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University of Hawaii, Ph.D., 1974
Political Science, general

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THE MILITARY AND TRADE UNIONS AS INITIATORS OF POLITICAL STABILITY AND INSTABILITY IN A SELECTED NUMBER OF WESTERN AFRICAN POLITIES. THE MILITARY AND TRADE UNIONS AS VEHICLES FOR POLITICAL CHANGE.

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE MAY 1974

By Leon Richards

Dissertation Committee:
Douglas Bwy, Chairman
Gary Busch
Philip Jacob
Glenn Paige
Robert Stauffer
ABSTRACT

The research which is undertaken in this dissertation involves an attempt to delineate the roles of the military and trade unions in political stability and instability in West Africa.

The format entails the tracing of the respective development of, the involvement in, and finally the alliance between, the military and trade unions in West African politics. The research approaches the roles, functions and structures of the military and trade union organizations in thirteen West African states and is divided into three parts. Part I examines and delineates the peculiar historical heritage of the colonial period and the factors which have created the predominantly political character of the trade unions and the armed forces. In Part II, the research attempts to denote and examine the nature and character of these two institutions through four closely knit stages of political involvement in order to determine the dominant forces operating within them. In brief, these stages are: 1) Period of Decolonization; 2) Disenchantment and Blackmail Period; 3) Political Upheaval Period; and 4) Supplantment Period. Using the societal approach, six case studies involving three coup states and three non-coup states compose Part III.

A number of simple statistical techniques are employed. Simple manipulation of data is employed in Part II to clarify and explain the comparative disadvantages of the military vis-a-vis the trade unions and other government institutions which eventually explode into mutinies in stage 2. In Chapter VII, stage 3, correlations and partial correlations are employed in the development of a
causal model of political instability (coup d'état). Similarly, a causal model is developed in Part III, Chapter XI, to explain political stability in the non-coup states. Chi square distributions are used in Part III, Chapter XII, to detect reliable applicable preconditions necessary for a coup d'état and to calculate coup potential for the thirteen West African states during the 1965-66 period. The resultant preconditions are employed to conceptually illustrate the 1966 coup d'état in Upper Volta.

A number of important preconditions and general findings were substantiated by this research. Chi square distributions reveal that, of the several important preconditions, the most essential for a coup d'état is a lack of effective control over the military by the civilians. Effective civilian control precludes intervention. A second major precondition which emerged is the unstable political situation which results from the inability of the single party system to aggregate interests of the associational and institutional groups. A third precondition is the presence of social, intellectual and economic unrest in the form of excessive inflation, high degree of interest articulation by anomic groups.

Some of the general findings are: 1) The military and trade unions, two non-governmental institutions with similar and dissimilar backgrounds, demands and interests which have provided the foundation for an alliance in a number of West African states, can initiate political stability and instability. 2) Although military and trade union intervention may differ from one state to another in terms of specific techniques and societal characteristics,
The likelihood of intervention is based on similar sets of circumstances throughout coup states in this study. 3) There are significantly different and similar preconditions found in those states in which the military has seized power and those in which civilian authorities have maintained power, and these preconditions can be discovered and delineated by chi square distributions. 4) In those West African states where the charismatic leaders are still influential, their survival and their ability to create stability and instability have depended and will continue to depend on the ability of the mass political parties to control, consolidate and centralize the trade unions, the military and, of utmost importance, to articulate and perform the input and output functions that are required of all political systems. 5) For many of the West African states where the military-civil service bureaucracy exists, future stability and instability will depend on the internal structures of the military and trade unions, and the leadership and ability of this bureaucracy to expand its base of support among the powerful associational and institutional groups.
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<td>AATUF</td>
<td>All-African Trade Union Federation</td>
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<td>AEF</td>
<td>Afrique Equatoriale Française, French Equatorial Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations</td>
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<td>AOF</td>
<td>Afrique Occidentale Française, French West Africa</td>
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<td>APC</td>
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<td>BDS</td>
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<td>BPS</td>
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<td>BTUC</td>
<td>British Trade Union Congress</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
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<td>Confédération Africaine des Travailleurs Croyants, African Confederation of Believing Workers</td>
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<td>Confédération Camerounaise des Travailleurs Croyants, Cameroun Confederation of Believing Workers</td>
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<td>CFTC</td>
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<td>CGT</td>
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<td>GTUC</td>
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<td>ICFTU</td>
<td>International Confederation of Free Trade Unions</td>
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<td>International Federation of Christian Trade Unions</td>
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<td>KANU</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDV</td>
<td>Mouvement Democratique Voltaigue (Upper Volta)</td>
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<td>MSA</td>
<td>Mouvement Socialiste Africain (Congo-B), African Socialist Movement-Congo (B)</td>
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<td>NCNC</td>
<td>National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons</td>
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<td>National Interim Council (Sierra Leone)</td>
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<td>NUTA</td>
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<td>RTOM</td>
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<td>RWAFF</td>
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<td>Syndicat Africain Agricole</td>
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<td>SFIO</td>
<td>Section Francaise de l'Internationale Ouvriere, French Socialist Party</td>
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION

With the last 15 years, many of the African states have witnessed and experienced a number of coups, successions, assassinations and other forms of political instability\(^1\) that have altered and/or reversed many of their attempts at state- and nation-building. The frequency of such upheavals has increased to the point where this period in modern African history could be labelled "the decade of instability." Army men have unmade and remade governments in one out of every four African states. Every independent African state except Gambia (which does not have a military) has experienced a major crisis of political instability. During this period, Grundy counted 64 instances of successful military coups d'etat, military successions, mutinies and other military acts instrumental in bringing about governmental changes.\(^2\) Specifically, in the Sub-Saharan region, there have been 25 successful coups in 15 of the independent states, 12 attempted but unsuccessful coups, and numerous reports of plots against established governments. In the same period, there have been intensive and prolonged civil wars in 8 of these states, relatively localized rebellions in 10, irredentism in at least 4 states, and revolts initiated by mass movements against national governments in 6 states.\(^3\)

In view of the magnitude of military intervention in African politics, one would expect a great quantity of books, articles, and studies on the role of the military in African politics. However, scholars of political change in new nations, especially African
nations, had almost totally neglected the role of the military until the political upheavals made this omission distressingly obvious.\(^4\) Writings on African armies, and also on trade unions, and their ability to function as tools of stability and instability were practically nonexistent before 1970.

In surveying the literature on Africa and African politics, one finds that the major emphasis has been on social structure, economic development and underdevelopment, political institutions, charismatic leadership, institutional political transfer, mass party, one party state structures—the list is endless.\(^5\) Kenneth Janda’s *Cumulative Index to the American Political Science Review*, which covers volumes 1–62 and the years 1906–68, contains only a couple of articles dealing with the military in African politics. None of these articles dealt with the military’s (and trade unions’) role in political stability or instability in Africa.\(^6\) A U.S. State Department bibliography entitled “The Role of the Military in Less Developed Countries” contains references to four articles dealing with Africa, compared with thirty-seven items on Latin America and thirty-three on the Middle East.\(^7\) There are no references to Africa in the bibliography of Huntington’s classic study, *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*.\(^8\)

Herbert Spiro’s “The Military in Sub-Saharan Africa” is typical of the research and findings of most of the writings that were published during this period. Spiro developed the thesis that the most important feature of the role of the military in Sub-Saharan Africa is its general insignificance. He hypothesized that "Africa's
greatest assets consist of its politicians who, unlike their counterparts in the other areas, face little competition from the military."⁹ Coleman and Brice dismissed the role of the African military as insignificant because of its small size, its unimportant role in the independence movement, and its colonial heritage.¹⁰ Similarly, Gutteridge, especially in his early writings, postulated that the military would not move into African politics because of its small size.¹¹

In addition to the above studies, the classic studies encompassing the underdeveloped world are also plagued by erroneous hypotheses and lack of applicability to the African situation. According to Samuel Finer's *The Man on Horseback*, the military intervened in politics according to levels of political culture, which were determined by the strength or weakness of attachment to civilian institutions.¹² Finer used the coup as the index of civil-military relations but, as is the case in Africa and elsewhere, the military organizations can exert a strong influence on government policy without recourse to a coup. Civil-military studies which use the military coup as an index are not precise enough because they ignore unsuccessful coups and other military acts and influences. Furthermore, Finer postulated that throughout Africa, with the exception of Algeria, armies had a low-flash point or a small propensity to intervene. Yet the African armies have intervened and, in those few cases where there has been nonintervention in terms of coups, the military and trade unions are subordinated to the mass party and charismatic leader, thus functioning as partners of political stability. Still another major
weakness of Finer's theory deals with "disposition." "Disposition to intervene," as he defined it, proved to be a skein of motives, moods and opportunities. But how does one operationalize or conceptualize motives or moods? In addition, Finer's descriptions of military organization and the social origins of soldiers are not likely to be helpful to those who study the role of the military in multiracial ethnic/tribal underdeveloped states such as the African states because his analyses did not take into consideration the environment of the social and political system. The present and future role of the armed services in new states cannot be separated from historical origins nor from the forces of nationalism. The latter acts to integrate the armed forces into society, the former to maintain a separate power role. The major shortcoming of Finer's 'worldwide theory' is its inability to answer the following questions: Why do coups (military intervention) occur in some states of minimal political culture and not in others? Why do coups take one form in some states and a different form in other similar states?

However, the strength of Finer's theory is the characteristic forms of military intervention: 'influence,' 'blackmail,' 'displacement,' and 'supplantment.' These terms will be very useful in classifying and delineating the stages of political instability. Thus, these characteristic forms, modified by additional clarifications, will be integrated into the development of a conceptual framework of political stability and instability. The clarifications revolve around Finer's misconception in linking 'influence' to 'mature political culture,' 'blackmail' to 'developed political culture,'
'displacement' to 'low political culture' and 'supplantment' to 'minimal political culture.' As conceptualized, these forms lack applicability to Africa because, in many of the African states (which Finer classifies as in the latter two stages of development), these four characteristic forms have taken place without regard to political culture.

Finally, Janowitz's attempts at developing a variety of types of civil-military relations will be helpful in delineating, for comparative purposes, the case studies of military-trade union relations vis-à-vis the government leaders and their mass parties. The types of relations that Janowitz develops revolve around two main questions: What characteristics of the military establishment facilitate its involvement (or lack of involvement) in domestic politics? What are the capacities of the military to supply effective leadership? These questions will serve as the bases for an explanation of the role of the military (and the trade unions) in political instability, the development of a causal model, and a delineation of the comparative case studies in Part III of the dissertation.

What has been noted above applies equally to the African trade unions. The phenomenon of trade unionism in tropical Africa has only recently become the subject of serious social inquiry. In the main, academic attention has been focused on labor as a commodity rather than as a social movement. Areas of interest in labor research have been primarily concentrated in aspects of productivity, efficiency, labor turnover, selection, control and training, the Pan-African labor movement, urbanization, and the influences of the
international labor organizations on African trade unions. Political scientists have made no detailed attempts to analyze and delineate the political and strategic role of African labor unions in state- and nation-building. Although before the 1950's there were occasional brief pamphlets and articles of varied quality about African trade unions, they were written either by visiting European trade unionists or by social scientists employed in African universities. According to Allen and Friedland, some of the earliest descriptive writings on African trade unions included W. S. Mare's *African Trade Unions* (London, 1959), which was an 84 page booklet on union organization and activities; R. E. Luyt's *Trade Unionism in African Colonies* (Johannesburg, 1949); and Walter Bowen's *Colonial Trade Unions* (London, 1954), which was nothing more than pamphlets in defense of British trade unionism in Africa. In addition to these writings, there were a number of descriptive articles published by the ICFTU and by the WFTU. However, the first significant work on African trade unions in terms of their origins, cultural and economic backgrounds, and organization, was J. I. Roper's *Labour Problems in West Africa*.

From surveying the literature on African trade unions, we can conclude that scholars of African development have viewed labor organizations more complacently than the situation has warranted. The basic assumption underlining these attitudes was the belief that African labor unions were too weak and chaotic to have an influence on political development. But what these scholars failed to consider was an analysis of these unions within the framework of their
respective African societies, which have few well-organized voluntary
groups and often lack effective administrative structures and systems
for the maintenance of public order in coping with labor protests.
Therefore, within this framework, trade unions loom much larger and
their ability to gain sudden great political potential as national
protest movements becomes less surprising. Also, their strategic
location in urban areas and their concentration in those industries
on which economic development depends were not taken into consideration
when the above erroneous assumptions were made.

Thus we may accept the following statement as a valid con-
clusion: Scholars of African politics, especially before 1970, have
neglected the military and trade unions as vehicles for political
change. The few studies that are available from this period are
either outdated, inaccurate, or both, in their assessment of African
political change and development. Common to many of these studies
are the inaccurate theses that (1) the pattern of political change
made knowledge of the military, trade unions, and other Institutions
(seem) irrelevant; and (2) Africa is the continent of political king-
dom or the primacy of politics, not the continent of army regimes.
Many factors account for this lack of academic attention and erroneous
theses, two of the most important ones being (1) the manner in which
colonial territories gained independence; and (2) the colonial heritage
of the African armies. Nonetheless, the strength of the army and the
strategic role of the trade unions have turned out to be the weakness
of other forces in society. Politics resembles a game of cards; hence,
players must agree upon trumps. If no other card is agreed upon, then
clubs become trumps.\textsuperscript{23} Such was the case in Sub-Saharan Africa in the mid-1960's.

The research which is undertaken in this dissertation will attempt to correct some misconceptions alluded to above and to build upon other assumptions and hypotheses dealing with the role of the military and the trade unions in African politics. However, this research will be a pioneering effort in that no one (to the author's knowledge) has attempted to analyze political stability and instability as outcomes of the relationships among the military, trade unions, government leaders and their mass parties. The military and the trade unions are treated as the units of analysis, with a concentration on their common characteristics, their national strength and weakness, and their differences, in order to shed light on their roles, functions and tasks in African politics.

The format of this dissertation entails tracing the respective development of the involvement of and finally the alliance between the military and the trade unions in West African politics. This format covers eleven chapters, which are grouped into three major parts. Part I involves a discussion and a delineation of: (1) British and French colonial policies and administrations in tropical Africa; (2) the peculiar historical heritage of the colonial period; and (3) the inherited factors which have created the predominantly political character of the trade unions and the armed forces. Part II involves an explanation and a discussion of the role of the military and trade union organizations of thirteen West African states through four closely linked stages. Simply stated, these stages are:
(1) abstention from political interference, which was confined to the post-independence period; (2) military disenchantment, which saw resentment against European officers, the slow pace of Africanization of the officer corps, and low pay scales explode into mutinies; (3) full scale military involvement, which involved the ouster of the civilian government leaders (a causal model is developed to explain coups d'etat and other instances of political instability); and (4) splits within the military-civil service bureaucracy, resulting in mutiny-coups d'etat. Part III contains six case studies involving three coup states and three non-coup states; a conceptual model is developed to delineate political stability in the non-coup states. This part also contains a chapter which serves as the summary to Parts II and III.

In this final chapter, chi square distributions are employed to find reliable applicable preconditions which are necessary for a coup d'etat. Using these preconditions, coup potential is calculated for each of the thirteen West African states for the 1965-66 period.

The thirteen African states involved in this study were selected because they provide excellent cases for the study of military and trade unions' development, involvement/non-involvement and alliance in political instability and stability. From this group, the six case study states were chosen for similar reasons: They best illustrate military-trade union alliances and alliances among the charismatic leader and his mass party, trade unions and the military. Guinea and Upper Volta were chosen to illustrate Causal Model 4 (political stability) and Figure 1 (coup via applicable preconditions), respectively, because they best exemplify characteristics of the non-coup and coup states.
Other Black African states—such as Nigeria, Zaire, Gabon—are referred to but not included in the study because: 1) Zaire and Nigeria have experienced protracted civil wars, outside intervention and other internal problems, making it difficult to delineate and analyze the military and trade unions and their political involvement; 2) Being a former Belgian colony, Zaire falls outside the scope of this dissertation, which delineates French and British influence on military and trade union development; and 3) There is significant debate over whether or not Gabon experienced a coup d'état in February 1964 before French intervention restored President Mba to power. This dilemma would only complicate matters in terms of classifying Gabon as a coup or non-coup state for isolating preconditions by chi square distributions.

There will be little discussion of the role of international labor organizations, foreign military powers or multinational corporations in the politics of Africa. These are all fruitful areas for study but exceed the more narrow scope of this dissertation.

In summation, the objectives of this dissertation are:

1. To analyze the influences of British and French colonial policies on the origin and development of Africa's trade unions and military.
2. To assess and analyze the strategic roles of the military and trade unions in African politics before and after independence.
3. To delineate the roles of the military and trade unions in the coups d'état and other instances of political instability in West Africa.
4. To delineate and analyze those factors leading to military and trade union involvement in African politics.
5. To denote and examine the impact, development and influence of the military-trade union alliance in a selected number of African states by way of case studies.
6. To assess the role of this military-trade union alliance and its ability to create the political stability necessary for state- and nation-building.
7. To develop causal models of political stability and instability (coup) in West Africa via simple statistics techniques.
FOOTNOTES

1 Political instability as used in this dissertation is defined as a condition in a political system in which the institutionalized patterns of authority break down (due in part to societal deprivation and the lack of centralization), and the expected compliance to political authorities is replaced by violence intended to change the personnel, policies or sovereignty of these authorities.


6 Kenneth Janda, Cumulative Index to the American Political Science Review, Vols. I-LXII (1906-1968). Janda used the "key word" concept to formulate his cumulative index. Other words denoting social and political upheavals, such as civil wars, rebellions, conflict, assassinations, and successions, were also checked.


13 To minimize the problems of military organization and social origins of soldiers, and their role in coups d'état, case studies based on the societal approach have been developed throughout the dissertation, especially in Chapters 10, 11 and 12.

14 Finer, The Man on Horseback, pp. 139-140, 232-234.

15 Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: Essay in Comparative Analysis (Chicago, 1964), pp. 5-8. Janowitz's five categories of civil-military relations, along with African examples, are: (1) authoritarian-personal control (Ethiopia); (2) authoritarian-mass party (Nkrumah's Ghana, Keita's Mali, and Toure's Guinea); (3) democratic-competitive and semi-competitive system (Tanzania, Kenya); (4) civil-military coalition (Togo following the death of Olympio, Congo B after the fall of Toulou in 1963); and (5) military oligarchy (Uganda, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Central African Republic).

16 Ibid., p. 1.


PART I

AN OVERVIEW OF BRITISH AND FRENCH COLONIALISM IN WEST AFRICA
CHAPTER II

COLONIAL INTERESTS AND MOTIVES: 1850–1885

Despite a general lack of activity on the part of the colonial powers in West Africa, the thirty-five years from 1850 to 1885 are significant because they help to explain why Britain and France obtained their colonies where they did. Although both nations in this period had negligible influence on West Africa as a whole, there were forces at work which were extending their influence in this area.

Colonial Expansion: To Be or Not To Be

Throughout this period the British Government, especially Parliament, maintained a deep-seated hostility toward colonial ventures in West Africa. This hostility was expressed when Lord Palmerston acquired Lagos in 1861; upon taking charge of Lagos, the Colonial Office described it as "that deadly gift from the foreign office." Strong opposition to colonial expansion also came from the increasingly tight-fisted Treasury, which kept a sharp eye on any venture on the West African coast that might involve it in an increase of expenditures, even if the motive were the protection of British trading interests. The Parliamentary Select Committee recommended the abandonment of all Britain's West Coast commitments except Sierra Leone. The predominant view at the Colonial Office toward colonial expansion was summed up in the words of Sir Frederic Rogers (Permanent Undersecretary, 1860–1871): "expensive and troublesome." The colonies were seen as useful neither for the prosecution of the abolition of the slave trade nor for the advancement of British trade.
Parliament's point of view contrasted sharply with the view held by the Cabinet.

It is essential to point out that Britain's hostility towards the acquisition of colonies in West Africa did not mean she was unwilling to help advance her trading interests there. Before the advent of the Parliamentary Select Committee of 1865, for example, the British Government had helped to finance the Niger expeditions of 1841 and 1854, and had been responsible for the great exploration of Hausaland and West Sudan, from which it was hoped that the means could be found to tap the supposedly vast commercial potential of that region. However, after 1865, the British Government was notably more reluctant to take action on behalf of her traders, taking the view that high risk brought high profits and that the merchants should look after themselves. Yet, when the British traders and missionaries on the coast needed help and protection, the British Government was quick in sending gunboats. The only area where British traders penetrated deeply into the African hinterland and became deeply involved in local politics was in Nigeria. And it is significant that the area in which her traders and Royal Chartered Companies (such as the Royal Niger Company, the Imperial British East African Company and the British South African Company) were the most active became Britain's largest colony on the West Coast. This fact substantiates the hypothesis that for Britain, at least, in the West African case, flag followed trade.

If the British Government was reluctant to extend her hegemony over West Africa but ended up following the interests of her
private citizens, then the reverse was the case with France. At first, France was as anxious as Britain to limit her colonial commitments in West Africa. Indeed a number of French administrations had shared the British Parliament's monolithic distaste for colonial enterprise on the West African coast. The French philosophers set the tone and others followed, so that anti-colonialism became almost a cult. The French Government and society commonly agreed that colonial development was an unjustifiable expense, a luxury, the costly fantasy of a great nation, and a burden for future and present alike. Clemenceau aptly expressed this view by denouncing colonialism as only a policy of national chauvinism. The French people opted for a steady internal development, concentrating power and strength for the Rhine fight alone, but, above all, building up national prosperity again, on an industrial basis. The colonial question was viewed as indissolubly linked with the recovery of the lost Rhine provinces of Alsace-Lorraine; in fact, it was deemed to be part of the same problem.

Nevertheless there was a small but important minority of political leaders in control of Quai d'Orsay which took the opposite point of view. Their main argument was that France was becoming industrialized and that overseas expansion would facilitate industrialization. They insisted that this was the most important fact in French existence and not any hysterical raving about the lost provinces or revanche; the changing position and demands of Industry were the vital features of the current situation and to concentrate on mere emotionalism meant a positive betrayal of the country's real
interests. Those political leaders believed that colonization was for France a matter of life or death: either France became a great power in Africa or, in a century or so, she would be a secondary power, counted in the world little more than Greece or Rumania counted in Europe.9

Thus there existed in the French Government conflicting and insoluble points of view. However, during this period, the non-expansionist view prevailed. Since colonial expansion and the acquisition of colonies were supposed to dissipate rather than increase the country's resources, anyone wanting expansion was viewed as a Germanophile. Any waste of economic resources or manpower in distant colonial ventures was considered not only ill-advised but tantamount to high treason. This attitude resulted in a number of government officials losing their jobs. Charles de Freycinet, director of Quai d'Orsay, was ousted from the government for openly advocating colonialism, for such a policy would have diverted attention from the Vosges. Jules Ferry, also a director of Quai d'Orsay, was overthrown for adding Tunisia and then Indo-China to the French empire. Leon Gambetta was defeated by the Chamber of Deputies for advocating a strong stand against the British in Egypt in 1882.10

Revanche against Germany for the crushing defeat of 1870 was the keynote issue of the seventies, and, for colonial expansion, this meant recueillement or withdrawal. The majority of Frenchmen thought that their nation was too weak to exert strength outside of Europe. Yet many demanded an impossible war of revanche against Germany. The effect of defeatism and the pressures of the revanchards
were keenly felt by the officials at the Foreign Ministry in Paris. Imperialism, then, was not a popular cause in the France of Freycinet, Ferry and Gambetta. Pursuit of revanche and Imperialism simultaneously was not deemed possible, and French public opinion opted for the former. This put a damper on colonial expansion for a period of time.

However, the French did not have a centralized administrative agency or a treasury, whereas the British colonial expansion tendencies were controlled by a strong treasury and parliament, duly reinforced or supplemented by a colonial office which saw fit to put a stop to any new colonial venture. Instead the French were subjected to strong contrary pressures, chiefly from their marines and army. Beginning with their defeat at the hands of the British in the Seven Years' War, which definitely put an end to French dreams of a new empire beyond Europe, the French marine and army had been seeking to compensate for their humiliation by extending France's hegemony overseas. The marine and army, whose ministry had responsibility for the colonies, served under administrations that were favorable to their colonial ambitions and were thus able to pursue limited expansion. Both branches of the military went into Algeria partly to provide some scope other than political agitation for the nation's energies, partly to restore French credit abroad, and partly to annoy England. France stayed there primarily because she could not evacuate and save face, and also because of a kind of inevitable but unwanted fatalism. Prestige for the monarchy and glory for the army appeared more important than trade in sending France into Africa.
Colonial Expansion: To Be

In 1880 there still seemed to be no pressing reason why any European government should consider the occupation of any portion of tropical Africa as either politically desirable or economically profitable. Any increases in trade that might be likely to occur as a result of such occupation still seemed to be offset both by political repercussions on the chanceries of Europe and by the expenses that would be involved in the imposition and maintenance of a colonial administration which, for the most part, Africans were quite unwilling to accept. Likewise, the slave trade could not be used as an argument in favor of occupation because the exportation of slaves had ceased. 15

What then can account for the spectacular change of attitude on the part of the European powers between 1880 and 1885, so that, within fifteen years, the whole of tropical Africa (except Liberia) was brought under European rule? In order to speculate on answers to this question, conditions in both Europe and Africa must be examined. First of all, ignorance of West Africa had led both traders and non-traders to believe that the area was a far more important market for their goods than it eventually turned out to be. The Congo and Niger Rivers assumed much greater importance as highways to the interior markets than events subsequently justified. European industrialists and traders were looking for outlets for their surplus capital, and Africa, still the "Dark Continent" as far as Europe was concerned, held promise of rich opportunities. Explorers like Stanley, who ventured into the Congo basin to assess among
other things) the commercial potential of the region, gave favorable reports. European investments and interests now needed more than an occasional gunboat for protection. Occupation of territory became the key concern as investors and traders moved into the West African hinterland.

Colonies and empires became increasingly popular subjects in the major capitals of Europe. Interest in colonies was manifested not only among the commercial classes, who were directly interested in overseas trade, but also among the literate upper middle class. To commercial motives for the acquisition of colonies were added those of national glory and "humanitarianism". Theories of the racial superiority of the white man, coupled with explorers' and missionaries' tales of the primitive conditions in Africa, increased support for the occupation of Africa and its subjection to the "benefits" of European rule. Jules Ferry told the French Chamber that "It must be said openly that the superior races, in effect, have a right vis-à-vis the inferior races," to which M. Jules Margne replied, "You dare to say that in a country where the rights of man were declared." In the Europe of the 1880's, the views of Ferry rather than Margne prevailed, thus making it easier for governments to undertake colonial ventures.

One of the more immediate causes which led to the coloniza-
tion of Africa was the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Crippled mentally and physically by her defeat, France during this period proclaimed, via her principal statesmen and writers, that a greater empire lay beyond the seas in West and Northwest Africa. After her tremendous
victory, Germany, too, desired colonies of her own, finding herself with a great and increasing industrial population and an urgent need for raw materials and additional food supplies. The rivalry between these two great continental powers induced an unwilling Britain into the competition. Britain believed that her colonies on the West Coast needed protection or they would become mere coast enclaves, cut off from all access to the interior by hostile foreign tariffs. However, it was her vital interest in India which eventually compelled Britain to protect her trading routes via Egypt and its Nile sources, the Suez Canal and the eastern shores of Africa.¹⁸

Another spur to occupation was the specter of protectionism. If governments were reluctant to occupy tropical Africa, they were even more reluctant to see any part of it fall to a power that espoused protectionism. Both Britain and Germany feared the protectionist trend in French West Africa. The French in West Africa were just as concerned about the protectionist aspects of British free trade in her coastal colonies. All three nations were determined to acquire the Congo and Niger River basins or to ensure that these basins remained open to free trade. The mutual suspicions among the interested European powers had reached such a pitch that none of them was willing to hold off the undesirable, for fear that their own interests might be pre-empted by another.

The newspapers of each nation, especially Britain and France, reflected the uneasiness and hostility over each other’s policy and motives in Africa. In May 1883 The Times editorialized that glory and mischief, not profit, motivated the French and whetted
It has been said that France is always peeping through the keyhole to see what Prince Bismarck is doing; and that if at anytime when she finds him looking the other way she sets off to amuse herself in her own old fashion in some unoccupied corner of the world. First it was Tunis, then the Congo, then Tonkin and now the Madagascar adventure is in full activity.  

Bitter insults were hurled at the French by the Daily Chronicle:  

France, largely out of consideration for her reverses 14 years ago and her decline as a European power, has been allowed a free hand—a too free hand, indeed—in diverse quarters of the globe and she has shown her gratitude to the powers that have left her free to pursue a 'spirited foreign policy' by ruthlessly trampling upon their interests when it has suited her to do so.  

Similar acrid remarks were hurled back at Britain by French periodicals. The Journal des Debats saw British obstruction in Egypt, the Far East and West Africa as the heart of the matter: "Not content with seizing the Nile, the English want to get their hands on the Congo and the Niger, those grand commercial routes." French sentiments were typified by the Journal during the abortive Anglo-French Egyptian Conference of June 1884: the Journal referred to the "chimerical time" when British troops would withdraw from the Nile, and labeled English promises as soap bubbles.  

In part, it was these uncompromising attitudes of the great powers which prompted King Leopold of Belgium to convene the Berlin West Africa Conference of 1884-1885. Both France and Britain were playing the balance of power game with Germany in the event of a power conflict. The Manchester Guardian reflected the consensus of English opinion at the time of the Berlin Conference, when the Anglo-German colonial rivalry was most bitter:
Are we to continue to regard the friendship of France as the keystone of our foreign policy, even though as in Egypt and in most other parts of the world at present, our interests are opposed to hers; or are we to maintain our traditional friendship with Germany, whose interests in Europe are identical with our own? So long as the continental powers were entirely absorbed in their own revolutions or unifications, it was possible for England to go her own way, gradually building up a colonial empire, and paying little or no regard to the disputes by which the unsettled commonwealth of Europe was agitated. Those days are over. The other powers seek to gratify a natural ambition for colonial extension. It is impossible for us to resist them all and we should be wise to make up our minds without delay which is the power whose interests be nearest to our own, and which is the power whom we should prefer in case of need to find upon the same side with ourselves.  

British Indecision and Insecurity was matched by the French dilemma of choosing between going it alone against England or siding with Germany and forgetting about the lost provinces. The issue was minimized by the French Intelligentsia, whose job it was to convince the public that a Franco-German entente was a colonial understanding and not an entente in the sense of a permanent alignment designed to change or stabilize the European balance of power. According to an editorial in the *Journal des Debats*, a permanent political alignment would be impossible; but there were certain areas where Germany and France had common interests to defend and it would not be a sign of weakness or humiliation if France joined Germany in "righting English wrongs" in Egypt or restraining English "annexationist tendencies" in other parts of Africa. Generally, it was thought that a Franco-German colonial cooperation pact would act as a check against Britain's maritime supremacy and would maintain equal access to territories not yet occupied.

The Insecurity of both Britain and France was evident and
papers from 1884 to 1885 will substantiate the country's uneasiness and indecisiveness: nearly every newspaper editorialized that France had provoked the colonial scramble; Germany had entered the race; and England's stance was indecisive. The Globe asked whether England could withstand an assault by a European alliance and, with the "capitalists of Europe" ready to advance into Africa and elsewhere, would she be able to maintain her current commercial supremacy. The issue of England's ability to counter the efforts of her continental competitors, who were challenging her colonial supremacy and threatening her with alignments, raised the question of whether or not the British Empire was in a state of "decline and decay". In jingo tone, The Morning Post answered, "England is still a great power... She is the greatest of powers...England has an empire in every quarter of the globe and her fleet still commands the seas." Gabriel Charmes, an expert on Egyptian affairs, resented Britain's occupation of Egypt in 1882 and summed up France's insecurity as he repeatedly sounded the alarms at British overseas activity elsewhere.

The Berlin West Africa Conference of 1884-1885, which was called to alleviate the fears and problems of the Great Powers' rivalry by drawing up formalities for the effective occupation of the coast, gave further impetus to the race for African colonies. It was stipulated that, in order for a claim to be valid, it should be supported by effective occupation. France insisted that effective occupation alone could confer title, and the dispatch of 1887 by Lord Salsburg to the Minister of Lisbon contained this sentence: "It has
now been admitted on principle by all parties to the Act of Berlin, that a claim of sovereignty in Africa can only be maintained by real occupation of the territory claimed. With the rules agreed upon, the various participants began to play the game with differing degrees of enthusiasm and for different stakes. As far as West Africa was concerned, it was rather like a game of monopoly, with France and Britain the only serious contestants. It was these major reasons along with minor ones (such as protection for missionaries, humanitarian reasons) that started the scramble for West Africa.

**British Motives and Interests**

Throughout the 19th century, Britain underwent a sweeping industrialization characterized by low taxation, limited public expenditures and a policy of laissez faire at home, and by free trade abroad. Britain's confidence in her industrial and maritime supremacy led to free trade becoming not only profitable but an established creed in which the colonies were regarded as an unwanted financial burden. Acquisition of any new African colony was justified largely in terms of its economic returns. British motives and interests in the African colonization drive were of a secondary nature, in that colonies in West, South and East Africa served as refueling stations and protective outposts for the maintenance of British trade routes to India. Colonial expansion centered around strategic points on the African continent, such as Egypt, Sierra Leone and South Africa. The value of these areas as coaling stations in the scheme of imperial policy was indeed recognized, but their vital importance as naval bases and communications centers was a lesson for the future to teach.
British colonial policy grew out of her designs to control Egypt and the Nile River; this meant preventing any foreign powers from controlling the upper Nile, which could easily be dammed, thereby starving Egypt. By 1889 Cairo was becoming more and more the pivot of British Mediterranean strategy. In the same year, the British agent Baring convinced Prime Minister Salisbury of the necessity of occupying Egypt. In his correspondence with Salisbury, Baring stressed the fact that if

...the Italians, who were advancing from the Red Sea toward the eastern Sudan, took Kassala...They would soon strike the valley of the Nile...at Khartoum...the establishment of a civilized power would be a calamity to Egypt...They could so reduce the water-supply as to ruin the country...What power holds the upper Nile valley must by the mere force of its geographical situation dominate Egypt.34

Although the Ethiopians momentarily removed the Italian threat by defeating them at Adowa in 1898, this concern over Nile sources was nevertheless applied to all European powers and for all parts of the Nile valley, indeed as far south as the headwaters of the Nile in Uganda.

Britain's West African colonial policy was a continuation or an offshoot of her Nile valley policy.35 West Africa, at least until 1895, was subordinated to British interests in eastern and southern Africa.36 Likewise the presence of British traders, missionaries and private companies, as well as fear of French domination of the Congo and Niger River basins, led to British occupation in West Africa. Britain's overriding purpose in Africa was security in Egypt, the Mediterranean and the Orient; time and again the British showed an obsession with security, a fixation on safeguarding the routes to
the East. The priorities of policy in tropical Africa confirmed this impression: West Africa seemed to offer better prospects for markets and raw materials than East Africa and the upper Nile; yet it was upon these poorer eastern areas that the British Government concentrated its efforts. Those African regions which interested the British investor and merchant the least, concerned government ministers the most. Britain believed that her strength depended upon the possession of India and a preponderance of power in the East almost as much as it did upon the British Isles. Maintenance of safe communications between the two areas, Britain and her Asian empire, was a supreme interest of Victorian policy.

French Motives and Interests

In France, the political pressures for expansion in Africa were almost as strong as the economic ones. As mentioned previously, such expansion was increasingly seen as a means to compensate for the humiliating defeat she had suffered at the hands of the Germans in 1870-1871. However, there still remained the division between those who sought expansion elsewhere and those who felt that France would be better occupied recovering the lost provinces of Alsace-Lorraine. This was well illustrated by the exchange between Jules Ferry and Deroulede, a poet and an ardent continentalist: "You will end by making me think you prefer Alsace-Lorraine to France. Must we hypnotize ourselves with the lost provinces and should we not take compensations elsewhere?" asked Ferry, to which Deroulede replied, "That is just the point. I have lost two children and you offer me twenty domestics."
Politically France still looked in two directions. Inwardly, she saw the continent and the nation of the Rhine, where so many national dreams had been realized and so many shattered. Premier Ferry in 1881 popularized the chief arguments in defense of overseas expansion. His theory rested on four indissolubly connected elements: industrialization, protection, markets and colonies. He acclaimed the overseas possessions as the outlets, the necessary markets for French goods, and as places for the investment of capital; colonial policy was the daughter of industrial policy. Ferry's policy greatly influenced his successor, Gabriel Hanotaux, who believed that France would be strengthened by acquiring a colonial empire. He concluded that "France must not be chosen; she must choose." In addition to justifying overseas expansion in terms of economic needs such as raw materials, markets abroad and outlets for surplus capital, Gabriel Charmes added the idea of colonization as an opportunity for mobilizing the manpower of Africa and Asia, thereby eventually compensating for France's inferior size and population growth. Thus France could improve both her economy and strategic potential against her continental rivals. In reality the French people were not asked to initiate a policy of overseas expansion but rather to accept it.

Statesmen such as Ferry, Hanotaux, Theophile Delcasse, Eugene Etienne and others who favored colonial expansion were given a great boost by Britain's unilateral occupation of Egypt. British expansion also aroused the indignation of the French public, already increasingly viewing Britain as the enemy presiding over a mighty and expanding empire. Suffering defeats at the hands of both Britain and
Germany, and losing again to British influence (in Egypt), France was afflicted with what might aptly be called a national inferiority complex.\textsuperscript{41} Seeking compensation through colonial expansion in West Africa, French political leaders hoped to regenerate the country's morale and prestige, and to regain in Africa and Asia what they had lost in Alsace-Lorraine. Thus, at the urging of the army and marine ministry (the main instrument in rousing jingoism among the French public),\textsuperscript{42} many Frenchmen began to look overseas for the greatness that had vanished in Europe.

France never had the pressing need for colonies as did Britain. The French economy was largely self-sufficient. She had no surplus or hungry population to export overseas. She only became an industrial nation in the 1840's and her need for outlets for her manufactured goods was never as pressing as Britain's. Any desire for colonies could not be explained by surplus capital seeking new fields of operation. Nor, too, was France interested in acquiring bases for the suppression of the slave trade, for she never showed herself to be an enthusiastic abolitionist. French occupation in West Africa usually followed conquests by the military. This drive to compensate for national humiliation serves partly to explain why France acquired tracts of land in West Africa that were little more than, if not actually, desert, and why, even in the early conquest of Senegal, Faidherbe claimed the least commercially interesting parts of that region.\textsuperscript{43} French motives and interests in Africa centered around the establishment of a permanent empire in which she hoped to regain lost prestige and, if possible, resources and profit.\textsuperscript{44}
Prestige was perhaps the most important element in the new expansionist drive. *Pour l'empire colonial* and *La Paix latine*, two books written by Hanotaux as *apologia* for his own colonial policies, gave strong evidence for this motivation. In these writings, he advanced the idea of inheriting the Roman empire, an obvious attempt to give France reflected glory.

**Comparison and Summary**

British motives and interests in Africa were of a secondary nature in that West Africa, along with South and East Africa, served as refueling stations and protective outposts for the maintenance of British trade routes to India. Any acquisition of a new African colony by the Colonial Office had to be justified in terms of its economic returns to Britain. French interest in Africa centered around the establishment of a permanent empire in which she hoped to regain prestige and resources lost as a result of her defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. In addition, French conquests and interests in Africa, especially Algeria, helped to divert attention from internal problems at home.

Similar to her colonial conquests in North America, Britain's movement into West Africa started with the granting of charters and the organization of private companies. Eventually, British armed forces were sent in to protect British citizens and to secure strategic ports for the trade routes to India. Once there, Britain began to exploit the continent's resources and raw materials for her domestic commercial and industrial factories and outlets. Seeking only enough control to protect the white settlers (especially the traders),
ports and strategic points, and to keep the raw materials flowing into the country, Britain arrived at a policy of indirect rule. In contrast to the British colonial policy of occupation following traders, the French movement into West Africa was an extension of her military conquest in North Africa. France sought conquest of both land and people; thus, a policy of direct rule was instituted. Although France's need for raw materials was important, it was not as crucial as Britain's because, since France was herself an agricultural country, colonial primary products were generally of a competitive nature. Algerian wines, for example, were in competition with wines produced in France.

French life was so many-faceted, so rural, that there was no grave economic problem; as a result, colonization was considered a waste of the country's wealth. As a matter of fact, many areas of France had a shortage of workers and personnel, so that there was no need to establish overseas outlets for people or products, as was the case with Britain. Therefore, French possessions in Africa were destined to be overwhelmingly 'native lands', as opposed to the basic division in the British empire between 'settler lands' and 'native lands'. The absence of this distinction gave a united base to French colonization, which provides a partial explanation for the French emphasis on subordination as opposed to the British emphasis on autonomy. The French emphasized a national point of view in the sense of a centralized organization with France viewed as a machine and the colonies as feeders. On the other hand, the British tended to view the colonies as societies, evolving their own lives and interests. For France
Centralization entailed dividing West Africa into *circles* or administrative subdivisions, the affairs of each being controlled to the most minute detail by a French administrator. This practice was diametrically opposed to the British idea of utilizing a minimum of British officers and a maximum of native institutions and personnel, especially native chiefs.46
FOOTNOTES


4 Ibid.

5 See Ibid., p. 33.


7 Journal Officiel (Deps), January 11, 1883.


12 Ibid., p. 2.

13 Crowder, op. cit., p. 52, and Roberts, op. cit., p. 3.


15 Crowder, op. cit., p. 56.


17 Quoted in Crowder, op. cit., p. 59.


19 The Times of London, May 25, 1883.

20 Ibid.
21 The Daily Chronicle, June 4, 1884.

22 Journal des Debats, October 12, 1884.

23 Ibid.

24 Manchester Guardian, January 2, 1885.

25 Journal des Debats, October 6, 1884.


27 Ibid., p. 171.

28 The Globe, March 21, 1884.

29 Pall Mall Gazette, July 30, 1884.

30 The Morning Post, August 12, 1884.


33 Lugard, op. cit., p. 13.


36 See Ibid.


40 Charmes, op. cit., p. 33, et seq.

41 Heggoy, op. cit., p. 2.

42 Hargreaves, op. cit., p. 283.

43 Crowder, op. cit., p. 52.


CHAPTER III
DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN COLONIAL POLICIES

Largely ignorant of the nature of the societies they were to govern and preoccupied with the next stage of conquest, the colonial powers had little time to consider the advantages and disadvantages of the administrative systems they had chosen for the territories they occupied. Many of the imposed administrations were ad hoc and were greatly influenced either by the personalities of the men imposing them or by the circumstances under which a particular area was occupied, by conquest or by treaty. Thus one found in Africa a bewildering variety of administrations, each of which sought congruence with the philosophy of the colonial governor and the colonial power. At first no allowances were made for, nor different techniques used to govern, the large centralized state, the small independent village or the desert nomad tribe. The central problem of concern of the colonial powers revolved around how the African peoples could be governed so that the colonial power would gain maximum benefit.

In the process of coping with the above concern and from the ad hoc experiences of the colonial administrators, there emerged three dominant trends in the colonization of West Africa: 1) indirect rule; 2) assimilation; and 3) association or paternalism. These local systems of administrations may, however, be broadly classified under two main types: 1) indirect rule; and 2) direct rule, consisting of assimilation and association/paternalism. The main example of the indirect rule system has been that of the British, to which Sir F. D. Lugard gave classic expression in his treatise, The Dual Mandate in
British Tropical Africa. The direct rule system has been practiced in varying degrees and with varying structural modifications by the French, the Belgians, the Portuguese and the Spanish.

**Indirect Rule**

Indirect rule was inspired by the belief that the European and the African were culturally distinct (though not necessarily unequal) and that the government institutions best suited to the latter were those which he had devised for himself. Therefore, the African colonial subjects should be governed through their own political institutions. Although this approach (at least in theory) did not necessarily mean governance through the African tribal chiefs, nevertheless, as the Europeans practiced it, indirect rule laid heavy emphasis on the role of the chief in the governance of Africans—even for those peoples who traditionally did not have political, as distinct from religious, chiefs.

The use of indigenous political institutions for the purposes of local government was contingent on certain modifications, which fell into two categories: modification of those aspects of native laws that were repugnant to European ideas of good government; and modifications that were designed to ensure the achievement of the main purpose of colonial rule—the exploitation of the colonized country. Examples of the former would be the abolition of human sacrifice or the abandonment of certain methods of treating criminals. Examples of the latter would be the introduction of taxes, designed to stimulate production of cash crops for export.
Assimilation

In regard to the relationship of the colony to the metropolitan power and to the status of the individual African, assimilation was the antithesis of indirect rule. As practiced in Africa, assimilation theories fell into two basic groups: those which advocated personal assimilation of the administered peoples; and those which, though they discarded personal assimilation as unrealistic, advocated administrative, political or economic identity between the mother country and the colony.

Theories of personal assimilation asserted that all men were equal irrespective of racial origin or cultural background, there being no differences between men that education could not eliminate. This implied that an illiterate African peasant was just as worthy of citizenship as an illiterate French peasant, and that therefore both should be treated as Frenchmen with all rights and duties. Out of this assumption, conflicts developed among the colonial policy makers over the actual equality of all men—here and now—and the potential equality of all men.

Overwhelmed by this philosophical dilemma and also by the economic and cultural obstacles to a successful application of a whole-hearted policy of personal assimilation, and yet reluctant to abandon the universalist approach to human society that is a part of their heritage, the French in many cases turned to what can best be described as a gradualist or selective assimilation policy. When it came to the people of the hinterland (protectorate; as opposed to the people on the coast (colony), the French argued that all men could be
equal given the right opportunities, but the Africans of the protectorate were not equal with French citizens here and now. The people in the hinterland had to prove themselves worthy of assimilation by demonstrating to authorities that they had the attributes of citizenship—attributes (whatever they were) which were to be determined by the colonial power. France, in her only Black Africa assimilationist experiment, practiced a policy of immediate assimilation in Senegal, which she then abandoned for a selective assimilation policy upon taking control of the Senegalese hinterland.²

Three basic variations occurred in the non-personal theories of assimilation. The first variation dealt with the administrative identity between the colonies and the mother country: for administrative purposes no distinction was made between France and the colonies. The Ivory Coast and Algeria could therefore be considered overseas departments, or the colonies could be collectively described as France Outre-Mer. Administrative assimilation was used to describe anything from the high degree of centralization of the French empire to the setting up of French-style local government institutions in the colonies.³

The second variation was that of political assimilation of the overseas territories with the metropolis.⁴ Under this form, the colonies could send representatives to the French metropolitan political institutions (after World War II) but never on the basis of parity of representation in proportion to the population with the mother country.

The last form of non-personal assimilation was that which
advocated the integration of the economies of the overseas territories with that of the metropolis.  

Association/Paternalism

French policy makers and critics who opposed assimilation fell into two main groups: those who argued that such a policy was, from both a practical and an economic point of view, impossible to implement; and those who asserted that Africans were inherently incapable of being assimilated.

The first group believed that if a full-scale policy of assimilation implied that those assimilated would have access to the same rights as the assimilators, then this was an economically unfeasible undertaking. Moreover, France would be politically dominated by the peoples she was assimilating, since the colonial population was greater than that of the mother country. Furthermore, how did one go about assimilating desert nomads or pygmy hunters? These critics concluded that, if assimilation were to be practiced at all, then it would have to be on a limited scale.

The second group based its criticisms on the belief that Africans were racially distinct from Europeans. They argued that, in terms of biological factors, Africans were irremediably inferior and therefore could not be assimilated. In terms of culture, they insisted that, even though the African qua human being was equal to the European, he was culturally separate and could not be assimilated to an alien culture.

Whatever the approach toward assimilation the critics took, there remained the problem of how to govern the masses of unassimilated
Africans. A policy of indirect rule was ruled out because many French officials believed that Africans had not really succeeded in evolving political institutions worth being called such, or, if such indigenous institutions existed, they would present serious difficulties for the colonial administration if these institutions were not modified or reorganized. A policy of direct administration was advocated, but this was deemed to be impossible to implement because of an insufficient number of Frenchmen or Europeanized Africans able to manage the system and also because of the prohibitive cost. The French colonial policy-makers finally devised a system of administration called association, which entailed a radical reorganization of the African society to meet the exploitative requirements of the colonial authorities. This reorganization involved the use of traditional and "French-made" chiefs in the subordinate role of agents of the colonial administration.

Before scrutinizing the administrations and colonial policies of Britain and France in theory and practice, it should be re-emphasized that British colonial administration was predominantly one of indirect rule, undecided as between an interventionist and a non-interventionist system. However, where African societies did not lend themselves to this policy or where British aims could be more readily achieved (for example, in large created townships like Kaduna, capital of North Nigeria, or in strongholds of opposition like Ashanti, Benin), there was a tendency to adopt a policy of association similar to that of the French. French administration consisted of assimilation and, in the latter stages of colonial rule, association.
British Rule and Colonial Administration in Nigeria

When the protectorate of Northern Nigeria was proclaimed on January 1, 1900, the British Government appointed Sir F. D. Lugard as High Commissioner. The governing of so vast a territory presented the utmost difficulty, especially as there were very few British ready and willing to undertake a career in the sub-Saharan climate of Nigeria. Since Britain had decreed that all colonies must be economically self-sufficient, there arose the problem of raising enough money for governmental expenditures. Using his past experience as director of the Royal Niger Company and the British experience of indirect rule in India, Lugard adopted the principle of indirect rule, with emphasis on building upon the existing native administrations. So effective was his method that, with a group of seventy-five administrative officers and a small army, he could control a territory of nearly 300,000 square miles and a population estimated at seven million.9

As Lugard conceived it, indirect rule was a system of colonial administration which not only relied on the indigenous authorities for local government but was constantly goading them to improvement.10 The agents for improvement were the British political officers; the agents for local government were the chiefs; and the means were those funds derived from taxation. Under Lugard's policy, at least in theory, the Resident acted as a sympathetic adviser to the native chiefs, being careful not to interfere so as not to lower their prestige or cause them to lose interest in their work. The advice of the Resident on matters of general policy had to be followed,
but the native ruler issued the instructions to his subordinate chiefs and district heads—not as the orders of the Resident but as his own.¹¹

The chief or emir came to be the pivot around which the whole of the local administration would revolve. The main characteristics of local administration and indirect rule were: 1) the chief and his traditional council, acting as the executive and legislature of the local government, including penal institutions and the police force; 2) the chief court, which heard disputes and executed judgments according to the well-established principles of a mélange of Islamic and customary laws; and 3) the chief treasury, which functioned as the local thesaurus into which were deposited all the customary tributes paid to the chief by subordinate chiefs and vassals, as well as certain land and cattle taxes which were distributed among certain designated officials. The system of taxation was based on the amalgamation of all previous tax dues into a single 'General Tax'; assessment was based on the total estimate of productivity of the village. The revenue from this tax was divided equally between the British Government and the emirs.¹² In many cases, the British colonial administration provided kickbacks to key and strategic chiefs. The Sultan of Sokoto, in recognition of his status as Sirkin Musulmi, was allowed seventy-five per cent of the general tax. In Sierra Leone, chiefs were granted a variety of financial incentives to administer their subjects; these included stipend payments, rebates on the collection of taxes, court fines and entertainment allowances. By 1930, these incentives represented ten per cent of the expenditures on administration.¹³ The chiefs thus acquired new sources of authority, influence
British reluctance to depose emirs except in extreme and obvious cases of misrule, coupled with an increasing unwillingness to intervene in the internal administration of the native authorities of the emirates, meant that the emirs became increasingly autocratic. This reluctance is well illustrated by the abdication of Muhammedu, Sultan of Sokoto, in 1931: when it became clear that the Sultan was deeply involved in corruption and was losing popularity with his people, the British, rather than depose him, engineered his abdication.  

The dramatic 'success' of indirect rule in Northern Nigeria resulted in its widespread application throughout British Africa. Lord Lugard introduced indirect rule in the northern protectorate as a form of administration for which the local native organization was peculiarly suited. There existed in the region a series of Moslem emirates formed through the conquest of aboriginal Hausa by the invading Fulani. Economic development had reached a point of considerable specialization, and an elaborate series of taxes on agricultural products, on cattle and on the practice of various trades, were collected by appointees of the emirs. Thus there already existed an organization which needed only slight modification to perform the tasks required by the British colonial government. Governing indirectly proved not only economical but effective. Running the administration through the chiefs was "colonialism-on-the-cheap." British rule was secured; the country was peaceful and orderly. Indirect rule transformed what had been a practical expedient to maintain control in northern Nigeria into the well-developed theory for governing alien
peoples that Lugard popularized in *The Dual Mandate*. Nevertheless, Lugard did not regard the Northern Nigerian example of indirect rule as valid for extension to other areas.¹⁶

After World War I, however, indirect rule of varying types was systematically instituted in Eastern Nigeria, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, Uganda and Southern Sudan. Although conditions in these areas were dissimilar to those in Northern Nigeria, the British colonial administrations made only minor changes by placing emphasis on how the Resident should interpret his role as adviser. Lugard's successors in Nigeria and the areas listed above preferred to let the emirs administer themselves, provided they did not incur any trouble.¹⁷ Lugard, for example, wanted to include the emirs' budgets in the General Budget of amalgamated Nigeria but was bitterly opposed by Governor Temple, who believed that indirect rule meant minimal interference by the colonial power and felt that subjecting the emirs' budgets to central control would inevitably lessen their autonomy.¹⁸

Whether indirect rule was interventionist or non-interventionist, it involved a considerable revision in the indigenous institutions of these areas, which was not suitable to Lugard's formula.

The British colonial system in Africa operated on two levels: indirect rule was practiced on the local level; however, on the national level, the indigenous emirs and African officials were subordinated to the British colonial administrations. In this system, the governor, an Executive Council and a Legislative Council were the chief institutions, real power being held by the governor. The Executive Council was no more than an advisory body consisting of
heads of important government departments. Due to the cry of 'taxa-
tion without representation,' British colonial policy instituted a
Legislative Council. In the Gold Coast, the first African was ap-
pointed as early as 1850 and, in 1863, two Creole merchants were
appointed to the Legislative Council of Sierra Leone.\(^\text{19}\) The Africans
used their seats on the Legislative Councils to attack British poli-
cies in Africa and to gain reform in order to block some of the laws
of the powerful colonial governors. Eventually, the Africans gained
control of the Legislative Councils as nationalism increased.

An Assessment of Indirect Rule

Many mistakes were made in the process of applying the
theoretical formulations of Indirect rule to specific areas. As the
Northern Nigeria case illustrates, there must be the ubiquitous chiefs
in order for the Indirect rule pattern to function. Where there were
no such traditional functionaries, as when the British proceeded to
appoint non-traditional "warrant" chiefs in parts of Eastern Nigeria
in 1929, riots were bound to occur.\(^\text{20}\) As another example, in Yoruba-
land, Lugard made the mistake of equating the position of the Yoruba
oba with that of the northern emir. Failing to take into considera-
tion the civil wars of the nineteenth century and the growth of a
missionary-educated elite which had radically changed the Yoruba
political system, Lugard appointed as "emir" Oyo, a Yoruba oba, who
was given authority over areas like Ibadan, which not only considered
itself independent but had saved Oyo's region from being overrun by
the Fulani. Not surprisingly, riots erupted and had to be put down
with troops. In this instance, Lugard and the British colonial
officials not only failed to comprehend the role of the educated Africans but also expected Oyo to collect direct taxes, which had never been imposed traditionally. By forcing the Yoruba back to a more traditional system, which was mistakenly considered to be the true system of Yoruba government, the British thus halted a modernizing process. Similar mistakes were made with the Kikuyu (Kenya), Mende (Sierra Leone), Ibos (Nigeria), and Tallense (Gold Coast) when the British attempted to introduce the full paraphernalia of chief into these areas. 21 It has often been said that the greatest British virtue in the art of government is their empirical approach to problems;22 but, in the above areas, they became the victims of a theory about government. Whatever the circumstances, British officials held up indirect rule as the panacea for 'native' administration. Worse still, in actual practice, the theory buttressed the more autocratic elements of African society and tended to militate against modernizing tendencies.

