such was not the case and by the time our famous party arrived at the site of the operation the enemy was already well entrenched and prepared for battle. As the soldiers took up their positions to surprise the enemy, the enemy surprised these unfortunate thirteen soldiers and poured withering fire on them, immediately killing three of the men. The remainder of the force, seeing itself in imminent danger and close to being lost, began to retreat with a determined valor and dignity in the face of heavy enemy fire. The enemy, perhaps believing that our numbers were greater than it appeared, did not pursue the force. At noon on Thursday, after spending two entire days wandering aimlessly in the jungle, overcome by

fatigue and almost dead from hunger after having only roots and herbs for food, our heroic soldiers, in an extremely sad state, reached the colony.

The effects of this experience made themselves felt very quickly. The spirit of rebellion and hatred that had been dormant in the natives rose anew in all of the tribes, and thereafter they would scarcely approach the colony, or sell their wares, and those who would were few. The missionaries as well were treated with extreme coolness in Kiti and Chocach. Very few children attended school and those who did would be friendly one moment and distant the next. Adding to that, the Kanakas expected their old friends the Methodists to return in a few days. The prospect of this wished for return made their boldness easier to understand. They certainly did not try to hide their satisfaction and joy and, indeed, throughout their lands they held frequent celebrations and tumultuous parties at which they ignobly disclaimed our right to sovereignty with war songs and derisive chants impugning our honor. They were encouraged and led in these displays by some foreigners who pretended to be our most intimate friends. These events, such as they were, occupied May and June. Nothing worthy of mention occurred until the 27th of last month, when the mail provided concrete evidence of the negative impression the events described above had on public opinion in Manila.

The Governor, aware that he had been relieved, halted his activities and concentrated his efforts on building various defensive works in Kolonia.

The cruiser VELESCO arrived in Ponape on August 22 carrying the new Governor, Commander Don José Pidal. Pidal immediately recognized the critical situation confronting the country and faced up to the need to take those measures that would gradually calm the tense atmosphere that prevailed on the island. He quickly and absolutely rejected the renewed request of the Captain of the MORNING STAR to permit the return of the missionaries, and indicated that in the future he would reject any similar entreaties. However, the Government of Spain has handed over to the United States 17,000 pesos in gold as reparations for supposed financial losses suffered by the deported missionaries.

At this time one cannot definitely predict what will be the result of Pidal's efforts.⁵⁸ We can only say that honorable policies have again opened the road of progress, that the Kanakas have abandoned their bellicose position, that the schools are more active than ever, and that throughout the island one can sense a remarkable change. If at the end of Governor Pidal's tenure of office he succeeds in bringing under control this island that for nine years has so badly vexed us, congratulations!

Madrid, November 1891 - Manila, March 1895

BUDGET OF EXPENDITURES FOR THE CAROLINE ISLANDS
FUNDED FROM THE PHILIPPINES

<u>War Section</u>	<u>Pesos</u>
Provisioning of the Forces in the Islands	64,000
Welfare and Justice - Allocation to the two	
Governors	3,000
Culture and Clergy - Personnel and Material	
for the Missions	20,000
Navy - Personnel, Salaries, and Garrison Ship	38,240
Government - Personnel, Salaries, and	
Office Expenses	11,200
Subsidy for six mail ships annually	9,000
Transportation of missionaries, employees, and	
troops who were relieved annually	10,000
Periodic Voyages of the Cruisers	<u>10,000</u>
Total	<u>165,440</u>
Expenditures of the 1st Company	200,000
Expenditures of the 2nd Company	450,000
Total expenditures from the date of	
occupation until today	2,138,960

