AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

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Abstract

American civil-military relations have profoundly changed from the interwar years that comprised the post Cold War era. Recent terrorist activity has mobilized American society with an intensity and intransience that recalls the Cold War. In many ways, with its focus on maximizing civilian casualties, terrorism is uniquely able to arouse the popular emotion. This research suggests that changes in the international security environment and American foreign policy will have ramifications for the use of the military and the relationship of the armed forces and society. Effective civil-military relations are important for the military to successfully conduct its mission and cannot be ignored as we move into an uncertain twenty-first century.
Chapter 1: Introduction

American civil-military relations have profoundly changed in recent years as the United States has engaged in a global war on terrorism unprecedented in the post Cold War era. The massive deployment of American forces into combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has propelled the armed forces into a visible and relevant position in society. As reserve components of the services have been activated and media coverage of these operations has become widespread, the military has gained a centrality to alter the nature of civil-military relations in the country. The prolonged nature of the war, and its controversy, may also affect the civil-military balance.

Perhaps even more important is the now vital importance of national security in the minds of the public. With over 3030 people killed and 2337 injured in the 11 September 2001 attacks, the vulnerability of the United States was highlighted in a graphic and personal display. The destruction of the World Trade Center towers and attack on the Pentagon raised American awareness of the threat of radical Islamist terrorism. However, those attacks were only the most dramatic in a series of assaults on American sovereignty and American citizens by the same radical movement. The October 2000 suicide attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden in Yemen killed 17 sailors and wounded 39, causing $250 million in damage. The August 1998 bombing of the American Embassy in Kenya killed 213 and injured more than 5000, and the June 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia killed 19 United States Airmen and wounded over 500. The first World Trade Center bombing, in February 1993, caused 6 deaths, injured 1041, and left $1 billion in damage.

The earlier attacks did little to raise public consciousness of the threat posed to national security. In contrast, the 2001 attacks, in the center of the American homeland in the major
population centers of Washington, DC and New York City, could not fail to alter American
misconceptions of the nation’s invulnerability and the way in which Americans view national
security. As John Gearson argued, “…the expressive violence that took thousands of lives
represented such a strategic challenge to the United States it became inconceivable that thereafter
the destruction of al-Qaeda could be anything other than the central goal of US policy.”1 The
mobilization of the armed forces to Afghanistan and Iraq returned the country to a wartime frame
of mind. The unprecedented attacks on the United States (the first since the bombing of Pearl
Harbor in 1941 and the first major incursion of a foreign power into the American mainland
since the War of 1812) have ushered a new era in American civil-military relations. This era
gives no sign of ending soon – as Andrew Bacevich argued, the consequence of 11 September is
to make war “an all but permanent and inescapable part of life in the 21st century.”2 This thesis
will explore the nature of civil-military relations in today’s age of terrorism in contrast to the
eyear earlier post Cold War decade.

Civil-Military Relations

The study of civil-military relations has interested thinkers in several disciplines,
including political science, sociology, and history. Different writers have defined the problem of
civil-military relations in different ways, but it ultimately boils down to what Peter Feaver called
the civil-military problematique.3 The problematique is a trade-off between military
effectiveness and military subordination. The military is a violent institution designed by society
to protect it; the dilemma is that society needs a military strong enough to provide protection but
not so strong that it will violate its trust and bring violence to the society it is supposed to protect.
Deborah Avant has called this the balance between efficiency and accountability.4
Early civil-military relations literature was suspicious of state power, although the topic did not attract serious interest among political scientists until the early years of the Cold War. In that time period, there was significant concern over the tension between the necessities of massive military capability brought about by the nuclear stand-off with the Soviets and preserving the values of a liberal society. President Eisenhower’s farewell address in 1961, in which he warned of the dangers posed by the “military-industrial complex,” indicates the misgivings with which Americans viewed a powerful military. Civil-military relations theorists tried to reconcile these conflicts, but it was Samuel Huntington’s *Soldier and the State* that proved most enduring. Huntington developed a theory of “objective control” over the military, in which civilian and military spheres were clearly defined and the military officer corps’ professionalism would allow the armed forces to serve effectively in the military sphere and also remain obedient to the civilian government. Such a system would leave the military strong militarily and weakened politically. Huntington also warned of the dangers of liberalism, where “subjective control,” the civilian authorities’ undue meddling in military affairs, would weaken the military both politically and militarily. Huntington felt that the liberal society of the United States would undermine the military to such an extent that it would not be able to deal with the long term threat posed by the Soviet Union. Only the weakening of the security threat (which appeared unlikely in 1957) or the diminution of liberalism would allow for American survival. Whether Huntington was correct, in that the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1989 constituted the former of his two conditions, or whether he was incorrect, in that the military strength of the United States prevailed and led to the Soviet collapse, is uncertain. Huntington argued a third alternative – that American society indeed became more conservative in the years after his
original predictions – but he did acknowledge in this argument (written in 1977) that the anti-militarism of the Vietnam War might presage a return to liberalism.⁸

Morris Janowitz published the next milestone in the American civil-military relations dialogue in 1960.⁹ While the Janowitzian paradigm is similar in many ways to Huntington’s, both focusing on professionalism and the officer corps, Janowitz did not draw the clear demarcation between the military and political realms that Huntington proposed. Janowitz found that the centrality of the nuclear security threat necessarily created overlap between the military and political spheres. In addition, Janowitz considered the role of the military to be more than the management and application of violence that Huntington asserted. Deterrence and constabulary operations were also important dimensions of the military function, with the latter being the professional ideal according to Janowitz’s analysis. While Janowitz advocated some forms of civilian oversight, like Huntington, his main mechanism to ensure military performance was professionalism in the officer corps. Although the two definitions of professionalism differed, the concept was ultimately similar. Janowitz also articulated the importance of integration among civilian and military elites.

Following Janowitz, there were numerous studies into the relationship of the American military and society,¹⁰ but it was not until the post-Cold War era that a resurgence in theorizing about civil-military relations emerged. The directional miasma of the American military, typical of armed forces in the aftermath of major wars, led to a reassessment of civil-military relations theory by the end of the 1990s. This period of interwar turmoil was coupled with disturbing signs of excessive influence by the military in American politics,¹¹ so the study of civil-military relations attracted significant interest.
Peter Feaver offered one of the major new theories of civil-military relations, suggesting that agency theory as developed by economists would be appropriate to apply to the study of civil-military relations. The civilian authorities must choose the degree to which they monitor military servants, and the military must choose between working (doing what the civilian government wants) and shirking (in some way violating civilian desires). Further, should the civilian government catch the military shirking, it must decide to punish or not punish. Feaver predicts difficulties in civil-military relations when intrusive civilian monitoring coincides with military shirking. In applying this model to the 1990s, Feaver has developed a systemic mechanism for linking changes to the civil-military environment.

Michael Desch has also developed a new theory that relies on structural explanations to assess changes in civil-military relations. Desch predicted the likely nature of civil-military relations under conditions of a high and low threat to society from external or internal sources. The worst conditions for civil military relations involve a high internal threat (where the military would have incentive to take domestic policies into its own hands), while a high external threat coupled with a low internal threat would be best for civil-military relations (because the armed forces have important work for the country directing their attention outside the domestic borders).

A major focus of many of these efforts has been the question of who governs the military and how. For the civil-military problematique, the focus is the accountability issue. As important is the efficiency issue – can the military do what it is called upon to do? This question is especially compelling from a civil-military relations perspective with an all-volunteer force. The successful integration of the military within the society at large will determine both the
degree of popular support the military receives in times of difficulty and the quantity and quality of personnel willing and able to join the service.

Sam Sarkesian developed a framework for understanding the boundaries and substantive elements of military professionalism.¹⁴ Military professionalism is one aspect of civil-military relations, as the review of foundational literature above (such as Huntington and Janowitz) revealed, but the Sarkesian framework is comprehensive enough to be useful for this research. The framework explores the political, social, and functional relationships between the armed forces and society. He defined three components of the model: military technical, ethical, and political. I must credit Snider, Nagl, and Pfaff for reintroducing this framework to the current literature and for populating the units in the matrix (although I have differed from their work slightly).¹⁵ The political component is of particular interest to this investigation of civil-military relations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components</th>
<th>Military Technical</th>
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<td>Level of Analysis</td>
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<td>Institution</td>
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<td>• Land mine ban</td>
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<td>• Recruiting</td>
<td>• Force protection</td>
<td>• Doctrine of Interventions (Powell doctrine,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Professionalism</td>
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<td>decisive force, precision force, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>• Tactical proficiency</td>
<td>• Individual values</td>
<td>• “Civil-military gap”</td>
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<td>Soldier</td>
<td>• Retention</td>
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<td>• Post-modern culture</td>
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Figure 1. A Framework for Analysis.

What this framework lacks is a dimension for how the international threat shapes the civil-military relationship and military professionalism. The centrality of the state of
international relations to the social role of the military is a major premise of this research.

Although there is no specific element to assess this in the Sarkesian framework, developments in the international realm that affect the use of the military will be included throughout the discussion.

**A New Age?**

Joseph Nye used a compelling metaphor to describe the change ushered in on 11 September 2001. Rather than creating change in itself, the event illuminated developments that had taken place over the years before. Nye argued that “the world changed in profound ways during the last decades of the twentieth century. September 11, 2001, was like a flash of lightning on a summer evening that displayed an altered landscape, leaving U.S. policymakers and analysts still groping in the dark, still wondering how to understand and respond.”

Whether the attacks were the originator of the change or a sudden and graphic indicator, it is a fairly accepted truism that a revolutionary step in world affairs took place. Financier George Soros argued it was not so much the attacks themselves, but the American administration’s response to them that was significant:

> It is generally agreed that September 11, 2001, changed the course of history. But we must ask ourselves why that should be so. How could a single event, even one involving 3,000 civilian casualties, have such a far-reaching effect? The answer lies not so much in the event itself as in the way the United States, under the leadership of President George W. Bush, responded to it.

In *Foreign Affairs*, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright blended Nye’s and Soros’s perspectives of events by suggesting that the attacks both were revelation of global change and led to a significant departure of the status quo in American foreign policy.

For President Bush, September 11 came as a revelation, leading him to the startled conclusion that the globe had changed in ways gravely hazardous to the security – indeed, the very survival – of the United States. This conclusion soon led Bush to a fateful decision: to depart, in fundamental ways, from the approach that has characterized U.S. foreign policy for more than half a century.
America’s “Global War on Terror” has earned the dubious moniker “Third World War” in arguably hyperbolic extravagances, but the conflict is truly a world war, if not in the same form as its twentieth century predecessors. World War I and World War II erupted in cataclysmic struggles between alliances comprising all the major powers across the globe. Among the most significant features of these wars was the devastation to both the victors and the vanquished as well as the major shifts in the international political order in their aftermaths.

The Cold War shared some of these key features, including the adversarial alliance system encompassing major international powers and the significant shift in global political organization after it ended. Its longer duration distinguishes it from the earlier two World Wars, but duration is not a defining feature of the wars in the first half of the century. The Cold War could be considered “World War III” if the absence of cataclysmic struggle is not exclusionary. Nuclear arms restrained such violence due to the unlimited destructive power technologically available to both opposing sides at that point in history.

The resultant absence of devastation also distinguishes the Cold War from the two World Wars, although the still ailing condition of the former Soviet Union may have resulted not only from an ineffective domestic system. Arguably, external pressure exerted by American participation in the arms race and the constant struggle for the domination and solicitation of vassal states contributed to the emaciation of the Soviet economy, from which its successor states have not yet recovered.

Nonetheless, the struggle of the Cold War and its ensuing damages were not anywhere near as dramatic as the true World Wars, and it has not yet earned the title “World War III” in most historical dialogue. During the Cold War, the prevailing socially constructed model was prevention of World War III rather than an assessment of engaging in a Third World War. This
model is still accepted more than a decade later. But if the Cold War can be accurately named a “war,” then it perhaps will eventually earn the title World War III in a more widespread fashion. After all, the Cold War involved the entire world as much as the earlier world wars, and the destruction that the Cold War might have potentially unleashed would have touched the world in ways that World Wars I and II could never have.

So if the Cold War has not earned the title World War III, it may be presumptuous to label the “Global War on Terror” as World War IV. (One cannot confidently assign a “Fourth” without assurance of a “Third.”) Indeed, the reluctance to view the Cold War as a World War deserving ordination with the First and Second World Wars lends a sense of bombast to any claim that anything less than open war spanning the globe constitutes a World War. (There is still no common acceptance on this matter. Former CIA director James Woolsey labeled the Global War on Terror as World War IV, while New York Times foreign affairs columnist Thomas Friedman called it the Third World War.)

If one accepts the term Global War on Terror at face value, a simple substitution of “Global” for its synonym “World” might establish some credibility for the proposition that the current struggle deserves such nomenclature. However, the name Global War on Terror is a label designed by the American administration that waged the war. This indicates a certain level of propaganda, and President George Bush’s speeches in the days immediately following the attacks of 11 September 2001 did focus on framing the conflict as one between the civilized peoples of the world and the enemies of freedom. In this way, the war was reminiscent of the earlier three twentieth century conflicts.

While Bush was conscientious in his efforts to avoid categorizing Islamic countries as the enemy in this new war, consideration of this dimension is inevitable. Samuel Huntington
seemed gruesomely prescient in the days after 11 September 2001. Whether Osama bin Laden was an actor in the Huntingtonian drama or a director trying to orchestrate such a production (or some combination of both), the views of the radical Islamist and his companions fit the paradigm of clashing civilizations. Images of celebrating Muslims around the world were soon silenced by the Western media, but not before they provided disturbing confirmation to suspicions of civilizational clash. The threat posed by the vast and rapidly growing population of Muslims around the world had earlier been documented by Huntington and others, and the demographic advances alone could be construed to constitute a threat to the Western world. Assuming an Islamic-Western clash, the shifting demographic globalizes the war by providing a greater population base from which to draw to find those in the radical minority willing to resort to violence. The dramatic past terrorist attacks provided validation that a threat exists.

In part, the expanding circle of enemies confronted by the United States since the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center seems to fit the Huntingtonian clash of civilizations paradigm. Attacking first Afghanistan and then Iraq has also fit the idea of a global war on terror. The world war almost expanded to the Philippines except for its constitutional proscription from foreign troops engaging in combat on its soil. As the American coalition has engaged Afghanistan and then Iraq with military force, and has used bellicose language directed at Syria and Iran, the clash of civilizations between the West and Islam seems apparent. This seeming clash of civilizations has been mitigated by several factors, including the allegiance of Arabic states such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar against Iraq as well as the opposition of Western states such as France and Germany to the United States led coalition. Nonetheless, increasingly radical factions or terrorist financial backing in apparently pro-Western Islamic states (most
notably Saudi Arabia\textsuperscript{23} and the unexpected lack of Turkish cooperation with the American coalition in the war effort in Iraq provide a counterpoint to these observations.

Another distinction between limited war and the total war of the first two World Wars and the Cold War and Global War on Terrorism is the extension of operations in time, space, and scope. Some limited wars, such as the first Persian Gulf War, have short durations. In addition, limited wars might have peacekeeping requirements that are limited both in space and scope (such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers, and others). Even Vietnam and Korea were limited in scope and space, although like more recent peacekeeping missions, the duration was long. The destruction to the United States has been limited in most of its military history, including both twentieth century limited wars and the mobilizations for World Wars I and II and the Cold War. It remains to be seen how long the war on terrorism will last, whether further attacks on the American homeland will emerge, or whether the war will be fought in other countries.

The war has already further globalized than most people probably realize. While combat operations in the Philippines have not been possible, an American task force has been conducting supporting operations against the Abu Sayyaf Islamist terrorist group since soon after the 2001 attacks. American special operations efforts in Yemen were documented by Robert Kaplan,\textsuperscript{24} and they are certainly taking place in other Muslim lands. While the impending American election may have put further war efforts on hold, the threat of further expansion always seems to loom on the horizon. The Global War on Terrorism is a new world war, and it foretells a qualitative shift in civil-military relations in the United States as surely as war of this magnitude affects every other aspect of military policy.
Overview

This investigation will be organized into three parts. The first part will consist of an assessment of civil-military relations in the inter-war years. This discussion is predicated on the assumption that the 1990s comprise an inter-war period between, as discussed above, the Cold War and Global War on Terrorism. Part I – Civil-Military Relations and the Inter-War Years – includes four chapters.

Chapter 2 discusses the international environment that predominated in the post Cold War era. This environment consisted of a unipolar system in which the United States military was primarily engaged in "operations other than war" and multilateral efforts where a compelling threat to national security was no longer present. This environment also included various pressures on sovereignty as multilateralist regimes, globalization, and interventions became more common.

Chapter 3 explores the impact of this environment, having largely left the military irrelevant and unknown to the public at large. The "civil-military gap" was a topic of interest to many political science researchers during the 1990s.

Chapter 4 assesses the impact of the civil-military relations at the social level by focusing on the issues of women in the military and the landmine ban. These issues involved significant pressure in the inter-war years from special interest groups to change military culture and policies. The military no longer could rely on the functional imperative of national security to preserve its policies. The military was thus subject to greater scrutiny in many areas, including homosexuals in the military, policies on heterosexual sodomy and adultery, and the role of women in the military. Chapter 4 will focus on the latter issue in particular, using that one topic to provide broader insight into the social-military interaction. The landmine discussion focuses
on the technical expertise of the military and how civil-military relations have influenced the acceptance of military expertise on technical matters. This professional issue has been of interest in previous studies of civil-military relations. The international effort to ban landmines during the 1990s provides insight into the technical military dimension of the civil-military interaction.

The second part further explores the age of terrorism and the new war that has ensued. Chapter 5 begins this discussion with the exploration of the new war. The war has already been discussed at some length in this chapter to distinguish it from the interwar period of the 1990s, and several features of the Global War on Terrorism are significant for the assessment of American civil-military relations. The perpetual threat of terrorist attack as well as the large scope of the American deployment will figure into Chapter 5.

The social construction of identity and service are discussed in Chapter 6. This chapter will focus on endogenous characteristics of the members of society that might affect whether and how they support military service.

Chapter 7 discusses the domestic implications of the Global War on Terror. In particular, the developments are assessed in light of Lasswell’s garrison hypothesis.

The final part of this investigation attempts to draw conclusions about civil-military relations based on the findings outlined above. Chapter 8 offers a competing perspective, raising the argument that the expansion of an “American empire” has been the consistent impetus of American foreign policy and that the national experience of 9/11 is one of continuity rather than change. Chapter 9 formulates new insights into civil-military relations from the Global War on Terror, and Chapter 10 discusses implications and recommendations for further research.

The following figure shows how these chapters are organized according to the framework for analysis:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Analysis</th>
<th>Components</th>
<th>Political</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Society</td>
<td>Chapter 4 – pre-Sept 11</td>
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<td>Chapter 7 – post-Sept 11</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Institution</td>
<td>Chapter 2 – pre-Sept 11</td>
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<td>Chapter 4 – pre-Sept 11</td>
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<td>Chapter 5 – post-Sept 11</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Individual Soldier</td>
<td>Chapter 3 – pre-Sept 11</td>
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<td>Chapter 6 – pre- and post-Sept 11</td>
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Figure 2. Organization.
PART I - CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE INTER-WAR YEARS
Chapter 2: The International Environment

At the end of the Cold War, the United States military was left without the clear purpose that had dominated its existence over the past half-century. The emerging international environment was one of rapid change and complex interdependence. The military found itself engaged in more peacekeeping and humanitarian missions than ever before. Among the greatest pressures on the military to change were the shifting acceptance of human rights as a dominant principle of international action and the attendant engagement in an unprecedented tempo of operations without the clear national interest that traditional military campaigns had exhibited. The following sections will consider first the international regimes supporting individual rights and intervention and second the significance of peacekeeping missions to the US armed forces.

From State Sovereignty to Individual Rights

According to the creation stories of many cultures, an individual person originated the human race. This person was the unit of political and economic activity until the evolution of organized society through his or her offspring, leading to groups of hunters and gatherers. At this point, the collective assumed greater salience for the purposes of survival. Social organization evolved into city-states and empires, and eventually into the modern state. The state, codified by the principle of sovereignty and the main actor on the global stage, has formed the basis for international relations. However, international law, a problematic area to begin with due to ambiguity and a lack of enforcement authority, has been experiencing a shift in past decades that is ultimately leading to greater emphasis on the individual and less on the sovereign state. The institutions of sovereignty and the state are under tremendous pressure from multiple sources.
The nation-state is a relatively recent innovation in political organization. The concepts of territorial sovereignty and non-intervention developed in response to the horrors of the European religious wars that ensued after the Reformation. The international system as it is currently constructed was designed to reduce the killing motivated by denominational differences among the various Christian communities. Norms of sovereignty, or political authority that is absolute within recognized territorial boundaries, became the convention for relations among different political entities. This form of relating depended on states respecting one another’s sovereignty through the practice of non-intervention. The next few sections examine the tension between sovereignty and human rights and discuss how human rights are becoming the dominant paradigm in world politics.

Foundations of Sovereignty and Norms of Intervention

The theoretical origins of the state have involved a supreme authority that has been accomplished to varying degrees throughout the practical existence of the state. The classical theory of the state was perhaps most compellingly articulated by Thomas Hobbes in *Leviathan* (1651).\(^1\) Hobbes argued that human beings covenant together to form the state, an artificial person endowed with the power over its subjects to prevent the anarchy of the “state of nature.” Bodin similarly viewed state sovereignty as an “absolute and perpetual power vested in a commonwealth.”\(^2\) The theoretical territorial absolute that the state sovereign enjoyed in Hobbes’ and Bodin’s constructions is being reconstructed in light of new moralities and new practices.

The international community, or more specifically, the liberal democratic community, has from time to time experienced guilt about intervening in the affairs of other countries. On the other hand, failing to intervene has also sometimes generated a bad conscience; “it is the second kind of bad conscience that is now moving into the ascendancy.”\(^3\) Sovereign status is no
longer limited to states. Absolute rights and absolute responsibilities are moving towards constructions of humanity without territorial or ethnic dividing lines. Malmvig put it well: "Humanity, people, and individuals are all granted a sacrosanct and sovereign status, which makes crimes against humanity, genocide, and human rights abuses absolute wrongs." A number of factors have led to this reconstruction of sovereignty from state actors to other units of rights and responsibilities that are growing in their ascendancy.

Krasner has argued that challenges to sovereignty were always part of international system and human rights have motivated intervention for hundreds of years. The reason for these challenges, however, is that the norms of sovereignty are a relatively recent innovation. In the fairly recent past, non-intervention was not the norm; territorial aggression by the strong at the expense of the weak was a customary feature of international relations. Since these times, however, things have changed. In terms of international law and the very recent past, "Non-intervention is the 'supreme norm' of international order." Krasner put it a different way, but just as compelling: "State sovereignty shapes all other international regimes."

Non-intervention is most important to the smallest and weakest states. Powerful states rely less on the conventions of international law than small states, which require some safeguards that their own military power or political influence cannot muster. In addition, the practice of non-intervention has created boundaries that have illegitimized many opportunities for conflict. Weakening the norm of non-intervention in international relations may increase the likelihood and potential for conflict between and among states.

Part of the changing nature of state sovereignty has been reducing the conceptualization of international relations along spatial lines. Even while the state retains many of its key functions, as technology and culture shift to decrease the importance of territorial boundaries, the
concept of the state becomes less salient. "To the extent that flows of money, information, and traded goods provide the organizing patterns for the future, the role of the state is certainly diminished even if it retains significance in relation to the maintenance of overall global security, the control of internal order, and the management of regional economic relations."12

Another key issue is the control exercised by the state. Philpott argued that sovereignty changes as ideas of legitimate authority change.13 The Hobbesian view of state power is based on a clear demarcation between the orderly internal workings of the state and the chaotic, anarchic global domain. Falk observed that such a "contrast between the serene world within and the chaotic world without no longer hold."14 Conditions in the arena of world politics have made domestic control less tenable for many states while international economic and political regimes have made the global system less anarchic and more subject to the desires of neighbors and collective associations of states. Perhaps even more fundamentally, it is questionable that the distinction between absolute domestic sovereignty and chaotic anarchy in the interstate system ever reached the extremes portrayed in classical theory.

In considering the theoretical basis for the state, it is significant that the foundation of the state is in fact protection of human interests. Clarke’s analysis stated it well: “Hobbesian, contractarian, and human rights arguments cannot yield independent justifications for states or government, but rather make the standing of the state conditional on what it is capable of providing for its members."15 From many standpoints, including the classical state theory, the reason for absolute domestic sovereignty is the security afforded to the subjects or citizens of the state.

There are still practical benefits to states for adopting norms of non-intervention. These include "the present desire to avoid dangerous and destabilizing arms races, as well as the
economic and political costs of compiling and maintaining excessive military arsenals."16 Non-intervention prevents abuses by those who may seek to exploit opportunities at the expense of other states. Looking at the expansion of population, literacy, technology, and culture in the centuries since the Westphalian origins of the current system, one must credit the state system for its accomplishments in favor of peace. However, due to the practical inequalities among states, the political equality afforded by sovereignty may not be the optimally effective system. In other words, the principle of non-intervention could be a threat to security as well as sustainable development in many parts of the world and even to "the very idea of an international community with a shared sense of duty and direction."17

The concept of popular sovereignty extends this view by minimizing the role of the construct of the state in determining policy in the international system.18 This school of thought argues that in the absence of effective government, the interests of civilians must predominate, so humanitarian intervention is legal.19 Somalia is a good example of this. In failed states that lose the capability to provide for society, the institution of the sovereign no longer exists, and intervention violates no norm of sovereignty. Cases of failed states are thus clearer than cases in which the state abuses its power. The accusation that sovereignty has become a shield to protect repressive regimes20 is apt in considering this issue. From this perspective, the disintegration of state authority can justify intervention. The implications for misuse of authority are less clear. While the concept of sovereignty has evolved from an uncompromising absolute to a contractual right to rule, international law has focused on the reality rather than the quality of rule.21

John Rawls pointed out that justice requires the right to self-determination as well as a complementary right to protection against intervention.22 Rawls' later writings are more critical, however, proposing that sovereignty must be reconstructed "in light of a reasonable law of
peoples." Other authors have developed contradictory or paradoxical understandings of sovereignty. For instance, one articulated it that "To legitimize intervention is to pay tribute to state sovereignty and at the same time to violate this sovereignty." The concept of intervention itself is presupposed on an assumption of sovereignty and the right of nonintervention. Attempts at justifying intervention only take place because of such an assumption, even if the justification is on strictly humanitarian grounds.

Further along the intellectual spectrum on intervention is the contention that intervention contributes to sovereignty. By enhancing states’ integrity, intervention can reinforce sovereignty. Rather than eliminating the territorial monopoly of violence, intervention has reconstituted failed or disrupted states into stronger, more inclusive states. Malmvig concludes his discussion by arguing:

Intervention reproduces two sovereign foundations at the same time. Instead of determining whether state sovereignty is obsolete or not, or whether and when human sovereignty precedes or transgresses state sovereignty, it might be more fruitful to study how the two are combined and given meaning in current practices and discourses on intervention.

Another author suggests that the issue of protecting human rights within the context of guarding state sovereignty is not a legal problem. He suggests this because of the state’s fundamental duty to protect human rights. However, this perspective leads to ambiguous conclusions about the practice of intervention. A state’s failure to perform its duty to protect rights may be viewed in two ways. First, it could be considered a justification for intervention; intervention would restore the state’s ability to perform its fundamental duty. On the other hand, a more relativist consideration would be that the state must construct how it performs its roles. Therefore, intervention would interfere with the state’s practice of its role, however poorly those outside the state view this performance.
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty articulated a “responsibility to protect,” which further codifies the international community’s duties in cases where sovereignty might otherwise contraindicate action. The concept is invoked when the state fails to protect the rights of or wages war against a large proportion of its population.\textsuperscript{29} This argument is compelling because of the instances of atrocities that have taken place while the world watched without stopping the killing or destruction. It may be somewhat paternalistic to view events in this way. It is almost reminiscent of ancient times, when overlords controlled the workings of those subordinate peoples whose conditions of non-sovereignty rendered them subject to the whim of more powerful nations. According to Dominic Lieven in his recent (and somewhat controversial) historical study, \textit{Empire}, “in its time empire was often a force for peace, prosperity and the exchange of ideas across the globe”\textsuperscript{30}.

Traditional moralities support nonintervention because of the importance of allowing a given people to take ownership of their rights and values. Immanuel Kant’s \textit{Perpetual Peace} argued for nonintervention because it allowed for the political autonomy for citizens to shape their way of life.\textsuperscript{31} John Stuart Mill argued that intervention damages a people’s own struggles for liberty. The authenticity of freedom achieved through intervention is compromised.\textsuperscript{32}

Mill did admit that some civil conflict can become so irresoluble that intervention might be necessary. Michael Walzer more recently discussed three types of cases where an intervention serves the underlying purposes that the principle of nonintervention was designed to uphold.

—when a particular set of boundaries clearly contains two or more political communities, one of which is already engaged in a large-scale military struggle for independence; that is, when what is at issue is secession or ‘national liberation’;

—when the boundaries have already been crossed by the armies of a foreign power, even if the crossing has been called for by one of the parties in a civil war, that is, when what is at issue is counterintervention; and
—when the violation of human rights within a set of boundaries is so terrible that it makes talk of community or self-determination or 'arduous struggle' seem cynical and irrelevant, that is, in cases of enslavement or massacre.33

Of course, for Mill, those nations in which intervention occurs in modern times are the uncivilized nations whose best hope would be benign colonialism. Doyle notes that Mill does not advocate racist domination. His reasoning applies equally to the once primitive northern Europeans who benefited from the imperial rule imposed by civilized Romans.34

The morality of intervention has numerous bases on which it is defended. These moral bases center around the concept of human rights. The concept of human rights is fundamentally a deontological principle not based on consequentialist considerations. In other words, the moral worth of human rights cannot be judged by the ends they produce.35 However, the international community is rarely rallied by such moral considerations alone. The consequences of the domestic human rights violations, rather than the violations themselves, have prompted recent interventions.36 'The ethical calculus supporting the rule [of non-intervention] involves a clear consequentialist choice to give priority to order over justice in international relations.'37 In addition, the legal foundations are found in the 'consequential stability-based principles of Chapter VII [of the UN Charter] have therefore provided a basis for intervention to prevent human rights violations.'38 The consequentialist argument will have less predominance as the norm of non-intervention has less hold over international conduct.

The Practice of Sovereignty and Intervention

Hashmi argued that the issue of sovereignty is particularly ripe in current times because of several interconnected factors: the collapse of the Soviet Union, the phenomenon of globalization and the attendant universalization of human rights, and the expansion of
transnational entities. Falk identified a number of factors presenting a challenge to traditional state institutions:

What clearly emerges at this stage of history is a challenge to the preeminence of the territorial state not only from global market forces and computer networks, with their bold signatures of mobility and elusiveness, but also from the spread of weapons, disease, drugs, pollutants, crime, unwanted ideas, illegal migrants, and icons of popular culture. All of these forces diminish the capacity of states and their leaders to manage affairs within an enclosed space on a map.

In response to these global political changes, the issue of sovereignty has been scrutinized by several large-scale efforts. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty defined the “just cause” for military intervention for human protection. The Commission contended that large-scale loss of life was justification for intervention, while other violations of human rights, such as systematic racial discrimination, was not. According to the ICISS, just cause also includes “situations of state collapse and the resultant exposure of the population to mass starvation and/or civil war; and overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened.” The ICISS report reformulates the notion of sovereignty “from the absolute rights of state leaders, to respect for the popular will and internal forms of governance, based on international standards of democracy and human rights.”

States still act primarily in their own interests; however, several recent interventions, including those in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo, have been motivated by factors other than national interest. With the possible exception of the former Yugoslavia, no Western state had a vital national interest in these conflicts. Domestic conduct is under the increasing scrutiny of international law with regard to human rights. Although this does not issue a general license for intervention, “it does expose the international regimes of all the members of international society to the legitimate appraisal of their peers.”
The practice of intervention may itself be leading to new pressures on the state. Disgruntled groups may become more inclined to forcibly challenge state authority in the hope of attracting international involvement on their behalf. These pressures indicate the emergence of new international organizing principles. This was highlighted in practice by the crisis over Kosovo. Furthermore, recent practice of intervention has established “jurisdiction over economic injustices when strong states set out to deliberately starve their own populations or where very weak states fail to meet minimum standards of human sustenance.”

There is ultimately a new sense of when and how to intervene. Multilateral authorization is assuming greater preeminence on these issues, and traditional consent-based peacekeeping has often been mixed with or replaced by a coercive model. The Report of the UN Secretary-General asserted, “the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by any reality.”