An important 'harmful' feature of the Indirect rule system was that the chiefs and their institutions excluded the non-traditional elements, such as the intellectuals and others who did not belong to any of the traditional families from which the chief council members were chosen. Under the British system, the educated elite was "disinherited" in favor of the traditional chiefs. This emphasis on the traditional ruler rather than the educated elite as the means for administering Africa was to have profound impact on the nature of nationalism in British West Africa and the character of the independent states. The preservation of traditional chiefs, repositories of
tribal customs, emphasized ethnicity; exclusion of the educated Africans from government participation led to their demanding independence much more vehemently than their French counterparts, who were more quickly absorbed into the administration. The educated Africans regarded indirect rule as an attempt by the British to stifle initiative and to restrict the scope for the evolution of modern forms of government. 23

Colonial Administration in French West Africa

When the question of colonization arose in the nineteenth century, France had a tradition and a legacy with which to face it. From the experience of the first overseas empire, France learned certain principles and methods of colonization that were deemed to be ingrained in the French spirit. This tradition and legacy formed part and parcel of every colonial scheme in which France dabbled. It was never doubted, for instance, that colonization was, in some vaguely metaphysical way, a special mission of the French nation. Expansion was a natural Gallic attribute; so too was the manner of that expansion. The first empire bequeathed to nineteenth century France its colonial creed—summed up in the twin dogmas of assimilation and the Pacte Colonial. 24

Just as Frenchmen unquestioningly accepted the Gallic capability of colonization, so too did they accept the method. Roberts aptly delineates this fixation:

Expansion was to be the expansion of France, of French civilization, of French ideas, for how could it be otherwise? Was not colonization national proselytism? What better fate for the West Africans than to be administered under the Paris Code and the details of French law? Were not French Insti-
tutions and the sacred principles of 1789 a goal greatly
to be desired for races that had not progressed so far?
And was it not as logical as it was desirable that the
finest embellishment of French civilization should be
transferred to the newest settlement? The French flag
meant France; France meant the apex of civilization; and
the duty of a civilizing nation was to proselytize. For
what otherwise would be the significance of the phrase
with which France described her colonies, 'La France
Outremer'? 25

Assimilation a outrance was thus the most striking legacy which the
first colonial empire left to the second. Attracted to the univer-
salism of the minutiae of French life, 26 the Gallic tradition cast
all French colonialism into a preordained mold. Development was
made synonymous with artificial growth along certain prescribed lines.

In retrospect, the well-defined theory of the first empire—
assimilation in politics and law, and the subordination of the Pacte
Colonial in economics—provided the foundations for which the new
empire was to be built, at least until 1910.

The French African empire was to become a part of France
by a policy of assimilation. Although variously interpreted, 27
assimilation essentially implied that the African colonies were to
become an integral part of the mother country. As practiced in the
four communes of Senegal, for example, this policy had the following
distinctive features: political assimilation to France through
Senegalese representation in the Chambre des Deputes of Paris; admin-
istrative assimilation by the creation of a conseil general for
Senegal modelled on the conseils generaux of the departments of France,
and by the establishment of municipal councils based on the French
model; personal assimilation of Senegalese in the communes by according
them full French citizenship, though they were allowed to retain their
An Assessment of Direct Rule

France's policy of assimilation created a French oasis in the four communes of Senegal. The hinterland and the rest of French colonial Africa remained virtually unchanged. The French never really faced the full implications of assimilation and, in practice, remarkably little was done to bring into effect the official policy that all colonial peoples should become Frenchmen, culturally as well as politically. General legislation was passed which established the following specific criteria for French citizenship: ten years' service in French employment; the ability to read and write French; evidence of good character; and the possession of means of support. Given these strict requirements, most Africans did not even bother to go about the process of qualifying for citizenship. Thus, France could never Gallicize the masses and, as a result, by 1921 (twenty years after France had established the A.O.F.), the vast majority of the population still had the inferior status of sujet—that is, they were subject to summary administrative justice and the corvee (mandatory labor). For example, the Ivory Coast had only 308 inhabitants with French citizenship, Dahomey had 121, Upper Volta had 17, Niger had 9. As late as 1936, out of a total population of 15 million in the A.O.F., there were only 2,136 Black French citizens besides the 22,000 citizens of the four communes of Senegal.

Economically, assimilation was a foregone failure. Close economic ties, which were forged by common tariffs and an active in-
tervention in the local economies, did not stimulate development as France had believed it would.

Politically, assimilation was less of a failure. France's administration of her African territories was characterized by uniform centralized rule from Paris. Giving the colonies institutions analogous to those of metropolitan France, she had hoped to gradually remove the distances separating the diverse parts of her empire by applying common legislation which would result in intimate union. Under these circumstances, no serious consideration was given to the indigenous institutions and values of the African territories. The African chief and his council, and even the African customary laws administered in the traditional courts, tended to become attenuated in the process of being used merely as local agents of the French administrator. The center of local administration became the local representative of the metropolitan ministry in charge of overseas dependencies. Local life became divided and placed in the charge of the various departments or ministries located in Paris, Dakar, and Brazzaville.

In essence, a military-type administration was developed in the French empire; military conquest was followed by military administration. Nationally, power was invested in the Governor-General and his two Lieutenant-Governors, who were assigned a designated area. The Governor-General had control over the budget, military, courts and the nominations of civil servants; he, along with the metropolitan minister of colonies, were the lawmakers. On the local level, sole authority was vested in the commandant de cercle, who, like the colonel
of a battalion, had jurisdiction over all fields of administration. To enforce his authority, the commandant de cercle had a para-military force at his disposal called the garde de cercle. These guards were able to obtain great power in the communities because of their police function and their frequent use as intermediaries between the administrators and the chiefs. The chiefs of the cantons and cercles of the administration were grouped into a hierarchy: chefs superieurs de province; chefs de cantons; and chefs de village. The chiefs played a very important role in the French network of direct rule: they were the agents for the collection of taxes, and were responsible for implementing the corvee—recruiting laborers to work on the roads, railways and even European plantations and ensuring the forced cultivation of certain cash crops. Thus the chiefs were selected for their ability to speak French and their loyalty to France, which evidence was based on some type of service in the army or police force. These chiefs bore little resemblance to those who had been conquered at the end of the nineteenth century and they received no sanction for their authority from their subjects. Therefore they became the most hated members of their communities. The position of the chiefs, which was one of the strongest and most respected institutions before French colonization, changed from that of tributary ruler to that of agent of the administration as new positions were created for them—commandant de cercle, sergeant-major, sergeant, and corporal. Although these chiefs owed allegiance to France, they ruled as traditional officials. This was direct rule at its best.

Condemned as rigid, unscientific and harmful, assimilation
was considered by most theorists to be no longer of value to France. Before World War I, the idea of assimilation was giving way to the reality of African diversity. Many French officials argued that colonial policy should vary according to local needs and should be characterized by cooperation rather than coercion. These critics, pointing to the extraordinary success of indigenous authorities in Madagascar and Morocco, were able to convince policy-makers of the necessity of shifting to a French version of association.

The policy of association, which superseded assimilation and remained dominant in the French African colonies from about 1910 to 1945, involved the belief that Africans were culturally separate from the Europeans and were therefore impossible to assimilate into French culture. However, this did not imply acceptance of traditional African institutions as a basis for colonial administration, as advocated by the British administrators.

The essential tenets of association were developed by Harmand, who postulated that the determinant factors in all colonial policy should be respect for native customs and laws, cooperation and assistance in place of exploitation. Order was the base upon which Harmand's idea of association was to be established. According to him, the chief factor lacking in more advanced native societies was stable, orderly government. Thus association involved a sort of contractual agreement—coexistence and cooperation between two profoundly different societies.

Politically, association meant that the indigenous authorities would exercise power, while the European officials would remain
ally, it was to be a collaboration between Frenchmen and Africans, the former providing the organization and technological skill, the latter giving their labor. Culturally, association never overcame its ambiguities—nothing was done to replace the firm belief in the superiority of French language and culture. 36

Although association bore similarities to indirect rule in theory, French administration in practice remained directed from the top down through a pyramidal bureaucracy to the lowest level. The chiefs continued to be the agents of French administration. At this level, where the ruling power met the people, the French political officer continued to intervene more directly in the affairs of the people than did his British counterpart.

British and French Colonial Policies: Comparison and Summary

Indirect rule transformed what had been a practical expedient to maintain control in Nigeria into the well-developed theory for governing alien peoples popularized by Lugard in *The Dual Mandate*. Commanding only meager forces in the field, colonial rule had to be riveted like 'a great steel grid' over the continent. The grid had to be tight and durable but it also had to be cheap. Lugard's improvised grid was "the offspring of expediency and parsimony". 37 Following World War I, indirect rule became the panacea for all the problems of governing a vast African empire.

Although the British administrative system was generally less obtrusive than that of the French, it was hardly without reproach. In adopting a system of indirect rule, Britain buttressed the
authoritarian aspects of the position of the chiefs, who frequently abused their power in a way they could rarely have done in traditional society without being deposed. Most crucial of all, the chief became an agent for political and cultural conservatism. In many areas, the British, like the French, attempted to discover chiefs where none existed or to give executive functions to chiefs without traditional political authority. In these instances, the British chief came close to fulfilling the same role as the French chief but, for the British administrator, the objective was different. The British chief was not incorporated into the administrative hierarchy as in the French structure; rather, he was delegated the problems of local government with the British officer as an advisor. The French chief became a part of the political system, subject to dismissal and punishment, and was transformed from an embodiment of the community's collective will into an agent of some of the most despised aspects of French rule. However, in both cases, the appointment and imposition of chiefs in areas where these institutions were unknown and unwanted was to facilitate administrative convenience. Instead of bringing about a preservation of modern indigenous political institutions and social customs, these "chiefs" proceeded to destroy them. In both instances, the colonial policies were ingrained in the grassroots of African societies.

Frequently, indirect rule produced stagnation in African society rather than the progressive development envisaged by its proponents. Invested with great powers by the European rulers, the traditional authorities became upholders of the status quo at a time
when social mobility and new educational opportunities were creating a young educated elite who were alienated from traditional society because there was no room for them. Indeed the British conceived of eventual self-government not in terms of a democratically elected government but through the delegation of national authority to the chiefs.

Finally, indirect rule simply could not work in the new towns that mushroomed around the centers of European administration throughout Africa. In these urban centers, the British were as assimilationist as the French in establishing European-style municipalities.

French colonial policy was unique in that it was governed, at least in theory, by a clearly formulated body of principles which were supposedly equally applicable to all her African colonies. With minor deviations, the guiding principle was the unity of France with her overseas possessions, from which it followed that all subjects of France were her children and had the same patriotic duties to the mother country. The exact nature of these duties was laid down by Albert Sarraut in *La Mise en Valeur de Nos Colonies*. Sarraut postulated that the role of the native involved fighting and producing for the mother country like a good Frenchman, while being civilized through exposure to French culture—thus helping both France and himself. The assumption which governed the entire attitude towards native development was that French civilization was necessarily the best and needed only to be presented to the intelligent African for him to adopt it.
The principle that indigenous institutions should be preserved and developed, which characterized British administration, appeared to the French to be nothing but a disguised form of color bar—a means of perpetuating the gulf between the dominant Europeans and the subjugated natives. Convinced that native institutions were doomed to perish, the French opted for a policy of suppressing those native authorities powerful enough to constitute a potential threat to French authority. However, to carry out those functions necessary for exploitation—taxation, recruitment of forced labor and troops, and checking on anti-French movements—the French created their own chiefs and institutions on a para-military basis.

The British system encouraged independent development for her colonial territories, which meant no representation in the British parliament. This tendency eventually provoked local agitation towards broadening the base of the legislative council system. The opposite theory was pursued by the French in that assimilation and association meant that Africans would be represented in the National Assembly and the Senate. This had the effect of discouraging spontaneous political consciousness among African community leaders, who had absorbed French culture and politics. This may in part account for the relatively slower tempo of political consciousness in French West Africa as compared with British West Africa.

It is only through an understanding of the divergent approaches to colonization by the British and French that we can begin to understand the very different courses taken by African political development during the struggle for independence and its consequent
effects on the post-independence period, and the formation of political institutions (military, trade unions) and their roles in African development.
1 Crowder, West Africa, p. 165.


5 Ibid., and Crowder, West Africa, pp. 169, et seq.


7 Ibid.


14 The Times of London, September 16, 1937.

15 Kilson, op. cit., p. 24.

16 See Lugard, The Dual Mandate, p. 198, and especially Chapters X and XI.


20 Crowder, West Africa, Chapters 1, 3 and 4, and Elias, op. cit., pp. 24, et seq. (especially Chapter 3).

21 Crowder, West Africa, p. 220.


23 Ibid., and Crowder, West Africa, Chapters 1, 3 and 4.


25 Ibid.


27 Many definitions of assimilation were used: 1) assimilation as the dominant colonial policy of France; 2) assimilation as the policy abandoned in favor of association; 3) assimilation as opposed to autonomy, i.e., integration versus devolution; 4) assimilation as a legalistic definition, i.e., representation in the mother country's parliaments; 5) assimilation as civilization; 6) assimilation as representing racial equality as against the British tendency to the color bar; 7) assimilation as a highly centralized form of direct rule of colonies. (Lewis, op. cit., pp. 129-153)


CHAPTER IV

THE INFLUENCE OF COLONIAL POLICIES ON THE FORMATION OF THE MILITARY AND THE TRADE UNIONS

Section 1

Military Formation: Introduction

The development of military forces in West Africa was essentially a concomitant of the extension of British and French Imperial rule. Contingents of West African troops were raised ad hoc to meet particular needs, especially after the Berlin West African Conference of 1884-1885 stipulated that an area must be occupied before claims could be made and recognized by the conferees. Immediately following this conference, rapid expansion into the West African hinterland necessitated additional manpower. Contingents of African troops were recruited and used as a fighting and conquering force against African resistance and opposition to the establishment of European rule. Subsequently, these African recruits were consolidated and regularized into official regional formations.

For the Imperial power, establishing political control would not have been practicable without locally recruited soldiers. This was certainly true of French West and Equatorial Africa, which was acquired by the deployment of a relatively small number of African soldiers under French officers. It is a commonly held thesis among scholars of French colonial history that, "Sans les tirailleurs, nous n'aurions pas eu d'empire africain." The French historian Cultru adds, "Le pays n'aurait pas supporté les dépenses enormes et
Although she used African troops less extensively than did the French, Britain did employ native soldiers to establish her occupation and the institutionalization of indirect rule in West, East and Central Africa. A typical example was the expeditions of Lord Lugard, who overcame resistance in Nigeria with a contingent of African troops.

Although there were differences between French and British military formations, largely due to divergent policies and practices, the initial effect was much the same. Military forces, whether composed of volunteers or conscripts, became a feature of West African life which affected the social, economic and political structure of society.

Generally, the motives of the European colonial powers for building and consolidating African armies were not directly connected with internal security problems but rather with external reasons and interests. These reasons and interests revolved around three principal motives: manpower resources, strategic mobility, and economic investments. First of all, the colonies seemed to provide a vast reserve of manpower which could be mobilized in case of war. In addition, the possession of colonies gave greater strategic mobility to the world powers by providing key political and military bases; thus, these installations had to be properly protected. The strategic advantages of the colonies played an important role in British military tactics. The French were not very concerned with routes to the East, particularly after the war in Indochina. In contrast, the
British for a long time continued to think of Africa in terms of routes to India and the Far East. In the discussions between British and French staff officers at Nairobi in 1950, the dominant theme, as enunciated especially by the British, was the protection of air routes across Africa. If either Britain or France was denied airspace in North Africa, the route from Takoradi to Entebbi via Kano and the South Sudan was considered very crucial, as it could be used as a supply route for bases in the Indian Ocean or farther East. Finally, all colonial powers were conscious of the need to defend their citizens' capital investments and any mineral rights which had so far been unexploited. Whereas the first two motives were of greater priority during the colonial period, the third became more important after independence and was (is) certainly more frequently quoted by writers on neo-imperialism as a reason for maintaining a military presence. In developing their force de frappe, the French were interested in protecting those minerals in Africa which were vital in the manufacture of atomic weapons.

The military structures which these considerations produced were naturally separated from local life. Armies in Africa were built up with the prime intention of using them in the national interests of the metropolitan powers. Any military concerns within the colonies themselves were of a secondary nature.

The Formation of Military Forces in British West Africa

In the early stages of implementing political control, Lord Lugard's efforts at establishing law and order in Northern Nigeria led directly to the creation of local military establishments.
called constabularies. The constabularies became the local British defense forces. In Nigeria, for example, the Lagos constabulary served in the Ashanti war of 1873-1874 under the leadership of Captain John Glover. In addition to the Lagos constabulary, there were the Royal Niger constabulary, which played a useful role in the Bida and Ilorin expeditions of 1897, and the Oil Rivers constabulary, which originated in the delta and was responsible primarily for the protection of commercial traffic on the Niger. Similar local military forces existed in the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone. These forces were raised at different times by local administrations or by the trading companies, which in many cases preceded British military forces.

In 1897, Joseph Chamberlain, then secretary of state for the British colonies, consolidated the constabularies in Nigeria, the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone into the West African Frontier Force (later the RWAFF). It was from this broader regional organization that the national armies of Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone were derived. The new regional force was based initially in Nigeria, partly because of the longstanding existence of the Nigerian constabularies and partly because of the threat of French rival territorial claims and the immediate availability of Lugard as first commander.  

During its initial years, the WAFF was used as the constabularies had largely been employed before—for expeditions to establish British rule on the frontiers of her African empire. WAFF regiments were used on expeditions against Bida, Kontagora, Yola, Bornu, Zaria, Kano, Sokoto and other areas of African resistance.
The WAFF was also used outside of British West Africa; in operations against the Germans in the Cameroun and Togoland during World War I and, twenty-five years later, against the Japanese in Burma. In these and other instances, African troops served Imperial needs, yet benefited from these experiences. Such overseas adventures revealed to the Africans the extent of political development in other imperially ruled territories. African troops were also able to observe the erosion of the myth of European invincibility by an Asian power, the Japanese. Upon their return, these African servicemen came to command respect from British colonial authorities in that they were often given significant status in subsequent political, social and economic development. The returning troops were given not only ready access to 'positions of trust' but also political influence.9

Two distinctive features of British policy had a particularly significant impact on military development in colonial West Africa. The first feature was the policy of indirect rule, under which traditional authority structures were recognized and used as intermediate agencies in colonial administration. Millions of Africans were 'administered' through traditional political structures by remarkably few Europeans and a minimum of organized force. Thus indirect rule decentralized responsibility for a substantial portion of the control function, in particular the maintenance of internal security. What little force was needed for internal security was concentrated on the Indian army and such mercenaries as the Brigade of Gurkhas. The second feature of British policy was that African
manpower was not mobilized for military service except in a crisis. During World War I, Britain used more than 10,000 African combatants and 10,000 porters in her campaign in German East Africa and, in World War II, she employed African troops outside of Africa. At the end of hostilities, however, there was rapid demobilization. Before and after these wars, Britain concentrated her efforts on maintaining reserves which could be rapidly mobilized into a colonial fighting force.10

The Formation of Military Forces in French West Africa

Like the British, the French developed the concept of defense on a regional basis. However, their distinctive approach to the problems of empire in the wider sense led to the creation of armed forces of an entirely different nature. Military development in French West Africa was influenced and shaped by three motives. First, France looked upon Black Africa as a source of military manpower for the defense of her position in Europe and other parts of the world. The first modern colonial force raised in French Black Africa was a unit of the tirailleurs senegaleis recruited by General Louis Faidherbe, Governor of Senegal.11 The tirailleurs senegaleis played an essential part in Faidherbe's Imperial strategy. Senegalese troops were used in the Napoleonic wars, in the Crimean War, in the assault on Madagascar in 1838, and against Mexico. Thirty thousand African troops were deployed in Algeria and 15,000 troops in French Indochina. African troops commanded by French officers provided the majority of the fighting force that subdued French West and Equatorial Africa.12 Second, France's African troops were used
Third, France used her African troops to supplement her own forces on the European battlefields. During World War I, a total of 181,000 African troops served in the French army. Thirty-one Senegalese battalions were on the Somme in 1917 and about ninety-two battalions were on the western front at the end of the war. In World War II, the 9th Colonial Infantry Division served as the First French Army in the Rhone campaign. France more than any other colonial power adopted a system of military service for her African population because of the distinct lack of Frenchmen available for use overseas. In addition, the need to offset Germany’s flourishing manpower, which became even more urgent after the Franco-Prussian War, intensified conscription in French West Africa. For example, French forces combined with her Black African army gave France an advantage in terms of manpower: 100,000 to 60,000 for the Germans. Consequently, the development of native troops responded to a vital need in the French colonial empire.

This valiant service permitted the creation of a stable and efficient colonial army which paralleled the structure of the colonial administration—namely, the centralization of control at Dakar and Brazzaville, the capitals of the two French federations (the AOF and the AEF). Given the policy of assimilation/association and the underlying assumption of a permanent Franco-African union, there was no reason for developing "territorial military establishments". The concept of developing embryonic 'national armies' was nonexistent, since the only legitimate 'nation' was France with its
overseas departments and territories, *une et indivisible.* Boundaries of military formation and political divisions coincided to meet military and political convenience. Thus, the French motives had a profound influence on African military formation and development.

**British Recruitment Policy and Military Structure**

All armies which have derived their present existence from a past incarnation, as were the African colonial forces, in most cases bear the marks of a clearly defined recruitment policy. British and French recruitment policies were based on ulterior political motives and sometimes reflected human prejudice on the part of the particular French or British agents. Both nations' authorities in Africa applied (until the 1950's) essentially a colonial criteria to the problem of recruitment.

There is no fundamental flaw in the generalization that, where there was any choice, British officers preferred the volunteer mercenary native soldier—especially if he happened to be both a Moslem and illiterate. The concept of martial races was not the prerogative of the British in India; nevertheless, the above concept was transferred to British colonial Africa. Men like Lord Lugard drew heavily on their Indian experiences to the extent of importing cadres of Indian noncommissioned officers and skilled tradesmen. In East and Central Africa, for example, army units were actually made up of Sikh volunteers, who remained in the area until as late as 1911. Paradoxically, the original 5th battalion of the King's African Riflemen was actually an Indian unit sent to help deal with a mutiny of Sudanese troops in Uganda in September 1897.
Influenced and molded by her Indian experience, Britain's recruitment policy in Africa fell into a rut: the concept of the warrior or martial race type, of whom ready loyalty to the Imperial command could be expected, was entrenched. The ideal soldier was supposed to be an illiterate, uncontaminated by a mission education, and from a remote area. In Africa, the preference of British officers for the simple Hausa or the good, solid, uneducated recruit was aptly stated by a seasoned KAR officer in 1953:

I went on a recruiting safari last month up in the northern province of Uganda. They're the best warriors, so it stands to reason that they make the best soldiers. Most of them can't add 2 and 2 together and can only sign their names with a thumb-print, but they make damn fine askari.18

Eventually, to meet the need for more skilled military personnel—such as commissioned officers and communications experts—this stereotype was occasionally modified, but always with reluctance. Basically, the British recruitment policy was based on the assumption that an upbringing in the wild hinterland would have inculcated both physical toughness and political unconsciousness, and that the bushman was more likely to make a good soldier than the towndweller. Such assumptions were deeply embedded in the British military psyche.19

Given the colonial situation, the British military attitude, and the particular use of these recruits, the preference for the warrior tribesmen from isolated regions seemed comprehensible within the British scheme. These warrior tribesmen had little in common with the coastal peoples and were capable of impartial and hostile action when serious internal security problems arose. Mainly for this reason, the British, like their French counterparts, seemed to prefer
the Moslem to the animist, the pagan, or the Christian convert. These colonial preferences carried dire consequences for the future pluralistic African states.

A brief examination of the effects of Britain's recruitment policy on the social structures of several West African colonies will substantiate the above generalizations.

**Nigeria**

The Nigerian battalions of the RWAFF were recruited largely from the Hausas. In 1950, almost eighty per cent of all infantry soldiers came from "Hausaland", the area north of the confluence of the Niger and Benue rivers, while almost all the clerks, drivers, educational personnel and other specialists came from the south (mainly Ibos). With the advent of a federated and eventually an independent Nigeria, the desirability of a conscious ethnic balance in the military became a 'three-sided' issue. The northern element actively promoted proportional regional representation because an imbalance favoring the southern region would almost inevitably result from educational or other specific restrictions. Ibos, like the then-Major Agviyi-Ironsi, argued strongly in favor of enlistment in accordance with educational qualifications, on the grounds that the federal public services of a united Nigeria should be filled by soldiers recruited on merit. The British, whose interests revolved around use of the military for her colonial needs, imposed a quota system which stipulated the following recruitment percentages: fifty per cent from the northern region and twenty-five percent from each of the two southern regions—the east and the west.
Safeguarding this regional imbalance tended to protect the interests of the North while at the same time serving the colonial purposes of Britain. This British 'balance' policy was readily open to twofold criticism: an artificial ethnic imbalance was not appropriate for a nation-state which ought to select federal public servants strictly on merit; and, in any case, there already existed a Hausa predominance in the army as a result of earlier recruitment bias.22

The Nigerian army at the time of independence reflected in its ranks all of Britain's colonial aspirations and characteristics. The majority of the infantry was from the north and middle belt, while the higher ranks, technical administrators and clerical appointees were often Ibos. Yorubas from the western region were underrepresented, probably because of a lack of enthusiasm for military service.

**Gold Coast**

In the Gold Coast, the British recruiting officers traditionally preferred the northern illiterate, a Moslem who came from a French-administered tribal area. As a consequence, four years after independence, sixty per cent of Ghana's soldiers were from the northern regions, in spite of their sparse population, while the officer corps was composed mainly of southerners.

**Sierra Leone**

The declared British objective in Sierra Leone was a tribal balance in the interest of stability.23 But, as in Ghana, there was never a fixed quota. As a matter of convenience, most recruits were
found in Mende country but an effort was made to keep Mende strength down to about forty per cent of the total. An 'unusual' feature of this particular situation was that most Mende recruits had some secondary education. Nevertheless, Britain's policy of avoiding the recruitment of too many sophisticated individuals into the security services took precedence over Sierra Leone's army structure. The effects of this system compounded and complicated the intense rivalry between the Mende and the Temne by contributing to a virulent situation in the political arena and the sub-units of the military.  

The above problem reflects the situation in Nigeria, but on a smaller scale. Since one of the major functions of the military establishment was to suppress internal uprisings and disturbances, it was more prudent to recruit military personnel from the more politically quiescent, less nationalistic groups or areas.

Although British recruitment policy in the above three colonies considered a tribal balance, nevertheless the outcome usually favored the uneducated, traditionalist northern areas. The outgrowth of this policy was internal rivalry and friction between the northern elements and the educated officers and NCO's of the southern region. This rivalry crept into the political arena as the military displaced civilian leaders in many African states.

**French Recruitment Policy and Military Structure**

With regard to the Francophone countries of West Africa, it is more difficult to be precise about the effects of Imperial recruitment policy, largely because the identification of particular units with particular territories was rare. On the whole, the fact
that African soldiers were essentially absorbed into the French army tended to minimize the importance of earlier recruitment policy. Nevertheless it is important to bear in mind that *ad hoc* decisions based on imperial expediency inevitably established a structure which new leaders of independent African states were preforced to adopt.

The fundamental difference between the French and British recruitment policies is that the French system relied predominantly on conscripts rather than volunteers. The conscription system was based upon the active cooperation of the native chiefs and was open to much abuse, since the chiefs often resorted to tyrannical methods to impress their young subjects into French service. In 1885, France's need for more troops to establish her colonial administrations resulted in further abuses. It was now decided that not only could *chefs de service administratif* receive voluntary enlistments, but they could also authorize agents to go into the interior to pay the necessary *primes* for recruits. This system worked well because it left the responsibilities of recruiting to the chiefs, thereby absolving France of charges of direct interference with native life and customs. Yet conscription and the intensive searches for 'volunteers' helped to put the armed forces in an opprobrious role and contributed to the development of a long-lasting animosity towards the military. The numerous punitive expeditions and the behavior of brutal and licentious soldiery attributed to the French created an unpropitious image. In the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey and Guinea, there was occasional disaffection among isolated
tribes because the activities of recruiting officers were equated with those of slave traders, who sought the best human specimens available. On the frequent French forays into these areas, recruiters encountered strong opposition or deserted villages. There were numerous cases of able-bodied males fleeing to the Gold Coast and Nigeria in order to avoid conscription. In 1917 in the Forest Zone of the Ivory Coast, for example, some of the Agni of Assinie fled to the Gold Coast rather than be put under pressure to enlist. The Fouta of Djallon in Guinea were strongly opposed to conscription on the grounds that they were warriors, not tirailleurs. Such experiences encouraged the French to concentrate their efforts in the Sara country of Central Africa, where large numbers of Moslem recruits were found. There were cases of French officers deliberately encouraging the spread of Islam on the grounds that its adherents made more reliable soldiers and that the superior nature of the religion made its believers more susceptible to the absorption of Gallic culture.

However, French African recruits found themselves in better political situations and received better benefits than did their British counterparts. Widespread conscription, which was instituted in 1912, generated political consequences in that French reliance on African troops was continually used as bargaining chips to secure concessions with regard to citizenship and the franchise. During the First World War, the French need for large-scale recruitment enabled Blaise Diagne (Senegal's first African deputy and Under-secretary of State for Colonies) to secure legal confirmation of
the citizenship rights of African soldiers while preserving their personal civil status. The right to vote was guaranteed by the law of September 29, 1916, at the price of cooperation with the French Government in recruiting 181,000 French West African soldiers to fight on the Western Front. In 1939 the intensified recruitment was coupled with the granting of the right to vote for colonial councillors. In local politics, the effects of enfranchisement, which was granted in 1946 to all who had completed military service, was significant. In 1949, fifty per cent of the 54,000 electorate in Dahomey were ex-servicemen or serving soldiers. This political bargaining power could be readily put to use in the French scheme of une et indivisible: since assimilation/association meant that independence was not a legitimate political objective, military agitation was directed toward the achievement of equality within the system. Therefore, the French were particularly responsive to pressure from African veterans and armed services members for greater equality. When grievances arose in 1948, a commission headed by Commandant Henri Ligier was sent to West Africa to appraise and resolve veterans' problems and grievances. These grievances involved discrimination between French metropolitan and overseas soldiers and veterans—both of whom belonged essentially to the same army—with respect to conditions of service, treatment on discharge, and inadequate systems of compensation and pensions. A metropolitan soldier serving in French West Africa, for example cost a total of 111 francs a day to maintain, in contrast to 57 francs for an African soldier. There were other signs of discriminatory attitudes
involving obligation to salute/conduct and mess hall privileges. Most important, the French Government was accused of deliberately setting up obstacles to Africanization of the officer ranks.\textsuperscript{30}

The Ligler Commission resulted in the establishment of offices to deal with veterans' affairs and grievances. As a result of this commission, African soldiers received many rights and privileges. Wounded ex-servicemen were exempted from the poll tax, and, in some regions, veterans' club houses and residential homes in a semi-military environment were built for their rehabilitation. In certain services of the overseas administration, twenty per cent of all jobs were reserved for discharged soldiers, who were granted such privileges as low-cost housing. Moreover, a decree of November 18, 1947, which established pay scales according to duties and assignments, was duly enforced, thereby removing the longstanding pay differentials between metropolitan and colonial troops. Steps were also taken to accelerate Africanization of the officer corps.

However, these privileges combined to isolate the military from the rest of the community in a way which made adaptation to the needs of post-independence society more difficult. The situation was aggravated by prearranged military aid before independence. The French Government was prepared to pay full rates to all officers serving in Africa after independence, whereas Britain encouraged a system by which new states engaged expatriate officers on contract. Nevertheless, it meant that, whatever the system, African rates of pay remained comparable to that of their European counterparts, at least until after independence.\textsuperscript{31} This exceptionally close
identification of the military elements with the imperial power in terms of recruitment, structure and pay was not psychologically the best preparation for political freedom; and it accounted in part for the military's impotent role in the nationalist movement and the post-independence period.

Early Africanization Attempts

Although African soldiers had rendered distinguished service to the British and French in the two world wars and other major crises, little consideration was given at that time to the possibility of commissioning officers from the ranks. In British colonial West Africa, a few Africans had achieved noncommissioned platoon commander status but only one, a Ghanaian, had achieved officer status. Using her Indian experiences as a gauge, Britain began to accelerate the Africanization or localization of officers only after the political demands for independence arose.

The influence of assimilation/association and the French 'acceptance' of African soldiers as full fledged citizens facilitated a somewhat different approach to Africanization. However, this did not mean complete Africanization at an early stage; as of 1948, Africans accounted for only two per cent of the officer corps. Both Britain and France believed that the key to a good native army was the standards maintained by the NCO's. Both countries expended considerable energy in making sure that suitable recruits came from recognized army families. For example, at key barracks towns, the French military maintained six schools designed primarily for the children of servicemen. The British arrangement
was more ad hoc. Some battalions maintained their own schools if they had educated officers to spare. Boys' companies were also maintained by these battalions, from which suitable recruits were chosen to enter the main unit of the army. The basic principle of both British and French policies was to encourage the sons of existing noncommissioned officers to follow in their fathers' footsteps.34

The essential difference between the French and British approaches to Africanization of the officer corps occurred in 1955-1956. The French began to solve the Africanization problem on a massive scale by instituting preparatory military schools in West Africa and an African officer training school, L'Ecole General Leclerc, in Chad. By 1960, there was a large number of African officers. In contrast to France's rapid Africanization, Britain proceeded very slowly and required higher initial standards of education and basic training, making no attempt to accept candidates for officer training on any other basis. The 'martial races' notion was suspended, especially in the British sphere, by the need to appoint African officers who were on the same or nearly the same educational level as the European expatriates. The officers were drawn mainly from the Europeanized educated elite, which led to an inherent inconsistency in the British approach to the composition of the Nigerian (as well as Ghanaian and Sierra Leonian) defense forces. For Nigeria, this meant that the officers would be predominantly Ibos, since they composed the majority of the educated elite, and that recruits and noncommissioned officers would be predominantly the 'uneducated' Hausas of the north. By 1960, three-fourths of all Nigerian
officers were Ibos, while the infantry was composed mainly of Hausas and recruits from the middle belt. The optimism held by British officers and administrators, who assumed that military ranks of essentially tribal composition would politically neutralize the army of Independent Nigeria, proved to be disastrously erroneous—as evidenced by two coups and a civil war. The combination of a tribally biased group of senior officers within a federal administration with a minister of defense who was essentially affiliated with the north inhibited the Africanization of senior posts, shortened the available time for the development of a professional ethos, and generally contributed to the breakup of Nigeria in 1966-1967.35

Comparison and Summary

At the level of imperial strategy, African territory and manpower were of greater consequence to France than to Britain, whose field of imperial soldiery was only marginally in Africa. This, in turn, had a profound impact on the types of military institutions developed by the imperialist powers. Britain delegated more authority and control to local governments in the elaboration of military policy; this coincided with her doctrine of territorial self-sufficiency and provided a firm foundation for the creation of national armed forces. France saw things differently: she did not localize military institutions and continued, until independence, to organize African manpower at the regional level. Essentially, African territories provided a vital supplement to the global military resources of the French empire through the mobilization of African forces for service at home and abroad. As Crocker hypothe-
sizes, "France saw in Africa a powerful military asset; Britain was unsure whether its African domain was an asset or a liability in Imperial defense." France considered itself an African power and thus placed emphasis on the Euro-African strategic core. According to French military thinking, the manpower and resources of her African possessions made her unrivaled in Europe. Britain considered African manpower as a buttress to her positions in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East areas in order to ensure the integrity of communications to the Indian Ocean and the Far East. The naval importance of Freetown, Capetown and Mombasa depended on circumstances in Asia. The permanence of France's African army resembled the permanence of Britain's Indian army.

Section 2

Formation of Trade Unions: Overview

Two factors were responsible for the formation of African trade unions and conditioned their later development—the economic situation and political dependence. The economic situation was closely tied to the level of economic and Industrial development, while political dependence was closely associated with external influences of the metropolitan powers.

If only special economic or social factors were to be considered in the development of African trade unionism, it becomes obvious that the physical difficulties of economic development created a climate unfavorable to trade union growth. Africa was without industries and dependent mainly on agricultural production. Thus, as a continent, she did not offer material conditions favorable to the
blossoming and strengthening of a trade union movement. However, where major physical difficulties were at a minimum, centers of trade unionism developed in many cases, similar to the classical models of European trade unions.

Hustling Laborers and the Formation of the Wage Earning Class

Numerous physical difficulties faced potential entrepreneurs in early Africa: a great deal of African territory, especially the hinterland, was closed off to Europeans because of disease and debilitating tropical climates; except for human bearers, transportation inland was almost impossible. 37 Given such conditions, it is not surprising that economic development, for the most part, began in accessible coastal areas and in the cooler regions of southern Africa. A chart entitled "Pioneer African Trade Unions" by Orr revealed that all unions appearing before 1900 were located either in North or South Africa and that they were almost exclusively unions of European workers. 38 The coastal regions were deficient in cheap and accessible labor; moreover, this manpower did not present itself voluntarily because of early dislocations and hostilities engendered by the slave trade, military expeditions and recruitment, and because of the prevalence of a subsistence economy throughout Africa and Africans' resistance to wage earning. It therefore became necessary to coerce workers into these areas, as labor power was needed for road building, ship loading, railroad and port construction, and plantations.

An important characteristic of the African subsistence economy was a relatively limited set of wants. In their efforts to
push Africans out of the villages and into paid employment, the Europeans used several avenues of attack to create additional or unlimited wants. One gentle but effective method was the imposition of a set of taxes which had to be paid in cash. This meant that an African had to provide some commodity which could be exchanged for cash or be forced to work within the money economy long enough to earn the tax money. Thus, many Africans were forced to migrate and offer themselves at the labor market in order to pay the tax for themselves and their families. Yet additional limitations and inducements were needed to further coax or force Africans into the money economy. The colonial power sent out labor recruiters, who offered blankets, clothing, knives, guns, and agricultural implements as 'target' acquisitions towards which the Africans could work. With their appetites sufficiently stimulated, these 'target workers' would migrate from their remote homelands to the coast, the mines, or the farms of Europeans in order to pay for their target goods.

In the French areas, however, money taxes and target workers were not the basic instruments for attracting manpower. The French resorted to different varieties of compulsory labor. The colonial administration imposed upon all able-bodied African males the obligation to work a fixed number of days (15) annually on public works. The definition of 'public works' was very elastic, so requisitions were frequently used to help out private employers who were short of labor. These labor dues (prestations) provided much of the work force in the early colonial years. Similar to their military policy of allowing chiefs to recruit manpower, the French made
arrangements with the tribal chiefs to indenture some of their tribesmen for prestations. Forced labor was extensive in many of the colonial territories. In Upper Volta, with a population of some 2½ to 3 million, the French administration took over 190,000 men in forced-labor drafts during the decade from 1920 to 1930. These practices and schemes had by 1920 resulted in a well-developed migratory labor force.

The British developed piecemeal a system of forced labor which was introduced into West Africa by the administration itself. In Nigeria, for example, after various unsuccessful attempts to recruit labor for new schemes in crop cultivation and the public services, Lord Lugard decided to use force on the grounds that, "among primitive tribes, a measure of forced labor through their tribal chiefs is justifiable as an educative process to remove fear and suspicion." Where directly forced labor failed, the poll or hut tax succeeded. With the impact of taxation, compulsory labor, and other aspects of colonial rule, the fabric of traditional society was torn. New products and fresh ideas penetrated the bush and made their way into the villages. As new goods and ideas became available, the Africans' wants increased. Money income became the medium for exchange and trade and was now used to buy brides, food, goods and other needs. Expanded demands for consumer goods, coupled with the need for cash incomes to pay taxes and buy wives, led to a continually widening gap between the needs of many Africans and their village incomes. To satisfy these needs, increasing numbers of men
migrated to towns and other areas to be hired as wage earners. This constant migration created urban concentrations of deracinated Africans who eventually became permanent urban dwellers. By the late 1920's, the urban dwellers became a true wage earning class fairly well integrated into the money economy.

**Formation of Workers' Organizations, Associations and Trade Unions**

Parallel to the growth of the Black wage earning class was the development of European trade unions in Africa. Workers had to fight many bloody battles for the right to establish trade unions. One method employed by the colonial governments to prevent Europeans from establishing effective unions or striking successfully was the use of Africans, and later Indians and Chinese, as strikebreakers. Imported by the colonial governments and major businesses to operate new factories, mines and railways, and to serve as government civil servants, the Europeans resented the African strikebreakers. This climate of distrust and resentment resulted in part in separate unions, which in many cases were oppressed by the authorities.

In areas with large concentrations of Europeans, African unions were harshly suppressed. Aside from other obstacles to African organization, the legal environment was hardly such as to encourage new forms of voluntary association among African wage earners. Relations between workers and employers were governed by harsh master-servant laws in many territories and, in most of the continent, work stoppages by Africans could be legally treated as 'desertion' and strikers jailed. However, in areas with small European populations, such as British West Africa, workers' organizations were allowed to
form for several reasons: 1) there were no large concentrations of European workers; 2) small scale commerce, industry and agriculture predominated so the largest employer, apart from the mineowners, was the government; and 3) the peoples of West Africa had a long, rich tradition of craft and trade guilds, market associations and funeral benefit societies. With the rise of a new class of wage earners, the workers formed associations which eventually evolved into trade unions. According to Cardinalli, voluntary associations were nothing new in West Africa. He speculated that associations and cooperation were ideas as indigenous to the Gold Coast native as to the burgher class in medieval Europe. Little asserted that the Poro Societies of Sierra Leone were probably even more ancient and were living examples of an elaborate form of traditional associations. These African associations, which had begun as tribal unions and mutual benefit societies, collected small fees for such services as burial rites, housing provisions and savings institutions. Although small and ineffective, 'association-unions' were formed in the Old Lagos Colony in 1905, an African civil servants' union in the Southern Nigerian Protectorate in 1905, and an artisans' union in the Gold Coast in 1920. Similar unions were formed in Sierra Leone in 1912. These 'association-trade unions' were multi-purpose organizations in that they attempted to meet the whole range of workers' needs rather than seek to copy contemporary western European models. For example, one of the aims of the Iwo Carpenters' Union in western Nigeria was "to make merriment with each other in joy, and to sympathize with those in sorrow."
Although these were the first distinctly permanent African trade unions, the workers at first did not differentiate between trade unions, friendly societies, or insurance societies. However, the constriction of the labor market during the Great Depression caused a change in the nature of these nascent unions. African unions began to assume many of the duties normally associated with a trade union, such as grievance procedures and job security. As previously mentioned, the principal employer in areas not heavily settled by whites was the colonial government; as a result, union demands took on strongly political overtones. Moreover, workers' unions represented potential political opposition, dangerous to the established order. In fact, labor protests during this period did tend to take the form of sporadic eruptions of African frustrations, the suppression of which usually involved violence and bloodshed. Nevertheless, by the early 1930's, African unionism had crystallized into a fairly rigid structure.

The period from 1930 to 1950 was a crucial one for African trade union development. Twenty-seven new unions were registered in Ghana within two years. In Nigeria, twenty-four new unions were registered in the same period. An immediate cause of new labor organizations was the rise in food prices, which became a source of discontent. Industrial unrest overflowed into the political movement of the period, and the unions provided political leaders with an instrument of 'positive action' which politicians were far from reluctant to use. The period from 1946 to 1950 was one of unrest and also of experiment in labor relations; the political and industrial objectives
of the workers were not clearly delineated. The unrest may be illustrated by the official record of strikes from 1939 to 1954.

TABLE 1

STATISTICS ON STRIKES, 1939-1953*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Sierra Leone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of Strikes</td>
<td>No. of Workers Involved</td>
<td>No. of Strikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3,338</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5,292</td>
<td>4,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3,927</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,533</td>
<td>5,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16,871</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7,468</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>17,416</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7,650</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31,987</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>6,930</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>11,835</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>9,990</td>
<td>4,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As indicated in Table 1, in 1949, 54 strikes occurred in Ghana involving nearly 40,000 workers and 46 occurred in Nigeria affecting 50,000 workers. These strikes and unrest prompted the colonial powers, especially Britain, to embark on a new policy towards African unions. The main concern of the colonial powers was that African trade unionism, if allowed to continue confusing economic exploitation with political domination, could lead to serious problems and danger in the form of nationalist demands. To counter the possibilities of such danger, several apparently different colonial policies were adopted throughout Africa: the first policy involved an
attitude of uncompromising resistance to the formation of African trade unions; a second policy was to work for the growth of trade unionism, the better to control it. Between these two extremes, a third policy evolved, that of allowing the right to associate when protests and demands had reached a certain pitch. 52

When describing the formation and growth of African trade unions, however, one is confronted with the difficulties of separating those elements which are typically African from those which are the result of external influences. This is especially difficult when one examines the formation of trade unions in British colonial West Africa. The relative importance of these two influences is of great significance in delineating the roles and functions of trade unions in the nationalist movement. If the African unions were offshoots of British unions in terms of formation, then, as Berg and Butler imply, their influence during the movement towards independence was minor. 53 But if their formation was due to conditions innate within the environment and to colonial repression, then the mere fact of their formation was of great significance to the nationalist struggle.

That there was a spontaneous desire on the part of many African workers to amalgamate to improve their working conditions, as Hodgkin claims, is undeniable. 54 Roper speculates that, because of the dramatic trading expansion in West Africa (1900-14), 55 new labor regulations were needed and new kinds of associations for the wage earning employees...the trade unions arose spontaneously to deal with this situation. The first organization of manual workers in
West Africa of which records can be found is the Railway Workers' Union of Sierra Leone, founded in 1919. Later, during the Depression, falling wages and employment provoked other workers to form trade unions. For instance, Sierra Leone's workers' unions were formed in 1929; the motor drivers of Ashanti formed a union in 1931. Transport and dock workers formed unions which met genuine industrial needs in several other territories. However, union expansion from these rather isolated examples into militant and integrated national trade unions was partly a result of forces which were external to Africa; this was especially true in French colonial Africa. In addition, working in close proximity to European workers influenced many African union leaders to adopt or attempt to adopt some of the European trade unions' principles and tactics.

Formation and Development of Trade Unions Under British Policy

Before 1940

The British policy towards the formation of trade unions in colonial Africa, especially before 1940, could be characterized as one of repression. Although a few individuals in the British Government made attempts to aid the growth of unionism, economic conditions and the government bureaucracy stifled any progress in this direction. On September 17, 1930, Sidney Webb (Lord Passfield), Secretary of State for the Colonies, sent directives to the colonial governors concerning the formation of trade unions. In essence, these directives stated that, since economic and social advances had created a situation favorable to trade unionism, government machinery should be set up to assist local improvements in industrial relations.
spite of Lord Passfield's dispatch, no progress was made in trade union growth. Shortly after this dispatch was issued, an austerity budget was imposed, forcing the closing of three colonial departments that dealt with labor. None of the other departments was prepared to establish the necessary machinery for supervision of labor conditions. 59

Before 1940, attempts by African workers to organize themselves into trade unions and to conduct struggles to back up their demands were regarded by the colonial government as forms of conspiracy or revolt and were thus crushed by brute force. British methods and tactics achieved their desired goal: union leaders and organizers were jailed or exiled and many unions collapsed due to a sudden loss of worker support. According to James Griffiths, Secretary of State for the Colonies, there were only three registered trade unions in all colonial territories in the 1930's. 60

Table 1 shows that strikes, protests and other acts of disruption continued the protracted battle for the right to form unions. It is interesting that this battle began in 1919 with the railway strike in Sierra Leone, where the first recorded strike in African history occurred in 1874. More railway strikes followed in 1921 in Nigeria and again in Sierra Leone in 1926. The 1926 strike was a catalyst in the formation of the Sierra Leone Railwaymen's Union. A list of demands drawn up by this union and presented to the European manager of the railways culminated in the dismissal of union leaders and the suppression of the strike. Similar but more hostile action was taken against the Aristan mineworkers of the Gold Coast in
September 1930, the mineworkers went on strike to protest the company's proposal to introduce a quarterly rather than monthly system of wage payments. The European managers and their staffs formed a vigilante squad and marched on the village of the African miners. Without warning, the armed squad fired into the crowd of miners and their families, killing five and wounding ten. Other acts of repression occurred in Uganda (1929), Kenya (1921–22) and Northern Rhodesia (1935). The local authorities and the Colonial Office in London justified this brutal action as a necessity against 'sedition'.

Although this pattern of repression continued throughout the inter-war period, the British were not always able to prevent African workers from winning partial victories. For example, the seamen in Bathurst, Gambia, struck for sixty-two days, from November to December 1929, reinforced by a general strike lasting twenty days. Despite an armed police raid on the workers—resulting in forty-one wounded, the colonial authorities were compelled to concede a wage increase, to give a guarantee of no reprisals and, above all, to grant recognition to the seamen's union. Similar victories were won by Nigerian mechanics' unions and the civil servants' and railway workers' unions in Ghana, which gained government recognition and defeated an attempt to lower their members' wages.

The evolution of the associations into trade unions presented the British Government with many problems because these nascent unions' demands involved not only economic but also political considerations. In part, it was demands like those enumerated above which shaped British trade union policy before 1940. During this
period, Britain did not foresee independent governments in Black Africa, so she tried to discourage political situations which could lead to demands for independence.

**After 1940**

During the early stages of World War II, there was a dramatic shift in British trade union policy: the attitude changed from one of suppression to one of cooperation and encouragement. This shift in policy was recommended by the Forster and Moyne Commissions of 1938-39, which were authorized by the British Government to formulate policy alternatives following the deluge of protests and strikes in West Africa and large-scale demonstrations in the West Indies. The commissions advised the setting up of government-controlled insipid 'trade unions' which would cooperate with employers and the government in destroying the genuine militant labor unions. Thus, the ineffective directives of Lord Passfield were followed in 1940 by the Colonial Development Act. This act stipulated that, "when a territory requests grants for certain development plans, the colonial secretary of state should ensure that the territory has made adequate provisions in its legislation for guaranteeing the establishment and functioning of trade unions." Shortly thereafter, the British established technical aid programs that sent BTUC personnel as advisors to the young African trade unions. This new British policy fostered the introduction of legislation in each colony to make trade unions legal. Trade union ordinances were introduced in Nigeria (1939), Sierra Leone (1940) and the Gold Coast (1941).

What were the motives behind this change in policy? Did
the British Government spontaneously accept and prepare the way for trade union development or, on the other hand, was the right of association granted only because of the pressure of workers' demands? If the first motive is considered accurate, then there were no fundamental differences between the French and British attitudes in the formation of trade unions. However, if the second motive is accepted, then trade unions in British West Africa were not appendages of the STUC and metropolitan government, as were the French unions.

The most widely held theory, spread mainly by the British Colonial Office and the Fabian Society, claimed that trade unionism in British colonial Africa was not the result of African efforts but the fruits of British generosity. These arguments were expressed by historians like Walter Bowen, who alleged that:

An important difference between the development of trade unions in colonial territories and in this country is that the colonial unions have not had to sustain a long and sometimes bitter struggle to secure their legal rights.65

In analogical fashion Luyt argued:

African workers are cutting-in on the trade union progression at an intermediate stage, a stage reached by long years of struggle and sacrifice of which they know nothing...66

Similarly, the Fitzgerald Commission declared:

We would not be failing in our duty if we did not speak to the members of the trade union of Nigeria with brutal frankness. We would first remind them that most of the things which are now regarded as the inalienable right of the workers have only been gained after a century of struggle by their fellow workers in the United Kingdom. The Nigerian worker should therefore consider himself fortunate that he is not faced with a similar struggle and that those hard won rights are available to him today if he chooses to act with reason.67
The second case is argued by Roper, Hodgkins, Woddis, Davies and others who questioned the so-called generosity and spontaneity of British colonial policy towards the formation of trade unions. To support his theory, Woddis delineated the earlier workers' demonstrations, strikes, and resultant killings before 1940. He saw a change in British policy after 1940 as a concession to African workers, brought about by the growing influence of workers' organizations. Woddis concluded that the creation of technical programs and the nomination of trade union advisers represented an attempt to control the inevitable growth of trade unionism and not a disinterested effort to create an atmosphere of good industrial relations.

Facts show that both sides tend to overstate their case. The evidence does suggest that the tendency of African wage earners to form trade unions for the purpose of maintaining or improving working conditions was operational in British and French Africa well before trade unionism began to receive encouragement and help from the colonial powers. However, it is also true that union development has been nurtured in a variety of ways by outside influences: the appointment of trade union officers by the British Colonial Office; the establishment in French Africa of the inspection du Travail; the assistance of metropolitan trade union bodies—the CGT, CFTC and FO in French Africa and the BTUC in British Africa; the encouragement and propaganda of international trade union centers, the WFTU and the ICFTU. Contacts between the African and metropolitan trade union leaders—through reciprocal visits, missions, conferences, special courses in training and observation—certainly helped African trade
unionists to gain an insight into techniques of organization, bar-
gaining and negotiation. However, British West African trade unions
were not mere appendages of the BTUC, even though they were strongly
influenced by this organization and the British Government.

Formation and Development of Trade Unions Under French Policy

Analogous to the formation of associations and trade unions
in British West Africa, the growth of industry and wage labor led to
similar nascent associations in French West Africa. African workers
began to grope towards collective expression and collective action
for job protection. As early as 1918, this took the form of mutual
aid societies, known as amicales. Occasionally these associations
initiated labor protests at Cotonou, at Abidjan and elsewhere. However, these associations did not evolve into trade unions, as was
the case in British West Africa.

Several factors stimulated the trade union movement in
French West Africa: 1) the increased economic activity stimulated
the growth and development of a small but significant proletariat;
2) the new urban agglomeration acted as poles of attraction for wage
earners and provided places where relatively large numbers of workers
could be in close proximity with each other; and 3) there existed
potential leadership for the trade unions in the French-educated
elite, mainly clerks and civil servants who generally had only narrow
avenues of economic advancement open to them.

The French colonial policy towards the formation and deve-
lopment of trade unions was one of containment—trying in various
ways to keep trade unionism in check. The initial push for trade
unions in the French colonies came as a response to the Popular Front victory in 1936, and the sit-down strikes which accompanied this struggle. On March 11, 1937, the Popular Front government issued a decree which gave legal birth to the trade union movement. A few trade unions were formed as a result of the Peoples' Front agitation. In 1937, for example, railway workers in Dahomey were organized into the Confederation Francaise des Travailleurs Chretiens (CFTC) and the rail workers of the Ivory Coast into the CGT. African civil servants and clerical workers started unions in Bamako and Dakar. However, these government regulations were too restrictive to foster the widespread growth of unions. In comparison with the British trade union ordinances, which required registration and financial accounting of all African labor organizations, the French trade union decree required that union members be literate in French and have the equivalent of an elementary school diploma, and that unions must not discuss political matters. On August 7, 1944, another Popular Front government decree abolished literacy requirements for membership in unions, thus making it legal for all African workers to organize. Educated clerks and civil servants then took the lead in the setting-up of trade unions.

The French policy of direct rule, which involved representation of expatriates in the French assembly in Paris, prompted the major French trade unions to begin the 1945-56 scramble for union membership overseas. The three major unions—CGT, CFTC and FO—which were affiliated with the major political parties and factions in the French assembly, readily sent paid organizers to Africa to
create labor organizations among the expatriate French workers. Later, with the adoption of the policy of association and the granting of large-scale African representation in the French assembly, these trade unions began to recruit African members. By the end of 1946, there were 175 registered unions in French West Africa; by 1956, there were 500.\textsuperscript{73}

Since these local African unions were formed under the aegis of the CGT, CFTC and FO and were administered by officials from the metropolitan offices, they took on the political colorations of the metropolitan unions. The political turmoil rampant in France during the inter-war period and the heightened class struggle were reflected in the political development of French African unionism. Thus, local African members were drawn into the quarrels and rivalries which the European unions brought with them.

