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A STUDY OF MOTIVATIONAL THEORY IN EARLY BUDDHISM
WITH REFERENCE TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FREUD

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PHILOSOPHY
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By
Manikku Wadu Padmasiri De Silva

Dissertation Committee:
S. K. Saksena, Chairman
John M. Digman
Harold E. McCarthy
Winfield Nagley
Walter H. Maurer
ABSTRACT

The basic claim of this dissertation is that there is a concept of the Unconscious in early Buddhism. This thesis seeks to illuminate the early Buddhist concept of the Unconscious by comparing it with the Freudian concept of the Unconscious.

The concept of the Unconscious in early Buddhism is a theme that has hardly been subjected to any systematic analysis by Buddhist scholars. Though a few references to the concept of the Unconscious are present in the writings of Buddhist scholars, many of them attempt to explain unconscious motivation in terms of concepts like bhavanga and ālayavijñāna. But these concepts really do not belong to the nikāyas of early Buddhism. It is advanced in this thesis that it is possible to work out a concept of the Unconscious in early Buddhism independent of the theory of bhavanga or ālayavijñāna.

This analysis of the early Buddhist concept of the Unconscious is based on concepts like the anusaya-s (latent tendencies) and asampajāna mano-saṅkhārā (dispositions of the mind of which we are not aware). Reference is also made to the viññāṇasota (the stream of consciousness). The viññāṇasota has a conscious and an unconscious aspect. The unconscious aspect contains the dynamic saṅkhāra-s (dispositions) which determine the nature of the next birth.
Most of these references indicate that the early Buddhist concept of the Unconscious can be explained as a disposition concept. This falls in line with the claim that the characteristically psychoanalytic meaning of the word Unconscious is **dispositional**. One significant difference, however, is that the sankhāra-s have a wider dimension connecting an innumerable number of births. In general, early Buddhism considers the mind as a dynamic continuum, composed of a Conscious mind and an Unconscious which has its roots in sāṃsāric existence.

This central thesis concerning the Unconscious is woven within a wider framework in which are discussed the concepts of man, mind, motivation and therapy. The brief introductory chapter on the nature of man brings out the significance of this comparative study to contemporary problems. The analysis of the theory of mind helps to understand the nature of unconscious motivation. The section on therapy brings out a common practical concern with the suffering of man found in both systems. Though the suggested remedies differ, both systems of psychology have a therapeutic goal. In short, both systems are concerned with the mastery of the Unconscious.

It is maintained that while the early Buddhist analysis resembles the Freudian analysis regarding the logical status of the Unconscious and the meaning of unconscious motives, it certainly is different from the Freudian system regarding the method of unravelling and the mastery of the Unconscious.
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# ABBREVIATIONS

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<td>Samyutta-Nikāya (Kindred Sayings), Part I and II, translated by Mrs. Rhys Davids; Parts III, IV, V, Translated by Woodward.</td>
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Humanism in Early Buddhism and Freud

The analysis of motivational theory presented here has to be viewed against the background of the spirit of "humanism" found both in the Pāli texts of early Buddhism and also the works of Sigmund Freud. It is this deep sense of humanism in these works that gives meaning and purpose to a comparative study.

The Buddha did not claim any special authority derived from an omnipotent being or any external power. The attainment of Buddhahood was for him the finest flower of the potentialities within man. It is human energy and human effort that helped him to discover a solution for the ills of man. There is no divine being that man has to serve. He is limited by the law of moral causation, but that merely means that he is not the creature of blind chance or of strict determinism. The Buddhist theory of causation avoids the two extremes of indeterminism and strict determinism. According to strict determinism the present and the future are dependent on the past and therefore unalterable, or every event is predetermined by the will of a personal god. The Buddhist theory holds the doctrine of dependent origination: whenever A occurs B occurs, and whenever A does not occur, B does not occur; thus, A and B are causally related. Such a theory of
causality is compatible with freewill. Freewill in this context means the ability of a person to control the dynamic forces of the past and present and make the future different from what it would otherwise have been. This ability to control the forces at work within the framework of the law of dependent origination makes him the master of his fate. No one is condemned to sin and any criminal has the potentiality to turn a new leaf. There is the classic instance of the thief An̄gulimāla who, after having injured hundreds, attained the holy state (araha, a) in that very same life. Buddhism says that in the last analysis the potentiality for good and bad is within one's own power and one is the master of his own destiny.

The Buddha also exhorts each person to use his reason without blindly following the dictates of authority and the Kālāma Sutta which embodies the idea is sometimes referred to as the Buddha's "Charte of Free Inquiry." It is said that we should not accept anything which is a mere rumor, because it is a traditional belief, because it is the opinion of the majority, because it is found in the scriptures, because it is a product of mere logic or inference, because of the prestige of the teacher, etc. It is this spirit of free inquiry and healthy criticism which again marks Buddhism as a humanistic rather than an authoritarian creed. This aspect of humanism has roused the attention of psychologists like Erich Fromm who says: "One of the best examples of humanistic
religions is early Buddhism. The Buddha is a great teacher, he is the 'awakened one' who recognizes the truth about human existence. He does not speak in the name of a supernatural power but in the name of reason. He calls upon every man to make use of his own reason and to see the truth which he was only the first to find.2

Apart from the factor of moral responsibility, the potentiality for spiritual transformation and the power of reason common to all humanity, there is another factor which brings men together. All men are impelled by the basic desires of sensuality, self-preservation and aggression. These desires when they emerge in the form of the desire for power and self-love certainly bring about antagonisms between man and man. When this aspect of man takes an excessive turn, it paves the way for mutual destruction, the kind of phenomenon so well presented in Freud's Civilization and Its Discontents.3 But in a paradoxical way these aspects of inhumanity display the common humanity of man, the "universal neurosis of man." It is the same point which is summed up in the axiom "sabbe sattā unmattakā" (all worldlings are deranged). Furthermore, all men, whatever race or country they come from, are subject to suffering (dukkha) i.e., disease, decay, death and anguish in various forms. Because there is such a universal malady common to all humanity, the Buddha advocated a remedy that can be obtained by all humanity without any distinction.
But apart from the fact that Freud is the founder of psychoanalysis, he must also be considered as a great humanist who brought forth solace for the ills of his age. He was a man who grappled persistently with the problem of human suffering. It is stated in Freud's autobiography that his original interest was in "human concerns," and that is how, in spite of his scientific career, he found in psychoanalysis the way of giving expression to the deep desire within him. Fromm says that "Freud expressed his humanism primarily in his concept of the unconscious. He assumed that all men share the same unconscious strivings, and hence that they can understand each other once they dare to delve into the underworld of the unconscious." 