One of the major factors leading to the disintegration of sovereignty is the realization that a domestic monopoly of violence is entirely unrealistic for a large portion of states. Without this basis for sovereign control, most of the projects for social and economic ends that states undertake are not possible. For instance, for many African states, sovereignty is a legal fiction that is not matched by governance and administrative capacity. As time passes, the capacity of the state to provide domestic stability is diminishing, thus undermining the social reality and institutional legitimacy that gave the doctrinal claims asserted on behalf of sovereignty their purchase on our political imaginations. This perspective is compellingly supported by Kaplan’s vision of the chaos of underdeveloped regions of the world, where governments no longer hold sway over people dominated by tribalism and violence.
Economic developments have also made human rights more salient and sovereignty less tenable. Economic interdependence has linked many discrete sovereign powers, disseminated human rights concepts across the world, and unified distinct cultures in ways never before imagined. One thesis on the decline of the territorially-based state is based upon the proposition that money and power no longer derive from land – a fixed asset – but from the more mobile assets of capital, labor, and information. The last of these, information, has recently expanded (and is still expanding) more rapidly than the others, and this is significant because it is the most mobile. Information flow is also significant because of the transformational power it has over people and culture.

Peter Drucker’s “post-capitalist society” describes the challenges at every level to the dominance of the nation-state, from the transnational down to the tribal. However, Drucker later sided with the abiding power of the nation-state: “Whenever in the last 200 years political passions and nation-state politics have collided with economic rationality, political passions and the nation state have won.” Clarke argued that these very political passions and identities are, however, opposing the classic state. There is increasing interdependence and inter-penetration not only of states, but of subgroups between and across civil societies. The resulting homogenization of experience will result in an expansion of the borders of community making the convergence of different moralities and language games more likely.

**New International Regimes**

So far, it seems that there are no international regimes that can successfully replace the system of sovereign states. Various economic and trade regimes exist, including global organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and regional ones such as the North American Free Trade
Association (NAFTA), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Economic Conference of West African States (ECOWAS). Each of these organizations in some ways constrain the absolute sovereignty of their constituent states and of non-member states with which they come in contact. More significantly, the European Union (EU) has achieved economic integration that significantly revises domestic economic policy and requires the surrender – to some degree – of political powers of its member states as well. It is possible to compare the EU to the thirteen American states that existed under the Articles of Confederation. It remains to be seen whether the EU will develop into a regional superstate with a strong and growing central government (as the United States did after the ratification of the Constitution – each of its three branches of government have established stronger powers for themselves over the past two centuries with the result of a significantly stronger government than at the nation’s inception).

In Africa, political integration has been harder to achieve and does not seem as possible as the integration that may be looming in Europe. However, the African states have surrendered significant powers and do not retain the protection from intervention that even EU-member states still enjoy. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), on the other hand, has defined (1990) standards of good governance that included democracy and declared (3 July 1993) that internal disputes are matters of regional concern. The Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) allows for intervention without the consent of the target state in a way that the OAU system of complete consensus never did. The Organization of American States (OAS) (in Res. 1080 and in the “Santiago Commitment of 1991”) declared coups against democracy illegitimate and has adopted economic sanctions against coups in Haiti and Peru. In this way, regional
organizations have asserted, to varying degrees, a revision of sovereignty and the norm of non-intervention.

On the global level, the United Nations (UN) has been the primary agent for most of the non-consensual interventions over the past few decades. The basis of the UN, however, is the member state, which retains its sovereignty as part of the agreement for membership. Article 2.4 of the UN Charter expressly states that: “All Members shall refrain ... from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” This creates a tension between the United Nations as a group of sovereign states that enjoy the norm of non-intervention and its occasional practice of coercive intervention. One author asserted that the UN is ineffective because of the contradiction of the collective structure of sovereign states and the mandate to preserve international order.57

The UN Charter confers on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and the right to use sanctions, blockades and (military) force to this end. The 1990s can be noted as a time of reinterpretation of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to justify intervention in civil conflict. While Chapter VII of the UN Charter was intended to augment the sovereignty of states and protect them from external aggression and unwanted intervention, not to intervene in their domestic affairs,58 coupled with the powers for consensual peacekeeping and mediation in Chapter VI, there seems to be an unofficial Chapter 6.5 that allows for aggressive intervention and that has been asserted several times since the end of the Cold War. Of course, the fact that the Security Council is not completely representative is another factor that threatens the sovereignty of smaller states.
The crisis in Iraq presented two alternatives that would both lead to reinforcement of the state system at the expense of internationalism. If the international community intervened in Iraq at the behest of the United States, it would seem that international regimes do not function as an equitable community of peoples, but merely as venues for manipulation by powerful states (or powerful state in the singular, for the US possesses an unmatched ability to successfully challenge weaker states, even if those states are collectively acting). On the other hand, failing to act more forcefully than continued unproductive sanctions and inspections might reduce the authority of international regimes as well. The credibility and power of the UN must be undermined by the persistent failure of the international community to enforce repeated United Nations resolutions requiring Iraq to meet its agreements ending the Persian Gulf War. The controversy over Iraq was in part based on questioning the legitimacy of the concept of intervention itself. According to this line of thinking, Iraq, as a sovereign nation, could not be subject to the preemptive military enforcement of internationally established standards of postwar peace agreement and disarmament. Such considerations, which were widespread among the political and academic community worldwide, reinforced the paradigm of sovereign states. At the same time, the extreme pressure exerted by the United States on the UN and its institutions (such as the Security Council with weaker, underdeveloped countries whom the US tried to influence with financial incentives) undermined major international regimes. So both sides of the Iraqi controversy served to emasculate the previously expanding power of these international organizations.

In addition to the United Nations, however, other international regimes have exerted power that has arguably detracted from the sovereignty of states. The era since World War II has seen a widespread voluntary surrender of sovereignty in the form of treaty agreements, which
have created new political regimes on a variety of topics. Military treaties, environmental standards, and economic agreements (many under the auspices of organizations discussed at the beginning of this section) served to establish some sort of supranational system that has to some extent weakened the sovereign power of states.

There is still no integrated regime powerful enough to substantially replace the state system. Individual rights and responsibilities have assumed greater salience, but there is no adequate entity to overthrow the state as the major actor in world affairs. As international organizations, conventions, and intervention practices have used a construction of human rights to justify and motivate activity and decision-making, state sovereignty may be less dominant than in the past. Human rights are developing into the favored paradigm of political being, with new international regimes supportive of this construction usurping some of the power once defined by the boundaries of sovereignty.

However, there is little reason to expect that the end of state sovereignty is imminent. Trends may be in place for reshaping international relations in the long term, but continuity rather than change will probably dominate the immediate future. Setbacks to the global authority of the United Nations caused by the Iraqi crisis may have effects lasting for years. While it has been suggested that the nations of the world reconvene in San Francisco in order to redraft a new United Nations Organization, this seems unlikely in the near future. For the present time, it seems that there will be a system of semi-sovereign states that still exists in an ultimately anarchical environment.

**Strategic Implications of American Interventions**

Peacekeeping and humanitarian operations have strategic implications both for the regional stability of the targeted nations and the military preparedness and availability of those
forces performing the missions. Walter Ulmer documented the proficiency with which standard Army units have completed numerous non-traditional missions. Arguing against claims of crisis in the Army’s “non-traditional” roles, Huntington highlighted a few of the traditional, non-combat uses of the armed forces in our history. Ralph Peters suggested that the end of the Cold War has particularly seen a return to constabulary traditions. In fact, the American military has historically been involved in “more Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) than in war itself,” there being over 250 instances of the use of US armed forces abroad since 1798 and only five declared wars. Most scholars agree that certain missions require military intervention. What is more controversial to the community of national security intellectuals and professionals is the cost and whether such a cost is worth performing the mission.

Peace operations are controversial in their goal to achieve greater regional stability. Clearly, humanitarian missions such as disaster relief accomplish their limited objectives to provide assistance to people with severe but temporary needs. The impact of peacekeeping missions, however, is less clear. One study of five peacekeeping missions (Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Haiti, and Kurdish refugee relief in Northern Iraq) assessed the cost, benefits, and harms and found that altogether there is a net benefit from peace operations. Conversely, a foreign service member’s analysis of peacekeeping operations suggested that, based on structural limitations, there is little chance for success. However, the analysis assessed the most difficult peacekeeping environments where tensions and underlying factors make lasting peace improbable. At the same time, he used permanent peace without peacekeeping as the standard for successful peace operations. In this way, the analysis may be excessively ambitious and unrealistic in its assumptions.
For example, the military presence in Bosnia has achieved most of the military goals of the Dayton Peace Accords, so this peacekeeping operation could be viewed as successful on its own standards. The forces of the major factions are separated, heavy weapons have been removed, and war has not resumed. Other goals of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) still remain, including the capture of notable war criminals in the region. Without the creation of lasting peace, the achievements of peacekeepers in Bosnia remain significant. Similarly, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai provide another example of peacekeeping that has met its agenda and contributed to regional stability. The force in the Sinai, which includes an American battalion along with Israeli and Egyptian participants, has enforced a peace between Israel and Egypt for almost twenty years. Although conditions have changed since the inception of the MFO, persisting Arab-Israeli violence in Israel indicates the potential for further instability in the region. These are only two prominent examples of a vast number of peacekeeping operations in which American forces have been involved. Worthwhile peace operations have value across several dimensions.

**Political.** Often implicit in arguments against peacekeeping is that the country pays a price in its national security resources for committing to such missions. Such an assumption fails to recognize that benefits are also reaped. This is the tendency of Western warfare, in which victory is viewed in terms of the successful end of a difficult struggle instead of Eastern military philosophy, which viewed victory as the prevention of greater conflict. Presidential Decision Directive 25 reflected the focus on a victorious conclusion in its advocacy of an effective exit strategy. Other advocates of peacekeeping have included calls for an exit strategy in their proposals for interventions. Rather than a guarantee of an exit strategy, it may be preferable to
have a strategy that articulates the global interests of the United States along with reasons for actively pursuing those interests.\textsuperscript{70}

Focusing on avoiding casualties and setting time-limits to operations are opportunities for indigenous factions to exploit the American public opinion and political sensitivity and prevent successful accomplishment of a peace operation.\textsuperscript{71} Other factors that endanger successful peacekeeping include the tendency to wait until large-scale violence and media attention force the issue, overly optimistic projections that lead to scarce resources, a desire for immediate results leading to flawed agreements or premature elections, and avoidance of political solutions in favor of humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{72} The lack of results caused by all of these problems may lead to future hesitation to get involved in international crises.

Some advocates of an American presence in Bosnia draw attention to the fact that unrest in Eastern Europe was the ultimate cause of the First World War. While this may be simplistic, the danger of escalation should not be underestimated, especially when the nation in question has close geographic proximity to important allies. Interests near Western Europe or Israel, where alliance has linked the United States in many practical ways to the security of those nations, make it worthwhile to intervene earlier when the cost in blood and treasure is less than if possible conflict emerged or expanded. Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory\textsuperscript{73} accounts for the geographic element in realist considerations of national security interests.

In addition, research has found that intervention has been an effective tool for democratization. Studies of United States interventions between 1945 and 1992\textsuperscript{74} and interventions by democracies between 1974 and 1988\textsuperscript{75} provide evidence that intervening in non-democratic states helps to transfer democratic institutions to these states. A discussion of how
democracy prevents war is beyond the scope here, but such results are beneficial to international stability.

**Economic.** Globalization has created many advantages for industrialized countries. Numerous benefits accrue to developing nations as well, but they receive a disproportionate amount of pollution, below-subsistence labor, and negative externalities. It is in the long-term best interest of industrialized countries that developing countries progress into more productive trading partners. As these societies become more affluent, they will consume more technology and goods produced by the leading economies of the world.

From the economic perspective, geography is less significant than in the political sense. This is because faster transportation and communication have reduced the economic barriers that exist due to geographic distance. Globalization is accelerating the importance of far-away countries in every other country’s economy. For this reason, peacekeeping may be in the economic best interest of industrialized countries. While costly interventions such as Bosnia may not have immediate economic pay-offs, less costly interventions where logistical, training, or administrative support is provided may have more clear advantages. Additionally, the magic of economic growth must be considered. Intervening now to set the conditions for stability and productivity will result in greater pay-offs five, ten, and fifty years later. This is especially true in situations that may deteriorate in the future. This postpones the results of economic growth and could result in a politically necessary, but more dangerous and costly, intervention in the future.

Studies have also shown that early intervention to prevent conflict may be more cost effective than waiting for an escalation to violence. In fairness, this is a difficult judgment to make because it is impossible to determine costs of conflicts that did not occur, or whether
preventative action had an effect in deterring conflict. However, the astronomical cost to victims of conflict has been well documented. Additionally, there have been comparative studies of the estimated cost of peace operations in the early stages of civil unrest versus the actual cost in later stages. Intervention in the 1990s has cost the world community approximately $200 billion. Earlier intervention would involve smaller scale operations and would significantly reduce this figure. For instance, the cost of peace operations in Rwanda was $4.5 billion, but an earlier intervention would have prevented unmeasured costs of the conflict to the victims and to regional stability for an estimated cost of only $1.3 billion to the international community.

Legitimacy. Human rights are a frequently-cited rationale for humanitarian intervention. This has been controversial because rectifying human rights violations may require the international community to violate a state’s sovereignty. Additionally, cultural differences in defining what constitutes a human rights violation make the issue more difficult. It is clear, however, especially in an age of mass media, that some human rights violations can be so egregious as to require intervention. The legitimacy of the rule of law, international collective security arrangements, and the moral authority of Western nations can diminish if such violations are ignored.

A recent example of this is the genocide in Rwanda. With 800,000 people killed in a span of 100 days, the massacre in Rwanda exceeded the genocidal efficiency of Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, Maoist China, or Pol-Pot’s Cambodia. French arms dealers sold weapons to the Hutu killers during the genocide, and UN forces commander Major General Romeo Dallaire knew of the locations of Hutu weapons caches as well as the plans for the massacre. Nonetheless, the United Nations refused to intervene. The American State Department possessed similar knowledge of the massacre during its early stages.
The failure to intervene effectively in Rwanda cost the United States and its leading allies in terms of their legitimacy and the legitimacy of the very institutions of human rights and international law. This has consequences for the United States in the worlds of diplomacy and foreign policy. Moral suasion is a primary way in which America pursues its interests. This tool is severely weakened when the United States fails to protect its ideals in a way commensurate with its available resources.

Political, economic, and moral justifications exist for humanitarian interventions. All of these factors support the security and well-being of the American people and their allies. Many critics disparage the haphazard decision to use military force to intervene in contingency operations. This is a valid grievance; each use of force and attendant risk of life and equipment must have sufficient justification. Burk offered a three-part model to address the justification for intervention, but there remains to be such an articulation from the nation’s strategic leadership. Overcoming the intellectual limitation that all applications of military force must end in decisive or destructive outcomes may be the first step in developing a more effective strategy for the future.

Military Attitudes

Many members of the military are resistant to peacekeeping. Familiarity with peacekeeping, turnover bringing about new soldiers, and other changes have led to greater acceptance of peacekeeping in the past and among certain parts of the military, but there is still significant resistance. Bacevich noted that soldiers may also tend to find peacekeeping unacceptable because it lacks the satisfaction of a victorious conclusion.

Sarkesian acknowledged the existence of historical non-combat units, but argued that "such constabulary squadrons quickly lost their preparedness for conventional battle." Allan
Millett discussed the problems posed by historical peacekeeping interventions, focusing on
damage to morale and readiness.\textsuperscript{83} In considering more recent force and contingency operations,
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Shalikashvali suggested that "such missions . . . are
damaging to our security."\textsuperscript{84} Snider argued that "constabulary roles" have had and will have a
"pernicious impact . . . on the Army's major role as America's land power for the 21st
century."\textsuperscript{85} This occurs in part because non-combat missions distract from the military's primary
task of preparing for combat, even as budget constraints reduce the means the military has at its
disposal to execute both tasks. It is asked "to do more with less."\textsuperscript{86} The numerous operations
that the Army is conducting create an "unsustainable operations tempo (optempo) that is
hollowing the force at an alarming rate."\textsuperscript{87}

Another concern is a shift in military values to reflect the past decade, with the force
looking more constabulary, reflecting "the values of impartiality, restraint, patience, and
passivity associated with successful peacekeeping."\textsuperscript{88} Not only does the changing activity of the
military change its culture, but these changes affect the culture in such a way that the
performance of the warfighting function is damaged, as the changes cause "military culture to
atrophy."\textsuperscript{89} The military is "hardworking and disciplined"\textsuperscript{90} due to its urgent warfighting
mission; removing the task would remove the culture. Snider suggests that recent constabulary
missions with limited use of force for limited objectives with often inconclusive results comprise
a major change from the warfighting focus of American armed forces.\textsuperscript{91} On the other hand, Hills
pointed out that in the majority of peacekeeping engagements, military forces have no active
public security role; they provide a deterrent presence but do not actually do police work.\textsuperscript{92}
(Hills' observation may not be entirely accurate based on the experiences of members of the
military, whose professional literature reflects feelings of unpreparedness and a need for additional training for these missions.

While the diversion of resources and the diminution of the American military edge are among the most frequent concerns about non-traditional missions, others exist. Coker discussed the dangers of peace operations, which are perhaps exacerbated by the assumption that such missions are less intense than war. He produced examples for his point, including the loss of more American soldiers in one day of peacekeeping in Beirut than in any single day of the war in Vietnam or the United Kingdom's losses in Ulster, greater than in any of 25 wars it has fought since World War II.

Avant and Lebovic surveyed officers on how appropriate they felt varying types of missions were to the military. Officers gave highest ratings of appropriateness for the traditional missions associated with fighting a world war or a regional war. These missions were ranked first and second by members of all four services. The officers surveyed saw nontraditional missions (drug interdiction, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, sanctions enforcement, and humanitarian assistance) as least fitting for the military. Segal, Reed, and Rohall had similar findings in a survey of Army soldiers, indicating that there was a belief that peacekeeping was not appropriate work for the military.

Avant and Lebovic's findings indicated that support for new missions does seem to be linked with an officer's specialty and the career rewards they see tied to it. Those officers from the combat arms tend to be more committed to traditional missions. Research focusing on other contingency operations has supported these conclusions. Soldiers in Somalia complained about the ambiguity of the mission and the sense that nothing tangible was being accomplished there. Almost half of the soldiers in Haiti (based on a survey sample of 2,000) believed that it was not
important for U.S. forces to be involved in that mission. Reservists serving in the Sinai experienced diminishing support for their mission over their six-month tour of duty there.

There have been findings to the contrary, indicating support among military personnel for operations other than war (OOTW). A study of soldiers deployed to Macedonia for Operation Able Sentry found that soldiers and officers supported that mission. Elements of low-intensity conflict in the peacekeeping mission made some feel that it was more worthwhile or appropriate. In addition, some felt that there were training benefits from their experiences although some combat competencies diminished over time. However, the findings reported that many training deficiencies were improved in as little as a month after the end of the deployment. This study did not have strong findings overall, however, as it reported a significant amount of dissenting opinions who were opposed to peacekeeping. Altogether, the literature indicates that soldiers and officers do not feel that peacekeeping is an appropriate use of American military force. A brief historical survey of American military attitudes on the use of force and strategic culture will help provide depth in understanding the roots of this resistance.

Decisiveness and Directness

Americans – even more than any others following the Western tradition – are accustomed to direct operations that have decisive outcomes. The need for decisiveness in the American military mind is a primary factor contributing to soldiers’ and officers’ resistance to non-warfighting roles. Janowitz predicted that support and stability roles would be difficult for officers to accept because they are focused on the most destructive and absolute applications of military force, allowing for limited contemplation of the nuance of international relations. Goldstein called this the “victory problem,” referring to the lack of clear victory in a contingency operation.
Russell Weigley’s *The American Way of War* (1973) provided an insightful historical analysis of American strategic thought. Weigley asserted that Americans, and particularly members of the military, hold a very narrow view of strategy. Rather than considering the social, political, and economic factors involved in the use of military force, Weigley pointed out that tactical matters have historically been at the forefront of American strategic thought. He used General Albert Wedemeyer’s experience at the German War College to contrast the broader issues explored in the professional education there than anything that General Wedemeyer had been exposed to in his military training in the United States.

The use of force throughout the history of the American military to achieve political ends had been manifested only in the pursuit of military victories until after the Korean War. With the major exception of Alfred Thayer Mahan, military theorists in this period wrote primarily on the structure of the armed forces rather than the strategy of how the forces should be used. Long-standing habits of thought and the practices over time have shaped our strategic thought today. Early campaigns such as those waged against native Americans and the Civil War were focused on the complete destruction of the opponent’s military capability.

The Allied experience in World War II shows that indirectness was more doctrinally tolerable to European planners than to Americans. Controversy in the Atlantic Alliance persisted through the early years of the war, with American strategists feeling that the British were drawing the war further and further into peripheral areas that would result in fruitless stalemate. Leighton contended that the 1943 Cairo and Teheran Conferences brought the strategic controversies to a head, with the Americans insistent on an overriding commitment to the cross-channel invasion OVERLORD and resistant to any delay. The British, on the other hand, were content to delay the invasion in order to pursue further objectives in the Mediterranean.
theatre. The issue was ultimately resolved by forceful Russian demands for direct confrontation with Germany to open a second front and relieve pressure on the Soviets.

What is clear from the strategic controversy is a prevailing attitude among U.S. military leaders for direct rather than indirect action. This is possibly a factor of American geography and economics. Located too far away to feel the same threat that Western European nations have felt in major wars, the United States may feel less anxiety over pursuing an ambitious and central approach. In addition, with a giant industrial machine producing large quantities of armaments and technology, an approach emphasizing the application of quantity rather than slow and meticulous weakening of the periphery seems to fit the American experience. The extent of British reservations about the invasion is unknown, but Leighton cited the suspicions of senior American leaders expressed in writings at the time. Fearing that the British were planning to use the invasion force as an occupation force to move into Germany after its eventual collapse, the Americans felt that their allies were still psychologically hampered from World War I and the more recent retreat from Dunkirk. Such a reason for restraint would emphasize the geographic differences motivating an American strategic approach that would be more tolerant of risk.

While World War II was the last total war prosecuted by the United States,104 Henry Kissinger felt that the addition of the atomic bomb to the modern weapons arsenal did little to change the previous pattern of thinking.105 Kissinger criticized the strategists for not recognizing the watershed that nuclear weapons represented, but rather viewing them as a tool of all-out war whose only goal could be total victory. The American people and their government were unable to conceive of communist military initiatives that would result in a lesser conflict than another world war. What the nuclear age was to represent, however, was the introduction of limited war that would force new ways of thinking.
The first limited conflict after World War II was the Korean War. Even though this conflict did not use the full spectrum of American capabilities since the atomic bomb was never used, it did represent the penchant for decisive warfare. General Douglas MacArthur personified the American strategist in his desire to pursue the war until the entire peninsula was retaken and conclusive victory was achieved. His unwillingness to accept a partial or ambiguous outcome ultimately led to his relief. MacArthur’s belief that “There is no substitute for victory” was actually shared by President Truman and the other members of the political-military decision making establishment in Washington. Indeed, the public strongly supported commitment of military forces to achieve a victorious outcome in Korea. A study on public support for military intervention found that there was a two to one ratio of those supporting escalation over those supporting withdrawal at the beginning of the war, and this ratio expanded to five to one by the end of the war.

While MacArthur’s commitment to decisive warfare was the ultimate cause of his relief, it was the administration’s view of Korea as a periphery theater that presented the disagreement. Washington was unwilling to be drawn into a war with communist China because they felt that doing so would endanger security in the European theater with the main Soviet adversary. From their perspective, MacArthur’s relief was not an unwillingness to pursue victory in war, but it was the way to do so; limiting commitment to the Asian theater in the 1950s sprung from the same approach that led Americans to avoid the Mediterranean one in the 1940s. Even though President Truman and General MacArthur were drawn into a conceptual conflict whose only resolution was to be the end of MacArthur’s career, they nonetheless shared the same basic premise of American strategic thought.
After the Korean War, the United States once again settled into the uneasy peace that was the Cold War with the Soviet Union. A strategy of deterrence would seem to require greater tolerance for less dramatic, limited military aims. However, frustrations over the Korean War existed among the American public and the new Eisenhower administration. While ultimately capable of achieving only a stalemate, nuclear deterrence nonetheless threatened the most decisive of military outcomes. The massive retaliation of President Eisenhower would theoretically reduce the possibility of limited war by threatening a nuclear response in limited engagements. The willingness to resort to nuclear destruction as the outcome of any prospective conflict gives further evidence for the American strategic proclivity toward decisiveness. Ironically, Soviet and American nuclear capabilities would preclude the actual use of nuclear weapons other than for deterrent effect because of the catastrophic consequences of such an exchange, even considering American superiority in both the stockpile and means of delivery at that time.

After only a few years, rapid Soviet development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems rendered the massive retaliation strategic still less decisive and cogent. This began the stalemate on the brink of nuclear chaos that was to characterize the rest of the Cold War. Such a parity with the Soviet adversaries and such impotence for decisive action were not conceived of by the architects of massive retaliation. The failure of the United States to mobilize a nuclear response (as some members of the administration advocated) to the communist incursion in Dienbienphu in 1954 further discredited nuclear weapons as a viable deterrent to limited, local communist advances.

In the aftermath of these events, scholars began to seriously question the American way of war and argue for a more limited approach, in both means and objectives. Robert Osgood's
Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (1957) argued that the United States had demonstrated a limited ability to connect political and military processes. The power applied once a policy of force was decided upon had little relation to the purposes of that policy. After political leaders resolved to resort to force, the military was unleashed with little connection at that point between the policy and power used to carry out that policy. Osgood contended that limited war would be a valuable asset for American interests in any case, but the advent of nuclear weapons made it all the more urgent to understand and to be prepared for less decisive engagements. Kissinger also felt that American thought allowed “no room for intermediate positions between total peace and total war” as a result of the historical development of a theory of war based on total victory.

Thomas C. Schelling wrote Arms and Influence in 1966 to discuss the new strategic considerations that must evolve in the nuclear age. Since total victory had taken on a new meaning due to the emergence of nuclear capability, coercion of rather than victory over foreign states must become the objective of strategy. Instead of the direct application of military force to which American and other Western militaries had become accustomed, indirect means such as intimidation, compulsion, and deterrence would become relevant uses of military force. Military power would thus need to be connected with diplomatic efforts. Rather than serving as an option to the international relations process, Schelling argued that military force must become part of that process.

The Vietnam War began with such objectives as Schelling articulated, but over time it degenerated into a strategy of annihilation. American special operations first attempted to influence Vietnam military through indirect means by training South Vietnamese freedom fighters. The Kennedy administration enthusiastically embraced counterinsurgency and the new
strategic outlook it implied. As the war heightened, however, by the Johnson administration, the strategy of the war was becoming more and more one of annihilation. Although the Johnson and the Nixon administrations used aerial bombing as a method of compulsion rather than destruction, the war on the ground was becoming one obsessed with destruction of the enemy and the “body count.” Even as the war became more controversial, greater numbers of Americans supported escalation in order to win the war, according to a RAND study of public opinion at the time. By the end of 1967, the ratio of those favoring escalation to those favoring withdrawal was five to one. In spite of the desperate desire for a conclusive resolution, the civil unrest and domestic chaos spawned by Vietnam created significant problems for the country. The war itself was one with limited aims and necessarily limited methods because of fear of expanding the war. The importance of the traumatic experience of Vietnam to the domestic psyche in the United States must not be underestimated. After that experience, Americans were much more hesitant to depart from their comfortable, decisive form of warfare again.

The evolution of doctrine to reflect this reaction, while coping with the necessities of a world in which total war was incomprehensible, occurred over the next few decades. This doctrine would find its articulation in what is now referred to as the Weinberger-Powell doctrine. Kenneth Campbell provided an excellent summary of the doctrine and how it evolved after the organizational chaos of the military in Vietnam. The Weinberger doctrine as it was called in the 1980s, or the Powell doctrine of the 1990s, seeks to restrict the use of military force except under a few well-defined conditions. These conditions include vital interests at stake, a commitment to victory, clear objectives, adequate forces to meet the objectives, public and congressional support, and force is the last resort. The goal is to “win overwhelmingly.”
This doctrine is a return to continuity rather than a significant change in the progress of American military doctrine and strategic thought. Where Vietnam represented a departure from decisive actions in the attempt to prosecute a limited war, the Weinberger-Powell doctrine is a return to the comfortable doctrine of decisive military actions with obvious measures of victory.

General Powell defended his perspective on the pages of the journal *Foreign Affairs.* Although Powell wrote that it is impossible, or at least imprudent, to precisely define the conditions for the use of force, he revealed a strong proclivity towards "decisive means and results, even if they are not always possible." Powell also argued that all war is limited by the territory on which it fought, the means used, and the goals. Indeed, General Powell is not an advocate for unrestricted warfare; he is merely an example of American strategic thought as it has evolved in the nuclear age. Since war can longer be total, it must at least be decisive. Powell does allow in his *Foreign Affairs* article that peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions will dominate future military engagements. However, his opposition to such operations is well known, even finding voice in a controversial op-ed piece in *The New York Times* a month before the 1992 presidential election.

The modern strategic doctrine is an extension of the dualistic view of war and peace. The conception of the use of force is as a last resort, so force cannot be an effective tool of politics, as it represents a failure of politics and diplomacy. The doctrine as it emerged in the early 1990s has been labeled *decisive force,* and it has been criticized for its inflexibility. Rather than addressing *why* force should be used, the doctrine addresses *how* force should be used. It is a strategic frame of mind that is both apolitical and absolute. Its absolutism reflects the all-or-nothing approach that has dominated past strategy, and it dissociates itself with politics because the only satisfactory outcome is a military victory. It is a paradigm that is inappropriate for the
entire spectrum of conflict, especially those missions that have emerged in the post-Cold War era.

While the Gulf War is praised as a model of the American way of modern warfare, it still has many critics because of the limits to its strategic approach. Rather than marching on Baghdad and overthrowing Saddam Hussein, the United States was satisfied with its original goal of expelling the Iraqis from Kuwait. It could be argued that anything short of using nuclear weapons on Iraq would have represented a limited war; however, the application of overwhelming force to achieve the liberation of Kuwait is largely a continuation of decisive operations, constrained by the nuclear age.

The Clinton administration departed from the progression of American strategic thought in adopting a long-range strike strategy consisting of cruise missiles and air power. Michael P. Noonan and John Hillen labeled this *precision force* and correctly observed that it was largely ineffective. The effect of air power in the Kosovo campaign has been highly controversial as critics have argued that NATO battle damage assessment was significantly exaggerated. September 11 revealed the futility of the use of cruise missiles against Afghan terrorist camps in response to the bombing of American embassies in Africa. The missile strikes neither impacted the terrorists' ability to conduct deadly operations with global reach nor did they provide an adequate show of force to prevent future targeting of Americans.

**Casualty Aversion**

Americans, as with citizens in most of the Western world, exert greater influence over their armed forces than is common around the globe. The democratic pressure of public opinion over government decision making creates an influence that extends into military affairs. Deborah Avant argued that civilian control of the military leads military officers to shape their
attitudes based on perceptions of what their civilian superiors want.\textsuperscript{120} Public opinion influences individual soldiers as well as senior leadership. Laura Miller and Charles Moskos found that soldiers were more satisfied with peacekeeping operations when they perceived greater levels of public support for the operation in their study of Operation Restore Hope.\textsuperscript{121}

According to many scholars, today's public feels a casualty aversion in military operations unprecedented in American history.\textsuperscript{122} Edward Luttwak, one of the most famous advocates of the casualty aversion hypothesis, contended that dwindling family size has made each child more valuable to Americans and hence each military casualty less tolerable.\textsuperscript{123} The casualty aversion hypothesis is somewhat controversial because of the changing nature of post-Cold War military operations. Some, such as James Kurth, have argued that the people do not want to expend American military casualties for human rights alone.\textsuperscript{124} Singer and Wildavsky explained that the disinclination toward risking casualties involves the insulation from violence and sustained physical hardship that people in wealthy economies enjoy.\textsuperscript{125}

Philip Everts found another explanation for casualty aversion more plausible than the latter argument or Luttwak's.\textsuperscript{126} Everts suggested that socio-economic factors have equalized members of society in the past century and raised the expectations of the population, and this has resulted in greater unwillingness to sacrifice for society. Such an observation would be consistent with post-modern social trends and their influence on the volunteer force.\textsuperscript{127} The social breakdown of authority and a growing individualist mentality have led to reduced willingness for service, and as Everts argued, the ultimate sacrifice that military casualties represent. Another possibility is the effect of vivid media coverage, which brings the war into the living rooms of the public. Such an “in your face” communication of military casualties can perhaps be one of the causes of the aversion. Alvis proposed that the “curse of Desert Storm”
has been an unrealistic expectation among the public for minimal casualties because of the unexpected and phenomenally low casualty rate in that conflict.\textsuperscript{128}

A RAND study in 1996 challenged the hypothesis that Americans are becoming increasingly risk-averse about casualties.\textsuperscript{129} Rather than being contingent upon the mere event of casualties, the aversion is directed at the expenditure of casualties without a clear or worthwhile purpose. With initial projections of casualties in the tens of thousands, the Gulf War still enjoyed high levels of support in its preparatory phases. Klarevas found that poll data from the Somalia intervention indicated that limited support existed for operations with high costs and a lack of vital interests.\textsuperscript{130} He proposed that it is the objective of a given military operation rather than the fact of casualties themselves that creates the aversion. The more recent operation in Afghanistan also shows that the public is willing to tolerate casualties if there is a compelling interest at stake. Whether aversion to casualties is intrinsic among today’s public or it is motivated by the type of mission, scholars agree that the perceived casualty aversion of the American public has affected military decision making.

