HAOLE MATTERS:
AN INTERROGATION OF WHITENESS IN HAWAI'I

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This work is dedicated with respect and aloha to the women who were, and are my inspiration – my grandmother, mother, and niece:

Estella Acevedo Kasnetsis (1908-1975)
Georgia Kasnetsis Acevedo (1938- )
Ho‘ohila Estella Kawelo (2002- )
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ABSTRACT

Haole (popularly understood as white people or whiteness in Hawai‘i) — now the largest and arguably most powerful socio-political influence in the islands — has gone largely unexamined, especially when contrasted to the extensive interrogation of native Hawaiian identity in both popular and academic discourse. Powerful state institutions including the media, academia, business and government, foment debate over who is native Hawaiian, what rights Hawaiians have, and what Hawaiians want. This singular obsession with Hawaiians has historically deflected attention from haole, normalizing and dehistoricizing the status quo, and working to naturalize haole in Hawai‘i.

This dissertation changes that frame, inverting the gaze and making haole subjectivity and power the problem. It explores how haole has come to matter: the ways it is reproduced across time and space, and relationally; the power it accrues; the possibilities of rearticulating it differently; and the openings produced in its simultaneity with other identities. By interrogating haole, I illuminate some of the processes behind the Hawaiian-haole paradox, and in doing so, produce a case study of situated whiteness within a neo-colonial American context.

As a feminist political theorist, I provoke new cross-pollinations regarding how haole matters by creating a problem-specific method utilizing a diversity of texts and theoretical approaches. I consult as my data sources: popular works, public controversies, and debates about haole; academic inquiries into Hawai‘i’s history and politics; my experience as haole; and legal cases. I analyze these materials through the lenses of Hawaiian history, feminist theory, critical legal theory, whiteness studies, critical social geography and indigenous studies.
The dissertation has five core chapters: colonization and haole hegemony; constructions of haole (by haoles, Hawaiians and locals); production of haole in the law (focusing on the recent Rice v. Cayetano U.S. Supreme Court decision); survey of literature and models for destabilizing whiteness; and intersectional and genealogical approaches to rearticulating haole. Structurally, the dissertation builds from historicizing and contextualizing haole, to deconstructing the multiple constructions of haole, to finally exploring possible elements of a genealogical stance toward haole.
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INTRODUCTION

You have to know who you are and why you are here.
- Kanaka Maoli activist (name unknown)

Statement of Problem

A recent search of the Hawai‘i State Library Newspaper Index, which catalogs the two major newspapers in the islands since 1989, produced 3302 article titles including the word "Hawaiians," 4 including "haole,“1 and 11 including "Caucasians." This is but one example raising the question: how is it that so much attention in Hawai‘i is focused on native Hawaiians, while haoles, now the largest – and arguably most powerful – group in Hawai‘i, go largely unexamined? Powerful institutions including the media, academia, business and government foment debate over who is Hawaiian, what rights Hawaiians have, and what Hawaiians want. This singular obsession with Hawaiians, this colonizer's gaze, has historically deflected attention from haoles themselves.

Dominant discourse is such that asking “what do haoles want?” or “what rights do haoles have?” is unthinkable, and yet, these types of questions are explicitly and implicitly asked about Hawaiians every day. This paradox normalizes and dehistoricizes the status quo, naturalizing haole in Hawai‘i, and making anything else seem unimaginable or unreasonable.

1 A note about language: I am attaching a glossary of Hawaiian language words. In a small decolonizing effort, I choose not to italicize them in the text since they are not “foreign” to Hawai‘i. Hawaiian Creole English (HCE) is also not foreign and I do not even glossary it because enough of it can be understood from context. As will soon become clear, my usage of “haole” employs native Hawaiian, HCE, and postmodern meanings. I use it to reference white people (I sometimes use the HCE plural “haoles”), but more broadly, whiteness in Hawai‘i, i.e. the power that has accrued through colonization and hegemony, as well as identity, culture, ideology, and performance. Additionally, I use several terms for the indigenous people of Hawai‘i: Kanaka Maoli, native Hawaiian and Hawaiian. Kanaka Maoli is preferred politically because it carries ties back to other indigenous Pacific people – ”Ma‘oli‘ is cognate with ‘Māori‘ of Aotearoa and ‘Mā‘ohi‘ of Tahiti” (Silva 1999, 15).
Given this paradox, I saw my project at its conception changing this frame by interrogating haole, moving the spotlight onto the colonizer. My objective was to excavate the history, power and privilege, as well as the responsibility, in haole – to make haole the problem. All seemed well and good until haole began slipping through my fingers like mercury. The harder I tried to pin it with a theory or hook it with a narrative, the slipperier it became. Introducing her study of local identity in Hawai‘i, Louise Kubo used a different metaphor: “To pin the butterfly down, to study it in stasis, is to kill it. The components which create cultural identities...are...multiple and complex – and always in flux” (Kubo 1997, 1). It must have been my prejudice against conceiving of haole as a “butterfly” that kept me from internalizing the full import of that statement. It was not until well into my dissertation journey that I think I really began to understand it – and then only under duress.

Right before my keystrokes, haole started moving and leaking. It became less easily corralled as a noun/thing, a definable delimited person/group, whether “discoverer,” “colonizer,” “savior,” or “settler.” It became more contingent, performative, and multivalent – more process than product, more verb than noun. And, I began to see my project not as the study of some knowable entity “haole,” but as an investigation into how what is called haole comes to be perceived as known; how it is produced – in multiple ways by various discourses, times and places. In essence, to borrow from Judith Butler, I began to

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2 To be “local” in Hawai‘i is more than to just be a resident. Local identity and culture in Hawai‘i is, as Kubo suggests, impossible to pin down and I discuss it in more detail in Chapter 2. Suffice it here to say that local identity and culture emerged primarily from the experience of laborers on sugar and pineapple plantations and is an amalgamation of Asian-Pacific immigrant cultures and native Hawaiian culture. The language of the local is Hawaiian Creole English (HCE).
explore how haole matters. Butler suggests that “to know the significance of something is to know how and why it matters, where ‘to matter’ means at once ‘to materialize’ and ‘to mean’” (Butler 1993, 32). Studying the materialization and meaning mobilized by and through haole necessarily meant deconstructing and destabilizing haole itself.

It is not coincidental that it was Kubo’s work on the local that reminded me to think of cultural identity as a matter of “becoming,” to use Stuart Hall’s terminology (Hall 1990, 225). Local and Kanaka Maoli discourses of identity privilege fluidity and performance over fixity. In local culture, there is considerably more acceptable race talk than in the dominant culture from the continent. Indeed, I think it is safe to say that race talk is one of the mainstays of local culture (food, of course, being the main mainstay). This adds a further layer of paradox to the story about the newspaper search. While the “dominant” discourse (i.e. that controlled by the media, politicians, tourist industry, and other power brokers) fails to talk about haole, it is a whole different story (literally) on the beach, at local haunts such as Rainbow Drive-in and Longs. In local and native Hawaiian discourses, haole gets talked about all the time – sometimes as performance or attitude, sometimes flexible social category, sometimes colonial legacy, but never as naturalized or normative to Hawai’i.

This deterritorializing of haole is in fact one of the things that makes the islands remarkable. Contrary to the newspaper search, haole is in fact examined

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3 This is not to say that locals or native Hawaiians are obsessed with haole. Haole is talked about often because race/ethnicity is talked about often.
4 The dominant discourse on racial politics in the islands represents Hawai’i as a remarkable “racial paradise.” This discourse necessarily ignores the work decentering haole done by local and Hawaiian discourses, not to mention on-going racialized colonial violence.
and challenged daily – from telling a friend not “fo’ ack so haolified,” to picking Wal-Mart for building on the bones of Hawaiian ancestors. In the islands, whiteness is not the normative transparent center, and never was. It is marked and called out as “haole:"

The discovery of one’s haoleness is an experience common to all whites who migrate to the islands. People who have previously thought of themselves as rather ordinary, average North Americans, who have learned to distinguish themselves by their occupation, city of origin, or their political affiliation, are now surprised to discover themselves to be haoles. It is a strange existential shift for those who have always thought of others as ethnics, themselves as Americans (Whittaker 1986, 53).

“Ordinary, average North Americans” who have “always thought of others as ethnics” do not fade into a comfortable, naturalizing white backdrop in Hawai‘i – they stick out until they acculturate (or leave). This does not mean white privilege does not exist in the islands, it very much does, but with a colonial difference – it is challenged by the local/Hawaiian majority. While I argue later that the strength of that challenge has diminished in the last few decades with the depolitization of local identity and the impacts of globalization, it is still a force. Additionally, the ebbs and flows of the strength of Kanaka Maoli resistance impact the intensity of the challenge in any given political moment.

The principle questions that drive my inquiry are: what is the history of haole, how was haole hegemony produced and contested through the processes of colonization; what are the ways in which haole is produced relationally and discursively; what are the processes through which local and Hawaiian discourses decenter haole; in what ways is the law and legal discourse mobilized in constructions of haole; how are whiteness and white privilege constructed vis-à-vis indigeneity in Hawai‘i and the Pacific; and how might intersectional theory help toward visioning a genealogical rearticulation of haole? Pursuing these
questions, I illuminate some of the processes behind the Hawaiian-haole paradox, and in doing so, produce a case study of situated whiteness within a neo-colonial American context.

**Background and Relevancy**

My family moved to Kaua‘i when I was seven and I grew up a haole girl continuously seeking an understanding of what that means and how it matters. I learned to understand myself as haole through local culture and native Hawaiian history and resistance. A few years ago I participated in one of June Jordan’s Poetry for the People classes. There I tried to find a way through poetry to express some of my experience growing up in Hawai‘i. I share my poem here with some trepidation because I think of it as a work in progress, and because I worry it centers me too much. I share it nonetheless, because I think it helps flesh out my relationship to this project.

haole girl

hippie hair/puka pants/stink bag lunch
carob cookie/smash sandwich/granola crunch
I no drink soda
I no eat arare

junkalunka car/bus’up backpack/highwada pants
surplus cheese/bumpy road/pakalōlo plants

i speak Standard English
i do homework every day

Dey say
“Eh, haole girl
tink you smat?
Go back Mainlan’
we neva say you could stay”

i learn fo’ talk pidgin
i learn fo’ bake manju

Mānoa rain/Bon Dance/baby luau too
sandy suit/ocean foam/haku lei
I take guidance from white feminist scholars like Ruth Frankenberg who wrote in her pivotal study, *White Woman, Race Matters*:

> White women need to become conscious of the histories and specificities of our cultural positions, and of the political, economic, and creative fusions that form all cultures. The purpose of such an exercise is not, of course, to reinvent the dualisms and valorize whiteness so much as to develop a clearer sense of *where* and *who* we are (Frankenberg 1993, 204, emphasis added).

A study of haole makes it clear that the "where" is intrinsically related to the "who," and that understanding both of these elements means grasping the relational and contextual underpinnings of our subjectivities. Or, as Adrienne Rich writes, "I began to experience the meaning of my whiteness as a point of location for which I needed to take responsibility" (Rich 1986, 219). I attempt to locate this project in the rich multidisciplinary nexus of Hawai‘i history and politics, whiteness studies, critical race theory, social geography, indigeneity studies, and feminist theory. I briefly discuss each in turn.

The only extensive study of haole to date was undertaken by visiting Canadian anthropologist, Eli Whittaker, in the 1980s (Whittaker 1986). This dearth of academic literature is another reflection of the lack of attention to haole, and whiteness in general, in dominant discourse. Currently, much is being
written about the sovereignty movement and demands for Hawaiian political autonomy by supporters (Osorio 2002; Silva 1999; Kauanui 2000; Trask 2000) and detractors (Twigg-Smith 1998). I hope to provide a crucial complement to these studies, and a broadened understanding of Hawaiian history, by analyzing haole.

The dominant historiography of Hawai‘i perpetuates the narratives of “discovery,” “civilization,” and “development” which center the haole as the agent of “progress” in the islands. The teleological march of American imperialism makes it “natural” that the haole should come to own, lead, and manage Hawai‘i. Colonialism paternalistically outstretches its benevolent hand. This historiography diminishes, obscures, and trivializes native Hawaiian and local histories. Given this background, contemporary racial politics in Hawai‘i are easily misrepresented through the malicious ideologies of “reverse racism” and “colorblindness.”

Critical whiteness studies burst on the academic scene in the early 1990s gathering a multidisciplinary constituency interested in deconstructing whiteness. The first wave of this whiteness scholarship has been criticized for abstraction and lack of historical context and geographic breadth (Hill 1997; Rasmussen et al. 2001; Kolchin 2002). The field has been largely limited to analyses of the continental United States within the black-white binary. Much is gained by recognizing whiteness as multiple, ambiguous and shifting – a dynamic social assemblage that varies with historical, political, spatial, and cultural contexts. My project brings these insights of second wave whiteness studies across the Pacific to Hawai‘i, challenging the field to consider a form of
whiteness shaped by colonialism, a non-white local culture, and indigenous sovereignty claims.

Critical race theory\(^5\) maintains that law and legal discourse are significant players in the processes of social construction, including racialization. It exposes colorblind ideology as a white historical amnesia that pretends we live in a post-racist society and therefore contends that race does not matter. I employ critical race theory to investigate recent legal arguments and rulings targeting Hawaiians. In defining who Hawaiians are and what they have a right to, these cases illuminate the machinations of whiteness and illustrate the flexibility of discourses and structures of racial privilege to adapt, maintain and shroud power.

Social geographers are making critical contributions to the study of racialization by drawing attention to the importance of place. They emphasize that space is dynamic, and that there is nothing “natural” or given about an environment (Bonnett 1996; Delaney 2002; McDowell 1999). Using David Delaney’s assertion that “race makes space,” I analyze how haole shaped the dominant representations of Hawai‘i as “heathen” territory, fertile soil, and strategic geo-political location. These representations emphasize the epistemological divide between Kanaka Maoli ancestral relationship to place and haole settlement.

Indigenous studies is a growing interdisciplinary field that explores the politics, histories, epistemologies, cultures, and languages of aboriginal or First Nations peoples. Indigenous theory challenges the regionalism and insensitivity

\(^5\) See, for example: (Crenshaw 1991; Harris 2000; Haney-López 1996; Delgado and Stefancic 2001).
of some postcolonial theory to what James Clifford calls the “rooted and routedness” (Clifford 2001, 470) of indigenous peoples. It insists that we recognize that those first displaced and dispossessed by colonization were the original inhabitants of a place. Native Pacific Cultural Studies in particular emphasizes the temporal and spatial difference of native Pacific epistemologies, cosmologies and ontologies.

Feminist theory is breaking ground in exploring the ways our many subjectivities simultaneously intersect, inform, and contradict one another. Intersectionality destabilizes any solid ground upon which we try to fix identity by insisting on the dynamism, contingency, and ambiguity of subjectivity. “Despite our eternal attempt to separate, contain and mend, categories always leak” (Minh-ha 1989, 94). I use intersectional theory to frame my thinking about the multiple ways haole is, and could be, constituted through the simultaneity of race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, and other salient subjectivities.

Methodology

Both my epistemology and my methodology are informed by my feminist orientation. I find it useful to think of feminist methodology as a stance (or perhaps, a dance, since that emphasizes the complicated relationship between researcher and research) one takes in relation to one’s research, rather than a set of rules or requirements.7

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6 Foundational feminist works on intersectionality include: (Moraga and Anzaldúa 1983; Combahee River Collective 2000; Hooks 1992; Lorde 1984; Collins 1998; Dill and Zinn 1996).
7 The idea of feminist methodology as “stance” was suggested in Kathy Ferguson’s “Feminist Methods of Inquiry” class Fall 2001.
Feminist methodology, then, may not provide the kind of strong scaffolding from which to build a comfortable or predictable practice, but maybe, after all, this is just what we want: a theory of research that neither stabilizes our practices nor essentializes us as researchers (Bloom, 153).

I seek a feminist orientation that neither stabilizes nor essentializes my data, my methodology, or myself as researcher. There are a number of elements to the dance to which I try to remain attentive: flexibility; attentiveness to what is excluded; maintaining a "light touch" with regard to the object of study; welcoming the messiness of contradiction and paradox; and cultivating an ironic approach while maintaining political commitment. The attentive reader will recognize the places where I stumble, step on my data's feet, or try to lead the dance too much. These mistakes are solely my own and I hope that there might be some learning in them as well.

As a feminist political theorist, I attempt to provoke new cross-pollinations regarding how haole matters by creating a problem-specific method utilizing a diversity of texts and theoretical approaches. I consult as my data sources: popular works; public controversies and debates about haole; academic inquiries into Hawai'i's history and politics; legal cases and discourse; and my experience as haole. Popular works include local literature, comedy, and performances that touch on the production of haole. Public controversies and debates about haole surface regularly and are captured in media including newspapers, magazines, TV, and video. Academic inquiries into haole specifically are rare, but I also include research into the history, social structure, politics and economics of Hawai'i. I look at a few historical and contemporary legal cases, and the discourses surrounding them, for the light they shed on dominant constructions of haole. Mining these diverse research sites allows me
to develop a broad and comprehensive account of the production of haole in a variety of popular and academic sites.

As I have already discussed, it is my personal experience as haole that drives my interest in this project, so including that experience in the project itself seemed obvious. I use my experience as one point of departure, neither privileging it over other data sources, nor devaluing it. Rather than play it as the trump card of unquestionable evidence, I use it to invite others to think with me about haole. I offer my experience as something to be (re)interpreted, something that has worked to construct my various subjectivities:

Experience is, in this approach, not the origin of our explanation, but that which we want to explain. This kind of approach does not undercut politics by denying the existence of subjects; it instead interrogates the processes of their creation and, in so doing, refigures history and the role of the historian and opens new ways for thinking about change (Scott, 96).

Following Scott, I seek to interrogate the processes through which I gain subjectivity as haole, and one of my vehicles for doing this is storytelling (the "haole girl" poem is a good example). Stories situate me and make my voice "embodied" (read: situated, located) rather than "objective" (read: disembodied, employing the authoritative god-trick). Stories demonstrate the dynamic between theory and praxis by illuminating my particular lived experience. Lisa Disch writes, "storytelling discloses the arbitrariness of the appearance of consistency, opens one's thought-musings to rival orderings, and invites contrary interpretations of the incidents that inspired them" (Disch, 3). In this way, storytelling is a method that facilitates a "light-touch" toward data by recognizing it as inherently mobile and always already interpreted. Storytelling encourages us to have many different conversations with the world:
A story exhorts its auditor to “go visiting,” asking, “how would you see the world if you saw it from my position?” The “visitor” is invited not empathetically to assimilate the different perspectives he or she finds, rather, but to converse with them to consider how they differ from his or her own (Disch, 13).

Finally, storytelling fits a Hawai‘i project since it is an integral element of Kanaka Maoli and local cultures. Sharing of mo‘olelo and the practice of “talking story,” invite us to consider different perspectives and nondominant narratives.

Contributions and Significance

While working on my M.A., I published a paper entitled Haole Girl: Identity and White Privilege in Hawai‘i (Rohrer 1997) – the impetus for this dissertation. In it, I endeavored to mobilize feminist theory and my experience as a lesbian to help me deconstruct haole. Since publication, I have heard from many who were touched by the paper, a number of whom teach it in a variety of Social Science classes (Women’s Studies, American Studies, Political Science, and Ethnic Studies) in the islands and on the continent. This group includes prominent native Hawaiian scholars and activists who have encouraged me to delve further into the subject. I interpret this encouragement as an invitation to consider this my kuleana – both opportunity and obligation to do what I can to further contribute to dialogues about Hawai‘i politics, American colonialism, and whiteness.

It is therefore my hope that through this dissertation I make small contributions to Hawai‘i history and politics, intersectional feminist theory, and

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8 I have often wondered in the last few years why I did not stop when I was ahead instead of ballooning a succinct article into the inevitably unwieldy animal we call “a dissertation.”
critical whiteness studies. I try to further scholarship on Hawai‘i politics by interrogating dominant narratives of “discovery,” “civilization,” and “development” that center the haole as normative subject-agent. I attempt to contribute to intersectional theory by highlighting the ambiguities, paradoxes, and contingencies within colonial/neo-colonial processes that bar any easy assignment of rigid dualities (colonizer-colonized, oppressor-oppressed), and that insist on thinking which recognizes the messy interrelations between multiple subjectivities. Finally, I respond to critiques of ahistorical, abstract whiteness studies by offering a case study of whiteness located temporally (within the history of American imperialism in Hawai‘i), spatially (in the Pacific region where the ocean, “rooted and routedness,” and indigenous epistemologies are primary), and relationally (in mutual constitution with native Hawaiian and local identities).

Chapter Roadmap

Structurally, the dissertation builds from historicizing and contextualizing haole, to deconstructing the multiple relational constructions of haole, to finally exploring possible elements of a genealogical stance toward haole. Chapter 1 locates haole within the history of colonization in Hawai‘i and discusses the production, and contestations, of haole hegemony. It argues that haole had its origins in the violent racializing processes of colonialism and needs to be considered from that context. Chapter 2 establishes multiple and relational constructions of haole (by haoles, Hawaiians and locals) and explores the two dominant discourses of racial politics in the islands. It suggests that a new discourse is emerging which reframes discussion away from focusing on either
racial harmony or conflict, and toward considering the processes of racialization themselves.

In Chapter 3, I deconstruct the *Rice v. Cayetano* U.S. Supreme Court decision and analyze how the discourse surrounding it furthers the construction of haole as victim. The chapter ends with a discussion of the gap between a Western legal framework and indigenous epistemologies. Chapter 4 looks at critiques of whiteness studies, the Pākehā movement in Aotearoa (New Zealand), Native Pacific Cultural Studies, and previous deconstructions of haole for learnings that can help in reimagining and rearticulating haole. Finally, Chapter 5 weaves intersectional theory, Chicana feminist theory, indigenous and poststructuralist genealogies together to suggest possibilities toward rearticulating a more historicized haole.

**Off the Map**

It is worth pointing out what is not included in this dissertation. Having consciously set out to make a broad sweep over virtually uncharted territory, I necessarily did not get as deep into some areas as I might have liked. Much more exploration could be done with local literature and performance (people like Lois Ann Yamanaka, Zamora Linmark, Lee Cataluna, Frank DiLima, Rap Reiplerger, and so forth have much to say about haole). I decided to focus on the *Rice* case because of its precedent-setting impact, but there are a number of other legal cases and histories crying out for analysis (for example, the on-going case of the haole student who sued for admission to Kamehameha School). Also, someone with more background in political economy could unpack the
intermeshed relationships between haole and Hawai‘i’s two main industries, tourism and militarism.

My hope is that what I offer here will spark discussion and generate interest in more research and analysis of haole. The deconstruction and rearticulation of haole is a big project, if for no other reason than it means swimming against the current: “problematizing the indigenous is a Western obsession” (Smith 1999, 91). Kicking such an obsession means problematizing the racializing processes of colonization instead. It means getting as many people as possible involved in thinking critically about haole matters.
CHAPTER 1

Contested Colonization:
The Establishment of Haole Hegemony in Hawai‘i

By the time of annexation, political control was indisputably in the hands of a small
white, essentially American minority comprising only 5 percent of the total population;
Christianity and capitalism dominated the cultural and economic fabrics of both
Hawaiian and haole societies, and white men owned more than three-quarters of all land
in the islands. Sixty years earlier David Malo, a Hawaiian scholar and nationalist, had
commented prophetically: “The white man’s ships have arrived with clever men from big
countries. They know our people are few in number and our country is small. They will
devour us.”
– Roger Bell

The decay of aboriginal society, when brought into contact with an advanced social order,
is inevitable.
– Stanley Porteus

To understand haole, to grasp its significance, one must understand
something of the history of colonization of Hawai‘i. Haole was forged, first and
foremost, in colonial fires. Since history is always active in the present, all
subsequent reconstitutions of haole carry some heat from those fires. Between
Captain Cook's arrival in 1778 and annexation in 1898, haole hegemony was
established through the radical transformation of the major pillars of Hawaiian
society including religion, law, economics, language and culture. From
annexation to present neo-colonial time, these early processes were built upon
and transformed, solidifying the dominant narrative of Hawaiian historiography
in which haole is the agent of “civilization” and “development.” This narrative
is being challenged today by new research drawing upon Hawaiian language
primary sources. If there is one thing that historians across the board seem to
agree upon (or at least cannot dispute), it is that by the time of annexation, the
haole oligarchy had a virtual stranglehold on the islands. As Malo foretold, the
Kanaka Maoli, even as they strongly resisted, were nearly completely “devoured” by the tsunami of haole colonization.

While haole historians who dominate Hawaiian historiography have tended to tell Hawai‘i’s story as part of some inevitable march of Western progress, contemporary scholars and activists (many of them Kanaka Maoli) are questioning this rendition and researching different mo‘olelo. These efforts are important because naming productions of power as colonial and hegemonic denaturalizes and thus destabilizes them, allowing for resistances to become apparent and contextualized, and for colonial legacies to be recognized and questioned. Specifically, in naming these processes as hegemonic, questions are raised regarding contemporary claims of haole, haole power, and responsibilities that have historically accrued to haole. Native Hawaiian Studies professor, Jonathan K. K. Osorio captures this when he writes that his book, *Dismembering Lāhui*, is,

A story of how colonialism worked in Hawai‘i not through the naked seizure of lands and governments but through a slow, insinuating invasion of people, ideas, and institutions. It is also a story of how our people fought this colonial insinuation with perplexity and courage. But ultimately, this is a story of violence, in which that colonialism literally and figuratively dismembered the lāhui (the people) from their traditions, their lands, and ultimately their government. The mutilations were not physical only, but also psychological and spiritual. Death came not only through infection and disease, but through racial and legal discourse that crippled the will, confidence, and trust of the Kanaka Maoli as surely as leprosy and smallpox claimed their limbs and lives (Osorio 2002, 3).

Osorio’s concept of “dismemberment” vividly captures the multiple violences of colonization that the dominant narrative seeks to sanitize. It is impossible to understand haole without understanding this violence. As much as contemporary haoles want to ignore, forget, or deny it, haole was conceived in and through the dismemberment of the Kanaka Maoli. In other words, this
dismemberment, the Kanaka Maoli quest to remember and recover their history, and the haole will to forget are intrinsically related. Remembering, rather than forgetting, is key to healing the dismemberment. Native American scholar Paula Gunn Allen writes, “Indians think it is important to remember, white Americans believe it is important to forget” (Allen 1988, 15).

A study of the colonization of Hawai‘i needs to continually guard against the interpretive tendency to totalize. The concept of hegemony allows us to see how the dominant group constantly reconfigures and renegotiates its power through a combination of force and consent. Some postcolonial scholarship applies learnings about hegemony to the particular workings of the imperialism and its embedded colonialism:

Imperial power emerged from a constellation of processes, taking haphazard shape from myriad encounters with alternative forms of authority, knowledge and power. ...Imperialism was a situation under constant contest, producing historical effects that were neither predetermined, uncontested nor ineradicable - in the context, it cannot be forgotten, of extreme imbalances of power (McClintock 1995, 16).

As contemporary Hawai‘i scholarship is making clear, haole colonization has never meant complete power; it has never been “uncontested” or “ineradicable” because contradictions, inconsistencies, and contingencies were always present. This is not to discount or in any way diminish the “extreme imbalances of power” or their devastating impacts as explicated by Osorio and others, but to show how the processes that produced them were neither inevitable, total, nor unchallenged. Ignoring or skipping over inconsistencies, gaps and paradoxes in colonial histories (often in order to write a narrative valorizing either the colonizer or the colonized) hampers a fuller analysis since it is in these cracks that some of the most useful information is located. The Kanaka Maoli were well
aware of some of the contradictions of the colonial processes in Hawai‘i and were able to exploit those tensions to their benefit as part of complex resistance responses and strategies. Legal scholar Sally Merry, in the introduction to her study of the legal aspects of colonization in Hawai‘i, writes:

Understanding the legacy of colonialism requires a thorough understanding of its complexities: its uncertainty, accident, and serendipity; its deep engagement with various forms of moral reform, including temperance and abolitionism; and the complex responses of mimicry, appropriation, and warfare by the objects of colonial transformation (Merry 2000, 12).

Following Osorio, McClintock and Merry, colonialism in Hawai‘i can be understood as a series of processes that are simultaneous and interspersed, separate and interconnected, congruous and contradictory, consensual and coercive. These vary considerably across time and space, but work toward the consolidation of power in the hands of the haole and the simultaneous dismemberment and dispossession of the Kanaka Maoli. Variance of these processes across time and space is important to understand, as this is an investigation of a particular colonial situation. In other words, colonialization (and thus decolonization) are not everywhere and always the same. One of the central criticisms of postcolonial studies (similar and related to the criticism of whiteness studies) is a tendency to universalize.¹ It is my hope that a study of U.S. colonialism located in Hawai‘i can avoid this tendency by remaining attentive to the particularities of cultural context, spatiality, and temporality.

¹ I was surprised to find that even Anne McClintock despite her sensitivity to nuance and complexity, as demonstrated in the above quote, proceeded in Imperial Leather to write about British imperialism as though it could stand in for any and all imperial processes. For example in a couple of instances she writes that women were “invariably disadvantaged” within their pre-colonial societies (McClintock 1995, 6). While perhaps that was true in the British empire, historical evidence from pre-contact Hawai‘i makes obvious the fallacy of such generalizations.
Noenoe Silva’s work is valuable in presenting some of these particularities. She writes about Hawai‘i’s colonization as follows:

Hawai‘i was not a formal, political colony of the United States until the highly contested annexation of 1898, but many settlers, both missionary and mercantile, colonized Hawai‘i from 1820 on. By ‘colonized’ I mean that (mainly) European-Americans came to Hawai‘i, settled here, attained positions of power in business and government, and proceeded to establish a capitalist European-American political and economic system that benefited themselves while subjugating and oppressing the Kanaka Maoli. They imposed the English language, a European system of government, U.S. currency, and Christian religion (Silva 1999, 21).

I would argue that while the processes of colonization hit full stride in 1820 with the arrival of the missionaries, they were put into play as early as Cook’s landing, especially through the mapping of Hawai‘i, the introduction of capitalism, and the dynamics of cultural transformation.

The discursive and material aspects of colonialism in Hawai‘i during the first century after contact were produced through the imposition of Western systems including: geography, cartography and demography; religion; law and politics; capitalism; language and communication; and culture. In what follows, I take a brief look at each of these areas with a discussion of culture and resistance woven throughout. My purpose is not to produce another history of colonization, but rather to provide a broad picture of the processes put into place that helped produce haole hegemony prior to annexation. My intent is to lay the groundwork for understanding both Hawai‘i’s colonization, and the production of haole, as contested and unstable from the very beginning. Therefore, I strive to highlight the contradictions and unevenness inherent in these processes.
Mapping Hawai‘i: Geography, Cartography and Demography

Geographers have made significant contributions of late into the study of the social production of racialized subjects. A leading social geographer, Alistair Bonnett, makes the case that geography is necessary to the study of racialization and racism because these processes are spatially contingent:

It is increasingly widely accepted, inside and outside the discipline, that geography should be as central to the study of ‘race’ as is history or sociology; that it is impossible to understand the categories of ‘race’...or the development of different ‘racial’ identities, without the assistance of spatial analysis (Bonnett 1996, 880).

David Delaney reminds us of Toni Morrison’s observation that we live in a “wholly racialized world” and argues that “race – in all of its complexity and ambiguity, as ideology and identity – is what it is and does what it does precisely because of how it is given spatial expression” (Delaney 2002, 7). Recent studies centering the spatialization and temporality of racialization include works on environmental racism (Pulido 2000), the prison industrial complex (Gilmore 2002), immigration policies (Liu 2000), and suburban racial violence (Kobayashi and Peake 2000). The framework provided by this new critical race geography, enables an analysis of how traditional geography, cartography and demography are heavily implicated in the production, meaning and performance of whiteness in the United States, and haole in particular. Each provides a system for ordering place, for producing Hawai‘i by the very act of mapping and categorizing Hawai‘i. Because the production of haole is part of the colonial project which began with Cook’s “discovery” and continues today, my intention is to highlight some of its key processes or moments enabled as they were by geography, cartography and demography.
The idea of the "inevitable" Westernization of Hawai‘i because of its geographic location is by now so ingrained in the popular psyche as to be common knowledge. Statements like the following are common:

This oligarchy was probably inevitable, for Hawaii was a crossroads, a center of the Pacific, which attracted the interest of several Western powers, any of which, if successful in settling the islands, would have settled it with determined men and women, whether missionary, trader, or military (McDermott, Tseng, and Maretzki 1980, 29).

The colonial intersections of geography, cartography and demography can be seen here. The islands continue to be mapped as stepping-stones between what are considered to be the vastly more important landmasses of North America and Asia. Therefore, demographically, it was "probably inevitable" that the islands would be "settled" by "determined men and women, whether missionary, trader or military." In other words, there was no question that the islands would be colonized by haole – their original inhabitants not even worth a mention since they did not "count" in the Western ordering of the world. Thus, from first contact, haole matters by insisting that Kanaka Maoli do not.

Geography

Geography’s role in colonial processes cannot be overestimated. Critical Geographer, Gerald Thomas writes:

Geography is deeply embedded with ‘whiteness,’ ... It is one of the disciplines that Europeans used to discover and define others and their worlds. And it is the discipline through which constructed social relations and ideologies are grounded and spatially organized. Deconstructing whiteness is, in fact, not just about confronting the geography it produces... it is also about the very discipline of geography (as quoted in Kobayashi and Peake 2000, 51).

Keeping all of this in mind, I will explore two key colonizing geographic processes deployed in Hawai‘i during the first century after “contact,” the
discourse of “discovery” and the transformation of ʻāina into property. A number of other geographic processes played a role in the production of haole, including: strategic military locationalism; the imposition of modern, capitalist temporality; and the creation of segregated spaces for or by haole. I focus on “discovery” and private property because they have been most investigated and provide evidence for understanding the contradictions of colonization.

It is impossible to understand the full extent of the violence of colonization through the framework of discovery. Increasingly, other historical narratives are being woven which look behind and beyond “discovery” at Kanaka Maoli civilization. Included in these narratives are understandings of Kanaka Maoli relationships to, and constructions of, space and time. Kanaka Maoli wove, and continue to recover and weave, an intricate and dynamic web of ontology, cosmology, epistemology and genealogy that includes interplay between gods, land, ocean, wind, sky, people, ancestors, plants and animals. Gods become people, and ancestors embody animals across fluid matrixes of time and space.²

Much has been lost, destroyed, or translated out of our contemporary understandings of this weave, but we know enough to know that colonization caused, and continues to cause, a violent and radical “dismemberment.” Kanaka Maoli saw no bright line between people and place. If the land was the people and the people the land, if elaborate genealogies traced ancestors flowing back across and through time and space, then the imposition of Western geography – which is all about boundaries – caused literal dismemberment:

² My intention is not to romanticize Kanaka traditional culture, but rather to establish a rudimentary understanding of some elements of that culture most impacted by the overlay of Western geography.
Hawaiian identity is, in fact, derived from the Kumulipo, the great cosmogonic genealogy. Its essential lesson is that every aspect of the Hawaiian conception of the world is related by birth, and as such, all parts of the Hawaiian world are one indivisible lineage. Conceived in this way, the genealogy of the Land, the Gods, Chiefs, and people intertwine with one another, and with all myriad aspects of the universe (Kame'eleihiwa 1992, 2).

“Discovery” indicates a beginning, a fixed starting point before which there was nothing. Hawai‘i’s historical canon is composed of books that locate the opening scene of Hawai‘i’s history in the moment of Cook’s landing. “Cook’s discovery is designated as the crystallizing juncture of historical recognition, the delimiting modern figure that triggers the historical memory for Hawaiians. His discovery is signified as a kick-start of moving time” (Halualani 2002, 16). Geography was key to producing the concept and the agent, the “discovery” and the “discoverer.” All that came before was without history or order; it was wildness, the chaos of the natural world. This “state of nature” is what the discoverer encounters, claims, and sets about conquering:

The notion of ownership and control, of finding, and perhaps subduing, is revealed in the concept of discovery. To ‘discover’ requires a particular view of humans in relation to nature. It is a state of eternal tension with natural forces, where the opponents hold positions of separateness, in a struggle for dominance (Whittaker 1986. 11).

To discover something, it must be previously unknown to humanity. If someone already knows about it, if someone else “got there first,” then it is not really a discovery. Following this logic, if it is unknown, it is also unclaimed or possessed in any recognizable modernist sense. And so, the production or “making” of discoveries becomes an important piece in imperialist projects. Captain Cook’s instructions from the Crown make this explicit:

You are also with the consent of the Natives to take possession, in the Name of the King of Great Britain, of convenient Situations in such
Countries as you may discover, that have not already been discovered or visited by any other European Power, and to distribute among the Inhabitants such Things as will remain as Traces and Testimonies of your having been there... (as quoted in Herman 1995, 63).

It was through this process of “discovering” Hawai‘i that the haole produced himself as the first to “find” Hawai‘i – as the triumphant expression of Western technologies and civilization. Cook is instructed to leave behind “Traces and Testimonies,” a sort of precursor to a graffiti tag announcing, “this is my territory” – an imperialist version of pissing in the corners.

The tension here is in dealing with the fact that the islands are already inhabited. Cook himself described the “natives” as “naturally well bred,” “exceedingly friendly” and wrote in some detail about their adherence to their religion/political system (Cook 1961). Furthermore, as cited above, his instructions were to get their “consent” before “taking possession” of any territory. All of this runs counter to the notion underpinning the discovery discourse – that the Kanaka Maoli were little more than “savages” operating on base animalistic instincts. These slippages attributing human agency to the Kanaka Maoli destabilize the discovery narrative by contradicting it.

The discovery narrative continually reasserts itself by conflating Kanaka Maoli with nature and/or in an ambivalent “half-man half-beast,” “primitive,” and “savage” state. Through the reiteration of this narrative, not only is haole “discovery” secured, but the haole stands out in contrast as remarkably civilized and morally good. Anne McClintock describes this move as putting indigenous people in “anachronistic space” where they “do not inhabit history proper but exist in a permanently anterior time within the geographic space of modern empire as anachronistic humans, atavistic, irrational, bereft of human agency –
the living embodiment of the archaic ‘primitive’” (McClintock 1995, 30). In this way then, “the colonial journey is figured as proceeding forward in geographical space, but backward in racial and gender time, to a prehistoric zone of linguistic, racial and gender degeneration...” (McClintock 1995, 369).

From the point of view of the missionaries, the “savages” needed to be wrestled from nature, from “anachronistic space,” to join the side of humanity and civilization. Again, images of dismemberment loom large. Rev. Hiram Bingham, one of two reverends in the first boatload of missionaries, begins his 1849 book on Hawai‘i thus: “Darkness covered the earth and gross darkness the people. This, for ages, was emphatically applicable to the isles of the great Pacific Ocean. But the voice of the divine said, ‘Let there be light’” (Bingham 1969, 2). Bingham’s statement is typical of early missionary ideologies which tied people and the land together in a construct of “gross darkness,” that required the “light” of religion, civilization, and discipline.3

The discourse of discovery is reified in contemporary histories that ignore or diminish Kanaka Maoli presence, humanity, navigational skills, and overall cultural sophistication, in order to valorize the haole discoverer. In a reappropriation of history and an example of continued resistance, Kanaka Maoli now talk about 1778 as the time “when the Hawaiian Islands discovered Captain Cook, lost in the Pacific Ocean” (Michael Kahikina as quoted in Milner and Goldberg-Hiller 2002, 33). Note here that it is “the Hawaiian Islands” who are

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3 Houston Wood suggests that the vehemence of the missionaries’ descriptions might not have just been produced out of fear of the Other and righteous self-promotion, but also from economic self-interest. “The worse this rhetoric would make Hawaiians seem, the more the missionaries could present themselves as courageous, righteous, and worthy of the continued remittances they required be sent for their support from home” (Wood 1999, 37).
the agents, not Hawaiians, as might be expected. Agency and knowing is attributed to the ‘āina, which is often wiser and more perceptive than individual people.

Having established Kanaka Maoli relationship to the ‘āina, it is clear how changing that ‘āina to property did violence, dismembering the Kanaka Maoli.4 "In traditional Hawai‘i, ‘Āina was not owned but was held in trust. It was the Akua, or Gods, who had made the ‘Āina; if anyone, it was the Akua who owned the ‘Āina. Moreover, having been born of the Akua, the ‘Āina is itself an Akua" (Kame‘elehiwa 1992, 10). This concept is still not widely understood by non-Hawaiians, perhaps because it destabilizes haoles’ claim to place and is suppressed in the dominant discourse. Non-Hawaiians sometimes speak about sovereignty activists’ call for reclamation of the ‘āina in ways that flatten "‘āina" to “property.” Not only does this disappear the multiple meanings of ‘āina, but it enables the representation of these activists as greedy. Conceived of as property, Hawaiian lands are worth millions; conceived of as ‘āina, their cultural value is priceless. "Hawaiians belong to the land. How could you ever own a place, let alone sell it as a commodity, if its true value is found as the sum of the lives, memories, achievements, and the mana of generations who once dwelled upon it" (George Kanahele as quoted in Wood 1999, 11-12).

The transformation of ‘āina to property was motivated primarily by capitalist ideology, but justified in the already dominant discourse of "saving the natives." The missionaries began circulating the panacea of "private property"

4 The story about how the ‘āina then became property through the Māhele, fundamentally changing Hawai‘i’s geography forever, is well documented (Kame‘elehiwa 1992; Merry 2000). I explore it in more detail in my discussion of law and politics later in this chapter.
as a means to “save” the Hawaiians at the same time they “discovered” the profitability of industrial agriculture. W.O. Alexander, whose family would become power brokers in Hawai‘i’s “Big Five” industrial giants, wrote in a report of his mission activities: “We have hundreds of acres of fertile soil that might easily be irrigated by our perennial streams that burst forth from our mountain glens, yet we produce almost nothing but kalō: whereas we ought to produce and export a thousand tons of sugar annually” (as quoted in Silva 1999, 83).

As cane was crowned the new “king” of the islands, the dominant discourse, mainly controlled by missionaries, began to shift from an overall theme of saving Hawaiians to saving “Hawai‘i.” With regard to agriculture haoles began to portray themselves as rescuing an “underutilized” territory. This was not a new line of thought, John Locke takes it up in his Second Treatise of Government: “land that is left wholly to nature, that hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, waste; and we shall find the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing” (Locke as quoted in Cox 1982, 27). For Locke, and for the haole, “subduing or cultivating the earth” gives one “dominion” over it (Locke as quoted in Cox 1982, 22). And so, it “naturally” follows that haole planters should gain control of huge parcels of land since they were the ones who knew how to rescue it from “waste” and manage it.

Douglas Herman studies the shift from early admiration of Hawaiian agriculture to criticizing the Hawaiians for “underutilization” and characterizing any success in agriculture as owing to the haole. He notes the example of a missionary on Moloka‘i who wrote, “The soil is of an excellent quality, and with proper cultivation would support four fold its present number of inhabitants; but
owing to the indolence of the people, only a small portion is rendered serviceable to either man or beast” (Herman 1995, 95).

Although this missionary is writing in 1835 and Kanaka Maoli are being devastated by disease and the impacts of contact, he ignores this. In fact, he suggests that the land could support many more Hawaiians if only they were not too “indolent” to work it. This could be read as an indirect suggestion that depopulation is partially the Hawaiians own fault for not being industrious enough. Additionally, the last statement about the land not being “serviceable to either man or beast” is yet another example of haole ignorance of Hawaiian culture, or more accurately haole’s self-reflective gaze. To think of land in terms of “serviceability” is insulting to a Hawaiian ontology based in the interconnection of all life and mālama ‘āina (stewardship of the land). The idea that land should be worked by “beasts” would also be curious in traditional culture since the introduction of cattle and horses came with the haole.

In 1835 the first sugar plantation opened in Kōloa.² Between 1837 and 1847 production had doubled and planters were clamoring for a radical revision in land tenure (Kent 1983, 29). In 1846, Robert Wyllie, the minister of the interior asked prominent missionaries to give recommendations for halting the decline of the Hawaiian people. According to Osorio, nearly all said a system of private property must be set up. J.S Emerson wrote:

I think two things are requisite to make the people industrious and provident. First, the feeling that the land they cultivate is their own, for themselves and their posterity. Second, the feeling that the land is of real value, and capable of being improved in value, and that all improvements are private gain (as quoted in Osorio, 32).

²I attended Kōloa Elementary School during the 1970s with the children of second and third generation plantation workers at this mill. They were the first to make me aware of my haoleness.
It mattered little to the missionaries that the Hawaiian way of being which had little, if anything, to do with being “industrious” toward “private gain.” To suggest that Kanaka Maoli had no “feeling that the land is of real value” expresses the profound gap between the cultures. This rhetoric continues after the Māhele, as exemplified by another haole who wrote, “I thank God that these things are now at an end [referring to notions of feudal oppression], and that the poor kanaka may now stand on the border of his kalo patch and holding his fee simple patent in his hand, bid defiance to the world” (as quoted in Kent 1983, 31). At the same time, in implicit acknowledgment that this was merely rhetorical hype, the theme of blaming the victim gets amplified in order to justify the inevitable consequences of the Māhele. Judge Lee, who played a large role in the Māhele and thus had a good idea of its outcome, wrote: “We shall advise the Hawaiians to keep their lands, but if they fail to, on them the responsibility” (Kent 1983, 31).

In fact, very few Kanaka Maoli went through the steps needed to secure their land as laid out by the Kuleana Act of 1850, one of the set of laws known popularly as the Māhele. The reasons for this, according to Hawai‘i scholars, are complicated and include lack of education and understanding of the new law, inadequate timelines for filing paperwork, and lack of money to pay for surveying. In addition, it is clear that Kanaka Maoli non-application was also itself a form of resistance. The maka‘āinana had faith in the traditional system of

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6 The Māhele was the land division between 1848-1855 that severed ties between the konohiki and the maka‘āinana by transforming the traditional system from communal tenure to private ownership following the Western model. Promoted by haole, the Māhele proved to be a “terrible disaster for the Hawaiian people” with “catastrophic negative consequences” (Kame‘eleihiwa 1992, 8).
reciprocity and did not want to further upset it by severing ties with their chiefs by claiming lands as their own. "From the maka‘ainana point of view...the law was systematically rending all traditional ties to the chiefs. If the konohiki had no right to their labor and could not deny them access that only the law guaranteed, then what was left to obligate the chiefs to the people?" (Osorio 2002, 55).