Freud's method of therapy is based on the assumption that man can acquire the means to cope with his problems rationally. "Freud is often presented as undermining the rationalist conception of man as a self-sufficient, self-aware, self-controlled being, that we are apt to forget that although he may have abandoned such a conception, as an account of what man is, he never retreated from it as an account of what man ought to be," says MacIntyre. Freud does not describe the unconscious side of man out of curiosity, but because he wants us to control it and be aware of it. MacIntyre says that, although Freud denied any moralistic purpose in his work, the ideal of conscious rationality gives to his writings a moral fervor and prescriptive flavor.
The Contemporary Spiritual Crisis in the West

Apart from the basic humanism found in the two systems, there is yet a deeper reason which prompted this comparison of two great philosophies separated by such a vast expanse of time. Both the Buddha and Freud are physicians of the soul. A detailed analysis of the two therapeutic systems is found in Chapter IV, so that here it is only necessary to note briefly their significance for man’s spiritual crisis.

According to Fromm "Psychoanalysis is a characteristic expression of Western man's spiritual crisis, and an attempt to find a solution."[^7] By the term "spiritual crisis" are meant the sense of despair and allied themes found in such works as Freud's Civilization and Its Discontents, the dreary spiritual desert depicted in T. S. Eliot's Wasteland, W. H. Auden's The Age of Anxiety and the rise of existentialism as the philosophy of crisis. In spite of the variety of schools within existentialism and the somewhat obscure terminology used by many of them, it is a symptom of a deep spiritual anguish within modern man. Some of the popular themes of the existentialists, like anxiety, dread, alienation, estrangement, absurdity, meaninglessness, nothingness, disgust, contingency, solitude, etc., certainly betray an atmosphere of restlessness that prevails today. Even humanistic psychoanalysis, though having a greater interest in man than the other types of psychology, is equally critical of the obscure terminology and the excessive emotional undertones of
existentialism. There have been attempts by psychoanalysts to reassess existentialism from the viewpoint of making use of its meaningful content as a basis for therapy. This is possible because Freud was one of the earliest to point to the deep sense of emptiness that haunted some of his patients. Some of the existentialists dramatized this on a cosmic scale.

In the light of early Buddhism the most significant point raised by an existentialist like Heidegger is the fear of death. Frieda Fromm-Reichmann refers to a phenomenon called "psychological death": "The fact that life ends with death remains to most people an inconceivable experience of ultimate psychobiological separation. To others, the fact that the time and cause of death are unpredictable conveys a painful sense of ultimate powerlessness. This fear and anxiety of death gains reinforcement from the fact that it does not stand only for itself but is also an expression and a symbol of unknown and unpredictable forces which govern human existence." Thus whether it is before death or what is called "psychological death," people feel the same helplessness and anxiety. There are many works by existentialists which display a remarkable sensitivity to this feeling of helplessness and the consequent spiritual aridity. But apart from depicting and displaying the malady, they do very little in the way of offering a solution. ...
is presented in Chapter IV, where the therapeutic systems of early Buddhism and Freud are compared.

The condition of man today gives a sense of timeliness to our underlying theme: the image of man as a patient, society as sick and the Buddha and Freud as physicians. We are concerned here with two therapeutic systems rooted in depth psychology--the psychology of unconscious motivation.
NOTES TO CHAPTER I


3. S.E., Vol. XXI.


CHAPTER II

I. THE CONCEPT OF MIND IN EARLY BUDDHISM

Vantage Points and Approaches to the Study of Mind

The analysis of mind is a more complex and intricate process than the study of matter and material phenomena and hence it is not surprising that the analysis of mind and mental phenomena has been viewed from a number of vantage points in Buddhist psychology. Thus, we see that the approach to the study of mental phenomena in the Sutta Piṭaka differs from that in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. It is not that one is opposed to the other, but that for purposes of emphasis and exegesis different kinds of analysis have been adopted. In one sense the Abhidhamma analysis of mental phenomena supplements the analysis of the Sutta Piṭaka. Firstly, there is what may be called the "nāma-rūpa" analysis. Here the approach is analytic, aspects of mind like perception, feeling and volition, being brought out with their differentiating characteristics. In the second place, there is the "paṭicca-samuppāda" analysis. This is a more synthetic approach, showing the dependence and the interdependence of all phenomena. The difference in these two approaches will be treated later when the role of viññāṇa (consciousness) as one of the five groups and as a link in the wheel of dependent origination is discussed. The dependent origination analysis is cast in the wider dimensions of the great cycle of endless births (the "samsāric" wheel).
In the Abhidhamma, that is in the later systematization of Buddhist psychology, a more self-conscious attempt to synthesize the study of mind is discernible. This approach combines analysis and synthesis and works out all the possible permutations and combinations of mental phenomena. The most valuable analysis in the Abhidhamma is that contained in the work called *Patṭhāna*. Herein are outlined 24 possible correlations between cause and effect. It brings out the condition, the circumstances and relations that determine the emergence of phenomena. This is a very valuable analysis, and we will later treat in detail the first of these 24 correlations called the root-condition (hetu-paccaya).