**Union Membership, Structure, Leadership and Collective Bargaining**

**Membership**

The extremely low level of industrialization in colonial Africa implied a relatively small labor force in relation to the total population. The potential organizable wage earning force was even smaller, being concentrated in mining, transport services, commerce and the public services. Hodgkin estimated that not more than five per cent of the total population in tropical Africa belonged to the wage earning group. Of this small percentage, less than half of the wage earners were organized into trade unions.\textsuperscript{74}
TABLE 2
TRADE UNION STATISTICS*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Number of Wage Earners</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Population</th>
<th>Number of Trade Unionists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French West Africa</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Equatorial Africa</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Camerouns</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria-British Cameroons</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold Coast</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (New York, 1957), p. 188.

Even among these wage earners, the stable regular workers composed only a small proportion. In the French West African territories, for example, only half the wage earners could be classified as belonging to the permanent labor force. The rest were either migrant or seasonal workers for whom wages were neither the sole nor, in many cases, the main source of income. The skilled workers, who composed about a third of the wage earners, were found mainly in transport, commerce and public service. 75

The most striking feature of union membership was/is the predominance of government employees and transport workers, reflecting the fact that the colonial governments were the largest employers. In virtually the entire colonial area, the railways, buildings, road construction and maintenance, other public works (especially in the British areas) and public services (which included the civil service, schools, mail, electricity, water, gas, ports, communications, aviation, marketing and plantations) were government-owned or operated. In French West Africa, for example, the colonial government employed
about one-third of the wage earners, while in Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Gambia, the British colonial government employed at least half of the wage earners. It is not remarkable, then, to find government workers predominant in trade unions. In French West Africa, for example, about half of the government employees were trade union members and they were thus able to exercise influence far out of proportion to their numbers.

The dominance of government employees and transport workers composed another interesting feature of trade unionism in West Africa. It was these two groups which led the way in union organization. The transport workers were the first to organize trade unions in at least ten territories. In Dahomey, the Ivory Coast and other French West African territories, the railway workers, which were among the strongest of the transport workers, were the first to organize unions. In British West and East Africa, the dock workers and motor drivers were the first organizers. To create larger and better organized unions, transport workers joined together into national transport workers' unions, especially in the British areas. The growth and development of transport unions paralleled that of government employees' unions. Government employees' unions were the first to appear in Lagos Colony, Southern Nigeria Protectorate, Sierra Leone and Senegal. In French West Africa, sixty per cent of the total union membership was government workers and over half of the remaining forty per cent belonged to white collar fields. The same held true for British territories, where most of the workers were clerical staff of the government or private business establishments. Moreover, transport and government
workers have in several states continued to dominate the union movement up to the present.

**Structure**

The influence of the mother countries on the structural forms adopted by African unions was considerable. As previously mentioned, the BTUC was reluctant to extend its activities to Africa because the leadership did not want to impose a union model that was developed from circumstances and conditions peculiar to Britain. However, at the encouragement of the colonial secretary, the BTUC agreed to send officials to Africa as advisers and instructors. 77 Thus, similar to the British model, African trade unions were organized on a national or, more frequently, a factory basis, not affiliated with the BTUC. A small number of large unions catering to government employees existed side by side with a large number of small enterprise unions.

In British Africa, the basic unit became the 'house' or company-wide union. The trades union congresses, which existed at the top, were in all but a few cases relatively powerless bodies. They had little money, few full-time staff workers, and limited control over the constituent unions. Authority in the labor movement thus tended to be more decentralized than in French-speaking Africa. This decentralization of authority and fragmentation in terms of 'company unions' threatened the future growth of trade unionism in Ghana and Nigeria and resulted in very small unions. In 1953, for example, about half of the trade unions in the Gold Coast and more than half of those in Nigeria had less than 250 members. 78
TABLE 3
FRAGMENTATION OF TRADE UNIONS*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of Unions</td>
<td>No. of Unions</td>
<td>No. of Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 50</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 to 250</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250 to 1,000</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 to 5,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 5,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The presence of these small unions, which implies limited membership and financial strength, delayed the development of a national trade union movement. Such a movement was not organized until the zenith of nationalist demands heightened political awareness among unionists.

The pattern of union organization adopted in the French territories followed that developed in France, and the influence of the mother country was even greater than was the case in the British territories. French metropolitan unions took a more direct and active part in organizing and running African unions than did the BTUC, and cooperation between the memberships of the two areas was extremely close for a ten year period. In fact, from 1937 to 1944, the trade union organizations were extensions of those existing in France.

The basic unit structure of French West African trade unions was the syndicat professionnel or occupational union; the local union
consisted of workers in one trade or industry. In general, the local union was industrial in form and territorial in scope; for instance, a single construction workers' union encompassed all of Senegal. More specifically, all the local unions of CGT allegiance in a city were joined into a regional union. The **regionals centrals** composed the territorial federation, whose 'nationwide' (AOF) activities were coordinated in Dakar through a national federation. Until 1956, the territorial federations were joined with French central confederations in Paris and, through them, with an international labor organization—the CGT with the WFTU, the CFTC with the IFCTU, and FO with the ICFTU.

Since decisions were made in a territorial level, the territorial federations became the main organs of action and the holders of decision-making power in French West Africa. Although union structure was significant in terms of trade union development in West Africa, the infighting among the CGT, CFTC and FO concerning the acquisition of members in certain areas of employment influenced and at times overshadowed union structure. The CGT and CFTC recruited African workers from all areas of employment, while FO recruited mainly among European and African professional classes, such as civil servants and office workers. These disparities were noteworthy in that they revealed that these unions not only carried over their domestic quarrels into Africa but were also fighting for the different professional interests of the two races. The transposition of factional differences to such an underdeveloped continent was obviously aggravating. The example of the Camerouns showed the results of such factionalism and fragmentation. There were approximately 40,000 union members in 1949, so trade
unionism could have exerted considerable influence. Unfortunately, the membership was divided among several factions: the Confederation Generale du Travail Kamerunaise (CGTK) with 15,000; the Union des Syndicats Autonomes du Cameroun (USAC) with 8,000; the FO with 5,000; the Confederation Camerounaise des Travailleurs Croyants (CCTC) with 5,000; and several other independent unions with a total of 5,000. 81

Union Leadership

In many parts of the underdeveloped world, politically-inspired outsiders usually composed a major part of the trade union leadership. This, however, was not the case in colonial Africa; rather, the leadership rose from the ranks. This practice was fostered in British colonial Africa by legislation stipulating that union leaders must remain in employment and could not accept payment for their work in the union. This stipulation was intended, so it was claimed, to create a solid nucleus from among the rank and file. However, as Berg speculated, "It was the desire to avoid letting union leadership come under outside control."82 Although in French possessions a union official was allowed to continue receiving his former wage,83 the French relied heavily on the educated elite for leadership. Thus, union leadership was thrust upon government employees, who were more articulate, educated and experienced than most unionists. The government employee readily accepted the position of leadership because it offered him a channel for the achievement of personal ambitions, a power base, prestige, and ideological goals which had been blocked by Europeans.
Collective Bargaining

The type of trade union organization adopted dictated the manner in which economic negotiations were carried out. In the British controlled territories, collective agreements were theoretically the outcome of negotiations between autonomous trade unions and employers. There was a minimum of outside constraints on either party; each was free to settle, by the process of collective bargaining, on the best terms he could obtain. In a number of cases, however, the British Government assisted the parties in arriving at an agreement that satisfied the interests of all concerned, especially the government. 

In the French model, a collective agreement was primarily a method of supplementing the basic terms and conditions of employment laid down in a legal code—especially the Code du Travail des Territoires d'Outre-Mer (1952), which set aside procedure for settling collective disputes. Three stages were involved: 1) conciliation by a labor inspector; 2) mediation by an independent expert; and 3) arbitration by an arbitration tribunal composed of a magistrate and two independent assessors. The bargaining process between the autonomous trade unions and employers was carried out under the guidance of an Inspecteur du Travail, representing the state. The state was involved at every stage of collective bargaining. The essence of the French model was that the government sought to determine the basic conditions of employment, minimum wages, basic hours, holidays and other provisions by a statutory legal code, supplemented by collective agreements. The principal function of unions was to bring social and
political pressure to bear on the government in the hope of improving the legal standard laid down. In contrast to the French model of applying pressure on the government, the British model of collective bargaining entailed unions bringing effective pressure to bear upon the employer in order to secure a favorable agreement.

**Comparison and Summary**

British and French policies differed mainly in the means of carrying out their policies toward trade union formation. However, the aims of both policies were essentially the same—that of keeping economic and political demands separate and ensuring that trade unionism did not reinforce the nationalist movements. In other words, African workers were to be encouraged to participate in colonial institutions because these were 'good' for them, but on no condition were they allowed to use these institutions for their own ends. Conflicts of interest were present from the beginning. It required only the rise of strong nationalist movements for the whole paternalist structure to crumble and for trade unions to remold their organizations and objectives.

The British Colonial Office had seen at a very early date the inherent dangers if trade unionism became the weapon of political leaders. Lord Passfield's directives of 1930 and the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 resulted in a change in British policy and facilitated a legal atmosphere for the growth and development of trade unions; but the British colonial government sought to control these unions by other means. Lord Passfield aptly summed up the view of the British Government:
recognize that there is a danger that, without supervision and guidance, organizations of labourers without experience of combination of any social or economic purpose may fall under the domination of disaffected persons, by whom their activities may be diverted to improper or mischievous ends.87

Essential to the execution of the new policy of cooperation was an entire body of legislation involving compulsory registration and other regulations. Trade unions throughout British West Africa were registered and closely supervised by the labor departments; accounts were scrutinized, political affiliation was discouraged, union offices were closed and, in practice, the right to strike was severely circumscribed by the 'emergency' actions of colonial governors or by the introduction of long lists of 'essential services' in which strikes were illegal. Trade unions had to be legally recognized by the administration and were required to comply with registration and other formalities which did not apply to British unions.88

The British administration seemed unaware of the logical consequences of its position. More important, the effect of this policy was that the same power methods used by the British colonial governments to control and regulate trade unions were also used by most of the newly independent African governments to establish control over trade unions in their own states.

In the French territories, the right to form African trade unions came much later. Except for the education and language requirements, which were eventually abolished, there were very few restrictions. The rights to associate, to strike and to take part in collective bargaining were secured in 1946 and were written into the constitution of the Fourth Republic. These rights were confirmed,
elaborated and extended in the Code du Travail d'Outre-Mer of 1952. The African unions, being appendages of French metropolitan unions, were sheltered from the abusive use of judicial procedure. However, this adjunction carried the 'kiss of death' in that irrelevant political struggles and issues were transported to French West Africa.

In the area of trade union legislation, the French were more deliberate than the British. France developed a common policy throughout its colonies, so that there were less marked differences in the implementation of union legislation. The effectiveness of labor policy in the British colonies depended on the enthusiasm of the local administration and the cooperation of employers, while, in the French colonies, labor policy relied on the power of popular movements to urge the implementation of the extensive labor laws. Assimilation/association provided a lever which the Africans used with great success. Because AOF and AEF were considered integral parts of France and Africans were represented in the French parliament, the campaign to improve working conditions switched increasingly from the colonies to Paris after the mid-1950's. African deputies were instrumental in drafting the Overseas Territories' Labor Code (indeed, the Lamine-Gueye law was named after Senegal's senior deputy) and, after its introduction, the deputies worked together with the trade unions in Africa to implement it.

During this period, the British African unions were concerned less with equality of rights than with the rights of African workers. This concern necessarily gave union demands a strongly nationalist flavor and made it natural that they should seek to ally themselves with nationalist political parties and trade union
congresses. In contrast, there was a marked tendency for the demands of French African trade unionists to be dominated by the idea of equality in wages and working conditions and the equality of trade union rights for African and European workers. The French-created union in Africa looked to France for the settlement of problems arising from inequality, since the government was the major employer and instituted legal work codes. When a union in the French areas sought redress for a problem, they tended to use the leverage of French domestic trade union strength rather than negotiating locally. In British West Africa, the African unions maintained marginal ties with the BTUC, and their strength and influence depended much more on the power they could wield within their own areas.
FOOTNOTES


"Without the native skirmishers, we would not have an African Empire." See Pierre Cultru, Histoire du Senegal du XVème Siecle a 1870 (Paris, 1910), p. 357.

3 "Frenchmen would not have tolerated the large expenditures and great loss of lives if France relied exclusively on white troops." See ibid.


7 Gutteridge, The Military in African Politics, p. 3.


13 Coleman and Brice, op. cit., p. 376.

14 Gabriel Charmes, Politique Exterieure et Coloniale, p. 25.

15 Coleman and Brice, op. cit., p. 378.


18 Quoted in Iain Grahame, Jambo Effendi (Seven Years with the King's African Rifles) (London, 1966), pp. 23-24.

19 Ibid.


22 Ibid.


24 It was not surprising that the National Reformation Council, formed after the military coup in 1966, found it necessary to balance tribal and provincial interests on the council and committees.


31 Lee, op. cit., p. 25.


34 Lee, op. cit., pp. 32-33.


43 Busch, "A Brief History," p. 3.


47 K. L. Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone (London, 1951), Chapter XII.

48 These unions were mentioned in the minutes of the first meeting of the Nigerian Civil Service Union, August 19, 1912, and in correspondence with the secretary of the union in Sierra Leone. The minutes for the years 1912 to 1922 were found in the U. S. Department of Labor Library, Washington, D.C.


54 Hodgkin, Nationalism, pp. 118-119.
During the period from 1910 to 1914, the cocoa of Ghana, the palm-kernels and tin of Nigeria, and the products of Sierra Leone and the Gambia gained some importance in world commerce. Nigeria's exports in 1914 were worth nearly six times as much in 1930; Ghana's exports increased more than fivefold while Sierra Leone's and Gambia's exports showed almost a threefold increase. Roper, op. cit., p. 50.


Woddis, op. cit., p. 37.

Davies, African Trade Unions, p. 75.

Woddis, op. cit., p. 41; and Roper, op. cit., p. 64.

Ibid.


See the arguments of Roper, Davies and Hodgkin presented above, especially Table 1.


Berg, "The Role of Trade Unions," p. 3.

74 Hodgkin, Nationalism, pp. 118-119, 133.

75 Berg, "French West Africa," p. 200; and Hodgkin, Nationalism, pp. 126-127.

76 Orr, "Trade Unionism," p. 78; and Hodgkin, Nationalism, pp. 126-128.

77 Bowen, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

78 Meynaud and Salah Bey, op. cit., p. 38.


81 Meynaud and Salah Bey, op. cit., p. 29.


83 Mouvement Syndical Mondial, May 1956, p. 35.


85 Roberts and De Bellecombe, op. cit., p. viii.

86 Hodgkin, Nationalism, pp. 38-55.

87 Passfield, The History of Trade Unionism, p. 10.

88 Davies, op. cit., p. 42.


90 Davies, op. cit., p. 44.

91 Hodgkin, Nationalism, pp. 129-130.
CHAPTER V

THE POLITICS OF THE MILITARY AND THE TRADE UNIONS IN THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD

Section 1

The Military During the Nationalist Period: Overview

Most African states gained independence through constitutional negotiation, with political pressure being exerted by party leaders and trade unionists. In such a setting of peaceful transfer of power, the military appeared nonessential and irrelevant. Then what was the role of the African armies in nation- and state-building during the period before and after the nationalist movements became widespread? Since the military was the standing forces created by the colonial powers in the evolution towards independence, they were used to reinforce the police forces, to put down tax revolts and labor protests, and to suppress nationalist demonstrations. In a limited number of cases, however, the impact of demobilized soldiers on the growth of political awareness in the hinterland was tremendous. A key event in Ghana's political history, for instance, was the march on Christiansborg Castle, led by members of the ex-service-man's union on February 28, 1948. Police gunfire, two deaths and a riot led to the Watson Commission Report and the hastening of constitutional progress.¹

Except for the two world wars and major campaigns of occupation, most military operations in British and French colonial Africa were concerned chiefly with internal security. The utilization of the RWAFF was determined by the Colonial Office during peacetime,
while, during wartime, it was under the control of the war office. Between wars, the RlAFF was organized for rapid deployment as a super police force to deal with native risings against Britain. Both Britain and France tried to design their security forces so as to separate internal security roles from external security roles. A field administrator, called a district commissioner in the British system and a *commandant du cercle* in the French system, was delegated power and responsibilities for security.

In both systems, three levels of security were in evidence during the rise of the nationalist movement: 1) the professional army was usually deployed only for national "emergencies"; 2) the police or the gendarmerie, which contained an intelligence network and a special mobile unit for intervention, was the mainstay of any government organization in a crisis;² and 3) each district or native authority employed their own kind of local guard or chieftaincy police. The question confronting both French and British colonial offices was when the armies were to be used in internal work and security. The general tenor of French policy was to discourage the use of the *force armée* for police action, as the gendarmerie was considered the appropriate instrument in this field. The most important examples of army intervention in internal security matters came therefore from English-speaking territories. The coal miners' strike in Enugu, Nigeria, in 1949, brought home to the colonial authorities the weakness of local police forces. The military was mobilized in the Gold Coast in 1948 and employed during the riots and nationalist demonstrations in Sierra Leone in 1955 and 1957. The army was also
brought into Nigeria to quell the Tiv on several occasions. The revolt of the Bamileke in the Camerouns necessitated a joint operation between British and French forces because of the division of the Camerouns into British and French mandates.  

French Colonial Africa

In the French colonial system, a military-type administration developed which took into consideration the role of the military in internal security. The civilian administration inherited an administrative infrastructure that was essentially military in composition. In fact, the local civilian administrator or commandant de cercle continued to require that the 'natives' salute him. Indeed, military conquest was followed by military administration. To enforce his authority, the commandant de cercle had a network of subordinate officials which extended into the local villages.

In 1946, due to the abolition of the separate system of justice for Africans, la justice indigene, the local French administrator lost his private army, les gardes de cercle. The French security system was remodeled in terms of using the gendarmerie d'outre-mer as the main source of internal security. Under the direction of the ministry of defense, the gendarmerie was to be a special kind of unit, geared toward internal security matters. Moreover, this new force was institutionalized by a decree of 1953 which stipulated that the armed forces were to be used only in very important emergencies, while minor disturbances would be dealt with by the gendarmerie.  

British Colonial Africa

The British design for a security system, as conceived by
Lugard, was also military oriented. Lugard created an autocratic command system which ran from his headquarters to the provincial outposts and the subordinated Fulani emirates, which themselves were military in origin. With British-approved local chiefs and territorial governors, internal security was built into the system. Operating from military headquarters instead of commercial capitals, Lugard and his subordinate officials were accountable only to the British Government in London.

However, with the advent of internal self-government, Britain was forced to design a new security system. This system was conditioned by two doctrines. First, it was decided that when a colony moved to a certain stage of internal self-government, the district administrative officer would be eliminated; and second, it was argued that economic development, particularly the growth of towns and the development of trade, required a police force. This police force, which included the criminal investigation department, was basically para-military. The new methods devised by the nationalist movements forced the British to supplement this para-military force with the development of special riot control units within the police force. For example, the administration introduced in Nigeria a special cadet entry system to deal with the fever of nationalism. Later, a special cadet entry system was formed in other British territories as the nationalist movements gained momentum. The creation of these special forces brought back memories of the brutal expeditions during the occupation campaigns.
Politicalization and Africanization of the Armed Forces

Beginning in 1955, when the bud of nationalism blossomed in tropical Africa, both France and Britain began the indoctrination and Africanization of their colonial armies. It is ironic that the nationalist movement, not the efforts of the military, provided the stimulus for rapid Africanization in many cases. The French Government began to evaluate its position on Africanization and the effects of more African officers. The French command began to make special provisions for overseas candidates with the creation of Ressortis-sants des Territoires d'Outre-Mer (R.T.O.M.). Within a single army, the French contingency plans called for one African staff officer for every battalion headquarters, one African adjutant for each battalion, and one African lieutenant or sub-lieutenant for each company.

However, due to early recruitment practices and the strained relationships existing between the army and the public, the French as well as the British found it difficult to recruit from the best secondary-educated men. There was considerable suspicion of and indifference to military life among those who had received higher education. A course in officer training at Dakar in 1955 was a complete failure because few educated Africans came forward for training. Similar failures were experienced in British programs. In Nigeria, the army was a good enough career for Hausas but beneath the dignity of the Fulani. In Sierra Leone, the contempt of Freetown's educated Creole population for the protectorate Africans affected the army's status and programs; nowhere else in West Africa has the soldier been so emphatically categorized as an 'ignorant illiterate'.

Britain and France were forced to recruit from poor, backward areas. Of course, these recruits had to be educated in the culture and ideology of French and British traditions as related to the role of the military. The French colonial commanders believed that their most important work was to create the right state of mind among the new African officer cadre. This meant socialization and politicalization in terms of stressing the unity created by the use of the French language and by emphasizing the world role which colonial troops were expected to play within the context of the French army and empire. Even in the post-independence period, when the concept of a single military organization was negated, the above supposition remained a facet of French military policy. France continued to keep her army in Africa and to make preparations for joint maneuvers with the local forces. There was no fundamental change in this policy until the decision in 1964 to reduce French garrisons in Africa from 35,000 to 16,000.13

The British Government commissioned General Templer, chief of the imperial general staff, to write a special report on the future development of the colonial defense forces. Under General Templer's guidance, the British sought to improve the recruitment of officers for the local defense forces by making training arrangements with the leading British military institutions—Sandhurst, Aldershot and Eaton Hall. While at these military academies, the African cadets were exposed to the British military policy, one of the basic tenets of which was the concept of a non-political army. Primarily, this policy asserted that the army had a divine right to run its own
affairs without political interference. The army was a sovereign entity, entitled to determine for itself who would or would not exercise command. However, this theory, which was advocated for the colonies, was not practiced in Britain nor in France. Yet the idea of a non-political army was transplanted in theory and practice to the colonial forces in British Africa. Troops were taught that it was not their duty to interfere with colonial administration or decision-making; they were not instructed, however, to remain neutral in the struggle between those demanding independence and those supporting the existing order. The armed forces during this period were indoctrinated to be 'non-political' in the sense that they should be against all politicians, whether they were like Nkrumah or like Dr. Danquah. It was the 'politicians', after all, who were threatening the colonial order. Under British command, the Gold Coast army was far from 'neutral' in the many confrontations between the CPP and the colonial administration.

**British Military Indoctrination in Ghana: Synopsis**

Britain's imposed ideological pattern, the concept of a non-political army, and colonial training of the Ghanaian military produced an officer corps that identified with and was committed to the Commonwealth's set of traditions, symbols and values. This commitment and identification influenced and socialized the officer corps so that its ideas, views and actions became anachronisms in the new state. The memoirs of Brigadier Afrifa and Major-General Ocran provide valuable insight into their beliefs and allegiance to the Crown. The strength of both men's identification with Britain
during the nationalist period was striking. The role played by the British was evaluated in a positive and laudatory manner—theirs were 'good intentions', they were 'duty conscious' and tried to do 'that which was right against all odds' and bowed to the wishes of the 'majority of the people'. In contrast, the Ghanaian nationalist movement was depicted in extremely derogatory terms—its aims were 'grandiose', its leader was a 'demagogue' and its rank and file were 'ignorant illiterates' whipped up to violence against both the British and the intelligent Ghanaians who wished to cooperate in working step by step toward independence. Ocran writes, "Despite the good intentions of those who handed over power and the grandiose aims of those who received it, the aftermath of yesterday, all over Africa, clashes with today, while the uncertainties of tomorrow add to the confusion."

Afrifa's denouncement of the nationalist movement is even more pungent:

Kwame Nkrumah played hard on the illiteracy of his fellow men and women, marshalling the majority of the 80 per cent illiterate citizens around himself and working them up against the rightful authors of Ghana's independence... and while these big brains, Danquah and others—advocated self-government step by step in the shortest possible time, Nkrumah insisted that it should be self-government now or never. His majority of illiterate followers, to whom he promised bread and honey if they supported him... disregarded brain and wisdom in favor of brawn.

The British had no alternative... but to grant the country its independence as the wish of the majority of the people. The more the British tried to hand over power step by step, the more Nkrumah and his followers shouted for self-government now. The British, duty conscious, tried to do that which was right against all odds, but the people had become so inflamed that they became violent.

General Alexander's memoirs of his time as Nkrumah's chief of staff contained anecdotes about politicians and the nationalist movement
which were mild in comparison to the views of Afrifa and Ocran.

Alexander labeled all politicians who secured a mass base of supporters as 'rabble-rousers'.

Furthermore, the training of the officer corps in Britain induced additional bonds of loyalty to the Commonwealth. The officer at Sandhurst, Eaton Hall or Aldershot was not told of the glory that was his particular territory's but of the glorified expeditions of British troops in Africa. Eleazu theorized that...

If he is from Ghana, he is not told of Osei-Tutu or Anokye, nor is he shown any corporate symbol of his people. He may, in fact, be politely insulted when Lord Baden-Powell's subjugation of the Ashanti is discussed. If he is from Nigeria, he will not be told about obas who fought the British... about emirs who stood their ground against the British colonialists... but he may be told of the punitive wars of Lord Lugard, euphemistically called pacification. No symbol of his society emerges; insofar as he is socialized by ideological symbols at all, it is that of the Commonwealth.

The training of Afrifa, Ocran and other Ghanaian officers and the resultant identification with and commitment to Britain, resulted in their opposition to Nkrumah's foreign policies. Nkrumah undertook three major policies—the Rhodesia and Congo situations, and the acceptance of military aid and training from communist countries—that ran counter to the officers' political and ideological loyalties. Again the memoirs of Afrifa provide substantiation and accuse his own president of paying lip service to the Commonwealth and of breaking "the bond that binds us in this great union of people of all races, colours and creed;" Afrifa asserted, "I am prepared to fight along with my fellow members of the Commonwealth."

Given the officers' commitment to the Commonwealth and their dislike for Nkrumah and his supporters, the concept of a
non-political army became more of a prolepsis as Ghana moved toward a one-party state. According to General Alexander, the army should be kept out of politics and politics out of the army, but, simultaneously, the army owed loyalty to the President and the state. President Nkrumah asserted that the CPP was the state; the President himself was loyal to the CPP; therefore, loyalty to the state meant loyalty to the CPP. A 'non-political' army was impossible to establish in the situation existing between the CPP-state-Nkrumah and the military officers' view of their roles and functions.

British teachings on the sovereignty and divine right of the military were avidly tested in the events preceding the 1966 coup and the efforts of Nkrumah to establish a partisan military. Nkrumah's dismissal of Major-General Otu (chief of defense) and his deputy, Major-General Ankrah, was, in the officer corps' view, a clear violation of the divine right theory and sufficient grounds for the removal of the President. This dismissal was one of the major factors leading to the coup. Afrifa aptly expressed the feelings of the officers in August 1965:

The dismissal of General Otu in 1965 gave me a shock...I anticipated he would take some military action to extricate himself from this humiliation and all it implied for the freedom of Ghana. I knew that the majority of the officers and men in the Ghana army held him in great respect,...I knew that if he was to take any action, he would have the full support of the young officers and the men.26

General Ankrah, chairman of the post-coup National Liberation Council, criticized himself for not organizing a mutiny the moment he was retired.27

The officer corps shared the British disdain for Nkrumah
and his policies, and, as a result, civil-military relations suffered. This close association with Britain accounted for the lack of army involvement in the nationalist movement and played a crucial part in the breach between Nkrumah and his officer corps. Price aptly analyzed the source of tension inherent in civil-military relations in new states:

When the officer corps of a nation's military organization, its symbol of independence and sovereignty, identifies itself strongly with a political unit other than one it officially serves, serious consequences for the stability of the state are likely to ensue.28

Summary

In the nationalist movement towards independence, the role of the military was still an extension of colonial rule and, in most cases, was regarded as such. Both Britain and France indoctrinated their colonial forces to be non-political in terms of not questioning colonial rule but highly political in terms of suppressing nationalist dissent. The theory of a non-political armed force served the purposes of the colonial powers, especially Britain, in that an army that questioned policies or politicians might be driven to question colonialism itself, which would have undermined the whole British colonial administration.

Section 2

Trade Unionism and the Nationalist Movement

The group that had the most solid claim to a persistently avant-garde position in the nationalist movement was the African trade unionists. The period from 1945 to 1960, in which the struggle
for Africa's independence reached its greatest heights, was also the period of the most rapid growth for African trade unionism, in which an unprecedented storm of strikes took place.\(^{29}\) It was partly the mass action of the workers which paved the way for the postwar upsurge of nationalism and the growth of national political parties and organizations. The general strike of 1950 led to the victories of the Convention People's Party in Ghana. In Nigeria, the general strike of 1945, the shooting of the miners at Enugu in 1949 and the general strike in protest against this massacre, and a successful strike against the United African Company in 1950, gave impetus to the N.C.N.C. and the whole Nigerian national movement. In Kenya, the general strike of 1950 preceded the "emergency" of 1952. The series of powerful strikes in the copper belt in 1935, 1940, 1952, 1955, and 1956 served to uplift nationalist feeling throughout central Africa. Union advances in Guinea and other French African possessions were prefaced by a whole series of strikes and demonstrations by the working class in the 1940's and 1950's.\(^{30}\) In both British and French areas, African trade unions became involved in the struggle for independence at a fairly early stage. While the intellectual 'elite' may have provided the political leadership, it was the unions which furnished the shock troops whenever violent clashes with the colonial governments became inevitable.

As previously mentioned, African trade unionism represented serious dangers for the colonial administrations, especially when it led African workers to relate economic exploitation to political domination and thereby encouraged nationalist demands. The
fact that, in both state and large-scale private enterprise, the Europeans were the employers while the Africans were the workers, made it inevitable that trade unions serve partly as vehicles for nationalist demands.\textsuperscript{31} Trade unionism was in part a revolt against an inferior economic, political and social status in the colonial areas: Blacks who were trained as engineers in France, for instance, found it difficult to find employment in A.O.F. because of discrimination;\textsuperscript{32} in the British areas, the distinction between senior and junior services was based on race.

There were three main levels at which the trade unions became politically involved in the nationalist movement. Initially, the trade unions' attempts to gain recognition through strikes were seen by colonial rulers as politically motivated, especially when such strikes were directed against the main employment agency—the government or a public corporation. Furthermore, the impetus for nationalist movements came from the French and British colonial governments, since they labeled all strikes as subversive.\textsuperscript{33} That strikes were so categorized led many African politicians and trade unionists to view the strike as a political weapon. Therefore, coordinated planning of some strikes became a part of the nationalist campaign. The cooperation between trade unions and political leaders constituted a second level of political activity. At first, the coordinated political strike was limited, due to the refusal of union leaders to be used for industrial action; but, at later stages, this situation was surmounted in many colonies by the creation of a combined trade union-nationalist party movement, in which independence
was seen as the first priority.\textsuperscript{34} Harmony in terms of alliances between the leading political parties and trade unions was established in Guinea, Ghana, Tanganyika, Kenya, the Ivory Coast and Mali. In these territories and others, unions became involved in political struggles on several levels: The unions allied themselves with the leading political parties or supported other special interest nationalist groups, such as students and women. In Nigeria and the French Camerouns, trade unions appeared in the vanguard of the political campaigns of the nationalist parties. In French West Africa, unions became the industrial wing of the inter-territorial party, the RDA.\textsuperscript{35}

Strike actions on behalf of the political party-trade union alliance were increasingly labeled as 'communist-inspired' and 'subversive'. In such an atmosphere, strikes which started out merely as complaints against working conditions were readily seen by employers (colonial governments) and nationalists as political in nature. Any industrial action which as a by-product raised the political temperature was banned.

Because of the differences in the British and French colonial policies, there tended to be a different approach to the process of decolonization. In the French areas, the major campaigns for independence were fought on a transnational level. In the British areas, the struggle for independence came within each territory and was the result of localized political activity; there was little meaningful contact among nationalist groups. Writing about Nigeria, Coleman speculates that, notwithstanding the relatively small
percentage of wage earners in the total population, the main weight of active nationalist support came from the hundred thousand-odd clerks, artisans and government employees. He further adds, "It is not the number of wage-laborers or of salaried workers but their strategic position in the structure of the economy and the administration which accounts for their important role in the national movement." Since union involvement in nationalist movements varied from British West Africa to French West Africa or from colony to colony, several trade union movements in the British areas must be individually examined, in addition to a discussion of transnational activities in the French areas.

Political Trade Unionism in British West Africa

Nigeria

In Nigeria, as in the rest of British West Africa, political trade unionism dated from the 1940's. This action was begun by Michael Imoudou, secretary of the powerful Railway Workers' Union. Imoudou's attempts to force Britain into granting a cost of living allowance resulted in the consolidation of the many trade unions into the Nigerian Trade Union Congress (NTUC), and an alliance of prominent political leaders, such as Dr. Azikiwe, Chief Awolowo, Macauley and Ikoli. Although the NTUC cooperated with the nationalist movement by becoming a founder-member of the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) in 1944 and by providing some of the party's leading organizers, in its initial period, the NTUC avoided political action. Nonetheless, a number of conflicts arose between party militants and trade union officers. The NTUC leaders--notably
Awo lowo, Macaulay and Ikoli, who were not workers themselves—sought to use the union members not for the advancement of workers' rights but for political motives. The antagonism between the political leaders and the workers was surmounted in the 1945 general strike, in which the trade unionists gave direct support to the nationalist movement.

Due to a fifty-two per cent spiral in the cost of living, the African Civil Service Technical Workers' Union in 1945 demanded a fifty-two per cent wage increase and the same fringe benefits for Nigerian civil servants that were enjoyed by the British expatriates. When these demands were not met, various individual labor leaders called a general strike against the colonial government. Consequently, seventeen unions with a combined membership of 30,000 workers struck for thirty-seven days, with the strike spreading to such essential services as the railways, tele-communications, and technical departments of the public services. The general strike was eventually settled in favor of the NTUC's demands.

This general strike was crucial for several reasons:
1) It fragmented the NTUC, whose president was forced to resign because of his opposition to the organization's involvement in the strike. 2) For the first time, Europeans and Nigerians saw the potential strength of efficiency-organized workers. An important phase in the development of the nationalist movement had begun. Dr. Azikiwe was able to use the strike as an important weapon in his political campaign. He integrated the NTUC into the nationalist movement and became the champion of the working class, thus giving political
coloration to the workers' organization. The strike proved that the territory was strategically under the control of the Nigerians and henceforth, they could defy the colonial authorities at will. Coleman accurately stated, "The 1945 general strike in Nigeria served as a dramatic opening of a new nationalist era." Although only a few Northerners had participated in the strike, a political leader in the northern region considered the action as the first awakening of ethnic and political consciousness in that part of Nigeria.

The 1945 general strike created disunity within the NTUC, but the Nigerian trade union movement united again and again to strike, protest, and to organize demonstrations which took on nationalist overtones. The November 18, 1949, strike at Enugu Colliery—involving 7,500 coal miners and the killing of 21 and wounding of 51—created an electrified atmosphere. National political parties coordinated their efforts; the two central trade union federations achieved, in part, a Nigerian labor congress, and the number of workers involved in strikes increased from 7,375 in 1948-49 to 50,000 in 1949-50. However, trade unionism continued to be plagued by disunity, which revolved around the question of international affiliation with the ICFTU or the WFTU. This internal dissension was generated between those leaders who wanted trade unions to perform a purely protective function and those who wanted to use the labor movement as a base for building a socialist party in Nigeria. A more detailed discussion of disunity in Nigerian trade unionism is outside the scope of this dissertation. The essential point raised is that, even in disunity, each faction played a key role in
contributing to heightened nationalist consciousness.

Ghana

In the period before and after World War II, Gold Coast government employees were the lowest paid in West Africa. Their poverty and desperate situation compelled the small, ineffective trade unions to unite. The need for a single centralized organization was attained with the formation of the Gold Coast Trades Union Congress (GCTUC). However, the GCTUC, with fifty-six unions and 17,985 members, was financially and politically weak and badly organized, as shown by its actions in the strikes against the Gold Coast Chamber of Mines. The only initial benefit gained was an agreement by the colonial government to appoint a commission to examine the wage structures and to review working conditions of the miners.40

In 1948, the nationalist campaign of "Self-Government Now" by Nkrumah's CPP had its reflection in the trade union movement. From 1948 onwards, the nationalist struggle dominated the entire socio-political scene in the Gold Coast. Increasingly, the workers concluded that, in the face of the colonial government's obvious indifference to their desperate economic plight, a fundamental change was needed. Supported by the CPP, the trade unions demanded a parity of wages and benefits with the European workers; when the benefits were not forthcoming, a series of strikes embracing key sections of the working class paralyzed the Gold Coast.

These strikes took place at a time of mounting nationalist feelings in the British territories. In the atmosphere of Nkrumah's Positive Action Campaign, every strike took on political significance
and was regarded by the people as a direct aid in the struggle for independence. It was in such a tense atmosphere that the strike involving the meteorological department employees occurred. With the cost of living rising markedly while wages remained stationary, the meteorological workers demanded wage increases and went on strike when their demands were not met. The colonial government dismissed all workers and issued a directive which immediately classified the meteorological department employees as civil servants, thereby making any strike on their part 'illegal'. The meteorological workers turned to the GCTUC for help. For the GCTUC, the strike was an important test case because the union in question held a government registration certificate. If such employees could be classified as 'civil servants' and, on that basis, denied the right to strike, then this was a dangerous precedent which could later be used by the government as a pretext for interference with other legitimate trade union activities. After its mediation efforts failed, the GCTUC called a general strike on January 7, 1950. The strike was an unqualified success as thousands of workers throughout the Gold Coast left their jobs. Trains stood immobile in the stations; offices were silent and deserted; no ships pulled into Takoradi Harbor; the mines were empty and building construction came to a standstill. The political and social revolution had begun in Ghana.

In the face of this vast sea of unity, the British colonial government dealt its last card—a declared state of emergency which included an imposed curfew and the arrests of GCTUC and CPP leaders, including Nkrumah. In Nkrumah's absence, the GCTUC and CPP became
inextricably bound together, and many union officials became members of the CPP. After a commission's recommendation, the Gold Coast eventually became the independent state of Ghana on March 6, 1957. The GTUC under Tettegah openly declared itself part of a grand alliance of popular groups under the leadership of the CPP.

The role of trade unionism in Ghana's nationalist movement was very similar to the Nigerian situation except for the latter's intense factionalism and discord. In Ghana the unions remained united. According to Woddis, "There is no doubt that this was one of the factors which made it possible for Ghana to win its political independence before Nigeria."42

Political Trade Unionism in French West Africa

Political trade unionism in the French administered territories were dependent on the internal political situation in France and on the ideologies of the metropolitan unions. The nationalist movement involving trade unions centered on racial inequalities, which had extremely important economic overtones. Most of the controversy over inequality revolved around the wage structure, in which two kinds of inequities existed: The first related to base-pay differentials between Africans and Europeans doing the same kind of work; the second concerned bonuses and other fringe benefits. The former was eliminated by labor codes, but the latter persisted. The European wage earner, whether in public or private employment, generally received a six-month paid home leave after each two year duty period in addition to eight weeks of vacation. The African wage earner was less favored—he got a shorter vacation, usually three
weeks, and a smaller family allowance. By 1957, the 22,000 Europeans constituted five percent of the total wage-labor force; but 10,000 of them held managerial or senior supervisory posts, 8,000 were clerks and 4,000 were skilled manual workers. Added to this European predominance was the growth in job preference for the "poor white" class over Africans. The presence of large numbers of Frenchmen made African workers and their unions much more conscious of racial inequalities than in the neighboring British colonies. Trade unions, which rapidly took on the character of political bodies with a strong ideological content, were looked upon as major vehicles for a more egalitarian society.

The first major industrial action organized by French African trade unions was the prolonged railway strike in West Africa from October 1947 to March 1948. The strategy of the labor movement entailed bringing pressure to bear upon the government in Paris and using lobbying efforts by African deputies in the parliament in order to obtain a unified labor code. The fruits of the prolonged railway strike were the passage of two important labor codes: the 1950 Lamine-Gueye Law, which regulated working conditions in the civil service, and the 1952 Overseas Territories Labor Code. The 1952 code, which stipulated that equal pay for equal work shall be the rule regardless of race or origin, covered all aspects of labor relations: the rights of trade unions; procedures for collective bargaining and settlement of disputes; health and welfare measures required for factories; and general principles on such issues as the forty-hour work week and paid vacations.
However, these two labor codes contained several important provisions which were generally worded, leaving considerable room for interpretation by the officials charged with implementing them. It was in the imprecise wording of these labor code provisions that the seeds of nationalism were sown. On a number of occasions, the African trade unionists accused the administrative authorities of sabotaging the intent of the lawmakers and demanded the "honest and proper" application of the law. Such an occasion was the massive strike action from July to December 1953, which involved liens for Africanization of higher level jobs in the colonial administration and twenty per cent wage increases to cover the fifteen per cent rise in living costs. With Dakar, Bamako and Conakry as the centers of unrest, 692,280 workdays were lost to strikes, compared with only 25,761 days in 1950. For the first time in confrontations with the colonial administration, the African trade unionists, along with some African deputies, called for a change in colonial policy:

If the administration does not revise its position, we will go beyond in demanding things which will not be of an economic nature. The African labor organizations, having behind them all social groups...will demand the revision of the ties which bind them to the French unions. For we will not tolerate that a people live in misery while, in our full view, a minority lives luxuriously with the most insolent superfluities.47

After much hesitation and warnings by several African politicians of extremists' takeovers of trade union movements, the French overseas minister announced a twenty per cent wage increase.

In addition to the drive for equality, the African trade unions were also involved in the nationalist movement in their relationships with the metropolitan and international labor centers.
During the postwar period, the CGT, the CFTC and FO, as well as internationals with which these French unions were affiliated—the WFTU, IFCTU, and ICFTU, made many efforts to organize African trade unionism on a continental scale. The first effort at continental organization was formulated in 1947 by the CGT at the Dakar Trade Union Conference. At this conference, opposition to colonial authority played second fiddle to the alignment of the African trade unions with the CGT and the international WFTU. However, at the next union conference—at Bamako on October 22-27, 1951, nationalism became an issue. The African delegates at this conference declared, "Without political independence, so-called trade union independence is empty of meaning."48 Although there was no fundamental change in the position of dependence vis-à-vis the French trade union movement, nevertheless there were signs that the idea of a specifically African union movement was growing. Several factors contributed to this widening split between the African and French trade union leaders. The Africans were aggrieved by the way in which their positions in the CGT, CFTC and FO hierarchy kept them in secondary roles. In international affairs, for example, African union members took part in WFTU, IFCTU and ICFTU meetings as members of the CGT, CFTC and FO and not as representatives of their own organizations. In addition, the African CGT unionists viewed the French communist party theory that freedom for the French colonies could come only after the victory of the French working class, as another kind of imperialism.49

The influence of the political party, the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA), was also an important factor in the
growth of nationalist consciousness among trade unionists and of a centralized trade union organization independent of French ties. A centralized trade union organization was established at the Dakar conference, where militant CGT members in Senegal-Mauritania and Upper Volta formed the first all-African trade union—Confederation Generale des Travailleurs Africains (CGTA). With the CGTA’s membership increasing rapidly—55,000 as compared with the CGT (60,000), CFTC (18,500) and FO (14,500)—the orthodox CGT was forced to alter its position. In April 1956, the CGT agreed to the principle of an independent, centralized African trade union organization, affiliated with the WFTU. The other French-affiliated unions in Africa were also hit by the disaffiliation fever. On January 16, 1957, many of these unions consolidated into the Union Generale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire (UGTAN). The disaffiliation and the creation of UGTAN was the first successful blow struck in French West Africa for independence from French institutions.

The UGTAN's aims were to unite and organize the workers of Black Africa, to coordinate their trade union activities in the anti-colonial struggle as well as against other forms of exploitation... and to affirm the personality of African trade unions. The UGTAN became involved in political activity when it took a definite stand in the referendum of September 1958. The organization decided to vote "no" in the referendum after the Bamako conference of September 10-11. This decision conflicted with that of the RDA parties in many French West African territories, resulting in suppression of the UGTAN in several areas.
The pressures resulting from the formation of the USTAN led in part to the enactment of the loi-cadre or Enabling Act, passed by the French parliament on June 23, 1956. This law profoundly altered relations within the RDA as well as those between France and its African dependencies. The loi-cadre eliminated the governor-general at Dakar and Brazzaville; each of France's Black African territories was given internal autonomy and an embryonic form of parliamentary government. The law went far in meeting African aspirations for a greater share in the management of their own affairs, but introduced a divisive element among their leaders.51

Two opposing points of view quickly developed. The autonomist view, espoused by Houphouet-Boigny, favored a federal relationship between the metropole and the eight territories; France would become one of a group of states united by a common parliamentary structure in which members from France would be elected on an equal basis with those from overseas. The federalist position, for which Toure was the chief spokesman, supported a strong African federal structure consisting of an elected parliament at the federal level and an executive council; under this arrangement, continuing relations between France and the African federation would be delineated on a confederal basis.

These two divergent viewpoints clashed at the Bamako conference of the RDA in September 1957. Toure's federalist view prevailed and a resolution by the delegates stipulated that "the congress gives its parliamentarians full powers to propose a law looking toward the democratization of the existing federal executive
organ's. 52

However, Houphouet-Boigny won where it counted most—in France. As a minister in the Mollet government (where he co-authored the loi-cadre) and a friend of DeGaulle, Houphouet-Boigny prevailed upon DeGaulle to institute the 1958 referendum, where each territory was given the opportunity to choose between outright independence and close association with the French Community. Houphouet-Boigny's opposition to federalism stemmed partly from the peculiar interests of the Ivory Coast and partly from his personal rivalry with Senghor of Senegal for leadership of French Africa. Houphouet-Boigny felt that, in a purely African federation, the Ivory Coast would be expected to contribute heavily to the development of the less favored members of the federation, at the price of slowing down the rate of development at home. An additional consideration was undoubtedly his disinclination to build up Dakar as a federal capital, thus adding to the prestige of his rival, Senghor. 53 Toure based his stand on his firm conviction that the Franco-African community, as conceived by DeGaulle, offered no genuine independence for its African members. In addition to breaking up the old federations, AOF and AEF, Toure felt that this community placed insurmountable obstructions in the way of future unions of African states. 54 Under Toure's leadership, the PDG and UGTAN-Guinee went into full operation and urged and received a "no" vote. (See Chapter X for case studies on Guinea and the Ivory Coast.)

However, the degree to which the African trade unions in each territory were directly involved in the nationalist movement
varied from territory to territory. In only two territories, Soudan (later Mali) and Guinea, did the unions participate fully in the political parties which ultimately gained power, the Parti Democratic de Guinee (PDG) and the Union Soudanaise (US). There was a close link in these two territories between leading politicians and the trade unionists.

**Guinea**

In Guinea, Sekou Toure—secretary-general of the CGT-Guinee and stalwart of the UGTAN—used the unions as a base for political campaigning. The 1953 strikes became an effective instrument for political education. Throughout the strike period, Toure emphasized African worker unity, the irrelevance of tribalism, and the need for the cooperation of rural workers in industrial action. "In Africa," he stated, "there is no opposition between capitalists and workers, only the mass movement of the people against imperialism and towards the improvement of society. The unions must be closely associated with the political parties in the first stage and with the national governments in the second." The impact of the political education campaign was profound: Union membership rose from 4,000 in early 1953 to 20,000 in 1954 and to 55,000 in 1955. Wage earners who joined the CGT in Guinea saw the unions as part of the party and all industrial actions as political. Leadership became interchangeable between the PDG and CGT-Guinee as nationalism spread throughout Guinea. With the trade unions as a political base, the PDG became more revolutionary and militant in its pursuit of equality and Guinea became the first African nation to leave the French
Community. The Union Generale des Travailleurs de Soudan (UGTS) followed the nationalist tendencies of CGT-Guinee and became firmly integrated into the nationalist party (US) structure. Out of the twenty-five members of the US executive committee, eight were trade unionists.

In other territories of French West Africa, the unions played a somewhat different role. In no case were they prominent within the leading political parties, although the trade unions did become the industrial wing of the RDA. In the Ivory Coast, the trade unions and Houphouet-Boigny's territorial branch of the RDA, the PDCI (which consisted largely of planters whose interests were akin to those of the European employers), were always in conflict. Similar strife existed between the trade unions in Senegal and the political party Bloc Democratique Senegalaise (BDS). Most CGT-FO affiliates remained outside of the BDS. In many of these states, the infighting among the CGT, CFTC and FO affiliates created additional problems and led to quarrels among Toure, Houphouet-Boigny and Senghor over such issues as maintenance of AOF as a single entity, decolonization, and the role of France in the area.

In French West Africa, where there were no Indigenous economic groups powerful enough to lead the nationalist parties, unions played an important part in political campaigns and the drafting of programs. However, in those areas where an Indigenous party structure formed independent of France, the trade unions and the party organization became united in terms of inter-linking leadership.
Comparison and Summary

In British West Africa, the multiplicity of small plant or company locals made political strikes for economic ends difficult to succeed. However, with the rise of the nationalist campaigns, these small unions were consolidated into national trade union congresses. Strikes were used more often for political purposes and were generally coordinated with the political leaders—like Nkrumah and his Positive Action Campaign in the 1950's. In the French West African territories, the unions were concerned mainly with wage demands and equality within the French empire. Because the French territories were categorized as La France Outre-Mer, pressure could be applied in the demands for equality within the French system.

Due to the political situation in France and the ideologies of the metropolitan unions and labor centers, French African trade unions disaffiliated from these labor centers. This began the nationalist movement in French West Africa. In Guinea and Soudan (Mali), the nationalist movement was spearheaded by trade unions and the indigenous political parties. In the other territories, trade unions remained a part (industrial wing) of the interterritorial party, the RDA.

In this section, Part I of the dissertation, a general outline of British and French colonial policies and the formation of the military and the trade unions were delineated. The references to military and trade union formations apply to those colonies in British and French West Africa—any implied extension to East Africa or North Africa is speculative.
FOOTNOTES


2 J. M. Lee, African Armies and Civil Order, p. 28.


4 Michael Crowder, West Africa Under Colonial Rule, p. 188.

5 Lee, op. cit., p. 29.


7 Lee, op. cit., p. 29.

8 Ibid., p. 30.

9 William Gutteridge, "Military and Police Forces," p. 302. See Chapter IV, Section 2, of the dissertation for documentation of these expeditions.

10 Lee, op. cit., p. 35.


15 The non-political army theory broke down in times of crisis in both British and French domestic situations. The Ulster crisis of 1914 showed that the British army was far from neutral in politics. When the Home Rule Bill for Ireland was moving through its last stages in the House of Commons, the Liberal administration was unsure of the support that it could command in the army. Prominent Conservative politicians were frankly urging the armed forces to mutiny.

Interestingly, one of the reasons privately expressed by apologists for the failure of the British Government to use force against the white rebel regime in Rhodesia was/is the uncertain response of the British army to such an order. As First asserted, whether this is a reason or merely an excuse, it does not say much for the supposedly unquestionable neutrality of Britain's armed forces.

If the British army was sharply divided by home rule for Ireland, the French army was even more dangerously split over Algeria.


18 Ocran, *op. cit.*, p. 4.


20 Afrifa, *op. cit.*, p. 54.


27 Ibid., p. 102.


33 Davies, op. cit., p. 95.

34 Busch, "A Brief History," p. 10.


36 James S. Coleman, Background to Nationalism (Cambridge, 1958), p. 70.

37 Meynaud and Salah Bey, op. cit., p. 53; Woddis, op. cit., p. 31; and Davies, op. cit., p. 82.

38 Coleman, Background, p. 70.

39 Ibid.

40 Davies, op. cit., pp. 81-85; and Woddis, op. cit., p. 132.


42 Woddis, op. cit., p. 132.

43 Davies, op. cit., pp. 84-85.


47 Le Proletaire, October 1953, p. 220.


54 Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. xv.

PART II

STAGES OF MILITARY AND TRADE UNION INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS
CHAPTER VI

STAGE I POST-INDEPENDENCE: THE PERIOD OF DECOLONIZATION

It has been said that achieving independence is not an overnight process by which a former colony becomes a new state, holding its rightful place in the world community of nations. The achievement of independence in most cases is a long drawn-out evolutionary process in which the essential institutions are almost imperceptibly modified in preparation for the event or adapted to meet the new circumstances after the formalities have taken place. However, one can question this modification process as it related to Africa. It is true that independence was a watershed in the development of contemporary African political conditions, but, despite this great wave which brought over forty African colonies to independence, a continuity remained between the old dependence and the new. Many of the means and ends that made up the spectrum of colonial administrations were inherited virtually intact by the newly independent states. Even today, the sediment of colonialism lies deep in African society. In many states, the political system during the first years of self-government was largely a transplant and, most important, the armies were colonial products.

New African Armies and Colonial Inheritance

More than any other institution left behind by colonialism, the armies of Africa were set in the colonial pattern, having been largely created from colonial regiments handed over at the time of independence. These were the same colonial regiments that the
colonial powers had built up to keep their empires quiescent. The African armies retained, with few exceptions, their expatriate officers, anachronistic equipment, inglorious responsibilities, paucity of authentic tradition, and colonial pattern of organization and arrangements. These same military organizations, part of whose function had been to quell political agitation and agitators, were questioned as to whether or not they would be capable of transferring their allegiance to these same nationalist political agitators, who, in many cases, were now the government leaders and commanders-in-chief of the armed forces. Under these prevailing prejudices and attitudes, the transfer of the army's allegiance from the imperial powers to the nationalist regime proved difficult. The most important fact concerning the question of loyalty is obviously that defense forces are instruments of law and order, closely identified with the original administration, which was, of course, imperialist.

The colonial utilization of the military also created public prejudices and attitudes which, in turn, affected the government leaders' efforts to deal with the military and to integrate it into the new state. Public opinion or popular prejudices about national security forces is likely to determine their standing in society. The image or stereotype of the soldier which exists in the public mind at different stages in the development of a state is therefore of considerable importance.

Generally, in the West African states, three main phases have been apparent in the evolution of public reaction to the armed forces: 1) the purely colonial phase, up until 1939; 2) World War
II and its effects on civil-military relations; and 3) subtle modification of attitudes during the independence period. As previous chapters of the dissertation have shown, resentment was widespread in many areas of West Africa during the first phase. In phase three, the attitude of the populace was overtly anti-military. In Ashanti areas, where the series of wars and expeditions had left lasting umbrage, the people's dislike for the military was ingrained. The Ashanti attributed their loss of military prestige and sovereignty to the colonial forces. In the rest of Ghana, the majority of the colonial army was often regarded as malcontents disturbing the traditional order of society, while the regiments remained a symbol of foreign rule. In Yorubaland (Egbas), special historical factors conditioned a negative attitude towards the military. The native armies in this part of Nigeria were composed of ex-slaves and therefore were despised. In the public's view, the modern army, besides being a relic of imperialism, was associated with the punitive expeditions of only forty years ago. Chapter IV documented the resentment of Freetown's Creole population for Sierra Leone's army, which was composed mainly of Africans from the protectorate. Similar public prejudices and attitudes prevailed in French West Africa.

Reasons for the deep-seated popular fear and distrust of the military in Africa are not hard to find. The respective national armies were often regarded as remnants of the imperial past. As mentioned previously, their chief assignment during the colonial period was to pacify the hinterlands; once that was accomplished, they were called upon to suppress disturbances and internal uprisings.
Not only did Black African soldiers, under European officers, play a large part in defending Britain and France in two global wars, but they also died defending the mother country’s colonial holdings in East Africa, Ethiopia, Burma, Indochina, Algeria, and even in their home territories. In this respect, the armies were looked upon as armies of occupation, betraying the nationalist struggle and oppressing the masses rather than defending their interests. The famed Mau Mau leader, "General China", wrote in his autobiography of the time when he was a member of the KAR and his unit was sent to Uganda to put down unrest. While there, he was lectured by an old Muganda...