James Burk has offered an alternative explanation to the casualty hypothesis.\textsuperscript{131} Burk suggested that elite consensus rather than public opinion is the determining factor upon which casualties may affect government decision making for a military operation. Burk called many of the assumptions of previous analyses into question, including whether changes in public attitudes on casualties have actually occurred as the previous authors implied and whether public opinion shifts would result in immediate shifts in foreign policy (to which some have perhaps erroneously attributed the pull out of troops from Somalia).

What remains unclear is what requirements would need to be fulfilled to achieve support in the face of casualties for less decisive operations. This matter is unclear because current
scholars are divided on the issue. Michael Desch argued that public interest in international affairs generally is low, and this factor limits support for humanitarian and peacekeeping interventions. Coupled with the strong preference for multilateral operations for peacekeeping, Desch concluded that American peacekeeping must decline in the future. Steven Kull and I.M. Destler, however, proposed that there is actually strong support for peacekeeping operations among the American public, and that there is no wariness over military casualties. More recent work by Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelphi agreed that the public is not casualty averse compared to military elites and veteran political leaders, who have been extremely reluctant to initiate the use of force. Further research is warranted to determine how public opinion responds to military intervention in peace operations, and if future operations are influenced by public support or lack thereof.

In summary, the inter-war years presented an international environment whose changing norms compelled American intervention in numerous nontraditional military endeavors. These interventions resulted as international collaboration undermined state sovereignty to some extent in favor of individual rights. Unfortunately, the American military was unprepared and ill-suited for these nontraditional missions in these new times. As the last section of this chapter indicates, the public and military interaction is significant for policy decisions. Having set the stage for the inter-war international environment in this chapter, the following chapter will assess the state of civil-military relations during those years.
Chapter 3: The Civil-Military Gap

A telling issue in civil-military relations escaped the attention of much of the major media, although some readers may be familiar with the case of Air Force Lieutenant Ryan Berry. Lieutenant Berry protested against being in close quarters with a woman officer during his duty assignment manning a missile silo at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota. The lieutenant claimed that the close proximity to a member of the opposite sex over the long 24-hour shifts presented an intolerable temptation to break the precepts of his conservative Catholic faith. Berry’s former commander had accommodated the lieutenant by adjusting the shift schedule so he would not have to work with any of the 83 female officers who served on watch duty at Minot. However, Wing Commander Colonel Ronald Haeckel responded to complaints of unfair treatment towards Berry and to the unfavorable unit morale climate by reversing this policy and refusing to afford Lieutenant Berry special consideration.

The scope of the controversy here seems to reveal a classic Huntingtonian conflict between the armed forces and society: the functional imperative of maintaining readiness versus the social imperative of the freedom to follow dictates of conscience and religious conviction. Lieutenant Berry attracted the support of several prominent advocates, including Cardinal John O’Connor, the Family Research Council (which undertook the “Saving Lieutenant Ryan” public relations campaign), and 77 members of Congress. While one officer’s personal conflict with the military is not evidence of a civil-military crisis, the opposition of Berry’s supporters to functional military necessities was more disturbing. Even those conservative factions who have traditionally advocated the interests of military readiness appeared to be in this circumstance ignorant of or apathetic to the nation’s security needs.
This failure to adequately appreciate the requirements of military readiness – which have historically been prioritized by government authorities, as the Supreme Court record shows¹ – is characteristic of a trend in the 1990s of disinterest and unawareness among not only cultural and political elites, but also among the public at large.

The broadening estrangement between the military and society sparked interest among scholars in the field. While some have focused on an increasingly hostile and politicized military, some charged that civilian culture is distancing itself from the military through a progressive deterioration of values, and others emphasized the growing chasm among elite spheres. The distance between elites in society and the military expanded throughout the 1990s.² However, in a democratic society, trends among elites are intractably related to developments in the public. John McCain, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, lamented, “Most Americans don’t care that much about national security and defense issues anymore.”³ Elective officials take an interest in those issues that their constituencies feel are important. The disconnect between the armed forces and society may have been one of apathy rather than hostility.⁴ The peacetime military was often viewed as irrelevant to the major issues of popular life. This led to less attention to military affairs and a reduced familiarity and comfort with the military.

**Army Recruiting**

By the late 1990s, the Army’s manpower situation had been labeled “desperate” and characterized by “unprecedented recruiting and retention challenges.”⁵ The Army had repeatedly failed to meet goals for recruiting. The situation had even been identified as a “recruiting crisis for the volunteer force,”⁶ and Charles Moskos said that “no problem is more serious in our armed forces than recruitment shortfalls.”⁷ Youth interest in military service declined from 32% in
1973 to approximately 10% in 1999. A 1999 RAND study argued that there were “indications that the current recruiting situation to some extent reflects ongoing and permanent changes.”

The military scrambled to make-up the shortfall, and the predicament occupied a significant amount of attention both within the services and in the media. In June 2000, a General Accounting Office report to the Senate noted “mounting problems in recruiting sufficient numbers of qualified enlisted personnel.” DOD is experiencing a recruiting challenge that resulted in an extraordinary increase in the attention and the resources focused on this area, but the outcome was not commensurate with the huge application of further efforts. From fiscal year 1993 through 1998, the Army increased its number of recruiters from 4,368 to 6,331 and increased its advertising expenditures from $34.3 million in FY 1993 to $112.9 million in FY 1999 (in FY 2000 constant dollars). The report also noted that there was a huge increase in the offering of enlistment bonuses. The shortfall incurred great costs for the Army. While concerns such as the job market and supply and demand impact the success of military recruiting, this chapter focuses on political sociological issues.

Several RAND studies found that the supply of potential recruits was higher than most observers might have expected. Reports revealed that throughout the 1990s, there were actually more potential recruits available in the pool of high-quality youths than before the drawdown, relative to accession requirements. This fact indicates that there were significant social forces working against the recruitment effort.

The continued flow of young Americans through the armed forces is one of the most visible linkages between the military and its client population in a peacetime environment. The trickle of this flow of young Americans in the inter-war years was indicative of a weak linkage between the armed forces and society. Bacevich argued that “To the question ‘Who will serve?’
the nation’s answer has now become: ‘those who want to serve.’”14 The fact that is significant here is that there were fewer and fewer who wanted to serve. The role of the armed forces had changed to such a degree that the structure of enlistment decisions had “altered radically,”15 calling into question whether econometric models using 1980s data could accurately forecast 1990s enlistment behavior.

The 1990s recruiting shortfall was a major indicator of the growing civil-military gap during that time period. Several factors have contributed to the sociological gap in civil-military relations. These include the end of the draft, changes in the Reserve Office Training Corps (ROTC), shifts in regional origin, decrease in total size, increase in service-members’ children making military a career, rise in Academy accessions (versus other commissioning sources), and significantly larger average time of service. The gap was a function of demographics, strategy, defense spending, and military policy.16 Many determinants led to the relationship between society and the military.

The gap was more severe than it had been in the past. General John Shalikashvili expressed apprehension: “I share deeply the concern that we are living through a period when the gap between the American people and their military is getting wider.”17 Major factors included the relevance of the military to society, public opinion, a disparity of values, evolving military professionalism, the isolation of the military, and conflicting social needs. The following sections of this chapter will look into these issues.

Social Attitudes About the Relevance of the Military

The significant issue affecting the relationship between the armed forces and society was salience rather than comparability. Rather than the growing disparity between civilian and military values, the waning presence of the military in the lives of most Americans had caused it
to decline in prominence. Institutional presence is defined in terms of both a material dimension (social contact) and a moral dimension (normative ordering of priorities for what constitutes a good society). 18

The discussion of the emerging multicentric world in Chapter 2 acquainted us with the latter dimension. In this world, the utility of military power for achieving political ends was diminishing. While military power was still important, it is less important than it was. Two reasons, both technological in nature, account for this change. First, the destructive power of modern weapons is so great that no one can imagine any benefit coming from their use, if they were used without restriction. In addition, modern armed forces are so expensive that it represents a great burden on even the wealthiest societies to contemplate their use. Security concerns were focused increasingly on questions of economic rather than military security. 19 Humanitarian missions (rather than warfighting) were increasingly becoming the Army's central focus, 20 and since these missions attract lower levels of public attention, they will have an impact on recruitment. Another indication of the degree to which the military issues had become obsolete in modern life appears through the military's repeated appearance in debates on issues of social equality and cultural change. Political advocacy groups such as homosexual activists and radical feminists had chosen to use the military as "key terrain" to conquer in furthering their cultural agendas. 21 Chapters 4 and 5 will look closely at these developments.

"The U.S. military is now more alienated from its civilian leadership than at any time in American history," were the first words of the article "Out of Control," describing the crisis in civil-military relations. 22 One commentator felt that the "extraordinary efforts to avoid military service during the Vietnam War by top political and military opinion leaders in Washington (President Bill Clinton, House Speaker Newt Gingrich, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott,
columnists George Will and Patrick Buchanan)" were extremely significant in measuring the current relationships and attitudes among political elites.\textsuperscript{23} The House of Representatives had 320 veterans in 1970, but fewer than 130 in 1994.\textsuperscript{24} Moreover, in 1997, for the first time ever, neither the secretary of defense, the national security advisor, the secretary of state, nor any of their deputies had ever been in uniform. Key leaders were “increasingly devoid of military experience or understanding.”\textsuperscript{25}

A detailed demographic analysis of military experience among congresses from 1901 to 1999 had significant findings for this inquiry on civil-military relations and its impacts on military recruiting. What is unique about the inter-war years’ decline is that for the first time in the twentieth century, there were fewer veterans in the House compared to expectations given the distribution of veterans in the population.\textsuperscript{26}

One of the reasons for the military becoming increasingly distant from the elite segment of society was the smaller prevalence of military issues and training in higher education. The closing of hundreds of college ROTC units across the country, as well as successful bans of recruiters from campus, indicated further divisions that are taking place between society and the military.\textsuperscript{27} Kohn stated, “Our best colleges and universities so neglect the study of war and the military, and abhor ROTC.”\textsuperscript{28}

Another issue in attitudes of the time period was a relative lack of congressional interest in defense issues.\textsuperscript{29} Military participation by elite classes had particularly declined during the end of the Cold War, leaving the post Cold War decade with new lows in elite understanding of military institutions.\textsuperscript{30} These trends suggest that the military was a political tool regarded as less and less significant in politics and elsewhere. An earlier prediction contended that the military was salient from World War II through Desert Storm, but it would face the prospect of fading
from public attention and experiencing manpower problems similar to those in Canada, the Netherlands, Australia, and New Zealand. As discussed in the previous section, the recruiting experience in the years following the Gulf War seemed to have confirmed that forecast.

**The American Public**

According to Hillen, the American people as a whole appreciate traditional military culture. Unlike the rest of government, the modern military perennially enjoys a high level of popularity. It has been suggested that the mass media are reluctant to simply accept and report what military officials say they are doing. This agrees with much of the perception of the media (especially within the military) that there is an active bias against military institutions. A content study of the media found, however, that media coverage is not as negative as commonly believed. This study involved examining the content of actual media coverage of military affairs over a period of time. It is therefore plausible to conclude that public confidence might have been high despite the civil-military gap because of the widespread misconception that the media underrates the military.

In spite of the public confidence in the military institution, there appeared to be a deficit of social capital to support armed forces. One reason for this was declining civic participation among Americans: “In a society in which half of the eligible voters did not even bother to show up at the polls in the last presidential election, the notion of an obligation to participate in the country’s defense has become an anachronism, an oddity from another time.”

Kitfield referred to a “nearly unbridgeable cultural divide” between American society in general and the U.S. military. Some of the issues of the social irrelevance of the military flow from popular entertainment. Public perceptions of the need for novels and movies that examine the military were also fading. The last large crop of serious works in this vein came in the wake
of the Vietnam War more than twenty years ago. Martha Bayles argued that Hollywood explorations into the conduct of war did not evoke the sense of national purpose or even noble sacrifice for soldiers’ comrades; by the 1990s, war movies portrayed violence for its own sake without a larger context.\(^{39}\) Subsequent American military involvements overseas were much shorter and relatively more successful, and whatever their ambiguities, did not lead to the kinds of soul searching that might inspire great novels and films or to a rising public appetite for portrayals of the interventions in Grenada or Panama. Examples of popular films of the decade focused on military affairs are distanced in time (either in the past or in the future) such as *Saving Private Ryan, We Were Soldiers Once...And Young, The Thin Red Line, Soldier, Starship Trooper,* or distanced in subject, such as *The General’s Daughter* or the remake of *Gone With the Wind,* whose central focus is not the military, although military affairs are part of the plot. Those films that do focus on the military of the time period emphasized social imperatives and the very forces which marginalized the military function at the expense of social interests, or they suggest that the armed forces are out of touch with social values, as in *Courage Under Fire* and *G.I. Jane.*\(^{40}\) Contrast this with the post-2001 release of the popular *Black Hawk Down.*

Kathy Ross, a civilian at the Hollywood offices of the US Army’s public affairs unit, emphasized that films about the military life are “vital to recruiting sergeants.”\(^{41}\) The image of the military presented in popular entertainment affects how salient people will think the military is.\(^{42}\) High levels of public confidence in the military did not necessarily indicate a healthy civil-military relationship; on the contrary, grouped with other evidence, it seems the result of an ultimately uninformed decision on a military becoming increasingly irrelevant to most citizens.
Values

Dramatic sociopolitical changes dating to the Second World War (particularly hedonism, personal expression, opposition to the military lifestyle, resistance to authority, and increased moral criticism), started the decline of mass armies in Western industrial nations, and that over the course of 25 years, the process had become increasingly apparent. The end of conscription or challenges to conscription in the West was a response to these pressures. This offers an alternative explanation to the relevancy of the civil-military rift to manning the force: a decline in military authority, which is a factor frequently associated with youth attitudes against military service.43

In addition to changes in attitudes on authority, changing political beliefs were affecting the military's ability to attract new personnel. Mayer's work showed that there is a strong case that there has been a countervailing trend toward more liberal positions on most social values.44 It is possible that American society has become more liberal and individualist than in Huntington's time when the theory of objective civilian control was first formulated in The Soldier and the State.45 This shift may have special significance for the civil-military gap because while a plurality of civilian leaders are classified as liberals, only a small fraction of military officers are in that category.46 A study of opinions across the military even found that dislike for President Clinton was not a major factor in these results. Even if the "studies had ended with the survey in early 1992, when George Bush was in the White House and a Clinton presidency seemed a very improbable long shot ... the primary trends described here would already have been in place."47

On a more fundamental level, basic assumptions and values are influencing the propensity for military service. Bennett documented a "palpable culture decline" and an actual
shift in the public’s beliefs, attitudes, and priorities over the past decades. This shift in popular values might have some impact on the civil-military gap and the recruiting crisis. For instance, a growing affinity for free will and individual expression damages both the ability of citizens to understand the military culture and the likelihood that they would become a part of it. Research has shown that young Americans who expect to serve place less of a priority on personal freedom than do their peers. As more and more Americans place a higher priority on personal freedom, less expect to find themselves in uniformed service.

Youth attitudes are shifting to take them further from the military perspective. Interviews with youths on the subject revealed several characterizations. “They don’t like to be told what to do.” “Most teenagers don’t want to commit to anything.” Teens “don’t like getting up early.” Some of these trends continue into the post-2001 culture, and they will be explored in further depth in the next part in Chapter 6.

**Professionalism and Citizen-Soldiers**

The changing requirements of the military profession were also factors affecting the military’s role in society. While the United States has a long tradition of citizen-soldier style service, the modern force faces more permanent and professional types of service. As one author argued, “for the force in being, the mission of peacekeeping requires it to be permanently mobilized while its dependence on technologically sophisticated weapons of mass destruction means that the military division of labor is much more complex. Consequently, greater emphasis is placed on longer service professionals instead of short-term conscripts.” This is also a trend that we can expect not only to continue, but the be exacerbated, by the war on terrorism.

The consequences of this involve a sort of incubation of the military away from society that reinforces isolation from more generalized values. For workers across different fields, a
career-oriented workforce can be expected to produce more attitudinally distinct groups.\textsuperscript{52} Van Doorn had earlier predicted that the gap between military and civilian sectors of society would broaden as a consequence of the declining size and legitimacy of standing armies that leads to less universal service or substitution of voluntary service, with a smaller and increasingly professional military becoming more isolated, inward-looking, rigid, and conservative.\textsuperscript{53}

This isolated military further exacerbates the civil-military tension due to the underlying distrust of the American society towards the military. This condition has been documented in studies of American history.\textsuperscript{54} Lehman suggested that one of the most important elements of the American civil-military dynamic is our tradition of citizen-soldiers. The officers and men of our military were expected to be drawn largely from civilian pursuits for limited terms, assuring a constant leavening of civilian cultural values within the military and in turn carrying back to the civil world a respect for and understanding of military culture.\textsuperscript{55} The failure to develop this respect and understanding will hamper efforts to recruit from the civilian society.

It is this contribution to the military and society that the citizen-soldier made over much of the history of the United States Armed Forces. Unfortunately, the military at the end of the twentieth century could not enjoy the same benefits since the professionalized force was necessarily more isolated and disparate from the population at large. Professionalization is a response to pressures from both changing technological and security conditions, but its effects on civil-military relations cannot be ignored.

**The Isolated Military**

Burk asserted that the "military is and ought to be isolated and institutionally different."\textsuperscript{56} While it is true that the military – like any profession\textsuperscript{57} – has distinctive values and beliefs, and while it is true that the military requires these differences for its functional mission, we must still
assess the impact of the isolation on civil-military relations. The differences between the military and society are not only those of values, but they also come from limited military social and community ties. 58 Military bases, complete with schools, churches, stores, child care centers, and recreational areas, can be characterized as never-to-be-left islands of tranquility removed from the chaotic, crime-ridden environment outside the gates. 59 Additionally, the increasing incorporation of technological functions that traditionally have not been part of the warrior role made the military less dependent on its parent society and therefore more isolated from it and more inward-looking. 60

In addition to physical and intellectual separation, the force was not demographically similar to the population at large. The all-volunteer force is demographically less representative of the population than the draft-era military was. 61 The location of military bases has also resulted in a structural necessity of geographic isolation, 62 and the closure of bases across the country in the early 1990s as part of the post Cold War “peace dividend” reinforced this isolation. Base closures and the non-monetary base benefits are removing those opportunities for military contact with society at large. 63

John Lehman argued that “We have created a separate military caste.” 64 He pointed out that while most American community leaders have had military experience, few of their children have. Exacerbating the situation is the fact that cadets and midshipman who are children of career military parents were at record highs at the service academies. Decreased involvement of military personnel in local communities contributed to the disintegration of the Army from society more broadly.
Social Imperatives

It has been argued that there was no gap between military and civilian cultures—the occupational model and politicization of the military indicate that the armed forces were moving towards mainstream society. Indeed, “the post-Cold War period has witnessed a convergence of views on several issues.”65 Related work also proposed that prospective soldiers would view military service more as part of the job market than in terms of civic obligations as the military assumed more traits of a competitive entity in the civilian market for human resources.66 Recruiting efforts of the period emphasized personal benefits to recruits such as education and character traits desired by civilian employers. These recruiting efforts and their results seem to have confirmed the trends outlined in that research. Owens warned, “The danger to the republic does not arise from any military threat to liberal American society, but from the reverse: the civilianization of the U.S. military ethos.”67

Pressure grew to incorporate women into all assignments, including combat roles, and issue which will be considered in detail in Chapter 4. How far this movement should go has been a matter for intense debate in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War.68 Traditionally, the courts have been reluctant to extend the protection of constitutional rights to military personnel. They deferred to the idea that the military was a unique institution, exempt from the usual standards of review based on established constitutional norms. However, they are currently allowing the military less and less of this traditional privilege.69

All of these developments provide superficial evidence for a military converging with the larger parent society, but when we reconcile these pieces of evidence with the discussion in the previous sections of this chapter, they seem to indicate that there is actually a civil-military gap based on indifference to the military. A lack of interest and awareness of the importance of the
military’s distinctive function has allowed what Huntington called “social imperatives” to become more dominant than the military’s functional mission.

The military became less of an instrument for its original design, a protection device against external enemies, and more a vehicle for advancing any number of other societal goals. The military is a tool with the unique and defining mission of the exercise of coercive power. But in the process of creating an institution capable of exerting coercive power, society has necessarily, if unintentionally, created an instrument that has a number of auxiliary capabilities. The military has the ability to execute manpower-intensive state programs, notably construction and disaster relief. Civilians can use the military to redistribute wealth, via the defense budget, to particular regions or corporate interests. And it has the ability to address questions of social injustice, by leveling the playing field for disadvantaged social groups, strategically distributing wealth and opportunity, and even coercively changing individual attitudes (through enforced sensitivity training). As society used its opportunity to accomplish these various ends, thereby neglecting the military’s main role, the most significant trend was not a convergence of values, but evidence of the view that the military is irrelevant. The institution’s main role was seen as becoming increasingly insignificant and marginalized.
Chapter 4: Case Studies on Social-Military Interaction

The following sections explore specific issues surrounding civil-military relations in the interwar years. In a pluralistic society of many competing interests, the degree to which a special interest can attract and maintain public support and attention reflects its saliency in society. To the extent that military issues were dominated by concerns arising from origins other than military effectiveness or national security, there was an imbalance in civil-military relations. In 1957, Samuel Huntington warned that the American liberal ethic posed a danger to civil-military relations because it might undermine the capacity of the military to accomplish its functional imperative.¹ Two conflicts in 1990s American civil-military relations reveal the tensions Huntington predicted. First, the pressures for increased roles of women in the military had little to do with the impact on military effectiveness; social justice, individual self-determination, equal citizenship, and other concerns consistent with liberal society dominated this debate. Whether the expansion of military specialties was salutary or harmful is not so significant as the major considerations making this a popular advocacy. Second, the movement to ban landmines similarly ignored the military functional imperative. Due to social pressures, the United States administration made critical decisions involving landmines before actually studying the operational effects and potential replacements for those effects. The following two sections will elaborate on the circumstances surrounding these issues as they arose and developed during the interwar years. The focus on liberal social versus functional military imperatives demonstrates the nature of interwar civil-military relations during the 1990s.
Women in the Military

In Figure 1, the uniqueness of the military culture was included in the society level of analysis. According to Edgar Schein’s work on organizational culture, an organization must manage its cultures to promote the mission and objectives of the organization. This prescription would seem to place the development and sustainment of a functional organizational culture within the domain of the military institution. However, in a democratic society, the military is one of many government institutions subservient to the people. Special interests within the society at large use the government to advance their cause, and the military is no exception to these pressures.

First, it would be worthwhile to define organizational culture: “what a group learns over a period of time as that group solves its problems of survival in an external environment and its problems of internal integration.” Another definition is “the ‘glue’ that holds the organization together as a source of identity and distinctive competence.” Military culture is one form of organizational culture. Feaver and Kohn asserted that “military culture self-consciously contrasts with civilian culture in order to shape its members’ mentality and behavior to accomplish victory in armed combat.” Murray explained, “Military culture represents the ethos and professional attributes, both in terms of experience and intellectual study, that contribute to a common core understanding of the nature of war within military organizations.” The focus of this ethos is the functional purpose of the military, which is to fight and win the Nation’s wars. Some observers pointed out that the armed forces of the 1990s were making increased efforts at inspiring a diminishing warrior spirit into their service cultures.

In a democracy with a number of competing special interests, the military can be viewed as a battleground for advancing those special interests. As a vehicle for promoting social causes,
the military has several advantages to the members of special interest groups: large amounts of government funding, high visibility, and a core mission to which many special interest advocates are indifferent if not actively hostile. As discussed in Chapter 3, the indifference to the military was a key factor during the inter-war years, making it particularly vulnerable to pressures from such special interests. One of the most enthusiastic pressures came from the feminist movement, which found the military to be a key arena for the advancement of social equality and women’s rights. This was an opportunity to improve military effectiveness in the All-Volunteer Force as the military could improve civil-military relations, adopting the principles of social justice and a more balanced demographic distribution to match the society from which soldiers are drawn. However, it also could damage military effectiveness by altering standards of performance and cultural norms necessary for competitiveness among foreign adversaries in what has proven to be a very dangerous world. Neither of these alternatives was considered by most of those driving for change; military effectiveness was inconsequential to advocates in the women’s movement who struggle for their own goals. This chapter will explore the evolution of women in the military, particularly during the 1990s, and exhibit the arguments of both sides of the controversy.

Women and the Profession of Arms

Finch described the military as “probably the most nontraditional of all career fields for women.”9 The renowned military historian John Keegan supports this characterization in his seminal A History of Warfare: “If warfare is as old as history and as universal as mankind, we must now enter the supremely important limitation that it is an entirely masculine activity.”10 In exploring the causes of the corporate “glass ceiling,” Oakley sympathized with the radical feminist position, which she explained attributes limitations on female advancement to the
hierarchical military structure upon which modern corporations are based. This analysis, agreeing with Ferguson's work, describes the entire organizational design of the military as inherently a power structure that is based on male traits. The military culture has numerous characteristics normally associated with masculine traits. The link between feminist activism and pacifism was formally established in the United States in 1915, when suffragists founded the Women’s Peace Party, bringing together members of other women's organizations. Because of a cultural stereotype associating martial endeavors and qualities with males, women in the military have existed in limited roles, limited numbers, and often in face of adversity. Understanding the controversial role of women in the military has occupied the attention of numerous studies, especially in the past several years.

History and culture are full of the records of women’s contributions in the military. In the 1800s, in the West African state Dahomey, women warriors were the elite force of the king’s army, and they were considered superior to male soldiers. Athena, the Greek goddess of war, tempered the power of battle with wisdom and judgment. The Amazons were a fierce tribe of women-warriors who struck fear into their neighbors; Penthesilea, the Amazon queen during the Trojan War, was renowned for her bravery. Joan of Arc was a hero of the Hundred Years’ War. Disney’s animated motion picture attracted attention to the Asian mythological character Mulan, who disguised herself as a male in order to enlist in the military. These legendary women are indicative of a romance many cultures explored with women in the military over time.

Women’s roles in the military have progressed slowly until they have reached the active role they have today, which many scholars expect will expand further. Initially, the inclusion of women did not appear to be a challenge to their traditionally prescribed roles. The government intentionally advertised women’s participation as a natural extension of their
This allowed women to participate without requiring the cultural reassessment of conventional assumptions about gender roles and the relationship of women to military functions and institutions. This benign and inactive level of involvement was not to last, however.

After the end of the draft in 1973, defense planners found that women had to be recruited to fill the demand for qualified personnel in the new All-Volunteer Force. Agitation for change in women's military roles was minimal in the draft era because of the abundant manpower sources, but traditional anti-military attitudes and the negative impact of the Vietnam War intensified the search for volunteers and paved the way for women. These urgent manpower requirements created a "hollow army" in the 1970s, and women were welcomed into military service as standards were adjusted to increase the number of personnel. Indeed, late twentieth century manpower shortfalls as documented in Chapter 3 made women's participation absolutely necessary for supplying the All-Volunteer Force with the personnel needed for daily operations. This development from the advent of the All-Volunteer Force remains no less true today. Women still remain a minority in the military, however, and their roles remain somewhat limited.

Gender-Based Differences

Men are "considerably more likely than women to indicate high propensity for military service." Matthews and Weaver suggested that a woman might be even more unlikely to join the military as opportunities expand because she would not want to be placed in a role that she, her family, or her friends feel is inappropriate for women. The self-selection that is the modern enlistment decision shows us that limitations of military women are not merely vestiges of a patriarchal and out-of-touch military institution, but that restrictions on the participation of
women are grounded in cultural and popular realities. This is not meant to excuse or justify stereotypes nor to serve as a support for limitations on functional or any grounds. What the enlistment decisions of young men and women do show us, though, is that the attitudes and realities restricting women in the military are widespread.

Similar to the United States, other nations historically limited the roles of women. After the Second World War, the Soviet Army completely abandoned the use of women in the operating military (they had been brought in due to the loss of some seven million male soldiers in combat). The Israelis at several points during their recent history have adjusted the roles of females. However, it currently is against Israeli law for a woman to serve in combat. Nations with a commitment toward values of equality, and without pressing dangers to their national security, will be likely to have more open roles for women. Canada and Sweden are two such examples. These nations allow women to volunteer for combat jobs. Additionally, support and stability operations such as peacekeeping and disaster relief seem to facilitate more active roles for women than higher intensity combat operations. Even when historical exigencies have demanded the use of women in the military, the extent of their involvement has often been underplayed.

Service academies and military colleges have attracted attention by researchers and the popular media. A main focus of this attention has been the attempts at gender integration. Jana Pershing pointed out that women at the Naval Academy still qualify as a “token” population based on Rosabeth Kanter’s definition, which indicates that there needs to be a significant demographic shift for women to become a “minority” population. Pershing’s study also makes a relevant point about gender as a salient factor in social differentiation (more so than race). She gives four reasons for this observation. First, minority men were first admitted to the service
academies in 1872 (compared to 1976 for women). Second, women are physically differentiated in a large number of curricular tasks. They also receive company and room assignments based on gender and are visible parts of the overall group because their uniforms are significantly different. The third reason is the significant under-representation at the Naval Academy relative to their proportion in the general public, compared to racial minorities, many of whom are over-represented in the military. Finally, Bodnar found that racial integration has been successful while sex integration lags behind; Moskos and Butler revealed similar findings in the Army.26

Bartone and Priest found that female cadets undergo higher levels of stress and symptoms than males, but the females also have higher levels of hardiness.27 The authors cited Maddi and Kobasa's work to define hardiness in terms of a high sense of commitment to life and work, strong beliefs in one's ability to control events and influence outcomes, and greater openness to change and challenges in life.28 This may be due to the added drive needed to pursue a nontraditional educational and career path (see the discussion above of Matthews and Weaver's findings) as well as the extra effort and coping required to live as a minority population in an environment in which male physical and social predispositions are favored.

Priest found that women and men serving at West Point believe that the overall gender climate is characterized by respect and professionalism,29 but these findings are not corroborated by all studies on the subject. Fisher and Good identified four factors that affected perceptions of the educational environment: (1) Indifference and Lack of Recognition, (2) Detection of Sex Bias and Discrimination, (3) Invisibility of Women in the Curriculum, and (4) Sexual Harassment and Differential Treatment.30 The appearance of these factors would be worthwhile to consider in light of the cadets at West Point. In particular, harassment has been a problem, recurring to such a degree that female cadets have the dubious distinction of "being the most
harassed women on record at any military college campus in America. O'Neill found that innuendo or derogatory jokes are part of the female cadet experience on a daily basis.

Integration and other issues related to female cadets have interested scholars, especially in the early years of women cadets. Several differences exist between cadet men and women. These are actual statistically significant differences from studies over the twenty years of women at West Point, not stereotypes. Priest, Prince, Rhone, and Vitters found that women at the military academy performed better than men in verbal ability tests. Female cadets were also more concerned with educational opportunities and had higher grades in high school. Houston found similar results in West Point's second integrated class.

The results of the growing integration of women have been mostly positive, although there is still resistance to expanding roles for women. Gender integration is perceived to have a relatively small effect on readiness, cohesion, and morale in the units studied by Margaret Harrell and Laura Miller. However, Stephanie Gutmann asked for an assessment of the female soldier "not in political terms, but in the real, inescapable terms of physical structure," and Binkin found that 41 percent of servicemembers had similar concerns, feeling that putting women in combat units would hinder the development of unit cohesion. Judith Hicks Stiehm also found that "acceptance of women [in the military] remains limited." Cynthia Nantais and Martha Lee proposed that public and Army reaction to the Iraqi capture of a female American soldier call into question the progress of gender integration in the armed forces.

