THE FAILED STATE DISCOURSE: A CRITIQUE FROM THE PAPUA NEW GUINEA EXPERIENCE

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Chapter 1. Introduction

So much has already been written about the state so why another thesis on the state? There are two compelling reasons: the first is the result of a personal disillusionment that arose out of my own working experience and association with the state and state actors in Papua New Guinea (PNG). It is a humble endeavor that sets out to bring a topic that entails complex and interrelated issues to a level of simple understanding. It is a personal yearning to learn for myself, in a holistic manner, about an imposing entity that has been seen as central to the lives of contemporary ordinary Papua New Guineans. The second reason is also personal and is an undertaking to critically analyze the impression and perception that the PNG state is a failed state. The personal undertaking came about after it became obvious that a discourse on failed state has been making the rounds in academic and political circles in the pacific in recent years following the two Fiji coups and the current (2001-2003) failed state scenario in the Solomon Islands (Chappel, 2003: pers.comm.). The discourse prophesied that given its present political and social upheavals within its own society, PNG would follow its two Melanesian neighbors down the path of state failure.

This thesis does not pretend to break new grounds nor shed valuable light on the subject. But it does intend to revisit what has already been said and written with the view to bring to the forefront what may not have been adequately covered. That is, what is it about state failure in PNG that has not been adequately covered or analyzed by the
current array of discourses and paradigms? Are there possibilities of picking up valuable threads or suggestions that may help to explain the root causes of state failure in PNG?

This thesis is about two issues: to ascertain the validity of the failed state discourse and to identify possible root causes of state failure in PNG. The overall argument of this thesis, then, is that the current discourse on state failure does not adequately explain root causes of state failure in PNG and that a wider approach should be able to suggest better ways of explaining this. What follows, then, is an attempt to examine these two issues in a critical light by analyzing similar examples and experiences of state failure around the world vis a vis the PNG case. It is hoped that the literature review in Chapter 2 and the historical analysis of state-formation and political development in Chapter 3 should be able to lay a firm groundwork as the way to expound on my central argument. On the basis of these two chapters, I also argue that the ultimate outcome of state failure is deeply intertwined with the forces and circumstances that helped shaped the state's own conception and subsequent birth.

I want to commence this inquiry by asking a few sociological questions: Why is it that some states take good care of their societies while others do not? Why is it that some states are stronger and more successful than others? Could the PNG state achieve the same level of success and prosperity enjoyed by other more successful societies using the same rules and ideological foundations applied so successfully in other states?
These questions in turn serve as bases for policy formulation, legislation enactment, and ultimately the politics of distribution of power and resources.

While there are significant bases for the failed state discourse to be widely accepted as a social fact in PNG and elsewhere, a broader approach is undertaken here to examine this discourse. While most of these views about state failure in PNG are not without merits and are well researched, this thesis will take a neutral stand when compared with the more extreme examples of state failure and collapse occurring in different parts of the world today.

There is a general intellectual perception both from within and outside of PNG that if the present negative impression of political trend is allowed to continue, there is a high chance of seeing the PNG state becoming a failed state. In a report published early last year (2003) in Australia, the two authors noted that PNG showed every sign of following its Melanesian neighbor, the Solomon Islands, down the path of economic paralysis, government collapse and social despair (Windybank and Manning, 2003: 1). After highlighting significant problem areas in the economic and socio-political structure, the authors strongly exhorted the Australian government to “rethink its relationship with PNG now to avoid high costs in the future”.
Thus much of the current literature on so-called weak states in the Pacific—including local news reports—describe in detail the forces and processes that have given rise to instances of weak and/or failed states. It is a phenomenon that gained popularity and significant attention following a sharp increase in crime and incidences of violence among the civil population and corruption and administrative mismanagement within the state apparatus. In other words, the states of these countries are being criticized both from within and outside for not “delivering goods and services” and for neglecting their basic functions and obligations to the society at large. In the context of the PNG state, this paradigm of the weak state gathered momentum in the 1980s and reached its peak and popularity throughout the 1990s within the context of developmental issues. It is now a subject of intellectual musings as well as government debates and official inquiries and reports (e.g. Clifford et. al., 1984; Dinnen, 2001; Windybank and Manning, 2003).

Similarly, earlier last year (2003) in a seminar in Port Moresby, a team of local academics at the University of Papua New Guinea reported findings from a study they conducted that suggested that the PNG state was very near to experiencing state collapse if present trends and patterns of development were allowed to continue. The authors argued that PNG is going down the path many African countries had taken before they experienced state collapse. (The National, 08/06/03: 3). Elsewhere, it was suggested that PNG needed to overhaul its state institutions and system as a whole in order to prevent state failure. Accountability, transparency, and good governance became the catchphrases
and were explicit in the literature on failed/weak states (eg. Larmour, 1998; Ray, 1998; Dinnen, 2001).

Despite these emerging intellectual musings and predictions about state failure in former colonized states, academics and scholars at the University of Papua New Guinea have come to a general concurrence that state failure in this context would refer to a general breakdown in formal state institutions and government control mechanisms and not to be extended to include the wider civil society (Winduo, pers. comm., 2003).

Shifting the focus towards the global level, recent international trends and political events affecting states in many nations today, have prompted fresh literature on state failure and collapse to come to light. Generally it is being observed that practically and conceptually, the state is under siege. It is in crisis (Milliken, 2003: 1). There are two sources where this crisis emanates: internally (within the state system, by 'players' themselves) and externally (outside of the state system, through events and conditions impinging on it).

Clapham (2003: 26) distinguishes this phenomenon as a process that comes in different stages, namely state failure and state collapse. State collapse is essentially concerned with the crumbling of institutions, and state failure is defined by the non-performance of key state functions. It was Zartman (quoted in Clapham, 2003) who, in 1995, proposed the definition of state collapse as “a situation where the structure,
authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart. State failure on the other hand, is a much more uncertain concept, because it begs the question of what the core functions of states actually are, and these may vary from a minimal concern with basic security, through to respect for the rights of their citizens and even the provision of welfare. To take an extreme example, the Rwandan state at the time of the 1994 genocide may very convincingly be regarded as having 'failed', in that it did not assure protection to much of its population. But certainly had not collapsed: on the contrary, highly disciplined agents of the state pursued the task of murdering many of its people with hideous efficiency. Equally there was no state collapse when the Rwandan state run by Habyarimana's successors was defeated and displaced in mid-1994 by the Rwandan Patriotic Front; there was merely the briefest hiatus between the ending of one regime and installation of another (Clapham, 2003: 26).

In order to provide a global overview of state failure, a range of generalized theories and paradigms\(^1\) of state failure and collapse are analyzed. These paradigms have come into usage mostly in the wake of recent armed and violent conflicts that have sprung up in many “hot spots” of the world during the last three decades. Concomitant with this, the subject of globalization has taken on a new twist with regard to problems associated with collapsed and failed states (Musah, 2003). On the one hand, failed states have acquired a negative role in terms of both local and global security and political order where rouge states have the tendency to wreak havoc within their own territories in

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\(^1\) For the purpose of this thesis, “paradigm/s” will be used to refer to both “theory/ies and paradigm/s” throughout the subsequent chapters unless otherwise stated.
causing mass migration and other social and health problems on a mass scale (Campbell and Flournoy, 2001). On the other hand, collapsed and failed states present opportunities to reexamine the dominant idea that western models of social and political organization may not after all be viable and certainly not transferable to other societies and cultures. (Clapham, 2003; Milliken, 2003; Paul et. at., 2003, Musah, 2003).

It was also suggested that state collapse and state failure should need a different conceptualization and should not be lumped into the rubric or political crisis and civil war (Milliken, 2003: 12, Clapham, 2003: 28-29). Clapham goes on to point out that recent research have emphasized the critical role of social values that are embedded in the structures of particular societies, and which cannot be readily replicated either by ‘training’, or even the creation of appropriate economic conditions advocated by international financial institutions. This in turn enables one to examine local conditions and indigenous structures with the hope that perhaps these may offer some insight as to why state-building does work really well in one society but is a virtual failure in another. While the causes and consequences of state failure are many and vary from country to country, this thesis argues that failed as well as collapsed states are mostly associated with violent armed conflicts in a significant way. The global perspective of the failed state has gained currency in the light of recent upsurge in international conflicts such as the destruction of the twin towers of the World Trade Center in the United States by terrorists and armed conflicts in parts of Asia (e.g. in the Philippines and Afghanistan), the Middle East (Iraq and Israeli-Palestinian tragedy) and Africa (Liberia and
Zimbabwe). An overarching or common trait that runs through those cases is that terrorists have used collapsed and failed states (such as Afghanistan) as their bases to perpetrate and promote their violent agendas around the world and also against their own governments (Goodson, 2001; Campbell and Flournoy, 2001; Cohen, 2003).

In the light of these diverse paradigms, it is suggested that a holistic analysis should be undertaken to identify the proper locations of individual states and the degree of their failure. That is, to contextualize the degree and occurrences of state failure and collapse. For example a salient feature of contemporary PNG society is the presence of a vigorous conglomeration of numerous cohesive ethnic and tribal groups, which, like many African nations\textsuperscript{2}, tend to act as 'checks and balances' in the state apparatus and political institutions. The location for understanding how these checks and balances work is within the system of central government itself. It has been argued that this implicit operation of check and balances is at play when, for example, in a national election, there is a high rate of elected officials not returning thus making it impossible for them to remain in power for longer than they expect. This indirectly prevents an elected official from amassing wealth or power that could eventually breed an ideal condition for state failure\textsuperscript{3} (Reilly, 2003: pers. comm.).

\textsuperscript{2} The PNG case may vary considerably from the African cases whereby there is no dominant ethnic group or tribe that could use their overwhelming numbers to "call the shots" in both government administration and social and political life.

\textsuperscript{3} The counter argument is that there are parliamentarians in PNG who have served more than three terms in public office but their wealth and power does not seem to bear any significant relationship with state failure.
To this end, this thesis project suggests that the criteria for judging the performance of a state should not only derive from the economic and political bases and/or the transplanted/introduced structure of governance and administration. By this I mean one should look at the broader perspective of civil society and its peculiar characteristics that dispel or weaken the circumstances and potential climate of state failure.

There have been studies of state collapse as a distinctive phenomenon undertaken by practitioners (governmental and non-governmental). Milliken (2003: 13) points out that this policy-oriented literature has mostly focused on post-collapse intervention strategies, or on specific economic, political or security aspects of state collapse. Concern about the prospect of state collapse has therefore not been matched by attempts to understand the conditions of its emergence (state collapse out of state failure) in a focused and sustained way. This inevitably has consequences for the quality of policy analysis, since a good understanding of processes of collapse is crucial to determine, for example, how the political reconstruction of state collapse might best be approached. This thesis sets out its analysis from this standpoint. The purpose of this thesis project would be to address questions and issues raised above in the context of pre-failure and pre-collapse state discourse. Analyses center on nations that are generally regarded as “developing” or “third world” and they are found in sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, South East Asia and the South Pacific.
Additional countries or regions will be included as and where their relevance to this project warrants such as the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia.

Some issues are worth raising in the light of the failed state discourse. Apart from what has already been known, is there any mutual benefit that could be identified in this project? Will these mutual benefits come forth from the commonalities or the differences that will be identified? What is it that the PNG case has to offer that other cases do not and vice versa? This can be seen as a mutual process of exchange and awareness with the view to induce the need for improvement in understanding the discourse of state failure.

By using references from other cases of failed and collapsed states, it would become obvious that, from an ‘insider’ perspective, the PNG case may not be as grim as what is currently being circulated as discourses of state failure. However, this does not mean that it is the end of the struggle to dispel misgivings and skepticisms. In the light of existing literature, this thesis seeks to articulate the strengths and weaknesses of the PNG state through a critical analysis of the historical state formation while taking on board similar or extreme experiences and examples from around the world. Through articulation, a process of drawing clear boundaries between the necessary and sufficient conditions for state failure may be achieved. The research question to be addressed in the subsequent chapters is, taking into account other paradigms of state failure around the world, what are the unique elements of state failure in PNG?
The plan of this thesis is this: Chapter 2 analyzes the various paradigms of state failure on an individual basis. It also introduces the operational definitions of the 'failed state' and the 'state' as well as a general impression and summary of this analysis.

Chapter 3 provides an analysis if not a comprehensive overview of the history and political development within which the PNG state and nation emerged. Discussion traces the early formation of the present nation-state through the processes of colonialism and then gives a historical narrative of how these historical forces have helped shaped the present state. Discussion is divided into the different epochs of PNG's political history.

Chapter 4 consists of two parts: the first is a synthetic summary and an eclectic overview of the overall theories and paradigms discussed in Chapter 2; the second is an individual analysis of the paradigms of state failure that are relevant in explaining elements of state failure or weakness in the PNG state. Analysis is discussed under the three core functions of the state: security, representation, and welfare. The usages of these terms are spelt in this Chapter 4.

Chapter 5 is the summary and conclusion of analysis of Chapter 3 and 4 where the applicability and relevance of the paradigms to the PNG case are ascertained and general impressions drawn on the basis of the analysis.
Chapter 2. The Notion of the Failed State

This chapter analyzes some recently investigated paradigms of state failure by comparing the diverse experiences occurring around the world today. In the light of these paradigms, it is argued that significant internal forces and factors that pertain to the social structure and cohesion within a civil society are keys to understanding the dynamics of state failure and collapse if the phenomenon is to be properly grasped and contextualized according to prevailing local conditions. The purpose of the analyses of the various paradigms of the failed state is an attempt to cast a wider net, so to speak, in order to gather as many as possible the different experiences of what different people have written about the phenomenon of failed states. By broaching through these variations it is hoped that these theories and paradigms of state failure can be contextualized and thereby providing the background from which a more detailed analysis of theories and paradigms that pertain to the Papua New Guinea case can be analyzed.

The plan of this chapter goes like this: First I deal briefly with the issues concerning the definition of weak, failed and collapsed states. From these issues I offer an operational definition of the ‘failed state’ for the purpose of this thesis.

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4 In this thesis project, the terms ‘state failure’ and ‘state collapse’ will be used interchangeably to refer to the overall phenomenon of failed or collapsed states. However, based on Rotberg’s (2004) continuum of states (i.e. weak states, failing states, failed states, and collapsed states) specific terms will be used to denote the type of state referred to.
Second, I spell out individually the major paradigms of the failed state as observed and argued by different authors who have been able to explore and provide pioneering conceptualizations of this phenomenon by way of approaching it from different perspectives according to country experience. This will be comprehensive and with the view to hopefully pick out the essential elements of the arguments as to why some states have failed and how they have failed and relate these to the PNG case.

Third, I identify commonalities and unique elements implicit in those theories and paradigms and then go on to suggest further exploration or in-depth look at elements that may be uniquely missing in the theories and paradigms – particularly as they relate to the PNG case. The third part is included in Chapter 4 as part of the main body of analysis.

Definitional Issues

There is a new and worrying situation which seems to challenge, if not threaten, international security in this millennium. Terms such as state collapse, failed states, state disintegration, breakdown of law and order, anarchy and chaos are being regularly employed in the international relations vernacular to describe this new and worrying situation (Yannis, 2004: 63). These terms refer to the drastic deterioration of the political, social and economic conditions of life in certain parts of the globe and to their implications for the populations, for the regional stability, and for international security. The general paradigms of state failure and collapse can be sketched on a spectrum or
continuum along which various categories and experiences of state failure and collapse can be placed and thus analyzed on comparative and contrasting terms.

The literature on failed states includes various meanings for state failure. This is not surprising, as writers, contemplating breakdown in states as dissimilar as Haiti, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, or Somalia are often considering different problems, and using a variety of indicators to measure failure and collapse. They disagree over whether the point is to identify critical indicators that measure a state’s political decline or the collapse of its authority; whether social norms that survive the collapse of political authority can soften its impact; and whether state failure can take place slowly or must occur suddenly (Kasfir. 2004: 57).

In an attempt to conceptualize and make a distinction between state failure and state collapse, Clapham distinguishes them thus:

"...state collapse... is essentially concerned with the crumbling of institutions and state failure... is defined by the non-performance of key state functions. It thus broadly accepts... state collapse as a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart. State failure, on the other hand, is a much more uncertain concept, because it begs the question of what the core functions of states actually are, and these may vary from a minimal concern with basic security, through to respect for the rights of their citizens, and even the provision of welfare" (Clapham, 2003: 26).
In a similar vein but more illuminating, Rotberg (2004: 2-4) explores the nature of failure and collapse and attempted to establish clear criteria for distinguishing collapse and failure from generic weakness or apparent distress, and collapse from failure. By doing so, he hopes that the definition would put the onus on performance rather than on reputation. By performance he refers to the ability of the state to deliver or provide three primary ‘political goods’ for its masses: security (both internal and external), democracy and delivery of basic services. Rotberg has classified states on a continuum: Strong states, weak states, failing states, failed states and collapsed states. Attention is focused only on weak, failing, failed and collapsed states. Rotberg contends that states exist to provide two primary political goods: Security (both within and outside a nation) and protection of human rights. These will be elaborated in the course of this chapter.

Taking into account Kasfir’s (2004) notion of indicators of failed and collapsed states and using Rotberg’s (2004) continuum of political goods and the indicators of their presence or absence, I propose an a priori definition of state failure thus: State failure occurs when there is a decline in state authority and influence which in turn handicaps its functional abilities (though not the loss/waning of its legitimacy) resulting in the following indicators: poor socio-economic status (mostly primary health care and universal education); a salient absence of new physical infrastructure such as road networks, public utilities (electricity and water supplies) away from the capital city; an inability to contain effectively crime and group violence; and a high level of corruption among politicians and non-elected state officials and bureaucrats. The form of corruption
envisioned is mostly in the form of embezzlement of public funds by politicians and public servants and their cronies. I further propose that these indicators are not mutually exclusive and that they have a tendency to influence and being influenced by each other.

In defining the state, I will employ the definition proposed by Migdal: “The state is a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representative of the people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts” (Migdal, 2001: 16; emphasis original).

Elaborating on this definition, Migdal argues that actual states are shaped by two elements, image and practice. These can be overlapping and reinforcing, or contradictory and mutually destructive. Image tend to be homologous from state to state, especially the image of the modern state that has its origins in the fifteenth through seventeenth centuries in northwest Europe and came to encompass the entire globe in the last half of the twentieth century. Conversely, practices have tended to be diverse, and while there are certainly recognizable comparative patterns, they have defied neat categorization.

In his most widely quoted definition, Weber defines the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Gerth and Mills, 1958: 78). Hence the usage of the term ‘Weberian’ to whom this legacy is attributed.
Paradigms of the Failed State

The framework for this chapter is based upon the notion suggested by Yannis (2003: 67) that state collapse and state failure are not the offspring of any state theory that promotes the total withering away of the state, but rather the "pathological by-product of a combination of local and/or global political, social and economic forces and developments". While state collapse may rightly be seen as the ultimate form of the decline of state authority, it nonetheless constitutes a distinct aspect of state decline. Thus disintegration of public authority is not the realization of state theories associated with anarchism or Neo-liberal 'minimal state'. This is similarly echoed elsewhere: "...the institutional realities of the state, being an empirical concept, must not be confused with the abstract idea of the state" (Bartelson, 2001:30).