**Cartography**

The dynamics of the violence of colonial cartography have been well articulated by Shapiro (Shapiro 1997), Hau'ofa (Hau'ofa 1993), McClintock (McClintock 1995), and Mignolo (Mignolo 1995). In studying Hawai'i we can see its workings in the mapping, claiming, and renaming of physical space.

Cartography was used to produce recognizable places that naturalized haole. McClintock writes:

> Map-making became the servant of colonial plunder, for the knowledge constituted by the map both preceded and legitimized the conquest of territory. The map is a technology of knowledge that professes to capture the truth about a place in pure, scientific form, operating under the guise of scientific exactitude and promising to retrieve and reproduce nature exactly as it is. As such, it is also a technology of possession, promising that those with the capacity to make such perfect representations must also have the right of territorial control (McClintock 1995, 27-28).

Mapping and claiming slide into each other; cartography and geographic "discovery" are intertwined in the larger project of imperialism. Political theorist Michael Shapiro reminds us of the difficulty in thinking outside the map, in recognizing that the map is simply operating "under the guise of scientific exactitude" in the service of "colonial plunder:"

> To recognize that the dominant geopolitical map had been imposed on the world by power rather than simply emerging as an evolutionary historical inevitability, as the dominant consensual narratives would have it, one needs to achieve an effective conceptual distance, to think outside of the
state system's mode of global comprehension, outside of the spatial predicates of its structures of power, authority, and recognition (Shapiro 1997, 15).

The map is, after all, a key naturalizing tool in that it is supposed to represent the physical world, to order it, to make it recognizable and navigable. To recognize the map as a non-innocent conversation with the world requires, if you will, stepping into the unknown.

It was the haole who mapped and continues to map Hawai‘i as a way of controlling and claiming it, thus naturalizing his place in it. Herman goes into detail expressing how locating the coordinates of Hawai‘i even prior to its mapping began the processes of appropriating Hawai‘i into the Western order (Herman 1995, 59-62). Hawai‘i became chartable, knowable, and thus claimable—a place for haole. Feminist theorists Kathy Ferguson and Phyllis Turnbull argue, “the experiential and spiritual energies inhabiting Hawaiian spaces were/are assaulted by the imposition of the western spatial imaginary, the rationalized grip of the grid…” (Turnbull and Ferguson 1997, 113-114). Haole maps reflect western geographic thinking and thus focus on the land, representing the ocean as emptiness, and historically as threatening.

Recognizing this, native Pacific scholar Epeli Hau‘ofa writes:

There is a gulf of difference between viewing the Pacific as ‘islands in a far sea’ and as ‘a sea of islands.’ The first emphasizes dry surfaces in a vast ocean far from the centers of power. When you focus this way you stress the smallness and remoteness of the islands. The second is a more holistic perspective in which things are seen in the totality of their relationships (Hau‘ofa 1993, 7).

7 A la Wendy Brown, Shapiro is suggesting we attend to “finding the map(s) in the state.”
The violence of cartography is also seen in the renaming and reconfiguring of places. Hawaiian place names link present to past and speak to shifting relationships, they recognize the "life of the land." Place names "participate in a complex and changing history much like Hawaiian places themselves are understood to do. ...Euroamerican settlers disrupted this Native system of naming, replacing it with a system that arrests fluidity and ignores Native history in order to create static symbols suitable for deeds and maps" (Wood 1999, 11). Part of the production of haole involves insensitivity to the uniqueness of place coupled with a yearning to be comfortable and in control. This desire is almost, but never quite fulfilled by overlaying place with a recognizable grid to contain and organize it. "Deeds and maps" make place and money for the haole while they simultaneously make the telling of genealogies and mo‘olelo into unrecognizable "chatter."8

In their discussion of the semiotics of Punchbowl, Ferguson and Turnbull write, "in Hawai‘i places were named by their relations to the movements of natural phenomena, people, and gods. ... Winds, waves, beaches, reefs, mountains, cinder cones, and springs had names" (Ferguson and Turnbull 1999, 112). Further, Elizabeth Buck writes:

Place names in Hawaiian poetry were embedded with layers of meaning that conjured in the Hawaiian memory and imagination historical events and people, mythical figures and stories associated with those places. To the uninformed, however, chants about places would appear as nothing more than an island travelogue (Buck 1993, 123).

The Kanaka Maoli cultural resurgence has included a reclaiming of traditional place names and a preservation of culturally significant places and

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8 Mark Twain (Wilson 2000, 527) and Rev. Hiram Bingham (Bingham 1969, 95) among others, labeled as “chatter” ka ‘ōlelo ‘ōiwi (the native language of the Kanaka Maoli).
routes. Hawaiian/local culture also resists haole cartography by refusing a directional orientation that has little meaning on islands. People in Hawai‘i give directions “island style” – mauka and makai and, in Honolulu, Ewa and Diamond Head – not north, south, east, and west. Often people talk about place in relation to family or friends, so that directions are given marking an Aunty’s house, a cousin’s office, a daughter’s school, the former location of a great shave ice store, and so forth.

Demography

Finally I turn to demography as a tool of haole hegemony. The debate regarding Kanaka Maoli population at first contact, and the discourse surrounding the devastating depopulation following contact, contain key elements fortifying haole hegemony. In contradictory colonizing narratives, demography is employed to dismiss charges of genocide, while at the same time shoring up the narrative of the vanishing Hawaiian.

The debate over the population of the islands at first contact is heated because of its political significance. If there were 800,000 or more Kanaka Maoli in Hawai‘i in 1778, as scholars including David Stannard contend (Stannard 1989), that indicates an incredibly healthy, thriving society. It also means there was a 95 percent drop in population by the end of the nineteenth century when population counts were more accurate (Osorio 2002, 9-10). This says something very powerful about colonialism as a form of genocide in Hawai‘i. Haoles in the early nineteenth century selectively addressed or ignored the horrific depopulation. When it was addressed, usually it was devoid of political

9 “Depopulation” is a deceptively antiseptic term to describe massive death. It has more accurately been called “the horror” by Stannard and “the great dying” by Osorio. It is
context. For instance, the missionaries wrote about ministering to the sick at the same time they criticized the Kanaka Maoli social and political structures for being in shambles without seeing (or admitting to) the connection. This conveniently preserved representations of haole superiority and moral goodness.

By the mid century, as part of the shift in discourse from “saving Hawaiians” to saving Hawai‘i, depopulation was mobilized to naturalize the transfer of power to the haole. Herman, analyzing discourse and policy regarding leprosy, writes that, “As the haole population came increasingly to control land, economy, and politics, discourses regarding disease and depopulation among native Hawaiians were increasingly mobilized to legitimate eventual white rule” (Herman 2001, 319-320). In a further example of blaming the victim, Kanaka Maoli were represented as morally and physically weak as evidenced by their depopulation and loss of power; it is futile to continue trying to “save” them since they seemed unwilling to save themselves. In a candid letter home, one missionary wrote, “the heathen around us are wasting away by disease, induced not by the climate, but by their imprudence and vices” (Herman 2001, 322). Herman argues that the haole policy of segregation of those with leprosy, which had been previously abandoned in Europe, was part of the larger dispossession of the Kanaka Maoli moving them “out of sight, out of mind, out of power.”

Hawaiian scholar and activist, the late John Dominis Holt offered his mana’o on depopulation, which is worth quoting at length:

In pious attempts to bring the civilization of the west to the Hawaiian people in their hour of need, the Protestant American Mission achieved primarily attributable to multiple diseases brought by foreigners to which Kanaka Maoli had no immunity.
little to stay the awful spread of death. Launching illogical and indefatigable attacks on almost the whole of native institutions the mission destroyed the chance they might have had to help Hawaiians bridge the revolutionary gap that existed between the past and the present. With more humane understanding of the true needs of the Hawaiians, the mission could have been more help to the native people. Instead, Hawaiians were subjected to thunderous denunciations of their traditional beliefs. They were told quite bluntly that they could not be themselves because their way of life was full of evil. They must denounce all aspects of their heritage and become overnight something of an American – New England variant... the Hawaiian began to disappear from the face of the earth. They willingly gave up their souls and died... (as quoted in Dougherty 1992, 62)

While criticizing the missionaries for not more effectively stemming the tide of death, Holt’s statement also perpetuates the demographic tale of the “vanishing” Hawaiian, which more effectively than anything else puts Hawaiians “out of sight.”\(^{10}\) While many probably did “give up their souls and die,” Hawaiians did not “disappear from the face of the earth.” Complete genocide was averted, however narrowly.

The tale of the vanishing Hawaiian has been a full-service narrative, mobilized by: 19\(^{th}\) century haole elite to justify their power grab; by 20\(^{th}\) century distressed haole historians critical of that power grab; and by 21\(^{st}\) century Hawaiian nationalists as the ultimate indication of how bad things are. It persists today – as evidenced by the video “Then there were None” (Lindsey 1996) – seemingly immune to counter information on population stabilization and the growing Hawaiian Diaspora, or discussions regarding identity and blood. Kehaulani Kauanui asks us to consider, “does mixture constitute vanishing? If ‘part-Hawaiians’ continue to out-marry, might this instead suggest

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\(^{10}\) The vanishing Hawaiian narrative is frequently mobilized along with its cousin, the story of the resigned Hawaiian, which disappears Kanaka Maoli resistance with a story about how Hawaiians gave up fighting early on. For examples see (Bell 1984; Fuchs 1961; Daws 1968).
that the numbers of 'part-Hawaiians' are increasing" (Kauanui 2000, 9)? This gets to the "bloody mess" of blood quantum, as Kauanui puts it, which I address in chapter 3. Kauanui and other contemporary scholars are asking important questions of demographic data including who is counting, how they are counting, and what exactly is being counted.

**Religion**

Religion played a key role in the establishment of haole hegemony in Hawai‘i, particularly between 1820-1850 when missionary activities were at their height. Key to understanding the strength of the missionary agenda are the interrelated elements of: traditional Kanaka Maoli socio-political structure; the horror of depopulation during this period; the role religion played in establishing Western social, political and economic ideologies and structures; and the foundation religion laid for subsequent control of the islands by a missionary-planter oligarchy. It is equally important to note the various resistances to the imposition of Western religion that often took advantage of the contradictions inherent in the missionary project.

As previously discussed, Kanaka Maoli operated with an integrated ontology that wove together creation, genealogy, power, nature, divinity, and leadership. Because they saw themselves as related to the land, each other, and the gods, Kanaka Maoli drew no distinct boundaries between social, political and spiritual spheres; each was part and parcel of the other (there was clearly a system of social ranking, but that system itself crossed these spheres). Thus, as the Hawaiian socio-political structure began to unravel as a consequence of foreign intervention in the first decades after Cook, so too did Hawaiian spiritual beliefs. This crisis of faith was the catalyst for breaking the sacred gender-
segregated eating kapu, instigated by Kaʻahumanu and carried out with the Mōʻi, Liholiho, his brother Kauikeaouli, and their mother, Keōpūolani (Osorio 2002, 11). This dramatic break with the longstanding religion in turn spiraled the culture into further crisis.

The American missionaries, who arrived five months after the ending of the eating kapu, exploited this crisis by offering The Answer – conversion and adoption of strict Calvinist discipline. Lawrence Fuchs argues that while the social crisis preceded the missionaries, they “rushed in to fill the void” with a culture and ideology completely at odds with traditional Kanaka Maoli lifestyle and beliefs (Fuchs 1961, 9):

The Hawaiians believed life was to be lived here and now; the men from colder climes insisted that life on earth was merely preparation for everlasting life beyond. Even in this life, the Hawaiian was not usually trying to prove his virtue, or improve his status; to the New England missionaries, life was a continuous struggle for moral and material self-improvement to receive God’s grace. To the Hawaiian, the sharing of the food, hut, and woman came naturally; the New Englanders maintained a stern sense of privacy... Sex to the Polynesians was pure joy; to these haoles, a grim and burdensome necessity. Children born in or out of wedlock received the affection of the Hawaiians; to Bingham and his friends, bastards were conceived in sin (Fuchs 1961, 9).

With such stark contradiction, it might seem strange that the missionaries were able to achieve any conversion at all. Lilikalā Kameʻelehiwa and Jonathan Osorio point to depopulation and the crisis in the social structure as partial explanation. “The church became an institution offering life when death was everywhere, and the eventual conversion of Hawaiians by the thousands must be understood in the context of a time when their own religion, akua, and Aliʻi could not prevent them from dying” (Osorio 2002, 12).

11 It is hard not to notice Fuch’s patriarchal assumption that “the Hawaiian” is male and he is sharing “his” woman.
As Osorio makes clear, conversion meant a radical reordering of Kanaka Maoli lifestyle and ideology. Following the broad missionary agenda, it meant becoming "civilized," becoming Westernized. Historian Patricia Grimshaw argues that what success there was in bringing a "civilizing" influence, was due in large part to missionary women (though not credited to them). She finds that women were "the effective agents for transmitting to Hawaiian girls and women not just Christian beliefs but the notions of proper femininity and female behavior as defined within Protestant American culture..."(Grimshaw 1989, xxii). It was this adoption of Western culture, not simply religious beliefs, that was supposed to make Hawaiians "successful:"

Granted that change in Hawaiian culture was inevitable, what, in fact, the American missionaries offered Hawaiian girls and women was initiation into that range of skills and behavior that would ensure some successful negotiation of the new order. Kaʻahumanu, the queen regent, was astute enough to recognize this fact (Grimshaw 1985, 96).

The narrative of inevitable change dominates Hawaiʻi's colonial discourse and paves its way right into Hawaiian historiography, as the Grimshaw citation exemplifies. Also, while Kaʻahumanu's motives and actions are a source of debate among Hawaiian scholars, haoles tend to write her into the story as an unproblematic convert (often spilling more ink on her physicality than her complicated negotiation of assimilation and resistance). Osorio and others argue that this Westernization was the beginning of a crisis of identity for the Kanaka Maoli that goes to the heart of issues Hawaiians struggle with today:

The Natives had every reason to complain that the physical resources of the ʻāina were slipping away, but for them the critical struggle was always over the haole seizure of the power to define them as a people and in the process determine the nation's values. The discourse of identity was never a distraction from the whites' seizure of political and economic control; it was instrumental to it (Osorio 2002, 143-44).
The immense cultural shift instigated by the missionaries, particularly the women, touched every facet of life and thus identity. It meant adopting Western clothing, family structure, domesticity, sexual mores, work ethic, social etiquette, educational systems, and parenting practices. Missionary documents are full of descriptions of their efforts on these accounts, and quite often, their frustrations. In an example that illuminates the contradictions and unevenness of colonization, Hawaiian women encountering American women ironing would sympathetically offer, “I pity you” (Grimshaw 1985, 89).

The depth of societal transformation and degradation of Hawaiian culture brought about under the auspices of religion is symbolized in the 1859 ban on hula advocated for by the missionaries. Noenoe Silva writes that “the banning of hula had as much or more to do with establishing colonial capitalism, and thus with establishing control over the labor of the Kanaka Maoli, as with religion and the repression of sexuality” (Silva 2000, 46). She traces the discourse about hula in both Hawaiian and English language court documents, letters and newspapers of the time and finds that “idleness” and lack of work ethic are raised as the primary evils resulting from too much hula. A Pacific Commercial Advertiser editorial in 1857 exhorting the dangers of hula exhibitions asserts:

Natives care little for anything else than witnessing them [hula exhibitions] by day and night. They are in fact becoming a nuisance, fostering indolence and vice among a race which heaven knows is running itself out fast enough, even when held in check with all the restraints which civilization, morality and industry can hold out. ...so infatuated do males and females become under [the hula] that it will be in vain to urge them to industry or to any efforts to raise them above brutes (Pacific Commercial Advertiser quoted in Silva 2000, 33).

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12 Kaʻahumanu had banned hula in a series of laws she announced in 1830 after her conversion, but hula had come back into practice soon after her death in 1832.
The missionaries-cum-planters had by this point resorted to importing laborers, having had limited success (for a variety of reasons) with the native population, and their resentment is clear. The citation is a good example of the paternalism and racialization that was common at the time, and makes good use of the discourse of the vanishing Hawaiian. It also indicates the shift in discourse from earnest attempt to “save” the Hawaiians, to a rhetoric condemning the hopelessness of the “race” – a shift that coincided with the missionary transition from concern about souls to concern about soil:

In Hawai‘i, the missionaries turned these values [Calvinist Puritan] to immense profit-making through the plantation economy. Their ideology necessarily included a firm conviction of their own superiority, and so they saw little contradiction in becoming the owners of the land and overseers of the production, while the people they had come to save labored, and lived in poverty (Silva 1999, 89).

Having been the first organized grouping of haoles on the ground, the missionary families were able to establish their dominance early on. The moral authority they marshaled as a consequence of their religious position, their contact with the culture, and friendships with the ali‘i opened up untold opportunities, especially in government and the acquisition of land:

It is true that some of the missionaries did maintain certain personal scruples by refusing to engage in land acquisition and speculation...but they were the exceptional few. ...of the eighty-seven ABCFM [American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions] missionaries that came to the Islands in twelve companies, only thirty did not possess land of any kind, and twenty-eight of those had either left Hawai‘i or died before the Māhele (Osorio 2002, 98).

While not all missionaries became planters, and not all planters were former missionaries, there was a remarkable level of crossover. “Missionaries and their children and grandchildren became a large part of the bourgeois class of planters. Many of them were able to buy large enough tracts of land for the plantations because of their positions and/or contacts in the government” (Silva 1999, 82).
Resistance to missionary consolidation of power took a variety of forms from mimicry and evasion, to playing foreign powers off one another, to violence. Many Kanaka Maoli, especially the maka‘āinana were at least ambivalent about conversion and became increasingly upset by expanding missionary power. By the 1840s, missionaries were discouraged that they were not making the "deep" change they had hoped for. They complained that the Hawaiians were evasive and were paying lip service to Christian principles, concluding that they were hopelessly stuck in their heathen ways. An American visiting his missionary aunt describes the scene in microcosm:

As I walked with her through the village, her presence operated as a civilizing tonic. True, the effect in many cases was transient... As she appeared tobacco pipes disappeared, idle games or gambling were slyly put by, Bible and hymn books brought conspicuously forward and the young girls hastily donned their chastest dresses and looks... (as quoted in Grimshaw 1985, 96).

Many of the missionaries, frustrated and befuddled by their inability to affect total conversion, moved on to other pursuits.

The missionaries could not see their own contradictions, although they were increasingly apparent to the Kanaka Maoli. The discourse of the noble savage ran up against notions of the Kanaka Maoli as heathens creating a tension in which native Hawaiians were simultaneously worthy of saving and inherently damned. Rev. Bingham, who never had much faith in the "natives" to begin with wrote,

By what means shall the knowledge of the arts and sciences be acquired by a nation so stupid and ignorant, whose destination seemed almost to forbid their progress, while it imperatively required it, and whose spiritual wants, first to be met, demanded more attention than the missionaries could give (Bingham 1969, 171)?
Further, Christian notions of equality clashed with missionary paternalism, racism, and discrimination. Nicolas Thomas argues that the mission adopted a familial model to naturalize its inequalities: “By imagining that others were part of a family, the mission was able to reconcile common humanity and hierarchy in a manner that was as natural and intelligible in the short term as it was insecure in the long term: After all, children grow up” (Thomas 2000, 244). And “grow up” they did, exploiting these contradictions as a method for building resistance.

At a fairly sophisticated level, Kanaka Maoli resistance took the form of giving the Calvinist missionaries some competition. Alexander Liholiho invited the Anglican Church to Hawai‘i in part as an attempt to curtail the predominance of the ABCFM. For a time there was a strong segment of the ali‘i who supported the Anglican Church and the British in opposition to the American Calvinists. Caught in the cross currents of imperial desires, the ali‘i made what strategic moves they could to shore up their independence, in this case playing colonial powers off of each other. The Calvinist-Anglican tension was a contributing factor in the 1874 “Emma Riots” when Queen Emma challenged Kalākaua for succession to the crown, lost, and her supporters attacked legislators. Kalākaua called on the Americans to land troops, which they did, followed shortly thereafter by British troops. To the dismay of Emma’s supporters, the British joined the Americans in putting down the conflagration (Osorio 2002, 152-159). The Anglicans never regained substantial power and the monarchy itself lost considerable credibility.14

14 It is worth noting that, although much controversy swirled around Queen Emma and the strength of her genealogy, there seemed to be no real issue with her part-haole ancestry (she was the granddaughter of John Young). Noenoe Silva indicates that this is a significant change from even fifty years earlier when haole blood was believed to
Law and Politics

Many scholars believe legal and political processes were the most important in establishing haole hegemony in the century after contact, and those processes continue to be paramount today. In this section, I touch on key moments of production and change mobilized through law and politics: the initial transformation to Western law (primarily the 1840 Constitution and codes); the Māhele; and the period of the overthrow, provisional government and Republic. Within each of these moments, contradiction and resistance is present, continually eating away at the sea wall of haole hegemony and reminding us of the instability of colonization.

Transformation to Western Law

The constitution of 1840 was heralded by haoles as a significant achievement, but its reception by the Kanaka Maoli was mixed. Rev. Hiram Bingham writes:

The spring of 1840 was a new era in the progress of the nation. A written constitution, or declaration of rights, and a new code of written laws were framed by the instructed natives, carefully discussed, and in the course of the year adopted. The mission rejoicing in every effort of the rulers to secure the just rights of the people, to encourage industry and thrift, to restrain vice and punish crime, took encouragement from this evidence of progress probably more than the mass of the people themselves (Bingham 1969, 561).

Notice Bingham’s emphasis on “industry,” as discussed in the previous section on religion. It is also instructive to note that Bingham found it necessary to say that the constitution was “framed by the instructed natives.” This is hegemony weaken ali‘i genealogy and leadership potential.

15 Other significant legal events building haole justification for the overthrow include the Reciprocity Treaty, the Bayonet Constitution, and constant maneuvering by haoles in the legislature to gain power. See for example (Dougherty 1992; Coffman 1998; Osorio 2002).
in practice, the balancing of coercion and consent. The constitution is represented as issuing from the "natives" and therefore more legitimate than being imposed by the foreigners. Yet, the natives were duly "instructed" – not being able to frame a constitution by themselves – and the agent of this instruction does not need to be named, since it is clearly assumed to be the haole.

Why did the Kanaka Maoli consent to this transformation? Many arguments circulate and most emphasize a desire by the ali'i to have Hawai'i recognized as a "civilized" nation:

> During the nineteenth century the Hawaiian king and chiefs adopted aspects of 'civilized' society in an effort to claim an autonomous space in the world of nations. Adopting the rule of law–a declaration of rights, a constitution, an independent judiciary, and written legal codes – was a central part of this strategy (Merry 2000, 20).

Where arguments diverge, not surprisingly, is in their analysis (or lack thereof) of the factors motivating this desire. Haole historiography tells a seamless story of "gradual and voluntary" change; a history which "presents the Hawaiian government as voluntarily asking Americans for help in adopting a Western legal system" (Merry 2000, 43). Bingham's quote above is indicative of this representation of Kanaka Maoli coming around to accept an inevitable march of progress.

Rather than an easy voluntary acceptance of a Western legal system, new research shows messier, uneven, contested processes stoked by power, desire, death and disease. Factors leading to the acceptance of Western law and political structure include some already mentioned and others: the devastation of disease; the disintegration of the traditional social and political structure, and the subsequent desire to reestablish pono; the introduction of Western military technology; the increasing debt of the ali'i; the influence of the missionaries; and
the demands of foreign residents and their respective governments, including threats to the independence of the Kingdom.

Central to studying haole hegemony is exploring how all these factors played into the matrix of coercion and consent. Both Wood and Merry highlight the role played by outright coercion. In fact, Wood begins his book listing the violence perpetrated by explorers and traders against Kanaka Maoli and the threats to sovereignty from imperial warships. "The pattern was thus established that would see American warships in 1820, a French frigate in 1838, and the British in 1843 aim their separate guns from offshore at Hawai‘i’s Native government" (Wood 1999, 9). Merry writes:

By the mid 1840s the Hawaiian kingdom had achieved a fragile independence through the negotiation of treaties with the major European powers. But there were conditions on this independence. It is clear from accounts by the negotiators that their success depended on their claims to ‘civilization’ in the kingdom. Threats of takeover by imperial powers and challenges by resident foreigners remained strong and imminent (Merry 2000, 87).

In today’s geo-political language, one could say the ali‘i were experiencing a "clear and present danger."

Perhaps even more important than complicating the story of ali‘i acquiescence to Western law, new research is uncovering the story of maka‘āinana resistance. Haole historians have paid little attention to the maka‘āinana, discounting the entire socio-political structure in pre-contact Hawai‘i as “feudal” and thereby discrediting the maka‘āinana as powerless. Yet, the protest of the maka‘āinana to increasing haole hegemony is evident in their response to the constitution of 1840 and the subsequent codes and Organic Acts (Osorio 2002, 30). What the maka‘āinana were quick to recognize was the “sovereignty paradox” that caught the ali‘i in a catch-22:
This is the sovereignty paradox of the late 1840s: in order to produce a government able to deal with the foreign residents and to gain respectability in the eyes of the imperialist foreign community, the leaders adopted the forms of modern government and rule of law, but these forms required foreigners skilled in their practices to run them. And as foreigners developed and ran these new bureaucratic systems of law and government, they redefined the Hawaiian people as incapable, naturalizing this incapacity in racialized terms (Merry 2000, 89).

While Merry points to a short period of time prior to 1840 when Hawai‘i had dual legal systems – traditional “rules” alongside newly adopted Religious Law – this period was short-lived. From 1840 on, haoles to a large extent, ignored, misrepresented or actively abolished the traditional systems of justice. Merry argues that “the single legal system virtually extinguished Hawaiian legal practices” while dual legal systems, such as those which existed in European colonies, “create a space for maintaining customary law even as they create institutional segregation and inequality” (Merry 2000, 114). David Wilkins supports this argument by illustrating how Native American tribes that were able to hold on to some of their traditional culture and laws tend to be more successful politically than others (Wilkins 2002, 126-129).

Māhele and the Discourse of Pre-contact Feudalism

Volumes have been written about the devastating impact of the Māhele on the Kanaka Maoli. Fuchs says, “probably no single event so drastically changed the social system in Hawaii as the Great Māhele...” (Fuchs 1961, 14). Osorio writes, “the single most critical dismemberment of Hawaiian society was the Māhele or division of lands and the consequent transformation of the ‘āina into

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16 Merry structures her book around two major transitions in Hawai‘i: the move to “Religious Law” spurred by the missionaries from the 1820s to 1840 (which allowed for continued recognition of traditional “rules”), and the transition to Western law in the 1840s and 50s.
private property between 1845 and 1850” (Osorio 2002, 44). Kent suggests the Māhele sealed the deal of capitalist appropriation of island resources:

The ouster of the Hawaiian people from the land was an irreparable blow which doomed them to cultural debasement, economic destitution, and a third-rate status in their own homeland. It continued the policy of appropriating Hawaiian resources to further the ends of capitalist accumulation and had the ultimate effect of undermining, once and for all, the viability of the ‘Hawaiian way’ (Kent 1989, 32).

In the previous section on geography, I discussed the violence done in flattening ʻāina to property and the accompanying discourse of “wasted land” that was used to justify the haole land grab and rapid conversion to industrial agriculture. Here I address how the Māhele ushered in a discourse of pre-contact feudalism that continues today despite strong evidence to the contrary. Haunani-Kay Trask cuts to the heart of the matter:

By inventing feudalism in ancient Hawai‘i, Western scholars quickly transformed a spiritually based, self-sufficient economic system of land use and occupancy into an oppressive, medieval European practice of divine right ownership, with common people tied like serfs to the land (Trask 1993, 150).

Taking a very sophisticated land use system that included reciprocal relationships between konohiki, makaʻāinana and different ‘ohana, and characterizing it as “feudal” is a classic example of haole unwillingness to think outside a Western framework. The complexity and nuance that Native Hawaiian Studies scholar Lilikalā Kameʻeleihiwa spends a book describing is lost in the roughshod approximations of the feudal discourse. Kameʻeleihiwa explains:

The makaʻāinana fed and clothed the aliʻi Nui, who provided the organization required to produce enough food to sustain an ever-increasing population. ...Hence, to mālama ʻĀina was by extension to care for the makaʻāinana and the aliʻi, for in the Hawaiian metaphor, these three components are mystically one and the same (Kameʻeleihiwa 1992, 30-31).
What I want to emphasize here is the power feudal discourse continues to hold today. Contemporary haole scholars as sophisticated as Douglas Herman and Sally Merry continue to believe, and thus perpetuate, a view of pre-contact socio-political systems in Hawai‘i as overwhelmingly violent and oppressive. This discourse enables the maintenance of haole hegemony by perpetuating representations of “oppressed Hawaiian serfs” as much better off in “liberated” Hawai‘i. I turn by means of example to Sally Merry.

In Merry’s description of Hawai‘i before the haole, she seems to impose her notions of Western law on Hawaiian governance systems and values (Merry 2000, 51-62). She places emphasis on hierarchy and kapu (structure and punishment) and only touches on pono and aloha briefly. She writes about a “legal system” and the “administration of justice” as though these concepts can be unproblematically translated to pre-haole Hawai‘i. She quotes Hawaiian scholar Malo saying the maka‘āinana were oppressed and lets this stand unqualified as many previous haole scholars have done (Merry 2000, 56). She offers only that “in Kame‘elihia’s view, despite their economically and socially subordinated status, they had great love for their chiefs and this love persisted throughout the nineteenth century” (Merry 2000, 54). Merry seems reluctant to accept this love and reciprocity, though many Hawaiian scholars, both nineteenth century (Kamakau 1992) and contemporary (Osorio 2002) (McGregor 1989) have documented it, in addition to Kame‘elihia. Even if Merry felt unqualified to take a position, it would have served her readers better had she acknowledged the debate.

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17 Malo is often quoted in dominant Hawaiian historiography since, as an early convert to Christianity, he was fairly critical of traditional culture.
Overthrow, Provisional Government, and Republic

By the time of the overthrow there was a wide-ranging discourse regarding Kanaka Maoli’s inherent inability to govern, “better,” or merely “save” themselves. This discourse was built on the notion of a feudal, oppressive traditional society, and on rhetoric about Hawaiians’ inability to adapt to (invasive) capitalist culture, stuck as they were in “anachronistic space.” “Through the historical imagination, Hawaiians become perpetually historical; they are represented as natives from a fading cultural past, thus making them unfit for citizenship and modern life” (Halualani 2002, 17). While historians may quibble about degree, there is no question that this discourse was influenced by the Social Darwinism and scientific racism which was in intellectual vogue on the continent. At worst, it was flagrantly racist, and at best paternalistic, either way it supported one conclusion: law and politics were the domain of the white man, it was time for Hawaiians to stop playing government.18

In 1881 the Hawaiian Evangelical Association wrote glowingly, “the Custom House Statistics of the Sandwich Islands for 1880 show at a glance the commercial prosperity of the islands.” They went on to give impressive figures on exports and immigration and end in a note of resignation regarding the indigenous population: “Whatever may come of the native population, the Sandwich Islands are clearly destined to hold an important position in the Western world” (Herman 1995,98). As Herman notes, this kind of oh-well-we-did-what-we-could attitude is prominent at the time and serves to exempt the

18 Merry does an excellent job talking about how the haole and international forces often mocked the Kingdom: “Paradoxically, as Hawai‘i sought to claim sovereign status as a nation, it was mocked by other nations because of its mimicry of the ceremonial forms of European nationalism” (Merry 2000, 20).
haole from responsibility for the devastating impacts of colonization and from justifying their enormous profits.

Having constructed Hawaiians as a lost cause, stuck in a time before time, racially inferior, and dying out, it was "natural" that the haole should take over economic and political control of the islands. The closer to the overthrow, the stronger the discourse becomes about the Hawaiians inability to govern themselves. An 1876 letter to the editor of the *Pacific Commercial Advertiser* is a classic example:

The natives are in no way able or fit to carry on any civilized government...It is a great law that where the white and colored races come together, the white takes the lead. And it must always be so here. The natives can no more alter this inevitable law of progress than they can choke up Kilauea by dumping in stones (as quoted in Osorio 2002,181).

This argument gets amplified as the haoles take increasingly coercive action against the Hawaiian government, including forcing King Kalākaua to sign the Bayonet Constitution in 1887. The oligarchy steps up its attacks on everything Hawaiian, including the leadership, making Kalākaua "the most reviled and ridiculed of the monarchs" (Silva 1999, 111). Hawai'i must be saved, and by the time of the overthrow, Americans have successfully positioned themselves as the obvious saviors. One foreign observer notes:

It is impossible for one to be on shore an hour without realizing that, after all, the controlling forces in this wonderful land are not tropical but American. Wherever there is directing energy, organizing power, enterprise, or action, there one will find the American... (as quoted in Herman 1995,115).

Once the overthrow is complete, the discourse becomes more desperately racist as the haole conspirators are met with resistances they did not expect both from
the Kanaka Maoli and the American government. In an 1894 public speech advocating annexation, chief conspirator Lorrin Thurston pronounces,

> I submit that these two principles [majority rule and strict republican government] are possible only in a country which has a homogeneous population. If we had nothing but Anglo-Saxons and Teutons here our problem would be very simple. An Anglo-Saxon community rules itself (Minister Thurston's Speech Friday Night 1894).

Upon realizing that annexation is not going to be immediate, the haoles in the provisional government scramble to write yet another constitution. Lorrin Thurston (who is in Washington D.C. battling a tariff bill threatening sugar profits), having convinced Sanford Dole to head the provisional government, writes Dole: “I hope that those who are drafting the constitution will not allow fine theories of free government to predominate over the necessities of the present situation” (as quoted in Coffman 1998, 155). He also suggests that the new government have the word “Republic” in the title to give it “more character and distinctness” (as quoted in Coffman 1998, 155).

Dole, soon to become President of the Republic of Hawai‘i, was doing some writing of his own. He corresponded with Professor John Williams Burgess, Dean of Faculty of Political Science at Columbia University, regarding how to construct a constitution to further disenfranchise non-haoles and not get caught up in “fine theories of free government:”

> There are many natives and Portuguese who had had the vote hitherto, who are comparatively ignorant of the principles of government, and whose vote from its numerical strength as well as from the ignorance referred to will be a menace to good government (Sanford Dole as quoted in Castle 1981, 27).

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19 Burgess had been attracting national attention as part of the wave of Social Darwinism for his theories of “Teutonic superiority” since the time of Lorrin Thurston’s schooling at Columbia (Coffman 1998, 89-90).
The provisional government ends up writing into their new constitution voting requirements based on property, naturalization, and facility with English or Hawaiian. On top of that, they require an oath of loyalty to the new illegal government – an oath that many Kanaka Maoli refuse to take. “The monarchy had been overthrown to enhance the interest of a few, not to bring about democracy to the population at large. Hence the rebel government...moved quickly to disfranchise virtually all nonwhites and supporters of the former monarch” (Bell 1984, 29). Alfred L. Castle, a descendant of one of the conspirators and the scholar responsible for bringing this correspondence to light submits, “Less respect for democracy could hardly have been shown by the leaders of the provisional government” (Castle 1981, 29).

The level of lawlessness and violence engaged in by the conspirators belies their rhetoric about establishing a “civilized” order and is further evidence of the dynamism of hegemonic control. Thurston organized the all-white secret group, misnamed the “Hawaiian League,” in 1887 in opposition to the Hawaiian Kingdom and folded the previously organized Honolulu Rifles in as its military arm. Although the Honolulu Rifles were supposed to act as a reserve force for the ill-defended Kingdom, through their alliance with Thurston’s gang they instead “became a vigilante force with a nominal allegiance to the government” (Coffman 1998, 81). After importing hundreds of new rifles from San Francisco, the conspirators forced their self-serving constitution on King Kalākaua with the thinly veiled threat of violence in 1887. When Robert Wilcox organized Hawaiians to try to overturn the Bayonet Constitution a year later, the rebellion is quickly put down by the Honolulu Rifles, killing seven Kanaka Maoli.
In 1892 Thurston organized an even more covert and selective seventeen member "Annexation Committee" bent on dethroning Queen Liliʻuokalani (in a public relations move, they later donned another misnomer, the "Committee of Safety"). They were encouraged by support from the U.S. Minister John Stevens who made no secret of his pro-annexation stance. It was Stevens, with support from D.C., who landed U.S. troops once the overthrow was underway, ostensibly to "protect U.S. lives" but with rifles pointed at ʻIolani Palace. The Queen relinquished her government under protest to avert bloodshed and placed her faith in the U.S. government to put things right once informed of the illegal overthrow.

Capitalism

A discussion of the early establishment of haole hegemony would not be complete without a discussion of capitalism, the backbone of the haole oligarchy. From the early fur,20 sandalwood and whale trade, to sugar and pineapple, and then tourism, haoles pursued profit making with a vengeance. One of the most vocal critics of capitalist enterprise in Hawaiʻi is Haunani-Kay Trask:

I think it's important to emphasize the longevity of the struggle, the longevity of the resistance, the longevity of the imperialism. In our case the imperialism is totally white, American, and it's still with us. And its war against Native Hawaiians continues; our lands get smaller; our people out-migrate for survival elsewhere...and its economic system, which is based on endless profit, doesn't care about, or for, the survival needs of everyday people. There's no larger social goal, no humanitarian vision at all... (as quoted in Calizar 2003).

20 In the first decades after Cook's arrival Hawaiʻi was a stopping place for fur traders from the U.S. and England on their way to China (Kent 1983, 14).
Trask frequently points out that Kanaka Maoli culture maximized pleasure and minimized work. Early visitors noted that Kanaka Maoli had sophisticated agricultural and ocean harvesting systems and could feed themselves well with a few hours work in the lo‘i or fishponds each day. "Supply and demand," "surplus," and "profit" were literally foreign concepts. Eloquently grasping the clash of cultures Kamakau wrote, "you foreigners regard the winds, the rain, the land, and the sea as things to make money with; but we look upon them as loving friends with whom we share the universe" (as quoted in Kent 1983, 14).

With the influx of foreigners however, the ali‘i became interested in acquiring Western goods: weapons, ironwork, clothing, technology and all forms of manufactured items. Barter and trade worked for a bit but soon they began to have a need for accumulated wealth. Historians innumerate multiple ali‘i desires: to hold on to their nation by proving it was as civilized as any other (docents at 'Iolani Palace are eager to reiterate this narrative); to make their people proud; to increase their mana; and to possess beautiful objects and riches of the East and West. One of the early consequences of this complicated weave of desires was that the maka‘āinana were compelled by King Kamehameha to leave their lo‘i to work for months at a time to cut sandalwood, as it was highly prized in Asia. This disruption in traditional cultivation led to famine and accelerated the Kanaka Maoli depopulation and social upheaval (McGregor 1989, 78-79; Kent 1983, 20).

Sandalwood forests were virtually wiped out by 1820 and the whaling trade stepped up as the next moneymaking enterprise. With it came more foreign traders with more diseases and more merchants eager to sell. Lahaina and Honolulu became raucous port towns. Prostitution flourished and
accelerated the spread of disease. "Whaling had a much greater impact on Island economic and social structure than did sandalwood. For the first time, the Hawaiian masses were drawn into a cash economy as workers and producers on a regular basis" (Kent 1983, 22). Significant as these early trading enterprises were, it was the arrival of the missionaries and their subsequent interest in sugar that was bound to have the greatest long-term impact on the Hawaiian economy and political future.

The rise of the sugar industry in Hawai‘i has been well chronicled and analyzed. It drove politics in Hawai‘i from the 1840s onward including the reciprocity treaty with the U.S., the overthrow of the monarchy, and the campaigns for annexation and eventual statehood. The phrase "King Cane" became true in more ways than one:

Hawaiian society came to be organized around sugar production. Ground and ocean transportation, utilities, housing, imports of food and retail items: all revolved around the development of the sugar industry. It was the sugar industry, whose lifeline was the U.S. market, that bound Hawaii to the U.S. and ultimately led to its incorporation into the United States (McGregor 1989, 81).

By 1883, haoles controlled 92 percent of plantation interests in Hawai‘i and were raking in enormous profits (McGregor 1989, 82). Ten years later the overthrow of the Kingdom formally put haoles in the driver’s seat. Fuchs instructs, “in Hawaii, the socially superior—the kamaaina haole elite—also governed. The elite consisted of an oligarchy which ruled in the broadest sense. It controlled not only the formal points of the political process, but labor and wealth in the Islands

For an analysis of how haole sugar planters were driven to support the overthrow and statehood by U.S.-Hawai‘i trade economics, while the U.S. Congress was less concerned about sugar than it was strategic military location see (Croix and Grandy 1997).
as well” (Fuchs 1961, 152). Fuchs goes on to describe a true “Hawaiian exceptionalism”22 as the hegemony established by Hawai‘i’s oligarchy:

No community of comparable size on the mainland was controlled so completely by so few individuals for so long. Rarely were political, economic, and social controls simultaneously enforced as in Hawaii. Rarely were controls so personal... Hawaii’s oligarchy skillfully and meticulously spun its web of control over the Islands’ politics, labor, and economic institutions, without fundamental challenge (Fuchs 1961, 152).

With the rise of sugar came the importation of massive numbers of Asian laborers and a drastic shift in the population of the islands that was destined to become the backdrop of every facet of Hawai‘i politics from then on. Much excellent scholarship has focused on the immigration of laborers and the plantation system and I will return to some of it in my discussion of local identity in chapter two.23 As a means of maintaining power and control, the haole oligarchy set up strict racial divisions within the plantations with separate jobs, pay scales, and segregated housing or “camps” for each group. The planters also established a harsh penal contract system through the Masters’ and Servants’ Act (1850) and participated in all forms of coercive and inhumane labor practices.

A visiting National Labor Relations Board representative remarked that what the haoles liked to call paternalism was just another form of fascism (Fuchs 1961, 49). “The immigrants were regarded by the plantation elite as less than fully human, as interchangeable cogs in the productive apparatus— as commodities to produce commodities” (Kent 1983, 40). Ronald Takaki graphically illustrates this by uncovering original requisitions from plantation managers to their

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22 I take issue with “Hawaiian exceptionalism” or the discourse of racial harmony which purports that Hawai‘i is a multicultural paradise free of racism, racial stratification, or racial conflict. I address this topic in chapter two.
23 See for example (Takaki 1983; Okihiro 1991; Tamura 1993).
suppliers that include “lists of orders for men and materials” (Takaki 1983, 23). One such order lists “Filipinos” alphabetically after “Fertilizer” (Takaki 1983, 24).

Resistance to these conditions was always present in the form of work slowdowns, songs, cane fires resulting from arson, desertion, and strikes. Unions were segregated racially and at first went on strike separately. In 1920 plantation organizers moved beyond “blood unionism” and the Japanese and Filipino unions struck together. With 77 percent of the O'ahu work force on strike, plantation operations ground to a halt. The experience led to the first interracial unions in Hawai‘i which more effectively took on the capitalist haole power structure (Takaki 1983, 153-176).

Language and Communication

There have already been hints at the importance of language and communication in establishing haole hegemony (i.e. naming the illegal government a “Republic,” calling pre-contact society in Hawai‘i “feudal,” and so forth). Here I address two processes of colonization that mobilize language and communications: the dismissal of the oral tradition of Kanaka Maoli and the establishment of a written language; and the battle over which newspaper(s) would reign as the major communication vehicle in the islands.

In an unusually sensitive description of Kanaka Maoli oral tradition Eleanor Nordyke writes, “the unwritten literature of pre-contact Hawai‘i was transferred from one generation to the next by carefully trained storytellers who received knowledge through their ears as societies that use the written word receive information through their eyes” (Nordyke 1989, 13). In contrast, Rev. Hiram Bingham wrote:
In place of authentic history they had obscure oral traditions, national or party songs, rude narratives of successions of kings, wars, victories, exploits of gods, heroes, priests, sorcerers, the giants of iniquity and antiquity, embracing conjecture, romance, and the general absurdities of Polytheism (Bingham 1969, 2).

As discussed in the geography section, the haole historical canon almost uniformly dismisses Kanaka Maoli pre-contact history as inconsequential, if it acknowledges it at all. Mele, moʻolelo, and oli, most of which included elaborate genealogies, were not considered worthy historical record. Kameʻeleihiwa counters, “the genealogies are the Hawaiian concept of time, and they order space around us. Through them we learn of the exploits and identities of our ancestors…” (Kameʻeleihiwa 1992, 19).

The missionaries made it one of their first tasks to capture the Kanaka Maoli language on paper, inevitably disappearing much of its nuance and fluidity:

Definitive texts depend on assumptions about reality, representations and knowledge that seem in important ways to be radically unlike the worldview transmitted by kupuna. Once an oral tradition is accepted as being adequately represented by its written versions, it loses much of its force as a radically alternative worldview (Wood 1999, 57).

The establishment of a written language was a mixed blessing for the Kanaka Maoli: it contributed to the demise of the oral tradition; it allowed for more rapid conversion to Christianity and subsequent abandonment of traditional culture; and yet, it also allowed for more efficient communication and therefore resistance. Here we see cracks and resistance as the struggle for hegemony plays out. The banning of spoken Hawaiian from schools can be seen as part of this effort to diminish Hawaiian oral tradition. The emphasis in today’s Hawaiian
immersion schools on spoken, rather than written, Hawaiian can be viewed as part of a legacy of resistance and an effort to recapture and reconstruct a culture.

Having produced the written language, the missionaries put it right to work:

For forty years the mission controlled the power of the printed word in Hawai‘i. They used this power not just to save souls but to assist in the progress of plantation/colonial capitalism, to control public education, to make government into Western forms and to control it, and to domesticate Kanaka women (Silva 1999, 19).

