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DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS, LEADERSHIP STYLES, AND POPULAR ATTITUDES: KOREA'S DEVELOPMENT POLITICS (1948-1972)

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

DECEMBER 1974

By

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"Development" is a multi-faceted concept. It is basically a Western social value which was largely created after World War II. In the process of its transplantation to the so-called backward societies, which often have their own centuries-old indigenous social values, the concept did not have any clear and well-defined meaning attached to it, thus making choices by the top leaders of the newly independent nations wide open.

The Republic of Korea, for example, is a good case in point. Three regimes of the Korean political system during their quarter century effort at "development" have not yet presented a clear and systematic picture of "development" in a way that this alien, imposed concept may clarify and project a future image for that particular society.

The development patterns chosen, the political leadership styles exerted, and the popular attitudes responding seem largely to be responsible for this failure. That is, political goals and means, the combination of which produces development patterns, seem to help shape particular political leadership styles, and leadership styles together with development patterns are subject to public responses, which, in turn, affect the ups and downs of the regimes engaging in societal development. The centuries-old indigenous social values of the Korean political system, in
a multiple way, are involved in the dynamics of the politics of "development" which in the Korean version is a vicious circle of unsystematic and non-directional changes which do not project a future image for the Korean political system and which perpetuate an extreme authoritarianism in political leadership that does not allow a peaceful transition of political power.

In order to have "successful" Korean development in the future, therefore, there must be, in the first place, an accurate and well-balanced interpretation of "development" that clarifies and projects a future image of the Korean political system, and, secondly, policies on the basis of such an interpretation of "development" that are able to change the centuries-old indigenous political culture without excessive friction. And for doing this, a more "human-populist" type of development, a more "democratic but consistent" political leadership, and a popular attitude which will voluntarily comply with various rules of the ball game named democracy are suggested.
INTRODUCTION

Korean society has experienced three regimes within a quarter century: The Syngman Rhee government (1948-1960); the John M. Chang cabinet (1960-1961); and the Chung-hee Park regime (1961- ). Having been liberated and become newly independent after World War II, one of the prime tasks that each of these governments had to undertake was "societal development"—a concept that was imposed upon the Korean political system by the West from the time of the birth of the first regime, and that includes all possible aspects of "development," such as political, administrative, economic, social, and so forth.

In fact, each regime claims to have done or still to be doing its business of "societal development." Despite the fact that each of the three regimes did this, their goal-priorities toward "development" are different, and the means to achieve them are different. None of their top leadership are identical in nature and style. Besides, popular attitudes toward "development" as well as political leadership vary.

For example, "national independence," "democratization of society," "national unification through 'March-to-the-North'," and "anti-Japanism" were some of the top priority goals under the Syngman Rhee government. The means used to
achieve these major goals were in the first place the bureaucracy, which was a by-product of colonial domination, plus a handful of traditional elites who either participated in the independence movement abroad or represented the upper class of traditional Korean society. Later, he created a political party (the Liberal Party [Jayu Dang]) in the name of popular participation, but in reality the party was formed solely for the purpose of extending his rule rather than for enhancing "development."

A descendant of an aristocrat family of traditional Korea who later became a Western Ph.D. from Princeton University, he portrayed himself with the self-images of the "national hero" and "founding father." His leadership is generally classified as either "charismatic" or "authoritarian." People at one time admired him as a "national hero," but later denounced him as a "dictator."

"Civil liberties," "economic construction," "national unification through the U.N. intervention," and "normalization of relationship with Japan" were major slogans for the John M. Chang cabinet. The principal means to actualize these policies under his cabinet were through negotiations with opposing factions in his own party (the Democratic Party [Minju Dang]).

A product of Manhattan College in New York City and also with "yangban" class (traditional Korean upper class) background, his leadership is generally viewed as "democratic,"
and although often also called "ambivalent" or "incapable."
To some people he is viewed as a "true democratic leader"
and to others he is regarded as a "mild Catholic priest" or
a "calm theologian."

"Anti-communism," "economic development," "modernization
of the fatherland," and "national revitalization" are
some of the foremost developmental values as well as goals
of the Chung-hee Park regime. His means of achieving these
goals are rather straightforward; he has heavily relied on
bureaucracy and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency,
both of which consist largely of military elites, although
he, too, created a political party (the Democratic Republican
Party [Minju Kongwha Dang]).

An offspring of a poverty-stricken farm family who later
became an honor cadre of the Japanese Imperial Army, his
leadership is generally known to be either highly "deter-
mined" or "authoritarian." Popular attitudes under his
regime seem to be "polarized"; on the one hand, there are
those who almost fanatically accept the development policies
as proposed by his regime and follow his leadership
enthusiastically; on the other hand, there seem obviously
those who are dissident, or apathetic toward the policies as
well as the leadership.

Despite their efforts at "development," two of the
three regimes were ousted. The April Student Revolution in
1960 toppled the Syngman Rhee government, and the May coup
d'état swept out the John M. Chang cabinet in 1961. The Chung-hee Park regime suspended its own constitution in 1972 by proclaiming martial law, dissolving the National Assembly and drastically changing the system, changes which it calls the "October Revitalization."

These variations in the Korean case in such variables as patterns of development, leadership styles, and popular attitudes, with their possible impacts upon "societal development," seem to provide an empirical basis for research. Besides, there is a practical reason for doing research on Korean development—that is, the present writer himself is a member of that particular polity and personally deeply concerned with the future course of "development" of that society. Hence, the decision to study Korea.

Assuming that the primary task of each of the three regimes is to bring about self-imposed "development," and the author's concern with Korean "development" is as such, it seems justifiable for the writer to start out by hypothesizing that changes in regimes may be related to the success or failure each of these Korean regimes achieved in bringing about "development" which in turn may be accounted for in terms of such variables as development patterns, political leadership, and popular attitudes towards them. Besides, more than half a decade of concern as a student in the field of "development politics" seems to suggest to the present writer that there are theoretical grounds to believe that
such variables as patterns of development, leadership styles, and popular attitudes are vitally important in the concerned field of study. Accordingly, it is the purpose of this dissertation to look into these variables and their possible relationships to "societal development."

In doing this I will divide the thesis into two parts. Part I will deal with the possible theoretical implications of these variables. More specifically, I will make an attempt in Chapter I to conceptualize the term "development" in terms of relationships between "developmental" goals and means, for in my view political goals and means are the most powerful and useful determinants of "development patterns." In Chapter II, I will investigate the roles of political leadership as well as popular attitudes in relation to "development." This should be done because those who carry out "development" are without doubt both the leaders and the led in the political system. Then, some hypotheses will be drawn, in Chapter III, as to the possible relationships between these variables—development patterns, political leadership styles and popular attitudes.

There will be three chapters in Part II. Chapter IV will review the traditional political culture of Korean society and consider some of its implications to the ongoing politics of "development" in Korea. This chapter is necessary because as will be shown "development" as the term is used in this study is not a concept "indigenous" to the traditional
Korean polity, and any idiosyncrasies in Korean "development" may better be accounted for in terms of the legacies of traditional political culture. Chapter V will make an attempt to evaluate the three regimes of the Korean society as to their development patterns, leadership styles, and popular attitudes, investigating their relationships with "societal development" and its subsequent impacts on each regime. Hypotheses drawn in Chapter III will be tested here. In doing this, findings from Chapter IV will be used as a compensatory reference whenever it is deemed necessary to do so. In Chapter VI, which is also the final chapter, conclusions of the research will be drawn and some possible policy guidelines for future "developmentalists" of the Korean society will be advanced.
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"Development" is a multi-dimensional concept, as most theorists have recognized. Yet, it still seems safe to say that no definition of this word is acceptable to a broad consensus of scholars. Inasmuch as the concept per se is multi-faceted, there seems, however, to exist various ways in which this term may be classified and defined meaningfully. Each of these ways begins with certain criteria which are pertinent to the purpose of particular investigations. For example, those who accept as convenient the subcategorizations of the social sciences will view "development" as divisible into political, economic, and social dimensions. Others will choose to specify the concept as a


2This is the most widely taken stance in defining "development" in the field.
dependent, independent, or intervening variable. Still others might consider it more important to classify the concept in terms of normative or empirical criteria.

Keeping in mind the semantic problems and the diversity of emphases as well, the present writer believes that there are four ideal-typical development theories. Of the four theories, two are related to goals served by "development" and the other two to means used to implement goals. In my opinion, "development" means "change" and such change becomes more meaningful when its directions, for better or worse, are projected. And it is the goals of a polity that gives directions to such changes. There are many who perceive change in this directional sense. Among them, Robert Chin's

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4 Ibid., pp. 172-182.


6 Samuel P. Huntington's motion of "Political Development and Political Decay" is significant here. World Politics, XVII (April, 1965), pp. 386-430.

7 For example, stages theorists like W. W. Rostow and A.F.K. Organski view change in this directional sense when the former formulates development in terms of five incremental stages and the latter in four. See their books, The Stages of Economic Growth (London: Cambridge University
conception of change seems to be relatively rigorous, for he perceives change not merely in terms of direction but also suggests a clue as to what makes change directional—the goal a polity purports to bring about. He writes:

Developmental models postulate that the system under scrutiny—a person, a small group, inter-personal interactions, an organization, a community or a society—is going "somewhere"; that the changes have some direction. The direction may be defined by (1) some goal or end state (developed, mature), (2) the process of becoming (developing, maturing), or (3) the degree of achievement toward some goal or end state (increased development, increase in maturity).

Hence, "development" is a goal-oriented term.

Another important aspect of the concept "development" is that directional change always presupposes certain means by which the process of becoming or the degree of achievement is being pushed forward or fostered. For instance, institutionalization of democratic political processes, and bureaucratic reform to encourage administrative achievement and five-year economic plans for economic growth are some of the measures


Also, systems theorists like G. A. Almond and G. B. Powell, Jr. imply that there involves a certain chain of directions when one thinks of changes in a political system, and they go on to say, "When one variable in a system changes in magnitude or quality, the others are subject to strains and are transformed; the system changes its pattern of performance, or the unruly component is disciplined by regulatory mechanism." See their co-authored book, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1968), p. 19.

8 Robert Chin, "The Utility of System Models and Developmental Models," in Janson L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable, eds.,
that scholars often cite as instruments conducive to "development." Although the ultimate goals of such instruments are political democracy, administrative efficiency, and increase in wealth, respectively, the institutionalization, bureaucratic reform, and five-year economic plans, per se, are regarded as "development." Hence, "development" is also a means-oriented term.

Combining these two aspects, we can safely say that "development" is a goal- and means-oriented concept. This implies that there are different types (patterns) of "development," depending upon the different combinations of goals and means.

1.1 Human Development vs. Technological Development. Let us first of all turn our attention to goals. Tentatively we will define "goal" as an "end state," or "desired result," of the "development" process. "Development" may be classified according to the kinds of goals sought and the extent to which goals are actualized.

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9Edward W. Weidner suggests "functionally differentiated system change" as a means to "development administration." He also conceives of this means as an important ingredient of "development administration" itself. See his book, Development Administration in Asia (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1970), pp. 3-24.
In this connection, Michael Haas suggests one way to classify developmental goals in his examination of the representative literature in the field. He believes that there are two theories that deal with different kinds of developmental goals. One is what he terms human development theory, whereby the goals are the cosmopolitanization of the population, the breakdown of residential segregation, the increase in social mobility, the creation of a compatible life style among the population, and a broad distribution of social values to all strata. Advocates of this theory typically use the term "nation-building." The other is what he terms technological theory of development, in which the basic problem for a developing country is to increase resources and achieve economic wealth over time, a common synonym for which approach is the term "modernization."

The main implication of this suggestion is that it is possible to draw distinct lines between goals if it is necessary to do so for a certain purpose. In human development theory, goals are more general, abstract, spiritual,


intangible, more complex and difficult to operationalize. On the other hand, in **technological theory**, the goals are specific, concrete, physical (material), tangible, and more readily operationalizable. Each of these theories singles out a societal attribute for emphasis— that is, demographic characteristics and resources, respectively.

These theories are adopted in practice, also. For example, Sukarno's Indonesia, by its ideology of "guided democracy," made an effort to actualize the idea of human development. "Pantja sila," unity, return to the revolution or spirit of 1945, and "Gotong-rojong and mufakat" are some of the symbols for this. Meiji Japan, on the other hand, concentrated primarily on the technological aspect of "development." Progressive statesmen applied commendable zeal and energy to transplant a variety of Western economic and industrial institutions to Japan. They did so in order to engage the nation's enthusiasm and give direction to the complex forces let loose by the industrial awakening.

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Populist Means vs. Elitist Means. Having developed a distinction between theories of development according to goals that are chosen, the next task is to conceptualize alternative theories of means to these goals. The means used to achieve goals are not self-evident, for there are many possible means from which to choose.

Here again Michael Haas gives a useful conceptual taxonomy, namely, populist and elitist approaches. In populist theory, he says, one must capture the hearts and minds of mass publics in pursuing development. Therefore, studies of national attitudes are of great significance. In a populist regime the salience of the development process should increase over time and be embraced by all regions of the country; moreover, there should be so much public interaction that the populace will become more attitudinally homogeneous, subcultures acquiring more empathy for one another.14

Elitists, on the other hand, assert that political leaders, rather than mass, must provide the know-how to bring about development. According to this view, elites should grow in size, become scattered about the countryside,

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be cohesive in times of stress, avoid internal rivalry between cliques in and out of power, and tackle festering or dormant social conflict situations through direct elite intervention. Similar to theories of goals, populism and elitism single out different societal attributes for emphasis. These are popular attitudes for populists and elite behavior for elitists.  

A typical example of the use of populist means is development through the victory of a political party, such as the heyday of the Liberal Party in nineteenth century England. Parties are organizations through which popular interests are expressed, and they serve to aggregate those interests.  

Another example of populist development is via mass movements and social mobilization. The national independence movements in former colonial areas and the "Cultural Revolution" in China embody populist means. In these cases, the leaders appeal directly to the populace, promoting a consciousness of the needs and rewards of


development, thereby seeking development through popular participation.\textsuperscript{17}

The elitist approach is a common strategy in developing countries. The bureaucracy typically is used as a means for carrying out developmental goals. Almost all the newly independent nations since World War II began development by utilizing a bureaucracy that was inherited from the colonial period. This is partly because the bureaucracy, under colonial rule, was the only institution in which national elites were recruited and trained in modern methods of government. Moreover, after new states emerged mass populations were still ignorant of technology and their degree of political consciousness was generally very low. Under such circumstances it was inevitable for the bureaucracy to assume the primary responsibility for developing the country.\textsuperscript{18} The military is yet another instrument of elitist development. "The significant fact for our consideration is," Lucian W. Pye notes, "that the armies created by colonial administration and by the newly emergent countries have been consistently among the most modernized institutions in their societies."\textsuperscript{19} Besides, in countries in which other

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Ibid., pp. 40-41.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} S. C. Dube, "Bureaucracy and Nation Building in Transitional Societies," in Finkle and Gable, eds., \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 403-408.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in Finkle and Gable, eds., \textit{op. cit.}, p. 380.
\end{itemize}
organizations exist but have not yet been able to function effectively, military men are viewed not only as possible saviors but also as alternative agents of development.  

We have so far examined "social development" in terms of its goals and means. The choice between such categories as human development and technological development is a matter of controversy within developing countries. Populist and elitist means are also controversial alternatives within developing nations. However, since developmental goals and means are dichotomized for the moment, we can derive a two-by-two matrix as shown in Figure 1.

1.3 Development Patterns. For political leaders, theoretically, only four options are available, according to our matrix: (A) they can choose to promote human development through populist means; (B) they can set up technological development as their goal, trying to carry that goal out by populist means; (C) they may apply elitist means to pursue human development; or (D) they may try to bring about technological development by elitist means.

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<td>(B)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elitist Means</td>
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Figure 1: Development Patterns

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20 Ibid., pp. 383-385.
In reality, however, there seem to be reasons for political leaders to choose a particular development pattern rather than another. Thus, Milton J. Esman writes:

Whatever energy (governing) elites may succeed in mustering, they work within the social cultural, and physical environment that constrain all social engineers. They must cope with a complex of real problems, only partially controllable or predictable, which are often not of their own making, yet are vital to the survival and welfare of the community they are governing . . . but the physical and cultural objects and events with which they must work are not indefinitely tractable to their design. Elites who disregard these constraints invite frustration and even disaster; those who defer timidly to situational obstacles fail to realize the development potentials of their societies. 21

Furthermore, we should not presuppose that all the development patterns are equally conducive to "societal development." On the contrary, different development patterns can end up with different degrees of "societal development." And it is possible that there may be different degrees of "societal development" even under identical development patterns, depending upon different intervening factors such as political leadership styles and popular attitudes that the development patterns involve. In this connection, again Milton J. Esman's evaluation of different regime styles in developing areas is worthwhile to note. He says:

There is no reason to believe that all types of regimes in the developing areas are equally capable of organizing and energizing their societies to accomplish these development tasks. On the contrary, the different structures, values, power configurations, and styles of regimes may profoundly affect these capabilities. It therefore seems relevant and useful both for analysis and for ultimate policy guidance to prove the relative capacities of various regime types to guide the modernization process.22

22Ibid., p. 87.
CHAPTER II
LEADERSHIP STYLES AND POPULAR ATTITUDES

Throughout our conceptualization of political development in terms of developmental goals and means, our implicit underlying assumption is that it is primarily the responsibility of political leaders to articulate the goals as they consider them important for national development. They also select whichever means they consider proper to attain these goals they value. Accordingly, we need to specify our approach to the study of political leadership.

In general, it is observed that there has been a lack of, or the neglect of, political leadership studies in political science.¹ This situation is especially true with the field of development politics. Thus, Charles A. Micaud points out that political science has somewhat neglected the problem of political leadership and its impact on development.² There is another writer who supports this view. Robert A. Packenham writes:

¹According to Glenn D. Paige, only 17 articles with titles mentioning "leaders" or "leadership" appeared in the American Political Science Review over a 57 year period from 1906 to 1963 out of a total of 2,614. See his paper titled "Toward a Developmental Political Leadership Profile for a Total Society," unpublished seminar paper (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, July, 1971), p. 2.

There is a woeful lack of theoretical knowledge about political leadership in developing countries. Indeed, the situation is much the same even with respect to leadership in the United States, where political life is studied much more intensively. ³

The reasons for this lack or neglect of political leadership studies are diverse. Some argue that leadership is not a fixed set of qualities possessed or even sought by all leaders everywhere, and the characteristics relevant for leadership vary with the situation. ⁴

Others contend that this is because political leadership is a variable that does not lend itself well to empirical and comparative analysis. ⁵ Still others find that the very nature of the roles that are played by, and expected of, political leaders as initiators of development policies, are considered of lesser relevance than the impact of economic, social, and cultural forces in which the leader appears as little more than a marginal actor doomed to fail if he attempts to manipulate forces necessarily beyond his control. ⁶

Despite all the handicaps in theorizing on political leadership in relation to development politics, there is a


⁵ Micaud, op. cit. ⁶ Ibid.
growing need to develop such theories. For it is, in the first place, the political leaders who choose among alternative behaviors and these choices have important impacts on public policies. Secondly, political leaders, as individuals and aggregates, make significant contributions to patterns of societal development. And furthermore, as far as developing countries are concerned, economic, social, and cultural forces can, more often than not, be the very products of active political leadership behavior. In this connection, Yehezkel Dror perceives that there is the need for improvement of leadership, and he goes on to say:

One of the most critical resources for modernization is the high-level political elite, that is leadership. The "nation building" aspects of modernization, the need for widespread active popular participation and enthusiasm, the necessary broad scope of governmental activities—-all these (and additional) needs combine to make the role of political leadership in "avant-garde" development countries a critical one and a very difficult one. The qualities required for successful leadership in development countries are much more demanding than those needed in modern states, in which the political elite does not attempt far-going directed social change, and in which the political elite is only one component of a highly developed social guidance

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7Barber, op. cit.
8Paige, op. cit.
9This is the major theme of Glenn D. Paige's "Rediscovery of Politics," in Montgomery and Siffin, eds., op. cit., pp. 49-58. The difference between the two Koreas in economic, social, and even cultural spheres after a separation of more than twenty years can only be accounted for by the difference in political leadership that the two societies have experienced.
cluster. At the same time, conditions in development countries are hardly conducive to spontaneous growth of political elite having the required qualities. The resulting inadequacies constitute one of the most difficult barriers to modernization, which frustrate most contemporary modernization policies. This diagnosis is well recognized both by modern theories of development and by development advisors and development-encouraging agencies. Nevertheless, practically nothing is being done to try and improve leadership in development countries. 10

So much for the current standing of political leadership research, especially in regard to development politics. I will now turn my attention to my own approach to political leadership. My major concern here is to develop a theory of political leadership styles. In doing this, I will first look at several conventionally representative conceptualizations of political leadership and the role of leadership in societal development. Then I will consider popular attitudes in relation to political leaders and their leadership in development politics. Finally, I will define leadership styles in relational terms between the leaders and the followers.

2.1 Role of Political Leadership in Societal Development.

There are many definitions of political leadership, although this concept is not so complex as that of development. The diversity of definition of political leadership

stems from various emphases upon which one describes leadership phenomena. For example, there are those who emphasize individual quality and define the leader as an individual high in his ability of performance and competent in social relationships with other people. According to this theory, leadership is "the behaviors of an individual when he is directing the activities of a group toward a shared goal."\textsuperscript{11}

Another way of perceiving leadership is based on group dynamics. According to this approach, an emphasis is given to functional role of a leader in group syntality and leadership is defined as "the performance of those acts which helps the group achieve its objectives, moving the group toward its goals, improving the quality of the interactions among the members, building the cohesiveness of the group or making resources available to the group."\textsuperscript{12}

Still others emphasize the needs of, and the satisfactions to, the group, and leadership is existent when some individual fulfills these requirements. Ordway Tead characterizes the act of leadership along with this line and he writes:

\begin{flushright} \textsuperscript{11}A. W. Halpin and B. J. Winer, The Leadership Behavior of the Airplane Commander (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Research Foundation, 1952), p. 6. \end{flushright}

\begin{flushright} \textsuperscript{12}Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, Group Dynamics: Research and Theory (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 3rd ed., 1968), p. 304. \end{flushright}
Leadership is the activity of influencing people to cooperate toward some goal which they come to find desirable. . . . The unique emphasis in the idea of leading . . . is upon the satisfaction and sense of self-fulfillment secured by followers of the true leaders. . . .

Harold D. Lasswell puts an emphasis upon relative influence in decision-making and goes on to assert: "it counts for who participates how often and with what weight in decisions and choices. If influence is equally shared, every participant in the situation belongs to the elite. If sharing is unequal, the most influential are called elite; others are mid-elite and rank-and-file." The implication of this assertion is that leadership is existent wherever decision-making takes place, and that the influence is usually skewed to some one rather than to others in any decision-making process.

For my purpose, the essence of leadership lies in an individual or a group of persons when he or they set(s) group goals and provide(s) the moving spirit, the prevailing ethos and the sense of purpose and direction that determine the quality of, and shape the form of, societal development. In operational terms, leaders consist of an individual or a group of persons whose influence frequently operates in


making crucial decisions, and establishing the basic tactics and strategy of the total political struggle within and among major political forces. More specifically, top-level political leaders choose developmental goals and means, and by dealing with popular responses toward the chosen development pattern, through various methods, shaping up the direction and quality of societal development.

2.2 Role of Popular Attitudes in Societal Development.

Although it is the responsibility of political leaders to choose goals and means, and thereby, select particular developmental style, it is possible to think of various responses of the governed toward the choice of goals and means. In fact, there is a study that defines leadership in relational terms between leaders and followers. Paul Pigors writes:

Leadership is a process of mutual stimulation which, by the successful interplay of relevant individual differences, controls human energy in the pursuit of a common cause. On this basis we might define any person as a follower during the time when, and in so far as, he accepts and is directed by the will, feeling, and insight of another in the pursuit of a cause which the other represents. According to this definition the general function of a follower is to cooperate in a common cause under the direction of the leader. He helps to actualize the leader's ideas, sometimes modifying them in the common aim. One might classify followers on the basis of predominant interest. But a more fruitful method seems to be to classify them according to the degree in which they understand and share in the common aim. This determines the manner in which they cooperate with the leader and their degree of independence. For if they have a good grasp of the whole purpose and their part in it, they are capable of constructive work of their own. But if they have no understanding
or interest of anything more than obeying detailed orders. They can be useful only under constant supervision.15

Similarly, we can conceive of popular attitudes in terms of degrees of their understanding or rejection toward the developmental goals and means that are directed by the leaders, and relate them to the formation of leadership styles. For example, followers may accept the leaders' goals and means as congruent to their own. If this is the case, the development style by the leaders will tend to last, and a peaceful adaptation by the followers to the newly created conditions may occur. A second case emerges when the followers agree partially but partially disagree with the leaders. For example, the populace may accept the goals perceived by the leaders but reject the means applied by the leaders, or vice versa. Under such circumstances some kinds of political bargaining processes are likely to mediate between the leaders and the led; the attitudes of the followers toward the development pattern chosen by the leaders will tend to be ambivalent. The third and final case is that the led and the leaders are totally incongruent in terms of their preferred goals and means. If this is the case, then the led will tend to be hostile toward the newly created conditions, and as a result the probability of popular unrest will increase.

2.3 **Leadership Styles.** In dealing with popular attitudes and responses, the leaders also have various methods of action. They can resort to such modes of action as peaceful concession, friendly persuasion, bargaining, coercive imposition, and so forth. The various kinds of methods chosen by leaders in coping with the followers' responses serve as criteria for determining leadership styles. In this connection, Samuel H. Barnes writes:

> By leadership I mean the nature of the relationship between the leaders and the followers . . . whether the relationship is democratic, authoritarian, manipulatory, or another type.  

For example, when a leader makes concessions or engages in friendly persuasion in dealing with the populace, we may term his leadership style as being "democratic." When coercion or imposition is exercised, such leadership can be called "authoritarian." Bargaining may yield "ambivalent" leadership style. Hence, the popular responses are an intervening factor in the relation to societal development and political leadership. In sum, the relationship between political leadership and societal development is being mediated by popular attitudes.

As to what and why of different leadership styles there are some behavioral science controversies. Among them a most representative one is the personality versus

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situation controversy. According to the personality trait theory, there are certain personality characteristics which account for specific leadership styles, while the situation theory perceives particular leadership styles as functions of societal determinants other than personality traits. But this controversy has recently been resolved by Cecil A. Gibb who formulates the concept of political leadership in a form incorporating both positions.

The traits of leadership are any or all of those personality traits which, in any particular situation, enable an individual to (1) contribute significantly to group locomotion in the direction of a recognized goal and (2) be perceived as doing so by fellow members. 17

For our part, one of the major concerns lies in identifying the possible relationships between development patterns and leadership styles. Thus, inasmuch as we consider certain development patterns as given societal determinants, it could mean that we may put a heavier emphasis on situational theory. And yet, this does not necessarily exclude the possible utility of other approaches. We shall discuss this in the following chapters.

CHAPTER III
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS,
LEADERSHIP STYLES, AND POPULAR ATTITUDES

We have so far concentrated our efforts on conceptualizing and defining variables which we believe may be associated with changes in patterns of societal development. Consequently, development patterns are defined in terms of the goals purported and the means mobilized to achieve these goals by political leaders. Leadership styles are classified by the methods the political leaders adopt in their dealing with the mass population.