In the wake of the various instances of the phenomenon of state failure and collapse, "...analysis is necessary given the conceptual confusion of recent years" (Hall et. al., 2003: 1). Political scientists in the West became interested in the state in the 1970s, leading to powerful new work on revolutions, political economy, and international relations. This work had little impact on policy choices. In the preface to an edited book, Hall and others (2003) stated that policy makers in the 1980s set about dismantling the state, in part because they heeded more to economists than to political scientists, and in part because they listened to the voices of people in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere who had been oppressed by vicious and inefficient states.
When this was linked to striking global economic change, the belief arose not just that the state should be dismantled but that it could not be reconstituted, that it had permanently lost its powers.

Times have now changed. Hall et. al. (ibid.) go on to note that in some parts of the world, it is increasingly clear that life without a Hobbesian minimum (that is, without the presence of a state) is indeed “nasty, brutish, and short” – as in the chaos of Liberia and the Mafia control so obvious in the post-communist Belarus. Further, events in the Balkans remind us forcefully that state powers most certainly do exist while the Asian response to the financial crises in the late 1990s seeks a modern state different from that of the Anglo-American variety. Accordingly, the time has come to reassess state-society relations, with reference to particular regions and to the nature of contemporary social understandings.

From another angle, the idea that statehood is universal and inevitable is now problematic in the wake of experiences from states in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and the Pacific. Clapham writes that “(in) a world conditioned by the idea of progress, and accustomed to the state as an essential element in the march of progress, the universality of this form of organization has been taken for granted, while the question of whether the whole world could afford states has been ignored” (Clapham, 2003: 28; emphasis original). He argued that there were good reasons why much of the world had not
previously possessed states. States with their expensive hierarchies and permanent employees are expensive to maintain.

The fundamental problem facing state-builders – be they pre-colonial kings, colonial governors or presidents in the independent era – has been to project authority over inhospitable territories that contain relatively low densities of people.

This is complemented by the fact that the Weberian state, with its extensive powers and massive bureaucracy, can only be legitimized through its provision of public goods to its populations; without these goods, it degenerates into a mere conspiracy for oppressions and extortion (ibid.). In addition to having a large bureaucracy, the state also has the obligation of fostering a sense of nationhood among its populations. Clapham (2003: 29) notes that though a sense of nationalism is not a necessary component of statehood, its absence greatly weakens the state, and correspondingly impedes the achievement of accountability to its population.

Doornbos has pointed it out that even though there is an extensive literature on the dynamics of state formation such as discussing and weighing variables that may have given rise to it, such as conquest, trade routes, population pressure and a range of other factors, there was generally little writing on state failure and collapse. Normatively, Doornbos states, once states had come into existence they were expected to last – and, in

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6 In the case of PNG, it is the problems associated with the inability of the post-independence state to project authority over a large number of people whose social groups and immediate communities have not come into effective contact or experienced statehood before.
recent decades, to help sustain the international system that had in turn come to be based on them (Doornbos, 2003: 45).

Doornbos (ibid.) believes that a better grasp of processes leading to failure and collapse should provide additional insights into what makes states work and what fails to do so. Depending on one’s understanding of collapse or failure, and the political dynamics that give rise to it, it is conceivable to regard collapse or failure as part of processes of state reconfiguration and formation. Certainly a better understanding of processes of collapse is crucial to determine how political reconstruction might best be approached. It is thus important to look into the complex web of conditioning and facilitating factors that may or may not set in motion a chain reaction eventually leading to state collapse. This may contribute to a better understanding not only of why certain dynamics tend to end in state collapse, but also of the extent to which we can identify any different patterns emerging.

In analyzing the dynamics of state collapse, Doornbos argues that the collapse of a state can hardly occur spontaneously, or all at once. If and where it happens, it is likely to have been preceded and initiated by complex and conflict-ridden processes of deterioration, decline and erosion of state functions. These processes have their own dynamics, which is not to say that they are strictly internal processes. He, however, notes that as processes, dynamics of decline are theoretically reversible, and one can only speculate about the number of instances where timely intervention, both internal and
external may have stopped a chain of events that could have culminated in state collapse (Doornbos, 2003: 47-48). As with historical state formation processes, where one may recognize in retrospect that a state has emerged out of various formative processes, the 'root courses', of state collapse will similarly have been at work well before any actual collapse manifests itself.

For example in the Somali case, Doornbos (ibid.) points it out that it was the inability to accommodate conflicting interests often articulated on a clan basis, and the instrumental use to which the state apparatus was put in the pursuit of this inter-clan violence, that caused the disintegration of the fragile system. Citing other writers Doornbos relates that in Sierra Leone, it was the greed for profit from control over the lucrative illegal diamond trade that became a key factor fuelling the rebellion and by implication the progressive undermining of the state system. He, however, argues that this leaves open the question of why the rebellion started, for which very little explanations have been offered, notably ethnic grievances spurred by unequal access to power and resources.

Both the Sierra Leonean and Somali examples stand in contrast to the pattern of the relatively short-lived, but no less dramatic, collapse of the Albanian state in 1996-97. In this case, collapse followed in the wake of the crisis triggered by the infamous pyramid schemes which had invalidated the savings and securities of so many people, in the end
causing a massive popular uprising against the ‘failing state’ (de Gaay; Vaughan-Whitehead, in Doornbos, 2003: 49).

Thus taking only these three instances of state collapse, the differences involved seem to represent a good deal more than ‘incidental’ factors. Rather, they underscore the need to explore more fully the emergence of different patterns in, or tracks to, state collapse.

Doornbos further proposes that other examples also illustrate this differentiation of patterns. For instance, the complex dynamics that led to the crisis and collapse of the Cambodian state framework followed on years of protracted and destructive struggle between the Pol Pot government and liberation forces, and eventually required a complex UN-led effort to restructure a state system expected to be reasonably open to and representative of the various political strands in the country. Recent configurations of other collapsing states exhibit similar patterns. Haiti, Bosnia, Liberia, Congo, and indeed Afghanistan require their own explanations of what went wrong. In a couple of cases like Haiti and Congo, state power had for so long been personalized, based on non-formal militias loyal only to the political leader, that the degeneration of the system caused the fragile state structure to become largely irrelevant and eventually to collapse.

Given the few examples above – there are many more given by other writers in this chapter – and given the precipitation of certain global events like the end of the Cold
War, ‘September 11’ and the global trend in international trade and exchanges, Doornbos (2003: 51-52) suggests that though there may be different trajectories to state failure and collapse, recent examples suggest that there are some recognizable and potentially recurrent patterns. That is, a number of distinct patterns begin to suggest themselves. In the following, the first four are more ‘basic’ in character, the last three conceivably more supplementary:

1. states in which the privatization of state assets and prerogatives of state rulers have become extreme, and in which there are deepening challenges to that rule from former associates as well as from liberation fronts (Zaire/Congo under Mobutu, Haiti under Duvalier, Uganda under Amin, Somalia under Barre);

2. states with a marked historical mismatch between the nature and orientation of state institutions and the socio-political processes and divisions within the society concerned (Somalia, Chad, Georgia, Rwanda);

3. states in which there are deepening conflicts over the control of strategic resources – diamonds, oil, timber, etc. – involving rebel groups and privatized armies, making state institutions irrelevant (Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, potentially Nigeria);

4. states undergoing a major struggle over power and over the political and cultural orientation and organization of society (Cambodia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, potentially Sudan);
5. states in which secession attempts get out of hand, potentially affecting the continuity of the state system as a whole (Congo, potentially Indonesia);
6. fragile states suddenly facing deteriorating economic conditions which seriously affect the livelihood of a large majority of the population, leading to a breakdown of state institutions (Albania at the time of the pyramid games, Rwanda allegedly prior to the genocide);
7. states in which institutional failures to provide basic security in one or more respects (physical security, health, nutrition) have gone beyond a point of repair, for whatever specific reasons, thus invoking a state bankruptcy of sorts. (This variant may figure as both a manifestation and determinant of collapse, the latter as deteriorating conditions become a factor in their own right).

It is to be noted that this is a tentative listing and that other tracks will be ‘discovered’ in due course. The resulting trajectory is therefore not necessarily strictly linear or singular.

One significant point that Doornbos makes is that several instances of state collapse or failure have been followed by international calls for restoration of ‘order’, sanctions or even advocacy. As a hypothesis, such a reading of the root to collapse emphasizes institutional failures as a root cause, while as a remedy it recommends redressing proper institutional mechanisms and procedures, thus putting the state back
into place. Doornbos argues that this is not necessarily wrong, but it still does not make it right, or sufficient, as the question still remains how those institutional mechanisms (that is, state structures) came to be undermined, and at the hands of what forces. Furthermore, although 'collapse' at one level may seem synonymous with 'disorder', it may not always require a reflex reaction intent on putting that same order back in place.

It is argued by some observers that the proliferation of the phenomenon of state failure and collapse is to be located in the post-Cold War era. For example in his analysis of the contextual factors that gave rise to the phenomenon of state collapse in the post-Cold War era, Yannis (2003: 63) states that in the early days of the post-Cold War period, the majority of observers approached the phenomenon of state collapse mainly from an African/Third World perspective. This is partly because a large number of disintegrating states could be found in these parts of the world, partly because the majority of the poorest and weakest states in the world could be found in Africa. Yusuf even suggested that some African nations have in the past few years reduced themselves to a state of “suspended statehood” in which there may still be recognized frontiers, but everything inside has become anarchy and lawlessness (Yusuf, quoted in Yannis, 2003: 64).

Some observers, however, began pointing to the global implications of state collapse. Helman and Ratner, for instance, introduced state disintegration as a global phenomenon. They state: “From Haiti in the Western Hemisphere to the remnants of Yugoslavia in Europe, from Somalia, Sudan and Liberia in Africa to Cambodia in
Southeast Asia, a disturbing new phenomenon is emerging: the failed nation-state, utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community” (in Yannis, 2003: 65). Kaplan goes a further step. He attributes to the phenomenon of state collapse dimensions of a disease of biblical proportions, starting in Africa and other Third World countries, spreading and threatening to infect the entire world. Kaplan argues that crime and lawlessness of West Africa is a model of what future life could become everywhere as demographic, environmental, health and social problems increase. He concludes that state collapse is manifested by disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels. For these observers September 11 vindicated their doomsday theories (in Yannis, 2003: 65).

The post-Cold War upsurge in the phenomenon of state collapse – the disintegration of governmental authority and the extreme disruption of law and order in some parts of the world – is clearly associated with the debate about the future of the state. State collapse is often contemplated as the ultimate form of state decline. Schachter has observed that the most dramatic examples of the decline in state authority can be found in countries where government and civil order have virtually disappeared (in Yannis, 2003: 66). Given these various scenarios of state collapse, some observers such as Reisman, have suggested that more than any other phenomenon, the disintegrating state has prompted doubts about the future of the state (in Yannis, ibid).
State disintegration is also associated with the theories of state decline and because it is largely viewed as emanating from the destabilization of the world's political systems in the aftermath of the Cold War and, especially, from the increasing marginalization of the state as a force capable of handling the impact of globalization and harnessing the growing strength of non-state and sub-state actors. While the forces of international capitalism and globalization are considered to be behind the financial instability and marginalization of certain parts of the world, and thus undermining the authority of the state, the various forms of “uncivil society”, several kinds of non-state and sub-state actors, are the major and most visible forces that erode state authority not only from outside but also from within. Shultz puts it as follows:

The end of the Cold War has been marked by an increase in the visibility of several non-state actors. They include extreme ethno-nationalist movements, religious radicals, local militias, international criminal organizations and terrorists, among others...Some of these nonstate actors effectively defy and openly challenge government sovereignty in various regions of the world...These developments result in the disintegration of state structures and authority, growing instability, and the inability of states to govern (in Yannis, 2003: 67).

From this perspective, the phenomenon of state collapse is another aspect of the cataclysmic impact on states and the international system of global political, social and economic changes that are underway. It signifies the inability of states to absorb those changes peacefully, and particularly highlights the dynamic advent of forces inimical to the concept of public order as defined by the twentieth century social state. While such
developments may lie at the root of the phenomenon of state collapse, the emergence of state disintegration as a distinct issue in post-Cold War international politics is linked with separate specific developments. Yannis (ibid.) argues that these developments include previous arguments and issues such as anarchy and minimal state intervention, human rights and humanitarian values, and the re-emergence of interventionism in the post-Cold War period. These three factors are briefly explained below.

While state collapse may rightly be seen as the ultimate form of the decline of state authority, it nonetheless constitutes a distinct aspect of state decline. State collapse is not the offspring of any state theory that promotes the total withering away of the state, but rather the pathological by-product of a combination of local and/or global political, social and economic forces and developments. Seen in this light, disintegration of public authority is not the realization of state theories associated with anarchism or Neo-liberal 'minimal state'. Yannis notes that none of the influential state theories question the role of the state as the ultimate guardian of public order. In fact, with the notable exception of nineteenth century anarchism, the internal aspect of Hobbes' Leviathan – the personification of the implied contract between citizens and the sovereign in whom citizens, in order to safeguard their security, have vested absolute power to maintain order within the state – has served throughout the history of the modern state as the lowest common denominator of all state theories. Accordingly, the minimum requirement of government has traditionally meant the provision of the structures of authority that can ensure, through the monopoly of legal and coercive means, that the state honors the social
contract to provide security for its citizens. In short, order requires some form of public authority.

Yannis (ibid) further notes that security in the world – that world being primarily a society of states – is largely predicated on the internal stability of the member states of the international system. In that sense, the state is the primary model not only of domestic public order but also of international stability. The disappearance of public order in a state thus constitutes a prime threat to international security. In fact civil wars have always posed security challenges to international society. State collapse, representing one of the worst forms of civil war, accentuates such challenges.

The phenomenon of state collapse is, indeed, widely associated in contemporary international relations with issues such as humanitarian disasters. The recent upsurge in concern over state collapse has been accompanied by questions about the physical security and, indeed, the very survival of peoples trapped in collapsed states. In fact state collapse emerged as a major issue in post-Cold War international politics as a result of the humanitarian crises that usually accompany state disintegration. Yannis (2003: 69-70) highlights an important point where he states that “the center of gravity in international relations has shifted away from exclusively state-centered considerations and increasingly towards the individual”. In the process, international society has been gradually transformed from a system exclusively focused on states to “an international society with a human face”.
According to Hoffman, the most challenging humanitarian crises are in fact, structural, provoked by the disintegration of a state or the deliberate evil policies of a government (in Yannis, 2003: 70). From a human rights perspective, therefore, collapsed states and tyrannical regimes pose an almost identical intellectual challenge to international society: what is the role of the international community in protecting human life and dignity in cases where there is no public authority capable and/or willing to do so? This is nicely answered where Yannis states that the international system, traditionally preoccupied with inter-state relations and disputes, was largely unprepared and unequipped, in terms of both ideas and practices, to address the humanitarian challenges of state collapse. Thus the major question now posed to international society by state collapse is not how to restore authority, but how to restore structures of authority that can ensure the protection of the basic interests and values of the population, such as life and dignity.

Yannis in turn suggests that the emergence of normative conceptions of state collapse is part of the tendency of the international community to go beyond state-centrism and to build a system that penetrates the political order of states to better protect the interests of peoples and individuals. This includes not only rules and normative conceptions but also procedures and mechanisms for their authoritative interpretation and application.
In his analysis of the politics of insurgency in collapsing states, Reno (2003: 83) observes that looting, banditry, greedy warlords, and well heeled arms traffickers have dominated media images of warfare in places like Congo, Angola, Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Colombia, and Chechnya. What is new about post-Cold War internal wars and rebellions, not only in Africa, is the extent to which economic interests appear to predominate, crowding out ideologically motivated mass reform and revolutionary movements. Reno notes that some scholars attribute causes of conflict to independent variables which include state reliance on revenues from easily extracted resources such as diamonds and oil. On the contrary, he argues that the variables that others identify as causes are in fact consequences of conflict. In his case study of the Nigerian state, Reno shows that rebellions and civil conflict in places like Nigeria, situated on the margins of the global economy, and with significant experience with personalist rule, constitute a special category of conflict. These conditions lead to the collapse of state institutions, which in turn creates structural obstacles to building long-lived and politically autonomous mass-based protest movements. It is not that countries like Nigeria are necessarily grossly more corrupt than Indonesia or South Korea have been at times over the past half century. More important is the coupling of corruption with a style of rule that destroys state institutions and public order.

Reno observes that Nigeria shows many signs of institutional state collapse; at the same time it is an ideal venue for the emergence of mass movements offering radical and reformist ideas and programs. He argues that organized interests and political networks of
state collapse survive corruption and the destruction of state agencies to shape the
cracter and aims of insurgencies. There are two sides of opposition in this context. At
times, young rebels behave like social bandits struggling to overturn a deeply corrupt
political order. Yet, many work for corrupt politicians and strongmen whom they
criticize, sometimes clandestinely, but often in public. Some even prey upon communities
that they say they protect. These opposition groups signal the emergence of a social
category associated with collapsing states and crises of patronage politics rather than
broader notions of a civil society distinct from the (collapsing) state. Though many see
themselves as marginalized critics of corrupt rulers, they often end up serving elite
interests. This is similarly argued by Kasfir (2004: 54) in instances where a failed or
collapsed state faces what he called security dilemma and predation. In its most extreme
form, state failure means the disappearance of both public authority and its supporting
social norms. In other words, state failure creates domestic anarchy, which invariably
involves the threat of violence if not violence itself.

In analyzing the shift of regime power from state institutions into commerce,
Reno (2003: 85) asks: Why would rulers intentionally undermine state institutions? Most
post colonial states lacked a clear consensus on how to govern, especially in Africa, and
arguably now in the margins of the former Soviet Union in Central Asia and the
Caucasus. A common strategy included articulating a vague sense of nationalism, which
during the cold war usually found expression in domestic policies of economic self-
sufficiency and externally in the diplomacy of non-alignment. Regardless of external
stability, rulers soon faced internal challenges. Sub-Saharan Africa suffered its first military coup in 1963. By 2002, military rulers have supplanted civilian governments in more than half of Africa’s states. Reno calculated that from 1970 to 1990 rulers faced a 72 percent chance that they would leave office under violent circumstances. This probability fell to 41 per cent in the 1990s as more countries held multiparty elections. Yet rulers still face considerable threats. The 2002 elections in Zimbabwe showed the extent to which multiparty elections were compatible with serious internal conflict. It was noted that before the 2003 election in Nigeria, there was already competition in advance which was a significant source of violence. These dangers encourage incumbent rulers to avoid centralizing military command structures. They keep rivals off balance by manipulating factional conflicts within militaries.