Silva lays out the war of newspapers that emerged in Hawai‘i once Kanaka Maoli began publishing their own newspaper in 1861. “[T]hey transformed themselves, to the shock and outrage of the missionary establishment, into speaking subjects, proud of their Kanaka ways of life and traditions, and suddenly unafraid to rebel” (Silva 1999, 20). In a continuation of the oral tradition, the Kanaka Maoli papers published mele and mo‘olelo. The haoles immediately proclaimed the first kanaka paper to therefore be publishing “obscenities” and tried to shut it down. When that failed the haoles began publishing their own Hawaiian language newspaper to compete and continued to try to censor the content of the Kanaka Maoli papers. And so it went, a perfect illustration of the contestations and refortifications of hegemony.

The missionary elite owned and controlled the English language press, dominated by Henry Whitney and then Lorrin Thurston’s, *Pacific Commercial Advertiser* established in 1856 and precursor to today’s *Honolulu Advertiser*. As previous citations have illustrated, this paper was a mouthpiece for the haole elite. It railed against the monarchy, degraded the Kanaka Maoli, promoted capitalism, congratulated the oligarchy, and obsessed over what to do about the “yellow peril.”
Newspapers were extremely important as a communication tool for the Hawaiians. By mid-century, literacy in Hawai‘i was nearly universal and the Kanaka Maoli press easily gained the largest circulation in the islands. Papers helped spread news more quickly between islands and allowed for uncensored expression of nationalist sentiment. Silva shows how this was underscored during Queen Lili‘uokalani’s imprisonment (Silva 2004, 187-191). The Queen was prohibited from having newspapers, so Kanaka Maoli would bring the Queen flowers carefully wrapped in the latest paper. Those papers contained elaborate mele with “hidden meanings” (hidden to non-native speakers of ka ‘ōlelo ‘ōiwi) that contained messages to the Queen. Frequently these were messages of support, encouraging the Queen not to despair, that her people were with her. She would write back also in “coded” language that was smuggled out for her and printed for all to read (but only some to understand).

Conclusion: Hegemony and Historiography

Stuart Hall wrote, “the hope of every ideology is to naturalize itself out of History and into Nature, and thus to become invisible, to operate unconsciously” (Stuart Hall as quoted in Moore, Kosek, and Pandian 2003, 42). The haole historical canon has attempted to do just that with the ideologies of American imperialism and white supremacy. Without the contextualization of Hawai‘i’s colonization, the legacies of power and contested privilege, and the contemporary constructions of haole cannot be fully understood.

I have attempted to illustrate some specific places where the workings of haole hegemony is disappeared from, or misrepresented in, the canon of Hawaiian historiography, and how that canon itself has served to perpetuate
hegemony. Many interrelated reasons for this exist, including haole resistance to interrogating that history and the related Western “obsession” with “problematizing the indigenous” (Smith 1999, 91). James Baldwin writes eloquently about the historical amnesia of whiteness: “Because they think they are white, they do not dare confront the ravage and the lie of their history. Because they think they are white, they cannot allow themselves to be tormented by the suspicion that all men are brothers” (James Baldwin as quoted in Roediger 1998, 180). Similarly, Haunani-Kay Trask writes of her epiphany regarding Kanaka Maoli history:

Suddenly the entire sweep of our written history was clear to me. I was reading the West’s view of itself through the degradation of my own past.

...And when they said that our chiefs were despotic, they were telling of their own society, where hierarchy always results in domination. ...And when they wrote Hawaiians were lazy, they meant that work must be continuous and ever a burden. ...And when they wrote that we were superstitious, believing in the mana of nature and people, they meant that the West had long since lost a deep spiritual and cultural relationship to the earth.

...For so long, more than half my life, I had misunderstood this written record, thinking it described my own people (Trask 1993, 153-154).

Baldwin and Trask name the paradox inherent in racialized colonial processes. They remind us that whiteness is constructed by and through contest and contradiction. A historiography that smoothes over these conflicts and disjunctures inevitably cracks from the tension, like concrete giving way to earth’s movement and life.

William Appleman Williams, a key figure in 1950s New Left diplomatic history, is said to have remarked that one of the “central themes of American historiography” is that “there is no American Empire” (as quoted in Kaplan 1993, 3). To write the contestations and machinations of haole hegemony into the
official history would inevitably require admitting to the history of imperialism. Mired in analysis of European empires, even postcolonial studies fail to vigorously consider U.S. imperialism.

So, why is it important, what does all of this matter? Why name the processes of haole hegemony now? Trask and Baldwin’s statements make the argument most eloquently. It matters because in so naming, those hegemonic processes become denaturalized and destabilized and we begin to question what we think we know about Hawai‘i, and about haoles, Hawaiians, and locals. We begin to listen for alternate mo‘olelo. We begin to see the resistance sprouting up through the cracks. We begin to imagine other possible relations of power and ways of reestablishing pono in the islands.
CHAPTER 2
Disrupting the “Melting Pot:”
Constructions of Haole and Discourses of Racial Politics in Hawai‘i

Identities are the names we give the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past.
– Stuart Hall

Having established the origins of haole in Hawai‘i’s colonization, this chapter considers the many different constructions of haole produced by haoles as well as others from “first contact” to present. Looking at these constructions illuminates the dynamism and the mutual constitution of haole. Haole has always been multiple and contingent, its meaning varying with constituency, time and place. Again, my interest is not so much in defining what haole is, as exploring how it is produced in all its variance. How the early missionaries represented themselves differed radically from how Kanaka Maoli constructed them, which differed again from how plantation workers talked about their haole bosses. In studying the varying constructions of haole, the dominant discourses of “race relations” – or what I prefer to call racial politics – in Hawai‘i are illuminated and can be deconstructed for what they offer regarding the intersected nature of identity production. Constructions of the three dominant social groupings in Hawai‘i – haoles, locals, and Hawaiians – are what they are because of each other. There could be no white colonizer without a racialized native. There could be no local without incorporation of certain elements of Hawaiian culture and resistance to haole hegemony. Processes of identity formation and racialization do not just move in one direction, they move in many directions simultaneously.
My analysis focuses on haole as a colonial/neo-colonial form of whiteness situated in Hawai‘i, and thus I foreground processes of racialization. Some literature refers to haole as an ethnic identity or that slides easily between race, ethnicity and nationality. While different constructions of haole certainly contain elements of all three as they are intrinsically related, I choose to highlight race – race talk, racialization, racial formation, racial production, racial identity, racial politics, racism and so forth. Within the context of U.S. imperialism, race has been the foundation for dominant systems of power, the motor driving the imperial engine. Haole matters because race matters. Some critical race scholars argue that the discourse of ethnicity in the U.S. has been strategically deployed in order to avoid direct discussions of race, racism and white supremacy. Angela Harris writes “ethnicity” is “a term developed as a way of not talking about white supremacy” (Espinoza and Harris 1998, 1624). By focusing on racial production in Hawai‘i, I look at the different deployments of power that produce and reproduce the violent fictions of race dispossessing some, privileging others, and segregating us from each other.

Theories of racial production contend that racial identities are relational, that the formation of an “us” occurs simultaneously with the formation of a “them.” Furthermore, the two processes do not just occur simultaneously, they are dependent on one another, and are mutually constitutive. Kathleen Blee, a scholar of white supremacist organizations, writes “white identity is based on distinctions from those marked as nonwhite, and is always in danger of challenge. Thus, whiteness is at once intensely significant and ultimately meaningless” (Blee 2000, 93). Like Blee, I am interested in the paradoxes in the production of whiteness. Whiteness produces itself in opposition to racialized
others. It is, so the story goes, what "they" are not. Racialized "others" in turn, produce certain counter-narratives of whiteness. In studying haole, we see how constructions including "savage," "Hawaiian," "Asian," and "local" were, and are, used to mark and patrol the boundaries of haole constructions of haole. At the same time, Hawaiian and local constructions of haole help define the borders of those identities. It is through this interplay and its symbolic and material manifestations that haole comes to matter in multiple, often conflicting, ways.

I begin by exploring historical haole constructions of haole: discoverer, savior, kamaʻāina, "Hawaiian at heart," and hapa. Manifest destiny and Christian proselytizing animate the early constructions. A desire to belong, a yearning to "go native," and a general resistance to being called "haole" drive the last three. If many haoles could have their way, the word "haole" would be banned as impolite at best, and pejorative at worst. One can almost mark one's calendar by the cyclical debate in public discourse over the use of the word.¹ It is a testament to Hawaiian-local resistance and/or cultural insistence that the term maintains its usage and salience. If haoles cannot claim kamaʻāina, Hawaiian at heart, or hapa status, we often seek refuge in race, ethnicity or nationality, identifying as "Caucasian," "Anglo" or "American."

I next move to a discussion of native Hawaiian and local constructions of haole. Here I draw on Chicana scholar Angie Chabram-Dernersesian's concept of "native constructions of whiteness" and emphasize that understanding any form of whiteness requires looking at it from the perspective of people of color. While there is increasing overlap between them, Hawaiian constructions center

¹ One such debate dominated columns and letters to the editor in O'ahu's *Midweek* newspaper in the late 2004.
haole as colonizer, whereas local constructions originate in the experience of haole as plantation owner. In Hawai‘i, these constructions represent a form of racialization-from-below or counter-narrative, where a subordinate group’s constructions of the dominant group destabilize dominant constructions. This tension becomes manifest in such things as the aforementioned reoccurring debate over whether “haole” is derogatory. Debates such as these, which place the differing constructions of haole in competition, take place within the discourses of racial politics in Hawai‘i.

Following this, I identify two such discourses – racial harmony and discrimination against non-locals – give their histories, and show how they enable various constructions of haole. I explain how the infamous Massie case\(^2\) exemplifies the mobilization of both of these discourses toward the reinscription of haole hegemony. I suggest that the question of racial politics be reframed away from the polarized discourses of harmony or conflict and toward consideration of the processes of racialization themselves.

In the final section, I turn to contemporary incidents and testimonials that cast haole as the victim of unjust discrimination. This contemporary construction of haole is by far the most pernicious as it cloaks itself in the language of equality and civil rights discourse. The *Rice* case, which I discuss at length in the following chapter, demonstrates how this move is clearly tied to the continental trend to reframe whiteness as a liability (Gallagher 1997).\(^3\) A 1990 controversy

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\(^2\) A 1931 case involving the alleged rape of a white woman, the subsequent murder of one of the accused, the related trials, and media frenzy.

\(^3\) In its 2000 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court in *Rice v. Cayetano* ruled that the State of Hawai‘i could not discriminate on the basis of race in any state election. This has effectively brought into question all state and federal programs that benefit native
between a haole student and a native Hawaiian professor (the Carter-Trask controversy) and a 1995 Hawai‘i Civil Rights Commission case both ride on the argument that “haole” is pejorative. Finally, two recent full-length articles shore up the notion of the plight of the unjustly targeted haole. It is one of the overall aims of this dissertation to disrupt the discourse of haole victimization.

This chapter’s exploration of haole, native Hawaiian, and local constructions of haole, and the discourses of island-style racial politics in which they are located, furthers my interrogation of haole through a relational and discursive analysis. Just as haole needs to be considered within the history of colonization, it must also be located in its relationships to other social groupings and racial discourses. Racialization and the undertaking of racial projects are central to colonization. This relational analysis makes apparent that haole has always been a contested category, understood in multiple ways by various constituencies. Part of how haole matters is located in how haole is constructed and what the consequences of those constructs are.

**Haole Constructions of Self**

Haole self-productions began with Captain Cook’s landing in 1778, the beginning of the influx of haole to Hawai‘i. Some major themes emerge when the shifts in dominant haole discourse regarding Hawai‘i, native Hawaiians, and the haole role are studied. Phyllis Turnbull and Kathy Ferguson make explicit the violence in haole racial productions:

> The most significant narrative productions have been those by explorers, missionaries, sugar planters, soldiers, and tourists. Each has carried Hawaiians by catalyzing a number of similar law suits (*Harold F. Rice v. Benjamin J. Cayetano*, 528 U.S. 495 2000).
multiple and intertwined accounts about what Hawai‘i offers and what it lacks, and about how they could supply Hawai‘i with what it needs. Historically, their projects have entailed the enforced movement of a variety of kinds of bodies across different borders, and the persistent transgression and frantic reinforcement of a range of critical boundaries. These movements have been attended by multiple and persistent violences: the material violence of displacement, uprooting, and resettlement; the discursive violence involved in reading a place through the lenses of their own desires; and the ontological violence of writing a particular order onto bodies and spaces (Turnbull and Ferguson 1997, 97).

Discoverers and Saviors

During that first hundred-plus years, haoles represented themselves primarily as discoverers or saviors. They “discovered” the islands and everything in them. Then they set about saving things – first Hawaiians, through religion, education, property ownership, and agriculture. And then Hawai‘i, through the utilization of “under utilized” prized agricultural land, and through the fulfillment of manifest destiny bringing the fledgling islands under the protective wing of the American government. These positionings overlapped, but they also show an evolution of haole attempts to deal with changing circumstances. The various narrative productions of the haole presented purpose and justifications for the being and the doing of haole in Hawai‘i; how they could supply Hawai‘i with “what it needs.” These productions were meant for: the haole themselves; the international community; the various funders of haole enterprise; the native Hawaiian population; the American public; and the U.S. government.

As explored in chapter one, the production of haole as “discoverer” was the first to legitimize haole presence in Hawai‘i. It was a critical first step in the American imperial project – a way to lay claim to a territory before any other Western or Eastern nation had the chance. It was managed on the ground
through the issuing of proclamations, the planting of flags, the erecting of monuments, and the distribution of “gifts.” The haole “discovery” of the islands later became important as the starting point for the dominant version of Hawaiian history; before discovery there was no history, only “darkness,” chaos and wildness. Through this discourse the Kanaka Maoli are neatly dehumanized and folded into the wildness, disabling any competing claim to the islands.

According to this narrative, it is a tribute to the haole that Hawai‘i was brought into time and civilization. Elvi Whittaker demonstrates how many books in the canon of Hawaiian historiography begin either with Cook’s “discovery” or with the “wild” nature of a volcano erupting from the ocean. She argues that,

> These openings tell us more about ourselves than they do about the world of the Polynesians. ...When Captain Cook steps ashore, in actuality or in print, the very act of doing so has become possible only because of a world view which has “making discoveries” as a way of making sense of the world (Whittaker 1986, 8).

The theme of “saving” Hawaiians through religion is strongest in the period of missionary dominance (roughly 1820-50) for obvious reasons. Missionaries were not the only haoles in the islands, but they were the most influential and their production of certain representations of haole held forth for a number of decades and continues to influence conceptions of haole today.

Many missionaries no doubt truly believed conversion and westernization were “good for Hawaiians.” Some probably were primarily motivated by a desire to secure their own salvation by making their conversion quota. Still others quickly became opportunists, using their positions to amass power and property. Rather than focus on intentionality, I look at the shifting ways the missionaries represented themselves. As Ferguson and Turnbull point out,

> The colonizers of Hawai‘i brought with them both a profound sense of entitlement and a fear of engulfment... Hawai‘i’s perceived deficiencies
provoked both desire (take it, fill it, make it ours) and anxiety (it's different, it's not like us, it's looking back at us). ...Hawaii both beckons and disturbs its newcomers (Turnbull and Ferguson 1997, 99).

There are copious writings (letters, diaries, reports, books) by missionaries about what was, in their minds, their formidable mission. Their writings explicitly express the anxiety Ferguson and Turnbull describe. Of their arrival in the islands, Rev. Bingham writes in 1849:

As we proceeded to shore, the multitudinous, shouting, and almost naked natives...exhibited the appalling darkness of the land which we had come to enlighten. Here...appeared a just representation of a nation...in as deep degradation, ignorance, pollution and destitution as if the riches of salvation...had never been provided to enrich and enlighten their souls (Bingham 1969, 86).

Bingham’s intense anxiety only seems to have escalated during his tenure, his project of enlightenment encountered more resistance than he anticipated. “So darkness and danger have sometimes hung over our young mission, and that infant nation whom we were attempting to guide out of deep embarrassment and gloom, when we seemed ready to be ‘swallowed up quick’” (Bingham 1969, 383). Within such an environment, the missionaries “frantically reinforced” the “critical boundary” between themselves and their “charges” hoping to keep from being “swallowed up.” For a few, primarily women, anxiety came with the mission’s enormous influence and some Hawaiians’ faith in their civilizing project. Missionary wife Laura Judd wrote in 1828: “We seem to be regarded as but little lower than the angels, and the implicit confidence of these people in our goodness is almost painful” (Judd 1961, 73). The irony, of course, is that it was the Hawaiians, not the missionaries, who bore the pain of “aloha betrayed.”

“Aloha Betrayed” is the title of Noenoe K. Silva’s book about Hawaiian resistance to the overthrow (Silva 2004).
After a couple of decades of effort, many missionaries felt they had failed in their project of "enlightenment," a failure they almost exclusively blamed on the Hawaiians. In her article lauding the missionary, Patricia Grimshaw writes:

The story of three decades of intercultural contact in Hawai‘i, a story of frustration for the mission women and evasion by the Hawaiians, was fraught with considerable tension and unhappiness for both groups of women. Neither side could triumph: by the late 1840s, stalemate was reached (Grimshaw 1985, 73).

There are many interesting aspects to this quotation. First, that Grimshaw uses the phrase "intercultural contact," insomuch as that phrase connotes a certain mutual appreciation and respect. There is very little in the writings of missionaries to indicate they considered there was anything "intercultural" at all about the encounter. Second, that "evasion" by the Hawaiians is noted, but neither Grimshaw nor other haoles thought to analyze this as a strategic form of resistance and cultural survival. Finally, that the passage uses the metaphor of contest or war – there was "stalemate," neither could "triumph" – which seems to belie the idea of intercultural exchange.

As indicated in chapter one, in the 1840s haole discourse began to shift from being dominated by conversion to more secular forms of "saving" the Hawaiians. This shift was tied to the increasing importance of the islands in international trade and military strategy. As world powers began to pay more attention to Hawai‘i and Hawai‘i formed diplomatic relations with a number of nations, missionary families began to think of the islands as a permanent residence rather than just a temporary outpost. As they began building their lives in the islands, they began to think about schools for their children, government, property, and economic opportunity. Missionary attitude seemed to suggest that if Hawaiians could not be made to see that conversion would
save them, surely they could be convinced of the need for civilizing themselves through education, property ownership, agriculture and democratic government. Thus efforts in education were redoubled, a constitutional monarchy was established, the Māhele converted 'āina into property, and Hawaiians were encouraged to labor in capitalist agriculture.

In 1853 the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) dissolved the mission in Hawai‘i, declaring the islands sufficiently Christianized to have their own home mission. The missionaries were effectively cut loose, officially encouraged to become Hawaiian citizens and purchase property (Wilson 2000, 533). The dominant thinking was that if the Hawaiians were still having trouble, it was through no fault of the missionaries who, after all, had spent decades in conversion, education, and all forms of civilizing efforts.

This idea, that the Hawaiians were unwilling to save themselves and embrace capitalism, is repeated in many places including the Grimshaw article. Grimshaw reiterates the dominant casting of Hawaiian history as an “inevitable” line of westernization and laments the “tragedy,” not just of the Hawaiians, but also of the missionary women who tried so hard to save them “The endeavor of the American missionary women could easily be described as comedy but more nearly is tragedy” (Grimshaw 1985). She suggests that American missionary women have not been duly recognized in history because male historians were envious of, and seduced by, an exotic Hawaiian lifestyle: “The constructive nature of the American women’s enterprise has tended to be overlooked partly from a tendency of historians...to envy, and to enjoy vicariously, the lives of those Polynesian island dwellers who were innocent of Puritanical drives”
(Grimshaw 1985, 96). The language here is quite telling: the American women are "constructive;" the historians "envious" of island pleasures; and the Hawaiians "innocent" of a higher moral order of conduct. It is language that centers the haole, simultaneously disallowing curiosity about and exploration of Hawaiian responses to conversion. 5

Eric Love, a Princeton scholar writing on racism and the annexation of Hawai‘i and the Philippines, asserts that Hawai‘i was annexed for the sake of the haoles. While Love overstates his argument by not considering the other factors motivating Congress, Hawai‘i’s "strategic" military location for example, race and racial politics did play a significant role in the annexation debate. 6 Haole annexationists argued that the hard work they had done civilizing the islands was threatened by the incompetence of the monarchy and a gathering "oriental menace" in the East.

Love notes that Lorrin Thurston went to lobby Congress with this message in 1897. In order to quell fears of embracing such a non-white territory, Thurston did everything he could to represent Hawai‘i as the (white) child of Uncle Sam. He opportunistically counted Portuguese as white to inflate the numbers (Portuguese were never treated as haoles in Hawai‘i) and claimed that the Chinese would leave if Hawai‘i were annexed (Love 1997, 157-163). A year later, when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee met to consider an

5 To her credit, Grimshaw’s book gives more critical treatment of the subject (Grimshaw 1989).

6 The military question was not so much about the military use of territories or harbors, which U.S. foreign policy makes clear does not require U.S. soil/water. In fact, the U.S. had already secured use of Pearl Harbor through the Reciprocity Treaty. At issue was the threat to such control posed by other nations with an interest in the islands, particularly Britain, France and Japan. This threat then built the imperial preference for uncontested ownership.
annexation resolution, it was clear Thurston's words had hit their mark. In their report calling for annexation, the Committee wrote, "The really distinctive feature of [Hawaiian] society is that it is American in all its traits and habits" (as quoted in Love 1997, 175).

The discourse of a teleological march of progress in Hawai'i lead by the capable haole - from darkness and chaos to Christianity, education, capitalism, and finally, inevitable Americanization - was successfully mobilized by the annexationists and was prominent in the arguments for statehood as well. In 1893, missionary son Samuel Chapman Armstrong wrote it was commonly accepted that:

The conquest by American missionaries of the Hawaiian Islands for a degree of Christian civilization gives the United State both a claim and an obligation in the matter - a claim to be considered first in the final disposition of that country, and an obligation to save the decency and civilization in that utterly broken-down monarchy (Love 1997, 130).

Saving Hawai'i from a "broken-down" government was one thing, incorporating it into the motherland, quite another. To become a state, Hawai'i would have to be represented as as white as possible. "Annexation made the triumph of white values and ideology through 'Americanization' a formal necessity if the new territory was ever to achieve statehood" (Bell 1984, 36). And so, haole comes increasingly to matter. In testimony before Congress in 1921, the secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association reported:

The Territory of Hawaii is now and is going to be American; it is going to remain American under any condition and we are going to control the situation out there. The white race, the white people, the Americans in Hawaii are going to dominate and will continue to dominate - there is no question about it (as quoted in Okamura 1998, 272).
Having constructed themselves as the clear choice for political leadership, haoles continued to consolidate their political power after annexation. They formed alliances with native Hawaiians against the growing population of Asian immigrants, whom they feared would seize power. Conveniently for the haole powerbrokers, anti-Asian racism and discrimination was at its height nationally, and (although now bound to uphold nettlesome U.S. equal rights doctrine) Asian immigrants were barred from naturalization by acts of Congress. It was, in fact, this racism that scholars credit in the prolonging Hawai‘i’s territorial period. Roger Bell, in his book on the subject, contends, “The racial and political complexion of Hawaii’s voters, and the anticipated impact they would have on the fortunes of conservative and racially sensitive factions of Congress, were the central reasons why it was for so long denied equality as a state” (Bell 1984, 6).  

The period between annexation and statehood offers a good illustration of the processes through which haole was constructed relationally. Haole constructions of self were successful to the extent they were coupled with the racialization of “others” in Hawai‘i. It is one of the fundamental tenets of whiteness studies that whiteness produces itself by marking and then patrolling its borders. The process of continually reinscribing whiteness demands considerable effort be spent creating racialized others. Kehaulani Kauanui lays out how the racialization of Kanaka Maoli was part of haole constructions of haole. She notes that on the continent, early constructions of whiteness are established in the triangulation of

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7 Amongst the evidence Bell presents is this statement by a Missouri congressman: “How can we endure our shame when a Chinese senator from Hawaii, with his pig-tail hanging down his back, with his pagan joss in hand, shall rise from his curule chair and in pidgin English proceed to chop logic with George Frisbie Hoar or Henry Cabot Lodge” (Bell 1984, 33).
Indian/Black/White, while in Hawai‘i, Hawaiian/Asian/White formed a similar triangulation (Kauanui 2000, 28). Referencing legal theorist Cheryl Harris, Kauanui agrees that whiteness is a form of property. Whiteness confers on its owners rights of disposition, use and enjoyment, reputation and status, and exclusion. Harris makes the point that these functions of whiteness have meaning and value only because they are denied to others (Harris 1993, 1744), i.e. part of the defining and patrolling of racial borders. There would be no whiteness if there were no "others."

Kauanui adds "the right to include" to the list referencing the politics of assimilation (Kauanui 2000, 54). She demonstrates how Hawaiians, like Native Americans, could be accepted as white if their blood was diluted enough and their performance assimilated enough (what counts for "enough" is a moving target). One of the final stages of colonization seems to be the deracination of a people once they are no longer seen as a threat. Much more is gained by subsuming them (not the least of which is property and absolution), than continuing to lock them out. And so, the 1920 Hawaiian Homes Commission Act launched government efforts at the rehabilitation and assimilation of the Hawaiians:

Selective assimilation has played as much a role in the formation of whiteness as has exclusion. For American Indians and Hawaiians, the legacies of inclusion have worked against collective assertions of legal subjectivity by conferring the franchise rather than sovereign recognition (Kauanui 2000, 78).

In contrast, Asians have historically been seen as much more threatening in their otherness, making them forever foreign and suspect, even when assimilated. There is a well-documented history of this in Hawai‘i that includes suppression of language, denial of citizenship, internment, and all forms of
discrimination. By playing Asians against Hawaiians, and “native” Hawaiians against “part” Hawaiians, haoles managed the borders of haole, granting and denying access. Part of what makes haole haole, are just these processes of mutual constitution.

**Kama‘āina, “Hawaiian at heart,” and Hapa**

Appropriation, the twin to assimilation and inclusion, plays an equally strong role in processes of racialization. Haole claims to being anything-but-haole lay bare desperate longing to escape haole and become naturalized by “going native.” The appropriation of kama‘āina, the creation of “Hawaiian at heart” and the wiggle toward hapa are some common responses to being named haole. They illustrate haole negotiation, contestation and reconfiguration of identity.

Houston Wood explores the processes by which missionaries and haole elite began appropriating “kama‘āina” and using it as a badge of belonging. Those originally claiming kama‘āina status were a select group of haoles largely from New England with political and economic power and close association with the ali‘i through intermarriage. They sought to distinguish and separate themselves from haole newcomers and those of lower social status. While the term is still used by some in this way, haole commoners democratized it, adopting the label for those who had been in the islands for at least seven years or who were born in the islands:

Kama‘āina was thus transformed from a concept denoting Native-born into a term meaning “island-born,” or even merely “well-acquainted with the islands.” By adopting a Native word to describe themselves, Euroamericans obscured both their origins and the devastating effects their presence was having on the Native-born (Wood 1999, 41).

Further appropriation has taken place to the extent that many now use the term
for all residents, regardless of race or class. This broad application has proven very successful as a marketing tool by conferring both belonging and status to non-Native residents, e.g. kama‘aina vacation packages, entrance fees, and supermarket cards.

“Hawaiian at heart” has more potentially insidious meanings. Wood suggests that this phrase began to circulate with the boom in tourism that followed statehood. It became a way of insuring haoles could have the exotic “Hawaiian experience” without staying years to earn the kama‘aina badge (Wood 1999, 48-49). The invocation insured tourists could successfully “eat the Other” on a seven-day Waikiki package:

The seductive promise of this encounter is that it will counter the terrorizing force of the status quo that makes identity fixed, static, a condition of containment and death... Difference can seduce precisely because the mainstream imposition of sameness is a provocation that terrorizes (Hooks 1992, 22).

hooks ties the violence of appropriation to the violence of fixing identity, reminding us that racialization is a trap for all involved. The “Hawaiian at heart” label has come to be used by haole residents in similar fashion to kama‘aina, to assert belonging, while additionally indicating an affinity with Hawaiian culture. In some New Age circles, it parallels the phenomenon of white people declaring Native American ancestry. In her interviews regarding haole allies, Kelly Kraemer found that Hawaiians were generally skeptical of anyone proclaiming her/himself “Hawaiian at heart.” One interviewee wonders, “what happened to their heart”? Another states, “...when we meet a

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8 In observing how many white folks claim a Cherokee princess in their ancestry, one Native American ironically noted that “like the mythological Christmas fruitcake, there was only one, but she got around” (Garroutte 2003, 91).
non-native who wants to be supportive we kind of hold our breath and hope that this isn't gonna be another burden to us or another idiot who thinks they wanna be Hawaiian... We all should celebrate our own history” (Kraemer 2000, 362).

Kraemer’s interviewees also note that the designation of “Hawaiian at heart” has very different meaning when offered by a Hawaiian rather than self-declared. It can be used by one Hawaiian to another to communicate, “she’s okay, she gets it.” In her book, Rona Tamiko Halualani discusses the reappropriation of “Hawaiian at heart” by diasporic Hawaiians in their Aloha Clubs as a way to allow for membership of non-Hawaiian friends and family:

A “Hawaiian at heart” identity position is invoked among mainland Hawaiians as a localized adjustment to a different social fabric of the mainland. It works on one level as a form of public outreach through which community membership boundaries are adapted, and yet, internally, it remains within a differentiating hierarchy of Hawaiian identity. …several members cast “Hawaiians at heart” as friends but not ‘true/authentic kanaka’ (Halualani 2002, 200).

A look at the Native American context helps broaden the scope by which we look at haole-Hawaiian relations. Eva Marie Garrouxite dedicates a chapter of her book to the issue of self-identified Native Americans and the phenomenon of “ethnic switching” or being a “born-again Indian.” Her respondents give mixed responses. Some see it as outright appropriation: “How do you get to be the sort of victor who can claim to be the vanquished also?” Others want to be more inclusive: “One of the fundamental human rights of individuals and groups includes the right to self-identification and self-definition” (as quoted in Garrouxite 2003, 55 and 94). A number of Native American scholars see dangers in heavily policing native identity boundaries. They argue that not all “ethnic switching” is done for personal gain (what James Clifford calls “the keys to the treasury”). It can also allow for “the introduction of new resources into tribal
communities – resources ranging from the professional, intellectual, and financial, to the cultural, emotional, and spiritual” (Garroutte 2003, 97).

“Hapa” is a relative newcomer to the block of haole self-identifications. Originally meaning “of mixed blood” in Hawaiian (Pukui and Elbert 1986, 58), it is more commonly understood in Hawaiian Creole English as the short-form of “hapa haole,” meaning half or part haole. Its popularity, especially among young people – hapa clubs, hapa music, and hapa literature – is another indication of the powerful desire to be something other than haole. In the last decade hapa has made a splash on the continent, especially among young Asian Americans who have retranslated it again. For them the half that is featured is Asian so that while it usually means half Asian and half white, it can mean half Asian and half something else. It is probable that the increasing popularity of contemporary Hawaiian music on the continent and the persistent desire to “go native” are influencing factors in this appropriation.

A University of Hawai‘i professor shared a relevant story about her teenage son. One day he told her that he was hapa, and when she asked how he figured it, he said because she was haole and his dad was Israeli. He was creatively trying to find an out for himself, like so many haole youth. I can only guess that when he proclaimed his “hapaness” to his local friends, he found that whiteness is not parsed in the islands in the same ways it is on the continent. Curt Sanburn, former editor of the Honolulu Weekly, sets hapa up as our hope for the future, invoking James Michener’s racist popularization of Hawai‘i’s alleged

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9 I take up hapa identity again in chapter five.
10 I tried a similar strategy when I first entered public school. When called “haole,” I insisted I was “Greek, Mexican, Swiss-German, Swedish,” only to get the response, “whateva, you still haole.”
"Golden Man" (Sanburn 1998). "Hapa" often gets used in conjunction with the discourse espousing "racial harmony" in the islands that I discuss later in this chapter.

**Native Hawaiian and Local Constructions of Haole**

Chicana scholar Angie Chabram-Dernersesian points out that whiteness studies is generally understood as the study of dominant white identities (by white scholars), which leads to static, essentialized notions of whiteness. Little attention has been paid to the ways people of color construct whiteness, despite the richness of that literature. She finds that counterdiscourses of whiteness within her community serve multiple purposes. They help Chicanas/os: navigate the social text; name social relations; negotiate a political identity (Chicana/o); think about other forms of oppression; and imagine different social locations for self and others (Chabram-Dernersesian 1999, 111).

I believe the discourse of haole plays similar roles for Kanaka Maoli and locals, which could be part of the reason why many from those communities are angered by suggestions that it be banned. It is not just that "haole" is a legitimate Hawaiian (and now Hawaiian Creole English) word, more importantly; it is an *extremely useful political* word. Haole as a discourse does not translate to "white" or "Caucasian" as many haoles would like to suggest.

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11 Michener writes, "...this unique contribution of Hawaii to the rest of the world, did not depend for his genesis upon racial intermarriage at all. He was a product of the mind. He was a way of thought, and not of birth...His awareness of the future and his rare ability to stand at the conflux of the world he owed to his understanding of the movements around him" (Michener 1959, 891). At the very end of the tome, we are supposed to be surprised when Michener identifies himself as a "Golden Man."

12 There is, for example, no argument about whether people should keep peppering their speech with the more benign "puka" or "pau."
(Viotti 1995) because it carries with it the legacy of colonization. Clearly counterdiscourses of haole help in the navigation of social relations, the naming of colonial processes, and the exposing of haole hegemony. It is also useful to think about the ways it allows for the negotiation of Kanaka Maoli and local political identities.

Chabram-Dernersesian defines “whiteness on the other side” as a construction of whiteness which,

Involves a kind of “decoding” position that is at odds with the preferred meanings that are encoded in hegemonic renditions of whiteness, which make it coterminous with that which is legitimate and “natural” about the social order. ... its meanings are “detotalized” in order to “retotalize” the message within an alternative framework (Chabram-Dernersesian 1999, 115).

Through this dynamic undoing and reconfiguring, whiteness is “intentionally deterritorialized from the center of Chicana/o identities, subjectivities, and political geographies” and, in effect, the “hegemonic character of whiteness is bracketed” (Chabram-Dernersesian 1999, 116). This idea of “bracketing” whiteness seems quite useful. It resonates with similar discourses in whiteness studies regarding “marking” and “making visible” the workings of whiteness, but they have the drawback of sliding toward the notion of a preexisting essentialized transparency. Bracketing seems potentially more useful in that it suggests not simply calling attention to, but actively decentering by temporary holding aside or segregating.

Local and Hawaiian counterdiscourses of haole involve similar elements of “deterritorializing,” “detotalizing” and “retotalizing.” They decenter haole, calling it into question, obstructing its efforts at naturalization. These counterdiscourses are now quite interrelated, but understanding them more fully
requires looking at their evolution. Kanaka Maoli experience with, and therefore discourse about, haole has a longer history than that of the local, and is founded in colonialism. The relationship between the local and the haole began in sugar and pineapple plantations almost a century later.

Native Hawaiian Constructions

The early Kanaka Maoli understanding of the haole is the subject of much debate and an area requiring much more research. Hawaiian language primary sources have barely been tapped for what they might yield on the subject, limiting the current discussion to English language sources. Much of what we currently understand about Hawaiian historiography will inevitably change, including what we know about early Hawaiian constructions of haole, once these sources are researched.

The breadth of the contemporary arguments run from whether the Kanaka believed Captain Cook was a god, to why the ali‘i enlisted haole as leaders and advisers, to why the ali‘i “easily” accepted Christianity and Western law. Clearly, just as haole constructions of themselves changed, so too did Kanaka Maoli constructions of haole – many of which were undoubtedly quite different than the image the haole was presenting (or in the case of contemporary debates, re-presenting).

Anthropologists have engaged in considerable debate over whether or not Captain Cook was misrecognized as the god Lono. The notion of Cook as a god has been perpetuated in popular discourse. In her dissertation, Lydia K. Kualapai writes, “the Eurocentric myth of preliterate natives venerating the awesome white man as a god has been central to the colonial discourse about Hawai‘i since the early nineteenth century” (Kualapai 2001, 18). The scaffolding
provided by this narrative supports the subsequent positionings by haole discussed earlier. If the natives believed the haole to be a god once, surely the haole can be savior of the people, the land, the government, and the territory. Kualapai and others pay attention to a more nuanced understanding of traditional Kanaka Maoli politics and cosmology. Many contend that there was no misrecognition of Cook, rather ali’i actions were prompted by political necessity.

Political necessity also seems to be a key to understanding ali‘i willingness to rely on haole as advisors and to convert to Christianity and Western law. Rather than adopting a foreign ideology of racial hierarchy or seeing god-like qualities in the haole, the ali‘i were accessing their rapidly changing world and making strategic judgments influenced by crisis, power and desire. Osorio submits:

It is even conceivable that the chiefs saw their role in very traditional ways. If it was haole power that mattered in the world now, then it was up to the Ali‘i to mediate that power to the rest of the community in the same way that the sacred chiefs had once mediated the power of Kū and Lono (Osorio 2002).

As is often the case, those with less power, and alternate desires, made different assessments of the haole (of course, as Osorio just pointed out, they also had less responsibility vis-à-vis the haole). As Kamakau (Kamakau 1992), Osorio (Osorio 2002), and Merry (Merry 2000) contend, the maka‘ainana were much more skeptical of and resistant to haole leadership and the imposition of Western law than were the ali‘i. Kamakau writes about the conversion to Western law:

The truth was, they were laws to change the old laws of the natives of the land and cause them to lick ti leaves like the dogs and gnaw bones thrown at the feet of strangers, while the strangers became their lords, and the hands and voices of strangers were raised over those of the native race. The commoners knew this and one and all expressed their disapproval
and asked the king not to place foreigners in the offices of government lest the native race become a footstool for the foreigners (Kamakau 1992, 339).

If, in the first century after contact, the ali‘i tried to mediate haole power and the maka‘ainana tried to resist it, Kanaka Maoli across the board saw the haole as increasingly mattering. In the above citations, Kamakau writes of “strangers becoming lords” and Osorio indicates “it was haole power that mattered in the world now.” I think it is safe to say that in the diversity of early native constructions of haole, the common thread was anxiety over how haole mattered.13

After over two centuries of trying to understand, approximate, mitigate and resist haole power, Hawaiians are experts on the subject. Kanaka Maoli discourses of haole share a good deal with local discourses, but with a colonial difference. Of all Hawai‘i’s diverse populations, the indigenous population consistently falls to the bottom of all the quality of life scales: highest unemployment; lowest life expectancy; highest alcohol and drug problems; disproportionately high welfare representation; disproportionately high incarceration; disproportionately low educational achievement; highest rate of hypertension and diabetes and so forth (McGregor 1989; Kelly forthcoming). Contemporary native Hawaiian constructions of haole are intrinsically tied to their experience of these conditions – the present-day manifestations of colonization – and their resistance to them. Haoles are “interlopers,” colonizers

13 It is interesting that anxiety seemed to be the key element to both early Hawaiian and haole constructions of haole. Haole anxiety over being engulfed by “the savage” caused larger than life self-representations. Native anxiety over these grandiose representations and their violent consequences prompted their resentment and caution.
and occupiers who have succeeded in making Hawaiians “strangers in our own land” (Trask 2002, 256). In Native Daughter, Trask writes:

We have been occupied by a colonial power whose every law, policy, cultural institution, and collective behavior entrench foreign ways of life in our land and on our people. From the banning of our language and the theft of our sovereignty to forcible territorial incorporation in 1959 as a state of the United States, we have lived as a subordinated Native people in our ancestral home (Trask 1993, 23).

These constructions can fix haole and Kanaka Maoli in polarized oppositions that fail to recognize their interrelation, contradictions, contingency, and complexity. Yet, most Hawaiian nationalists find space for haole allies. Haunani-Kay Trask writes that there are “haole exceptions” who have proven themselves in years of struggle. “Haole who honestly support us, do so without loud pronouncements about how they feel what we feel or how they know just what we mean. Moreover, they readily acknowledge our leadership...” (Trask 1993, 251). On the question of allies, Kekuni Blaisdell, who has a Japanese hanai son says, “those who share [Kanaka Maoli] values are welcome. We hanai you if you want to live our way” (Blaisdell 2003). Lilikalā Kameʻeleihiwa says that the old saying about allies used to be “if you can cook, you can stay” and the new maxim should be, “if you love and support us, you can stay” (Kameʻeleihiwa and Spivak 2003). These sentiments echo some of the Native American views on “ethnic switching” discussed earlier.

An exploration of the etymology of “haole” reveals a bit more about Kanaka Maoli constructions of haole. The word “haole” was used in pre-contact days although its exact meaning is uncertain (and would be nearly impossible to convey in translation to English). Its earliest use seems to mostly refer to things that were foreign, not from Hawai‘i. The Pukui-Elbert Hawaiian dictionary gives
its definition as, “White person, American, Englishman, Caucasian; American, English; formerly, any foreigner; foreign, introduced, of foreign origin, as plants, pigs, chickens…” (Pukui and Elbert 1986, 58). So it seems that the word’s general evolution went from foreign, to white person, to its complex set of meanings today reflecting over two hundred years of colonization.

It is worth noting that I found a folk etymology of “haole” popping up everywhere in my research, even among well-respected scholars. It is frequently reported “haole” originally meant “without breath.” This etymology is derived from splitting the word, adding emphasis to the “a,” and adding a glottal stop: “hā ole,” “hā” meaning breath and “‘ole” meaning without or lacking.

Diacritical marks are critically important in Hawaiian, signifying different pronunciations that in turn – given the oral tradition – constitute different meanings. One interpretation of “hā ole” is that it referred to haoles’ greeting which differed from the Kanaka Maoli rubbing of faces and sharing of breath. A slightly different interpretation says it indicated that haole were not to be greeted in this traditional way by Kanaka Maoli. Hawaiian language scholars, including Noenoe Silva, doubt the “without breath” stories due to lack of evidence. The fact that this interpretation persists however, flags a continuing Kanaka Maoli desire to mark haole as outsiders, those to regard with learned caution.

Local Constructions

This evolution of the word haole ushers us neatly into consideration of local constructions of haole. Haole is one of many Hawaiian language words that have become incorporated into Hawai‘i Creole English (HCE), the language of local. If haole-Hawaiian relations find their basis in colonization, haole-local
relations were molded in Hawai‘i’s plantations, where local itself had its beginnings.

The past three decades have seen an explosion of local literature, arts, and cultural studies. Within local cultural studies, two of the strongest debates revolve around origins and definitions of local and whether the local can exist harmoniously along side Hawaiian sovereignty politics. While almost all scholars credit the plantation for the creation of local, there is debate between those who emphasize plantation politics and those who look more toward plantation culture – as though culture and politics were easily split. The question of the origin of the local involves the local construction of haole since they are relational. Further, some argue that the local emerged as an identity of resistance, as a counter stance to haole, and thus is much more about politics than culture. In this discourse, the foundational production of the haole is as the greedy plantation owner. Jonathan Okamura is the strongest proponent of this view, taking it so far as to say that cultural elements of the local are “trivial” (Okamura 1998). Okamura and those who emphasize local as resistant also tend to construct haole fairly rigidly. Haole is the anti-local, everything the local is not. These constructions can disregard haole-Hawaiian relations and colonization.

One mainland scholar has gone so far in this direction as to place the origins of haole, not just local, in the plantation. She writes, “the consolidation of haole as a racial category occurred with the development of the plantation and the need for the small proprietorial and managerial class to distinguish itself from workers” (Glenn 2002, 207). Such a view erases a hundred years of haole colonization and haole-Hawaiian relations, making it seem as if haoles decided
to gather themselves as an elite class at the advent of plantation agriculture. While the plantation was undoubtedly the origin of the local’s haole, as I have shown, it was certainly not the origin of the Hawaiian’s haole, or even haole’s “consolidation” and depiction of themselves as a group.

The contending group of local scholars argues that local culture and identity are not simply reactions to the haole. For them, many elements of the local have little if anything to do with haole. This group is divided between those who want to promote the local as a model of multicultural harmony (Grant and Ogawa 1993; Takaki 1983) and those who are unwilling to smooth over contestations within the local (Kubo 1997; Fujikane 2000; Chang 1995).

The multiculturalists tend to deemphasize the negative aspects of haole. Haole is just one of many groups of people living in racial harmony in Hawai‘i. Those who are willing to problematize the local, see identities as much more complicated, intersected and conflicted. They tend to recognize the history of colonialism as driven by the haole, but not without the complicity of some segments of the local, particularly local Japanese. Also for them, some locals can be as haole as the most haole of haoles. They recognize the relational, contingent character of identity production and see that if in the last century the dominant triangulation of social identities in Hawai‘i was Hawaiian/Asian/White, it is now Kanaka Maoli/Local/Haole. Heated debates rage regarding the firmness and the elasticity of the boundaries between these identities.

The processes of racialization involved in the plantation system have been well documented.14 They included physical and social segregation, the pitting of racial/ethnic groups against one another, discriminatory laws and contracts,

14 For more on the plantation system see: (Takaki 1983; Fuchs 1961; Kent 1983).
physical violence and coercion, and a racist dominant discourse. The main
distinction to be upheld through these systems was between haoles and labor
(the foundation of the local). Ronald Takaki writes, “As planters imported
workers to meet their labor needs in the nineteenth century, they created a
racially stratified labor structure based on an ideology of white supremacy”
(Takaki 1983, 76). This structure was made manifest in the physical layout of the
plantation:

Indeed the physical organization of plantation housing reflected, as well
as reinforced, a social hierarchy. The manager lived in a mansion with
spacious verandas and white columns overlooking the plantation; his
foremen and technical employees were housed in “handsome bungalow
cottages.” ... workers of different nationalities were usually housed in
separate buildings or camps (Takaki 1983, 93).

This segregation carried over beyond the plantation with haoles
establishing their own institutions (schools, clubs, newspapers, social/business
networks), neighborhoods,15 and intermixing as little as possible with the new
immigrant populations. It is exactly this separation that produced the conditions
giving rise to local culture, language, and politics:

While the haole plantation owners/managers no doubt sought to keep the
great unwashed masses at a safe distance, this separation had the
concomitant effect of keeping the haoles away from the immigrants and
shielding them from haole cultural dominance, including language (Kubo
1997, 10).