Elsewhere in the Abhidhamma we find an even more comprehensive and extensive analysis of 89 forms of thought (citta) and 52 mental factors (cetasika). These 89 forms of thought are in turn divided into 4 groups: the sense-plane (kāmaloka), the form-plane (rūpaloka), the formless plane (arūpaloka), and the supramundane plane (lokuttara). The 52 mental factors are also divided into four groups: the universal mental factors, the particular factors, the moral factors and the immoral factors. A detailed analysis of this system is given in the *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*.

In summation, then, the various approaches that form the basis of the Buddhist psychology, are: 1. The nāma-rūpa
analysis, 2. The paṭicca-samuppāda analysis, 3. The Paṭṭhāna analysis, and 4. The Abhidhamma classification of citta (thought) and cetasika (mental factors). All these are different standpoints that help the understanding of the psychology of mind and motivation in Buddhism. In the Freudian analysis of mental personality too, are found a number of vantage points from which Freud examined the concept of mental personality. These were referred to by Freud as the 1. dynamic, 2. the economic, 3. the topographic and structural, and 4. genetic points of view.

The Mind as a Psycho-physical Complex (Nama-rūpa)

The Buddha denies the existence of any permanent entity either mental or physical. He considers the mind as a psycho-physical complex, "nama-rūpa," to use the Pāli term. Nāma and rūpa are together referred to as the five "aggregates" or "groups" (paṭcakkhanda). Nāma is used generally to refer to the four non-material "groups" (khandas): 1. feeling (vedanā), 2. perception (sāññā), 3. disposition (sañkhāra), and 4. consciousness (viññāna). Rūpa, the fifth aggregate, is the material shape derived from extension, cohesion, heat and mobility.

It is an interesting fact that the Buddhist analysis of the mind has been compared to the tripartite division of mind into cognition, conation and affection so common in western psychology. Of course, contemporary western psychologists consider this an artificial and over-simplified
analysis. But as Flugel says "... some such classification is probably necessary, if we are to attain any kind of ordered understanding of the rich facts of mental experience. ..." Thus we can use this classification as a way of understanding the mind without, of course, putting absolute value on it. Accordingly we can say that feeling (vedanā) refers to the category of affection, disposition or volition (saṅkhāra) to conation and perception (sañña) and consciousness (viññāna) to cognition. This resemblance has been pointed out by a number of writers on Buddhist psychology.

The Buddhist concept of mind, considered as a psychophysical complex, has a number of significant logical features. The Buddha maintained that all things, including both mind and body, are subject to change, transitory (anicca). He described the universe in terms of the arising, decay and dissolution of all things. By this rejection of any eternally abiding substance it follows that he also rejected an eternally abiding pure Ego (atta). According to the Buddha, then, neither inside nor outside of mental and physical phenomena is there any permanent substance. The mind is often compared to a flame, whose existence depends upon a number of conditions, i.e., the wick, oil, etc. The Buddha maintained there is no substance, but a continuous flux of material and mental processes arising from their particular conditions. That is why it has been remarked
that Buddhism had to begin, very early in the history of humanity, to "psychologise without a soul." The mind as a dynamic process is also compared to a stream (sota) in the Pāli Suttas.

Another very significant feature of the early Buddhist concept of mind is the mutual dependency of the body on the mind and the mind on the body. This is clearly brought out by the law of dependent origination (paṭicca-samuppāda). According to one usage, as we have seen, mind and body (nāma-rūpa) are the twofold division of the five groups of existence. But according to another usage nāma-rūpa is the fourth link in the formula of dependent origination. The Buddhist scriptures bring out the dependency of mind and body thus: "Sound is not a thing that dwells inside the conch-shell and comes out from time to time, but due to both, the conch-shell and the man that blows it, sound comes to arise. Just so, due to the presence of vitality, heat and consciousness, this body may execute the acts of going, standing, sitting and lying down, and the five sense organs and the mind may perform their various functions."

Both the mind and body have a conditioned existence, and it is possible to conceive of a variety of relations between the mind and the body. Early Buddhism was not embarrassed by any kind of Cartesian dualism. The Buddhist concept of mind as a dynamic continuum is not limited to one span of life. The mind is always in flux and extends
to a number of births. This is a very significant fact and will be of crucial importance in our comparison of the Freudian and Buddhist concepts of mind. The concept of the Unconscious in early Buddhism is closely connected with the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth. It has been pointed out by K. N. Jayatilleke that in early Buddhism man is considered a "psycho-physical unit whose 'psyche' is not a changeless soul but a dynamic continuum composed of a conscious mind as well as an unconscious in which is stored the residue of emotionally charged memories going back to childhood as well as into past lives."

The mind, viewed in this way, is continuously subjected to pressure by the threefold desires, viz. sense-gratification (kāma-taṇḍhā), self-preservation (bhava-taṇḍhā) and self-annihilation (vibhava-taṇḍhā). Jayatilleke concludes: "Except for the belief in rebirth, this conception of mind sounds very modern, and one cannot fail to observe the parallel between the threefold desires of Buddhism and the Freudian conceptions of the eros, libido and thanatos."

It will be our chief objective to bring out some remarkable points of similarity between motivational theory in early Buddhism and Freud. Apart from the very striking similarity between the threefold desires of Buddhism and their counterpart in Freud mentioned above, an attempt will be made to show that in early Buddhism there existed a concept of the Unconscious, although not systematically worked out as such.
To sum up, we have mentioned a number of significant features of the early Buddhist concept of the mind, viz. the rejection of the concept that the mind is a substance, but rather that it is a psycho-physical complex and a dynamic process in continuous flux, and the mutual dependency of the mind and body as a result of their conditioned nature. It was also mentioned that early Buddhist psychology considers the mind to be a dynamic continuum composed of both a conscious and an unconscious aspect. Thus it is not surprising that Early Buddhist motivational theory should offer some striking resemblance to the dynamic psychology of Freud. But before dealing with motivational theory it will be necessary to examine the concept of mind in Buddhism and Freud in greater detail.