Throughout our discussion of development patterns, leadership styles, and popular attitudes, there has been an underlying assumption: that is, any political behavior, whether it is of the political leaders or that of the led, is, in one way or another, a function of political goals and means of that particular political system. To put it differently, the behavior of the governing elites and that of the governed are influenced and regulated by the goals and the means under the particular regime.¹

In Chapter II, we have said that developmental goals and means are something that can be chosen by the political leaders among possible alternatives. Despite the leader's act of goal- and means-selection, the goals and means so chosen in turn may give certain constraints to the effort of political leaders in the process of actualizing the societal development. This is because there is a clear distinction between the act of choosing the political goals and means and the goals and means per se. In other words, political leaders will have a free will to the extent that they can put priorities on some specific goal(s) and means rather than others, but it does not mean that such an act of choice incurs any change in the nature or attributes of chosen political goals and means. For example, if political leaders choose "democracy" as their developmental goal and "popular party" as the means to achieve that goal, then they are selecting Development Style (A) in our typology, where the goal is "human development" and the means "populist." Nevertheless, their act of choosing this particular development style does by no means alter the original nature or attributes of "democracy" and "popular party."

This point is of great importance to the understanding of the notion that each of the proposed development patterns will consistently have its own nature or attributes which will offer some unique opportunities, and impose limitations
on the behavior of political leaders and the popular attitudes.2

Thus, while societal development is possible under any of the four proposed development patterns, their relative capacities for, and their constraints to, particular political leadership styles as well as to popular attitudes could differ to a significant degree. And it is necessary for us to examine these different aspects of specific development patterns in terms of their impact upon political leadership and upon popular attitudes.

In an ultimate sense, this problem of assessing development patterns is an empirical question. However, it is not impossible for us to give a meaningful answer to this question, largely by drawing from the literature in the field that deals, directly or indirectly, with relationships between development patterns, leadership styles, and popular attitudes. In doing this, we will divide our inquiry into two parts. In the first place, we will consider relationships between development patterns and leadership styles. Then, we will proceed to see how these development patterns as well as leadership styles relate to popular attitudes.

3.1 Development Patterns and Leadership Styles. In dealing with the first problem, since we have typologized development

2Milton J. Esman supports this point. See Esman, op. cit., p. 87.
patterns based upon goals and means, it would be logical to see whether leadership varies according, first of all, to different goals and then, to different means. These goals and means are, of course, those perceived, and applied, by political leaders.

At the outset of our modeling, we have made an assumption that the populace is secondary in terms of choosing the goals and means. In other words, the populace is supposed to respond to the chosen development patterns and, for that matter, to react to particular political leadership styles rather than to directly intervene in the act of political leaders selecting the goals and means, or inducing specific leadership styles.

Let us, therefore, try to follow, in the first place, some literature which deals with the relationships between developmental goals and leadership styles. It seems generally understood that the developmental goals can affect markedly the behavior of leaders.\(^3\) The problem rather seems to be how the goals are related to leadership styles. According to David C. Korten, goal structures in developing countries such as Indonesia, Burma, Malaya, Ghana, and etc. can be divided into two conceptual

categories: namely, "low goal structure" and high goal structure.\textsuperscript{4} By low goal structure, he means the goals which are, to a large extent, "non-operational," "not specific," and "of no time schedule to accomplish." He exemplifies the goals purported in American democracy as a typical symbol of this category. On the other hand, the goals which are within high goal structure are "operational,"\textsuperscript{5} fairly "concrete," and "of a definite time-table of accomplishment." He draws the examples for this latter category from those sought after in Russian communism.\textsuperscript{6}

\textbf{His categorization of "low and high goal structures" seems to be approximate to our typology of developmental goals, which is a "human" and a "technological" model. We also defined "human development" as consisting of goals that are "non-operational," "abstract," implying that such goals


\textsuperscript{5}Originally, March and Simon developed this concept of "operational" and "non-operational" goals. According to them, "when a means of testing actions is perceived to relate a particular goal or criterion with possible courses of action, the criterion will be called operational. Otherwise the criterion will be non-operational." See J. G. March and H. A. Simon, \textit{Organizations} (New York: John Wiley, 1958), p. 155.

\textsuperscript{6}Korten, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 148-149.
are "non-specific" in terms of a time-table of accomplish-
ment, while in "technological development" the goals are
"operational," "concrete," and more "amenable" to a ready
implementation. Hence, we may safely conclude that as far
as the goals are concerned these two approaches can be
held identical.

His operational definitions about leadership styles
rely on what was developed by White and Lippitt:7
"authoritarian" and "democratic" leadership styles are
their major components. White and Lippitt's taxonomy of
leadership styles into authoritarian and democratic modes
is also based upon the kinds of relationship between the
leaders and the group that they are leading. According to
these authors, if all policies, techniques and activity-
steps, and the particular work tasks (including the selection
of work companions for each member of the group) are deter-
mined by the leader with no respect to group responses
toward them, such political leadership is "authoritarian."
On the other hand, leadership is "democratic," if all of
these matters are subject to group discussion and decision
encouraged and assisted by the leaders.8 Since we have
defined our leadership styles on the basis of various

7Ralph K. White and Ronald Lippitt, Autocracy and
Democracy: An Experimental Inquiry (New York: Harper and

8Ibid.
kinds of methods chosen by the leader in coping with the followers' responses toward decisions and policies, there also seems to exist a similarity between these two approaches to the taxonomy of leadership styles, if not a perfect one.

Another factor that the Korten model presupposes important in the explanation of the dynamics between developmental goals and leadership styles is the notion of stress. The term "stress" is used to include actual stress, motivation, desire, etc., which are existent in any political system, and regardless of the source from which it might arise, it will cause "shifts in leadership patterns."9

It is generally suggested in his framework that in the absence of stress, perpetuation of the status quo will tend to be sought after, and this is more likely under the "low goal structure." When stress is introduced into the political system, the status quo is no longer satisfactory, and change is desired in order to reduce the anxiety. This is more probable under the "high goal structure."10

While shifts between democratic and authoritarian leadership can take place at either high or low goal structure, Korten hypothesizes that the direction of the shifts in a high goal structure situation will be only from democratic to authoritarian, and in the low goal structure situation from authoritarian to democratic.11

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10Ibid.
11Ibid.
Figure 2 presents this hypothesis.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low Goal Structure</th>
<th>High Goal Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>non-stress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>non-stress</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The order of goal structures is reversed to adjust to the goal orders used in this thesis.


Figure 2: Goal Structures and Leadership Styles

In sum, inferring from this model, we are able to come up with a hypothesis as to the relationships between the different kinds of goals and their corresponding probable leadership styles. In fact, the Korten hypothesis is that where high goal structures are given greater importance than are low goal structure (and there is more stress to change the status quo in the political system), the leadership tends to be authoritarian; on the other hand, where low goal structures assume more importance than do the high goals (and there is less stress in the political system), democratic leadership tends to be prevalent.12 This hypothesis can perhaps be rewritten in our own terms as below:

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12 Korten, op. cit., p. 163.
If human development is more emphasized than technological development (and there is no eminent stress to change the status quo of the political system), then, democratic leadership will prevail; on the other hand, if technological development is given more importance than is human development (and there is stress to change the status quo of the political system), then, the leadership style tends to be authoritarian.

Having seen the hypothetical relationships between the developmental goals and the leadership styles, we now have to examine the relationships between development means and leadership styles. What we have conceived as "developmental means" is simply the developmental instruments by which to achieve developmental goals. More specifically, these instruments refer to various organizations that are being geared into the (successful) performance of development policies and programs. We illustrated earlier that political parties and popular movements are "populist" means, and bureaucracies and the military-in-politics are "elitist." Hence, our concern is to examine whether there is any difference in leadership styles in the operations of these two different categories of organization.

It is relatively well established in the literature of organizational behavior that different organizations espouse different types of leadership behavior. For instance, C. A. Gibb says, "Both leadership structure and individual leader are determined in large part by the nature of organization in which they occur."\(^{13}\) W. R. Nord, in his

\(^{13}\text{C. A. Gibb, "Leadership," in G. Lindzey and E. Aronson,}
observation of what is called interactionist theory of leadership and organizations, concludes that, in general, different organizational situations require different leadership behavior. Daniel Katz conceives of organizations as parts of social structure and goes on to say that social structure in which leadership is exercised in good part determines the nature of that leadership. Thus, it would be safe to assert at this juncture that there exist certain relationships between leadership styles and development means.

Our next task, then, is to find the directions of leadership styles commensurate with particular categories of organization. Operationally, this is the question of which of the two categories of organization in our terms—"populist" or "elitist"—are more amenable and/or conducive to which of the two leadership styles, democratic or authoritarian. Hahn-been Lee seems to suggest a clue to this question. According to him, we can divide the political elite into two subcategories: power holders, that is, the


power elite, and task-oriented leaders, that is, the task elite. In institutional terms, the chief executive, members of the directorate of the ruling party, and the caucus of the ruling party in the legislature are the power elite, while the cabinet and their politically appointed deputies are the task elite.\textsuperscript{16} He further elaborates:

\begin{quote}
Rarely are these two identical. A normal pattern is one in which older, charismatic, amateur leaders become the power elite, while younger, technocratic, and professional leaders form the task elite. The former are the so-called 'solidarity makers' and the latter the 'instrumental leaders.'\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

Although Lee's conception of the political elite into two subcategorizations is originally based on their composition or function, this composition or function of the political elite derived, in its essence, from the norms and structures of organizations. For example, the power elite's being "solidarity makers" can be interpreted as an attribute expected by the very norms and structures of, let us say, political parties or popular movements. The same can be said of the task elite's being "instrumental leaders."

Their composition or function ultimately reflects the norms and structures of bureaucratic or military organizations. Thus, even here we can say that a certain relation exists between development means and leadership styles.

\textsuperscript{16}Hahn-been Lee, \textit{Korea: Time, Change, and Administration} (Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center Press, University of Hawaii, 1968), pp. 35-36.

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid.
More importantly, the probable (or ideal) nature of such *esprit de corps* is implied. That is, charismatic and amateurish leadership is likely to espouse "populist" means while the leadership based on "elitist" means tends to be technocratic and professional.

Difficult as it may be to make a direct extrapolation from Lee's inventory of leadership, he seems to suggest that under "populist" means, "democratic" leadership seems to be more ideal than authoritarian leadership. This is because in such organizations as the chief executive, the directorate of the party, and the caucus in legislature, popular confidence in them from the general public is without doubt of first consideration. In this situation, friendly persuasion and other democratic methods may be more conducive to secure such popular support. On the other hand, efficiency and effectiveness are of utmost importance to those who are the members of "elitest" means such as the cabinet and their politically appointed lieutenants who lead the bureaucracy and military organizations, under which circumstances more coercion can be justified in the name of effectiveness and efficiency, thus making "authoritarian" leadership style more amenable.

Besides, it seems to be common-sense knowledge that if we compare leadership patterns between competitive, interest-oriented political parties and efficiency- and effectiveness-minded bureaucracy, we find that leadership tends to be more
democratic within the former and more authoritarian within the latter. This common-sense observation may be explicated in terms of role expectation and, for that matter, political socialization. Political socialization for becoming a member of, and role expectations as a member of the American Democratic or Republican parties, or for being an independent, are distinctively different from those of being a member of the White House staff, the State Department, of the F.B.I. Obviously, the former organizations demand more democratic leadership while the latter require more authoritarian leadership. In sum, I hypothesize that the more "populist" the means, the more "democratic" the leadership, and the more "elitist" the means, the more "authoritarian" the leadership.

3.2 Popular Attitudes, Development Patterns and Leadership Styles. Now that two hypotheses have been advanced as to the possible relationships between developmental styles and leadership styles, a consideration about popular attitudes toward development patterns (i.e., the developmental goals plus the development means) and leadership styles is in order. Dissonance theory (also called balance theory) from

18 Differences in leadership patterns between a voluntary association like a Rotary Club and a prison camp can be a supportive example to this observation.
social psychology seems to be helpful in exploring these relationships.

According to this theory, the individual has a basic need to make his attitudes about the world consistent, and to the extent that his attitudes are inconsistent, he is motivated by the resulting dissonance to change one of the beliefs that is out of phase. The motivation for attitude and behavior change stems from an awareness of the inconsistency activated by a particular situation in which the person is involved. The theory when applied to politics asserts that whenever the people and the government become involved in a confrontation, there are two types of beliefs activated in such a confrontation. First are the popular attitudes toward authority (i.e., leadership in our case) and second are the attitudes toward the issue (i.e., development in our case).

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21 Joe Allman gives as an example of this situation a "typical" university confrontation that might occur between students and the university administration over a certain issue. See ibid.
By virtue of this theory, we can, then, come up with a construction of a typology as to the possible attitudes of the governed toward leadership styles and development patterns. For instance, there may be some people who have a positive view of the leadership style exercised and some others who have a more negative view. We can also conceive that some people would be in favor of the chosen development pattern and that others would not. Figure 3 illustrates such popular attitudes toward leadership styles and development patterns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes toward Leadership Style</th>
<th>(+)</th>
<th>(-)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People who accept Leadership Style</td>
<td>Cell(I)</td>
<td>Cell(II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People who reject Leadership Style</td>
<td>Cell(III)</td>
<td>Cell(IV)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

People who accept Leadership Style are in favor of the chosen development pattern. People who reject Leadership Style are not in favor of the chosen development pattern.

*D.P. = development pattern

Figure 3: Popular Attitudes toward Development Patterns and Leadership Styles (Balance Model)

In Cell(I) are the people who are in favor of the chosen development pattern and who also have a positive attitude toward the leadership style that is exercised in carrying out
the development. In Cell(II) are those who are in favor of the development pattern but reject the leadership style. In Cell(III) are the people who accept the leadership style but who are not in favor of the given development pattern. In Cell(IV) are those who not only reject the exercised leadership style but also are not in favor of the development pattern.

Throughout our study, one underlying assumption is that the degree of societal development will be high when both the development pattern and the leadership style are accepted (or supported) by the populace, and the opposite will be the case if both of them are rejected (or opposed). This is rather a self-evident assumption if we accept for the moment the general notion that political stability is positively correlated with smooth societal development and that instability functions negatively toward the societal development.22

Logically, therefore, if the majority of the people hold Cell (I) type attitudes, then societal development will be high, and as a result of this the existing regime will be sustained. On the other hand, if more people have Cell (IV) type attitudes, a high degree of societal development...

22There are many pros and cons to this theory. For a compact discussion on this, see Chapter 15 of Janson L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable, eds., Political Development and Social Change (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2nd ed., 1971), pp. 557-642.
development will be beyond expectation, and there will even be difficulty in maintaining the existing government. What kinds of development pattern and leadership style are more conducive to what kinds of popular attitudes is a separate question yet to be explored. And how much popular acceptance and rejection would mean sustenance or withdrawal of the existing regime is still another question.

The popular attitudes in Cells (II) and (III) would probably contribute to the formation of an atmosphere in which societal development becomes ambivalent. Acceptance of leadership style but rejection of development pattern as in Cell (III) will surely cause inefficiency in terms of concerted energy both by the governing and by the governed toward the direction of positive societal development.

Zealous adherence to a particular development pattern, when there is a clear lack of popular acceptance of given leadership, e.g., as in Cell (II), will certainly result in unsuccessful societal development.

One thing that should be kept in mind when dealing with Cells (II) and (III) is that changes either in popular attitude toward the development pattern or in leadership style will yield different attitudinal groups. For example, in Cell (III), people are not in favor of the ongoing development pattern and if they change this attitude toward a more positive direction, then the group becomes supporters like those in Cell (I). This is also possible when the leaders
present a different development pattern more likely to gain popular acceptance. On the other hand, if the leaders change their leadership style in an attempt to impose the unfavorable ongoing development pattern upon the populace, then it is more probable for popular attitudes to oppose such leadership change, and as a result the group will come to hold the attitude specified in Cell (Iv).

If people in Cell (II) change their attitude toward leadership style and accept it, they will become the group in Cell (I). Also, this is possible if the leaders voluntarily change their leadership style to make it more amenable to popular acceptance. On the other hand, change in developmental pattern either by the leaders or by the led in Cell (II) would not be likely to emerge in this case, for developmental pattern is already proposed by the leaders and approved by the populace. If the leader makes any change in development pattern which is already accepted by the populace, it will probably bring the popular attitude more to the direction of Cell (IV).

When and under what conditions such changes in leadership style and development pattern actually occur is an empirical question. However, speaking in general terms, socio-economic status of the populace seems to be an important variable which accounts for such changes in attitudes toward the leadership style and the development pattern. Seymour M. Lipset, through his examination of
studies on the conditions of the democratic order concludes that the "lower" the socio-economic status, the more favorable attitudes the populace tends to have toward "technological development" plus "elitist means" (Development Pattern D), and "authoritarian" leadership style. On the other hand, the "higher" the socio-economic status the more favorable toward "human" development plus "populist" means (Development Pattern A), and "democratic" leadership.

Lipset states the hypothesized relationships in these words:

The poorer strata everywhere are more liberal or leftist on economic issue; they favor more welfare state measures, high wages, . . . But when liberalism is defined in non-economic terms—as support of civil liberties, internationalism, etc.—the correlation is reversed. The more well-to-do are more liberal, the poorer are more intolerant.

The result analyzed according to occupational status indicates that the lower strata of the working class and the rural population were less likely to support a multi-party system than the middle and upper strata . . . All of these characteristics produce a tendency to view politics and personal relationships in black-and-white terms, a desire for immediate action, an impatience with talk and discussion, a lack of interest in organizations which have a long-range perspective, and a readiness to follow leaders who offer a demonological interpretation of the evil forces . . .

Public opinion data from a number of countries indicate that the lower classes are much less committed to democracy as a political system than are the urban middle and upper classes. . . . Many studies in this area, summarized recently, showed a consistent association between authoritarianism and lower-class status.23

3.3 Summary. This chapter has made an attempt to see theoretically plausible relationships between variables such as development patterns (development goals plus means), leadership styles, and popular attitudes. (Figure 4 gives a diagram of these multiple relationships.) Such an inquiry has been couched majorly in terms of analytical elaborations, largely based upon literature which we deem relevant. Any further verification (validation) of such theories, however, is subject to empirical examination using Korean cases.

Propositions developed in this chapter are:

1) The more "human development" the goals are of, the more "democratic" the leadership tends to be; the more "technological" the goals are of, the more "authoritarian" the leadership.

2) The more "populist" means, the more "democratic" the leadership, and the more "elitist," the more "authoritarian" the leadership.

3) The "higher" the socio-economic status of the populace, the more favorable their attitudes toward "human development" plus "populist means," and the more "democratic" the leadership; the "lower," the more favorable toward "technological development" plus "elitist means," and the more "authoritarian" leadership.
Figure 4: An Interaction Model of Development Patterns, Leadership Styles, Popular Attitudes, and Societal Development.
PART II

CHAPTER IV

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE TRADITIONAL

POLITICAL CULTURE OF KOREAN SOCIETY

I accept the notion as axiomatic that the ongoing political practices of any political system, whether they are political goals or means, are largely related to the traditional social values of that particular society. Furthermore, I also accept the notion as legitimate that the tendencies of leadership behaviors as well as the population attitudes toward authority and power are, to a considerable degree, reflective of the traditional authority patterns of that particular society. This is because social values and authority patterns including power relations are known to be related to political motivation and behavior of the members of that particular society, the leaders and the led alike.\(^1\) Hence, it is worthwhile to consider some of the distinctive and peculiarly persistent qualities of the traditional political culture of the Korean society. In doing this, I will first investigate what were some of the

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important traditional social values of the Korean society and how these social values were generally reflected in the political goals and means that were purported and selected by the Korean polity traditionally. Then, I will examine what were some of the significant characteristics of authority patterns including power relationships in that traditional political culture and how these were related to the political leadership behaviors and the popular attitudes.

4.1 Traditional Political Goals and Means in the Korean Society. Virtually all of those who identify themselves as being Korea specialists are in accord that the traditional social values of Korean society were derived almost solely from Confucian philosophy, although to some extent these values were also affected by other religions such as Buddhism and Chondogyo, an indigenous religious belief system. This seems to be a valid judgment justifiable in the historical context of Korean society, for Confucianism alternated with Buddhism as the state creed of the Yi Dynasty and gained permanent ascendancy through nearly seven centuries.

To illustrate, Gregory Henderson, Hahn-been Lee, Sung-chik Hong, Pyung-choon Hahn, Tai-kill Kim, Sang-eun Lee, Bong-youn Choy, David C. Cole and Princeton N. Lyman, Kenneth C. Clare and others are representative Korea specialists who hold this view. See Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge: Harvard
According to the Confucian philosophy, the universe is a single reality in which all things, including man, take their places in a hierarchically arranged natural order. Human society reflects this reality in its own division into high and low, superior and inferior, ruler and ruled. For the individual, proper behavior is determined by his position in the social hierarchy. An elaborate code of etiquette prescribes the forms of appropriate conduct, which varies with occupation, education, sex and age; and it was through the observance of these prescriptions by each member of society that the ideal Confucian harmony was to be realized.

Focused on the practical problems of social existence, Confucianism has been concerned with human relationships rather than spiritual phenomena. It undertook to order the social system in terms of five paired human relationships: king-subject, father-son, husband-wife, elder brother-younger brother, and friend-friend. "Li," the ideal standard of conduct in each of these relationships, called for love

University Press, 1968), Chapter 2, especially. Also, Hahn-been Lee, Korea: Time, Chance, and Administration, op. cit., pps. 43, 44, 79, and 95.

in the father, filial piety in the son; gentility in the elder brother, humility and respect in the younger; righteous behavior in the husband, obedience in the wife; humane consideration in elders, deference in juniors; benevolence in rulers, loyalty in subjects. 4

From this highly mystical and naturalistic Confucian ethics based on an agnostic concept of human existence, there seems to emerge, among other things, two important features of the traditional political order of the Korean society. First, in terms of political goals the ultimate goal of Confucian political ideology was to practice (or realize) the proper rules of conduct (li) in human relationships. To maintain "order" and "political harmony" was the operational meaning of practicing the proper rules of conduct (li). If political development means, as we conceived at the outset of this study, certain directional changes in the dynamics of the political system, then the Confucian ideology on political goals is not by any means "developmental." For example, "structural differentiation" and "subsystem autonomies" which are generally taken as the major characteristics of political development were always regarded as detrimental to the successful functioning of the political system. Furthermore, this Confucian harmony

4 Ibid.

Also, according to Confucianism, since the selfishness of a man was regarded as moral degeneration, it was improper and even dangerous to make any claims of self-interest on the political system and to organize interest groups in order to pursue one's interest through the political process, especially when it came to material interests. Legitimacy was completely denied to any pursuance of technological development. Denigration and contempt of manual labor and craftsmanship by the yangban\footnote{The traditional nobility or ruling class of Korea. Membership, though rarely hereditary, depended upon land ownership.} class was a very good example for this.

In sum, the Korean society was suffering from a lack of national goals of "development" under the Confucian state ideology whether they be what we call "human development" or "technological development." Maintaining "order" and "political harmony" on the bases of such status qualities as love, filial piety, gentility, humility, respect, righteousness, obedience, humane consideration, deference, benevolence, and loyalty--an ideal practice of
the proper rules of conduct (li), though they may sound like "human development," are by no means "developmental," because of their static nature that did not allow any changes in the political system. And the society totally lacked the doctrinal origin for "technological development" to emerge as we have already seen.

Another important Confucian ideology lies in its prescription about who should govern. According to the Confucian political philosophy, because all men are not equally wise and capable to discern the proper rules of conduct (li) in human relationships, it is the responsibility of those who know the li to govern. Only the intellectuals and moral elites who mastered the Confucian classics should indoctrinate their "inferiors" with the proper instructions in order to prevent the latter from deviating from the natural way to heavenly blessings, which the former firmly believed would be awarded by conforming to li. Therefore, government was not a contractual arrangement between the ruling elites and the populace but an educational institution whereby the rulers taught Confucian ethics to the people. Accordingly, the ideal government was to be secured only when it was ruled by a sage-king and his morally and intellectually excellent scholar-officials because they could distinguish right from wrong. This highly exclusive view of Confucian teachings on statehood left a legacy of the "politics of monopoly" on the part of the intellectuals
and moral elites, while an asceticism was imposed upon the general public as to political participation. The only legitimate way to participate actively in politics was to become a bureaucrat, which, except for a very limited number, meant that the majority of the masses could not afford to in terms of the resources and leisure essential to mastering the Confucian classics which was the predominant requirement to recruitment. In short, the Confucian political machine which, in our term, is the "developmental means," was highly "elitist" in its nature and composition.

4.2 Authority Patterns and Power Relationships in Traditional Korean Society. The authority patterns as well as power relationships of traditional Korean society can be characterized as being "domination" on the part of leaders and "submission" on the part of the led. By domination is meant a relationship between the governing elites and the governed in which the former exercise "coercive influence" in an absolute manner. It also means a process in which

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7 Doh-chull Shin, op. cit., p. 15.

8 Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: The Hearst Co., Avon Books, 11th edition, 1971), p. 163. Both of these two concepts, "domination" and "submission" are defined in terms of "masochistic and sadistic strivings" as they exist in varying degrees in normal and neurotic persons respectively.

only those who govern participate in the making of decisions without any involvement from those who are being governed. By submission is meant that authority or power is to be unconditionally obeyed by the populace, although authority is generally defined as power that is justified by the beliefs of voluntary obedience.¹⁰

These traditional orientations toward authority and power may again be accounted for in terms of Confucian ethics. Inequality and distinction between superior and inferior were, in the Confucian view, the natural order or innate in nature for the good of society. Thus, Confucius taught in the doctrine of inequality, saying:

As soon as there was heaven and earth, there was the distinction of above and below (superior and inferior); when the first wise king arose, the country he occupied had the division of classes. The ancient kings established the rules of proper conduct and divided the people into nobles and commoners, so that everybody would be under someone's control.¹¹


In essence, everyone and everything should be under someone's control. Responsibility and benevolence descend from above, from heaven and the emperor; and obedience, loyalty and respect ascend from below, from the common people.

The political consequences of this Confucian doctrine of inequality can be said to have borne an authoritarian element both in authority patterns and power structures of Korean society. That is, the Confucian doctrine of inequality justified the social structure and political culture of traditional Korean society against the notions of individual rights, freedom, and equality. In other words, such democratic concepts as articulation and aggregation of public interests, representation of public opinion, political participation, and so forth were completely alien to the traditional authority patterns as well as to the power structure. Instead, such extreme notions as "total power,"12 "unipolar pattern of authority,"13 "paternalism,"14 and the lack of "vertical control"15 are


pronominal of the power and authority patterns, and became 
even the "social character"\textsuperscript{16} of the traditional society 
of Korea.

4.3 The Impact of the Japanese Colonialism (1910-1945) 
on the Traditional Korean Social Values and Authority 
Patterns. So far we have briefly looked into the traditional 
social values and authority patterns of Korea as they relate 
to political goals and means as well as leadership behavior 
and popular attitudes. The Confucian ideology was viewed 
as a crucial variable accounting for much of the dynamics 
of the traditional political system. Chronologically 
speaking, traditional Korea covers the period of the Yi 
Dynasty (1392-1910) which is the most recent and last 
dynasty in Korean history. Imperial Japan occupied and 
annexed Korea as its colony in 1910 and hence dominated for 
thirty-five years. Japan ruled the peninsula with various 
colonial policies during this period of time, and it is 
worthwhile to investigate whether alien policies affected 
the traditional Korean social values and authority patterns 
at all; and, if so, then how.