Kubo goes on to discuss the emergence of Hawaiian Creole English (HCE) and
other elements of local culture.

One of the things visitors and scholars frequently note is the extent to
which people in Hawai‘i openly categorize each other by race. This makes many

15 In the 1930s, a study showed that 80% of Mānoa property was owned by haoles (Rosa
2000, 98).
"mainlanders" uncomfortable since they are used to a culture that politely
pretends to be colorblind. One of the mainstays of local culture is the way it
marks, stereotypes and pokes fun at the different groups in the islands. Haole is
far from exempt. Hawai’i’s comedians rely heavily on this culture of
racial/ethnic humor and their retort to those who get offended is “wat, no can
take one joke?” Kubo ties local humor to the cultural importance of humility
(often reinforced by teasing):

Local humor acts to keep us from thinking too much of ourselves... One
of the ways it does this is by calling attention to race and ethnicity. It
takes that which has been a tool of oppression, of public and private
shame and humiliation, and through caricature and parody transforms it
into a source of humor (Kubo 1997, 58).

In HCE, the language of the local, haole definitely is as much about how
one acts as anything else. In *Pidgin to Da Max*, an early reference on HCE, haole
is defined as “Caucasian, or someone who acts like one” and the very next listing
is “Haolefied: Just like a haole. ‘George went mainlan’ an’ he wen come back so
haolefied I hahdly knew heem!’” (Simonson 1981). While there are all sorts of
constructions of haole in local culture, for the most part they are variations on a
theme. Haole in local discourse is generally arrogant, aggressive, ignorant of
island culture(s) and histories, greedy, loud, and rude. Haole stubbornly
continues to be “foreign,” will not or cannot adapt to the island environment and
culture:

Stereotypes...help grease the wheels of interethnic interaction. They
remind us that others’ behavior cannot be judged through our own
specific ethnic/cultural lenses. “Haole ‘as why,’” depersonalizes and
defuses behavior that might otherwise be interpreted as rude within one’s
own cultural standards. This understanding of behavior as determined by
culture and the recognition of variation between cultures creates space, a
kind of leeway, in which cross-cultural interactions can take place (Kubo
1997, 58).
The “deterritorializing” of haole within local discourse is familiar to those who have spent time in the islands. A self-made bumper sticker on a customized pick-up truck I observed one day read “Locals Only: We Grew Here, U Flew Here.” While the “locals only” phrase is common, the second part more specifically does the work of marking haole as outside, neither “legitimate” in, nor “natural” to, Hawai‘i. At the same time, it counters white ethnocentrism by suggesting that, while locals proved their strength and commitment by “growing” here, haoles came by plane, taking the easy route to Hawai‘i.

An incident in a class at the University of Hawai‘i relates. A haole student from California on a one-year exchange program ended up in one of my classes. Almost from day one, she defensively expressed irritation at being called out as a haole, being “deterritorialized.” After a few weeks listening to this student, our professor spoke from her fifty-some years in Hawai‘i. She instructed: “You have three choices. You can be a haole, a dumb haole, or a dumb f---ing haole. It’s up to you.” This description stuck with me as it captures the essence of local constructions of haole. Professor Turnbull elaborated later that at the first level, haole is simply a descriptor, used as any racial descriptor is used in Hawai‘i. The level of “dumb haole” involves a socio-cultural “not noticing,” such as not bringing food to a gathering, or kicking sand on someone as you run past (Turnbull 2004). Locals will tolerate a certain amount of this behavior, especially in newcomers (“haole ‘as why”), but “dumb f---ing haoles” are never allowed to go unchallenged. They cross the line from relatively benign ignorance to belligerent disrespect for people and place.

The case of Portuguese immigrants illuminates the way racialization often creates its own paradoxes and contradictions, and is therefore inherently
unstable. The haole elite manipulated Portuguese racialization to fit their various needs. Imported to work on the plantations, the Portuguese were put in position as lunas (field bosses), bridging the ever-widening distance between haole managers and workers. They were given this high position in the racial plantation hierarchy due to their assumed “racial closeness” to the haole:

Their hulking size in comparison to the Asians, their European language base, and their Caucasian features associated them with the power elite, while their dark complexions and non-Anglo customs linked them to the working immigrant class...While the Anglo remained separate and aloof from the workers, assuming a status accorded racially based deference symbolized in their sometimes being known as “Father” and “Mother” to the workers, the Portuguese luna took the brunt of hostility, resentment, and rebellion (Grant and Ogawa 1993, 144).

The Portuguese luna enjoyed perks to maintain their loyalty to the haole manager, but they were never considered haole – except when it suited the elite, such as when Thurston wanted to represent Hawai‘i as essentially white and therefore included them in the demographic count. Evidence of the precarious position of the Portuguese is also found in their disenfranchisement following the overthrow. In his letter seeking advice on the construction of a new constitution, Sanford Dole singled out “natives and Portuguese” for disenfranchisement because he felt they were “ignorant of the principles of government” (Dole as quoted in Castle 1981, 27).

In processes similar to those involved in the racialization of native Hawaiians, Portuguese were partially included at times, and wholly excluded at others. The borders of haole, local, and Hawaiian were continually reworked around, and with, them. In an article about race relations in Hawai‘i during World War II, Beth Bailey and David Farber write:

“Caucasian” meant little to island residents. The more important category in Hawaii was “haole” (literally “stranger”), a term with a complicated
history that by 1940 designated the relatively affluent whites of Northern European ancestry. Members of ethnic groups that had come to Hawaii to do plantation work, no matter how light-skinned, were not considered haoles. Thus Caucasian Portuguese and Puerto Ricans were not haoles (and were listed in census data as “other Caucasians”). Haoles made up less than 15% of the islands’ population. The term “local” often designated the rest of the islands’ peoples (Bailey and Farber 1993, 818-19).

Hawai'i could use more scholarship on local constructions of haole that moves beyond the polarized debate over whether local is simply the flip side of haole. Clearly the relationship is more complex. One starting point could be Chabram-Dernersesian’s notion of how “counterdiscourses of whiteness” serve multiple purposes in non-white communities. How do the counterdiscourses of haole in Kanaka Maoli and local communities serve those communities? How does the fluidity of Hawaiian and local constructions of haole — colonizer, ally, oppressor, anyone acting superior — help those communities navigate a sea of social and political relations? A sea where the aggressive, insatiable haole tsunami often looms large.

Two Contemporary Discourses of Racial Politics in Hawai'i

There are two dominant discourses of racial politics in Hawai'i. The first is the well-worn discourse of racial harmony that represents Hawai'i as an idyllic racial paradise where there is no racial conflict or inequality. Frequently contrasting the islands with the “racist mainland,” this discourse circulates among many communities and is widely referenced. There is also a competing discourse of discrimination against non-locals that contends haoles and non-local people of color are treated unfairly and with disrespect in Hawai'i. As negative referents for each other, these discourses in many ways reinforce one another
and are historically linked, as illustrated in the Massie incident. I look at the
discourses separately, then explore their interrelationship through the Massie
case, and finally suggest a third way of thinking about racial politics in Hawaiʻi
that breaks free of the not racist/racist dyad.

Racial Harmony Discourse

The discourse of racial harmony has been given decades of play by
academics, politicians, writers, and the Hawaiʻi Visitors Bureau. Three
mainland-trained sociologists, Romanzo Adams, Andrew Lind and Bernhard
Hormann, taught or highly influenced by Robert Ezra Park (a well-known liberal
race relations theorist from Chicago who took an interest in Hawaiʻi), built the
academic foundation of this discourse in the decades between the 1920s and the
80s. Romanzo Adams is credited as the first person to describe Hawaiʻi as a
“racial melting pot” in 1926 (Okamura 1998, 267), and Andrew Lind made a
career for himself fortifying that metaphor into the 1980s. Lind wrote, “the
important and distinctive fact about Hawaiian [sic] race relations is, of course,
the existence of a code of equalitarian relations which is deeply rooted in and
had developed out of customary conduct of a similar nature” (as quoted in

Their model constructs Hawaiʻi as exceptional in its lack of racial
prejudice, its egalitarian relations, and its opportunities for non-white upward
mobility. Not much attempt is made to square this model with Hawaiʻi’s
colonial history (not to mention its pre-colonial history), which Lind brushes off
as “benign and democratic” in nature (as quoted in Chang 1995, 22). Neither
does this model, in its “liberalizing and insistently racializing” character, break
with the "pencant for the naturalness and unfragmentability of 'whites'"
(Dominguez 1986, 12).

Hawai‘i was (and still is to some extent) perceived as an amazing "racial
laboratory" by academics eager to study it, some with more sensitivity and
success than others. Historian Lawrence Fuchs, ends his canonical *Hawaii Pono*
thus:

Hawaii illustrates the nation's revolutionary message of equality of
opportunity for all, regardless of background, color or religion. This is the
promise of Hawaii, a promise for the entire nation and, indeed, the world,
that peoples of different races and creeds can live together, enriching each
other, in harmony and democracy (Fuchs 1961, 449).

So compelling (and selling) was this idea of Hawai‘i’s exceptionalism that it
quickly became integrated into local discourse, political speeches, novels, and
tourist propaganda. In fact, its perpetuation became critical as a key argument
for those who championed statehood and needed to reassure a race-anxious
continent that the natives were not restless, but rather docile and happy. Three
key factors are reiterated in the literature as the basis for Hawai‘i’s racial
harmony: the “welcoming” nature of the host culture; the lack of a racial
majority; and the high rate of intermarriage. Sociologists and demographers get
particularly excited about this combination of factors, waxing eloquently about
Hawai‘i’s “melting pot” or “ethnic mosaic.” While all of these claims have some
basis, this discourse exaggerates and manipulates them and ignores complicating
data. I explore each of the three elements in turn.

The “prostitution” (to use Haunani-Kay Trask’s metaphor) of the “aloha
spirit” has been the subject of much analysis. The “aloha spirit” provided the
cornerstone in constructing the idea of Hawai‘i’s racial harmony. Stripped of
cultural context and the material reality of today’s Kanaka Maoli population, it
acts as a powerful free-floating metaphor opportunistically invoked in order to assure everyone that they are not just welcomed, but invited to make themselves at home in Hawai‘i. Trask ties this appropriation back to claims to being “Hawaiian at heart:”

The cheapening of Hawaiian culture (e.g., the traditional value of *aloha* as reciprocal love and generosity now used to sell everything from cars and plumbing to securities and air conditioning) is so complete that non-Hawaiians, at the urging of the tourist industry and the politicians, are transformed into “Hawaiians at heart,” a phrase that speaks worlds about how grotesque the theft of things Hawaiian has become (Trask 1993, 3).

Rona Tamiko Halualani provides an analysis that puts this appropriation in the context of (mis)recognition and reinscription by the dominant culture:

The notion that “Hawaiians are inherently generous” is a vested rereading and (mis)recognition of the philosophical concepts of *aloha‘aina* (love and respect for the land), *Aloha* (sharing, exchange in reciprocity), and *‘ohana* (family, kinship, and interdependence). These are reinscribings that mimic a native being and stand as distortions tightly guaranteeing a one-way line of compassion and charity (Halualani 2002, 23).

The perceived importance of a lack of racial majority is cited repeatedly by scholars along with the story of how former Governor John Burns, when asked what the biggest threat to Hawai‘i was, scribbled “51%” on a pad of paper (Blair 1998, 50; Grant and Ogawa 1993, 152). Burns and many others believed, and continue to believe, that if any race were to gain a demographic majority it would spell the end of racial paradise. Dennis Ogawa and Glenn Grant reaffirm this notion in their 1993 article “Living Proof? Is Hawaii the Answer?:”

In the absence of a single racial majority, the result has been the creation of a new culture that reflects the legacy of *aloha* and points of commonality – a truly diverse community that binds Asian, Pacific, and European, and American heritages into a lifestyle shared across the boundaries of race (Grant and Ogawa 1993, 154).
In contrast, Jonathan Okamura, a vocal challenger of the harmony myth, points out that the overemphasis on a lack of a demographic majority draws attention away from questions of hegemony:

The emphasis on demographic population rather than social status, especially in reference to the term "majority," also masks the monopoly for political and economic power wielded by haoles as an oligarchy of planters, merchants, and politicians during much of Hawai‘i's history from the late nineteenth century to the middle of the present century (Okamura 1998, 276).16

Regarding the supposition that intermarriage is one of the keys to paradise, statistics generally are given for the population as a whole and fail to reveal that haoles and Japanese actually have comparatively low rates of intermarriage (Nordyke 1989, 52). Furthermore, Okamura questions the assumed linkage between intermarriage and harmonious relations: "there has been a decided tendency to overemphasize the significance of outmarriage on the overall quality of interethnic relations in Hawai‘i. High rates of intermarriage may indicate an ethnically tolerant society but not necessarily a harmonious or egalitarian one" (Okamura 1998, 269). Clearly more research is needed before anything conclusive can be said about this relationship (and let it not go unnoticed that there is a heterosexist ideology operating here).

Virginia Dominguez asks us to question the collection of statistics on intermarriage in the islands in the first place. Her research on the racialization of Hawai‘i’s population through the imposition of the census is an important reminder that racial categorization was not "native," but a process imbedded in

16 Studies of specific institutions, including the University of Hawai‘i (Johnsrud and Sadao 1998), show haole hegemony alive and well.
colonialism. The collection of quantitative data on intermarriage began in the 1920s as the discourse of racial harmony was being constructed:

Obviously a great deal of marriage and parenting in Hawai‘i goes on now— as it apparently has for far longer— without much evidence of people caring about the lines of demarcation introduced by mainland Americans and institutionally transported to Hawai‘i in the hundred years of Americanization... They make the institutional commitment to a racial taxonomy much more poignant, for they show that it goes on even in the face of personal and familial actions that constantly complicate the classification system beyond belief and arguably call the usefulness of their resulting numbers much into question (Dominguez 1998, 11).

Dominguez makes clear that those collecting the data imbued it with meaning that those actually participating in the “intermarriages” did not share. Generally for them, intermarriage was not remarkable as they did not share the same assumptions that there are racially demarcated groups or that such groups tend toward segregation. Both the racial harmony and the racial discrimination discourses start from the assumption of naturalized racial categories and racial conflict, and then ask how to minimize racial conflict. My intent is to take a step back and question those assumptions, to ask how we come to have racial categories and how they come to matter.

**Discourse of Discrimination against Non-locals**

The discourse of discrimination against non-locals (most often meaning haole, but also voiced by Blacks and Filipinos) has been less prevalent, or perhaps just less public, than the racial harmony discourse, and has a shorter history. Yet, in the wake of the *Rice* decision and the forced admission of a haole boy into Kamehameha Schools, it is gaining strength. This discourse holds that Hawaiians/locals exclude, discriminate against, and even attack non-locals simply because of their non-localness. At its most benign, non-locals complain they are ignored or that locals are rude to them. More serious are charges of
discrimination in housing, state services, and employment. At the far end of the spectrum are claims of property damage and physical violence.

This discourse has gone through a number of transformations, just as have haole constructions of themselves. During early colonial and territorial periods, it mostly took the form of a fear of "savage," then "local," anti-haole violence (I discuss this more in relation to the Massie case). It surfaced again in the 1970s largely in response to the Ariyoshi administration and its policies. During this decade, Japanese were moving into positions of power and determined to hold on to it. Many undertook and institutionalized an effort to reinforce the representation of haoles and Filipinos as "non-locals" who were flooding Hawai'i and should be kept out. Efforts were made to put caps on immigration and create residency requirements for state employment and welfare (Haas 1992, 63-67). While not all of these policies were successful (some were instituted only to be struck down by the courts), they contributed to a discourse and sentiment against non-locals.

Jeffrey Kin Wah Chang has painstakingly documented perhaps the most widespread discrimination against Filipinos and haoles during this period – the employment practices of the Department of Education. Discrimination was a problem across state agencies but most prevalent in the D.O.E., Chang conjectures, because of the D.O.E.'s decentralized hiring processes that enabled favoritism to trump merit (Chang 1995, 68). In the 1970s haoles began to file affirmative action complaints in large numbers. This caused a number of federal investigations resulting in a bitter battle between local Japanese administrators and "mainland" (mostly haole) bureaucrats. Japanese locals complained that the "hippie type" applicants had no real intention of working but were applying
because it was a requirement of the welfare system that they be actively looking for work (Chang 1994, 62).\textsuperscript{17} The Japanese \textit{nisei} justified their overrepresentation through an ideology of assimilation and meritocracy, which was harder to support when complaints began coming from Filipino immigrants who had lived in the islands for years (Chang 1994, 64). D.O.E. administrators then used American citizenship requirements, Standard English tests, and assimilation requirements to exclude Filipinos, ironically some of the same tools colonial \textit{haoles} used to exclude locals (Chang 1994, 77).

The discourse of prejudice against non-locals has continued to the present day, even though the institutional policies and official rhetoric against non-locals largely ended in the late 1970s (Haas 1992, 67). Complaints circulate in popular media (especially letters to the editor) and social circles, often raised by new arrivals. The perception of anti-haole sentiment seems widespread on the continent, and it is possible that it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy for some.\textsuperscript{18}

Take this example from a 2000 letter to the editor:

I did not believe my husband's recruiting employer when he warned us of the prejudice against haoles. We felt we were a well-rounded, culturally sensitive family who had lived in several other counties outside the United States without difficulties. I believe him now, and want to move home (Ballard and Ballard 2000).

\textsuperscript{17} It was during this same period that my father, a long-haired hippie, successfully worked as a substitute in Kaua'i elementary schools. His popularity among teachers (teachers got to request their substitute) and dispatchers was probably due to his popularity with students and the fact that he did not threaten their jobs. Had he applied for a full-time position, the discrimination Chang documents might have surfaced.

\textsuperscript{18} My anecdotal evidence for this comes from my experience writing this dissertation on the continent. Unless I am explicit about my politics, white people frequently hear my topic, "haoles in Hawai'i," as a sign of racial allegiance. More than once I have had someone launch into a story about some "anti-haole" incident he/she, a friend, or a family member, experienced while on vacation.
I will come back to this issue in my discussion of the contemporary construction of haole as a victim. Before leaving this section I want to address the issue of violence.

Hawai‘i only just belatedly passed a hate crimes bill and began collecting hate crimes statistics, so it is impossible to make any quantitative determinations about anti-haole violence. Emblematic of anti-haole violence is the specter of “Kill Haole Day” in the public school system. The day terrorized haole kids and was so often referred to that it was discussed by the state legislature in debate over hate crimes legislation in 1999, though the representatives were unable to point to any concrete incidents (Gima 1999). This is not to suggest that haole kids were/are not beaten up, but that the anxiety over the day may have outstripped the reality.

When incidents of racial violence against haoles do occur, they tend to get media and political attention with lots of finger-pointing but little analysis. The establishment admonishes local folks to, “show more aloha,” the unspoken threat being potential negative impacts on tourism. Individual haoles feel emboldened to make sweeping generalizations about their mistreatment by locals and their lack of safety. The discussion rarely rises to a level of considering the legacies of colonialism, including haole racism and violence against locals (when haole military personal are involved, the negative impacts of living in the most militarized “state” in the nation are ignored). While in no way condoning or diminishing the violence, I am suggesting that this type of

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19 Specifically, some legislators argued against a hate crimes bill because they feared the practice of “kill haole day” would open the state to lawsuits if such a bill passed.
superficial treatment is not productive because it fails to look at either the scope of the problem or its root causes.

Massie Case and the Dominant Discourses of Racial Politics in Hawai‘i

The Massie case offers an example of how the two discourses of racial politics in Hawai‘i – racial paradise versus caldron of local prejudice and violence – mirror each other and enable the various constructions of haole, local, and Hawaiian, often reinforcing haole hegemony. In 1931 when the sensationalized news of the alleged rape of Navy wife Thalia Massie hit the presses, it had huge local and national impact. The business establishment and military in Honolulu were worried about the story having a negative impact on expanding tourism and militarism and tried to keep a lid on it. After the jury deadlocked and defendant Joseph Kahahawai was murdered by Massie’s husband and mother (with the help of two other Navy men), the story was all over the news (Stannard 2001).

The story that was reported, however, was not about an innocent Hawaiian man murdered by Navy men and a vengeful mother. Instead, the colonial imagery of Hawai‘i as a savage land where white women, and all “civilized” persons were unsafe had a resurgence. A syndicated Hearst editorial declared Hawai‘i to be a place where “the roads go through jungles, and in those remote places bands of degenerate natives lie in wait for white women driving by” (as quoted in Stannard 2001). Time Magazine went even further, blaming Kahahawai for his own murder, describing him and his co-defendants as “five brown-skinned young bucks” acting out of the “lust of mixed breeds for white women” (as quoted in Stannard 2001). Here the discourse of racial conflict is at its highest, inciting outraged Americans to call for the institution of martial law
(ironic, since it was military men who took the law into their own hands with premeditated murder) and the stripping of territorial status from the islands. The situation could not have been more critical for Hawai‘i’s political future.

In order to quell the hysteria, the U.S. Secretary of the Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur dispatched William Atherton Du Puy to “fact find” about the “unprecedented situation that exists in the islands” and to write a report (as quoted in Du Puy 1932, xi). Du Puy’s 131-page report, published in 1932, reads like a travel-log and public relations piece for industry – complete with photos. In an effort to signal its lack of importance, Du Puy does not address the “race problem” until the very end of the report, and then does all he can to dismiss it. He never names the Massie case directly:

There is much talk in the continental press of race antagonisms in Hawaii. This talk is based on a lack of understanding of the relations between the races over there. In the States race conflicts and race prejudices are often intense. In the islands they are practically nonexistent. The masses are of a common, lowly, and unpretentious origin. The whites through a century have felt sympathetic toward them. *The social question of race has never been raised. It does not exist* (emphasis mine Du Puy 1932, 129).

Earlier in the book Du Puy lays the groundwork for this statement. He describes each racial group, and suggests that Hawai‘i’s racial harmony is owing to a three-part combination of: strong, capable leadership of a small group of “white Americans...responsible for the remarkable industrial, commercial, and social development of the islands” (Du Puy 1932, 94); immigrant laborers who were all “accustomed” to “unremitting toil” being as they were “equally lowly, poor, and obscure” in their homelands (Du Puy 1932, 98); and finally, Hawaiians—“a lovable, attractive, and always popular people, they have been furnishing wives for a hundred years to the men of many races who settled here without
bringing their women” (Du Puy 1932, 122). Chang provides the following analysis of Du Puy’s project:

Founded on a racial paternalism rooted in white supremacy but pragmatically tempered by a recognition of white demographic fragility and of the economic necessity of non-white labor, Du Puy’s [sic] structures a new ideology based on faith in the Americanization project and a trust in democratic principles (Chang 1995, 17).

Thus, the political establishment sought to blanket the incident with platitudes about racial harmony and the capable leadership of the haole.

The impact of Du Puy’s report is hard to gauge. The events around Massie however, were not easily swept under the rug of racial-harmony-through-Americanization and are said to have been contributing factors in delaying statehood until 1959 (McDermott, Tseng, and Maretzki 1980, 34). What is interesting is how the case continues to be recruited both by proponents and opponents of the racial harmony discourse. Grant and Ogawa claim that Massie shows the strength of racial harmony since, even in the volatile environment that surrounded the case, “race riots” did not break out (Grant and Ogawa 1993, 147). On the other hand, Eric Yamamoto, following Andrew Lind, fingers the Massie case as the birthplace of local identity, forging collective opposition to haole racism (Yamamoto 1979, 102).

Moving away from this polarization, recent scholarship on Massie suggests a need to reframe the debate about racial politics in Hawai’i. John Rosa and Ty Kāwaika Tengan both see the Thalia Massie’s story as, “a rallying call to the haole community to guard and preserve the gendered boundaries of race and class which maintained white privilege and property in the islands” (Tengan 2002). David Stannard sees the conduct of the defendants and jurors in the
Massie trial as an example of "character and courage" under "extraordinarily difficult circumstances:"

It took character and courage to speak out against the racial and political injustices that permeated life in Hawai'i at the time, at a time when a former Advertiser assistant editor recalled how American naval officers commonly referred to Hawaiians as "niggers" (Stannard 2001).

The analysis of these scholars suggests that rather than construct Massie as all about either racial conflict or racial harmony, it is more useful to look at the various and often conflicting processes of racial production and their relationship to the dominant haole power structure.

A Third Way

The polarized relationship between the two discourses of race in Hawai'i feeds on itself, making it hard to see that a fuller understanding may lay in reconsidering how we ask the question. In Okamura's analysis, the motivation for maintaining the "illusion of paradise" is that it masks the much messier political reality:

This perhaps is the primary reason for the continued insistence that tolerance and congenial coexistence obtain among ethnic groups despite obvious evidence and knowledge to the contrary; it allows multicultural Hawai'i to avoid acknowledging and addressing the differential power and status among groups and the resulting resentment and tensions that have been generated (Okamura 1998, 268).

While I agree for the most part with this analysis, what troubles me about Okamura is that he pushes so hard to make his argument that he tends to flatten out the complexity. For example, as mentioned earlier in this chapter and elsewhere he marks as "trivial" elements of local identity that have to do with
social relations, culture, food and so forth in order to create a totalizing narrative about racial unrest and the rise of the local as strictly an identity of political resistance to the haole. And thus, he falls into the binary trap of seeing Hawai‘i as either full of harmony or full of conflict.

Other scholars (including Stannard, Tengan, and Rosa above) have argued for a more historically based, political and economic examination of racial politics in Hawai‘i. This means disrupting the discourse of racial harmony without exaggerating or sensationalizing racial conflict. This is possible only through an understanding of colonization and racial production in the islands:

Boundaries between groups are relatively fluid, and overt conflict is minimal. Hawaiian society lacks ethnically based group violence and is marked by a high level of interpersonal sharing and tolerance... The myth of multicultural harmony, however, obscures enduring patterns of racism and exclusion, now directed particularly toward people of Hawaiian, Filipino, and Pacific Islander descent. The façade of harmonious multiculturalism conceals long-standing racial discrimination and persisting inequalities... (Merry and Brenneis 2003, 16).

John Kirkpatrick attributes the relative lack of manifest racial conflict in Hawai‘i to some of the same factors as the racial harmonizers, but significantly also includes “haole domination” for the work it does to stamp out local/Hawaiian resistance (Kirkpatrick 1987, 301). Without downplaying haole power, Beth Bailey and David Farber, attribute the latitude given to Black soldiers during World War II to the fact that Hawai‘i was more “progressive” on the issue of race than the continent – “the lines were less absolute, the barriers more permeable”

20 For a study of how these elements are central to the local, see (Kubo 1997).
21 Kirkpatrick, like Okamura and others, overplays the extent to which local identity grew up in response to haole domination. This tends to fix haole identity and disallow local agency and creativity.
(Bailey and Farber 1993, 819). Ferguson and Turnbull remind us to attend to the intersected nature of all social relations:

Central to the streams of order that converge and rebound on Hawai‘i’s present are particular organizations of sex, race, and class as triads of vectors of power: sex/gender, race/ethnicity, and class/property... The terms of these energetic, interactive triangles chase and dodge around one another, powerfully enabling each other while sometimes getting in each other’s way, confounding their dance steps... (Turnbull and Ferguson 1997, 99).

Scholars of local identity worry about the ways both the Harmony and the Conflict discourses tend to homogenize the local and disregard the indigeneity of native Hawaiians. Rosa writes, “Local is a cultural identity, but it is also an inherently political identity that can be used by those who wish to gloss over and minimize the historical differences between Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians” (Rosa 2000, 101). Chang voices a similar concern:

When Asian American scholars discussed the idea of the Local, they de-emphasized the tensions and conflicts inherent in its formation. They argued that this new panethnic identity intended to supplant oppressive, unequal relations with pluralistic, egalitarian relations. But even a radically plural conception of the Local tended to mask over large gaps in status and power between Asian and Pacific Islander ethnic groups (Chang 1995, 25).

In arguing for a less rigid, more nuanced understanding of the local, Kubo writes, “communities do not travel or ‘progress’ in straight lines. Because they are inherently made up of multiple intersecting relationships, communities twist and turn, double back, and sometimes end up not very far from where they began” (Kubo 1997, 7).

A new discourse of racial politics in Hawai‘i is emerging which takes all of this nuance, complexity and contradiction into account. It recognizes the struggle in the local between polarized constructions of politics and culture. It
highlights tensions between local representations of racial harmony and conflict within the local, as well as local complicity in native Hawaiian dispossession. This new discourse provides a historical framework for native Hawaiian debates over identification by race or nation, and various sovereignty models. It disrupts haole attempts to claim victim status by instead centering a critical analysis of colonization.

**Contemporary Haole Constructions of Haole as Victim**

The most omnipresent and disturbing construction of haole today is that of victim of alleged discrimination and prejudice, what some refer to as “reverse racism.” The notion of haole victimization certainly is not new; I have explored earlier renditions of it in the Massie case and during the 1970s clashes over affirmative action. I have also noted a tendency for it to be most loudly proclaimed by haole newcomers across the decades (especially those in the military whose isolation from local culture, and indoctrination into an Us- Them ideology, inhibits their acculturation). The *Rice* case provides some of the best material for analyzing this construction and I do that in chapter three. In this section, I look at haole victimization as articulated by newcomers by exploring the Joey Carter–Haunani-Kay Trask controversy. I further look at the charge that haole is derogatory, constituting a verbal attack, with discussion of debate over a 1995 Civil Rights Commission case. Finally, I offer an analysis of a popular article and an academic paper to demonstrate the variability and spread of this construction.

In 1990 an exchange in the University of Hawai‘i student newspaper, *Ka Leo*, between Professor Haunani-Kay Trask and undergraduate Joey Carter
launched a huge controversy over the use of the word "haole" (Carter 1990; Trask 1990). In the hurricane of letters, petitions, articles, forums, cartoons and flyers that followed, the frame was shifted from a discussion of haole and Hawai‘i’s history of colonization to a debate over whether or not Trask was being racist. Calling someone “haole” was likened to calling someone “nigger.” Similarly, the experience of being a haole in Hawai‘i was equated with being an African American on the continent (Trask: Racist or Righteous? 1990). Trask’s letter was said to constitute harassment and many (led by faculty from the U.H. Philosophy Department) called for her removal from her position as director of the Center for Hawaiian Studies. Trask fought back and was ultimately not fired, but not much was gained toward building a fuller understanding of haole’s place and history in Hawai‘i.

The debate over the word arose again in 1995 when a case before the state Civil Rights Commission made the news. A former haole employee sued her local Japanese employer charging he used “haole” as a racial slur against her. Amidst the controversy, the Honolulu Advertiser editorialized that “haole” was “either innocent or offensive, depending on its use” (Talking Haole: No Offense on Its Face 1995). The Civil Rights Commission ultimately agreed, ruling against the employer because he called the employee “f---ing haole,” but maintaining that “haole” by itself was not a slur (Matsunaga 1995). Again, the discussion remained on the level of semantics without delving into the processes of colonization and racialization from which haole originates.

Reporter Vicki Viotti followed up a month later with a feature article in the Honolulu Advertiser, “Haole: is it a dirty word?” (Viotti 1995). Viotti interviewed a number of people and investigated the etymology of the word.
The responses she got speak to the continuing contentiousness of the term: a few haoles, including professor Noel Kent and “Haole boy” playwright Mark Pinkosh, tried to put a multicultural gloss on it; a local haole understood its nuance; a local Asian student was ambivalent about it (or perhaps just uninterested); most haoles were offended by it; and Hawaiian Studies professor Kanalu Young was the only one to attempt to historicize it. But newspaper articles are not the best place for in-depth analysis, as is evident by the framing of the question by Viotti, and so the discussion remained relatively shallow.

The notion of the victimization of haole is often expressed in short letters to the editor or newspaper columns, but two relatively recent longer pieces provide ample material for analysis. Curt Sanburn, the former editor of the Honolulu Weekly, published a feature article in 1998 entitled “Growing up Haole: A reflection on race in Hawai‘i from ‘Iolani to Island politics” (Sanburn 1998). Sanburn writes about feeling out of place and ostracized as the “Ur-haole” at ‘Iolani because his classmates “fixated on [his] haole-ness and never let up” (Sanburn 1998, 6).22 Unable or unwilling to locate himself in Hawai‘i’s history, Sanburn complains about social segregation and finally condemns “provincial localism.”

The politics of exclusion, born out of resentment, aren’t working. When we discount newcomers and their ideas simply because they were born elsewhere, when moral authority is only granted to people who can tell us what high school they went to, that’s when our provincialism – our lack of worldliness – becomes the essence of stupidity and stops progress dead in its tracks (Sanburn 1998, 8).

22 Following patterns of historical racial segregation in island education, ‘Iolani is a predominantly Japanese private school in Honolulu. Punahou is predominantly haole and Mid-Pacific is mostly local, with many dorming Pacific Islanders. In general, a class divide separates these student populations from those in public schools.
This complaint about Hawai‘i is often voiced by haoles who feel excluded without giving much reflection to the history that has built local culture. Earlier in the article, Sanburn makes passing reference to Hawai‘i’s plantation history as “too much baggage” which keeps people apart. Further, Sanburn’s dismissal of local cultural relations that place people in a complex web of place and kinship shows his lack of situated analysis. Questions like “where you grad?,” “where you grew up?” and “you know my cousin?” are part of local genealogy, an important cultural practice for establishing social relations.

While we might accept a journalistic piece written as a self-absorbed personal narrative without much substance, similar writing that passes itself off as academic opens itself up to more scrutiny. Such is the case with an article that appeared in a recent issue of *Cultural Values* provocatively titled, “Local Haole – A Contradiction in Terms?: The Dilemma of being white, born and raised in Hawai‘i.” The first sentence reads, “I should start out by saying that I am neither white nor born and raised in Hawai‘i” (Ohnuma 2002, 273). The author claims legitimacy to talk about haole based on a “simpatico” she has with her local haole friends, and because, “in the worrisome clamor over ethnic issues in Hawai‘i, no one speaks for them. They certainly do not feel in any position to speak for themselves” (Ohnuma 2002, 273-274).

Without any substantiation, she asserts that “the bulk of haoles who have made Hawai‘i their home descended from people in shipping, trading or drifters and escapers guided by a vision of ‘leaving it all behind’ and beginning again in ‘paradise’” (Ohnuma 2002, 279). She misrecognizes this group of people as
"local haole."^23 "The local *haole* whose financial means and knowledge of the outside world is as limited as any other local’s does not participate in ‘whiteness’" (Ohnuma 2002, 275). Here she classes both “local” and “local haole” as poor unsophisticated islanders, invoking a similar, although romanticized, representation of provincialism as Sanburn. By casting the “local haole” as lower class, she excuses them from white privilege and insists they are mistreated by discriminatory “localism.”

There are many ways in which this article furthers the construction of haole victimization through historical inaccuracy, but Ohnuma’s fantastic rewriting of “first contact” is the worst. Ohnuma waxes nostalgic for haoles about the time “before the Sin, when white people still existed in harmony with the Hawaiians. Before they were haole” (Ohnuma 2002, 280). She continues:

Localism, which constructs “*haole*” at the moment of theft/rape/colonization, denies the local *haole* any route out of history, into a future free of guilt. He can only travel back, to a time before the breach, to the magic of that original encounter... How much of the culture we now consider of the islands – whether under the rubric “Local” or “Hawaiian” – is the bastard child of that first encounter, which, whatever the motivations on each side, began pure and equal, like the first meeting of lovers (Ohnuma 2002, 280)?

Miraculously, Ohnuma in these few sentences transforms “the moment of theft/rape/colonization” into “the first meeting of lovers” giving haoles a new “route out of history, into a future free of guilt.”

The Sanburn and Ohnuma articles illuminate what I believe to be a growing sentiment among haoles that they are victims. The Carter-Trask controversy, the Viotti article (and countless letters to the editor), and the Civil

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^23 “Local haole” is a label used by locals to indicate that a haole understands, respects and practices local culture and values. It is an identity that is earned, not self-appointed.
Rights Commission ruling all point in that direction. The next chapter on the *Rice* decision takes an in-depth look at the construction of that discourse through the appropriation of rights talk. The victory in *Rice* has done more to bolster this construction than anything we have seen so far.

**Conclusion**

The discourses of racial harmony and conflict and the construct of haole as victim all assume race as a given. With racial harmony, Hawai‘i’s multi-racial population is featured and peaceful coexistence is deemed remarkable. There is no question of how Hawai‘i’s people came to be raced or how racial productions continue. The racial conflict discourse also assumes naturalized racial categories and focuses on discord between them, asking, “Can’t we all get along?” (in the words of Rodney King). It does not stop to consider that violent processes of racialization and their legacies might be one cause of counter-resistance and violence. Haole constructions of haole as victim suffer from the historical amnesia of whiteness, forgetting that colonization always brings resistance (and frequently demands reparations).

Native Hawaiian and local constructions of haole remind us of the contestations inherent in colonial processes, as well as the relational nature of racialization. Their interrelated counter-narratives of haole bring the legacies of colonization and the plantation system to the center. They insist that you cannot pretend that haole does not matter, unless you forget Hawai‘i’s history, and they insure that will not happen. While in certain instances they tend to fix haole, there have always been elements in both native and local constructions that recognize the dynamism, contingency and interrelated nature of racial productions.
Building a new discourse of racial politics in Hawai‘i means disrupting the "melting pot," historicizing haole, and recognizing the interdependence of all racial productions in the islands. It means recognizing "identities are the names we give the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past" (Stuart Hall as quoted in Moore, Kosek, and Pandian 2003, 40). It means changing the terms of the discourse from assuming race to asking how we are raced.
CHAPTER 3

Got Race?:
The Production of Haole and
the Distortion of Indigeneity in the Rice Decision

Haole residents presumed their absolute natural right to Hawai‘i by practicing their legal and citizen rights from ‘home.’ In so doing, private (white) sovereign residency was normalized while a Hawaiian subject position was racially marked and structured existing through its constructed difference: signs of prehuman, non-Christian ways, and the absence of a capitalist system of land production.

– Rona Tamiko Halualani

I wish the best for the Hawaiians. If anything, I’m pro-Hawaiian. …most of my friends are Hawaiian.

– Harold Rice

Haole is a social assemblage produced in multiple ways through vectors of power operating in terrains of law, spatiality, temporality, culture, history, politics and representation. One of the dominant contemporary productions of haole is that of victim, unfairly discriminated against by state policies that benefit Native Hawaiians and by a local culture characterized as “anti-haole.” The issue of state discrimination or “reverse racism” came to a head with the Supreme Court decision in Harold F. Rice v. Benjamin J. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000), hereafter referred to as Rice. The case was front-page news in Hawai‘i, and closely watched in the rest of the country as well. Framed by the dominant discourse (molded by the media, lawyers, politicians and so forth), the case appeared to be about Native Hawaiians (asking questions about who they are and what rights they have), and not about haoles (assuming there are no questions about who they are and what rights they have). It is my contention that delving into some of the controversies of the case identifies some of the key
processes involved in the production of haole first as normative subject of the law, and then as putative victim.

I explore three major points of contention arising from the case: divergent narratives regarding Hawaiian history; the question of Native Hawaiian collective identity; and conflict over "colorblind" ideology. The friction created by each of these controversies produces openings through which we can observe some of the multiple matrices of power working to fashion particular representations of haole. I suggest that this work producing haole as a victim was central to the case and made possible by diverting the spotlight to Native Hawaiians while normalizing haole identity. After looking at these three hot spots and what they tell us about the production of haole, I introduce the broader issue of discursive frame and the inadequacy of Western legal discourse to deal with indigeneity. This is important because the ability to frame the discourse means considerable power over the subjectivities mobilized, sidelined, and (re)created in that discourse. The continued problematizing of indigenous identities has the reciprocal effect of normalizing nonindigenous identities, including haole. Thus, the case tells us more about haole than it does about Kanaka Maoli.

I take as my texts for this exploration a broad assortment of materials generated regarding the decision: the text of the case itself; public debate surrounding the case at the time of hearing; statements by key players including Harold "Freddy" Rice, lawyers, politicians, scholars and Kanaka Maoli activists; and discourse surrounding the decision since the ruling. I access a wide-range of theoretical material to help unpack these texts including critical race theory, post-colonial theory, and indigeneity studies.
I want to take a moment to address how critical race theory (CRT) helps frame my analysis of Rice. The discourse in the Supreme Court, the popular press, the legal community, and academic circles framed Rice around the question of Hawaiianess and claims based on Hawaiianess. From the outset, it is important to recognize that white subjectivity, both in Hawai‘i and on the continent, is constructed through the law as much, and often more, by what is not said and not regulated than what is. A significant project within CRT is listening for the silences, unpacking assumptions, making visible what is “hidden in plain sight.”¹

An overall argument of CRT scholars is that law is a significant player in the processes of social constructions. Since race is a social construction, it is important to consider the involvement of law in its production. Ian Haney-López writes:

Law is one of the most powerful mechanisms by which any society creates, defines, and regulates itself. Its centrality in the constitution of society is especially pronounced in highly legalized and bureaucratized late-industrial democracies such as the United States. It follows, then, that to say race is socially constructed is to conclude that race is at least partially legally produced (Haney-López 1996, 10).

It follows that a study of the production of haole would necessarily need to address the law. Furthermore, it is critical to my project that what counts as the law, legal discourse, and legal processes be conceived of broadly to include all intersections and implications with and across social, economic, and political relations.

Angela Harris traces the history of “race law” in the U.S. from the first Reconstruction through present day. She argues that race law is much broader

¹ Thanks to Kathie Kane for this extremely useful turn of phrase.
than equity law since it is "law pertaining to the formation, recognition, and maintenance of racial groups, as well as the law regulating the relationships among these groups" (Harris 2000, 1928). Thus, race law includes laws regulating immigration, naturalization, taxation, marriage, adoption, inheritance, and so forth. Additionally, she also includes nonstate action that relies on "unwritten law" or legal norms such as lynching or today's white supremacist militias. When race law is conceived of this broadly, the myriad ways the law is used to construct and maintain racial categories and hierarchies is exposed.

Looking at Rice specifically, I contend that the case was fundamentally about making space for haole in Hawai‘i (and white people generally as part of a national anti-affirmative agenda) by taking it away from Kanaka Maoli through a denial of their legal claims and a disappearing of their extra-legal witness and moʻolelo. Rather than simply paying attention to the reconstitution of haole hegemony however, I attend to the ways the case highlights the instability of that hegemony and complicates any polarized binary of colonizer-colonized. Moving beyond a legal, or even a Western framework, Rice points to an epistemological disconnect between Western notions of the production of knowledge and indigenous articulations of the same.

Before moving into the analysis I will sketch the main elements of the case. The case was filed in 1996 by Big Island rancher Harold Fredrick Rice, a fifth generation “kamaʻāina” haole, and his lawyer, John Goemans. Rice charged that the Hawai‘i State Office of Hawaiian Affairs’ (O.H.A.) Hawaiians-only voting restriction for trustees constituted unlawful racial discrimination violating the 14th and 15th amendments. Federal District Court Judge David Ezra and the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided against Rice ruling that the O.H.A.
restrictions were based on a special trust relationship between the Hawaiian people and the state, and therefore did not constitute racial discrimination. Rice and Goemans, wanting to appeal but out of funds, approached the Texas-based Campaign for a Color-Blind America, a conservative organization that ended up providing major backing. Goemans states, “Without the support of the Campaign for a Color-Blind America, we would not have been able to pursue the appeal” (Rees 1999). The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in 1999 and decided Rice v. Cayetano February 23, 2000. In a 7-2 ruling, the court held that the Hawaiian-only voting restriction violated the 15th Amendment’s ban on voting restrictions based on race. The two dissenting justices were Stevens and Ginsburg.

Competing Narratives of Hawaiian History

Eric Yamamoto and Chris Iijima write, “What lay at the core of the Court's decision was a battle of conflicting histories. Indeed, justice struggles through claims of rights are, first and foremost, struggles over collective memory” (Yamamoto and Iijima 2000, 3). Two divergent historical narratives vied for recognition, one emphasizing colonization and its impacts, and the other highlighting Americanization and “development.” Within the colonization narrative, Kanaka Maoli have suffered and continue to suffer the devastating impacts of the illegal overthrow of their nation and U.S. colonization. Justice requires somehow redressing these wrongs. The Americanization narrative represents the same history through the teleological trope of development and rhetoric of “civilization.” In this section I look first at the clashing historical narratives in Justice Kennedy's decision and Justice Steven's dissent for what
they illuminate regarding the production of haole. I then turn to Harold “Freddy” Rice’s own narrative for the ways he tries to comfortably place himself at home in Hawai‘i, mobilizing pieces of both narratives in a destabilization that highlights the asymmetries of colonial processes and their narration.

The first paragraph of Justice Stevens’ dissent makes it clear that he sees the case in terms of conflicting histories:

The Court’s holding today rests largely on the repetition of glittering generalities that have little, if any, application to the compelling history of the State of Hawaii. When that history is held up against the manifest purpose of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and against two centuries of this Court’s federal Indian law, it is clear to me that Hawaii’s election scheme should be upheld (Rice V. Cayetano 2000, 527-28).

Justice Stevens points to some of those “glittering generalities” in his dissent including: a reinscription of pre-contact of feudalism; the construction of haoles as settlers rather than immigrants; the centering of the plantation experience and its appropriation in shoring up the discourse of meritocracy in Hawai‘i; and the intimation that the Queen was responsible for her own overthrow. Overall, the majority decision encourages us to remember Hawai‘i’s history as one of positive Americanization and development brought about thanks to enterprising haoles. What is spun is “a remarkable narrative, essentially retelling the favorite American fairy tale of how the white man ‘civilized’ the savage – this time in the context of Hawai‘i” (Iijima 2000, 98).

It is not surprising that this is the history Justice Kennedy cites when one recognizes his sources. In his opinion for the majority, Kennedy unabashedly begins by stating his reliance on the haole canon on Hawai‘i’s history (he cites Fuch, Kuykendall, and Daws). That canon has come under increasing scrutiny, challenge and reinterpretation by contemporary scholars, including those who
are basing their research on Hawaiian language sources ignored by haole historians. The stories they share about Hawai‘i’s colonial past challenge haole hegemony and naturalization. Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, writes that his purpose is to “recount events as understood by lawmakers, thus ensuring that we accord proper appreciation to their purposes in adopting the policies and laws at issue” (Rice V. Cayetano 2000, 10). His historical account then can only be articulated through a Western legal framework.