In Georgia, the disintegration of Soviet rule did not lead to an orderly process of transition whereby existing institutions were remoulded into those of an independent state. Instead, the emergence of strong independence movements resulted in the fragmentation of political power and authority, secessionist wars in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Demetriou, 2003: 104). By 1994 the political system and social fabric of Georgia had disintegrated, riven by ethnic antagonisms and institutional collapse. In the absence of central control, several regions gained de facto independence, politics and economy were criminalized, warlords governed, and Russia established a firm military presence in the country.
Examining the case of Georgia, Demetriou (2003) identifies specific historical, political, and social processes that led to state collapse. He conceptualizes state collapse as generally the breakdown or disintegration of centralized political institutions, the system of authority that underlies them, and the unraveling of the complex relationships between state and society.

Drawing on the political theories of Mann and Gramsci, Demetriou (2003: 107) states that the essence of the state is its hegemonic hold over the articulation and maintenance of political order defined in terms of the relations of power and authority that permeate society. These constitute the basis for all secondary state attributes, including institutions, territorial-administrative boundaries, form of government, legal systems and monopoly over violence. In this regard, there is no neat distinction between state and society. The state is both a ‘site’ of socio-political interaction and an ‘actor’ in the form of political agents and institutions.

Demetriou argues that although the political and social dynamics leading to the formation or destruction of state structures vary widely and are context-specific, several broad tendencies can be identified. First, the constitution of political order that emerges from interactions between political agents is usually manifested in terms of ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ competitions for hegemonic authority and power. Vertical competition is the struggle to delineate which agents and corresponding visions of political order will control the institutional ‘center’ of the state. Horizontal competition is the struggle over
territorial-administrative power between local or regional political agents and those representing the center, or ‘national’ interest. These twin processes characterize many historical cases of state formation, and explain how seemingly chaotic contests can either give rise to an intermeshing of political relations and the coalescence of central order and authority, or increased fragmentation, polarization and (eventually) violent conflict.

A second tendency in state formation dynamics explains how hegemonic authority and a system of political order are consolidated in the form of a state. Three interlinked factors characterize this phenomenon: the acquisition and control over coercive power, and the establishment of authority on the basis of this threat or use; the imposition of hegemony over main political agents (whether through coercion, manipulation, or affinity), and the circumscription of their activities within the framework of state institutions; the institutionalizing of a particular discourse of state-society relations (the organic ‘vision’ of how social and political order are structured and intermesh) and its association with political hegemony (what has been termed ‘ideological’ power). All three factors together explain how a political agent can gain control over power relations to form the superstructure of the state.

Demetriou (ibid.) goes on to argue that in contrast, the dynamics of state collapse entail a dispersal of relations of power and authority throughout society, and a progressive loss of control by political agents over the articulation or maintenance of a
centralized system of political order. In the context of state collapse, power and authority are dispersed among a number of competing actors and not channeled through, or evident in, state institutions. Hence while there may be much social and political interaction, there is no one regulating pole or axis around which interaction crystallizes. Rather than a dominating political ideology, the situation is one of fragmentation of worldviews, each with different social interests, customs and codes for self-regulation.

In their analysis of the Afghan state, Cramer and Goodhand (2003) focus on what happened to that state during more than two decades of war. It was noted that both Russia and the United States poured far more resources into Afghanistan to sustain the conflict than they had ever devoted to co-operation for development and that many analysts characterized the period of Soviet occupation as one of state breakdown. However, despite massive support for the Afghan government in the mid-1980s, state institutions survived, although failing to fulfill many of their core functions. The state became even more dependent on foreign aid and sales of natural gas to Russia. Conversely, political parties in Pakistan and Iran interceded as logistical conduits between the local resistance commanders and ‘fronts’ in Afghanistan. Western aid fostered a new leadership, with the emergence of commanders the demise of the country’s intelligentsia and local khans. The system of brokerage that developed around the arms pipeline laid the foundations for the regionalized war economy that was to emerge in the 1990s. Profits accumulated by commanders and traders were invested in illicit activities such as the drugs and cross border smuggling economies.
Cramer and Goodhand (2003: 143) note that the trajectory of Afghan state-building has been one of 'punctuated equilibrium'. ‘Try again, fail again’ is an apt description of the Afghan state-building project over the last two centuries in that it has occurred not in linear and gradualist fashion, but rather in fits and spurts. Change has been the result of complex combinations of contingent factors. A famine in 1970-71, for example was one such contingent factor, which undermined regime legitimacy leading to the Saur Revolution. Efforts to build a modern nation-state – through mixtures of capital and coercion – have been interrupted periodically by violent resistance and war itself has been a forcing house for accelerated political and social change.

Cramer and Goodhand (2003: 144-148) point out that there are three salient factors identified in the history of Afghan state-building. These are the inability of state-builders to develop in a sustained way a) a monopoly of violence; b) a trajectory of development that provides wealth and welfare for its citizens; and c) credible forms of representation and legitimacy. These are briefly examined below.

Territorial sovereignty, it is argued, has been an ideal to which Afghan rulers aspired but rarely, if ever, achieved in practice. Arguably, processes of internal colonization were never completed in Afghanistan because rulers lacked the military force to subdue the tribes or withstand external aggression. The point of friction was always the terms of tribal participation where tribes traditionally want to set the number of conscripts and stay as tribal units. Edwards noted that in practical power politics, the
concept of ‘might is right’ remains an essential ingredient of legitimacy, particularly so in tribal politics (in Cramer and Goodhand, 2003: 144). The state schools and the military were the two main avenues through which deracinated tribal Afghans entered into state apparatus. Unfortunately regimes that failed to develop a strong and loyal army were resisted and ultimately overthrown. Warlords have access to sophisticated weaponry and lootable resources while fighters can be recruited for one meal a day. The means of violence became increasingly decentralized, driven by centrifugal forces of neighboring country interference and the war economy. This was the key factor behind state collapse in 1992. It was also why the Taliban initially received widespread support as they were seen as an alternative to the corruption and insecurity of mujahedin rule.

The welfare functions of the state – which were funded through the ‘uneearned’ income of foreign aid – played an important role in regime legitimation maintenance strategies. Aid was used to support neo-patrimonial redistributive structures. Foreign assistance projects favored particular groups and regions, with most irrigation projects benefiting Eastern Pashtuns, for example. Khans in the countryside competed with one another for state patronage and government corruption contributed to a growing sense of grievance. Shahrani states thus: “from the perspective of both rulers and their subjects, an official government appointment at any level was seen as a means of extracting and accumulating wealth from the people and not one of dispensing the needed services for their citizens” (in Cramer and Goodhand, 2003: 146).
Roy argues that in seeking to supplement rentier bargains and lessen the need for coercion, rulers (and revolutionaries) have employed three main modes of persuasion to gain legitimacy – tribalism, Islam and nationalism (in Cramer and Goodman, 2003: 147-148).

It is argued that tribalism, as a tool for generating legitimacy, is a doubled-edged sword. Whilst it may buy short-term room for maneuver, tribal systems do not provide stable institutionalized bases of power. They are fragmented structures subject to fluctuations and fissure. This has been one of the dilemmas of tribally-based state builders. War provides an opportunity for those on the margins to advance their position. However, the Taliban’s arrival led to a violent re-balancing of power back in favor of Pashtuns. This was again reversed with the removal of the Taliban who were replaced by a United Front-dominated interim authority. It is noted by Fielden and Goodhand that while the origin of the war may not be ethnic, the politicization of ethnicity has had a corrosive effect on the potential for reconciliation (in Cramer and Goodhand, 2003: 148).

Cramer and Goodhand (ibid.) state that the nation is seen as a religious community by the great majority of Afghan peasants. Legal authority is vested in Islam, and the faith requires a strong central power to defend the community of believers against infidels. The Afghan state as the arbiter of the faith draws legitimacy from Islam. Oleson observes that state, religion and politics are connected (in Cramer and Goodman, ibid.). Rulers such as Abdur Rahman draw upon Islamic heritage to sanction the centralized
state and create a political community that transcended the parochial identities of the tribe, ethnic group and local community. However, the growing secularization of the state in the 1960s met religious opposition, from Islamists who emerged from the university campuses and schools after 1965. Their vision of Islam was different from the religion of the village. It involved a perception of Islam as a political movement aiming to address society in its entirety. The Islamist influence saw its influence weakened in the 1980s, but the Taliban harnessed Islam to consolidate their power. Mullah Mohammad Omar was designated ‘Leader of the faithful’ in a similar manner to Abdul Rahman’s assertion of his divine right to rule in the nineteenth century. While the Taliban may have been removed, the processes of Talibanization or radicalization of Islamic groups continue within the region.

Nationalism was the third means through which Afghan rulers tried to employ to foster a legitimate state entity. Many of the trappings of nationhood such as the national anthem, flag and the celebration of a national day were introduced at the turn of the century. However, like other modes of legitimacy, nationalism served particular interests. Afghan nationalism was essentially Pashtun nationalism (Rubin, in Crammer and Goodhand, 2003: 148). A nationalist discourse was propagated to keep the issue of Pashtunistan alive, while non-Durrani Pashtuns saw it as a means of wrestling a monopoly of power from the establishment. The Taliban similarly attempted to mobilize around a Pashtun nationalist discourse. Historically, such attempts to enforce conformity
to Pashtun culture were resisted by Persian speakers and undermined the legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of the minorities (Shahrani, in Cramer and Goodhand, ibid.)

All in all, it was noted that Afghanistan’s history confirms a more realistic pattern of state formation rooted in conflict and contingency. The state-building strategies of regional powers have contributed to state collapse. Without due attention to the real politics of Afghanistan, there is every danger that international aid supporting the state capacity will simply reproduce a state incapable of managing the conflicting interests passed down the generation and reshaped by two decades of war.

In his essay on the privatization of security, arms proliferation and the process of state collapse, Musah (2003) analyzes the nexus between these three factors and the worsening structural paralysis in Africa’s weak states. He argues that the primary purpose of colonial rule in Africa was to secure resource enclaves for raw materials, such as diamonds and gold mines. Therefore any rudimentary institutions that were built in colonial states were either incidental to this central objective or designed to facilitate pacification and resource exploitation.

Musah (2003: 161-162) goes on to argue that the modern state can be argued to have passed through a ‘Tillian’ formation, whereby the state operated as a ‘security racket’ (Tilly, in Musah, ibid.), to a ‘Weberian’ (Bonapartist) form marked by

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7 Though the author did not elaborate on the usage of this term, my own understanding is that he must have referred to the leadership style of Napoleon Bonaparte.
bureaucratic impartiality and the pursuit of public welfare in a context of relatively widespread socio-political legitimacy.

By Tillian states, Musah means that a marked feature of most African states has been that the state is the primary source of violence. This owes much to an important failure of the first generation of African leadership, namely its inability to overcome the contradictions of the colonial legacy and to transform inherited structures to meet popular aspirations for human security and peaceful transfer of power. To the extent that ordinary people did not see themselves as stakeholders in the state-building project, the typical African state lacked legitimacy and has remained a shell from independence. Fearful of societal backlash for its failures, the post-independence leadership in most African states retreated into security paranoia. Leaders’ preoccupation with assuring personal and regime security blocked any move towards democratic institution-building. Starting off at independence as parodies of the liberal democracies of the former colonial powers, African governments had transformed themselves into one-party states a decade later. The advent of coups d'etat gradually emphasized the decisive role of weapons as the shortest route to power, and their proliferation increased with the entry of junior military officers into the political arena. The diffusion of arms into the civilian domain became a facilitating factor in the emergence of the civilian warlord, desperate to create his autonomous politico-economic power base by jumping of the bandwagon of legitimate

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8 A detailed analysis of state formation amid violence can be found in Tilly’s (1990) historical analysis of state formation in Europe and its legacy as this spread around the world in contagious forms and characteristics.
internal grievances, appropriating these grievances and using them as a smokescreen for his personal gain.

By Weberian states, Musah means that it implies an effort to fill the ‘shell’ of the state with institutional content, and to minimize the state’s propensity to become a protection racket. In the African context, a few leaders adopted the ‘development before democracy’ model and with it they assumed a father figure role under a Bonapartist arrangement and made genuine efforts to develop infrastructure, create public goods, and develop a sense of belonging among their populations by closing internal inequality gaps. Examples of such leaders were Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana (1957-66), Presidents Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), Sekou Toure (Guinea), Modibo Keita (Mali), Houphouet Boigny (Cote d’Ivoire) and Leopold Senghor (Senegal). They all exhibited authoritarian tendencies but were charismatic and untainted by massive corruption. Unfortunately, the radical non-aligned stance of these leaders made them the prime targets of controlled destabilization by internal conservative forces and the west. They became the victims of mercenary forces and coup plots, originating both from within and outside their respective nations.

Thus the internal dynamics within African states that have attracted mercenary intervention do not occur in a vacuum. In states that are weak or failing, rapid globalization has ruthlessly exposed the inadequacies of governance and catalyzed the violent empowerment of non-state actors – warlords, terrorists and private military
entrepreneurs. Musah (2003: 166) states that we live in an era when state and non-state actors alike are guaranteed speedy and often indiscriminate access to lethal technologies, including night vision equipment, satellite communication gadgets, and rocket-propelled grenades. These are known to have been supplied by mercenaries who tend to profit from arms and military gadget sales mostly in countries where internal armed conflicts flourish. According to Harding, what these mercenary outfits and their mining partners have done so successfully to date was to “interpret political instability in Africa as a market issue, and position themselves perfectly in that market” (in Musah, 2003: 167).

Musah concludes that the unending cycle of violence in the weak states of Africa cannot be divorced from the interplay between irresponsible governance, illegitimate resource appropriation, transnational corporate greed, and weapons proliferation.

In an equally innovative and groundbreaking outlook at the phenomenon of state failure and collapse, Rotberg (2004) introduces typifications of problematic states by grouping them into four typical categories: Weak states, failing states, failed states and collapsed states. In the world today, there are a total of forty seven states, of varying sizes in terms of social and political characteristics and geographic location. Most of these states, scattered all over the globe, are in the weak and failing categories. It must be noted that the status of these states is not terminal nor static: this depends on their ability to improve or otherwise. Most are found in Africa, Eastern Europe, Central Asia with the rest scattered in Southeast Asia, South America and Oceania.
The salient argument in Rotberg’s (2004) analysis is the state’s ability to effectively deliver two primary ‘political goods’ for its citizens: Security and protection of human rights and democratic freedoms. Traditionally, individuals and groups cannot easily or effectively substitute privately arranged security for all the spectrum of public-provided security. Rotberg contends that the state’s prime function is to provide that political good of security – to prevent cross-border invasions, and infiltrations, and any loss of territory; to eliminate domestic threats to or attacks upon the national order and social structure; and to enable citizens to resolve their differences with the state and with their fellow inhabitants without recourse to arms or other forms of physical coercion. Another key political good enables citizens to participate freely, openly and fully in politics and the political process. This good encompasses the essential freedoms: the right to participate in politics and compete for public office; respect and support for national and regional political institutions, such as legislatures and courts; tolerance of difference and dissent; and fundamental civil and human rights. Other political goods typically supplied by states and expected by their citizenries include medical and health care; schools and educational instruction; roads, railways, harbors and other physical infrastructures – the arteries of commerce; communication networks, a money and banking system, usually presided over by a central bank and lubricated by a nationally created currency; a beneficial fiscal and institutional context within which citizens can pursue personal entrepreneurial goals, and potentially prosper; a space for the flowering of civil society; and methods of regulating the sharing of the environmental commons.
To together, this bundle of political goods, roughly rank ordered, establishes a set of criteria according to which modern nation-states may be judged, strong, weak or failed.

Strong states obviously perform well across these categories. Weak states show a mixed profile, fulfilling expectations and some areas and performing poorly in others. It is argued by Rotberg that the more poorly weak states perform, criterion by criterion, the weaker they become and the more that weakness tends to edge toward failure, hence the sub-category of weakness that is termed ‘failing’. Many failed states flunk each of the tests outlined above. But they need not flunk all of them to fail overall, particularly since satisfying the security good weighs very heavily, and high levels of internal violence alone does not necessarily imply that the state in question is unfailed. It is necessary to judge the extent to which an entire failing or failed profile is less or more that its components parts.

Strong states unquestionably control their territories and deliver a full range and a high quality of political goods to their citizens. They perform well according to indicators like GDP per capita, the UNDP Human Development Index, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index and Freedom House’s Freedom of the World Report.

Strong states offer high levels of security from political and criminal violence, ensure political freedom and civil liberties, and create environments conducive to the growth of economic opportunity. The rule of law prevails, Judges are independent.
Road networks are well maintained. Telephones work. Snail mail and e-mail both arrive quickly. Schools, universities and students flourish. And so on.

Weak states (broadly, states in crisis) include a broad continuum or states: they may be inherently weak because of geographical, physical, or fundamental economic constraints; or they may be basically strong, but temporarily or situationally weak because of internal antagonisms, management flaws, greed, despotism, or external attacks. Weak states typically harbor ethnic, religious, linguistic or other intercommunal tensions that have yet to thoroughly become overtly violent.

In weak states, the ability to provide adequate amounts of other political goods is diminished or is diminishing. Physical infrastructural networks are deteriorated. Schools and hospitals show signs of neglect, particularly outside the main cities. GDP per capita income and other critical economic indicators have fallen or are falling, sometimes dramatically; levels of venal corruption are embarrassingly high and escalating. Weak states usually honor rule of law precepts in the breach. They harass civil society. Weak states are ruled by despots, elected or not.

PNG is classified as a weak state (Rotberg, 2004: 49). In many respects what has been categorized by Rotberg (2004) concerning the continuum of indicators of strong states and weak states (see below), very nearly represents or typifies the experiences of the state in Papua New Guinea.
To provide a wider understanding of state failure and collapse, the state civil society should be examined especially in the context of fulfilling institutional obligations and functions. Many new states have experienced considerable difficulties in carrying out the most basic tasks of statehood, including the maintenance of public order, preserving political stability and social cohesion within their national borders, providing basic services, and managing the national economy. The term weak state is found increasingly in policy and development debates with reference to states that find it hard to fulfill these basic tasks (Dinnen, 2001: 5).

Dinnen (ibid.) goes on to note that many observers see Papua New Guinea as a classic example of a weak state. Its institutional shortcomings are manifested in its limited capacity to maintain public order, to deliver government services, to implement policy decisions, to manage the national economy, and, in general, to command the allegiance of its subjects. As a result, numerous capacity-building projects have been initiated in the principal sectors of government in recent years, largely funded by foreign aid.

General Impressions and Summary

A general impression implicit in the above analyses of the various paradigms is the issue of lack of monopoly of violence by the state. In the traditional Weberian approach of viewing the state, these analyses have demonstrated that the said states have
lost their monopoly of violence over their citizens and given territories. Without a monopoly of violence by a central authority, non-state actors such as insurgents, freedom fighters, revolutionaries as well as deposed political figures constantly challenge the debilitating state entity and its legitimacy in its entirety.

Also implicit is that on the one hand, failed states have acquired a negative role in terms of providing both local and global security and being unable to deliver political goods the consequences of which rogue states have had the tendency to wreak havoc within their own territories in causing mass murder, migration and other social and health problems on a mass scale. On the other hand, collapsed or failed states are presenting opportunities to reexamine the dominant idea that western models of social and political organization may not, after all be viable and transferable to other non-western societies and cultures.