The ultimate goals of Japanese colonial policies in 
Korea lay in political suppression, economic exploitation, 
and cultural assimilation. Koreans had no political or civil 
rights under Japanese rule, and high government positions 

\textsuperscript{16}Erich Fromm, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 304.
were not open to Koreans; more than 85 percent of the total national wealth was under Japanese control; and no teaching of Korean history, culture, or language was allowed in the schools where, instead, Japanese history, culture, and language were taught.  

To put these various colonial policies categorically, first, Japanese political suppressive measures took the forms of political education and indoctrination in an effort to inculcate in the Koreans the supreme value of political submission. Such political slogans as "the oath of Imperial subject" and "the spirit of loyal subject" are good indications of this colonizing endeavor. All government agencies, schools, public gatherings, and even factories were forced to start with reciting these slogans. In short, under the Japanese political ideology, loyalty to the state and the virtue of political submission to the authorities were the highest values. And through the political socialization processes as mentioned above, the Japanese contributed to the creation of a "subject political culture." 

Second, in the economic sphere, Korea was primarily a source of raw materials and a colonial market for Japanese


industrial development. Korea was also one of the main sources of food, especially rice, for them. Japan literally monopolized Korea's economy after the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. A new landholding system that resulted in the forfeiture of certain holdings for delinquent taxes and "the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia" are examples typical of Japanese colonial exploitation of the Korean economy.

Third, the cultural assimilation policy was at its apex in the middle of the colonial rule era when the governor-general declared in 1938 that the Japanese language was the national language of Korea; the Korean language was to be no longer taught in any school, public or private. Emperor worship and Shinto shrine visitations were demanded of all Koreans. The two native language newspapers remaining until then were ordered to close. Furthermore, the governor-general forced the Koreans to change even their family names into Japanese. "Naisun-ilche," which means "Japan and Korea oneness," was the

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20 The native religious system of Japan, the central belief of which is that 'mikado' (Sublime Porte), the title of the emperor of Japan is the direct descendant of the sun-goddess and that implicit obedience is due to him. An idol-worship.

21 The Dong-A-Ilbo and the Chosun-Ilbo which were founded in 1920, and were known to be very nationalistic in their editorial principles.
main slogan for these harsh cultural assimilation policies. Tables 1, 2, and 3 will be helpful to summarize the various obliteration policies toward Korea under Japanese colonialism.

Table 1: Government Officials by Nationality in 1943

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Korean Number of Officials</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Japanese Number of Officials</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Rank</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>95.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Rank</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>3,880</td>
<td>86.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Rank</td>
<td>29,508</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>48,156</td>
<td>62.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Rank</td>
<td>51,061</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>27,508</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2: Korean and Japanese Farms in Korea (1918)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Number of Koreans</th>
<th>Number of Japanese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 0.5</td>
<td>1,664,000</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5 - 0.99</td>
<td>671,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 2.99</td>
<td>773,000</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - 4.99</td>
<td>206,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 9.99</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 40.99</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 or more</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In chungbo: one chungbo equals 2.45 acres

**The most significant factor was that, after only eight years of annexation, more than one thousand Japanese had become first-class landlords, equalizing the number of Koreans.

The principal political machine for implementing the above-mentioned obliteration colonial policies toward Korean identity was bureaucratic centralism heavily backed by a militaristic gendarmerie. A good indication of this militaristic regimentation by Japanese colonialism is the fact that all of the seven governors-general were military personnel (six generals belonging to the extremist army clique and one admiral) who firmly believed in the use of force in politics. Their methods for regulating every aspect of Korean life included torture, searches, arrests without authorization through the police and gendarmes who formed a large part of the bureaucracy, demanding an absolute loyalty to authority and power.

Table 3: Thought Offenses for the Period of 1928-1938

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Cases</th>
<th>Number of Arrested</th>
<th>Number of Consigned</th>
<th>Number of Prosecuted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>1,592</td>
<td>1,092</td>
<td>592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>1,743</td>
<td>1,109</td>
<td>627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>4,025</td>
<td>1,107</td>
<td>1,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>3,659</td>
<td>1,842</td>
<td>1,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>4,989</td>
<td>2,132</td>
<td>1,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>2,641</td>
<td>1,108</td>
<td>705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>2,389</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>1,740</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>2,762</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>1,637</td>
<td>1,512</td>
<td>893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>1,344</td>
<td>1,212</td>
<td>511</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, Koreans never recognized the colonial rule as legitimate, nor did they acquiesce in the colonial policies as was amply demonstrated by their active independence movements at home and abroad. The ideal of the life of the Korean people was not only conserved but even enhanced by the awakening of Korean nationalism. A good example for this type of nationalism can be found in their attitudes toward the Japanese encouragement of Confucianism. The Japanese encouraged Confucianism, reasoning that the dual principle of loyalty to high authority and to the family would work to the benefit of their own administration, since respect for high authority would be transferred from the displaced Korean kings and officials to their own emperor and administration. The Koreans, however, had less respect for the conquerors than they had for their own ruling class, with the result that loyalty to the state was deemphasized while the loyalty to the family was greatly reinforced.  

Besides, comparing the rule of the Japanese colonial government with that of the traditional Korean regime, specifically the Yi Dynasty, there are more similarities than differences in terms of social values and authority patterns. For instance, the Yi Dynasty's monarchical rule confined political participation to the yangban class for

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22Kenneth G. Clare and others, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-164.
the reason that the populace did not know what was good or bad for society. Likewise, the Japanese colonial government excluded the Koreans from the political processes for similar reasons. Both regimes also destroyed the foundation for the birth and growth of political infrastructure and pluralism by suppressing any ideas and movements critical of the existing rule. In essence, both regimes can be said to have reinforced each other in creating a legacy of the politics of monopoly and absolute submission, except the Korean people's denial of legitimacy to Japanese power and authority.

4.4 Confusion in Social Character. Korean attitudes and behavior, as we have seen, reflect a system of values that has evolved as a result of historical influences. The values governing family and social relationships are predominantly Confucian in origin, but to some extent Buddhist and indigenous religious beliefs have moderated the asceticism of Confucian ethics with mystical and naturalistic concepts. Thus Koreans had lived in a highly structured system of interpersonal relationships based on an agnostic concept of human existence while at the same time maintaining a belief in supernatural powers, transmigration of souls, and life after death.

24 Kenneth G. Clare and others, op. cit., p. 167.
We have also noticed that Japanese colonialism did not incur basic changes to this philosophy mainly due to its similarities in social values about authority patterns. However, following the Liberation in 1945, the Korean society underwent a series of fundamental changes in various aspects. This was due to the adoption of Western democracy, which is based on hitherto totally unexperienced alien values to the Korean society. Although such adoption was, at the first stage, limited to formalistic and legalistic structures, the establishment of constitutional government in 1948 was highly significant to both the leaders and the led as well. Above anything else, it caused a change in the perception of power and authority. For instance, for those who were governed and had never had access to power and authority, the adoption of government on the basis of contractual arrangement was viewed as a symbol of the "ideology of equal opportunity." Furthermore, this type of perception of democratic institution gave rise to a psychology of "sado-masochistic striving" for power and authority. One writer contends that such a tendency can be accounted for by the fact that traditional regimes of Korea imposed to a great extent on the populace unconditional obedience to power and authority and this, in turn, created a motivation

25 Hahn-been Lee, op. cit., p. 46.
26 Erich Fromm, op. cit., pp. 170-172.
for the enthusiastic striving for power and authority.\textsuperscript{27} Meanwhile, for those who are governing, power and authority continued to mean the same absoluteness which they sought to perpetuate at any cost. Under these circumstances, power and authority were viewed as "charisma" or "divine force" by both sides.\textsuperscript{28} And such a perception of power and authority has given birth to a political culture in which struggles for power and authority are fierce and no political compromises are to be made between the two parties. To put it differently, this type of political culture is characterized by those who have authority and power in that they can do anything, and political oppositions are generally considered something to be mercilessly muzzled rather than to be bargained with on the basis of certain rules of the game. For those who do not have power and authority, on the other hand, such a condition usually means no political participation, indifference in policy formulation or its implementation, and an all-out political apathy with no suggestions of alternative courses of action.

4.5 Summary. In this chapter, we have seen some of the persistently peculiar qualities in traditional political culture of the Korean society. Social values and authority


\textsuperscript{28}Ibid.
patterns were given some consideration as they affect the choice of political goals and means and are related to general patterns of political leadership as well as popular attitudes toward power and authority. The Confucian ethic was regarded as a crucial variable mainly accounting for various peculiar phenomena, especially for the non-existence of developmental goals, super-elitist means, and absolutely authoritarian leadership style as well as forcefully imposed unconditional submission in the popular attitudes toward power and authority.

Chronologically, we have picked up the Yi Dynasty (1392-1910) as our starting point and later examined the period of Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945), including the short-turnover (1945-1948) post-Liberation period. We have focused our attention on seeing if there occurred any changes during these periods in the major features of the traditional political culture.

The rules of both the Yi Dynasty and the Japanese colonial government revealed a tendency of mutual reinforcement in terms of social values and authority patterns, despite the legitimacy crisis to the latter. This was because colonial obliteration policies toward Korea were largely based on similar social values and authority patterns as had long been embedded in the Confucianism which was the state order of the Yi Dynasty.
Real confusion in social character emerged when Western democracy was brought into the traditional Korean political system. We have implied a problematic challenge of how we can evaluate the changes in social values and authority patterns which will, in turn, affect the political behaviors of the leaders and the led who are to a great extent preoccupied with century-old traditions.

The following chapter will attempt to examine how the three regimes of new Korea have endeavored to bring about development politics with all the characteristics of political legacies of traditional Korea. The Syngman Rhee government (1948-1960), the John M. Chang cabinet (1960-1961), and the Chung Hee Park regime (1961-1972) will be investigated.

29 Although President Chung-Hee Park's government is in power yet, for the purpose of analysis I have arbitrarily set up a cutting-point, which is October, 1972, when this regime proclaimed "the October Revitalization Constitution." See the Introduction of this dissertation.
CHAPTER V
COMPARING THE THREE REGIMES OF THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA (1948-1972)

Section I: The Syngman Rhee Government (1948-1960)

Dr. Syngman Rhee, a descendant of a tradition-bound Confucian yangban family remotely related to the Royal Family of the Yi Dynasty later became a product of American universities (George Washington, Harvard, and Princeton), was the first president of the Republic of Korea from August 15, 1948 to April 26, 1960. He was elected first president of the First Republic in the first National Assembly on July 20, 1948 on an almost unanimous vote (180 out of 196). It is true that to a great extent there existed at the time of Korean independence a consensus on his image as a founding father of the republic, and this image is generally known to be attributable to the recognition by the Korean people of his merit in being a most outstanding leader of the independence movement. He remained as president two more consecutive terms and was elected to a fourth-term as president, largely by virtue of his constitutional maneuverings such as the "Pusan Political Undulation of 1952," the "Constitutional Amendment of 1954," and the "December 24th Upheaval of 1958." These maneuverings gradually created an anti-Rhee sentiment among elite groups
and the general public as well. His regime was overthrown on April 26, 1960 by the Student Revolution.

In order to analyze adequately his political performance as a leader, I accept Hahn-been Lee's division of the period of Rhee's reign into three sub-periods. They are the period of "nation-building (from 1948 to 1953)," the period of "post-war recovery (from 1954 to early 1958)," and the period of the "Liberal oligarchy (from late 1958 to April, 1960)." According to Lee, these periods went through some distinguishable shifts both in his effective power and in the general orientation of government programs. Similarly, I also believe that there were some observable variations during these sub-periods in terms of developmental goal and means, his leadership style and the popular attitudes toward them.

5.1.1 Nation-building Period (1948-1953)

The nature of political goals which were advocated during this initial period of the republic can be termed, according to our taxonomy of developmental goals, as predominantly of the "human" development type. "Nation-building," as is already indicated by the name applied to the period itself, was the ultimate political goal for which operational meanings were specified in various public

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1 Hahn-been Lee, op. cit., p. 74.
statements made by the first president. Among these
statements, President Rhee, in his inaugural address on
August 15, 1948, emphasized the following as his major
policy goals:

(1) **Democracy**

We should have a firm belief in democracy. There are some among our people who seem to
advocate a certain authoritarianism (or dictatorship), reasoning that such is more
efficient in dealing with many difficult problems at this initial period of the
republic, especially with the acts of the communist destruction. This is a grave
mistake, for only democracy will bring about permanent welfare in the long run. History
clearly evidenced that dictatorship cannot bring about freedom and progress. Difficult
and time-consuming as democracy in solving problems, the ultimate victory belongs to
it, for righteousness wins vice in the end.

(2) **Civil Rights and Individual Freedom**

We will guarantee civil rights and individual freedom. The essence of any democratic govern­
ment lies in protection of the fundamental individual freedom. Freedoms of speech, press,
association, religion, organization, and thoughts should be guaranteed. Democracy tolerates differ­
ing views as well as oppositions. And it reflects a reality in which pros and cons, and right and
wrong are co-existent, but at last wins wrong. We, therefore, have to have a firm stand in this con­
viction.

(3) **Mutual Cooperation**

Mutual understanding and cooperation should be the cornerstone of nation-building. In order for the
new republic to have a stable foundation at home and to earn an international prestige, it is very
important for the people to have a firm conviction that this is the government of the people, for the
people, and by the people. The Constitution guarantees the civil right to political participation
in the form of voting, but it also provides an
obligation of civilian to observe laws
and regulations which are being promulgated
by this government.

(4) Economic Assistance from Abroad

What we urgently need for now is foreign
economic assistance. It was true in the
past that such foreign economic aids usually
accompanied political strings attached to
them. But now the international political
situation has changed in such a way that,
no matter how small a nation may be, it is
to the concern of greater nations. This is
because mutual cooperation and reliance have
become essential factors to the maintenance
of international peace and welfare. The U.N.
Charter, international laws, and the consti­
tutions of member states made such cooper­
ation explicit. Our allies are to help us and
this aids will continue not for any imperialis­
tic desire but solely for the cause of inter­
national peace and goodwill. 2

Thus, Syngman Rhee perceived "nation-building" as the
principal goal during this period. Realization of democracy
which he believed guarantees both civil rights and individual
freedom on the basis of mutual cooperation among people
was, at least at this stage, his outspoken policy goal.
The economic dimension, which in our terminology is
"technological" development, was almost neglected as a
developmental goal except in his encouragement of foreign
economic assistance. In short, as far as the political
goals during this period of the new republic are concerned,
it can be safely said that they were predominantly of
"human" development.

2Sung-ha Park, ed., Woonam Nosun (The Syngman Rhee
The political means by which the selected goals of this period were carried out were ambivalent. President Rhee was at first opposed to any idea of creating a political party until he later undertook the commitment to create his own party—the Liberal Party. Instead, by pronouncing what is in a loose sense a political ideology, ilmin-jui (the one-people principle), he tried to mobilize popular support toward his chosen political goals. Rhee declared:

I advocate ilmin-jui, the one-people principle. With this principle I will set forth my national policy. We, the Korean people, have a long national history as one race and we have always been together as one people, not two. Therefore, we, the Korean people should be one people in all situations. Our race is one: therefore our national territory, national spirit, our treatment of each other, our national politics and national culture are to be one. If we have failed in making ourselves one in any of these in the past, we must succeed as soon as possible. In the meantime, if there is any obstacle to this development of oneness, we must stamp it out at once. Any individual action contrary to oneness must be eliminated. Our race will be aroused by this idea of oneness. Separatists will not dare join in the oneness movement. Remember this: if we are divided we will die and if we unite we will survive; that is, we will die separated and we will live united.  

The political consequence of this nationalistic monism of Rhee's ilmin-jui was contradictory to what was explicitly advocated in his goal-setting. For example, as we have already seen, Rhee advocated "democracy" as a basic principle for "nation-building" and conceded that democracy tolerates

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differing views as well as oppositions. But under the ideology of ilmin-jui, no such things in politics are allowed for the sake of "oneness" and national unity. Hence, civil rights and individual freedoms, the essentials of democracy, are, in actuality, not recognized. Instead, blind acceptance of his leadership was demanded of the populace.

Besides, even with the vague and loose notion of ilmin-jui, Rhee did not attempt to establish any political organization—for instance, a political party or an organized popular movement—which would have possibly interlocked the ideas of ilmin-jui with political reality. His principal political tools were, as is often pointed out by Korean specialists, (1) a few self-appointed political lieutenants on the basis of their personal loyalty to him and (2) the bureaucracy which was inherited from the colonial administration. Pum-suk Lee, Sung-mo Shin, John M. Chang, and Taek-sang Chang were the premiers during this sub-period: all of them were, in one way or the other, personally associated with President Rhee himself from the time of the independence movement abroad. The injection of new blood

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4 Ibid.

5 All of these premiers, except Sung-mo Shin, confess that their relationships to President Rhee developed through personal contacts during the independence movement era. Sung-mo Shin is well known for his extremely emotion-charged loyalty to Rhee. See Sasil-ui Chonbu rul Kisul Handa (Collected Memoirs of Nine Political Leaders) (Seoul: Himang Publishing Co., 1966), pp. 53-130.
into the bureaucracy was almost negligible although the first recruitment on the basis of the merit system took place on August 23, 1949. For instance, during this period of "nation-building (1948-1953)" there were about 5,000 administrators in the bureaucracy whose ranks were the third or above but among them only 105 were recruited by the merit system.\(^6\)

The modus operandi of these political means was characteristic of neopresidentialism.\(^7\) For instance, Rhee presided over a weekly routine meeting of the State Council which consisted of the premier and ministers, but in fact, that was to conceal his one-man decisions with a democratic facadé. The Council did not perform the role of decision-making on the basis of discussion but merely was used to approve the presidential-decisions as a rubber stamp. The premiers were given no authority to appoint or even recommend personnel under their own leadership. Ministers were not participants in policy-making on any substantial issue but were simply relegated to the position of policy


implementation. Rhee also used his constitutional authority to appoint the members of the State Council as a control mechanism. He selected the State Council members from heterogeneous persons representative of various factional groups in the National Assembly.\(^8\)

In Chapter I of this study I typologized development patterns on the basis of the kinds of goals and means that are purported and selected by political leaders. Development Pattern (A), for instance, combines "human" development and "populist" means, DP(B) that of "technological" development and "populist" means, and so forth. Then in Chapter III, hypothesized relationships between development patterns and leadership styles were proposed. One hypothesized relationship is that "human" development as a political goal and "populist" means as political means may be associated with "democratic" leadership, while, on the other hand, "technological" development and "elitist" means with "authoritarian" leadership. Further, as to the popular attitudes toward development patterns and leadership styles, what is generally called in social psychology balance model (theory) would be effective to account for the relationships between attitudinal variations of the populace and the degree of societal development. That is to say, if the

\(^8\)Hahn-been Lee, "Choego Kwanri (Top Management)," in Hahn-been Lee and others (eds.), \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 393-394.
populace are in accord with both ongoing development patterns and leadership styles, the degree of societal development tends to be high and, if otherwise, low. As to the specific question of what kinds of development patterns and leadership styles would be favored or disfavored by what types of the populace, I suggested that the socio-economic status of the populace would be an important variable. In other words, the higher the socio-economic status, the more probable "human" and "popular" style of development and "democratic" leadership would be favored; conversely, lower socio-economic status groups would probably prefer "technological" and "elitist" development and would acquiesce in "authoritarian" leadership.

This initial period of the First Republic of Korea will now be analyzed on these criteria. First of all, in terms of developmental goals this period is characterized, as has been described, by its pronounced commitment to "nation-building" of which the ingredients were to establish democratic government, to guarantee civil rights and individual freedom, and to call for national integrity on the basis of mutual understanding and cooperation. These elements are, by definition, "human" development. Secondly, in terms of developmental means, despite President Rhee's vague elaboration of so-called ilminjui which is the one-people principle, his principal political tools were to rely on a few political lieutenants appointed on the basis of personal loyalty to
him and on the bureaucracy which was inherited from Japanese colonial administration. These are again, by definition, "elitist" means.

Thus, for the moment, it seems valid to conclude that as far as development pattern for this initial period is concerned it was DP(C) where "human" development is pursued by "elitist" means. This yields an ambiguous position for exactly what type of leadership was most probable in this period. For, on the one hand, the goals were of "human" development which it is hypothesized are positively associated with "democratic" leadership but, on the other hand, the means were highly "elitist" which goes with the "authoritarian" side of leadership. The only logically plausible explanation, according to the theory, would be, then, that Syngman Rhee's political leadership style during this period was ambivalent; that is to say, he was democratic in his national goal-setting role but he was authoritarian when it came to the problem of dealing with governmental machines. This sounds like a very inconsistent evaluation of his leadership style as a whole, but such a conclusion is inevitable because we have started out with hypothesized associations between development patterns and leadership styles, not with development pattern as a unit, but rather with its components--namely, developmental goals and means. In order to examine the relationships more realistically, therefore, it is necessary to ask ourselves an
empirical question; which of the two components of development pattern under investigation contributed more strongly to the creation of Rhee's leadership style during this sub-period? Was it the political goals or was it the political means that gave rise to his particular leadership style in this period?

The literature generally seems to be in accord that throughout the whole period of his rule, Rhee's ultimate political aim, in fact, was to keep his personal power. Political power per se was important to him. To put it differently, Rhee's outspoken political goals such as "democracy," "civil rights," and so forth were not the real ones toward which he was seriously working. A good indication can be found in his persistent rejection of the first draft bill of the Korean Constitution which adopted the parliamentary form of government. The majority of the first National Assembly was in favor of this government system, and was about to pass the bill on an unanimous vote when suddenly Rhee, despite his outspoken advocacy of "democratic" procedure, urged the Constitution Draft Committee to stop the movement by threatening that he would not run for the presidency if the bill passed, and he further forced the Committee to adopt the presidential system of government as he desired. 9 Also, in this connection a Korea specialist notes:

9Byung-hye Chang, Sangrok ui Jayu Hon (An Ever-green Spirit of Freedom: A Biography of the Former Premier and
Rhee had two political aims: one, to keep his power over all opposition in South Korea; two, to unify the country during his lifetime. Since he insisted that the second aim should be accomplished on his own terms, he identified Korea's interests with his own. As a result, he was a ruthless, irresponsible, and arrogant politician when his authority was challenged. He was so preoccupied with the two aims that he treated as secondary such vital matters as economic reforms, reconstruction problems, development of democratic parliamentary procedures, educational reforms, and social welfare. (Emphasis added)

In sum, Rhee's pronounced political goals such as we have seen above can be said to be pronominal and his real goal was to keep his own political power. And there is no doubt that pursuing political power *per se* can hardly be considered a "developmental" goal as we choose to define the term. Hence, we may safely say that Rhee's goal announcements, no matter how plausible they were to the expectation of the people at the stage of nation-building, had little association with his leadership style during this subperiod. Instead, it was the means that really contributed to the formation of his leadership style. Such "elitist" means as his reliance on personal political lieutenants and the colonial bureaucracy obviously seems to have created, on the one hand, a paternalistic organizational atmosphere whereby an absolute obedience and loyalty to Rhee's authority

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was demanded. On the other hand, such "elitist" organizations clearly failed to channel the popular interests and participations to the political system, which, otherwise, might have been a challenge for a more "democratic" leadership. It seems, therefore, plausible to say that his reliance on these "elitist" means contributed to his authoritarian leadership.

Popular attitudes toward political authority and issues during this period can be considered to be consistent, which in our balance model was the Cell(I) attitudes. Ninety-five and five-tenths percent of the eligible population participated in the voting of the general election of May 10, 1948, which was the first election of this type in more than four thousand years of Korean history: the election created the first National Assembly. Dr. Syngman Rhee was elected first president of the first republic through the vote of this assembly. The vote turnout in his favor was 180 out of 196. In the second presidential election of July 18, 1952 which was conducted by popular vote, although a product of

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11 COLLECTED MEMOIRS OF NINE POLITICAL LEADERS, OP. CIT., PASSIM, ESPECIALLY PP. 91-93, 116-125, AND 365-375.

12 Ibid.

the so-called "Pusan Political Undulation," more than five million out of seven million voted in his favor. If we can assume that the results of these two consecutive presidential elections, whether congressional or popular vote, indicate de facto popular acceptance of Rhee's authority and his political performance during this period, such a popular acceptance can be most plausibly accounted for in terms of two factors that were presumably prevalent in Korean politics at the time.

First, Rhee obviously enjoyed a certain charisma attributed to his leadership mainly created by his

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14 Rhee, although elected first president on an almost unanimous congressional vote in 1948, came to create an antiadministration atmosphere in the National Assembly largely because of his arbitrary cabinet appointments. For instance, the Korean Democratic Party, which was the only well-organized political party and having a majority in the National Assembly, cast their votes in support of him, but Rhee turned down the candidates for ministerial positions recommended by this party. Rhee's first term was to end on August 15, 1952, and he knew that he would not be reelected by this antiadministration assembly. In May, 1952, in the middle of the Korean war, Rhee pressed the assembly to act on a constitutional amendment to change the election of the president from an assembly vote to a popular vote. The assembly rejected the amendment 143 to 19. Thereupon Rhee declared martial law on the ground that some assemblymen had connections with North Korea, and arrested the 14 assemblymen who had led in opposing the constitutional amendment. On July 4, 1952, the National Assembly was forced to approve the amendment on the basis of a stand-up vote. This political maneuvering is generally called the "Pusan Political Undulation of 1952." See Collected Memoirs of Nine Political Leaders, op. cit., passim. Also Bong-youn Choy, op. cit., p. 261, especially.

15 Young-ho Kim and others (eds.), op. cit., p. 33.
unceasing activities in the independence movement. A good indication of this charisma was the fact that no one who could have had potentially comparable popular support dared, or was willing to, compete with him for the presidency during this period. In the 1948 presidential election in the National Assembly, for example, there were two other political leaders who also received votes for the presidency. However, they were not announced candidates, nor was the number of the votes they received impressive at all. Ku Kim got thirteen votes and Jai-hong Ahn only two, whereas Rhee received as we have already seen an overwhelming landslide of 180 out of 196. The Korean Democratic Party which was the largest party in the national assembly was reluctant to nominate its own candidate and, instead, supported Rhee. The same was true with the presidential election of 1952. The majority of ambitious politicians like Bum-suk Lee, Pyoung-ok Chough, and others, though they were slowly beginning to oppose Rhee's leadership style, still hesitated to run against him. Instead, they competed for the vice-presidency, each of them seeking Rhee's official endorsement as his running-mate.

16 Collected Memoirs, op. cit., passim.

17 One vote was cast to Dr. Jai-hong Ahn who was at the time an American citizen, thus the vote was voided. See Young-ho Kim and others, eds., op. cit., p. 27.

18 Collected Memoirs, op. cit., passim.
Second, those demographic background characteristics of the populace that are generally known to be associated with political consciousness were still very low during this period. For example, the average literacy rate reported was not more than 20 percent, and only about 18 percent of the population was urbanized. At the time of Liberation in 1945, only a little over 20 percent of Koreans had had any formal education, although this state of affairs was much improved by subsequent developments as primary education became universal and second and higher education grew very rapidly in volume. Besides, historically speaking it was during this period that the Korean people for the first time in their long history came to experience Western democracy. Under these circumstances, it is not very difficult to understand that the populace accepted the existing political authority and its performance without any accurate evaluation.