The Fourfold Analysis of the Buddhist Concept of Mind

1. Viññāṇa (Consciousness)

There has been a great controversy regarding the exact meaning of the word viññāṇa. There are four strands of meaning attributed by various scholars to the word: 1. cognitive consciousness, 2. survival factor, 3. the medium in which jhānic or spiritual progress takes place, and 4. a sort of anoetic sentience. However, before considering these different views, we should notice two distinct types of contexts in which viññāṇa is used. The first is what may be called consciousness as a "short range" concept when it refers to one of the five khandas (groups). The second is
a "long range" concept when it refers to consciousness as link in the chain of causation (paṭicca-samuppāda).

Obscurity about the meaning of viññāṇa arises because in certain contexts it is said that nāma-rūpa depends on viññāṇa and viññāṇa on nāma-rūpa, and in certain other contexts viññāṇa is included in the definition of nāma-rūpa. Sarathchandra considers this a contradiction and the usage of viññāṇa as a transmigrating entity to be a later intrusion. The very contradictions inherent in the explanation show it up as a later intrusion. It is said that if viññāṇa did not descend into the mother's womb, the growth of nāma-rūpa would be prevented. If nāma-rūpa here stands for the whole individual composed of mental and physical factors we should have to regard viññāṇa as something over and above nāma-rūpa, a position which is not consistent with the rest of the Buddhist teaching. Nāma-rūpa, wherever it stood for the individual, always included viññāṇa as well.

It seems, however, that there need be no contradiction between the two usages of viññāṇa. In fact later we will see how the term saṅkhāra (disposition) also has a similar usage. The two terms saṅkhāra and viññāṇa are used in the analysis of the five aggregates in the narrow sense of those dispositions and acts of consciousness which manifest themselves only so long as the body and mind are together. In this sense mind and body form a configurational complex
based on conditions. But they also have a deeper sense in the formula of dependent origination. There has loomed round this usage a large controversy. Does viññāṇa pass over from one body to another? There are some who feel that this concept goes against the empiricist view of the mind found in the canon. 15

Yet O. H. De A. Wijesekara has made a good case for the usage of viññāṇa in a deeper sense as a link in the samsāric wheel. He says that apart from biological evolution, there is samsāric evolution. 16

It is said in the Pāli canon that if viññāṇa does not descend into the mother's womb, if it were to become extinct, name and form (nāma-rūpa) would not become constituted therein or if viññāṇa having descended into the mother's womb, if it were to become extinct, name and form would not come into existence. Again it is said were viññāṇa to be extirpated from one yet young, youth or maiden, name and form would not attain to growth, development and expansion. 17 Thus in this sense viññāṇa is the basis of name and form. Thus the question arises as to how viññāṇa is dependent on name and form, for the sequence is "viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpam" and "nāmarūpapaccayā viññānām." 18 In elucidating this point the Pāli canon says that if viññāṇa were to gain no foothold in name and form, it would not manifest itself in that concatenation of birth, death and the origin of pain. 19 Thus name and form will be together with viññāṇa, so far as there
is a process of birth, growth, decay, death and rebirth.

This is a very crucial usage of the word viññāṇa and it is not possible to accept Sarathchandra's contention that it is a later intrusion into Buddhist thought. In fact, a special term "samvattanika viññāṇa" is used to refer to consciousness as a surviving factor in the individual. "At the breaking up of the body after dying this situation exists, that that evolving consciousness (samvattanika viññāṇa) may accordingly reach imperturbability." Horner thus translates the term samvattanika viññāṇa as "evolving consciousness." This is what Wijesekara refers to as the survival factor. In fact it is difficult to find an equivalent for this in western terminology. The closest seems to be what C. D. Broad calls the "psychic factor" in his comments regarding evidence for human survival. He says that "instead of a single mind which animates a successive series of organisms we should have a single psychic factor which combines with such a series of organisms to form a successive series of minds." This type of concept has the advantage of dealing with the "origin" of the mind at conception as well as some kind of "end" at death. Some critics find this type of interpretation unsatisfactory because they wrongly believe that by this we consider consciousness a permanent entity or a substance which transmigrates. The Buddha certainly rejected the conception of consciousness as a permanent entity. In the Suttas it is
said that consciousness is one of the four substances (āhāra) for the maintenance of beings that have come to birth. The Buddha says that if someone raises the question "Who now is it, lord, who feeds on the consciousness?" it is not a proper question, but if someone were to ask "Of what, lord, is the consciousness a sustenance?" that is a proper question. The answer is that the consciousness sustenance is the cause of renewed becoming, of rebirth in the future. Consciousness is the influx conditioned by a causal pattern and it is a dynamic continuum. It is also referred to as a stream of consciousness (vinñāṇasota) and also a stream of becoming (bhavasota). The evolving consciousness which continues after death maintains its dynamism because it is nourished by the manifestations of craving. There is a residuum derived from the psychological part of the individual. This dynamism makes possible the continuation of the phenomenal existence and the continuation of individuality (nāma-rūpa).

The Buddha admitted the existence of a life beyond. But this is not a theory based on pure reason (takka), but it is based on supernormal powers attained by the Buddha and his disciples. It is possible to acquire the power of recollecting past births (pubbenivāsānussati) and also observe the death and survival of beings by clairvoyance (dībbacakkhu). It is also noteworthy that the evidence for rebirth has been brought under experimental
investigations by psychologists today. "The claim that is being made is that in the case of some of these experiments, the long forgotten memories of alleged prior lives are not only brought to the surface, but are re-lived by the subjects as if they were their own." It is time that the psycho-analyst worked out the clinical implication of the hypothesis of rebirth. The significance of this point for our comparative reference will be discussed in the section on Freud.

So far we have referred to a very significant use of the word viññāṇa, viz. the surviving factor in the individual. There seem to be three more strands of meaning in the word viññāṇa: 1. the sense of cognitive consciousness, 2. the "medium" in which jhānic or spiritual progress takes place, and 3. a sort of anoetic sentience.