Why have you come here to plague us and to punish us for trying to get our freedom? Why aren't you helping your own people to get theirs...You have a duty to fight until you have made Kenyatta your Kabaka and until your taxes go to him, not to the English. You should be making your own armies and your own roads and building schools for your own kind of education. If you don't fight for Kenyatta to become your Kabaka you will be a useless lot of people.4

Colonel Afrifa aptly expressed the people’s attitude when he wrote:

...In Ghana people normally underrate the intelligence of the soldier. This has a long tradition. The British Army did not at first attract the most able of our men. To our people, therefore, it seemed only the failures in our society joined the army.5

The literate urban population resented an armed force composed deliberately of illiterate minority groups from some remote corner of the state. Similarly, an army composed of tribes with long established warrior traditions became a dangerous anachronism in some new states, whose other institutions were controlled by nonmilitaristic peoples.

The adjustment of public attitudes and the military forces
to the conditions created by independence was a slow process for several reasons: educated manpower was lacking and defense institutions were themselves an essential expression of imperialism. During this period, the armies of Africa tended to retain their colonial flavor, their foreign advisers and their affinity with colonial powers longer than did the civilian public services. Given the history and traditions out of which the armed forces emerged, armies were not viewed as institutions in which Africans took pride. Essentially, during this period of decolonization, the military remained a matter of mystery or suspicion to almost all of the elected representatives of the people.

Given the prevailing attitudes, especially in domestic affairs where public opinion was anti-military, the nationalist leaders were in many cases unwilling to expand the national armies or to institute a rapid program of Africanization. As Gutteridge writes:

...The ability and willingness of nationalist leaders to recognize the value of armed forces and, if necessary, to expand them depends upon their assessment of the popularity, or otherwise, of the military element in society.6

Thus, the legacies and traditions of imperial rule formed the essential background, the bases on which adjustments were made after the departure of the colonial powers. Unable to perceive a role and function for the military in the structure of the new state, the attitude of most political leaders was one of neglect. Of all the first generation leaders of independent Africa, only Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika seemed to sense the importance of identifying the army with the transition from colonial rule to independence. In
his spat with DeGaulle, President Toure refused to allow a contingen-
tent of army veterans to return to the new state of Guinea, sending
them back to France.⁷ Some leaders flirted with the idea of doing
away with the military altogether; in fact, President Olympio of
Togo was supposed to have said that he could do without the army
which was 'offered' to him by the colonial powers.⁸

**Internal Conditions of the Armed Forces and Political Changes**

The army in a new state can play an important role in
nation-building. Military training implies discipline of some kind
and discipline creates cohesion and perhaps a real sense of esprit
de corps. Soldiers are brought into a tight community with a clear
set of rules, which tends to minimize personal and tribal differ-
ences. The military directly affects not only the servicemen but
also their families, in that they too are often brought together in
the contiguity of the military camps and subjected to similar dis-
cipline. However, British and French recruitment policies and mil-
tary organizations distorted the virtues of military discipline and
cohesiveness. Many of the new states inherited armies whose compo-
sition and methods of recruitment and organization were liabilities
rather than assets during post-independence. The British, for ex-
ample, had followed a policy of tribal quotas so closely that hardly
any of the new West African states possessed an army whose compo-
sition corresponded to its population. Previous chapters have shown
that recruitment policies in Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone created
an ethnic and tribal imbalance—in Nigeria and Ghana, the great ma-
minority of the ordinary troops were recruited in northern areas while
while the officer cadre was drawn largely from the southern coastal areas. According to figures given by the Kenyan ministry of defense at the end of 1961, of nearly 6,000 African ranks serving in the King’s African Rifles, thirty-four per cent were Kamba, thirty-four per cent Kalenjin and other tribes. The largest tribe, the Kikuyu, were not even mentioned and their representation was negligible.9

The French recruitment policy and organization avoided some tribal and ethnic problems. Nevertheless, concentration on tribes with martial traditions and little education for recruits and NCO’s, and on Europeanized ethnic groups for officers resulted in some states having an abundance of recruits and some having an abundance of officers. Given the above facts and figures, every facet of the military became sensitive about its ethnic composition. For instance, when Captain Ngouabi, commander of the parachute commando battalion, was dismissed from the army, soldiers from his tribe kidnapped the chief of police and the army commander and attacked the party headquarters.10

In many states, an educational, tribal, regional and ethnic gap existed among the recruits, the officers and the political leaders. Converting the new armies into tools of national policy was not an easy task, as the ethnic balance and composition turned the military into a political football. Moreover, the identification of the officer corps with the departed colonial powers further isolated them from the new government bureaucracy and created sources of tension between the two.

During the post-independence period, the first mark of change was a broadened base of recruitment, especially if the
military composition did not favor the political leader's tribe. For example, President Kenyatta made it known that the Kenyan army should be composed as nearly as possible of men drawn from all tribes and reflecting the demographic composition of the state. However, in Uganda, the ruling group was able to take advantage of Nilotic predominance in the army to rally support against those who were trying to use other minority groups as a basis for revolution. In Sierra Leone, Sir Albert Margai (Mende) relied largely on his contacts with the army commander, Colonel David Lansana (Mende), in his efforts to remain in power. Many political leaders realized that the composition of their army could be crucial in the survival of the new regime. To achieve a tribal balance in their favor and also to indoctrinate their new armies, many political leaders instituted a national draft, while others sought to create militias or small presidential forces as a check/balance against the uncertain loyalty of the new armies.

In the post-independence period, military units faced two alternative dangers: either the direct challenge of rival structures or the risk of a complete collapse in the command structure. Both possibilities included a loss of authority. Policemen were assigned to spy on soldiers; party officials were armed to protect the political leaders; people's militias were established as buffers between the party (state) and the military. President Nkrumah imposed political control over the Ghanaian army in 1961. Nkrumah took Hassan, a member of his Nzima tribe and a trusted friend, out of the diplomatic service, promoted him to lieutenant-colonel and appointed
him director of military intelligence. Both the officer corps of the police and the army perceived Nkrumah's security system and Presidential Guard to be a threat to the military and the British traditions which they had been trained to uphold. Similar presidential guards or militias were created in Congo (B), Mali and the Ivory Coast.

It was an impressive tribute to the effects of tradition that, on the whole, the African armies, whose role in the achievement of independence was nil or minimal, so readily accepted the independence situation in its early stages. To ensure continued military acquiescence, government leaders, while vehemently criticizing the colonial powers in public, retained expatriate officers in key advisory and executive positions. The presence of these expatriates was a readymade deterrent to unconstitutional action of any kind. But, on the other hand, this procedure continued the close identification of the officer corps with the values and traditions of the former colonial powers. The presence of foreign advisers and commanders helped to continue the fostering of the anti-military attitude.

Nkrumah, a vocal critic of colonial power, kept British expatriates in command positions until 1961, when General Alexander was dismissed. The Congo (B) retained French officers in the military school, Ecole Leclerc, even after it was decided to weaken the national army by removing its French military support. In many of the other former French territories, especially the Ivory Coast, the armies were not actually handed over to the new regimes until after the date of formal independence.

During this stage, the military was not used by the new
government leaders in state- and nation-building. In most of the new African states, the military profession was linked with low social status, and this attitude was carried over to the independence period.16 The military was not given 'legitimacy' by the nationalist political leaders in anticipation of independence and its consequences. Because of this, the military role in the process of state- and nation-building was jeopardized and tended to be marginal.

Period of Decolonization and Foreign Military Ties

Few African leaders embarked upon drastic changes in their foreign military aid programs immediately after obtaining self-government. If assured of obedience, the new heads of state often wished to leave the organization of the armed forces essentially unchanged. Although politicians supported Africanization in principle, the uncertainties of the post-independence period gave them second thoughts about dismissing experienced Europeans. As delineated above, President Nkrumah of Ghana retained a British chief of staff (Alexander) for more than four years after independence, despite pressures for naming an African to this position. Even the mercurial leader of the Congo (K), Patrice Lumumba, felt the need for continuity in the army—that is, retention of European officers.

Military aid to developing countries can take several different forms, the emphasis on which tends to change as progress is made after independence. Basically, however, such aid consists of either equipment or training facilities or both. Many African states sought to diversify sources of military assistance but, as shown in Table 4, colonial powers continued to provide the bulk of military
# TABLE 4

THE ARMIES OF NEW AFRICAN STATES*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Sources of External Military Assistance+</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Defense Agreement With:</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>France; USA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>France; Union Africaine et Malgache+++</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>France; Israel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Union Africaine et Malgache; Equatorial Defense Council++</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (B)</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Union Africaine et Malgache; Equatorial Defense Council</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>France; USA; Israel</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Union Africaine et Malgache; Equatorial Defense Council</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Canada; Pakistan; India; Israel; USA; UK; USSR; Yugoslavia; Australia; New Zealand</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>USSR; W. Germany; France</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Union Africaine et Malgache; Regional Defense Agreement w/ Niger &amp; France</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>France; Israel; USA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>France; USSR; USA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>France; USA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Union Africaine et Malgache; Regional Defense Agreement w/ France &amp; Ivory Coast</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>France; USA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>France; Union Africaine et Malgache</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>UK; Nigeria</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>France; Union Africaine et Malgache</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>France; USA; Israel</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Union Africaine et Malgache</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Considered here to include past and current external sources of supply, whether gifts or purchases and training, whether provided in Africa or elsewhere. The list is incomplete and is an ongoing program.

**Includes France, Gabon, C.A.R., Congo (B) and Chad.

***Includes France and all her former African colonies except Guinea, Mali and Upper Volta.
assistance—especially France, which furnished officers directly.

**French Military Presence**

When France granted independence to her possessions in West Africa, she took steps to ensure her military presence there, in the event that she might want, at some future date, to deploy troops anywhere in the area. This policy was devised after the fall of France in 1940, when strategists reasoned that the bulk of French fighting power could have been withdrawn intact to the strategic African platform until the moment came to confront Nazi Germany. From the lessons of her humiliation, France subsequently organized her defenses on a Euro-African basis. Accordingly, when decolonization came, France not only built national armies for her former colonies—with the military hardware coming directly from her resources and with the *quid pro quo* that the African states were committed to her for supplies and training—but also erected an elaborate system of defense cooperation. Shortly after independence, many of the states of French West and Equatorial Africa negotiated bilateral treaties with France which, with some modifications, are still operative. These agreements permit extensive interconnections between French and African armies to the point of allowing France both to intervene directly and to establish and maintain French bases and military installations. Such bases exist in Senegal, Chad and Malagasy Republic, from which intervention forces can be airlifted to trouble spots anywhere in Africa. Small detachments are maintained in several other states. Over 1,300 French officers and noncommissioned officers serve as technical advisors in all the Francophone states except
Mali and Guinea. France maintains about 7,000 troops in Black Africa: 450 in the Ivory Coast; 450 in Gabon and Niger; 2,300 in Senegal; 2,000 in Madagascar; and 800 in Chad. In addition to public affirmation of military support, the French Government was alleged to have signed numerous secret treaties, under which French troops could participate in maintaining public order in the Francophone states.

The regional defense pact, Union Africaine et Malgache de Defense (U.A.M.D.), stipulates that the signatories should come to the defense of any threatened member. This defense agreement, as well as others, generally carries a provision that, while the African state alone is responsible for its external and internal defense, it can call on French help under certain special conditions. Under this provision—Au Maintien de l'Ordre, French forces have intervened at least twelve times in Africa between 1960 and 1964: several times in Chad and the Cameroun to combat 'insurgency'; in Niger in December 1963 to discourage a military uprising against President Diori; twice in Mauritania; in Congo (B) in September 1962; and in Gabon in 1964. The spate of coups, counter-coups, and plots in former French Africa in 1966 brought a warning from President DeGaulle; he warned African military leaders not to spring any more military coups or he would cut off French aid. However, this did not curtail military action, as witnessed by military activities in 1967. Moreover, a few years later, a company of French troops—sent to the C.A.R. ostensibly on a training exercise—thwarted a counter-coup against the regime of coup-maker General Bokassa.
British Military Presence

British defense agreements with her former African dependencies were made exclusively on a bilateral basis; there was no regional organization comparable to the French-sponsored U.A.M.D. However, the basic thrust of the treaties provided for the same contingencies as French agreements: mutual defense, provision of equipment, officer training and a gradual phasing out of metropolitan troops stationed in the Anglophone states. Nevertheless, there was far less British military intervention, save for mutinies in East Africa.

These brief observations point inescapably to the conclusion that African armies, in the immediate post-independence period, were not 'national armies'. Organization and equipment depended heavily on external sources, and most of the trappings of the colonial period were simply carried over, except where the process of independence brought a rupture between the new state (such as Guinea) and the former colonial power. Defense pacts, the dominance of Europeans in the officer corps, and a relatively slow-paced Africanization of command positions—contrasted with Africanization of the civil service—helped to perpetuate the image of the army as an imperialistic expatriate-controlled entity.

Trade Unionism and Decolonization

The colonial tinge of the African military contrasted sharply with the populist image of the African trade union movement in the independence period. Trade unions sought to reach all parts of the labor force and the population itself—to fire them with
anti-colonial fervor; armies remained in their barracks, cut off from direct participation in nationalist activities, and occasionally fought against trade unions and other groups favoring self-government. Trade unions often attracted the best educated, the young modernizers who had studied abroad; the armies were seen as refuges for upstate illiterates. Budding African trade unions dis-associated their organizations from metropolitan unions; European officers held tight control over the military. Armies were instruments of colonial oppression; trade unions served partially as the means of liberation.

Thus, unlike the armies, many trade unions enjoyed an avant-garde position in the fight for independence. "They arose," Berg and Butler write, "in response not to capitalism or industrialism as in the West, but to the colonial situation." The trade unions, especially in the British areas, regarded the expulsion of foreign powers as their primary purpose and, through crippling strikes, they led the fight for independence. As tension and hostility increased, many unionists allied their organizations with the leading political parties. Such informal alliances existed until independence and beyond in some cases and were cemented by an interlocking leadership. A chain of relationships connecting these two groups resulted in the trade unionists becoming second level political leaders, many of whom emerged from the trade union movement to prominence as politicians: Sekou Toure became president of Guinea; Cyrille Adoula became prime minister of the Congo (L); the late Tom Mboya held the positions of secretary-general of KANU and minister
of labor in the Kenyan Government; Michael Kamaliza was minister of labor in Tanganyika; John Tettegah held the same post in Ghana; Rashidi Kawawa became prime minister in Tanganyika; and Abdoulaye Ba was a member of the Senegalese Eastern Regional Assembly and also the National Assembly. In addition to interlocking and secondary political leadership, it was a common practice, especially in the English-speaking states, to give the post of labor minister to a trade unionist. In French-speaking West Africa, trade union leaders held portfolios in seven out of the eight governments.26

Being intimately involved in politics before and sometimes along with the political parties in the nationalist movements, many of the trade unions developed and behaved more as political institutions than as economic and collective bargaining agencies. During this period, political leaders who sought popular support for programs and projects turned to unions and other sympathetic labor-oriented urban groups. Many leaders realized that if their development goals were to be met, then the support and participation of the active urban population had to continue. Thus, these political leaders could not safely ignore pre- and post-independence promises to unionists, for fear of losing their support. On this fact rode much of union strength and bargaining power during the period of decolonization.27

A formidable force in the struggle for independence, the labor movement was logically expected to be equally important in the post-independence period. Moving beyond mere representation of an organized labor force, trade unions were frequently visualized as
important elements in the formation of national development policy and in the implementation of such policy once it was drafted.

**Unions' Assigned Roles in Nation- and State-building**

At independence, the colonial regimes ascribed extraordinary powers to the political leaders who, in turn, ascribed power to their 'mass political parties' and trade unions in their efforts at nation- and state-building. Nation-building, which requires the inculcation of political loyalties to the system as a whole—transcending the bounds of kinship, language and locale, was assigned to the mass parties and the trade unions. Likewise, the task of state-building, which involves efficient administration, economic development, and further specialization and expansion of the civil service, was left to the state bureaucracy and therefore to the trade unions as well, since unions were represented in the state bureaucracy by the civil servants, especially the junior officers. It was natural that trade unions should be involved in state-building because of their educational advantage and strategic role in economic development and leadership. Moreover, because of interlocking relationships among the government leaders, mass political parties and trade unions, many governments continued to rely on this alliance in the post-independence reforging of society.

During decolonization, trade unions were 'drafted' into the process of modernization and economic development by the new governments. Consisting of white-collar workers, government civil servants and public works staffs who were fairly urban, well-educated and integrated into the money economy, trade unions formed one of
the few readily identifiable and mobilizable interest groups in these societies. With such modern assets, trade unions were encouraged to continue to break down tribal, ethnic, linguistic and communal ties by taking in all workers and other elements of the population and integrating them into a new type of society. As nation-builders, unions were expected to bridge the deep cultural and traditional cleavages which result from rapid modernization and to act as agencies of socialization in introducing traditional agrarian populations to the rhythms, patterns and behavior codes of industrial life. Moreover, trade unions were expected to function as educational institutions by providing managerial and technical skills necessary for development. In undertaking these activities on behalf of governments, unions were expected to establish and support other social institutions, such as national cooperatives or local self-help schemes involving improved health conditions in the cities, better housing and improved schools. All these expectations stemmed from the perception of unions as an integral feature of the government's effort towards nation-building and economic development. In Mali, for instance, the labor code promulgated in August 1962 gave unions the right to establish provident schemes, experimental farming stations, educational curricula, and mutual aid and pension funds for union members. The Ghana Trades Union Congress (GTUC), at the urging of the government, undertook a program of technical training for cadres. The National Union of Tanganyikan Workers (NUTA) undertook an adult education program. Many unions readily accepted 'administration' of these social service programs.
Trade unions became natural allies of the government; they had mutual interests and investments in the 'overhead' of programs of development. Urban workers had an immediate stake in improved schools, health and housing facilities. By drawing trade unions and their leaders into the process of planning and operating these facilities, the new governments served their own interests, hoping to avoid at least some of the inherent problems of bureaucracy and centralism. An appreciation of this 'potential' area of union activity was apparent in the Kenyan Government's statement:

Government will assist trade unions to become involved in economic activities such as cooperatives, housing schemes, training schemes, workers' discipline and productivity and, in general, to accept their responsibility.32

In the post-independence period, trade unions were assigned a number of nation-building tasks: programs of literacy training, adult education, women and youth programs, housing, health, as well as trade union training programs. Unions, which for the most part represented skilled workers, school teachers and civil servants, were expected to be the foremen of nation-building.

Unions and State-building

Most African leaders view economic development as their primary objective and, in Africa, the inducement of economic change is an overwhelming task. Unlike Western industrial societies, where economic development was a product of the activities of a private entrepreneurial class, African societies must depend upon state leadership and initiative in the effort to bring about rapid social and economic change. The political leadership of Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Senegal and Tanzania has been acutely aware of the
economic, political and social significance of the unions. Because of their strategic location in the centers of urban populations, their strategic place in the economies of the new states and their concentration in precisely those industries and services on which economic development depends, the trade unions have been viewed as agents through which the government's goal of greater productivity could be achieved.

Perhaps the most significant role projected for the unions by the new governments was that of acting as an agency for capital accumulation. Basing their actions on the assumption that, as consumers, the workers add little to economic development in terms of capital formation, many of the new governments gave serious consideration to using unions to effect savings by workers—savings which could be accumulated in sufficient quantities to permit the unions to make a contribution to capital growth. In Tanzania, for example, the NUTA felt pressures from the government to make some 'positive' contribution to national development and, to this end, a Workers' Investment Corporation (WIC) was constituted. The purpose of this legislation was to keep NUTA's administrative expenditures below forty per cent of total income; the residue would be made available for investment through the WIC. With these anticipated capital resources, the Tanzanian Government envisaged substantial union investments in housing, factories and commercial quarters intended for rental purposes, cooperative shops in conjunction with COSATA (the consumer cooperative organization), and canteens for workers' use, as well as dispensaries which would make medical services available.
to workers and their families.  

In Ghana, a somewhat similar program was established by the Industrial Relations Act of 1958, which provided for the creation of a department through which the GTUC could develop its own enterprises in industry and agriculture. The government required that, out of total dues collected by the national unions, ten per cent was to be allocated for social welfare work and another five per cent was to be channeled directly to a fund concerned with the development of business enterprises. Similar programs were instituted in Mali, Senegal and the Ivory Coast.

In many of the new governments' plans for economic development in the public-owned or -controlled sector, unions were called upon to subordinate immediate wage gains to the development of the state, to educate their members to give up spendthrift habits and to encourage small savings. The economic implications of the governments' behavior were twofold: 1) to restrict consumption; and 2) to bring about an increase in the desired levels of production. The desperate need for capital accumulation and the already great disparities between the incomes of the workers in the industrial sector and those in agriculture readily led government leaders to call upon unionized workers for sacrifices.

Union Responses to Government Demands

In the press for rapid national development, which is always an immediate sequel to the installation of a new government, the leaders of labor organizations are usually the most ardent champions of the goals espoused by the new regime. If the pace
lags, they are also among the most vocal in demanding a speed-up, for unionists are aware that both social change and the success of unionism depend on economic growth. However, at some point in the partnership, conflicts arise, sometimes related to the means of achieving the mutually desired goals and sometimes reflecting personal power struggles. Trade unionists are confronted by an ambivalent situation: trying to satisfy the claims of the union membership without transgressing the claims of their political partnership. If they ignore the wage demands of the membership, unions risk losing members and their power base. On the other hand, governments and political parties exert strong pressures for resistance to such demands, until development plans are more firmly established. Thus, the question of how much development versus how much consumption may loom large, and mutual agreement that rapid development is necessary does not preclude conflicting interpretation of the specifics involved.

Although the union leaders committed themselves to accepting the goals of national development at an early period following independence, most were loath to surrender the main weapons which had provided them with success. Where governments attempted to impose forced savings activities upon workers, there appeared strenuous objections. The Sekondi-Takoradi strike of 1961 is a case in point. The strike developed largely as a protest against a government scheme to deduct five per cent from the wages of all workers with incomes of over 120 pounds a year. The deducted monies were to have been invested in development bonds earning 2.5 per cent
day strike involved 10,000 workers and took substantial government intervention—an ultimatum by Nkrumah and imprisonment of forty-eight strikers—to end it. Considering that the strike was vehemently condemned by the national trade union leadership, especially John Tettegah, the ability of the workers to remain on strike for such a long period provides a rough index of the workers' reactions to the forced savings proposal.

Similar sensitivity to government methods of forcing capital accumulation developed in Tanganyika. In August 1963, the Tanganyikan Government announced its intentions of taking over management of the ports and the dockworkers' union the following year. When this announcement was made, the dockworkers vociferously demanded that provident funds, then being held by the private employers of dockworkers, be returned in cash. The considerable distrust and hostility to the intentions of the government were made clear at a mass meeting, during which the minister of labor, Kamallza, tried to address the workers. He was shouted down despite the promise of a $28 bonus for those workers who complied with the government's measures. The government received another blow when the NUTA failed to accumulate substantial sums for investment purposes. For example, Kamallza projected the construction of 3,000 houses with required capital of $5,600,000; at the first annual conference of NUTA, he reported the construction of only six model houses.

Generally, parallel responses were generated by trade unions toward government productivity programs. In many new states,
the government tried to reorient the unions towards higher productivity goals by enacting legislation limiting the right to strike. In Kenya, strike control was initially attempted in February 1964 through a tripartite agreement in which unions would forego strikes and wage claims for one year in exchange for a guaranteed increase in the number of government employees. Despite this agreement, by June 1964 there had already been 150 strikes as compared with 230 for the entire previous year. Ultimately, this situation contributed to government takeover of the two competing national trade union centers. Similar occurrences took place in Guinea, Ghana, Senegal, Mali and the Ivory Coast: In Guinea, the Executive Committee of the teachers' union was replaced following the teachers' strike in 1961; in Ghana, John Tetteghah, who had established a significant measure of control over the GTUC and was using his power as a member of the CPP's seven-man central executive committee to push through union legislation, was replaced by party decision in the spring of 1962. Even when legislation was adopted in state after state limiting the use of the strike, unionists remained obdurate and autonomous, thereby forcing government leaders to look to more direct takeovers of the trade unions as solutions to their problems.

That the unions failed, in many cases, to fulfill the roles projected for them by government is hardly surprising. Unions continued in roles they had assumed for themselves during the pre-independence period of growth, which were influenced by imported Western models of trade unionism. These models were frankly consumptionist and stressed that the prime function of unions was to increase
the living standards of their members. Reinforced by considerable successes, supported by their membership, and taking advantage of their strategic place in the economy, the unions were able to win wage increases, benefits, and improvements in working conditions. Although they were unable to challenge the government leadership and 'mass political party' directly, unions were continually able to mobilize their followers on economic issues.

Comparison: The Influence of the Unions and the Military

A comparison of the armed forces and the leading trade union component, the civil service, in terms of Africanization and pay scales will further substantiate the degree of significance of these two organizations in post-independence politics. Independence brought changes far more rapidly in the administrative sectors of African states than in the military sector. The pace of Africanization differed dramatically. Replacing European cadres in the civil service was a first order priority. This task was eased by accelerated retirement and pension schemes and by absorption of former colonial civil servants into the national civil service. In the armed services, however, the replacement of Europeans in command positions was relatively leisurely—at least until mutinies or political decisions to limit foreign influence in the military occurred.

During this period, trade unionists were able to convince and pressure government leaders into initiating programs for rapid Africanization. Arguments for Africanization usually revolved around the thesis that: 1) independence is meaningless unless it is matched by the ability of the people to run or control their own
institutions; and 2) political independence without an administration which is African in complexion would eventually lead to disharmony. In addition to this twofold thesis, several corollaries were advanced. First, it was argued that there existed some posts which were extremely sensitive from the national point of view and these key posts—such as police commissioners, defense ministers, foreign service officers—should be taken over by Africans as soon as possible. Government leaders became increasingly discomfitted politically when their independent states were represented by non-nationals at foreign negotiations dealing with trade, agriculture, finance and other civil service matters. Unionists and other nationalist groups voiced the prevalent suspicion that British, French or other European officials acting in behalf of the new state might not sincerely represent the interests of that state. Moreover, these groups felt that African officials could be expected to be in tune with local psychology, character and attitudes. The second corollary asserted that it was more economical to employ local rather than expatriate personnel, considering such 'capital drains' as housing, travel expenses, and remittance of savings to home countries. It was also felt that stability could be ensured only by the build-up of a local cadre of officers whose careers and fortunes were linked with those of the state and who were bound to their jobs by financial benefits and national loyalty. The final argument was patriotic in that national pride demanded that all relations between a government and its citizens should be conducted by the citizens of that state. In essence, the real justification for Africanization, according to the
unionists, was every state's natural desire to manage its own affairs.

National pride and prestige, coupled with the arguments delineated above, were convincing enough to institute rapid Africanization—and the benefits that went with it—for unionized workers in the civil service, transport services, and the public corporations. The contrast between the civil service and the military officer corps in terms of pay scales and the pace of Africanization was striking in many states. As Table 5 illustrates, Ghana's military in 1957 contained a mere 12.8 per cent or 27 African officers, compared to 87.2 per cent or 184 Europeans or Asians, while approximately 40 per cent of the civil service officers were Africans. Similar tendencies were shown in Nigeria and Sierra Leone. In the former, Africans composed 15.1 per cent (57 officers) of the military officer corps, compared to 84.9 per cent (320) Europeans or Asians; in the latter, 84.8 per cent (50 officers) were Europeans or Asians, compared with 15.2 per cent (9 officers) for the Africans. Yet, in both states, more than 40 per cent of the civil service officer corps were Africans.46

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Year of Independence</th>
<th>Approximate Size of Army</th>
<th>Commissioned Officers</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanganyika</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the Congo (K), Belgian army officers were retained while European civil servants were replaced. According to Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, "We are not, just because the Congo is independent, going to turn a second class soldier into a general." Yet Africanization of the civil service showed a rapid increase even though only about fourteen Congolese had college degrees at the time of independence.

The budgets of many new African states remained under ten per cent for the military, in contrast to tremendous salary increases for civil servants and other unionized workers. The annual defense budgets in Table 6 clearly show the relatively low priority accorded military expenditures. The $322,000,000 spent by the Republic of South Africa in 1965 for its armed services was sixteen per cent more than the total military expenditures of the twenty-eight states in Central, East and West Africa. In the colonial period, a third of the French West African recruits received privileges such as the right to vote and parity of pensions with French metropolitan rates. But when the armies were turned over to the new states in the early 1960's, these servicemen had to accept pay cuts and reduced standards in all states except Senegal and the Ivory Coast. In Nigeria and Ghana discharged soldiers received meager pensions and gratuities: For example, an ex-serviceman with a total disability drew only three pounds a month. Generals Afrifa and Ocran aptly described the conditions in Ghana:

...troops went about in tattered uniforms, often without boots on their feet...Even the officers went about in very unpresentable uniforms...The commanders were really hard put to it. They had known and had been accustomed to high standards of turnout and cleanliness. What then could they do to soldiers who turned out on parade in torn uniforms...soldiers with no polish or shine on their boots or with their toes showing through their canvas shoes?
TABLE 6

EXPENDITURES AND THE AFRICAN ARMIES*

| Nation                        | Size of Armed Forces | Police and Other Security Forces | Approximate Annual Defense Budget+++
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun (1960)</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>5,900</td>
<td>$15,600,000 (1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (B) (1960)</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>3,700,000 (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey (1960)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>1,100,000 (1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana (1957)</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>35,300,000 (1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea (1958)</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>5,800,000 (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast (1960)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>2,280</td>
<td>8,700,000 (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali (1960)</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>8,700,000 (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger (1960)</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>3,400,000 (1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal (1960)</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>9,000,000 (1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone (1961)</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,200,000 (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo (1960)</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta (1960)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,335</td>
<td>2,800,000 (1963)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


+Refers to the estimated strength of standing armies and other clearly military forces, normally under the ministry of defense.

++These differ from 'armed forces' in that they are concerned primarily with maintenance of law and order, are usually under the ministry of interior and are normally untrained in military tactics. However, some are paramilitary in organization and function, thus complicating the task of distinguishing policemen from soldiers.

+++These are informed but rough estimates of defense-operating budgets only and should not be regarded as a record of actual expenditures. Precise details on the extent of foreign subsidies and grants to African armies are closely guarded and, even when made available, are often incomplete.

#This figure does not include the budget for police and other security forces.
The British established a Ghana Legion which was affiliated with the British Legion. Such organizations were established by Britain in her former colonies to provide pensions, social benefits and the operation of villages for disabled veterans. However, Nkrumah combined this legion with the ex-servicemen’s union (which had supported him prior to independence) and allegedly used money allotted by the British Government for political ends.\textsuperscript{49} The memoirs of General Ocran provide excellent illustrations of the decline in benefits for the military:

When the British were here our interests were better protected. Members of the military could travel at reduced fares on public transport; were given privileged shopping facilities through the NAADI; had special housing schemes, retirement homes, furnished bungalows and other amenities.

Nkrumah, after squandering millions of Ghana’s hard-ear ned pounds, ordered the immediate withdrawal or curtailment of the small amenities and benefits enjoyed by members of the forces. Free passages abroad for children were cancelled...travelling allowances were reduced to such a low level that government servants could not afford to use their cars for daily journeys; rent was increased...

One day they (army officers) were to pay for electricity; the next day they were to lose their training allowances; the following day, they were to lose their travelling facilities...We all wondered what was happening to us...\textsuperscript{50}

In contrast to the low priority accorded the military, the organized union workers received outlandish privileges. In five years of independence, Nigeria’s civil service increased by fifty per cent. In Ghana there were 60,000 trained professionals by 1960; one in six was self-employed; of the remainder, two-thirds were employed in the public sector.\textsuperscript{51} In 1961 the ‘political class’ in the Congo (K) received salary hikes of 380 per cent, while school teachers, civil servants and other government employees gained increases
of 96 per cent, 93 per cent and 115 per cent, respectively. In the Central African Republic, 81 per cent of the budget went to the civil service and, of that amount, 58 per cent was allotted for salaries alone. In the Congo (B), expenditures for government personnel rose 88.8 per cent in four years, to constitute 62 per cent of the budget; the population at this time (January 1964) was 826,000, of which 10,931 were state employees. In the Ivory Coast, there were 15,000 civil servants—less than 0.5 per cent of the total population, but they received 58 per cent of the budget. Senegal’s 1962 budget was five times that of 1957. In the Cameroun, the administration swallowed 18,550 million CFA francs, while capital expenditure was only 1,409 million CFA francs. Guinea’s administrative expenditures rose by 80 per cent between 1959 and 1962. During the same period, Mali experienced a 60 per cent rise. However, the record is held by Dahomey, where civil servants absorbed 64.9 per cent of the budget.52

Through pressures, the trade unionists—especially the civil servants—received not only expatriate pay but also ‘colonial’ privileges like the system of subsidized rentals, car allowances and a free passage to Europe each leave. Along with the phenomenally rapid growth of the government-employed elite went an equally rapid rise in social status and living standards. When expatriates left the civil service, Africans stepped into their posts and inherited their pay rates. In Nigeria, where twenty-nine pounds was the per capita income, a ministry’s permanent secretary drew 2,500 pounds in basic salary.53 In Francophone states, a deputy worked three months out of the year and received 120,000 to 165,000 francs a month all
year around. Thus, in six months (or a month and a half of actual work), the deputy earned as much as the average peasant did in thirty-six years—a whole lifetime of hard labor.\textsuperscript{54} Deputies, ministers and the elements of the civil service constituted a highly privileged group whose members supported each other. Because of the assimilation policy and strikes for equality—whereby the colonies were to be put on the same footing as France, a Gabonese deputy earned more than the British MP: 165,000 CFA francs, compared to the equivalent of about 100,000 francs for a British MP.\textsuperscript{55}

The post-independence period found the government leaders and trade unionists in an informal alliance, while members of the armies remained on the sidelines. Political enthusiasm ran high. A bandwagon effect helped to mobilize support or at least votes behind the mass party.\textsuperscript{56} Government leaders and trade unionists enjoyed the fruits of Independence, as reflected in burgeoning salary increases, while the armies of Africa lacked channels to make their wishes known—owing to the continued influence of the former colonial powers, anti-military attitudes held by the public, and political leaders' suspicion and distrust. Accordingly, government leaders tended to ignore the soldiers and work on more familiar constituencies: teachers, public works officials and other civil service officials. Distribution of post-Independence 'rewards' seemed to pass the military by. Such neglect soon manifested itself in mutinies, the second stage of West African politics.
FOOTNOTES


2 Ruth First, *Power in Africa*, pp. 27, 73.


10 First, *op. cit.*, pp. 215, 435.


13 See *ibid.*, p. 20.

14 *Africa*, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-102.


31 The role of administering social services is not unusual for unions in many parts of the world. Russia's unions, for example, conduct social service activities as a main part of their work. In the non-communist world, unions in Scandinavia and the Netherlands all conduct social service activities and some free enterprises in the U.S. handle some social service activities. For more on this point, see William Friedland, "Labor's Role in Emerging African Socialist States," Beling, op. cit., Chapter 2.


40 Kamallza, op. cit., p. 11.

41 Africa Political, Cultural and Social, February 1964 and July 1964.


43 Africanization is defined as the process of transforming a colonial-type civil service into a national service. It implies the control of key policy advising and formulating posts by citizens. The civil service comprises all servants of the state other than holders of political or judicial offices.


45 Ibid., pp. 109, et seq.

46 Lee, op. cit., p. 45; and Welch, ed., op. cit., p. 9.


48 Ocran, op. cit., pp. 45-47; and Afrifa, op. cit., p. 104.

49 Alexander, African Tightrope, p. 17.

50 Ocran, op. cit., pp. 41-43.


53 First, op. cit., p. 106.


55 Ibid.

CHAPTER VII

STAGE 2 PERIOD OF DISENCHANTMENT AND BLACKMAIL

Direct military involvement in the political life of the African states came initially through mutinies. Their proximate causes appear to have been dissatisfaction within the ranks over such internal issues as promotion, Africanization and pay scales. Though they had a direct impact on politics, the mutinies were not directly political. The revolts," Welch explains, "primarily represented insubordination to officers, not direct rebellion seeking to displace elected officials." The causes were intrinsic to the army, not extrinsic to the political system.

Africanization of the officer corps had barely begun in most of the sub-Saharan states, especially the Anglophone states, when the colonial powers 'withdrew'. Many government leaders continued to neglect the military in terms of pay scales and Africanization; the leaders viewed it as their duty to assure a continuation of the policy of military neglect instituted during the period of decolonization.

The mutinies in the Congo (K) and East Africa and the mutiny-coup in Togo will be surveyed in order to delineate and analyze those factors that led to the military's political involvement during Stage 2.

First African Mutiny: Congo (K), 1960

Unlike the French or British, the Belgians sent no metropolitan troops for the colonial occupation of the Belgian Congo. The
Congo had to be quickly organized so that it would conquer itself. Therefore, Belgium created and organized the Force Publique in 1888 and, by 1897, it numbered 14,000 men, of which 12,000 were Congolese. To minimize the likelihood of tribal military rebellion, the Belgians resorted to social engineering: There were explicit instructions that platoons had to be scrambled to contain representatives of at least four tribes. As a result, a lack of esprit de corps and cohesion existed within each unit, making a centralized command structure very difficult to institute. The Europeans who composed the small corps of expatriate officers were mercenaries recruited with the assigned purpose of conquering the Congo. According to General Emile Jannsens, the Belgian commander, the least promising individuals—the pupils who had been expelled from school, the refuse of the nation—made up the officer corps, NCO’s and recruits of Force Publique. Nowhere was an army used more ruthlessly as the tool of colonial coercion than in the Belgian Congo. The Force Publique attained a high degree of cohesive proficiency in ‘disciplining’ Congolese for offenses ranging from tax evasion to religious zeal, acquiring in the process a reputation for strong-arm methods that verged on gangsterism.

At the time of independence, the Force Publique consisted of 25,000 men, with only three Congolese holding the rank of sergeant-major and no Congolese officers. What plans there were for African-ization would have taken generations to fulfill. Many of the Congolese troops felt that the fruits of independence had eluded them. Their suspicions were confirmed by two speeches, made by Prime
Minister Lumumba and Force Publique commander, General Janssens. In a speech before the Congo Executive College two months before independence, Lumumba told his audience:

It is essential that the Force Publique, the only force available, stays intact. It must pass under the command of the Congolese Government exactly as it is—with its officer class, its junior officers, its traditions, its discipline, its unique hierarchy and, above all, its morale unshaken. Continuity entailed limitations on immediate promotions—a stricture which many Congolese soldiers were unwilling to accept. General Janssens provided the immediate trigger for the mutiny in a speech before a sullen group of officers and soldiers at the Leopoldville military camp. To emphasize a point, he wrote on the board "Before Independence = After Independence." This display infuriated the soldiers, who proceeded to riot and arrest and dismiss all European officers. Eventually, the demands of the Congolese soldiers were met in terms of Africanization and pay raises. The Congolese soldiers were given an astronomical pay increase of 450 per cent and every soldier was promoted at least two grades. The aftermath of the July 1960 mutiny was a clear indication of the military's bargaining power.

There were unconfirmed reports of a short-lived army revolt in one of the military installations in Bangui, Central African Republic, in September 1963. Discontent over pay and lack of amenities was cited as the cause.

East African Mutinies

The confidence of General Janssens was more than matched by that of Prime Minister Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika. Shortly
after the Congo mutiny, Nyerere declared:

These things cannot happen here. First, we have a strong organization, Tanganyika African National Union (T.A.N.U.). The Congo did not have that kind of organization...There is not the slightest chance that the forces of law and order in Tanganyika will mutiny.11

Three and a half years later, after Nyerere had devoted considerable attention to reorganizing T.A.N.U. and assuring military loyalty, the first battalion and then the second battalion mutinied and marched into Dar es Salaam, demanding higher pay and total Africanization of the officer corps.

Tanganyika's army, which had its origins in the colonial King's African Rifles' sixth and twenty-sixth regiments, had never been a factor in politics prior to January 1964. However, following independence, the army—consisting of two battalions totaling 2,000 men—remained British-trained and British-commanded. The officer corps consisted of 64 commissioned officers, of which 58 or 90.6 per cent were European or Asian, compared to 6 or 9.4 per cent African. Moreover, until the mutiny, all officers above the rank of captain were British. Of the approximately $1,750,000 for the annual defense budget, Britain directly contributed two-thirds of the maintenance costs, including supplies and equipment,12 as illustrated in Table 4, Chapter V.

By the end of 1963, thirty-five officers in the Tanganyikan army were African, of whom about half were warrant officers. Still, complaints began to arise within army ranks over the slow pace of Africanization and low pay; the soldiers complained that their pay of $14.70 a month was less than that of the unskilled workers. The
officer corps; upper ranks were still dominated by the twenty-nine Englishmen who composed all officers above the rank of major. In addition to complaints about Africanization and pay scales, resentment arose over the appointment of young Israeli-trained officers who were promoted over longtime KAR NCO's.

There was evidence that the slow rate of Africanization was partly due to Nyerere's attitude. At a press conference in Washington D.C., responding to questions about his government's military plans and needs, Nyerere flatly stated, "We'd rather spend our money on bread." Idealism and economic problems had originally led him to think in terms of dispensing with an army altogether. As late as April 1961, a few months before independence, Nyerere was inclined to disband his share of the KAR when the time for turnover came. Prudence, prestige considerations and the Congo situation eventually led him back to a conventional position on this matter, although he remained skeptical about the political dangers of an army.

Thus, out of necessity, Nyerere was forced to retain an armed force. However, he took steps to keep the military out of politics: Promotions, for instance, were not via political channels but by a selected board of civil service officers. Simultaneously, Africanization was to be a gradual process, taking ten years to complete. Nyerere's plans were in direct opposition to British plans, which called for complete localization of the officer corps by the end of 1964. However, the British plan was blocked by a state house circular calling for a slow down in Africanization—an attempt to accommodate non-Africans who had opted for Tanganyikan citizenship.
under the provisions of the independence constitution. Stipulating that the nation must use the entire reservoir of skilled and experienced personnel, the circular asserted, "We cannot allow the growth of first and second class citizenship, Africanization is dead." This statement was a blow, especially to men in the army who were preoccupied with promotion prospects. The Tanganyikan Federation of Labour (T.F.L.) took issue with the deceleration of Africanization, especially since the state house circular also applied to the civil service. Teendwa Washington, member of the local government workers' union, asserted that Nyerere was taking Tanganyika back to the colonial days. Nyerere's efforts to slow down Africanization were based on his conviction that a multiracial society should award appointments and promotions on merit regardless of race.

At the time of the mutiny, the British plan for localization was molding in the Government Office, even though its specific provisions—such as the early promotion of three African officers to the rank of major—would have been an answer to some of the grievances. Nevertheless, on January 20, 1964, troops of the first battalion moved from Colito Barracks to Dar es Salaam, where they took control of such key points as the radio and police stations, airports, the State House and the home of President Nyerere, who had gone into seclusion. After deposing and shipping British officers to Nairobi, the mutineers stated their demands: higher pay and the complete Africanization of the officer corps. In a confrontation with President Nyerere, the leaders of the mutiny insisted that they wanted no coup, but reiterated their demands for a wage increase,
from $14.70 to $37 a month for privates. Soldiers' pay had fallen since independence in both Tanzania and Uganda, where army pay was regarded as having a relatively low priority—partly a reflection of the government leaders' view of the armed forces as relics of imperialism and not really their own. The confrontation between the mutineers and the President remained in limbo until disenchanted trade unionists and opposition politicians attempted to exploit the situation for a complete overthrow of Nyerere's government. During the week of January 20-27, the infectious revolt spread to the second battalion at Tabora, and to armed forces in Uganda and Kenya. However, the respective governments of Uganda and Kenya requested and received British troops to subdue their mutineers, who were also demanding higher pay scales and complete Africanization of the armed forces.

Fearing the spread of discontent to the police force and the attempts by subversive elements to exploit the situation, Nyerere called upon British troops to restore order. On January 27, the British commandos landed from the HMS Centaur, lying off the coast, and took control of Colito Barracks.

The top ranks of the army were Africanized: A former British-trained lieutenant, M.S.H. Sarakikya, was appointed brigadier and commander of the defense forces, and H. Ellsh Karana, another British trainee, was appointed second in command. However, the Nyerere Government's determination to prevent a reoccurrence of such events resulted in the disbanding of the army. "No popular government can tolerate an army that disobeys its instructions," said
President Nyerere, as he sought to remedy the situation in Tanganyika,²⁰ All privates in the first battalion were dismissed. A National Service composed mainly of party members was institutionalized.²¹ The purpose of this national service was to form a new army by providing recruits and indoctrinating them in government activities, especially nation-building. The British practice of refusing soldiers the right to political participation was banned. Kawawa, the second vice president, informed recruits of their rights as citizens and their participation in politics.²² Police, soldiers and whole company units responded en masse to Kawawa's appeal to join T.A.N.U. Officers were expected to do party liaison work and also to explain to troops their role in national development.²³

However, the essential point was that, as a result of the East African mutinies, army pay in Tanganyika increased by 500 per cent, which figure may include part of the expenditures for the creation of a new army. In Uganda, army pay increased by 600 per cent, as shown in Table 7. The Congo mutiny and the East African mutinies brought special attention to the welfare of the armed forces and established the military as a force to be reckoned with in the near future. Perhaps the event that had the most impact on political leaders throughout Africa was the mutiny-coup d'etat of January 1963 in Togo.

**Mutiny-Coup d'Etat In Togo**

The events of January 1963 revolved around the policies of the dynamic President Sylvaus Olympio, a former businessman of Brazilian extraction who had led his small country to independence on
April 27, 1960. As leader of the former United Nations Trust Territory, Olympio pursued a course of financial austerity: He balanced current expenditures without resorting to external economic assistance. However, one of the main victims of these austerity programs was the small army of 200 men, inherited from the French at independence. Under Olympio's program, the 1962 annual defense budget was only $500.24

However, Olympio's problems were just beginning. The reduction of French military installations in Africa, due to the end of the Algerian War and re-orientation of French military defense policy toward a nuclear strategy, produced a cutback in manpower. As a result of this cutback, a contingent of 625 Togolese troops was deposited on the struggling economy of Togo.25

The returning veterans, organized by Sergeant Emmanuel Bodjolle, became a powerful pressure group, working for the expansion of Togo's minute two-company army and their subsequent absorption into it. These veterans were supported by the French military adviser, who also favored a larger force. Partly on the grounds of expense and his estimate of relative social priorities, Olympio was reluctant to expand his defense forces. Moreover, he had a natural aversion to re-employing these professional soldiers because he suspected their political motives and regarded their role in the Algerian War as a betrayal of the cause of African independence.26 On January 12, 1963, the returned veterans petitioned the President to increase the size of the Togolese army; he rebuffed them and labeled them as mercenaries, telling the Bodjolle delegation, "I shall use
The President believed that these veterans had no greater claim on their home country than any other unemployed Togolese, and he agreed to enlarge the army by 100 men—from groups other than the returned veterans. Following Olympio's decision, a small group of the rebuffed veterans, led by Sergeant Bodjolle and Etienne Eyadema, surrounded the presidential residence and shot Olympio as he tried to escape to the American Embassy. Olympio's death appeared to have been unpremeditated; having killed the President, the veterans did not know what to do next. They did not attempt to form a government. Eventually the veterans called upon Nicholas Grunitzky, exiled politician and brother-in-law of Olympio, to form a military-controlled government. Of course, Grunitzky quickly appeased the veterans and the army was enlarged by two companies.

**The Political Rise of the Military**

It was the mutiny-coup in Togo, along with the Congo and East African mutinies, that established the political significance of the armed forces. Many of the African leaders were shocked by the events in Togo and refused to recognize the new military-dominated government. Moreover, during this period, politicians realized the power potential of the army as a lever to be used against their opponents. The military became the Instruments of the politicians, as attested to by the Congo (K) coup of September 1963, the Gabon 'coup' in February 1964, and the aborted coups in Niger in December 1963 and in Senegal in December 1962.
### Table 7

**Comparative Change in Military Expenditures, 1961-65**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Size of Armed Forces (In thousands)</th>
<th>Military Expenditures (In millions of $)</th>
<th>Per Cent Change 1961-65</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'61 '62 '63 '64 '65</td>
<td>'61 '62 '63 '64 '65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>4 5 5 5 5</td>
<td>8 19 14 17 15</td>
<td>25 87.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.A.R.</td>
<td>— — — — —</td>
<td>1 1 1 1 2</td>
<td>3 — 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (B)</td>
<td>1 1 1 1 2</td>
<td>2 4 4 5 5</td>
<td>0 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>1 1 1 1 1</td>
<td>1 1 1 4 4</td>
<td>0 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>10 10 10 10 10</td>
<td>28 33 62 39 42</td>
<td>0 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>5 5 5 5 5</td>
<td>4 6 6 5 11</td>
<td>0 175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>4 4 4 4 4</td>
<td>4 4 8 11 13</td>
<td>0 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2 3 3 3 3</td>
<td>8 9 5 9 10</td>
<td>50 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>— — — — —</td>
<td>1 1 2 3 5</td>
<td>6 — 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>4 4 4 4 4</td>
<td>3 6 8 11 15</td>
<td>0 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1 2 2 2 2</td>
<td>3 2 5 2 3</td>
<td>100 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>— 1 1 1 1</td>
<td>— 1 1 3 3</td>
<td>0 200*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>— — — — —</td>
<td>1 1 2 3 3</td>
<td>3 — 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>3 3 3 3 3</td>
<td>NA NA 8 8 8</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>2 2 3 3 3</td>
<td>NA NA 1 7 9</td>
<td>50 800**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1 2 2 2 2</td>
<td>NA 1 1 3 6</td>
<td>100 500**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
(Computation of percentages by the author)*

NA = Not Applicable (refers to pre-independence period).
— = None or Negligible.
++ = Data for the first year of independence.
As a result of mutinies and other instances of instability, the political value of the military began to rise. Africanization and pay raises were accelerated, as indicated in Table 7. Although a per cent change and breakdown in military expenditures by rank would have been more valid, nevertheless the per cent change in military expenditures for 1961-65 does provide a significant indicator of the rise of the military's political influence. (Note the rise in military expenditures for Uganda and Tanzania following the East African mutinies of 1964.)

Similarly, a rise in Africanization was also experienced in French West Africa following limited military involvement in the political sphere.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Per Cent of African Officers</th>
<th>Africans Training In France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Rep.</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (B)</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Political Decline of Trade Unionism

Prior to independence, the consumptionist orientation and
activities of the unions were fully consistent with the political goals of the nationalist movements for several reasons. First, the colonial governments were the major employers; secondly, most private employers were expatriates and identified with the colonial governments. Increasing the living standards of the workers served to drain the resources of the expatriates and the colonialists. In the period of decolonization, consumptionist activities continued, due to pre-independence promises and alliances between unionists and government leaders. But, with the rise of the military, unions generally became less significant in domestic politics as the governments and their 'mass political parties' sought more responsibilities for the operation of the entire economy. More than ever, the political leadership found itself in the role of the former British and French employers in dealing with unions. The question of whether the loyalties which existed between unionists and political leaders before and after independence would override economic problems, or whether these problems would overcome former loyalties, was largely placed in the background as centralization, consolidation and economic development became top priority government goals.

Generally lacking in substantial numbers of investment-oriented entrepreneurs, African states must rely for their economic dynamism upon massive politico-administrative efforts, in the creation and implementation of centralized development plans. Central planning is, in effect, a functional substitute for private capitalism. To be effective, however, such an economic approach necessitates a high degree of governmental control over major sectors of the
economy, including such factors as wages and, to a large extent, labor conduct. Unanticipated wage increases or sporadic strikes can upset the balance of a comprehensive development plan and critically jeopardize its chances of success. Yet, the curtailment of wage increases could ignite such sporadic strikes.

In the West, unions appeared after industrialization and thus organized workers were not in a position to challenge prevailing wages or working conditions; as a result, capital accumulation and national development could take place. However, this situation did not prevail in West Africa: relatively well-organized trade unions were already in existence at the earliest phase of economic development. Consequently, many trade unions were in positions to challenge the curtailment of wage increases and to make demands on the political system at a less mature stage of industrialization. As unions sought to increase wages and the government acted to control inflation and wages, and to implement centralized development plans, a constant struggle was created.31

In this struggle, many government leaders attempted to define the role of the trade unions in state-planned economic development. Nyerere made reference not only to unions and parties being "legs" of the same nationalist movement32 but also to the case of the right hand helping the left.33 Nkrumah referred to the nation as a "great tree", with the Convention People's Party acting as the roots and the trunk, and the unions and other organizations constituting the branches.34 Senghor called the party and the unions "Siamese twins."35 But, as the political leadership came to grips with the
realities of national and economic development, they discovered that, while unions and party might be 'legs of the same body', the unions were not always marching in the same directions. Nevertheless, the government remained adamant in its position that the trade unionists must break with consumptionist activities and make contributions to national development. The unions must therefore cease their concern with extracting higher wages and better conditions from employers (governments) and begin to act as disciplinary agencies and to implement governmental development plans. This implied that, in order to be effectively involved in nation-building, unions must play a broad 'productionist role' in terms of taking on major responsibility for increasing overall economic output while accepting conditions of austerity, so that the entire society might benefit.

**Government Apprehension towards Unionism**

The political leadership in many African states was acutely aware of the economic, political and social significance of the trade unions. The unions' strategic position in the national economy and in centers of urban population put them in an effective situation relative to the modern sector. As a result, unions constituted a potential threat to the political leadership, particularly since they are traditionally oriented toward channeling discontent. This position was exacerbated by growing unemployment in the urban centers. In addition, many of these unions had at their disposal a communications network independent of the mass party. They were capable of acting autonomously for purposes of mobilizing the crucial sectors of the masses and the economy against the government.
Facing serious problems of organizational weakness, limited penetration of society by political structures and the fragility of formal institutions, the African governments feared the power potential of the unions, which were among the best organized and disciplined mass movements within their societies. Thus, many governments have manifested a reluctance to permit the existence of autonomous centers of power which obviously represent potential, if not actual, sources of opposition.

Perhaps of equal importance was the concern of governments that, if given a relatively free hand, trade unions would sabotage economic development programs through their unceasing pressure for higher wages and improved working conditions. Related to this was the fact that roughly thirty-five per cent of the organized workers was engaged in fields which might be broadly characterized as public service: transport, communications, civil service and other public works. As the employers of the largest single segment of organized workers in their countries, African governments were highly sensitive to trade unions' demands.

Allowing for minor deviations, most African governments perceived trade unions as organized segments of society to be continuously scrutinized and carefully held in check. 'Held in check' became synonymous with subordination of unions to government leaders and the mass party. To consolidate their control and also to limit the potentially powerful unions, government leaders in many African states institutionalized firm control over workers' organizations and activities.
Government Regulations and Trade Unionism

In terms of resources and strategies for instituting political control over trade unions, the African governments possessed overwhelming advantages. In many cases, strategies used by colonial administrations to control the nationalist movements and the unions were simply adopted wholesale by newly independent governments to suppress, integrate and consolidate trade unions into the 'mass party'. Everywhere, the government party brought to bear a combination of rewards and punishments—rewards for unions and union leaders who were prepared to accept the role designated by the party, and punishment and harassment for those who were recalcitrant. The rewards have included: 1) money; 2) direct subsidies and new headquarters (as in Ghana); 3) indirect aid by establishing the checkoff system (as in Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania); and 4) most important of all, political plums to union leaders—ambassadorships, places on executive and consultative agencies, or seats in parliament. It is probably no coincidence that Alioune Cisse, a former CGT militant who became a mover in the creation of a labor organization friendly to the Senegalese Government, was later appointed ambassador to Guinea. Likewise, the nascent opposition of the Tanganyika Federation of Labor (T.F.L.) to the T.A.N.U. was dissipated, at least temporarily, by the appointment of C. S. K. Tumbo as high commissioner in London and of Michael Kamaliza as minister of health and labor. Tumbo soon resigned his position but his absence during the debate on Tanganyika's new industrial legislation allowed for easier passage of the Industrial Relations Act, which regulated trade unions. The
checkoff system strengthened unions in Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania con-
ciderably, especially in financial terms. However, this financial
strengthening did not mean that the unions had greater autonomous
strength than before. Indeed, the respective governments of the
three states took steps to ensure that the enhanced powers of the
unions did not get out of hand. In Tanzania, for instance, President
Nyerere appointed the two main officials of N.U.T.A. and designated
Kamaliza, who was minister of labor, as general secretary of N.U.T.A.
Kamaliza retained his ministership and his seat in Nyerere's cabinet.
In Ghana, President Nkrumah appointed GTUC leader John Tettegah to
his cabinet. These rewards were powerful instruments and frequently
sufficed to bring trade unions into an alliance or an association
with the party.