5.1.2 The Period of Post-War Recovery (1954-1958)

The Korean Conflict which broke out on June 25, 1950 with a surprise attack by the North Korean Communist Regime

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20 Hahn-been Lee, Korea: Time, Change, and Administration, op. cit., p. 61.

and ceased on July 20, 1953 with an armistice, incurred tremendous changes in various sectors of the Korean society. Approximately one million human casualties reportedly resulted from this conflict. The physical damage such as to private houses, governmental offices, schools, hospitals, churches, public utilities, etc., amounted to about three billion in U.S. dollars which was almost double the republic's gross national product for the year preceding the invasion. Inflation had been a serious problem even before the Korean conflict but it rapidly increased to reach the 1952 apex of 557 percent in the wholesale price index on the basis of 1947 as 100. Under these circumstances changes were inevitable both in terms of ecology and in terms of human valuation of life itself. Hence, we are interested at this juncture in seeing if any shifts resulted from these changes in our major variables, and if so, what.

President Syngman Rhee, in a special policy message after the war, emphasized national unification and economic stabilization as two major national policy goals. He said:

As we all know there are two most urgent and important problems that our country is facing at present: one is reunification of the South and the North; the other is economic stabilization.

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22 The statistics in this paragraph derived from a combined calculation of two source materials: Hahn-been Lee, op. cit., pp. 55-56; and Kenneth G. Clare and others, eds., op. cit., pp. 56, 300, and 301.

23 From a special presidential message on budget retrenchment, issued by the Office of Public Information on November 30, 1955.
Annihilation of communism and a march to the North were the operational meanings of national unification. Recovery of the war-devastated national economy required above anything else curbing the ever-increasing inflation and rebuilding the infrastructures of the national economic system. At least on face value, these are two policy areas in which marked shifts in his thinking took place as a result of the Korean conflict.

Although Rhee had been known as anti-communist long before the war broke out, his anti-communism then was fairly vague and loose in nature. A good indication of this is found in his inaugural address of 1948. As to communism he maintained:

We are opposed to communism not as a principle but its wickedness to sell our country to others in the name of it. We, therefore, propose to the northern communists that they give up such plot and join us in establishing a unified nation first and then we will decide according to the will of the people on our ideology—whether it be communism or democracy.²⁴

Even further indication of this superficial anti-communism prior to the Korean conflict was the unpreparedness for war itself. Despite the fact that South Korea had almost double the population of North Korea at the time, in terms of military preparedness (e.g., military manpower and artillery), North Korea exceeded by more than three times the amount the

Southerners possessed, not to mention the question of quality. However, during the course of the war, Rhee's anti-communism sharpened a great deal: he was now convinced that "the communists respect only force," and he became determined to exterminate them. As a result of this determination, his anti-communism began to take the form of much more specific demands. For example, he demanded, in the name of the US-ROK Mutual Defense Agreement, that the United States provide Korea with annual military aid of approximately 350 million dollars. And he also demanded that the National Assembly pass a bill which would authorize the maintenance of a 720 thousand military force.

As we have already seen in his inaugural address in 1948, President Rhee's principal policy on the national economy during the initial period of the republic can be categorized as being a "foreign aid economy," beyond which there were literally no specific economic plans. However,

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26 Ibid., p. 129. Even the North Korean manpower at the time of the invasion was about 200 thousand, which was more than double the South Korean military force. See ibid., pp. 115-116.

27 There was a land reform law promulgated on June 22, 1949. But the Rhee administration originally opposed the law on the ground that the subsidy provisions would impose a financial burden upon the government and would lead to further inflation. Rhee never made a genuine effort to implement the land reform law, for Rhee's political support came from the ultra-conservative landlord class in the country, and he did not want to destroy it through land reform. See Bong-youn Choy, op. cit., p. 354.
with the physical damage produced by the war, doing something for the national economy became imperative. Curbing inflation which had been an endemic disease since the birth of the republic and rehabilitation of what little economic infrastructure the country had had before the war were urgent tasks that President Rhee had to face during this post-Korean war period. And, clearly, the president saw to it that this should occur. A good indication of this can be found in the change in his recruitment of top administrators during this period. Previously, he employed ministers, including premiers, in economic positions who were generalists, but now he recruited technocratic and task-oriented elites into such positions. Tu-jin Paek, Hyun-chul Kim, and In-sang Song are all well known for their abilities in the economic field, and they were recruited either as premier or as finance minister or both during this period. 28

The major resource for economic recovery, however, was still predominantly economic aid from the United States. 29

In terms of our typology of developmental goals, this post-Korean war period can be distinguished from its previous one; that is, a loose transition in political goals took

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28 Hahn-been Lee, op. cit., p. 75.

29 The average annual economic aid from the U.S. during this period was approximately 250 million dollars. See Sung-ha Park, (ed.), The Syngman Rhee Line, op. cit., p. 129.
place from predominantly "human" development in the initial period to a mix of both "human" and "technological" development in the latter. Rhee's anti-communism, no matter how intensified it was, can be categorized as "human," and economic recovery ventures as "technological."

As to the political means by which President Rhee was trying to carry out various political goals, it is noticeable that a certain inconsistency occurred in this period: that is, Rhee organized a political party (the Liberal Party). As we have seen the politics of the initial period, President Rhee did not advocate the idea of organizing political parties, reasoning that such an endeavor would lead to national disintegration, frequently referring to the unfortunate political consequences of the struggles among the Four Factions\(^{30}\) of the Yi Dynasty. Accordingly, with the vague ideological notion of ilmin-jui (the one-people principle), he relied heavily on his own political lieutenants and bureaucracy for the task of nation-building. However, this philosophy of non-partisan politics changed when his super-partisan image as "national father" was challenged in the National Assembly in the middle of the Korean war.

According to the first constitution of the republic, the president was to be elected by the vote of the national

\(^{30}\) For detailed information on the Four Factions of the Yi Dynasty, see Bong-youn Choy, Korea: A History, op. cit., pp. 80-87.
assembly and Rhee clearly foresaw that he would not be reelected by the then anti-administration national assembly (see footnote 14 of this Section). Thus, in his independence memorial speech on August 15, 1951, the President said:

So far I have considered it premature to install a party system until the people can fully understand the meaning of a political party . . . But the time has come to organize a large party covering the whole country on the bases of farmers and working people, in order to promote national welfare and to protect the common interests of the people. We shall have to make such a political party a permanent base upon which the government can firmly stand.31

This party was so conceived in 1951, but it was not until in 1956 when the party functioned fully as a political organization mainly in the presidential election held in the same year. The party grew rapidly since then (1956), and by the time of 1958 it exercised full control of the total political system.32 The nature of this party, however, was far from being a popular party fulfilling the functions of articulation and aggregation of popular interests. A good indication of this non-popular nature of the Liberal Party (Jayu-Dang) can be seen in its structure and functions. President Syngman Rhee had the authority to veto party policies, personnel changes, and appointments. Ki-bung Lee, who was the second man of the party, had been one of Rhee's

31 The Syngman Rhee Line, op. cit., p. 142. See also Hahn-been Lee, op. cit., p. 72.
32 Hahn-been Lee, ibid., p. 81.
henchmen for many years. He carried the same message from Rhee to both the party and the national assembly. Authority always came from the top, and every member of the party had to obey party decisions without reservation. The Liberal Party (the LP) was thus totalitarian in structure and functions. Besides, this party was mobilized mainly for the purpose of overcoming President Rhee's legitimacy crisis as president rather than for the purpose of implementing developmental programs. For example, Rhee exploited the LP for such personal interest-oriented political purposes as moving a constitutional amendment in 1954, which enabled him to run for the presidency for an unlimited number of

35. Rhee's second term was originally to expire in 1956. And he was not supposed to run for a third term because of the constitutional limitation at that time. In order to overcome this constitutional handicap (to him), Rhee ordered Ki-bung Lee, then Chairman of the LP and Speaker of the National Assembly, to move a constitutional amendment which would enable Rhee to run for unlimited terms. After much sharp debate between the Liberals and the opposition Democrats and Independents, the amendment bill came to a final vote on November 27, 1954. It was defeated by one vote. However, the next day the director of public information issued a statement that "the constitution amendment was carried by the assembly, because the needed two-third majority was 135 and not 136." The government spokesman further explained that "a two-third majority of 203 is 135 and 1/3, but the fraction could not be counted, and 135 was therefore the needed majority." At once, fighting broke out in the assembly hall between the pro-amendment and the anti-amendment assemblymen, and more than 60 assemblymen left the assembly hall in protest. The remaining LP assemblymen and one independent carried a motion that 135 was the needed two-third majority
terms, and passing the so-called New National Security Act in 1958\(^{36}\) which contributed to the use of rigged elections thereafter.

Bureaucracy was still the main vehicle by means of which the economic recovery policies were to be carried out during this period. In this connection, Hahn-been Lee observes:

> It took four years for the Liberal Party to achieve a full consolidation of power after

\(^{36}\) In the presidential election of 1956, Rhee confronted a hitherto unexperienced strong opposition candidate, Ik-hi Shin (Patric Henry Shinicky), enthusiastically backed by the leading mass media and the urban intellectuals. Although Rhee was able to secure his third presidency as a result of the sudden death of Shin shortly before election day, his running-mate for vice-president, Ki-bung Lee was defeated by the opposition candidate, John M. Chang. This was the first decisive blow to Rhee's leadership since he had seized power. Rhee viewed this type of strong challenge to his leadership as attributable mainly to the press and opposition leaders in the assembly, and was determined to "regulate" them by some measure. The measure took the form of a new national security bill. The reason for a new bill was, according to him, the inadequacy of the existing security act to cope with communist conspiracy and communist infiltration from North Korea. The opposition party and social organizations including the Korean Bar Association and the Korean Editors' Association opposed the bill. Nevertheless, the bill was passed by the party in power, after 300 policemen and 30 regular guards had driven 80 opposition assemblymen from the assembly chamber on Christmas Eve of 1958. It became law on January 15, 1959, twenty days after the president's signature. The security law was so loosely drawn and sweeping, covering almost all phases of the citizen's daily activities, that it could easily be abused. In fact, the LP used it as a means of suppressing oppositions in national elections and whatever
its reorganization in 1954, and this lag of four years coincided with the relative administrative improvement and economic recovery. An auspicious combination of charismatic political leadership with strong task orientation was largely instrumental in bringing about such improvement in administration. 37

Thus, in terms of our typology of development patterns, this period of post-Korean war recovery is characterized by its dualism. In other words, on the one hand, DP(A), which consists of "human" development by "populist" means, is theoretically observable in President Rhee's strong anti-communism combined with his political maneuvers by means of the LP. On the other hand, what little new blood he put into the bureaucracy he did to carry out the task of economic recovery, which, according to our typology, belongs to DP(D), where "technological" development is proceeded by "elitist" means. A question readily comes to mind: which of these two development patterns contributed more to his leadership style, how and why? In order to answer this question more appropriately we have to look more rigorously into the true nature of political goals and means as they were perceived and mobilized by President Rhee in this period.

opposition was offered by the Democrats and Independents in the assembly. See Bong-youn Choy, ibid., pp. 274-286.

37 Hahn-been Lee, op. cit., p. 81.
First of all, as proposed at the outset of this study, certain political goals are "developmental" when they clarify and project the image of the future, for the purpose of which they accompany certain directional changes in the dynamics of the political system. In this sense, Rhee's strengthened anti-communism in this period could have been "developmental" if it had helped to clarify and project the image of the future of such anti-communism, let us say, of Korean democracy. On the contrary, however, Rhee used this political slogan to kill the future image of Korean democracy as we have already amply witnessed in such political maneuverings as the Pusan Political Undulation in 1952, the Constitutional Amendment in 1954, and the New National Security Act Case in 1958. In reality, securing political power per se was his genuine political goal, and we have also seen that political power per se cannot be a "developmental" goal within the definition of the term used in this study (cf. p. 75). As to economic recovery as a political goal it is interesting to notice that a Korean specialist observes that although approximately 38 percent of Rhee's speeches during this period were devoted to the discussion of economic matters, they were related to ad hoc problems in the process of post-Korean war economic recovery rather than economic development. Consequently, it becomes difficult to assess

the political goals of President Rhee at this period as "developmental" as a whole.

Secondly, any political means, whether "populist" or "elitist," by the same token, become "developmental" only when they are mobilized for the purpose of implementing "developmental" goals. If we examine the LP on this criterion, we can readily see that it was not mobilized at all for the purpose of implementing any "developmental" goals—for instance, Korean democracy—but solely exploited as leverage for extending Rhee's tenure of power which cannot be identified as a "developmental" goal. Bureaucratic recruitment with technocratic and task-oriented elites, to be sure, is a step toward the formation of "developmental" means, but insomuch as Rhee's economic recovery policies during this period are viewed as ad hoc measures, the relative weights of such means are, in a logical sense, diminishing.

Consequently, then, our propositions on the possible relationships between development patterns and leadership styles come to rest on limited empirical grounds in Rhee's case during this subperiod of post-Korean war recovery. Instead, it seems to be highly probable that his leadership style can be accounted for in terms of his orientation toward power and authority.

In Chapter IV of this study we saw some characteristics of the traditional Korean political culture with special reference to power and authority relationships. President
Rhee cannot be an exception in this respect. In fact, despite his Western education which could have contributed to the formation of democratic attitudes, the Confucian world outlook and, for that matter, highly authoritarian interpretation of authority and power, remained most persistently with him, becoming an insurmountable part of his personality. Many writers, especially those who tend to attribute a certain leadership style to the leader's personality, contend that this was the case with Syngman Rhee. For example, Hahn-been Lee representatively singles out two broad aspects of Rhee's personal history as being particularly relevant. According to him, Rhee's yangban class origin with a solid grounding in Confucian mores in his childhood and his long life in exile which turned out to be a life of estrangement and frustration jointly operated to incur in him a unique orientation toward statehood—a swinging between the retrospective and utopian poles, with a pronounced penchant towards the former. Accordingly, his image of Korea was of the country that had existed before her capitulation to Japan, of which an indication was his antipathy towards Japan, and his persistent urge to march northward. Meanwhile, to him, problems of contemporary life such as economic problems did not matter ultimately. He tended to deal with them summarily in accordance with his limited preoccupation instead of viewing the many practical problems of government as items to be solved through systematically developed
policies. Nor did contemporary personalities figure importantly; instead of considering them as forces to be integrated into a larger framework for a common purpose, he considered them either as irritants to be eliminated or mere instruments to be exploited. Hence his "authoritarian" leadership style. 39

Popular attitudes toward both Rhee's political practices and his leadership style during this period were most manifestly revealed in the process of the presidential election of 1956. The public was no longer passive to state affairs as was the case in the initial period of nation-building, nor was the populace tolerant any more toward Rhee's authoritarian leadership. They wanted some changes to be made in the political system toward the direction of democracy. They also demanded something to be done about modernization of the country. A vivid indication of the public rejection of both the development pattern (which we have assessed as non-existent except seeking power per se and some economic recovery policies on ad hoc basis) and leadership style (which we evaluated as highly authoritarian) can easily be found in their enthusiastic massive response to the election campaign slogan of the opposition party which said, "Let's change, for we simply cannot live any longer as we are now!" Ik-hi Shin and John M. Chang who

39Hahn-been Lee, op. cit., pp. 79-80.
were candidates of the opposition party, the Democrats, for president and vice-president, respectively, could attract Seoul crowds with this provocative campaign slogan to their rally on the banks of the Han River of more than 300,000. This is generally regarded as the greatest campaign in the history of Korean elections, and the unprecedented size of the crowds is also generally interpreted as being a true and spontaneous expression of popular feeling of dissidence toward the Rhee regime during this period. 40

The election result seems to further support the popular dissidence. Although President Rhee, owing to the sudden death of Shin a week before the election, managed to secure his third term, his majority fell from 80 percent in 1952 to 56 percent in 1956. The Progressive Party candidate Bong-am Cho who was in hiding obtained more than 23 percent and the dead Democratic candidate Shin received almost 20 percent, in spite of the government warning "not to vote for a dead man." 41 More significant factor in this

40 Even a prominent LP leader later recognized the effectiveness of this opposition slogan and conceded, saying, "The Democratic campaign slogan seemed to be overwhelming among the people and such popularity of it has its own reason at the time." Jae-hak Lee, in Collected Memoirs, op. cit., p. 148.

41 Percentages here are the author's computation based upon data given in Young-ho Kim, eds., op. cit., p. 46.
election is that Rhee lost in urban areas. For example, in Seoul, Rhee polled less than did his dead opponent Shin --205,253 to 284,359. Another evidence came from the shocking fact that the opposition candidate for vice-president, John M. Chang, defeated Rhee's teammate and his heir-apparent, Ki-bung Lee. Thus, in terms of our balance model dealing with popular attitudes toward authority and government policy, a marked shift occurred in this period, i.e., from Cell (I) which is public accord both in authority and policy, to Cell (IV) which is popular rejection of both existing authority and governmental output.

Just what caused this type of drastic change in popular attitudes toward Rhee's leadership style and his political performance during this subperiod may be explained in various ways. However, since we hypothesized that there are some relationships between popular attitudes (toward governmental authority and policies) and the socio-economic backgrounds of the populace, it is worthwhile to see if any changes in this factor occurred during this period. Urbanization, education, and communication, are, among other variables, frequently selected as powerful indicators to explain the variations in popular attitudes. I will use

---42 For example, Seymour Martin Lipset, Phillips Cutright, and Gilbert R. Winham typically use these factors as major indicators to explain "democratic political development" and report that there are positive correlations between these
them to help explain changes in public opinion toward Rhee's authoritarian leadership and nondevelopmental, power-oriented political practices in this period.

The proportion of city-dwellers during this period swelled to 26.3 percent in 1958 as compared to 17.7 percent in 1953. College-level institutions rose from 31 in 1948 to 62 in 1960, the number of college teachers increased from 1,800 to 3,633 in the same period, and the college student enrollment soared from 24,000 to 97,819. Both the number of newspapers and newspaper circulations, overwhelmingly concentrated in Seoul, multiplied. Dong-a Ilbo, dean of newspapers, increased its circulation from a low of 17,000 just after the war to a height of some 360,000 in 1958.


45Dong-a Nyonq~ (Dong-a Annual) (Seoul: The Dong-a Ilbo, Co., 1967), p. 855.
An important point can be made to these increases in urbanization, education, and communication; that is, they gave rise to a Korean intellectual class with opinions, diversity, complaints, and dissent toward the political performance of existing government that in turn generated a mounting and increasingly hostile urban public opinion that became the vanguard of political change. Thus, our hypothesis on the relationship between socio-economic background and attitudinal change in the populace seems to be positively supported as far as this period is concerned.

5.1.3 The Period of Liberal Oligarchy (1958-1960)

As we have seen, the presidential election of 1956 which was Rhee's bid for a third term was a turning-point after which Rhee's self-awareness of a legitimacy crisis markedly increased. After 1956 he was no longer able to consider any consistent policies toward the country's development except as ventures to extend his own officialdom. The political consequence of this legitimacy crisis was a rather grave one; Rhee set up a police state, and during the course of 1958 this symptom reached its apex. Rhee was anxious to eliminate all opposition forces before they became too strong. The National Security Act Incident which was usually called by the mass media the "December

leverage and availing themselves of this available channel of power, the party oligarchs gradually exerted direct influence upon administration.47

Thus, in terms of our typology of development patterns, although publicly-announced goals were still "economic recovery," and "anti-communism," they were obscured and disturbed by Rhee's self-awareness of the legitimacy crisis. Hence, he could not systemically pursue these developmental goals except as expediency measures for retaining power per se. And means were highly "elitist"—an oligarchy disguised in the name of a political party.

Leadership style became even more authoritarian in this period. In fact, it came to verge on dictatorship as was revealed in a series of political incidents such as the New Security Act Incident in 1958, the Kyunghyang newspaper close-down, the execution of an opponent presidential candidate in 1959, and the election manipulation in 1960. The regime lacked goals for development and increasingly dependent upon the Liberal oligarchs who enjoyed a tight control of the bureaucracy and mobilized the police-state methods in almost every political incident for the purpose of legitimizing Rhee's power. These conditions seem to have contributed to the emergence of this type of dictatorial leadership.

Meanwhile, in terms of popular attitudes, there was growing public opposition toward both Rhee's failure in

47 Hahn-been Lee, op. cit., pp. 92-93.
development and his dictatorial leadership. Such an increased degree of opposition now took the forms of open letters to the President from opposition leaders and massive popular demonstrations, calling for President Rhee's resignation. Dr. Pyoung-ok Chough's open letter of 1959, for example, sharply accused President Rhee of failure in developmental policies and especially of dictatorial leadership. The major theme of various public demonstrations during this period was "Down with dictatorship!" and "Let's make a change!".

Nevertheless, President Rhee ignored all these callings for change in development and leadership, and he intensified his police-state methods in an attempt to muzzle all these oppositions. By 1958, the number of police reached approximately 40,000 and this was, indeed, a tremendous increase in quantity, compared to some 600 left at the time of Liberation. The police remained faithful and fanatically loyal to the government, and their principal methods in dealing with opposition were surveillance, sudden arrest, unjust trials, trumped-up accusations, and threats


of all kinds. The presidential election of May 15, 1960 can be cited as an extreme case in which these ruthless police-state methods were uncovered. A strange coincidental fate fell on the opposition presidential candidate, Dr. Pyoung-ok Chough, as it did to Shin in 1956, who died shortly before the election, thus making Rhee unopposed once again. Nevertheless, his running-mate, John M. Chang, stood a better chance than in 1956. The worried LP, under the instruction of the party directorate and the auspices of the then Minister of Home Affairs, directed a campaign replete with highly secret plans for group voting, ballot stuffing, and invalidations or removal of opposition ballots. Rhee received 88.7 percent of the vote, and, more incredibly, his teammate and heir apparent, Ki-bung Lee, defeated then incumbent vice-president and opposition candidate, John M. Chang by 8,225,000 to 1,850,000.\(^{51}\)

Thus, in terms of our balance model nothing is new in this period from the previous one which we assessed as being Cell (IV) where the public attitudes are negative toward both authority and policies. The only observable difference was the intensified degree of opposition which at last led to violence. This took the form of the April Student Revolution which toppled the Syngman Rhee government on April 26, 1960.

\(^{51}\text{Ibid., p. 174.}\)
5.1.4 Summary

President Syngman Rhee's goal perception is very difficult to evaluate in terms of our typology of developmental goals. He at one time showed an explicit interest in "nation-building" on the basis of "democracy" as we noted from his inaugural message of August 15, 1948. Later in the middle of his reign there emerged a shift in his goal perception toward the direction that might be called a mix of "human" and "technological" developments such as anti-communism and economic recovery. And then, toward the end of his regime, nothing seemed to interest him except political power per se. Of course we can find reasons for this type of unsystemic goal switches. For instance, his verbal endorsement to "democracy" at the outset of the new republic is attributable largely to his long life in the West where his higher education was obtained. The marked change in his policy-thinking during the second period toward anti-communism and economic recovery is rather from the ecological challenge of the Korean conflict than from his original value disposition. His legitimacy crisis as president after 1956 definitely seems to have accelerated his power-seeking orientation at the end of his reign. As a whole, therefore, Rhee's goal perception can hardly be labeled as "developmental" as we defined the term. We define political goals as "developmental" when they clarify and project the future image of the total political system, and hence, encourage systemic and directional changes in it.
Insomuch as his goal perception is non-developmental, there is no way of associating his leadership style with his political goals in any developmental perspective.

His selection of particular political means seems, however, to be positively related with his leadership style. Despite his organization of a political party (the LP) in the middle of the Korean war, he showed a consistent reliance on his own small group of political lieutenants and the bureaucracy, which, in our typology, is "elitist" means. These two "elitist" means seem to have contributed positively to reinforcing Rhee's authoritarian leadership style by two factors. On the one hand, such "elitist" means had, as we have seen, a paternalistic organizational atmosphere whereby absolute obedience and loyalty to Rhee's authority was demanded. On the other hand, such "elitist" organizations as the State Council of the bureaucracy and the Directorate of the LP clearly failed to channel popular interests and participation in the political system to the highest leadership.

In terms of leadership style there is no doubt that Rhee's was very "authoritarian" as we can see from such political incidents as the "Pusan Political Undulation of 1952," the "Constitutional Amendment of 1954," the "New Security Act Incident of 1958," and the "March 15 Rigged Election of 1960." The declaration of martial law, the ruthless suppression of oppositions in and out of the
National Assembly, and the police-state methods applied to the press and popular political participation are the major components of his mode of conduct. Partially explicable for his leadership style as his constant resort to the "elitist" means may be, we have also conceded that his personality and political socialization under the dominant influence of Confucian mores may be a more powerful explanation to account for his unique power-seeking orientation.

Popular acceptance of both his leadership style and his political performance during the initial period of the republic was accounted for by the low status of their demographic background characteristics which presumably means low political consciousness. However, as there emerged some changes in the socio-economic status of the population in a positive direction, these changes slowly gave rise to an enhanced political consciousness which, in turn, produced a more critical evaluation of Rhee's authority and political performance. A total rejection of both occurred from the middle of Rhee's reign and was at its apex at the time of the demise of his regime.

Thus, in terms of our interaction diagram as conceptualized in Chapter III of this study (see p. 43), the Rhee government, as a whole, may roughly be pictured as presented in Figure 5.
Societal Development

1) stable (1948-1956)
2) unstable (1956-1960)

Authoritarian Leadership style (low->high)

Non-developmental (Power)

"Highly Elitist Political Means"

Linguistic style: "Authoritarian or Dictatorial"

Sustenance or acquiesce line
Conflict or rejection line
Reinforcing or intensifying line

Figure 5: The Syngman Rhee Government (1948-1960)
Section II: The John M. Chang Cabinet (1960-1961)

It took about four months after the downfall of the First Republic of Syngman Rhee before John M. Chang was elected as the first Prime Minister of the Second Republic (the form of government had been changed to the parliamentary system). Shortly before his collapse, Syngman Rhee appointed Chung Huh who was the former Mayor of Seoul and also the former Acting Premier as Foreign Minister. After Rhee's retreatment from office, Huh was promoted to the post of Acting President to head the "Interim Government." Maintaining law and order in the political vacuum brought about by the demise of the Rhee regime and administering a general election which would pave the road to a new government were the two major responsibilities mandated to this government. Although there are certain studies which attempt to deal with the political performance of this government in various perspectives,\(^1\) for the purpose of this study it seems rather difficult to include this government, mainly because of the nature of the functions it was supposed to play—duties that were of a "caretaking" nature. For that matter, any efforts at "development" would have been illegitimate.