A study revealed that a majority of civilian college students sampled indicated incorrect answers on questions about the status of women's military service opportunities. This suggests that women's participation in the military is an issue that is not salient among the general (and even college-educated) public. Women scored worse than men on the knowledge test about...
military roles, and this is possibly a reflection of the non-traditional nature of the military vis-à-vis women’s interests and roles. Snider, Priest, and Lewis found a gender gap in opinions on the use of military force in their study of West Point cadets and Duke University students. 43

There are several indications of progress and achievement in the gender-integrated military. In the early 1990s, the U.S. Navy conducted pilot programs with gender-integrated companies in basic training. Survey data on twenty-two companies (nine all-male; four all-female; and nine integrated) found that members of the integrated companies perceived that unit cohesion in their companies was higher than in segregated ones. 44 An Army Research Institute study found “no significant trends” associated with gender integration. 45 Further, “soldierization” (as measured by self-reported levels of pride and commitment, individual improvement during basic training, individual and platoon morale, and teamwork and cohesion) of female soldiers in a gender-integrated environment was much higher than that of women in all-female units. Male soldiers in gender-integrated companies had the same or higher levels of soldierization as men in all-male companies. 46

There have been counterexamples, such as a publicized incident during the Panama invasion when two female truck drivers taking troops into combat zones started crying and were relieved of duty. Bray, Camlin, Fairbank, Dunteman, and Wheeless found that two thirds of military women reported at least some stress from being a woman in the military. 47 However, the Persian Gulf War and numerous peacekeeping operations have convinced many people that men and women can live in the field without detriment to unit cohesion or efficiency, and that the American public can tolerate women casualties and POWs. 48

Advocates of women in the military have also targeted the physical fitness issue, highlighting outstanding female athletes like pitching ace Kathy Arendsen, who throws a softball
96 miles per hour, and Florence Griffith Joyner. "These women demonstrate that trained individuals can do anything." Miller suggested that the abilities of exceptional women are used to suggest a world in which girls would be socialized the same as boys, which is, of course, not the one in which Army women currently live. Other supporters of women in the military contend that physical strength requirements vary by job, and that not all men have great upper body strength.

This criticism led to measurement of fitness according to the requirements of particular military roles. The Army developed the Military Entrance Physical Strength Capacity Test (MEPSCAT), which categorized military occupation specialties into five categories of physical demand. The test placed 64 percent of jobs to be in the heaviest labor category, and estimated that only 8 percent of the 42 percent of women in those fields could meet the standard. These low results coupled with pressure from special interests caused the test to be abandoned. However, further studies have found similar results. Women experience more than twice the number of lower extremity injuries and over four times the number of stress fractures than men. Without special training, the commission found, women have only 50 to 60 percent of the upper torso muscular strength of men. They have 70 to 75 percent of the aerobic capacity of men.

Training can ameliorate some of these problems. After training in an Army Research Institute study, 78 percent of the women could lift more than 100 pounds. That qualifies them for "very heavy" military occupational specialties that are generally limited to men. The volunteers increased their repetitive lifting ability, improved by one-third their time carrying a 75-pound backpack, increased their aerobic ability by 14 percent and increased their hip and thigh muscle strength and endurance dramatically.
More recently, research and the popular media have focused on the fact that females in the military are increasingly falling victim to eating disorders.\textsuperscript{56} This may be related to the difficulty in living up to male physical fitness standards. In their preliminary study to set female physical standards in West Point training, Peterson and Howal found that there is practically no overlap in the distribution of men and women's physical performance scores.\textsuperscript{57} For any given submaximal workload, women are usually operating at a level closer to their maximum than men and will reach exhaustion sooner.\textsuperscript{58} Vitters and Kinzer revealed that the percentages of stress fractures had a woman-to-man ratio of 10:1 for cadet basic training (consider this despite the 1:10 population ratio).\textsuperscript{59} One study found numerous statistically significant physiological differences: shorter height, larger tricep skinfold, larger abdominal skinfold, larger thigh skinfold, less body weight, less lean body weight, more fat body weight, more percentage of body fat, less dominant hand grip strength, less non-dominant hand strength, less bench press power, less bench press power endurance, less leg press strength, less leg press power, less leg press power endurance, and less maximum oxygen uptake (in both liters/minute and ml/kg-minute).\textsuperscript{60}

Physical fitness has not been the only area in which female cadets have had difficulty in the West Point environment. Vitters revealed several concerns in a field environment that were uncovered through observation of Cadet Field Training.\textsuperscript{61} Seventy-five percent of the women felt that "feminine hygiene during their menstrual cycle" was a significant problem. Women had difficulty speaking loudly enough to be heard in the Fire Direction Center in field artillery training. Additionally, leaders tended to assign women to less physically demanding tasks. Overprotective attitudes among males surfaced through excessive advice to females in peer leadership roles. This resulted in an apparent feeling of low confidence and a reduction of
female participation. Favoritism toward or special treatment of females was observed in later studies of Cadet Field Training. Priest found that negative attitudes about women persisted, and in most cases even increased, in spite of intergroup contact. This outcome may have occurred due to inequity issues emerging from the disparities discussed above.

The administration at West Point has accounted for shortcomings in military performance. There is a policy that women must "not be automatically excluded from consideration for leadership positions because they are not best qualified." A scientifically controlled, experimental study including 288 cadets found that the sex of the leader can influence both morale and performance of groups. Male cadets are perceived by subordinates as more effective leaders than are female cadets, although a more recent study of ROTC cadet leadership found no significant sex differences.

On the other hand, Adams reports no difference in outcome effectiveness between male and female leaders as well as gender parity in several process measures. These include creating valence and instrumentality according to Vroom's work, using the range of social power bases identified by French and Raven, and choosing influence strategies such as those Falbo developed. The latter set of findings are particularly salient as they fail to meet the expectations of earlier theoretical works that predicted disparate male and female leadership styles as Kanter and Deaux did. Adams' work involved mission specific situations rather than general perceptions that Rice used. This may indicate the appropriateness of some missions over others for specific genders.

Using surveys from Army leadership experiences that cadets do in their summer time, another study found that no statistically significant differences in leadership appeared due merely to gender. Sayles suggested the women in the military may be better at leading men than the
reverse (men leading women) due to the male-dominant culture of the military. This is because women are forced to understand the perspectives and tendencies of males, but there is no such imposition upon males by the negligible female minority.\textsuperscript{72}

Rosemary Salomone observed that the integration of military academies such as the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) and the Citadel represented a victory for equal opportunity and showed us that society is ready for less socially defined roles for the sexes.\textsuperscript{73} Looking at the case of these two academies is instructive in terms of progress made at West Point. West Point has had over twenty years to develop; its progress over this time provides a contrast to the current struggles ongoing at these recently integrated academies. Priest’s description of the initial attempts to integrate women reflects much more recent problems at the Citadel.\textsuperscript{74}

In the military at large, women are improving their status and the potential to enhance their role in the armed forces exists. Past progress and continuing trends seem to indicate that women’s expanding military roles, while still limited, are more acceptable to society in general as well as to members of the military. However, the demand for immediate change in the inter-war years has been muted by the emergence of a military that is suddenly more essential and more mission-focused.
The Landmine Ban

Almost fifty years ago, Samuel P. Huntington outlined the basic guidelines for American civil-military relations and the balance of military professionalism with civilian control. Huntington advocated both the liberal ideology that promotes freedom in a democratic society as well as the preservation of a professional military ethic to protect the interests of the state. Problems would emerge if society sought to "impose liberal solutions in military affairs as well as in civil life."\textsuperscript{75} Civilian political leaders, beholden to the public at large, would determine where and when military force was required. The military would determine strategic and operational methods to accomplish political objectives.

Morally, these two spheres could be divided into the realms of \textit{jus ad bellum}, the justice of war, and \textit{jus in bello}, justice in war. The former consideration involves decisions on what would justify a declaration of war, and the latter consists of rules of engagement once war is declared. \textit{Jus in bello} has been an area in which deference has historically been given to military expertise, and is primarily a military responsibility.\textsuperscript{76} Both of these areas have always been subject to pressures from social groups advocating humanitarian and moral interests.

\textit{Jus ad bellum} outlines the circumstances in which war may be declared, including conditions such as a just cause, a reasonable chance of success, public declaration, and a legitimate governmental authority making the decision. These concerns involve the relationships between states, and responsibility for them rests with civilian leaders. Perhaps one of the most notorious examples in the modern era of an assault on the traditional understanding of \textit{jus ad bellum} occurred after World War I. The passage of the Kellogg-Briand treaty was an effort to outlaw war as an instrument of policy. The futility of this endeavor cannot be exaggerated – with independent states free to act as they will, the victim of aggression or his protector can
never take responsibility for the acts of the aggressor. This is what Kellogg-Briand seemingly intended to do. While states are always free to refuse to fight in a war (at great cost to the liberties and conscious of humanity), they have no way of preventing other states from engaging in an act of war. Thus the logical conclusion of an international agreement outlawing war is the ultimate implementation of the appeasement policy. Aggressors would be free to demand and seize whatever they desire; without resorting to force, there would be no way to enforce any measures against rogue states.

Because of historical setbacks, principally the outbreak of World War II and the Cold War, pacifists have had to revise their methods in order to make any progress towards their goal of eliminating war. Most people rightly have a more realist view of the world, wishing to avoid war when possible but in the end willing to support policies defending themselves and their allies from outside attack. The lessons of the twentieth century have repeatedly emphasized the necessity of such willingness. The post Cold War era provided additional support for many in the pacifist movement to advance their hopes of outlawing war. However, taking into account the set-backs of the twentieth century to the pacifist movement, they have altered their tactics.

Pacifists now hope to use a more indirect method of attacking the practice of war by focusing on jus in bello issues. Nuclear weapons were a justified target for such criticisms, as these weapons are primarily designed for use on major population centers (as they were deployed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in their only historical use). After the end of the Cold War, conventional munitions became a target of pacifist criticism as well. With the world no longer on the seeming brink of nuclear war, the effects of other military weapons have assumed greater urgency among the international humanitarian community. Banning landmines became a
popular effort in the inter-war decade. For instance, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and its coordinator, Jody Williams, received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize.

The main focus of the anti-landmine constituency is the destructive effects of minefields on civilian populaces after the end of hostilities. Rather than concentrating on the effects of landmines in military operations, much of the literature in a variety of publications has been devoted to the harmful effects of anti-personnel landmines on civilian victims. These studies of mines often are concerned with the effects that can occur for years, or even decades, after the mines were originally emplaced. Rather than focusing on available technology to prevent such lasting harms, however, the landmine ban also includes “smart” or self-destructing/self-deactivating mines.

These concerns show that consideration of the military’s functional imperative is not a major interest of many in the anti-landmine community. Like much of the dialogue on military issues by special interests, the military’s ability to perform its role is not an important part of the critique. Military professionals, however, possess the motivation and the expertise to contribute substantive guidance to the landmine debate. As Huntington recommended, the realm of technical military operations must not be invaded by the leanings of the civilian culture, and the military should have preferential treatment in matters focusing on the conduct of war.

The departure from this convention is inimical to healthy civil-military relations and to the interests of our national security. The following sections will assess the decision to ban landmines and the military efficacy of such a policy and review just war theory and the humanitarian concerns over landmines.
The United States Decision to Ban Landmines

There have been cases in which the military senior leadership may not have vociferously raised objections to civilian political decisions, but the military has been as outspoken as have the anti-landmine advocates on this issue. The Department of Defense considers anti-personnel landmines to be militarily significant weapons. A letter signed by 24 military general officers (all but one retired) urged President Clinton to “resist all efforts to impose a moratorium on the future use of self-destructing anti-personnel landmines by combat forces of the United States.” They concentrated on the defensive use of non-self-destructing anti-personnel landmines (APLs) in Korea and of self-destructing APLs elsewhere, and the generals attested that, in their experience, “such responsible use of APLs is not only consistent with the Nation’s humanitarian responsibilities; it is indispensable to the safety of our troops in many combat and peacekeeping situations.” They noted that “studies suggest that U.S./allied casualties may be increased by as much as 35% if self-destructing mines are unavailable -- particularly in the ‘halting phase’ of operations against aggressors.” Another letter with a similar message was sent to Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Strom Thurmond from the U.S. Armed Forces’ active duty leadership.

Despite these admonitions, President Clinton responded to pressures from humanitarian groups and directed that anti-personnel landmines, to include self-destructing mines, will no longer be used by the United States. The entire process of the international campaign to ban landmines was unlike the development of most major treaty conventions; it was dominated by non-governmental organizations and non-major states. In addition, popular figures and activists participated in the negotiations, using the media to simplify the issue as a trade-off
between banning landmines or maiming children. The outcome of the involvement of these non-traditional players was a faster process than needed for effective arms control negotiations. The Clinton directive has sparked research into the development of alternatives to anti-personnel landmines. It may be informative to note that alternatives to landmines are being developed after the president pledged to ban them, which is perhaps indicative that the operational effectiveness of the landmines or their alternatives is not of primary concern in this decision.

**Operational Effectiveness**

It would be fruitful to proceed with a brief overview of the operational effects of landmines in order to understand the ramifications of this decision for military effectiveness. In a recent study of anti-personnel landmines, it was found that “APLs almost always have some sort of operational effect” and “that exact replication of the psychological effects of APLs is likely [to be] possible only if alternatives have maiming and lethality capability.” A rudimentary review of available information on landmines shows that they will be difficult to replace.

*Field Manual (FM) 20-32* states that minefields are used to

- Produce a vulnerability on enemy maneuver that can be exploited by friendly forces.
- Cause the enemy to piecemeal his forces.
- Interfere with enemy command and control.
- Inflict damage to enemy personnel and equipment.
- Exploit the capabilities of other weapon systems by delaying enemy forces in an engagement area.
- Protect friendly forces from enemy maneuver and infiltration.

Mine warfare serves four primary purposes in countermobility operations: disruption of enemy formations and control, canalization of enemy forces, protection of friendly forces from enemy assault, and attrition of enemy personnel and equipment. The last is the most
fundamental purpose of mine warfare in countermobility operations and it is this potential – or
the enemy’s fear of it – that allows mines to accomplish the other three tasks, usually in
conjunction with direct and indirect fire systems.\textsuperscript{87}

There are three distinct functional features of landmines that make it difficult for the
replication of effective alternatives. These three features are activated simultaneously when a
mine explodes. In such an instance, the mine serves in an alerting or observing capability,
indicating the potential presence of hostile forces in the area; it communicates this information,
signaling to friendly troops the possible approach of the enemy; and, finally, it acts against or
attacks this threat.\textsuperscript{88} In fact, using battlefield calibrations, mines enhance the effectiveness of a
defending weapon system by a factor of between 1.5 and 2.5.\textsuperscript{89} Historical reviews of the
effectiveness of APLs demonstrate that they do, indeed, perform their intended military
purposes.\textsuperscript{90}

The Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) conducted a series of simulated battles to
determine the operational effectiveness of landmines. The IDA used the Janus combat simulation
model to conduct a series of simulated battles in which battles were conducted with APLs, AT
mines, and various possible mine substitutes and the subsequent effects observed. The study
supported the argument that – at least in high intensity mechanized land warfare – landmines
provide economy of force, canalize attacks, increase an attacker’s losses, and reduce a defender’s
losses.\textsuperscript{91} Another study of APL alternatives sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition & Technology also used standard combat simulations (Janus, CASTFOREM,
and the Joint Conflict Model) to establish the battlefield contribution of current APLs. The
results suggested that the most important battlefield contribution of APLs was to reduce friendly
force casualties and the second most important contribution was to increase the effectiveness of
other weapons (i.e., AT minefields, artillery, and direct fire). Other contributions were to increase enemy force casualties, reduce battle tempo, and allow the friendly force to win.\textsuperscript{92}

Recognizing that landmines provide an effective method of enforcing the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between North Korea and South Korea, the Clinton policy's goal of replacing the mines on the DMZ with alternative technologies has a suspense of 2006 (in contrast with the goal of 2003 outside of Korea). The demilitarized zone provides a clearer demarcation than ongoing military operations in an active conflict. The permanency of the DMZ and the ability to clearly delineate and restrict mined areas are among the reasons that the danger is less compelling in the DMZ. However, experience in the Kashmir indicates that a boundary between two hostile states not at war will not necessary promise freedom from landmine casualties. Reports of landmine injuries or deaths in the Kashmir have increased in the past decade,\textsuperscript{93} and in some cases have been a spur for escalating and retributive violence.\textsuperscript{94} Altogether, there has been a trend of increasing injury caused by landmines in the Kashmir even while direct fire injuries (those caused by bullets) have decreased.\textsuperscript{95}

**Landmines and Just War Theory**

The idea of the just war has recently resurfaced in interest among political science and international relations circles. It is a mid-point among a spectrum of ideas on how to practice war. Military realism, the call for no restrictions on war, assumes that for nations fighting for a just cause, there should be nothing that can prevent them from winning. Further, according to General Sherman's famous dictum from the American Civil War, "War is hell." Thus any moral limitations on how armies fight prolong the hell of war. Since the nation with the just cause did not invent the injustice that started the war, it is exonerated from blame for any action that tries to bring the unjust nation to rectify its unjust acts and end the war. On the other hand, pacifism
is the refusal to fight wars using any means under any circumstances. (A fourth perspective, militarism, does not accept the assumption of pacifism, realism, and just war theory that war is an evil whose harms should be minimized. This perspective is one of tyrants and criminals and will not be discussed here.)

Just war theory has been criticized by thinkers taking both of those approaches. For instance, Laurie Calhoun suggested that the very existence of just war theory legitimizes the injustice of war, especially in cases where calls of a just war are used insincerely by those not adhering to the conventions of just war. A less forceful and subtler argument for pacifism has been advocated by Lisa Sowle Cahill, who presented two views of just war theory and two views of pacifism from a Christian theological perspective. The disturbing implications of the pacifist perspective are that there are no possible limitations on war. Like the realist approach, pacifism asserts an “all-or-nothing” model that has little relevance for political and military decision making in the real world.

Rather than causing war as Calhoun suggested, the idea of a law of war can have the positive effect of preventing or reducing war crimes. If officers and soldiers internalize the idea of chivalrous or honorable means in the conduct of war, the realist or militarist approaches that lead to atrocities on the battlefield may be more limited. In addition to an objective code, how and whether a war is fought must depend on the moral costs and benefits of each particular case.

Francisco de Vitoria made significant contributions to the just war doctrine and the development of a theory of international law. Vitoria’s innovations were motivated by massacres and cruelty to natives in the exploration and conquest of the New World. A major
Proportionality and discrimination are two significant themes of *jus in bello*. Discrimination, the distinction between combatants and noncombatants, seems to be the central goal in opposing the use of landmines. Proportionality, originating from Thomas Aquinas’s principle of double effect, seeks to minimize collateral damage, or the negative and unintended effects of war. To meet the criteria for moral justice according to the principle of proportionality, the negative effect must not be intended, proportional to the desired military objective, and not directly connected to intended outcomes. Additionally, military units are expected to accept additional risks to minimize negative effects to noncombatants. Christopher used the example of defoliation in Vietnam as an illustration of proportionality. The long term destruction of vegetation was not proportional to the military objective of removing cover and concealment, even though that destruction was not intended.

It is a worthwhile consideration to question whether landmines can adhere to proportionality, discrimination, and the *jus in bello* tradition. A destructive force left to its own devices with no discriminating decision maker operating the device can have deadly consequences for noncombatants. Matthew and Rutherford suggested that the doctrines of proportionality and discrimination are violated by the use of landmines. Since mines cannot discern combatants and since the costs to victims are extremely high, the authors advocate a total ban.

At this point, it will be worthwhile to assess humanitarian concerns over landmines in light of current technology and uses of mines. The characteristics of landmines, and specifically
those in the United States arsenal, will inform discussion on whether the weapon adheres to the standards of just war.

**Humanitarian Concerns**

Humanitarian issues have arisen because of the injuries and fatalities occurring in areas of the world where there are concentrations of anti-personnel landmines that do not self-destruct or self-deactivate. The concerns are valid; more than eighty percent of victims of the worldwide use of landmines are civilians rather than military targets. There is also significant damage from landmines to the natural environment as well as socio-economic structure of the area where mines are left.

“Dumb” or non-self-destructing/deactivating APLs are effective substitutes for real soldiers in combat not subject to battle stress or fatigue, and they are typically permanent guardians once hostilities end. This is not the case for so-called “smart” APLs that self-destruct or self-deactivate after some amount of time and, hence, have a limited lifetime. In addition, current U.S. doctrine according to FM 20-32 allows for the use of non-self-destructing APLs only for defense of the Korean demilitarized zone and training. Except for those two situations, the United States uses self-destructing or self-deactivating APLs.

It is also worthwhile to note that most of the landmines causing suffering in areas of the world with active minefields are not American munitions. The American decision to ban self-destructing landmines may therefore not affect the use of the much more harmful non-self-destructing form of these weapons in many parts of the world. This is much like the failure of the Kellogg-Briand treaty orchestrated by United States and France to prevent the Axis powers from going to war several years later.
The capabilities of landmines make them a weapon of choice for those who may not have
the ability or inclination to remove them after hostilities. Anti-personnel landmines are cheap
(often between $3 and $30\textsuperscript{106}) and simple. As a result, they are plentiful and can be used in large
quantities. They can be a force multiplier in defensive scenarios, especially when used against a
numerically superior force. This economy of force function of APLs is frequently hailed as one
of their most critical operational roles.\textsuperscript{107}

Mines are used in considerable numbers by terrorist and insurgency groups because of
the high effectiveness and low cost of the systems.\textsuperscript{108} The landmine gives such groups an
asymmetrical edge, allowing them to create significant operational and psychological effects
without needing either a large amount of training or resources. Due to the technological
advancement of landmines, counternining techniques have not been able to keep up with the
innovations in mines. This makes them so much more attractive to the technologically
disadvantaged enemy.\textsuperscript{109} In the low-intensity conflicts and insurgency campaigns that will be
common in the coming century, landmines will be a weapon of choice.\textsuperscript{110}

Anti-helicopter mines provide an example of how enemy forces use landmines as an
equalizer to create asymmetrical advantage in combat situations. American forces and those of
other industrialized nations usually have air superiority based on the expensive, effective
 arsenals they bring into a foreign country for combat or peacekeeping operations. Foreign
countries have developed anti-helicopter mines as a way to counter the advantage of more
expensive and technologically complex rotary aircraft.\textsuperscript{111} The mines are emplaced in landing
zones where resupply or insertion missions would be likely to occur. Camouflaged, the mines
are not easily detectable from the air. They are activated by helicopter downdraft or noise
signature. Just the threat of these mines can provide an advantage for an insurgent or other
underfunded or outnumbered threat. Such a threat may alter the planning considerations of the stronger forces and significantly reduce their ability to use the helicopter advantage.

Mines have been extremely important in the recent combat in Chechnya. Russian estimates indicate that mines and other booby traps have caused more than half of the Russian casualties from the war. Often the enemy will show their disregard for conventions of the law of war in their use of mines. Since both Russians and Chechens feel it is important to recover the bodies of their soldiers killed in action, corpses often serve as the targets for mine placement. While this may not violate a clear proscription agreed upon by the combatants beforehand, it does demonstrate how they exploit their shared cultural values in favor of military expediency.

The just war tradition sometimes steps into an ideal world. The value of honoring the dead that would cause each army to recover their slain reflects similar military ideals to the *jus in bello* principles that require armies to respect certain limits in engaging their opponents. However, the use of landmines to exploit this shared practice to honor the fallen warrior shows how landmines can become a tool of those who abandon standards of decorum in war, even standards they themselves hold in common with an opponent. Earlier Russian actions in Afghanistan in the 1980s also demonstrate this point. To terrorize the population, the Soviet forces would leave toys in the street with mines nearby or connected by a trigger mechanism. The explosion of the mine would maim a noncombatant with no purpose other than to cause terror to the civilian populace. These examples that show the use of landmines to violate the laws of war does not necessarily indicate that landmines in themselves cause violations of the law of war. Rather, landmines are the weapon of choice for disadvantaged underdogs who will abandon rules as a privilege of the strong. Thus a landmine ban would be as respected by these desperate forces as would all the other conventions of war that are quickly abandoned in their pursuit for military
advantage. Rather than preventing civilian casualties and the egregious contravention of just war conventions, the landmine ban would aggravate these problems by affording significant advantages to those who would be most likely to ignore the law of war and to recklessly and maliciously place innocents in harm’s way.

Another issue arising in the Chechen War is the placement of landmines that may harm people in the area long after hostilities have ended. United States doctrine involves meticulous tracking of landmine placement locations. Testament to the inadvertent placement of mines by troops of even as large and professional a military as Russia is that up to 40% of mine casualties came from the Russians’ own landmines. A number of factors in Chechnya contributed to the problem of mine fratricide. Chaotic combat situations, frequent troop rotation, ineffective landmine tracking systems, and widespread employment of scatterable minefields are among the causes of the inability of the Russians to avoid friendly casualties from minefields during that conflict. American self-deactivating and self-destructing mines would avoid many of these problems, especially the implied longer term considerations for civilians. However, the problem does highlight the danger of continuing to use landmines as a part of the arsenal of many countries that are not capable of effectively placing and monitoring their minefields. At the same time, it also can call attention to the fact that those war-torn countries or non-state actors that would be least likely to monitor minefields are also the same armies who would not adhere to a landmine ban.

Furthermore, chaos and terror directed at civilians may be part of a terrorist organization’s goals, and landmines will often be scattered intentionally at random. Deeply committed to a cause, terrorists often view their acts as part of a just war in which citizens of a government opposing their goals are legitimate combatants. Recent observations have noted that
mines have been used in increasingly cunning manners: to deprive access to water sources, wood, fuel, pathways, and burial grounds. This versatility only adds to the incentive of technologically and economically disadvantaged groups to acquire landmines and use them in military operations. Unfortunately, these groups will be the least likely to have the resources to acquire more expensive, self-deactivating mines, the professionalism to accurately record where mines are placed, or the inclination or ability to remove them afterwards.

While the anti-personnel landmine ban will have symbolic value, it seems that as a matter of substance, it will be less significant. Since the United States does not use non-self-destructing landmines outside of the Korean theater, the APL ban on American munitions will have little substantive impact on the suffering of innocents. On the other hand, terrorists and insurgents will not comply with the agreements as they are not members of the legitimate international community, so the parties most likely to cause lasting harm will continue to do so. In spite of these facts, the humanitarian community has still focused on attacking the idea of landmines rather than removing the bad effects, and the United States government has reacted to this pressure.

This case study shows the tension between civilian conscious and the technical expertise dimension of the military professional. It is a further indicator of the state of civil-military relations in the inter-war years, which favored civilian values over the military. The following part will set the stage on the exogenous changes that have led to new formulations of civil-military relations.
PART II – THE AGE OF TERRORISM AND THE NEW WAR
Chapter 5: The New War

The suicidal collisions of hijacked commercial airliners into the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 entailed the most destructive terrorist attack in world
history. Before the deaths of over 3,000 people in those attacks, the historically greatest single
terrorist attack claimed the lives of about 380 people. The 2001 disaster took place at a time
when experts had been defining a new form of terrorism focused on millennial visions of
apocalypse and mass casualties. The catastrophic attacks seemed to confirm the unheeded fears
of terrorism experts – that a qualitatively different form of terrorism was emerging.

The State Department’s *Patterns of Global Terrorism* revealed that terrorist attacks have
scaled back in number even while more casualties have occurred. ¹ The State Department’s
report indicates that the total international terrorist attacks have decreased somewhat from earlier
years. The late eighties were a high point for the number of terrorist attacks, with the number of
attacks exceeding 600 in the years 1985-1988. With the exception of 1991, the number of
terrorist attacks since 1988 have decreased to below 450 every year, reaching their nadir in the
years 1996-1998, when the number of attacks decreased to a range close to 300. The number of
attacks have increased slightly since 1998, when there were 274 attacks, but the level has not
reached the amount realized in any of the years of the 1980s. This report is not a linear
progression from a large amount to a small amount of attacks, but the trend revealed is one of a
decreasing number of attacks.

Osama bin Laden and the *al-Qaeda* network of international terrorists are the prime
examples of the new terrorism, but Islamic radicalism is not the only form of apocalyptic,
catastrophic terrorism. Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese religious cult, executed the first major
terrorist attack using chemical weapons on a Tokyo subway in 1995. The bombing of the
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma revealed similar extremism by American right-wing militants. Other plots by Christian identity terrorists have shown similar mass casualty proclivities.

Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole labeled nuclear-biological-chemical (NBC) terrorism as the “third wave of vulnerability” experienced by the United States beginning in 1995. (The first two waves were the Soviet test of the atomic bomb in 1949 and the escalating nuclear arms race that followed.) David Rapoport made a similar assessment that religiously motivated modern terrorism is the “fourth wave” in the evolution of terrorism, having been preceded by terrorism focused on the breakup of empires, decolonialization, and anti-Westernism.

The National Commission on Terrorism found that fanaticism rather than political interests are more often the motivation, and that terrorists are more than ever unrestrained in their methods. Other scholarly sources have reached similar conclusions. Terrorism is increasingly based on religious fanaticism. Warnings about dangers of nontraditional terrorism have been raised frequently in recent pre-2001 literature. For instance, Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow declared in 1998 that the new threat of catastrophic terrorism has emerged. Past concerns about alienating people from supporting the cause are no longer important to many terrorist organizations. Rather than focusing on conventional goals of political or religious movements, today’s terrorists seek destruction and chaos as ends in themselves. Yossef Bodansky’s Bin Laden references The Quranic Concept of War:

Terror struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means, it is in the end in itself. Once a condition of terror into the opponent’s heart is obtained, hardly anything is left to be achieved. It is the point where the means and the ends meet and merge. Terror is not a means of imposing decision upon the enemy; it is the decision we wish to impose upon him.
Many terrorists are ultimately more apocalyptic in their perspective and methods. The National Commission on Terrorism quoted R. James Woolsey: “Today’s terrorists don’t want a seat at the table, they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it.”

Terror has evolved from a means to an end to becoming the end in itself for many violent and radical organizations. The argument has been posited that the evolution of terrorism represents continuity rather than change, that mass casualty bombings have long been characteristic of terrorist methods, and that radical extremism has always dominated terrorist motivations. Laqueur’s most recent book warned against trying to categorize or define terrorism at all because there are “many terrorisms,” and he emphasizes the particularities of various terrorist movements and approaches. (Laqueur, however, recognized some evolving strains of terrorism, especially the Islamist variant.) Hoffman discusses the definition of terrorism at length in his 1998 book, and his final definition includes “political change” as the desired end-state of terrorist activity. This would be more consistent with traditional means-end constructions of terrorism. Furthermore, Falkenrayth pointed out that mass casualty terrorism is still an aberrant occurrence. A recent survey of terrorism suggests historical and intellectual links between the fascism of fanatical Islamist terrorism today and the totalitarian movements of the twentieth century, further emphasizing continuity rather than change.

Most recent scholarship, however, has taken the perspective that contemporary terrorism represents a significant departure from the past. Various factors have led to the development of this new type of terrorism. Paul Wilkinson pondered the increase in indiscriminateness among terrorists, and he posited several possible reasons accounting for this upsurge. First, the saturation of the media with images of terrorist atrocity has raised the bar on the level of destruction that will attract headline attention. Second, terrorists have realized that civilian soft
targets involve lower risk to themselves. Finally, there has been a shift from the politically minded terrorist to the vengeful and hard-line fanatic.

This chapter will explore this issue in further depth. While Wilkinson's factors accurately describe developments in terrorist strategy and tactics, there are more fundamental forces at work. The world has undergone a variety of changes on several levels. While it is impossible to link all social changes to terrorism today, it is possible to track several distinct factors that characterize a form of terrorism that is unprecedented in the level of threat posed to the rest of the world. This chapter will explore these factors from a cultural, political, and technological perspective and American strategic response to these developments.

Cultural Factors

Islamic radicalism is the most notorious form of the new culture of terrorism, but it is only part of a larger cultural trend leading to terrorist activity. Numerous cults, whose emergence in many cases has been synchronized with the turn of the new millennium, have also posed an increasing threat. Finally, the American religious right has been active with escalating and destructive objectives, although law enforcement presence has restrained the latter group.