FOOTNOTES

1. W. P. Morrel, Britain in the Pacific Islands (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960), 268.
2. Theodore W. Livingston, "The Role of the Eastern Caroline Islands in Spanish-American Relations, 1885-1898" (Unpublished Mss., Pacific Collection, University of Hawaii, 1971), 9.
3. Rafael Garcia y Parejo, Considerations on the Rights of Spain Over the Caroline Islands, trans. Patricia Bieber (Honolulu: Pacific Islands Program; Miscellaneous Working Papers, 1973), i.
4. U.S. Office of Naval Operations, East Caroline Islands ("Civil Affairs Handbooks; Washington: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1944), 19.
5. Livingston, 10.
6. Morrell, 268.
7. Garcia, iii.
8. Joaquin Costa y Martinez, El Conflicto Hispano-Aleman sobre La Micronesia (Madrid: Imprenta de Fortanet, 1886), 123-125.
9. Livingston, 11.
10. Costa, 123-125.
11. "Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau," Diccionario Enciclopedico Hispano-Americano de Literatura, Ciencia y Artes (Barcelona: Montaner y Simon, 1898), 43.
12. Probably the American merchant Grifford, whom Hambruch describes as the representative in Ponape of a San Francisco firm. Grifford expressed similar views to Hambruch. See Paul Hambruch, Results of the South Seas Expedition, 1908-1910 (Hamburg: Friederichsen, De Gruyter & Co., 1936), unpublished translation by Ruth E. Runeborg, 1980, 301.
13. Hambruch, 274-277.
14. Hambruch, 304.
15. Edward T. Doane, prominent Protestant missionary on Ponape from 1855 to 1889. Frank E. Rand, Protestant missionary on Ponape from 1874 to 1894.

16. As mentioned in the Introduction and Commentary, Cabeza uses Methodist throughout his narrative rather than the more accurate Congregationalist.
17. Father Bachelot was the first Catholic missionary in Ponape, arriving in 1827 and establishing himself in Metalanin. According to Fischer, he was respected and indeed loved by the Ponapeans, who nonetheless rejected his religious teachings. See John L. Fischer with Ann M. Fischer, The Eastern Carolines (Behavior Science Monographs; New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1970), 21-22.
18. Cabeza fails to mention that the establishment of the mission at Kiti was widely opposed by the native population. For a brief account, see Fischer, 41.
19. This is the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, known also as the Boston Missionary Society.
20. Kusaie was not, in fact, the focal point of Protestant mission activity in the Carolines. Rather, it served as a central station for the Marshalls and Gilberts. See Fischer, 20-35.
21. Dr. Edmund M. Pease, missionary doctor who began his work in the Marshalls in 1877. Alfred C. Walkup, a missionary who began to work in Micronesia in 1880. Walkup divided his time between the Gilberts and the Gilberts Training School on Kusaie.
22. Robert W. Logan, established the mission on Moen in 1885. Ponapean teachers had begun missionary work in the Truk Lagoon some years before Logan's arrival.
23. Based on the description provided by Cabeza, probably Albert A. Sturges, who served in Ponape as a missionary from 1855 to 1885, David Hanlon, personal communication, 1983.
24. ". . . without distinction . . ." as used here means the schools accepted both Christian and non-Christian students. Hanlon.
25. Henry Nanpei, one of the most important and prominent Ponapeans of his day. He played a central role in the events described here as well as in later Ponapean history. For a more thorough study of Nanpei, see Paul Ehrlich, "Henry Nanpei: Pre-eminently a Ponapean," More Pacific Islands Portraits, ed. Deryck Scarr (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1978, 131-154.
26. Annette A. Palmer, missionary in Ponape 1884 to 1906. Mrs. Lucy M. Cole, a widow who came to Ponape shortly before the outbreak of violence between the Spanish and Ponapeans. Hanlon.
27. The missionaries flatly rejected the charge they had given military training of any kind to the natives. Hempenstall, however, notes that the missionaries had their own law enforcement

- agency. See Paul J. Hempenstall, Pacific Islanders under German Rule: A Study in the Meaning of Colonial Resistance (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1978), 74.
28. Narcissus de Santos, the father of Henry Nanpei's wife and a prominent figure in the early Protestant church of Ponape. See Ehrlich, 135.
 29. In fact, George (Sturges) returned in 1882 and remained until 1885 when a stroke forced him to leave permanently. Hanlon.
 30. Needless to say, the Protestant missionaries' account of the following events varies considerably from Cabeza's. For a short account of the period from a different perspective, see Fischer, 36-44.
 31. In fact, the Spanish forced the Ponapeans to work. This, along with no pay, poor accommodation, poor food and long hours helped spark the rebellion. Torres, the official translator, contributed to the problem by stealing funds intended for the Ponapeans, misrepresenting their views to the Governor, and insulting their chiefs. See Hambruch, 274-275.
 32. Doane had attempted to prevent the Spanish from building on the site they had selected for the colony, claiming the entire area had been ceded to him in 1880 by two local chiefs, Lepen Net and Souwenin Metipw. Posadillo investigated the matter and determined that the Lepen Net had only given Doane rights to the land on which his house and church were built. Doane protested this in a sharp letter to the Governor that called the decision "arbitrary." This letter prompted Doane's arrest and ultimate transfer to Manila. Fischer suggests that the local chiefs may have found it useful to support the Spanish against Doane in this affair. From the chiefs' point of view, they had the right to dispose of their land as they saw fit and could easily have decided to take it back from Doane and give it to the Spanish. See Fischer, 37, Hambruch, 271-273, and Hempenstall, 75.
 33. It was hardly an "ambush." Both Hempenstall and Hambruch agree that Martinez commanded his men to fire on the Ponapeans after they refused his order to return to the colony. This action prompted them to attack the Spanish column. Hambruch adds that Torres, who was killed in this attack, had told the Governor that the Ponapeans' resistance could be broken if some of them "bit the dust," resulting in the Governor's decision to send the column in pursuit of the natives. See Hempenstall, 75, Hambruch, 276-277.
 34. Macario, with Torres, contributed to the ill-feeling that led to the up-rising. See Hambruch, 274.
 35. The American Consul in Manila intervened with the Spanish Governor on Doane's behalf and successfully argued for his return to Ponape. The matter was also raised in Madrid by American Diplomats. See Hambruch, 282.