The July 29, 1960 general election won the Democratic Party (Minju Dang) an overwhelming majority in both the

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\(^1\) A good example of such studies is Chapter 6 of Hahn-been Lee's Korea: Time, Change, and Administration. See his book, op. cit., pp. 109-122.
House of Representatives and the House of Councillors. They were mandated to establish a new government based upon the newly amended constitution which envisaged the parliamentary system of government. After some factional bickerings over the candidates for president—an office of ceremonial nature now—and prime minister, head of administration, Po-sun Yun, a leader of the "old faction," was elected president in a joint session of the both Houses on August 12, 1960, by a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No. of Seats in the Lower House</th>
<th>No. of Seats in the Upper House</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Democrats</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Liberals</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Social Mass</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Korean Social</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Unification</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-partisan, Independents and Others</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There were two opposing factions within the Democratic Party, the so-called "old and new factions." The "old faction" originated from the Democratic National Party and consisted mainly of rural elders with landlord backgrounds. The "new faction" came from the Parliamentary Liberal Party comprising mostly of young men with backgrounds of colonial civil service. These two heterogeneous factions launched a united front to oppose Rhee's authoritarian leadership and his LP, and married into the Democratic Party in September, 1955. But now that the Democratic Party itself became the ruling party, largely by virtue of the April Student Revolution, their heterogeneous interest orientations quickly became irreconcilable and took the form of factional struggle over various political issues. A good example of this is their bickerings over presidential and premiership candidates. The "old faction" supported the idea that John M. Chang, the leader of the "new faction" be president and To-yun Kim, a leader of the "old faction" be prime minister. On the other
comfortable majority vote, and John M. Chang, a leader of the "new faction" was accepted as the first Prime Minister of the Second Republic in the House of Representatives on August 17, 1960, by a sheer margin of votes. Accordingly, John M. Chang formed the first cabinet of the Second Republic on August 23, 1960.

hand, the "new faction" supported its own leader, John M. Chang, as premier and Po-sun Yun, the boss of the "old faction," as president. Po-sun Yun, after having been elected president, first nominated To-yun Kim as candidate for premier and he was rejected by the House of Representatives by a slight margin of three votes. President Yun then nominated with reluctance John M. Chang for the premiership, who was approved also by a sheer margin of three votes. For complete details on this factional bickering, see Sung-joo Han, The Chang Myon Government in South Korea: A Study in the Failure of Democracy (Berkeley: University of California-Berkeley Press, 1974), Chapter VI. (Material taken from manuscript before publication.)

Po-sun Yun received 208 votes out of 263. John M. Chang obtained 117 out of 228—only three votes more than the absolute minimum required. See Young-ho Kim and others, eds., op. cit., pp. 65-66.

After the House of Representatives accepted John M. Chang as premier, there emerged a move among the "old faction" members to split from their mother party and to form a new opposition party. This move was initiated by To-yun Kim, the unsuccessful nominee of the "old faction" for premiership and was backed up by President Yun. Prime Minister Chang tried to prevent the "old faction" from splitting away from the party by allocating to them some cabinet positions. For instance, he included a member of the "old faction" in his first cabinet, and later allocated to them five ministerial positions in his second cabinet. However, the "old faction" declared the intention of forming a separate party and registered itself as the "New Democratic Party," recalling all the cabinet members of the "old faction" from the second Chang cabinet. For details, see Sung-joo Han, op. cit., Chapter VI.
5.2.1 Political Goals of the John M. Chang Cabinet

On August 27, 1960, Prime Minister John M. Chang, through his first keynote speech to the House of Representatives, presented a general picture of his policy directions. He emphasized above anything else that the "embodiment of the spirit of the April Revolution" and "economic reconstruction" are the two "utmostiy important responsibilities" his cabinet "should carry out." He further reiterated in the same policy message:

Of course, the ultimate responsibility of this cabinet lies in carrying out faithfully those policy goals, enunciated in our party platform, and promised by our election pledges.

During the campaign for the July 29, 1960 general election, the Democratic Party (the DP), under the slogan "Let's give our votes to the party that fought against dictatorship!"; made an election pledge of some fifteen policy goals largely based upon the party platform. These policy goals can be summarized into two broader categories

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7 Ibid.

8 The policy goals were: (1) completion of the April Revolution; (2) establishment of the foundation of civil rights and development of party politics; (3) a new start toward economic build-up; (4) practising social justice; (5) providing job opportunities to the unemployed; (6) reconstruction of the farm and fishery villages; (7) encouraging the petty and middle-sized business enterprises; (8) reduction of public expenditures; (9) popularization of banking services; (10) developing labor movement; (11) expansion of
Thus, in terms of our goal typology, the Chang cabinet can be said to be "dualistic." Their endorsed goals were "dualistic" because they chose both "human" development ("democratization of society") and "technological" development ("economic build-up") as their main policy goals. And they were "ambivalent" in their goal perception in the sense that they did not set any priority between these two different goals. This dualism in goal selection as well as ambivalence in goal perception seems to have had grave political consequences for the survival of the Chang cabinet itself as we will see later. But first of all, let us take a closer look at how these two goals were elaborated by the Chang cabinet.

The measures taken by the Chang cabinet as to the basic policies toward "democratization of society" were rather more of a laissez faire nature than of any carefully calculated social welfare service; (12) moral armament and prevention of luxury; (13) innovation of the educational systems and expansion of scholarship system; (14) positive move toward diplomacy of peace, goodwill, and unification; and (15) innovation of defense policy. Source: Young-ho Kim and others, eds., op. cit., p. 250.

It is noteworthy that throughout the whole public statements that were made by the Chang cabinet, the term "economic development or modernization" was seldom adopted. Instead, "economic reconstruction," "economic build-up," and "economy-the-first principle" were employed. These are in the writer's view, closely comparable to the term "economic development" as a translation of Chang's Korean version of the terminologies. Cf. Hahn-been Lee, op. cit., p. 130.
action. For example, Premier Chang, through his policy message, emphasized as "political innovation measures" the "neutralization of the police," "local autonomy," and "registration of the wealth of public servant."\(^{10}\) And he urged the National Assembly to act promptly on these bills. However, only the local autonomy bill was passed (in October, 1960) and put in effect in December of the same year; the rest of the bills were still pending. Punitive actions against the "traitor to democracy" and the "illicit fortune makers" under the Rhee regime were so frustrating both in tempo and in degree that on October 11, 1960, a group of student activists intruded into the House of Representatives and occupied the Speaker's seat calling for more decisive measures.\(^{11}\) The press enjoyed this type of laissez faire atmosphere, and a number of newspapers, journals, and magazines sprang up like mushrooms after rain. In 1959 the number of these periodicals was approximately 580 but as of November 1, 1960 the number jumped to nearly 1,200.\(^{12}\) The

\(^{10}\)John M. Chang, op. cit., p. 180.


\(^{12}\)Hap tong Nyongam (Hap tong Annual) (Seoul: Hantong News Agency, 1961), p. 335. There are two reports that give the number of reporters employed in this period: John Kie-chang Oh figures 160,000 and the Military Government source says that it was some 10,000. But the author does not accept the figures as accurate, for Oh's is based on an unreliable material while the Military Government's could have been exaggerated. See John Kie-chang Oh, op. cit., p. 90 and especially his footnote 36 on page 214; and Military
number of demonstrations can also serve as a measure for the Chang cabinet's *laissez faire* nature of "democratization of society." According to a report made by the military government which overthrew the Chang government, there were about 1,800 demonstrations involving more than 950,000 participants between May 1960, and May 1961, and half of the participants were students.  

Chang himself later elaborated on this *laissez faire* nature of "democracy" as follows:

> It was one of the DP's policies to give people an opportunity to enjoy a complete freedom they so much desired. . . . An intention to let them learn the meaning of freedom by experience, not by ear and mouth. Freedom that is learned through theories may cause confusions, but that learned by experience will serve as a firm foundation on which genuine democracy stands. A sound freedom is possible when people become hateful of the confusion and by-products of freedom itself.

In other words, "democracy" under the Chang cabinet was fairly *laissez faire* and hence did not clarify or project the future image of Korean democracy.

Meanwhile, action programs of the enunciated "economy-the-first principle" by the Chang government were (1) the

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"National Construction Service" (NCS) and (2) a "Five-Year Economic Construction Plan" (FYECP). The NCS had two broad objectives: building social overhead capital and unemployment relief. On the infrastructure side, it included large-scale construction projects such as power plants, roads, land reclamation, water resources development, and reforestation. On the employment side, the program envisaged employment amounting to approximately forty-five million man-days of idle labor force on the various projects. Third, it was a multi-year program with a built-in long-range perspective. The program contained a systemic annual estimation of capital requirements for key developments for the five years 1961-1965.\(^{15}\)

The FYECP was conceived largely on the basis of an earlier economic development plan drafted by the Economic Reconstruction Council during the last period of the Rhee regime. The basic goals of the FYECP were to increase the gross national product, to reduce unemployment and to gradually reduce excessive dependence upon external aid. It was the first purely indigenous plan of this kind and the Chang government was to adopt the plan extending the period from three to five years. The plan was to start in 1962.\(^{16}\) Thus,  

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\(^{15}\)Hahn-been Lee, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-132.  
\(^{16}\)Ibid., pp. 90-91, and p. 133.
as far as the economic aspect of the political goals of the Chang cabinet is concerned, their goals clarified and projected the future image of Korean economy. Hence, they were "developmental" as a plan, although in political reality the implementation of such programs was limited and they remained as plan only, due to the extraordinarily short survival of the regime itself.

5.2.2 Political Means of the Chang Cabinet

The political means that were to be mobilized by the Chang cabinet for the purpose of promoting its political goals were without doubt "political party" and its party politics. This was, from the beginning, imperative due to the fact that the DP itself was the very champion of party politics and its leaders had long advocated the parliamentary system of government in protest of the Rhee's presidential form of regime. Thus, in terms of our typology of "developmental" means, for the first time in the long political history of Korea, a certain "popular" means was to be adopted at least at its face value. Whether the DP was in reality a "developmental" political means as we define the term may be uncovered as we see its evolution and performance. Accordingly, a brief look at the party history and its structure is in order.

The Korean Democratic Party (Hanguk Minju Dang), the predecessor party of the DP, was initially organized by the conservative nationalists shortly after the Japanese defeat
in 1945 as a response to the leftist dominated "Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the Korean Government."\textsuperscript{17} The organizers of the KDP consisted mainly of those Koreans who had opposed Japanese rule in Korea, but who were not interested in any drastic changes in social structures.\textsuperscript{18}

The leaders of the KDP represented a highly educated intellectual elite whose opposition to Japanese rule was expressed in relatively moderate ways. A wealthy educator from Southwestern Korea, Sung-soo Kim, had brought together a wide circle of prominent men during the Japanese period by assisting them in their youth with funds and jobs through various schools and enterprises under his control, and they were generally known as the "Posung Group."\textsuperscript{19} It is,

\textsuperscript{17}Upon hearing the news of initial surrender negotiations on August 11, and of final capitulation on the 15th, 1945, the Japanese Governor-General to Korea, Abe Nobuyuki, took immediate steps to form and turn over to a transition government. His hope was that, in exchange for authority, he could obtain assurances of minimal security for Japanese lives and property in Korea until the incoming forces arrived. Several potential Korean political leaders were called in for possible turn-over of authority. Among them was Woon-hyung Lyuh, "a charismatic leader of immense energy, personal magnetism, and speaking ability" who had taken part in the Provisional Government in Shanghai as a communist in the early 1920's. He agreed to assume administration on some conditions. Lyuh set up a tentative plan of organization for a ruling committee, the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence with returning Syngman Rhee as its head-designated. Rhee rejected the offer and Lyuh was assassinated on July 19, 1947. For details, see Gregory Henderson, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 113-136.

\textsuperscript{18}Sung-joo Han, \textit{op. cit.}, p. III-4.

\textsuperscript{19}Gregory Henderson, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 275-278.
therefore, possible to characterize the KDP as basically a collection of close friends who shared with each other a common life experience rather than any ideological commitment. Soon after its organization, the KDP attracted a large number of property and land owners, former bureaucrats, and non-leftist politicians of various backgrounds, and by the end of 1947, it claimed a membership of more than 865,000. 20

When the KDP was refused by Syngman Rhee a share of power in his government (see footnote 13 in Section I of this Chapter), it sought to broaden its power base through alliances with other political forces and changed its name to the "Democratic Nationalist Party (Minju Kukmin Dang)" (DNP), in 1949. At the same time, changing government system into the parliamentary type became the most important platform issue of the DNP in light of the fact that the constitution of the First Republic under the leadership of Syngman Rhee stipulated a presidential form of government. 21

Meanwhile, in the second National Assembly (1950-1954), there was a group of independent politicians who comprised a substantial majority of the seats (120 out of 210). 22 This

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21Sung-joo Han, op. cit., p. III-5.

22Young-ho Kim and others, eds., op. cit., p. 138.
group formed a loose political circle which was called the "Republican-Democratic Rule Club (Kongwha Minjung Hoe)" and they also favored a parliamentary-cabinet type of government. They were interested in inviting Syngman Rhee as a figurehead president under the proposed system of government. Rhee, of course, rejected the idea. Instead, he mobilized other political forces outside the national assembly which, as a whole, were called the "Extra-parliamentary Liberal Party." He later created his LP heavily based upon this party. The estranged Republican-Democratic Rule Club now became the "Parliamentary Liberal Party" (PLP), and was driven to become an opposition to Rhee. It was precisely in this political milieu at the time that both the DNP and the PLP spontaneously sought a coalition that resulted in the formation of the DP in protest to Rhee's authoritarian leadership in 1955. Also a by-product of such an expedient coalition of two different political forces was the birth of factions within the DP, namely the "old and new factions." (The DNP elements became the "old faction," and the PLP group and other members who supported John M. Chang for the leadership the "new faction.")

While it may be difficult to assess on any definitive terms the DP as to its unique characteristics in approaching societal development, it seems possible for us to look at its categorical attributes, namely, those between the "old and new" factions, and to infer its general orientations toward dealing with its choice of political goals.
There is a study which made a comparison of the higher echelons of the two factions as to the socio-economic backgrounds and the general attitudes of its members toward politics (and changes in the political system as well).

Sung-joo Han reports:

A typical old faction leader in 1955 would have been a man from one of the Southwestern provinces and in his early or middle fifties. He came from a reasonably well-to-do and an educated family, and was educated abroad, either in Japan or in the United States. He had been engaged in some kind of anti-Japanese or other politically significant activities within Korea during the Japanese rule. He most probably had a close personal tie with Sung-soo Kim through either the Posong High School (presently Korea University), the Dong-a Ilbo, or any one of the enterprises owned by him. Since Ik-hi Shin's death in 1956, he supported Pyoung-ok Chough for the leadership of the DP until Chough's death in March, 1960.

A typical new faction member in 1955 would have been between forty and fifty years of age and born in either one of the Northwestern or Southeastern provinces. He was educated in Japan and was active in the Japanese judiciary or in other bureaucratic organizations. If he belonged to the younger category, he received his education in Korea and served Syngman Rhee's administration as a bureaucrat or a member of the Korean judiciary. Like the old faction members he would be strongly anti-communist by virtue of either his having been forced to flee from his home in the North by the communists or having fought the leftists in South as a prosecutor or a leader of a rightist organization. His views were more practical and flexible than his old faction counterpart and showed less of the traditional and conservative traits. He was as much "pro-American" as the old faction member, but his attitudes seemed less exclusivistic both in foreign and domestic politics. At the same time, his commitment to a constitutional amendment to a cabinet system of government as firm as the old faction man. He supported John M. Chang, former Korean representative to the United Nations and Prime Minister under
Syngman Rhee, for the leadership of the new party.23

Thus, the DP was originally a reflection of the central-southwestern yangban class (the KDP-DNP), and later absorbed heterogeneous power bases from the northwest-southwest middle class (the PLP and other elements). It can, therefore, be said that the party represented a fairly well-rounded portion of various strata of the Korean society.24 Its general orientation toward politics (and changes in the political system) can be characterized largely as being conservative. Anti-communist, anti-Japanese, pro-American, opposition to any drastic changes, pro-authoritarian political leadership, and exclusivism in foreign and domestic policies to some extent were some of the typical ingredients of this conservatism of the DP.

In terms of our typology of development patterns, the John M. Chang cabinet can be said to have tried two different development patterns simultaneously. That is, on the

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24 One might disagree to this point on the ground that the DP did not represent the farm-labor sectors of the Korean society. But given the tradition that politics was an absolute monopoly of the upper class for such a long part of Korean history, it may be an exaggeration if one contends that such a mass party could have possibly been formed except for a Marxist-Leninist type of political party. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the DP largely represented the growing political consciousness of the general public in the process of their struggle against the Rhee regime, for example.
one hand, the blueprint for development proposed by the Chang cabinet subscribed to DP(A) where it pursued "democracy" as its political goal by means of "party politics" of the DP, and DP(B) when something was to be done about "economic build-up" by the same political tool. These development measures are to be interpreted as a response to, as well as a recognition of, the popular demands about "liberal democracy" and "economic development" which gradually became more explicit and even radical through the processes of the party's struggle against the previous Rhee government.

5.2.3 Leadership Style of John M. Chang

It seems that a great majority of the literature and the evaluations of political practitioners as well is in accord that Premier Chang was indecisive, inflexible, too honest, and often lacking in courage. They, therefore, contend that he was inadequate to be a top leader during the turbulent post-revolutionary period. Those who perceive leadership as a function of personality accordingly explain

25 For a representative example, W. D. Reeve questioned whether "Chang was the right man at the helm at so difficult a time." See his The Republic of Korea: A Political and Economic Study (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 145. Many of Chang's political acquaintances also reminisce on this point. See "Unsok Chang Nyon," in Honja chulpansa, ed., Chonggye yahwa (Behind the Scene Stories of the Political World) (Seoul, 1966), Vol. II, pp. 333-358.
the general passivity, moderation and cautiousness in Chang in terms of his personal background such as his familial origin, education and career. Chang was born to a reasonably wealthy family of Catholic faith in 1899. He studied education and religion at Manhattan College in the United States for about half a decade. After his return to Korea in 1925, he engaged for some twenty years in education both at Catholic churches and at the Catholic Dong-sung School.

By virtue of his knowledge of English he was appointed by the American Military Government in Korea as a member of the Interim Legislative Assembly in 1946. However, his real political career began with the first National Assembly in 1948 when he was elected as its member representing a district of Seoul. He was also appointed by Rhee to various key positions of the First Republic such as the first Korean Ambassador to the U.N. and later to the U.S., and the third Premier of the Rhee regime.

Although this explanation of Chang's "weak" leadership cannot totally be disregarded, it simply seems to fail as a convincing explanation for how his relatively moderate personal background and smooth political career contributed to the formation of such an "indecisive," "inflexible," and for this reason "weak" leadership of Premier Chang. It seems true that, in general, Prime Minister Chang showed a considerable degree of timidity and indecisiveness in situations which were considered to require strong determination and
immediate action. His unexplained absence as the principal speaker at a meeting of the anti-Rhee politicians in 1951 and his irresponsible five-day disappearance as prime minister following the military coup d'état are some of the indications of his timidity and indecisiveness. 26

However, inasmuch as his personality traits are insufficient in explaining his particular leadership style, it seems rather plausible to attempt to relate his ('"ambivalent"') leadership to situational determinants. Hence, the situational implications of the political goals and means that he chose for the Second Republic become significant.

In this connection, Chang's indecisive attitudes in dealing with the opposition faction within the DP over the problem of cabinet reshuffles and his ambiguous action in

26 For example, John M. Chang was scheduled to read the main declaration against Syngman Rhee's scheme for a constitutional amendment at a meeting of the anti-Rhee politicians in Pusan in 1951. Upon hearing that the meeting might be disrupted by pro-Rhee terrorists, however, Chang simply failed to show up, and his absence delayed the reading of the declaration and the meeting itself which was eventually broken up by unidentified intruders. Toward the end of the meeting, scores of terrorists attacked the participants, and anti-Rhee politicians like Pyoung-ok Chough were seriously injured by them. Chang's complete withdrawal from the political scene during this period was very similar to his five-day disappearance following the military revolution of May 16, 1961. As in the situation nine years earlier, Chang's whereabouts were unknown, and he took no action concerning the existing critical situation. Sung-joo Han, op. cit., pp. VI-23/24.
response to the demands of the "university-press nexus" on. special legislation seem to serve as good measures for his unique leadership style--an "ambivalent" leadership. Chang had to make three cabinet reshuffles during his nine-month period of reign. Each of these reshuffles was not conducted on the basis of his initiative or his political principles but was done amidst his political indecision over the conflicting factional forces within the DP. There were also popular demands, especially from the urban-intellectual sector, calling for a more decisive punitive action over the so-called "traitors to democracy" under the old regime. Chang responded to this battle-cry with the promulgation of a "retroactive" punitive law, which "he himself was in principle opposed to." Let us now take a little closer look at these indications of his "ambivalent" leadership.

27Since the John M. Chang cabinet was a product largely of the student revolution, it is understandable that the urban-intellectual sector became vocal and active in political issues during this period, especially the university and press jointly playing a leading role in dissident activities. Accordingly, Hahn-been Lee named this role of the universities and press as the "university-press nexus." See his op. cit., pp. 119, 126, 131, and 140.

28According to our definition of leadership style, "ambivalent" leadership differs from "democratic" leadership in that the former lacks any coherent principles in its influencing, persuading, and conceding upon dealing with followers.

29John M. Chang, op. cit., p. 69.
The first Chang cabinet was formed on August 23, 1960. The list of the new cabinet members included ten "new" faction members, one "old" faction member who had supported Chang in the parliamentary voting for the premiership, and two individuals who were not members of the National Assembly. This first cabinet was generally noted for its composition of "task-oriented," or "bureaucratic-bent" personnel rather than "power-oriented," or "parliamentary-oriented" ones. This can then be interpreted as a reflection of Prime Minister Chang's commitment to his chosen developmental goal—"economic build-up."

Opposition to this overwhelmingly "new" faction cabinet came not only from the "old" faction but also from some sector of the "new" faction itself, namely the younger group. More than eighty of the "old" faction members registered in the National Assembly as a separate parliamentary group and made it explicit that they would boycott all meetings of the DP. Furthermore, the younger members of the "new" faction, who were much more "power-oriented" and "parliamentary-bent" and who believed that their contribution had been most crucial in Chang's victory over the "old" faction for his premiership, were conspicuously left out of the composition of the new cabinet and thus feeling bitter and frustrated, began to oppose Chang, making

30 Hahn-been Lee, op. cit., p. 135.
31 Chull-sung Lee, the then leader of the junior group (and now Vice-Speaker of the National Assembly) explained
compromises with the "old" faction in various political issues. Chang immediately realized that the cabinet he had formed had only limited usefulness for strengthening his political power and legitimacy.

Thus, only two weeks after its formation Chang had to persuade four cabinet members of his own faction to resign after which he attempted to make a political bargain with the "old" faction members over their replacements. The "old" faction members accepted the cabinet positions "with proviso that they could be recalled at any time by their factional leaders." 32 However, the demands of the young group of the "new" faction for cabinet posts were ignored.

The second cabinet reshuffle took place at the end of January, 1961, when the members of the junior group of the "new" faction having failed to obtain any cabinet positions in the first reshuffle, now began a struggle to bring the party under their control. They formed the so-called "New Wind Society" for a common course of action in the National Assembly, joining the "old" faction's attack on the party leadership. 33 This time Chang ousted the "old" faction

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33 Despite the fact that their own members were serving in the cabinet, the "old" faction never ceased to oppose Premier Chang throughout the whole period of his reign. Their
ministers from his cabinet and gave the positions to key individuals of the senior group of the "new" faction, refusing also to accommodate the wishes of the junior group for fear of their "power-seeking orientation." Chang offered only two vice-ministerial positions to the junior group. The political consequence of this second cabinet reshuffle was grave. It meant not only a failure to reduce the dissatisfaction and hostility of the junior group but also a total loss of the assured support of two groups in the party, namely the "old" faction and the "New Wind Society."

Chang's continued difficulties with the DP and especially with the National Assembly caused another cabinet reshuffle in early May of 1961, less than two weeks before the military coup d'état. Even this time the Premier refused to meet the demands of the junior group (NWS) and did not allocate a single cabinet post to them. It seemed obvious that Prime Minister Chang together with members of the senior group were convinced that the junior members (especially with Chull-sung Lee as their leader, a well-known main complaint was that Chang gave them what they called only "rubbishy" positions which carried less weight and political opportunities, and by the time of the second cabinet reshuffle, the "old" faction had ceased to be a partner to the Chang regime. (The "old" faction formally registered itself as the "New Democratic Party (Shinmin Dang) (NDP)" on November 24, 1960, and the formal organization of the new party was on February 20, 1961.) See John M. Chang, op. cit., pp. 66-67.
manipulator of political power) would turn into a direct and serious challenge to his leadership once the latter were allowed to occupy key positions in the cabinet or the party. Thus, in short, John M. Chang's political attitudes in dealing with political crises can be characterized as being highly unprincipled and impromptu.

His indecisiveness in response to popular demands was most manifestly revealed when Premier Chang reluctantly agreed with the violent demonstrators who were encouraged by the "university-press nexus" to take necessary steps to promote a "retroactive" punitive law against the "traitors to democracy." Following the inauguration of the Chang government, national attention was focused on the trials of former officials of the Liberal regime who were accused of being responsible for wrongdoings such as the April 19th massacre, the March 15, 1960 election frauds, and other abuses of power including "illicit" fortune-making. While public sentiment was almost consensual in favor of severe

34 An editorial of the Dong-a Ilbo eloquently reflected this type of public feelings prevalent at the time and spoke for the public, saying, "It is a matter of common sense that the revolutionary punishment of the counter revolutionary pro-Rhee officials is a basic and necessary first step toward the achievement of revolutionary goals." The paper went on: "The public was urging the government at every opportunity to enact special revolutionary laws, only to be told that the culprits could be effectively punished under the existing laws. The existing laws, however, were laws meant to serve in ordinary times, and had not been enacted in anticipation of an emergency situation like the present. Therefore, to say that the culprits should be punished under the existing laws was merely a subterfuge to ignore today's reality, namely revolution." The Dong-a Ilbo, October 11, 1960, p. 1.
punishment for these "traitors to democracy," the Chang cabinet, largely because of its commitment to "liberal democratic principle" and especially of respect for "due process of law,"\textsuperscript{35} originally rejected the suggestions from many quarters to enact retroactive laws to impose more severe punishment on the political and economic criminals under the Syngman Rhee regime. As a result of this, a very mild punishment was handed down,\textsuperscript{36} and the political consequence of this light punishment was violent demonstrations and protests throughout the major cities of the country. Among them the most serious was the one which intruded into the National Assembly on October 11, 1960 and occupied the seat of the Speaker, forcing the Assembly to enact the laws. Chang hurriedly agreed to proceed with the enactment of the retroactive laws without attempting to persuade the public in line with his original democratic principles which were against such laws. He, later, regretted having done this, saying in his memoir that "a retroactive law is clearly against moral principles of democracy."\textsuperscript{37} In short, the

\textsuperscript{35}John M. Chang, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 70-71.

\textsuperscript{36}For example, in the October trials, only one was given the death sentence out of nine defendants who were accused of being "traitors to democracy" and prosecuted for the death penalty. See Sung-joo Han, \textit{op. cit.}, p. VII-5.

\textsuperscript{37}John M. Chang, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 69. He also conceded that "the situation at the time was such that I could not possibly avoid enacting the retroactive laws."
quality of his leadership in dealing with public demands was ambiguous and indecisive.

Myron Weiner, in his study of Indian democracy, perceptively pointed out that a policy of making piecemeal concessions in a passive fashion would eventually have the self-defeating effect of inviting more "troubles" and "trouble-makers." This is exactly what happened to Premier Chang's leadership in the process of dealing with both the elites and the mass, as we have amply witnessed.

In the zigzag processes of frequent cabinet reshuffles, although he claims that he did so because of his basic commitment to "democracy," he was constantly revealing his weak personality traits. Indecisiveness, unprincipledness, and irresoluteness are words frequently employed to describe his leadership behavior in dealing with factional strife. He also showed highly defensive and passive attitudes toward the populace over various political issues including the case of enactment of the retroactive laws that left a distinct impression to observers that he was basically lacking in leadership and self-assurance. Hence, his leadership style can, as a whole, be said to be "ambivalent."