It is important to distinguish religious terrorists from those terrorists with religious components, but whose primary goals are political. Religiously motivated terrorist groups grew six-fold from 1980 to 1992 and continued to increase in the 1990s. Hoffman asserted that "the religious imperative for terrorism is the most important characteristic of terrorist activity today."16 This may not be as much an entirely new phenomenon as a cyclic return to earlier motivations for terror. Until the emergence of political motives such as nationalism, anarchism, and Marxism, "religion provided the only acceptable justifications for terror."17 However, terrorism in modern times has not, until recent years, been so dominated by religious overtones.
At the time when modern international terrorism first appeared, of the 11 identifiable terrorist groups, none could be classified as religious.¹⁸

Today's terrorists increasingly look at their acts of death and destruction as sacramental or transcendental on a spiritual or eschatological level. The pragmatic reservations of secular terrorists¹⁹ do not hold back religious terrorists. Secular terrorists may view indiscriminate violence as immoral. However, not only moral justification, but righteous and necessary advancement of the religious terrorists' cause are the perspective of many terrorists today. In addition, the goals of secular terrorists are much more attuned to public opinion, so senseless violence is not palatable to them since it would be counterproductive to their cause. In fact, Hoffman observed that the constituency itself differs between religious and secular terrorists. Secular terrorists seek to defend or promote some disenfranchised population and to appeal to sympathizers or prospective sympathizers. Religious terrorists are often their own constituency, having no external audience for acts of destruction.²⁰

Aum Shinrikyo has been included in typologies of terrorism that include radical Islamists as part of a group of religiously motivated organizations that attack symbols of the modern state.²¹ In many ways, the dynamics of cultist followings make groups such as Aum Shinrikyo (also known as Aleph) more dangerous than religious terrorists rooted in conventional and broadly-based religious traditions or denominations. There is no constituency of more moderate adherents to share common beliefs with the radical group while at the same time posing a restraining influence. For the fundamentalist Islamic or Christian radical, authoritative figures from either of those religions can condemn violence and de-legitimize the terrorist, at least in the eyes of the average faithful.
Another feature of religious cults that make them incredibly dangerous is the personality-driven nature of these groups. Cultist devotion to one leader leaves followers less able to make their own moral decisions or consult other sources of reasoning. If that leader is emotionally or mentally unstable, the ramifications can be catastrophic. More dangerous religious terrorist groups from more traditional faiths may often share this feature of the cult: a charismatic leader who exerts a powerful influence over the members of the group.

According to many analysts, Aum Shinrikyo demonstrated its comparatively more threatening potential in its sarin attack in the Tokyo subway. As D.W. Brackett wrote, "a horrible bell had tolled in the Tokyo subway . . . . Terrorists do not follow rules of engagement in their operations but they do absorb the lessons to be learned from successful acts of violence." If for no other reason than providing an example to others, Aum has gained notoriety as one of the more dangerous terrorist elements. Despite setbacks such as the incarceration of key leadership figures, Aum Shinrikyo continues to pose future threats. The ability of Aum Shinrikyo to recruit individuals with a high level of education and technical knowledge has also been a significant aspect of the threat posed by the cult.

In the past, cults were not viewed as national security threats; they were more dangerous to unwary individuals who might succumb to the cult's influence. Even the emergence of cultist mass suicides did not alter this perception. However, the recent appearance of cults willing and able to adopt destructive political goals has revised the more benign view of the cult phenomenon. Since cults are often fundamental based on the violence of coercion, they can be accustomed to the mindset necessary to adopt terrorist methods. Although the cult more often practices a mental violence with psychological control and panoptic invasions of privacy, they do occasionally engage in physical abuse. The most dangerous cults are also fascinated by visions
of the end of the world, which, like radicals from more mainstream religions, cultists often believe that they are instrumental in bringing about. The nature of the cult's mythical figure can also be indicative of the level of threat. A vengeful deity is more threatening than a suffering savior. This sign is somewhat unpredictable, however, because cults can switch their principal myths as circumstances change. In summary, cults are particularly dangerous forms of religious terrorism because they can appear quickly without warning, have no rational goals, and become agitated due to the apprehension and hostility with which they are viewed by the society at large.

Whether cultists or extremists from more established religions, violence can be particularly threatening in comparison with the political terrorists of earlier years. As Hoffman noted, "for the religious terrorist, violence is a divine duty...executed in direct response to some theological demand...and justified by scripture." Religion can be a legitimizing force that not only sanctions but compels large-scale violence on possibly open-ended categories of opponents. Terrorist violence can be seen as a divinely inspired end in itself. One explanation that has been proffered to account for violent Islamic extremism views revenge as the principal goal of the terrorists. This reasoning makes political change or conventional political objectives irrelevant, and it is consistent with observations that violence is itself the objective. Fundamentalist Islam "cannot conceive of either coexistence or political compromise. To the exponents of Holy Terror, Islam must either dominate or be dominated." A recent study has traced the Islamic theological doctrine to the Middle Ages and noted recent philosophical developments that explain the preponderance of religious mass-casualty terrorism coming from adherents of Islam.
Remarkably, a recent analysis of Bin Laden’s fatwa, published in *Studies of Conflict and Terrorism*, found that the content of the fatwa was “neither revolutionary nor unique, as it encapsulates broad sentiments in the Muslim world, especially that of Islam’s being on the defensive against foreign secular forces and modernization.”\[^{30}\] However, some of the content of the fatwa does fall directly within the paradigm of contemporary religious terrorism. Consider the following excerpts:

Praise be to God, who revealed the book, controls the clouds, defeats factionalism, and says in his book: ‘But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the pagans wherever ye find them.’ . . .

On that basis, and in compliance with God’s order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims:

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies — civilians and military — is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it. . . .\[^{31}\]

Simon and Benjamin noted that many *al-Qaeda* attacks, including the major planning phase of the 11 September attacks, took place during favorable times for the Palestinians in the Middle East peace process, and that no foreign policy changes by the United States government could possibly appease the bin Ladenist radical.\[^{32}\]

While Islamic terrorists are the most notorious of today’s violent radicals, others such as right-wing Christian extremists also exhibit many characteristics of the new terrorism. Juergensmeyer identified three elements that Islamists, radical Christians, and other religious terrorists share: they perceive their objective as a defense of basic identity and dignity, losing the struggle would be unthinkable, and the struggle is in deadlock and cannot be won in real time or in real terms.\[^{33}\]

In the past, Christian right-wing terrorists conducted racially motivated or religiously motivated acts of violence discriminately against chosen victims, and confrontation of the state was limited to when the state interfered in the right-wing agenda of the terrorist groups.\[^{34}\] Today, the groups are directly hostile to the government, which they believe is engaged in a widespread
conspiracy threatening the existence of the white Christian way of life. A recent FBI strategic assessment of the potential for domestic terrorism in the United States focused on Christian Identity and other right wing movements associated with Christian fundamentalism. The most extreme of these fanatics attribute a subhuman status to people of color, which mitigates moral grounds to avoid harming those groups. In addition, they view themselves in a perpetual battle with the forces of evil (as manifested through non-white races and a powerful, sinister government) that must culminate in the apocalyptic crisis predicted by the Book of Revelations. The Christian terrorists’ view that it is their duty to hasten the realization of this divine plan permits and even exhorts them to greater levels of violence. That violence is directed against existing social structures and governments, which are viewed to be hopelessly entangled with dark forces such as Jewry, enormous financial conglomerates, and international institutions trying to form an ominous “new world order.”

While Christian violence in the United States has been discriminately focused for decades against racial minorities and “immoral” targets, it recently has expanding into attempted bombings and poisoning municipal water supplies. These indiscriminate attacks demonstrate a willingness to tolerate greater levels of collateral damage in efforts to generate mass levels of casualties. The bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City was the pinnacle of this trend, and although Timothy McVeigh accepted responsibility for that attack, it is believed that there was involvement of other right-wing militia or Christian terrorists. Effective domestic law enforcement in the United States has largely prevented these groups from achieving widespread violence on the level of Oklahoma City, making that incident a tragic exception among a larger number of foiled plots.
While there is certainly no cooperation between foreign Islamist and domestic Christian radicals, there is a disquieting solidarity in their views. August Kreis of the paramilitary group, Posse Comitatus, responded to the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers with this disconcerting rant: “Hallelu-Yahweh! May the WAR be started! DEATH to His enemies, may the World Trade Center BURN TO THE GROUND!”

Jessica Stern’s recent book, compiling five years of interviews with international terrorists, does not begin with an example from the Guantanamo Bay detention facility or the streets of the Middle East. Her introductory example is a former Christian terrorist in a Texas trailer park. While Islamic terrorism is the most salient threat to the United States, it is not the only danger posed by the new trend of a culture of violence and extremism.

A cluster of several cultural features among new international terrorist groups indicate the high level of threat. These aspects include a conception of righteous killing-as-healing, the necessity of total social destruction as part of a process of ultimate purification, a preoccupation with weapons of mass destruction, and a cult of personality where one guru dominates his followers who seek to become perfect clones. These aspects taken together represent a significant departure from the culture of earlier terrorist groups, and represent a serious threat to the industrialized world.

Political and Organizational Factors

A number of developments in the international scene have created conditions ripe for mass casualty terrorism. Gross inequalities in economic resources and standards of living between different parts of the world are a popular reason given for the ardency and viciousness of contemporary terrorists, although governmental collapse in “failed states” as a breeding ground for terrorists presents a more convincing variation on this logic. However, there is no
"comprehensive explanation in print for how poverty causes terror" nor is there a "demonstrated correlation between the two." The intrusion of Western values and institutions into the Islamic world through the process of free market globalization is an alternative explanation for terrorism, which is the weaker party's method of choice to strike back. The process of globalization, which involves the technological, political, economic, and cultural diminution of boundaries between countries across the world, has insinuated a self-interested, inexorable, corrupting market culture into traditional communities. Many see these forces as threatening their way of life. At the same time that globalization has provided a motivation for terrorism, it has also facilitated methods for it.

One of the major consequences of globalization has been a deterioration of the power of the state. The exponential expansion of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), regional alliances, and international organizations has solidified this trend. Although not a conventional NGO like the Red Cross or Médecins sans Frontières, al-Qaeda distinguished itself as among the most successful NGOs. The trend among terrorists to eschew direct connections with state sponsors has had several advantages for the enterprising extremist. Terrorist groups are more likely to maintain support from "amorphous constituencies," so extreme methods are more acceptable because such methods can be used without fear of alienating political support. Kushner described this development as a growth of "amateur" groups as direct state sponsorship has declined. Lawrence Freedman pointed out that the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan was not so much a state sponsor of terrorism as it was a "terrorist-sponsored state."

However, terrorists do continue to enjoy benefits of indirect state sponsorship. Although the opportunity for state sponsorship has arguably diminished due to the Bush administration's war on terror that has been prosecuted in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, state
sponsorship remains widespread. In fact, developments in the counterterrorist measures may propagate some dangerous trends of modern terrorism. As terrorists cannot rely on direct state sponsorship, they will become less accountable and harder to track. States must conceal their involvement by exercising less control and maintaining less comprehensive intelligence of radical terrorist organizations. Many states have been on American government lists of state sponsors for over ten years, including Cuba, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Syria. More recently, Sudan and Afghanistan became government sponsors of terrorism. Many state sponsors cooperate with one another to promote terrorist violence, making terrorist activity further disconnected from the foreign policy of any single state. Iran has funded training camps in the Sudan, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad has received support from both Iran and Syria.49

Further exacerbating the problem is the method of funding, which often has no measures for accountability. Iran’s support for terrorist organizations can include no target selection and occasionally results, with the funds disappearing, in no terrorist attacks.50 This unpredictability is tolerated by state sponsors because of the destructive pay-off and the obfuscation of evidence connecting the state to the terrorist. Iran has self-consciously created a decentralized command structure because of these advantages.51 A further advantage of maintaining “arm’s length” from extremist operatives is for self-protection. The Sudanese government intelligence monitored Osama bin Laden while he lived in that country apparently to prevent his activist from eventually doing harm to even that extremist government.52

While American occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq has diluted the threat from those states, other sponsors have possibly been left off official lists for political reasons. (It has been frequently argued that inclusion of a state on the list of state sponsors of terrorism reflects its relationship with the United States.53) Pakistani intelligence has reportedly been involved in
sponsoring violent terrorists, both in Afghanistan and the contentious Kashmir. Additionally, the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been at the center of controversy over sponsorship and
proliferation of radicalism and violence. Laurent Murawiec, an analyst at the Rand Corporation,
attracted public attention by pointing out the dangers of Saudi support for radical Islamists and
specifically Osama bin Laden in a briefing to the Defense Policy Board in 2002. While there is
no official publication of the Rand Corporation documenting this analysis, Murawiec highlighted
evidence of Saudi support for the Islamist agenda through Islamic educational venues and
financial backing.

So while globalization has helped remove many of the restraints that state sponsorship
once imposed, terrorists can still enjoy the funding and protection that sponsorship provides.
Another factor of globalization that benefits terrorism is targeting: “In today’s globalizing world,
terrorists can reach their targets more easily, their targets are exposed in more places, and news
and ideas that inflame people to resort to terrorism spread more widely and rapidly than in the
past.” Among the factors that contribute to this are the easing of border controls and the
development of globe-circling infrastructures, which support recruitment, fund-raising,
movement of materiel, and other logistical functions.

In addition to international political changes, there have been developments in
organizational practice that have enhanced the lethality of terrorists. As corporations have
evolved organizationally, so have terrorist organizations. Terrorist groups have evolved from
hierarchical, vertical organizational structures, to more horizontal, less command-driven groups.
Leadership is derived from a “set of principles [that] can set boundaries and provide guidelines
for decisions and actions so that members do not have to resort to a hierarchy – ‘they know what
they have to do.’” The authors describe organizational designs that may “sometimes appear
acephalous (headless), and at other times polycephalous (Hydra-headed).”  

Paul Smith observed that the multi-cellular structure of *al-Qaeda* gave the organization agility and cover and has been one of its key strengths. This flexibility has allowed *al-Qaeda* to establish bases using indigenous personnel all over the world. It has infiltrated Islamic nongovernmental organizations in order to conceal operations. Jessica Stern recently commented on *al-Qaeda’s* ability to maintain operations in the face of an unprecedented onslaught:

The answer lies in the organization’s remarkably protean nature. Over its life span, al Qaeda has constantly evolved and shown a surprising willingness to adapt its mission. This capacity for change has consistently made the group more appealing to recruits, attracted surprising new allies, and — most worrisome from a Western perspective — made it harder to detect and destroy.

**Technological Factors**

In addition to the cultural and religious motivations of terrorists and the political and organizational enabling factors, technology has evolved in ways that provide unprecedented opportunities for terrorists. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the possibility of proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-state users is the primary factor that has significantly increased the danger of nuclear terrorism. However, non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction and information technology have also created opportunities for terrorism that are in many ways more threatening than radiological terrorism because these alternatives are more probable.

Some theorists have argued that weapons of mass destruction do not represent a weapon of choice for most terrorists, even in these changing times. “Most terrorists will continue to avoid weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for a variety of reasons,” preferring the “gun and the bomb.” Jenkins agreed that most terrorist organizations are technologically conservative, but he admitted that the self-imposed moral restraints that once governed terrorist action are fading away. As the trends in the preceding sections reach fullness, increasing the level of mass
casualty terrorism, terrorists may turn more to these weapons that will better fit their objectives and moralities.

Laqueur’s *New Terrorism* emphasized the availability of very powerful weapons of mass destruction as the major current danger facing the industrialized world. Aside from the nuclear variety of WMD, biological and chemical weapons pose serious dangers. Biological weapons are limited in that human contact is required to spread the effects, but as the Asian brush with Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) demonstrated, the panic and uncertainty can take a large economic and political toll. This is not to mention the cost in human suffering for those exposed to the pathogen perhaps without knowing why or even whether they have been infected. Biological weapons can come in a variety of forms, to include viruses, bacteria, and rickettsia (bacteria that can live inside host cells like viruses).

Chemical toxins differ from biological weapons in that they are nonliving pathogens and require direct infection and contact with victim. This negates the continual spread of the weapon, but it entails more direct and possibly more damaging effects. Chemical agents appear in several types: choking agents that damage lung tissue, blood agents that cause vital organs to shut down, blister agents (also known as vesicants) that damage the skin, and the most lethal, nerve agents. Various methods allow the agent to infect its victim, including inhalation, skin effects, and digestive tract. Exacerbating the danger is the fact that many deadly chemicals, or their components, are commercially available.

The State Department’s annual report on terrorism asserted that the events of 11 September 2001 confirmed the intent and capability of terrorist organizations to plan and execute mass casualty attacks. The report also stated that these unprecedented attacks may lead to an escalation of the scope of terrorism in terms of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
methods. The report further cited evidence discovered in military raids of Afghan terrorist facilities, the use of poison by Hamas in coating shrapnel of improvised explosives, and an unnamed group arrested in Italy with a compound capable of producing hydrogen cyanide and maps of the US embassy. Activities of cults such as Aum and American right-wing terrorist plans to poison municipal water facilities provide further evidence of the WMD threat.

Another key development is information technology. This technology provides both an opportunity for targeting as industrialized societies place greater reliance on information infrastructures. Terrorists will likely avoid dismantling the internet because they need the technology for their own communication and propaganda activities. As such, these terrorists may be more interested in "systemic disruption" rather than the total destruction of information networks. While the consequences of a major disruption of American or global information infrastructures could be catastrophic financially or socially, terrorists have not shown the inclination or capability to undertake massive strikes in this area. There have been limited attacks along these lines, but the major use of information technology has been as an aid for rather than a target of terrorist activity. The publicized use of the internet and e-mail by al-Qaeda to coordinate such strikes as the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks is an example of this sort of coordination. As Paul Pillar noted, "Information technology's biggest impact on terrorists has involved the everyday tasks of organizing and communicating, rather than their methods of attack." 

Technology has altered the ability of terrorists to conduct mass casualty attacks. Perhaps surprisingly, the greatest single terrorist attack (other than the attacks of 11 September 2001) claimed the lives of about 380 people. The yield of contemporary radiological, chemical, and biological weapons can realize the goals of today's terrorists as exemplified by the World Trade
Center and Pentagon attacks, the Oklahoma City bombing, the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway, and similar failed attacks of the past decade. Technological developments and their availability as spread by the globalized market economy have unavoidably expanded the dangers of terrorism in the new century.

The practice of terrorism has undergone dramatic changes in recent years. The categorical fanaticism that is apparent in terrorist organizations across a spectrum of belief systems is a major part of this change. In the past, terrorists were more likely to be dominated by pragmatic considerations of political and social change, public opinion, and other such effects. Today, what was a minute rarity in the past, terrorists bent on death and destruction for its own sake, is more commonplace than ever. In addition, the statelessness of terrorists removes crucial restraints that once held the most extreme terrorists in check or prevented them from reaching the highest levels in their organizations. Terrorists can still enjoy the funding and shelter that only a national economy can mobilize, but they are on their own to a greater degree in greater numbers than in the past. Organizationally, terrorists are using the non-hierarchical structures and systems that have emerged in recent years. Finally, unprecedented availability of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction technology provides the means for the realization of the previous trends.

Terrorism has quantitatively and qualitatively changed from previous years. Whether it is Gurr and Coleman’s “third wave of vulnerability” or Rapoport’s “fourth wave of terrorism,” contemporary terrorism is a significant departure from the phenomenon even as recently as during the Cold War. The 2002 United States National Security Strategy has recognized terrorism, in the memorable phrase “the crossroads of radicalism and technology,” as the predominant security threat in the post-Cold War world. The cataclysmic impact of September
11 both on the American strategic consciousness and the international security environment must not be underestimated. Those attacks resulted from a combination of cultural, political, and technological factors and were a revelation to the world of the emergence of the new terrorism.

The American Strategic Response

As noted in Chapter 1, there is great significance of the attacks of 11 September 2001 to the strategic consciousness of the United States. National security theorists had remarked upon the changing nature and growing threat of terrorism for years before the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks. The revelation of national vulnerability in the collapse of the twin towers was not the result of the first attack on the territory of the United States, but one of very few such episodes. The surprise bombing of Pearl Harbor was recalled by many, and Noam Chomsky in 9-11 pointed out that it was not since 1812 that the continental United States had been violated by foreign assault. The uncompromising nature of the zealous determination of violent extremism coupled with the horrible and unparalleled consequences of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons have created what the 2002 US National Security Strategy called “the crossroads of radicalism and technology.”

The National Security Strategy described this newly revealed threat in contrast to the Cold War Soviet menace. The Cold War was a balance of terror in which mutually assured destruction forced conflict to the periphery, as discussed in detail in Chapter 2. The nuclear arsenals of the United States and the USSR implied the possibility of ultimate devastation of the civilized world. Peace activists who opposed deterrence during the Cold War now embrace this doctrine as the strategy of choice against rogue states (or, more euphemistically, “states of concern”). What was once seen as a strategy of reckless irresponsibility endangering the survival of humanity is now the only alternative that peace activism sees to avoid more
belligerent direct confrontation in the post-Cold War age. The National Security Strategy outlines several key differences between the Cold War and the current threat.\textsuperscript{67}

The Strategy’s first point is the risk-averse nature of the status quo. The Soviet empire was stable because it had strong interests in maintaining the status quo. This status quo was a situation in which the USSR held part of a bipolar dominance over world affairs. The prospect of retaliation that restrained the Soviet threat is less likely to deter leaders of rogue states seeking to improve their marginalized status with bold action.

In addition, the prevailing view of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) during the Cold War was as the last resort. The Strategy points out that the concept of asymmetric warfare has asserted the use of WMD as tools of intimidation and aggression for lesser powers. The National Security Strategy also warns of the possibility of WMD as rogue states’ instruments of blackmail to counteract American deterrence or repulsion of aggression.

Finally, the statelessness of terrorist enemies provides an outlet for the capabilities of rogue states. Rogue states seeking to cause harm to the United States can sell chemical, biological, or nuclear arms to nonstate terrorist organizations. The National Security Strategy warns that the gravest danger lies in the fact that it is the same states that seek weapons of mass destruction that are known for support of terrorist activity.

American military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan provide a practical application of this new strategic mindset. One of the major criticisms of diplomatic efforts in the months leading up to the invasion of Iraq was the greater danger posed by the Kim Jong Il regime in North Korea. Critics asserted that North Korea, not Iraq, should be the object of the Bush administration’s attention. Indeed, diplomatic challenges experienced by the US administration can be partially attributed to the increasingly belligerent activity of North Korea during the Iraqi
weapons inspections crisis. North Korea formally withdrew from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty on 10 January 2003 and continued with missile tests and further hostile diplomacy in the following months. These developments sparked criticism that North Korea is a far more dangerous threat than Iraq. With North Korean nuclear blackmail destabilizing the region – as the US National Security Strategy had warned – the larger threat emanating from Pyong-Yang was clear.

The international community urged the United States to engage North Korea bilaterally on the missile issue while Iraq would be best left to the sluggish multilateral Security Council. In this way, the members of the international community were maximizing the chances for defeat. Confronting North Korea while it is brandishing a nuclear capability must lead to concession or appeasement. It is best to avoid attacking where the enemy is strong, and the US rightly refused to engage the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) at this unfavorable moment.

At the same time, Iraq was weak, but time was in its favor. Given time, Hussein’s Iraq would grow rather than decrease in the danger posed to the United States. It could develop into an asymmetric threat equaling the Korean regime. The principle behind intervention to preempt this growth is similar to the theme of Chapter 2, in which humanitarian or peacekeeping intervention is less costly and more effective at earlier stages.

The first Gulf War started when Saddam Hussein invaded his neighbor Kuwait to annex it as part of a greater Iraq. The issue of previous American support to Iraq was not relevant in intervening during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The decision was made to repel Hussein for various reasons: to preserve international law, to defend a helpless victim, to stabilize oil prices, and perhaps most importantly, to prevent further aggression in the region.
against Saudi Arabia or other nations. The multiple levels of justification are similar to the second war with Iraq.

President George W. Bush and members of his administration have included enforcement of UN resolutions, connections to al Qaeda, humanitarian abuses of the Hussein regime, and present capabilities in weapons of mass destruction (as well as future capability in nuclear weapons) as various justifications in the case for war. The latter concern has been the subject of particular controversy in recent months, but evidence has apparently surfaced that the Hussein regime was harboring some weapons capabilities.\textsuperscript{68} It is interesting that the possibly major impetus to war in both cases was a concern for the future – in the case of Operation Desert Storm, it was preventing further Iraqi aggression in the region; in the case of Operation Iraqi Freedom, it was preempting sponsorship of terror and the proliferation of WMD.

The Gulf War ended in 1991 with an agreement for certain disarmament measures by Iraq. The continued violation of this agreement and repeated international calls for compliance caused many observers to question the efficacy of weapons inspections regimes and economic sanctions. However, the United States pursued various diplomatic options in order to compel Iraqi disarmament in spite of years of unsuccessful attempts to enforce the Iraqi peace agreement and subsequent UN resolutions.

Hawkish critics have argued that the failure to invade deeper into Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein in 1991 was the cause of recent difficulties and ultimately the crisis. However, the decision to repel the invading Iraqis from Kuwait and leave the existing Iraqi regime in power is consistent with the principle to undertake minimum possible violence. The economic sanctions and weapons inspections that took place in the following years could similarly be
interpreted as attempting to win the peace in Iraq without resorting to further direct military
conflict.

The Bush administration decided to propose Resolution 1441, symbolizing the desire to
build an international consensus to pressure Iraqi compliance with disarmament. Rather than
immediate unilateral military action, or action taken with an ad hoc coalition of allies, the United
States accepted the risk of cooperation with the entire international community and further
diplomatic solutions. This risk comprised a desire for nonviolent resolution of the Iraqi crisis.

After the farcical Iraqi declaration of armaments, it was clear that the Hussein regime would not
comply with the resolution, which had put the burden of proof on Iraq. Instead, the inspection
process would evolve into a “scavenger hunt” led by Hans Blix to uncover Iraqi weapons. As
this was taking place, the United States still hoped that a show of credible force on the Iraqi
border would compel disarmament.

The actions leading up to the Iraqi invasion attempted to avoid fighting. While the war
was one of choice in that there was no immediate threat to the United States or an ally, it was
also pursued at opportune time when the cost was lower than it would be in an indefinite future.

It was pursued after a series of alternatives attempting to win without fighting had failed.

It is important to note that the failure to find a comprehensive WMD threat after the fall
of the Iraqi regime has somewhat muddied this analysis, but there is still compelling evidence to
justify intervention. Iraq’s evasive weapons report and the expulsion of UN inspectors in 1998
pointed to a dangerous and hidden WMD capability. As of this writing, the reasons for the
failure of that capability to materialize are yet unclear. Various possibilities – that Iraq never had
large quantities of WMD or that it moved them before the coalition invasion – seem to defy
logic.
A final note about current strategy is that it includes unprecedented efforts towards taking forces and territory without destroying resources that would be of use during later hostilities and after hostilities had ended. In addition, perhaps still cognizant of Vietnam, the U.S. has taken care to avoid prolonged operations that would deplete friendly resources and morale as well as necessarily extend the level of destruction brought about during the war. (Unfortunately, the tendency towards direct and decisive combat operations noted in Chapter 2 has left the aftermath of the war chaotic and without an apparent end.)

During the offensive phase of the war, it can be noted that of historical military endeavors, Operation Iraqi Freedom was one of the most conscientious about preserving enemy noncombatants and avoiding destruction to the nation’s resources. Technological capabilities contributed to this effect because increasing precision in targeting allows American firepower to be more effective and less indiscriminately destructive. Max Boot observed that the precision bombing, within meters of an intended target, allowed for lighter loads of munitions. This possibility was capitalized on by US forces, who minimized collateral damage by using the smallest possible explosives, even dropping bombs filled only with concrete. Although the Iraqis used schools, hospitals, and mosques to provide military forces with unlawful Geneva Convention shielding, the US “took great care to spare civilians…. Even though U.S. Army doctrine favors nighttime operations, the 101st Airborne Division operated mainly during the daytime -- because, as one of its brigade commanders put it, ‘You can much more easily discern civilians during the daytime.’”

The “shock and awe” campaign may not have been as spectacular as the news media audience had anticipated, but it did borrow from Sun Tzu’s philosophy of reducing enemy morale to achieve victory without imposing physical damage. The authors of Shock and Awe...
point out that the doctrine is consistent with Sun Tzu’s philosophy to disarm the opponent before
the battle is joined. The central example they use is based on a story from China in which Sun
Tzu was summoned before the King of Wu, who wanted to test his theory of managing soldiers.
The king proposed that Sun Tzu should teach drill and ceremony to 180 young women in the
palace. Sun Tzu divided them into two companies, and placed one of the king’s favorite
concubines at the head of each. He then had them all take spears in their hands, and addressed
the group:

“I presume you know the difference between front and back, right hand and left hand? When I
say ‘Eyes front,’ you must look straight ahead. When I say ‘Left turn,’ you must face
towards your left hand. When I say ‘Right turn,’ you must face towards your right hand. When I
say ‘About turn,’ you must face right round towards your back.”

The girls indicated that they understood the instructions. Then he gave the order “Right
turn.” But the girls only burst out laughing. Sun Tzu said, “If words of command are not clear
and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, then the general is to blame.”

So he explained his instructions again and restarted the drilling. Again, the girls burst
into fits of laughter after hearing the command. Sun Tzu announced, “If words of command are
not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, the general is to blame. But if his
orders are clear, and the soldiers nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of their officers.”

So saying, he ordered the leaders of the two companies to be beheaded. The King was
watching the scene from the top of a raised pavilion. When he saw that his favorite concubines
were about to be executed, he was alarmed and hurriedly sent down the following message: “We
are now quite satisfied as to our general’s ability to handle troops. It is our wish that these two
concubines should not be beheaded.”
Sun Tzu replied, “Having received His Majesty’s commission to be the general of his forces, there are certain commands of His Majesty which, acting in that capacity, I am unable to accept.” So he had the two leaders beheaded and installed two others as leaders. When this had been done, the drum was sounded for the drill, and the girls went through all the evolutions, turning to the right or to the left, marching ahead or wheeling back, kneeling or standing, with perfect accuracy and precision, not venturing to utter a sound. Then Sun Tzu sent a messenger to the King saying, “Your soldiers, Sire, are now properly drilled and disciplined, and ready for your majesty’s inspection. They can be put to any use that their sovereign may desire; bid them go through fire and water, and they will not disobey.”

The story is meant to describe effective discipline. One can also draw conclusions relating to Huntingtonian conceptions of civil-military relations, in which professional officers exercise control over tactical decisions once war has begun. Harlan Ullman and his coauthors, however, draw parallels between the story of the palace concubines and shocking the opponent into submission. While this might not be the original intention of this example, Ullman’s point is valid in that the use force to induce compliance is a relevant tactic in Sun Tzu’s philosophy of warfare.

The intent of the shock and awe campaign was in part to demonstrate America’s overwhelming military superiority in support of the psychological operations campaign and the negotiations with senior Iraqi commanders to surrender their forces. Extensive psychological operations also were focused on reducing the length and destructiveness of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Iraqi military put up more resistance than some expected, but the massive surrenders that did take place were a major contributor to reducing the fighting. Max Boot noted:
Spurred by dramatic advances in information technology, the U.S. military has adopted a new style of warfare that eschews the bloody slogging matches of old. It seeks a quick victory with minimal casualties on both sides. Its hallmarks are speed, maneuver, flexibility, and surprise. It is heavily reliant upon precision firepower, special forces, and psychological operations. This approach was put powerfully on display in the recent invasion of Iraq, and its implications for the future of American war fighting are profound.71

Keeping operations short in duration helped avoid the attrition of both friendly and enemy resources (from both moral and physical perspectives). The movement to Baghdad was unprecedented in its speed.

Operation Iraqi Freedom and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime highlighted the stunning success of American decisive offensive operations. However, the success in accomplishing the tactical objectives of the war also presents a stark contrast to the chaotic aftermath of the war and the lack of planning for and execution of larger strategic and political objectives. The second Gulf War confirmed a major argument of Chapter 2, demonstrating the capability of the American armed forces in direct combat and their inattention and inability in the softer side of the spectrum of operations.
Chapter 6: The Reconstruction of Social Identity

Chapter 5 presented the persistent and terrible threat posed by twenty-first century terrorism and the aggressive and militarily intensive response to that threat. These developments have overcome the challenge of irrelevance discussed in detail in Chapter 3, but sociological changes that have evolved over the past decades are also leading to changes in the all-volunteer force. The social construction of culture, citizenship, and military service define the relationship between the armed forces and society. This chapter will explore the changing construction (or reconstruction) of these elements and the ramifications for civil-military relations.

Changing prevailing attitudes in society are leading to new formulations about the relationship between the individual and the state in industrialized countries. The emerging belief systems and social trends underpinning them are collectively described using the term “postmodern.” Understanding the sociological environment that is developing in this postmodern era will allow us to better understand the behavior of members of the postmodern society. This society is one in which major assumptions of the past are subject to greater scrutiny, if not entirely invalid. Among these assumptions are the existence of moral imperatives, the binding nature of civic obligations, and the stability of contemporary living. Each of these traditional formulations has been significant for military service and the effectiveness of military institutions in the Cold War era and earlier. However, the social construction of today’s soldier is significantly different from the past; as Abrams and Bacevich forcefully stated, “the mythic tradition of the citizen-soldier is dead.”