36. Hambruch suggests that Cadalso was biased against the Capuchins and, as a consequence, actually supported the Protestant missionaries. Hambruch, 283.
37. There is considerable doubt that the men finally charged with the Governor's murder were, in fact, guilty. See Hambruch, 278.
38. It should be noted that the cutting of trees without permission would have been viewed by the Ponapeans as an egregious violation of traditional land rights and a serious insult to their chiefs. Hanlon.
39. Henry Nanpei's wife.
40. This is obviously not accurate. Pingelap lies some 150 miles East South-East of Ponape and could not have been the location of these children.
41. Probably Nahlainmw en Madolenihmw, an important chief in the area.
42. What Cabeza means by this allusion is unclear. The names may possibly refer to two long since de-commissioned warships.
43. Miss Poka possibly is the Ponapean wife of Charles Bowker, a former crew member of the MORNING STAR who worked for the Protestant mission on Ponape. Hanlon.
44. Cabeza has confused his political geography here. Oa is a part of Metalanin and not, as he suggests, vice versa.
45. The main Protestant mission was at Oa, explaining why MORNING STAR anchored there. Because much of the Island's unrest centered on Oa, it is easy to understand why the Spanish assumed that the missionaries were involved in the Ponapeans' resistance.
46. Cabeza consistently refers to the Colonel as "Gutierrez Soto," whereas all other commentators use the more common "Gutierrez y Soto." In spoken Spanish, the "y" is often dropped, a fashion Cabeza seems to have adopted for the written word.
47. The circumstances surrounding the death of Gutierrez y Soto remain unclear. Hambruch suggests, as do others, that he was killed by his own men. See Hambruch, 326, Fischer, 42.
48. Captain J. C. Dewar, owner of the yacht NYANZA, shared Cabeza's gloomy view of the capital, describing it as "a miserable place." Hambruch, 294.
49. This apparent discrepancy is explained by the fact that at any one time no more than one-sixth of the total company was expected to be bedridden. The remainder would be treated as outpatients.
50. See note 12.

51. Albert Guse is not mentioned by other writers on this period and cannot be identified.
52. The only other American warship I can identify as having called on Ponape after the American Civil War is the USS JAMESTOWN, which gave its name to the site that eventually became Kolonia. The JAMESTOWN visited Ponape in 1970 to survey Langar Harbor and while there secured guarantees from the local chiefs for the safety of American missionaries. There appears to be no record of an 1887 warship visit, even in Cabeza's account. See Fischer, 33.
53. Christian Barbus, whose behavior along with that of Torres and Macario, contributed to the uprising of 1887. Hambruch, 274.
54. Hempenstall gives a slightly different figure which, when converted from marks to pesos, would have given the chiefs some 34 pesos each month and Nanpei 1,000 pesos per year. Hempenstall, 77.
55. Hambruch says that de la Concha and Rand were friends and that de la Concha worked hard to secure the return of the American missionaries to Ponape. Hambruch, 308.
56. Pidal, in fact, had a relatively successful tenure as Governor. His successors avoided for the most part any further clashes with the Ponapeans and no more "massacres" of either Europeans or Ponapeans were recorded. On October 12, 1899, the imperial Spanish flag was replaced by Germany's and Spain's adventure in the Carolines came quietly to an end.

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