A recurring theme is the notion of the state as a by-product of a combination of internal and external factors. The consequences of this combination of factors are the disintegration of the legitimate or duly constituted central authority and the extreme disruption of law and order – a virtual disappearance of government and civil order. On the one hand, this in turn sets in motion doubts about the future and relevance of the state under conditions of failure and collapse. On the other hand this is deeply contrasted by another equally important consideration that states are a representation of domestic and international order and cooperation. The fact that there is chaos and indiscriminate
violence within and between human societies and communities brings to the fore the reality that it is unthinkable for humans to live in harmony without a central Hobessian authority to contain chaos and uncivil behaviors.

It is therefore suggested that the criteria for judging the performance of a state should not only derive from the economic and political bases of governance and administration. There is a need to understand state failure and collapse from the indigenous and internal point of view. In his study of the civil wars in the Balkans and African states, and their ensuing state failure, Ignatieff (1998: 7) argues that some long-standing adamantine antipathies of the ethnic war zones turn out to be expressions of fear created by the absence of collapse of institutions that enable individuals to form civic identities strong enough to counteract their ethnic allegiances. Thus when individuals live in stable states – even poor ones – they do not need to rush to the protection of their ethnic group. It is the disintegration of states, and the Hobbesian fear that results that produces ethnic fragmentation and war.

In the light of the wider analysis of state failure and/or collapse, it is obvious that this discourse of state failure ought to be reexamined in a different light given the current status of the PNG state. As noted by Dinnen (2001) and Rotberg (2004) above, PNG is a weak state because – as the subsequent chapters show – while it tends to fare well in one aspect, there is a dismal failure in other aspects. In this respect, there is an impression of a coexistence of functional as well as dysfunctional aspects of the PNG state. On the one
hand states are seen as indispensable in regulating and minimizing the Hobbesian fear. On the other hand, given the rise of self-determination as in the case of East Timor and West Papua in Indonesia, what are the obstacles or opportunities for the state to project its authority successfully over its mandated territory in order to maintain its legitimacy?

Some following key issues drawn from the foregoing analysis are anticipated to inform the subsequent analysis of the PNG state:

1. As pointed out by Yannis, state failure is a by-product of various kinds of forces, both locally and globally. I hold that in the PNG case, this lies in the historical formations of the nation and the state and how these concepts were subsequently embraced by the indigenous leaders and people before and after independence. At the international level, these forces come in the form of international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund whose conditions for granting financial assistance to a cash-strapped state are predicated on adherence to stringent management of the economy, which is never possible. Another important force is the global system of trade in which the PNG state has not been faring well since the collapse of the Bougainville mine in 1989.

2. It follows from # 1 that by its own historical making, how are state institutional mechanisms undermined? As suggested by Doornbos above, causes of state failure may in fact be consequences or symptoms of a much deeper problem. The notion that once in existence states are expected to last despite its setbacks is
seriously being challenged in the wake of the failed state discourse. A new approach to viewing state performance is thus in order. It can be likened to a birth defects of a child that are not being properly understood or wrongly diagnosed so that the wrong treatment and remedies have been prescribed but the conditions have not shown signs of improvement over time.

3. The presence of non-state actors who tend to challenge state authority and existence to a considerable extent is an important factor in the PNG case. It also challenges the role of the state as the ultimate guardian of public security and order.

I argue that state formation and its subsequent failure is a legacy of the colonial process that lies in its own history. To this end, these issues are explored in the following chapter as we analyze the PNG using a historical approach.
Chapter 3.  State and Nation Formation in Papua New Guinea

This chapter is an analysis of the history of the state and nation in PNG. It is a descriptive analysis of its historical development that saw the recently-independent nation slowly emerging within the climates of decolonization and the specter\(^9\) globalization. It is also an attempt at providing a comprehensive discussion at how the present nation-state came into existence. The basic argument in this chapter is that the process of colonialism has disparate aims and objectives and that the process of decolonization is not merely a reversal of the process of colonialism but a falsification of the aims of decolonization. The falsified process of decolonization is said to be complete when political independence is attained. Relating a similarity using an African experience, it was stated by Vaughan (1993: 135) that there is at present a great debate about whether the postcolonial states of Africa possess legitimacy; whether they have rooted themselves in civil society or operate merely as exploitative mechanisms, poised above society and only engaging it to expropriate. Any resolutions of this debate needs to begin with an examination of the ideological origins of the postcolonial nation-state, a historical inquiry into its emergence from colonialism.

I contend that the origins and root causes of state failure in PNG lie in the distorted visions of national unity propagated by the young educated indigenous elite who, in their own wisdom, thought that they could make better leaders and architects of a

\(^9\) I say specter because given both the negative and positive effects of globalization on smaller, less successful states and nations, globalization can work both ways.
new nation (e.g., see Davidson, 1992). As a criticism of early independence, there is no compelling reason that could be used as justification to create national unity when the majority of people who would become citizens of the new nation had never heard of the concept before, nor know of its implications and what lies in the future for them if they accepted national unity.

Thus the path to PNG’s independence lacked what Geertz has described as “the consciousness of massive, univocal, irresistible movement, the stirring to action of an entire people...” (Quoted in Kavanmur et. al., 2003: 2). It has also been mentioned by a one-time Member of the PNG parliament that independence for PNG was not the result of national consensus. The majority of Papua New Guineans were not concerned, against, or not committed. It was the doing of a small group of people led by the Pangu Party and its sympathizers in the House of Assembly. Many people were not sure of what independence would bring for them (ibid).

Wanek has mentioned an observation that I see as a root cause of state failure in PNG. In the period prior to independence, political struggle tended to be confined to the jockeying amongst various groups for advantageous positions rather than against the colonial state. The introduction of the dual wage system for public servants in 1964 is often cited by some Papua New Guineans as the beginning of a political consciousness amongst urban tertiary educated Papua New Guineans that eventually led to
independence (In: Kavanamur et. al., 2003: 2). In essence, the modern PNG was never a nation before nor does it have common ancient glories before independence that could serve as causes for national unity for common causes and celebrations. It lacks what Apter refers to as ‘political religion’ (ibid).

Discussion of this chapter is confined to the general historical attempt at creating a nation and its state system and how international trends lend their influence to such a creation; it mainly looks at the political and administrative aspects of how a colony was transformed into a self-governing entity and how historical events and forces shaped the tone and character of the new nation and its state.

Basic Facts and Statistics

The modern-day nation of PNG, which has a total land area of 467,000 sq. km, is located in the South West Pacific Ocean on the eastern half of the island of New Guinea. It is the biggest nation in the Pacific in terms of, languages and language speakers and cultural and ethnic groupings. It ranks second after Australia in terms of population and landmass. The territory includes the Bismarck and Louisiade Archipelagoes as well as the Trobriand and D'Entrecasteaux Islands and other offshore islands including New Britain, New Ireland and Bougainville. It is bound by the Gulf of Guinea and the Coral Sea to the south, Indonesia to the west, the Solomon Sea to the east and the Bismarck Sea to the northeast. The main island which accounts for around 85% of the land area has a complex chain of ranges that make the central mountain core of the country. PNG has a monsoonal
climate characterized by high temperatures and humidity throughout the year. The North West Monsoon season is from December to March while the SW Monsoon season is from May to October. Rainfall is at its heaviest in the highlands with average annual precipitation varying between 2,000 and 5,000 mm (79 to 197 inches). Average temperature ranges in Port Moresby (capital city) are from 26 degrees Celsius (79 degrees Fahrenheit) to 28 degrees Celsius (82 degrees Fahrenheit) all year (Ridgell, 1995: 239).

Figure 1. Papua New Guinea – Provincial Capitals and Urban Centers


10 Due to time limitations and technical handicap I have a ‘tourist’ map which was easy to be copied and pasted from the internet. It is hoped however, that this map gives a rough visual image of the physical locations of some of the things mentioned in this thesis.
The 2000 Census revealed that PNG now has over 5 million people. This is a significant increase from the Censuses of 1990 (3.6 million) and 1980 (2.9 million). From 1980 to 1990, there was a 25% increase and a 2.3 % growth rate – said to be one of the highest for a young developing nation. The 2000 Census also revealed that the bulk of the population live in rural areas (85%) compared to the 15% who live in the urban areas. This ratio has not changed much twenty years ago (National Statistics Office, 2002; 1990; 1980).

Despite the fact that PNG has one of the largest numbers of distinct ethnic and linguistic groups in the world for such a relatively smaller nation, there are no dominant ethnic or linguistic group in government and society as in the case of African nations. As a legacy of the colonial era, though, the country's population was broadly divided into two distinct political groups: Papuans and New Guineans – for purposes and reasons best left to the wisdom of the colonial administrations. The Papuans occupy the Southern half of the country, and they include the Central, Western, Oro, and Milne Bay provinces; during the colonial era, they were administered by the British and subsequently the Australians. The New Guineans occupy the Northern half and the interior as well as the outlying major islands of Manus, New Britain, New Ireland and Bougainville; they were administered by the German colonizers until 1914 when Australia, under the auspices of the League of Nations and Great Britain, took control of the administration of the present-day PNG. The country is predominantly Christian, mostly with around 58% Protestant and 33% Roman Catholic. 5% are Anglican. The remainder proportion follow
local native tribal beliefs or do not associate themselves with any form of religion, past or present (Rannells, 1995).

The official language of government, business and education is English, although an unofficial Pidgin form called *Tok Pisin* ('talk pidgin') is more widely used. Over 869 languages and dialects are also spoken throughout the territory (Rannells, 1995). There is a high rate of illiteracy among adults and lack of continuity in schooling among school age children due to high costs, lack of public infrastructure such as roads and buildings, and geographical obstacles. Children in the urban centers stand a high chance of receiving adequate education while those in the rural areas are not. Owing to the geographical make-up and a weak state, major obstacles in providing basic public goods are absence of road networks and other physical infrastructure such as school buildings and facilities. The demographic characteristics taken from the 1980 national Census are as follows: Those who were aged 25 or over and having attained no formal schooling 82.6%, incomplete primary education 8.2%, primary education 5.0%, high school and higher 4.2%. The overall literate population aged 15 or over stood at 757,500 or 42.3% (http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pp.html).

In December 1973 Papua New Guinea (PNG) gained internal self-government and on Sept. 16, 1975 gained full independence from Australia. What follows below is the long chain of events and developments that paved the way for the attainment of self-rule and the birth of a nation-state.
Formative Years: 1880-1900

I use Baycroft’s (1998: 61) line of reasoning that the European imperialism of the nineteenth century can be considered a mere extension of the competition between nations – the desire to demonstrate that one’s own nation was the best and would show the way for the rest of the world. In the nineteenth century, many European leaders were keen to bring glory to their nation. At the same time they used imperialism as a way of solidifying support for their respective nation and focusing on tensions away from home rather than on internal ones. The imperialists believed that by colonizing other lands and peoples, this would contribute to the fulfillment of the need to bring civilization to the world, a missionary spirit which came with the belief in modernity and progress. While the purely economic and military arguments leading to imperialism are strong, the fact that European nation-states embarked on vast projects of imperial expansion was at least in part linked to their increasing sense of nationalism, their desire to bring glory to their nation, and their rivalry and competition with other nations (Baycroft, 1998: 62).

Such views are similarly echoed by Ranger (1983: 211) where he stated that the 1870s, 1880s and 1890s were the time of a great flowering of European invented tradition – ecclesiastical, education, military, republican, monarchical. They were also the time of the European rush into Africa as well as other parts of the world.
Thus it was European imperialism and its expansion around the globe during the nineteenth century that provided the background and some plausible explanations to understand how European models of states were transplanted if not made to reproduce themselves in non-European settings.

It has also been demonstrated historically during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when hegemonic European powers, to demonstrate their imperialistic and capitalistic prowess, made indigenous peoples their own subjects and exploited these new-found lands and their resources for their own capitalistic needs. In some important way, understanding capitalism and its spread around the world is another significant site to understanding the genesis of nation-states of contemporary third world societies (Howard, 1989). In other words, capitalism is intricately woven into the processes of colonialism and imperialistic expansion; one cannot be analyzed independently without some reference to the other. In this Chapter’s analysis, I propose that imperialism and capitalism are intricately linked and thus not mutually exclusive, at least as manifested in the colonial experiences of most third world nations.

In 1884, the southern half of the present day PNG was declared a British Protectorate and Port Moresby became the headquarters of the Colonial Administration. Moore (1989b: 1) argues that the declaration was necessary because in 1883 the Premier of the Queensland State (of Australia) sent a police magistrate to Port Moresby to take possession of eastern New Guinea and adjacent islands for Queensland in the name of
Queen Victoria. When the news of the attempted possession reached London the reaction was not the tacit approval for which Queensland had hoped, but a curt refusal and a reminder that colonies were not supposed to acquire colonies of their own. The annexation was a major attempt to put a stop to illegal capturing of native men to work on sugar cane plantations in Queensland. Once the Protectorate was established, the Administration pursued policies designed to protect village societies. The colonial administrators felt that “native customs must be recognized, and native rights must be respected” (Oram, 1989: 53).

It was also seen that annexation was done to serve other purposes. The expansion of Australian commerce, investment and missionary activity into the Pacific seemed to the governments of the Australian colonies to require the protection of British annexation. It was felt that any foreign acquisitions of territory in the Pacific would seriously threaten security of the Australasian possessions. In the 1880s such views aroused reluctant response from the British Colonial Office and in 1884 Britain declared the annexation and called it British New Guinea (Tomasetti, 1970: 1).

In the northern half, between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries several European navigators sailed along the north coast of New Guinea. Some made contact with coastal and island villagers (May, 1989: 109). Between 1616 and 1884 there was occasional contact but it was not a sustained one until after the German annexation of New Guinea in 1884. The annexation covered the mainland and offshore islands of
northeast New Guinea and was administered by the New Guinea Company set up by the Germans. Soon after the annexation of the company, there was an expedition to explore the uncharted coasts and northern mainland “in order to discover harbours, to establish friendly relations with the natives, and to acquire as much territory as possible” (May, 1989: 110).

The hinterland of the second biggest island nation in the Pacific was not to be “discovered” until late into the twentieth century when, in the 1930s Australian gold prospectors stumbled upon a highland region that was more populous and vibrant than their coastal counterparts. However, full government contact and outside influences did not come into the highlands until the 1950s (May, 1989: 111).

Thus it took about thirty years (from the early 1870s – 1900) for most of the present day PNG to be exposed to the ways of the outside world as brought on by colonialists, capitalists and missionaries alike.

Colonial Administration: 1900-1950

Since the dividing of the eastern half of New Guinea between Germany and Great Britain in 1884, Australia has been responsible for the administration of the south-eastern portion. In 1906 Australia took over full control of the territory from Britain, changed its name to Papua, and from then until the Japanese invasion of 1942 ruled it as a separate
dependency of the Commonwealth. In 1914, after Germany suffered defeat in World War I, Australian troops seized the neighboring territory of German New Guinea, and when, at the end of World War I, the former German colony was mandated to Australia it was proposed to amalgamate the two administrations. The proposal was not adopted, however, and Papua retained its separate identity until, during the second world war, a military administration assumed control of the parts of both territories not captured by the Japanese. At the end of World War II the amalgamation of the two administrations was carried out, and the territory of Papua-New Guinea came into being (Legge, 1956: 1).

In the first two decades of the last century much of the work to do with governing and administration of the protectorate or British New Guinea was left to the Australians. Australians felt that they had a sense of duty to provide service and governance to the annexure. In November 1901, the Australian House of Representatives was told that it should accept responsibility for the government of British New Guinea. Alfred Deakin, Attorney-General in the first Commonwealth Government, told his fellow members that they should provide £20,000 a year to pay for the administration of British New Guinea, and that they should transform the area into a territory of the Commonwealth. That was, he said:

the only guarantee...that the settlement of New Guinea shall form as far as possible an exception in the history of the development of a tropical country inhabited by native races – that the settlement shall take place on the lines of peace, order and good government, so that the great land monopolies and injustices to the natives may be
prevented...is that the Commonwealth Parliament see to the administration itself (Quoted in Nelson, 1989: 19).

Without a division being called the House voted to allocate the funds and to authorize the government to begin the formal process of making British New Guinea into the first Territory of the Commonwealth.

Even in the brief debate of 1901 Australian parliamentarians expressed many of the aspiration, fears and contradictions that were to characterize Australian perceptions of their rule in Papua and New Guinea. That is, on the one hand they would like to make themselves available to help the new territory while on the other hand they certainly wanted to get out of there before they were embroiled in embarrassing internal conflicts; they would leave these to the new independent indigenous government to resolve. And it is inconceivable that Australians would have been engaged in decolonization without the sequence of events which had already taken place in Asia, Africa and parts of the Pacific. Australia was clearly a follower of international trends (Nelson, 1989: 20).

One may be prompted to ask what are the interests and motives behind the annexation and the subsequent assumption of control of the administration of the territory of Papua and New Guinea? A possible reason was military strategy. Legge (1956: 2) argues that this is the key to the history of Australian administration in New Guinea. Vague fears of attack were easily aroused in the nineteenth century, and New Guinea was
regarded as a bulwark against such attack, or at least as a base which must not be allowed to fall into the hands of a possible enemy. These fears were sometimes aroused by European powers with expanding Pacific interests, and Britain was constantly applying colonial pressure that sough to induce her to pursue a more active policy in the south-west Pacific to offset French or German advances. At other times it was the Asiatic menace that was dreaded. Australians have for long been sensible to the fact that they inhabit a sparsely populated continent, situated so near to the thickly peopled countries of eastern and south-eastern Asia, and far from Britain on whose naval strength they relied, before the experiences of the second world war, for their defense.

The fact that possession of New Guinea was considered necessary for Australian security but for very little else had certain implications for the kind of policy which was followed in the colony. A key aspect of this policy (which was previously applied in Fiji by the same colonial Administrator who went to serve in New Guinea) was the protection of the native population in its contact with Europeans. However, this was complicated by the presence of influential European and Australian groups seeking abundant land and a cheap and stable supply of labor and the fact that the government of the territory was “condemned to penury” (Legge, 1956: 3). The development of the territory was on too small a scale to provide sufficient revenue to meet the costs of administration, and the Commonwealth Government in Australia confined its responsibility to the making of an annual grant sufficient only to meet routine expenditure. This lack of sufficient expenditure is similarly echoed elsewhere. Groves was critical about how the Australian
colonial administration would administer such a huge territory with such insufficient funds. He stated that

We (Australians) have thrown our resources into the development of Papua and New Guinea very late in the day. In our colony of Papua before the war, the Australian Government never contributed more than £42,500 per annum to the task of social and economic development. In the pre-war mandated territory of New Guinea the Administration had to support itself from local revenues. We left the medical and educational needs of the indigenous people almost entirely in the hands of impoverished Christian missionaries, to whom we paid paltry subsidies. Except by occasionally encouraging them to plant coconuts, we made no attempt to establish cash crops or industrial enterprises among the indigenous people, most of whom indentured plantation labour was the only alternative to village subsistence...we had alienated 2 ½ million acres of land from indigenous ownership by 1939, leasing parts of it mainly for plantation enterprises; but the low price of copra on the world market throughout the nineteen-thirties continually depressed the plantation economy, which therefore contributed little to public revenue (Groves, 1960: 1).