Much attention has been focused on the changes in the international system following the breakdown of the Soviet Union as well as attendant changes to the force structure and activities of the United States armed forces. Indeed, the introduction to a recent edited publication
identified five major changes that characterize the postmodern military: structural and cultural overlap of civilian and military spheres; a decreasing sense of difference within the military based on branch, rank, or role; moving from war fighting to nontraditional missions; more internationally authorized missions; and the internationalization of military forces. None of these major changes reflects the new character of society and its members that is the subject of much of the sociological and political science research on the emergence of a postmodern era. A chapter in this book focusing on postmodernity in the armed forces also does not concentrate on the civic commitments or individual belief-systems in the postmodern age. Foster presented a view of the postmodern military that concentrates on its organizational, strategic, and technological capabilities. Booth, Kestnbaum, and Segal asked the question of whether post-Cold War militaries are postmodern. They suggest that changes in military organization reflect continuity of the modern military and further adaptation. This article uses neither the international environment nor even the institutional or organizational armed forces as a unit of analysis; if the military is postmodern, perhaps the individual soldier is the one making it so.

In scholarship on military personnel issues, there seems to have been (until recently) a dearth of consideration of the cultural tendencies of the American citizen in this era. For instance, in a brief piece summarizing the reasons for failing Army recruitment, factors included the shift towards college enrollment, the civil-military gap that has emerged because of fewer veterans in the population, and the Army's excessive deployments. None of these reasons accounts for the changes within the individual American citizen; the civil-military gap comes closest since it addresses social differences between the armed forces and society, but the presence of veterans does not completely address a fundamental cultural shift.
Postmodernity can perhaps link failing military participation to other civic trends such as the unfulfilled obligation to vote or the disavowal of mandatory youth service programs. Recent opinion surveys found significant attitudinal differences between members of the military and their civilian counterparts due to self-selection and socialization, and the authors have suggested that these differences are increasing. The social construction of citizenship is changing, and this must be assessed in order to be aware of the political environment in which the country now finds itself. Recent contributions to the field have addressed this issue, but there is still much research to be done.

The postmodern reformulation of social and philosophical assumptions will have ramifications for manpower issues in the All-Volunteer Force of the coming century. This chapter explores the dynamics of the members of postmodern society and their likely impact on military service. After introducing the general characteristics of postmodernity, it will be necessary to develop a framework for assessing its effects on society and culture. Finally, the implications of these developments are assessed for military service in the twenty-first century.

**Postmodernity: Origins and Effects**

A variety of social conditions have evolved to lead to the postmodern world in which Americans and other citizens of industrialized nations now find themselves. The unparalleled destruction and human misery unleashed in World War I shook people's faith in the systems of knowledge that they had created over centuries. The modernist reaction to this horror failed as the hopeless Kellogg-Briand Treaty outlawing war fell apart in World War II, whose repugnance exceeded even that of the First World War. This strengthened emerging postmodernist doubts about the progress of humanity and the universal absolutes that existed to the modernist thinker. The use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and more significantly the nuclear arms
race that ensued for four decades after the Second World War, further cast doubt upon the inevitability of progress or the system of morality in which the conventional world believed. (I would hesitate to assert that the postmodern era is necessarily synchronized with the end of the Cold War. Most literature on the subject places the development of the trends of postmodernity decades ago, and while the end of the Cold War may have exacerbated some of these trends for the military, it should be recognized that many of them have been in effect long before.)

The term “postmodernism” is one that is used in a number of different senses. Depending on the author and the context, it is a dynamic term, that seems to shift meaning as one tries to hold onto it as did the Greek mythological figure Proteus. Since postmodernism derives its name from what it is not rather than from what it is, there is some room for debate about the exact nature of the movement. What makes the definition more abstract is that postmodernists themselves characterize their philosophy as dynamic rather than static; the term postmodernism is a “shifting signifier.” The discussion here will be limited to two main senses: first, a school of thought that goes beyond the assumptions and beliefs of modern thinkers, and second, the changes in society that comprise a movement beyond modern society as defined by mid-twentieth century industrialized nations.

Postmodernism has been a response to the growing body of scientific and technological knowledge, which many thinkers feel has often left us with more questions than answers. Increasing uncertainty and complexity have caused society to reject absolutes and adopt positions more tolerant of difference and diversity. Increased awareness of other cultures and lifestyles has resulted from the diminution of modernist belief in the definite superiority of one way of life, of one Kantian moral categorical imperative. This has driven much of the movement of respecting difference and moving towards equity.
Postmodern thought has had a growing influence in academia. The influence of postmodernism is limited not only to the university, where it has commanded a great amount of attention. We can also observe a shift away from the modern paradigm in dominant social patterns. Elkind identified the “urbanity” of the postmodern family, in which there are fewer boundaries between public and private life, home and work, and even the child and the adult.

The 2000 Census has confirmed that a redefinition of the family is taking place in American society: cohabitation increased by 72%, and the percentage of households that were nuclear families (married couples with children under 18) has declined from 45% in 1960 to 30.2% in 1980 to 23.5% in 2000. The outbreak of homosexual marriages in 2004 further exemplifies a reconstruction of traditional marriage and family arrangements. The breakdown of the nuclear family, brought about by the notion of consensual love that makes divorce and alternate family arrangements permissible, has possibly set the stage for a deterioration of ties between the individual and society.

This has not so much been a factor of society becoming less involved in the individual’s life as the converse. The individual has withdrawn from the collective unit of society, and America has recently experienced a crisis of association and social capital. Loeb also suggested that “increasingly, a wall now separates each of us from the world outside, and from others who’ve likewise taken refuge in their own private sanctuaries” in what he labeled “our wholesale retreat from social involvement.” In light of increasing work hours, diminishing job security, escalating health care costs, and less stability in family life, Loeb pointed out that “guarantees that once allowed most of us to take our basic survival for granted have eroded. Small wonder that the common good has become an uncommon concern.”
Postmodernism has seen the disappearance of allegiance to units greater than oneself, whether these units be the family, an organization, or society itself. One reason for this is the breakdown of authority (which we will discuss in detail below) in conjunction with increased moral criticism. Elkind emphasized that “Many children come to school today expecting to relate to teachers as equals.” Without any system of absolutes, it is more difficult to develop the ties that once bound the citizen to society. The disappearance of cultural and economic constraints has led to a steadily increasing degree of freedom among youth throughout virtually all of the developed nations. All of this shows the personal and social reconstruction of the postmodern era.

The movement’s origins can be traced to the sixties and seventies, perhaps born in the upheavals in American society (such as the civil-rights movement, the Vietnam War, and political crises ranging from assassinations to corruption at unprecedented levels) and Europe (such as widespread civil disobedience in France relating to the 1968 Algerian crisis). Since then, it is not difficult to see the effects that postmodern trends have had both in the world of ideas—academia—and in the larger world of human behavior—general society.

We may be tempted to conclude that the events of 11 September 2001 have reduced (or will reduce) the effects of postmodernity by renewing awareness of absolute values, consolidating political authority in the struggle against terrorism, and highlighting the dangers of cultural or ideological differences. Chapter 1 and Chapter 5 documented the effects of the attacks on the national political system and the military. Nonetheless, there is contrary evidence to suggest that these changes are temporary or even illusory to the popular culture. Perhaps the fact that September 11 was the first attack in decades on the American homeland will crystallize public attitudes and return us to modernity, at least for a time. However, the reaction by many in
academia and the media to search for American contributions to these attacks reveals the underlying relativistic postmodern culture. The tragedy of September 11 will probably not generate a cultural shift to undo the developments of the past decades. Continued conflict along cultural lines may return modernist qualities to citizenship, but as of this writing, it is too early to determine whether developments in the war on terror may halt or reverse the civic deconstruction of postmodernism.

While postmodernists resist attempts to subject postmodernism to definition or taxonomy because this violates the very principles of postmodernism, we will still try to arrive at some sort of rough categorization to use as a framework for further analysis. By perceiving trends in postmodernist literature, originating perhaps with the writing of Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard, it is possible to make generalizations (albeit not absolute, a characterization that is perhaps ironic in its relation to postmodernism) about postmodernism. Burbules and Rice defined three features that they feel are common to all postmodernist writing: (1) the rejection of absolutes, (2) the saturation of political discourse with themes of power and dominance, and (3) the celebration of difference. These three concepts frame the following analysis of how postmodernism is manifested in today’s social and civic realm.

In the midst of the discussion of transformational change and the revolution in military affairs, the military is stagnating in the preservation and perpetuation of an old-war status quo. While attempting to wrestle with adaptation to the newly evolved security and technological environments, the twenty-first century military must now find a way to contend with the new societal environment as well. Battisellie found that “postmodern motivations,” departing from conventional motivations such as either a commitment to serve or even personal financial concerns, outnumbered these other incentives in two samples of Italian soldiers performing what
authors have labeled postmodern military operations. These issues imply that the following
discussion is highly pertinent to today’s military.

The Rejection of Absolutes

The search for absolutes is viewed by the postmodernist school of thought as having an
ultimately limiting effect on human potential. By trying to find order where there is none, by
trying to create a system where nothing is systematic, philosophers are revealing their human
need for security and safety. The postmodern approach rejects universalizing philosophies that
seek truth. Anderson described a collapse of belief in which all ideas have no reality
independent of their social construction. According to this perspective, objective thought
systems and goals can also be epistemologically stifling to the human mind. So the search for
and assertion of absolutes not only are futile and meaningless because absolutes cannot be
achieved, they are also themselves dangerous to the realization of human possibility.
Postmodernism asserts the impossibility of arriving at any reliable epistemological or moral
assumptions, which has significant implications for the social contract as it is conceived in
postmodern societies. Botwinick asserted, “postmodernism in the sense of a generalized
agnosticism enables us . . . to be consistently skeptical and relativist.”

Elshtain contended that the moral crisis in America is related to a spreading abdication of
adult responsibility, continuing disintegration of marriage and the family, unacceptably high
levels of violence and disorder, deteriorating educational systems, increasing coarseness in
popular culture, a dramatic undermining of the distinction between right and wrong. This
breakdown in ethical imperatives and absolutes will portend serious consequences for free
societies trying to maintain an armed force through voluntary means. Postmodern attitudes
already prevail in some military circles, in light of the castigation of adultery laws in the
aftermath of the Kelly Flynn debacle and the 1999 recognition of wicca as a legitimate faith by the Army chaplaincy among other examples. The evolution of Army moral education in the decades since World War II may reflect the movement toward a more secular, relativist society. Loveland described a transition in moral and character education that reflected a shift from a religious to a secular, social-scientific orientation, from an absolutist to a relativist view of moral values, and from an authoritarian to a nondirective mode of instruction.

Social pressures against conscription can be seen in democratic countries that have been susceptible to postmodern trends in the past several years. Snider, Nagl, and Pfaff noted that the rejection of any objective truth or standards is a harmful trend for sustaining a professional military ethic. This indicates that maintaining the necessary behavioral and moral standards needed by a professional military will become more and more difficult in the prevailing climate of contemporary society.

The emergence of uncertainty is manifested not only in the relativist ethical climate of our age, but also in the exigencies of contemporary life. Particularly in the military, a series of innovations in information, biological and other technologies is blurring the distinction between civilian and military targets. In addition, the spectrum of operations is moving from war fighting to a variety of nontraditional missions. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, asymmetrical and nontraditional threats in the form of ideological terrorists have assumed greater salience in military planning and action. These circumstances have created greater uncertainty within the military itself. Uncertainty has also become a common condition in the lives of the population from which the military must draw. Thomas cited surveys on the American family finding that over 40 percent of American children have no personal goals for the future, inadequate education, and a sense of hopelessness about their lives.
Moskos and Burk’s analysis argued that the transition from modern certainty to postmodern uncertainty “about the meaning or purpose of central roles and institutions [and] various collective activities” is the central social development relevant to changing military organization.\textsuperscript{41} This is true inasmuch as the unwillingness to enunciate great certainties has resulted in societies being unprepared to fight for them.\textsuperscript{42}

On an individual level, it means that the military will find fewer citizens willing to wear a uniform and serve in the armed forces. Today’s citizen is frequently described by what Sandel called the unencumbered self, who is not tied down by any commitments to family or community.\textsuperscript{43} This developing civic conception may be unsuited for the obligation required by the state. The motivation to volunteer for service as well as the expectations of conduct in the military are both based on ethical standards that are becoming less relevant to today’s society. Unfortunately for the military, which still constructs its demands on the basis of ethical obligation, “the suspension of ethical judgment, in the conception or misconception of pluralism now current, makes it inappropriate to speak of ‘ethical commitments’ at all.”\textsuperscript{44}

**Power and Authority**

The second idea, that of the discourse of power, is reminiscent of Marxist ideology that brought attention to the oppression of the have-nots by the haves, of the workers by the owners, or more recently, of dependency theory in international relations, which also frames interactions in the context of power, focusing on the exploitation of the Third World by the industrialized world. Postmodernism admonishes us that all discourse involves political considerations on the most fundamental level.\textsuperscript{45} The deconstruction of “natural” hierarchies has made us realize that what once seemed transparent and unquestionable is neither. In the context of the “radical unsettling that is postmodernism,” the academy finds that it is no longer outside the
power/knowledge nexus that necessarily advantages some and disadvantages others, but falling more and more within that nexus.\textsuperscript{46}

Postmodern society is not fixated on power in all communication as postmodernist critiques are. However, society has become more sensitive and critical of modernist power structures; those who formerly had a claim to authority no longer enjoy such privilege. This diminution of authority is related to the rejection of absolutes, in that authorities’ moral power bases no longer retain the value they once had. Sennett observed a reconstruction of the power structure in society in which there was a rejection of traditional authority, which he attributed to increased civic freedom.\textsuperscript{47} A comprehensive study of public opinion finds that confidence in major institutions is in a pattern of decline that “raises questions about the legitimacy of our major social and political order.”\textsuperscript{48} A decade later, another survey on the political climate in this country found a sharply fragmented society, sharing only one major conviction—the belief that American decline is imminent or in progress.\textsuperscript{49} The weakening of authority in major social institutions is resulting in fear and mistrust among citizens.\textsuperscript{50} These findings are significant for the military, which is characterized by a stratification of rank, in which great responsibility is placed in higher ranks, and the culture pays considerable deference to superiors.\textsuperscript{51}

Several causes for this debilitation of authority have been proposed. Kurth suggested that the information economy and the displacement of the industrial economy have increased individual choice and devalued conventional hierarchies.\textsuperscript{52} Burk asserted that the fragmentation of authority originated from the progression away from power being vested in whole, relatively self-sufficient social organizations to more numerous, and sometimes overlapping, bases of power.\textsuperscript{53} Hirschhorn claimed that new authority relationships in the postmodern era have developed because organizations are flatter, there are fewer opportunities for upward mobility,
and constant technological and economic changes cause increasing instability. New relationships to authority exist in part because leaders are not as powerful as we would like them to be, and instead, we must rely on our own personal authority to find that which we can control and trust to be stable and reliable.

Lasch contended that the “crisis of authority” has developed because of the degradation of the professions. As the service to society of a calling has increasingly been overtaken by careerism, institutions no longer can command the respect and confidence that was at one time vested in them. The military, especially in the officer corps, is subject to the dangers of careerism as other fields are. In addition, there is evidence that many in and out of the armed services consider the military to be an occupation rather than a civic institution. Related work also proposed that prospective soldiers would view military service more as part of the job market than in terms of civic obligations as the military assumed more traits of a competitive entity in the civilian market for human resources.

The collapse of authority structures in postmodern society has had visible effects on military organization. Human resources issues have become especially cogent for senior military leadership in recent years. While difficulties have emerged because of these developments, it may lead to better and more effective models of leadership for the armed services. The deficit of social capital that the crisis in authority has created, however, should be a compelling concern for the military as it approaches the transition period that is currently under way.

**Difference**

In postmodernist terms, the acceptance of difference goes beyond even extremely tolerant and accepting paradigms put forth in the context of modernism. For toleration is not the principle upon which postmodern respect of difference is based. The term toleration suggests an
undervaluing of diversity compared to the postmodernist conception of it. Tolerance implies the mere indulgence in or forbearance of a situation. But to adherents of postmodernism, difference or plurality is not viewed as a state to be tolerated on the path to some unified ideal; on the contrary, postmodernism calls for a promotion of difference, a recognition that difference is an abiding (and desirable) existential quality. This questions the assumption that the nature of community relies on uniformity. As uniformity and consensus are replaced by diversity and "dissensus," society may become fragmented. This will alter the prominence and nature of national citizenship and perhaps the propensity of Americans to take part in a culture that emphasizes uniformity. In fact, these effects may already be under way.

The previous attitudinal orientation to create an undifferentiated unity that has been the basis for democratic politics will no longer be realistic in the coming decades. The reconceptualization of democracy by a society that has abandoned modernist assumptions will entail a movement away from the desire to preserve similarity. The fragmentation that has emerged will solidify. Hunter argued that the major social issues of our time are characterized by greater fragmentation and polarization, with decreasing ability by the differing factions to find any common ground.

The Post-Modernity Project found that people are now defining themselves, and their enemies, by their race, gender, ethnicity, or some other social characteristic. In so doing, the most important democratic category, the citizen, will dissolve in this new ideology of difference. There has been a greater "emphasis on the political significance of the sub-groups that are defined through gender, ethnicity, religion, disability, sexuality, language and so on." A large number of contemporary social movements are rooted in the common yet divisive identification of race, class, and gender, and political activity has been ordered around these identities rather
than around commonalities. Beiner pointed out significantly that fixation on cultural differences within the political community creates difficulty in sustaining an experience of common citizenship. In addition, the prospects of difference and multicultural rights will complicate the challenges of the construction of citizenship. The increasing prevalence of difference leaves us uncertain about the possibility of a “theory of citizenship.” Without the institution of citizenship, the increasingly tenuous prominence of civic obligation in which military service has traditionally been vested will become even less reliable.

The trend towards inclusiveness of all possible cultures and perspectives makes it difficult to establish a moral sensibility because it resists the advocacy of any content-based morality. The fragmentation of society results in a moral culture that is “authoritative in social life and binding on individual conscience only in the particularity of moral traditions and the communities that embody them.” As these communities hold less sway over individuals in a world where family and social ties erode, the basis for any moral authority decreases.

Global Effects

It is not difficult to see the overlapping and linked nature of the three areas of analysis in our discussion. The disappearance of absolutes, the sensitivity to and ultimate rejection of existing power structures, and the celebration of difference have each contributed to the others. For instance, the rejection of absolutes and the breakdown of authority are intimately related. Both of these trends may have found a strong influence from the fragmentation of society, which has probably reinforced the abandonment of past moral assumptions and patterns of behavior. While it was useful to categorize the postmodernist movement into various components for analysis, the effects on military personnel issues are better assessed in terms of global effects that have developed as a result of the three interrelated themes discussed above.
Self-Absorption. Traditional motivations, whether economic or idealtic, have been replaced by attitudes that may be described as self-oriented or individualistic, even narcissistic. These attitudes are perhaps related to a belief system that frequently coexists with the postmodernist relativism among many Americans today. Snider, Nagl, and Pfaff have labeled this belief system unreflective egoism, in which an individual has an objective standard—self-interest—upon which all moral decisions must rely. Since such a standard can vary over time, and is hardly absolute, it is possible to simultaneously hold the relativist beliefs of postmodernism along with a self-centered decision-making ethic.

Coker reflected on the nature of the changing movement towards an egoist ethic. His analysis is based in part on temporal considerations. He felt that the modern era was obsessed with the future, on being remembered by posterity. This preoccupation was a major motivation for the collective courage of the generations of the modern era. The self-abnegating sacrifice, a major feature of the military ethic as it was practiced and evolved during that time, was, and must be, based on posterity. Current trends indicate that this part of the ethic will diminish. Our postmodern world by comparison lives for the present, for the latest fashion or style, for the contemporary tune or book that lasts a year, not a lifetime. We no longer care about, or believe in, the afterlife. The West even has a declining fertility rate, though it seems determined to extend the life cycle.

Furthermore, the phenomenon of child abuse, which emerged as a major problem in the past few decades, is possibly evidence of the postmodern fixation with the self and the present rather than posterity and the future. In 1962, an article appeared in the Journal of the American Mental Association under the title “The Battered Child Syndrome,” and since then it has been the subject of significant media, clinical, legal, and public attention. Coker observed that the
situation appears to be getting worse rather than better. Not only is child abuse on the increase, so is child murder. In the past 40 years in the United States, recorded figures for children murdered in the first year of their lives has doubled. The figure for children between the ages of one and four has quadrupled. Among African-Americans, more than 20 children per 100,000 are killed. Sixty percent of those charged with murder are parents of the child. Perhaps the expansion of abortion rights as a constitutionally protected liberty is another indicator of the preeminence of the focus on the self rather than posterity. All of these trends are indications that children have replaced minorities or women as the targets of social oppression, and they are characteristic of an age in which members of society think obsessively of themselves as the society in the past age thought of its posterity.

**The Future of Service.** Peters pointed out that service is becoming an experience dominated by a private, intimate, or sentimental language and culture rather than the function of community that it had been in the past. Such a trend prevents or limits the ability of participants to create useful frameworks for the difficult work of public problem-solving. The position that democracy can dispense with civic virtue is not a new one. According to this way of thinking, it is liberal institutions, not the character of citizens, that make democratic societies work. “The impending crisis of competence and civic trust, however, casts a heavy pall of doubt over the agreeable assumption that institutions, as opposed to character, provide all the virtue democracy needs.” The military may be a major area in which postmodern democracy is found wanting by the requirements of the nation and its security.

The nature of contemporary citizenship is still evolving and uncertain. Habermas offered “two mutually contradictory interpretations” of the citizen’s role that pit the Aristotelian communitarian against the Lockean individualist, with each vying for “pride of place” in the
philosophy of law. Beiner introduced his book by noting the "competing perspectives" of the liberal, "emphasizing the individual, and the individual’s capacity to transcend group or collective identity," and the communitarian, "emphasizing the cultural or ethnic group, solidarity among those sharing a history or tradition." Bridges also emphasizes dualisms such as civic freedom versus civic good. These constructions of citizenship leave us feeling that service is incompatible with liberty.

The prevailing value of individualism is consistent with the trends of postmodernist thought. The rejection of absolutes and the abandonment of authority have left the individual or the self as the significant social unit, and the emphasis on difference over unity has reinforced the marginalization of community. As Bacevich observed, the concept of civic obligation has become an "anachronism." He relates this decline to the dwindling voter participation, but other subtler trends such as a steady decrease in political interest and volunteer association among Americans have been noted. "To the question ‘Who will serve?’ the nation’s answer has now become: ‘Those who want to serve.’" Significantly, those who want to serve have become fewer and fewer, and if existing sociological patterns persist, they may become still fewer. Voluntary service itself has led to a reexamination of soldiers’ rights and responsibilities and has done much to reconstruct the nature of a citizen’s military service in the past few decades.

Trends of diminishing civic obligation and diminishing civility are related to the "plurality of ethical commitments," which "means that we make no demands on anyone and acknowledge no one’s right to make any demands on ourselves." The illegitimacy of demands is intrinsically connected to the egoism of the postmodern society. Worldwide, there is a "growing preoccupation of military personnel with their own welfare."
Chapter 7: The Garrison State

Consider the modern airport in a developed country. Uniformed and armed security personnel roam the premises. Citizens are subjected to numerous searches of their persons and effects. Multiple forms of personal identification are required for all seeking access. Metal detectors, x-ray machines, and other instruments directed at the prevention of violence are commonplace. Rigorous screening procedures control the movement of individuals through areas of varying levels of restriction. Loudspeakers with synthesized voices routinely announce warnings such as the consequences of leaving baggage unattended due to the possibility of bombing. These precautions and numerous others are reminiscent of a military garrison subject to espionage, sabotage, or attack by a foreign adversary. However, the airport reveals another dimension – civilians going about their affairs in pursuit of family vacations or business travel rather than soldiers in constant readiness for armed conflict and restaurants and shops reflective of life in the brand-name, materialist modern marketplace rather than the colorless, uniform world of mess halls and post exchanges. The garrison and society are starkly juxtaposed in the atmosphere of the airport, and even in this restrictive manifestation of the state’s police power, terrorists were able to exploit vulnerabilities to carry out the most massive single terrorist operation in world history.

There are indications that security in other realms of society must also increase in order to prevent other domestic vulnerabilities from being targeted by terrorist aggression. When Harold Lasswell framed the construct of the garrison state,¹ he saw preparation for and deterrence of conventional war as the major impetus for the militarization of modern states. The emergence of a decades-long Cold War seemed to confirm these predictions as runaway arms races and enormous standing armies dominated government expenditures and public policy for
the world's two major powers. The implosion of the Soviet Union was to produce a peace dividend from the demilitarization of both Russia and the United States. In so doing, it would seem that the dangers in Lasswell's warnings would not come to pass. However, the terrorist threat that has increased in salience, culminating (as of this writing) with the horrific attacks on the World Trade Center, may lead to alternative versions of Lasswell's construct. No longer focused on the state-to-state violence, major states must now contend with the asymmetrical menace of non-state actors. In the bipolar system of the Cold War, the US and the USSR were the most relevant units of analysis for Lasswell's theory. Today, in an arguably unipolar world, the United States will constitute the focus of this analysis, although the terror-focused garrison state exists to greater or lesser degrees in Europe, Israel, China, Russia, India, Japan, and others.

While states no longer appear likely to evolve into a system of armed camps directed at one another, the threat of terrorism may necessitate the garrisoning of society and enhance the role of military and police organizations as Lasswell warned. Chapter 7 explores this hypothesis and the effects of the new age on domestic security. This chapter delves into another dimension of civil-military relations, the degree to which the militarization of American society will take place during the new age. It is first necessary to define the theory of the garrison state and to what degree it has evolved over the past half-century and then to address implications of this threat for state security and individual and social civil liberties.

**The Garrison State Theory**

The theoretical origins of the state have involved a supreme authority that has been accomplished to varying degrees throughout the practical existence of the state. The classical theory of the state was perhaps most compellingly articulated by Thomas Hobbes in *Leviathan* (1651). Hobbes argued that human beings covenant together to form the state, an artificial
person endowed with the power over its subjects to prevent the anarchy of the “state of nature.” Bodin similarly viewed state sovereignty as an “absolute and perpetual power vested in a commonwealth.” The justification for the loss of liberty implied by this arrangement is the security of the individual. Ferguson extends the point further, arguing that a strong, centralized sovereign both preserves and threatens civil society in a populous nation.

Tocqueville warned of the possibility of a democratically elected despotic state. Although Tocqueville’s fear was the concentration of state power in a centralized authority whose mission was equal treatment of all citizens, his conclusions are applicable to the garrison possibility. Whether it is the drive for social equality or national security, Tocqueville’s concerns over the possibility of despotism in the midst of democracy are relevant to this analysis.

This theoretical basis has been partially validated by actual events. Historically, the functions of the state were military rather than economic and focused on international affairs rather than domestic ones. Although multiple justifications existed for the state, war was the most important of these. As states developed over time, their power and roles have expanded in societies. External threats played a key role in expanding state power and cohesiveness.

Hirshman’s framework explained the consolidation of state power through the “loyalty” option that predominates when external threats lead to the exclusion of the “exit” and “voice” options. Thomas Paine stated it well: War is the “art of conquering at home.” The predominance of security as a function of government is reflected in a pre-September 11 report that asserted, “Homeland defense will always be the most essential function of our government.”

Harold Lasswell developed the theory of the garrison state in response to his vision of the military competition of several powerful states dominating the international system. Lasswell’s theory was partially fulfilled by the emergence of the Cold War, but the full extent of his
predictions were never actualized. The main components of the garrison state include compulsion, full labor, abolition of political parties, abolition of legislatures, and abolition of elections. These extremes never came to pass, but other elements of the garrison construct have to some degree emerged. For instance, the nexus between civil defense, military force, and disaster response have led to the fulfillment of Lasswell’s argument that specialists of violence will train in skills that we have traditionally accepted as part of modern civilian management. Lasswell later reevaluated the garrison state, beginning the assessment by considering future expectations of violence. The dangers of perpetual crisis are foremost among Lasswell’s concerns. He concluded that two possibilities could emerge: a garrison-prison state or a free man’s commonwealth (in which capitalists and socialistic institutions will be merged in various combinations). The perpetual crisis of an ongoing war on terrorism was not part of Lasswell’s original thought process. However, there is striking similarity between his central theoretical problem and the practical problems of sustaining civil liberties while facing the challenge of an active crisis of national security with no apparent end.

Other theorists expanded upon Lasswell’s original constructs. Dribble’s discussion of a garrison society – one in which it makes no sense to ask whether or not civilians control the military – is worth consideration. The garrison society’s institutions and military, economic, and political leaders are completely interdependent with complementary goals and interests. Traditional boundaries between military and civilian spheres are no longer meaningful. Dribble defined the garrison society more specifically:

(1) a large and powerful military that penetrates deeply into civilian life; (2) the great importance of civilians in military affairs, the increasing resemblance between military officers and civilian executives in politics and business, and the greater contact and cooperation between officers and civilians in politics, in science, and in business; such that (3) the traditional boundaries between civilian and military society break down; and (4) the military are blended into an alliance with government and with large corporations, whose goals include (a) counter revolution and American
hegemony abroad and (b) a large dose of centralized, executive control of the economy and of politics at home.\textsuperscript{17}

Seemingly contradicting this prediction is the well-documented divergence between civilian and military elites.\textsuperscript{18} "The U.S. military is now more alienated from its civilian leadership than at any time in American history," were the first words of the article "Out of Control," describing the crisis in civil-military relations.\textsuperscript{19} While it is true that this divergence may contraindicate the nexus of civilian and military control, it does not completely dismiss the possibility of a government where distinctions between civilian and military functions are meaningless. A war on terrorism can accomplish such a convergence to a greater extent than other alternatives, including the Cold War or massive conventional mobilization. This is because military intervention occurs in the homeland, and the homeland is also the front line for the terrorist’s war.

C. Wright Mills discussed a tripartite elite in the 1956 \textit{Power Elite}.\textsuperscript{20} Mills felt that the corporate, government, and military hierarchies of American society dominate all other forms of social organization. He makes a convincing argument, comparing these structures to education, the family, and religion. He pointed out that the government relies on the indoctrination of the education system, and could easily change the system if this support were not available. He also observed that a corporate bankruptcy rate similar to the divorce rate among Americans families would be catastrophic for the economy. Finally, the commitment from believers to their churches would create military crisis if it were a model for members of the military. In addition to the precedence of the political economy and the military, Mills argued that there are numerous linkages between these power institutions in the modern capitalist nation. The economic impact of the September 11 attacks would have supported Mills’ argument, and he also had ample evidence from his time to make his case.
Foucault's surveillance state theory is also relevant to this analysis. His theory is based on the contention that power and knowledge are closely interconnected. The state capitalizes on this power-knowledge nexus through the instrument of surveillance. 21 Although surveillance is a passive activity that does not necessarily physically restrict individuals, it is a form of repression due to the power than can be obtained and exercised through the accumulation of knowledge. Foucault’s theory is based on Jeremy Bentham’s proposal on developing the ideal prison through the use of the panopticon, an instrument of constant and complete surveillance. 22 Foucault warns of the dangers of expanding this surveillance to the rest of society, and although Foucault did not argue on the technological opportunities for surveillance afforded by electronic media, such developments only bolster his argument. The panoptic vision of Foucault is relevant in many of the counterterrorism methods proposed in the wake of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks. Lyon argued that the panoptic has more descriptive utility than Orwellian images (which must include Lasswell’s theory) as a metaphor for state control. 23 The surveillance technologies and the powers exercised by the American government may create a synergy, in which the convergence of various types of surveillance lead to a total effect greater than merely the sum of the parts. 24

Aaron Friedberg theorized that the Cold War led to the development of a “contract state” rather than a garrison state due to reliance on the market and private industry rather than public organization for provision of military resources. 25 Friedberg later expanded his argument to include descriptions of how the political culture of the United States, suspicious of state power, prevented the expansion of the state in spite of the external provocation of the Cold War. 26 While this anti-statist tendency may prevent a terror-oriented garrison, the changing nature of the threat requires exploration.
Chief Justice Rehnquist documented, with approval, the necessity of suspending American civil liberties during wartime. This tension is relevant to the current threat environment because of the declaration of "war" on terror. There was sufficient reason to adopt the "state of war" narrative, and the domestic and international use of military force since 11 September 2001 has in part justified this construction. The term has been controversial.