The haole is the natural agent of Kennedy’s history. Starting with Captain Cook, the lofty goals of discovery, trade, religious conversion, and agricultural industry propel the haole to the islands. Colonization is misrecognized as primarily the individual acts of enterprising white men, and the “natural” outcome of an encounter between the so-called civilized and uncivilized. In a glaring example of constructing and maintaining a normalized status for the haole, Americans and Europeans are recognized by Kennedy as “settlers” (Rice V. Cayetano 2000, 501), whereas the “people of many different races and cultures” who came to work on plantations are “immigrants” (Rice V. Cayetano 2000, 506). As far as the Court is concerned, immigrants may come from “many different races and cultures,” but they are not white. Chris Iijima writes:

There is... one group never referred to nor described as an ‘immigrant’ group. That group is constructed differently from immigrants because throughout the opinion it is assumed to be the rightful and natural heir to the land of Hawai‘i. It is not insignificant that the Court refers to the Tahitians as the first Polynesian settlers of Hawai‘i and consistently also refers to white immigrants as settlers. This latter group – apparently never immigrants – consists of white missionaries and other ‘settlers.’ Their descendants are implicitly constructed in this way as the natural heirs to Hawai‘i. In other words, these ‘nonimmigrants’ are the ancestors of Freddy Rice (Iijima 2000, 103).

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2 See in particular, (Silva 2000) and (Kame’elehiwa 1992).
Not only does this reliance on telling a certain story of the immigration of laborers and the settlement of haoles allow for the naturalization of the haole as leader, it also sows the seeds of a belief in meritocracy. This belief is then mobilized against Hawaiians as they are seen to fail to measure up to the immigrants who pulled themselves out of the plantations, through discrimination, and up by their bootstraps. Kennedy writes, "each of these ethnic and national groups has had its own history in Hawaii, its own struggles with societal and official discrimination, its own successes, and its own role in creating the present" (Rice V. Cayetano 2000, 506). Note how this sentence simultaneously assumes and marks a host of immigrants as racialized "others."

As Kennedy's statement indicates, the centering of the plantation narrative as the key to understanding Hawai'i politics occludes a narrative of colonization. The statement about (nonwhite) immigration is offered as background for understanding Hawai'i's demographics, the material necessary to construct contemporary Hawai'i as a multicultural land of harmony and equal opportunity. As discussed in the previous chapter, this racial harmony construct in turn makes "discrimination" against the haole look even more odious. The immigration statement is coupled with one about the impact of disease on the Hawaiian population. While disease and the dramatic depopulation of Hawaiians was one of the most immediate and devastating consequences of colonization, in Kennedy's telling, it is folded neatly into a discussion of demographics and armchair psychologizing. Disease was "a tragedy," he says, and the "initial cause of the despair, disenchantment and despondency" observed in early Hawaiians (Rice V. Cayetano 2000, 506). There is no hint here of a larger understanding of colonization.
Thinking about settlement, immigration and Kanaka Maoli indigeneity raises issues of divergent spatial conceptions and processes of making, claiming, and inhabiting space in pre-colonial and colonial contexts. In the dominant narrative, haoles were conceived of as settlers and therefore responsible for taming a “wild” nature and democratizing a “feudal” system. As discussed in chapter one, “visions of wasted lands and their idle inhabitants...authorized violent colonial interventions into both land and livelihood in the name of improvement” (Moore, Kosek, and Pandian 2003, 7).

The haole discourse of settlement and claiming ran (and still runs) in stark contrast to the Kanaka Maoli discourse of mālama (to take care of, care for, preserve). It would be easy to condemn the first and glorify the second in an easy slide to a dangerous nostalgia that places “nature” and indigenous peoples prior to politics and history. In this process, both become reified Truth or Essence – pure and authentic. It is important to remind ourselves that “natural affinities are historical artifacts; natural identifications with native place must themselves be cultivated” (Moore, Kosek, and Pandian 2003, 34) at the same time “native places” are also created and cultivated. Indigeneity and nature are made, not given.

In the story the Supreme Court told in Hawaii Housing Authority et al v. Midkiff et al, 467 U.S. 229 (1984), and referred to in Rice, Hawai‘i is said to have always suffered under oligopoly. “The people of Hawaii have attempted, much as the settlers of the original 13 Colonies did, to reduce the perceived social and economic evils of a land oligopoly traceable to their monarchs” (Housing Authority V. Midkiff 1984, 241-42). No distinction is made between control of lands by ali‘i and ownership of lands by haole “settlers.” The Court, calling
upon the "settlers of the original 13 Colonies," effortlessly overlays an "American dream" of individual rights and property ownership on the islands. It does not matter that Rice owns, or leases from the state, lands originally held by the monarchy for use by the people – 'āina cared for through an indigenous version of sustainable agriculture and protection of uncultivated areas, now trampled by cattle and cut by fences.

Finally, the narrative of seamless Americanization is bolstered by intimating that Queen Līlīʻuokalani was responsible for her own overthrow. Kennedy writes that the Queen, upon attempting to "promulgate a new constitution restoring monarchical control over the House of Nobles and limiting the franchise to Hawaiian subjects," was "replaced...with a provisional government" (Rice V. Cayetano 2000, 505). This re-telling of events makes the Queen appear undemocratic and blankets the violence of her overthrow. After briefly noting that President Cleveland opposed the overthrow, Kennedy writes simply "the Queen could not resume her former place, however, and in 1894, the provisional government established the Republic of Hawaii. The Queen abdicated her throne a year later" (Rice V. Cayetano 2000, 505). Since this all appears to happen in a vacuum, we are left to assume that the Queen was just not up to the task of ruling. Since she could not rule, it follows that Americans should take over and lead the islands into democracy.

Justice Stevens' dissent goes quite a way in deconstructing the Kennedy opinion, opening space for alternative stories, and thereby destabilizing the haole as the normative subject of the law. Stevens is incensed by what he describes as the "wooden" approach of the majority to the elements in the case (Rice V.
Cayetano 2000, 547). He chides them for their lack of understanding of the unique history of Hawai'i:

> It is a painful irony indeed to conclude that native Hawaiians are not entitled to special benefits designed to restore a measure of native self-governance because they currently lack any vestigial native government – a possibility of which history and the actions of this Nation have deprived them (Rice V. Cayetano 2000, 535).

Stevens believes the ruling is wrong because: 1) it disallows the federal government "wide latitude in carrying out its obligations arising from the special relationship it has with the aboriginal peoples"; 2) it blocks the State from carrying out its "fiduciary responsibility" based on the public trust; and 3) it assumes "invidious discrimination" which is not present in the state's "effort to see that indigenous peoples are compensated for past wrongs" (Rice V. Cayetano 2000, 59). Stevens continuously refers to native Hawaiians as "indigenous" or "aboriginal" and brings colonization back into the picture by writing about the "history of subjugation at the hands of colonial forces" (Rice V. Cayetano 2000, 529). In this way he disrupts the majority's developmental narrative that comfortably places haole as "natural" leader in Hawai'i and turns OHA's voting requirements into unfair retribution.

Justice Stevens reminds the Court of the origins of OHA and the content of the Apology resolution – two significant legal events that go almost completely without mention in the majority opinion. He twice points out that OHA and its voting requirement was established by a vote of the entire electorate of the State (Rice V. Cayetano 2000, 544 and 546). This undercuts the claims of "reverse racism" on which the case is built since it makes it harder to construct a disgruntled minority acting with intention to discriminate against the majority. In fact, haoles and other non-Hawaiians voted in the requirements Rice
complains about. Further, Stevens finds ample evidence in the 1993 Apology resolution of federal involvement in the overthrow and the need to recognize the federal trust relationship with native Hawaiians (*Rice V. Cayetano* 2000, 533).

The Apology resolution (US Public Law 103-150, November 28, 1993) was signed by President Clinton into law on the one hundred year anniversary of the overthrow of the monarchy and is an official apology from the federal government to the Hawaiian people. Bringing the Apology resolution back in to the *Rice* case destabilizes arguments relying on “special rights” rhetoric because it establishes that the federal government does have a “special” relationship with native Hawaiians based on their indigenous status and U.S. involvement in the overthrow of the Kingdom. This resonates with Yamamoto and Iijima’s contention about *Rice* as a struggle for collective memory. If the violent history and impacts of colonization are denied (as the Americanization narrative tries, but never completely succeeds to do), haole is dehistoricized. If haole is dehistoricized, any limitations on haole legal subjectivity seem unfair, and thus

3 The text of the law is quite strong. In its declaration it reads: The Congress -

(1) on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the illegal overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii on January 17, 1893, acknowledges the historical significance of this event which resulted in the suppression of the inherent sovereignty of the Native Hawaiian people;

(2) recognizes and commends efforts of reconciliation initiated by the State of Hawaii and the United Church of Christ with Native Hawaiians;

(3) apologizes to Native Hawaiians on behalf of the people of the United States for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii on January 17, 1893 with the participation of agents and citizens of the United States, and the deprivation of the rights of Native Hawaiians to self-determination;

(4) expresses its commitment to acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, in order to provide a proper foundation for reconciliation between the United States and the Native Hawaiian people; and

(5) urges the President of the United States to also acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii and to support reconciliation efforts between the United States and the Native Hawaiian people.
haole is cast as a victim of discrimination. In a dehistoricized Hawai‘i, everyone “naturally” has equal opportunity and equal claim to everything.

Harold Rice’s historical narrative is far less seamless than Kennedy’s and far less critical than Stevens.’ Rice wears his contradiction on his sleeve, smuggling colonization back in, however unwittingly. Rice exemplifies the uneven quality of colonial processes creating unpredictable convergences, conflicts, and disconnects between and within variant subjectivities. He is proud of his (male) ancestors and talks at length about how they supported the monarchy. He claims that his great grandfather, H.P. Baldwin, was against the overthrow and that his great-great-grandfather, William Hyde Rice, “was a good friend of (King) Kalākaua, and helped him to write the Bayonet Constitution” (Rice as interviewed by Sodetani 2003) (Rice seems oblivious to the impossibility of Kalākaua writing a constitution that was forced on him through threat of violence). He further reports that his great-great-great grandfather, William Harrison Rice, gave up his American citizenship, “pledged his loyalty to the king and became a Hawaiian citizen” (Rice as interviewed by Sodetani 2003).

He proudly asserts that given this history, Hawaiian activist Keanu Sai has told him that he, Harold Rice, is a Hawaiian citizen (since his ancestors never relinquished their Hawaiian citizenship) and therefore has no standing to sue the state. He seems to like this determination, asserting, “if I had to make a choice, a citizen of U.S. or citizen of Hawai‘i, I’d never think twice, I’d be a citizen of Hawai‘i” (Rice as interviewed by Sodetani 2003). The statement is not disingenuous. It is clear from his interviews that he is quite knowledgeable about, acculturated to, and supportive of Hawaiian culture. More cultural
hybrid than straight haole, his aesthetics are local/Hawaiian, yet filtered through a U.S. constitutional framework.

Ann Laura Stoler's work on the processes of colonization helps put Rice's autobiography into a larger context. While writing mainly about European colonization, there are comparable elements to the U.S. processes. Stoler, like McClintock (McClintock 1995), Merry (Merry 2000), Clifford (Clifford 1997) and others, is critical of a methodology that assumes a fixed polarity between "colonizer" and "colonized" where the colonizer has complete hegemony. She argues, "Colonialism was not a secure bourgeois project. It was not only about the importation of middle-class sensibilities to the colonies, but about the making of them" (Stoler 1995, 99). "Cultural competencies" and "sexual prescriptions" were continually altered in attempts to maximize profit and stabilize colonial rule (Stoler 1995, 113). New subjectivities are made and others remade through colonial processes that destabilize a neat colonizer-colonized binary. Rice is material evidence.

Take the example of a challenge coming from Lilikalā Kameʻeleihiwa. She asks how it is that Harold Rice is fifth-generation haole and there was no intermarriage with Kanaka Maoli until the generation of his children (Kameʻeleihiwa and Spivak 2003). Kameʻeleihiwa attributes this to racism, and yet we know that haole "sexual prescriptions" during those five generations varied widely enough to make any easy attribution of cause difficult. There certainly was a discourse of the "eugenic peril," as Stoler calls it, of blood mixing circulated primarily by missionaries in the first decades after contact in an attempt to stem the high rate of sexual intercourse between haole men and Hawaiian women. This discourse faded in light of an increasing incidence of
intermarriage, especially to aliʻi, motivated in varying degrees by a desire to inherit land and gain political power. Here sexual prescriptions get remodeled and bright racial divisions get blurred. Where Rice’s ancestors stood with regard to those dynamic discourses is difficult to assay without intensive historical research, furthermore it is doubtful they all had the same take on the matter.

Rice reconciles his dissonant positions – Hawaiian national v. champion of U.S. constitutional rights – through an articulation of aloha for the Hawaiian people. In a statement that parodies itself Rice states, “I wish the best for the Hawaiians. If anything, I’m pro-Hawaiian. …most of my friends are Hawaiian” (Rice as interviewed by Sodetani 2003). He asserts that he is playing a positive role in history, following in the footsteps of his ancestors (his language is reminiscent of the “tough love” rhetoric in circulation in the 1980s). Talking about the case, he says:

It was good for Hawaiians, and certainly good for the state. Got everybody thinking. Hawaiians took advantage of being able to play the part of victim and get entitlements based on race. They stepped over the line. The Rice decision made everyone step back (Rice as interviewed by Sodetani 2003).

Through this patronizing framework, Rice echoes the Americanization narrative of Hawaiian history. Regardless of the overthrow (which he says his great grandfather opposed), Hawaiians ought to be treated like everyone else and ought to act like everyone else (“everyone else” measured by the naturalized haole standard). The palpable material and psychological impacts of colonization are nothing more than Hawaiians “playing the part of victim.” The Hawaiian Kingdom functions on the level of nostalgia for him, it has no real relevance anymore.
Rice's cultural hybridization makes it difficult for him to ignore Hawai'i's history of colonization. He attempts to find ways to fold that history into the Americanization narrative which triumphs through Kennedy's retelling in the decision. In Kennedy's story haoles are courageous settlers who build a meritocracy, democracy and racial paradise out of a repressive monarchy. Rice's family history destabilizes this easy narrative, even while his case makes use of it. It breaks down the colonizer-colonized duality and opens space for the question of native Hawaiian collective identity.

Native Hawaiian Collective Identity

One of the key controversies in the case involved multiple, often conflicting, definitions of Native Hawaiian collective identity including "race," "tribe," "Hawaiian nationals," "wards of the state," "political entity," and "indigenous peoples." These identities are fashioned through discourses of blood, ancestry, history, legal documentation, and culture. The knot only became more tangled in the course of the case: Rice argued race; the State argued anything but race (including "tribe-like"); the majority contended ancestry was proxy for race; the minority argued ancestry (decoupled from race) and indigeneity; and Kanaka Maoli activists were unable to argue at all. No one in the courtroom represented them and many of their arguments would fall outside Western legal discourse anyway.

The key thread to follow in unraveling the controversy over Kanaka Maoli identity and opening up an understanding of how haole is normalized in the process is the race thread. The case was framed around race and ultimately decided on grounds of racial discrimination, requiring that we descend into what
Kauanui calls the "bloody mess" of the racialization and deracination of Hawaiian identity: "The bloody mess of who counts as Hawaiian is fraught with histories of contested entitlement and colonial dispossession. Hawaiian racial definitions have been thoroughly bound-up with struggles over land and identity" (Kauanui 2000, 4). Two main strands running through Kanaka Maoli racialization are made visible in Rice: the violence of the imposition of a Western legal racial identity on an indigenous people in a colonial process; and the specific use of blood quantum measurements to contain and control identification. I will touch briefly on each and indicate the ways in which they serve to (re)produce haole.

Precontact Kanaka Maoli did not think in terms of race and certainly never asked to be raced (this is the crux of the argument against using the Western racial label of "native Hawaiian"). Useful here is an article by Virginia R. Dominguez about the U.S. obsession with racial taxonomy, especially as evidenced through the census and its imposition on Hawai'i. She indicates that King Kalākaua was interested in trying to understand the U.S. practices of racial categorization, but never adopted them, continuing to use nationality (which had been adopted by previous aliʻi) as the premier system of population classification:

So the nonadoption of racial taxonomy may not have been accidental. What we do know for sure is that 'race' and 'color' remained elusive as principles of classification and modes of reference at least into the 1880s. Everything changed the minute the United States annexed Hawai'i in 1898. The very next census – of 1900 – blatantly classified the population by 'color' (Dominguez 1998).

4 "Lāhui" is often translated as "race" by scholars, but assuming an easy equivalence is but one example of the violence of translation. "Lāhui" had and has many meanings including "nation" and "people." It came to stand in for "race" when that Western concept was imported (Silva 2003).
Dominguez goes on to track the mapping of racial categories onto Hawai‘i’s people by continental bureaucrats for whom Hawai‘i was “just one more place to adapt, recategorize and incorporate within the racial taxonomy [of the U.S. government],” no matter how ill-fitting that taxonomy might be. She traces how U.S. census categories fluctuate with changing political, social, legal and scientific positions and how that has meant a proliferation and splitting of categories for racialized “others,” while maintaining the “naturalness and unfragmentability of ‘whites’” (Dominguez 1998). In Hawai‘i, this overlay at the point of annexation meant that all of a sudden “white” was a “natural” category by official standards (one of the few categories that literally counted), whereas Hawaiian did not even appear in the taxonomy.

One of the ways the haole racialized Kanaka Maoli even before the official importation of racial taxonomy was through representation, first as sometimes noble but definitely savage, then as inherently lazy and infantilized, and from the 1920s until the recent backlash, as unfortunate victims deserving government charity, which also meant regulation through government bureaucracies. These representations fed the legal categorization of Kanaka Maoli. Haunani-Kay Trask writes, “Who we believe ourselves to be is often not what the colonial legal system defines us to be. This disjunction causes a kind of suffering nearly impossible to end without ending the colonial definitions of who we are” (Trask 1993, 135). A primary goal of decolonization then is (re)discovering community-based definitions of ones’ group and trying to make place for them in neo/postcolonial societies.
Rona Tamiko Halualani writes about the violent and delimiting nature of legal colonial definitions imposed on an indigenous population. She sees law and governance as,

Violent technologies of struggle and identification that exceed the textuality of identity representations. Legal definitions of identity, for instance, are activated and supported by militarization, courts of law, and state administrations and result in material consequences like the denial of indigenous identification for cultural rights and entitlements (land, benefits) and racial (mis)recognition as a means to negate one’s formal claim to indigeneity (Halualani 2002, 38).

Halualani, Trask, and Kauanui all mark the establishment of the technology of blood quantum as a measurement of Hawaiianess in 1920 as pivotal in the legal racialization of Hawaiians; a text-book example of the violence of colonial identities.

Turning to the issue of blood quantum for Native Hawaiian identity, I will analyze: the history of blood measurement for Hawaiians; how this fits with Native American experience; Kennedy’s assertion that ancestry is “proxy for race;” and documentation requirements. Blood quantum measurements were instituted through the 1920 Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (HHCA). In effect these rules have contained and controlled Kanaka Maoli identification and simultaneously transferred power and property to the haole. The definitions set up in this act and brought forward in subsequent laws played a critical role in the majority’s decision in *Rice*.

J. Kehaulani Kauanui painstakingly lays out for us how the racialization and deracination of Kanaka Maoli via blood quantum is intricately and insidiously tied to the on-going project of colonization. The HHCA hearings, Kauanui points out, show a shift from consideration of Hawaiian entitlements to a bureaucratized concern with “rehabilitation” that constructs Hawaiians as a
racialized beneficiary class, at the same time it protects white property interests.
The HHCA was the first to institute a blood quantum system of classification for Kanaka Maoli, setting up a category called “native Hawaiian” consisting of those with 50% or more blood traceable to pre-1778 inhabitants. Eligibility for approximately 200,000 acres of ceded land set aside by the act for “Hawaiian homesteads” was based on this classification, which became the legal standard of Hawaiian identity for both federal and state policy. Kauanui argues:

The blood quantum policy is racist because it works to redefine Hawaiian identity from a genealogical link to the land to a mathematical fraction. It also works towards the end of lowering the numbers of ‘authentic’ Hawaiians, and thus dispossessing other Hawaiians from the land bases entitled (Kauanui 2000, 53-54).

Similarly, Trask writes:

Imposed systems of identification are instituted to separate our people from our lands and from each other in perpetuity...the white people who created our classification hoped that Hawaiians of 50 percent or more blood quantum would eventually die out, thus leaving our lands and revenues not to Hawaiians of less than 50 percent blood but to the state and federal governments (Trask 1993, 135).

Both Kauanui and Trask’s statements harken back to Franz Fanon and the imposition of systems of classification by the colonizer that effectively alienate the colonized from themselves. So internalized becomes the colonizer’s gaze that those fixed by it almost no longer recognize themselves.

The blood quantum standard did violence by redefining Hawaiian identity away from genealogy, fortifying the discourse of the vanishing Hawaiian, and insuring that property continued to accumulate in the hands of the haole. It also firmly established the haole as the normative citizen in Hawai‘i decades prior to statehood. Through the processes of deracination, the closer Hawaiian subjects were to the haole, i.e. the more their blood had been
“whitened,” the more assimilated or “civilized” they were assumed to be, and therefore the greater their potential toward citizenship. On the other hand, those who were at least half Hawaiian were considered almost hopelessly backward and often paradoxically, in need of saving through the rehabilitative magic of homesteading. “The less Hawaiian one is, the more competent, capable, assimilable, and citizen-like she or he is, which in turn regrids a position of normative whiteness ironically through the articulation of a part/mixed Hawaiian identity in the HHCA hearings” (Halualani 2002, 72).

Critical race theorists are exploring ways the legal processes not only exclude people of color or native peoples but also selectively include and assimilate them in complicated and contradictory ways as part of the continual refortification of white legal hegemony. As briefly discussed in the previous chapter, Kauanui discusses the way Hawai‘i legal processes and discourses have triangulated the inassimilable Asian “outsider” with the whitened (and therefore dispossessed) Hawaiian, and the unquestioned, normative haole. She cautions against “selective assimilation” which confers “franchise rather than sovereign recognition” (Kauanui 2000, 78). Native American scholar, David Wilkins also points to the problems with forced inclusion for Native Americans:

While most racial/ethnic groups and women faced a forced exclusion from the American social contract, Indians, from the 1880s, faced a forced inclusion into the American polity. However, it was an inconsistent and ambivalent inclusion at best. Most of the actions by federal policymakers from the nineteenth century to the 1970s were aimed at ‘Americanizing’ and ‘civilizing’ Indians (Wilkins 2002, 192).

Along similar lines, Eve Marie Garrouette in her insightful book Real Indians: Identity and the Survival of Native America lays out the minefields, contradictions and varying consequences of navigating legal definitions of
Native American identity. She quotes Jack Forbes on the reversal of hypodescent for natives quipping that modern Americans "are always finding 'blacks' (even if they look rather un-African), and... are always losing 'Indians'" (Garrouette 2003, 48). A policy of forced inclusion, no matter how ambivalent, can "vanish" native peoples in a literal whitewash, thereby silencing or illegitimating their claims. If there are no "real" Indians or Hawaiians, there can be no obligations toward them, no claims from them.

The assumption of high blood quanta for native peoples was made evident in Justice Breyer's concurrence in *Rice*. OHA required voters either be "native Hawaiian," as defined by 50% blood, or "Hawaiian," a broader category forged after the HHCA to include anyone with pre-1778 ancestry (usually eligible for fewer benefits). Breyer found the state's definition of "Hawaiian" too broad to be "reasonable" because it could include someone with less than one five-hundredth original Hawaiian blood (assuming nine generations since 1778). In his concurrence he writes:

There must... be some limit on what is reasonable, at least when a State (which is not itself a tribe) creates the definition. And to define that membership in terms of 1 possible ancestor out of 500, thereby creating a vast and unknowable body of potential members – leaving some combination of luck and interest to determine which potential members become actual voters – goes well beyond any reasonable limit (*Rice V. Cayetano* 2000, 527).

For Breyer, it seems obvious that the class is too broad. No "reasonable" person would consider someone with such "diluted" blood to actually be Hawaiian. Their Hawaiianess, he purports, is based on "luck" (disqualified for being arbitrary) and "interest" (disqualified for being anti-democratic). "He presumes that genealogy is the arbitrary modality of identity when it would seem that blood quantum is not only arbitrary, it is abstract and restrictive" (Kauanui 2002,
Breyer argues that he was “unable to find any Native American tribal definition that is so broad” (Rice V. Cayetano 2000, 526), but he must not have looked very hard.

Garrouette instructs that while two-thirds of Native American tribes use blood quantum in their definitions for membership, the remaining one-third use other measurements often requiring some sort of lineal descent, but also using criteria based on residency, community participation, vote, parental enrollment, and the maintenance of annual contact (Garrouette 2003, 15). The Cherokee, for example, have no blood requirement at all. Tribal membership is open to any who can show a legal-historical relationship to the tribe through an ancestor listed on the Dawes roll.⁵

Garrouette tells the story of Cherokee tribal member and registrar, R. Lee Fleming, registering a girl who was 1/2048 Cherokee (one can only guess what Justice Breyer would have to say about that). Fleming talks about how the Cherokee nation is onto its third constitution, none of which have had a blood requirement. He emphasizes that it is the “legal-historical relationship” between member and tribe that are important. “People might find this standard surprising if they don’t understand the whole context of how it was created, and our tribe’s history. But our reasons for crafting it were sound reasons, reasons that come from who we are as people” (R. Lee Fleming as quoted in Garrouette 2003). Many Hawaiian activists, including Jonathan Osorio and Kehaulani Kauanui, echo Fleming’s sentiment. “If being a descendant of a Native makes

⁵ The Dawes Rolls were taken between 1899-1906 by federal commissioners and are themselves problematic because of the inconsistent way those who applied were denied or accepted and because many actively resisted registration (Garrouete 2003, 20-22). See also (Sturm 2002).
one Native, what if anything does blood quantum have to do with who we are" (Osorio 2001, 361)? “Blood quanta classifications have consistently been used to enact, substantiate, and then disguise the further appropriation of native lands while they obscure and erase a discourse of specifically Hawaiian sovereignty and identity as a relation of genealogy to place” (Kauanui 2002, 110).

The HHCA definition of native Hawaiian gets carried forward, amended, and rearticulated in subsequent legislation including the State’s Admission Act and the 1978 amendment to the State Constitution that created OHA. Looking back on this legal history, the majority in the Rice decision is able to find multiple instances where “race,” “ancestry,” and “peoples” are used seemingly interchangeably to define Hawaiians and native Hawaiians. The majority exploits this untidiness, affirmatively answering the question, “Got race?” In perhaps the most destructive and controversial statement in the Rice decision, Kennedy writes, “ancestry can be a proxy for race. It is that proxy here” (Rice V. Cayetano 2000, 514). Thus, ancestry is easily dismissed as nothing more than a cover for racial difference. Kauanui counters:

It is not that the state is using ancestry as a proxy for a race; it is that blood quantum inherently mobilizes racial categories as a proxy for ancestry. For many Hawaiians, what this case highlights is the necessity for insistently articulating discourses of genealogy, with their attendant notions of responsibility to place and to descendants, as a basis of Hawaiian discourse of sovereignty (emphasis mine Kauanui 2002, 120).

It was through the imposition of blood quantum percentages that Hawaiians were legally racialized and severed from identity claims based on the more fluid concepts of genealogy.6 Kennedy’s statement is so destructive

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6 It is worth noting the paradox between the fluidity of blood as a substance and the forced rigidity of “blood quantum” as a racializing concept.
because it disappears the historical processes of racializing Hawaiians via blood quantum and then denies the materializations of those processes. *Rice* can be read as evidence of the white historical amnesia that races a people, forgets it raced them, and then denies the material impact of that racialization when it becomes the ground on which that people begin to make claims. Halualani talks about this amnesia with regard to the HHCA when she writes,

> Blood and its seemingly objective markings could specify difference in the same moment it wiped away the structured dispossession of Hawaiians, a process of historical forgetting that is achieved just as a moral claim of rehabilitation emerges. By this logic, blood economizes land allotments in line with citizenship (Halualani 2002, 63).

In the *Rice* case, race as proxy for ancestry is taken from simply “economizing” Hawaiian rights to invalidating them. No longer does it seem permissible, even for those who can document their 50% blood to the authorities, to claim state or federal entitlements. Any claims to a “special relationship” or “trust” are trumped by the race card, in this case played *against* racialized neo-colonial subjects who cannot give indigeneity weight on the (colorblind) scales of justice.

Justice Stevens, in his dissent, strongly objected to Kennedy’s claim that ancestry was a stand-in for race. While he admits that this may sometimes be the case, he is steadfast that it is not in this instance:

> The distinction between ancestry and race is more than simply one of plain language. The ability to trace one’s ancestry to a particular progenitor at a single distant point in time may convey no information about one’s own apparent or acknowledged race today. Neither does it of necessity imply one’s own identification with a particular race, or the exclusion of any others ‘on account of race.’ The terms manifestly carry distinct meanings... (Rice V. Cayetano 2000, 539).

Stevens is careful to use the language of “indigenous status” or “aboriginal people” and yet, he does not address race as a fiction of colonization. He
continues within a framework that assumes that race is an objectively knowable, pre-political, “natural” attribute.

Another significant aspect of the use of blood quantum for Hawaiian entitlements is that it has put Hawaiians in a situation of having to legally document their identities. Halualani does an excellent job of describing this in the third chapter of her book. This is an incredibly fraught position for many, not just because of the violence of having to “prove” themselves to the state, but also because of all of the ways it re-intensifies the violence of colonization. First of all, traditional Kanaka Maoli culture was oral not written. bell hooks reminds us:

> The burden of proof weighs heavily on the hearts of those who do not have written documentation, who rely on oral testimony passed from generation to generation. Within a white supremacist culture, to be without documentation is to be without a legitimate history. In the culture of forgetfulness, memory alone has no meaning (Hooks 1992, 1993).

Second, even when written records started being kept, the processes were extremely haphazard, random and biased. Missionaries were the first to keep records and they had their own ideas about racial taxonomy, and as Dominguez illustrates, even the dominant taxonomy was in flux. Birth certificates would misclassify parents or only list one racial category when they were multiple, or only list a category for one parent. Names were frequently misspelled. Records were often lost or destroyed in fires. Third, the bureaucracy that now exists and is putting records into an electronic database is completely overwhelmed, prone to frequent error and very hard to navigate. Some have made it their life’s project to try and document their family’s history. Some cannot even talk about it, it is so painful:
Hawaiian interviewees walk us through the painful, private memories of locating identity documents. They reconcile the writing over of their names and raced identities, tragically reducing family genealogies to blood verification. Hawaiians also negotiate competing versions of their histories as told by family members versus what the formal documents reify as the concrete truth (Halualani 2002, 83).

Again, this is a situation shared by many Native Americans who have to document their blood for tribal, federal or state law. Many are resentful of having to “prove” their identities when there is no such requirement for any other racial group. One of Garroutte’s interviewees said with tongue-in-cheek that he is enrolled in the Ojibwe tribe and also “part white, but I don’t have the papers to prove it” (Garroutte 2003, 29).

Neither do haoles have “papers to prove it.” Haoles are never asked to document their identities in order to claim space in Hawai‘i, have never experienced the structural violence of racialization (this is substantially different than being culturally marked as haole, even when this leads to violence). The Rice case was about eliminating any benefit that might come from having documentation of a Hawaiian identity. It is not enough for Harold Rice—situated as the normative subject of the law—to live free from any requirements that he prove his identity to justify the land he ranches (even if it includes ceded land leased cheaply from the state) or the privilege he assumes. Additionally, he wants to be able to claim any benefits reserved for Kanaka Maoli, or ideally to eliminate them altogether by invoking a colorblind ideology.

Colorblind Ideology

The Court found that OHA’s voting regulations violated the 15th Amendment guarantee that the right to vote would not be “denied or abridged”
on account of race. The majority based its decision on a colorblind read of the law that ignores institutional, historical, racial inequality (including racialization and inequality produced by the law itself) in order to construct the myth of an "equal playing field" or meritocracy. Colorblind legal analysis thus serves to reinscribe institutionalized racial inequalities and hierarchies, including white power and privilege, by pretending they do not exist, by being "blind" to them. Cheryl Harris, in her important article establishing the connection between whiteness and property writes, "colorblindness is a form of race subordination in that it denies the historical context of white domination and Black subordination. This idea of race recasts privileges attendant to whiteness as legitimate race identity under 'neutral' colorblind principles" (Harris 1993, 1768-1769) (I would simply expand "Black" to encompass all non-white racializations since colorblind ideology is applied in various ways to other racialized groups as well). Or, from the collectively authored Whitewashing Race:

Formal colorblindness fails to recognize or address the deeply rooted institutional practices and long-term disaccumulation that sustains racial inequality. ... it has become a powerful sword and a near-impenetrable shield, almost a civic religion, that actually promotes the unequal racial status quo (Brown et al. 2003, 58).

This idea of "long-term disaccumulation" is helpful in thinking about the disintegration in status of native Hawaiians. After the period of massive dispossession of Kanaka Maoli from the Māhele through the overthrow, one could argue that a slower, more insidious process of "disaccumulation" has set in. Again we are reminded that processes of colonization are uneven.

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7 I cannot use the metaphor of "blindness" to signify unknowing without noting its ablest assumptions. I do not intend to reify constructions of disability as lack or incompletion. I use it here because of the terminology of "colorblindness."
Colorblind ideology emerged over the most recent “post-civil rights” decades as part of the conservative backlash against political claims and assertions by people of color, particularly focusing on affirmative action. “Thus, at the very historical moment that race is infused with a perspective that reshapes it, through race-conscious remediation, into a potential weapon against subordination, official rules articulated in law deny that race matters” (Harris 1993, 1798). Charles Gallagher’s study of white racial formation corresponds with this assertion. It highlights the influence of legal thinking in racial formation and the reactionary move to imagining whiteness as a “liability” which drives colorblind ideologues:

The racially charged and politically conservative environment of the late 1980s and 1990s has reinterpreted whiteness as a liability. The cultural mythology that has become today’s commonsense understanding of race relations is a definition of society that is colorblind. The ascendancy of color blindness as the dominant mode of race thinking and the emergence of liberal individualism as a source of white entitlement and racial backlash was a central finding in my work (Gallagher 1997, 9).

The law, according to this ideology, has become too color positive; it has made race matter. This perception drives the notion that white people are being disadvantaged and therefore the law must be reined in to a “neutral” colorblind state.

Employing a Foucaultian analysis of the shift to a colorblind racial discourse illuminates how this discourse can seem both new and renewed at the same time. Similar to the shift between the discourses of a “symbolics of blood” and an “analytics of sexuality,” there are “overlappings, interactions and echoes” (Foucault 1978, 149) of the discourse of “color” racism, in the discourse of “colorblind” racism. To maintain the racist status quo, the rhetoric needed to shift from one where color is relevant to one where it is not, but the former
continues to “haunt” the later. Stoler is interested in Foucault’s analytic concern with the “tension between rupture and reinscription, between break and recuperation in discursive formations” (Stoler 1995, 61). She writes, “what concerns him is not modern racism’s break with earlier forms, but rather the discursive *bricolage* whereby an older discourse of race is ‘recovered,’ modified, ‘encased,’ and ‘encrusted’ in new forms” (Stoler 1995, 61). We might think of colorblind ideology as a “new,” “encrusted” form of racism.

Having established colorblind law as one of the latest strategies in the recuperation and reinscription of whiteness, I want to turn to the work it does fortifying specifically haole power and privilege. As I noted earlier, the *Rice* case received critical funding from the right-wing Campaign for Color-Blind America, but that was certainly not the only source of support:

*Rice* himself was financed by the Campaign for Color-Blind American and Robert Bork’ Americans Against Discrimination and Preferences; the United States Justice Foundation; the Center for Equal Opportunity; New York Civil Rights Coalition (Carl Chen and Abigail Thernstrom); and the Pacific Legal Foundation – all of which submitted legal briefs on his behalf. Each of these institutional think-thanks have been central in the nationwide attack on affirmative action and other civil rights gains (Kauanui 2002, 121).

The majority opinion could not have been far from these groups’ best-case scenario, and it is important to see this case in the context of this growing national campaign against affirmative action. As I have shown, the colorblind language of the decision turned a history of colonization into developmental progress, and discrimination and oppression into meritocracy. Chris Iijima charges that “the court neither understands nor synthesizes the different meanings and uses of race” (Iijima 2000, 110), instead it “merely undertook an abstract hunt and peck search for any racial references” (Iijima 2000, 112).
Two specific examples of this colorblind ideology at work are the related matters of Kennedy calling Harold Rice “Hawaiian” in his decision and Rice calling himself “Hawaiian at heart.” Both of these incidents highlight the friction between an empty, disconnected colorblind ideology and local culture’s racial and ethnic embeddedness. Kennedy stirred up a huge controversy by matter-of-factly declaring early in his decision that Rice was “a citizen of Hawaii and thus himself a Hawaiian in a well-accepted sense of the term…” (Rice V. Cayetano 2000, 499). One assumes that this follows from the practice of naming people by their states, regions or cities of residence, (i.e. someone who lives in California is a Californian, in the Midwest, a Midwesterner, in New York, a New Yorker, and so forth). These are geographic and cultural signifiers more than anything else. This system breaks down in Hawai‘i because a “Hawaiian” is not a resident, but a racialized indigenous identity.

No one in Hawai‘i, not even the conservative Honolulu Advertiser8 or Harold Rice, could concur that it is “well-accepted” to consider a haole, a Hawaiian. The statement only served to illustrate the enormous gap between Kennedy’s ignorant presumption and the reality of social relations and histories in the islands. Far from being colorblind, Hawai‘i could be called color-cognizant. Racialized ethnic discourse is intrinsic to local culture, not primarily as a foundation for discrimination or inter-group conflict, but more as a recognition of the different histories and cultures that come together in the islands (which, of course, is not to go so far as to proclaim the islands some sort of racial paradise). To impose on Hawai‘i a discourse that is “blind” to this

8 The paper responded to Kennedy’s claim in an editorial March 2, 2000 with the retort “Well-accepted where? Certainly not in Hawaii.”
history and these distinctions, a discourse which gives everyone equal claim to being Hawaiian, is itself a haole act – an act of ignorance and arrogance, the product of a foreign culture and ideology.

While Harold Rice is perceptive enough to know not to deem himself “Hawaiian,” he does feel comfortable with the “Hawaiian at heart” label (Rolo 1999). In fact, he credits his Hawaiianess for the relative lack of backlash against him:

I think one of the reasons that I was able to come out popular in the Rice v. Cayetano case is that I grew up with Hawaiian cowboys, and played with their kids. ... And even today, half the people I associate with are Hawaiian... And so my body language and my... what I exude out to the public is, um... not anti-Hawaiian (Rice as interviewed by Loomis 2001, 17).

Here, as in the Sodetani interview, he struggles to represent himself as anything but an “anti-Hawaiian” haole. In this statement, he seems to almost want to say that he “exudes” Hawaiian, but he pulls himself back. Because it is so important to him to not be seen as “anti-Hawaiian” he strongly holds to a discourse in which justice and merit are colorblind. In this framework, he can be against “discrimination” but not against Hawaiians:

The case was not about OHA, was not about Hawaiians, it was about discrimination in the voting box. Just happened to be OHA. And the people who know me, and any Hawaiian that talks to me knows that. Just instinctively they know that I’m not against them (Rice as interviewed by Loomis 2001, 17).

People instinctively know he is “pro-Hawaiian” or “Hawaiian at heart.” It frustrates him to think otherwise. Just as he used Keanu Sai’s statement to legitimize him as a Hawaiian national, he uses interactions with other Hawaiians to show how Hawaiian, how not-haole, he is. He tells a story about an old Hawaiian woman who was mad at him over the case. He claims that her
comment was: “Well, Freddy, at least it wasn't some haole that did this” (Rice as interviewed by Loomis 2001, 17!)

Not only is Rice colorblind, but through my research I discovered he was “cattleblind” as well. In an extended interview Rice does with the O'ahu Cattlemen’s Association, some of his thinking about ranching sheds light on his broader ideology. He argues repeatedly that ranchers would be more successful if they would stop focusing so much on the cattle and focused on the grass. His product, he asserts, is not cattle, it is grass – the cattle simply process the grass:

So if the rancher will think of himself as a grass farmer, and manage for the grass, and just have the numbers of cattle to manage the grass and harvest it, um, to me that's been the success of my ranching career... Of course, you've got to have a good harvesting machine. You've got to take care of it, and all that. But my product is really grass (Rice as interviewed by Loomis 2001, 9).

While this may be a useful framework for ranching, his insistence on the grass at the expense of the cattle parallels his insistence on “anti-discrimination” at the expense of Hawaiians. Hawaiians, like the cattle, are an afterthought; they are not the point. While the cattle reap the fortunate (or unfortunate, depending on your animal politics) consequences of Rice’s focus on grass, Hawaiians reap the temporarily “unfortunate” (to use his language) consequences of his focus on “discrimination.” In any case, it all works out fairly neatly in his world, reaping him overall benefits in both instances. Still, he does seem upset that some people refuse to see how his focus on discrimination is actually helpful for Hawaiians in the long-term (just like attention to grass is good for the cattle).

Following colorblind logic, Rice believes Hawaiians should not get special entitlements or receive free handouts. “Hawaiians are just as capable as anybody of doing well in today’s world. They have the intelligence and ability and the
advantage of this being their home, so they don’t need the help” (Rice as interviewed by Sodetani 2003). According to Rice, Hawaiians have not been disadvantaged by colonialism. In a bitterly ironic twist, he contends that Hawaiians have the advantage because they are at “home” – a home his ancestors and other haoles have controlled for over a century. And then, in an essentializing gesture that goes even further and reinscribes the notion of the simple carefree native, he states,

Frankly, I’ve never run into a Hawaiian who wasn’t smarter and more capable than me. I sort of kid that’s why us haoles have to push and work so hard – we don’t have the talent. I mean, if I could play music and sing like these Hawaiians, I wouldn’t have to be so pushy, I’d be more happy, content (Rice as interviewed by Sodetani 2003).

It is because Rice grew up in Hawai‘i that he is so contradicted and this shows in his statements. He somehow wants to acknowledge indigeneity (Hawaiians being “at home”), while at the same time erasing colonization and declaring a level playing field with a home team advantage. He wants to be a Hawaiian national based on his ancestry but not recognize a Hawaiian nation with claims against the U.S. government. He wants to be seen as supporting Hawaiian language and culture at the same time his case opens up challenges to programs that do just that. Rice’s paradoxical positioning highlights the dehistoritization of colorblind ideology, which enables white subjectivities to be normalized while failing to recognize indigenous articulations of subjectivity at all.

Western Legal Discursive Framework & Inarticulable Positionings

Thus far I have looked at how tensions created in controversies over historical narrative, Hawaiian identity, and colorblind ideology served to help
naturalize haole. The *Rice* case also illuminates a major inadequacy of the Western legal frame – its inability to deal with indigenous identity. In this final section, I turn to a discussion of this limitation and how it serves to reinscribe the white/haole individual as the normative subject of the law.

The inability of the courts to hear arguments that do not conform to a Western legal framework is made undeniably evident by Kennedy’s dramatic closing statement in *Rice*:

> When the culture and way of life of a people are all but engulfed by a history beyond their control, their sense of loss may extend down through generations; and their dismay may be shared by many members of the larger community. As the State of Hawaii attempts to address these realities, it must, as always, seek the political consensus that begins with a sense of shared purpose. One of the necessary beginning points is this principle: *The Constitution of the United States, too, has become the heritage of all the citizens of Hawaii* (emphasis mine *Rice v. Cayetano* 2000, 524).

This statement is problematic on many levels: history is reduced to a fate overpowering hopeless primitives; the impacts of colonization are reduced to “dismay;” justice is twisted into “political consensus;” and “shared purpose,” which is the apparent remedy to the “dismay,” is supposed to come from a constitution written centuries ago by non-indigenous men in another nation, on a remote continent. Kennedy elides any question of Kanaka Maoli indigenous identity, neatly capturing them as citizens of the United States bestowed with the esteemed “heritage” of the Constitution. It is to this heritage, not the constitutions of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i, not their culture and genealogies, that Kanaka Maoli are patronizingly advised to turn.

In this section on discursive frameworks, I first turn to the Mashpee trial, perhaps the most famous example of indigeneity on trial, for the light it sheds on *Rice*. The Mashpee’s desire to find a way to claim resources and recognition
through the law leads me to a discussion of the Akaka bill as a direct response to the Rice case driven by fear of a loss of resources. The Akaka bill highlights the tension between those Kanaka Maoli who hope to find recognition and protection in U.S. law, and those who want nothing to do with it. The Mashpee case and the Akaka bill, along with Rice, further illustrate the ways in which legal discourse renders indigenous peoples identities, histories and epistemologies unrecognizable. In the last half of this section I explore indigenous articulations outside and beyond Western law. I look at how Western legal scholarship, even when sympathetic to this problem of unrecognizability, still has trouble seeing beyond the law, and therefore inadvertently continues to center whiteness. Indigenous articulations of identity and epistemology are necessary to a critique of modernity (including whiteness), at the same time that critique is not their main purpose.

It is useful to look at the infamous 1976 Mashpee case as a similar instance of indigeneity on trial while behind the scenes whiteness consolidates power. In this case, the self-identified Mashpee filed suit in federal court for possession of land they argued was wrongly transferred to the Cape Cod town of Mashpee under the 1790 Indian Non-Intercourse Act. The suit made non-Indian residents nervous, as the 16,000 acres in question constituted about three-quarters of the town (Garroutte 2003, 61). Lawyers for the town charged that the Mashpee were not a tribe and therefore had no claim. It would seem the Mashpee could call themselves anything they wanted until it started interfering with property, which ties back to the Cheryl Harris article (Harris 1993). The differences from Rice are significant. The Mashpee were proactively trying to use the law, whereas OHA (which represented the State and not Kanaka Maoli) was
defensively trying to protect itself against the law. The Mashpee were trying to find a way into the box labeled “tribe,” whereas OHA and many Kanaka Maoli were trying to find a way out of the box labeled “race.”