In such circumstances, the policy of ‘protecting natives’ and their traditional societies could not be given adequate attention and treatment and thus has not realized due to the gruesome task of managing a large land area. The problem is further compounded by lack of finance and other resources faced by the colonial administration.
The 'benevolence' of the Administration could be expressed easily enough in the measures designed to control the contact made, at the economic level, between European and native. More positive expressions of benevolence in the form of health services, education services or adequate schemes for expanding native production within the framework of the village were prohibitively expensive. It was thus the hope of the colonial administrators that increasing European development would relieve the position eventually.

But then one has to consider the race relations which were observed to be real and existing in everyday living. Groves (1960: 4) was critical in this important area of social interaction. As a social anthropologist he observed that the indigenous people and the Europeans have few interests in common. No more than a small minority of Papua and New Guinea's 19,000 Europeans have any desire to stay there permanently. Apart from those who own plantations or business enterprises in the Territory, and those who hope to own them, most European employees in both government service and private enterprise, some came to Papua and New Guinea primarily for short-term economic advantage, in order to earn higher salaries than they can command at home. Eventually they retire to Australia.
The colonial policy of partnership and cooperation, as propagated by the then Minister of Territories states:

The Australian has his rightful place in (Papua New Guinea). When the goal is reached we trust that we will both deserve and receive the respect of the indigenous people for our own rights...Two races can live permanently together if there is partnership, strict respect for each other’s rights and friendship as well as justice in race relations (Groves, 1960: 4).

In the period 1950-1970, however, it became apparent that relations between Europeans and the indigenous were seen to have gone sour. Groves (1960: 5) had observed that inter-racial marriage was discouraged; very few sporting bodies play Papuans and Europeans together in the same team; there were only two European houses in Port Moresby which Papuans visits informally, and in which they were fully welcome as equals; the law forbidding Papuans to drink liquor inhibited social intercourse; the main cinemas in Port Moresby and Lae excluded indigenous people, and some stores served indigenous customers only at separate hatches; and a notice in Port Moresby’s main beach, declaring it to be a “European Swimming Area” was still there quite recently despite persistent protests.
Given the above exposure of the colonial experiences in New Guinea, it can be said that the basic structure of the present nation of PNG has been a reluctant as well as an ad hoc construction the parts of which had been put together piecemeal mostly according to international trends of political ideology and with the view to suit local circumstances and situations. In a real sense, the post-war Australian effort to develop Papua New Guinea politically, economically, and socially can be styled as a magnificent and perhaps unparalleled effort at social engineering. The task of attempting to bring two million people (1960s estimate) from the stone age, or the fringes of the stone age, to a point of where they may soon be expected to be fully self-governing, and to do this within a period of twenty years, almost defies description. Some will argue that it also defies reason. Until very recently, Australia assumed the task would require many generations. But during the past few years, particularly since 1960, external pressure (which in turn created internal pressures), have shortened the time reasonably available to Australia from generations to years, and to not very many of the latter (Dorrance, 1966:1). It never occurred to the Australians that, given the international pressure from the United Nations and a cooperative Australian Prime Minister then, PNG would be independent in 1975.

The initial impetus that pushed the Australians to set the basic foundations of a modern Papua New Guinea came from the United Nations. Just as the end of the Second
World War brought on the waves of decolonization around the world, Moore (1998a: xxiii) noted that the first years of the 1960s were crucial to shaping modern PNG. The UN Trusteeship Council adopted a resolution calling on Australia to set target dates for stages in political advancement.

Responding to the resolutions of the United Nations, the Papua-New Guinea Act 1949 was passed in the Australian Parliament in the same year. The Act was an important step in the constitutional evolution of New Guinea as it provided for an Executive Council, a Legislative Council, a permanent public service, and an administrative union between New Guinea and Papua. The Act was the earliest attempt at pulling together a “nation” that was yet to become a nation. But it did lay the basic foundations upon which latter legislative provisions were to be issued from. Even though the Act was expected to serve the interests of the territory, the Australian Parliament had the last say and thus overruled the provisions of the Act itself.

With the adoption of the Act, Australia set out to build one culture, one country, and one people; it was the objective of the dim and indefinite future to be gained by painfully slow methods, pragmatically arrived-at decisions, and on Australian terms. The key elements in the policies and philosophy behind this implementation of the Act evolved along the following lines between 1949 and 1959 (Dorrance, 1966: 34-39):
Semi-Assimilation – Given the atomistic nature of the native society and the absence of commonalities amongst the people, the Australian government set out to build a “new society”.

Uniform Development – In essence, this policy provided that social, educational, economic, and political advancement must be developed in parallel throughout the territory at a more or less even pace. In particular, the policy assumed that there could be no effective political advance without adequate mass social and educational progress. In practice, it meant an effort at step-by-step “civilizing” of the entire population.

The composition of the councils was drastically altered by the Papua and New Guinea Act of 1961 – which was further replaced by another Papua and New Guinea Act of 1963 that provided for further radical changes. These changes came into operation after the first indigenous representatives were elected in 1964. The Legislature was renamed the House of Assembly and its membership increased from 37 to 64. A speaker, elected by members, replaced the Administrator in the chair.

It was noted by Moore that the 1964 national elections was the first large scale exercise of democracy. In 1961, the elections operated on a nominal electoral role of less than 500,000, which was doubled to 1,029,000 in 1964. Political education campaigns preceded the elections with patrols reaching out into remote villages, though many of the officers did not bother to try to explain the intricacies of the Australian system of
preferential voting. Many voters used the “whisper” system in which they were shown photos of candidates, whispered their choice and watched the polling officer mark their ballot paper (Moore, 1998a: xxv).

The 1964 national election set the stage for a vibrant political development as more and more indigenous people came to embrace this new system and ideology of a nation under one government, constitution, and set of laws. In a significant way, it changed forever the way modern politics was to be approached by the indigenous people.

In the minds of the indigenous people politics was largely the way to change and progress – or at least that was what was propagated by the colonial administrators and the early leaders most of whom were probably looking for a stepping stone into the world of European civilization. The 1964 election and the subsequent ones provided an important public platform upon which every aspiring politician – both indigenous and expatriate - could stand on to further their interests. Every contestant had their own interests and reasons for contesting the election.

The statistics associated with the election presented some interesting discoveries and also gave an indication of the degree of political participation and the level of awareness that pervaded the new nation still in its embryonic stage. Moore (1998a: xxv) pointed out that seventy-two percent of eligible voters actually took part. 298 hopeful
candidates contested: 31 Europeans stood in the ten special electorates and 235 indigenous and 32 Europeans contested the forty-four open seats.

For the indigenous leaders who were elected as representatives in those early stages, it was clear that there was a formidable barrier in communication and literacy associated with conducting official government business in a foreign language and style. The educational standards and political abilities of the thirty-eight members varied: three had served in the 1961 Legislative Council; nineteen had no schooling and only four had been educated past Grade VI (all school teachers). Generally, coastal members were better educated than the Highlanders. There were considerable language difficulties in the parliament: only two from the Papuan region were fluent in English; twelve others spoke little English, and only one Highlander spoke English. One Highlander knew only his mother tongue and could not communicate directly with any other member of the House. He was provided with an interpreter. Debates were in English, and the two commonly used lingua franca\textsuperscript{11} with simultaneous translator services provided.

Despite all these shortcomings, the time table for an early independence for Papua New Guinea as anticipated by the United Nations resolution prompted the Australians to formulate social, political and economic policies in laying the groundwork for the incoming new nation.

\textsuperscript{11} That is, Motu, widely used on the Papuan side and Tok Pisin, on the New Guinea side.
The United Nations raised many issues concerning New Guinea with the Australian government, and these issues formed the specific points on which the United Nations-Australia relationship regarding New Guinea hinged (Tomasetti, 1970: 21).

Even before independence in 1975, there were a lot of critics and non believers of Papua New Guinea’s early independence both in Australia and PNG. The Highlands, the most densely populated region of the Papua New Guinea, was also the most conservative voting public. Having only recently gained relatively ready access to the consumer goods and services provided by the Australian colonial administrators, they were extremely cautious. The expatriate business people whose businesses flourished in the highlands at that time raised skeptical claims and speculations that independence would mean the mass exodus of whites and the certain loss of newly acquired benefits. When political parties began to be formed, around 1963, the Highlands based party was dominated by expatriate plantation owners who opposed early self-government. They, in fact, actively promoted the concept that independence could only be achieved after one hundred years (Ryder, 1992: 7).

Hastings (1973: ix), for one doubted the possibility of an independent Papua New Guinea and its chances of being a viable, politically stable nation-state in the western sense of the term. He was quite right in speculating that there is an analogy of sorts with learning to swim. The Australian Government view was that Papua New Guinea will only
learn to swim by being thrown into the water and forced on its own resources. The danger was that it may drown under the weight of its problems (Hastings, 1973: 241).

It cannot be denied then, that Australia was a follower of international trends; it tried its best to formulate an acceptable level of structural foundation that would qualify as necessary preconditions for the creation of a new nation. While the result was beneficial and satisfying to all the parties concerned, there were also negative ramifications that grew naturally from these results – results which nobody or party can attribute to someone else or other parties. Rather such negative consequences should be regarded as the unintended consequences of a process that had different objectives in mind.

*Post Independence Experience: 1980-Present*

In the years that followed after independence in 1975, most of the basic ground work for nation building laid out by the Australian colonial administration began to crumble and wither away as indigenous forms of social and economic exchange systems began to creep into the formal bureaucratic structure and institutions of governance and administration. The acquisition of private wealth using a public office may be said to be born with the nation’s independence. It became a public issue in parliamentary debates. In 1978, just three years after independence, it was observed that the then Prime
Minister\textsuperscript{12} was prone to sudden changes of direction which appear to reflect his ambivalence about changes taking place in Papua New Guinea under his stewardship.

He wanted the best of all worlds: on the one hand, foreign investment and foreign aid on a large scale, big resource projects, a thriving national economy, a high level of urban services, a powerful government and administration, and personal aggrandizement; on the other hand, the ideals enshrined in the government’s Eight Aims – self-reliance, social and regional equality, rural development, honesty in public affairs, a Melanesian way of life (Amarshi et. al, 1979: ix-x). Tribalism was one of the major forms of indigenous social support and exchanges systems that permeated the formal bureaucratic institutions of administration to produce what can be referred to as corruption and white collar crime.

As a people within a national boundary, Papua New Guineans did not have a prior common experience that they could use to imagine themselves as a national community. This lack of a common identifier can be seen to be a discouraging factor for people to freely express themselves as Papua New Guineans. They would rather identify themselves tribally than nationally. Thus Hastings observed that it will be a long time before Highlanders see themselves as Papua New Guineans rather than as Jiga, Yamuga and Porgera. This is beautifully summed up by Mazrui where he stated:

\textsuperscript{12} After leading PNG to independence in 1975, Sir Michael Somare suffered a series of political hiatus in the 1980s and 1990s that saw him languishing in the background of PNG politics. However, his newly formed National Alliance party won many seats in the 2002 national elections and he was once again voted Prime Minister. He is the only Parliamentarian since the 1968 second House of Assembly and has never lost an election after that.
In the long and slow process of national integration it is not enough that people should interact economically; it is not enough that they should begin to share cultural traits; it is not enough that there should evolve a multiplicity of institutions for resolving conflict. There is a fourth dimension required to pull these other three together and focus them towards the center. The fourth dimension might be called the collective cumulation of shared national experience (Quoted in Hastings, 1973: 245).

Of course it was obvious that Australia tried to create “something out of nothing” by way of instilling a foreign concept of governance and civil society in a land that comprises thousands of small tribes and multiple languages. One could then ask the question, how can the good intentions of the colonial masters be perpetuated and nurtured so that the objectives of these intentions can be realized? As a helpful insight, Foster (2002: 3) argues that in contemporary Melanesia, there are no panoptical regimes expeditiously disciplining, surveying, and producing national citizens through pervasive social regulation. In PNG the national state succeeded a financially strapped colonial state, the administrative and ideological apparatus of which did not reach far into the territory or lives of its subjects. A hasty decolonization process unfolded more in response to international pressure than to popular anti-colonial protest. Foster draws observations from other writers that subsequent ‘official nationalism’ – state-sponsored attempts to define a national culture – has generated shallow, contradictory, and often empty effects. Thus what are the alternative sites that one can look to in order to understand how a conglomerate of autonomous tribes like PNG is held together.
We can look at this problem from other angles. For example, following from the thesis of 'imagined communities' first introduced and popularized by Anderson (1991), Foster (2002) analyzes aspects of the contemporary PNG society against the background of commodities, a national custom (e.g. Narokobi’s (1983) philosophy of the ‘Melanesian Way’) and Christianity. Foster argues that these three factors should be treated as unifying elements in imagining a nation of autonomous tribes that do not have common symbols and meanings in their individual cultural and political repertoire. The following excerpt captures the essence of his argument:

What insights, then, does a focus on the instrumental effects of commodities, custom, and Christianity in producing that nation yield? First of all, such a focus has the virtue of taking seriously certain mundane activities – watching television, drinking a Coke, reading a newspaper – that are of increasingly global scope as more and more people are drawn into the capitalist markets and networks of commercial media....(S)uch a focus also makes clear how precisely some of the features often associated with...globalization – commercial media, ubiquitous brands, fundamental religions – provide in PNG resources for making the nation an aspect of ordinary people’s everyday experience (Foster, 2002: 8; emphasis added).

On the whole, it is still a difficult question especially in the context of living and abiding by the legal-rational laws and the formal organizational and bureaucratic system
of getting things done – a legacy of the colonial era that was and is still not properly understood and grasped. When the Australians exited from the political and administrative scene in PNG, they took with them a wealth of experience in modern governance and administration. This created a huge vacuum that was either not properly filled or not filled at all. This single historical event is a significant source of the possible causes of breakdown in the process of building and nurturing a harmonious civil society that respects the rule of law and the state as the ultimate arbiter of order and civil living.

Hastings (1973: 247) noted that there was a salient lack of bureaucratic skills needed to support uncertain and inexperienced political leadership. This was further complicated given the fact that Papua New Guinea is very much fragmented by language and geography. Australia did not begin to think about indigenous skills required for self determination until very late in the day. This was the legacy of inflexible policies devised in Australia. The local administrator in Papua New Guinea never had the relative flexibility of decision allowed a British colonial governor. Even the training of indigenous civil servants has been rigid and unpromising. In a lot of ways, this was the legacy of neglect that gradually lead to apathy and thus stagnation.

On a brighter and optimistic note, it has been observed that PNG is one of the few post-colonial states that have managed to maintain an unbroken record of democratic government (May, 2003). Parliamentary elections have been held regularly and on schedule (the latest in June 2002), and although no government has lasted a full
parliamentary term, every change of government has followed constitutional requirements and procedures. All changes of government (most of them by parliamentary votes of no confidence against the prime minister) have been accepted by both defeated members of the parliament and the general public.

Some of the issues discerned in the foregoing analysis are as follows:

1. The colonial government of Australia was conscious of protecting and respecting native rights and way of life. They tried as much as possible to maintain this policy as well as providing an introduced system of government and administration as a means to hold together a territory that was itself a construct of imperialism and expression of foreign power and domination.

2. Being a follower of international trends and whims, Australia, under the auspices of the United Nations, tried its best to create an indigenous government that would reflect and hopefully represent a ‘home grown’ government. They were, however, bedeviled by the fact that the bulk of the country were still living ‘in the stone age’. There was fear was that it would take a hundred years to make PNG a viable, self-sustaining nation. Another setback to this initiative was that some colonial politicians and bureaucrats in Port Moresby and Canberra wanted the formation of the nation and state of PNG to be on Australian terms for reasons obvious to their own wisdom and reasoning.
3. There was a formidable challenge for the colonial government to educate the masses about political participation and self-government. To this end, the then department of information did prepare education and awareness materials on governance, elections, and administration. But this was not maintained on a consistent basis over time.

4. Many of the European settlers came into colonial PNG just for the money and very little else. They were entrepreneurs and business owners who had no interest in permanent settlement and the overall development of the new nation. It would seem that life was enjoyable and prosperous for them and their businesses as long as Australia ruled. Thus when talks and feelings of independence were growing by the day, some of the settlers began to spread unfounded speculations that there would be violence, bloodshed, and a mass exodus by white people – which, it was argued, would lead to loss of privileges and benefits for the locals. Some prominent politicians in the highlands, probably as a result of being convinced by the white settlers’ arguments against early independence, strongly called for independence to be delayed to give enough time for the rest of PNG, especially the highlands, to ‘catch up’.

5. An important issue that I feel constitutes that bulk of the problems associated with state failure in PNG is that the indigenous social and political superstructure was largely ignored. In other words the cultural mechanisms for making a people accept something foreign were either not properly instilled or not instilled at all. The planning process to prepare for independence had been ad hoc and piecemeal
- Australia being careful not to attract international resentment and also to be seen to be cooperative in realizing the United Nations’ policy of self-determination. The dilemma as pointed out by Hastings (see above) was to throw the new nation into the deeper end where it would force to swim on its own resources. The danger was it may drown under the weight of its own problems. Of course one can rely on the formal educational system to play that role but in essence it would take hundreds of years for foreign concepts and ideologies to eventually replace primordial ones. (Thankfully we have globalization to speed that process up, either for the better or worse).

In the following chapter some of these issues are further examined in the light of the various paradigms spelt out in Chapter 2 and this.
Chapter 4. Analysis of PNG as a Weak State

This chapter is divided into two parts: The first part provides a summary of the various theories and paradigms analyzed in Chapter Two. This consists of an examination of overlapping elements, both implicit and explicit, that are identified in the said theories and paradigms. Following that, some unique elements, both implicit and explicit in the theories and paradigms, are examined. The final component of the synthesis is an introduction of possible elements that are either missing or needing further re-examination within different contexts and which are not identified or elaborated by the various theories and paradigms. After the summary, an eclectic overview of the various theories is constructed with the view to reorient discussion towards the PNG case. It is hoped that through the eclectic overview of the various issues involved, the basis for addressing my research questions will emerge. This will provide the background from which the research questions are to be addressed.

The second part of this chapter is an analysis of some aspects of functional failure of the PNG state. It is here that the issues of validity and roots causes raised in Chapter 1 are addressed. The premise here is that what was made in history laid the groundwork for how the state would perform its role in this time and for the time to come. I argue in this chapter that state failure is the result of functional failure of roles and obligations by people in the state system. It is the result of the interplay between endogenous and exogenous factors. Using models proposed by Rotberg and Milliken below I identify
three major dimensions of state failure: security, representation and welfare. The analysis in this chapter examines the PNG state within the confines of these three concepts.