Let us take usages 1 and 3 first as they refer to viññāṇa as the fifth of the five khandas (groups). The Mahāhatthipadopama Sutta describes the condition of perception thus: Ajjhatikā añ ca āvuso cakkhuṁ aparibhinnaṁ hoti bāhīrā ca rūpā na āpātham āgacchanti no ca tajjo samannāhāro hoti, n'eya tāva tajjassa viññāṇabhāgassa phātubhāvo hoti. Horner renders this passage to mean that even if the "eye that is internal is intact but external material shapes do not come within its range and there is no appropriate impact, then there is no appearance of the appropriate section of consciousness." What this passage describes is the conditions of cognition: 1. the eye as the
organ of sight, 2. external form coming within the field of vision, 3. tajjo samannāhāro hoti, which Horner renders as an "appropriate impact," but which could be rendered as an "act of attention." Now the crucial word here is viññāṇabhagassa which Horner renders as "section of consciousness"; Sarathchandra renders this word "resulting sensation" and Jayattileke "perception." This divergence shows the ambiguity in the word viññāṇa in describing cognitive consciousness. Sarathchandra considers viññāṇa a kind of anoetic consciousness or bare sentience in this context. This seems to be his basic theme in the attempt to connect viññāṇa and his theory of bhavaṅga. He says "We shall attempt here to analyse the various meanings of viññāṇa, and to show that, though it stood, in the early texts, as a general term for sense-consciousness when it came to be applied to the psychology of perception, it meant, not full cognition, but bare sensation, a sort of anoetic sentience that occurs before the object is completely apprehended. In this sense, we shall perhaps find that the later Abhidhamma meaning of this word was consistent with the earliest tradition."31 Thus Sarathchandra considers the usage of viññāṇa in the psychology of perception as a sort of anoetic sentience and goes on to say that viññāṇa in the earliest texts was synonymous with samhā.

Though the idea that viññāṇa as anoetic sentience is connected with the bhavaṅga theory has a certain structural
neatness, yet it is not true to the spirit of the Pāli sources. For one thing, as will be noted in a later chapter, the concept of bhavaṅga is not of such focal significance to early Buddhist psychology as Sarathchandra maintains. Secondly viṁśāṇa in these contexts has a cognitive import, and we should not lose sight of this fact. When it is used in the context of the process of perception viṁśāṇa is rather a general term for cognition or cognitive consciousness than any kind of anoetic sentience.

Six kinds of consciousness are described: 1. visual consciousness arising through the eye and material shapes, 2. auditory consciousness through the ear and sounds, 3. the olfactory consciousness through the nose and smells, 4. the gustatory consciousness through the tongue and tastes, 5. bodily consciousness through the body and touches, and 6. mental consciousness through the mind and mental states. The sense-organs are referred to as internal sense fields (ajjhattikāyatana). Sense objects are referred to as external sense fields (bāhirāyatana).

Now let us analyse the use of viṁśāṇa in the sense of the "medium" in which the course of meditational progress takes place. Later, when we analyse the concept of ālayavijñāna, we shall examine the role of this usage in the development of the idealist tradition. For the present the fact that interests us is that the stages of spiritual development (samāpatti) are called the "footholds" or "abiding
places of viññāṇa" (viññāṇatthiti). Regarding the usage of
the word viññāṇatthiti Wijesekara says that throughout all
these states of spiritual development, the stream of con-
sciousness (viññāṇasota) appears to abide in a certain
plane of existence for some duration. In the first jhānic
state viññāṇa manifests itself as reasoning and investigation
(vitakkavicāra). Vitakka is thinking with concepts and
vicāra is discursive thinking. In the second jhānic state
there is a subsiding of reasoning and investigation followed
by tranquility and oneness of mind. It is born of concentra-
tion (samādhi) and is filled with rapture (pīti) and joy
(sukha), but yet it is a state of consciousness. Even up to
the sixth stage or the second of the higher stages con-
sciousness is present. The sixth stage is called the
infinity of viññāṇa, a stage that may be described as un-
bounded consciousness. Beyond this is the stage of nothing-
ness. Both these states are called viññāṇatthiti. Then the
final abiding place of viññāṇa is the sphere of neither
saññā nor asaññā (nevasaññā-nāsaññāyatana). This shows that
though this is not a "conceptual" state yet it is some form
of experience. Even this does not imply the attainment of
nibbāna. Viññāṇa ceases to manifest altogether only in the
final state of the ceasing of conceptual and empirical
experience.

Now it is clear that there are a number of strands of
meaning in the word viññāṇa that we have attempted to
disentangle. From our point of view what is going to be of
great significance for the study of motivational theory is the
use of viññāṇa as the factor of survival and the relation­
ship of viññāṇa to craving and clinging which provides a
residuum (upādhi) for the further dynamism of viññāṇa. This
peculiar quality of viññāṇa is due to its position in the
wheel of dependent origination, but it seems that it retains
at least a part of this connection as one of the five
khandas. This is very clearly apparent from a passage in
the following Pāli canon.34 [A person] thinks "Such was
my vision in the distant past, such were material shapes,"
and his consciousness (viññāṇam) is bound fast there by
desire and attachment (tattha candarāgapatibaddham hoti).
Horner says in a note that the commentary to the Majjhima
Nikāya refers to this type of consciousness by the term
"Nikanti Viññāṇa," that is consciousness that is desire,
craving and longing for.35 There is another context in
which it is said that "consciousness is lust-tied to the
material element" (rupadhāturāgavinibaddham). In the same
way it is said that consciousness is lust-tied to saññā,
vedanā and sañkhāra.36 It is difficult to disassociate
consciousness from its connection with the body and sense­
organs, as then it has craving as its base.37

2. Sañkhāra (Disposition, Directed Disposition)

Sañkhāra is an extremely difficult word to render
into English. This is likewise true of many concepts in
the Pāli canon which do not have equivalents within the conceptual framework of Western philosophical systems. The problem is made even more difficult as within the Pāli canon itself the term has different shades of meaning in different contexts.