However, when 'rewards' such as the above failed to accom-
plish the desired goal of consolidation, government leaders used a
number of tactics to punish and harass those trade unions in opposi-
tion. Such tactics have included: 1) Imprisonment and exile of union
leaders. In Guinea, trade union leaders were jalled for fomenting
illegal strikes, and four trade union leaders in the Cameroun were
imprisoned after convening a congress of labor federation. Such
incidents also occurred in Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Niger and the
Congo (B). 2) Use of governmental machinery to suppress strikes.
During the civil servants' strikes in Senegal, the government fired
all workers that failed to return to work; in the Ivory Coast, more
than 500 established civil servants were dismissed and another 300
were suspended for a month. Strikes by civil servants in Ghana
and Tanganyika were also severely repressed. 3) When unions were regarded as irreconcilable, the government encouraged a split in the labor movement and/or created a rival union more friendly to the government. Senegal is a classic example of this ploy: the Union Progressiste Senegalaise, the government party, encouraged a split in UGTAN and, with the aid of Cisse, created a labor organization friendly to the UPS.41 A similar occurrence took place in Zambia. 4) The use of the legislative weapon, through which it was possible to forbid strikes, to regulate collective bargaining, to establish administrative scrutiny over internal union affairs, to demand fiscal accountability, and to cancel membership registration. This weapon has been used in nearly all the African states. However, the practice was more widespread in Ghana and Tanzania where, through the Industrial Relations Act, the governments took control of the trade unions. And 5) Surveillance, inspection, registration and compulsory arbitration.42 The labor movement, if not completely subordinated to the party, was at least pliable and responsive to party pressures.

This is not meant to suggest that unions lacked important means of preserving autonomy. Although the trend towards a consolidation of political power over trade unions was practiced in virtually all independent African states, there was wide variation in actual control of unions by the government. Many African trade unions remained relatively free of political supervision and could produce a style of union activity directly reminiscent of the AFL-CIO. At the other extreme were those unions which had been so fully integrated
into the political system that they were virtually indistinguishable from the government itself. Yet, even in those states where the absorption of unions had been most complete, the trade unions were not mere puppets. In Ghana and Guinea, for example, strikes have taken place despite government control. Within this enormous range of variation, independent, semi-independent and dependent trade union centers (sometimes in combination) were to be found in Africa following the wave of consolidation and integration of unions into the mass party structures.

Independent Trade Union Centers

The independent trade unions were those which retained a fairly high degree of associational freedom in that their internal management and organization were free of governmental scrutiny. Two of the chief characteristics of this type of unionism are the right to strike and the freedom to choose union leaders. The unions of Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Togo and Congo (L) best reflect this type. In these countries, union activities and orientation corresponded somewhat to the classical pluralistic model of the trade unions in Britain and the United States.

Semi-Independent Trade Union Centers

Semi-independent trade unions included those where a certain amount of state supervision and control had been established but fell short of full integration of the trade union movement into the political system. The primary characteristic of this type of unionism is that at least one and sometimes several forms of government regulations have been employed to limit union autonomy. The most frequent
regulations have included: 1) government selection of trade union leaders; 2) official government recognition of a union before it can operate; and 3) restriction of international affiliation. Of these controls, the necessity of government recognition is of utmost importance. Since the right to recognize implies the right to not recognize, this regulation allowed governments to introduce and employ subtle and indirect pressures to control the internal operations of unions. The principle examples of semi-independent unions can be found in Kenya, Uganda, the Ivory Coast, Senegal and Zambia.

Dependent Trade Union Centers

Dependent or controlled unions describe those African organizations where government efforts resulted in political dominance and the full integration of the trade union movements into the government, the dominant party, or both. Such administrative integration enables the national political leadership to exercise full managerial and policy control over unionism. In Ghana, Mali, Guinea and Tanzania, managerial and policy controls were supplemented by a range of legislation affecting such labor activities as the right to strike and the internal conduct of union affairs.

The Ghana Trade Union Congress (GTUC) provided an excellent example of a 'dependent trade union'. Government control of unionism in Ghana began during the colonial period with the realignment of a large number of trade unions with small memberships and very limited financial resources into a United Trade Union Congress labeled the GTUC. This reorganization prepared the way for the 1958 Industrial Relations Act, which codified the relationship between the CPP and the
unions. The major purpose of this act was to institute a strong centralized union organization under the auspices of the government. Thus, the GTUC constitution had as one of its aims the maintenance of the GTUC as one of the militant branches of the movement which would build the socialist state of Ghana under the political leadership of the CPP. To strengthen the GTUC and to eliminate competition, the Industrial Relations Act gave the GTUC exclusive rights as the workers' representative organization. Only those unions affiliated with the GTUC were recognized and could benefit from legislation in favor of trade unionism. As a consequence of this act, other unions could not enter into collective bargaining or be represented in certain organizations; thus, some of the oldest unions disappeared, such as the UAC Workers' Union, with 4,000 members.

The most serious aspect of the Industrial Relations Act was the innumerable restrictions placed on the right to strike. Teachers and civil servants, for example, were forbidden to strike; other government employees had to obtain the approval of the minister of labor, a presidential appointee, before striking. If unions went on strike without governmental approval, their assets were frozen. The interlinking of leadership and members between the GTUC and the CPP was another control factor. Membership in the GTUC implied membership in the CPP. For example, the major figure in the GTUC, E. C. Turkson-Ocran, was the parliamentary secretary of the CPP, personal secretary to Nkrumah, and a member of the CPP's executive committee.

This wide range of variation in terms of the relationship
between government and unions is doubtless the product of a large number of individual circumstances and situations which differ considerably from state to state. The stability of the government, the state of the economy, the nature of the party system and the internal characteristics of the unions themselves are a few of the many considerations which affect the character of relations between these two institutions.

Of all the factors which may influence the extent to which political leadership actively seeks and successfully establishes dominance over trade unions, four may be singled out as having special importance: 1) the process of consolidating and centralizing government control in terms of a one-party state; 2) the drive for economic development via central planning and state-managed economy; 3) the ability of the armed forces to play a key role in the political system; and 4) the ability of the union organizations to challenge the government in terms of wage demands and economic and political decay. These factors, taken individually or in any combination, help to explain the degree of control achieved over trade unions. If consolidation and centralization were accomplished and ethnic and tribal pluralism were subordinated, then the trade unions were brought into the governmental structure—as in Ghana, Guinea and Tanzania. On the other hand, if consolidation and centralization were not accomplished, which also meant that ethnic differences were not subordinated, then trade unionism remained outside of government control and in a pluralistic state, as witnessed in Nigeria, Dahomey and the Congo (B). In Nigeria, the pluralistic trade union movement has been
able to capitalize on the fragility of the political system, because
the government had to adapt itself to the pressures of diverse and
highly assertive associational and interest groups in order to func-
tion in a pluralistic society.\textsuperscript{46} In contrast, the Tanzanian Govern-
ment was able to centralize and consolidate the limited ethnic and
tribal pluralism into a one-party state. Therefore, the trade union
organization was integrated into the party.

Especially in those states where dependent and semi-
independent unionism exist, the governments do not relish the exis-
tence of potential sources of opposition. Trade unions were looked
upon as threats to the fragile national entities, for one of the
major institutional weaknesses in African states, especially one-
party or dominant states, is the vulnerability of the political
elites. This can be partially attributed to a striking cultural gap
between elite and mass, a gap often based on life styles, education
and incomes, which results from a dependence on the decaying mass
party and its weak structure. Radical cultural and economic differ-
entiation along these lines weakened the legitimacy of the elite and
left it open to political and social criticisms from below.

This elite-mass gap had a special bearing on the political
status of trade unionism in Africa. The trade union functioned as a
'middle group' between the elite and the mass and, by their support
of the regime, helped bridge the gap. Unions were best situated to
take advantage of the extreme social distance which characterized
elite-mass relations. Since union leadership did not bear direct
responsibility for economic development, it was in a position to
criticize inadequacies or failures in the development process. Unions could thus capitalize on the "rising expectations" of the broad mass of the population and place themselves in the position of championing the aspirations of the entire population, not merely the union membership. Moreover, unions tended to occupy a politically strategic position in the society, their greatest strength being in the large cities and in those sectors of the economy which are vital to modernization. The strategic economic position of the unions was enhanced by the dearth of other interest groups or intermediate bodies capable of representing the millions of people emerging from the confines of the traditional value system; thus, unions were given the authority to speak for people other than their own presumed memberships. In addition, aside from the dominant political parties themselves, the unions constituted the strongest political force in a large number of pluralistic and non-pluralistic African states. The trade unions' potential either to help shape a strong consensus or to exploit the possibility of elite-mass alienation helps to explain why African political leaders established firm controls over union organizations and their leaders.

Summary

During this phase of African politics, trade unions and other interest groups were regarded as integral parts of the governing party mechanisms. In Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Tanzania, unions were absorbed into the one-party state structure, while unions in Kenya, Uganda, the Ivory Coast, Senegal and Zambia remained in a fluid situation between a dependent status and an independent status.
Whatever the extent of their subordination or commitment to politics or political action on behalf of a party, unions were rarely the puppets of these political parties. In the majority of cases, the trade unions continued to fight for self-determination and survival but were often too weak to fight the government leaders alone. Nonetheless, the government in many states now had two forces to contend with: the trade unions, especially the civil servants, and the politico-economic situation, which was dismal. Meanwhile, political leaders simultaneously watched and used the military against their opponents.
FOOTNOTES


3 Crawford Young, Politics in the Congo (Princeton, 1965), p. 441.

4 Ibid.


6 First, Power in Africa, p. 78.

7 Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence, p. 60.

8 Ibid., p. 86.


11 Mazrui and Rothchild, op. cit., p. 82.


13 Quoted in Weeks, op. cit., p. 19.


15 First, op. cit., p. 205.

16 Tanganyikan Standard, January 9, 1964, p. 3.

17 The mutineers met no resistance from the police force, which had been weakened by the shipment of 300 of their members to Zanzibar to stabilize the situation and help restore peace after a revolutionary coup had deposed the ruling Arab minority. There have been speculations that this coup in Zanzibar on January 12, 1964, influenced the mutiny in Tanganyika. For additional information, see Henry Bienen, Tanzania Party Transformation and Economic Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 364-365; Mazrui and Rothchild, op. cit., p. 82; Gutteridge, The Military in African Politics, p. 28; and Frere Glnwala, "The Tanganyika Mutiny," World Today (March, 1964), p. 94.
In Uganda, a pay increase was granted and Africanization took a step forward with the rise of Idi Amin to deputy commander of the army.


The Kenyan Government also turned to the youth wing of KANU for re-creation of the armed forces.


37 Berg and Butler, "Trade Union," op. cit., p. 367


40 Afrique Nouvelle, November 6, 1959, p. 3.

41 Berg and Butler, op. cit., p. 368.


44 West Africa, August 29, 1959.


46 Lofchie and Rosberg, op. cit., p. 15.

47 Millen, The Political Role of Labor in Developing Countries, p. 88.
CHAPTER VIII

STAGE 3 PERIOD OF POLITICAL UPHEAVALS

Section 1

Theoretical Model of Military and Trade Union Intervention

The political upheaval period in Africa involved the displacement of political leaders. During this stage, Black Africa was rocked by military takeovers. In rapid succession, the military overthrew civilian administrations and instituted military-dominated governments in the Congo (K) (November 25, 1965), Dahomey (December 22, 1965), Central African Republic (January 1, 1966), Upper Volta (January 4, 1966), Nigeria (January 15, 1966), Ghana (February 24, 1966), Nigeria once again (July 29, 1966), Burundi (November 28, 1966), Togo (January 13, 1967), Sierra Leone (March 23, 1967), Congo (B) (August 4, 1968), and Mali (November 19, 1968).

A survey of these coups d'etat reveals a multitude of factors which precipitated intervention. But the two factors common to all of these coups were: popular discontent, which in many instances was triggered and led by trade unionists, especially the government employees; and economic stagnation, which brought about austerity budgets, reductions in government workers' salaries, inflation and unemployment for the urban population. These two issues, along with others delineated below, gave the trade unions the impetus to strike and demonstrate against the politicians. Too weak to bring about government changes on their own, the unions in several states turned to the military for assistance. The eventual outcome was the toppling of the civilian government and the formation of an alliance...
between the military and the unionized government workers. However, the politicians in several states invited the military to intervene, especially in those states beset with a constitutional crisis involving elimination of strong opposition in addition to the above problems.

The reasons for military and trade union intervention, including the two previously mentioned factors, may be summarized as follows:

1) The declining prestige of the major political party or mass party, as exemplified by: a) an increased reliance upon force to achieve compliance; b) a stress upon unanimity in the face of centrifugal forces; and c) a consequent denial of effective political choice.
2) Schisms among prominent politicians, domestic social antagonisms which, in a few instances, brought the state to the brink of tribal or ethnic conflict.
3) Economic malaise, leading to austerity policies which most affected the articulate urbanized sectors of the population, namely trade union members.
4) Corruption and inefficiency among government and party officials, especially noticeable under conditions of economic decline.
5) A heightened awareness within the army of its power to influence or displace political leaders.

Declining Party Prestige and Political Schisms

Most African states became independent by organizing a nationalist movement which laid effective claim to power. The standard pattern during the nationalist and independence period was the existence of one major party which symbolized the struggle for independence and one or more weak, often regional-based, opposition parties. Where there was no 'one party' which commanded overwhelming support, there existed a number of strong patron parties, which were also regional or ethnic oriented. These patron parties, which
centered around a personal leader (father/hero-type figure), were weakly articulated and comparatively undisciplined, had small direct membership participation in terms of state-wide influence, and tended to be based on traditional authorities. In a number of states, these parties formed an 'alliance' to create a single dominant political party at independence. Thus, the broad anti-colonialist nationalist movements succeeded, in varying degrees, in juxtaposing ethnic, tribal or political groups into a 'nation'.

In the process of obtaining political independence, however, African political leaders made compromises with patron party leaders and grandiose promises to the African masses which aroused unwarranted high expectations—an end to taxes, communal labor, unemployment, ethnic conflict and other colonial ills. Independence was regarded as a panacea, the application of which would either solve the outstanding problems or at least make them more amenable to solution.

In short, the psychological preparation for independence was sometimes euphoric optimism about what life would be like after the great day. This optimism carried over, in most cases, beyond independence, allowing the new African governments a period during which they could use the support mobilized during the drive to independence to begin implementation of their programs.

Of course, these promises could not be fulfilled. In most cases, independence did not bring instant solutions to the old problems: It could not and did not resolve the old antagonisms among the Ibo, Yoruba and Hausa in Nigeria; It could not alleviate the economic weakness that plagued Dahomey, Upper Volta and the Central
African Republic. The aftermath of independence became disillusionment for the majority of the African population.

Moreover, post-independence programs, with their lack of concrete rewards for the masses, created cracks in the 'heterogeneous' single party and state. The tactics and organization of the single parties—appropriate for anti-colonial activities—were not necessarily suited to the tasks of governance after independence.

The parochialism of kinship and locality made it difficult to create stable and coherent nation-wide parties. Loyalty to a dominant party, its leaders and the 'nation' it purportedly embodied could not be readily internalized in the face of conflicting, ethnically based loyalties. For most of the newly enfranchised Africans, an understanding of politics could not be disentangled from traditional outlooks and antagonisms. The patron or elite parties once again came to fore because the primordial attachments of their limited membership remained strong, despite the nationalist alliance and independence. In addition, these elite parties, because of the extension of political awareness through mass party activities, demanded an equal share of the spoils for their members, tribe or region. Each section of society feared being exploited or suppressed by others when they felt that the government was considered to represent particular kinship or local interests. Group tensions were exacerbated instead of eliminated, due to obsessive concern with the relation of one's region, tribe or elite, to the center of power. The basic struggle was for control of the levers of the state machine: The state was conceived as a set of levers with which to apply direct pressure on
opponents within the system; besides, control of the state machine
gave one "the right to eat its fruit." In Africa the state is the
main source of domestic capital and its accumulation, the principal
employer of labor, and the chief dispenser of jobs, benefits, patron­
age, contracts, foreign exchange and license to trade. The exer­
cises of power are associated with the idea of personal consumption
of food.

Given such an attitude, all the component parts of the
state apparatus became subject to rivalry between different groups.
(All political organizations in Africa, including the 'dominant
parties', have ethnic components and hence, what differentiates the
ins from the outs in this respect is that the outs, in seeking an
organizational base from which to challenge the ins, cannot but
stress particularistic appeals.) Politicians and political leaders
sought support from their tribe or ethnic group by ensuring that
their own region or tribe was represented in the state organization.
In addition, every patron party leader felt obliged to help his kins­
men obtain jobs in the government. The leader/officeholder was re­
quired by social customs and traditions to support a kinsman or
tribesman who was unsuccessful in finding a job. Leaders found that
they could control their followers only through some patronage or
clientage system which develops its own rules of social obligation.
Thus, these leaders secured places of profit, contracts or more ex­
tensive resources for their followers, who in turn demonstrated their
support by adhering to the patron party. Kilson described competition
in Sierra Leone in terms of the principle of reciprocity. He argued
that the exchange of gifts binds an individual to his unit and that these loyalties can be seen in operation while the coalitions which form a government are being made. When these rewards are not forthcoming, the mass basis of the national party dissipates. The government becomes an uneasy coalition of sectional interests.

Essential to the above reasons for disintegration or decline of the 'mass party' was the shift of gravity from party organization to state, from the ways of popular mobilization to the methods of the administration. Using Ghana as an example, First and Zolberg aptly delineated this shift:

When the party came to power, its leading cadres deserted it for government and other state jobs. The leader of the party became head of state. The committee of the party became the cabinet. Local party leaders were given key posts in local administrations. The local party branch blurred indistinguishably with the local administration...in Ghana the CPP ceased after some years to be a 'tangibly separate organization'; far from transforming Ghana it came to reflect all the cleavages in the country. Government and party thus drew weakness from one another. Government was centralized in the capital and fairly rudimentary in the provinces; likewise, the party had a large head and underdeveloped limbs. Because the political party, government and power elite were almost indistinguishable, a blow against any one was liable to bring down all three.

How to regain the apparent unity of the anti-colonial struggle was a problem with which most African leaders wrestled following the decolonization period. Many leaders turned their attention to the creation of a one-party state. President Ahmadou Ahidjo of the Cameroun and Nkrumah of Ghana pinpointed the advantages of a one-party state. Ahidjo asserted:

The one-party structure is the only way to escape this demagogy...appeals to tribal, ethnic and religious difference in politics. The only means to forge national
Nkrumah echoed, "One party rule is the most appropriate political instrument for ending tribalism and planning for development." The achievement of the one-party state became synonymous with the achievement of unanimity, and unanimity entailed erasing all traces of political opposition.

A number of methods and tactics—similar to those used to curb the power of the trade unions—were employed against the elite/patron parties and other sources of opposition. A quick checklist of the steps involved in the attempts to create unanimity included the following:

1) *co-optation*, 2) *intimidation*, and 3) *exile or detention* of political opponents. Two leading politicians were included in the Guinean cabinet following independence; and in Senegal, two leaders of a small party were brought into the government as a result of a merger with the UPS in 1963. Although Ghana did not include any of the remaining opposition MP's in the 1965 parliament, several other former enemies became CPP representatives. Throughout West Africa, a number of political opponents have been incarcerated or exiled. The process of co-optation, negotiation and reconciliation has been ideal because many opponents fundamentally share the concern of the incumbents with political unity. These opponents are usually willing to participate in the ruling group when they have the chance because, in Africa, political office remains the single most important source of status and economic welfare.

4) In the process of creating unanimity, the government...
leaders have resorted to modification of the electoral system to make competition impossible or at least unlikely. The overall trend in electoral modifications centered on simply reducing the opposition's chances of success at the polls by means of a government-administered plebiscite. Many states, especially in French-speaking Africa, adopted this system of managed elections—a common French colonial practice—by transforming their states into single constituencies with a simple majority and list voting. (This process closely paralleled the American method of choosing presidential electors—within a single state, regardless of the distribution of votes, all seats go to the victorious party.) The Ivory Coast, for instance, moved from a sixty-seat assembly and nineteen constituencies in 1957 to one hundred seats and four constituencies in 1959 and finally to seventy seats and a single constituency in 1960.¹² Although the constitution specifically provided for freedom of opposition in terms of organizing political parties, nobody challenged the PDCI. Furthermore, the PDCI developed a clever technique for dissuading potential candidates from filing independently of the party by revealing its own list of nominees only a few minutes before the filing deadline. Hence, hardly anyone with even the slightest chance or hopes of obtaining a place on the dominant party ticket would jeopardize his chances by betraying his uncertainty and impatience. Controlled elections were instituted in Guinea and Senegal in 1963, and in Mali in 1964. With their single constituency, the dominant party and its leader usually received close to one hundred per cent of the vote.
5) **Transformation of the constitution**, inherited from the European tradition, to give wider discretionary authority to the executive and to restrict the activities of representative assemblies. Transformation of the constitutional process has included several variations: the use of political loyalty for selecting key administrators; administrative control over local government; reduction of the independence of the judiciary or the creation of a rival set of dependable political courts; control over written and radio communications; transformation of major voluntary associations into ancillary organs of the mass party; and the institutionalization of adulation of the paramount leader or, alternatively, concentration of all effective authority in the hands of a few men while using the language of collective leadership.¹³

By erasing all political opposition via transformation, modification, co-optation, intimidation, and exile, African political leaders sought to achieve 'unanimity' and to create a new institutional structure—the mass one-party state. Such methods were sufficient for a number of states. However, these measures backfired in the pluralistic states, given the deeply rooted nature of ethnic identity and its stimulation through political participation. Schisms were created in the ruling governmental structure, and the pluralistic states were compelled to go one step further in attempts to achieve unanimity: the use of force to attain goals of integration unreachable through 'persuasion'.¹⁴

The use of force to eliminate political opposition affected the political life in many African states. The following points,
taken from the writing of Zoiberg and Parsons, illustrate the complexities of the shift from power to force:

1) Governments may fall into the snare of believing that harsh treatment will eliminate disruptive demands. However, the government may become more vulnerable to other threats, since the limited capital of force is used up and may not be readily replenished.

2) Increasing the use of force enhances the significance of the police, military, and other groups capable of its exercise. By contrast, the significance of political parties, civil services or similar institutions declines.

3) If groups or individuals lack the opportunity for legitimate political activity, that is, the exercise of the power to express their demands, they are tempted to use force to press these demands. Thus, a vicious circle of power deflation occurs. 15

Such a vicious circle was readily witnessed by events in Nkrumah's Ghana and in Nigeria before the 1966 coup. Nkrumah's government restricted opposition politicians by a variety of means: the constitution, electoral process and judicial system were transformed into tools of the CPP. 16 Intimidation, detention and exile were widespread. These heavy-handed efforts to stamp out opposition caused the CPP to lose the aura of legitimacy it had commanded; no longer could it assure regular coordination. The attempt to restrict claims on the political system resulted not in a lessening of claims but in a decrease in the extent to which they were effectively communicated— with attendant frustration and discontent within the system. The army and police leadership represented the only institutional groups capable of posing a serious threat to the state.

"Power deflation" promoted the Nigerian coup of January 1966. In the Western Region, steps that were taken against the Action Group (the governing party of the Western Region until mid-1963) brought the area to the brink of civil war. Following a party split in May
1962, a state of emergency was declared by the Nigerian federal government. The leaders of the Action Group were convicted of conspiracy in an arms plot. A regional election in late 1965 was marred by blatant rigging, which triggered wholesale political violence and the breakdown of public confidence—manifested in looting, arson, and murder.

In addition to creating a 'power deflation', the use of force to achieve unanimity created political rivalries and schisms which increased the likelihood of military intervention. The collective leadership of the mass party became divided when a single leader sought to grasp the reins of control. In the Congo (K), a constitutional impasse occurred between Prime Minister Lumumba and President Joseph Kasavubu over functions and powers of their respective offices. Kasavubu relieved Lumumba of his duties, an act whose legality Lumumba denied. General Joseph Mobutu intervened, neutralized all politicians and assumed power until the dispute was settled. A power struggle between President Senghor and Prime Minister Mamadou Dia in Senegal was settled when the military sided with Senghor. After the conquest, Senghor commented, "After God, it is first to the armed forces that I must address the thanks of the nation." Similar occurrences of political rivalries and schisms settled by military intervention took place in Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Togo. Moreover, government efforts at achieving unanimity created unstable social situations in terms of tribal and ethnic tensions, as experienced in Nigeria, Dahomey, Uganda and within the military of a number of African states. When members of the armed forces perceived
the government as dominated by members of an ethnic group hostile to their interests or their respective ethnic groups, grievances based on tribe or region\textsuperscript{19} quickly developed, as evidenced by the coup in Nigeria in July 1966.

**Stagnating Economic Situations and Corruption**

Many of the major political upheavals in Africa occurred in those states whose economies were on the verge of collapse and where corruption was widespread. Following independence, many heads of state attempted to spread social benefits widely and rapidly. Universal primary education, for example, was a goal with obvious attraction but one involving tremendous cost in relation to overall resources. The primary school leavers, the product of universal education, could not find jobs for which their education had prepared them. The rising and visible urban unemployment presented a major challenge to the political leadership.\textsuperscript{20} The sources of income on which the extended family system depended was all but dried up when these educated school leavers could not find employment.

Economic problems were compounded by shifts in world prices for primary commodities—such as cocoa—on which many African economies depended for export earnings, and a financial squeeze resulted. The situation was further exacerbated by the termination of preferential market agreements and the increasing demands for consumer goods, manufactured and luxury items. For instance, in 1964 the fourteen former French colonies spent six times as much in importing alcoholic drinks as in importing fertilizer; half as much was spent on perfume and cosmetic imports as on machine tools; almost as much went for
importing petroleum for privately owned cars as for the purchase of tractors; and five times as much was spent on importing private cars as on agricultural equipment. In addition, private funds were diverted for consumer loans. Moreover, these loans were used to pay for imported luxuries—such as deputies buying cars on hire-purchase with loans made available by the Treasury Department. These loan concessions made it more difficult to lower salaries, as too many civil servants were burdened with high monthly payments. Each cabinet member had an official car and chauffeur at his disposal. Meanwhile, the Presidents, along with their ministers, amassed savings accounts in Swiss banks and constructed villas at home. Dumont speculates that the cost of the African presidential and ministerial establishments was probably higher, in relation to national income, than the cost to France of the court of Louis XVI in 1788. Lacking ready reserves or a sufficiently growing quantity of export-generated funds to cover the cost of the luxury needs and wants, the governments found themselves in an economic quandary. Few avoided inflation. Deficits and trade imbalances were the rule, not the exception. In the Congo (K), for instance, the central government in 1962 estimated that it would receive approximately four billion francs, while expenditures totaled more than nineteen billion francs.

Yet the demands could not be stilled. The economically privileged parts of African society—the politicians, ministers and senior civil service officials—benefited most from government pay hikes and waste. When economic necessity interrupted the flow of these financial benefits, the discontent of these educated elites
was difficult to contain. It was the imposition of 'austerity' measures that precipitated the trade union strikes and protests which brought down the governments in Dahomey, Upper Volta and Congo (B). The cry of austerity was probably implausible, even insulting, coming from the notoriously profligate politicians who reigned in these states. Indeed, revolutions tend to be made by the relatively privileged, not by the downtrodden.25

The imposition of austerity measures and the involvement of trade unions in coups d'état are phenomena closely associated with the Francophone rather than the Anglophone states. The latter use the techniques of deficit financing, while the former are compelled by the Franc Zone to employ austerity measures if insuperable economic difficulties arise. Deficits which cannot be financed from reserves are therefore met either by French aid or by special austerity measures.26 In Dahomey, President Ahomadegbe ordered a cut of twenty-five per cent in all civil service salaries. Austerity measures of this kind are more likely to provoke sudden waves of indignation on the part of trade unions and other urban groups than the mounting inflation experienced by the Anglophone state of Sierra Leone.

In addition to stagnating economic situations, many of the African states were plagued by widespread corruption, as exemplified by coup leaders in stating their reasons for intervention: to clear up the affairs of state and restore fiscal integrity and responsibility. General Ankrah accused deposed President Nkrumah of bringing Ghana to the brink of economic disaster by mismanagement, waste and
One of the first acts performed by the military was to ban political parties, which was partially intended to cut down opportunities for corruption and to reduce government spending.

**Corruption and the African Society**

For many of the African states, corruption became a major obstacle to economic development and the cause of political instability. Corruption represented a rise in the price of governance in that the number of government employees was doubled due to the distribution of sinecures to relatives and friends. Such practices lowered respect for constituted authority and undercut popular faith in government. If loss of faith in government leads to loss of legitimacy in the eyes of those with the guns, then political instability and disintegration of existing political institutions can be expected to follow. In Ghana, for example, corruption may not have been a direct cause of the coup, but the widespread revulsion at dishonesty and the effect of corruption on the economic situation in terms of wage declines created an atmosphere conducive to the coup's occurrence.

Corruption can upset the ethnic balances that make up the many groups of the mass party by exacerbating problems of national integration. If a corrupt leader must be fired, it may upset ethnic arithmetic, as was the case in Kenya and Zambia in 1966. A typical African official has been educated at the expense of a large number of his kinsmen, who collectively paid for his schooling in the expectation that he will look after them when he reaches a high position. If he put his duty to the state above this debt of gratitude,
he would be regarded as a despicable traitor, be ostracized and perhaps have to make immediate cash repayment of what had to be spent on him. Social pressures and traditions combined with ingrained sentiments are enough to prompt a man to bend the law. Thus, the typical African official provides jobs for hundreds of his clansmen and gives decent presents and money for education to a vast array of relatives, in addition to supporting friends and relations who flock to urban areas seeking employment. As he cannot meet such extensive obligations out of his salary, he is often compelled to squeeze, embezzle public funds and take kickbacks and rake-offs. If he is fired for his offenses, his village and tribe become alienated and group tensions occur. Moreover, his kinsmen and tribesmen know that unless he receives a substantial bribe from a non-kinsman, their man would appoint all members of his own tribe. However, other villages and tribes of elite and patron parties are ignored, causing group tension and protests to arise within these ranks. Under the circumstances of far-reaching disregard for job qualifications in selecting personnel, while many of the most crucial decisions are determined by bribery, the administration cannot fail to be utterly inefficient.

The clash of old customs and attitudes with the new forms of government give rise to corruption. Some of the delineated examples are: the customary gifts; the extended family system, which leads to the overburdening of an official with family responsibilities—so that his pay becomes insufficient and his family and tribal loyalties obscure his devotion to the national community; the absence of an established class system, which makes it hard for the
increased Military Professionalism

Before 1965 almost all examples of military involvement in political crises could be explained as responses to comparative disadvantages and to initiatives taken by politicians. During this period, the military was the instrument of politicians; if military men intervened in the political system, they usually formed a caretaker administration, which involved making a couple of changes in terms of personnel and policy, then returned the political system to the politicians. Colonel Soglo of Dahomey expressed the views of military leaders during this period:

The intervention of the army in national politics is not desirable...The Dahomian army is not praetorian. It has no ambition to seize power...The trouble with our country...is separatism and regionalism with all their threats of division. The political leaders are not bad; they are men with great qualities who have rendered considerable service to their country, but they have proved that they cannot rise above their personal quarrels...our objective is to introduce into this country a new style of politics in which the people will rally around a program and not around personalities. 32

Within a short period, however, the military became the principal initiator of changes in regimes, marching against politicians. What caused this change? Several factors stand out: the upgrading of Africa’s military establishments, their increased professionalism and sense of pride, and, inevitably, their growing awareness of the potential power they wielded. Many top military leaders became progressively estranged from the politicians they served. 33

At independence, most African military establishments were
small, ill-equipped, and dominated by European officers and NCO's. Following the mutinies and increased military professionalism, however, the progressive withdrawal of British and French forces from Africa, the transfer of African NCO's and officers from the colonial armies, and the return of African officers from European military academies began a build-up of various African officer corps. Moreover, with Africanization of the officer corps, national budgets soon began to include significant sums for military expenditures, augmented by foreign aid in the form of money, hardware and technical assistance. Per cent changes in military expenditures showed extraordinary increases, as indicated in Table 7, Chapter VII. Some of the more notable figures include Dahomey's 300 per cent increase in military expenditures, 400 per cent for Senegal, and 200 per cent each for Togo, C. A. R., and Upper Volta. Provisions of the revenue budgets for 1967-68 revealed that, in Francophone Africa, eight of fifteen states had provided the army with between 15 and 25 per cent of their resources. In Upper Volta, the 1,500 man army swallowed one-seventh of the country's total budget. The army's strength in taking such a high proportion of state revenue would perhaps not be so significant if the budgets were not frequently running up large deficits.

In any reconstruction of the budget, army salaries seem the least likely to be touched. The Ghanaian National Liberation Council gave a five per cent salary increase to the army after the coup. In its austerity measures of 1966, the government of Mali decided not to include the army in the cuts which it was making on
the grounds that the troops were fighting against the Touareg. Often when the military took over the political system, military pay was not reduced. After the coup in 1966 in Upper Volta, the military regime decided that those soldiers who served in civilian posts should retain their military salaries and not be transferred to the civilian wage structure, where austerity cuts had been made, largely because it feared that the army might be tempted to interfere in a delicate political situation.35

In addition to the extraordinary rise in military expenditures and its effect on increased professionalism, Africanization also played a crucial role. A number of African states had nearly completed Africanization, as Table 9 indicates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Size of Military</th>
<th>African Officers</th>
<th>Expatriate Officers</th>
<th>Per Cent of African Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>4,060</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>88.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. A. R.</td>
<td>1,075</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (B)</td>
<td>1,975</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>96.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>1,768</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>76.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>5,060</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>3,740</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>3,020</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>2,030</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>93.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>5,320</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1,260</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>86.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>1,715</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>87.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>14,500</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>5,700</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>7,350</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Lee, op. cit., p. 5. Computations are those of the author.
The possession of a stylish professional army became a matter of national prestige as well as a welcome aid to governments seeking to maintain internal peace. The politicians began to see their armies as valuable adjuncts to the exercise of civilian power. The armies were usually well cared for, informed of their significance, paraded before visiting dignitaries, displayed with pride on holidays and their officers deferred to and consulted. Officer training schools were opened in several states and young, intelligent men could now see in the military stable careers as officers, with promotions and rewards coming as rapidly as in the civil service. In the process of serving the politicians, however, the armies began to acquire a sense of their own importance. They became instruments of social integration, taking men from diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds and giving them a common cause in the acquisition of a sense of discipline and devotion to duty. The army offered a haven to many young men, for whom the confusions and uncertainties of civilian life had become burdensome. Military indoctrination implanted a sense of national citizenship and an appreciation of political action, yet also stressed loyalty to the army as an institution set apart from its political system.

By 1965 most armies in Black Africa had become vital political tools, stable and reliable props for the regime. Disciplined, cohesive, purposeful and with a sense of national mission, the military increasingly stood out in relief as the political system decayed. The military soon began to distinguish between the national interest and the policies espoused by the government in power. This
process of differentiation created a disposition to intervene. As the estrangement between African military leaders and politicians intensified, the temptation to intervene to 'save' the country became too strong to resist. Intervention was perceived as a duty and as the only way to correct the misdeeds of the politicians. General Ankrah expressed the typical rationalization for the military coups in Africa: He viewed the toppling of the Nkrumah government as "necessary to save our country and our people." Thus, the military looked upon itself as a selfless liberator.

Antagonism between the military and the civilian leaders was aroused by those factors delineated above—the declining prestige and legitimacy of the government and mass party; schisms among the collective leadership; unstable social situations; corruption and economic adversity. Far more significant, however, especially in the one-party states, was political interference in the internal affairs of the army. There is nothing the professional soldier appreciates less than meddling in his bailiwick. As a specialist in the use of violence, army officers consider themselves unequaled in this sphere. Once again the example of events in Ghana is appropriate. President Nkrumah imposed numerous controls upon the army and police—first arming, then disarming the police; forcing the retirement of generals Ankrah and Otu in mid-1965; using informers within the ranks; lavishing money and equipment upon the specially created Presidential Guard (POGR) under his direct command, at the expense of the regular army; attempting to associate the armed forces more closely with the CPP; and finally, announcing his intentions of
forming a civilian militia. These practices placed the armed forces at Nkrumah's mercy and created a military disposition to intervene. Similar efforts and practices of government leaders to interfere with and neutralize the armed forces' monopoly on force took place in Mali and the Congo (B). The army in Mali intervened to clip the wings of the popular militia, and, in the Congo (B), the army saw the Cuban-trained youth movement as a counterweight to its own armed autonomy. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that key officers in the C. A. R., Ghana, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Congo (B) and other states had become convinced that, by late 1965, they alone could rescue their states from collapse, chaos and disaster.

Military-Trade Union (Civil Service) Alliance

If the incidence of coups d'etat appears random, this is not the true manner in which they develop. The atmosphere within which a coup is likely to occur can be created by almost any type of conflict situation originating almost anywhere in the social structure, within the ruling elite or outside of it. But, as the number of attempted coups shows, not every kind of showdown between the government and its opponents will lead to the government's downfall. The government has to be physicially threatened, which implies that the initiators of the coup must be able to deploy force in the capital. Hence, successful coups in Africa usually involve two bodies of manpower: trade unions, especially junior civil servants, and the army and the police, the formal bearers of force. These two bodies are related in an asymmetric-symmetric fashion: the unions cannot bring about the direct fall of the government without the
support of the armed forces, while the armed forces can topple governments but, to be successful in terms of ruling, are obliged to rely on the technocrats, technicians and other trade unionists.

Section 2
The Development of a Causal Model

To integrate the reasons and variables denoting military and trade union involvement in African politics and to test some of the hypotheses coming from Stage 3 (political upheavals), a causal model will be developed. Such a model will serve as a bridge between the historical or theoretical analysis and the testing of this analysis and hypotheses via quantitative data and techniques.

In developing a causal model or relationship, a number of tasks must be focused on; two of the foremost are distinguishing causally significant relationships from illusory associations and explaining these relationships. These two tasks help to identify the inferences that can be made from concrete evidence of a correlation between variables x and y. The process of distinguishing causally significant relationships from illusory associations can be substantiated by a number of statistical techniques—correlation, partial correlation, multiple regression, and cross tabulation and plotting. However, explanation, which consists of the formal aspects of elaboration and some substantive ordering of variables, is a difficult undertaking. Nonetheless, this is the key to the development of the causal relationship. Explanation or elaboration can be used to decompose a universe of data into different subgroups and the correlation between x and y in each subgroup can then be
examined; this task distinguishes orders of complexity and the substantive ordering of the relationships among $x$, $y$ and the control variable $c$; and finally, the formal aspects allow all components to be subsumed under a comprehensive theory. Therefore, by using explanation or elaboration, correlation and partial correlation, a causal relation may be delineated as any demonstrable association that is not spurious.

The basic features of the causal approach are the temporal ordering of variables $x$, $y$ and $c$, and the requirement that no antecedent third variable wash out the relationship between $x$ and $y$, indicating it to be spurious.44

A detailed analysis of military and trade union motives for political involvement and the extraction of variables will lead to a brief theoretical explanation and a conceptual drawing of the causal model.

In the process of obtaining independence, a number of political parties and groups combined to form a 'coalition' or mass single party as a show of strength and also at the prodding of the departing colonialists, who wanted to leave behind the European models of government with all their liberal democratic principles—such as loyal opposition, proportional representation and 'vote of confidence'. This coalition remained intact in a number of states, due in part to the novelty of independence and in part to the stable political and economic situations. Political and economic stability were due to subsidiary aid and preferential treatment, bilateral and multilateral defense arrangements, and the ability of the leading
politicians to manipulate the political system through the use of funds, patronage and the spoils system.

As the newness of independence wore off, a number of problems—unemployment, deficit budgets, trade imbalances, corruption (which became more salient)—combined to undermine rewards. Without patronage, funds and jobs available for key members of patron/elite parties, political coalitions quickly dissipated.

To regain the apparent pre-independence unity and to centralize and consolidate control in one-party states, many governments resorted to eradicating all traces of political opposition, including trade union organizations. As mentioned previously, tactics such as legal restrictions on the opposition, manipulation of election machinery, assassination and exile were employed, but these strategies backfired for a number of political leaders. In their efforts to create unanimity, the political leaders created schisms within the ruling structures and institutions, especially in the pluralistic states, where tribal, social, economic or regional parties' attachment to the national level were superficial but where attachments to leaders of patron/elite parties were strong and genuine. As a result, when the leading political figures from a certain patron/elite party were eliminated from the coalition, so were his followers or tribesmen, who were then left without representation in the government.

Since many of the trade unions were looked upon as elitist parties and were dependent on the government for employment, wages and other fringe benefits, they were most affected by the economic
situation. On a number of occasions, trade unionists were forced to accept austerity budgets which instantly brought a ten to twenty-five per cent cut in salaries. Austerity budgets and also government attempts to eliminate or reduce trade unionism led unionists to become the harbingers of demonstrations and strikes against their employers (the government). Located in urban sectors of the population and in strategic areas of the economy, unions experienced no problems in attracting followers. Too weak to act on its own, the union leadership turned to the military, which was also disposed to intervene; with the latter's cooperation, the government was toppled. In the resulting new government, trade unionists (especially government workers) wielded the executive power and the military the physical power.\footnote{45}

The approach starts with a preliminary causal model which tries to say as much as possible about the causes of the coup prior to the investigation of the hypothetical model.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
  \node[draw, text width=2cm, align=center] (A) at (0,0) {Economic Stagnation};
  \node[draw, text width=2cm, align=center] (B) at (2,0) {Eliminating Opposition};
  \node[draw, text width=2cm, align=center] (C) at (4,0) {Corruption};
  \node[draw, text width=2cm, align=center] (D) at (0,-2) {Military};
  \node[draw, text width=2cm, align=center] (E) at (2,-2) {Popular Discontent};
  \node[draw, text width=2cm, align=center] (F) at (4,-2) {Trade Unions};
  \node[draw, text width=2cm, align=center] (G) at (0,-4) {Alliance};
  \node[draw, text width=2cm, align=center] (H) at (0,-6) {Coup};

  \draw[->] (A) -- (B);
  \draw[->] (B) -- (C);
  \draw[->] (C) -- (F);
  \draw[->] (D) -- (E);
  \draw[->] (E) -- (F);
  \draw[->] (D) -- (G);
  \draw[->] (G) -- (H);

  \node at (-1,0) {\footnote{239} Economic stagnation};
  \node at (1,0) {\footnote{9} \textit{Mass Party}};
  \node at (2,0) {\footnote{11} Eliminating opposition};
  \node at (3,0) {\footnote{5} Corruption};
  \node at (4,0) {\footnote{8} Trade Unions};
  \node at (5,0) {\footnote{1} Coup};
  \node at (0,-1) {\footnote{7} Popular discontent};
  \node at (1,-1) {\footnote{4} \textit{Mass Party}};
  \node at (2,-1) {\footnote{6} Eliminating opposition};
  \node at (3,-1) {\footnote{5} Corruption};
  \node at (4,-1) {\footnote{8} Trade Unions};
  \node at (5,-1) {\footnote{1} Coup};

\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

CAUSAL MODEL 1
Developed from Theoretical Analysis of Stage 3
Operationalization and Hypothesis Building

If the test of the above causal model is to explain political instability (coup) or stability as an outcome of conflict or cooperation, then such concepts involved in the model must be conceptualized and operationalized in such a way as to insure validity and reliability.

As used in this research, political instability in terms of a coup d'etat is defined as any successful attempt by officers of the military or other coercive forces or members of the ruling elite to overthrow the central government or replace its executive through the use of force or the threat of force. In such a political system, institutionalized patterns of authority break down and the expected compliance to political authorities is replaced by violence intended to change the personnel, policies or sovereignty of the government. It is hypothesized that coups d'etat are due to societal deprivations in both the economic and political spheres, and to the lack of centralization and consolidation of government authority over powerful institutions. Societal deprivation induces aggression by individuals and groups against the political system, stemming from frustration at the lack of improvement in the economic, social and political spheres. The lack of centralization and consolidation on the part of the national government allows powerful institutions--trade unions and the military--to challenge the government, resulting in the breakdown of authority.

As a prelude to testing the causal model of coups d'etat, the six variables--(1) economic stagnation, (2) popular discontent,
(3) changes in the mass basis of party affiliation, (4) corruption, (5) eliminating opposition, and (6) alliance—were operationalized and conceptualized. (See Appendix 1.) The two remaining variables—(7) influence of the trade unions and (8) the heightened influence of the military—were delineated in Chapters VI, VII and VIII.

Since these concepts and their operationalizations do not in themselves constitute theory, the need to formulate a testable model of the theoretical relationship between the above operationalized variables becomes apparent; testable hypotheses between the variables must be formulated.

The basic hypotheses of this stage and model may be stated as follows:

H1.1 If the direct relationship between economic stagnation, corruption and eliminating opposition is positive, then a decline in the mass basis of party affiliation will be rapid.

1.2 The greater the negative change in the mass party affiliation, the more likely that a coup will occur in that political system. The greater the positive change in mass party affiliation, the less likelihood of a coup.

H2.1 The greater the elimination of representation of politically relevant units in the political system, the more likely that a coup will take place.

2.2 The greater the representation of politically relevant units in the political system, the less likely that a coup will occur.

H3.1 The greater (lesser) the legitimacy of the established mass political party and its leaders (the government), the less (more) likelihood of a coup.

3.2 The greater (lesser) the legitimacy of the mass political party, the easier (more difficult) the facilitation of centralization of authority.

3.3 The greater (lesser) the centralization of authority of the established government, the less (more) the coercive potential will be required by the government to avoid a coup.

3.4 The greater (lesser) the level of coercive potential available to the government, the less (more) likelihood of a coup against government.
The greater (lesser) the level of coercive potential available to the government in its attempts to control and regulate the trade unions, military and other powerful institutions, the less (more) likely that a coup will displace that government.

The likelihood of a coup varies inversely with the loyalty of the military, trade unions and other powerful institutions.

The likelihood of a coup varies directly with the intensity and scope of the relative deprivation of members of the military and trade unions.

As centralization of authority and coercive potential increase, the probability of a coup resulting from economic stagnation, eliminating opposition or corruption decreases.

As centralization of authority and coercive potential increase, the probability of a coup resulting from popular discontent decreases.

As centralization of authority and coercive potential increase, the probability of a coup resulting from negative changes in mass party affiliation decreases.

Methodology

In the formulation of causal models 2 and 3 and the evaluation of the hypotheses, three features distinguish the methodological process in terms of testing hypotheses and insuring validity and reliability: 1) operationalization and conceptualization of the indices and variables through the use of a multidimension of sources; 2) collecting data on these operationalized variables from a variety of sources; and 3) performing correlations and partial correlations to assess the validity of the several variables.

In terms of operationalization of the variables, multiple indices were used. In many instances, indices that were used by different observers to measure the same or similar concepts were analyzed and evaluated in terms of their applicability to measurements of the causal model and to African politics.
relevant indices were modified and adopted in the collection of data. Using multiple indices rather than a single attribute item offers two particular advantages: 1) it enhances the comparability of variables by expanding the operational definitions; and 2) it adds insurance against confounding influences of unmeasured variables.

Similar to the use of multiple indices, a number of sources, which are listed in Appendix 2 code sheet, was used in collecting data. The two main sources for recording of events (raw data) were the New York Times Index and the Africa Diary. As a source of reliability, other data sources were also used in the collection of raw data. (See Appendix 3.) The collected raw data for each index was multiplied by assigned weight and summed according to indices for each variable and each state. These summed variable scores were used to rate and rank each state on an interval scale of 1 (low) to 5 (high). (See Appendix 2 for more details and coding procedures.)

Although data were collected on each of thirteen nations during the time period from 1962 to 1968, only data recorded prior to any coups were used to compute the summed variable scores. For example, the Central African Republic experienced its first and only coup on January 1, 1966; thus, data from the time period 1962-1965 were used. The Ivory Coast experienced no coup; thus, the data period covered 1962 to 1968. (See Appendix 2, code sheet D, for data periods based on coups d'état.)

To test the degree of the relationship among the several variables and the consequence—the coup, interval scale scores were programmed into the BMD 02R stepwise regression computer program.49
The correlation matrix of this program was used to construct causal model 2, which shows all important linkings.

CAUSAL MODEL 2

Similar to causal model 1, which was linked by theoretical analysis, causal model 2 does no more than link the variables by correlation coefficients. In order to sufficiently test this model and evaluate the above hypotheses, spurious correlation coefficients must be detected and eliminated.

To test for spurious correlation coefficients and to also detect the direction of relationships, first-, second- and third-order partial correlations were computed. Briefly, the coefficients of partial correlation measure the relationship between the dependent variable and each of several independent variables, while
eliminating any linear tendency of the remaining independent variables to obscure the relationship. The stepwise regression analysis will demonstrate: a) whether the different independent variables are valid in the sense that they predict to a dependent variable; b) whether there is converging evidence for the hypothesized direction of association between measures of different concepts; and c) whether variance in the dependent variable is adequately accounted for by the independent variables, with the aid of the partial correlations in Table 10, on page 246. Spurious linkings were detected and the causal model was redrawn.

A Preliminary Discussion of the Results

Since a lengthy discussion of all first-, second- and third-order partial correlation coefficients and linkings would be
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlations/Partial Coefficients</th>
<th>Degrees of Freedom</th>
<th>F value at p = .05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(1)(3) \cdot (7) = +.27$ (spurious)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(1)(3) = +.48$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(1)(4) \cdot (3)(7) = +.93$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>56.435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(1)(4) = +.87$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(7)(4) \cdot (3) = +.40$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(7)(4) = +.56$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(7)(1) \cdot (3)(4) = +.75$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(7)(1) = +.75$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(4)(2) \cdot (5)(6) = -0.32$ (spurious)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(4)(2) = +.63$</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(4)(6) \cdot (2)(5) = +.60$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(4)(6) = +.92$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(4)(5) \cdot (2)(6) = .001$ (spurious)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(4)(5) = +.88$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(6)(5) \cdot (2) = +.91$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(6)(5) = +.93$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(6)(2) \cdot (5) = +.73$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(6)(2) = +.78$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(5)(2) \cdot (6) = -0.49$ (spurious)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.155</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(5)(2) = +.61$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(5)(3) \cdot (2)(6) = -0.194$ (spurious)</td>
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<td>0.3534</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(5)(3) = +.76$</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(2)(3) \cdot (4)(6) = -1.293$ (spurious)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.1530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(2)(3) = +.62$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(6)(3) \cdot (2)(5) = +.54$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon(6)(3) = +.84$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
tedious, only the major linkings that have a direct bearing on the basic foundation of the causal model will be discussed in detail. (The remaining partial correlation coefficients, degrees of freedom and significant F values are listed in Table 10.) Also, the majority of the hypotheses which require comparison between coup and non-coup situations will be discussed in Part III, Chapter XII, of the dissertation, where comparative case studies between coup and non-coup states are delineated.

In addition to substantiating the lower half of the causal model, partial correlations established a causal link between (4) mass party and (1) coup. The zero-order correlation between \( \xi(1)(4) = +.87 \). However, when the intervening variables (3) popular discontent and (7) alliance were controlled for, \( \xi(1)(4)\cdot\xi(3)(7) = +.93 \); the coefficients increased with F value of 56.435 which is significant at .001 level. Thus, a decline in the mass basis of party affiliation can bring about a coup regardless of whether popular discontent or alliance occurs in the political system. A brief examination of coups in Mali and Ghana will further clarify this linking. In both states, there was no widespread mass popular discontent when the 1968 and 1966 coups d'état occurred. The authoritarian regimes of Keita's Union Soudanaise and Nkrumah's Convention People's Party had enough coercive potential to stifle mass political dissent and to neutralize, at least in the beginning, the trade unions and the military. The US and CPP only articulated and aggregated the interests of their own members. The interests of other institutions and associational groups were largely neglected and
suppressed. Elections and other forms of political participation were abolished because these party systems realized the narrowness of their base of support among the masses and the potential of their opposition. Thus, as mass political participation declines, the legitimacy of government also declines. In Mali, however, Keita's economic policy, which involved the breaking of monetary relationship with the Franc Zone, resulted in the devaluation of the new Malian franc and economic stagnation. This stagnation increased as French economic aid and foreign investments decreased. Trade unionists, especially the government workers, were forced to bear the burden of devaluation and the resulting austerity budget. This was what created a confrontation between the government and the Malian trade unions. However, Keita's austerity budget adeptly bypassed the military on the grounds that it was fighting the Touareg. Nonetheless, Keita's creation of a militia broke the remaining ties of loyalty between his government and the military. The likelihood of a coup varies inversely with the loyalty of the military, trade unions and other powerful organizations: On November 19, 1968, military intervention toppled the Keita regime. The Ghanaian case has been sufficiently delineated in previous chapters. In the non-authoritarian regimes—such as Dahomey, Congo (8) 1963, and Togo—the predictive pattern suggests (3) → (7) → (1) as the correct causal relationship. For example, correlation between \( r(1)(3) = +.48 \), but when alliance is controlled for \( r(1)(3) \cdot (7) \), the already weak zero-order correlation decreased from +.48 to +.27. The relationship between popular discontent and coup is spurious.
The original causal relationship between popular discontent→ alliance→ coup holds.

In the top half of the causal model, partial correlation reveals that (6) eliminating opposition more than (2) economic stagnation and (5) corruption, has a stronger effect on (4) mass party and (3) popular discontent. (See partial correlations 5, 6, 7, 11, 12 and 13 in Table 10.) An explanation of this weak effect of corruption and economic stagnation lies in the domain of African societies and customs. Corruption or "dash" is an acceptable way of life. As delineated in Section 1 of this chapter, the state is looked upon as a provider of jobs and whosoever controls the state machinery has the right to eat its fruits. Likewise, social customs and traditions require that a job holder provide jobs or support for family members and tribesmen. This overburdening of the government official requires that he squeeze, embezzle public funds and take kickbacks in order to meet his extensive obligations. The weak effect of economic stagnation on mass party and popular discontent may lie in part with the African economy. The majority of Africans still live in a subsistence economy where local farms, markets and craft guilds predominate. Besides, many African governments have instituted programs to deal with unemployment and other indices of economic stagnation. For instance, President Diori of Niger in June 1964 ordered all unemployed men to take up agricultural work or face prosecution as vagabonds. The ILO classified Niger among the African states practicing a disguised form of forced labor. Other states—the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Guinea—have instituted a
civic service program. The institutionalization of such programs and the reliance on governmental data or UN estimation also plays its part in the distortion of that information which is found in UN and other publications.

In terms of the strong linking among (6) eliminating opposition, (4) Δmass party and (3) popular discontent, $r(4)(6) = +.60$ and $r(6)(3) = +.54$ with $F$ values of 5.122 significant at .05 level; $r(6)(2) = +.84$ with $F$ value of 3.688 significant at .10 level. Many of the governmental mass parties are still conglomerations of elite/patron parties which revolve around regional, economic or tribal leaders. The elimination of elite/patron party leaders results in their followers disaffiliating themselves from the mass party and the government. The greater the elimination of representatives of politically relevant units in the political system, the more likely the occurrence of a coup.