*Synthesis of Paradigms*

The paradigms of state failure and collapse spelt out in chapter 2 can be categorized as providing the bases for the conceptualization and theoretical grounding upon which one can conduct analyses of state failure and collapse (Milliken and Krause: 2003: 14). Broadly speaking, the conceptualizations of state failure and collapse have overlapping elements and can be subsumed under three general, interrelated rubrics: The crumbling away of former empires and repressive regimes (such as the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s); state entities as we currently experience them are expensive to run; and thirdly, the western models of state entities and systems may not, after all, be compatible and certainly not transferable given today’s emergence of heterogeneous expressions that can be found within many a society or culture across the world’s nations. In other words, the experience of state-and nation-building in the post-World War II era will not be able to reproduce itself in societies where such experience has not existed before.

It is argued under the first rubric that the collapse of former empires and conglomerates of states is seen as a major harbinger of social and ethnic tensions and violence that had been suppressed during the reign of those oppressive regimes.
In a significant way, some of those are peoples who had previously been separate nations or national and cultural identities and the collapse of the oppressive regimes was the opportunity to reclaim and rebuild their lost or suppressed nations and identities. In regions like the Balkan states or countries where the former Yugoslavia has had direct involvement with, the transition process has been encountered with much difficulty often in the form of violent civil wars. The Balkans case in Eastern Europe is a good example (e.g. see Cohen, 2003: 218). Writing about the Serb-Croat war of the early 1990s, Ignatieff saw how neighbors were turned into enemies, how people who once had a lot in common ended up having nothing in common but war and found it to be puzzling. He argued that in the wake of civil wars such as the ones experienced in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Afghanistan, there are no civilization fault lines or geological templates that have split apart. Rather, it was about how neighbors once ignorant of the very idea that they belong to opposed civilizations begin to think – and hate – in these terms; how they vilify and demonize people once they called friends; how, in short, the seeds of mutual paranoia are sown, grain by grain, on the soil of a common life (Ignatieff, 1998: 36). There seems to be some kind of chain reaction or causative order in the wake of the disintegration of an overarching polity: first the collapse of the overarching state, then Hobbesian fear, and only then nationalist paranoia, followed by warfare (ibid. 44-45).

Towards the end of the 1980s, as the specter of the Soviet Union began to lose its influence and fade away, new if not suppressed forms of social and political expressions
begin to surface in areas that it once had control over. Given the crumbling away of the former USSR, client states that used to be dependent on Soviet assistance are now left to their own devices. This event also paved the way for the arch rival of the Soviet Union, the United States, to withdraw its support from states that used to be its allies during the Cold War. Injection of funds and other resources into those satellite states came to a halt since there did not seem to be any interest or reason to do that in the wake of the Soviet demise (e.g. see Van De Walle, 2004). This in turn paved the way for heads of weak and failing states to turn their attention to other international partners for support and sustenance. Their situation may worsen if they are not able to establish mutually beneficial relations with potential international partners.

The argument under the second rubric is that a state system and entity may be seen as a monolithic structure serving no useful purpose if it cannot expand its influence and legitimacy over its given territory. To do that, it needs large amounts of finance, capital, and manpower resources. In failed states where the leaders have reputations of clinging to power and suppressing democracy through violence, an argument that arises in such contexts is that countries with high levels of natural resources are more likely to engage in civil wars and that the presence of natural resources is likely to increase the length and intensity of such conflicts since they can finance soldiers and weapons (Van De Walle, 2004: 96). On the other hand, most failed or collapsed states are not able to acquire these successfully in their day to day existence. Although, they may have resources and manpower, structural considerations (such as cultural factors and lack of
adequate education or knowledge) and physical impediments such as geography and road networks may tend to restrict their abilities to effectively carry out their functions within their mandated territories. It was noted by Clapham (2004: 88) that in many African states, the relationship between statehood and economic resources, which might well have been expected to be positive, has in practice been subordinated to the impact of the social resources required for effective economic management. What matters, in short, is not states' access to a given level of wealth, which would in turn generate a higher level of legitimacy for state institutions and create among dominant classes a set of shared incentives in the maintenance of the economic system that assured their welfare, but whether governments and the societies that sustain them are capable of creating, from their own resources, the levels of authority that are needed to maintain basic structures of production. In short economic performance is the dependent variable, political culture the independent variable.

Under the third rubric state collapse is the result of clashes of primordial forms of social and political expressions with the modern formal institutions and values systems of the state that are modeled along western ideals of governance and social order. This in turn renders a state modeled along western principles of governance and democracy as incompatible and therefore unable to function in its ideal form within an environment that is fraught with those primordial forms of expressions. Bearing this in mind, it is obvious that statehood is not a given for some societies. This calls into focus such questions as what makes some political and economic contexts more vulnerable than others and what
variables lead to different tracks. With the evidence that states using the European models are not functioning as ideally as they should, one begins to question the existence of the state as a ‘one size fits all’ type of remedy for societies that did not have such entities before. In most instances state failure and collapse tend to be wrongly interpreted as breakdown in institutions and functions. Thus the usual remedy is the restoration of the functions and re-strengthening of institutional capacities. Thinking along that line, it is usually assumed that there is an ideal type of status that all states should try to attain. This kind of way of viewing state failure is a superfluous treatment that tends to deny the need to look beyond root causes of failure and collapse. In short, it should be an attempt at examining the primordial forms of social and interpersonal relationships and how these give rise to the flouting of established universal norms of governing and delivering political goods, such as the existence of tribal alignments that determine social and political structures and organizations in Afghanistan and Somalia.

So far, we have looked at a variety of paradigms that specify instances and examples of state failure and collapse. Underpinning these various theories and paradigms is the notion of the state as the primary producer, and deliverer of political goods, i.e. security, modernization and an increase in the standard of living, and free participation in democratic and political activities and processes. It ought to be noted that democratic and political participation has not been a problem for most states in their nascent stage since the idea of a sovereign people and, indeed, of representative democracy as the only viable form of state is a twentieth century invention. The specific
examples and case studies (discussed in Chapter 2) provide a wide variety of insights into how and why states fail or collapse and how this differs from one nation to another. In a certain way, they provide a general anatomy of state failure and collapse by way of offering individual case studies of state experiences in different nation-states and contexts.

Just as the paradigms converge or agree on some major trends and share similar or overlapping experiences, they also provide unique insights into how and why a conceptualization of state failure and collapse is to be approached as an independent discipline in its own right. For example, Cramer and Goodhand argue that the Afghan state is a failed state because of its tendency to “try again, fail again, fail better?”; this tendency, they argue, arises out of the Afghan state as being a rentier economy, one that is largely reliant on foreign aid and thus is not a self-sustaining entity on its own (Cramer and Goodhand, 2003: 131). Collapsed states are ideal breeding grounds for insurgents whose purpose may not always be political. In the politics of insurgency, there seems to be an ambivalent portrayal of resistance and banditry. Reno, for example writes that what is new about post-Cold War internal wars and rebellions is the extent to which economic interests appear to predominate, thereby crowding out ideologically motivated mass reform and revolutionary reforms. He states that variables that some scholars identify as causes of conflict (such as reliance on revenue from resource extraction, bad economic policies, and weak governments) are in fact consequences of conflict (Reno, 2003: 83). This in turn leads to or acts as structural obstacles to improvement.
The second unique insight is now that the specters of Communism and Cold War are very much faded into oblivion, the trend of globalization itself, as it relates to the existence of states and their perpetuation, poses serious reconsiderations as to its intents and purposes. Basically, globalization encourages or increases probabilities of state failure. Arms proliferation is an important dimension of the global system of trade. As pointed out by Musah (2003) the privatization of security by heads of failed or collapse states and the flourishing of arms in the civilian domain of society has led to a rise in the number of local warlords each having certain interests and claims; these in turn serve as the basis for launching their confrontation with the state apparatus and its agents. The heads of states, fearful of their own positions in turn launched suppressive policies and measures in order to protect their privileges and ‘right’ to rule.

The third unique perspective is the emergence of strong political and independence movements by peoples whose identities as such have been formerly suppressed. It ought to be noted that after World War I, the idea of self-determination became critical. Peoples whose identities had been suppressed now wanted to have independent states of their own as means to realize their own notions of self-determination. This is seen in the present-day Iraq and Palestine after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. It is also seen in the light of the post-Cold War era. For example in Georgia, this has resulted in the fragmentation of political power and authority (Demetriou, 2003). A direct consequence of this has been the surfacing of ethnic
antagonisms among the various ethnic groups within a nation that led to a complex relationship between the state and civil society.

Despite these broad conceptualizations of state failure and collapse, there are assumptions that I discern as essential to this thesis and needing further examination. I identify two: The first assumption is suggested by Doornbos (2003) that once in existence, states are expected to last. That is, to the extent that they are able to self-sustain themselves through managing an economy and using the civil society to carry out some of its tasks. As part of this, the state must be seen as necessarily "democratic" in order to perpetuate itself. This calls into question the state’s legitimacy and how it maintains it by way of serving civil society. Rotberg (2004) argues that state failure arises from an inability of the state to deliver certain basic political goods to its citizens. In addition to security, within and outside its territory, democratic processes of representation and governance are taken to be essential. Moreover, the provision of basic services such as physical infrastructure, health and education are seen as part of this. These goods are what give the state its legitimacy and purpose to exist as the sole arbiter of order and peaceful living in society. Dinnen (2001) similarly argues that PNG is a weak state because of its chronic ineffectiveness in realizing these political goods. This is to say that as long as states exist, they must provide these political goods.

It is arguable, then, that the existence of states has been taken for granted and that since their founding or establishment their purpose has never been critically evaluated
once a state is seen developing symptoms of failure and collapse. Of course there are advocates calling for the ‘withering away’ of the state because its existence is deemed obsolete especially in this age of technological revolutions concomitant with instant global interactions between nations and peoples. For example, Kalyvas argues that “…globalization and postmodernism together have relativized the state, reducing it either to an impotent and irrelevant international agent or to an inconsequential and derivative domestic social institution” (Kalyvas, 2002: 106). On the other hand, it is obvious that the state is an indispensable overall authority in society. This indispensability is clearly evidenced by the fact that instances of violent armed conflicts and other serious crimes (such as against humanity) in many parts of the globe today have been averted or successfully contained through international diplomacy where different states and international organizations (such as the United Nations) are working together towards finding peace and solutions to those conflicts. We see an example recently in Haiti where political turmoil caused civil riots that eventually compelled the US and French governments to send in troops to quell civil disorder and wanton violence (New York Times, March 1, 2004).

A second critical assumption following from the above is that newly created states and those that we have looked at may look and sound like states per se, but their actual operations may suggest otherwise. They can be regarded as “quasi-” or “prototype” states or even pale imitations of strong states. That is, it may not be that they have “failed” but that they never had the chance to succeed. On that basis, it can also be argued that there
are core functions of the failed or weak state, but it may well be that the newly created state never had the chance and capacity to carry out its key functions. Undertaking a historical analysis of state formation and development provides an effective tool to explain why some states are doomed to fail or remain weak and incapacitated even as they see themselves as states controlling their respective nations.

Contemporary Status of the PNG State

For the framework for analysis of the PNG case, I use what Milliken and Krause (2003: 4) have proposed as the three core functions of the state – security, representation, and welfare. In the most straightforward sense, failure to perform any of these functions is an indication of state weakness, failure or collapse. Using this approach, I argue that the PNG state demonstrates functional failure arising from weak institutions.

The key terms are worth specifying. By institution, I mean the various official offices including government departments and their accompanying positions which comprise the overall state apparatus – in other words, it is the personnel, bureaucracy, and rules and procedures that provide the overall framework within the state machinery. By function I mean the responsibilities and duties of individual state institutions and government departments whose action or inaction either produce delivery or non-delivery of ‘goods and services’ that are supposed to benefit the society within the mandated territory. Human agency, operating in a social setting not compatible with modern
bureaucracy, is of the essence here. It is the crucial element in determining whether a state is effective, weak or failing. Occasionally, the state may, from time to time, delegate the responsibility of performing these functions to other parties as a matter of policy and cooperation within and outside of its mandated territory. For example, non-government organizations or private companies can be contracted by the state to help deliver the political goods without undermining the overall authority and legitimacy of the state. On the other hand, state apparatus such as the institutions and offices are sole ‘properties’ of the state and therefore cannot be delegated. For example the judiciary, the police and the military are the sole properties of the state because of the very nature of the state if one uses the Weberian model.

It is also worth spelling out what I mean by ‘security’, ‘representation’ and, ‘welfare’. By security I refer to two dimensions: the first dimension is the ability of the state to have a successful monopoly over the physical use of violence in order to contain and dissipate civil disorder and maintain harmony and security within its territory. The second is a strong presence of criminal elements and their ability to spread disharmony and harm in civil society and the inability of the state to effectively contain them. By representation I mean active mutual participation between the state and civil society in order to produce and reproduce popular governance and political participation by way of

\[\text{In some of the cases discussed in this thesis, one sees the opposite of this where the state uses its monopolized physical violence to suppress opposition and flout rules and principles of popular governance. In such instances, it can be said that the state has perverted one of its own core functions.}\]
regular elections through legally accepted voting systems. This also extends to the rule of law that sees the independence of the judiciary to interpret the law and dispense justice. By welfare, I mean the state’s ability or inability to provide basic public services that include but are not limited to health, education, and physical infrastructure such as road networks, hospitals, and schools.

It should be noted that while the core functions are analyzed under their respective headings, they are not mutually exclusive. They overlap at varying degrees. Also it is felt that a broader analysis of some aspects of institutional failure is needed. This allows one to see how the post-independence state and its actors fared as they set out to fulfill the promises of national unity and bring about the benefits.

Institutional Corruption and Defects

The PNG state, as a product of the colonial experience, has had difficulties in maintaining effective institutions and functions. Institutional corruption was a major factor that contributed to this chronic weakness. Here the functional failure of the state is attributed to human agency. For example, just a couple of years soon after its independence in 1975, symptoms of weakness began to creep into the system of government and public administration. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, corruption and graft were already seen to be serious problems in parts of the state apparatus. This is

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14 In making such distinctions attention is drawn to the fact that there are countries where democratic participation especially popular governance is non existent but state failure per se is not an issue. China and Cuba stand out as prime examples.
evident in a 1982 report by the Ombudsman Commission where a state Minister was referred to the Leadership Tribunal\textsuperscript{15} and subsequently recommended for dismissal from office (Papua New Guinea Ombudsman Commission, 1982).

Part of the reason why this institutional weakness was not properly addressed and rectified can be attributed to the policy of the nascent government then struggling to promote its policy of localization which envisioned filling up of government jobs by indigenous officials and workers. To this end, it would appear that inexperienced and unqualified people were recruited. Fresh university and college graduates – few in number then – were thrust into the higher echelons of important decision making offices in government circles. It was envisioned that such a trend in utilizing low-level local skills and manpower would help create nationalist sentiments. One observer noted that the PNG localization policy was an adaptation of development practices and philosophies from other similar countries that have recently become independent (e.g., Jacobsen, 1995).

Still the difficulty was that there was a great deal of incompetence and shortage of manpower in some government agencies. In one of its annual reports in the early 1980s, the Office of the Public Prosecutor stated that there was a huge backlog of cases dating

\textsuperscript{15} In PNG the conduct of leaders, both private and public, are guided by the Leadership Code. The Ombudsman Commission, an independent body set up by the national constitution, enforces the Leadership Code. It polices the conduct of leaders. The types of leaders that come under the Ombudsman Commission are known as constitutional office holders and they include members of parliament (politicians), judges, and heads of government departments and statutory bodies. A leader, if found guilty of misconduct in office, is tried by a Leadership Tribunal which consists of exclusively Judges and Magistrates. If found guilty, a leader is usually dismissed from office. There is a provision in the Leadership Code that allows a leader who is indicted with misconduct in office to resign from office where he/she does not have to face the Leadership Tribunal and answer to the charges. Over the years, this provision has been seen as a loophole that some corrupt leaders have used to get away with their crimes.
back some 10 years but because of fewer officers, they were not able to pursue and clear most of them. Even the permanent parliamentary Public Accounts Committee, though it has done valuable work in revealing corruption and inefficiency, there seemed to be little follow-ups to the discoveries. Lack of trained support staff was identified to be a major impeding factor. Within the public sector, it was pointed out that taking disciplinary action against recalcitrant officers has not been strictly adhered to, thereby significantly encouraging the temptations of engaging in corrupt practices and behavior (PNG Ombudsman Commission, 1982).

Other factors contributing to the prevalence of corruption were attributed to the lack of proper screening of appointed officials with questionable employment records into positions of trust and greater responsibilities. This becomes crucial when such officials were entrusted to manage state-owned enterprises and business corporations, and the practice of transferring corrupt officials from one government department to other posts instead of discharging or disciplining them. Thus even though the symptoms of corruption were identified and remedies suggested, it seemed that few people were willing to grasp the nettle, so to speak, and tackle it head on, but there was a considerable degree of apathy among the majority of those within government circles and the public sector (PNG Ombudsman Commission, 1982).

There is a general concurrence among people in PNG at this time that it is not the ‘system’ that is at fault but those who are in the system that needs ‘fixing’. In one of his
tour of duty, a National Court judge has described the public service machinery in the resource-rich Southern Highlands Province as "not working". Apart from the teachers and the hospital, most of the public service personnel were not working. It was also reported that the provincial civil service Head Quarter was devoid of people during work days – there was no one there apart from the security guards. The Judge also noted that other provincial government buildings were without curtains and furniture with only one or two public servants working. The judge’s comments followed concerns raised by the Minister for Public Service, who had announced his decision to send investigators to probe the public service machinery there and report back to him on a course of action (Post Courier, February 16, 2004).

In another separate news, it was reported that the government suspended the head of the National Fisheries Authority in the wake of alleged financial mismanagement. The person concerned was appointed acting managing director amid some controversy last year. His appointment drew the ire of an international donor organization which put a halt to a US$35 million funding for the fisheries industry in PNG. A ministerial statement put it that the suspension was primarily over allegations of serious financial mismanagement that related to funds misuse, ineffective control and lack of implementation of donor funding projects, including strained relationship with foreign donor agencies, lack of proficient partnership with the fishing industry sector and significantly, lack of consultation and briefs to the Minister responsible for fisheries. One of the specific
questions to be addressed is the allegation that the head paid himself K306,800 (US$102,266) when he was acting in the post without a signed contract for two months in 1999. Other issues to be dealt with include the engagement of consultants, hiring, alleged abuse of internal loans processes and breach of tender procedures. The ministerial statement said these issues hampered the authority’s vision and model objectives and the ability of Fisheries Authority implement the Government’s export-driven economic recovery strategy had been considered unsatisfactory under the suspended head’s management (Post Courier, April 20, 2004).

While some parts of the public service machinery are not working, the general trend in seeking public sector employment adds an interesting dimension of hypocrisy and contradiction to the whole process. It has been noted that in PNG public office and public sector jobs are fiercely contested ‘prizes’ funded by mineral revenues and aid receipts\(^\text{16}\). These monies increase the power and resources of the government and bureaucracy relative to the rest of the society, promising comparatively large rewards and squeezing the commerce most people revert to. Democratic elections have become the primary means of accessing state finance. To this end, almost 3000 candidates competed for 109 seats in the National Parliament during the 2002 elections (Windybank and Manning, 2003: 6).