39 There is almost no one among Korean specialists who does not use all or some of these words in characterizing Chang's leadership behavior.

40 Sung-joo Han, op. cit., p. VI-53.
It seems to be rather difficult to determine why Premier Chang took this seemingly unwise course of action. However, as in President Rhee's case, the majority of the literature seems to associate Chang's "ambivalent" leadership with his personal background. It is generally argued that such "mild and smooth" life-paths as his early childhood in a religious (Catholic) and pedagogic family atmosphere, his experience with American democracy, and his uneventful career as both educator and bureaucrat are positively related to the formation of a character which is totally unprepared for, and unsuitable to, the turbulent period during which he served as supreme decision-maker. Plausible as this might be, our concern is more directed toward the situational determinants than personality traits.

First of all, in terms of our "developmental" goals typology, Chang's era was ecologically constrained with conceptually dichotomizable political goals, namely "political democracy" which is "human" development and "economic development" which is "technological" development. On the one hand, it was a primary responsibility for his cabinet to guarantee the fundamental democratic elements such as freedom and equal opportunity to all, and simultaneously his regime had to "feed well" all the members of society once and for all. Under these circumstances, a leader may easily lose the focus of attention in the choice of national goal-priorities and, for this reason, become "ambivalent."
Furthermore, there was great tension existent in the political system during this particular time mainly because the Korean society underwent a revolution, but Chang timidly deferred to this. Consequently, the hypothesis that "ambiguity" in goal perception (with tension present in the political system) tends to lead to "ambivalent" leadership seems to have been confirmed.

Secondly, in terms of our typology of "developmental means, Chang's political means was, by his choice of the parliamentary-cabinet system of government, "party politics" which is "populist" means. This was also supported both by the DP's long advocacy of the parliamentary-cabinet type of government and by the popular demand which had been seriously against Rhee's presidential form of government. However, if we observe more closely the members of the Chang cabinet, we will readily notice some characteristics in their backgrounds and political orientation as well, which will serve as a measure of the discrepancy between the composition of the cabinet and the operation of the parliamentary system of government. For example, except for the few "old" faction

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41President Syngman Rhee's statement of resignation on April, 1960 seems to serve as a good measure of this popular demand. In his statement, a "constitutional amendment to a parliamentary system of government" was an important point. See To-yun Kim, op. cit., p. 350.
members who served in the second cabinet, the majority of Chang's cabinet members were of the formerly PLP element and they were more "task-oriented" than "power-oriented" as we have seen. To put it differently, Premier Chang, on the one hand, had to assure congressional support by means of these "bureaucrat-bent" ministers who were in most cases congressment themselves, and he also had to push forward economic programs with personnel of this nature. It is interesting to notice, in this connection, that a Korean specialist maintains that Chang's heavy reliance upon these "task-oriented" cabinet members accounts for his failure to secure the support of a stable majority in the National Assembly. According to him, these "task-oriented" associates of Chang's generally had very defensive attitudes toward political power and hence were passive in attempting to make any meaningful political bargaining with opposing factional elements.\(^{42}\) Failure to secure such congressional support obviously resulted in unstable cabinet reshuffles as we saw. With this type of cabinet instability it was impossible for Chang to have control of the bureaucracy in pursuit of his economic programs. Thus, we can safely say that the dual development styles that were imposed upon the Chang cabinet at the time helped create an "ambivalent" political leadership in him.

\(^{42}\)Sung-joo Han, "cit.", p. VI-53.
5.2.4 Popular Attitudes toward the John M. Chang Cabinet

As we have already seen, during the last period of the Syngman Rhee government and throughout the period of the Chang cabinet, there was a strong public demand for "political democracy" and "economic development." Good indications for this are to be found both in the numerous placards the public posted in their demonstrations protesting against the Rhee regime and in an opinion poll conducted by the Secretariat of the Chang cabinet in November, 1960, as to "what was the most urgent request to government?"

"Down with the dictatorial government!" and "Return to democracy" were the major battle-cries displayed on the placards. After their success in removing authoritarian Syngman Rhee from office, a great majority of the populace, however, looked to the Chang cabinet for "economic development." The Chang cabinet employed survey groups from eight Korean universities and let them ask 3,000 Koreans randomly selected as to their "most urgent request to government." The top eight items most heavily endorsed in their response were "economic" in nature. Over 70 percent of the South Koreans surveyed named the solution of economic problems as their "most urgent request to government." Thus, in terms of our typology of developmental goals, both the "human" development (in this case "democracy") and "technological" development...
development (solving "economic" problems) were endorsed as public political goals.

These are at face value the same political goals as those of the Chang cabinet. The only difference—but a crucial one—between these same goals was the time to be allowed for their implementation. While the cabinet perceived these developmental goals as something that needed "some time" to be carried out, public expectations toward the government for implementing these goals were "hasty" and "urgent" on the time dimension.

The parliamentary-cabinet system of government as political means, proposed by the DP, was widely approved by the populace. In the general election held on July 29, 1960, the electorate gave a solid majority vote to the DP—175 out of 233 in the House of Representatives and 31 out of 58 in the House of Councillors—which had long advocated the

44 John M. Chang, op. cit., p. 74.

45 Chang himself associates this "hasty" public demand partly with the DP's overly futuristic campaign slogan in the 1956 presidential election: "We can't live any more, let's have a change!" Po-sun Yun, the President of the Second Republic, also reminisced in the later years that the slogan aroused unwarranted wishful thinking among the majority of the people to the effect that "if only they topple the Rhee regime, then a DP cabinet succeeding it will create a new world in which everybody will live well all of a sudden." See Hahn-been Lee, op. cit., p. 127.
cabinet system of government.\textsuperscript{46} This sweeping victory of the DP is attributable not only to the fact that the DP was the only well-organized political force at the time, but also to the blind belief by the populace in the myth of parliamentary government.\textsuperscript{47}

Factional strife thereafter discouraged public trust in this system, and as a result of this, the populace later showed a lower rate of political participation in subsequent local elections.\textsuperscript{48}

A basic inconsistency in popular attitudes toward politics during the Chang regime seemed directed to his leadership style. Such political incidents as the October 11, 1960 Students' Intrusion to the National Assembly, the Reformists' Torchlight Demonstration on March 22, 1961,\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{46}Young-ho Kim and others, eds., \textit{op. cit.}, p. 253.
\textsuperscript{47}To-yun Kim, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 355-356.
\textsuperscript{48}While 82 percent of the total eligible population participated in the July 29, 1960 general election, only about 38 percent did so in the December, 1960 local elections. See Young-ho Kim and others, eds., pp. 256-257, and also John Kie-chang Oh, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 92-93.
\textsuperscript{49}During the Rhee regime, due to the heavy emphasis on anti-communism, there was no room for even a socialistic political group to survive as we saw in the case of the execution of Bong-am Cho in 1959, who was the head of the socialist-oriented Progressive Party. However, after the Chang cabinet took over power, various political groups of such nature emerged rapidly and they actively claimed a north-south detente. In the meantime, the Chang cabinet was preparing for an enactment of two special laws for the purpose of regulating this type of "irresponsible" political activity including demonstration. Upon learning about this measure various reformist political groups formed a coalition and
and the "North-South" Student Conference proposed by the so-called Student League of National Unification in late April, 1961, are good indications for this inconsistency in popular attitudes toward Chang's leadership style. Through political incidents like these (mostly in the form of popular demonstrations) the people attempted directly to meddle into state-affairs ranging from demands for cabinet changes to national unification. These direct intrusions disclosed a wide variety of incompatible demands. As we have already seen, an estimate placed the number of demonstrations during this period at about 1,800 with more than 950,000 participants. The number of newspapers and periodicals soared to 1,200 by April, 1961 from that of about 580 one year ago. Taken together, these developments seem to have caused as a whole a chaos (or decadence) in popular attitudes toward the existing political leadership.

launched a massive night demonstration with torchlights in their hands. For a comprehensive coverage of the reformists' activities during this period, see Sung-joo Han, op. cit., Chapter V.

The Student League of National Unification was an academic circle consisting of small numbers of radical students in the College of Liberal Arts and Science, Seoul National University, and they were generally known for their pro-socialist orientation. Toward the end of the Chang regime this group arbitrarily proposed a north-south student conference in which students from both sides could discuss and try to solve the problem of national unification. Their activity was stopped by the military coup d'état of May 16, 1961, and the circle was dissolved with most of its members imprisoned. For further details, also see ibid., pp. VIII-28/38.
In short, popular attitudes during the short-lived Chang cabinet had a dual nature. That is, on the one hand, they were in accordance with the development patterns that were being undertaken by the Chang cabinet, but on the other they rejected and challenged the "ambivalent" leadership the Premier provided throughout the whole period. Accordingly, there is no doubt that the role of political leadership is very important in the process of societal development. Their "hasty" and "utopian-inspiring" demands can best be accounted for in terms of the unique power-strivings found in traditional Korean political culture as discussed earlier (Chapter IV). In this connection, it is worthwhile to quote a member of the "university-press nexus" who said that "the intellectuals should take full responsibility for the fall of the John M. Chang government." 51

5.2.5 **Summary**

From the beginning to the end, the John M. Chang cabinet's task was dual in nature. That is, while the DP long advocated a policy goal that "democracy" should be achieved through "party politics," on the other hand they also were ecologically constrained to undertake "economic

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construction" by the same means. Thus, in terms of our typology of development patterns, an attempt was made to implement simultaneously both DP(A) where "human" development is pursued by "populist" means and DP(B) in which "technological" development is carried out by "populist" means.

However, "democracy" as a political goal of the Chang government came to mean merely a laissez faire response to political pressures because of the lack of concrete or firm principles. "Economic build-up," despite the Chang cabinet's endeavors toward such long-term programs as the NCS and the FYECP, evolved pretty much along conservative lines largely because of their exogenous motivation. "Party politics" was totally traumatic because of the endless factional strife which was probably caused by the unpreparedness and indiscipline of the members of the DP to the rules of the ball game called the democratic political process.

Dual political goals of different nature obviously seem to have affected Chang's leadership style. Combined with his indecisive and irresolute personal character they helped contribute to shaping an "ambivalent" leadership. In other words, on the one hand, the Chang cabinet had to be involved in continuous political bargaining with other political forces in order to secure a comfortable majority in the National Assembly, which was essential to promoting "democracy" under the given parliamentary system of government.
On the other hand, Chang had to maintain "task-oriented" personnel in his cabinet to provide an efficient instrument for implementing various programs for "economic construction."

Chronic factional strife in the DP itself created recurrent tensions both in the party and in the total political system. And yet Chang simply could not overcome these difficulties and regulate them by resorting to some other course of action, let us say, for example, "authoritarian" or "democratic" leadership. Hence, Chang's leadership became even more "ambivalent." This seems also to be a good test of the hypothesis that "ambiguity" in political goals and means is associated with "ambivalent" political leadership.

Although there were no significant changes in the demographic characteristics of the population during this short regime as compared to those in the last period of the Syngman Rhee government, the political freedom that the populace obtained through courageous and persistent struggle against the Rhee regime obviously brought about extreme political activism. This political activism, in turn, brought an avalanche of inconsistent and incompatible political demands. Thus, it is very difficult to assess this type of popular attitudes in terms of the balance model employed in this study. However, to characterize roughly, popular attitudes during the Chang cabinet can be said to have zigzagged across all the four cells. For example, at
first the people accepted both the development pattern and leadership style, which is a Cell (I) attitude. Next they began to oppose at one time or another the proposed development pattern or the leadership style of Chang which is either a Cell (III) or Cell (II) attitude. Later, toward the end of the regime, a Cell (IV) attitude, which is a total rejection of both development pattern and leadership style was prevalent in the South Korean political system. Demographic changes in the populace offer little explanation to these inconsistent and ambivalent popular attitudes toward the government. Instead, the sadomasochistic striving for political power which was unleashed with the mood of *laissez faire* political leadership at the time, seems to account for the zigzags in popular attitudes toward the John M. Chang cabinet.

Under these circumstances, it is not difficult to understand that the degree of societal development achieved by this regime was very low. As we have already seen, the political aspect of societal development was soaring in an atmosphere of loose *laissez faire*, a misinterpretation of liberal democracy. Unceasing factional strife in the DP and among other political forces was the political consequence of such misled democracy. The economy was stagnant. The fragile cabinet simply could not push
forward its economic programs. The consequence of this inability in the economic realm was grave. Inflation became rampant, businesses on all levels collapsed, and hundreds of thousands of unemployed were idling about.  

The Chang cabinet had to devaluate the hwan (₩), the exchange ratio of which fell from 650 to the dollar to 1,300 to one. Lawlessness and disorder as we saw in some of the violent demonstrations speak for the social aspect of the Chang cabinet's societal development. Accordingly, although Chang himself later claimed that "inability" and "corruption," employed more often than not to describe his regime, were not the reasons for the military coup d'etat, the John M. Chang cabinet would not have survived longer unless something was really done for more rapid and improved societal development. (He pointed out that the coup had already been plotted by a small group of "power-hungry" military "conspirators" only eighteen days after his inauguration.) Figure 6 roughly pictures the John M. Chang cabinet's political performance.

52 John Kie-chang Oh, op. cit., pp. 84-85.  
53 Ibid.  
54 John M. Chang, op. cit., p. 82.
Figure 6: The John M. Chang Cabinet (1960-1961)
Section III: The Chung-hee Park Regime (1961-1972)

At the outset of this section, two things are important in the writer's view and worth mentioning. They are the questions as to (1) why the military, rather than any other political force intervened in the Korean political scene, and (2) why only the period of 1961-1972 is being dealt with, whereas the same person is still in power at the time of writing. The first question is on civil-military relations in Korean politics, which is clearly beyond the scope of this study, for the proposed research limits its interest to "who did what and how?" but not in "why who?" Besides, there are a number of studies already done in the field of civil-military relations in Korean politics.¹

The second question is the matter of the "drastic" change the Korean political system underwent since October 17, 1972 (the official name of which is "October Revitalization"). Since the reform, it seems obvious that the South Korean political system has been imposing many drastic changes on various sectors of society. However, it is inappropriate that this study include post-revitalization politics, mainly because it is analytically premature and

furthermore practically prohibited. Hence it is the purpose of this study to limit its scope to the political performance of the Chung-hee Park regime from May 16, 1961 to October 17, 1972.

President Chung-hee Park originally seized political power on May 16, 1961 through a military coup d'etat. He was then a Major General in the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA). Through the October 15, 1963 presidential election he became the first President of the Third Republic of Korea. He continued to serve his second term by winning in the May 3, 1967 presidential election. By virtue of the constitutional amendment of October 17, 1969 which enabled him to run for a third term, he was again elected to a third term as president on April 27, 1971.

In order to analyze more rigorously the political performance under his regime, some subdivisions of the period under consideration (1961-1972) as in the case of the Syngman Rhee government seem necessary. They are: (1) the period of military rule (1961-1963); (2) the period of "modernization of the fatherland" (1964-1968); and (3) the period of "national revitalization" (1969-1973). In each of these

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2See the Presidential Decrees No. 1 & 2, which were proclaimed on January 8, 1974. The Dong-a Ilbo (January 9, 1974), pp. 1 and 3. For subsequent political developments related to decrees, see Time (June 24, 1974), pp. 46 and 48.

3The quoted terminologies are as used by President Park himself and not the writer's creation. See Park Chung-hee Daetongryong Gakha Yonsolmun-jib (President Chung-hee Park's
subperiods certain shifts seem to be observable in terms of the major variables that this study employs—namely development patterns, leadership styles, and popular attitudes, thus making such subdivision justifiable.

5.3.1 The Period of Military Rule (1961-1963)

Political Goals

As soon as Major General Chung-hee Park successfully overthrew the John M. Chang cabinet during the predawn hours of May 16, 1961, the military authorities took over the executive, legislative and judiciary branches of the state, and consolidated full political power by creating the Military Revolutionary Council (MRC). The MRC then made six pledges:

1. Anti-communism will be the cardinal point of national policy and the nation's anti-communist alignment, which has thus far been no more than a matter of convention and a mere slogan, will be rearranged and strengthened.

2. The U.N. Charter will be observed and international agreements will be faithfully carried out. The friendly ties with the United States and other Free World nations will be further strengthened.

3. All corruption and past evil practice in this country will be wiped out and fresh and clean morality will be pursued in order to redress the degenerated national morality and spirit.

4. The condition of national life which is on the brink of despair and stagnation will be quickly ameliorated and all-out effort will be made for the reconstruction of a self-reliant national economy.

5. In order to implement the long-cherished national desire to unify the divided land, all-out efforts will be directed towards the nation capable of coping with communism.

6. As soon as such tasks are accomplished, we will ready ourselves to turn the reins over to new and conscientious politicians and return to our original duties.

On May 19, 1961, the military authorities changed the name of the MRC (to the more auspicious title of Supreme Council for National Reconstruction [SCNR]), and the following day, May 20, thirty-two military officers were appointed to assume the supreme governmental policy-making and policy-executive functions. On May 21, some of them augmented by other military officers were assigned as cabinet ministers and the following oath was pledged by them.

'I do solemnly pledge to the people that I will concentrate my efforts upon strengthening national power for unification of the nation, developing national economy, preserving national independence and freedom, strengthening the ties with U.N. and friendly countries, and overcoming the national crises through the strengthening of power and effectiveness to combat communism and complete the elimination of corruption and social evils, acting in the basis of the patriotic spirit of the glorious armed forces.'

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5Se-jin Kim, op. cit., p. 103.
Thus, at their face value, the political goals of the military revolution can be summarized under three headings. They are: (1) national unification on the basis of strong anti-communism, (2) national economic development, and (3) national independence and freedom on the basis of friendly ties with the U.N., the U.S. and other Free World nations.

In terms of our typology of "developmental" goals, then, the political goals of the junta can be said to be more directed toward "human" development than toward "technological" development. As we see above, among the three broadly summarized goals the ratio between "human" and "technological" development is two to one, respectively. However, one precaution must be taken, for unless we examine these face-value political goals thoroughly as to their relative weights we are not in a position to pass judgment in any definitive terms as to which goal(s) was in reality assigned more importance.

Fortunately, it is not very difficult to identify the priorities of the major goals that were being promoted under the military regime. General Park himself clearly assigned top priority to "technological" development by saying right after the coup, "I cannot think of anything else that would make me more miserable than to be hungry." He continued, "Priority one of my duties at this moment is to drive poverty away from this chronically poor country, and I believe this
is the only way to win the struggle against communism."\textsuperscript{6} Moreover, General Park, in his capacity as Chairman of the SCNR, again emphasized this point and said, "It is only too natural that democracy should fail to prosper in such a place as Korea where the per capita income runs low and so does the living standard of the people, for one of the fundamental requirements for the sound growth of democracy is, in the first place, to promote national economic development."\textsuperscript{7} Thus, whatever higher level of goals, let us say "democracy," or "national unification," had been set in his public statements, it is obvious that in reality his first goal priority was "economic development."

This type of goal was immediately reflected in the action programs undertaken by the SCNR. For instance, except for a couple of expedient measures to restore law and order in the initial period of the junta,\textsuperscript{8} a heavy emphasis was placed upon economic development. The SCNR's


\textsuperscript{7}Chung-hee Park, in Koreana Quarterly, op. cit., pp. 20-26.

\textsuperscript{8}A series of reform measures were undertaken by the SCNR right after its positions were filled. These were the measures in order to win public confidence and support by restoring law and order. About 4,200 hoodlums, thousands of beggars, over 2,000 communist agents and suspects, and others guilty of business misdemeanors such as smugglers and blackmarketeers were arrested. Calling for a "responsible" press, 1,230 out of 1,573 press and news services were closed down, leaving 343 which had been in existence prior to April, 1960. See Se-jin Kim, op. cit., pp. 105-107.
powerful economic planning agency, the Economic Planning Board (EPB), and its First Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1st FYEDP announced January 13, 1962) serve as good measures for this emphasis. Hence, the political goal of the military regime was heavily "technological" development.

Political Means

The political machinery of the military government consisted of three institutions: (1) the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR), (2) the Cabinet, and (3) the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). The SCNR was created on May 19, 1961, consisting exclusively of military officers (32). It functioned as the supreme governmental policy-making and policy-executing body. The Cabinet was installed on May 21, 1961, and was comprised also exclusively of fifteen military officers. Its functions were originally administrative but there were certain inherent role conflicts involved in its relationship to the SCNR. And finally, there emerged the powerful KCIA on June 19, 1961 by SCNR Decree No. 619, which was placed

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9 For both the structure and functions of the EPB and the statistics of the 1st FYEDP, see Hahn-been Lee, op. cit., pp. 157-160.

10 For a complete coverage of the make-up of the SCNR from May 19, 1961 to February, 1963, see ibid., p. 166.

11 For both the make-up of the Cabinet and its role conflicts with the SCNR, see ibid., pp. 167-168.
directly under the Chairman of the SCNR for the purpose of "supervising and coordinating both international and domestic intelligence activities, including those of the military." 12

Thus, in terms of our typology of developmental means, there is no doubt that the political tools which were mobilized by the military regime during this period were highly "elitist" in nature. Combined with the particular developmental goal endorsed by the military regime, which was "technological" development, this "elitist" means yields a DP(D).

Leadership Style

General Park's leadership style during this period of the military revolution was stern and determined. In fact, his leadership was so decisive and aggressive (as we can see in Table 4 which is a resume of the measures taken by the military administration during the first one-hundred days) that the literature generally seems to agree that "Gen. Park's leadership was highly authoritarian." 13

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12 Article 1 of the SCNR Decree No. 619, as reported in The Hankoo Ilbo, June 21, 1961, p. 2. And for various activities and arrest records, see Hanquk kunsa hyokmyongsa (Records of the Korean Military Revolution) (Seoul: Dong-a Publishing Co., 1963), Vol. I, pp. 1743-1746. It is strange to notice that neither the SCNR Decree No. 619, nor any other materials specify the structure of the KCIA although they do its functions.

13 Publications on his leadership style, except for those by the government, are in accordance with this point.
Table 4: Measures Taken by the Military Administration During the First Hundred Days

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 16</td>
<td>Martial law: Dissolution of the National Assembly and local councils. Disbanding of political parties and social organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 22</td>
<td>Arresting of 4,200 gang leaders and 2,000 communist suspects by this date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 23</td>
<td>Proclamation of &quot;Press Purification Act.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 25</td>
<td>Announced plan for liquidation of rural usurious debts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 10</td>
<td>Act establishing the KCIA. Act for Liquidation of Rural Usurious Debts. Act on the National Reconstruction Movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 14</td>
<td>Act on Disposition of Illicit Fortunes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 15</td>
<td>Consolidation of three public electric companies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 27</td>
<td>Agricultural Price Support Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 18</td>
<td>Emergency Economic Measures for Industrial Recovery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 22</td>
<td>Establishment of the EPB and announcement of the outline of the 1st FYEDP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 17</td>
<td>Act establishing Capital Defense Command.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hahn-been Lee, Korea: Time, Change, and Administration, op. cit., p. 155.
Of course the military coup d'état, by definition of its "revolutionary" nature, embedded such decisive leadership in its top leader. In addition, however, his choice of the particular development pattern (in this case DP[D] where "technological" development was being pursued by "elitist" means), seems to have contributed to a rise of "authoritarian" leadership. For example, "economic development" as a political goal if it is to be implemented for the purpose of visible short-run returns, will, without doubt, call for a firm commitment to pushing forward whatever plans seem necessary which, in turn, will probably contribute to a rise of "authoritarian" leadership. This seems especially so in a country like Korea where resources for economic development are scarce and the traditional value system of society is largely not in favor of "technological" innovations or entrepreneurship.

General Park's own remarks on the nature of the crisis as he perceived it at the time of revolution seem to speak for themselves on this point:

Nations of Asia similar to ours are now faced with crises which are peculiar to Asian society, resulting from their historical, cultural and social heritages. Most Asian countries, pressed by the instinctive desires of the nearly illiterate masses, have to discover some way to achieve rapid economic growth. The reality they face calls for strengthening without delay the government's economic stability and satisfying the justifiable impatience and discontent of the general public based on economic and social poverty and insecurity. In order to secure efforts to improve the living condition of the people in Asia, even undemocratic emergency measures may be necessary. For this reason, it is almost impossible
for a government in Asia to be of people, as it is in West European countries. It is also an undeniable fact the people in Asia today fear starvation and poverty more than the oppressive duties thrust upon them by totalitarianism. So, the fact that all governments in Asia are in a position where they must risk another new danger in attempting to avoid starvation and poverty is undeniable. 14

Furthermore, it seems obvious that such "elitist" political means as the SCNR, the Cabinet, and the KCIA were highly hierarchical in nature and for this reason contributed to authoritarian leadership of the supreme decision-maker to an even greater degree. For example, in the SCNR which retained not only the function as supreme governmental decision-maker but also as legislative body, serious debates or discussions over policy-making were almost non-existent, and this was mainly attributable to its efficiency-the-first principle, consequently making the pattern of decision-making almost an exact replica of that in the military hierarchies. 15 Despite its role conflicts with the SCNR, the Cabinet, in an ultimate sense, was an organization to implement those policies laid down by the SCNR, and the incumbents of the cabinet were, like those in the SCNR, exclusively military officers. "The first task undertaken by the KCIA was a loyalty check which involved the screening


15 Yo-chan Song, "Memoirs," in Collected Memoirs of Nine Political Leaders, op. cit., p. 474. See also his "An Open
of all major political figures and high-ranking government employees. The KCIA later announced that it had screened and checked over 41,000 persons, of whom, 1,863 were found guilty of some culpable actions or past.\textsuperscript{16} Under these circumstances it is not difficult to imagine that the military regime's resort to only "elitist" political means helped contribute to an organizational atmosphere in which "authoritarianism" became the norm for the top leadership. Consequently, then, the hypothesis that the more "technological" the nature of developmental goals the more "authoritarian" the leadership tends to be, and the more "elitist" the developmental means the more "authoritarian" the leadership seems to have been confirmed.

Besides, it is interesting at this juncture to notice that even a Korean specialist whose approach to leadership behavior is pretty much geared to what is conventionally called a personality-trait theory supports our major hypothesis on Park's leadership style. He observes:

\textit{Park represents the new breed of scientifically oriented officers. As an artillery expert, he seems to be thoroughly aware of the supremacy of technology in the modern world. As a political leader, Park is more closely tied to the traditional system of administrative government than to representative democracy. He belongs to the old and almost Prussian school of thought, which values administrative efficiency above individual freedom or popular}}
representation. A revulsion for the bungling legislature of the Second Republic appears to have played a part in his decision to undertake the coup. The immediate dissolution of the National Assembly and the replacement of civilians with military officers in all the key executive and administrative positions bears out his distrust of representative government. Gen. Park presented a sharp and enigmatic contrast to his predecessors, Syngman Rhee and John M. Chang. He was a soldier of rural background, a cultural chauvinist with a predilection for rule by administration, and a thoroughly modern man who nevertheless retained the traditional Confucian faith. 17

Popular Attitudes

At the initial stage of the military revolution there seemed to exist an indifference (or even apathy) prevalent in the attitudes of the general public, and people clearly held a "wait-and-see" attitude toward the military authority. In this connection, Se-jin Kim observes:

[The coup] aroused in the Korean intellectual community a general sense of negativism and skepticism. It met with hostility from those who were loyal to the old regime and from those who faced the prospect of more loss than gain from the new order. 18

This situation can be accounted for in terms of suspected legitimacy of the military government. That is to say, the military overthrow of the constitutionally elected government, no matter how justifiable it might have been in terms of inefficiency of the civilian leadership and nobility of the military intentions, clearly constituted a violation of legitimacy.