In partial summary, eliminating opposition, Δmass party, popular discontent and alliance were hypothesized to affect directly the incidence of coups d'état, especially in the non-authoritarian states, while, in the authoritarian states, the coercive potential of the government prevented or curtailed widespread popular discontent and alliances. Thus, change in mass party affiliation links directly with coups. The above explanations of the causal model will be further delineated in Part III of the dissertation. The above hypotheses serve as focal points in delineating political stability and instability in the six case study states.
FOOTNOTES


2 Usually there existed three types of patron or elite parties in African states before independence. The first type consisted of those parties led by prestigious figures of the older generation of nationalists who did not accept the uncouth aspects of mass politics. Their own outlooks militated against obtaining a mass following of their own. Examples of this type were patron or elite parties led by J. B. Danquah of Ghana, founder of the United Gold Coast Convention and president of the Ghana Bar Association, and Lamine-Gueye of Senegal, the first Black African deputy elected to the French parliament. A second category was elite party organizations led by political entrepreneurs who based their claims on primordial solidarities, mainly ethnic. The third major category of elite parties was socio-economic groups based on education, occupation and source or amount of income; these included especially the civil servants and other organized workers—railroad, harbor and construction workers. Aristide Zolberg, Creating Political Order The Party-States of West Africa, pp. 11, 67; and Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa: Politics of Independence (New York, 1961), p. 95.

3 Weich, op. cit., p. 18.


6 First, op. cit., p. 101.

7 Zolberg, op. cit., p. 67.

8 Martin Kilson, Political Change in a West African State, pp. 268, 270, 274-275, 278.

9 Zolberg, op. cit., p. 105; and First, op. cit., p. 119.


12 Zolberg, op. cit., p. 79.

14 Welch, ed., op. cit., p. 20.

15 Zolberg, op. cit., pp. 73-77; and Talcott Parsons, "Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process," Eckstein, ed., Internal War: Problems and Approaches (New York, 1964), p. 44. According to Parsons, power deflation... essentially in a constitutional regime, is marked, on the one hand, by restraint in the expectation of fulfillment of various demands and, on the other, by restraint in the coercion of the opposition by those in power. It is when these restraints are broken in the interaction between incumbents and opposition that the markings of a revolutionary situation are present. Some characteristics of power deflation are a sharp increase in death attributable to domestic group violence; rampant electoral manipulation; a greater military participation ratio (armed forces::total population); transfer of allegiance of intellectuals; heightened dependence of political leaders upon the police, gendarmerie or army support; and various symptoms of social disequilibrium.


19 Welch, ed., op. cit., p. 28.


21 Rene Dumont, False Start in Africa, pp. 78-84.

22 Ibid., p. 82.

23 Ibid., p. 65.


34 Lee, *op. cit.*, p. 90; and First, *op. cit.*, p. 87.


37 S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, pp. 23-60.


41 First, *op. cit.*, p. 429.


44 Hubert Blalock, Jr., *Causal Influence in Nonexperimental Research* (Chapel Hill, 1964), pp. 4-5.

45 First, *op. cit.*, p. 432.

46 This conceptualization of political instability differs from

47 Relative deprivation is defined as actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life which members of the trade unions and military believe they are rightfully entitled to. Value capabilities are goods and conditions that they think they are capable of getting and keeping. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p. 366.


49 The stepwise regression program computes the multiple linear regression equations in a stepwise manner. At each step, one variable (which makes the greatest reduction in the error sum of squares, has the highest partial correlation with the dependent variables, and the highest F value) is added to the regression equation. (See pp. 233-254 of BWD program manual.)

Military-Trade Union Alliance: Contrived and Natural

Following the ouster of the politicians, the military seeks to justify its seizure of control by rationalizing that the army regime is necessary due to the politicians' failure to resolve the fundamental economic, political and social problems confronting the state. The next step is to seek legitimacy by gaining or creating social and political bases of support and by building effectiveness among them. Legitimacy is one of the most important problems that the military must overcome: Rule by force alone, or the threat of such force, is inadequate. A government which bases its rule on the fact that it is materially stronger than any other force in society would prove both ephemeral and ineffective. The reason is simply that the claim to rule by virtue of superior forces invites challenges. Moreover, relying on legitimate authority instead of force is an efficient and more economical way of securing obedience. Strong public attachment to institutions cannot be created if obedience is based merely on force.

In addition to the problem of legitimacy, the military must deal with the problem of supplying national political leadership and of developing mass support for its programs. If the military is to succeed in this political aspect, it must develop a political apparatus outside of the military establishment through a system of alliances with civilians but under direct military domination.
Hence, obtaining legitimacy and providing national political leadership can both be achieved by careful cultivation of a strong base of popular support. The trade unions, which are nontribal and nonregional, form and furnish such a base.

Many military leaders have sought legitimacy by naming civilian advisory councils, often in response to mounting discontent with policies imposed by the military regimes. Ghanaian civil servants were prominent in the committees established by the National Liberation Council. For example, a civilian political committee was named on June 30, 1966, four months after Nkrumah's ouster, when austerity policies were causing increasing unrest. Nevertheless, the exalted role played by Ghanaian civil servants bespeaks a marriage born of more than convenience, rather one born of a similar view of politics. Plans for the return to civilian rule were devised in a fairly tight circle of civilian advisers. The Nigerian army was much too small to govern directly after the first coup of 1966 and relied on civil servants to run the machinery of government. Likewise, following the second coup of 1966, the Gowon regime created a civilian advisory council in June 1967; its creation was intended to prepare the way for the formation of twelve states within a federal framework. When Sierra Leone's miniscule army (only 0.06 per cent of the total population) took power in 1967, its officers could only fill a few top administrative posts without the risk of diluting its energies or neglecting army command functions. General Soglo's first government was composed almost entirely of technicians. African armies have not developed the features associated
with the 'modernizing' armies in the Middle East or Latin America, which set up counter-bureaucracies to their civilian counterparts.

Even in Francophone states, where military claims to efficiency were more obvious, the civil service has not been displaced by the officer corps. The Ewe elite continues to run the Togolese system under a series of army ministers. The Central African Republic military regime in 1966 decreed that no one with financial responsibility under the old regime should be reintegrated into the civil service. But such bans were temporary due to the scarcity of trained manpower. Those Senegalese civil servants who were demoted for their support of Prime Minister Dia's bid for power against President Senghor in 1962 were often quickly promoted into other branches of the civil service.5

Military-dominated African governments have, out of necessity, worked closely with civil servants and other trade unionists.

Chief Awolowo has expressed this affinity:

> It has been said that governments may come and governments may go, but the civil service remains forever. It is a most merciful thing indeed that the civil service remains largely unaffected by the vicissitudes of politics. What a tragedy, for instance, it would have been if the recent reverses in the fortunes of politicians had hit the civil servants more or less equally. The smooth takeover by the army would have been impossible. There would have been a chaotic collapse of public administration, with harsh and injurious effects on the welfare of the people.6

Similar comments have been voiced by First:

> Once the army seizes governments, the corridors of control rarely run from the officers' mess alone. Common to most military regimes installed by coup is a civil service-military axis in which armies have physical power and the civil service wields effective executive power in the state.7
Apart from the immediate post-coup gains which accrue to the military and trade unions, the demands and actions of the two groups are interwoven. It is inevitable that, during and after the coup, the coup-makers forge this army-civil service axis, for the officers are too few in number and too inexperienced to rule without alliances. The ruling junta must exercise its power through civilians, whether the civil servants or other trade unionists. Alliances are both natural and necessary. The military tends to join forces with experienced government employees, other trade unionists and politicians that opposed the former regime. According to First, "No military regime could survive even a week without the civil servants running the administration." Many regimes rest on two pillars: the army, and the trade unionists and neutral politicians.

"It is tempting to assert," says Welch, "that the similar technocratic orientation and organizational hierarchy of army officers and civil servants bring both groups into a natural alliance." In terms of technocratic orientation and organizational hierarchy, the armed forces have three massive political advantages over other institutions: 1) a marked superiority in organization; 2) a highly emotionalized symbolic status; and 3) a monopoly of arms. Although the military possesses several outstanding features—centralized command, hierarchy, discipline, intercommunications, a degree of esprit de corps, and a corresponding isolation and self-sufficiency, nonetheless it lacks technical expertise. Moreover, the military has few comprehensive programs and is thus directionless. Military
men are not businessmen, nor are they civil servants with an ideology of economic growth. If the military stands on its own, the country will stagnate. The deeply rooted demand of the educated for a dynamic modernity will reassert itself and the military elite will be put on the defensive. The military realizes that it is not a complete regime in terms of having comprehensive programs or a perspective of the future. On the other hand, the deficiencies of the military are the assets of the civil service—technical expertise, and economic, political and social capabilities. The weakness of the civil service is its lack of physical power to overthrow the government or enforce laws and regulations. In short, the military elite can run the state only with the collaboration of the civil service. Even though it might denounce, check, supervise, interfere with, purge, transform or dominate the civil service, the military cannot replace it. The military realizes that the effectiveness of its reign depends on the efficiency of the civil service. Since the military regime views its role essentially as purging the state of political venality, the ruling officers tend to exalt the role of the technocrats. Both civil servants and members of the military are purportedly apolitical—hence alliances come naturally. The extent of military domination can range from complete army control to behind-the-scenes manipulation but, in most African states, military control falls near the center of the spectrum.

Both the trade unions and the military are concerned with state-building and the rational use of resources and governmental efficiency. They share an instrumental outlook, a belief that
society can be altered by application of certain administrative techniques. The organizational structure of the civil service parallels that of the armed forces: both can be bureaucracies or "rational-legal" authorities. Trade unionists (civil servants) have an important role in the rational use of resources; knowledgeable and experienced in such matters, their expertise is vital to the formulation and execution of any proposed policy. A close working relationship brings into play a relatively uncorrupt group whose members have been long overshadowed by politicians.

In terms of nation-building, both the military and unions serve to integrate diverse ethnic groups into a national community. The military can widen horizons beyond village and locality. This symbolic contribution of the military organization is important in building national identification by presenting the army as a national entity rather than a tribal or traditional group.12

The affinity of outlook also arises from distrust of politicians. As Nzeribe remarked on the Independence struggle in Nigeria, "People who had done nothing took over the country and the workers were relegated to the background."13 Union members, who had the expertise and functions to perform before the politicians entered the scene, generally regarded the politicians as incompetent upstarts. Drilled in the concept that political contests should be free and open—with the civil service administration itself disinterested, civil servants were quick to accuse politicians of defying the neutrality of the civil service and its incumbents by using the government for self-serving ends. This British concept—civil servants
should be apolitical in order to respond effectively to the policies of the party in power—was attacked by the political leaders, who vehemently opposed such ideas and considered the civil service as an integral part of their administration and the mass party apparatus. Movement of officials between party organizations and government ministries and departments became common practice. Both Ghana and Tanzania, for example, forced the civil servants to join the CPP and TANU. President Nyerere announced that, henceforth, party ideal rather than merit and party supervision rather than a public service commission would prevail in the public service. In 1964, the Tanzanian Government had already departed from the British model by 'permitting' civil servants to join TANU, so as not to deprive the party of the country's most educated citizens. Ghana's Civil Service Act of 1960 automatically embodied all civil servants in the GTUC, the exception being those holding superscale appointments, legal officers, labor officers and others holding sensitive posts. A number of difficulties arose for this system, the chief one being that office supervisors and local heads of departments were subjected to conflicting loyalties. If they were zealous in representing the interests of the government as an employer, then clashes occurred with the local staff trade union officials, who did not hesitate to remind civil service officials that they were also subject to union discipline.

Civil servants and other organized government employees were subject to attacks by politicians and public criticisms in newspapers, parliaments, and on political platforms. Moreover, the
civil servants resented the attempts of ministers to control or influence appointments, promotions, discipline—which led to the political appointment of relatives and friends over more experienced career civil servants. Merits and qualifications ceased to be requirements for promotions and appointments, undermining morale and efficiency within the civil service. The government workers were forced to work within two basically incompatible frameworks of loyalty—to the state and to the incumbent government. Their first loyalty was to the state, and their conduct and actions had to be brought into consonance with the state's best interests. In addition, the civil servant owed allegiance to the government of the day, as expressed through his relations with the ministers. If government employees are forced to subordinate loyalty to the state to loyalty to the ministers, then the civil service administration becomes riddled with politics and loses its integrity, impartiality and permanence. For, obviously, any shift in power within the government is likely to lead to purges or removals of supporters of the former regime. In Senegal, for instance, the young civil servants talked of politics as a "basket of crabs". They realized that dissent from the party leadership would mean the loss of their jobs, so they avoided politics. In Upper Volta, there was the same criticism about les anciens in power and, when the coup came in January 1966, it brought a significant number of the second generation elite into office. The avoidance of partisan politics by the junior civil servants distinguishes them from the senior civil servants. The junior civil servants, mainly administrators who were often more
qualified and better educated than the men in office, saw the first generation leaders as part of a closed corporation; les anciens occupied the positions of real power. The military's displeasure with the politicians has been delineated mainly in Chapter VIII.

Finally, the affinity of the military and the civil service also stems from their colonial origins. The military's colonial origins have been documented in detail in Chapters IV, V, and VI. The civil service in West Africa had its origins in the machinery created by Britain and France to consolidate their colonial administrations. Since it was formed mainly to pacify and to prosecute imperial policies in Africa, the early civil service grew out of military occupations and, in many cases, the first public officers were military personnel drawn from the colonial regiments and occupation forces. During the early stages of occupation, the functions of the civil service were mainly concerned with collection of revenue and the maintenance of law and order. The political administrative service—composed of provincial and district commissioners, the police and treasury officials—constituted the core of the civil service. These officials maintained liaisons with local traditional authorities, wherever they existed, or created chiefs where there were none, and helped to bring colonial administration to the people. In essence, the civil service was geared to the rather negative policy of preventing trouble and bringing colonial rule to all the dependent territories overseas. However, the junior civil servants, mainly Africans, were allowed to join trade unions and participated in nationalist movements. Hence, many disassociated themselves from
colonial policies and simultaneously obtained a degree of legitimacy through the nationalist movement.

Due both to their colonial origin, when they were institutions manipulated by external controllers, and to the economically restless nature of indigenous political power, the army and the civil service have fought similar battles to escape governmental and political party control and manipulation. The power that each has acquired through pressure and force is thus not an extension of any indigenous ruling groups or party but is usually independent of it. The military-bureaucratic compact has demonstrated in one coup after another that it can act independently and over and above government.

Splits Within the Military-Trade Union Alliance

If armies in power remain united, there is little that will topple them, short of outside intervention. But once armies experience internal rifts, they are far from impregnable, notwithstanding their monopoly on violence. However, the armies of Africa are agglomerations of several social groups and interests that have been trained in diverse traditions, which training inculcates different values and attitudes. They thus play shifting roles and they adjust to the shifting conditions of African politics. The soldier not only acts from army grievances but also from his identification with his generation, his region or community, or his political affiliation. During this stage, the soldiers and the junior civil service acted on such issues as pay scales, attitudes toward professionalism and rank involving educational background. Splits occurred between the senior and junior officers within the military-
trade union administration, resulting in mutiny-coups d'état. The better educated junior officers in both institutions felt stepped on by senior officials (new government) who held the strategic positions used to block the advancement of the young Turks. In the trade union organizations, a split developed as the upper ranks of the leadership received better pay, privileges and usually sided with the new government leaders, while the ranks of the unions continued to look to the lower levels for preservation of their unions as instruments for expressing dissatisfaction in much the same way as before independence.

The first issue underlining tensions between senior and junior officers in the new government was the pay scale. In most of the African states, the wage system had been distorted by the effects of foreign rule. In general, the wages paid to high-level manpower have been determined by the rates that were necessary to induce Europeans to enter the civil service and officer corps during colonial times. Since the colonial powers were the major employers, the standards they set for high-level manpower markets have dominated the wage structure, which is characterized by extremely wide differentials between high-level manpower, second-level manpower and manual workers. Furthermore, this wage structure conformed to racial lines, with Europeans occupying the high levels and Africans occupying the low levels. In a number of cases, skilled jobs for which no local expatriated personnel was available were upgraded to senior posts in order to attract Europeans. For instance, European type-writer mechanics were placed in the senior service. All posts that
were originally occupied by Europeans—immigration officers, executive officers, senior clerks, stenographers—were therefore graded into the senior service. The sharp division in status between the races reflected itself in separate housing arrangements, separate social institutions such as clubs, and separate social service facilities such as hospitals and schools. When the barriers began to break down, it was almost automatic that Africans would move into these vacated senior posts and continue all the positive and negative benefits. This status consciousness was so strongly entrenched that, even when new service structures abolished the distinction between the senior service and junior service, the officers by an adopted convention drew the line where it previously existed. As the local people invaded the senior ranks of the service, their emoluments bore close relation to those of their expatriate colleagues. This had a distorting effect on the whole salary structure, in addition to creating tensions between the senior and junior service. The legacy of this structural system still burdens many African states, as witnessed by Adu's pay scales table. (See Table 11 on page 267.)

In Senegal, for example, about fifty civil servants had salaries over £2,400 per annum; another 275 earned between £1,200 and £2,400. The next lower category of civil servants, numbering 1,600, earned over £850 per annum while, in private employment, there were about 350 Senegalese with a mean income of £850 per annum. Similar salary scales existed in the other Francophone states.
TABLE 11

SOME TYPICAL EXISTING SALARY STRUCTURES—MID 1960's

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<tr>
<th>Grades</th>
<th>Salary Range (in £)</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Grade/Superscale Posts</td>
<td>1728-3900</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administrative, Professional, &amp; Scientific Classes</td>
<td>1368-1890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>720-1584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive, Technical, &amp; Senior Secretarial Classes</td>
<td>312-1584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical, Junior Secretarial, Minor Technical &amp; Artisan Classes</td>
<td>174-828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Clerical and Auxiliary Classes</td>
<td>132-371</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Nowhere is the retention of 'senior service' expatriate salaries more obvious than in the security forces. Like their counterparts, the civil servants, the upper rank army officers inherited the colonial pay scales in many of the African states. There was a deliberate policy to keep salaries for the officer corps comparable with those of metropolitan armies. While officers' salaries were deliberately kept at something near the expatriate level, there were vast differences in personal status and power between officers and enlisted men. An African colonel in Anglophone African states expected a starting salary of about £2,500 without allowances. The lieutenant-colonel of a battalion earned as starting salary as much as ten to fifteen times the wages of ordinary recruits. These great
differences were maintained in both Anglophone and Francophone states. According to Peter Lloyd's definition, an elite was one who received some form of western education and could command an income of more than £250 ($700 at 1964 values) or 150,000 CFA francs. Therefore, the average noncommissioned officer in African armies belonged to the 'elite class' in terms of salary. A sergeant could expect to earn between £250 and £500 a year; senior warrant officers and regimental sergeant-majors might earn up to £800 or £900. Table 12 shows some of the discrepancies in military pay scales in some of the Anglophone states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
<th>Malawi</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Sierra Leone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major-General</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier</td>
<td>2,520</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>3,118</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>2,410</td>
<td>2,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>2,175</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>2,601</td>
<td>2,166</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>2,095</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt.-Col</td>
<td>1,935</td>
<td>1,935</td>
<td>2,177</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>1,960</td>
<td>1,690</td>
<td>2,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>1,690</td>
<td>1,690</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,779</td>
<td>1,690</td>
<td>1,271</td>
<td>1,307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,366</td>
<td>1,190</td>
<td>1,647</td>
<td>1,014</td>
<td>1,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lieutenant</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>1,003</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lieutenant</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadet</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSM</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W01</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W02</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The annual starting salaries for each rank are listed without allowances in pound sterling at current rates of exchange before devaluation.

Other sources of discontent contributing to the split in
the new government—and eventually to mutiny-coups—were education, rank, age and professionalism. The tension which developed from this discontent may be divided into three categories: 1) differences based on ethnic or tribal origins; 2) differences based on generation; and 3) differences based on functional and educational distinctions, such as general versus technical duties. In most of the African armies, there were three principal levels in the officer corps of each army: 1) officers who obtained full status before 1955 (more analogous to Francophone states); 2) NCO's, promoted particularly during the expansion period of World War II, who predominated among African officers and chiefs of staff (however, no NCO acquired full officer status until after independence.); and 3) officers who had been commissioned through a direct entry system. Members of the third group received more formal education than either of the other two groups because they were recruited through the school during the pre-independence crash programs. After independence, difficulties arose over reconciling conflicts between the second and third groups. The promoted NCO's, who had considerable military experience under colonial officers, were naturally prejudiced against their younger direct-entry colleagues. A more persistent source of tension between these two groups has been the age gap. After the military assumed political power, the younger officer group, stationed mainly in the provinces, repeatedly sought to launch counter-coups.

Another common problem among the new armies was education. The officers in command positions had risen through the ranks and
been promoted with the post-independence Africanization process. The younger officers, subsequently better educated and better trained at intensive officer training school, considered themselves better qualified to command. Within the middle and younger generations, there existed a promotion bottleneck. Instead of careful gradations in age and seniority, there were great clusters of officers similar in age, experience and training; and, in each group, the career hopes of all but a few seemed certain to be blighted. Frustration and conspiracies flourish in such situations. In Ghana, all officers were relatively young: none was older than forty-five and a great many were in their twenties. The dangers of a promotion block were important arguments for gradualism. Educational provisions, promotion bottleneck, and political necessity led to the creation in East Africa of a half-rank known as the effendi. The existence of the effendi underscored the fact that a position in the new state apparatus depended on formal educational qualifications rather than professional experiences.

Also contributing to splits within new governments are a number of conflicting interests that originated from underlying factors—colonial traditions and new governments' practices. In African societies, these conflicts revolved around: a) class interest, where factions in new government tended to support officers drawn from the same social class and to overthrow those drawn from a different or hostile class; b) regional interest, where officer corps members drawn from one particular section of the state develop special ties with regional recruits, thus acting as a motive for
mutiny; and c) the self-interest of the individual. In conditions where "orders" is poorly defined, military discipline tends to deteriorate. Either specific military units act independently of headquarters or ad hoc groups of soldiers decide to take authority into their own hands. In most cases of military intervention in the African states, the army did not act cohesively; rather, one segment of it acted and was then opposed by others.

An intergenerational conflict along ethnic lines characterized the first Nigerian coup in 1966. This coup generated the July 1966 coup, which exhibited a complete lack of cohesion, for the officer corps was divided along ethnic and regional lines. The same intergenerational and interethnic considerations were detected in the composition of the Ghana National Liberation Council and the counter-coup that eliminated Lieutenant-Colonel Kotoka. The Francophone states exhibited similar divisions. In the Dahomey coup of 1963 and the 1966 coup in Upper Volta, the armies were plagued by ethnic division. The Togolese army has been repeatedly plagued by ethnic conflicts between the Ewe and non-Ewe officers.

The effect of colonial recruitment and traditions is evident in these mutiny-coups. The officers were not recruited from homogeneous social and economic backgrounds; they were still ethnically divided, which, in turn, meant that they lacked common myths and symbols. Furthermore, as indicated by Table 4, the officers after independence were trained in diverse culture and military traditions. Cohesion among and within different levels in the military was impossible. For instance, Ghana under Nkrumah had men trained
in and received military aid from ten different countries, including the United Kingdom, United States, USSR and Egypt. Such varied sources inculcated different values and attitudes, which worked against cohesion.

The new government, especially the military sectors, soon finds that power divides. Any cohesion disappears as soon as the army ceases to perform the functions for which it was drilled. The reasons are obvious: Armies are agglomerations of interest and social groups; once they have stepped beyond the barracks and must make policy decisions that are not defined in terms of mere military procedures, they soak up social conflicts like a sponge. Armies have shown that they can be as prone to divisive loyalties as are politicians and parties. Once the new government divides along communal lines, the incumbent army-trade union bureaucracy is doomed to failure. Although the new government may embark upon control of the government with assurance of widespread popular enthusiasm, little can guarantee the maintenance of this climate of enthusiasm. Just as the euphoria of achieving independence gave way to disenchantment, the moment of rejoicing at the fall of the unpopular civilian regime gave way to resentment of the policies of the new government. The new government could not solve the problems of unemployment, deficit budgets, and pay cuts for junior civil servants, nor could it automatically eradicate corruption or eliminate primordial sentiments in the interest of greater national unity. In essence, the new coup leaders faced the same difficulties and problems over which their civilian predecessors stumbled. The new
government fell prey to corruption, unwarranted use of force, denial of political rights—the same weaknesses that justified the overthrow of the civilian government. According to Payne, the junior officers have witnessed a certain amount of corruption within the new government and perceive the closed association and identification of the senior ranking officials as having a part in this corruption. This may partially explain why many coups are led by either colonels or lower ranking officials. The oppressed junior officers in both the military and trade unions became the opposition leaders and challenged the new 'politicians', as illustrated by events in Sierra Leone and Dahomey.

**Mutiny-Coups d'Etat**

**Dahomey**

Dahomey's economic vicissitudes, trade union unrest, and the bitter heritage of strong regional tensions—exacerbated by excessive centralization—led to a brief intervention in late 1963 by Colonel Soglo, who returned power to civilians after general elections in January 1964. (See Chapter X, case study 2, for detailed documentation.) In late 1965, Colonel Soglo intervened twice, first transferring power from the premier to the speaker of the national assembly, and finally assuming full military control. Nonetheless, the economic crisis continued unresolved, and tensions increased within the armed forces. Crucial decisions in the Soglo Government were made by an informal junta comprising three to five officers. Moreover, each member could arbitrarily pass information to lower echelons of the officer corps in order to build up pressures
and to influence the final outcome on policy issues. These officers felt no need to bring junior officers into decision-making, potentially sowing the seeds of the government's downfall.30

On December 17, 1967, Lieutenant-Colonel Alley (the army chief of staff), Captain Kerekou, and several junior officers toppled Soglo's military government in a bloodless coup. The coup was directed against the top echelon of the military hierarchy by the lower ranks. (Trade union strikes and protests against the government's austerity measures made the atmosphere more conducive to a coup.) The discontent of two officer groups fused and brought about the mutiny-coup. After the takeover, Alley was asked to become head of state, apparently because he was satisfactory to the trade unions and because he had not been identified with any particular region. The new government was composed of an equal number of northern and southern personnel, who were younger than their predecessors.

The apparent causes of the mutiny-coup d'état, according to young officers who had complained of Soglo's failures, were:

...to put a stop to absurd quarrels between rivals by appeasing the people and restoring respect for the sense of duty which many Dahomean citizens were beginning to ignore; to remedy the economic and financial ills from which the country was suffering...31

According to young officers, the hopes and promises of Soglo's government had not been fulfilled; and the masses hated and despised the military.32 As Radio Cotonou broadcast:

This is why we, the young cadres of the army, aware that the role of the whole army was in question; considering that our seniors in the army had disappointed the people and betrayed the national army; aware that it is the duty
of us, the young army cadres, to restore the situation as well as the authority and dignity of the nation, decided in the higher interests of the nation to dissolve the government of General Soglo and the military committee of vigilance...33

Colonel Alley declared that elections would be held within six months, no matter what the consequences were.34 A draft constitution providing for a modified presidential regime was approved by Dahomean citizens on March 31, 1968. On August 1, 1968, two weeks after the inauguration of appointed President Emile Zinsou, the military government was dissolved. However, schisms continued within the military and new government and, on December 10, 1969, a group of junior officers led by Lieutenant-Colonel Kounandete deposed President Zinsou.

The mutiny-coup in Dahomey resulted from several shortcomings of the Soglo Government: failure to effect economic recovery and national reconciliation; failure to include the junior officer corps in decision-making; Soglo's intention to disregard his earlier promises of a return to civilian rule; and waste, corruption, misappropriation, and nepotism. Moreover, the junior officers' professional pride was wounded by the activities of the military government and its neglect of them.35 The composition of Soglo's government brought about divergencies based on age and education. The junior officers, many of them graduates of French military academies, were impatient at being placed under the command of their less well-educated and rather conservative superiors and resented being assigned economic tasks rather than purely military duties. But even the younger generation of officers was divided between the
predominant Fon and the northern faction, headed by Major Kounandete.36

The only link that kept the young officers together was their hostility to Soglo and his clique of older, corrupt officers.

Sierra Leone
The mutiny-coup in Sierra Leone grew out of the results of bitterly fought general elections in 1967 between the opposition African People's Congress (APC), led by Siaka Stevens of the Limba tribe, and the ruling Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), led by Prime Minister Sir Albert Margai, a member of the Mende tribe. The APC was the apparent winner. Shortly after Stevens was sworn in as prime minister, Brigadier Lansana, a Mende, intervened and arrested him. According to the Dore-Edwin report and a government white paper,

The whole of Margai's government arrangement for the 1967 election was rigged and corrupted. SLPP declared APC nomination papers invalid and raised the required deposit by 150 per cent. Margai and his corrupt followers were determined to use all means fair or foul to win and remain in office and, if all failed, to get Brigadier Lansana to take over.37

Nonetheless, within two days of the intervention, Lansana and former prime minister Margai were supplanted by the National Reformation Council (NRC), composed of young officers drawn mainly from the Mende group. The NRC refused to restore Stevens to power on the grounds that the election returns had indicated a tribal polarization between the parties and that to allow the APC to form a government by itself would exacerbate tribal tensions. According to Cartwright, the officers' refusal to return power to Stevens was probably motivated by a combination of their own tribal interests, class fears, and a desire to hold power themselves.38 The majority
of officers being Mende like the SLPP leadership and thus linked to the traditional ruling families, the NRC was opposed to Stevens, a trade union leader, and his urban-dominated coalition.

The NRC set up a civilian rule committee whose supposed duty and purpose was to facilitate the turning over of the government to civilians. To the apparent chagrin of the NRC, the committee agreed on the critical point that civilian rule could be restored without another election and declared that military rule could end by mid-1968. But the officers in power now were reluctant to return to their barracks, and this decision instituted a split among the ranks. Amid spreading rumors that the NRC chairman, Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew Juxon-Smith, was planning to declare Sierra Leone a republic with himself as president, the NCO's, led by Sergeant Rogers, formed the Anti-Corruption Revolutionary Movement and staged their own coup on April 18, 1968. Disgruntled with low pay, the apparent self-serving attitudes of the NRC and the feeling that the army was threatened by internal cleavages, the NCO's established a National Interim Council (NIC), which announced that the thirteen month interlude of army rule would end. After consultations with APC and SLPP leaders, Stevens was again sworn in as Prime Minister of a coalition of the APC, SLPP, and independents. 39

The apparent cause of the mutiny-coup was aptly stated by Sergeant Rogers:

Little did we realize that the people we had chosen in March, 1967, to direct our nation's affairs were more corrupt and selfish than the ousted civilian regime. It has since become absolutely clear that most of the so-called NRC members only wanted to benefit their selfish ends; the rank and file of the army have been ignored.
A mutiny-coup attempted in the Congo (B) on March 22-23, 1970, by Lieutenant Kikango was quelled by President Ngouabi, who, as a captain, had overthrown civilian President Massamba-Debat in December 1969. 41

Summary and Conclusion

There were many variables which eased military withdrawal from active political roles in Dahomey and Sierra Leone. Two of the most important were: 1) The firm commitment of the commanding officers to step aside. The Revolutionary Military Committee in Dahomey and the National Interim Council in Sierra Leone did not envisage indefinite periods of rule but a time for quick surgery of problems in the political system. 2) The most significant variable, the belief that military unity and effectiveness would be further impaired by remaining in control. The professional interests of the commanding officers, such as the cohesion, morale and effectiveness of the two organizations, conflicted with the demands inherent in political dominance. In addition to regional interests, members of the NRC and the Soglo Government neglected the middle ranks.

Unlike the mutinies in stage 2, which occurred mainly because of comparative disadvantages across institutions—between military and organized workers, stage 4 mutinies occurred from
comparative disadvantages within these same institutions. However, similar to the mutinies in the second stage, the new opposition in many cases sought not to take over government but to return it to civilian rule or to form a caretaker government. The junior military officers felt that, by remaining in power, the military itself would be irretrievably divided among officer, tribal and ethnic factions. In essence, military professionalism and unity would be destroyed. The junior government workers, steeped in the tradition that the civil service should be nonpartisan, likewise wanted to uphold its tradition of implementing government policy and leaving elections to civilians and political parties. Nevertheless, in Togo, Upper Volta, Mali, C. A. R. and Congo (B), the military leaders have attempted to imitate the Kemalist Model and thus have remained in control. These bureaucracies have attempted to immerse themselves in the civilian realm by renouncing direct involvement in the armed forces or trade unions. These military leaders have expanded their bases of support by including other sectors of their societies in their regimes. Perhaps the closest imitator of Ataturk's actions in tropical Africa is General Joseph Mobutu, the president of Zaire. Since seizing power in 1965-66, Mobutu has established his own mass political party, the Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution, by means of patronage, coalition building and, moreover, by centralization and consolidation of authority. Thus far, he has been successful in his attempts to make a personal transition from a military figure to a charismatic president. Perhaps of more importance in this transition were Mobutu's ability and efforts to draw the nationalist-Lumumbist
mantle upon himself. President Mobutu has largely succeeded in bringing political stability to Zaire. For example, from 1960 to 1966, the Congo-Kinshasa had five heads of state, experienced three known coups d'etat and an intermittent civil war. Since Mobutu's assumption of full control in 1966, the only major activity of political instability was the continuation of the civil war to 1967.

Imitating Mobutu's example of bringing stability to Zaire, the military leaders of the Central African Republic (1966), Mali (1968), Togo (1967) and Upper Volta (1966) have attempted to block or counter the next round of mutiny-coups d'etat by resorting to administrative and political measures. Such measures have included separation of coercive instruments through plurality of chains of command, division of responsibility for armed forces between two or more ministries; creation of paramilitary formations, such as brigades, popular militias; reliance on foreign military personnel and advisers; and dense implantation of security and intelligence networks within the armed forces and trade unions. These leaders have sought legitimacy and political stability by: 1) tapping accumulated resentment against the preceding civilian regimes; 2) establishing a basis for national unity above and beyond traditional tribal-based legitimacy; 3) co-opting civil servants, other trade unionists and politicians unblemished by association with the deposed regime into a new ruling coalition; and 4) creating firm political support by means of new or rejuvenated nationwide mass-based political parties. However, along with the establishment of legitimacy, these states faced the herculean task of building political institutions
across regional, ethnic, economic and social lines. In addition, other nation- and state-building activities need to be solved. These processes require time, caution and exemplary skills. Until these problems are solved, the possibility of another round of coups and counter-coups cannot be discounted. Only time and the ingenuity of Presidents Bokassa (C. A. R.), Eyadema (Togo), Lamizana (Upper Volta) and Lieutenant Traore (Mali) will determine whether or not these leaders will succeed in bringing stability to their states. Since these leaders seized power, these four states have thus far experienced no major crisis of political instability in the form of coup d'état. Yet they have not been in power long enough for a detailed and accurate assessment of their rule.

The absence of coups d'état in these four states coincides with the decline in political instability in Black Africa. The greatest intensity period (1966-68) of coup d'état and other major forms of political instability has passed in African politics. Coups are becoming more spaced out in time and perhaps even increasingly less frequent in absolute number, as Graph 1 on page 282 indicates.

This pattern may be explained by the increasing institutionalization, centralization and consolidation of national political authority by the military-controlled government in terms of creating mass political parties which are coterminous with the political system. Nonetheless, in some of the African states, especially Dahomey and Congo (B), coups d'état will be no stranger because of the failure of political leaders, the military men and trade unionists to create an alliance acceptable to all. The main obstacle to the
Sucessful military-union coups, military-led secessions or military-union actions instrumental in bringing about governmental change.

Attempted military takeovers, secessions, mutinies that failed to gain power but reached the overt stage.

Planned military coups or planned coups significantly involving the military or portion thereof that were foiled before being put into operation. Only those ultimately made public by the government are included.
formulation of such an alliance lies in the economic, political and social tensions and rivalries of the three regions within Dahomey and between the Kongo and M'bochi in Congo (B), which are reflected in the armed forces, the trade unions and other institutions. Coup begets counter-coup. The meteoric rise of a lieutenant-colonel (or political opponent) to challenge and garner political power does not pass unnoticed. For coups d'etat have become the major mechanism for change of political personnel and for different out-groups to control the levers over state jobs and patronage. Thus, those who seize control risk arousing jealousies and tensions, thereby becoming victims of the whirlwind they have unleashed. As Dahomeans have come to realize, legitimacy once broken cannot readily be restored.
FOOTNOTES

1. Finer, The Man on Horseback, p. 17.


5. Ibid.


7. First, op. cit., p. 432.

8. Ibid., p. 112.


22 Ibid., pp. 106-108.
23 Janowitz, op. cit., p. 69.
24 First, op. cit., p. 434.
25 Gutteridge, Military Institutions, p. 100.
27 First, op. cit., p. 436.
28 Welch, op. cit., p. 59.
29 Payne, op. cit., p. 44.
32 Ibid.
33 See ibid.
35 Bebler, op. cit., p. 41.
37 Bebler, op. cit., p. 95; and African Research Bulletin, IV (1967), Col. 929B.
39 Ibid., p. 28.
40 See ibid., and African Research Bulletin, V (1968), Col. 1035C.
PART III

COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES
CHAPTER X

ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND TRADE UNIONS
IN CONGO (B), DAHOMEY, AND UPPER VOLTA

Introduction to Comparative Case Studies

The use of quantitative data manipulated by statistical techniques is an excellent methodological technique for delineating causation. However, there are many approaches to causal inquiry: different approaches may even yield different answers. If, for example, idiosyncratic causation is the focus of a study on the 1966 military coup in Ghana, it might be found that the personality of Kwame Nkrumah played an important part. If the role of institutional groups in the political process is the prime interest, it might be determined that this same coup was the result of a conflict between the army and police on the one hand, and the presidential palace guards and the CPP on the other hand. If the approach centers on economic causation, it might be found that the Ghanaian coup was the result of changes in the world price of cocoa (the chief financial resource), which brought on economic stagnation, rising prices and unemployment. Even if it is accepted that the causes of the coup in Ghana resulted from a highly personalistic regime and/or the inhibiting consequences of neo-colonialist manipulation of the economy, it can be proven that other West African states—the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Niger—had equally personalistic regimes and suffered equally from foreign economic domination but did not experience coups d'état. Dissatisfaction with such causal explanations may lead to a search for factors other than personalism or neo-colonialism as
explanations of all or most coups. Since causation of any coup or the absence of coup is a complicated affair and since the causes may be different in every situation, the author believes that one of the best roads to the truth of causation is the case study method. There are, however, disadvantages to this approach. Besides being too narrow an approach for testing hypotheses and producing theories, the case study method leads to conflicting hypotheses and suffers from the narrowness of argument based upon the specific instance. For example, while this method has led some scholars to hypothesize that internal conflict is caused by grinding poverty and the despair that accompanies that poverty, it has led others to the hypothesis that internal conflict is caused by rapid economic progress and the dislocation associated with economic growth. Using the case study approach, examples could no doubt be found in which each of these hypotheses is true. For instance, Upper Volta is a coup state where poverty has been excessive, while Congo (B) and Ghana are also coup states, yet have two of the highest per capita incomes of the thirteen West African states. Nevertheless, the case study method does examine all the relevant institutions and societal development. If comparative study of the thirteen West African states established that, in ten states, grinding poverty and the despair that accompanies this poverty seemed to cause a coup and in only three states was a coup apparently caused by rapid economic growth, it would be suggested that the poverty hypothesis had been tested. To obtain the best result from both methods and to supplement and qualify findings from Part II, six detailed case studies will be presented
in this section of the dissertation. Methodologically, these case studies—using the societal approach—involve an analysis of the relationships among the political leadership, trade unions and the military. The analytical significance of these case studies is that the above research dealing with thirteen West African states does not fully take into consideration the impact of each of the several sectors of society.

In addition to the stated advantage of examining all relevant institutions, the case study method will eliminate some of the pan-African generalizations that result from formulating sweeping theories about so diverse a region as West Africa. The previously mentioned methods of causal inquiry fail to take into consideration the unique characteristics of each nation and to heed the caveat—to every general statement, some exceptions can be found. The case study method is an ideal way of presenting the military, trade unions, political leaders and other societal institutions in their respective national environments and the role they have played in coups d'etat, and other instances of political stability and instability.

The hypotheses delineated in Section 2 of Chapter VIII are further substantiated in this part of the dissertation. In addition to relying on correlations and partial correlations from causal models, additional statistical techniques will be used to enunciate the preconditions necessary for a coup d'etat by comparing the coup states with the non-coup states.
Early Political History

The first elections in 1945 for the French National Assembly began the geographic division of politics in Congo (Brazzaville). In these elections, Jean Felix-Tchicaya of Pointe Noire outmaneuvered a large number of candidates representing other ethnic groups by purchasing the support of lesser candidates from the lower Congo against those of the upper Congo. After his election, Tchicaya joined the Communist African deputies. Since elections in AOF and AEF affected party politics in terms of designating the majority party, appointment of the colonial Governor-General, and ideological orientation of the execution of colonial policies, Tchicaya's move induced the French socialists at Brazzaville to encourage the candidacy of Jacques Opongault of the upper Congo. Thus, the lines were drawn for the ethnic and geographic division of Congolese politics. The North, and particularly Opongault's M'Bachi tribe, opposed a southern coalition organized by Tchicaya, while the Balali, formerly the most dynamic group in Brazzaville, remained withdrawn from politics. Nevertheless, Tchicaya was able to hold his larger coalition together and therefore controlled elections; but the balance of power in the territorial assembly was held by the conservative European minority.

The geographic and ethnic division of politics resulted in the creation of three political parties in the Middle Congo: 1) the Mouvement Socialiste Africain (MSA); 2) the Parti Progressiste Congolais (PPC); and 3) the Union Democratique de Defense des
**Intérêts Africains** (UDDIA). The MSA, which was founded in 1946 as a local section of the French socialist party, SFIO, was led by Jacques Opongault and found its strength among the Mbloshi, the freemasons and the lower European ranks of the administration. The PPC, founded in 1946 by Tchicaya, received its major support from the coastal people, especially the educated elites at Brazzaville and Pointe Noire. The PPC was affiliated with Houphouët-Boigny's inter-territorial party, the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA). The UDDIA, which received its support from the Balall and other tribes of the Congo basin, was founded and led by Abbe Fulbert Youlou, a Catholic priest. The UDDIA eventually replaced the PPC as the Congolese wing of the RDA.

The 1956 elections for the National Assembly saw the rise of Youlou, who succeeded in organizing the support of the Balall at Brazzaville and the surrounding areas. However, with the aid of the French colonial administration, which intervened against Opongault and Youlou, Tchicaya emerged victorious. Nonetheless, Youlou emerged as an important new leader and, in the November 1956 municipal elections, Youlou's party captured control of the Brazzaville city council by a large majority, while his ally, Stephane Tchitchelle, upset Tchicaya at Pointe Noire. The defeat of Tchicaya and the PPC set the stage for renewed rivalry between Youlou and his UDDIA of the southern region and Opongault and his MSA of the northern region. In the 1957 elections, Opongault's alliance gave him an unstable majority of twenty-three seats in the territorial assembly to twenty-two seats for Youlou's UDDIA. A French compromise
resulted in a coalition government with Opongault at the head.

Political power in the Congo (B) became the object of a continual struggle fought in France. Both the local Europeans, who sought control of the Brazzaville city administration, and the interested French political parties opposed any possible accommodation between Opongault and Youlou. Their persistent exploitation of ethnic and other rivalries defeated all attempts to maintain stability in the territorial assembly and in the council of government.

Internal Autonomy and the Achievement of Independence

Following ratification of DeGaulle's constitution in the referendum of September 1958 and the elections for the national territorial assembly in November 1958, Youlou became prime minister when Opongault's MSA lost its one vote majority in the assembly. When the assembly convened on February 17, 1959, to consider plans for a constitution and new elections, ethnic rioting, solidified by the rival parties, occurred between Opongault's MSA M'boshi and Youlou's UDDIA Balali. The battle continued for three days—with scores of deaths and hundreds of homes damaged—before French officials and the gendarmerie were able to restore order. Since Youlou controlled the government, Opongault and his followers were arrested and jailed.

In Opongault's absence, Youlou sought to centralize and consolidate his power by some of the following techniques: redrawing constituency lines in order to place a majority of Opongault's supporters in as many districts as possible; increasing the number of assembly seats; moving the capital from Pointe Noire (MSA's stronghold)
to Brazzaville (UDDIA's stronghold); and the appointment of UDDIA members to important positions throughout the country. Youlou and his UDDIA were able to win 64 per cent of the popular vote and 51 out of the 61 seats in the assembly. The remaining 10 seats located in Opongault's stronghold were won by the MSA.

Attempts at Unanimity and the 1963 Coup

When independence came on August 15, 1960, Youlou and the UDDIA continued to consolidate political power. A referendum on March 2, 1961, approved a new constitution which brought into existence a strong presidential regime. Through 'managed' elections, Youlou—the only candidate—received 88.4 per cent of the vote. However, during both the independence and post-independence periods, Youlou followed a policy of broad entente, taking opposition leaders into his government. Opongault became vice-president and Tchicaya's former lieutenant, Germain Bikoumat, who was used as a link to the unreconciled members of the PPC, joined Youlou's government as a cabinet minister. Despite this appearance of unity, the radical labor and youth movement, which derived from the militant wing of the old PPC and from the communist-affiliated CGT, refused to be absorbed into the national consensus being negotiated or imposed by Youlou. In fact, Kikhouna-N'Got, leader of the labor movement, planned the creation of a new political party with several Brazzaville labor leaders. As a result, he and his associates were arrested and imprisoned for 'subversive activity'. Due to Youlou's perseverance in creating a coalition, Kikhouna-N'Got was released from prison and appointed to the council of ministers. Through the
distribution of rewards and privileges to all groups, Youlou was able to keep the coalition in check.

When independence was achieved, the Congolese economy was dependent on receipts from customs duties and French subsidies. The government salaries, social programs and major capital development consumed an enormous percentage of expenditures. Added to budget problems was the inheritance intact of the colonial salary structure, with its great disparity between public administrative salaries and other salaries. To maintain his coalition and his office, Youlou adeptly balanced the execution of regional and ethnic interests at each level of government and, most important, in the distribution of development projects and social facilities. Yet economic planning was undercut by the attempts to satisfy the immediate demands of each region, ethnic group and their representatives. In addition to poor economic planning, unemployment, corruption and other economic problems hit the Congo (B). Patronage and rewards, which were used to maintain the coalition, were undermined. To keep the political control firmly in his hands, Youlou began maneuvers to replace his coalition of parties and partners.

In preparation for the creation of a single party system and the achievement of unanimity, Youlou removed his strongest opponents from the government. Opongault was retired from the vice-presidency in December 1962 but was retained as a minister; Alphonse Massamba-Debat and Germain Bikoumat, two radical spokesmen in the cabinet, were removed. The removal of Massamba-Debat and Bikoumat merely added fuel to a campaign of increasing criticism by the labor
unions and other groups against the government's incompetence in dealing with the economic crises. On a second front, Youlou sought the merger of his own UDDIA with the NSA. The merger of these two parties and the two key tribal groups, the Baonga-Balali and the M'boshl, would have permanently excluded other tribal groups from government power, patronage, interest aggregation and articulation.

Simultaneously, the government sought to unite and subjugate the trade union organizations. When these intentions became known, many of the unions in July 1963 consolidated into the Comité de Fusion des Organisations Syndicales and presented to President Youlou a proposal on constitutional and political reforms for a radical revision of the government before the creation of a single party. The trade union centers did not oppose the one-party state in principle, but they favored one based on the Guinean model, which would end corruption, tribal conflict and mismanagement. The unions, emphasizing that they represented over 60,000 workers in a population of about 800,000, sought a voice in the government and cabinet representation. Youlou rejected these demands, asserting that, "The role of a trade union is limited to the defense of professional interests under government direction." The unions called for a general strike on August 13, 1963.

In addition to the above problems, the Congo (B) was in a state of widespread corruption and economic stagnation. Government funds were wasted in absurd projects: a television station, when there were only fifty receiving sets in the country, and a $625,000 hotel built for President Youlou's mother are examples.
Inflation was sky high: meat cost $1.50 a pound and the price of
plantains, the basic diet of the poor, was out of sight.\textsuperscript{7} To add
to the pending explosion, the pool of the unemployed kept growing
as Congolese men drifted into the city from the bush, looking for
employment.

The trade unions, led by the civil servants, called for
demonstrations and strikes. In attempting to control the situation
and to prevent the August 13 general strike, President Youlou on
August 12 banned public assemblies, declared martial law and arres-
ted four key trade union leaders. The unions had prepared for this
eventuality by alerting their followers in the slum district of
Poto-Poto to ready themselves for challenging the government. On
August 13 as planned, the general strike started simultaneously at
Pointe Noire, Dolisie and Brazzaville. Automobiles and villas of
government ministers were burned. The strikers stormed the jail and
freed their leaders. Finding the ship of state sinking slowly, the
President on August 14 made appeasement offers: social reforms;
the postponement of his program of unanimity; and the establishment
of a committee of public safety, which would consist of three cabinet
members representing the major tribal elements, to negotiate with the
opposition. However, these concessions failed and, on August 15,
before a contingent of army and trade union representatives, Youlou
dissolved his government.\textsuperscript{8}

The military leaders supported the labor leaders in their
choice of a provisional government comprised of young technicians
and headed by Massamba-Debat. Under the guidance of the National
Revolutionary Council (CNR), formed by trade unionist and youth leaders, the provisional government proclaimed a regime of financial austerity, with drastically reduced official salaries and an end to special privileges such as free chauffeured cars, vacations and loans. This brought to an end Youlou's patronage and nepotistic system (his relatives were widely spread throughout the government). Labor leaders broke with their tradition of shunning political office as they accepted positions in the new assembly and the new council of ministers, headed by newly elected President Massamba-Debat. Leon Angor, a labor union official, was nominated and elected president of the National Assembly.

But the division continued within the trade union movement and in Congolese politics. The CATC union refused to join a Confederation Syndicale Congolaise (CSC), the major trade union center. The CATC, a leading African exponent of the position that labor must be independent of government and party, made this a condition of unification with the other unions. In the political arena, tribal supporters and followers of Youlou continued to fight for his return. Early in February 1964, for example, municipal elections in Brazzaville, Pointe Noire and Dolisie were annulled when a large percentage of Youlou supporters refused to participate. On February 7, an uprising of Balall partisans of Youlou in the Brazzaville quarters of Baongo required military action to quell.

Case Study 2 Dahomey

Dahomey's political history has been marked by the progressive, relative decline of the early predominance of one leader
and by the adjustment of national politics to ethnically based regionalism. The country's pluralism, however, was never expressed fully in politics. It was truncated by a succession of bi-regional coalitions whose leaders, having sidetracked one region, spent their energies on eclipsing each other. These centrifugal forces and inequalities, expressed in regional rather than ethnic terms, remain Dahomey's greatest handicap to the achievement of nationhood.

**Early Political History**

France brought together under a single colonial administration the Independent kingdoms of the North and the South in the area now known as Dahomey. But their divergent and individualistic populations have never fused into a single people, and the centrifugal forces of regionalism remain so strong as to make the creation of a national unified state in Dahomey exceptionally difficult.¹¹

Dahomey differed from the other French African states in several respects: the survival in the south of more traditional chiefs; the regional differences that continued to distinguish the Abomey area from that of Porto Novo; and the sharper cleavage between the northern and southern parts of the country. During the forty-six years of colonial rule, the French did little—except in economic matters—to weld together the two regions. After the French put an end to the chronic warfare in the northern region, for example, the tribes lived on their ancestral lands without mutual contact. In fact, the French colonial governors of Dahomey periodically proposed separate administrations for the cercles of Parakou, Natitingou and Kandi;¹² this would have given the less developed northern region
greater autonomy. Even after independence, resentment between the two regions remained strong. Teachers, doctors and officials sent from the south to northern posts felt that they had been exiled to a primitive, alien land. Conversely, the northerners resented the fact that the more educated, talented and aggressive southerners received the lion's share of development funds and that the whole country was being run by and for the benefit of the south. When independence came, Dahomey remained a land divided both economically and psychologically. There was no state-wide infrastructure between the two regions. In fact the north had no road network which would have facilitated contacts between the mutually isolated villages, so these areas remained virtually untouched by trade and a money economy.

**Internal Autonomy and the Achievement of Independence**

After World War II, Dahomey was 'united' under the leadership of Sourou M. Apithy, a Porto Novo accountant. Apithy organized the Parti Républicain du Dahomey (PRD), which received its support from the Porto Novo region, the civil servants and the Roman Catholics. However, the gradual extension of the franchise allowed other groups to participate in the political process. The first region to challenge Apithy's PRD was the north, with its distinct social and economic structure. By 1951, the north and south were about equal in voter strength, so that Apithy was joined in the French assembly by Hubert Maga, a northern school teacher, who attached himself to Senghor's interterritorial regional party, the IOM. In a region that sorely lacked trained leaders, Maga and his wife, a nurse, gained widespread influence. It was not surprising that Maga founded
the first political organization, Rassemblement Democratique Dahomeen (RDD). The next group to benefit fortuitously from further extensions of the franchise was the Fon people, heirs to the prestigious Abomey kingdom, who emerged as a serious political force in 1956. With the support of Houphouet-Boigny's RDA, Justin T. Ahomadegbe organized UDD and secured 40,000 Fon votes, compared with 65,000 votes for Apithy and 60,000 votes for Maga, during the elections for the French Assembly. Ahomadegbe's prestige derived from being the direct descendant of the powerful Abomey kings, who had resisted the French conquest, and from being a wealthy traditional chief and graduate of Dakar's medical school. Ahomadegbe's influence was confined to the Fon people and his alliance with trade union leaders of Cotonou.

It was the individual leader alone who could rally a region's support, thus making alliances and coalitions the 'acceptable' way of governing Dahomey. However, the country was so politically unstable during the period from May 1957 to December 1960 that it had six coalition cabinets which proved unable to stabilize or consolidate any government in power. For instance, the first African government in Dahomey in 1957 was a coalition headed by Apithy and Maga. In typical Dahomeyan fashion, no sooner had a 'united party' (Parti Progressiste Dahomeen—PPD) been formed then dissension broke out. Six small groups abandoned the coalition when the request for more seats on the executive committee was refused. At the same time, a split occurred among the northerners of Djougou, of whom the most important were Apithy's ministers Darboux and Bio Tchane. Although they were members of Maga's RDD, the four assemblymen refused to
accept Maga as their leader and formed their own political party. As a result of the personal and regional antagonisms, within a few weeks the PPD's strength had rapidly ebbed. It was on such shifting sands that Apithy had to build a new coalition government. He was successful in persuading Maga and Tchane to enter the same cabinet as ministers of labor and finance, respectively. The inclusion of these two stalwarts gave the new government a degree of continuity. This continuity was short-lived as internal factions appeared again and destroyed this coalition and the succeeding alliance with Ahomadegbe.

Finding it impossible to keep a coalition government intact, Apithy turned to the manipulation of electoral laws for the 1959 Constituent Assembly elections. According to the government figures, Apithy's PRD received 144,038 votes and 37 assembly seats, Maga's RDD received 62,132 votes and 22 seats, while Ahomadegbe's UDD received 162,179 votes but only obtained 11 assembly seats. Ahomadegbe and his followers protested and rioting followed. To quell the crisis, the French flew in troops from Niger. The political stalemate was settled by the Ivory Coast's Houphouët-Boigny, a longtime antagonist of Apithy, in favor of Maga. Apithy remained in the cabinet while Ahomadegbe was left in opposition. Thus Maga, the northerner, rose to the premiership because the more advanced and talented southerners could not agree among themselves on any other candidate.