\(^{16}\) That is, most people today see jobs in public offices as means to accumulate private wealth to the exclusion of those they are supposed to serve. That is why there is a high degree of favoritism and nepotism as people compete to hire their own kind and kin wherever and whenever possible. Winning the national election is the ultimate goal for every aspiring leader as this will give them the leeway in accessing national wealth and resources ostensibly on behalf of their constituents.
It is assumed that the vulnerability of the PNG state lies in its own making—ineffective and inexperienced leadership that tend to thrive in an environment where rules and procedures of governing are flouted or deliberately ignored. This has prompted the discourse on good governance, accountability and transparency to assume a prominent space in areas of policy sciences and international relations. The basic assumption of good governance is that irresponsible leaders and deteriorating state institutions are seen to be the causes of or providing the conditions for state failure and so they have to undergo ‘capacity building’ and ‘institutional strengthening’. Ultimately such courses of action are anticipated to elicit a strong sense of accountability, community, responsibility, and the eradication of corruption (e.g. Lamour, 1996, 1997; Helu, 1997; Douglas et. al., 1998; Dinnen, 2001). However, a weakness in this discourse is that upon critical examination, it would seem that the symptoms and not the cause have been treated. To say that a state has failed, is to place a value judgment on the performance of a state without understanding the perennial conditioning factors and elements. Values then, can be regarded as ideals of some state of perfection that set the measure and standard of things that can be thought of as objectives or goals. That is why Doombos (2003: 48) has pointed out that state failure is sometimes wrongly interpreted as institutional failure by the international community. It is thus assumed that the process of transplanting or reproducing a model of state has not been complemented by the creation of an overall social and political structure that is compatible with the new state system and apparatus. Factors such as the proper introduction of a political culture and the accompanying value systems that would serve as bridging mechanisms have not been properly inculcated
among the indigenous masses. Clapham (2003: 31) notes that when we come to look at specific cases of state collapse, we invariably find particular circumstances, either in the make-up of the states concerned or in the conduct of their rulers and officials, which have helped to precipitate a collapse that other states, perhaps with wiser rulers or a somewhat less disadvantageous social or economic inheritance, have been able to avert.

*Representation*

Despite the serious problems associated with the 2002 national election in PNG, particularly the apparently steadily rising level of voter manipulation and election-related violence, it is noted that PNG appears to have survived another election and to have maintained its broad record of democratic politics (May, 2003: 9). However, questions arise as to how one reconciles PNG's record of democracy with patterns of political behavior marked by parochialism, nepotism, rising levels of corruption and violence, and administrative breakdown, and what are the prospects for continuing democracy (ibid.).

May (2003: 4) notes that elections are lively affairs in PNG despite the fact voters tend to be cynical about politicians and their accountability to their voters. In the absence of major social cleavages, and with political parties having limited capacity to mobilize voters, electors tend to vote very largely along clan or village lines, though winning candidates generally manage to secure a broader spread of votes. The securing of more votes than what a candidate expects can be achieved through illegal means which include
but are not limited to voter intimidation, tampering of ballot boxes, armed hijacking of
officially recognized ballot papers and boxes, and harassment of polling officials and
flouting of voting procedures. For example, in the film *Pigs and Politics* (2002), one sees
the election process in a rural polling site of one of the highland provinces completely
devoid of proper voting rules during the 2002 national elections: tribesmen and families
members of a candidate walked into the polling area and demanded the polling officials
certain number of ballot papers claiming that they would be casting their votes for
themselves as well as for the other family members who were not present at the polling
site! Fearing for their lives, the polling officials had to comply with the ‘requests’ of
those tribesmen. Dinnen (2001: 152) notes that with PNG’s first-past-the-post system of
voting, the greater the number of candidates, the easier it becomes to win with a small
number of votes. In this regard, the chances of unseating incumbents are also high, with
over 50 per cent of parliamentarians losing their seats at each election since
independence.

Coupled with this is the fact that political parties have little impact on voter
behavior in PNG politics. Party organization remains weak, with parties being closely
identified with the personalities and fortunes of individual leaders rather than with any
coherent ideology or set of policies. An important consideration is that in the absence of a
developed party system, it is usually unclear who will form a government, even after the
votes are in (Dinnen, 2001: 153). Thus political horse trading and lock-ups of winning
candidates in the lead-up to government formation are the usual means through which
coalitions are formed. In this sense, then, political success is measured not so much in terms of a politician’s contribution to abstract national policy goals, as in his ability to acquire resources at state level and distribute benefits to his local support base (ibid. 172). Thus country by country studies consequently emphasize the role of particular local circumstances, rather than shifts in the underlying structures of the global system as the cause of weakness, failure or collapse. As it is stated, “...statehood in much of the developing world has a fragile base; this must always be borne in mind as providing the setting for any analysis of state collapse” (Clapham, 2003: 31).

One of the key factors in the emergence of conflict in Georgia was the pro-independence movement’s espousal of a discourse that defined statehood in terms of an exclusively Georgian community. Drawing on the works of other writers, Demetriou related that the movement generally did not feature discrimination against other ethnic groups, but it often represented or condemned ethnic grievances as machinations of the Soviet center. Also, certain radical elements in the movement did capitalize on anti-minority sentiments, causing consternation in non-Georgian communities.

The PNG state has not gone as far as the Georgian state where strong independence movements and dissent from the various ethnic groups have challenged the overall legitimacy and authority of the state. Nevertheless there had been effective political and secessionist groups in the 1960s and 1970s who did not want PNG to be united. Groups like Papua Besena in the Papuan region and the Mataungan Association
from East New Britain province were two such groups whose leaders were critical of the overall purpose of early independence and unity for PNG. The most successful and sustaining one has been the secessionist movement on the island of Bougainville in the 1960s and 1970s. This compelled the national government to come to a compromise with the Bougainvilleans, the result from which came forth the provincial government system to address the question of autonomy for individual provinces (e.g., Saffu, 1992: 341). Towards the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s sentiments of secessionism on Bougainville in the aftermath of the civil war that claimed hundreds of innocent lives, was at its highest peak. It has arguably been claimed by a leader of the secessionist movement that the people of Bougainville are known throughout the world as the only indigenous people who have (successfully) shut a world class mine owned by one of the mining giants in the world (http://www.eco-action.org). The decade-long conflict that resulted from disagreements over mine benefits and concerns about environmental degradation has been seen to hasten the PNG state to introduce legislation and policy change in the mining industry as preemptive measures to contain potential future uprisings from disgruntled landowners (Saffu, 1992: 340). As more people came to accept the idea of independence and free national elections under a united PNG, many of the skepticisms and resentment paled into insignificance as the rhetoric of development and progress took hold in the people’s political consciousness.
Reno’s closer investigation of Nigeria’s ‘field of leverage’ reveals numerous informal linkages between armed groups and elite political networks. Quoting a journalist Reno related that “…a good number of these boys were also used for some of the dirty jobs carried out during the Abacha reign of terror, and they are all moving about freely, ready for the highest bidder to engage their services” (Agekameh, in Reno, 2003: 91). Demobilized paramilitaries and security agencies formed during General Sani Abacha’s regime contributed to the weaponry and military experts available to these groups. Reno goes on to argue that armed opponents are themselves creations of the collapsing state, whether as demobilized soldiers or as members of disbanded paramilitaries, or simply those suffering the consequences of misrule and economic devastation. It reflects maneuvers on the part of politicians in the state and the ‘marginalized’ to renegotiate (and force) their positions in the state, not some versions of a state-society struggle that will lead to reform or politics or renewal of society.

In the PNG context, the link between state officials and criminal or insurgent elements is not firmly established, although if it is any indication, it has been a controversy in PNG that in 1997, the then Prime Minister was secretly videotaped wherein he bragged that he was the ‘godfather’ of criminals in the capital city (Dorney,
2000). It has been suggested, however, that should PNG’s current state of affairs continue unabated, it could attract transnational criminals, people smugglers, drug and arms traffickers and terrorists. PNG can neither effectively monitor its land and sea borders nor control parts of its territory, making it relatively easy for such groups to slip in undetected and use the country as a base for operations or point of entry into Australia (Windybank and Manning, 2003: 10).

The PNG state has not been subjected to internal warfare, turmoil and war lordism such as the Afghan and Somalia experiences, although one can consider the Bougainville conflict as having an important place in the history of armed conflicts within the territorial nation-state of PNG. But this did not prompt the whole nation to take up arms and take sides. Moreover, the conflict happened on an island off the mainland and thus was an isolated case. But it did have tremendous social, political and economic impacts on the state and society as a whole, not to mention serious violations of human rights and deaths of innocent people and denial of basic services to the people of Bougainville Island. Nevertheless, the state’s authority to monopolize violence and its legitimacy was not seriously threatened or challenged although it did come close to a military take over in 1997 when the top military commander committed sedition against the state (e.g. see Dinnen et. al., 1997).

17 These include rising levels of ethnic violence, institutional corruption, violent crimes including rape and armed hold-ups, a general decline in law and order, manipulation of electoral processes and proliferation of illegal high powered arms in civilian hands.
Musah (2003: 172-174) asserts that there is a causal link between negative state reconfiguration, private military intervention, and worsening security environment in the weak states of Africa. Although such cases are rarely experienced in PNG, it is speculated that a growing drugs-for-arms trade across PNG and Australia is known to have existed, where drugs from PNG – marijuana – are exchanged for guns brought in from Australia. Firearms are sold to the highlanders of PNG and criminal gangs, thus contributing to the corrosive effect of escalating crime and violence in PNG (Windybank and Manning, 2003: 10). Although public perception seems to be strong, there has not been an official report or document made public to ascertain such speculations.

On a different dimension using the PNG situation, Dinnen uses three broad case studies namely urban *raskolism*\(^\text{18}\), mining security, and election-related violence to document these elements of society that have challenged state functions. The rise of raskolism is documented against a background of urbanization and growing social and economic marginalization. The case study on mining security tells the story of two government initiatives aimed at improving security at mining and petroleum projects in the Highlands of PNG. It is observed that large-scale projects located in undeveloped rural areas generate conflicts over issues of ownership, political control, social and environmental impacts, and matter relating to compensation and the distribution of resource rents. Thus given the significance of mining revenue to the national economy, avoiding disruption has been a strategic concern for successive governments.

\(^{18}\) This is the general local reference to the term ‘rascal’ which in the local context means a criminal or a criminal gang.
The potential for conflict and the limited capacity of state policing are also of major concerns to project developers, which in PNG, include some of the world’s largest transnational corporations. The third case study examines reported incidents of violence during the 1992 national elections. Dinnen argues that here one can see the complexity of social ordering in PNG and the ways in which customary and liberal-democratic rationalities, and their associated technologies, intersect. The centrality of politics in this process is made explicit. PNG’s intense and often volatile style of politics is simultaneously a consequence and source of the weakness of the post colonial state and has contributed directly to marginalization, conflict, and social fragmentation. A focus on material factors highlights the primacy of politics as a major path to material advancement in the weak economy. Viewed through cultural lenses, social continuities are identified that link the actions of modern political leaders to older patterns of leadership, as well as to those of leaders in new occupational categories, including crime and business (Dinnen, 2001: 10).

Dinnen’s analyses reflect the current trend of social and political progress occurring within the larger society. A major problem lies in the functional aspects of the state to make effective the delivery of goods and services especially in terms of providing security and crime-free environments. Crime and criminal activities still remain a significant scourge in many urban communities in PNG today. There is a trend slowly emerging whereby *raskols* tend to kill indiscriminately if their demands are resisted or not entertained. There are newspaper reports in the local media that told of the use of
high powered weapons such as M-16s, automatic assault weapons and fragmentation
grenades recovered by police during curfew operations and raids (Dinnen, 2001:62).
Some are believed to be stolen from the main defense force armory in Port Moresby.

The mining industry in PNG requires tough investment decisions because of its
risky nature. At the same time, much of the state’s revenue comes from mining projects.
Dinnen notes that the absence of a significant manufacturing base or, comparable source
of government revenue, has increased dependence on mining and petroleum. The early
1990s heralded PNG’s so-called minerals boom, a period of dramatic expansion in the
number and size of mining projects and prospects, accompanied by buoyant forecasts and
rising popular expectations. There are six major gold, oil and gas projects currently in
operation. The problems begin when landowners demand greater recognition and
privileges in return for their resources. For example, the closure of the Bougainville mine
in 1989 followed violent protests by local landowners demanding a larger share of mine
profits and substantial compensation for environmental damage. Thus against this
background, project security has become a major law-and-order concern (Dinnen, 2001:
117). In 1991, in the wake of the Bougainville conflict, a paramilitary force was
established by a government policy decision called the Rapid Deployment Unit whose
duties were confined to dissuading armed resistance in mine sites. This unit was not
sustainable in the long run due to questions about financial support and sources.
It is further noted by Clapham (ibid. 37-39) that the most basic function of the state – the maintenance of a framework of legitimate order can no longer be taken for granted, thus reaffirming the notion that once established or created, states are expected to last. Following the two military coups in Fiji, (1987; 2000), there were speculations in political and academic circles within the Pacific region that the PNG state was likely to follow suit. Unexpectedly the Solomon Islands, PNG’s closest Melanesian neighbor, experienced its own state failure. Kabutaulaka (2004) has documented the chronology of events leading to the failure of the Solomon Islands state. He wrote that the conflict started as an ethnic tension between two rival groups in 1998 that led to an armed confrontation in 2000 when the state failed to intervene effectively to address one of the group’s grievances.

Doornbos (2003: 49) thus argues that state failure internally means there is a lack of meaningful linkages between state and society, greed for resources, excessive concentration of power and gross institutional mismanagement mostly for geopolitical or economic reasons. This calls for an analysis to determine the degree of corruption coupled with the use of violence to suppress opposition to popular government if not to obliterate it. In the PNG case, this represents an extreme form of blatant exploitation by the state over its own population. However, this is not to say that PNG is free from armed violence and corruption. Dinnen documents a body of evidence and sources that suggest that PNG is indeed confronted with a wide array of crimes and ethnic violence that tend to defy the authority and legitimacy of the state. These instances of violence can occur
spontaneously as in armed hold-ups in highways or during specific events as in elections. For example during the 1997 election an incident occurred in which ballot boxes containing cast votes for a constituency in the Southern Highlands were hijacked. According to reports, twenty-eight boxes were being transported under police escort from the district headquarter to the provincial capital when they intercepted by an armed gang. Twenty-one boxes were totally destroyed, and seven were returned after having been opened (Dinnen, 2001: 164). Serious allegations of electoral malpractice were also made. Double, triple, and even quadruple voting was reported in another highlands province (ibid).

A casual look at the local news is a sufficient opportunity to gauge the extent of how the young nation is faring overall. News and reports of crime, violence, corruption and other social ills seem to dominate the public forum. For example on April 13, 2004, in the capital city of Port Moresby, it was reported that about 60 members of the PNG defense force mobilized themselves with petrol bombs and went into a settlement and attacked residents there and burned houses and other properties as a pay back after one of their man was beaten by male resident members of the settlement. The soldier who was beaten later said that he was drinking with his in-law at a liquor outlet near the settlement when they were harassed by men from the settlement and later beaten severely. The settlement was near the proximity of the defense barracks so the soldier and his companion were able to flee into the barracks and gathered their comrades for retaliation. It turned out to be a rampage through the civilian settlement that left twenty families
homeless when their houses were burnt to the ground; four residents of the settlement sustain injuries during the rampage (Post Courier, April 13, 2004). In a separate report published on the same date, it was reported that there was a mass breakout of prisoners in the early hours of Easter Friday in the provincial capital of one of the Highlands provinces. Police reported that between 1am and 5am during a heavy down pour, the 13 male prisoners walked out of the police cell. The local police chief said there was one policeman on duty that night and in the early hours of Friday the “prisoners walked out of the cell under mystified circumstances….How they opened the two locks are not known,” the chief said. He said the prisoners were supposed to be taken to the local prison by the local Correctional Services but were kept overnight at the police cell.

In terms of international security and peace issues, Yannis (2003: 67) points out that there is a need for a reexamination of the present system or arrangements of international cooperation. This is being necessitated by the fact that armed conflicts in the form of ethnic cleansing (e.g. Rwanda and former Yugoslavia) and mass genocide have caused mass migration and border problems for neighboring countries as well as the international community. PNG has not had such a problem of mass migration or internal instability such as had happened in other countries. Also it had not had a single international confrontation with its neighbors where mass migration and major social upheavals of international proportions are the consequences. One can, however, recall the Bougainville conflict throughout the 1990s whose spill-over effects brought about high
tension with the neighboring Solomon Islands. It was the result of illegal crossing by Bougainville rebels and the attempts by the PNG Defense force to control them.

PNG has enjoyed good relations with its immediate international neighbors Indonesia, Australia, and Solomon Islands. Since independence in 1975, there never has been a major social or political turmoil of such a magnitude like those experienced in other countries where mass migration and border crossings have engendered international efforts and concerns.

Welfare

To date, the PNG state’s inability to provide basic goods and services has been at the center of popular resentment and antagonism towards the state by the population at large. These include but are not limited to universal education, primary health care, and physical infrastructure especially road networks to link the rural areas with the urban centers. There is a significant disparity and a high level of inequality when one considers the proportion of isolated communities vis a vis the state’s ability to deliver these basic goods. Out of the total of 5.1 million people, the 2000 census reveals that more than 4.5 million people live in the rural areas. This leaves just over 600,000 who live in the cities, towns and other urban centers. Thus over 90% of the population are rural-based while less than 10% are urbanized (National Statistics Office, 2003). In terms of road networks, a total of 19,600km is in existence. Out of this, 686km are paved while 18,914km are
unpaved – mostly in the rural areas. As for airport, there are 21 that are paved and 470 that are unpaved – mostly in the rural areas. The 2000 national budget estimate recorded $894 million as revenue and $1.1 billion as expenditure.


In terms of provision of education services, a brief presentation is given in Tables 1 and 2 below. It is obvious that as more and more children are being enrolled, more schools are being established. But it is also obvious that judging by the tables the number of children entering schools far outweigh the number of facilities and teachers available to absorb this demand or increase\(^\text{19}\).

**Table 1. Total Number of Primary Schools, Secondary/High Schools and Teacher Training Institutions, 1980 and 1994.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1994</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Schools</td>
<td>2606</td>
<td>2781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary/High Schools</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Training Institutions</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12 (a)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Institutions include total of 10 teacher training colleges and two universities that offer teaching programs.  

\(^{19}\) These figures include both the rural and urban population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Level (a)</td>
<td>284,094</td>
<td>490,866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Level (b)</td>
<td>37,767</td>
<td>66,949</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes both rural and urban schools.
** Figures for Tertiary Institutions and universities not available.
(a) PNG Curriculum enrolments only; excludes international schools.
(b) PNG Curriculum enrolments in Government High Schools, non-government high schools and technical colleges (grades 9 and 10).