The similarity of the cases is that both required an indigenous population to define itself in Western legal discourse in order to accrue benefits from a Western judicial system. “In order for the state to hear their claims...these Indians were forced to speak in a formalized idiom of the language of the state — the idiom of legal discourse” (Torres and Milun 1990, 628). So, the Mashpee tried very hard to look like a “tribe,” while OHA tried very hard to make Kanaka Maoli not look like a “race.” It was the fuzziness of those terms, and the strictures of the legal discourse that disallowed better-fitting self-originating concepts, that proved the downfall of the Mashpee and OHA. Ironically, one of the ways OHA tried to buck “race” was to argue “tribe,” to the consternation of many Kanaka Maoli who did not want anything to do with either categorization.

The Mashpee trial degenerated quickly into a battle over cultural authenticity as the all-white jury settled on culture as the defining element of Indianess. Lawyers for the town successfully convinced the jury that one was either Indian or one was not and that, given the evidence of assimilation by the Mashpee (miscegenation and adoption of American cultural practices), they surely were not. Martha Minnow (Martha Minnow as quoted in Iijima 2000, n4), Cheryl Harris (Harris 1993, 1764-1766), James Clifford (Clifford 1988, 277-346), Eve Marie Garroutte (Garroutte 2003, 61-81), Michael Shapiro (Shapiro 2002, 35-36), Gerald Torres and Kathryn Milun (Torres and Milun 1990) all regard this case as key in demonstrating the laws’ inability to allow for the “negotiated,” “mutable,” “historical” quality of identity. “The tragedy of power was manifest
in the legally mute and invisible culture of those Mashpee Indians who stood before the court trying to prove that they existed” (Torres and Milun 1990, 649).

The paradox highlighted by Rice is that while many Hawaiians believe they need to reject or move beyond government programs or monies provided based on their racialization, the specter of Rice threatens to take away that racialization, and thus governmental programs or grants based on it, before other structures are in place. Kauanui worries that “in light of the legal logic in the Rice case, which reduces Hawaiians to ‘equal’ American citizens, it may seem necessary to hold onto any and all marks of distinction, no matter how tainted by colonial relations” (Kauanui 2000, 6). Osorio similarly worries that Rice “could initiate a trend to divest the Kanaka Maoli of entitlements that, at this point, represent one of the few hedges against massive poverty and homelessness” (Osorio 2002, 254). Osorio’s book makes it strikingly clear that Western law is unable to deal with the sovereignty of indigenous peoples and yet, because of the power of the law, indigenous peoples (including himself) continue to struggle with the tension between wanting to reject the law and wanting to be recognized and protected by it (like the Mashpee).

It is just this tension that has come to a head in the struggle over the Akaka bill, which was a direct result of the Rice decision. In brief, the bill purports to shore up government funding for Hawaiian programs by establishing some limited federal recognition of a vaguely defined Hawaiian sovereign entity. Those who whole-heartedly support the bill, including OHA, tout it as granting the sovereignty Kanaka Maoli have been fighting for. Those who stand adamantly opposed argue that it is just “another form of genocide,” a sort of deal with the devil because it forces Hawaiians into an extremely
compromised relationship with the U.S. government similar to that of Native Americans. The opinion of many Hawaiians fall somewhere in between these positions. Some acknowledge the limits and dangers of the bill, but believe it can serve as a stopgap measure. What is clear is that the bill keeps the discussion of Hawaiian identity squarely within a Western legal framework. Kauanui, who opposes the bill, has advocated a different path entirely:

For many Hawaiians, *Rice v. Cayetano* makes it all too clear that the discursive apparatus of liberal citizenship, equality, and ‘race’ cannot address issues of collective inheritance and native title. Attention must now turn, insistently, to non-racialized discourses of genealogy, with their attendant notions of responsibility to place and descendants (Kauanui 2000, 189).

If Kanaka Maoli, like the Mashpee, were rendered “mute and invisible” by legal discourse, they can be seen surfing other discursive oceans.

**Beyond Western Law**

What many indigenous peoples are struggling for is explicitly *not* civil rights as citizens of the colonizing nation, nor the federally determined tribal rights of recognized Native American nations. Yet, if Westerners cannot place indigenous peoples in these boxes, we have difficulty knowing where to put them. Perhaps it is our failure to acknowledge the particular colonial histories of indigenous peoples, nearly, but not quite, subsumed within our nations. The *Rice* case, Akaka bill and Mashpee trial in different ways illuminate the power of the law and legal discourse to seduce indigenous people into trying to bend and fold their subjectivities to fit in a flattened, hardened slot rather than pursue Kauanui’s “non-racialized discourses of genealogy.”
A number of legal scholars have analyzed the problems this causes, yet, those trained in Western methods often find it difficult to see the world in any other way. As a result, we can end up where we started, i.e. with the law (and thus centering whiteness), because we can see no alternatives. I use examples from Neal Milner and Jon Goldberg-Hiller here not as a condemnation of their important contributions, but by way of trying to make visible some of our Western blind spots and how they can unintentionally reinscribe white normativity.

Goldberg-Hiller and Milner (Milner and Goldberg-Hiller 2002) struggle to be able to capture the Hawaiian sovereignty movement in some new articulation of legal discourse even though they recognize the “incommensurability” of law and indigeneity. In their paper on Hawaiian sovereignty they go a long way toward recognizing how “Hawaiian culture has the ability to expand beyond legal or racial boundaries” (Milner and Goldberg-Hiller 2002, 15). In their most poetic articulation of this idea, the authors invoke its spatial as well as discursive features: “Focused within the fluid eyes of the sea rather than the rigid and fixed categories of Occidental law that floated here accidentally, sovereignty is reimagined as prior to and more extensive than the cartographic boundaries of Hawai‘i” (Milner and Goldberg-Hiller 2002, 16).

What troubles me is the seemingly contrary move in which they argue that “indigenous rights claims may rematerialize law in a different register” (Milner and Goldberg-Hiller 2002, 8) and describe sovereignty politics as a “postcolonial rematerialization of rights” (Milner and Goldberg-Hiller 2002, 35). First, as I describe elsewhere, many Kanaka Maoli scholar-activists argue that Hawai‘i is still in a colonial or neo-colonial phase. There is a wider discussion
necessary here about what is meant by “neo-” and “post-“ colonial and how they are overlapping and interrelated. Second, I worry about a possible misreading, or an incomplete reading, of Kanaka Maoli politics that expand beyond “rights” and the law.

The “rematerialization of rights” being discussed in the article seems to primarily mean land. The authors suggest that one of the crucial differences between civil rights claims and indigenous “rights” claims is that indigeneity is necessarily about land. “Kanaka Maoli are of the land, from the land, in a way that no pluralist immigrant model of law could ever adequately account for. The primacy of land challenged American colonial and postcolonial hegemony” (Milner and Goldberg-Hiller 2002, 35). While there is no question that indigeneity and land are inextricably linked, it is the linkage of indigeneity to “rights” and “the law” that is troubling. The authors at some points question that linkage, but at others, end up stabilizing it. Land is not flatly “material” to Kanaka Maoli, nor are all “claims” about “rights.”

Elsewhere in the article, the authors analyze what they describe as the “performative aspects” of Kanaka Maoli testimony before a federal panel regarding the Akaka bill. While they see the testimony as an invocation of Hawaiian sovereignty, they have difficulty seeing it as enacted regardless of the law – not with it, not against it, not inside or even consciously outside it:

Opponents of the bill often interrupted the testimony with applause or comments. Very few people who testified finished within the five-minute limit despite the legislators' repeated pleas and threats. There were plain-clothes police officers and deputy sheriffs present to help keep order. Still, the hearing at times had a comfortable informal feeling about it (Milner and Goldberg-Hiller 2002, 12).

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9 I explore some indigenous critiques of postcolonial studies in the next chapter.
In this description, we are not asked to question the presence of the cops “to help keep order,” but we are encouraged to think that it is remarkable that such a hearing could “still” have a “comfortable informal feeling.” Kanaka Maoli performance – including the chants, prayers, recitations of genealogy, discussions about food, and local social interactions of all varieties – frustrated the presiding officials as “disorderly,” and struck the authors as extraordinary.

There is another reading that suggests that all of this was simply the norm in any local gathering, perhaps heightened by the excitement of having so many Hawaiians together in one place. For many Kanaka Maoli, it just seemed a good opportunity to talk to each other, in their own style, irrespective of procedure or official intent of the hearings. As Osorio notes, “it became obvious that we were not so much speaking to the American delegation as speaking to ourselves, contending over the central problem that had underwritten our loss of sovereignty in the first place. How do we protect our lāhui, our kinship with one another” (Osorio 2001, 373)?

As haoles, we have a hard time thinking it is not about us, our law, our country. Colin Perrin helps us understand a piece of the dynamic by illuminating a problem of recognition particular to the indigenous Other. He describes the particular anxiety of the non-indigenous in defining indigenous peoples as citizens of both an indigenous and modern nation. They represent “an otherness which can never be,” an “ambivalent in-between” (Perrin 1995, 57) because of the “undecidability of their place and time” (Perrin 1995, 66). He writes,

Indigenous peoples attest less to a formative and exclusionary violence of modernity and the nation, and more to its failure. They evoke the memory of ‘something that never ceases to be forgotten’ and as such their insistence is, at the same time, an insistence of the postcolonial: the
dislocated expression of a colonialism which can neither be remembered nor forgotten; the paralyzed and anxious persistence of an excess which cannot quite be consigned to the past (Perrin 1995, 74).

As Perrin suggests, the problem is one of historical memory of colonization, but it is more than that. It is temporal and spatial, and as many are now arguing, epistemological.

In her article about teaching in Aotearoa (New Zealand), Alison Jones describes resistance from Pākehā (white) students to admit the “possibility of margins to their knowing” (Jones 2001, 286). Jones, who is Pākehā, often team-teaches with a Māori instructor. She finds that the Māori woman is often treated as a “native informant” who is expected to “colour-in” the whole picture for the Pākehā so that they then can feel they have “absolute knowledge” (Jones 2001, 284). Jones poses the question: “Do we have a cultural incapacity to recognize that we assume we can know (everything)” (Jones 2001, 288). She suggests instead that we need to allow for “the possibility of not-knowing, of non-mastery” (Jones 2001, 289). Yet this is decidedly not a possibility within many Western discourses (the Mashpee and Kanaka Maoli make this clear in the case of legal discourse, and many other scholars following a Foucaultian tradition have similarly exposed this quality of medical and academic discourses).

Let us turn for a moment from the struggle of the West to understand or “place” indigeneity, to what indigenous scholars themselves have to say about their epistemologies and politics. Indigenous scholar Taiaiake Alfred articulates a distrust of Western law similar to Kauanui, including a suspicion of the Western concept of sovereignty. He writes that “the challenge for indigenous peoples in building appropriate post-colonial governing systems is to disconnect the notion of sovereignty from its western, legal roots and to transform it”
(Alfred 2001, 28). People need to reconnect and create relationships to land, culture, and community, not follow Western notions of rights, blood and status. The tools of struggle, the tools for reconnection, he argues, are rooted in one’s own culture. Too many indigenous peoples are “like tumbleweeds” he says, easily manipulated by the dominant culture (Alfred 2003).

Similarly, Eva Marie Garrouette ends her book calling for a “radical indigenism” which is more about practice, relationship, and traditional knowledge than strict definitions or legal documentation. She argues, “in our communities we already possess the resources to meet the challenges of identity that confront us, and to do so without damaging those communities” (Garrouette 2003, 143). Noenoe Silva articulates a related position with regard to Kanaka Maoli:

To fully recover, we have to go beyond the nation and nationalism, which are, after all, constructs of the West. We must recuperate a definition of ‘lāhui’ that will truly provide for Kanaka control over the ‘āina, and that will give birth to social and political institutions that are good for us (Silva 1999, 209).

Walter Mignolo would call these articulations “border thinking from the perspective of epistemological subalternity” (Mignolo 2000, 9). He sites examples from Gloria Anzaldúa, Vine Deloria Jr., and Rigoberta Menchu among others and analyzes how they make explicit the “tension between hegemonic epistemology with emphasis on denotation and truth, and subaltern epistemologies with emphasis on performance and transformation” (Mignolo 2000, 26).

Mignolo invokes Foucault’s concept of genealogy, the union of “erudite knowledge and local memories,” as helpful toward conceptualizing the tension between disciplinary and subaltern knowledges. Genealogies, Foucault writes,
Entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchise and order them in the name of some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects (Foucault 1980, 83).

One of the limits of Foucault's genealogy, in contrast with Mignolo's "border thinking," is that it is predicated on a struggle between "local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges" and scientific knowledge. It assumes a contest. "Genealogy should be seen as a kind of attempt to emancipate historical knowledges from subjection, to render them, that is, capable of opposition and of struggle against the coercion of a theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse" (Foucault 1980, 85). But, what if these knowledges are not about "opposition and struggle;" what if they exist irrespective of Western positivistic scientific discourse, not necessarily in competition with it? What if, as Osorio suggests, indigenous discourse and performance simply enable an internal communication and discussion?

This limitation of Foucault comes from not being able to grasp the difference or "excess" of indigeneity that Perrin describes. Indigenous knowledges may be "subaltern," but they are subaltern with a difference, a difference tied to colonization. Ann Laura Stoler criticizes Foucault for "short-circuiting empire:" "colonialism was clearly outside Foucault's analytic concern, to him a byproduct of Europe's internal and permanent state of war with itself, not formative of those conflicts" (Stoler 1995, 28).

Mignolo wants to "avoid a Eurocentric critique of Eurocentrism" because postmodern theories are "blind to colonial difference. They are blind not to colonialism, of course, as an object of study, but to the epistemic colonial difference and the emergence of border thinking as a new
It is "colonial difference" that is a blind spot for Foucault, Justice Kennedy, and Harold Rice. And it is border epistemologies emerging from the "wounds of colonial histories, memories, and experiences" (Mignolo 2000, 37) that will transcend colonial difference:

The transcending of the colonial difference can only be done from a perspective of subalternity, from decolonization, and, therefore, from a new epistemological terrain where border thinking works... border thinking can only be such from a subaltern perspective, never from a territorial one... Border thinking from a territorial perspective becomes a machine of appropriation of the colonial differences; the colonial difference as an object of study rather than as an epistemic potential. Border thinking from the perspective of subalternity is a machine for intellectual decolonization (Mignolo 2000, 43).

This section has touched upon what Mignolo calls "a new epistemological terrain" — "border thinking from the perspective of subalternity," "radical indigenism," "non-racialized discourses of genealogy," and "recuperating lāhui." Mignolo, Garroutte, Jones, Perrin, Silva, Kauanui, and Osorio are all in different ways attempting to describe an indigenous politics that accounts for colonialism, centers traditional epistemologies, and moves beyond Western law.

**Conclusion**

Kennedy's decision seeks to deny colonial difference, to whitewash Hawai'i's history with a developmental narrative that centers the haole. OHA struggles to find a way to capture colonial difference in Western legal discourse. Harold Rice seeks to romanticize colonial difference as the source of essentialized, depoliticized intelligence, happiness, and petrified cultural tradition. All of these moves normalize haole subjectivity by problematizing,
assimilating, or exoticizing Kanaka Maoli subjectivity, and ignoring the fundamental meaning of colonial difference.

The point here is not to vilify Harold Rice, the Supreme Court, or even Western law. Vilification keeps the focus on the object under contention rather than changing the frame. Following the scholars above, I am suggesting that indigeneity changes the frame by decentering Western epistemologies and law. On the other hand, putting indigeneity on trial (as with the Rice and Mashpee cases) through a narration of the past which forgets, denies or diminishes colonization, creates forms of victimized whiteness that demand redress. This is because Western law is unable to truly recognize or account for indigeneity, most often misrepresenting it through racialization. For those of us trained in Western thinking, refusing to recognize the "margins of our own knowing" — trying to capture, categorize, contain, know, and even become Kanaka Maoli — simply reproduces haole.
CHAPTER 4

Honkies, Haoles, Pākehās and the Pacific: Locating Whiteness Critically, Relationally and Contextually

"I am a Pākehā because I live in a Māori country."
- Mike Grimshaw

Whether we are leaving it or coming into it, it's here that matters, it is place. Whether we understand where we are or don't, that is the story; To be here or not to be.
- Barbara Kingsolver

In previous chapters I attempted to establish that haole is more about the production of a specific colonial (and now neo-colonial) form of whiteness in Hawai‘i than it is about a discrete group of people. Further, it is evident that there have been, and are, multiple constructions of haole surfacing in and through different communities and historical periods, overlapping and colliding in ways that make it impossible to neatly pin them down. All this multiplicity, congruence and contradiction enables an understanding of haole as dynamic and contingent, while at the same time constrained by the particularities of its contextualization.

Further analysis of haole is built by examining several specific literatures for their theoretical and political offerings. In this chapter I look at: whiteness studies and its critiques; the Pākehā movement in Aotearoa (New Zealand); identity theorizing within Native Pacific Cultural Studies; and the few pieces attempting progressive deconstructions of haole. My journey through these fields followed a certain logic that I reproduce in their presentation here. I started by delving into whiteness studies, which has been critiqued for being ahistorical and abstract. These critiques led me to some useful located analysis of white racialization. Review of these located studies pointed me to writings about
Pākehā (white people in Aotearoa). Thinking more broadly about identities located in the Pacific brought me to Native Pacific Cultural Studies, which in turn led me back to looking at existing progressive deconstructions of haole. I mine each of these literatures for theoretical tools and models for praxis that assist in my project to deconstruct and rearticulate haole. This chapter, then, locates the study of haole in relation to relevant academic fields, anti-racist mobilizations, and the cultures and geographies of the Pacific.

**Critiques of Whiteness Studies**

I begin with an overview of some of the critiques of whiteness studies for being ahistorical and abstract. I offer some examples of situated studies of whiteness that provide useful models for illuminating the variation among specific productions of whiteness. While these situated studies help address the abstraction critique, they for the most part do not offer suggestions toward change-making praxis. This, despite the fact that, almost to a fault, whiteness studies scholars make a point of attesting to their anti-racist intentions. Alongside located studies (although too frequently not in conversation with), there is quite a substantial subset of work clustered around the themes of whiteness studies pedagogy, conducting anti-racism workshops, and becoming a “race traitor.” Without diminishing the positive outcomes of some of this literature in suggesting praxis models, I explore how it can end up reifying whiteness.

Whiteness studies has been criticized for abstracting and essentializing whiteness in the following ways: missing nonwhite constructions and analysis of whiteness and thus recentering white people as experts; overemphasizing white
normativity, invisibility and transparency at the expense of recognizing the historical, intersected, relational, and contextual nature of whiteness; overdetermining class as the key to whiteness;¹ and getting caught up in postmodern language that can obscure material consequences and institutional racism. Inattention to nonwhite constructions of whiteness and an overemphasis on the “invisibility of whiteness” are related phenomena most pervasive in the literature, and at the heart of most critiques of whiteness studies. The study of haole can help mitigate some of these weaknesses while animating the inescapable paradoxes of whiteness. It is just these paradoxes that fuel the tremendous anxiety and ambivalence about studying whiteness that pervades recent scholarship by white academics. Rather than see these paradoxes as “double binds,” I wonder if there are not ways to use them as a reminder of the need for humility and irony in the always incomplete businesses of identity production and social change.

The study of whiteness did not originate with the advent of self-proclaimed “whiteness studies” in the early 1990s. Toni Morrison (Morrison 1993), James Baldwin (Baldwin 1985), bell hooks (Hooks 1992), and W.E.B. Du Bois (Du Bois 1989) among others, remind us that people of color have, of necessity, been scholars of whiteness for centuries. James Baldwin writes, “By means of what the white man imagines the black man to be the black man is enabled to know who the white man is”(Baldwin 1998, 123). Similarly, there have always been white “race traitors” who recognize and challenge white supremacy (Bailey 1998). This being the case, there is certain skepticism among

¹ This seems to be the consequence of having a number of significant works on whiteness done by labor historians.
some critical theorists about the recent “discovery” and proliferation of
whiteness studies in the academy. Critics rightly raise the question of “whose
interests are served by examining whiteness” (Chabram-Dernersesian 1999, 109)?

Related to this skepticism is the critique of whiteness studies works for
painting whiteness with too broad a brush, for not being attentive to its
variability and contingency, and for thus reifying whiteness rather than
decentering it. Central to this criticism is the oft-touted claim of the
“invisibility,” or universal “normativity” of whiteness. The editors of the
anthology of papers given at the 1997 “Making and Unmaking of Whiteness”
conference at the University of California Berkeley write:

The idea that whites do not recognize or acknowledge their unearned
racial privileges has become one of the most cited claims of critical
whiteness studies.... This assumption rests on two presumptions. First,
the ‘invisibility’ of whiteness as a concept is predicated on an unknowing
and unseeing white racial subject. Second, it posits a clear distinction
between a group of white insiders who cannot recognize themselves for
who they ‘really are’ and nonwhite outsiders whose point of view affords
them authentic insight. Neither of those presuppositions allows for the
possibility that whites who are positioned differently in society may
actually view or live whiteness quite differently. The claim also tends to
privilege the viewpoint of whites, begging the important questions of
how, when, and to whom whiteness becomes visible (Rasmussen et al.
2001, 10).

These editors contend that overplaying a universal normativity for whiteness
produces a kind of false consciousness argument in which only some
“enlightened” whites gain the power to see behind the veil of whiteness.

2 Thus far, whiteness studies in the U.S. has tended to treat whiteness as an American
phenomenon, rather than focusing on variability of whiteness across time and space,
including national borders. “Whiteness travels across national borders in contingent
ways, and the same white body can be lived differently in various locations as
intersections of race and gender flux” (Rasmussen et al. 2001, 9). Also, “white racism has
by no means been a peculiarly American phenomenon, and grounding the study of
American whiteness in broader international context could help accentuate the
particular nature and features of race making in the United States” (Kolchin 2002).
Similarly, Ruth Frankenberg, whose seminal work *White Woman, Race Matters* has been criticized for generalizing from a specific group of women, admits that she was mistaken to write about the invisibility of whiteness as though it were a "timeless certitude" (Frankenberg 2001, 73). On the contrary, she now believes, "the more one scrutinizes it...the more the notion of whiteness as unmarked norm is revealed to be a mirage or indeed, to put it even more strongly, a white delusion" (Frankenberg 2001, 73). The "delusion" of the universal normativity/invisibility of whiteness is made explicit in located studies of whiteness.

Cynthia Levine-Rasky suggests approaching the study of whiteness through models that integrate critical, relational and contextual approaches (Levine-Rasky 2002). She finds that these are the three main approaches taken by whiteness scholars, but frequently they are deployed in isolation. Critical approaches focus on the normativity of whiteness. They argue that whiteness needs to be marked and interrogated as a socially constructed racialization, rather than assumed as the normative backdrop for studies of racialized "others." Critical approaches call whiteness out in general but have the limitations outlined above.

Relational approaches analyze the symbolic and material interdependence of whiteness with other racializations. An example of the material relationalism of whiteness is the political economy of racism with its racially coded disadvantages and privileges. Levine-Rasky gestures here to the institutional example of whites being advantaged in New Deal federal housing programs. Cheryl Harris' article on whiteness as property is a cornerstone for this approach (Harris 1993). The discursive relational quality of whiteness is most eloquently
described in Toni Morrison’s *Playing in the Dark*, which clearly shows how black characters in American literature were, and are, negative referents for the construction of whiteness (Morrison 1993).³

According to Levine-Rasky, contextual approaches can be temporal, spatial, or both. For example contextual approaches are mobilized by work that analyzes whiteness in relation to colonization, class, and European racial relations. Just as whiteness cannot be understood outside its mutual constitution with other racial subjectivities, neither does it stand outside of political, economic, historical, and geographic forces. Taken together, all three approaches (critical, relational, and contextual) to studying whiteness help guard against essentialism and provide more nuanced analysis. “When whiteness is erected as an essentialist construct, it neglects other competing identities that are themselves in flux, multiple, and open to shifting cultural processes...whiteness itself becomes a field where meanings are contested, recede, and diverge” (Levine-Rasky 2002, 335).

Elizabeth Ellsworth offers a complementary analysis in which she suggests that whiteness is “never just one thing” and is “never the same thing twice” (Ellsworth 1997). It is never just one thing because it is always articulated in and through other simultaneously occurring subjectivities. It is never the same thing twice because it is temporally and spatially located, and thus always variable. This being the case, strategies for political engagement with whiteness and white privilege must also be multiple and changeable. “If whiteness is always more than one thing, and if it is never the same thing twice, then

³Morrison writes, “The subject of the dream is the dreamer. The fabrication of an Africanist persona is reflexive; an extraordinary mediation on the self; a powerful exploration of fears and desires that reside in the writerly conscious” (Morrison 1993, 7).
discourses and actions that refuse to perform the racist work associated with any one enactment of whiteness must be recognized and staged as historically situated and context specific" (Ellsworth 1997, 261). This seems like such a simple and yet powerful idea – a good starting point for looking at located studies of whiteness.

Located Studies of Whiteness

A particularly strong challenge to the tendency to universalize whiteness has been lodged by critical social geographers (Bonnett 1996). They argue that whiteness, or any other racial formation, cannot be understood outside its mutually constitutive relationship with space. Race could not exist without certain racialized spaces, and racialized spaces are only possible because of particular located processes of racialization. In his article, “The Space that Race Makes,” David Delany writes, “race – in all of its complexity and ambiguity, as ideology and identity – is what it is and does what it does precisely because of how it is given spatial expression” (Delaney 2002, 7).

Taking these critiques to heart, scholars have undertaken studies which destabilize the notion of universalized whiteness by making evident the contingent, fluid, relational and contradicted nature of whiteness in particular space and time. It is useful to survey this work in order to see where and how the study of haole might contribute to it. Leading critical geographer Alastair Bonnett writes:

The contemporary formation and reformation of Whiteness is not a generic process. It requires geographical sensitivity and attentiveness to the distinct historical development of ‘racial’ categories in particular regions and nations. Here again, research is notable largely for its absence. White identities world-wide are changing, yet very few scholars are asking how or why (Bonnett 1997, 198).
Wendy Shaw, in her study of neo-colonial whiteness in gentrifying Sydney, Australia, writes, "it is not whiteness itself that needs to be made visible, but the historical and geographical contexts in which it operates, and the processes of normalization in which it is embedded and which work to bestow upon it its 'naturalized' power" (Shaw 2002, 31). Shaw explores whiteness at the local level of neighborhood processes and the entanglements of power that marginalize and exclude Aboriginals in the creation and refortification of white spaces. Shaw finds whiteness expressed as "membership to privileges, and processes of privileging, that are not necessarily fixed in time or space, or even to specific bodies" (Shaw 2002, 210).

It is not just critical geographers who are undertaking located studies of whiteness. Like Shaw, cultural anthropologist John Hartigan Jr. is attentive to the materialization and practice of whiteness within particular locations and histories. Both theorists are particularly attuned to the ways in which whiteness articulates or disarticulates with class. Hartigan's study of whiteness in Detroit, Michigan offers this challenge:

The widely trumpeted assertion that whiteness is an unmarked and normative identity often seemed laughable in Detroit. The lives of white Detroiters disrupt as much as they confirm generalizations about whiteness and its operation, maintenance, and reproduction. Which is not to say that their distinct situations discount an overarching attention to whiteness as a position of power and privilege; rather, the ludicrousness of rendering them as a homogeneous subject prompts a consideration of how the specificity of these whites' lives can be accounted for in conjunction with an understanding of why and how whiteness matters (Hartigan 2001, 139).

The claim of normative whiteness in Hawai'i is similarly "laughable" to anyone who knows the islands. Haole is culturally nonnormative – it is marked and
challenged – yet, as in Detroit, it still maintains power and privilege. Therefore, the ways haole matters are particular to this paradoxical context.

In their provocative work on “white trash,” Annalee Newitz and Matthew Wray disrupt notions of whiteness as transparent and whites as oblivious to race (Newitz and Wray 1997). Their analysis shows complicated dynamics in which lower class whites are appropriating the white trash label as a banner of victimhood (i.e. as “victims” of multiculturalism and/or affirmative action), at the same time middle class whites use the label to scapegoat them rather than recognize root causes of poverty and class difference. The authors argue that these lower class whites are not only aware of their racialization, but they are strategically mobilizing it in hopes of gaining attention to their “plight.” Part of this strategic mobilization includes a reclamation of the “white trash” label because, as the authors write, “sometimes it is better to be named something terrible than to have no name at all” (Newitz and Wray 1997, 170).

Kathleen Blee has done some path-breaking work on women in white supremacist organizations and contends that these women have much more complicated understandings of race than is popularly believed. In fact, many see race as fluid, as indicated by their narration of stories in which persons gain or lose racial identities through their actions (Blee 2000, 107). Interviewees did not necessarily assume Blee’s racial allegiance, and were keenly interested in trying to determine, and perhaps recruit, it. One woman commented: “I’m just assuming you’re [my kind of] white. I could be wrong here... It [whiteness] covers a lot of territory, you know. There’s all kinds” (as quoted in Blee 2000, 104). The last two sentences of her comment are strikingly similar (down to the
use of spatial metaphors), to statements found in academic discussions of whiteness.

In an innovative study, France Winddance Twine interviews young women of African descent who grew up in white middle-class suburbs identifying as white, a population she dubs "brown-skinned white girls" (Twine 1999). She rightly criticizes whiteness studies for almost exclusively studying people of European descent, despite the rhetoric regarding fluidity and contingency. While there are a number of works, including those cited earlier, on what Black people think of whiteness, Twine’s tact is to ask what “brown-skinned white girls” think of whiteness and to look at how they acquired their white identities. The biggest limitation of the study is that Twine does not pull apart the interlocking but separate dynamics of identification and recognition. As has been clearly demonstrated, identity is not just stories we tell about ourselves, but those others tell about us. According to Twine’s data, the girls’ identification as white is unproblematic until such time as they begin to date, when suddenly they find themselves distinctly marked as “other.” I would argue that as young girls in “polite” white middle-class society, where there is a cultural taboo against talking personally about race, they were allowed to think of themselves as white, but they were not really passing as white. It would be worth troubling this phenomenon a bit more.

Many located studies of whiteness involve autobiography, an interrogation of one’s own life as text (Bulkin, Pratt, and Smith 1984; Segrest 1994; Thompson and Tyagi 1996; Berger 1999; McIntosh 1988; Cuomo and Hall 1999). There is quite a spectrum of opinion across the disciplines about the usefulness and scholarly heft of this writing. As I indicated in my discussion of
methodology in my introductory chapter, I believe personal stories can provide excellent sources of data, but have their limitations, as does all data. Personal stories are one of the best ways to pull discussions of whiteness from the abstract to the particular. But this asset is also their biggest danger – the risk of becoming too particular, of turning a story into a confessional. There is a tendency to want to tell our stories and, as the literature indicates, especially for white people our “race” stories. There is also a tendency to want to make public our sense of guilt and our angst over racism, whether we are seeking absolution or direction from people of color. The trick seems to be to somehow use one’s own experience for what it illustrates or troubles on the larger scales of culture and institutional practice.

In one example, Dalton Conley takes his own experience growing up as a “honky” in a New York city ghetto as a text: “I’ve studied whiteness the way I would a foreign language. I know its grammar, its parts of speech; I know the subtleties of its idioms, its vernacular words and phrases to which the native speaker has never given a second thought” (Conley 2001, 25). For Conley, whiteness is not taken for granted, not normative but “foreign.” Having grown up with New York black culture as the norm, he had to “learn” to be white when he traveled outside that universe. Contrary to being oblivious of whiteness, he is hypersensitive to it. Yet, his statement universalizes whiteness, rather than showing an appreciation for its variance. Given his experience, I would venture to guess that Conley would be quick to recognize the manyness of whiteness – that “honky” is not the same as “Yankee,” which is similar, but not equivalent, to “haole.”
Whiteness and Anti-Racist Praxis

Nearly every article, book or anthology published in the recent tidal wave of whiteness studies situates itself as anti-racist, but only a small subset of the literature deals explicitly with how that politic is made manifest. The work that deals most directly with praxis is centered on classroom pedagogy, anti-racism workshops and white abolitionism. While there are certainly exceptions, these works tend to offer individualized remedies for whiteness at the expense of more politicized engagements. The pedagogy literature and anti-racism workshops have been roundly criticized for reliance on paternalistic victim-ally models and a tendency to fix and essentialize whiteness:

The notion of allies reinscribes the exclusive and fixed categories friend/enemy, oppressor/oppressed, knowledgable/ignorant. Exclusive categories such as these ignore the complexities of social positionings and of the structures of social relations ... Exclusive categories foreclose the possibilities of the context-specific responses made possible when whiteness is considered in relation to the other positionings that people live out and live through (Ellsworth 1997, 267).

Here Ellsworth makes a crucial point that highlights the distance between theory and practice. On the one hand, there is a theoretical understanding of whiteness as variable, multiple, complex, and on the other hand, when we come to social change strategies, everyone is sent back to their pre-assigned seats. The tension here is between getting white people to recognize their (particular) whiteness and white privilege, while simultaneously allowing for the contingent, ambiguous, intersected character of whiteness.

The “race traitor” or white abolitionist movement righteously asserts that the only salvation for white people is the denunciation of their whiteness. Noel Ignatiev, one of the movement’s founders, states: “We believe that so long as the white race exists, all movements against what is called ‘racism’ will fail.
Therefore, our aim is to abolish the white race” (Ignatiev 1997, 608). Their plan is for all “so-called” white people to become “traitors to their race” by refusing the benefits of white privilege and “defying the rules of whiteness” (Ignatiev 1997, 607). It is not just that this is much easier said than done that draws criticism. At an even more basic level, thinking that one can simply “opt out” of whiteness is another expression of the privilege of whiteness. One also cannot miss the militaristic masculinity being recruited in the stridency and disciplinary nature of these proclamations:

The stentorian tone of soul-searching, accompanied by its rhetorical rectitude, comes uncomfortably close...to the way in which ‘nationalist’ discourses of the state frequently address the people or the troops as a homogenous mass waiting to be mobilized. Such a disciplinary political program makes it impossible to exert one’s own right to make a nuanced response, to suggest a variation in terms or tone. One is obliged, more or less, to act or answer passively, in the affirmative (Bhabha 1998, 24).

There must be political engagements with whiteness that hold on to the theoretical promise of intersectionality and avoid angst-driven mea culpas, paternalistic helping models, or militaristic calls to arms. I come back to the invocation issued by a Kanaka Maoli activist that “you have to know who you are and why you are here,” and think about the importance of located praxis. It is not surprising that there are not more works that attempt the construction of new models or stances toward whiteness. It is extremely difficult to do without being prescriptive, without suggesting a disciplining of both whiteness and the self that only serves to refix us in the boxes we only recently broke out of. In my search for such models, I discovered a literature and movement in Aotearoa interrogating Pākehā.
RECEIVED
AS
FOLLOWS
The Pākehā Model

In the 1980s and 90s white settlers in Aotearoa began reclaiming – as opposed to ignoring, diminishing, or denying – their Pākehā identities. This move was a response to the Māori political resurgence of the 1970s and 80s and part of an effort by progressive Pākehā to accept the Māori challenge that they grapple with the history of Pākehā domination (Spoonley 1995; Lawn 1994). In terms of colonization, Hawai‘i and Aotearoa have much more in common than Hawai‘i and any of the African or South Asian countries generating the most well known post-colonial theory. The Māori are regarded as relatively successful in the native Pacific in their anti-colonial struggle, and there is a deep and enduring relationship between Māori and native Hawaiian activists. It seemed to me that haole and Pākehā might follow this lead and start learning from each other. I will explore some of the paradoxes and contradictions that I found, but first it is necessary to sketch the biggest differences between Aotearoa and Hawai‘i with regard to indigenous and nonindigenous populations. As many indigenous Pacific island scholars have so eloquently pointed out, there are vast differences between island nations and peoples, including different experiences of colonialism.

First, “Māori” is a term that was adopted to indicate the indigenous people of Aotearoa, but pre-contact there was no conception by “Māori” of themselves as a whole. Rather, there were hundreds of separate and distinct iwi (tribes) (Ranford; Allen 2000; Mulgan 1989, 12). This contrasts with Hawai‘i where the indigenous cosmology identifies Kanaka Maoli as one people and subsequently the Hawaiian Kingdom identified them as subjects of the monarchy or Hawaiian nationals.
Second, the Māori struggle stands out as the closest thing to a success story to be had by indigenous movements in the Pacific because of the strength the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi negotiated with the British Crown and signed by over 500 chiefs (Allen 2000). The Treaty has become the basis for Māori activist demands for legal recognition and land claims, many of which have been successful and others that are on-going within a national process of reconciliation. The Kanaka Maoli have no document of similar strength to stand on, nor any national process of reconciliation.4

Third, the British empire is clearly a different beast than the still largely unacknowledged American empire, and the trajectory of British colonies has been quite different. Aotearoa obtained independence from an overextended United Kingdom in 1907, while Hawai‘i was brought into the folds of empire through the 1893 illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, territorialization, and eventual statehood in 1959. While the British empire was in retreat, the American empire was on the march.

Finally, the notion of biculturalism is very strong in Aotearoa and permeates political rhetoric and policy decisions. The Māori are represented as one half of a bicultural society seeking a just and peaceful coexistence. As discussed earlier, Hawai‘i has a history of enormous immigration, creating an ethnically and racially diverse population, and catalyzing a discourse of “melting pot” multiculturalism.

Pākehā scholar Paul Spoonley writes, “the 1980s mark a watershed in how Pākehā have come to understand their role in the history of Aotearoa. They

4 I disagree with arguments that the Akaka bill could foster such a process because under this legislation the state and federal government would continue to have the ultimate power, not the Hawaiian people.
moved from seeing themselves as ‘colonized’ (in relation to the British) to a perception of themselves as ‘colonizers’ in relation to the Māori” (Spoonley 1995, 99). Challenged by Māori activists, many Pākehā undertook a process of self-reflection and political discernment. Their process shows some of the potential positive developments, as well as some of the contradictions and pitfalls of attempting to rearticulate the identity of colonizer, however cautiously.

Perhaps the most impressive development is the fact that such a movement was able to take hold at all. While it would be difficult to say how many Pākehā took part, a large number were willing to reexamine their collective responsibility in colonization and actively participate in building some type of reconciliation. These Pākehā, working alongside Māori activists, were able to significantly impact public policy. The Treaty of Waitangi Act (1975), which set up a tribunal to officially interpret and make recommendations on claims based on the Treaty, was significantly strengthened by amendments in the 1980s that widened the power of the tribunal and gave it teeth. While far from perfect, relative to the situation in Hawai‘i, the political will of the state seems genuinely set on the process of reconciliation and making concrete change with regard to land claims, education and training, and ownership rights of natural resources.

Consider the following public statement:

As Māoridom began to reassert its new sense of identity and its wish to have the wrongs of the past put right – particularly in respect to land – so the level of tension between Māori and Pākehā began to rise. There was no way of avoiding a day of reckoning. It was a matter of necessity for all New Zealand that we faced up to it... the honour of the Pākehā was very much at stake (Laidlaw 1990, 2).
The speaker, Chris Laidlaw, goes on to talk about "land grabbing," makes connections to other colonial societies, and quotes the first president of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta: "When the white man came to Africa we had the land and he had the bible. He asked us to close our eyes and pray. When we opened them he had the land and we had the Bible" (Joma Kenyatta as quoted in Laidlaw 1990, 3). It surprised me to discover that Laidlaw was New Zealand’s Commissioner of Human Rights in the early 1990s, yet this is the relatively enlightened state of dominant discourse in Aotearoa. It is hard to imagine a high public official in Hawai‘i talking about missionary “land grabs,” the need to redeem the “honor” of the haole, or suggesting a true redistribution of resources to Kanaka Maoli.

In a second positive development, Pākehā activism and research has helped destabilize polarized constructions of colonizer and colonized. This was evident, for example, in Pākehā women’s groups that formed to educate themselves about the Māori struggle. Some of these groups were successful at forming alliances with Māori women. While problematic in ways I will discuss later, the anthropological work of Michele D. Dominy on Pākehā populations has been significant in offering a more multiple and complicated understanding of Pākehā:

The anthropology of colonialism has paid insufficient attention to the anthropology of white settler societies. There is variation in expressions of settler identity; it is not a homogeneous discourse even within New Zealand. Transplanting a culture renders it vulnerable to the influencing effects of geography and cultural environments, of distinctive landscapes and indigenous populations. As Ann Laura Stoler (1989; 136) has written, ‘colonial cultures were never direct translations of European society planted in the colonies but unique cultural configurations, homespun creations’ (Dominy 1990, 12).

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5 Stoler reference: (Stoler 1989). As shown in previous chapters, Ann Laura Stoler and
Spoonley suggests that Pākehā was reoccupied as a political, rather than ethnic identity. "I want to argue that the progressive political position adopted by many of those who identify themselves as Pākehā can be understood as the exercise of agency with the goal of social and economic transformation" (Spoonley 1995, 104). For him, the Pākehā movement includes an affirmation of the "centrality of biculturalism," an understanding of Māori-Pākehā history, and a solidarity with Māori struggles. It is interesting to think about how this might look in Hawai'i. Could haole become a political identity in a similar way? Could it be pried free from the racialized field of discourse in which it now resides without diminishing the legacies of colonialism?

The Pākehā movement has its limitations. Spoonley identifies: the problem of male domination; the question of how much influence the movement has; the limitations of class; and the possibility of a reasserted Pākehā identity being co-opted by "neo-racists." To this list I would add the problem of white guilt distorting responses to racism and colonialism in ways that depoliticize them. The first three problems are ones faced by many progressive movements, while co-optation by "neo-racists" and white guilt are issues particular to white anti-racist organizing. I therefore focus on these last two issues.

The phenomenon of a movement that is supposed to be anti-racist being co-opted by racism is particularly dangerous. Spoonley worries that "the label 'Pākehā' might be captured by neo-racists in order to argue that it is Pākehā who are the victims of racism, that it is the Pākehā who are denied resources and an

Anne McClintock's path-breaking works use feminist theory to complicate any homogeneous notion of a single colonizer identity or colonization process (McClintock, Mufti, and Shohat 1997; Stoler 1997). Stoler's scholarship in particular suggests the dynamism and relational aspects of identity that Dominy seeks to foreground in Pakeha.
identity by the dominance of Māori...” (Spoonley 1995, 109). It is a worry that has become reality in Hawai‘i with the Rice decision and across the United States in the sweep of colorblind ideology. While it is easiest to recognize this attack when the charges of reverse racism are explicit, there is a more hidden level of operation. In Aotearoa, it functions through discourse that equates Pākehā and Māori by dehistoricizing those identities and downplaying power differentials. Michele Dominy’s work has been criticized along these lines and provides an interesting case study.

Dominy came under fire most when she agreed to testify for her Pākehā respondents in a land dispute case before the Waitangi Tribunal. Her research involved looking at “high country” Pākehā farmers’ relationship to the land and concluded that they had a “spiritual affinity” to the land equivalent to that of the Māori (Dominy 1990). While Dominy argues that she merely presented some of her outcomes to the Tribunal without giving an opinion in the case, it is easy to see how her “expert” testimony worked in favor of the Pākehā. In response, the New Zealand Association of Social Anthropologists (NZASA) wrote a public letter stating that Dominy’s “cultural perspective is not only limited, it is distorted, ignoring that these settlers have been able to develop their culture uncontested over several generations as a result of Pākehā political and economic dominance over the Māori” (NZASA et al. 1990, 3). The letter goes on to suggest that “by using the rhetoric of ‘spiritual affinity’ for both Māori and Pākehā linkages, we suspect she [Dominy] conflates two very different sets of values, historical experiences and ways of thinking” (NZASA et al. 1990, 3).

This type of conflation is seen elsewhere in Pākehā literature to differing degrees. In his book Māori, Pākehā and Democracy, Richard Mulgan tries to
advocate for a biculturalism that diminishes the present-day impacts of
colonialism by representing Pākehā and Māori as equally at home in Aotearoa (a
term he rejects for being "monocultural"). He believes Pākehā “need a more
positive view of themselves, their culture and their history” (Mulgan 1989, 120).

In *Being Pākehā Now*, Michael King continually asserts that Pākehā have
just as much claim to Aotearoa as Māori. His prologue poetically pronounces
that “in the beginning we were all immigrants to these islands, our ancestors
boat people who arrived by waka, ship or aeroplane” (King 1999, 11). In his
conclusion, he grants Pākehā indigeneity:

> To be Pākehā on the cusp of the twenty-first century is not to be European;
it is not to be an alien or stranger in my own country. It is to be a non-
Māori New Zealander who is aware of and proud of my antecedents, but
who identifies as intimately with this land, as intensively and as strongly,
as anybody Māori. It is to be...another kind of indigenous New Zealander
(King 1999, 239).

King pushes this point so hard that one begins to sense a crisis of confidence. In
an article surveying some Pākehā writing, Jennifer Lawn finds this same
tendency in King’s introduction to *Pākehā: The Quest for Identity* (King 1991). She
contends that:

> King demonstrates his own wholeness and security by asserting national
belonging: ‘my place is in New Zealand; New Zealand is my place,’ he
writes, with a chiasmic balance designed to convey fullness, finality,
necessity and naturalness (9). Yet ironically the repetitive structure of this
equation suggests anxiety, a need for reassurance that King’s place really
is in New Zealand and that Pākehā culture really does matter (Lawn
1994).^{6}

These statements echo haoles who adamantly insist that they have as much claim
to Hawai‘i as the Kanaka Maoli, either because like King, they believe everyone
is an immigrant to the islands, or because they can trace their particular lineage

^{6} King reference: (King 1991).
back to the days of the monarchy. While there are not many haoles (publicly) going so far as to claim indigeneity, adopting the label of “Hawaiian at heart” can be one short step away. There is a desperation to these claims that parallels King, a craving for “home” and belonging to place that I discuss in the next chapter.