Attempts at Unanimity and Coups (1963, 1965)

Maga began his premiership by making an alliance and a
coalition government with Apithy. The two politicians merged their parties into the Parti Dahomeen Unifie (PDU). In the December 1960 elections for an independent government, this coalition party received 69 per cent of the vote and Ahomadegbe's UDD received 31 per cent. But, under the recently passed election law, all 60 seats in the new state assembly went to the PDU. On December 30, Maga announced the composition of his new government, of which he would be premier and Apithy would be vice-premier. Most of the secondary leaders of the PDU and small independent parties became cabinet members, state and local government officials. Not one member of the UDD was represented in the legislature; however, a couple were given minor posts in the cabinet. Moreover, the UDD-dominated trade unions (UGTAN) forced Maga to consult with them before he named his minister of labor. Maga acceded to their demands by appointing Paul Darboux to the labor post and G. Kpakpo as secretary of state. Thus, at Independence, a major 'alliance' existed among the three major parties. Nevertheless, like the previous alliance, the Grand Alliance crumbled. Maga began the 'divide and conquer' process, first eliminating Ahomadegbe, next Apithy, and then wooing Ahomadegbe. To ensure his continuity, Maga embarked upon a conquest of Ahomadegbe's UDD and the labor unions, the basis of the UDD's strength. Using the legislative weapon, Maga pushed his anti-sedition law through the assembly on January 18, 1961, despite protests from the UGTAN and CATC trade unions. This security bill gave Maga the legal means to deal with the opposition, the press and any persons considered likely to foment disorder. Under these pretenses, on April 11, 1961,
Maga dissolved the UDD and jailed Ahomadegbe and his party associates. Simultaneously, he created a rival trade union, the *Union Generale des Travailleurs du Dahomey* (UGTD), with the intended purpose of drawing unionists from the two dissolved federations, the UGTAN and the CATC. Unlike most of the other West African premiers, Maga did not have to deal with civil servants' unrest when, under the PDU's austerity program, he cut the salary of the organized workers by ten per cent. These workers were glad that they were not dismissed, since Dahomey's supply of trained personnel far exceeded the demand.

After his success in curbing Ahomadegbe and the labor unions, Maga turned his attention toward the coalition, with the avowed purpose of centralizing his authority and achieving unanimity. He began by reducing local grass roots support and patronage of his opponents: He dissolved the elected municipal councils of the five largest cities and replaced them with his own followers. To counter Maga, Aplthy began courting the progressive intellectuals concentrated in the schools of Porto Novo. Maga retaliated by imprisoning some of the intellectuals and conscripting others into the army for twenty-four days. He subsequently sidetracked Aplthy by appointing him ambassador to France.

By 1963 it was clear that Maga was making progress in his attempts at creating unanimity, as shown by his attempts to court Ahomadegbe and to isolate Aplthy. Maga engineered a reconciliation with Ahomadegbe by appointing an Ahomadegbe supporter to his cabinet, by releasing 300 political prisoners, and finally, by granting a
pardon to Ahomadegbe and his associates, who had previously been convicted of plotting against the state. Thus, Maga had succeeded in clipping Apithy's wings, as well as those of Ahomadegbe and the unions. The vision of a one-party state was beginning to bear fruit. However, in the southern part of Dahomey—where the center of power lay, Maga was still regarded as an outsider and a northerner. His elimination of Ahomadegbe and the UDD left this region without any effective political representation.

In addition to the problem of southern representation, Dahomey was in economic chaos. Maga indulged in lavish spending. He had built at a cost of $3.5 million his presidential palace and approximately the same amount was spent for the 'palace' for the Conseil de l'Entente, whose headquarters was located in Dahomey. Underlying the problem of lavish spending for the two 'palaces' and patronage rewards and social projects for the northern region, Dahomey was plagued by economic stagnation. Unemployment was endemic and growing at an alarming rate. The young intellectuals in the government and other organized government workers grew increasingly restive in the face of another salary cut and other austerity measures (which included a 20 per cent cut in government workers' salaries) and the apparent inability of the government to improve the economic and political situations.

Tension mounted between the three politicians, especially when Apithy resigned from the PDU in protest over Maga's solidification of the party's executive council and the Christophe Bohiki affair. Serving as a catalyst, the Bohiki affair sparked protests
and demonstrations in the streets of Porto Novo. Taking advantage of the disorder, the national central labor organization, the UGTD, called for a general strike on October 26.\textsuperscript{21} In addition to joining the demonstration, the union leaders called for an army takeover and, on October 27, Colonel Christophe Soglo, armed forces chief of staff, announced the dissolution of the Maga government.\textsuperscript{22}

Colonel Soglo created a provisional government headed by himself and the three deposed politicians—Maga (minister of foreign affairs) and Apithy and Ahomadegbe (ministers of state).\textsuperscript{23} Unlike the unions in the Congo (B) coup, which stepped out of the limelight following the fall of Youlou's government, the UGTD continued to press its advantage. It demanded and received far-reaching purges of corrupt officials, including ex-cabinet members and the former president of the assembly. The UGTD convinced Soglo to form a provisional government with a national and regional revolutionary committee which would include union membership, a parliamentary political system instead of a presidential type, and finally the removal and arrest of Maga, who was dismissed for attempting to assassinate Soglo, Apithy and Ahomadegbe.\textsuperscript{24}

After Colonel Soglo withdrew to the barracks, Ahomadegbe and Apithy formed a coalition party, the \textit{Parti Democratique Dahomeen} (PDD), and a new government. Apithy became president of the republic but his partner Ahomadegbe, as premier and vice-president, controlled the government. Once again, a new Dahomean regime began with truncated pluralism and this time with Apithy playing second fiddle while Maga was on the outside looking in. The convulsions which punctuated
the first Dahomean republic also punctuated the second. The two leaders at the top, after agreeing to neutralize the missing partner, maneuvered to 'neutralize' each other. Since Ahomadegbe pulled more strings than Apithy, neutralization struck the latter. Apithy fought back and sought to redress the balance by once again courting the progressive intellectuals and embarrassing the Ahomadegbe Government abroad. Apithy leaned toward the East on foreign policy while Ahomadegbe leaned toward the West, resulting in the recognition and presence of two Chinese and two German delegations in Dahomey.

With the combined help of the PDD national executive council, the cabinet and a joint session of the legislature, Apithy was removed from the presidency. Ahomadegbe tamed the trade unions by appointing Theophile Paoletti, the general secretary of the new unified UGTD, as the labor minister in his new cabinet. The UGTD acquiesced to Ahomadegbe's demands by participating in the establishment of a new state party, also called Parti Democratique Dahomeen (PDD). Once again, power in Dahomey was centralized in one man, Ahomadegbe, thus leaving the supporters of Apithy and Maga without representation. As in 1963, the followers of two missing partners and the trade unions took to the streets in Porto Novo, and popular rebellion demanded an army takeover.

The labor organization, UGTD, joined and led the demonstrations for an army takeover for three main reasons: a) austerity measures and cuts in workers' salaries; b) politicians' quarrelling, which prevented them from paying proper attention to economic issues; and c) lack of union participation in the formulation of a national
economic policy. Union grievances in 1963 and 1965 were very similar. The 1963 grievances included specific issues: 1) Maga's attempt to control the unions by the creation of the central national union, the UGTD, in 1961; 2) the introduction of a ten per cent salary tax and salary cuts as part of an austerity program; 3) the decline in standard of living for urban workers due to rising inflation and a freeze on salary increases; and 4) the absorption of more people into an already plethoric civil service in order to stem the rising tide of unemployment. Moreover, the union leaders were convinced that the government was not living up to its responsibilities. As one union speaker put it in October 1963, "We have always heard the slogan of austerity; we have accepted it. We have decided to collaborate, but has the Maga Government ever considered us as real collaborators?"27

In 1965, the government had made some concessions: It had replaced a ten per cent salary cut for public employees with a five per cent investment tax on salaries in excess of $80 per month; it had ended the wage freeze and curtailed government expenses. Nevertheless, by mid-1965, Ahomadegbe's government was faced with serious economic and financial difficulties, which sounded the alarm for further austerity measures. Budgetary deficits, in spite of French aid, totalled over twelve million dollars, and declining exports covered a bare forty per cent of the cost of imports.28 A twenty-five per cent cut in government workers' salaries was instituted.

The UGTD offered a counter proposal which was rejected by the government. This proposal suggested: 1) reducing the number of government
agencies; 2) maintaining consumer imports, since local production would not satisfy demands; and 3) rescinding salary cuts. To back up their proposal, the unions during the traditional May Day meeting reminded the government that it was not immune to the fate which befell its predecessor:

It is incumbent upon us to be ready to remedy the certain failings of the party, to the extent that it mistakes itself for the government. The time has come to reaffirm our complete independence toward the government. The PDD may be a single party, but it is a long way from being a true mass party. The government cannot expect any true collaboration from us. 29

Although Paoloitti, leader of UGTD, was in Ahomadegbe's cabinet, many unionists revolted against him on the grounds that he had sold out to the PDD. In addition, the dissolved UGTD was too weak in terms of a major confrontation with the government. However, the Porto Novo crisis gave the unions the opportunity they were all waiting for; thus, they made common cause with supporters of Apithy and Maga against Ahomadegbe. Three of Dahomey's four trade union centers joined forces under Trade Union Action Front and asked their members to observe a 48-hour strike beginning on July 5 in protest against the government austerity program. In the strike and demonstration confrontation, troops refused to fire upon the demonstrators as ordered by Ahomadegbe, who then reprimanded General Soglo. 30 On November 29, 1965, Soglo intervened again in Dahomeyan politics by dissolving the government and appointing Tahirou Congacou, president of the National Assembly, as head of the provisional government. Porto Noviens and unionist leaders, however, continued to protest for the dissolution of the unrepresentative National Assembly and the
dismissal of Congacou for his role in the assembly. The unionists called for the formation of national and regional committees which would have included workers, youths, students and army veterans. As in 1963, the combined pressure of Porto Noviens and the unions led to an army takeover on December 22, 1965, with General Soglo becoming the new president of the republic.

Case Study 3 Upper Volta

Early Political History

Between 1957 (internal autonomy) and 1960 (national independence), power in Upper Volta was concentrated in three regionally based secular political parties: Rassemblement Democratique Africain—Haute Volta (RDA); Mouvement Democratique Voltaique (MDV); and Parti Social d'Education des Masses (PSEMA). The RDA was Upper Volta's wing of Houphouet-Boigny's interterritorial party. The MDV originated with a group of younger, educated Mossi in Ouahigouya who based their political campaign on a long-standing split between the northern and western Mossi. Led by Gerard Quedraogo and Michael Dorange (a French captain), the MDV represented the interest of the Ouahigouya Mossi veterans of the French armed forces. The PSEMA, led by Joseph Conombo, supported the Mossi emperor in Ouagadougou.\(^3^1\)

Politics in Upper Volta was characterized by intense regional and tribal divisions and the splintering of the Voltaic elite between the animistic-Christian Mossi majority and the largely Islamized western tribes, as reflected in the jealousy that existed between the administrative capital of Ouagadougou and the commercial capital of Bobo Dioulasso.
in national elections for the assembly, with each of the three major parties assigned an exclusive zone of political influence, the RDA won 37 of the 70 seats, the NDV won 26 assembly seats, PSEMA won 5 seats, and small independent parties won the remainder. A coalition party, Parti Democratique Unifie (PDU), and a government headed by Quezzin Coulibaly (another compromise candidate of Houphouet-Boigny) made PDU the first political party in Upper Volta to represent Mossi as well as non-Mossi. However, the fragile coalition broke up when members of the NDV and PSEMA left because of uneasiness over Coulibaly's close relations with the Ivory Coast and the election of Moro Naba as honorary president of PDU, which revived regional ethnic tensions. Moreover, Coulibaly was accused of trespassing on the areas assigned to the parties of Conombo, Nazi Boni and Quedraogo. The three party leaders combined to form a 'solidarity group' whose combined strength enabled its members to pass a no-confidence vote in the Coulibaly Government. Coulibaly retained his majority and coalition when four pivotal NDV members remained loyal to the PDU. One of these four was agriculture minister (and trade union leader) Maurice Yameogo, who, because of his support, was awarded the interior ministership and handpicked as Coulibaly's successor. With his newly restored majority, Coulibaly neutralized his opposition by distributing council portfolios among the opposition members. Yameogo's star continued to rise and, with the death of Coulibaly in a plane crash in September 1958, Yameogo rose to the top of Voltaic politics.
In 1959, Maurice Yameogo formed a new party, the Union Democratique Voltaigue (UDV), and proceeded to centralize and consolidate power into a one-party state by attempting to eliminate all traces of opposition. Yameogo's attempts at unanimity included, foremost, the adjustment of electoral laws so that his party received only 62 per cent of the votes but garnered 70 out of 75 assembly seats, while the three opposition parties, which had combined into the short-lived Mouvement de Regroupement Voltaigue, got only 5 seats. Using his majority, Yameogo solidified his position through the patronage system, appointing sixteen ministers from his own party. With the aid of the legislative weapon, Yameogo banned all opposition parties and, in 1963, created a special security court modeled after that of the Ivory Coast; court members, appointed by the president, could arrest and try anyone without an appeal.33

After successfully eliminating the opposition parties, Yameogo turned his attempts at unanimity towards the organized workers and his political opponents. Since most politically active people were civil servants, it was easy for President Yameogo to transfer recalcitrant employees to outlying areas. The more important 'opposition' leaders either suffered administrative internment, like union leader Joseph Ouedraogo (who had helped Yameogo rise to power); were exiled, like opposition party leader Boni; were sent abroad, like Henri Guissou, who was appointed ambassador to West Germany; or simply sidetracked through a reorganization of local governments, whose elected heads were replaced with Yameogo's
supporters.34

During the latter part of 1965, Yameogo opted for complete unanimity and control of the formal political process. He dismissed five cabinet ministers, took over the defense portfolio, and appointed his cousin, Denis Yameogo, as interior minister. The election laws were further modified in terms of having the president re-elected one month before the legislators. Taking advantage of this and other election modifications, Yameogo received an official 99.98 per cent of the vote in the 1965 national elections. Officially elected president, Yameogo drew up a single list of candidates for the national assembly which retired a large number of his earlier supporters. Similar to truncated politics in Dahomey and the Congo (B), Yameogo's centralization policy left three of the four regions of Upper Volta without effective representation. In effect isolating himself from supporters, he increasingly narrowed the base of his own legitimacy.

Yameogo's excessive centralization of authority resulted in a general malaise, which was greatly exacerbated by dissatisfaction with the government's handling of several key issues. This dissatisfaction crystallized on the following issues: 1) Yameogo was criticized for not supporting more effectively the interests of some half million Voltaic citizens (ten per cent of the population) who earned their living in the Ivory Coast. This fear of being 'sold down the rivers' crystallized when Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast proposed common citizenship for the states of the Conseil de l'Entente.35 Trade unionists as well as opponents of the regime
argued that, unless salaries of Voltaic civil servants were increased to match those of their Ivoirien colleagues, single nationality would tend to abolish national frontiers and hence empty Upper Volta's administration. 2) Yameogo used Upper Volta as personal fief in disputes with Houphouet-Boigny. Yameogo personally intervened in the dispute between Guinea and the ivory Coast. For example, President Yameogo signed a beneficial trade agreement with Ghana in 1963 but voided the agreement when relations with Houphouet-Boigny improved. 3) Another issue concerned the retention of Denis Yameogo in the cabinet. His qualification for office, aside from family ties, appeared to have been inadequate education and a penchant for pugilism. His boxing talent was used to persuade union leaders and others of the nobility of government policy. 4) Finally, the luxurious presidential palace was constructed at enormous expense and with French funds.

The new government budgets for January 1966 included a twenty per cent cut in government workers' salaries over $60 per month, an increase of personal income taxes for monthly salaries of $40, and a reduction of family allowances for children. Union leaders found these measures unacceptable and their confidence in the Yameogo Government had been exhausted. The unionists argued that a president seriously concerned with his country's economic welfare should not have flown to Brazil on an expensive honeymoon at the taxpayers' expense. When union pressure failed to prevent the Yameogo-controlled legislature from passing the new budget, the two central labor organizations, the Union Nationale des Syndicats des
Travailleurs de Haute Volta (UNSTHV) and Union Generale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire—Haute Volta (UGTAN), and several small autonomous unions—representing nearly all the public employees—established a Joint Union Committee with Joseph Ouedraogo as its president. The Joint Union Committee called and made plans for a general strike on January 3, 1966. During the New Year's Eve celebration the committee sent out 500 union messengers to spread the news of the impending strike. Moreover, the committee informed Lieutenant-Colonel Sangoule Lamizana, armed forces chief of staff, of their plans and relayed the message that relations between the unions and the government had reached a point of no return, which could be settled only by the government's resignation. 37

In spite of Yameogo's declaration of a national state of emergency, the general strike was an unqualified success. On the morning of January 3, the government employees did not report to work. Teachers, students, and unemployed persons began the demonstration, where cries of "The army to power" were heard and an end to the 20 per cent salary cut was demanded. When the armed forces showed no hostility, ignored orders to open fire, and withdrew quietly from several strategic points in the city, the emboldened demonstrators advanced and invaded the interior minister's residence and the assembly building. 38 Summoned to army headquarters by freely circulating soundtrucks, 25,000 demonstrators asked for an army takeover and some, in obvious reference to the previous national and municipal elections, carried signs reading, "We, the 0.02 per cent". The process of keeping the army informed on the general strike
continued. Ouedraogo addressed a letter to President Yameogo (who was attending a meeting of the Entente in the Ivory Coast) which asked for his resignation; a carbon copy was sent to Lieutenant-Colonel Lamizana.

The government attempted to stop the strike by arresting 100 union leaders but could not find the top leaders, who remained in hiding. Once again Houphouet-Boigny acted as mediator, offering Yameogo the funds needed to rescind the austerity measures. Yameogo sought to negotiate with union leaders but, by this time, the unions would talk only to the army. After nine out of thirteen cabinet members resigned, President Yameogo dispatched Colonel Lamizana to announce to the demonstrators his decision to leave austerity measures out of the budget. However, the demonstrators and unionists refused to accept Yameogo's compromise and demanded his dismissal. The jubilant demonstrators returned home only after Lamizana told them that he had taken over the government.39

It is essential to emphasize that union leaders had kept Lamizana au courant of their attempts to reach an understanding with Yameogo. According to reports, the unionists had conferred with several officers and extracted a commitment for help.40 On the whole, however, the officers counseled patience. The army felt that intervention had to be justified by more than union grievances. The benevolent neutrality of the military encouraged union leaders to create the conditions under which army officers could intervene without violating their notion of legitimacy.41

Lamizana's regime was dominated by military officers and
a few technocrats. Some concessions were made to the unions: they obtained the cancellation of the austerity measures and the release of detained trade union leaders. But Lamlaza announced at the end of 1966 a reduction in the civil servants' family allowances and instituted a "patriotic contribution" amounting to two weeks' salary for all wage earners and imposed new taxes on many consumer goods.

Summary and Conclusions

The formal political history of the Congo (B), Dahomey and Upper Volta before and after independence appeared to have been leading from pluralism through truncated pluralism to domination by a single leader, thereby eliminating pluralistic expectations. This pattern was accompanied by a process of disaffection which grew in strength as domination neared. The process of centralization culminated in efforts to monopolize decision-making. Having achieved independence, the leaders of the Congo (B), Dahomey and Upper Volta looked upon these historical events as the terminus, rather than the beginning, of their ascent to lofty pinnacles from which nothing could ever topple them.

The process of toppling the civilian governments in the three states began when lavish spending on luxury dwellings, social benefits for associates, corruption and economic stagnation culminated in the imposition of austerity measures. Such measures most affected the trade unionists, who, along with other urban groups, were cut off from the patronage system and other social benefits when their leaders were eliminated from the new consolidated
governments. These disaffected groups then took to the streets and invited the military to intervene.

In all three states, following the coup, the military had to deal with the unions, whose influence derived from a number of factors: 1) Unions had graduated from the passive role perceptions and thus made greater demands on government; 2) Restless members forced additional militancy upon their leaders; and 3) Since the political parties were forced to remain officially inactive, unions knew that they constituted the only 'power base' left for the military to lean upon.

Confronted with the need for at least some organized popular support and with a simultaneous commitment to economic recovery, the leadership in Congo (B), Dahomey and Upper Volta spoke loudly and carried a small stick. On the surface, government-union relations suggested a positive correlation between increased military control and a better climate for economic improvement. Such correlation was also a function of the degree of mutual trust and of the military's willingness to seek union leaders' counsel. However, tensions remained and union support could not be taken for granted.

In Upper Volta and Congo (B), relations between unions and the military were closer than in Dahomey. Nevertheless, there was a good deal of cooperation between unions and government. Union leaders obviously feared a return to the ancien régime and thus had a common interest with the new government and armed forces, who were willing to consult them on important aspects of economic policy. In all three states, less stringent austerity measures were accepted.
The junior civil servant in many cases readily accepted the elimination of colonial financial benefits, which were enjoyed mainly by the senior officials. However, in Dahomey, tensions between unions and the Soglo Government surfaced again. Deeper tensions resulted from three major causes: 1) stern austerity measures, which were extended to the private sector; 2) economic stagnation, which sapped the unions' confidence in the military regime and cast doubt on the usefulness of further sacrifices; and 3) gradual centralization of decision-making in the hands of a few top military officers. The unions went on the offensive when Soglo dissolved the National Renovation Committee, which included the trade union leadership, and instituted a 25 per cent salary cut for government employees. (See Chapter IX for the mutiny-coup d'etat against the Soglo regime.)

Following the coup in 1965, unions continued to strike when new governments instituted austerity measures. In the Congo (B) and Upper Volta, the military leaders consolidated all trade unions into a state-controlled labor organization and proceeded to solve the economic problems facing their respective states. Centralization and consolidation of political authority in Upper Volta has outpaced centralization in Congo (B). Soon, the latter experienced another round of mutiny-coup d'etat. The less the centralization of authority—and thus the less the level of coercive potential, the more likely that a coup against the government will occur.
FOOTNOTES


3 Ibid., p. 247.

4 See Ibid., p. 248.

5 See Ibid., p. 233.


8 Ballard, op. cit., p. 250.


10 Morrison et al., Black Africa, p. 214.


13 Ibid., p. 169.


15 Skurnik, op. cit., p. 71; and Thompson, "Dahomey," p. 179.

16 Skurnik, op. cit., p. 72; and Thompson, "Dahomey," p. 216.

17 Skurnik, op. cit., p. 71.


19 Skurnik, op. cit., p. 73.

20 Bohiki, a legislator in the national assembly, was implicated in the murder of a prominent Apithy supporter. The Maga Government refused to bring Bohiki to justice, resulting in protests and demonstrations by the victim's tribe in Porto Novo and Cotonou. Friedland, "Paradoxes of African Trade Unionism," p. 11.

22 Skurnik, op. cit., p. 76.


25 Skurnik, op. cit., p. 76.


28 See raw data appendix 3.


30 Skurnik, op. cit., pp. 74-76.

31 Ibid., pp. 63-64.

32 Virginia Thompson, West Africa's Council of the Entente, pp. 8-9.

33 Skurnik, op. cit., p. 65.

34 Ibid.

35 The Conseil de l'Entente includes Dahomey, Upper Volta, Niger and the Ivory Coast.

36 During a Guinea-Ivory Coast crisis over an alleged plot to overthrow Toure, it was said that, whereas the Ivory Coast remained silent, Yameogo answered Guinea's charge and hurled insults at President Toure. Skurnik, op. cit., p. 67.

37 Carrefour Africain (Ouagadougou), January 2-9, 1966.

38 Ibid.

39 See ibid.

40 See ibid.

41 Skurnik, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

43 Skurnik, *op. cit.*, p. 94.
CHAPTER XI

ALLIANCE AMONG THE CHARISMATIC LEADERS, TRADE UNIONS
AND MILITARY IN GUINEA, SENEGAL AND THE IVORY COAST

In the states of Guinea, Senegal and the Ivory Coast, the mass political parties of the Parti Democratique de Guinee (PDG), Union Progressiste Senegalaise (UPS) and Parti Democratique de la Cote d'Ivoire (PDCI) had achieved a predominant position and had eliminated the small, loosely organized political opposition before the states were granted formal independence by France. Hence, independence legitimized the existing situation, which found the one-party system in control. Thus, any remaining fringes of opposition were looked upon with contempt by the masses as being colonial-inspired or being obstacles to national and economic development. The legitimacy of the mass party facilitated the centralization of authority by the nationalist leaders in Guinea, Senegal and the Ivory Coast. This is in contrast to the situation in the Congo (B), Dahomey and Upper Volta, where independence found a coalition of political parties in control of the government, with a small number of patron and elite parties in opposition. Following the granting of independence in these three pluralistic states, the coalitions disintegrated when a regional leader sought to garner power or eliminate his rivals and allies in the coalition. With the elimination of politically relevant units in the political system, these leaders more readily faced the possibility of coups d'etat.

In contrast to the case studies in Chapter X, where political instability was examined and delineated in terms of the roles of
the trade unions and military, this chapter denotes and examines the development of, influence of and role of the mass parties' leaders, the unions and the military in political stability.

**Case Study 4: Guinea**

French colonialism imposed artificial unity in Guinea through the suppression of tribal warfare. The establishment of French hegemony was delayed by the bitter resistance of the last of the great 19th century Soudanese conquerors, the Almamy Samory Toure, great-grandfather of Sekou Toure of Guinea. The rise to power of Toure's great-grandson as the leader of resistance against the French colonial regime was regarded by many as a sign of the rebirth of Guinean independence. Public consciousness of Samory Toure's role in Guinean history played an important part in the enthusiastic support of Sekou Toure's PDG, the backbone of Guinea's nationalist movement. The struggle for independence eliminated the imposed artificial unity and created national unity throughout the country. Nevertheless, perhaps the most powerful and lasting influence in the creation of national unity was the spread of Islam throughout Guinea after the 17th century. Islam served as a unifying agent for the remote tribes of the state.

**The Nationalist Movement**

Nationalism in Guinea and other French West African territories had its origins in the political ferment that spread through Black Africa following World War II and in the nationalist movements on the Indian subcontinent and political situations in French Indochina. The growth of the nationalist movement in French-speaking
Africa was indissolubly bound with the growth of postwar African trade unionism and political parties, particularly with the inter-territorial political party, the RDA. The origin of the RDA sprang from African leaders' dissatisfaction with French colonial policy and was an effort to secure greater concessions for equal rights for African citizens with those of metropolitan France. The RDA became a reality in October 1946 at the Bamako Convention, where it was stipulated that semi-autonomous sections should be established in each territory under the overall control of a coordinating committee; the committee included a president, secretary-general, four vice-presidents and a representative of each territory.2

The foundation of the Guinean section of the RDA was established in May 1947. However, it was not an easy task. From 1945 to 1953, Guinea was dominated by loose ethnic or special interest electoral alliances arranged around the traditional chiefs and the French colonial administration. With the reorganization of the PDG by Toure, the Guinean section of the RDA was able to challenge these electoral alliances.

During the period from 1952 to 1953, the PDG, under Toure's guidance, became a unified nationalist party. As a major trade union leader, Toure used the Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT) as the basis for a mass political movement which cut across ethnic differences.3 Due partly to the rapid growth of unionism as the economy developed and also to Toure's ability to use the labor movement for political purposes, the PDG made rapid gains in membership and strength. As the PDG increasingly became the vehicle of the new
nationalist sentiment, the power of the older ethnic groups waned correspondingly. Some chiefs whose traditional authority had remained strong sensed the changed direction of public opinion and swung their support to the PDG. However, it was the French colonial administrators' tampering with election results that gave the PDG an anticolonial image and state-wide support. The colonial administrators' rigging of ballot boxes in 1951 in favor of Yacine Diallo, and the falsification of the ballot votes against Toure in 1954, provoked open violence among the 80,000 new voters. The colonial administration continued election rigging in favor of the French-backed Bloc Africain de Guinee, led by Dlouadou Barry, and against Toure's PDG, resulting in violence and protest directed against the French administration. The PDG after each rigged election became the undisputed spearhead of the nationalist movement, which included the young intellectuals, traditional chiefs outside of the Fouta Djallon and the trade unionists.

The PDG reached its zenith during the January 1956 territorial election for the French Assembly and the May 1951 elections for the territorial assembly. The PDG candidates, Toure and S. Diallo, won two out of the three deputies' seats, and the PDG easily won 57 out of the 60 seats, compared with 2 out of 48 seats in the previous assembly elections. Thus, by mid-1957, Guinea became, for all practical purposes, a one-party state.

Achievement of Independence

By an overwhelming 95 per cent of the vote against the constitution of the Fifth Republic on September 28, 1958, Guinea
received its independence. The independence vote showed the overwhelming support of Guineans for the stand taken by Toure and the PDG. Out of the 1,200,171 that voted in the referendum, 1,130,292 voted 'No', 12,920 ballots were spoiled or left blank, and 56,959 voted 'Yes'. Of the 'Yes' votes, 27,140 came from Labe, an opposition stronghold in the northeastern Fouta Djallon Plateau. The fact that almost half of the 'Yes' vote came from this single circonscription reflected the traditional antagonism between the Foulas and the coastal peoples rather than a desire of the plateau people to retain the colonial regime.

On October 2, 1958, the territorial assembly changed into the Constituent Assembly and unanimously elected Toure to the post of president. Moreover, the former opposition leader, Barry, joined Toure in the legislative meeting and, in December 1958, the PDG became the only party in Guinea after it fused with the opposition parties.

Role and Structure of the PDG

The PDG since independence has become a dominating influence at virtually every level of human activity in Guinea. Under the domination of party secretary-general Toure, the PDG controls the national and local government, the judiciary, the economy, education, culture and social affairs. The fundamental principle of party supremacy has been delineated by Toure:

The PDG has not hesitated to say that more than ever it will retain its supremacy over all other institutions in the country. Only through the party can we...raise ourselves to the level of great responsibilities.

Thus, the PDG is the supreme organization, occupying a place higher
than the government itself.

The PDG is a mass party which rests on some 26,000 party cells and the 7,164 villages and urban local committees which are the point of articulation between the party and the masses. The party resembles a triangle with the base solidly built—upon the villages, which elects representatives to the section committees, which elects representatives to the regional conferences, which, in turn, elect representatives to the PDG party congress, the next to last stratum of the triangle. The tasks of the party congress are primarily to fix party policy for the forthcoming triennium, to receive reports from the secretary-general on the activities of the party. An analysis of the PDG congressional representatives shows an abundance of civil servants, private individuals, senior administrators, national inspectors of the youth section, members of the executive committee of the labor federation and senior military officers. These congressional representatives elect the members of the national executive of the party, the Bureau Politique. Virtually every organized group in Guinea—such as the army, trade unions, youth, women—are directly related to the mass party through the presence of their leaders in the Bureau Politique. The Bureau Politique is composed of seventeen members, of which nine are ministers of the government and the remaining members hold other responsible posts—president of the national assembly, head of the armed forces or trade union organization. This body, in theory, contains the ultimate decision-making power; but Sekou Toure controls the Bureau Politique and thus, in effect, all decision-making powers.
Therefore, the influence of the PDG and Toure is nation-wide. Out of every eleven Guineans, there is one who holds an elective office of some kind, either in the government or in the party.9

The PDG has instituted a number of successful projects which have mobilized the Guinean society. The most important one is the Investissement Humain, a 'voluntary' labor program. The purpose of the Investissement Humain is to mobilize the energies of the people in support of public works programs because of a limited budget and the need to further develop a unified Guinean society. In 1959, for example, Toure announced that 5,035 miles of road, 33 schools, 672 bridges and 15 mosques were among the program's major accomplishments.10

Role of the Trade Unions

In 1956, Toure created and led the UGTAN. Based on his union experience—secretary of the Postal Employees' Union, secretary-general of the territorial section of the CGT, and coordinating committee of the CGT unions—Toure was elected as one of the secretaries of UGTAN. In 1957, led by Toure, UGTAN broke with the metropolitan labor movement, the CGT. Following the break with the CGT and independence, Toure created the Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs de Guinée (CNTG).

Under PDG control, the CNTG has shifted its emphasis from promoting higher wages and better working conditions for their members to advance PDG goals in the field of national production. In the private sector, the unions are permitted to call strikes against employers, but the party exercises the right to intervene should it
appear that the workers' demands may be harmful to the national economy. At least a few unions have not always agreed with the party line. In November 1961, deaths resulted from riots in Labe of the Fouta Djallon region following the suppression of a strike for higher pay by the local teachers' union. However, the PDG has not gone as far as the CPP in Ghana in forcing the trade unions to become an integral part of the mass party. The PDG recognizes the right of the unions to remain separate entities and to define their own means of action, providing they remain within the framework of its larger objectives. In seeking to extend its control over Guinean society, the PDG could not permit the exclusion of such a strongly organized segment of society, regardless of how important the support of labor may have been during the tense period of the referendum.

**Role of the Military**

After Guinea opted for independence in the 1958 referendum, France began to repatriate Guineans then serving in its army. The return of a large number of military personnel gave rise to fears among the PDG leaders that the returning veterans might develop political consciousness or become a pressure group outside the party. Added to these fears were rumors emanating from disgruntled veterans that they would create trouble unless the new Guinean government found jobs for them. Speaking before the PDG Congress in 1958, President Toure warned the veterans:

Today some say if you don't give us work we'll do this or that. Who do they think they are talking to? They are talking to the Guinean people, the very ones who brought independence to their country. Do they imagine that the people will listen or will let them do what they want?
Nevertheless, President Toure had to find work for about 50,000 veterans. 500 were already employed in the civil service. The task of finding work for and Indoctrinating the veterans was given to the PDG. Wherever possible, the former soldiers were given a prominent role to play in local affairs. Some were assigned the responsibility of directing the 'voluntary' work projects. Toure sought to establish a military that was directly involved in the nation-building process and to publicize its new role: "Our army is not the old army of occupation. It is a popular army, springing from the people, at the service of the people. It works for the people." To this end, the ministry of defense has been renamed and is now the more euphemistic ministry of the people's army and civil action.

From the territorial gendarmerie established by the French and from the ranks of the returning veterans, President Toure built his new army. The painstaking effort to create a new army was matched by the military orientation to the Guinean society. Toure asserted that all would enjoy equal status as members of the party, but the PDG would retain its dominance over all organizations, including the military. The President asserted:

We often said that, in our eyes, there are no soldiers, no civil servants, no intellectuals: there are only supporters of the party...The party is and must remain the directing organ. The supremacy of the party is not a formula, but a reality and must develop itself constantly.

The military was forced to participate in voluntary work programs. As Toure stated, "The army will build bridges, it will open roads, it will build houses, it will make plantations. We have too many things to do to tolerate do-nothings and, worse still, among those
who are paid and supported by the people.\textsuperscript{17} The PDG has been successful in integrating the army into the work of national reconstruction. Soldiers cultivate rice fields in Koundara, build schools in Conakry and open roads in the forest region. Likewise, through compulsory military service, Toure has used the military as an effective instrument of national unification and other nation-building tasks.

At every level, the army is intimately associated with and influenced by the PDG and President Toure. Both officers and enlisted men are members of the party. Commanders of local military posts participate, in their official capacity, in regional and national conferences held by the party. In view of the intimate relationship between party and government, it is questionable whether most of the soldiers distinguish between the two organizations. This intimate relationship is further cultivated by indoctrination at the national military academy, the Ecole Nationale Militaire, where the chief emphasis is on training in accordance with the requirements of the national revolution. Each new officer must take the following oath:

"I swear to be loyal to the Republic of Guinea, to its people, and to its great party, PDG, the symbol of African emancipation; to give my life for the defense of the country and the constitution..."\textsuperscript{18}

This ideology has been inculcated by graduates of the academy to the men under their command.

Case Study 5 Senegal

Senegalese 'political life' began with the extension of French municipal law to Senegal in 1872. French assimilation policy resulted in the creation of four self-governing communes—St. Louis,
Dakar, Goree and Rufisque. The commune inhabitants were allowed to send a deputy to the French parliament and representatives to a general council which dealt with problems involving the communes. Under French colonial policy, Senegal became the hub of French activities in French West Africa and Dakar became the headquarters of the AOF.

**Nationalist Movement**

Senegal's experiences with assimilation kept it outside of the RDA. On the parliamentary level, however, Senghor left the French socialist party, SFIO, and established the Bloc Democratique Senegalais (BDS) which, in November 1948, allied itself with the interterritorial party, the Independant d'Outre-Mer (IOM).

Under the leadership of Senghor, the BDS captured both deputy seats in the June 1951 elections for the national assembly. This election marked an important point in the political life of Senghor. It was in this election that he built a new electoral force, composed of the peasants who considered Senghor one of their sons and voted overwhelmingly for him. In spite of his university degrees, the peasants recognized Senghor as a hero and also as a unifying force in Senegal. With the peasants' overwhelming support, Senghor moved to create a state-wide unification by dissolving the BDS (the majority party) and, on June 13, 1956, creating a new coalition party, the Bloc Populaire Senegalais (BPS).

Unlike Guinea, which voted against the French constitution in the September 1958 referendum, Senegal voted 'Yes' and thus became a state in the French Community. This status entailed autonomy
in domestic affairs, but France retained control in the area of foreign affairs.

**Achievement of Independence**

During the transition period from 1958 to August 1960, Senghor continued to drive for unification. In February 1959, for example, he created a new coalition party, the *Union Progressiste Senegalaise* (UPS), with the fusion of the BPS and the SFIO of Lamine Gueye. The UPS won all 80 legislative seats in the 1959 elections.

To insure unanimity, Senghor transformed Senegal into a single constituency with a simple majority and list voting. Although opposition parties were allowed to campaign, they labored under very severe official difficulties. The *Parti du Regroupement Africain—Senegal* (PRA), is the major opposition party and is subjected to considerable governmental harassment. The PRA has not presented an electoral list since 1959. The *Bloc des Masses Senegalaises* (BMS), which was created in September 1961 by several former UPS members who were dissatisfied with the UPS leadership, was quickly banned. Using the methods of creating a mass party denoted in Chapter VIII, Senghor's UPS absorbed most of its early rivals. For instance, Senghor co-opted two members of the BMS, which then merged with the UPS.²⁰

Senghor built the UPS on a series of coalitions, which continues to be one of the outstanding features of Senegalese politics. Senghor's party coalition has always reflected the basic social structure of the state by using clan politics, where members of a clan fully support their leader who, in return, looks after their interests on a patron-client basis. The clan leader delivers the
vote and receives favors in return. Much of Senghor's public appeal lies in his mastery of the tactics of political coalition and his ability to balance and reconcile the traditional interests and modern forces that sway the state's society. So successful has he been that, in the 1963 elections, he received 1,034,724 votes out of 1,223,237 cast, and the UPS received 1,049,927 votes to 58,179 for the PRA for the 80 assembly seats. In elections held since 1963, President Senghor has received over 95% of the votes.

Role and Structure of the UPS

The structure of the government party also resembles a triangle. The base of the triangle rests upon the arrondissements, which are the basic administrative units. Immediately above these arrondissements are the cercles, controlled by the commandant de cercle. The commandant wields the power in his area through control over the police and local civil servants. The cercles are grouped into regions, each of which is presided over by a governor appointed by the cabinet. Each region has an assembly which is empowered to vote a regular budget financed by self-imposed taxes. These regions serve two purposes: to decentralize the administration, and to adapt the administrative structure to the large national economic regions of the country. The governor, who serves as kind of a superprefect, provides the link between the cabinet and the cercle. Each governor has two deputies: one is in charge of administration and the other, known as the 'development advisor', coordinates the regions' economic development. The principal urban centers have been set up as self-governing municipalities.
At the apex of the political process in Senegal is the government party, the UPS. The Executive Committee of the UPS serves as its parliament, which includes several hundred elected members representing all the cercles and a number of ex-officio members—ministers, deputies, UPS youth delegates. The Executive Committee elects forty-one members to the Executive Bureau, the supreme organ of the party, which supervises the activities of the ministers through the UPS parliamentary group meeting. However, unlike the situation in Guinea, the Executive Bureau does not exercise directive power over the executive or the legislative branches of the government. Thus, Senghor’s concept of democratic centralism is different from that of Guinea in that the party does not direct the totality of the nation’s life; rather, the government seeks the participation of the party militants in developing general policy. Nevertheless, political power in Senegal is based on the personal popularity of Senghor and his ability to handle the coalition nature of Senegalese politics. A new constitution, approved after Dia’s attempted coup, gave Senghor almost dictatorial power: He chooses the members of the legislature and cabinet, heads the civil service and the armed forces, and is secretary-general of the UPS.23

Role of the Trade Unions (UNTS)

The role of the trade unions in Senegal, as elsewhere in the Francophone African states, has always been a highly political one. It is not as an economic institution, as a seller of labor, that the African trade union has its strength but rather as a latent political agency, a potential rocker of the political boat. Since
the UPS government assumed power, its policy has been to restrict
the unions' power to rock the boat, by transforming their latent
political strength into support of government plans and programs.
The UPS began its efforts to domesticate the labor movement after
the 1958 referendum, in which most union leaders had campaigned
for a 'Non' vote. In a series of moves, the UPS government broke
the dominance of the PRA-oriented UGTAN, unified and brought the
unions into the government-dominated Union Generale des Travailleurs
Senegalais (UGTS).

The UGTS was rebaptized the Union Nationale des Travailleurs
Senegalais (UNTS). Although the UNTS has no legal ties with
the UPS, its programs are closely tied to that of the government.
The Labor Code, passed in 1961, provides for tight control of labor
practices and regulates recruitment, contracts, the employment of
women and children, and general working conditions. At its third
national union workers' council, the UNTS adopted a resolution which
stated that it was satisfied with the results of its cooperation
with government authorities. This resolution also urged the exten-
sion of this cooperation to all fields and to the private and semi-
public sectors. The role of the UNTS is as much to educate and
rally the workers behind a given governmental policy. Senghor has
specifically charged the union centers with safeguarding the inter-
est of the great mass of nonsalaried peasants. Moreover, the UNTS
is led principally by members of the UPS. By being related to the
governing party, the UNTS has political influence on national policy
in the inner councils of the party. In the spring of 1961, for
example, when the union leaders protested the deputies' voting themselves a retroactive pay raise, the legislators backed down. Although controlled by the UPS, the UGTS is not in a dependent state. In 1968 and 1969, for instance, the unions, along with the students, staged serious protests which caused the government much concern.

**Role of the Military**

Since 1962, the military has essentially allied itself with President Senghor. In the 1962 attempted coup, the President called upon the army, which outmaneuvered the DIa-controlled gendarmerie. The loyalty of the armed forces, especially the paratroopers, was rewarded in kind by Senghor's increased spending for defense, while other areas experienced austerity measures during the 1963-64 period. The commander of the paratroopers became head of the Senegalese armed forces.

President Senghor's power over the armed forces is guaranteed by the constitution, which names the president as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and empowers him to appoint military personnel. Senghor's control over the military is further guaranteed by his presiding over the supreme defense council, the senior policy body of the government on military matters. Using the principles of compulsory military service, Senghor has instituted a number of controls over the military and used the military in civic programs. The chief value of such a compulsory system is that it provides the beginnings of an effective system of registration among the civilian population and gives the state an opportunity to choose the best people in each call-up group of conscripts for noncommissioned
officers. In addition to its normal defense and training mission, the military is charged with carrying out work projects that further national economic development. The Senegalese government has initiated a civic action program. In this program, elements of the army undertake extensive road and airfield construction projects in outlying sections of the country.

Case Study 6 The Ivory Coast

The most important obstacles to French rule in the Ivory Coast were the solidified positions of the traditional chiefs. Through the use of military power and treaties, a protectorate was established over the traditional chiefs and the Ivory Coast, whereby Frenchmen were given trading privileges and protection. With the advent of direct rule—which included head taxes, military recruitment and colonial administration—the chiefs were subjugated but remained powerful, especially in the eastern region.

Nationalist Movement

The rise of nationalism began in September 1944 when a Catholic Baoule chief and physician, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, organized the Syndicat Africain Agricole (SAA) as the first political party. The principal aim of the SAA was to defend the interests of small African farmers vis-a-vis the big French planters and lumbermen against the large European commercial firms. By the end of World War II, the SAA had acquired some 20,000 members, which were drawn from a wide variety of ethnic and economic groups—with the peasant being the most active element.

The SAA became the Ivorian branch of the interterritorial
party, the RDA, under the name of the Parti Democratie de la Cote d'Ivoire (PDCI). Unlike the territorial branches of the RDA in Mali and Guinea, the PDCI's impetus did not come from African wage earners, nor was its program geared to the satisfaction of labor's demands. The PDCI developed and was influenced by its close association with the French communist party. This association with the communist party in the French parliament led to tension and violence when the French colonial administrators engineered electoral defeats of PDCI candidates and arrests of many PDCI militants.30 Nevertheless, with the help of the French communists, the PDCI at an early date was able to organize a thorough pyramidal party structure modeled on the communist party throughout the Ivory Coast. Along with this pyramidal structure went a great rise in the popularity of Houphouet-Boigny throughout French West Africa as well as the Ivory Coast.

Going on the assumption that his alliance with the French communists had outlived its usefulness and that his movement would fare better if it collaborated with the French administration in terms of attracting French business interests, Houphouet-Boigny disassociated his PDCI from the French communist party. This volte-face ushered in unprecedented prosperity during the first honeymoon period of Franco-PDCI relations. So great was this prosperity that by the latter part of 1955, the Ivory Coast had outdistanced Senegal as the federation's wealthiest territory. Under the prevailing system of redistributing federal revenues, the Ivory Coast was making the heaviest contribution to the budgets of its poor neighbors.
This fact increased the power and influence of Houphouet-Boigny's RDA vis-a-vis Senghor's IOM.

This unprecedented prosperity paid off great dividends for Houphouet-Boigny and the PDCI. In the March 1957 elections, the PDCI won all seats in the territorial assembly. Two months later, the PDCI was able to form and control a homogeneous government council. With his popularity approaching its zenith, Houphouet-Boigny accepted a ministerial portfolio in the Mollet Government in France. Houphouet-Boigny's influence was decisive in matters concerning the federations of French Africa. His views and positions on internal autonomy within the French Community but independence vis-a-vis the other French West African states (the latter position would prevent reappropriation of Ivory Coast funds to the poorer states) were incorporated into the French constitution and the September 1958 referendum. The referendum called for the states of the two federations to choose between complete independence or internal autonomy within the French Community. The popularity of Houphouet-Boigny's views were further substantiated when only 219 Ivorians voted against membership in the Franco-African community.

Achievement of Independence.

During the transition period from 1958 to 1960, Houphouet-Boigny returned to the Ivory Coast and took control of the party and the government. Using the methods of creating a mass party, he became unrivaled in the Ivory Coast. The President moved the country from a sixty-seat assembly and nineteen constituencies in 1957 to 100 seats and four constituencies in 1959 and finally to seventy
seats and a single constituency in 1960. Although the constitution specially provides for freedom of opposition, nobody challenges the PDCI! A case in point is the November 27, 1960, elections. Nearly 99 per cent of the votes cast (1,578,000 out of 1,597,000) went to Houphouët-Boigny, and PDCI candidates received 96 per cent of the votes cast for the 70 state assembly seats.\textsuperscript{32} President Houphouët-Boigny, known as the master of coalition building, carefully constructs a slate of candidates designed to incorporate and, where necessary, to appease important elements in the state. The PDCI runs a list of candidates called the union list, which shows a fine geographical, tribal and professional balance; however, not all of the candidates are PDCI members. The President wants to include nonparty elements in his government in order to produce a homogeneous assembly and extend patronage to all groups. Some of these nonparty elements may be potential leaders of opposition movements. The composition of successive cabinets has also demonstrated the President's talents for coalition building.

In addition to the use of the union list, Houphouët-Boigny has used co-optation, exile, transformation of the constitution and the judiciary. In his dispute with the Ivorian Student Association Union, the President created a more cooperative student association and, after a suitable cooling off period, pursued his usual tactics of offering posts in his government to some of the dissident students. Included on the PDCI union list for the assembly elections in November 1960 were two officials of the outspoken \textit{Union Generale des Etudiants de la Cote d'Ivoire}.\textsuperscript{33} Thus, tribal, regional, social
or political dissatisfaction at Houphouet-Boigny's policies in the form of political opposition remains unorganized because potential leaders of such discontent are offered high governmental posts at home or abroad, but remote from their tribal or geographical backing. Some are assigned duties that leave no time for opposition political ventures. Many political parties bent on opposition have arisen, but each one has subsequently died because their leaders were co-opted into the ranks of the PDCI. By being a chief himself, Houphouet-Boigny has been successful in his policy of inducements and appeasements with the great majority of the traditional chiefs and with the rank and file of the PDCI. In essence, the master coalition builder has absorbed or neutralized the various opposition groups.

**Role and Structure of the PDCI**

The Ivory Coast's constitution empowers the president with almost dictatorial powers in terms of appointing or dismissing ministers and as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Through his selection of candidates for the union list, President Houphouet-Boigny controls the PDCI and the seventy-member assembly. Structured on the communist model, the PDCI extends to all areas of the state and coincides with the division of the Ivory Coast into four general councils, which are composed of forty members. The four councils serve as the headquarters for the departments of the southeast, center, north and southwest. These general councils are further divided into cercles. Under the guise of decentralization of national government—but actually a plot to strengthen the PDCI and his patron-
age system—Houphouet-Boigny divided the four départements into 100 subprefectures, each endowed with an elected council of 20 members.

Role of the Trade Unions

A more dangerously active group than the student union or the traditional chiefs has been the urban labor leaders, whose unions were affiliated with the UGTAN and its headquarters at Conakry, Guinea. Particularly recalcitrant have been the civil servants' unions, which have resisted the President's efforts to make them cooperate with the government. Similar to the union-government relationship in Senegal, the Ivorian civil servants were regarded by the POCI as an unduly privileged group whose demands for improved working conditions and pay were unjustified and whose political activities were largely inspired by Guinean leaders bent on disrupting the Ivory Coast's administration. The transfer of UGTAN's headquarters to Conakry, the sending of UGTAN militant Yao Ngo Blaise to the Ivory Coast and the UGTAN campaign of 'No' vote in the 1958 referendum justified such apprehension.35 To alleviate this fear following a strike led by Blaise and the dismissal of 184 civil servants, Houphouet-Boigny in July 1959 sponsored the government-dominated Union Nationale des Syndicats de la Côte d'Ivoire (UNSCI). Under severe government-instituted repression of recalcitrant labor leaders, these unions broke with UGTAN and joined the UNSCI. Returning to his time-honored method of offering posts and prestige to the opposition, the President gave UNSCI leaders assembly seats in the legislature. To further appease recalcitrant labor leaders, Houphouet-Boigny established in April 1960 a labor advisory commission which recommended
an increase in the minimum wage. The government followed these recommendations and raised the hourly rate by eight per cent for all organized urban workers. In many cases, strikes are permitted, but labor disputes must be submitted to government councils of arbitration. Unions are free from overt government control or interference as long as their activities conform to government economic policy.

Houphouet-Boigny has consistently practiced his belief that offering lucrative positions to his opponents will miraculously soften his past, present and potential enemies. The President has obviously recognized the danger to his government of a possible alliance between such explosive and revolutionary forces as students and urban leaders. To prevent such danger, he has preferred to take the calculated risk of bringing into the assembly and the government any men who have shown themselves eager to overthrow the PDCI government by force. Thus, through rewards and punishments, the PDCI government and Houphouet-Boigny created and became intimately linked with the UNSCI.

**Role of the Military**

The constitution gives the president control over the appointment of officers and command of the military. Using these and other powers, Houphouet-Boigny has assigned his armed forces the task of quelling internal uprisings and aiding economic construction. To solve the unemployment problem in Abidjan, the President in July 1961 instituted compulsory military service and a modified form of forced labor involving regiments of the military. Under the above program, all conscripts were required to devote half of their one
year tour of duty to perform civic construction programs called service civique, which are similar to programs instituted in Mali, Senegal and Guinea. Military and civil forces were put to work on public projects such as school and road construction, in addition to regular military and civilian duties. In addition to using the military's manpower for economic development, the service civique was also designed to provide on-the-job training for youths, to promote national consciousness and pride among the rural population and to eliminate youthful unemployment in the urban areas. After completing basic training, the recruits were assigned to small dispersed units and set to building their own camps and raising their own food before being assigned more elaborate civil projects.36

Summary and Conclusion

Toure, Senghor and Houphouet-Boigny have largely succeeded in the creation of mass party organizations which have been interwoven into the majority of the political, social and economic institutions found in their respective states.

The pattern of the mass party system in these three states rests upon a foundation laid during the pre-Independence period. The mass party, which originated in many cases as a nationalist party, dictated the achievement of independence as a goal. The successful completion of the struggle for independence made necessary the mobilization of all energies of the people; to this end, the nationalist movement in the form of the mass party evolved a highly disciplined, cohesive structure whose roots were solidly fixed in the basic cell of African life—the village.
Usually the nationalist (mass) party was the only party in existence. The need to mobilize popular support left little room for the growth of opposition parties. During this period, potential opposition leaders could offer no alternative program. In the post-independence period, the popular enthusiasm which carried the successful nationalist party to victory also ensured its continuation in office. The institutionalization of party competition or opposition was not considered by the masses in Guinea, the Ivory Coast and (to some extent) in Senegal a necessary prerequisite for the successful functioning of the political system. A continuing challenge to the authority of the popularly supported leadership was looked upon as an attempt to undermine the unity on which future national development depended. Thus, during the pre- and post-independence periods, it was relatively easy for the nationalist parties and their leaders to make the transition to a mass political party. At the apex of the mass (nationalist) political party hierarchy emerged the charismatic figure (Toure, Senghor, Houphouet-Boigny), who was to become at once the symbol of the new freedom that independence guaranteed and the link with the traditional past.

Since the legitimacy of the mass party and its charismatic leader was insured by the nationalist movement, the facilitation of centralized authority was a foregone conclusion. Thus, two of the most important institutions in Guinea, Senegal and the Ivory Coast, the military and trade unions, have been sufficiently penetrated in terms of reorienting them toward the execution of projects and programs considered essential to economic and political development. By
the use of coercive potential, patronage, punishment, key placement of command personnel—usually with a member of their own tribe—and stationing the military units away from key urban centers, the leaders of Guinea, Senegal and the Ivory Coast have been able to check and control their armed forces. As further insurance, Toure, Houphouet-Boigny and other mass party leaders have incorporated their own private army into the state apparatus. In 1963, for example, Houphouet-Boigny created a presidential guard from the ranks of his tribesmen. Similar methods were used to bring the trade unions into the mass political party network. The level of coercive potential available to these governments has been sufficient to control and regulate the unions, the military and other powerful institutions. Thus the states of Guinea, Senegal and the Ivory Coast have not experienced any coup d'état. However, many of the same economic, political and social conditions that plagued the Congo (B), Dahomey and Upper Volta were also present in Guinea, Senegal and the Ivory Coast, as indicated in the raw data. Using the same hypotheses and formulation of a causal model of political instability in Chapter VIII, the same procedures can be applied to develop a causal model of political stability. The test of such a causal model will be conducted in the summary and conclusion to Parts II and III of the dissertation. The model of political stability in Guinea, Senegal and the Ivory Coast must involve the predominance of the mass party, its leader and its control over other institutions, especially the military and the trade unions.
CAUSAL MODEL 4

POLITICAL STABILITY IN GUINEA

President Toure

Government (Bureau Politique)

Military Cabinet Members

Trade Unionists

Representatives

Student Groups

Women's Groups

Economic Stagnation

Eliminating Opposition

Corruption

Parameters of PDG and Toure

Student Groups

Government Officials

Women's Groups

Military

PARTI DEMOCRATIQUE DE GUINEE
LEADER OF PDG: PRESIDENT TOURE

Tribes

Villages

Trade Union CNTG
Variations of this model can be conceptually drawn for the
Ivory Coast and Senegal. Although the Ivory Coast's POCI and Sene-
gal's UPS have a predominance of power vis-a-vis the military, trade
unions and other organizations, and have penetrated most organiza-
tions, this infiltration and penetration have not gone as far as in
Guinea. In the Ivory Coast and Senegal, for instance, the state-
dominated trade union centers are semi-independent in that, on a
number of labor matters, they are free to function; however, on major
labor decisions—the right to strike, wages, working conditions—the
state has the prerogative. Nonetheless, similar to practices in
Guinea, the parameters and coercive potential of the mass political
party and government are sufficient to control potential problems
arising from economic stagnation, elimination of opposition or cor-
ruption. Besides coercive potential, opposition arising in the poli-
tical systems of the Ivory Coast and Senegal are co-opted or elimi-
nated through coalition building or through clan politics; the con-
stant changes in both cabinet and legislative membership reflect the
demands, inputs and outputs of the political system. In Guinea,
periodically held congresses, elections and changes in the PDG hier-
archy reflect demands, inputs and outputs. However, in Guinea,
suppression is more likely to be the most frequently used method of
controlling the opposition.
FOOTNOTES


5 See Chapter V for background information on the independence movement.

6 There were 1,405,968 voters on the list. Cowan and Toure charged that the number of 'No' votes in other territories might have been larger had the colonial administration not been responsible for counting the ballots. See Cowan, "Guinea," p. 169; and Toure, op. cit., Part I.