Table 3 presents the total number of hospitals and total number of beds. These totals are the sum of the 19 provincial hospitals around the country including their available beds. There are numerous health centers, sub health centers, clinics, and aid posts both in the rural and urban centers. Given the overwhelming population, the provision of current beds in provincial hospitals are a hundred times inadequate in order to provide adequate basic health care to the general population. To make matters worse, supposing the number of hospitals and hospital beds remain constant, the increase in the general population at the end of the decade further stretches the already-limited resources to new extremes.
Table 3. Comparison of Health Facility/Population Coverage as at December, 1990.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizen Population</th>
<th>Hospitals(a)</th>
<th>Population/bed ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number Beds</td>
<td>hospital beds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 3740600</td>
<td>19(b)</td>
<td>4767 785</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Excludes health centers, aid posts and clinics
(b) This figure represents the total of 19 provinces, each having one hospital and several other complementary health facilities.

Source: Handbook, Health Statistics, 1990, Department of Health, Port Moresby

For economic and developmental issues, the PNG state has had much difficulty in reconciling the expectations of international financial institutions and donor countries with that of its own society at large. For example as an important condition of dispensing loans to the PNG state, the World Bank proposed certain ‘structural adjustment programs’ in the mid-1990s for the government to accept and implement. Unfortunately there was strong opposition to these programs from the society at large, which was spearheaded by non-government organizations and university students\(^20\). One of the ‘programs’ recommended was that land\(^21\) under local or customary ownership ought to be registered as a collateral or security for bank loans as a way to stimulate business and entrepreneurial activities (e.g. Power, 2000). The rationale used was that customary

\(^20\) This is a personal reflection back in 1995 as I was one of those active participants who joined in the protests and carried out nation-wide awareness campaigns. Students groups collected money from the public, bought plane tickets and given pocket moneys for food and lodging for two weeks. Groups of four students were sent to the provincial capitals to ‘educate’ people about the negative effects of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. While this was happening on the ground level, the NGOs protested at the official levels with the government and the World Bank and tried to negotiate for an outcome that would be in favor of civil society.

\(^21\) It is widely known that more than 95% of land in PNG is owned by the people, although this is slowly reducing as local people are selling off portions of their land to meet their own economic pressures.
landownership has been an obstacle to development and progress in PNG as a whole. Because of its chronic tendency to prop up its economic base with commercial loans from international financial institutions, the PNG state is terminally obliged to repay them come every fiscal year. The current external debt that still needs to be repaid stands at US$2.8 billion\textsuperscript{22} using 2002 estimates. As is characteristic of other countries, the PNG’s national budget in 2002 was US$1.1 billion which is twice less than its total external debts (http://www.cia.gov./publications/factbook/html).

In this chapter, aspects of the state’s core functions are analyzed to bring out the essential elements of the various paradigms of state failure using the PNG state. This is done by identifying examples that reflect either broadly or specifically these essential elements. Analysis is done under the rubric of the three core functions of the state – security, representation, and welfare. It is by no means comprehensive, nor extensive, but more or less a generalized view at the phenomenon of the failed state in the PNG context. The analysis here has adopted Milliken’s (2003:13) direction of investigation which analyzes state failure in a pre-failure and pre-collapsed perspective since concern about the prospect of state collapse has therefore not been matched by attempts to understand the conditions of its emergence.

Due to the overlapping nature of the state’s core functions it is seen that while some aspects of the failed state paradigms reflect similarities with the PNG case, other aspects do not. This suggests an existence of unique elements and factors within PNG

\textsuperscript{22} This is more than 8 billion PNG Kina using current exchange rates.
society that contribute to state weakness in PNG. The reasons can be located within the resulting cultural environment where endogenous and exogenous factors interreact.

In light of the PNG state’s ability and inability to carry out its core functions, Rotberg’s (2004) paradigm of a weak state has a significant relevance to the PNG case. The paradigm articulates what much of PNG as a nation lacks: delivery of basic social services, namely education and health.
Chapter 5. Summary and Discussion

This thesis has tried to address some of these questions: Under what conditions and given what factors will the state fail and eventually collapse? Is the failure to be found in the state’s historical development when it was in the process of forming and emerging from its embryonic stage? Are outside forces responsible for the state’s failure? Can state failure and collapse be attributed to both internal and external forces? To achieve that, a wide range of paradigms that emanate from instances and experiences of state failure and collapse around the world was used.

In the analyses three general themes have been identified that needed further examination to ascertain their relevance to the discourse on state failure:

1. Historical processes of state formation. As seen from the many examples, many nation-states encountered difficulties while trying to come to terms with what to do when formal institutions and procedures of governance collide with their own primordial tendencies. This is an area that inevitably brings in the issues of nation formation and perpetuation.

2. State and civil society interactions and the ensuing problems and prospects very much influences the way the state is organized and run.

3. The presence and subsequent practice of indigenous characteristics, socio-cultural traits and behavior patterns have the tendency to create and sustain a climate of functional and dysfunctional aspects of state functions. In other words, the sustenance of a mediocre
state entity. In PNG despite a diversity of indications that the state is weak and failing, there are certain elements that act as buffer against the trajectory leading to terminal failure (e.g., Dinnen, 2001; Reilly, 2003).

On the one hand, in the light of the presentation of the paradigms of state failure, it is likely that PNG is prone to follow a trajectory of chronic state weakness that is likely to lead to the scenario of a failing state. On the one hand, the PNG state has demonstrated resilience in upholding the core function of representation whereby free and fair elections are always held on schedule but then blatant disregard for rules and procedures of fulfilling this core function has been a cause for alarm and intrigue.

In Clapham’s conceptualization, states that were created from a colonial establishment or emerged from the clutches of former empires are prone to a vicious circle of decay. This is evident in the PNG case where graft and corruption became embedded when they were not effectively addressed soon after independence. In specific cases of state failure, one finds certain circumstances especially in the make-up of a ruler’s or a state official’s conduct. This is demonstrated in the example where the public service machinery is not performing to expectations in some provinces and government departments. An ambivalence is implicit here: One the one hand, public office and public sector jobs are fiercely contested because of the financial and social rewards state
Institutions offer. On the other hand, there seems to be apathy in doing one’s job dutifully and that occasionally established rules and norms are likely to be flouted or disregarded.

Given such a scenario one is likely to ask: how does one reconcile PNG’s ‘impeccable’ record of active political process and fulfillment of democratic obligations with patterns of political behavior that is marked by parochialism, nepotism, institutional corruption and ethnic and criminal violence? I suggest that this goes back to the question of the sociology of knowledge where human agency, with their everyday consciousness, cast in their cultural upbringing and socialization processes produces an opposite reaction to established institutional rules and principles which then tends to impact on institutional arrangements and thus affect the functional output of delivery of political goods and services causing state failure.

I hold that it is this aspect of human agency that may best explain the contemporary political economy of the PNG society and state. The politics of distribution of resources, including the whens and the hows of distribution lies in two important locations: 1) at the polling booth and 2) through nepotism and favoritism, mostly in the public sector jobs and offices. At the polling booth, tribes and close knit groups literally clash - physically and verbally - with other factions to ‘put their own man’ into power. When in power, the winning candidate in turn is obliged to channel state resources to his own clan, tribe and close knit groups to the exclusion of the larger constituency. The high prevalence of bureaucrats and officials favoring their own kind and kin in public offices
makes merits-based criteria in applying for a public job difficult. Somewhere in the selection process a person with less skills and competency is more likely to be selected than one who has more skills and experiences.

In this sense, it is arguable that the vulnerability of the PNG state lies in its own making, which consists of a culture of ineffective and inexperienced leadership that tend to thrive in an environment of deliberate ignorance and flouting of established norms and principles of good governance. Hence the discourse on good governance which anticipates reduction in corruption, increases accountability and instilling of a strong sense of community and responsibility. State failure in this respect is a deviation from an ideal of good governance.

There is a need for more in-depth look at types and extent of state-society interactions. For example, in the PNG case, election-related violence brings about a sense of ambivalence by citizens towards the state: while the procedures of elections to vote for the choice of representatives are diligently adhered to, the extreme, often violent, means by which candidates and their parochial supporters use to ‘win’ votes totally defeats the spirit of free and fair representation. The notion of state failure as arising from the non-delivery of political goods, very much portrays if not reflect to a large extent the contradictions and ambivalence that prevail in the PNG state. While the country has enjoyed harmonious relations with its international neighbors, it has not been able to address effectively its own internal security where the prevalence of criminal elements
and related dangers threaten citizens and their personal security. In terms of the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, has been keeping the faltering PNG state in checks and balances without coercion or intimidation (e.g., May, 2003). Following from that, democratic principles and rules of political participation have constantly been adjudicated by an independent judiciary and this has reproduced equilibrium and order between the state and civil society and help to maintain general stability and progress within society.

A global society of states has been produced so that instability within a nation tends to affect other nations or the international community in one way or another. This is exemplified in the PNG state where its inability to handle the national economy well prompted the World Bank to recommend some structural adjustment programs. The result is that this has caused internal dissent and strain among civil society and the state with the former rejecting the World Bank's policy. The state, in this respect, is not able to reconcile what international organizations expect with the needs and aspirations of civil society.

Starting from the premise of PNG as a weak state, Dinnen's analysis of the PNG indicates that there is no effective penetration of the state into all aspects of society. Also the state is not able to regulate effective social relationships and extract resources and appropriate or use resources in a determined as well as a sustained and consistent manner. Dinnen's analysis of three broad case studies suggests that the PNG state has not been
able to perform well the three core functions. This can be attributed to a wide array of factors and elements that are either inherent in the cultural setting or in the legacy of the state itself.

Conclusion

There is an overt inadequacy of the failed state discourse to take into account how political ideology has helped shaped what one has to say or write something about failed states. For example, in nearly all of the paradigms of state failure the writers are virtually from liberal democratic societies and they expound on their arguments from that perspective. Therefore socialist states like Cuba and China are not included in their analysis. Thus there is a need to devise a value-free if not universal model of analysis that should include such societies. That model should be able to take into account universal issues such as poverty and human rights.

In this thesis the use of democracy has been predicated on what Dahl calls the ‘logic of equality’ (1998: 22). He describes democracy as: Effective participation, equality in voting, gaining enlightened understanding, exercising final control over the agenda and inclusion of adults. Of course one cannot overlook the fact that there are two dimensions of democracy: the ideal and the empirical. Virtually all nations have a combination of both operating. My conclusion here is that the PNG state exercises a
combination of ideal democracy and actual results of this via individuals’ own interpretations of ideal democracy given limits and circumstances.

My view of the phenomenon of the failed state is that certain global trends and/or events tend to impinge on local subjective perceptions and socio-economic structures to produce a broad spectrum of heterogeneous expressions of varying forms and consequences within individuals regardless of the political, social, and cultural domains of societies. It arises out of an individual’s need to articulate the objective changes that are impinging on his/her usual subjective way of life. In the context of this thesis, state actors and agents such as politicians and bureaucrats adopt modern formal institutions of government into their traditional systems of socioeconomic progress. This results in instances of bad governance, corruption, nepotism, etc. On a micro-level of social interaction, these expressions are found to emanate from a certain consciousness resulting from interaction between contemporary socio-political structure and human agency. The inspiration for this possibility is taken from an excerpt on the sociology of knowledge:

Society is viewed...as a dialectic between objective givenness and subjective meanings – that is, as being constituted by the reciprocal interaction of what is experienced as outside reality (specifically, the world of institutions that confronts the individual) and what is experienced as being within the consciousness of the

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23 I say ‘mostly between and within’ state actors and agencies because I assume that the society at large is ignorant and docile due to the lack of political socialization and shared values of a national community and that it is those elected as well as self-proclaimed representatives who tend to take advantage of the ignorance and apathy of the society at large.
individual. Put differently, *all social reality has an essential component of consciousness*. The *consciousness of everyday life* is the web of meanings that allow the individual to navigate through ordinary events and encounters of his life with others...Consciousness...does not refer to ideas, theories or sophisticated constructions of meaning. The consciousness of everyday life is most of the time, *pre-theoretical consciousness*. Therefore, the sociology of knowledge must not concern itself primarily with the analysis of theoretical consciousness like the history of ideas or the history of philosophy, but rather *with the consciousness of ordinary people as they lead their ordinary lives* (Berger, et al., 1974: 12; emphasis original and added).

Applied to the context of this thesis, this consciousness is also the result of individual *interpretation* of how introduced models of governance and bureaucracy can be adapted or modified to suit the indigenous culture and society in order to fulfill primordial expectations of social exchanges, obligations, and reproduction.

Using western concepts of progress and change, it is obvious that ‘traditional’ or indigenous interpretations do not feature very much in explaining the marked discrepancies prevalent between the eternal divide that separates the “First World” and the “Third World”. This notion of Eurocentricism does not provide an adequate balance for explaining the intermingling of western models of governance and civil society and indigenous representations of social, political and economic life. We can conceive of the
outcome as social change resulting from the intermingling of European models and indigenous interpretations of these models. I am inspired by what Robillard says about social change:

Social change has no constancy or generality. Social change occurs whenever there is a discourse of its articulation. Social change occurs in whatever form and from whatever source discourse stipulates. Therefore social change can be in any discourse, even discourse that attributes social change to the spirits. *It is a mistake to reduce everything to production of an instrumental reflective ego, an event in bourgeois discourse* (Robillard, 1992: 21. Emphasis added).

Thus having a failing state such as the PNG case is indeed social change because as individuals within the doomed state system grope for a way out of the present dilemma, they create totally new experiences – experiences that need new outlooks not only in a negative light but as an opportunity to challenge ‘bourgeois discourse’.

The dominant discourse that determines social change in contemporary PNG is that the tribal and familial obligations take precedence over individual and self-centered ones because the tribe and the family are PNG’s version of the western models of the welfare and social security systems. The PNG state does not provide social security benefits to its citizens. There is mutual dependence between individuals and their families and/tribes. It is thus the norm that an individual who becomes a politician or who works
in a public office must first see to it that his/her tribe or family’s needs are taken care of first before other priorities can be considered.

So how does the tribe and family dimension feature in the failed state discourse? The simple conclusion is that instead of serving the interests of the nation, individuals within the state system use the state’s public resources for their own benefit and personal uses, thereby incapacitating the state’s ability to perform its functions of delivering the three political goods. Thus cultural considerations certainly help to explain how resources of the state are being diverted causing state failure or weakness.

This area should be the focus of further inquiries in order to understand why people act the way they act. The matter is not only confined to corruption within government offices and institutions. It should be extended to investigate why there is a phenomenal persistence of tribal warfare as in the highlands of PNG or ethnic violence in the streets and squatter settlements of the capital city of Port Moresby. It should also be extended to understand why there are wanton and indiscriminate killings of innocent people by criminal elements who also challenge the legitimacy of the state and its ability to provide internal security for its citizens.

Such dynamic upheavals within society may be attributed to lack of proper socialization into the modern civil way of living and interacting. It may also be attributed to how the general population view themselves within the broader framework of the
nation. In my interaction with people in PNG, most people do not see themselves as Papua New Guineans but as Sepiks, Engans, or Taris. Some even go as far as evoking the name of their tribal totems or village names as a source of personal pride, competition, and arrogance. It is as though people want to get as many personal benefits as they can out of this ‘imagining’ or ‘invention’ called Papua New Guinea, without articulating a clear interest or reason for having to live within the already-demarcated national boundary. There is little personal obligation or recognition from most people in helping to perpetuate feelings of patriotism and unity. This is deeply contrasted here in America where people tend to display the national flag in their homes, offices and vehicles. Such is rare in everyday PNG life except on independence anniversaries or other national celebrations.

This thesis is a personal undertaking to articulate the strengths and weaknesses of the PNG state. It arises out of a deep personal disillusionment with how the present state in PNG is faring both internally and externally. My focus of attention is on those state officials (members of parliament and top bureaucrats) whose handling of the state institutions have left much to be desired. However, rather than making a sweeping statement and impression about the state in PNG, I wanted to move beyond this simple rhetoric and traverse the overall scenario of the failed state phenomenon using a holistic approach.
This entails analyzing recent literature on specific instances of state failure and collapse as well as how the vernacular of state collapse and failure has been conceptualized given the diverse experiences and occurrences of the phenomenon of state failure.

An overall impression, then, is that while sharing similarities with examples from other failed or weak states, the PNG state has its own unique problems associated with the phenomenon of failed state and it is mostly concerned with the welfare aspect of the state's core functions.

In the light of the foregoing analysis and discussions, some root causes of state failure in the PNG case are outlined as follows:

1. The processes of colonization and decolonization are themselves both means and ends. In creating a nation it was obvious that the overall social structure was very much far removed and certainly not compatible with the introduction of European models of governance and civil living. Thus instead of individuals *adapting*, these introduced institutions are *adopted* into the local culture and subsequently modified to suit the local circumstances and conditions. The end result is that these institutions can now work for individuals and not individuals working for the institutions.

2. There has been no clear and consistent vision of sustaining the new nation once it gained independence from its colonial masters. A large part of the problem lies
with the indigenous educated elite of the pre-independence era who saw the colonial masters as obstacles to their own ideals of personal wealth and prosperity. The idea of a national unity had to be made acceptable if their distorted visions were to be realized.

3. There is a serious lack of national consciousness and a common mindset. Consequently, it is obvious that people are getting into ‘the system’ and helping themselves to state resources. As these instances of ‘self-help’ increase, attempts at sustaining the national consciousness recede into the background of national progress.

4. The presence of landowners and resource owners has been seen as a formidable force in its own right when it comes to determining who or what is the overall authority in the land. This factor does not necessarily cause the state to fail but its mere presence does present the state some obstacles in carrying out its core functions. This becomes noticeable when landowners in resource-rich areas take up arms to demand the state to consider their views about benefits in a favorable light.

5. Inexperienced and unethical leadership paves the way for incompetence and thus ignorance of rules and norms of proper institutional behavior and official conduct. The prevalence of a culture of institutional corruption is deeply embedded in public institutions which in turn renders ineffective the ability of the state to deliver or produce core political goods it is supposed to deliver. For example, a former prime minister once contended that corruption within the PNG state and its
public institutions is both ‘systemic and systematic’ – systemic because it have invaded that whole process of policymaking and decision-making, and systematic because it is organized and often highly sophisticated (Windybank and Manning, 2003: 4).

Coupled with corruption is the perception that nepotism is entrenched at the highest levels in government and bureaucracy. The arbitrary appointment of clan members or political cronies to public office, regardless of merit, has politicized and destabilized the bureaucracy and state-owned enterprises, most of which are running at a huge loss (ibid.).

In the analysis against cases from other failed states, it would appear that the PNG case may not be as grim as what is currently perceived. But this does not mean that the dimensions of failure or weakness experienced in the PNG state are less severe or less extreme than those experienced in other countries. Rather, in its own unique ways, the PNG case has been faced with serious chronic weakness where both the symptoms and the cause have not been properly grasped and eradicated.
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