American leaders have often adopted a call to war to struggle against social ills, and the war on drugs has also included limited international military activity and enhanced domestic security policies, but there is mixed similarity of the war on terror to more traditional wars. As Gore Vidal observed, U.S. case law requires war be declared against "a sovereign nation, not a bunch of radicals." Statements of Secretaries Colin Powell and Donald Rumsfeld asserted that the "war will be won when Americans feel secure again, an objective that sounds more like psychotherapy than international politics." Thus, the ambiguity and permanence of the war on terror are reminiscent of the war on poverty, but the political stakes, the use of military force, and the effects on civil society are reminiscent of historical examples of American armed conflict.

Significant problems emerge from the declaration of a war on terror. The unclear enemy leads to an indefinite stalemate. Declaring war on an idea leads to little chance for resolution, but in the case of terror, the threat to the survival of society produces restrictions on civil liberties that wars on poverty or even crime or drugs do not. Rehnquist's argument implies that civil liberties are suspended temporarily because war is a temporary matter, and it is the prospective continued threat of non-state terrorism that distinguishes this situation from previous conflicts. As Stanley remarked about the Lasswell garrison thesis, "The central hypothesis here is that the presence of continued crises radically alters the structure of societies." The style of governance
required by conditions of war is opposed to the idea of civil association reflected in the American constitutional state.  

Another issue that makes the current concept of homeland security problematic is the mingling of the two categories “acts of war” and “disasters.” This issue emerged as military targets are no longer relevant due to the technology available in the modern arsenal. Lasswell observed in his postulation of the garrison state theory, “The growth of aerial warfare in particular has tended to abolish the distinction between military and civilian functions.” Hannah Arendt later continued this line of thinking by assessing the impact of nuclear weapons: “...the history of warfare in our century could almost be told as the story of the growing incapacity of the army to fulfill [the basic function of defense], until today the strategy of deterrence has openly changed the role of the military from that of a protector into that of a belated and essentially futile avenger.” The authors understood the implications of the aerial bombing of World War II and the nuclear threat of the Cold War. They could not have foreseen the destructive asymmetric power of terrorists with means of mass destruction (whether these be airplanes filled with fuel, homemade bombs as used in the Oklahoma City bombing, or more conventional weapons of mass destruction of a radiological, chemical, or biological variety obtained on a black market). Lasswell seems prophetic in his statement, “In some periods of modern warfare, casualties among civilians may outnumber casualties of the armed forces.”

Jervis observed that the construct of deterrence replaced the classical concept of defense, in which the armed forces literally stand between the population and the enemy. While deterrence was ultimately predicated upon the mutual vulnerability of states’ civilian populations, terrorists have several features that reduce the utility of this model. First, terrorists are often non-state actors, and they are thus not necessarily subject to the massive retaliatory
response to which the opposing superpowers were. In addition, since terrorists are not necessarily linked to any state or national population, the response would not be commensurate. The terrorist is generally striking a noncombatant target, but in hunting down the terrorist organization, the response is fundamentally focused only on combatants willing to give their lives. Exacerbating this is the fact that terrorists are so ideologically committed to their cause that they often welcome death, as much propaganda has shown that martyrdom has significant rewards in the afterlife and terrorist techniques have recently tended more and more to the suicidal.

Stanley felt that Lasswell perceived a “democratization of risk” due to the development of atomic weaponry, rocketry, missiles, and increasingly efficient delivery systems, thus altering the previously held American assumption of invulnerability, an assumption based on the great oceans separating the United States from any major enemies. Stanley observed that technology reduced the buffer of these oceans, but terrorist techniques may prove ultimately more instrumental in this area than previous developments because of their self-conscious attempt to randomly democratize risk in order to accomplish the imposition of terror.

Lasswell “visualized the development of the garrison state as a product of the rise to power of the military elite in response to long-term international tension. That is, he hypothesized that freedom within a society is reduced as the preparation for war becomes the dominant thrust of society.” The age of terror may lead to such tendencies and the ascendency of a military (or security or homeland defense) class as Lasswell warned in the different context in which his analysis was originally framed. Alexander Hamilton expressed the domestic dangers of military mobilization well:

The violent destruction of life and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and
security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more
safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.\textsuperscript{42} 

A recent analysis suggested that a “Global Leviathan” may be the essential response for
preventing “atrocious fanaticism” that may threaten the very survival of humanity.\textsuperscript{43} This
leviathan would no doubt begin with the United States, and perhaps nascent forms already have.
Between changing state domestic activity and foreign incursions, the United States is
aggressively acting to prevent the manifestation of atrocious fanaticism that threatens its citizens.
At this point, it would be worthwhile to assess the nature of the threat that is precipitating these
changes.

The New Threat

\textit{The New York Times} summarized the effects of terror on Americans during the
emotionally intense beltway sniper shootings. The article effectively captured the panic and fear
among the public in the area, although it should be noted that this threat was minimal compared
to the level of civil disturbance in further developed garrison states such as Bosnia or Israel:

We don’t want to buy gas. We don’t want our children going to school. We don’t want to shop. We
don’t want to drive to work. We may deliberate for hours whether we go to the grocery store or
pharmacy. These days, we cringe beneath the shadow and roar of every low-flying passenger plane.
We worry about opening our mail. At the office, we demand X-ray scanners and other high-tech
devices that might detect explosives or anthrax. We decide not to buy that new house or car. Really,
we rationalize, we don’t need anything right now. New clothes can wait. A dinner out at our favorite
restaurant isn’t a necessity. In fact, let’s not go anywhere. Forget vacation plans or conventions.
Forget any activity that might involve travel or expense.\textsuperscript{44} 

The panic incited by this incident was significant, and it likely had roots in the popular
consternation over the events of 11 September 2001. In at least two ways, September 11 was a
watershed. The United States had been the victim of earlier terrorist attacks, including the
devastating bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and an earlier attack on
the World Trade Center. The 2001 World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks were not new in
the sense of the beginning of terrorist aggression on American soil. However, it was significant
in explosively revealing trends that had been mounting for several years. The discussion of the
terror threat below will include numerous analyses conducted before September 11 that are
entirely consistent with the events that transpired on that day. Moreover, the 2001 World Trade
Center attack was a watershed in American public consciousness. In the past, planning and
preparations for armed conflict seemed to implicitly assume that U.S. territory would remain a
sanctuary.\textsuperscript{45} Shattering a complacent sense of invulnerability, the bombing moved these threats
to salience in the public perception. This fact is almost as significant as the nature of the threat
itself for the formulation of the garrison state. The Hart-Rudman commission warned that
“America will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland, and our
military superiority will not protect us” and that “Americans will likely die on American soil,
possibly in large numbers.”\textsuperscript{46}

Several factors in the international system have led to these developments.\textsuperscript{47} Post-Cold
War American military operations have taught competitors that successful challenges to the
United States must be asymmetrical. Indeed, vulnerabilities inside the open American borders
may be easier to exploit than an attempt against even a small element. In addition, strategic and
economic incentives have motivated states such as Russia, China, and North Korea to proliferate
weapons of mass destruction. This problem has been compounded by globalization and the
enhancement of non-state actors. Individuals and their extended action networks in the form of
non-governmental organization (NGOs) have evolved as important actors on the world scene.
The propensity of such actors to engage in international violence has reduced accountability,
restraint, and predictability. Above all, deterrence is no longer a viable option against such
adversaries.
The result of these developments has been a progressively greater concentration on domestic threats—both by adversaries and authorities—as well as further complicating factors such as a possible significant period of time between the attack and its discovery or the debilitating effects of mass panic in addition to physical consequences of domestic attacks. The threat is real and compelling, and this is necessary for meaningful transformation of the state. (Perhaps the actual existence of a threat is less important than the perceived threat, but the citizens of dominant powers have historically rarely overestimated threats. Therefore, the magnitude of the real threat must be great because the perceived threat will be smaller.) After having reviewed the nature of the threat, it will be fruitful to explore the state’s response thus far.

The State

There is little doubt that the state has enhanced its use of power in the aftermath of September 11. The questions remain in what ways has this power base expanded and whether these enhancements are appropriate. Much of the dialogue on reacting to the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks insists, or more often implicitly assumes, that the liberties and public safety must be protected through unanimous acceptance of the application of technology to new invasions of privacy.

Invasions of privacy run counter to the traditional philosophy of American democracy, and that the tensions created by this conflict may ultimately lead to a break down of the conditions necessary for a free and democratic state. Over time public support for increased civic restrictions will erode, leaving permanent restrictions that may turn citizens against government officials and civic participation. There has been no evidence of an adequate level of civic engagement necessary for sustaining efforts to prevent terrorism. The post-September 11 response has involved little change to the level of civic participation.
Jervis argued that one of the long-run consequences of September 11 is almost certain to be a larger and more powerful state apparatus. He cites the deployment of the National Guard to New York City and airports across the country, the infusion of federal moneys into affected locales, federalization of airport security, and other expansions of government power that revealed the propensity of Americans to turn to national government rather than other support systems in times of crisis. In particular question has been the extent to which military involvement ought be permitted in these situations. America’s Achilles Heel suggested that one of the features of terrorism is that boundaries of authority to respond are ambiguous because defense, law enforcement, and protection of civil liberties overlap. Such emergencies merge national security, law enforcement, and emergency management and thus invoke legal authorities that permit and prohibit different kinds of conduct by the military under different circumstances.

A basic tenet of this relationship between military and civil authority has been the Posse Comitatus, which prohibits military intervention in American civilian law enforcement. Quillen suggests legislators originally designed the law to end the practice of using federal troops in the Reconstruction Era to police state elections in former Confederate states. Since then, the law has evolved to reflect a more fundamental feature of American political sociology – hostility to a powerful military that could impose itself into domestic affairs. Although current understanding of the principle of Posse Comitatus restricts military participation, few areas remain in which military activity would be precluded in times of national emergency. This is due to statutory exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act passed in the past decade as well as the general Constitutional authority of the President to preserve order. The emerging threat posed by terrorism has blurred once clear lines defined by Posse Comitatus because military capabilities
may be needed to react to these contingencies and also because the distinction between a crime and act of war is not clear in such cases. Unfortunately, ambiguity in legal authority can provoke or tempt potential aggressors or contribute to mass panic.55

Reviewing the progress of anti-terrorism legislation may prove worthwhile. There has been criticism of the legal infrastructure after the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks on grounds that US law fails to make defeating terrorism a national priority and that technology has outpaced the statutes. Law enforcement tools created for rotary telephones are unprepared for e-mail, the internet, mobile communications, and voice mail.56 Despite these evaluations, there have been efforts at improving the state of the nation’s level of vulnerability to terrorist attacks in the years leading up to the World Trade Center attack. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 designated the FBI as the lead federal organization for crisis management in 1995, to include efforts to prevent or stop an attack, arrest terrorists, and gather evidence for criminal prosecution. As multi-agency efforts grew more complex, PDD 62 established a National Coordinator for Security, Critical Infrastructure, and Counterterrorism as part of the National Security Council Staff in 1998. The establishment of Joint Task Force - Civil Support in Norfolk, Virginia, commanded by a National Guard general officer, initiated the coordination of Department of Defense support to state Governors, FEMA, and the FBI in complex emergencies other than natural disasters.57

A more recent development in counterterror legislation is House Resolution (HR) 2975, the PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) combined with the Senate version, S. 1510, or the USA (United and Strengthening America) Act of 2001, collectively entitled the USA-PATRIOT Act of 2001. The changes encompassed in these statutes have largely enjoyed popular and governmental acceptance with
minimal criticism on civil libertarian grounds. A pre-2001 analysis cautions on the dangers of
overreaction, pointing out that the quest for absolute security may result in the destruction of
democratic values with little reason to believe that excessively forceful strategies to combat
terrorism would be effective.\footnote{58} However, the analysis also concluded that some increase in
domestic surveillance is appropriate considering the current threat.

The USA-PATRIOT Act directs greater coordination and information exchange between
various governmental agencies responsible for intelligence or law enforcement activities. This
guidance has been somewhat controversial on various grounds. Intelligence and other sensitive
information are usually compartmented so that no single individual can access so much
intelligence as to be severely damaging to national interests if that information is compromised.
This is important for the United States, where the single greatest source of disclosure of sensitive
information to foreign intelligence collectors is American agents taking their information to the
free market. Another consideration reflects the concerns of Posse Comitatus. Intelligence and
surveillance agencies coordinating too closely with law enforcement could lead to abuses of
power and excessive imposition of the government into the private sphere. A recent white paper
on the USA-PATRIOT Act suggested that multiple government agencies in the same intelligence
operation might serve to check potential overreaching by individuals within one of the agencies
rather than threatening civil liberties.\footnote{59} In addition, bureaucratic compromises, rather than an
interest in promoting civil liberties, led to the development of many of the boundaries between
government agencies. The Act seeks to correct these deficiencies.

Another significant issue in the USA-PATRIOT Act is the expansion of surveillance
powers of government agencies. While it has been argued that “In reality and contrary to
conventional wisdom, the CIA has \textit{no} weapons with which to threaten civil liberties,”\footnote{60} the
expanded domestic surveillance powers of the FBI and other federal agencies are significant concerns among many critics. Technology has evolved, leading to new ways for terrorists to gather and disseminate intelligence and to communicate to plan and execute operations, but the tactics legally available to law enforcement have not kept pace with technological development. The underdeveloped concept of electronic privacy is relevant to the developing application of law enforcement, and this concept will perhaps surface more frequently in academic and legal circles. Requirements such as the one to continually reapply for authority to investigate telephonic communications in venues throughout the nation hamper the ability of law enforcement to follow the chain of communications.  

The various parts of the Act permit the government to expand its powers in specific ways. Section 201 adds chemical weapons and terrorism as offenses that are subject to wiretap regulations. Section 203 provides for limited sharing of criminal investigative information that was before not permissible, including disclosure of “matters involving foreign intelligence or counterintelligence” occurring before a grand jury to “any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense or national security official in order to assist the official receiving that information in the performance of his official duties.” Section 203 also allows law enforcement to release the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication to any other federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official.

Section 206 of the USA-PATRIOT Act modifies the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to allow surveillance of a person who uses multiple communications devices or locations (rather than requiring law enforcement to reapply for authorization for surveillance as the individual changes modes of communication). In Section 209, the Act authorizes government
access to voice mails with a court order supported by probable cause in the manner in which
e-mails may currently be accessed. Before this revision, the government needed to apply for a
Title III wiretap order before it could obtain unopened voice mail. Section 210 broadens the
types of records that law enforcement may obtain from electronic communications service
providers by forcing providers to disclose the means and source of payment. Section 216 of the
Act authorizes courts to grant pen register and trap and trace ("PR/TT") orders that are valid
anywhere in the nation and to facilities other than telephone lines (such as the internet). Section
220 of the Act provides for nationwide service of search warrants for certain electronic evidence.
Previously, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, the evidence had to be obtained
"within the district" of the issuing court. Finally, according to Section 905, "the Attorney
General, or the head of any other department or agency of the Federal Government with law
enforcement responsibilities shall expeditiously disclose to the Director of Central Intelligence
... foreign intelligence acquired by an element of the Department of Justice or an element of
such department or agency, as the case may be in the course of a criminal investigation."

In addition to the legislative developments, the executive’s enforcement has sparked
controversy. The treatment of US citizen Jose Padilla and Qatari student Ali Saleh Kahlalah al-
Marri provide good examples of the issues at tension. Padilla was arrested in Chicago in 2002
for targeting a radiological attack. Al-Marri was arrested in 2001 in Peoria, Illinois for being a
"sleeper," or inactive terrorist standing ready for future attacks. Both men were declared enemy
combatants, allowing the government to hold them indefinitely without charging them or
providing evidence of any crime. The declaration of combatant status carries serious
implications; in addition to allowing the government to hold such men indefinitely, the laws of
war allow enemy combatants to be shot on sight even if they provide no immediate threat (unless they are trying to surrender or are incapacitated).62

The law has evolved so as to expand state surveillance and law enforcement powers. This has occurred through enhanced information sharing and methods of surveillance. While the state has responded to the growth of the terrorist threat over the past decade, the recent USA-PATRIOT Act codifies many further changes. The explosive and sudden attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001 allowed the development of these changes to make significant and almost immediate progress. The state has extensively expanded in recent years in response to the threat environment.

Conclusions

Despite significant changes in the state’s use of power, there is no evidence that a garrison state currently exists in the United States. The state of war narrative that has surfaced in recent times is, according to one author, “likely to emerge as the primary perspective in the near future.”63 One might agree with this author's conclusion based on several factors. First, the state has reacted with increasing coercion in response to the increasing threat. This progression has taken place over several years, but it accelerated rapidly in response to September 11. Second, the level of vulnerability is extremely high and seems to be getting worse. Demographic and economic patterns in the developing world indicate that the United States is losing hegemony and will no longer maintain its current level of dominance that it has maintained since the end of the Cold War.64 In addition, the power of non-state actors, such as al-Qaeda, is on the rise. As technology allows such organizations to coordinate operations even more effectively, the reach of terrorists into the US homeland will grow stronger. Current security measures may not be
adequate to stop these incursions. The country has been described as one terrorist attack away from a fascist state.

On the whole, however, it appears unlikely that the garrison will emerge in the United States as it was envisioned by Lasswell and others. All of the criteria of compulsion, full labor, abolition of political parties, abolition of legislatures, and abolition of elections will probably not take place. To some extent, compulsion and full labor may evolve, as well as the civil-military convergence of which Lasswell conceived. However, given the anti-statist impulses documented by Friedberg, the abolition of long-standing democratic institutions seems less likely. The country appears too strongly divided on many social and political issues (as documented by authors such as Davison Hunter\textsuperscript{65}) for the abolition of political parties. While the country has low voter participation and has had recent problems in vote tabulation, it still has democratic participation among the strongest in the world. While the garrison construct is a valuable tool for analysis, its pure form may not be politically relevant to the future of the country. However, it is still valid to heed Lasswell’s advice to include “appraisal of all social values and institutional practices with state-power consideration in view.”\textsuperscript{66}
PART III – CONCLUSIONS
Chapter 8: Empire – An Alternate Perspective

Rather than internationalist regimes replacing the centuries old institution of the nation-state, many critics have observed a more sinister development: the inexorable expansion of an American imperium. This perspective has attracted further support since the advent of the 2001 war on terrorism, but it had advocates in the post-Cold War era of intervention and even during the Cold War. Connecting the United States to the Roman Empire of antiquity has been popular for some time, and the recent clash with the neighboring civilization of Islam has renewed interest in this comparison. ¹ In addition, comparisons to the British Empire have been popular as well, although as one recent author noted, few outside of the intelligentsia articulate an image of the United States having emerged as a new global empire. ² Cold War era explorations frequently debated the hegemonic role of the United States, or when comparing the American system to earlier empires, were in the context of the decline versus the expansion or persistence of American power. ³

The topic has been popular among neo-Marxist critics on the Left, who view the threats of both the American state and the global capitalist market system as fundamental truths. Chalmers Johnson argued that perpetual war, the loss of Constitutional liberties, and financial ruin are inextricably connected to the expanding presence of an American empire. ⁴ Some themes of civil-military relations interest, including the first two of Johnson’s analysis, are addressed elsewhere in this investigation. Conservative perspectives have also criticized the danger of over-commitment to imperial goals and obligations, ⁵ although such arguments are often dismissed as a neo-isolationism.

At its heart, the American empire perspective goes deeper than merely making analogies to the empires of other cultures and earlier times. The theoretical foundations of American
empire go to the uniqueness, or exceptionalism, of the United States, its constitutional system, and its foreign policy over the past decades or even centuries. The implications of an American imperial project on civil-military relations may be more significant than other frameworks of the post-9/11 age or the twenty-first century, including the “postmodern” armed forces or the revived “garrison” or national security state. Nonetheless, many of the proponents of American empire articulated their visions well before 9/11. According to these advocates, rather than the release of a new American imperial project, the war on terrorism constitutes merely a more obvious expression of continuity in a United States foreign policy that has been constantly focused on the boundless expansion of American power and influence.

The Concept of American Empire

Globalization has been a topic of interest over the past decade, and some have argued that developed nations, and especially the United States, have disproportionately benefited from the trends of globalization at the expense of the developing world. Many of the anti-globalization protests that have taken place at international conferences during this time period have reflected such sentiments. The economic dimension of American empire certainly supports such a worldview. However, economics and international trade are hardly the only – or even most important – aspect of empire. Cultural domination has occurred through the venue of the global market system, but there is disagreement over how passive or active, or how destructive or beneficial, the process of cultural transference has been.

Andrew Bacevich has articulated a vision of American empire with some credibility. An international relations theorist with a realist background, experience as a military officer, and a conservative perspective, Bacevich's criticism of neo-realist enterprise in the war on terror could be seen as somewhat unexpected. In addition, his American Empire spreads disapproval
between Bush and Clinton administrations in admonishing against an overactive foreign policy. *American Empire* first attempts to dispel the “myth of the reluctant superpower,” drawing on policies and statements since the 19th century. (One can find earlier articulations in Thomas Jefferson’s “empire of liberty” and Hamilton’s frequent use of the term “empire” in *The Federalist Papers.*) A belief in the “missionary” role of United States foreign policy has motivated these efforts. The ultimate expectation is a Kantian perpetual peace that will emerge when American values are accepted throughout the world.

Traditionally, the goal of “openness” in American foreign policy has been the code for dominance of foreign spheres of influence. In the latter part of the 20th century, the drive to expand markets and the proclivity to use military force have emerged as major thrusts of American foreign policy. Bacevich analyzed the post Cold War presidential administrations of George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and the first year of George W. Bush. He argued that although the competition of the Soviet Union has vanished, the basic aspirations of American diplomacy remain the same.

Walter Russell Mead explored the concept of American exceptionalism, and concluded that US strategy since 1945 has progressively extended the Monroe Doctrine from Latin America to the entire world.⁹ The dismantling of British and French colonial empires recall the rejection of European spheres of influence in the American hemisphere. Similarly, the doctrine of preemption that justified the war in Iraq resembles the activeness of the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.

Hardt and Neghri articulated a different version of American Empire in their recent book *Empire*. *Empire*’s opening words dramatically asserted the emergence of this new form of sovereignty.
Empire is materializing before our very eyes. Over the past several decades, as colonial regimes were overthrown and then precipitously after the Soviet barriers to the capitalist world market finally collapsed, we have witnessed an irresistible and irreversible globalization of economic and cultural exchanges. Along with the global market and global circuits of production has emerged a global order, a new logic and structure of rule—in short, a new form of sovereignty. Empire is the political subject that effectively regulates these global exchanges, the sovereign power that governs the world. 10

Hardt and Negri’s conceptualization of Empire reduces the active role of American foreign policy that Bacevich and others focused on. The term Empire is contrasted with imperialism, and the discussion of Empire is reminiscent of the reconstruction of sovereignty offered by the theory of globalization. Empire is conceived not so much as the active pursuit of territorial dominance as the systemic result of the global capitalistic system; Empire is another name for “McWorld.” Another aspect of Empire is its totality—the tendency of these forces to dominate across all aspects of humanity. The authors draw from Foucault and use the term biopolitics or biopower to describe the role of political power in the life of the population. The inexorable drive for expansion has also characterized the new formulation of Empire. Like classical imperial movements, where conquest drove constant movement to extend the boundaries of the empire, today’s Empire experiences the ongoing drive for profit that drives capitalists to constantly seek new markets, leading to a constant impulse for expansion. Hardt and Negri expound four models of Empire: juridical, the global bio-political machine, mixed functional, and three-tiered mixed constitution.

**Juridical.** The logic of the juridical model is similar to the argument about the breakdown of national sovereignty discussed in Chapter 2. The acceptance and promotion of a set of universal values that recognizes some fundamental human rights has ultimately provided the groundwork for the juridical model of Empire. Since Empire itself has a universalizing dimension, this model of Empire recreates itself as the expansion occurs. The juridical basis for the establishment of this regime of universal human rights is international law, but not in the
traditional understanding of a body of international law based on treaties and conventions to which sovereign nations have agreed. In contrast, the international law is rather a supranational law based on a conception of natural law. This natural law is ultimately interpreted, promulgated, and enforced by the powerful, the masters of Empire. The enforcement of these universal values has the concurrent benefit of expanding the power of the enforcers, and the authors argue that these values represent “a form of right that is really a right of police.”12 Thus Hardt and Negri’s Empire can be seen in Bacevich and Mallaby’s words as a “humanitarian empire.”13

Global Bio-Political Machine. The concept of biopower is discussed above. Although this signifier is ambiguous and open to various interpretations, part of its meaning is to imply the totality of Empire. It is a politics of life, where economic, cultural, and social patterns are subsumed by Empire’s expansion. The domination and destruction of traditional languages, foods, and cultural practices has long been a source of anxiety for many marginalized peoples. Western readers of Nobel laureate Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart and viewers of the Broadway stage presentation The Fiddler on the Roof are presented with images of the pressures of modernization on local cultures respectively in Ibo Nigerian and Jewish settings. However, in the stories there is an inevitability and even redeeming value in these developments. The suicide of Okonkwo at the end of Achebe’s Things Fall Apart is tragic and gives the reader pause. However, the Western reader must be comforted by the fact that the civilized European district commissioners will replace the brutal Ibo culture with one more fitting with universal values, eliminating offensive traditional practices appearing earlier in the book such as infanticide, polygamy, and casual domestic violence against women. Similarly, one can sympathize with the patriarch in The Fiddler on the Roof as the character, Tevye, is presented in his humanity and
desperation. However, the sense of the loss of tradition is ultimately overwhelmed by the inevitability and salutary effect of traditional practices such as the independence of women, the elimination of arranged marriages, and the marginalization of the authority of the patriarch. In addition to traditional practices, food is a central aspect of the totalizing appearance of Empire. The ancient Roman Empire charted its territory with an abbreviation, SPQR; today’s Empire can be traced with the appearance of a McD where the M appears in two golden arches. As developing countries get a taste for Western foods, traditional foods lose their saliency often with adverse effects on the health of indigenous populations. The Atlantic Monthly addressed this problem in an article beginning with the following quotation: “Spam and turkey tails have turned Micronesians into Macronesians. A case study of how fatty Western plenty is taking a disastrous toll on people in developing countries."14 So bio-politics is more than merely diplomacy and military force. It is a totalizing domination of the lives of people over which the Empire exerts power; there is a break-down of traditional dualities such as mind and body or public and private as Empire dominates all of these things (versus the classical empire that dominated the body and the public). The authors’ use of the term “bio-political machine” is perhaps to contrast the Empire as an impersonal machine that coldly and relentlessly exerts this influence even while it invades the most personal aspects of the people’s lives.

Mixed Functional. The authors briefly15 address this model of Empire in which the structure and basis of authority are considered. The traditional, charismatic, and bureaucratic-legal-rational sources of authority are all included in the structure of Empire. These forms of authority synthesize an authority that draws from both pre-modern and modern power structures. While the authors do not examine this model in the same depth as the other ones, the multiple
and reinforcing sources of authority do highlight an important aspect of Empire’s system of control.

Three-Tiered Mixed Constitution. The authors use a pyramid image to illustrate the hierarchical system of control. At the top are the decision-makers, the United States and global financial institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund. These powers dominate the mid-level of the pyramid, minor league nation-states and transnational corporations that carry out the intent of the decision-makers. Finally, the lowest level, which includes the United Nations General Assembly and the global multitude, represents the interests of the people. It is interesting to note that non-governmental organizations fall within this tier, in this model curbing the effects of Empire. This contrasts with the juridical model, where NGOs served the interests of the universalizing influences.

In addition to these models from Hardt and Negri’s Empire, consideration of fundamental aspects of the American system of governance itself might lend insight to the existence of American empire. The federalism of the American constitutional system can help to explain the construction of a new American empire that resembles previous imperial endeavors while differing in significant ways. Consider that the governmental innovation of the American Constitution has contributed to the form of American empire that has emerged and is currently evolving. First, expansion is built into the constitutional system. While the earlier Articles of Confederation clearly indicated the member states in their opening statement, the new federal Constitution did not include such a restriction. The federal system clearly allows for an unlimited admission of new states in the fourth article of the Constitution. This distinction is highlighted in The Federalist Papers as an oversight in the earlier Articles.¹⁶ The principle previewed the expansions that would occur in later periods of American history. The manifest
destiny spread across the North American continent, the age of imperialism, and finally the
twentieth and twenty-first century military expeditions seemed to fulfill the founders’
expectations for unlimited political expansion of the union.

Second, the system is principle-based. The Declaration of Independence establishes the
purpose of government as one of securing rights and asserts that certain fundamental human
rights are universal and inalienable. The preamble to the United States Constitution further
pursues this line of thought, listing among its fundamental goals to “establish justice” and
“secure the blessings of liberty.” This unprecedented principle-centered basis for government
was unlike rationales in the past. The focus on universal and morally absolute principles has
justified the imperial aggressions of American civilization. Rather than spreading an empire for
the sake of aggrandizement or conquest, American expansion (at its most benign) has been not so
much to empower the United States as to promote these universal values.

Finally, the evolution of a more powerful central authority and executive has led to a
system that is more willing and able to exercise power over foreign lands and peoples, whether
militarily, politically, economically, or culturally. Federalist 39 distinguished between the
federal and national aspects of American government, noting that many institutions of the United
States Constitution, such as its unanimous ratification, the representation by state in the Senate,
and the process of electing the president are consistent with a federal rather than national
government. However, several institutions, such as the House of Representatives and the
presidency are more consistent with the powers exercised by a national government. This latter
national character has grown and the power of the presidency itself has grown to contribute to
the expansion of empire even while the federal character of the Constitution is what allows for
unbounded expansion.
The American Military in the Age of Empire

In the post-World War II age, it is interesting to observe that the United States military force has remained after interventions far more often than it has left. Japan, Germany, Korea, Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq have all taken on a sense of the permanency of a garrison rather than the transience of warfare or even a humanitarian operation of immediate scope. Notable departures of American forces include Vietnam and Somalia, but both of those exits followed public relations debacles in which the operational effects of the missions were ultimately dubious.

While Afghanistan and Iraq persist in active combat or counter-insurgency operations, military outposts in Japan and Germany have more the feel of bases on American soil and largely exist for strategic reasons that date to the Cold War. Korea is much the same, although it – like Bosnia and Kosovo – presents a more immediate threat to the soldiers garrisoned there and it characterized by shorter tours of duty unaccompanied by family members.

The tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, lengthened to one year like a tour in South Korea, have many of the accoutrements of garrison life, such as gymnasiums, cafeterias, post exchanges, and other qualities that evince a more stable garrison life rather than a nation at war. Ongoing violence in those areas remind us of a war, or at least a support and stability peace operation, that mitigates the signs of a perennial garrison. With American soldiers deployed in 165 countries, duty in a foreign land is a common experience for the United States military. American contributions to United Nations efforts have only magnified this effect.

During the 1990s, overuse of the military in overseas deployments was a common concern in academic research and political discourse. Studies identified numerous problems with personnel and unit readiness that occurred due to an excessive number of deployments in a
given time period (deployment tempo). A study of the US Army Europe (USAREUR) found that the Cold War peace dividend led to a 70 percent drawdown between 1990 and 1999, but the unit participated in more than 100 missions from the end of the 1991 Gulf War to 1999, more than three times the deployments from 1945 to 1989. 18 For the overall Army, the General Accounting Office estimated a 60 percent increase in deployments between 1986 and 2000 for a force that has 700,000 fewer members over that time period. 19 The USAREUR authors also argued that operations tempo (optempo) consists of not just deployments, but also training and garrison duties. In addition, deployments must consider not only the number of deployments, but the rate at which they occur, the length of the deployment, the geographical location, the type of military operation, and the meaningfulness and relevance of the mission. The research concluded that some moderate degree of operations tempo enhanced soldier and unit performance, but that further increases in intensity beyond that optimal level would be accompanied by a gradual decline in performance. RAND studies found that 1990s deployments were not necessarily associated with lower levels of retention among officers and enlisted personnel. 20

Polich and Sortor argued that several factors aggravated the effects of multiple deployments. 21 First, personnel shortages in the Army cause units to be short of their required wartime personnel strength; while this is not a new problem, deployments lead to a scramble to fill a unit’s end-strength and further deplete neighboring garrison units. Second, even small deployments have a ripple effect across the force, disrupting training cycles and creating personnel turbulence. Third, deployments generate additional workload for the home station in planning, split operations, and sustaining levels of garrison services and operations. Finally, the deployments occur in the context of other goals such as training objectives and other missions.
(The authors mention preparation for major theater war as a major diversion from peacekeeping missions, and contingencies such as the North Korea situation still divert attention from the central Asian and Middle East theaters. However, previous small-scale contingency deployments such as Haiti and the Balkans are now added stressors to the major deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan.)