There are four basic shades of meaning of this word in the Buddhist scriptures. As a link in the wheel of dependent origination (paṭicca-samuppāda) saṅkhāra has an active aspect of "forming" and signifies karma, i.e., wholesome or unwholesome volitional activity of body, speech or mind. Horner renders saṅkhāra in this sense by "karmic formations," the same terminology as suggested by Nyānatiloka Thera.

As a suffix to kāya, vaci, citta or mano it is rendered by Horner as a function, impulse or activity. Saṅkhāra occurs also as the fourth of the five khandas. Horner renders saṅkhāra in this usage as "habitual tendencies." It also occurs in the sense of anything formed and conditioned and so often refers to phenomenal existence in general as it is conditioned. In the phrase "all formations are impermanent" (sabbe saṅkhāra aniccā) this meaning is found.

It is because of these varying shades of meaning that the P. T. S. Dictionary says: "We can only convey an idea of its import by representing several of its applications, without attempting to give a 'word' as a definite
Horner states that there may be some inner bond of reference that has so far escaped interpreters of Buddhism. Horner in supporting this claim refers to an analysis in the Majjhima Nikāya and its commentary where the saṅkhāras are referred to as 69 types of body, speech and mind.

However this kind of unity of reference is not very helpful in getting at the role of saṅkhāra in motivational theory. It has been pointed out by some that the concept of will is central to the meaning of saṅkhāra. While it is not wise to simplify the complex strands of meanings woven into this difficult word, it seems safe to say that saṅkhāra refers to the conative aspect of behavior. But what kind of evidence tends to strengthen this conclusion?

Reference has already been made to the threefold classification of mental processes into the categories of cognition, affection and conation popular in Western psychological literature, on the basis of which it could be said that viññāna and saññā refer to the category of cognition, vedanā to the category of affection and saṅkhāra to the category of conation.

In the Sutta Piṭaka, cetanā and saṅkhāra are used synonymously. In the Abhidhamma cetanā is used instead of saṅkhāra in the sense of volitional activity. In the Saṁyutta Nikāya the question 'What is saṅkhāra?' is raised and it is said that the saṅkhāras are the six seats of will
There are terms like abhisāṅkhāra and sasāṅkhāra which shed light on this usage. The P. T. S. Dictionary says that the term abhisāṅkhāra implies "purposive intellection." In the Dīgha Nikāya (III, 217) and the Saṃyutta Nikāya (II, 82) the term abhisāṅkhāra is brought under a three-fold classification: 1. Puññābhisāṅkhāra, 2. āpuññābhisāṅkhāra, and 3. anesiñjerabhisāṅkhāra. These refer to the meritorious, demeritorious and the imperturbable karma formations. The term karma formation in this context is suggested by Nyānatiloka Thera. Abhisāṅkhāra in the Dīgha Nikāya is rendered by Rhys Davids by "complexes" and in similar context in the Saṃyutta by Mrs. Rhys Davids and F. L. Woodward by "planning." This difference in terminology again shows how many interpretations of the term abhisāṅkhāra are possible. The idea of a complex or a compound is not quite a central implication of saṅkhāra or abhisāṅkhāra in the Sutta Piṭaka. It is found in the later Abhidhamma classification. As Zan Aung points out, in the Abhidhamma classification saṅkhāra is a collective name given to the fifty mental properties (cetasidas) which go to make up citta (consciousness). "They are named saṅkhāras because, as concomittants, they perform their respective functions in combination as one whole, of act, speech, or thought." Aung says that since phassa (contact), vedanā (feeling) or saññā (perception) were not pre-eminently active elements the
only other representative property was chosen to be the namesake of the other 49 namely, that volitional activity which we understand by both cetanā and saṅkhāra.\(^\text{53}\)

Rendering abhisāṅkhāra as karma formation can be accepted but we must visualize the nature of a karma formation as such. This is well brought out with a graphic image in the Aṅguttara Nikāya: "The wheel kept rolling so long as the impulse that set it moving lasted (abhisāṅkhārassa gati). Then it circled round and fell to the ground."\(^\text{54}\) Here abhisāṅkhāra refers to some kind of momentum. It is because of this momentum and dynamism that some consider the usage of saṅkhāra in the paṭicca-samuppāda as a synonym of the developed cetanā (karma).\(^\text{55}\) F. L. Woodward says that according to the commentary "abhisāṅkhārassa gati" is equal to "payogassa gamanām."\(^\text{56}\) Nanamoli renders the term payogābhisaṅkhāra as the "formation consisting in momentum."\(^\text{57}\) The term payogo is explained in reference to the term sasaṅkhāra by Mrs. Rhys Davids as "motive."

The terms sasaṅkhāra and asaṅkhāra form the defining character of two types of consciousness, the latter referring to thought that is spontaneous and effortless in an act of will, and the former referring to an act done with deliberation. According to the Atthasālinī the following explanation of sasaṅkhāra is given: "For instance, a bhikshu dwelling in the neighbourhood of a vihāra is inclined, when duty calls him to sweep the terrace round the sthūpa, wait on the elders,
or listen to the Dhamma, to find the way too far and shirk attendance. Second thoughts, as to the impropriety of not going, induce him to go. These are prompted either by his own conscience (attano vā payogena), or by the exhortation of another who, showing the disadvantage in shirking, and the profit in attending, says, 'Come, do it!' And the 'good thought,' i.e., of course, the resolve to go, is said 'to have arisen by way of a concomitant motive, by way of the taking hold of a cause.'

This illustrates the idea of deliberation or planning associated with the word saṅkhāra.

It seems, then, that through the diversity of meanings associated with the word saṅkhāra there run two basic threads of meaning: 1. the idea of deliberation, planning, making a choice, persistence in an effort, aspects suggested by volition and conation, 2. dynamism, disposition, habit, in which sense it is often associated with karma. For instance, the dynamic saṅkhāras in one's own person which have the potentiality of bringing about the next birth are called "ponobhavikabhava-saṅkhāra." Thus, saṅkhāra is associated with some kind of momentum, like the wheel that moves as long as the impulse that set it rolling lasts.