The final limitation to the Pākehā movement I want to address, not discussed by Spoonley at all but taken up by others, is the problem of individualized, depoliticized responses to white guilt. Māori scholar Ani Mikaere stated in a recent lecture, “one barely has to scratch the Pākehā surface to find the guilt lying immediately beneath, guilt which manifests itself as denial, self-justification, defensiveness, and incredibly enough, a sense of victimhood” (Mikaere 2004).

Jennifer Lawn draws a parallel between the Pākehā movement and the men’s movement. “In both the men’s movement and what I call the ‘Pākehā renaissance,’ members of a hegemonic group ostensibly abject themselves to an idealized other, while diverting the terms of debate from material conditions of oppression to their own psychic malaise” (Lawn 1994). Lawn points out that much Pākehā writing is personal testimonials and has a strong confessional tone. Another critic calls it “moral flagellation” (Baker 1992, 145), apparently in hopes of some sort of absolution.

Similarly, Alison Jones writes about problems that ensue when Māori teachers step outside their expected role as “native informant” and refuse to provide their Pākehā students with some type of “redemptive communion” (Jones 2001). After conducting research which included anonymous surveys of students she writes, “by being authoritative harbingers of the unknowable, of
uncertainty...they [Māori teachers] were seen as ‘hurting’ the unhappy Pākehā students who felt ‘marginalized,’ ‘disrespected,’ ‘disconcerted,’ ‘uncomfortable,’ and ‘guilty’” (Jones 2001, 284). In both of these instances, critical self-reflection is refracted through the lens of guilt and discomfort into a deep hole of self-centered need. What was supposed to be genuinely about the Other becomes more of the same, all about the self.

Kanaka Maoli are familiar with the guilt response from haoles (as are African Americans who ironically become painful reminders for white people of the legacies of slavery). Kelly Kraemer analyzes how guilt generates anxiety which she finds indicates a lack of commitment to doing solidarity work. “Worrying about appropriate roles allows allies to appear sincerely committed, expressing a genuine desire not to overstep their welcome, while at the same time they avoid taking substantive action pending determination of an appropriate role” (Kraemer 2000, 326). Kraemer quotes a frustrated Hawaiian activist: “this kind of personal angst about ‘my role,’ I don't really care about your role. And the longer you angst out, the less ability you have to really contribute” (Kraemer 2000, 326).

Along this slippery slope is also the danger of exploiting white guilt toward personal gain. Lawn points to the industry developed around the men’s movement (books, workshops, retreats, drum pounding lessons, and so forth) and wonders about the careers built on the Pākehā movement. As with critiques of broader whiteness studies, the question being asked is, in whose interest is the study of Pākehā? Lawn suggests that “to develop strategies towards achieving substantively equal ‘dialogue,’ Pākehā will need to recognize their economic and psychological investment in inequality” (Lawn 1994). This investment seems to
be returning capital gains not only through the continued exploitation of Māori, but also through the more recent marketing of a quick fix for white guilt to Pākehā. Since there is no “haole movement” to speak of, this kind of opportunism is, as yet, not a problem in Hawaiʻi (in fact, if recent haole publications are any indication, haoles are more interested in works which valorize haole history).?

The Pākehā movement and literature provides a comparative model for thinking about a progressively politicized haole movement. From its limitations haoles are warned to not be too self-assured and to remain open to criticism and change. These weaknesses should not overshadow the benefit of having a Pacific island neighbor where white colonizers engaged in serious self-reflection and policy change in a process of reconciliation. Two elements of the Pākehā movement that I explore with regard to haole are the destabilization of polarized constructions of the colonizer and the colonized, and a rearticulation of the colonizer as a consciously political identity.

Native Pacific Cultural Studies

The past few decades have seen the growth of a vibrant body of multidisciplinary scholarship focused on Pacific islander identities, initiated by Pacific peoples, and evolving out of movements for political sovereignty and decolonization in the 1970s–80s. These scholars make strong arguments for grounding theorizing in the particularities of their localities and regions, while at the same time pulling from contemporary postcolonial and postmodern studies. They pay specific attention to indigenous epistemologies, cultural practice, and

7 See (Twigg-Smith 1998) and (Cook 2003).
geographic elements (most significantly, the ocean). Teresia K. Teaiwa breaks down "Native Pacific Cultural Studies:"

We see our work as the expression of 'Native' genealogies, 'Native' commitments – complicatedly entangled with, but distinct from 'colonial' products. We ground ourselves in the 'Pacific' – large and fluid as that space is... ‘Cultural Studies’ does not describe so much a shared methodology, as it does shared frames of reference – a new theoretical canon, perhaps—and new modes of representation... (Teaiwa 2001, 343).

Native Pacific Cultural Studies is relevant to the study of haole on a number of levels. First, haole is a Pacific identity, however “at home” or not in the region, however in synch or at odds with native genealogies and commitments. Also, haole is relational with native Pacific identities, especially those most represented in Hawai‘i (which, in addition to Kanaka Maoli, include Samoan, Tongan and Chamorro people). Learning more about native Pacific identities can only help in contextualizing haole. And finally, there is a methodological argument. Social science research in Hawai‘i often draws theory from the North American continent, even when the subject of study is local or regional. This reproduces the imperialist schema in which the Pacific produces “exotic” objects for research, but no original thinking of its own. Increasingly, academics in Hawai‘i are engaging scholarship from the “sea of islands” to the south rather than drawing exclusively, or even primarily, from the (main)land.

A number of overlapping themes run through the current discourse regarding Pacific identities: a focus on indigenous epistemologies and temporalities; on-going struggles with colonization; a tension with postcolonial

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8 As mentioned in chapter one, this phrase was coined by Epeli Hau’ofa in the early 1990s as a reversal of the common Western expression capturing the region as “islands in a sea.” Hau’ofa’s phraseology centers the sea as the source of life and connection, rather than empty space between islands, and has become popular with Pacific scholars.
theory; the primacy of place and kinship relations; the historical “rooted and routedness” of Pacific peoples that problematizes the concept of diaspora; a strain over debates regarding “authenticity;” and an emphasis on inclusivity and fluidity in identity formations. I briefly explore each thread, quoting extensively, to amplify the voices of these scholars.

As I have described in previous chapters, one of the most destructive elements of colonization is its suppression of indigenous epistemologies and temporalities causing the “dismemberment,” to use Jonathan Osorio’s phrase, of the people. Along these same lines, Epeli Hau’ofa writes,

To remove a people from their ancestral, natural surroundings or vice versa, or to destroy their lands...is to sever them not only from their traditional sources of livelihood, but also and much more importantly, from their ancestry, their history, their identity, and from their ultimate claim for the legitimacy of their existence. It is the destruction of age-old rhythms of cyclical dramas that lock together familiar time, motion, and space (Hau’ofa 2000, 469).

Native Pacific scholars, like Hau’ofa, emphasize non-scientific indigenous ways of knowing and cyclical temporalities found in their cultures of origin. “One of the most positive aspects of our existence in Oceania is that truth is flexible and negotiable... Versions of truth may be accepted for particular purposes and moments...” (Hau'ofa 2000, 454). The oral traditions of many indigenous Pacific cultures helped enable this flexibility and fluidity:

The written world has undermined the fluidity of indigenous history. Oratory allowed for debate and negotiation. On the other hand, the written word fixes the truth. Genealogies, land titles, customary practices, secret rituals, disputes, religious beliefs (and so on) that were previously embedded in social relations are no longer subject to change or modification (Hereniko 2000, 84).

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9 Many of these themes are also shared with Native American scholarship regarding indigeneity and identity, but here I focus on Pacific scholarship.
Many scholars write about Pacific peoples' orientation toward the past — having the past in front, rather than behind them. "It is as if the Hawaiian stands firmly in the present, with his back to the future, and his eyes fixed upon the past, seeking historical answers for present-day dilemmas" (Kame'eleihiwa 1992, 22-23). This alternative temporality makes the past very much alive and at play in the present day. It helps explain indigenous resistance to impatient Western insistence that colonization happened "a long time ago" and native peoples ought to "get over it" or "move on."

Given this orientation, Pacific scholars focus on colonization as a project with "ambivalences," "estrangements" and "messy entanglements:"

History recognizes there are no neat boundaries defined by the will and intention of colonizers on the one hand, and clear perspectives and actions of the colonized on the other. Instead there are a series of 'messy entanglements' within colonizing and indigenous communities and between them, back and forth, that encompass unities and cleavages, alliances and conflicts, contradictions and adaptations, half-successes and failures, willful action and misread responses (Hempenstall 2000, 46).

When thinking about indigenous identities, this web of entanglement makes any easy, neat categorization impossible. This idea of colonialism as a messy, contradicted, fluid project is one that is shared with many postcolonial scholars. For instance, Gyan Prakash suggests that, "one can see contradictions, variations, and ambivalences as essential characteristics of colonial regimes... neither the colonized nor the colonizers were monolithic entities. Many motives, many interests were in play" (Gyan Prakash interviewed by Borofsky 2000, 298). And yet, many native Pacific scholars are skeptical of postcolonial theory. Well-respected Māori scholar, Linda Tuhiwai Smith relates an incident from a conference on postcoloniality:
Post-colonial discussions have also stirred some indigenous resistance...to the idea that colonialism is over, finished business. This is best articulated by Aborigine activist Bobbi Sykes, who asked a conference on post-colonialism, 'What? Post-colonialism? Have they left?' There is also, amongst indigenous academics, the sneaking suspicion that the fashion of post-colonialism has become a strategy for reinscribing or reauthorizing the privileges of non-indigenous academics because the field of 'post-colonial' discourse has been defined in ways which can still leave out indigenous peoples, our ways of knowing and our current concerns (Smith 1999, 24).

Part of the criticism of postcolonial theory has to do with its inability to deal with the primacy of place and relations (and the interconnections therein) for indigenous peoples. "Land and sea constitute our genealogies and, not surprisingly, they lie at the heart of the varied movements to restore native sovereignty and self-determinations. Land and sea are ways by which peoplehood is fashioned" (Diaz and Kauanui 2001, 319). It is cross-cultural practice among many indigenous Pacific peoples to introduce themselves in terms of their genealogies, explicating ties to place and relations. "Hawaiians identify themselves through their 'ohana - extended families - affiliations and island locations. And Hawaiians use genealogical relationships to establish a collective identity through the social nexus of 'ohana" (Kauanui 2000, 15).

These ties to peopleplace\(^\text{10}\) have led some anthropologists\(^\text{11}\) to mischaracterize indigenous Pacific peoples as immobile, caught in pre-modern time and space:

I challenge the way in which Pacific peoples are often represented as simply rooted, as grounded in the land, partitioned by the borders of a village or an island, as static in place and time while foreigners –

\(^{10}\) Here I borrow from Donna Haraway’s "natureculture" and coin "peopleplace" as a way of gesturing toward the inseparably intertwined relationships between people and place in indigenous thinking (Haraway 2003).

\(^{11}\) For an illuminating look at the triangulation between anthropology, cultural studies, and the Pacific region, with a focus on Hawai‘i, see (White and Tengan 2001).
Europeans and Asians – are represented as mobile explorers, as invasive strangers... foreigners are constructed as the agents of change and transformation... engulfing Islanders who are imaged as hapless victims trapped in the closed inertial of community, or lost in nostalgic recollections of times past (Jolly 2001, 418).

Jolly (Jolly 2001, 1992), Hau'ofa (Hau'ofa 1998, 1993), Clifford (Clifford 1997, 2001), Diaz and Kauanui (Diaz and Kauanui 2001) all challenge this representation and argue instead that native Pacific peoples are, and have always been, both “rooted and routed,” both deeply invested in place and incredibly mobile. This view has encouraged discussions of Pacific diasporas and how indigeneity intersects with, complicates and contradicts some notions of postcolonial diaspora. Jolly insists upon a recognition of both “groundedness and mobility” within Pacific cultures that incorporates the impacts of colonization and globalization:

Pacific peoples live in both spatialities and contextually deploy metaphors of both groundedness and mobility, settlement and detachment to articulate their being in the world. But where they live, the specific places of their being, also matters. Divergent colonial histories and different contemporary Māori configurations of interest – between indigenes, white settlers, and migrants – mold how roots and routes are ‘articulated’ in Clifford’s sense (Jolly 2001, 425).

The misconception of indigenous peoples as static and stuck has also led academics to question the “authenticity” of some contemporary indigenous cultural practices and identity claims. Increasingly indigenous scholars are avoiding the trap laid by this line of attack, refusing to scramble for “evidence” to legitimize themselves within a Western framework. One way out of the trap is through the development of Pacific identity theorizing that embraces the creativity and contingency of culture and identity. Writing about, but not from,

12 For an interesting discussion of the idea of Pacific diasporas see (Subramani 2000).
the Pacific, James Clifford argues for a redeployment of Stuart Hall’s “politics of articulation” which understands identity as inorganic, “nonrigid positioning” that is “more like a political coalition, or in its ability to conjoin with disparate elements, a cyborg” (Clifford 2001, 478). Clifford prefers the language of “articulation” to that of “hybridity” because hybridity references nature rather than politics:

In articulation theory, the whole question of authenticity is secondary, and the process of social and cultural persistence is political all the way back. It is assumed that cultural forms will always be made, unmade, and remade. Communities can and must reconfigure themselves, drawing selectively on remembered pasts. The relevant question is whether, and how, they convince and coerce insiders and outsiders, often in powercharged, unequal situations, to accept the autonomy of a ‘we’ (Clifford 2001, 479).

The limitation of Clifford’s conception is that it does not adequately address the difference that is particular to indigenous Pacific identities – the relationship to the Pacific islands and ocean. Clifford recognizes the inadequacy of articulation theory to “rooted” indigeneity. Articulation theory is unable to deal with the indigenous “desire called ‘the land’” which is “persistently active” (Clifford 2001, 481). But he is silent on the specificity of Pacific indigeneity. What is missing is the ocean (which incidentally is never silent). Even Clifford’s strongest statement celebrating a “Native Pacific” articulated identity uses the terminology of “landedness:”

The movements of Native Pacific people suggest newly inventive struggles for breathing space, for relational sovereignty, in post- or neocolonial conditions of complex connectivity. They are about finding ways to exist in a multiplex modernity, but with a difference, a difference derived from cultural tradition, from landedness, and from ongoing histories of displacement, travel, and circulation (Clifford 2001, 483).
If he misses the ocean in Pacific identities, Clifford is careful to avoid essentializing gestures by locating difference in history and culture. Hau’ofa, on the other hand, argues for an “Oceanic identity” for Pacific peoples anchored in the sea as common heritage. His conceptualization embraces the same type of inclusivity and connectivity called for by Clifford, but with the recognition that “the ocean is in us.”

As the sea is an open and ever-flowing reality, so should our oceanic identity transcend all forms of insularity, to become one that is openly searching, inventive, and welcoming. In a metaphorical sense the ocean that has been our waterway to each other should also be our route to the rest of the world (Hau’ofa 1998, 406).

It is important to note that Hau’ofa’s Oceanic identity is not necessarily indigenous since in his inclusivity he welcomes “anyone who has lived in our region and is committed to Oceania” (Hau’ofa 1998, 402). And so, discussions continue with regard to identity, indigeneity, diaspora, nationalism and so forth.

This quick survey of some of the themes in Native Pacific Cultural Studies scholarship is intended to further contextualize a discussion of identities in Hawai’i, and haole specifically. In considering a rearticulation of haole, three themes from this body of work seem particularly applicable: the idea of facing the past; the importance of dealing with colonization; and the idea of “articulated” or nonrigid identities. Some of these themes have been discussed in previous chapters and will resurface in the final chapter.

13 This is the title of Hau’ofa’s paper.
Progressive Deconstructions of Haole

Some progressive attempts toward deconstructing haole have been made. Compared to analysis of Hawaiian identity, local culture, or any of the many racial or ethnic groups that inhabit Hawai‘i however, the scholarship on haole is paltry, even when including reactionary works.\textsuperscript{14} While Elvi Whittaker’s book remains the only comprehensive study of haole to date (Whittaker 1986), two subsequent articles by haole academics at the University of Hawai‘i (Wuthnow 1994; Reed 2001), and a play by a local haole (Pinkosh 1992) also problematize haole identity. Kelly Kraemer’s dissertation, addressing problems with haole allies involved in the Hawaiian sovereignty movement, also touches on haole identity (Kraemer 2000).

Each of these works argues for a located understanding of haole as a specific form of whiteness in Hawai‘i. Each drives home the point that being white in Hawai‘i is very different from being white in most places on the continent, because whiteness is not the cultural norm in Hawai‘i. In fact, Pinkosh’s one-man play “Haole Boy” is founded on this principle and is successful insofar as it uses humor and drama to realistically portray common experiences of growing up haole in the 1970s-80s. “Haole is more than simply ‘white.’ It is historically and economically situated and encompasses a variety of cultural behaviors, sensibilities and a particular interactional style” (Reed 2001, 332).

\textsuperscript{14} The distinction I am making here is a rough cut between those works on haole that reinscribe certain dominant narratives regarding haole (i.e. benevolent, civilizing force or one element of a multicultural mosaic) and those which make an honest attempt at deconstructing haole by looking at colonialism and white privilege.
These works also situate haole as more about attitude, culture, history, and behavior than as static racial categorization. There are ways, these authors suggest, to be “less haole,” although they are careful not to suggest that one can escape haoleness altogether. There are also ways for non-haoles to become more haole. Negative references are made to “acting haole,” being “so haole” or being a “haole haole.” Key to becoming less haole for each of these authors is exhibiting an awareness of, respect for, and participation in local (and to varying degrees, Hawaiian) culture and values. Pinkosh’s depiction of his character’s acculturation to the point where he is recognized as a “local haole” goes far in illustrating this point. As Reed points out, “there are shades of haole that intersect with shades of local which make the picture far more complex than the simple duality suggests” (Reed 2001, 332).

Wuthnow satirically points out that even once one has some awareness, becoming less haole is not a simple matter, especially for those who have not grown up in the islands. As she attempts to reconfigure haole as a conscious political identity – in similar fashion to aspirations of the Pākehā movement – she encounters similar stumbling blocks of structure, class, and attitude. To address how haoles deal with being haole, she breaks out haole subsets of “most haoles” (liberal, usually newcomers from the continent), kamaʻāina, military and progressive.

[Most haoles... just don't get it. Kamaʻāina haoles, by virtue of their vast privilege, don't have to get it. But some of us, the 'enlightened,' the 'responsible,' the 'ethical,' not only get it, but by virtue of our superior understanding are able to change our ways and become a truly different sort of non-oppressive, polite and always appropriate haole. If only it were so easy (Wuthnow 1994, 48).]
This statement is similar to the criticism by Rasmussen et al of "enlightened" whites who are able to see through their whiteness. Wuthnow knows better than to fashion some easy answer for being haole. Where these works differ is in how easily they make space in Hawai'i for haole, and in their treatment of colonization and the relationship between Kanaka Maoli and haoles. Wuthnow is the most tentative about making space for haole and the most forthcoming about colonialism as a continuing process. She suggests that the best that one can ever hope for is to be a "recovering haole," analogous to the Twelve Step notion of a recovering alcoholic. "At best, the subject who has achieved ideal haoleness can only be in recovery from colonization; the craving for home will always be there" (Wuthnow 1994, 49).

Reed is less tentative suggesting, "haole identity can be unfastened but it takes work," without really exploring what that "work" might entail (Reed 2001, 332). She gestures at colonialism a few times, but never seriously addresses it, focusing instead on a haole-local relation. Within this frame, Reed is able to emphasize "sensibilities," "attitudes," and "cultural affiliation" without having to squarely address questions of history and power, including indigenous claims. Pinkosh wants to go even further in making space for haole, indicating that haole is "part of the tribe, the people of Hawai'i" (Pinkosh as quoted in Viotti 1995). This is similar to the equivalence argument that King makes between Pākehā and Māori, flattening any difference held in indigeneity.

Both Wuthnow and Reed draw on a poststructuralist conception of identity with some success. Reed's analysis is useful in that she destabilizes identities in Hawai'i in the same way Dominy does in Aotearoa by playing up their contingency, contestation, and multiplicity:
The Hawai‘i case provides some insights into the ways that identity is negotiated in a changing social, historical and cultural context. The examples that are cited in this essay suggest that local, non-local and haole terminologies are imprecise and flexible, that they are historically situated, continuously contested and partially rule driven. They sometimes depend as much on the cultivation of sensibilities and attitudes as they do on ethnic heritage and history. Their salience is derived from the meanings that insiders and outsiders infuse them with and from the work that insiders and outsiders do to fasten, unfasten and refasten identity (Reed 2001, 337).

This analysis is helpful in understanding the slide between "being" haole and acting haole. The danger here is the tendency to follow a theoretical thread too far without sufficient check of historical and material contextualization. Reed fails to recognize Kanaka Maoli identity (as distinct from local), its political history and its interaction with other identities. Instead she sets up a duality between locals and “non-locals,” as “insiders” and “outsiders,” and then attempts to blur those lines by showing how “non-locals,” including haoles, can attain varying degrees of localness.

Reed’s overriding metaphor for the paper of a “fastening and unfastening” of identity is also too facile. Although it suggests some of the same notions of identity as an assemblage or coalition as articulation theory, it lacks the political sophistication. Reed waxes on about the advantages of claiming hapa identity in Hawai‘i without problematizing the denial of haole in favor of hapa. In her final section, she talks about non-Hawaiians giving their children Hawaiian names as a way of showing “a sense of place and cultural affiliation” without discussing the related minefields of appropriation (Reed 2001, 337).

While the paper has interesting points to relate about the fluidity of race in Hawai‘i, the fastening-unfastening model over simplifies racial formation and
politics in Hawai‘i by erasing important variabilities and contestations, not the least of which are colonization and Kanaka Maoli subjectivity.

Wuthnow is also interested in adopting a “postmodern view of subjectivity” with regard to haole and suggests this might be possible by “discussing the intersection of haole and homo subjectivities” (Wuthnow 1994, 48). As far as I can determine, she is the first to suggest looking at haole through the lens of multiple subjectivities. Thus, her approach to haole identity as nonrigid and multiple is similar to some of the Pacific identity theorizing discussed earlier. In fact, she offers a queering of identity that I have not yet seen much of from Pacific scholars. Unfortunately, Wuthnow does not fully exploit the opportunities of “homo haole,” choosing instead to focus solely on potential pitfalls of the intersection. She worries about a Queer Nation overlaid on what should be a Hawaiian nation and her anxiety unintentionally renders the queer Hawaiian invisible. She fears queer haoles seeking exemptions from haole on the basis of the fact that they are oppressed as queers:

That clean and simple claim to victim status needs to be complicated and confounded by the recognition that yes, haoles who are queer are oppressed, and...still colonizers. Identity is a complicated affair that is closer to additive than exclusive, however unsatisfying that might be in terms of political strategizing or in terms of the ability to claim a coherent and comprehensible self (Wuthnow 1994, 51).

Wuthnow is right to be concerned about the tendency to want to claim only categories of oppression and not privilege. This limited victim-centered identity politics disallows the openings created by our complicated, contradicted selves. Similarly however, Wuthnow does not exploit the “and” that she

15 Wuthnow’s use of “homo” is tongue-in-cheek. She admits to liking the alliteration of “homo haole.”
emphasizes. She finds no way that being “homo” can help in understanding oneself as haole. “[L]ocal folks mostly don’t care if haoles are gay; what matters is that we are haole, and more importantly that we are almost always acting haole” (Wuthnow 1994, 51). The question begged is whether being queer can be mobilized with and through haole in such a way as to open up new awareness and suggest behaviors that are not so haole (as well as differently queer). Without becoming the basis for claiming an exemption from haole, can we make “homo haole” work for us by exploiting the interrelationship between homo and haole?\textsuperscript{16}

Conclusion

Each of these literatures offers insights, tools, and warnings that inform a study of haole and an activist engagement with the identity. Traveling through, I have attempted to collect, organize and digest this knowledge. From whiteness studies comes cautions about being too abstract and ahistorical, and subsequent calls for situated analysis. The literature, however, is lacking regarding situated praxis to challenge or reinvent whiteness toward social change (pedagogical and anti-racism models have not kept up with theoretical understandings, and tend toward individualized rather than collective action).

The Pākehā literature helps in destabilizing the colonizer-colonized binary and attending to the violences, ambiguities and contradictions of colonialism. The move to rearticulate Pākehā identity as political, rather than racial, holds

\textsuperscript{16} It should be noted that Wuthnow’s is just a working paper and that she should be credited for raising some very important questions and taking the important step of putting haole into play with intersecting subjectivities.
promise despite the difficulties it surfaces (many of these difficulties are noted in the larger literature on whiteness). Native Pacific Cultural Studies highlights four related elements of Pacific identities: respect for native epistemologies; embeddedness within colonial histories and processes; attention to the importance of spatiality (peopleplace); and inclusive, rather than exclusive, formulations of who matters. Progressive deconstructions of haole stress the particularity of haole as a Pacific neo-colonial form of whiteness; the performative aspects of haole; and the relational processes that produce haole and other identities in Hawai‘i. Carrying these learnings with me, I move to consider the possibilities for rearticulating haole.
CHAPTER 5
Paradox and Politics in Paradise:
Toward a Genealogical Approach to Haole

*I want to know how to live with the histories I am coming to know.*
– Donna Haraway

*The ocean is in us.*
– Epeli Hau’ofa

Up to this point my exploration has considered the processes through which haole has emerged in its many different constructions, both in the past and the present. Understanding these historical, political, legal, spatial, and cultural processes opens up possibilities for thinking about the conditions that produce haole and possibilities for reconfiguring haole; becoming haole more carefully and consciously. The sequencing here is of primary importance to me. I have tried to deconstruct and decenter haole from as many angles as possible before considering its rearticulation. Rather than try to deny or appropriatively refashion haoleness – like those who claim to be kama‘aina, hapa, or “Hawaiian at heart” – I think it is more productive to confront and unpack haole in order to begin to rethink it toward progressive change in Hawai‘i.

This undertaking has its minefields and paradoxes and I proceed cautiously knowing mistakes are inevitable. This is less a “how to haole” guide than suggestions for further discussion, analysis and action toward reimagining and rearticulating haole. On the other end of the spectrum from the white abolitionists discussed in the previous chapter, are whiteness scholars who seek to create a “positive,” “attractive,” anti-racist model of whiteness. One in which white people can again be “proud” of their “heritage” (Kincheloe 1999). Joe
Kinzeloe's pedagogical suggestions and Michael King's orientation toward Pākehā follows this line (Kinzeloe 1999; King 1999). Neither of these are my objective: I am not interested in abolishing haole, or in reconstructing it into some sort of panacea, a new improved great white hope. I do not believe either project is possible, much less desirable. My goal here is less grandiose, less neat and complete, more tentative. I intend to explore some possible elements of a genealogical stance toward haole. One of the big tensions here is finding a way to vision a new orientation toward haole without suggesting that one can ever comfortably rest in haole. A related paradox that nearly paralyzes many whiteness scholars is the fear of reinscribing, rather than decentering, whiteness by making it the subject of analysis. A genealogical orientation toward haole is not the final ground upon which haoles can solidly stand, rather it offers strategies for imagining and performing haole in more historicized, relational and contextualized ways.

I turn to intersectional theory to build on the ground that Wuthnow, Reed and Pinkosh have laid in deconstructing haole, the lessons offered by the Pākehā movement and whiteness studies more broadly, and the theorizing being done within Pacific cultures. Holding all this in mind, I weave intersectional and Chicana theory with pieces of my own personal story, and with hapa haole identity, putting theory to work troubling unified notions of haole. I move to a discussion of "home" and "homeland" as they relate to Hawai'i and desires to belong to peopleplace. Taking the charges of abstraction in whiteness studies seriously, I offer another specific production of haole for analysis – the recent controversy over the firing of University of Hawai'i President Evan Dobelle. This controversy provides an excellent complement to the Rice case, as Dobelle
and Rice are seen to represent opposite ends of a mainland-local haole continuum.

The Dobelle story offers a springboard into my discussion of adopting a genealogical stance toward haole. I see this stance as striving toward genealogy in the indigenous sense of connection to peopleplace with its temporal and spatial fluidity, and in the poststructuralist sense of remaining attentive to our will to power, cautious of truth claims, and privileging of nondominant perspectives. Without flattening the complexity of the event, I believe Dobelle’s performance suggests that he was dismissive of the need to attend genealogically to the specifics of the Hawai‘i context. Mobilizing genealogy, I argue, remakes both haole and Hawai‘i as more verb than noun, opening up new possibilities for reestablishing pono in the islands by building social change.¹

**Intersectional Theory**

The concept of intersectionality is being employed in various disciplines with different terminology – multiplicity, simultaneity, post-identitarianism, and intersectionality are most common. Broadly speaking, the concept refers to an understanding of identity not as a singular, unified static, essential thing, but as a becoming which involves any number of multiple components and vectors of power that intersect, collide, collaborate and contradict in contingent relation to each other and material and discursive contexts. Women of color theorizing was one of the first sites to articulate the concept of multiple oppressions which is one aspect of intersectionality. Foundational works here include the …*But some of us are Brave* anthology (Hull, Scott, and Smith 1982), the *This Bridge called my Back*

¹ Thanks to Kathy Ferguson for suggesting the verbing of “haole.”
anthology (Moraga and Anzaldúa 1983), and Audre Lorde’s *Sister Outsider* (Lorde 1984).

In the 1990s this early work was built on and complicated by legal, cultural, postmodern, disability, queer, and other feminist theorists. They stressed not just the multiple aspects of identity, but its contingency, fluidity and contradictions. Highlights of this work include: Patricia Hill Collins’ work on the family as intersected site of mutually constitutive multiple oppressions (Collins 1998); Kimberlé Crenshaw’s analysis of the way the law insists on singular categorizations thereby disappearing or misrepresenting the complex experiences of those living “intersected” identities, especially of women of color (Crenshaw 1991); Judith Butler’s destabilization of the sex-gender dyad (Butler 1999); Gloria Anzaldúa’s path breaking theorizing of Chicana hybridity and mestiza consciousness (Anzaldúa 1999); Kathy Ferguson’s concept of “mobile subjectivities” (Ferguson 1993); and the work of many disability theorists challenging the bright line between “able” and “disabled” (Wendell 1996; Davis 2002; Morris 1996).

All of this scholarship produced some common themes to intersectional theory that are especially helpful to my study of haole. First, is the idea of identity as dynamic rather than static. Stuart Hall says identity is “a matter of ‘becoming’ as well as of ‘being.’ It belongs to the future as much as to the past. It is not something that already exists, transcending place, time, history and culture” (Hall 1990, 225). Subjectivities are variable across and with time, space, power, and audience; boundaries between self and the world are porous, not solid. In other words, identities are inherently political, historical, economic, geographic, and social.
Second, a fuller understanding of identity cannot privilege one subjectivity over others, assume all the pieces put together make a complete whole, or fail to recognize the multiple dimensions of power through which subjectivity is constituted. While one category or constellation of categories may be more salient in one time or place than others, or chosen as an analytic lens, one must always keep in mind that each modality is “always already operating in relation to other salient vectors of meaning and power” (DiPalma and Ferguson 2003). None of our subjectivities is innocent of these politics. Political theorist, Wendy Brown insists that we pay as much attention to the specific variability in modes of subject production as we do to the listing of oppressions, which she contends, tends toward positivism. She points to the limitations in earlier theorizing that has tended to speak of subjectivities as if they were separate, discrete units of being:

Subjects of gender, class, nationality, race, sexuality, and so forth, are created through different histories, different mechanisms and sites of power, different discursive formations, different regulatory schemes. On the other hand, we are not fabricated as subjects in discrete units by these various powers: they do not operate on and through us independently, or linearly, or cumulatively... these powers of subject formation are not separable in the subject itself. These powers neither constitute links in a chain nor overlapping spheres of oppression; they are not ‘intersectional’ in their formation (Crenshaw); they are not simply degrees of privilege (Hurtado); and they cannot be reduced to being ‘inside or outside, or more or less proximate to, dominate power formations’ (Hill Collins). As so many feminist, postcolonial, queer, and critical race theorists have noted in recent years, it is impossible to extract race from gender from sexuality, or masculinity from colonialism (Brown 1997, 86).

Third, it follows that binary oppositions between identity categories (whether self-self or self-other) turn out to be unproductive in that they fix and overdetermine what could otherwise be creative tension. Hence, while it may be tempting to talk in terms of oppressor and oppressed or dominant and
subordinate, a more nuanced analysis of identity and power serves us better.

Applying this notion to the imperial processes, McClintock writes,

Imperialism emerged as a contradictory and ambiguous project... For this reason, I remain unconvinced that the sanctioned binaries – colonizer-colonized, self-other, dominance-resistance, metropolis-colony, colonial-postcolonial – are adequate to the task of accounting for, let alone strategically opposing, the tenacious legacies of imperialism (McClintock 1995, 15).

Before moving into a discussion of how intersectional theory might help in destabilizing and rearticulating haole identity, I want to share a relevant story. In 2000 I attended a multiculturalism workshop at a women’s conference in San Francisco. The facilitator, an African American woman who has made a profession of these workshops, put up a chart showing some “target” and “non-target” groups for different oppressions (i.e. disabled/able-bodied, gay/straight, etc). She said that almost everyone could come up with at least one category in which they are in the target group. She asked us to identify what “non-target groups” we fell into (i.e. to name our privilege). At first there was dead silence in the room. Then someone nervously asked for clarification. Then a woman finally shared that she was about to buy a house and join the “propertied class” and explained that this gave her discomfort. I recognized this as one of those moments when I should speak. So, palms sweating and heart-pounding, I said something about being a white woman from Hawai‘i and struggling to understand my position and responsibility vis-à-vis the Hawaiian sovereignty movement. The facilitator thanked me for sharing and said I should pay attention to what Hawaiian people think my role might be. She then added that she was glad I had identified myself as white because she would not have necessarily recognized me as such; she might have thought I was “Chicana.”
This stunned me, and I immediately wondered what I was wearing. I am often misrecognized as a boy/man – an encounter I usually take pride in and sometimes seek to facilitate through dress and body language – but I had never, to my knowledge, been thought to be anything other than haole or white. I realized that having grown up in Hawai‘i, I recognized myself as haole, both in Hawai‘i and on the continent. I had translated myself seamlessly to white on the continent without really giving it a second thought.

Clearly I was recognized as white by others, and benefiting from white privilege, but could I also be (mis)recognized as Chicana in certain situations? I began to wonder if I would have had a stronger Chicana identification (and thus, performance) had I grown up in California or Arizona and known my mother’s Mexican side of the family. My mother – the child of a Mexican waitress and Greek cook who took pride in their immigration stories, assimilation and subsequent American citizenship – never conveyed strong “ethnic” cultural bonds (the reasons for this are complicated, but certainly include the fact that this would have been difficult in rural Hawai‘i in the 1970s). Yet, she told me family stories, fed me frijoles and tortillas, and helped me struggle through high school Spanish classes. I began to wonder whether I could bring my Chicana side in theoretically (to do so culturally feels appropriative), and use it to produce myself as a more nuanced, intersected haole? I began to think I needed to, in the words of James Baldwin, “do my first works over:”

To do your first works over means to reexamine everything. Go back to where you started, or as far back as you can, examine all of it, travel your road again and tell the truth about it. Sing or shout or testify or keep it to yourself: but know whence you came (Baldwin 1985, xix).
If there is hope for haole, I think it comes in the recognition that, thankfully, one is never just a haole. This is a crucial piece that the Pākehā movement is missing. In their focus on biculturalism, they have built too solid a wall around Pākehā (and by extension, Māori). I have been fingerling this problem since 1996 when I wrote an article about growing up as a haole girl (Rohrer 1997), in which I attempted to complicate my haole identity with my lesbianism. Like Wuthnow, I was a “homo haole” seeking an understanding of what that meant. Also like Wuthnow, I realized I could not simply deny my colonizer status by overemphasizing my lesbian status. Unlike Wuthnow however, I felt there had to be something useful in my queer experience that I could recognize and articulate in my process of becoming haole. For, as Wendy Brown and Elizabeth Ellsworth suggest in the previous chapter, it is not about adding queer to haole and stirring. Rather, it is about recognizing those subjectivities as always already in relation, though never relating in exactly the same way (Brown 1997; Ellsworth 1997).

This experience of (mis)recognition as a Chicana pushed my thinking a step further. If I was seeking to rearticulate haole in a less oppressive way, could I draw both from my lived experience as a lesbian and whatever small amount of racial fluidity I had stumbled upon at that conference? Could I use those interrelations as ways in, as wedges to crack the seemingly impenetrable monolith of my haoleness? These experiences do not form any sort of truth, but they do provide an opening for theorizing. “It is not individuals who have experience, but subjects who are constituted through experience. Experience becomes...not the origin of our explanation... but rather that which we seek to explain” (Scott 1999, 83).
Mestiza Consciousness, Hapa Haole, and My Grandmother

In an effort to theorize these experiences, I turn to Gloria Anzaldúa, who among other things, identified as Chicana and lesbian, and whose concept of hybridity and mestizaje offer fruitful opportunities for a rearticulated haole:

They would chop me up into little fragments and tag each piece with a label. You say my name is ambivalence? Think of me as Shiva, a many-armed and legged body with one foot on brown soil, one white, one in straight society, one in the gay world, the man’s world, the socialist, and the occult worlds... Who, me confused? Ambivalent? Not so. Only your labels split me (Anzaldúa 1983, 205).

Anzuldúa refutes the idea that living with so many complex and contradictory identities makes her “confused” or “ambivalent.” At the same time, she does not seek to transcend her subjectivities or to bring them together in a neat, ordered stasis. She is finding a way to live in the in-betweeness – to be many places and to be herself a new place, what some call “a third space.” There is ambiguity and hybridity here, but Anzaldúa is resolutely unambivalent. She refuses a politics that insists she be one thing and not another – she will not be split, nor will she be whole. Shane Phelan discusses Anzaldúa’s ability to construct mestizaje not as an essence but a “point of departure:”

The strength of mestiza consciousness is a result of its multiplicity and ability to sustain contradiction and ambiguity... The revolutionary force of the mestiza is the ability to refuse the reifications of cultural nationalism without abandoning the nation entirely, and to provide links to class-based movements without becoming subsumed within them. Because she never simply ‘is’ any one element of her blended being, the mestiza cannot be captured in the oppositions that are presented as inevitable; class or nation, sex or race, or any other reified opposition. The mestiza does not dispute the historical or contemporary reality of these designations, but she does operate constantly to undermine their unitary solidities (emphasis mine Phelan 1994, 74-75).

Angie Chabram-Dernersesian also relies heavily on Anzaldúa in her discussion of native constructions of whiteness (discussed in chapter two).
Chabram-Dernersesian critiques Mexican nationalist constructions of whiteness as essentializing and flattening and therefore sees great potential in the mestiza:

Anzaldúa disrupts the kind of binary (Mexican white) that is evident in the gringo/Mexican Indian split by peopling the borderlands with other social identities (sexual, ethnic, gender), by contemplating the complicity of the natives in their oppression and by suggesting a third space of ethnic identification that overwrites whiteness (Chabram-Dernersesian 1999, 122).

By “peopling the borderlands” with other identities, Anzaldúa demands space for the complexity and ambiguity of lived experience on the margins, no matter how uncomfortable or politically problematic. Marginality and oppression are not flattened by valorization or condemnation; they simply are, and they are always in motion.

I think about how this mestiza consciousness works with and troubles what I know about whiteness and haole. Clearly it emerges from the specificity of the Mexican-American border and cannot be overlaid directly on Hawai‘i. Still, it offers a theoretical model that is useful for thinking through haole. It encourages me to allow for partialities and pluralities, convergences and “contradiction and ambiguity,” as well as excesses, for which there is no accounting. Regarding haole subjectivity, it suggests that I “not dispute the historical or contemporary reality” of that designation, but that I “operate constantly to undermine” its “unitary solidity.” I take heart that I never am simply haole, at the same time I acknowledge the weight and responsibility of never escaping haole.

Many of the contributors to This Bridge We Call Home (the sequel anthology to This Bridge called my Back, also co-edited by Anzaldúa), build on the call for a mestiza consciousness:
We must learn to make peace with contradiction and paradox, see its operation in our own lives' uneven structures, and learn to sense, taste, and understand paradox as the motor of things... living contradiction is necessary if we are to create the asylums of identification and solidarity with and for one another, without which our lives will surely wither (Alexander 2002, 89).

"Making peace with contradiction and paradox" includes learning to live all our subjectivities as they shift and flow, cascade and eddy. It means being able to recognize pieces of ourselves in others and others in ourselves. It means embracing a society that is multicultural, multiethnic, multilingual, multireligious, multigendered, multisexual, multiclassed, multiabled, multiaged and so forth, so that we might "create asylums of identification and solidarity."

James Clifford asks, "Is it possible to locate oneself historically, to tell a coherent global story, when historical reality is understood to be an unfinished series of encounters? What attitudes of tact, receptivity, and self-irony are conducive to nonreductive understandings" (Clifford 1997, 13)?

"Locating oneself historically" using the "motor of paradox," "tact, receptivity, and self-irony" to forge "nonreductive understandings"—what could that possibly look like? I recognize myself as the lesbian auntie of a niece and nephew who are (part)Hawaiian and already more local than I could ever be. I recognize myself as a Punahou graduate who luckily went first to Kōloa Elementary School, Kauaʻi High and Roosevelt High. I recognize myself as the hippie child forced to choose between the equally humiliating options of raising my hand in homeroom for a "free lunch" or bringing squished banana sandwiches and carob cookies. I recognize myself as able to play in the Poʻipū

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2 As indicated earlier, Punahou is an elite missionary-founded mostly haole private prep school. Kōloa school, Kauaʻi High and Roosevelt High are mostly local public schools.
Sheraton pool undisturbed with my haole friends (regardless of how disruptive we were to paying guests), but being kicked out if our group included any of my local friends. I recognize myself the day before my nephew's big baby luau, scooping 'opipi, chunking pineapple, chopping tomatoes, avoiding the imu, and appreciating the vegetarian chili made especially for me that night. I recognize myself doing my small part queering a nation while I also support recognition of native Hawaiian political sovereignty.

Further consideration of hapa haole identity (meaning part, usually half, haole) can provide a useful entry point to this multiplicity. Hapa identity is dealt with in various conflicting ways. As discussed in chapter two, hapa can be used as an escape route out of haole. Certainly, for those who value local identity, being hapa haole is better than being just haole. But what about those who can pass for just local, do they consider themselves hapa? Or those who are culturally Hawaiian and support sovereignty? Or those who look haole and not local at all? There is a growing literature by those identifying as hapa and some of it addresses these contradictions and paradoxes directly without attempting to smooth them over.

In a Bamboo Ridge collection, I found an excellent short story about a hapa woman (Hawaiian-Chinese-Irish named Stephanie Keke‘oke‘omaikanalu Yap) coming home to be with family during the death of her grandmother. Stephanie grapples with being identified as "a minority" on the continent (where...
her last name becomes the signifier), and haole in Honolulu. It pains her that, when she gets lost while driving home from the airport, a local guy calls her a "stupid haole." She admits to being in a rental, dressed like a haole, and no longer familiar with the landmarks – but she still does not feel she is a haole:

I spent twenty-two years as a local girl before I went to Yale. Eleven years in New Haven didn't turn me into a talk-too-much, talk-too-loud, no-mos­sense mainland haole, and even though the seven years I taught at Harvard gave me plenty of excuses to talk too much and talk too loud, still I resisted, frequently reminding myself who I am and where I come from (Kearns 1999, 122).

She does not act haole. She knows where she came from. She discusses her consternation with her grandmother who asks her if she knows what her name means. Stephanie says her Hawaiian Tūtū (grandmother) who named her told her it meant "the foam of the breaking waves."5 Her Chinese grandmother responds,

Maybe so, but dat not why she wen call you ke keʻokeʻo. I was in da hospital, too, you know. She wen pick you up, no mo clothes on you...and she say, 'No look like one Kanahele, dis kaikamahine, no look like one Yap. One hundred pahcent look like one Leahy. Jess like one haole.' But bumbye you come brown aftah you play at da beach long time, you no look so haole, you look like one hapa-haole girl. Maybe Tūtū tink she wen give you da wrong name. She tell you one fancy story about da foam. But now you come back from da mainland, you look like da foam on da wave, like one haole. Ke keʻokeʻo. Da name not wrong (Kearns 1999, 130).

Stephanie protests and her grandmother asks her to look in the mirror and tell her what she sees. She finally relents, "a stupid haole." Her grandmother responds again, "Nah! I see Doctah Stephanie Kekeʻokeʻomainokanalu Yap, my akamai granddaughtah who wen come home so her popo can see her face one

5 In Hawaiian culture, naming is extremely important. Names convey genealogy, tell stories of place and deeds, and transmit mana.
mo time” (Kearns 1999, 131). Her grandmother does not resolve the contradiction she is living. In fact the story about her naming is intended to explain to Stephanie that even her family saw her as haole originally, and then as hapa-haole, but never as simply local. Her name means white, like the foam of waves – and it is not wrong. In the end, the grandmother indicates that even if Stephanie presents as haole, she knows other aspects of Stephanie’s identity – her name that ties her to her genealogy, her academic achievement which makes her family proud, and her family loyalty in coming back to see her dying grandmother.

In contemporary Hawai‘i politics, this haole paradox is evidenced by the lack of Hawaiian activists who proudly claim mixed or hapa ancestry, and who can blame them? The politics of identity is complicated enough without having to admit to the colonizer inside. Yet, it is hard to see how healing or coalition can happen if people are bent on denying their haole subjectivity. Closeted, I worry it only gains more negative strength. I turn again to Anzaldúa:

To live in the Borderlands means you

are neither *hispana india negra española*  
*ni gabacha, eres mestiza, mulata*, half-breed  
crung in the crossfire between camps  
while carrying all five races on your back  
not knowing which side to turn to, run from;

To live in the Borderlands means knowing  
that the *india* in you, betrayed for 500 years,  
is no longer speaking to you,  
that *mexicanas* call you *rajetas*,  
that denying the Anglo inside you  
is as bad as having denied the Indian or Black;

*Cuando vives en la frontera*  
people walk through you, the wind steals your voice,  
you’re a *burra, buey, scapegoat*,  
forerunner of a new race,  
half and half—both woman and man, neither—
a new gender;...