The fact that a large portion of a unit’s population (up to almost one half) is non-deployable at any given time exacerbates the effects of deployments on the unit and the remaining personnel.\textsuperscript{22} A small portion (about four percent) is non-deployable due to reasons such as pregnancy, serious medical issues, and other reasons. Two larger categories include personnel about to rotate out of a unit due to a move (permanent change of station, or PCS) or transition out of the Army into civilian life (end of term of service, or ETS) and personnel returning to the unit from another deployment who are on a 90-day stabilization, not eligible to deploy. Today’s Army has accounted for the former problem by suspending all PCS moves and ETS transitions in a policy known as “stop-move, stop-loss.” In the long term, the PCS issue has been addressed by ending short, three-year garrison tours of duty in favor of longer terms at the same installation lasting up to seven years.\textsuperscript{23} However, stop-loss creates a strain on the force’s morale and will result in a large departure of personnel because the Army cannot suspend the arrangements of enlistment contracts indefinitely. Such a display of bad faith would hurt reenlistment of other members with a propensity to continue military service and might ultimately hurt initial entry rates if the news media publicizes the situation to the general public.

Polich and Sortor suggested that only ten percent or so of the active-duty force was deployed at any one time, but that was under the rubric of less demanding missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, the Sinai, and other small-scale contingencies. Major deployments to Afghanistan and
Iraq have dwarfed the deployments of the 1990s. Research on the number of security personnel required to stabilize a population has indicated that success in the war on terrorism interventions will require an extended presence of American forces, at current and even greater levels of troop strength. James Quinlivan studied comparable stability and support missions to determine the number of soldiers required to stabilize a restive population. For instance, the United States has about 2.3 police officers for every thousand people in the general population, and European nations exhibit a similar ratio. Under more chaotic conditions, however, the ratio shifts to larger numbers of security personnel. For instance, in northern Ireland, the British deployed more than 20 security personnel per thousand people for more than 25 years. The initial NATO Implementation Force in Bosnia contained a similar ratio of forces, although it was possible to scale this back to under 10 per thousand after five years, when the Stabilization Force took over. Ongoing insurgent attacks in Iraq demonstrate a high level of unrest. Much of Afghanistan is not policed at all with current force levels there, further supporting Quinlivan’s argument. With 2003 population estimates of over 27 million in Afghanistan and 24 million in Iraq, stability forces of 540,000 and 480,000 respectively would be required to police the two nations. With effective troop rotation schedules, this would require even larger military forces from which to draw. While these numbers are clearly not feasible, it raises awareness of the enormity of the challenge of policing the former “rogue states” of the war on terrorism.

Despite the evidence that the use of the American military in the 1990s did not strain the force as much as often assumed, the present and prospective challenge of the war on terrorism shows the possibility of adding significant strain. Quinlivan noted in his 1995 article:

In recent history, Western governments have been unwilling to impose protracted tours. European countries and the United States now generally accept that units will conduct intervention operations in six-month increments (or less).
The war on terrorism has frustrated the expectation of six-month tours as the Department of Defense in 2003 adopted a policy of one-year rotations to Afghanistan and Iraq. (Before the announcement of this policy, deployment extensions in the post-9/11 theaters of Afghanistan and Iraq transformed tours originally scheduled for six months into one-year, or longer, deployments.) Further, the stop-loss policy discussed above also exhibits signs of strain on the armed forces.

Implications for Civil-Military Relations

Since the American empire perspective emphasizes continuity rather than change in American foreign policy, the implications of these developments for civil-military relations are unclear. Since empire by definition is an enterprise committed to continual expansion, continuity in some sense is change. The direction of change (more foreign commitments, more economic ties, more military presence) is predictable if one accepts the premise that empire exists. The pace of change, whether it is a constant acceleration or cyclic, and its effects given societal and military factors, are more ambiguous. However, it is certain that this major expansion of the use of force in combat operations will affect the relationship between the armed forces and society. There are several possible developments that might occur due to these changes in the military.

First, a renewed retention and recruiting crisis could develop as a result of the exponential increase in operations tempo that results from the war on terrorism. While self-selection has created a military of dedicated and loyal service members, the strain of repeat 365-day deployments into a hostile combat zone, away from family and friends will convince the most patriotic young enlisted soldier or officer that he has served his country well and has earned a transition to civilian life. The rate of soldiers volunteering to deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan is
high, and many are extremely interested in serving in a mission perceived as active and meaningful in its contribution to national security. In addition, pay incentives such as tax-free income in a combat zone, hostile duty pay, and family separation allowance may make the opportunity to deploy a beneficial one for the family, even for a lengthy twelve-month tour. However, the repetition of deployment into dangerous areas with extended tours away from family and the comforts of garrison life cannot occur indefinitely without having some negative impact on the perceived quality of life in the military.

Second, the military may increase in end strength due to the over-commitments of the war on terrorism. Such an increase would lead to a greater salience of the military in society as more Americans would be exposed to family members or friends in the military, or have military experience themselves. Increased military recruitment would have the effect of bringing the military into more American homes. Overall, this change would enhance the relationship of the armed forces and society.

Third, exogenous developments might limit public support. Eventualities such as another catastrophic terrorist attack would have a significant impact. A major attack to forces overseas might return to Somalia or Vietnam style political pressures to withdraw forces from the country. Such an event would ultimately shake popular confidence in the military institution to effectively conduct its mission and in the worth of the war on terrorism itself. A domestic terrorist attack by radical Islamists, or even another variant of modern terrorists, would also have serious implications for public trust of the military as an institution capable of protecting the national interests. Such an event would have even more detrimental effects on the salutary nature of the war on terrorism itself.
Finally, notwithstanding the possible withdrawal of forces in the event of a major attack or a change in political leadership, the military must grow more salient as a result of these major deployments. Already, the unexpected success of Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry demonstrates the greater value on which voters – even the more liberal democratic primary voters – place on military experience. Despite the consistent defeat of combat veterans in presidential politics by politicians with no combat experience over the past decade (first with Bill Clinton’s defeat of the senior President Bush in 1992, and then Clinton’s victory over Dole in 1996, and then George W. Bush’s primary defeat of John McCain in 2000), Kerry succeeded in the 2004 primaries in large part due to his credentials as a veteran of the Vietnam War. These credentials correspond to President Bush’s image as a “wartime president,” which does not capitalize on personal combat experience, but it does also indicate the value the public now places on national security and military expertise.

American empire has put strain on the military, which like the Roman legions of past millennia, is the ultimate means of enforcing the imperial will. The boundless nature of empire, and the boundless nature of its most aggressive variant, the preemptive foreign war on terrorism, put excessive strain on the armed forces. Military analyses have already noted the dangers of the ambitious objectives and unsustainable nature of the war on terrorism. These characteristics show a manifestation of American empire that is both more obvious and more aggressive than the previous foreign policy adventures that have fit in the empire paradigm. Empire may not harm civil-military relations, but only if the United States can militarily resource its ambitions.
Chapter 9: New Civil-Military Relations

American civil-military relations have profoundly changed from the interwar years that comprised the post Cold War era, whether these changes are a shift in foreign policy as has been popularly argued since 9/11 or whether they are a continuance of the foreign policy of expansion of American empire. The new age of terrorism has mobilized American society with an intensity and intransience that recalls the Cold War. However, the threat of modern terrorism is more immediate and more likely to recur than the threat of the Soviet bloc. In many ways, with its focus on maximizing civilian casualties, terrorism is uniquely able to arouse the popular emotion.

Catastrophic terrorism has aroused the vigilance of the military and law enforcement agencies, and numerous terrorist leaders have been killed or captured and numerous terrorist plots have been foiled since 2001. The United States have killed or taken into custody nearly two-thirds "of the senior al-Qaeda leaders, operational managers, and key facilitators the U.S. government has been tracking." In addition, "the Department of Justice has charged over 260 individuals uncovered in the course of terrorist investigations, and convicted or secured guilty pleas from over 140 individuals. The U.S. government has disrupted alleged terrorist cells in Buffalo, Seattle, Portland, Detroit, North Carolina and Tampa." The financial efforts to disrupt the flow of monetary support have cut off access to nearly $200 million from terrorist networks. However, such vigilance by its design cannot enjoy perpetual success. Further terrorist attacks are all but inevitable. While public memory is short, the destructive consequences of another terrorist incursion into the American mainland could once again mobilize popular support for national security.
In spite of American and coalition nation law enforcement and preventative efforts, terrorist activity has since 2001 has been intense. While terrorists have been unsuccessful in penetrating United States defenses, activities abroad have revealed the frenetic pace with which Islamist terrorists have resumed activities. Large casualty bombings and suicide attacks killing over 30 people took place in March 2004 at Madrid, Spain, November 2003 at Istanbul, Turkey, July 2003 at Quetta, Pakistan, May 2003 in Casablanca, Morocco, May 2003 at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and October 2002 at Bali, Indonesia. Of course, this list, which consists mostly of Muslim state victims of terrorism, does not mention numerous attacks in Israel, Chechnya, India, and Iraq, whose targets were not primarily Muslim, and all of which have attracted migrations of international terrorists. Thus far, US domestic security and aggression against terrorist organizations have been sufficient to prevent further attacks, but the pattern of terrorist activity seems to indicate that attacks will be forthcoming.

Another important factor is the commitment that military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq has created. Like former sites of the use of American military force, such as Japan, Germany, Korea, Bosnia, and Kosovo, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have led to what seems to be a lasting military presence. This long term mobilization of forces in dangerous war zones ensures a relevance in political discourse and media attention that was lacking in the previous decade. In addition, if the war on terrorism should expand to other campaigns in nations such as Syria or Iran, further engagement and activity would be assured.

In his review of civil-military relations in The Annual Review of Political Science, Peter Feaver discussed the dependent variables of the study of civil-military relations, adapting his discussion from Michael Desch. These variables include coups, military influence, civil-military friction, military compliance, and delegation and monitoring. As discussed in Chapter
1, coups are somewhat uninteresting in American studies as they have been unknown and are unlikely in the US experience (although there have been several provocative explorations into the possibility of an American military coup). The following sections will explore each of the latter four categories.

**Military Influence**

Huntington made a persuasive argument for the preeminence of this dimension of civil-military relations over actual coups: "The problem of the modern state is not armed revolt but the relation of the expert to the politician." Chapter 4 established the civilian elites' disregard for technical military expertise during the interwar years. However, in some ways, the 1990s exhibited unhealthy excess in military influence that imperiled American civil-military relations.

This point can be made by highlighting the differences between a controversial leading general of each the two periods. Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the early 1990s, attracted widespread attention from academics in the field of civil-military relations. This attention was highly critical, and Powell became an embodiment of the disobedient military, using bureaucracy and inertia to countermand policies of its civilian superiors. The most dramatic violation of the neutrality of traditional military professionalism occurred when Powell published an op-ed in the *New York Times* that appeared less than a month from the presidential elections, in which he asserted, "You bet I get nervous when so-called experts suggest that all we need is a little surgical bombing or a limited attack. When the desired result isn’t obtained, a new set of experts then comes forward with talk of a little escalation. History has not been kind to this approach." Powell was regarded as an unscrupulous, but savvy, member of the Washington political establishment.
In contrast, General Eric Shinseki served as the Army Chief of Staff under the beginning of the Bush administration. It quickly became clear that relations between Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and General Shinseki were no better than those between Powell and Clinton administration officials. Rumsfeld leaked a selection to replace Shinseki almost two years before his scheduled retirement, seeking to undermine the general and perhaps force his retirement. The antipathy between Rumsfeld and senior active-duty Army leaders reached its peak in the weeks before the Iraq war, when Shinseki testified before Congress that the Defense Department’s war plans were woefully undermanned. This led to the sudden resignation of the Secretary of the Army Thomas White, whose support for Shinseki aroused Defense Department animosity. Rumsfeld further solidified his control over the senior Army leaders by making the unusual selection of a retired general, Peter Schoomaker, to replace Shinseki. The message was that none of the active-duty candidates could be entrusted with the position.

In this way, civilian control of the military in political matters has once again been reasserted in the Bush administration after taking a beating during the interwar Clinton years. At the same time, however, military influence in technical matters such as the landmine ban and the roles of women in the military has grown stronger. Indeed, President Bush’s public deference to General Tommy Franks during the Iraq War seemed supportive of objective control. Painful as it was for the Army’s active-duty leadership, the Rumsfeld Defense Department reestablished the objective control of the military that entails a recognition of professional jurisdiction on military matters while minimizing military influence in political matters.

**Civil-Military Friction**

The episodes in the previous section reveal continuing friction in elite circles trying to establish boundaries of civilian control. However, friction can also occur in broader cross-
sections of society. The Lieutenant Berry example that introduced Chapter 3 provides an illustration of this friction. In addition, the prosecution of Air Force Lieutenant Kelly Flinn for adultery aroused indignant criticism from members of the public, the media, and civilian government who bewailed an archaic military culture out of touch with modern society. The irrelevance of the military's mission was the main theme during those years, but the analysis in Chapter 6 also revealed that underlying sociological trends affecting military effectiveness will persist into the twenty-first century.

The reconstruction of socially perceived notions of citizenship and service make the national sacrifice of military service difficult even in times of war. The military's solution to manpower shortages due to massive deployments of forces to Afghanistan and Iraq has been to extend overseas tours and even enlistment terms for a large number of service-members. A widely circulated photograph in Iraq depicts an Army Reservist's military vehicle with a sign in the windshield – "One weekend a month my ass!"

Civil-military friction will continue due to the collectivist and objective ethic required for military effectiveness and the individualist and subjective ethic that has evolved with postmodern society. Rather than publicized and high-level battles over civilian control, friction may increasingly manifest as a popular resistance to service and sacrifice as part of the postmodern social ethic.

**Military Compliance**

Chapter 7 explored the possibility of the emergence of a national security state devoted in unprecedented ways to militaristic protection. The military compliance variable measures whether civilian or military preferences prevail in the case of a dispute, but the integration of military and domestic agencies and goals may result in less empirical utility for this variable.
The variable is already of limited value for analysts because many policy disputes may never reach the public eye. The sharing of intelligence and counterterrorism efforts may further limit the use of military compliance in assessing civil-military relations because civilian and military authorities become conflated in so many ways that it is difficult to distinguish them. Feaver argued, "A particularly adept military could enjoy enough political influence to shape policy without the issue gaining salience as a major policy dispute." However, the surrender of authority and domestic roles to the military in a Lasswellian garrison state does not require political adroitness in the military institution to make the compliance dimension somewhat irrelevant.

**Delegation and Monitoring**

This variable is gaining interest in the civil-military relations literature as a process measure since the ultimate product outcome – the coup – is so unfathomable in the modern industrialized democracy. The post-11 September 2001 war on terrorism should benefit delegation and monitoring. Altogether, oversight mechanisms for military activity will be subject to greater public, media, and government scrutiny and thus be more effective for overseas military deployments. The salience of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has made these events the central issue in the 2004 election year. Ongoing public debate has led to numerous forms monitoring and delegating, including the replacement of interim administrator Jay Garner with L. Paul Bremer and the establishment of an oversight agency led by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, the Iraq Stabilization Group, in October 2003. A December 2003 Army War College report also gained notoriety for its public criticism of American strategy in Iraq and elsewhere in the global war on terror. While domestic counterterrorism uses secrecy and expands governmental surveillance powers, recent judicial review of cases involving detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba shows that this aspect of the war on terrorism is also subject to scrutiny and oversight.

While it is possible that American foreign policy in the aftermath of the attacks of 11 September 2001 represents continuity rather than change, the evidence in the various dimensions of civil-military relations indicate a military that is more subject to objective control, better connected with and more important to the society at large, and at the same time overtaxed in its current employment around the world. It is possible that these shifts in civil-military relations are due to changes in the presidential administrations, especially given the unpopularity of the Clinton administration among the military. Nonetheless, evidence in Part I pointing to the senior Bush administration as well as the Clinton administration seems to mitigate that fact. In addition, inter-war re-adaptation of military forces is a common historical exercise across time periods and national experiences. The return to war has been a subject of much discourse on world affairs and American foreign policy; this change has also led to a reconstruction of American civil-military relations.
Chapter 10: Implications and Further Research

After only a few short years since the 2001 terrorist attacks and the following mobilization of the United States armed forces, it is impossible to chart all of the changes affecting the American military and society. However, it is clear that some major changes have occurred. Further research should focus on continuing to operationalize these changes, exploring whether future changes in political leadership will reverse some of the trends noted in Part II of this study. In addition, quantitative data analysis of survey results could assist in bolstering research on trends in the relevance of the military to the public and the presence of civil-military friction in light of challenges from both the postmodern turn in the civic ethic described in Chapter 6 and the increased pressure of military activity on the domestic American way of life described in Chapter 7.

The remainder of this chapter will discuss recommendations in light of the new international environment and civil-military condition in the United States. The first section will address the challenges of redefining the military professional paradigm in light of both the changing norms of sovereignty and intervention that evolved in the 1990s and the need for long term peace operations in former terrorist states that evolved in the 2000s. The second section will focus on the issues of professional jurisdiction and technical expertise. While this issue, as discussed in Chapter 9, has been largely resolved, the professional military must do its part to remain the voice of expertise on technical military matters. Finally, the issue of remaining relevant to society in light of the civil-military gap discussed in Chapter 3 has become somewhat less urgent since the beginning of the war on terror. (However, the new Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker includes “relevant and ready” as a central slogan for his strategic vision statement. This seems to indicate that being perceived as relevant is still a concern for
American military leaders.) In addition, the evolution of the postmodern society has posed challenges that will be discussed in third section of this chapter.

A New Professional Paradigm

We are reminded of the Western predilection to use military force in war rather than in less destructive methods of preserving security, such as deterrence or peacekeeping by Coker’s derision over Ministries of War becoming Ministries of Defense during the Cold War. He also scathingly pointed out that a group of retired NATO and Warsaw Pact generals signed a declaration in 1984 that “the only purpose of war is peace.” While this is ironic in its elocutionary relation to the Ministry of Peace in George Orwell’s ominous 1984, Coker’s point is less compelling. If the purpose of war is not peace, then there is hardly an imaginable end that would justify the extreme cost and suffering that war entails. In fact, not only war, but all of its implements, only exist among free societies for the preservation of peace, freedom, and justice. Viewed in this context, the use of military force in limited fashions for limited aims may be more palatable.

Rather than viewing peace operations and combat readiness as trade-offs, military leaders must recognize that both are tools contributing to the same goal. Lasting international peace in the Wilsonian sense seems less and less likely in the foreseeable future. However, order and stability are attainable, although these conditions require intervention from the international community. Since the United States armed forces are not intellectually prepared for operations other than war, organized training and doctrine is still slowly evolving. Practical experience has been considerable for many service members, but this does not reflect the self-conscious preparation that is necessary for success. Ralph Peters said it well: “Military readiness is essential – but the military must be ready for reality, not for its fantasy war.” This may be
somewhat harsh, since events may prove that being prepared for the worst-case scenario is prudent rather than fantastic. However, Peters' point is valid; peacekeeping should be an objective of readiness and training rather than a distracter from those objectives.

There is currently no training center focusing on peacekeeping operations for the U.S. Army, and there is also no proponent agency for peacekeeping doctrine or training. The United States Army Peacekeeping Institute is a research center at the Army War College, but it is not staffed nor resourced to meet the pressing training needs of the entire Army. In fact, as Max Boot lamented, the Army War College decided to shut down the Peacekeeping Institute, indicating "that the army still wants to avoid focusing on noncombat missions," the failure of which could easily squander "battlefield victories in places like Afghanistan and Iraq." In addition, there is a problem of "ad hoc-ery" because there is no centralized leadership or strategic vision for peacekeeping. The doctrinal publication that does exist on peacekeeping, Field Manual 100-23: Peace Operations, advises commanders that peace operations should not be part of the unit's mission essential task list, which is the standard by which units are measured for training assessment and planning. Finally, there is an inadequate force structure of civil affairs professionals in the active-duty force. Civil affairs experts are primarily drawn from the Army Reserves, which over-tasks the reserve components while leaving the Regular Army without full-time continuity in this area.

Collective unit training is an important factor in preparing the armed forces for an expanded role. There is currently a deficiency in training for humanitarian missions, leaving leaders and soldiers unprepared for roles they will certainly assume in the current security environment. Nagl and Young argued for introducing greater training in contingency operations at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) in order to give officers and soldiers exposure to the
demands of humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. The political dimensions of stability and support operations require additional training for which military units and leaders may not be completely prepared. Cultural differences alone provoke significant difficulties in conflict resolution, and training is important for successfully dealing with these issues.

Daniel Possumato advocated the establishment of a training center devoted entirely to peacekeeping. Such a center would have a number of advantages: a permanent staff and resource center always available for unexpected contingencies, the integration of lessons learned from the experience of different units, the publication and update of relevant documents, effective liaison with non-governmental organizations and other nations involved in peacekeeping, and a signal to soldiers that peacekeeping is a "legitimate, though adjunct, military mission." In the interim before such a center could be established, a training support package should be made available for units selected for deployment to provide them an integrated resource for information on relevant training courses offered throughout the military, after action reviews from previously deployed units, and outside agency points of contact.

Liaison with other governments and non-governmental organizations is important for two reasons. Participating with these entities during a multi-lateral operation can be a nightmare in planning and coordination. Previously established links, and especially combined training and planning exercises, would seriously reduce the administrative problems that surface due to the ambiguity nature of multi-lateral operations. Additionally, such links would allow American forces to benefit from the experiences of foreign armed forces or non-governmental organizations that have participated in other peace operations. The Canadian military, as well as those of the Nordic nations, are famous for their active involvement in a large number of peacekeeping operations. While American forces can offer a high level of tactical proficiency,
technological capability, and professionalism, there may be significant benefits from shared training opportunities with militaries that have a greater historical focus on peacekeeping. In addition, non-governmental organizations, such as the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), have valuable collective experience. The UNDPKO, for instance, has distributed 50,000 publications and offers over 400 courses to promote training in peacekeeping.\footnote{11}

Brien Hallett argued that the conception of war should not be limited to armed conflict or the violence of the combat. The physical or tactical part of war is only one component of that very complex activity; other dimensions include social, cultural, political, industrial, historical, psychological, logistical, and strategic components that may or may not directly involve violence.\footnote{12} Recognizing these dimensions will have practical significance if officers and policymakers can view the military as more than merely an organization of technicians or managers of violence. Rather, they are managers of warfare, which includes, but is not limited to, physical combat. The need for peacekeeping in war is historically validated; few wars end without an occupation or monitoring force to ensure that treaty agreements are emplaced effectively. Rather than hampering an army’s warfighting ability, such policing duties call on different qualities of soldiers and units. A person or organization must not necessarily give up certain critical skills in order to develop other important skills.

Rapid change has been rare for the American military, although changes to the security environment have occasioned those rare instances of major institutional change.\footnote{13} In the wake of terrorist attacks, the U.S. armed forces will be reassessing approaches to conflict. This presents an opportunity for not only perfecting the counter-terrorism techniques, tactics, and procedures used by the military, but also expanding the dominant view of how security is achieved.
Professional Jurisdiction and Technical Expertise

The onus is on the military to provide expertise in technical military matters, and it also expected that civilian leaders will defer to military expertise when appropriate. Several points highlighted from Chapter 4 indicated that the United States failed to achieve this jurisdicational balance in the interwar years. First, the type of anti-personnel landmines used by the United States Armed Forces do not produce the effects that civilian humanitarian groups hope to avoid. Second, the operational effects of landmines may or may not be replaceable, and they almost certainly will not be at the same cost. Third, research to develop alternatives has not been concluded, so it is impossible to say what will be the cost of banning landmines in military effectiveness. Finally, the unanimous advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CinCs has been entirely disregarded in what is a technical military matter.

Politics is admittedly not characterized by anything so simple as a sharp demarcation between strictly military and strictly civilian affairs. International status and internal political pressures affect the decisions of democratically elected officials responsible to their constituencies, and in military affairs our leaders are subject to these same pressures. However, in the interests of national security, civilian leaders should give greater worth to military recommendations within those matters involving the conduct of war. Military professionalism is a valuable institution that should be preserved by our governmental leaders rather than eroded or disregarded by them.

The military also must also continue to act vigilantly in enhancing and maintaining professional standards. For instance, General Shinseki’s reading list – a development in institutionalizing Army professionalism – is a step in the right direction. However, a greater emphasis on the ethics of war might be in order if the military is to be responsible in offering
professional expertise on *jus in bello* issues. Books such as Michael Walzer's *Just and Unjust Wars* or William Nagel’s *Morality and Modern Warfare* would perhaps be worthwhile to add to the list of reading for professional soldiers. An awareness of the moral issues of war would allow military leaders to be better equipped to make recommendations on issues such as the anti-personnel landmine ban. (I am not suggesting that senior military leaders are unaware of such issues; however, I do feel that the absence of any book on the morality of war is conspicuous and that the issue requires more emphasis.)

Pacifist advocates did successfully advance their cause during the interwar years. Finding it impossible to outlaw war altogether, banning the implements of war was the next best solution. The success of their efforts were threatening to the standards of military readiness as well as the standards of civil-military interchange that are required for national security in the face of a variety of possible threats. Without a government willing to recognize and support military professionalism in our armed forces by accepting advice on technical military matters, the success of the American military would indeed be endangered in future operations. Kellogg-Briand was promulgated in the years following the “War to End All Wars,” and perhaps the new anti-war movements are also capitalizing on the end of the Cold War. Chapter 9 revealed some improvements in this area as civilian control over political matters was once again asserted and technical military expertise was once more relied upon for making decisions in the appropriate military realm.

**Social Influence**

In advancing a position that the civil-military gap should not be closed, it has been pointed out that no criteria establishing an “acceptable” gap have been articulated.\textsuperscript{15} However, it appeared from the trends shown in the interwar years in Chapter 3 that the civil-military gap has
actual and dangerous implications. The 1990s recruiting problem was a consequence of an inability to establish strong ties between the military and society.

Many leaders, such as Congressman Ike Skelton, advocated limiting the separation between military and civilian America. Three broad approaches can support narrowing the civilian-military gap: (1) restoration of mandatory national service, (2) curtailing on-post facilities that enable military personnel to most of their needs without much contact with civilians; and (3) changes in the education of the officer corps. Some of the following policies are being considered by Army leaders, and some are even underway in various forms, but others of these recommendations might require a significant departure from current thought paradigms in order for decision-makers to seriously entertain them.

Conscription has been a popular choice in numerous discussions on the subject of civil-military relations despite the assured impracticality of implementing such a policy, given our national experience during the Vietnam era. If both sexes were drafted, with the possible support of feminist special interests (that would now see the military treating females as equals, pursuant to their advocation discussed in Chapter 5) that are usually opposed to the military, the option may be somewhat more palatable, although it would still run into what would most likely be an insurmountable opposition. Another possibility would be combining the draft with some sort of nonmilitary national service. This variation seems to conflict with some of the same attitudes about citizenship that are preventing successful recruiting for military service. In a democratic society, a plan that runs so counter to the nature of citizens' perceptions of their civic duty would not last very long. Specific examples support this point: "As the Nazi war machine was rolling over Western Europe in 1940, a conscription bill passed the House of Representatives by only a single vote, and President Harry Truman's proposal for a one-year stint of universal military
training went nowhere.” The possibility of national service may also be unlikely due to the numerous lawsuits against some school boards that have imposed minimal requirements of community service for high school graduation.°

The second approach would “monetize” the benefits enjoyed by military personnel, replacing them with higher pay scales. Such a policy would make it easier to recruit soldiers and officers because their pay would be more competitive with the civilian market. (While the addition of non-monetary benefits can be a recruiting incentive, the simplicity of comparing salaries is something much easier to contemplate. Witness the mass exodus of junior officers in the past decade to higher-paying civilian jobs.) It might also be beneficial in reducing the rapidly escalating costs of those benefits. Its central focus, however, would be to alleviate the potential civil-military dangers of an isolated military identified by several scholars and discussed earlier in Chapter 3.

The final approach involves education of officers. Some authors have advocated eliminating the service academies (despite the political difficulties in this) due to their tendency to generate a more isolated military culture. However, it has been posited that officers accessed through ROTC are no different ideologically than those accessed through academies. Advanced civil schooling may also have a limited impact since most attitudes are deep-set long before officers would be sent to further schooling. Nonetheless, the contacts engendered by graduate education at least provide opportunities for both military and civilian students to challenge stereotypes they hold of one another. Expanding ROTC, especially at elite schools, and shortening the military academy service requirement to encourage former officers – trained by the academies’ rigorous military development program – to pursue careers in civilian society would be beneficial in closing the gap.
A RAND study recommended increasing the number of soldiers who attend college or receive college credit before enlisting into service.\textsuperscript{24} They prescribe this course of action in order to attract more college-bound youths into military service. Another recent analysis argued a similar course of action as part of the recommendations from an examination of youth subgroups.\textsuperscript{25} There are difficulties with this proposal since the GI Bill no longer has a monopoly on tuition assistance programs. Many private employers provide tuition assistance, and government aid not contingent on service is widely available.\textsuperscript{26} Nonetheless, targeting college-bound students might also have beneficial civil-military implications as there would be more military experience among the educated segment of society. Many have advocated expanding college assistance programs, but this is an incentive rather than a means of shifting our social attitudes about the military. Moskos argued that a shorter enlistment would make recruiting these students easier as they could perform a tour of duty during a 15-month interregnum in their college education.\textsuperscript{27} Many students would consider a break from school to do something different and positive in a foreign locale. These shorter terms of service have the added benefit of enhancing the civil-military linkage.

Other solutions would involve education of the civilian public rather than the military. Courses in high schools and universities dealing with civil-military issues and national civic responsibilities could be seeded by relatively small grants and have a large pay-off if they were successful in reducing the civil-military tension\textsuperscript{28} and thus resulting in more successful recruiting efforts. Establishing special preparatory programs would enable more of today's inner-city youths to enlist and he also believed that expanding ROTC at historically black colleges would open new avenues for civil-military intercourse.\textsuperscript{29}
Even more creative solutions have been posited. For instance, the Army suffers from an inability to contemplate lateral entry by talented civilians at levels high enough to be attractive to successful executives or professionals. Almost all other large organizations, with the exception of well-established religions, routinely bring in at least a small percentage of executives from the outside as a way of bringing special talents and fresh perspectives to bear on enduring problems. In addition to organizational benefits, this interchange between military and civilian elite spheres would help reduce the civil-military gap.30

The former Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Lieutenant General David Ohle, stated that the Army is undertaking a retention-based strategy with the rationale that keeping soldiers for longer periods of time will reduce the stress on recruiting.31 Indeed the “stop-loss” policies effected during the Afghanistan and Iraq wars are a forcible retention strategy. This strategy may further separate the military from society, and it could have the unintended effect of making recruiting even more difficult as even less citizens are exposed to the military. Trends of lowered recruiting (which a retention-based strategy is designed to allow) could have the effect of accentuating the differences between civilian and military institutions and thereby widening the gap.32 This could lead to even more difficulties in the future.

Given the incompatibility of the military ethic with the postmodern social ethic, I am reluctant to recommend that the military should attempt to shift its culture to better resemble the civilization in which it exists. I do think that it is advisable, however, for policy-makers to be aware of the social and cultural environment in which they are operating. The past few years have seen a chorus of criticisms of the civilian lifestyle and a call for society to become more like the military. While it is inadvisable for the military to abandon professional standards to become more like society, it is unrealistic to expect society to abandon deep-rooted assumptions.
and belief-systems. The themes of Chapter 6 – the rejection of absolutes, the dismissal of authority, and the celebration of difference – call into question the effectiveness of an American military in everything from attracting qualified Americans to general operations to its socialization program, which emphasizes uniformity and sameness.\textsuperscript{33}

In some ways, the postmodern soldier can be beneficial to the military in new times. For instance, the prevalence of peace operations has met resistance from the officers and noncommissioned officers who still construct their service in the modernist sense of defending the country from all enemies. Meeting the operational demands of current missions while maintaining motivation and readiness is one of the major challenges of the contemporary armed forces. According to Battistelli's work, however, it is likely that, given their subjective characteristics, postmodern soldiers are most ready to undertake dynamic missions abroad. Battistelli suggests rightly that motivating factors for soldiers in the postmodern world may not be consistent or easy to define, but they are still instrumental for predicting the satisfaction of soldiers with missions and service in the military.\textsuperscript{34}

The international threats to American society will have escalating impact on the military in the years to come. Understanding the nature of this environment will therefore be more and more crucial to policy-makers as we progress into the twenty-first century. Like technological improvement and international security issues, social considerations will be a major variable in the post Cold War adaptive process in which the armed forces are currently engaged.

This research suggests that changes in the international security environment and American foreign policy will have ramifications for the use of the military and therefore the relationship of the armed forces and society. Further research must couple analysis of new threats and the United States response to these threats with an assessment of the effects on civil-
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Notes

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