17 Ibid., p. 91. 18 Ibid., p. 102.
The junta regime did not stand idle before these post-revolutionary uncertainties as we have already seen in its immediate reform measures. Among them, its propaganda campaign seems to have been significant in curbing skepticism and antipathy toward the military government and even in encouraging popular support for the revolution. According to Records of the Korean Military Revolution, millions of copies of national mottos and pamphlets containing Park's speeches, and listings of government accomplishments were distributed over the entire country free of charge. And in the first two years, over 20,000 transistor radios and over 1,000 loudspeakers were sent to the rural areas.¹⁹ Eleven new transmitting stations were built and there was a great increase in both government broadcasts and propaganda films.²⁰ These intensified efforts at propaganda definitely seemed to help contribute not only to the publicity of the new leadership but also to a better popular understanding of the new military regime. A good indication of this type of popular acquiescence came from such an authoritative newspaper, Dong-a Ilbo. For example, the paper in its editorial of May 28, 1961 accepted the junta as de facto and cautioned:

It is our conclusion that due to the over-insistence upon democratic legalism prior

to May 16, Korea was in danger of a communist success. The May 16 Military Revolution was undertaken because the situation was critical. It was the last hope for the establishment of liberal democracy in Korea. Henceforth, this military revolution must succeed. We the citizens must be aware of the great, historic meaning and mission of the May 16 Military Revolution and must recognize that the success of the revolution is the only remaining opportunity for the construction of democratic nation. 21

Nevertheless, the question of legitimacy of the military regime remained quite unresolved, and as a result of this, popular attitudes can be said to have been "undecided" toward both development patterns and leadership styles under the military government. The result of the October 15, 1963 presidential election serves as a measure for this type of "undecidedness" in popular attitudes. In the process of the election campaign, Chung-hee Park, recently retired from military service, appealed to the public that his being elected would be interpreted as support for his past military regime "of which noble spirit the forthcoming government should succeed." 22 On the other hand his opponent Po-sun Yun, who was the president during the John M. Chang cabinet, urged the public to join him to put a "real period" to military rule by defeating his counterpart. 23 Park received 4,702,640 out of 10,081,198

22 Young-ho Kim and others, eds., op. cit., pp. 67-76.
23 Ibid.
effective votes, while his opponent Yun got 4,546,614. Park won with less than 160,000 votes which was about 1.6 percent of the total votes. If only one-fourth of the 831,944 votes that were scattered to the four other opposition candidates had been added to Yun's votes, his victory over Park would have been "comfortable." Yun later claimed that "in realistic terms this means the victory of the opposition." 24

Thus, in terms of our balance model, popular attitudes toward authority and policies of the military regime can be said to have been either Cell (II) where people reject leadership but accept the development style, or Cell (III) in which leadership is approved but development style rejected. However, if we take into account the performance of the military regime in such development programs as restoration of law and order, institutional reforms, and economic development plans, it seems plausible to say that popular attitudes in this period were likely to be the former.

Societal Development

Despite the political tension which was generated by the unprecedented military junta in the Korean political system, the degree of societal development seems to have been moderately "high" during this period. This situation seems also to reflect the specific developmental orientations

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24 Ibid.
of political goals plus means chosen, and of the "determined" political leadership that the military government showed in this period.

As to the economic aspect of societal development on which the regime placed its greatest emphasis, the annual economic growth rate in 1963 was more than 8.0 percent as compared to less than 4.0 percent in early 1961; the volume of exports in U.S. dollars was 84.4 million in 1963 as compared to less than 43.0 million in 1961; the per capita income in 1963 was $106.60 as compared to less than $90.00 in the last period of the preceding government; and there was already a sign of decline in the receipt of foreign aid, that is, 216 million dollars in 1963 as compared to 245 million in 1960.25 These are some of the indisputable achievements of the Park's military regime through the 1st FYEDP. W. W. Rostow, as early as the summer of 1962, commenting on Korea's future economy, stated that "South Korea is going to pick up and go."26

In other aspects of societal development such as the restoration of law and order and civil liberties, the

25 Joun-sik Kil, Park Chung Hee: President of All the People (Seoul: Government Printing Office, Republic of Korea, 1972), pp. 148-158. See also In-joong Whang, Administration and Economic Development: Korea's Development Administration, op. cit., p. 3.

military regime showed both merits and demerits. For example, its swiftness and effectiveness in treating the social disorders inherited from its "weak" predecessor was remarkable as we have already witnessed. On the other hand, in the civil liberties arena, there obviously was a setback and it is true that people felt a repression of and restriction to their "democratic" fundamental rights. However, this also seemed to be accepted in the name of "revolution." Hence, the degree of societal development can be said to be relatively "high" during this period.

5.3.2 The Period of "Modernization of the Fatherland" (1964-1968)

There was a series of political crises that emerged from the civil-military tension over the time-table for the transition of political power to a constitutional government and the political participation of General Park himself in the transition period of 1962-63. An additional factor at this juncture was that the U.S. Government also played a significant role in the process of transition of political power to civilian government. Table 5 gives a brief picture of the entire process of this transition.

Political Goals

President Chung-hee Park's uppermost political goal during this period of the Third Republic was "modernization of the fatherland." In fact, he was the first supreme decision-maker who emphatically endorsed "modernization" as
Table 5: The Processes of the Power Transition from the Military to the Civilian Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date (mo./day/yr.)</th>
<th>Political Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8/12/61</td>
<td>Gen. Park as Chairman of the SCNR announced that the military would relinquish power to the civilian government in the summer of 1963, following a referendum on a new constitution before March, 1963.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/14/61</td>
<td>President John F. Kennedy invited Chairman Park to visit the U.S. and in a joint communiqué reaffirmed the time-table of power transition to civilian government in May, 1963.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/16/62</td>
<td>A &quot;Political Purification Act&quot; was promulgated banning political activities of 2,907 civilian politicians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/14/62</td>
<td>Gen. Park, in a message to the 1st Corps of the ROKA, said that &quot;those military officers who have participated in the junta cannot return to their original duties.&quot; (The major implication being that he might participate in forthcoming civilian government.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/17/62</td>
<td>A national referendum on a constitutional amendment stipulating a &quot;strong&quot; presidential system of government was held. (Seventy-eight point eight percent of the total in favor of it.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/27/62</td>
<td>Gen. Park, at a news conference, reaffirmed his intention to run for president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/18/63</td>
<td>A &quot;Democratic Republican Party (DRP)&quot; was formed under the skillful organization at work of Jong-pil Kim and his KCIA staff members. (This party was to nominate Park for its presidency in civilian government.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/18/63</td>
<td>Gen. Park, confronted with opposition to his plan to participate in civilian politics from many quarters, suddenly changed his mind and announced that &quot;he will not run for civilian office.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/7/63</td>
<td>In a speech at the Headquarters of the 1st Field Army Gen. Park hinted that he might not turn over power to civilian leaders if they would precipitate political crises.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 5 (continued) The Processes of the Power Transition from the Military to the Civilian Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date (mo./day/yr.)</th>
<th>Political Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3/25/63</td>
<td>There was a demonstration by military forces calling for a prolongation of military rule. (It was the first event of such nature in ROKA history.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/16/63</td>
<td>Gen. Park announced cancellation of the forthcoming election, and substituted a referendum to let the people decide the proposed four-year prolongation of military rule.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/25/63</td>
<td>The U.S. Government issued a statement making its position explicit against the idea of extension of military rule in ROK. (It was later revealed that President Kennedy sent a stern message to Gen. Park urging him not to renge on the earlier pledge.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/6/63</td>
<td>Gen. Park announced that he would postpone the proposed referendum until September, 1963 and that the junta would permit immediate resumption of political activities by civilian politicians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/16/63</td>
<td>At the second anniversary commemoration of the Military Revolution Gen. Park pledged to transfer power to civilian government within the year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/27/63</td>
<td>Gen. Park was nominated by the DRP as candidate for presidency and he accepted the nomination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/31/63</td>
<td>Park retired from ROKA and became the president of the DRP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/15/63</td>
<td>Presidential election was held and the DRP's Park won over his opponent, former President Po-sun Yun by a very slim margin.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Dong-a Ilbo (from August 12, 1961 to October 16, 1963.)
the most important policy goal in a "developmental" sense. It is true that Syngman Rhee and John M. Chang also occasionally employed similar terms of this nature as we have already seen, but theirs did not clarify or project a new image of the Korean future.

On December 17, 1963, President Park, in his inaugural address as the first President of the Third Republic introduced his ideology of "modernization of the fatherland," and stated:

> Our unavoidable historical task in this decade, as instigated in the course of the April and May revolutions, is the modernization of the fatherland in all fields--political, economic, social and cultural. To this end we should dedicate our bodies and souls in a pan-national effort to this task.²⁷

Then he categorically specified the meaning of modernization of the fatherland. "Political autonomy," "economic independence," and "social stability" were the operational meanings of "modernization of the fatherland." Besides, among the goals of "modernization of the fatherland," he put heavy emphasis upon "economic development" by saying, "The solution of the living problems and the rational promotion of the 1st FYEDP, the goal of national independence, are urgent tasks."²⁸

In his state of the union message to the National Assembly on January 10, 1964, he reiterated the importance of

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²⁷Bum-sik Shin, op. cit., p. 286.
²⁸Ibid., pp. 286-290.
"modernization of the fatherland." He also said in it that "the guidelines for this modernization of the fatherland are self-assurance, self-reliance and prosperity." Furthermore, "this target of economic development can be successfully undertaken only by diligence, frugality, and savings."29

Again in 1967 when he became second President of the Third Republic he reaffirmed "modernization of the fatherland" as his main political goal and showed his strong determination to achieve it. This time he made some changes in the guidelines for reaching his policy goal: that is, from "self-assurance," "self-reliance" and "saving" to "more production," "exports" and "reconstruction."30 In other words, the guidelines were made even more specific to and practical for "economic development."

This heavy emphasis on "economic development" continued throughout the entire period of "modernization of fatherland." A content-analysis of Park's four budget messages for FY 1964-67 as to the four categories of values and perceptions instrumental to "economic development" shows that 50 percent of Park's speeches during the period were devoted to projecting the future path of Korean economy.31 Table 6 shows the analysis.


30Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 20.

31This content analysis compares two Korean leaders, Syngman Rhee and Chung-hee Park, as to their values and
Table 6: A Content Analysis of President Chung-hee Park's Major Speeches (1964-67)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>(Unit: No. of Words)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President Park's Budget</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messages (FY 1964-67)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security and Diplomacy</td>
<td>7,700 (15 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Stabilization and Development</td>
<td>25,840 (50 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and Social Welfare</td>
<td>5,973 (12 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Administration</td>
<td>3,182 (6 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>9,305 (17 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>52,000 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Thus, in terms of our developmental goal typology, it can be comfortably said that President Park's political goal during the "modernization of the fatherland" period was heavily skewed to "technological" development. Just why he became so obsessed with economic matters is beyond the scope of this study. However, it may be explained in terms of both his personal background and his unique perception of statehood. For example, he confessed that "he was an unwanted child in a poverty-striken farm family, and hunger and misery were the only things that he knew of as a young boy."


32Mok-ku Chun, Junki: Park Chung Hee (A Biography:
His military career was filled with conflict and he had to be transferred more than twenty-five times in his seventeen years of military service. He is a self-made man and when he assumed political power through a military coup d'état his major perception of statehood was the responsibility to feed the people. He announced that "priority one of my duties ... was to drive poverty from this chronically poor country." It, therefore, seems to be apparent that he was greatly frustrated by the John M. Chang cabinet's inability to cope with the nation's economic problems.

Political Means

The major political tools by means of which the newly established constitutional government was to govern were three: the DRP, the Bureaucracy, and the KCIA. Among these political institutions, the DRP was a new creation and hence deserves some description and explanation as to its birth, structure, and functions.

As we have already seen in Table 5, the DRP announced its formal organization on January 18, 1963. The initiator of this political party was Jong-pil Kim, then director of the KCIA, who was generally known to be a central member of the coup, second only to General Park, and a group of

Humanity and Statesmanship) (Seoul: Educational Critiques Printing Co., 1966), passim, especially, p. 5.

33 Se-jin Kim, op. cit., p. 90.
politically ambitious young colonels. As to the political atmosphere and background at the time which led to the birth of the DRP, Gregory Henderson observes:

After the army seized control and found that foreign and domestic pressures would not permit a total ban on politics, the colonels followed through on their political planning. In the early part of 1962, a year before the official ban on political activities was lifted, the KCIA started intensely secret but quite systemic attempts to form a political party that would continue and further the military government's program and be responsive to its leaders even when military rule lifted. Certain key KCIA former military officers were in charge of the new party project; they recruited civilian university friends to help them. Political-science teachers were, in some instances, plucked from the streets at nights and "persuaded" to participate.35

The same writer describes the structure of the DRP in these words:

The new party reflected much of the same Communist-Kuomintang type of organization as its LP predecessor. The party was organized from the top, with Chung-hee Park as party president and under him a chairman who might or might not have personal importance. Below this level came a strong planning committee, followed by a hierarchy of councils, provincial chapters, and election chapters. The party was provided with a permanent administrative secretariat, originally paid by KCIA funds, its staff drawn from the armed forces, the universities, the press, and the fringes of the former political parties. Originally, each of the hundreds of election districts was to have four of these secretariat members, provincial offices eight. This permanent core, recruited and paid by KCIA, was responsible for searching out suitable candidates, instructing them in the government's--or the KCIA--wishes and seeing that party discipline was

35Gregory Henderson, op. cit., p. 305.
maintained. Members of this secretariat were wont to talk privately about the plans of the KCIA to create "puppets." 36

The functions of the DRP are also described by Henderson:

Every KCIA actively had the imprint of the long experience of its leaders in Army Intelligence. Party formation was no exception. Research groups were set up to study the political problems and methods involved, and the secretariat was to accumulate detailed files and become intimately familiar with all possible candidates and with the exact political complexion of each district. Personal weakness were carefully noted as means for control, character assassination, blackmail, or political defeat. No previous political group--not even the LP--had ever before been graced with this professionalism of political approach. These innovations had their curious breeding in American G-2 techniques, well learned by Korean officers, and in Japanese bureaucratic colonialism. 37

In short, the DRP was born as a response to the political necessity the military rule had to confront at the time, namely to dismantle itself into a civilian regime. Its organizational structure was, in essence, KCIA-fabricated, and for this reason, the party was highly "elitist" in nature. A functional characteristic of the DRP may be typically found in its professionalism to geiment its members rather than to articulate or aggregate the public interests. The DRP was mobilized mainly for the purposes of consolidating political power for Park and securing the legitimacy of his regime,

36 Ibid., pp. 305-306.
37 Ibid.
purposes that help account for the peculiarities in its birth, structure, and functions.

The first political consequence of such efforts by the DRP was its victory both in the October 15, 1963 presidential election and in the November 26 general election in the same year: Chung-hee Park had been elected as the first President of the Third Republic of Korea and the DRP became the ruling party of the Republic with an overwhelming majority (110 seats out of a total of 175) in the National Assembly. 38

The DRP continued to grow in size "by scooping up free-floating elements from all over the social map--former officers and intelligence agents, former bureaucrats now unemployed, those of fringes of the former parties who now wanted roles front and center." 39 And by the time of the May 3, 1967 presidential election, it claimed a total

38 According to the new Constitution that was approved by a national referendum on December, 1962, the once-powerful legislative branch was changed into a feeble unicameral body under a strong president and the total number of seats in the National Assembly decreased from more than 200 to only 175. For more information on this third Constitution, see C. I. Eugine Kim, "Some Korean Constitutional Development: the Meaning of the Third Constitution," Papers of the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts & Letters, XLIX (1964), pp. 301-302.

membership of more than one and a half million. Chung-hee Park won over Po-sun Yun with a margin of about 1.2 million votes. (Park received 5,688,666 against Yun's 4,526,541.) In the June 8, 1967 general election, the president's party carried all but 27 of 131 electoral districts, and claimed 130 out of the 175 National Assembly seats, including those allocated on the basis of vote percentages political parties received from the whole electorate. Although this sweeping victory was mainly attributable to splintering among the opposition political parties, it leaves little doubt that the DRP was a well-financed, effectively-managed "elitist" political party.

From May, 1964 to May, 1968, there were 68 members recruited in 17 governmental ministries including two prime ministers. Among them 20 were retired military officers, thus making the ratio between the military-turned-civilians to the pure civilian ministers about 26 to 74. However, the premiership and other so-called politically-weighed ministries such as interior and defense were all kept by the ex-generals.

40 President Chung-hee Park's Speech Series, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 73.

41 Statistics as to the results of the two elections came from Young-ho Kim and others, eds., pp. 85 and 348.

42 Statistics are based on the author's own computation using the raw data given in Hahn-been Lee and others, eds., A Historical Analysis on Korean Administration, op. cit., pp. 544-549.
Hahn-bee Lee reports that a survey at the end of the period of military rule showed that of the key government posts, including cabinet ministers, vice-ministers, ambassadors, and presidents of major government corporations, 228, or 28 percent, were occupied by former military officers.43

In terms of the bureaucratic infrastructure there were during this period of "modernization of the fatherland" some newly-built organizations and expansion of others as well. For example, the Ministry of Technology and Science was first created in 1967, and the director of the EPB was boosted to the level of vice-minister. The Ministry of Public Relations and that of General Affairs were each enlarged and promoted to ministries from office or bureau levels. In 1968, there was a reform to strengthen the Office of Presidential Secretaries and as a result came to function as a "petty cabinet." These reforms in bureaucratic structures as a whole can generally be said to have been directed toward more reliance on technology and greater efficiency.

As to the structure and functions of the KCIA during this period few data are available except for the legal provision that stipulates formation of such an organization specifying its functions in very broad terms. Naturally information regarding its activities are speculative in nature. However, one thing that is more obvious than not

43Hahn-been Lee, op. cit., p. 174.
with this political machine is the fact that it had a composition of highly "loyal" elements to the existing top leadership and for this reason exerted a relatively heavier influence in presidential decision-making.44

Thus, in terms of our typology of "developmental" means, Park's major political means during this period of "modernization of the fatherland" were highly "elitist" in nature. And the DRP was no exception despite its party facade. Besides, as far as Park's developmental means during this period were concerned, it is generally observed that he relied more heavily on the bureaucracy and the KCIA than on the DRP.45 Accordingly, President Park's development pattern in this period was clearly a DP(D) where "technological" development is pursued by "elitist" means. A brief look at how this particular development pattern affected his leadership style is in order.

Leadership Style

One of the many political incidents in which President Park's leadership style was clearly demonstrated was the

44 Jong-pil Kim, Jae-choon Kim, and Hyung-wook Kim were the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd directors of the KCIA, respectively, during this period. They are well known and famous for their "uncontestable" loyalty to President Park. As to their presidential decision-making, see Pado rul nomoso (Overcoming the Tidal Waves: the Two-Year History of the DRP) (Seoul: The DRP, 1964), passim.

Korea-Japan rapprochement. The normalization of relations between the two countries had long been a delicate issue in Korean politics since the Liberation in 1945. Two incompatible reasons seem to have made the issue problematic. On the one hand Korea had a bitter historical experience with Japan while on the other there was obviously a growing economic interest involved in the problem. Syngman Rhee took an idealistic position on the issue and because of his strong anti-Japanism there was little room for any development to be made in their relations. John M. Chang had a plan for normalization but it remained as a plan indefinitely because of the cabinet's short survival.

President Park took a more realistic stance on this issue and he was determined to make early progress on the normalization of Korea-Japan relations. As early as October, 1962 he secretly studied the possibility of Korea-Japan rapprochement by sending his personal political lieutenant, Jong-pil Kim, to Japan. Then, in his first state of the union message he made rapprochement an explicit and "important" foreign policy to be pursued by saying:

We will proceed with the ongoing Korea-Japan Negotiations in a speedy way with an ultraparty effort, for this is not only a contribution to the maintenance of peace and security in the Far Eastern area but also

beneficial to the mutual prosperity of Korea and Japan.  

As soon as this policy became de facto, a school of dissidents emerged from many quarters of the Korean society. First, there was a series of student demonstrations: on March 24, 1964, about 5,000 students of Seoul National University, Korea University, and Yonsei University took to the street; about 2,000 SNU students had a meeting on campus to protest against the "pro-Japanese government policy" on May 20; and on June 3, approximately 10,000 students launched a violent demonstration.  

Second, dissident politicians got together and formed what they called the "Committee for Struggle against the Humiliating Diplomacy with Japan (CSHDJ)." They engaged in massive campaigns on a nationwide scale against the proposed Korea-Japan negotiations while simultaneously they launched a series of filibusters in the National Assembly in an effort to stop the treaty bill and its ratification.  

Park's responses to these protests were "firm" and "categorical." He first praised the student activism as "patriotic" behavior. He then issued a special message warning that he was determined to root out of the campuses

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50 Ibid.
what he termed the "omnipotence of demonstration" and that he would ask the faculty to assume the responsibilities for student activism. Martial law was proclaimed on June 3, 1964, and many of the dissidents were arrested on charges of possible anti-government conspiracy.51

For dealing with the dissident politicians in the National Assembly he mobilized his DRP members. As soon as martial law was imposed, the opposition groups submitted to Congress a bill that would override martial law: the bill was defeated by 139 to 55 votes in the Assembly. He further pushed the DRP to pass counter-bills which were called the "Press Ethics Code" and the "Campus Protection Laws" that claimed that "the responsibility of ongoing political instability goes to the reckless behaviors of a small group of dissident politicians, the agitation of a few irresponsible students, and their unlawful activities." "But ultimately the government itself is to be blamed for its excessive tolerance" (Emphasis added).52

President Park, in his special message to the National Assembly on June 26, 1964, reiterated that he was proceeding with Korea-Japan rapprochement in a "firm belief that such a move is conducive to 'economic development' which in turn is to promote national interest and its international

51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
prestige." To put it conversely, his firm commitment to "economic development" during this time of "modernization of the fatherland" definitely seems to have been related with the "decisive (or authoritarian)" political leadership that he demonstrated. His "elitist" political means, e.g., the DRP and the Il-kwon Chung Cabinet, also seem to have contributed to a rise of this type of leadership style, largely by being "efficient" in a unilinear direction.

Hence, the hypothesis that the more "technological" development and the more "elitist" means, the more "authoritarian" political leadership seems to be confirmed in this context.

The second political crisis of a similar nature occurred in 1967 when the ruling DRP occupied the National Assembly with an "absolute" majority of 130 seats as compared to only 44 by the opposition party (the NDP) and one by another.

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54 After the junta's Political Purification Act was revoked in 1963, the military coup leaders themselves organized the DRP (Minju Kongwha Dang), and opposition parties also began to mushroom again. Among them the Civil Rule Party, the Popular Party, and the reconstituted Democratic Party were the major ones. In 1964 these rival opposition parties were integrated into a new party by the name of the Civil Politics Party under the leadership of Mrs. Soon-chun Park, but Po-sun Yun and his followers seceded in 1965 to form the New Korea Party. On February 7, 1967, the Civil Politics Party and the New Korea Party merged to form a united opposition party by the name of the New Democratic Party (Sinmin Dang) (NDP), electing Chin-o Yu as party leader and nominating Po-sun Yun as the presidential candidate opposing Chung-hee Park. See Kyung-cho Chung, Korea: The Third Republic (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1971), p. 154.
Actually in the June 8, 1967 general election, the voter turn-out was 50.61 percent for the DRP and 32.70 percent for the NDP.\footnote{Haptong Nyongam (Haptong Annual), \textit{op. cit.}, (1968), p. 20.} But because of (1) failure in the opposition political groups to unite themselves and (2) the winner-take-all type of bonus allocations of the seats from the district of nation as a whole, the DRP came up with 13 seats more than the two-third majority which is necessary for constitutional amendment.

These election returns touched off another major political crisis. In condemnation of the widespread election irregularities and in response to the virtual domination of the National Assembly by the ruling party, a legislative boycott was staged by minority assemblymen. Student demonstrations protesting the election irregularities were once again instigated on a massive scale. Ignited by a group of about 400 students of the College of Law, SNU, on June 12, more than 20,000 students from ten universities participated in a violent demonstration on July 3, and more than 600 were arrested.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 20-21.} (This time even high school students were restless and took to the street.)

President Park's way of crisis-management this time was also "stern" and "resolute." First, he expelled six assemblymen from his own party whose election results were
most suspected and denounced by the public. Secondly, he suspended the school semester. Third, he demanded his party members to resume the National Assembly and push forward legislative activities even without the presence of the minority. Thus, again his uncompromising, "authoritarian" leadership style was manifested as we have already seen in the previous political crisis.

Popular Attitudes

Popular attitudes toward the Park regime during this period were most clearly discernible in the language that was used in various placards and statements, employed both by the student demonstrators and the dissident politicians in those two major political crises we have just reviewed. In the student demonstrations and the CSJ campaigns against the Korea-Japan rapprochement in 1964, a heavier share of the criticism was directed toward Park's legitimacy and leadership style than toward the program itself (in this case economic development). "Down with the dictatorship!" "Which of the two is a real violence, a demonstration or a coup d'état?" and "Retreat the militaristic regime!" were, for example, some of the major slogans employed in those movements. It is noteworthy that in this period of political unrest there rarely were any slogans that sharply criticized

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57 Ibid.
"economic development." Thus, in terms of our balance model, Cell (II) attitudes which approve ongoing development pattern but reject the leadership style were dominant.

In the political crisis of 1967 there was no basic change in the nature of popular attitudes as compared to that of 1964. That is to say, although the political problem at this time was the perceived election irregularities, students and opposition politicians mainly denounced the manner in which the Park regime carried out the election. Here again it is noticeable that the dissidents were not directed to the political issue but to authority and leadership styles.

There are studies which seem to support the point that popular attitudes during this period of "modernization of the fatherland" were more negative toward leadership style than to development pattern, which in our balance model is a Cell (II) attitude. Sung-chick Hong during this period surveyed a group of randomly selected Korean intellectuals (in this case university professors and journalists) with a questionnaire that explored the task priorities of the Korean president on given 10 items. Approximately 47 percent of the respondents considered economic problem to be the most urgent tasks to be solved. He concluded that the task-priority

perceived as important by the populace was highly consistent with the policies of the government at the time. Hahn-been Lee succinctly points out that the die-hard efforts of the military-turned-civilian government at economic development, like those under the junta regime, showed its determination to secure political legitimacy through the achievement of its policies. Conversely speaking, the Park government, even after the change to a civilian regime, seemed still to have a sense of legitimacy crisis. The legacy of traditional Korean political culture to react rather strongly and negatively to his leadership style, and this problem did not seem to be easily resolved in the minds of the populace. President Park's very slim-margin victory over his opponent in the 1963 presidential election can serve as a measure for this type of popular attitudes. However, despite the political opposition to his leadership demonstrated in the above-mentioned political crises, his near landslide victory in 1967 over the same opponent seems to imply that such a legitimacy crisis of top leadership can be to a great extent resolved through governmental achievements.