The term "directed dispositions" may do justice to both these elements, and hence this is here suggested as a translation of saṅkhāra. The fusing of concepts like that of deliberation and habit behaviors into one concept is not foreign to western psychology. For instance, Flugel cites...
the case of the concept of orexis which cuts through both conation and affection. He says: "It is true that the distinction between affection and conation has proved in many cases more difficult than that between either of these and cognition, hence the increasing use in recent years, at least among British psychologists, of the term orexis to cover both affection and conation as distinguished from cognition." So, in a similar way, we could conclude that as a motivational concept saṅkhāra is a term that has both forward looking and backward looking aspects.

3. Vedanā (Feeling or Hedonic Tone)

Commenting on the meaning of the word vedanā, Mrs. Rhys Davids says: "Vedanā is a term of very great import, meaning sentience or reaction, bodily or mental, on contact or impression. Sensation is scarcely so loyal a rendering as feeling, for though vedanā is often qualified as 'born of the contact' in sense-activity, it is always defined generally as consisting of the three species—pleasure (happiness), pain (ill) and neutral feeling—a hedonistic aspect to which the term 'feeling' is alone adequate."59 This is a very significant observation and indeed vedanā can be rendered "hedonic tone." The role of pleasure and the threefold manifestations of craving becomes quite meaningful, if feeling is understood in this manner. The commentary to the Dhammasaṅgani describes the nature of feeling with a very apt metaphor. It says: As regards
enjoying the taste of an object, the remaining associated states enjoy it only partially. Of contact there is (the function of) mere touching, of perception the mere noting or perceiving, of volition the mere coordinating (the associated states of exerting or being active), of consciousness the mere cognizing. But feeling alone, through governance, proficiency, mastery, enjoys the taste of an object. For feeling is like the king, the remaining states are like the cook." Feeling has thus been described on the analogy of taste and the function of feeling then becomes the experiencing of the flavor of the object.

As is evident from the Bahuvedañña Sutta, feeling can be classified in various ways. "Ananda, two feelings are spoken of by me according to (one) classification, and three feelings are spoken of by me according to (one) classification, and five feelings . . . six feelings . . . eighteen feelings and thirty six feelings . . . and one hundred and eight feelings are spoken of by me according to (one) classification. Thus, Ananda, Dhamma is taught by me according to classification." The twofold classification is a reference to bodily and mental feelings; the threefold to pleasant, painful and neutral feeling; the fivefold to feelings based on the five sense organs; the sixfold to that based on the sensory impingements by way of the sense doors; the eighteenfold refers to the six ways of attending to material shapes based on happiness, six founded on grief
and six on equanimity; the thirty-sixfold refers to the six forms of happiness connected with the household life, six connected with renunciation, the six indifferences of a householder and the six indifferences of renunciation; the hundred-and-eightfold refers to the thirty-six feelings as manifest in the past, present and future.  

Feelings and Their Relation to Motivational Roots

Feelings are also analyzed on an ethico-psychological basis into a threefold manifestation: wholesome (kusala), unwholesome (akusala) and indeterminate (avyakata). This is a very significant classification which brings in an ethical dimension to the study of feeling which is foreign to a psychology like that of Freud. Pleasant feeling induces an attachment (upadana) to a pleasant object. There is a potency in pleasant feelings to arouse latent sensuous greed (rāgānusaya), in painful feelings to arouse latent anger and hatred (patighānusaya). It is also said in the Pāli canon that greed emerges due to unwise reflection (ayonisa manasikāra) on an attractive object and hate through unwise reflection on a repulsive object. "Greed (lobha or ragā) comprises all degrees of 'attractedness' towards an object from the faintest trace of personal desire up to gross egoism, whilst hatred (dosa) comprises all degrees of repulsion from the faintest trace of ill-humour to the highest pitch of hate and wrath." Unwholesome
feelings rest on these twofold roots of greed and hatred as well as on a third root moha, usually translated "delusion." These three moral roots make the feelings wholesome and the three immoral roots make the feelings unwholesome. The psychology of feelings in early Buddhism can never be grasped without an understanding of these roots of human motivation.

In general, though feelings are directly conditioned by contact (phassa), their nature depends on a number of factors. Flugel, making an analysis of the basis of feeling, says: "The visual perception of a bowl of choice fruit or of a lovely girl may in their different ways pleasantly stir the imagination even when the desire for eating or for sexual intimacy is absent owing to satiation or to other causes."65 This strengthens the Buddhist claim that even though desires can be temporarily satisfied at a purely physiological level, their psychological roots are strong. Human desires continually emerge to the level of consciousness and find temporary satisfaction (tatratatrābhìnandinī), but they ever remain unsatisfied and thus provide fuel for the continuation of the individual. Hence, we should not lose sight of the ethical dimensions in which the pleasure-pain polarity is analyzed in Buddhism.

Buddhism does not insist that with any feeling there emerges craving, rather it says that, if there is craving, then feeling is a condition by way of decisive support (upanissaya). The Visuddhimagga describes the position thus:
The Greatest Sage announced the law
'With feeling as condition, craving,'
Since all three feelings thus can be
Conditions for all kinds of craving
Though feeling is condition, still
Without Inherent-tendency [anusaya]
No craving can arise . . . 66

Thus the relationship of anusaya to vedanā is very significant for an understanding of the role of craving (taṇhā).

The Nettippakaraṇa makes out a grouping of persons based on motivational roots and feelings. It is said that
1. a person of lusting temperament (rāgacarita) liberates himself by abandoning greed as a root of that which is unprofitable and by not approaching contact felt as pleasant;
2. a person of hating temperament (dosacarita) liberates himself by abandoning hate as a root of that which is unprofitable and by not approaching contact felt as painful;
3. a person of deluded temperament (mohacarita) liberates himself by abandoning delusion as a root of that which is unprofitable and by not approaching contact felt as neither painful nor pleasant. 67 This analysis illustrates the deep rooted nature of feeling.