To survive the Borderlands
you must live *sin fronteras*
be a crossroads.

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gabacha—a Chicano term for a white woman
rajetas—literally, “split,” that is, having betrayed your word
burna—donkey
buey—oxen
*sin fronteras*—without borders (Anzaldúa 1999, 194-95)

It is useful to think about how Hawai‘i might be a borderland, an in-between for haole, rather than a home. The boundary between Hawai‘i and the continental U.S. is contested in some ways similar to the Mexico-U.S. border, most significantly as relates to geo-politics, nationalism and national identity. But perhaps the metaphor of borders is not so useful in Hawai‘i because borders suggest landedness. Perhaps, following native Pacific scholars, it would be more productive to think of Hawai‘i as nonterritorialized, as part of a region where the ocean, not the land is paramount. Nation-centered Western geography has not presented Hawai‘i in this way. A good example of the violence of cartography is the way a standard map of the United States squeezes Hawai‘i into remainder space in a bottom corner, severed from its ocean, artificially sutured to the continent. I return to this idea of deterritorializing Hawai‘i toward the end of the chapter.

Hawai‘i tends to be relatively open to thinking along the lines of inclusion (both/and) rather than exclusion (either/or). It never had an anti-miscegenation law and has led the country in interracial marriages. A few years ago it came so close to legalizing gay marriage that the opposition had to fly in heavy-hitting evangelists and funds from continental homophobes to defeat the measure. In
general, local people are proud of their “mixed plate” or “poi dog” ancestry and tend to have progressive social politics, if for no other reason than, more often than not, the person standing in line behind you at Longs is either a relative or a cousin’s friend from high school. This is not to idealize social relations in the islands but to suggest that, if it is possible for any persons to aspire to “live sin fronteras,” it should be possible in Hawai‘i.

Let me relate another story. My grandmother, Estella Acevedo, was born in Cuidad Obregon, Sonora, Mexico in 1908 and went to school there through the sixth grade. Her father, who was a farmer and storekeeper, died when she was still a young teen. Estella, her younger sister, older brother, and mother moved to Nogales, Sonora, Mexico. Some years later, when her brother left to join the U.S. army, Estella crossed the border every day to Nogales, Arizona, U.S.A. to work as a waitress. She met my grandfather, George Kasnetsis, when he began to cook for the restaurant. George was seventeen years older and had emigrated to the U.S. as a young Greek from Athens with very little education. This was during the depression and George was one of many migrants scratching out a living for himself and his young son (his first wife had died young of tuberculosis).

As the story goes, they fell in love and George proposed, but Estella turned him down because she was supporting her mother and her sister. George was so upset that he left his job, and Nogales, only to come back some time later to propose again when he heard through the grapevine that Estella’s mother had passed away and her sister had gotten married. Estella accepted this time (the

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6 Longs Drugs in Hawai‘i is an important social, cultural institution accommodating local tastes and providing the environment for all types of daily social interactions.
first “interracial” marriage in her family) and made the familiar journey across the border, but this time as an immigrant. She and my grandfather settled in Prescott, Arizona and had one child together, my mother, Georgia Estella Kasnetsis, for whom they wished all the best America could offer.

Nogales is now a militarized zone – a city with the unfortunate luck of transgressing what is now a very important boundary to some very powerful corporate and governmental interests. This border, that my grandmother walked back and forth across each day eighty years ago, is now demarcated by a huge wall, razor wire, dogs, flood lights, border patrol, and lots and lots of guns. Some of my grandmother’s relatives…my relatives, die or are captured each day trying to make the crossing for the same reason she originally did, economic survival. In my grandmother’s lifetime, love could more easily cross and recross sin fronteras; love for family, love for a partner. And now? As we reinforce boundaries between countries, so too do we build walls between kin and within ourselves.

My grandmother died of an aneurysm when I was only seven, shortly after my family moved to Hawai‘i. I never got a chance to talk with her about her life in Nogales, and she never made it across the Pacific to visit us on Kaua‘i. What would she have thought about making that crossing? What would I eagerly have shown her of my new life, so different from hers? How would she have understood Hawai‘i? How would Hawai‘i have understood her?

I relate this story as a way of thinking about identities and borderspaces, as a way of putting the past in front of me as suggested by indigenous cultural practitioners and scholars, and as a way of honoring my grandmother and creating “points of affiliation with the women left behind” (Chabram-
Dernersesian 2004). I could not write this dissertation but for the love, the labor, and determination of my grandmother, and my mother after her. Chabram-Dernersesian suggests that in all the talk in the academy of transnational feminism, sometimes working-class women of color are invisible. As women academics move across class into the academy, mothers, sisters, grandmothers are “the women left behind.” She suggests that we find ways to “dignify and write of this convergence” (Chabram-Dernersesian 2004) – to name the ways, in the words of the old political slogan, “we are here because they were there.”

Home, Homeland, and Living Sin Fronteras

Living sin fronteras means rethinking home, a place of comfortable belonging whether it is a physical place or Benedict Anderson’s “imagined community” (Anderson 1983). Shane Phelan believes mestiza consciousness teaches us to resist the desire to belong:

It is tempting to think that we must fully belong somewhere, but the temptation must be resisted. The ideal of full and uncomplicated belonging rests on the ideal of the unitary, harmonious self, thus demanding that we seek out and eliminate the obstacles to this harmonious unity (Phelan 1994, 67).

Similarly, Wuthnow warns that haoles, can only ever be “in recovery from colonization” because “the craving for home will always be there” (Wuthnow 1994, 49). I have explored in other chapters how haoles have sought to make home for themselves in Hawai‘i – rewriting colonization as civilization, remapping physical and social geographies, resisting indigenous claims, and producing a naturalized discourse of haole in Hawai‘i. Haole resistance to being labeled “haole” is partly fueled by the desire to belong. Whatever else it does, “haole” continues to mark otherness, being of foreign origin, or not of a place.
This is why the protagonist in the short story did not want to be labeled haole. And yet, her grandmother insisted she acknowledge both her haoleness and her localness, in all their messiness, rather than continue striving for some ideal "harmonious unity."

It is worth remembering that Pākehā exhibit a similar craving for home. A craving that I suspect is exacerbated rather than quelled by the strong sense of biculturalism in Aotearoa, since it reinforces a dichotomy between Pākehā and Māori. In an amazing statement, King succeeds at constructing Pākehā as victims, conflating recognition of indigeneity with ethnic cleansing, and appropriating Māori language to naturalize Pākehā:

The fact that one group has been here longer than others does not make its members more New Zealand than later arrivals, nor give them the right to exclude others from full participation in the national life. If we said that it did, then we would be embracing precepts of Hitler’s Reich, Enoch Powell’s Britain and Idi Amin’s Uganda. Pakeha born in and committed to New Zealand have no other home, no other turangawaewae, any more than Maori do in the Cook Islands, Tahiti or the Marquesas, points of departure for the Polynesian migrations to New Zealand (King 1999, 11).

“Turangawaewae” is a Māori word whose inadequate translations into English include “a place of the heart,” “a place to belong,” and “a place where your feet stand via inclusion in the kin group” (Dominy 1990, 13). While it may be true that Pākehā born in New Zealand have no “other” home, that does not necessarily make Aotearoa their home – and it only shows a Pākehā sense of entitlement to consider it a turangawaewae.

One cannot talk about “home” and Hawai‘i without talking about the Kanaka Maoli claim to “homeland.” This is an indigenous claim based on continuity of habitation and aboriginality, being the first people of a place, or as is often said, living in a place “from time immemorial.” Aboriginality is
recognized in national and international laws and as such, claims to a “home” and a “homeland” do not exist on the same plane. The Hawaiian sovereignty movement in simplest terms is a struggle for return of a homeland and self-determination for Kanaka Maoli. The movement encounters resistance from both haoles and locals who see it as threatening their claims to home in the islands.

The local claim to home and belonging is based in generations of inhabitants, shared exploitation in the plantation system, and local culture. There is a strong vein within local discourse that is specifically about land and place revolving around having toiled in the earth, planted one’s roots in the soil, “paid dues” required for making claims to place, and feeling love for the islands. Ronald Takaki offers an expression of this narrative in *Pau Hana*, his classic book on the plantation system:

Gradually, in the plantation camps, far away from their homelands, they created new communities. Over the years, they came to feel a love for the land, the ‘āina, and accepted Hawai‘i as a place to settle and raise their families. No longer sojourners, no longer strangers in the islands... (Takaki 1983, 178).

Takaki ends the book in a poetic imagining of a visit to a plantation cemetery by a relative today whispering to the wind “this is home, our home...” (Takaki 1983, 181). The question being asked more recently is how this claim to home intersects with the Kanaka Maoli claim to homeland. Are they mutually exclusive? Is there any literal and/or figurative commonground?

Kearns’ short story brings this element in as Stephanie describes the tension in her extended family between the “Kanahele ‘ohana” and the “Yaps and Changs:”
Recently Mom admitted it's gotten worse ever since her brother Hiram joined the sovereignty movement, started calling himself Palani, and told Mom her in-laws are members of a settler population that helped the haoles displace Hawaiians from their rightful lands (Kearns 1999, 128-29).

As this passage indicates, a critique of local claims to place is growing within the sovereignty movement. In the last decade a number of local and Kanaka Maoli scholars have deconstructed nostalgic immigration and "plantation days" narratives and challenged the local community to admit its complicity in the dispossession of Kanaka Maoli. These scholars resituate the local community not as immigrants, but as a settler population. The term "settler" in this context is meant to disrupt the heroic local narrative by emphasizing locals as settlers, a people not originally from a place occupying it even though it belongs to others.

A leading scholar in this area, Candace Fujikane writes:

> For many people in Hawai‘i, local identity is based on having a history on this land and a commitment to the peoples and cultures of this place. With the important gains made by the Hawaiian sovereignty movement, however, locals who claim Hawai‘i as home often do not understand Native Hawaiian nationalists who claim Hawai‘i as homeland, and as non-Hawaiian locals, we need to ask ourselves what our commitment to Hawai‘i and its peoples really means (Fujikane 1997, 43).

There has been a tendency in the dominant discourse on local identity to smooth over distinctions between Kanaka Maoli and local. Local was, and is, often conceived of as the space where everyone but the haole gathers in a cultural amalgamation and political solidarity. Local scholar John Rosa contends local identity "conveniently allows current residents to imagine a romanticized past, one where Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians joined in struggle against haole

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7 The power of personal names is evident in this passage as well. It is probably no coincidence that the Kearns chose "Hiram" which was the name of one of the most powerful and disliked early missionary preachers.
The strongest critique to local claims to home comes, not surprisingly, from Hawaiian nationalists. In an article entitled "Settlers of color and 'Immigrant' Hegemony: 'Locals' in Hawai'i," Haunani-Kay Trask writes that "'locals' have no indigenous land base, traditional language, culture, and history that is Native to Hawai'i" (Trask 2000, 6). She continues:

The issues before Hawaiians are those of indigenous land, cultural rights, and survival as a people. In contrast, the issues before 'locals' have merely to do with finding a comfortable fit in Hawai'i that guarantees a rising income, upward mobility, and the general accoutrements of a middle-class 'American' way of life (Trask 2000, 20).

While this critique may be harsh and unnecessarily polarizing, it does resonate with recent dilution and depoliticization of the local.

In a short but provocative interview in *Honolulu Magazine*, Jonathan K. Okamura, another leading scholar on local identity, addresses the question of whether Hawai'i is experiencing "The End of Local?" Like Trask, Okamura worries about the impacts of global corporate capitalism on the islands. "In Hawai'i, beloved pidgin English has been diluted by hip-hop jargon, community activism is nearly dead and the sense of controlling one's own destiny is part of ancient history" (Okamura as quoted in Choo 2003). He laments about local "losing cultural distinctiveness" and political edge, and points to the zenith of local as the grass-/taro-roots struggles against development in the 1970s.

If local claims to home are being eroded through depoliticization and globalization and challenged by sovereignty advocates, haole claims, while not very stable to begin with, seem to be undergoing a retrofit. High profile legal cases like *Rice v. Cayetano* position haoles as victims of discrimination who have as much claim to Hawai'i as anyone else. The state has a Republican haole
governor (who, to claim legitimacy, has to emphasize some localness) for the first
time since the “democratic revolution” of 1954 when the Democratic party, lead
by powerful AJAs,8 seized power from the haole Republican oligarchy. Haoles
are now the largest population in the state (25%), displacing a huge Hawaiian
diaspora living on the continent (40% of native Hawaiians in the U.S. live outside
Hawai‘i) (State of Hawai‘i Department of Business 2002), and another “internal”9
diaspora living in prison (Hawaiians are 20% of the state’s population and 40% of those in prison). Speaking of the continental diaspora, Kauanui writes, “the
traffic between Hawai‘i and the U.S. continent sometimes resembles a two-lane
road, with disenfranchised Native Hawaiians leaving to look for opportunity
and rich white Americans arriving to retire in paradise” (Kauanui 1993).

On the other hand if, as Okamura and others contend, Hawai‘i is losing its
distinctiveness as the tide of globalization washes over it, one consequence could
be a Hawai‘i as familiar and comfortable to haole as to any “citizen of the
world.” Some resident haoles are resisting this capitalist homogenation, since for
one thing, it would devalue the currency of their claim. But haole claims
continue to be challenged by both locals and Kanaka Maoli. The slogan “haole
goose home” still has salience no matter how hard haoles try to imagine, and
convince everyone else, that we are, in fact, home.

In Hawai‘i, haole is simultaneously emulated and decentered; invited in
and asked to leave. Further, many haoles have one foot in Hawai‘i and one on
the continent and manage those cultural translations with varying degrees of

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8 Americans of Japanese Ancestry.
9 My use of scare quotes here is meant to indicate that some of the Kanaka Maoli prison
diaspora is twice displaced, first by incarceration, then by dislocation to prisons on the
continent, effectively ending familial and cultural contact and context.
success. Rethinking the desire to belong, the desire for completeness, may be a key to hope and the beginning of justice. "Categories of either identity or nature, like coalitions themselves, are temporary, fragile, delicate, and highly political. They must be maintained and lived carefully rather than comfortably" (Bartsch, DiPalma, and Sells 2001, 163). How might haole begin living "carefully rather than comfortably" in Hawai‘i?

**Genealogy and l‘affaire Dobelle**

Local challenges to haole were at the forefront of the firing of University of Hawai‘i President Evan Dobelle. I analyze that incident as another example of a contemporary production of haole and to use it for thinking about a more genealogical approach to haole. Before moving into the details of the Dobelle incident, I sketch some elements of this stance pulling from indigenous understandings and poststructuralist frameworks.

From indigenous genealogies comes a strong connection to peopleplace and temporal and spatial fluidity. Having covered this ground previously, I will just offer some reminders here from Lilikalā Kame‘eleihiwa’s scholarship. In Hawaiian cosmology, all things are interrelated and the Hawaiian people are direct descendants of Wākea and Papa, the sky-father and earth-mother. “Hawaiian identity is, in fact, derived from the Kumulipo, the great cosmogonic genealogy. Its essential lesson is that every aspect of the Hawaiian conception of the world is related by birth, and as such, all parts of the Hawaiian world are one indivisible lineage” (Kame‘eleihiwa 1992, 2). This interrelation is the basis for the concepts of aloha ‘āina, love of the land, and mālama ‘āina, caring for the land. Within this understanding, exact time and place is less important than the people
or elements involved and the sequence of events. "The genealogies are the Hawaiian concept of time, they order space around us. Hawaiian genealogies are the histories of our people" (Kame'eleihiwa 1992).

Poststructuralist genealogical perspectives call attention to our will to power, question truth claims, destabilize projects of mastery over nature, excavate nondominant discourses, and privilege beginnings over origins. They caution us that "to expect one's understandings of the world clearly and neatly to specify value and actions, to expect some sort of deductive link between what is, what ought to be, and what must be done, is a kind of will to truth" (Ferguson 1993, 29). Poststructuralist scholarship has not generally embraced indigeneity and visa versa. Rather than insist on one or the other or some happy marriage of the two, I find it more useful to explore their convergences as well as their tensions. It is these frictions that produce the spark to enliven a posture riding temporarily on smooth convergence and choppy intersections of these two perspectives. One of the most productive frictions is between indigenous connection and subsequent commitment to specific place, and a poststructuralist suspicion of all ties or commitments as part of self-generated truth claims.

James Clifford offers an excellent analysis of this tension in his discussion of Stuart Hall's articulation theory. "Land...signifies the past in the future, a continuous, changing base of political and cultural operations. Articulation theory, which sees every thing as potentially realigned, cut, and mixed, has difficulty with this material nexus of continuity" (Clifford 2001, 482). Land, or really, place, constrains the unending contingency of poststructuralist theory. At the same time, Clifford writes, "Nativism, the xenophobic shadow of indigeneity, values wholeness and separation, pure blood and autochthonous land. It denies
the messy, pragmatic politics of articulation” (Clifford 2001, 483). The type of located genealogical stance I am suggesting does not resolve these conflicts but finds ways to hold them in tension, to ride their upsurges and patiently bob in their backwater.

It is this type of flexibility and fluidity, the mark of a good surfer, which Evan Dobelle failed to exhibit. To take the metaphor one step further, he seems to have jumped into the surf without first studying the conditions and learning from the locals. If Harold Rice represents a contradicted local haole, Evan Dobelle is, by many assessments, the quintessential “mainland haole.” Dobelle was hired in July 2001 by the UH Board of Regents and fired in a storm of controversy in June 2004. The controversy, described by the national Chronicle of Higher Education as “Wipeout in Hawaii” (Basinger 2004) and by a local columnist as “l’ affaire Dobelle” (Jones 2004), provides another window into contemporary productions of haole.

Dobelle came to the University of Hawai‘i with an impressive resume: former president of Trinity College, San Francisco City College, and Middlesex Community College; White House Chief of Protocol under the Carter administration; and former treasurer of the Democratic National Committee. He negotiated a base salary of $442,000, which was not only significantly more than any previous UH president (and four-times the governor’s salary), but ranked him among the highest-paid public university presidents in the country (Basinger 2004). He represented himself as a “change agent,” encouraged people to “think big,” and bragged that, “if they turned me loose I could make [the University of Hawai‘i] into Berkeley in three years” (Rees 2004) (ironically, after three years he was shown the door, and it looked nothing like Sather Gate).
Many faculty and administrators were impressed and ready to believe in a new vision. They saw Dobelle as a go-getter, a man with enthusiasm, connections and conviction. He brought hope to an institution tired of feeling second-rate.

What happened? There are a number of interpretations, most of which cluster around three themes: financial mismanagement and unmet expectations; party politics; and localism. Much ink has been spilled arguing over the first two explanations, but my interest is in the third. There is a strong strand within the discussion that makes arguments based on localism or local culture, both supporting and criticizing Dobelle. An analysis of these arguments and the tension between them provides a window into another dominant construction of haole, and more specifically serves as a catalyst for a discussion of a Hawai‘i-located genealogical ideology and practice.

The arguments about local culture in l’affaire Dobelle cut both ways. Some argue, as I just have, that Dobelle failed to take local culture into account, to pay it due respect and to make necessary adaptations in style. Others argue that Dobelle’s sole mistake was to threaten a local “provincialism” which stagnates positive change in Hawai‘i by bringing “outsiders” down before giving them a chance. I am not about to argue that there are no negative elements of local culture or that Dobelle always acted inappropriately. My interest is thinking about what might have been possible had Dobelle been more of a genealogist and less of a superstar, more local haole, less mainland haole.

As explored in chapter two, local culture in Hawai‘i has its own particular socio-cultural style drawn from the multicultural mix of the people who live in the islands. While there are certainly regional variances on the continent, dominant social relations in Hawai‘i are so different they remind U.S. visitors of
being in another country (which many would argue, they are, although as discussed earlier, some of this is changing with globalization). Generally speaking, local culture frowns on: talking too loud or too much; bragging or exhibiting prideful behavior; calling attention to oneself; acting in an aggressive or assertive manner; or taking up lots of space. Affirmatively, one is encouraged to: express humility and self-deprecating humor; be quick to apologize; defer to, and respect, elders or authority; and share generously (especially food).

In the discussion swirling around Dobelle’s firing he was described numerous times as “arrogant.” People complained of his insensitivity and cavalier attitude, and more than one headline suggested he failed to adapt to local culture.10 Fujio Matsuda, the last home-grown UH president instructed future presidents, “You’re not trying to make something happen in St. Louis. It’s Hawai‘i. They will have to understand the Hawai‘i context” (Matsuda as quoted in DePledge and Creamer 2004). Honolulu Advertiser columnist Lee Cataluna wrote, in an article otherwise sympathetic to Dobelle and critical of local culture, “Dobelle was all big talk and big promises with nary a drop of self-deprecating humor. He came off as arrogant and at times had trouble connecting with local people, spending more effort telling folks what he had done or could do for them than listening to what they had to say” (Cataluna 2004).

The evidence presented about Dobelle’s lack of regard for local culture and politics is both behavioral and discursive. Dobelle spent money extravagantly and blurred the lines between his personal expenses and those passed on to taxpayers. He drove a flashy Porsche, remodeled the already plush

10 Examples include: “Dobelle flunked ‘Locals 101’”(DePledge and Creamer 2004); “How Dobelle failed the ‘Local Test’” (Jones 2004); and “ Outsider Dobelle lacked feel for Hawai‘i” (Riggs 2004).
President's residence to the tune of one million dollars, hired friends from the continent at unheard of salaries, and traveled extensively and expensively. He was dismissive of the growing friction between himself and the Board of Regents saying, "I work on passion. My trouble is they have a sense they can't control me" (Dobelle as quoted in Rees 2004). After one tense review session with the Board he stormed out issuing the famous last words, "You can't fire me" (Dobelle as quoted in Basinger 2004). There is clearly a gendered aspect to all of this as well, an exercise of white male privilege.

There are those who argue that Dobelle acted just as he was hired to act, as a "change agent," a big league fundraiser. The Board of Regents hired a mainland haole and that is what they got. These critics fault Board "micromanagement" and a "provincial" localism for the conflict. Commentator Robert Rees is a strong voice in this camp: "We're a narrow-minded bunch – nearly a mob at times – opposed to meaningful change, fearful of new ideas, resentful of any perceived transgressions into what we label 'local'..." (Rees 2004). Using less personal language, others noted problems with "small-town culture," "secret government decision-making," and just plain "politics." The most surprising and disturbing remarks came from Honolulu Mayor Jeremy Harris. He said he warned Dobelle about localism when they first met:

I told him it was called the 'Captain Cook effect,' that he would come into this community, be welcomed with open arms, people would all praise him and he would feel like he had the full support of the community and the leaders to accomplish great visions. And in a couple of years, he would turn around and find a big knife in his back, and a boot to the back to get out of town. At the time, he laughed. But unfortunately, just as I

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11 While I believe some of these criticisms are valid to a certain extent, it is not part of my project to undergo a critique of local culture or politics. I am interested rather in the places where the incident tells us something about the production of haole.
predicted, that’s exactly how he’s been treated (Harris as quoted in DePledge 2004).

The statement ties the “provincial localism” criticism to an essentialized view of native Hawaiians specifically, suggesting Hawaiians “naturally” back stab any do-gooding outsider/haole (never mind that the demographics of the Board of Regents was mixed local, not predominately native). Harris makes it sound like no one indicated to Dobelle that there was a problem, but as one reporter put it, “Dobelle’s termination was about as much a surprise as getting a fruitcake at Christmas” (Hamada 2004). Far worse, the remark reinscribes the dominant colonial narrative surrounding Cook’s death that posits Cook as an innocent victim of primitive savagery. In this respect, Harris works with Harold Rice in reinscribing the narrative of haole victimization. One would think Harris, who has lived in Hawai‘i since the 1970s working his way into and up the Democratic Party hierarchy, would be smarter (or at least more diplomatic) than that. Yet, in this instance he simply reinforced the local/Hawaiian construction of mainland haoles, showing similar arrogance and willed ignorance as Dobelle. Their privilege enables them to believe they do not need to know about colonization, local culture, or being haole.

Evan Dobelle let his colors show in an article that ran in The Chronicle of Higher Education following the controversy. Characterizing his performance as “very successful,” he explained to a mainly continental audience, “People aren’t used to success in Hawai‘i … I understood what the local people needed. It’s the local political culture that I chose to ignore” (Dobelle as quoted in Basinger 2004). And, as if that was not arrogant enough, he followed up with his most outrageous swipe at the Board of Regents thus far: “It’s time for them to come off
the plantation." It is interesting that here the Board is described as unsophisticated laborers, whereas Harris used the categorization of savage natives. Whatever the Board’s failings, these depictions are undeniably racist, presuming a higher moral and intellectual order for the haOLE. Both caricatures reference an overplayed colonial imaginary: immigrant plantation labor stubbornly clinging to "provincial custom," and the moment of "first contact" where "civilization" met the "savage."

What is to be made of all of this? A genealogical perspective encourages attentive listening for what is not being said and the most glaring silence in the whole affair was from the faculty. The biggest collective outcry from faculty protested the manner in which Dobelle was fired, not the fact of the firing itself. The exception to this weighty silence came from some in Native Hawaiian Studies and Athletics, programs that were generously supported by Dobelle. In a letter to the editor, Hawaiian Studies chair, Lilikalā Kameʻeleihiwa defends Dobelle asking, "Is a man arrogant if he stands by his beliefs" (Kameʻeleihiwa 2004)? The vocal support from Native Hawaiian Studies was cited by Honolulu Advertiser reporters as "ironic" given the criticism that Dobelle did not fit well in Hawaiʻi. Such a statement confIates native Hawaiian and local politics Dobelle clearly made himself the champion of native Hawaiians, but he was less able to gain local support.

Still, stories are rarely so seamless, and people rarely so two-dimensional. I am sure the story of UH politics is much more complex and there are indications that Dobelle did worry that he had a problem. The most telling come in a few polls he ran and tried to keep under the press radar. Questions appeared in these polls regarding the public’s perception of government officials,
the university, and most interestingly for this project, whether “haole” is an insult (DePledge 2004). The question about “haole” appeared in a 2003 poll commissioned by Dobelle and asked specifically: “When people use the term Haole to refer to people do you think it is a positive term, a negative or insulting term, or is it just a word with no positive or negative meaning” (DePledge 2004).

When Dobelle’s attorney was asked about the haole question he said neither he nor Dobelle knew anything about it and that it was probably chosen by the Cambridge firm hired to conduct the poll (DePledge 2004). One has to wonder why some pollster on the East Coast would know or care about haole. Despite his attitude, I conjecture that Dobelle was worried about public perception. The polling question suggests he was trying to figure out if the fact that he kept getting called “haole” was a bad sign. Had he simply listened and paid more attention to those locals around him, he might not have resorted to such a dull instrument. Of those polled, half said haole was a neutral term and a third said it was negative. Had the question allowed respondents to answer, “It depends on the context,” I imagine the results would have been quite different.

**Paradox in Paradise**

This brings us back to a discussion about mobilizing a genealogical perspective toward becoming haole differently. Not surprisingly, genealogists are usually not big pollsters. Indigenous genealogy suggests that we look to the past to guide us in the future and that we attend to interrelations. Poststructuralist genealogy suggests putting more focus on questions than “answers,” and thinking about how our desires and positionality shapes both our questions and our answers. Rearticulating haole involves rethinking both
Hawai‘i and haole as more verb than noun, more ambiguous than settled, more paradox than paradise. It means understanding haole as “never just one thing” and “never the same thing twice” (Ellsworth 1997). In this final section, I look at reimagining Hawai‘i as a fluid borderspace and rethinking haole as a historicized animated social assemblage.

I illustrated how Chicana feminist theory can help in reconceiving Hawai‘i as more of a borderspace than a comfortable home. Such a gesture is necessary to loosen neo-colonial impulses that reterritorialize place through capitalist enterprise, nationalist ideology, and exoticized desires. Chicana feminist theory successfully mobilizes images of fences, walls, and barbed wire in representing the U.S.-Mexico border as a borderland. Here I want to bring Native Pacific Cultural Studies back in and continue the exploration of less landed metaphors for Hawai‘i. I return to Epeli Hau‘ofa: “the sea is our pathway to each other and to everyone else, the sea is our endless saga, the sea is our most powerful metaphor, the ocean is in us” (Hau‘ofa 1998, 409).

Oceanic metaphors for Hawai‘i literally destabilize any easy conceptions of home; there is no solid ground upon which to lay a concrete foundation, there is only movement. There is no way to stake a claim, to mark off a boundary, to grab and horde – all slips out between greedy fingers. A borderland, marked by a wall, is unmoving, impenetrable, and silent. A borderspace, encompassing the ocean, is never still and never silent, always multiple and dynamic, full of attitude and life. The ocean is seemingly limitless and unfathomable; it can never be fully known, never wholly contained by objective knowledge, never completely captured by map or grid. It always retains its own agency, shifting just when we think we have it, expanding beyond our capacity to grasp, spilling
over beyond our horizons.

And yet, this metaphoric conception, however poetic, does not quite get us where genealogists like Donna Haraway or Epeli Hau‘ofa are going. In loosening barriers between human and natural categories and reaffirming agency for nature, Haraway is clear that “nature” is not simply for us. Haraway, in her most recent book, argues that “dogs are not surrogates for theory; they are not here just to think with. They are here to live with” (Haraway 2003, 5). As native Pacific theorists such as Hau‘ofa have been saying, the ocean is “here to live with” as well. Haraway insists that we not simply theorize on the backs of our “companion species” or any other natural assemblage. Instead we need to recognize our complicated interdependence. Using Haraway’s theorizing to analyze the politics of wetlands in Florida, Bartsch, DiPalma and Sells write, “relationality with nature recognizes human connectedness with nature as a fluctuating, tense, and responsible interdependence, construed along the vectors of power that define civic life” (Bartsch, DiPalma, and Sells 2001, 149).

Indigenous genealogies are built around the concept of living in, with and through the natural environment since there are no static barriers between people and place. People become place, place embodies people, the movement back and forth is continuous and without closure. Eva Marie Garroulte writes about Peruvian-based nongovernmental organizations that have refocused themselves from international development models to local models: “They speak of the Andean world, not as judging outsiders, but as ones bonded to that world... They write of the Andean world, not primarily as a world to know, but as a world to live in, to participate in, to be part of, and to collectively make” (Garroutte 2003, 145). This close interrelationship with place is reflected in
Hawaiian culture and spirituality in which the ‘āina is alive with wisdom, personality, and needs. The story about the islands finding Captain Cook lost in the middle of the ocean is a good example of this perspective. And, at a more poignant level, so too is the poetry of Haunani-Kay Trask:

This night I crawl into the mossy arms of upland winds, an island’s moan welling grief:

Each of us slain by the white claw of history: lost genealogies, propertied missionaries, diseased haole.

Now, a poisoned pae ‘āina swarming with foreigners and dying Hawaiians.

(Trask 2002, 12)

Reconceptualizing Hawai’i as dynamic and oceanic through the convergence of indigenous and poststructuralist genealogical thought encourages that we swim (as opposed to tread) lightly there. Rather than “resisting” the desire for home as Phelan and Wuthnow advocate, swimming lightly suggests a stance less interested in vesting in an individualized notion of home, than in building commitment toward an interdependent, historicized, respectful partnership with place. “Resisting” is too disciplinary for poststructuralists, echoing the white abolitionists’ rhetoric and leading to a politics of negation that has no long-term sustainability and little attraction. This is in no way is to suggest that non-Hawaiians can have equivalent relationships
to Hawai‘i as Hawaiians. Those relationships are produced and constrained differently by the intermingled histories of indigeneity and colonialism.

Following the same model, liberating haole from the constraints and problematics of its existence as noun and into the vibrant world of verbs is a genealogical move that opens possibilities for new becomings. Again, as Stuart Hall reminds us, “identity is not the past to be found, but the future to be constructed” (Hall 1995, 14). Constructing the future is about doing and becoming – it moves, it is a process in which you never arrive but are always traveling. Haole as a noun limits the discourse to persons or groups, fixed quantities that only move in two-dimensions. Conceived of as a thing, one can be more or less haole, one can “fasten and unfasten” haoleness as Reed suggested, or one can use an adjective to qualify haole, such as “local haole,” “mainland haole,” “stupid haole,” and so forth. Such language however is inadequate for describing the multiplicity, fluidity, contingency and ambiguity of identity.

At the risk of being too prescriptive, I offer what might be core elements of a Hawai‘i-located genealogical stance toward haole-ing differently: embracing kuleana; participating in local culture; supporting Kanaka Maoli self-determination; striving toward “situated knowledges;” and building temporary coalitions from partial convergences. I use the Dobelle case to think through some ways these elements might or might not take shape.

The idea of “embracing kuleana” is clearly guided by native Hawaiian culture, which roughly translates “kuleana” as privilege and responsibility. “We have certain privileges, and those privileges also carry responsibility. The word ‘kuleana’ expresses the relationship between privilege and responsibility in a
way that you cannot detach one from the other" (Dudoit 1998, 1). There are all sorts of privileges (or gifts) that come from living in Hawai‘i, and there are different privileges (or unfair advantages) that come with being haole (depending, of course, on the context). To recognize that haoles benefit, however unevenly, from both types of privileges, and to bear the associated responsibility, is embracing kuleana. The criticism of Dobelle as being too cavalier in attitude and performance gets at this. Seeing the amount of privilege Dobelle enjoyed, people wanted to see him acting more responsibly, being more respectful. There was a concern that he was not taking his job, local people (especially politicians), or criticisms of his performance seriously enough.

It is not hard to understand why participating in local culture is important. This means more than the simple “when in Rome” adage, or the donning of an aloha shirt and slippers. Acculturating to Hawai‘i takes time and considerable effort for most continental haoles. Afraid of failing, assured of their cultural superiority, or simply indifferent, many do not even try, refortifying the dominant local construction of haoles as arrogant and ignorant. Acculturating is easier to talk about than do. I have already addressed the potential pitfalls of appropriating local culture and/or presenting oneself as “Hawaiian at heart.”

Some survival strategies for participating in local culture include learning how to take a joke (not taking oneself so seriously), educating oneself on local food ways, being willing to make mistakes, and “not tryin’ fo’ talk pidgin if you no can.” It appears Dobelle continued to act as he had on the continent, making little if any allowances for local culture, much less participating in it. In fact, stating, “people in Hawai‘i are not used to success” shows a certain disdain for local culture and a privileging of “mainland” culture where, evidently, people
are used to success and therefore successful – like him. Perhaps Dobelle conflated the negative elements of local politics with local culture and people as a whole. We can only conjecture.

Both participating in local culture and supporting Kanaka Maoli self-determination (and recognizing the convergences and tensions therein) manifest a connection to peopleplace. On the latter front, Dobelle at least seemed to partially get it – his support for Native Hawaiian Studies far exceeded his predecessors. Supporting (decidedly not leading or blindly following) Kanaka Maoli self-determination comes from an understanding of Hawai‘i’s colonial history and recognition of Hawaiian indigeneity. Figuring out how to appropriately be supportive turns out to be more difficult than it might seem. Kelly Kraemer identifies five main stumbling blocks as lack of commitment, hidden agendas, dominant behavior, racism, and wanna-be syndrome (Kraemer 2000). While her study provides invaluable information in an under-researched area, it falls into the same traps earlier discussed with regard to anti-racism trainings: the paternalism of positioning oneself as ally and the refixing of identity categories.

I suggest honoring “situated knowledges” as an alternative to positioning oneself as in “recovery” or even as “an ally.” Wuthnow emphasizes that being a “recovering haole” is all about process since one can never fully escape their haoleness/privilege/historical positioning. This idea of a never completed process is useful in that it suggests adopting the humility of a genealogical perspective. “Living with the tensions and incompatibilities that result from such a strategy requires an ironic stance, a wry shrug at the impossibility of
complete resolution and a concomitant willingness to keep struggling for partial victories" (Ferguson 1993, 182).

I have already touched on the biggest limitations of the recovery model: it fosters a disciplinary resistance rather than a retooling of desire and it tends to essentialize identity. Haraway's concept of "situated knowledges," on the other hand, allows the continued mobility of subjectivity asking simply, but profoundly, that we become "answerable for what we learn to see" (Haraway 1988, 583). In Hawai'i, for haole, this necessarily means becoming answerable for the history of colonization. One of the strengths of this theory is that it allows for relational multiple subjectivities without assuming the innocence of any one. Thus, becoming answerable for haole can include the recognition and tapping of one's other "situated knowledges," since one is never just haole and haole is never the same thing twice. A Haraway analysis argues, "relationality is a dynamic and fluctuating comparison of not only marginal positions to the dominant one, but marginal positions to each other as construed through vectors of power" (Bartsch, DiPalma, and Sells 2001, 132).

Both Haraway and Ferguson deny the possibility of closure or complete resolution but expect continued political engagement. For Ferguson, that engagement is the politics of "struggling for partial victories;" for Haraway, the responsibility of holding oneself accountable. It is not clear that Evan Dobelle knew where he was (historically, culturally, politically),¹² and even less likely that he had a "wry shrug" in him. Admittedly, genealogists make poor politicians, but politicians might learn to offer fewer pat answers, entertain more questions and hold themselves accountable.

¹² So, perhaps the analogy between Dobelle and Captain Cook was apt in one sense.
Living in contradiction and paradox, living sin fronteras, not attempting to build a solid fortress of home or identity feels scary and vulnerable. This must be where comrades and coalitions come into play. With its diverse population and "mixed plate" local culture, Hawai‘i is an ideal location for practicing intersectional, rather than strict identitarian, politics. Among other things, this means mining one’s own multiple subjectivities for resources to build understandings and points of convergence for political action. It also means attending to the dangers of nativism, as Clifford warned, and nationalisms in all varieties. If one is never simply haole, one is never simply native Hawaiian or local either. We are the set of stories we tell ourselves, the stories that tell us, the stories others tell about us, and the possibilities of new stories. I am these stories. I lived them or I inherited them and they live vibrantly and turbulently in and around me. Hopefully by now it is clear that I am certainly not making a solely discursive argument. All stories are political; they involve power that has structural underpinnings and material consequences.

It is not new, this idea of coalition building based in political struggle rather than simplified identity. It is infused with the spirits of Audre Lorde, Bernice Johnson Reagon, bell hooks, June Jordan and so many others. Jordan once wrote “I am looking for an umbrella big enough to overcome the tactical and moral limitations of ‘identity politics’—politics based on gender, class or race. I am searching for the language of a new political consciousness of identity” (Jordan 1996, 300). Jordan called the new consciousness “justice.” If we are to be able to call anything home or belonging, it must be solidarity and accommodation, the synergistic moments on the bridge between you and me, us and them, myself and myself—“this bridge we call home.” In the words of
Bernice Johnson Reagon, “that's why we have to have coalitions. Cause I ain't gonna let you live unless you let me live. Now there's danger in that, but there's also the possibility that we can both live – if you can stand it” (Reagon 2000, 352).

What might these coalitions that include genealogically oriented haoles look like? I imagine they would look like Hawai‘i culturally and politically; they would be mixed plate. They would not tokenize local involvement because locals would be key players. They would not use scare tactics to divide people or to manipulate political outcomes. They would make decisions about future work by facing and considering the past, especially the legacies of colonialism. They would not pretend that everyone is positioned equally in these histories or has an equal claim to Hawai‘i, as the Rice v. Cayetano decision does. They would not follow Robert’s Rules or insist on legal-objective “Fact” as congressional hearings on the Akaka bill have done. These coalitions would include lots of talking story, listening, chanting, joking, and yes, lots of eating. They would make it their business to “make trouble,” adopting a sassy, wry politics that is often as fun as it is effective. They would embrace paradox and ambiguity leaving self-righteous certainty for the Evan Dobelle’s of the world. They would be inclusive of multiple issues and strategies, struggling to find temporary points of convergence in order to agitate for progressive change.

Conclusion

As I stated in the beginning, this is not meant as a recipe for success. I can only ever attempt to shed my own “partial light” and analyze what I see. And in
that light, what do I see when I look in the mirror? “Mr. Auntie Judy.”\textsuperscript{13} My grandmother crossing borders for love and survival. A queer feminist frequently called “Sir.” A white woman once (mis)recognized as Chicana. A temporarily-able-bodied advocate for disability rights deathly afraid of her own mortality. I answer to “eh, haole girl,” and I am all of these stories:

Nor, however, am I only raced. I am gendered, classed, abled, aged, and sexed. Nor is it as simple as refusing the imagination of the oppressor. We do not get to choose that. We are there. Perhaps while this is complicated, it may be useful. Those of us who for various reasons are in positions to critique the oppressor have valuable knowledge on how not to be. If we can force our eyes open and look in that mirror and see our face in there, if we can keep the eyes open long enough for the mind to engage and the heart to respond, we can figure out a better way to be (Kubo 1997, 118).

Significantly, Kubo focuses on the processes of identity production (being raced, gendered, classed, etc.) and their uncomfortable complexity and contradiction, rather than illusionary static subjectivity (race, gender, class). She is also all of her stories, and attempting to rearticulate them through an engagement of both mind and heart.

Living \textit{sin fronteras} seems to be about using our contradictions productively to “figure out a better way to be.” It must be about “living carefully, rather than comfortably” since living with ambiguity and contradiction while still stretching toward progressive political change is uncomfortable. Recognizing the legacies of colonialism is uncomfortable. Coalition is uncomfortable. Learning “how to live with the histories I am coming to know” is uncomfortable (Haraway 2003, 81).

\textsuperscript{13} My 3-year old nephew started addressing me this way in response to me calling him “Mr. Kānehoalani.”
There are clear examples of “how not to be,” how not to haole: Captain Cook, Rev. Bingham, Lorrin Thurston, Harold Rice, and Evan Dobelle to name a few. I would like to be historicized, but still hopeful, in how I haole. I want to strive toward a genealogical stance that recognizes my kuleana – that I have both an opportunity and a responsibility to peopleplace. Perhaps then I can momentarily stand, facing the past, and (following Lilikalā Kame‘eleihiwa’s lead)14, quietly offer, “eh, you like me cook or wat?”

14 As mentioned earlier, Kame‘eleihiwa reported that one measurement Hawaiians use for “guests” to Hawai‘i is, “if you can cook, you can stay” (Kame‘eleihiwa and Spivak 2003).
## HAWAIIAN LANGUAGE GLOSSARY

The translations given here are abbreviations from the Pukui-Elbert Hawaiian language dictionary focused on usage in this dissertation (Pukui and Elbert 1986).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hawaiian</th>
<th>English</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'āina</td>
<td>Land, earth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aloha</td>
<td>Love, affection, compassion, mercy, sympathy, pity, kindness, sentiment, grace, charity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>akamai</td>
<td>Smart, clever, expert.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>akua</td>
<td>God, goddess, spirit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aliʻi</td>
<td>Chief, chiefess, officer, ruler.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aliʻi nui</td>
<td>High chief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>haku lei</td>
<td>A braided or plaited garland, wreath of flowers, leaves, shells, ivory, feathers, or paper, given as a symbol of affection; an ornament worn around the head.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hana</td>
<td>Work, labor, job, employment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hanai</td>
<td>Foster child, adopted child; foster, adopted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>haole</td>
<td>White person, American, Englishman, Caucasian; American, English; formerly, any foreigner; foreign, introduced, of foreign origin, as plants, pigs, chickens. (In this dissertation, my usage of &quot;haole&quot; employs native Hawaiian, Hawaiian Creole English, and postmodern meanings. I use it to reference white people, but more broadly, whiteness in Hawai‘i, i.e. the power that has accrued through colonization and hegemony, as well as identity, culture, ideology, and performance.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hapa</td>
<td>Portion, fragment, part, fraction, installment; to be partial, less; Of mixed blood, person of mixed blood.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imu</td>
<td>Underground oven.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ka ʻōlelo ʻōiwi</td>
<td>The native language of the Kanaka Maoli.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kalo</td>
<td>Taro, a kind of aroid cultivated since ancient times for food, spreading widely from the tropics of the Old World.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kamaʻāina</td>
<td>Native-born, one born in a place, host.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Kanaka Maoli: Full-blooded Hawaiian person. *(In this dissertation I am using a more contemporary definition to include all native Hawaiians, regardless of blood).*

kapu: Taboo, prohibition; special privilege or exemption from ordinary taboo; sacredness; prohibited, forbidden.

ke keʻokeʻo: The whiteness of breaking waves.

konohiki: Headman of an *ahupua'a* land division under the chief.

Kū: Ancient Hawaiian god of war.

kuleana: Right, privilege, concern, responsibility.

kumulipo: Origin, genesis, source of life, mystery; name of the Hawaiian creation chant.

kupuna: Grandparent, ancestor, relative or close friend of the grandparent's generation, grandaunt, granduncle.

lāhui: Nation, tribe, people, nationality.

Lono: One of the four major gods brought from Kahiki.

loʻi: Irrigated terrace, especially for taro, but also for rice; paddy.

luna: Foreman, boss, leader, overseer, supervisor.

makai: Toward the sea, on the seaside, in the direction of the sea.

makaʻāinana: Commoner, populace, people in general; citizen, subject.

mālama ʻāina: To take care of, tend, attend, care for, preserve, protect, beware, save, maintain the land, earth.

mana: Supernatural or divine power.

manaʻo: Thought, idea, belief, opinion, theory.

mauka: Inland.

mele: Song, anthem, or chant of any kind. *(Also poetry, per Noenoe Silva).*

Mōʻi: King, sovereign, monarch, majesty, ruler, queen.

moʻolelo: Story, tale, myth, history, tradition, literature, legend.

ʻohana: Family, relative, kin group; related.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>oli</td>
<td>Chant that was not danced to.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'öpihi</td>
<td>Limpets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pae 'āina</td>
<td>Group of islands, archipelago.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pakalōlo</td>
<td>Marijuana, &quot;pot,&quot; &quot;grass.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pau</td>
<td>Finished, ended, through, terminated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pono</td>
<td>Goodness, uprightness, morality, moral qualities, correct or proper procedure, excellence, well-being, prosperity, welfare, benefit, behalf, equity, sake, true condition or nature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>puka</td>
<td>Hole.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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