61 Hahn-been Lee and others, eds., op. cit., pp. 403-405.
Societal Development

Despite the multiple problems that the Park regime had to overcome, the degree of societal development, especially in its economic aspect, was remarkably "high" during this period of "modernization of the fatherland." The achievements seem to be a political consequence largely attributable to the President's "decisive," "resolute," and "consistent" political leadership. First, he pursued the Korea-Japan rapprochement policy decisively and succeeded in obtaining the congressional ratification of the treaty on August 14, 1965, although it was done so without the consent of the minority in the National Assembly. At the same time he was successful in getting the congressional votes in favor of dispatching about 50,000 ROKA men to South Vietnam. These two moves in the international field clearly seemed to contribute to boosting Korea's image in terms of international prestige and resource mobilization for economic development. 62

The Park regime's policy of "economic development" resulted in spectacular industrial growth during this period, and particularly since 1966, when the 2nd FYEDP was installed on the basis of the highly successful 1st FYEDP. "The nation's gross national product--the most accurate indicator

62 For the contribution of these two policies to economic development, see David C. Cole and Princeton N. Lyman, op. cit., pp. 132, 135, and 183.
of economic health—jumped from an average annual growth rate of about eight percent during the period 1962-65 to a phenomenal 13.4 percent in 1966 and 8.7 in 1967."63 (The population growth rate was about 3.0 percent during 1955-65 but this has been brought down to 2.4 percent in 1969.) Per capita income increased from $106.60 in 1963 to $195.00 in 1969, and the increase in the volume of exports reached nearly 650 million dollars in 1968 as compared to only about 84 million in 1963.64

Meanwhile, the vigorous implementation of an economic development program at such a rapid tempo seemed to be the source of new frustrations for the general public centering on the widely-felt unequal distribution of wealth and the possible potential corruption in the higher echelons of society. Such new evils, indicators of which we will witness in the next regime subperiod, were already slowly but steadily in the making. Besides, the least advancement had been made in the realm of civil liberties. Se-jin Kim perceptively observes this and points out:

In terms of the procedural aspect of law enforcement, very little or nothing has been done (during this period of "modernization of the fatherland"). In fact, all the ignominious traditional methods of executing the law, including the "third degree," still prevailed. The relationship between public

63 Se-jin Kim, op. cit., p. 139.
servants, particularly the police, and individual civilians has altered little. The former still act with arbitrary arrogance; the latter respond with fear but not respect. The rise of the KCIA with practically unlimited power to investigate and to detain any person accused of aiding the enemy has severely restricted the right to dissent and to criticize the regime in power. 65

5.3.3 The Period of "National Revitalization" (1969-1972)

Political Goals

In the years of 1968-69 there were several "exogenous" impetuses to the Korean political system which served as turning-points for President Park's major policies. Specifically, provocations from the North Korean Communists challenged Park's leadership of the South Korean Government and its friendly relation with the United States. On January 21, a 31-man communist commando unit raided Seoul in an attempt on the life of President Park, and two days later, the U.S. intelligence ship Pueblo with its 83 crewmen was hijacked by the North Korean naval ships off Wonsan. 66

Reacting to this challenge from the Northern Communists, President Park swiftly added "all-out national defense" to his hitherto major political goal of "economic development," and his slogan now became "We construct while fighting!" In his new-year's message for 1969 he announced that the 1970's

65 Se-jin Kim, op. cit., p. 145.

will be an era of "national revitalization" with "national defense" and "economic development" as the two indivisible integral parts of "national development." His various public statements such as the new year's messages, the keynote speeches, the state of the union messages, and the guidance messages to the DRP, including press conferences, clearly reiterate that this policy of "national revitalization" is the "undisputable" major political goal during this period.

The policy of "national revitalization" was reflected in several action programs during this period.

For example, a Homeland Reserve Force (HRF) aiming at an organization of 2.5 million manpower, was activated on April 1, 1969, and the president assured that one million automatic rifles would be imported within the year to arm the reserve forces. The Board of National Unification, a governmental institution at the ministerial level, was established on March 1, 1969. Above anything else, on October 10, 1969 President Park proposed a national referendum for a constitutional amendment which would enable him to run for a third term. He stated that he needed such an extension in his tenure for the purpose of "uninterrupted

68 Ibid., Vols. VII, VIII, and IX, passim.
Thus, in terms of our typology of developmental goals, President Park's major political goals during this period can still be classified as highly "technological." "National defense" might cause slight confusion in our use of the term, but when it comes to President Park's interpretation, it is obvious that he meant by it specific and material programs such as the HRF and the supply of arms as we have seen. In fact, his conception of "national defense" even seems to intensify the degree of "technological" development largely because of its "instrumental" nature.

Political Means

Basically, there seems to have been no major changes during this period in President Park's reliance on the triangular political machine used earlier--namely, the DRP, the Cabinet, and the KCIA. However, in terms of relative degrees of reliance, the KCIA seems to have become a more important political means during this particular period, and its used-to-be "covert" activities became much more "overt." For example, beginning with its abduction of 34 intellectuals in the controversial East-Berlin-based Conspiracy Case in 1967, the KCIA announced that it took part

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69Ibid., Vol. VI, p. 247. The referendum was held on October 17, 1969, and it was approved with 65.1 percent in favor and 34.9 percent against. See Haptong Nyongam (Haptong Annual), op. cit. (1970), p. 22.
in about 12 political cases, ranging from communist infiltration to arrests of politicians during the period 1969-71, and this was a significant increase if compared to only two or three during the period 1964-68. This increase in the number of the KCIA's overt interventions in political affairs seems to suggest that there is a positive correlation between the nature of political goals and that of political means. In other words, President Park's emphasis on "national defense" as a political goal apparently seems to have resulted in an increased number of KCIA interventions.

The ORP was continuously mobilized for a rather conventional purpose—namely, that of securing political legitimacy for the existing regime. As we saw, the ORP was successful in securing a victory in the October 17, 1969 national referendum for the constitutional amendment. It also succeeded in acquiring a third term for President Park's over his strong and vocal opponent Dae-jung Kim in the April 27, 1971 presidential election. Meanwhile, the

70 The figures here are based on the author's computation using the data given in Haptong Nyongam (Haptong Annual), op. cit., Vols. for 1965-72. In these data books, the political incidents of major importance are given in bold print.

71 The voter turn-out was 6,342,828 for President Park and 5,395,900 for Dae-jung Kim, leaving a margin of about 950,000. See Young-ho Kim and others, eds., op. cit., p. 92.
bureaucracy was used for the purpose of "economic development" as before. In 1971, the 2nd FYEDP (1967-71) was "successfully" completed, and a 3rd FYEDP (1972-76) with an estimated average annual economic growth rate of 8.6 percent was adopted.

As a whole, therefore, President Park's political means during this period were still highly "elitist" in nature. In fact, the degree of being "elitist" was intensified as we can see in the KCIA case. Accordingly, Park's development pattern during this time can be classified as a more intensified DP(D) than its counterparts in the preceding sub-periods.

Leadership Style

President Park's leadership style during this period of "national revitalization" seems to have been an intensification of authoritarianism as his political goals became increasingly "technological" and his means went further in the "elitist" direction. He was so determined and resolute in carrying out his own development pattern that there was literally no concession or bargaining in dealing with various political forces. His sharp criticism of the minority in the National Assembly seems to be a good measure of his

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72 The expected average annual growth rate of the 2nd FYEDP was seven percent. However, an average annual growth rate was in reality 11.6 percent during the period 1967-71. See Haptong Nyongam (Haptong Annual) (1967), p. 27 and Joun-sik Kil, *op. cit.*, p. 158.
uncompromising leadership style. In his special message issued on the occasion of proposing the national referendum for the constitutional amendment on October 10, 1969, he said:

I have thus far carried out my gravely important responsibilities with absolutely no support or encouragement from the minority whatsoever. In fact, they presented to me harsh opposition only, opposition for its own sake. When I was carrying out the Korea-Japan rapprochement treaty, they called me "traitor." When I dispatched our soldiers to South Vietnam, they accused me of "selling the blood of the youths." When I was dealing with foreign loans, they denounced "it is an act of ruin by foreign loans." And upon my organizing the homeland reserve forces, they charged that I was creating it to use "for my own political purpose." ... Had I timidly suspended or given up such programs as these just because they opposed me, what would have become of this country now? Besides, they claim that I am a dictator. They mean by this my determined attitudes toward national development efforts. I will not make any change in my belief and attitude in these no matter how fiercely they claim that I am a dictator! I strongly believe that whoever becomes a future president, unless there be a change in the minority behavior to oppose for opposition's sake, he who is called dictator is a real president for our national interest.73

Frequent acts in the one-party National Assembly including that of referendum, and ruthless purge of dissident members of his own party like the cases on April 15, 1969 and on October 2, 197174 illustrate this type of decisive and resolute leadership style of President Park.


74On April 8, 1969, a non-confident vote was passed in the National Assembly which drove out one of the cabinet members who was much trusted by the president. This non-confidence vote was possible because some of the DRP members opposed the cabinet member in question joined the minority
His decisiveness and resoluteness in dealing with dissidents in the general public was also well revealed in his consistently stern measures toward student demonstrations and other popular movements against government policies. For example, in the summer of 1969, when the discussions as to the possibility of a constitutional amendment for his third term became open and a proposal for a national referendum was about to be made by the ruling party, thousands of students of Seoul National University, Korea University and Yonsei University rose up in demonstrations to protest against it. But the government's response to them was again a clear-cut and even sterner one—an earlier summer vacation with a warning through a special ordinance of the Ministry of Education that any campus activities other than for academic purpose should not be permitted.\textsuperscript{75} There emerged among the populace what was generally called the "Pan-People Front in Protest against Constitutional Amendment for a Third Term" led by religious and press leaders.\textsuperscript{76} This dissident movement was also silenced. In the spring of


\textsuperscript{76}Ibid.
1971 campus protests against the proposed military training programs in the universities took place. 77 Again the government was successful in silencing the campuses by imposing a special recess upon them.

Perhaps one of the best measures for President Park's leadership style during this period can be found in the manner in which he conveyed his keynote speeches and the state of the union messages to the National Assembly. Records show that from 1964 to 1967 he presented them in person to the National Assembly but since 1968 he has never brought them to the Assembly in person. Instead, he let his premiers read them on his behalf. 78 Thus, in terms of our typology of leadership style, it can safely be said that President Chung-hee Park's leadership was, though very decisive and resolute in the sense of program-implementation, highly "authoritarian" during this period of "national revitalization."

Popular Attitudes

As we have seen from the cases presented above, popular attitudes during this period can be characterized as having been polarized. On the one hand, popular attitudes were very negative toward government polices and its leadership. Such negative public attitudes seem to have been at their apex

78 Ibid. (1965-73), passim.
in 1971 when Dae-jung Kim could gather an audience of from four hundred- to eight hundred-thousand for his campaign rally in Seoul (April 18, 1971) as the opposition party (the NDP) presidential candidate. He challenged the existing government by arguing that "dictatorship and corruption are a good hot-bed for communism."  

On the other hand, there were also such popular attitudes which not only accepted President Park's leadership but also governmental policies of "national development."

For example, in 1969 when President Park announced his plan for the national referendum on a constitutional amendment enabling him a third term, there followed a series of public statements from some quarters of society which were in favor of the proposed constitutional amendment. About 225 retired generals issued such a statement as did the National Economy Federation. In their statements they made it explicit that "they not only accept President Park's leadership as..."

79 Ibid. (1972), p. 12. Although Dae-jung Kim was defeated by the incumbent president in the April 27, 1971 presidential election, he received about 46 percent of the total votes. This voting trend seems to have been reflected in the subsequent general election held on May 25, 1971. The opposition party (the NDP) received 47.55 percent securing more than 89 out of a total of 204 seats in the National Assembly, a number of seats well above the so-called constitution amendment obstruction point. This is the first election result of the sort in the Korean political history. However, this assembly was dissolved by the "October Revitalization" of 1972. See Young-ho Kim and others, eds., op. cit., p. 392.
legitimate but also approve his national development programs. The result of the referendum itself seems to reflect this type of positive attitudes toward the existing government, and it was reported that about 65 percent was in favor of the proposed constitutional amendment.

Thus, in terms of our balance model it can be said that popular attitudes during this period were either Cell (IV) attitudes which reject both the leadership style and policies of the existing government or the Cell (I) type attitudes which approve both the leadership and development patterns. The results of both the presidential election and the general election in 1971 seem to serve as a good measure of this type of polarization in popular attitudes. Dae-jung Kim and his party received nearly half of the total votes as we have already seen.

As to why this polarization, demographic changes, though they were "higher" on the socio-economic scale than previously, do not seem to account much for this type of polarization of the popular attitudes toward government.

81 Ibid., p. 22.
82 To use GNP per capita as an index by means of which to infer such changes, Korea reached $195.00 in 1969 as compared to less than $90 before 1960. See Joun-sik Kil, op. cit., p. 148. For details on demographic changes, also see Doh-chull Shin, Socio-Economic Development and Democratization in South Korea, op. cit., Chapter III.
For as we can see from the above-mentioned groups which either reject or accept the existing government, there is no significant difference in the two polarized groups in terms of social status. The opposition leaders, the students, the retired generals, and the business leaders are, according to Korean standards, relatively "high" on the socio-economic scale. Instead, the legacy of traditional culture with its unique power striving seems to provide a more powerful explanation for this, namely, "all or nothing" or "black or white term" attitudes toward authority and power.

Societal Development

The degree of societal development during this period of "national revitalization" was again reported to be remarkably "high." For example, the average annual economic growth rate during the period 1967-71 was 11.6 percent, with a drop to 8.6 percent in 1972. The volume of exports was 1,352 million dollars in 1971 as compared with that of approximately 500 million in 1968. GNP per capita in 1971 reached $252.90, a gigantic forward step compared to that of $143.40 in 1967.83

Income distribution and potential corruption in a certain sector of society (mostly the upper echelons)

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83Statistics in this paragraph came from Joun-sik Kil, op. cit., pp. 148, 157, and 158.
seem to have been agonizing problems to President Park. However, these problems, too, were tackled by decisive and resolute leadership. For example, he established the "Reform and Supervisory Secretariat Section" within the Office of the Presidential Secretaries in 1971, empowering it with extensive authority to investigate corruption and to punish it. 84 As of the spring of 1972 he initiated what is called the "New Village Movement," and adopted a plan to allocate a total of approximately 26.75 million dollars to "modernize" about 16,600 villages. 85 The politico-socio aspects of societal development, especially the civil liberty area, are yet to be improved.

5.3.4 Summary

In this section we have examined various political practices under the Park-regime. In doing so we first limited our inquiry to the period from May 16, 1961 to October 17, 1972 for analytical and practical reasons. Our focus was on such variables as political goals and means, leadership style, and popular attitudes as they relate to one another and to societal development.

We found that "economic development" was President Park's major developmental goal and that it was emphasized

84 Haptong Nyongam (Haptong Annual), op. cit. (1972), p. 15.
85 Ibid. (1973), p. 12. The New Village Movement was originally conceived as a device for "innovating human spirit" ultimately aiming at manpower training, although as a starting point it does include construction of facilities.
through the entire regime period under investigation. Of course, there were some observable variations in guidelines and principles for achieving the chosen "economic development" goals depending upon different subperiods of the regime. For example, "reconstructing infrastructures of the national economy" was the major component of "economic development" during the period of military rule (1961-63). "Frugality," "diligence," and "savings" were the guidelines for people to follow during the period of "modernization of the fatherland" (1964-68), while "production," "exports," and "construction" were simultaneously emphasized as major principles for a rapid economic development. The concept of "national defense" became an indivisible element of economic development during the period of "national revitalization" (1969-72). The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd FYEDPs were the action programs for economic development during the Park regime.

As to why he emphasized "economic development," we have conceded, on the one hand, that his personal background with its constant economic deprivation might have impressed on his mind a strong motivation to economic development, and, on the other hand, that the ecological situation, especially the low economic achievement under the preceding regimes might also have caused him to perceive rapid economic development as a most urgent task for the nation upon his assumption of political power. At any rate, it is clear
that economic development has been consistently advocated during all the subperiods of his regime, making his developmental goal "technological" development in our typology of goals.

His original choice of developmental means was military. This we saw in its raw fashion when Korea was experiencing military rule. Later, military personnel were injected into key positions in various political institutions such as the DRP, the bureaucracy, and the KCIA. The DRP was mobilized mainly for the purpose of legitimizing political power of the Park government. Bureaucracy has been the champion of carrying out various economic development plans like the 1st, 2nd, 3rd FYEDPs. The KCIA has been a backbone of the power structure, directing the nation's security and defense.

During the period of "modernization of the fatherland," the DRP was pretty heavily mobilized, largely because it was a period for political legitimatization of the regime, although reliance on the KCIA was none the less heavier in a substantial sense as we have seen. Ever since national defense and security became a focal point because of exogenous challenges, the KCIA has been a powerful overt political machine and this is especially so during the period of "national revitalization." Bureaucracy has run through all the subperiods as an important instrument for economic development. Thus, despite the facade of the DRP as a political party, the developmental means of the Park regime
were as a whole, characteristic for their "elitist" nature. Accordingly, in terms of our typology of development style, the recurrent pattern of development through President Park's entire regime under investigation has been DP(D) in which "technological" development is pursued by "elitist" means.

His leadership style has been "decisive," "resolute," and for this reason "authoritarian." Efficiency and effectiveness in carrying out the reform measures during the junta period seemed to be the factors that made his leadership "decisive" and "resolute." His firm commitment to economic development as a developmental goal did not allow any political compromise or bargaining with other political forces such as the opposition party and the university-press nexus, even when the legitimacy of his political power was not very solid as during the change-over period from military to civilian rule. Rather, he was a firm believer in the proposition that political legitimacy can be secured through achievements in economic development, and this philosophy seemed to intensify the "decisiveness" and "resoluteness" in his leadership to even a greater degree during the period of "modernization of the fatherland." The regimentary nature of national defense and security as a political goal during the period of "national revitalization" also seems to have contributed positively to enhancing the degree of "decisiveness" and "resoluteness" in his leadership.
Developmental means such as the DRP, the Cabinet, and the KCIA, largely because of their hierarchical organizational atmosphere, seem to have embedded in the minds of the ruling elites a spirit of unconditional loyalty and obedience to the supreme decision-maker, and this, in turn, seems to have contributed to a rise of "authoritarianism" in his leadership style. Thus, the hypothesis of a possible relationship between developmental goals and means vis-à-vis political leadership finds positive support in President Park.

Popular attitudes toward the Park government during the former half of the entire regime period were the Cell (II) type in our balance model, i.e., "positive" to development pattern but "negative" toward leadership style (especially political legitimacy in this case). In the latter half of the regime period it seems that there emerged a phenomenon of polarization in popular attitudes; that is to say, on the one hand, there have been those who totally reject the ongoing development and leadership style as we witnessed in the behaviors of the opposition party and the dissident university-press nexus; while on the other hand, there have been groups such as the retired military officers and the business leaders who enthusiastically accept the leadership and approve its ongoing development. This attitudinal rivalry among the different social groups seems to mean that the Cell (IV) and the Cell (I) groups in terms of our balance
model simultaneously coexist in Korean society. Although there was a remarkable improvement in the socio-economic status of the populace in this regime period as compared to that under the preceding regimes, we saw that this demographic change provided little explanation for the popular attitudes. Instead, the unique power-strivings that stem from the traditional Korean political culture provide a better explanation for the attitudinal polarization, namely, all-or-nothing, and once-and-for-all type of striving for political power and authority.

Despite all these complicated and complex social dynamics that President Park's government has had to go through, the degree of societal development, especially that of economic development which is the government's choice as the major developmental goal, has been remarkably "high" as we have seen. However, a reservation can still be made on the socio-politico aspects of societal development, particularly in the arena of civil liberty. The "New Village Movement" to modernize the rural area and thus to ease the tension between the have and the have-nots, and the task force to combat possible corruption among the higher echelons of society seem to imply a long-term policy change in President Park's government toward a more "human" and "popular" direction in development pattern. As yet, there seems to be much that is unaccounted for in the Korean political system. Figure 7 presents a crude picture on the political dynamics of the Chung-hee Park regime.
(Reinforcement or Sustenance Model)

Figure 7: The Chung-hee Park Regime (1961-1972)
"Development" was basically an alien concept to the Korean political system when it was first introduced to her at the time of her Liberation. After a practice of "development" for more than a quarter century, it still seems to remain to a large extent an imported social value as we have seen throughout the whole analysis of this study. This seems to have been caused by two major reasons: namely, semantically the concept originally at the time of its introduction to Korean society was ill-defined, and it was in conflict with the centuries-old indigenous social values which Korea had.

To put this unique phenomenon more specifically, first, "development," at the time of its introduction to Korean society, did not itself have any systemic, well-defined meanings attached to it. On the contrary, it was a multi-faceted concept of which definitions were widely open to the arbitrary and diverse interpretations of the policy-makers. The political consequences of this semantic problem, as we saw in the comparison of the three regimes of the Korean polity, are rather grave: unsystemic and non-directional changes in the Korean polity.

For example, Syngman Rhee's interpretations of "development" zigzagged. He first thought that "development" is
"nation-building" on the basis of various "democratic" principles such as civil rights and individual freedom. In an attempt to pursue self-defined "development" policies, he established a democratic facade in terms of institution-building such as three branches of government—administration, legislature, and judiciary. Later, challenged by domestic impetuses such as the Korean conflict and his own legitimacy crisis, he had to revise his assessment of "development." He changed its meanings to "economic recovery" and "political power per se," respectively.

John M. Chang's perception of "development" was from the first environmentally constrained by demands for "freedom and bread, all at once!" Before he could come up with his own meanings of "development," he had to meet various demands ranging from "democracy" to "economic build-up," which he tried to do mostly by means of "expedient" measures. Besides, the endless factional strife of his party politics—another misinterpretation of "development"—helped shorten the life of his cabinet.

Chung-hee Park's "modernization of the fatherland" and "national revitalization" are, to be sure, the most well calculated interpretation of "development" among the three. "Economic development" is the essence of the former and that plus "national defense and security" the latter. Efficiency- and effectiveness-oriented political mechanisms such as the bureaucracy and the intelligence agency have been mobilized
for the speedy implementation of self-defined "development." However, his hasty endorsement of stage-theories (mostly economic) of "development" can be said to be too narrowly directed--still another misinterpretation of "development.” Other aspects than economic development such as civil liberties, individual freedom, and "democratic" political procedures are totally neglected.

Another unfavorable social origin for "development" stems, as we have seen in Chapter IV of this study, from the centuries-old social values of Korean society towards "development" itself and "power and authority"--namely, a static interpretation of "development" and the politics of monopoly. Confucian political philosophy of the so-called li (rule of the proper conduct) subscribed to the lofty ideal of "political harmony," which prejudged any systemic and directional change in the political system to be detrimental to the desired statecraft--an ideology of "non-development."

Furthermore, the sado-masochistic power strivings, an inevitable by-product of the age-old politics of monopoly, have strongly lingered in the process of "value allocation" ever since the country was exposed to "development politics."

Taken together with the problem of semantic fallacy, Korea's quarter-century old effort, as a whole, can perhaps be assessed to be a failure at "development"--a vicious circle of unsystemic and nondirectional changes which do not project and clarify the future image of the Korean political system.
and which perpetuate an extreme authoritarianism in political leadership that does not allow a peaceful power transition.

Any future endeavor at a "successful" Korean "development" must, therefore, meet at least two requirements. On the one hand, there must be an accurate and well-balanced interpretation of "development" such that it may clarify and project the future image of the Korean political system. On the other hand policies on the basis of such interpretation of "development" must be able to change the centuries-old political culture without excessive friction. Therein lies the necessity of, and challenge to, future research.

In doing this, there seem to be some observations that this study can meaningfully offer. They are:

1) Certain kinds of "human" development such as democracy and civil liberty seem to have a positive association with "democratic" leadership style as we can infer from the cases of the initial period of the Syngman Rhee government and the John M. Chang cabinet. (In reality, however, Rhee's ultimate goal was political power per se and Chang's democracy became shaky with the decline in economic development, making their leadership styles "authoritarian" and "ambivalent," respectively.)

2) "Technological" development like economic development seems to have a positive relationship with "authoritarian" leadership behavior as we can witness in President Chung-hee Park's case. Furthermore, the degree of
authoritarianism seems to be almost a function of the level of commitment to "technological" development. (Notice the varying degrees of coerciveness as he intensified his goal commitment from economic development to that plus national defense and security.)

3) Developmental means of a "populist" nature as through political parties seem to have a positive contribution to a rise of "democratic" leadership as we saw partially in the case of the John M. Chang cabinet. (In reality, this, too, was disturbed by excessive factional strife in the party politics of the Democratic Party. And the DP was the only political institution of a "populist" nature in Korean politics within our use of the term "populist.").

4) "Elitist" developmental means definitely seem to be related with "authoritarian" political leadership as we have seen in Rhee's political lieutenant group, ex-colonial administrators, and his Liberal Party with its "elitist" composition, and through Park's bureaucracy, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, and the Democratic Republican Party with its similar nature to the LP.

5) Although it is conceded in the literature that in many cases leadership behavior is a function of political socialization, the degree of such association seems to be relatively weak when it comes to Korean politics. (A comparison of Rhee to Chang, and that of Rhee with Park seem to assure this thin relationship. Both President Rhee and Prime Minister Chang did have similar family and educational
backgrounds but they produced different leadership styles. There is a fundamental difference in the familial and educational backgrounds that Presidents Rhee and Park had, but their leadership qualities are, as we saw, not fundamentally different from each other.)

6) Socio-economic status theory on popular attitudes toward governmental authority and policies seems to have only limited relevance in the Korean context. That the higher the populace on the socio-economic scale the more favorable attitudes they tend to have toward "human-populist" development, and vice versa did not have significant empirical confirmation except in the case of the last period of the Syngman Rhee government. (Instead, in Korean politics popular attitudes can more easily be accounted for in terms of the legacy of traditional political culture.)

7) Degrees of societal development seem to be more dependent upon political leadership than on development patterns. Conversely, in development politics political leadership is more crucial than are developmental goals and means to encourage or discourage societal development, although as we saw in this study the latter have some associations with political leadership styles. Consistency in political leadership, regardless of its quality or nature, seems to have a positive correlation with rapid societal development (in this case economic development) as we can see in President Park's case. (Ambivalence in political...
leadership as in the case of Premier Chang or inconsistency in leadership manipulation as with President Rhee all seem to be detrimental to a "higher" achievement of societal development.)
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24th Upheaval of 1958," the close-down of Kyunghyang Shinmoon which was the most outspoken of Seoul newspapers, and the execution of Bong-am Cho (who was Rhee's opponent twice in the presidential elections) on the alleged charge of communist conspiracy, amply demonstrate his hasty resort to police methods in statecraft, which, in turn, became the dominant style of his leadership in this last period of the First Republic.

In terms of political goals, the prior concern of the Rhee regime during this period was the expediency of retaining political power. The few ad hoc policies toward economic recovery that had been adopted earlier were disturbed by the legitimacy crisis: the economy was left to take its own course. As a result, there were no long-run programs which can possibly be labeled "developmental" goals.

The major political machine for legitimatization of Rhee's extended power was the Liberal oligarchy. In this connection, Hahn-been Lee observes:

The third and last subperiod of the Rhee government—from the latter half of 1958 until its demise in April, 1960—was a period of virtual oligarchy by the leaders of the LP. The LP, which had continuously consolidated its power since its reorganization in 1954, completed this process by the middle of 1958. The bureaucratic politicians who joined its directorate on the occasion of the 1954 general election were mostly re-elected for the second term in the May, 1958, general election. Having been thus reconfirmed and emboldened in their political role, they came to occupy positions of greater power, second only to Party President Rhee himself and Party Chairman Ki-bung Lee. Conscious of their enhanced power