8 Quoted in Cowan, "Guinea," op. cit., p. 177.

9 Toure, op. cit., Part II.

10 Cowan, "Guinea," op. cit., p. 182.

11 Ibid., p. 203.


13 PDG Congress, pp. 126-128.


17 Ibid., pp. 89-90.

18 Quoted in DuBois, "The Role of the Army In Guinea," p. 5.

20 Zolberg, Creating Political Order, p. 87.


26 First, op. cit., p. 220.


30 Thompson, "The Ivory Coast," op. cit., p. 240.

31 Zolberg, Creating Political Order, p. 80.


34 Area Handbook for the Ivory Coast, p. 460.

35 Le Monde, October 16, 1959.


CHAPTER XII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION TO PART II AND PART III

The phenomenon of political instability and stability is a manifestation of a wide range of problems in the six case study African states. The above case studies sought to delineate the role of the military, trade unions and the mass political party and its leader to ascertain whether or not significant differences exist between the three coup states and the three non-coup states. It was found that, of all societal preconditions, the ones dealing with centralization, consolidation and control over the military and trade unions by the mass political party and its leaders are significantly more important than those preconditions relating to social, cultural and economic aspects in determining the probability of a coup d'état.

The underlying purpose of this section of the dissertation is to test by quantitative methods for those societal preconditions which make the coup probable or improbable in a given state. If these preconditions can be discovered and shown to be different in coup states as opposed to those in non-coup states, then the preconditions' relationship to the coup can be explained. Thus, it must be proven that the likelihood or nonlikelihood of a coup d'état depends more on the preconditions dealing with centralization of authority by the mass political party than on other societal preconditions. This proposition was partially substantiated by the causal models 3 and 4, and the case studies. To further clarify and substantiate the findings and the hypotheses set forth in Chapter VIII, a causal explanation and model for the phenomenon of coups d'état,
based upon the statistical comparative study of eight coup states and five non-coup states, will be developed in order to isolate those particular preconditions that persist in coup states.

**Societal Preconditions and the Precipitant Cause**

If the coup-makers do little more than turn the flintwheel which precipitates the coups d'etat in a society, then certain social, economic and political preconditions have already made the society amenable to the coup. By the same token, the coup fails to occur if the proper preconditions are not present. The degree to which the societal preconditions are favorable or unfavorable, as well as the presence of the precipitant cause, determine the probability of a coup. If the preconditions are numerous and there is a precipitant cause, coup probability is high. On the other hand, if only one or two preconditions are present, the coup potential of the society is low.

Preconditions are defined as those circumstances—social, cultural, political and economic—which make the successful coup possible. The preconditions say something about the general nature of a given society, its population, and its political and economic infrastructure. The preconditions facilitate the circumstances which make it possible for the precipitant cause to bring about the coup d'etat.¹

Departing from the conventional definition of a precipitant as an expected event, this research has conceptualized a precipitant
as an intent. It is the intent of the coup-makers which reflects their perception of what caused the coup. It is not the events in and of themselves which cause coups d'état, but the interpretation of these events in coup-makers' minds that give rise to causes. Something made the military or trade unions change their minds from 'not to overthrow the government' to 'overthrow the government'. Whatever caused this change is the precipitating cause. If, for example, the immediate cause of the coup is an attack by the government upon the military establishment, the intent of the officers in effecting a coup is to eliminate the causes of the threat to the army's security.

Precipitant causes are relatively easy to discover if thought of in terms of intent because, in almost every case, the coup-makers explain their intentions immediately after the coup. If there are no such pronouncements, the precipitant causes can usually be discovered from an examination of events immediately preceding the coup.

Using the intent of coup-makers as the basis of analysis, Collins divides coups d'état into three motivational categories: the personnel, authority and ideological. Briefly, in the personnel coup, the coup-makers depose the ruling government simply because they desire a change in personnel. An example would be the July 11, 1963, coup in Ecuador, where a military junta deposed President Arosemena because he had disgraced himself and the government by his drinking escapades. The personnel coup envisages nothing more than personnel revisions. Thus, it is both less important and less frequent.
On the other hand, intervention in the authority coup occurs because of the military's sense of obligation to society to change a government which has become oppressive or to restore order in the midst of chaos or to protect itself as an institution from a government policy which the soldiers feel is a threat to their security. The intent here is to correct problems in political authority, but there is no intent to change the substructure of the society or its major domestic or foreign policies. Collins divides the authority coup into four subcategories: a) the military threat coup; b) the oppressive dictator coup; c) the civil strife coup; and d) political impasse coup. Usually, in most states which have experienced an authority coup, the coup-makers establish a provisional government or junta which arranges for new elections or a new constitutional convention in an effort to restore governmental legitimacy. Sometimes, however, if the state is evenly divided between equally transient groups, the coup-makers remain in power. In contrast to the personnel and authority coups, where little or no changes are involved, the ideological coup involves a great deal of change. In the ideological coup, the precipitant itself signals considerable changes in orientation or the prevention of change in the directions and goals of the nation's political life. The ideological coup is mainly concerned with what group will participate in the decision-making process, such as pro-modernization groups or those with religious, pro-West or pro-East orientations. The coup-makers' intentions can be labeled and explained in terms of their relations to the preconditions.

Essentially, if the coup is to take place, there must be a
causal relationship between the precipitant and the preconditions, for the preconditions facilitate the execution of the coup.

Testing for Applicable Preconditions

Any effective causal enquiry should be addressed to specific differences between comparable situations. To ask why political instability happened in the coup states is to ask simultaneously why political stability did not occur. By using the chi square distribution test, it can be shown which of the political, economic or social variables presented in the hypotheses and reasons for military and trade union intervention are most frequently present in the coup states of the C.A.R., Congo (B), Dahomey, Ghana, Mali, Sierra Leone, Togo and Upper Volta, but are not found in the Camerouns, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Niger and Senegal.

In a statistical problem of this kind, a chi square test can be used to determine whether the differences between the coup and non-coup states would be statistically significant. The chi square correlation indicates the probability that such a distribution would occur by accident or chance in a statistical state of nature. For our purposes, a level of significance value of 0.05 or less/3.841 or greater is statistically significant.

In addition to raw data in Appendix 3, additional data were collected, mainly from Morrison, et al., Black Africa, and United Nations Statistical Yearbooks. These data were used to compute chi square distributions and applicable preconditions. The data (which has been collapsed into two cells--high and low), along with chi square distributions, are located in Appendix 4.
Discussion of Results

in Chapter VIII, a number of hypotheses were delineated. These hypotheses implied that differences in cultural pluralism, interest articulation by anomic groups, eliminating opposition, corruption, mass communication, military expenditures, urban patterns and legislative-executive structure exist in the coup and non-coup states; however, chi square distribution of indices in Tables 15, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28 and 29 show no significant dissimilarity between the coup and non-coup states.

The most significant distinction between the coup and non-coup states are—as was predicted—those dealing with centralization, consolidation and control over the military, trade unions and the mass political party. Also, a number of economic development indices were slightly higher or significant in the non-coup states. These indices reveal from high to moderately high statistical correlation between coup and non-coup states, as shown in Tables 16.2, 16.3, 16.4, 16.6 and 16.7 in Appendix 4.

Table 17.2 Dominant mass party political system
\( x^2 = 6.96; P < .01 \) with one degree of freedom. The presence of a dominant mass party correlates significantly higher with the non-coup states.

Table 18 Degree of control over the military
\( x^2 = 9.48; P < .01 \) with one degree of freedom. A high degree of control over the military is highly associated with the non-coup states and thus absence of coup d'état.

Table 16.6 Consumer Price Index 1965 (Inflation)
\( x^2 = 5.76; P < .02 \) with one degree of freedom. There is significantly less inflation in the non-coup states.

Table 16.7 Difficulty in achieving long-run economic growth (ca 1967)
\( x^2 = 5.29; P < .05 \) with one degree of freedom. The non-coup states (as a group) are significantly more economically advanced than the coup states.
There are seven indices which do not have a chi square level of significance less than .05 but do fall in the category of less than .10. They are noted here only because they are somewhat suggestive of preconditional differences which might be significant in some states. In terms of economic development, the non-coup states were/are slightly more advanced than the coup states...

Table 16.2 Number of wage earners
\[ x^2 = 3.26; P > .05 \text{ but } < .10 \text{ with one degree of freedom.} \]

Table 16.3 Per capita energy consumption in kilograms of coal equivalent (1966)
\[ x^2 = 3.74; P > .05 \text{ but } < .10 \text{ with one degree of freedom.} \]

Table 16.4 GNP in millions of U.S. dollars (1965)
\[ x^2 = 3.26; P > .05 \text{ but } < .10 \text{ with one degree of freedom.} \]

The dominance of the mass political party in terms of its origin and its control over other institutions besides the military is further substantiated by the following indices...

Table 17.1 Percentage of the vote cast for the winning party in the election closest to but before the date of independence.
\[ x^2 = 3.74; P > .05 \text{ but } < .10 \text{ with one degree of freedom.} \]
The political party in the noncoup states received a high degree of votes and greater control at independence.

Table 19 Degree of control over the trade unions
\[ x^2 = 3.74; P > .05 \text{ but significant at .10 level. A slightly high degree of control over the trade union is exercised more by the non-coup states than by the coup states.} \]

**Mass Political Party and the Coup d'Etat**

Discontent with the economic situation and the state's leadership were among the primary preconditions isolated between the coup and non-coup states. In many of the coup states, rivalries among political leaders crystallized into a regional pattern, and, at
the same time, these states' economies declined to such a level that the masses' living standards, especially for the urbanized organized workers, had sunk below those of the prewar period. So preoccupied were the politicians with seeking power that they neglected their states' economies, which continued to rest almost exclusively on shrinking export sales in a fluctuating world market. This economic stagnation was closely tied to the in-fighting between the in and out groups for control of the government.

The dominant party systems that were formed after independence by the leadership in coup states floundered because they were built on unstable coalitions of highly personalized ethnic, tribal and regional parties. Moreover, this party system—unstable, situational, personalistic and sometimes ad hoc—had no direct widespread popular support. Incapable of drawing together the various desires of disparate elements of the society and including them in general platforms or programs, the dominant party system articulated interests that were narrow and represented the hopes of too small a segment of the whole society. Thus, the political party and the legislature failed to aggregate interests, resulting in a political system in which many groups articulated diverse interests that could not be effectively crystallized into larger national programs. This situation contributed to the alienation of unrepresented elites and is a fundamental cause of internal political unrest and social ferment.

A political party that does not aggregate interests, but only represents attenuated interests, tends to behave more as an interest group than as a political party. When it captures control
of the government, it is usually reluctant to hold competitive elections because of its awareness of widespread opposition to its laws and programs, which necessarily reflect interests that are too restricted. The dominant political party allows no competing groups and aims at total social, economic and political control. This kind of party does not aggregate interests but attempts to impose its own interests on the rest of society. There is also a tendency for such parties to label the unrepresented interests as unpatriotic or even treasonable. A typical example of this 'coup-state situation' occurred in Ghana. In the general election before independence, seven political parties had elected representatives in the legislature. By 1966, however, there remained only one party, which selected Nkrumah as president for life. Nkrumah's CPP articulated its own meager interests while neglecting the interests of various opposition groups, such as the Ashanti, cocoa farmers, the Moslem minority in the North, or Ghanaian intellectuals. Nkrumah and the CPP failed to consider those interests as articulated by these associational and institutional groups and to work out possible compromises. Nkrumah's efforts were limited to educating them to accept his own position, and explaining why their interests were misguided and not in the national interest. The one group he failed to 'educate' was the military. The CPP and Nkrumah destroyed or centralized all competing parties or groups except (in part) the military, which was kept in existence for several reasons: a) to symbolize sovereignty; b) to defend against foreign enemies; and c) to help suppress other competing groups. As the chi square reveals, the coup states were not
able to articulate the interests of the military and trade unions, and thus, these two institutions were free to move against these governments.

If political parties tend to be situational, personalistic and ad hoc, there is the probability that government will have the same attributes. Government and parties of this nature do not have substantial legitimacy in the view of the general populace, because of their transitional character. Legitimacy requires time and traditions and familiarity. The vast majority of society neither establishes an identity with nor understands institutions which appear suddenly.

In addition to the problems of economic stagnation and the failure of the party system to represent many of the diverse interest groups, these coup states were also plagued by perpetuated regional antagonisms which usually resulted from the underdevelopment and isolation of a region in their states, usually the North. Regionalism and lack of interest articulation by groups handicapped the state in that all issues and problems became politicized, and elite commitment to politics was geared to the quickest and easiest means of upward mobility. In turn, this has led to a neglect of the already dismal economy. Political instability derives from the refusal of the elites of the bureaucracy to aggregate the interests articulated by the masses, military, trade unions and other associational and institutional groups.10

In contrast to the dominant mass political party systems in non-coup states, which have proved beneficial in building national
identification and served as the mainstay in achieving unanimity, the coup states had party systems in which one political party controlled the central government, sometimes in a coalition, but with semi-strong based regional or ethnic parties in opposition. The opposition parties and organizations were reasonably cohesive and organized but were unrepresented in the policy-making structure or input functions of the political system. This single party system did not have a broad appeal to all segments of the population. Thus, for interest articulation and aggregation, the urban masses turned to the trade unions and military—the two most important institutions in terms of critical preconditions for a successful coup d'etat—to alleviate the situation. As Lee notes, any state which does not possess a dominant indigenous political culture is likely to meet great difficulty in establishing a secure system which commands national respect.11

As the chi-square distributions indicate, the non-coup states resembled the coup states in some of the preconditions. Among these were the unequal development of the north or south, the heterogeneity of their ethnic composition, the elite's orientation to government employment, eliminating opposition, corruption, communication and urban patterns. Nevertheless, unlike the coup states, the non-coup states produced national leaders who asserted their control throughout their states by organizing a strong mass party system. The establishment of the mass political party allows its leader to direct more of his attention to policies and programs aimed at promoting economic development or preventing economic stagnation,
maintaining public order and his authority, and of utmost importance, inspiring confidence and respect among the population.

Furthermore, the non-coup states have been able to integrate the diverse parties and interests into a stable mass party system, and these parties (as alluded to in the comparative case studies) perform the traditional work of recruitment, socialization, political communication, and interest articulation and aggregation. As Almond and Coleman aptly state, "Every political system has some way of articulating interests, claims, demands for political action." Among the input functions, interest articulation is of crucial importance because it occurs at the boundary of the political system. The particular structures which perform the articulation function and the style of their performance determine the character of the boundary between polity and society. Since, in the non-coup states, interest articulation is performed mainly by and through the mass political party system, there is virtually little separation between the political system and the boundary of the state, the state's population and institutions. Thus, the interests aggregated and articulated by the mass political party in the non-coup states are representative of broad segments of the community. This is reflected in the fact that there is significantly less interest articulation in the form of protests, demonstrations or mutinies by the military or trade unions. As the chi square distribution indicates, the most critical precondition for a successful coup in the coup states (Table 16--$x^2 = 9.48; P < .01$) was the lack of effective civilian control over the military. To this critical precondition can be
added that of the trade union (Table 10—$x^2 = 3.74; P \leq .10$) as an important precondition in facilitating a coup d'etat. Through clan politics, coalition building and expansion of political systems to take in opposition, the non-coup states have been able to consolidate and centralize the military and trade unions, thereby preventing these two organizations from igniting the preconditions favorable to a coup d'etat.

A typical example of the above situation occurred in the non-coup state—the Ivory Coast. In January 1963, a serious plot which involved members of the armed forces, as well as the ministers of education, health and agriculture, and in 1965 a series of student revolts were instigated against Houphouet-Boigny. These groups represented the fact that power was held by the long-entrenched party leaders, the autocracy of Houphouet-Boigny and the predominance of Houphouet-Boigny's fellow Baoule tribesmen in the administration. To cope with the above oppositions and their demands, the President purged the PDCI to make room for the oppositional members, reorganized the government structures and departments, and reduced and dispersed the armed forces, while at the same time creating a militia to insure the continued loyalty of the regular military. The results of giving government positions to the opposition and the strategic use of the military have allowed the master coalition builder to continue in power.

**Updating the Causal Models of Political Instability and Stability**

If our preconditional variables are thought of as representing societal phenomena, a '+' or a '-' can be assigned to each state
TABLE 13
PRECONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO
INDIVIDUAL THIRTEEN AFRICAN STATES

Variables and Indices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Wage Earners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Rep.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates non-coup states.
in terms of whether or not the precondition is present or absent in each state. A '+' indicates the precondition is present and a '-' indicates that it is not. For example, those indices which correlate negative with the coup states, such as the indices for consumer price index (Table 16.6) are represented by a '+' when the correlation is negative in order to show the same sign for all variables when they expedite the coup. A '0' indicates unascertainable, unascertained and ambiguous. (See Table 13, page 365.)

The coup potential for each of the thirteen states can be computed by dividing the number of preconditions that are present for a given polity into the number for which there is usable data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
<th>Coup Data-1965 or later</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1/1/66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1/3/66; 2/74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1/13/67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>12/22/65; 12/17/67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3/21/67; 4/18/68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo—Brazzaville</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>8/3/68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>11/19/68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger*</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>No Coup*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>No Coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2/24/66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>No Coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No Coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No Coup</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*4/15/74 Military coup d'état overthrew the government of Niger's President Diori.

Table 14 is not static. There is constant change in the preconditions. As one precondition ceases to exist, another may appear. The frequency of coups in Dahomey, for example, has lessened
the regard for constitutional norms and procedures. This general lack of respect for constitutionalism is itself a possible precondition that correlates with the successful coup d'etat. On the other hand, the society may evolve in such a way that the coup is no longer probable. It seems that, following coups in Upper Volta (1966) and the Central African Republic (1966), the military leaders who have taken on civilian roles are beginning to tackle and eliminate some of the preconditions which facilitated their coming to power.

All coup states with the exception of Ghana show a coup potential of 75 per cent or above. Far more noteworthy is the fact that only one non-coup state (Niger) shows a coup potential of 50 per cent or greater. If there were a proper precipitant, it might very well be predicted that a coup in Niger is highly probable.

However, President Diori's control, centralization and consolidation of the military and trade unions through the mass political party (Parti Progressiste Nigerien—PPN) have successfully prevented these two organizations from demonstrating and attacking the government. Diori's PPN has achieved a balance of power in terms of other institutions, notably the military and the unions. The PPN has provided an effective defense against the potential of political decay or disruptive elements in Niger from rising beyond the interests and demands articulated by the PPN. Even though the societal preconditions necessary for a coup are present (5 to 4 as indicated in Table 13), the government of Diori has been more effective than that of Nkrumah of Ghana (where societal preconditions were unfavorable 8 to 1) in controlling the military establishment. Nevertheless, since
many of the preconditions are present in Niger, all that is needed for a successful coup is a precipitant cause. In the case of Ghana, which has coup potential of 11 per cent but experienced a coup in 1966, the precipitant cause and several societal preconditions were extremely significant in toppling Nkrumah's regime. Another look at the raw data and chi square distributions reveal some very interesting facts. Raw data on page 392 reveal that Ghana's exports-imports balance increased slightly from -42 million dollars in 1962 to -48 million in 1964, but took a drastic leap in 1965 with an imbalance of -154 million dollars. Similar trends occurred in the balance of payments. In 1963, for example, Ghana had a deficit of 63 million dollars, 75 million in 1964, but an enormous deficit of 212 million in 1965. Although Ghana had only one applicable precondition (See chi square distribution, page 398.), this precondition was extremely significant. Ghana led all thirteen states in terms of Consumer Price Index 1965 (an indication of inflation) with value of 181 based on 1958 prices.

In addition to these economic indicators, Ghana on a scale of 5 had a value of 5 in terms of change in the mass basis of party affiliation. As the correlations (page 246) and the discussion in Chapter VIII indicates, the erosion of the mass party is strongly related to coup d'état. Table 18 (page 400) indicates that Nkrumah's control over the military was indeed high, but what is not revealed by this table is the military officer corps' underlying hostilities toward Nkrumah for his interference in their bailiwick. (See especially Chapter V, pages 122-126.) The above factors combined with
the external rigging of the cocoa market (Ghana's one-crop economy) give insight as to why Ghana experienced a coup d'état. If the military is tightly controlled, the soldiers may find it impossible to decide to act, since they will not know whom they can trust. However, in atmospheres conducive to coup d'état, it is very difficult for the government to maintain control or centralization over the military or trade unions.

Having isolated the preconditions and classified the coups d'état according to intent of the coup-makers in Appendix 5 and using the chi square distributions, coup potential and preconditions, the 1966 coup d'état in Upper Volta can be illustrated.

**FIGURE 1**
COUP D'ETAT IN UPPER VOLTA (1966)
in Figure 1, on page 369, the coup-makers felt strongly that Upper Volta needed a change in leadership because of the civil strike that was plaguing the state. Preconditions favored a coup 10 to 0. Coup potential was 100 per cent and, due to the presence of a precipitating cause (to restore order), the overall coup probability was high.

Summary and Conclusion

Part I of the dissertation examined and delineated British and French colonial policies and administrations in Black Africa, the peculiar historical heritage of the colonial period and the inherited factors which have created the predominantly political character of the trade unions and armed forces. British and French colonial policies greatly influenced military and trade union development and eventually their involvement in African politics. Many of the colonial policies and practices were adopted by the new governments.

Trade union pluralism, which resulted from attachment to metropolitan union centers in the French colonies, was simply carried over after independence. However, the attempts of the new political leaders to consolidate the many trade union centers into a single organization within the proposed single political party, led to union grievances and confrontations with the government. Case studies in Chapter X reveal that the attempts of Youlou, Maga and Yameogo to subjugate the trade unions led to their downfall. The existence of a single trade union organization (the BTUC in Britain) facilitated the creation of trade union congresses in the Anglophone states. Likewise, the French practice of employing austerity measures if insuperable
economic difficulties arose to 10 to 25 per cent salary cuts for unionized workers. As Ahomadegbe, Maqa, Youiou and Yameogo failed to realize, austerity measures of this kind are more likely to provoke sudden waves of strikes, demonstrations and protests by trade unions than are the mounting inflation and deficit financing techniques experienced by the Anglophone states. The involvement of trade union centers in coups d'état in Anglophone states was practically nil.

British and French colonial recruitment policies and their effect on the composition of the new African armies influenced and widened the generational, educational, ethnic and regional gaps between the senior and junior officers, resulting in mutiny-coups d'état. Similarly, the salary structures of the colonial period and their inheritance by the new nations became a contributing factor in the split between the senior and junior officers in the military and the trade union centers.

The British and French concept of a non-political army and the socialization of the military officers in French and British traditions and customs created a disposition to intervene in the political arena. For example, the tradition of military intervention to quell domestic disturbances has a long history in Africa, dating from the earliest colonial days. Both colonial powers' policies created armies that were functionally and emotionally distinct from the rest of their societies. This partly explains the insignificant role of the military in the independence period and hence its neglect by the new governments in terms of pay scale increases and Africani-

zation. This neglect in many cases exploded into mutinies.
Part II denoted and examined the nature and character of the military and trade unions through four closely linked stages of political involvement, while delineating the dominant forces operating within them. Stage 1, the **Period of Decolonization**, involved military abstention from political activities, while trade union centers entered into informal alliances with the political leaders. Unionized workers received many of the benefits and privileges previously enjoyed by expatriates. Stage 2, the **Disenchantment and Blackmail Period**, denoted the military's attempts to obtain some of the fruits of independence and its eventual ascendance in the political system. Military disenchantment—resulting from resentment against European officers, the slow pace of Africanization of the officer corps, and low pay scales—exploded into mutinies. Contrasted with the rise of the military is the decline of trade union influence. Adopting many of the colonial methods of control, the new government leaders sought to limit the power of the trade unions and to integrate them into their party system and government. Stage 3, the **Political Upheaval Period**, was characterized by full scale military and trade union political involvement. Too weak to overthrow the government on its own, many trade union organizations turned to the military (also disposed to intervene) for help. In many cases an alliance was formed between these two organizations. By extracting variables, formulating hypotheses, collecting data and using correlations, a causal model is developed which explains coup d'etat. In Stage 4, the **Supplantment Period**, splits within the military-trade union bureaucracy (new government) resulted in mutiny-coups d'etat. Inherited colonial
factors (which were exacerbated by the new government) such as salary scale, and regional and ethnic composition of these two organizations, contributed significantly.

Part III contains six case studies involving three coup and three non-coup states, as well as a conceptual model developed to delineate political stability in the non-coup states. This part also contains a chapter which serves as the summary to Parts II and III. By the use of chi square distributions, societal coup potential is computed for each of the thirteen African states in the study, with a conceptual illustration of the 1966 coup in Upper Volta.

The discussion in the preceding chapters suggests several general and specific findings. The general findings are delineated in the Abstract (pages iii and iv). Some of the specific findings are:

1) The most essential precondition for a coup d'etat is a lack of effective civilian control over the military and trade unions in some states. Effective civilian control as shown in the non-coup states precludes military intervention.

2) Another major precondition which emerges from the preceding chapters is a unique unstable situation which results from an unstable party system, in which the single party system fails to aggregate interests of associational and institutional groups.

3) A third major precondition preceding the successful coup results from the presence of social, economic and intellectual unrest in the form of excessive inflation, and high degree of interest articulation by anomic groups.

4) The erosion of the mass basis of party affiliation can
bring about a coup regardless of whether popular discontent or alliances between the military and trade union have occurred beforehand in the political system.

5) Eliminating opposition, more than economic stagnation and corruption, has a strong effect on the erosion of the mass party and on popular discontent. Many of the governmental mass parties are still conglomerations of elite/patron parties which revolve around regional, economic or tribal leaders. The elimination of elite/patron party leaders results in their followers disaffiliating themselves from the mass party and the government. The greater the elimination of representatives of politically relevant units in the political system, the more likely the occurrence of a coup.
FOOTNOTES


3 Ibid., p. 74.

4 In the military threat coup, the military is perceived as reacting to one particular policy instituted by the government. The military feels that this particular policy threatens its own health and welfare. An example is a policy calling for a reduction in military expenditures or members. The oppressive dictatorship coup is used as a political corrective device for ousting overly burdensome governments. In the oppressive dictator coup, the military desires a change in governmental structure, a return to constitutional rule, changes in government policy, the inclusion of more groups in the decision-making process or the destruction of secret police forces or militia. The civil strife coup arises out of the inability of government to control the state, which is usually beset with general strikes, riots or generally destructive confusion. The intent or precipitant cause is simply to restore order. Finally, the political impasse coup occurs as a result of stalemate between government leaders. As a result, the decision-making process or entire political system grinds to a halt. Collins, op. cit., pp. 75-76.

5 Ibid., p. 79.


8 Ibid., pp. 314-316.

9 The coups d'etat against the authoritarian-mass single party system of Ghana, Mali and other states invalidates Janowitz's hypothesis of these regimes' 'invincibility'. See Janowitz, op. cit., p. 86.


12 Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 33.

13 Virginia Thompson, West Africa's Council of the Entente, p. 96.

OPERATIONALIZATION AND CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE VARIABLES

1) Corruption is a difficult variable to operationalize and conceptualize, and even more difficult to collect data on. It has been neither precisely measured nor rigorously operationalized or conceptualized in terms of systematic studies by the academic community. The terse investigations of corruption have been done mainly by journalists and other purely descriptive or impressionistic writers. In addition to the lack of any systematic studies, another preliminary problem which must be faced but cannot be solved is that of evidence. Arguments and statements about corruption cannot be demonstrated by factual or statistical evidence of the type normally acceptable as a basis for political or sociological generalization. There are plenty of reports, histories and trial records exemplifying corruption in different countries, but corruption is not a variable which can be investigated openly by means of questionnaires and interviews. Finally, the problem arises as to whose norms should be followed in establishing the criteria for corruption. In surveying the New York Times, New York Times Index, African Diary and other sources, those acts which were condemned by society or were considered illegal by the population, its leaders and especially the judicial officials, were recorded.

Nevertheless, corruption as used in this proposal is operationalized as a behavior of a public official who accepts money or money's worth for doing something that he is under duty to do anyway, under duty not to do, or to exercise a legitimate discretion for improper
reasons. This would include such behavior as: a) bribery—use of reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust. As an example of bribery as recorded in the above sources, H. K. Djaba, businessman jailed by Nkrumah, testified that he gave Nkrumah $280,000, a bullet-proof car costing over $30,000 and another car costing over $3,000; b) nepotism—bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merits. An example is the appointment by Upper Volta's President Yameogo of his cousin Denis Yameogo (as interior minister), whose qualifications for office—aside from family ties—appear to have been inadequate education and a flair for boxing; c) misappropriation—illegal appropriation of public resources for private uses. A case of misappropriation would be the use of government funds by President Youlou of Congo (B) to build a $625,000 hotel for his mother. In other words, corruption was taken to include those modes of employing money to attain private ends by political means which are criminal or at least illegal, because they induce persons charged with a public duty to transgress that duty and misuse the function assigned to them.

2) Economic stagnation was operationalized as the failure of the nation's economy to move forward or to make progress in terms of GNP, etc. The following indicators were used to conceptualize the variable 'economic stagnation':

a) unemployment—the total number of persons wholly unemployed and temporarily laid off.

b) trade (balance/imbalance)—a comparison of imports (c.i.f.) and exports (f.o.b.).

c) deficit budgets/balance of payments

d) GNP/per capita—total value of goods and services produced in a nation in a year's time divided by the total population.
3) **Popular discontent** is dissatisfaction of the population with the government as exemplified by certain acts. This was operationalized by the following indicators:

a) **riots**—any violent demonstration or clash of citizens against the government involving the use of physical force. The existence of a riot is generally evidenced by the destruction of property, people being wounded or killed. A riot as delineated here occurred in Senegal during the December 1963 presidential election, when 2000 members of the banned African Independence Party clashed with government forces: 12 dead, 60 hurt. (African Diary, January 4-10, 1964; and *New York Times Index*, December 2-3, 1963).

b) **general strikes**—any strike involving industries or services that involve the government as one of the employers and that is aimed at national government policies or authority. Such a strike took place in Dahomey on October 26, 1963, led by the Union Générale des Travailleurs du Dahomey (the national central labor organization) and the supporters of Apity. The strikers took to the streets to protest against Maga and his policies of centralizing authority (attempting to create a one-party state) and economic problems. They demanded an army takeover.

c) **assassinations**—any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high government official or politician. Among high governmental officials are included governors of states or provinces, mayors of large cities, cabinet members, and members of the national legislature. Among high politicians are included members of the ruling party or group's 'inner core' and leaders of the political opposition. An example is the murder of President Olympio (January 13, 1963) by rebuffed military insurgents. (*New York Times Index*, January 1963)

d) **anti-government demonstrations**—any peaceful public gathering for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing opposition to government policies or authority. Student strikes aimed at the government are considered anti-government demonstrations, but political party rallies, general strikes, violent demonstrations (riots) were not coded as anti-government demonstrations. An example of anti-government demonstration as defined here is the July 18, 1967, demonstration by 2000 citizens who presented a petition to Mali's President Keita, demanding that he eliminate 'dishonest functionaries'. (African Diary, September 24-30, 1967, pp. 3582-3583.)

e) **state of emergency/major governmental crisis**—any rapidly developing situation which threatens to bring the immediate downfall of the present government. Such situations are
usually evidenced by the declaration of martial law, state of siege or the suspension or abrogation of the constitution. This case is exemplified by events occurring in Ghana during the latter part of September 1963; at a rally marking Nkrumah's 53rd birthday, 100 people were hurt in two bombing incidents; 3 dead, 120 hurt in bombing in Accra; 256 hurt, 12 dead in bombing incidents in Tema and Accra; 230 held for violating the curfew; police raided private homes in Accra. These events culminated into forcing President Nkrumah to declare a state of emergency. (New York Times Index, September 21-24, 1962.)

f) terrorism—occasional or continuous acts of arson, sabotage, bombings, assassination of minor officials, sniping, harassment and underground activity directed at the government or at the people with the aim of undermining their support of the government or the eventual overthrow of that government. An example is the continuous acts (independence, 1968) of bombings, harassment, etc., against the Nigerian government by members and exile leaders of the banned Sawaba Party (Parti de Regroupement Africain--PRA). (African Diary, 1963-1968; and Africa Report, 1962-1968.)

g) plot—any discovery of plans to overthrow the central government or to assassinate its leaders; this includes governments' announcements of the discovery of such plots. An example of a plot is the attempted overthrow of the Guinean government (October 18, 1965) by two high ranking officials and civilians. (African Diary, November 13-19, 1965, p. 2598.)

4) Eliminating opposition is the attempt by the government in power to transform their regimes into a dominant single party or to silence the opposition. The means used in the attempt to establish a single-party system, to consolidate or centralize power, were used to operationalize the variable 'eliminating opposition':

a) purges/cabinet reshuffle—any systematic elimination, by removal from office or position, jailing or execution, of political opposition within the ranks of the regime or opposition that may have been co-opted or intimidated into joining the government. An example is the ouster of Chief Justice Korsah of Ghana's Supreme Court by President Nkrumah (New York Times Index, December 12, 1963.) An example of cabinet reshuffle is the dropping of four ministers from the cabinet by Mali's President Keita in October 1966. (African Diary, October 16-16, 1966.)

b) manipulation of election laws—denotes the efforts of the government leader to create a single constituency, single
list of national candidates for offices, with the primary aim of reducing the opposition's chances of success at the polls. This has been done by transforming national elections into a 'limited' government-administered plebiscite. Competition is made impossible or at least unlikely. An example of this process occurred in the Ivory Coast, which moved from 60 assembly seats and 19 constituencies in 1957 to 100 seats and 4 constituencies in 1959 and finally to 70 seats and a single constituency in 1960.  

C) **Constitutional changes**—involves transforming the constitution to give wide discretionary authority to the executive and to restrict the activities of representative assemblies: administrative control over local government, reduction of the independence of the judiciary, or the creation, side by side with it, of dependable political courts. As an example of constitutional changes, President Nkrumah requested and got changes giving him the power to turn Ghana into a one-party state and to dismiss the state's supreme and high court judges. (African Diary, February 22-28, 1964, p. 161.)

d) **Exile or detention of political opponents.**

e) **Assassinations**—See the definition above. However, in this instance, the act is carried out by the government or its followers.

f) **Party banned or exiled**—does not include party banned or exiled following coups.

5) **Changes in the mass basis of party affiliation.** Mass dominant single party as used in this research denotes a coalition or a combination of political parties. When the distinction between the parties becomes indistinguishable, the party system was designated as a mass political party. The mass dominant single party which originated in the independence period was based on ethnic, tribal, social, economic and political groupings. As the political system became more differentiated, the many political groupings were superseded by regional or patron parties which were built around politicians from that particular region.

Since these parties were unstable, situational, personalistic and sometimes *ad hoc*, they only attracted support from particular
regions or groups. In such a political system, it was difficult for any one political leader to emerge as the leader of the entire nation in terms of aggregating and articulating the interests of all groups. Those groups whose interests were neglected turned to the creation of opposition parties; such practices were classified as negative changes in the mass basis of party affiliation. Thus, the operationalization of this variable included the following indices:

a) **creation of opposition political parties.**

b) **decline in the number of votes cast for government or dominant party.**

Likewise, changes could occur in other directions, if government leaders could strengthen this coalition by mergers with other factions or by expanding the cabinet and other offices to take opposition leaders into the government. Therefore, positive changes in the mass basis of party affiliation were operationalized as:

c) **merger of opposition parties.**
d) **an increase in the number of votes cast for the dominant party.**
e) **cabinet reshuffle to take into the government selected members of the opposition.**
f) **changes in the mass political party to take in opposition party members.**

g) **Coup** is any successful attempt by officers of the police or military or members of the ruling elite to overthrow the central government or replace its executive through the use of force or threat of force. Thus, a coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its control of the remaining segments.9

7) **Military-trade union alliance** is another variable which
presents a problem in terms of conceptualization and operationalization since no written formal agreements exist between these two organizations. Alliance (as used here) is said to exist if the trade union leaders or members, during the period of popular discontent, ask the military to take over the government. For example, union officials in Congo (B) asked the military to take over the government and to form a provisional government with their approval or, as in the Central African Republic, the demonstrators carried posters and signs..."Army to power". Also, after the coup, the position of the civil servants and other trade union officials in the new government was coded as denoting a military-trade union alliance (but with a lower value).


7 Ibid.


APPENDIX 2

CODING PROCEDURES: CODE SHEET A

The seven variables denoted in the causal models were operationalized and conceptualized into a number of indicators. Data were collected on these indices from the following sources:

2) Africa Diary, 1962-68.
6) Dimensionality of Nations Project Data.
8) United Nations Yearbook of International Trade.

Each indicator (see Appendix 3) was multiplied by assigned weights. These indices were summed according to each variable. The sum scores for the seven variables were ranked from highest to lowest in terms of the following interval scale:

```
   5  4  3  2  1
  High  Low
```

The interval scale scores (which are contained in Appendix 2 Code Sheet C) were used to compute correlation coefficients and first- and second-order partial coefficients. The coefficients were used to construct the causal models in Chapter VII.

As a source of further reliability and validity, raw data were used only for those years preceding the coups d'etat. The final ratings and rankings of the thirteen African states were calculated by using the coups d'etat time period. See Appendix 2 Code Sheet D for data periods.
### APPENDIX 2

CODING PROCEDURES: CODE SHEET B

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
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<th>(b)</th>
<th>Cameroon</th>
<th>C.A.R.</th>
<th>Congo</th>
<th>Dahomey</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Guinea</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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APPENDIX 2. (Continued) CODE SHEET B

h) state of emergency/maj or
govt. crisis

TOTAL

△ Mass Basis
of Party Affiliation
a) creation of opposition parties (-) 4
b) party mergers 4
c) decline in votes for dominant party (-) 3
d) others (-) 4
e) increase in votes for dominant party (+) 3
f) cabinet change 2
to take in opposition (+)
g) party changes 2 (+)
h) others (+) 4

TOTAL

Military-Trade Union Alliance
a) demonstrators ask for army takeover 1
b) trade union officials' positions in new govt. 2
c) no trade union involvement 0

TOTAL
### APPENDIX 2

**CODE SHEET C: INTERVAL SCALES RATINGS**  
(RATINGS BASED ON RAW DATA)

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APPENDIX 3

I Corruption

1) Bribery
2) Nepotism
3) Misappropriation
4) All of the above

II Coup d'Etat

5) Presence of coup (number of coups)

III Eliminating Opposition

6) Purges/cabinet reshuffle (number)
7) Purges--parties/local government (number)
8) Exile (number of cases not individual)
9) Detention (number of cases)
10) Assassination of opposition (number of cases)
11) Constitutional changes
12) Manipulation of election laws
13) Party banned/exiled

IV Popular Discontent

14) General strike
15) Strikes
16) Riots
17) Anti-government demonstration
18) Assassination of government officials
19) Plots
20) Mutiny
21) Terrorism
22) State of emergency/major government crisis

V Military-Trade Union Alliance

23) Demonstrators ask military to take over government
24) Trade union officials given 'positions' in New government

(-) No coup took place/no evidence located
(+ ) Yes trade union involvement

VI Economic Stagnation

25) Unemployment
26) Per capita/GNP in U.S. dollars
27) Exports--Imports ('-' indicates imbalance)
28) Balance of payments in millions of U.S. dollars
VII A Mass Basis of Party Affiliation

29) Creation of opposition parties
30) Decline in number of votes cast for dominant party
31) Merging of parties
32) Increase in number of votes cast for dominant party
33) Addition of governmental opposition—cabinet changes
34) Addition of governmental opposition—party changes
### APPENDIX 3

**RAW DATA**

|     | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 |
|-----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| **CAMEROUN** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1962 | - | - | - | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | - | - | .4 111 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 1963 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | .5 127 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1964 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | .4 130 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 1965 | - | - | - | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | .2 136 | -13 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 1966 | - | - | - | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | .4 149 | -20 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 1967 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | 1.6 161 | -36 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1968 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | 3.5 175 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **C. A. R.** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1962 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | - | 102 | -10 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1963 | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | - | 110 | -4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1964 | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | - | 125 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1965 | + | + | + | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1966 | + | + | + | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | + | - | 148 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1967 | + | + | + | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | - | -11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1968 | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| **CONGO (B)** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1962 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | .6 182 | -31 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1963 | + | + | + | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | + | + | .5 187 | -20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1964 | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | - | + | - | 194 | -18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1965 | + | + | + | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | 201 | -18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1966 | - | - | - | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | - | - | - | 207 | -27 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1967 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | -34 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1968 | - | + | - | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | -35 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
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### APPENDIX 3. (Continued) RAW DATA

| Year | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 |
|------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 1965 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  |
| 1966 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  |
| 1967 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  |
| 1968 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  |

**MALI**

| Year | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 |
|------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 1965 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  |
| 1966 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  |
| 1967 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  |
| 1968 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  |

**NIGER**

| Year | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 |
|------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 1965 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  |
| 1966 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  |
| 1967 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  |
| 1968 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  |

**SENEGAL**

| Year | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 |
|------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 1965 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  |
| 1966 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  |
| 1967 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  |
### APPENDIX 3. (Continued) RAW DATA

| Year | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 |
|------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 1968 | - | + | - | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | - | - | - | 226 | -29 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

#### SIERRA LEONE

| Year | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 |
|------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 1962 | - | - | - | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | 4.3116 | -27 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1963 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | 4.8132 | -3 | -20 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1964 | - | + | - | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | 5.3139 | -4 | -25 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1965 | - | + | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | 6.8154 | -19 | -39 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1966 | + | + | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | 8.0160 | -17 | -31 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1967 | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | - | - | 8.5160 | -20 | -30 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1968 | + | + | - | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | - | - | 8.6157 | 5 | -6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

#### TOGO

| Year | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 |
|------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 1962 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | - | - | 84 | -10 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1963 | + | + | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | 86 | -11 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 1964 | + | + | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | 95 | -12 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1965 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | 108 | -18 | -19 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1966 | - | + | - | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | 112 | -11 | -10 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1967 | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | - | - | -13 | -6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1968 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | -7 | -5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

#### UPPER VOLTA

| Year | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 |
|------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 1962 | - | + | - | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | .2 | 45 | -28 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1963 | + | + | - | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | 47 | -27 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1964 | + | + | - | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | 49 | -25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1965 | - | + | - | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | - | - | - | 50 | -23 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1966 | - | + | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | + | - | 52 | -22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1967 | - | - | - | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | -18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1968 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | .4 | -20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
**APPENDIX 4**

**CHI SQUARE DISTRIBUTIONS**

**TABLE 15**

CULTURAL PLURALISM (1967)*

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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (B)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>25-48 (Low)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>49-70 (High)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>x² = 0.283; P &gt; .05 with one degree of freedom. There is no significant difference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>between coup and non-coup states in terms of cultural pluralism.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>C.A.R.</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Definition: Per cent of the total population who speak the dominant vernacular language.

**TABLE 16**

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (ECONOMIC STAGNATION)

Table 16.1

Non-Agricultural Development Potential Index*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
<th>Mean 8.6</th>
<th>Range 10</th>
<th>Interpretation of scores:</th>
<th>coup states</th>
<th>non-coup states</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HIGH 2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (B)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4-7 Poor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8-11 Fair</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12-14 Good</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15-19 Excellent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>x² = 1.59; P &lt; .05 with one degree of freedom.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.A.R.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Definition (Table 16.1): Summation of ranking on short- and medium-run opportunities for development in a) forestry; b) fishing; c) mining; d) hydropower; and e) manufacturing.

Table 16.2
Number of Wage Earners (1963)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Interpretation of HIGH scores:</th>
<th>non-coup states</th>
<th>coup states</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>8973.8</td>
<td>33,840</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>17,100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>1160</td>
<td>8974</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (B)</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>8975-35000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.A.R.</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>2,750</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1,880</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interpretation of HIGH scores: LOW 1160-8974; HIGH 8975-35000. Economic development tends to be slightly higher in non-coup states.

Source: Morrison et al., op. cit., p. 40.

Table 16.3
Per Capita Energy Consumption in Kilograms of Coal Equivalent (1966)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Interpretation of values:</th>
<th>non-coup states</th>
<th>coup states</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congo (B)</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>HIGH 12-72.8 (Low)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>159</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>73-180 (High)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>145</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>54</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.A.R.</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

x² = 3.74; P > .05 but < .10 with one degree of freedom. Economic development tends to be slightly higher in the non-coup states.

### Table 16.4

**GNP in Millions of Dollars (1965)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th><strong>Mean 500</strong></th>
<th><strong>Range 2,185</strong></th>
<th><strong>Interpretation</strong></th>
<th><strong>HIGH</strong></th>
<th><strong>LOW</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2,207</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>963</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>680</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>670</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>344</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>297</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>257</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>257</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>250</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>165</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>156</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (B)</td>
<td>138</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.A.R.</td>
<td>122</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 16.5

**Per Capita GNP (1965)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th><strong>Mean 119.6</strong></th>
<th><strong>Range 244</strong></th>
<th><strong>Interpretation</strong></th>
<th><strong>HIGH</strong></th>
<th><strong>LOW</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>291</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>253</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>223</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (B)</td>
<td>187</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>154</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>135</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.A.R.</td>
<td>110</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>108</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See Raw Data sheets.
### Table 16.6

**Consumer Price Index 1965 (Inflation)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Consumption (High)</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>77</td>
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<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (B)</td>
<td>145</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.A.R.</td>
<td>134</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>126</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>119</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>114</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>104</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No data for Dahomey, Mali, Togo, Guinea.

*Definition: Ratio of prices in 1965 to prices in 1958 times 100. Increase of index indicates rising prices.*

### Table 16.7

**Difficulty in Achieving Long-run Economic Growth (ca 1967)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>non-coup states</th>
<th>non-coup states</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C.A.R.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (B)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Definition: 1. Growth not difficult.
2. Growth not very difficult.
4. Growth very difficult.*
### Table 17.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Percentage of Vote cast for Winning Party in the Election closest to but before Independence*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>100 * Mean 65.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.A. R.</td>
<td>89 * Range 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>83 * Interpretation HIGH 2 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>77 * of per cents: 66–100 (High) 6 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>77 * 16–65 (Low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>76 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>60 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>60 * $x^2 = 3.74; P &gt; .05$ but $&lt; .10$ with one degree of freedom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (B)</td>
<td>58 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>57 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>50 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>46 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>16 *</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Definition: Winning party is the party from which the government executive (cabinet) or head of a coalition government is chosen.

### Table 17.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Interpretation of values:</th>
<th>Present coup states</th>
<th>Non-coup states</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>'+' mass party system present</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>'−' mass party system absent</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>−</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.A. R.</td>
<td>−</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (B)</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>Sources: Morrison et al., op. cit., pp. 175–377 (see each of 13 West African states); Case studies, Chapters X and XI; Carter, op. cit., see section on each state.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>−</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>−</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>−</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Definition: A mass political party system denotes a system whereby the party dominates or controls through its leader all important institutions. An example is that of the PDG in Guinea. See Ch.XI.
APPENDIX 4. (Continued) CHI SQUARE DISTRIBUTIONS

for operationalization of mass political system.

TABLE 18

DEGREE OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Interpretation of values:</th>
<th>COUP STATES</th>
<th>NON-COUP STATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>'+' high degree of control</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>'-' low degree of control</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.A.R.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (B)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Definition: High degree of control over the military would be the control exercised by PDG over the military. Low degree of control would be the relationship between the political systems and military in Dahomey or Congo (B).

TABLE 19

DEGREE OF CONTROL AND CENTRALIZATION OF TRADE UNIONS*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Interpretation of values:</th>
<th>COUP STATES</th>
<th>NON-COUP STATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>'+' high degree of control</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>'-' low degree of control</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.A.R.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (B)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Definition: See above definitions for mass political party and military.
APPENDIX 4. (Continued)  CHI SQUARE DISTRIBUTIONS

TABLE 20

STABILITY OF POLITICAL SYSTEM 1960-65º
(INTREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Interpretation</th>
<th>Mean 23.3</th>
<th>Range 45</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congo (B)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>40½</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>33½</td>
<td>4—23.3 (Low)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24—49 (High)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>x² = 0.12; P &gt; .05 with one degree of freedom. There is no significant difference between coup and non-coup states on the stability-instability indices.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.A.R.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>8½</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Definition: This Index is calculated as the sum of all reports of (with assigned weights in parentheses) general strikes (4), riots (2), anti-government demonstration (3½), assassination of government officials (2½), plots (2), mutiny (2), terrorism (3½), coup (5), attempted coup (3½), and state of emergency (5) in the period from independence to 1965. (See Appendix 1 for operationalization of Indices, and Appendices 2 and 3, respectively, for assigned weights and raw data.)
APPENDIX 4. (Continued) CHI SQUARE DISTRIBUTIONS

Table 21
ELIMINATING OPPOSITION 1960-65

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>*Mean 37.1</th>
<th>*Range 74</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.A.R.</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (B)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>non-coup states</th>
<th>non-coup states</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Mean 6-37 (Low) 39-80 (High)

Interpretation of values:

Source: See raw data sheets, Appendix 3.

Table 22
CORRUPTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>*Mean 9</th>
<th>*Range 22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C.A.R.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>161/2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (B)</td>
<td>161/2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>121/2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>121/2</td>
<td>0-8,5 (Low)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9-22 (High)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>non-coup states</th>
<th>non-coup states</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C.A.R.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (B)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Mean 0-8,5 (Low) 9-22 (High)

Interpretation of values:

Source: See Appendices 1, 2, and 3.
APPENDIX 4. (Continued) CHI SQUARE DISTRIBUTIONS

TABLE 23

MASS COMMUNICATION

Table 23.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Radios (1966)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30—123 (Low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124—555 (High)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 23.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Daily Circulation (1968)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2—64 (Low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65—220 (High)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN Statistical Yearbook, 1968.

*Definition: Total Daily Circulation is given in hundreds.

Table 23.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Telephones per 10,000 Population (1967)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6—31 (Low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32—103 (High)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 23.4

**Number of Movie Houses (ca 1966)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean 24.5</th>
<th>Range 97</th>
<th>coup states</th>
<th>non-coup states</th>
<th>$x^2 = 1.31; P &gt; .05$ with one degree of freedom. There is no significant difference between coup and non-coup states in terms of mass communication.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2—24 (Low)</td>
<td>HIGH 1</td>
<td>LOW 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25—99 (High)</td>
<td>LOW 3</td>
<td>LOW 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** UN Statistical Yearbook, 1969.

### Table 24

**TRADE UNION: PERCENTAGE OF WAGE & SALARY EARNERS* EMPLOYED IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR (ca 1965)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean 31.7</th>
<th>Range 40</th>
<th>coup states</th>
<th>non-coup states</th>
<th>$x^2 = 2.24; P &gt; .05$ with one degree of freedom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14—31.7 (Low)</td>
<td>HIGH 5</td>
<td>LOW 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32—52 (High)</td>
<td>LOW 4</td>
<td>LOW 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Morrison, et al., op. cit., p. 90.

*Definition of wage and salary earners and of 'public sectors' may vary from country to country.

### Table 25

**MILITARY EXPENDITURES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean 9.0</th>
<th>Range 13</th>
<th>coup states</th>
<th>non-coup states</th>
<th>$x^2 = 3.74; P &gt; .05$ but significant at .10 with one degree of freedom. The non-coup states' military expenditures are slightly higher than in the coup states.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0—9 (Low)</td>
<td>HIGH 2</td>
<td>LOW 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10—36 (High)</td>
<td>LOW 1</td>
<td>LOW 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** See sources to Table 16.4.
Table 25.2

Military Expenditures as Percent of GNP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Coup States</th>
<th>Non-coup States</th>
<th>( x^2 = 0.12; P &gt; 0.05 ) with one degree of freedom.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.9—2.3 (Low)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4—4.3 (High)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See sources to Table 16.4.

Table 26

URBAN PATTERNS

Table 26.1

Estimated Percent of Population In Cities of 20,000 or more (ca 1965)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Coup States</th>
<th>Non-coup States</th>
<th>( x^2 = 0.008; P &gt; 0.05 ) with one degree of freedom.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN Demographic Yearbook, 1967, p. 163.

Table 26.2

Number of Cities, 20,000 or more in population, per million in National Population (ca 1965)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Coup States</th>
<th>Non-coup States</th>
<th>( x^2 = 0.44; P &gt; 0.05 ) with one degree of freedom.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.6—1.5 (Low)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>There is no significant difference between coup and non-coup states on the urbanization indices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6—4.6 (High)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See source to Table 26.1.
APPENDIX 4. (Continued) CHI SQUARE DISTRIBUTIONS

TABLE 27

SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT*
(LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>coup states</th>
<th>non-coup states</th>
<th>$\chi^2 = 0.14; p &gt; .05$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidential System</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary—Royalist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of the legislative-executive structure, there is no significant difference between coup and non-coup states.

Source: See sources to Table 17.2.

*Definition: A presidential structure is characterized by the presence of an elected official (whether directly or indirectly designated) who serves for a stated term as both head of state and effective executive.
APPENDIX 5

CLASSIFICATION OF COUPS D'ETAT
IN TERMS OF INTENT (PRECIPITANT CAUSE)

Authority Coup d'Etat

a) Military Threat Coup d'Etat
   1) The Central African Republic 1/1/66
   2) Togo 1/13/63
   3) Congo (B) 8/3/68
   4) Dahomey 12/17/67; 12/10/69; 10/28/63

b) Oppressive Dictatorship Coup
   1) Togo

b) Civil Strike
   1) Congo (B) 8/15/63
   2) Dahomey 12/22/65
   3) Upper Volta 1/3/66; 2/74
   4) Sierra Leone 3/21/67

d) Political Impasse Coup
   1) Togo 1/13/67

Ideological Coup d'Etat

1) Mali 11/19/68
2) Sierra Leone 4/18/68
3) Ghana 2/24/66

Personnel Coup d'Etat

1) Ghana 1/13/72
SERIALS, PUBLIC DOCUMENTS AND UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS.

Africa Political, Cultural and Social, February and July, 1964.


*Europe Outremer.* No. 385, Paris.


Huguet, P. Code du Travail d'Outre-Mer, 1953.


Le Proletaire (African CGT Journal), No. 29, October 1953.


Manchester Guardian, January 2, 1885. Manchester.


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Personal History

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Educational Background

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  Major/Minor .......... History/Political Science--Education
M.A. Degree ............... University of Hawaii, December 1970
  Major Field .......... Political Science (International Relations)
Ph.D. ............... University of Hawaii, May 1974
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Work Experience

Researcher ............... Advisory Council on International Relations at University of Hawaii, 1974
  Researcher ............... Dr. Daniel Lerner (MIT), visiting professor--East-West Center Communication Institute, 1974
  Publication ............... "The Kauai Pilot Survey," Daniel Lerner, George Cooper, Jean Lerner and Leon Richards
Graduate Tutor ............... Model Cities' Research and Planning Program, 1972-75
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