4. Saññā (Perception)

As one of the groups subsumed under nāma-, saññā is generally rendered "perception." Mrs. Rhys Davids considers it as a relatively simple form of intellection or cognition which consists in the discernment, recognition and assimilation of sensations. 68 The role of saññā seems to fall between pure sentience or awareness and a sophisticated
judgment. There is a very interesting analogy mentioned by Jayasuriya which throws light on the nature of saññā. 69 He states that the relationships among saññā, viññāna and paññā are clarified by an analogy. A gold coin is given to a child, a villager and a goldsmith. Each one conceives it differently: the child knows it as a colored object; the villager knows it as something capable of procuring many things he needs; the goldsmith knows a great many things about it, such as its nature, impurities, tests and purification. Likewise saññā, translating "noting" by Jayasuriya, makes a note of the object as being of such a color, of such a shape and size, etc., so as to identify it subsequently. Wisdom (paññā) understands that object as having a real un-changing nature, as being impermanent, etc. Cognition (viññāna) is the medium which assists the diversification of thinking by the mental factors.

This analysis is based on the Abhidhamma tradition. But it also shows the role of saññā as discernment or recognition, as found, for instance, in the Majjhima Nikāya (Mahāvedalla Sutta). 70

Saññā is sometimes divided into two kinds: patigha-saññā and adivacana-saññā. Saññā that arises out of contact with the sense organs is described as patigha-saññā. Adivacana-saññā is of a nominal character and includes sense images and concepts. As perception it is of six kinds: visual forms, sounds, smells, tastes, bodily sensations and images.
In a more popular sense saññā denotes a sign or mark. The basis of this usage seems to be the underlying element of recognition in a sign or mark. As the Atthasālinī says, "We may see this procedure when the carpenter recognizes a piece of wood which he has marked by special knowledge," or when "we recognize a man by his sectarian mark on the forehead." There are some other contexts in which it is used. Sometimes it stands for consciousness in its entirety (neva-saññā-nāsaññayatana), the realm of neither perception nor non-perception. It also refers to ideas which are objects of meditation like impermanence (anicca), non-soul (anattā), impurity (asubha), etc.

Though saññā is used in different contexts, its dominant role is as the third of the five groups. Compared with saṅkhāra or viññāṇa it does not involve so much subtlety and complexity. However, it has been translated by a number of terms which are practically synonyms, for example: discernment, recognition, noting, concept, idea, notion, sign, mark, all of which emphasize aspects of perceptual activity. But as was mentioned earlier, saññā seems to fall between pure sentience and sophisticated cognition. There are some scholars who render viññāṇa as "cognition" and saññā as "recognition."
2. THE CONCEPT OF MIND IN FREUD

Models and Vantage Points

In charting the nature of mental personality Freud introduced a number of conceptual models. These are various approaches and vantage points that Freud took to plot out the complex psychological phenomena. He introduced two basic conceptual models to delineate the nature of mental personality: 1. the Conscious, Pre-conscious and the Unconscious, and 2. the Ego, Id and the Super-ego. He viewed his two conceptual models from various angles, viz. the dynamic, the economic, the genetic, the topographic and structural.

The Freudian concept of mind can also be examined under the threefold categories of cognition, affection and conation. As was pointed out earlier, though this threefold division is somewhat artificial, it is very useful for evaluating the theories of motivation. The value of the Freudian system lies in elucidating the complicated nature of the affective processes. According to the topographic viewpoint the psychic apparatus is threefold, consisting of the Conscious, the Preconscious and the Unconscious. Freud says that consciousness is not a necessary attribute of the psychical. He considers consciousness the sensory organ of the mind. As the eye sees the object in the outer world, so the function of consciousness is to discern endopsychic processes. This "eye" of consciousness is somewhat similar
to the manodvāra (mind-door) in Buddhism. The Pre-conscious contains memory traces which can be recalled without much effort. The term Pre-conscious refers to latent ideas which are accessible to consciousness under ordinary conditions. In the case of the Unconscious it is not accessible without a special procedure, such as hypnosis or free association.

This topographic model had to be revised in the light of new findings and this revised model is referred to as the structural model. According to this revision we get the division of personality into the Id, Ego and the Super-ego. The Id represents the archaic impulses and the Ego the seat of reason and sanity. The Super-ego is the voice of conscience, morality, prohibitions and demands.

The dynamic represents the mind as an interaction of forces. The upsurge of desires and wishes, their interplay and conflict can be designated as the psycho-dynamic point of view. As Hartman points out, in the early beginning (even after the significance of unconscious processes had been discovered), Freud upheld the theory of associationism. It is only when he found conflict to be a primary motivating force that he built up a dynamic psychology. "The consideration of mental processes from this angle of synergistic or antagonistic motivating forces is what has since been known as the dynamic aspect of psychoanalysis. The systematic and objective study of conflict has remained one of its essential aspects and has proved a necessary and fruitful
avenue to the explanation of human behaviour."77

Connected with the dynamic avenue is another approach called the "economic." This deals with the measurement or the quantitative analysis of these conflicting forces. The forces are described in terms of energy. The basic instinctual drives like sex, self-preservation and aggression are the main sources of energy. These various approaches to the study of mind are called "metapsychology" by Freud. This term may offer some similarity to the Abhidhamma (literally the "Further Dhamma") of Buddhism. Hartman says that the prefix meta- here points to a theory "beyond" the investigation of conscious phenomena, adding that metapsychology is really nothing but a term for the highest level of abstraction in analytic psychology.78 A variety of approaches to the study of mental personality have now been presented. It was noted that there are two basic conceptual models introduced by Freud: 1. Conscious, Pre-conscious, Unconscious; 2. Id, Ego and the Super-ego. The Id, Ego and Super-ego will now be treated in detail.

The Id and Its Structure

One of Freud's greatest discoveries was that hysterical paralysis was caused by purely psychological factors. He traced these causative factors to early infancy, to certain traumatic factors buried in the past. Freud considered the Unconscious as the area of repressed memories. Later he
realized that the Unconscious was not only the area of repressed memories, but was the receptacle of deep instinctual desires, which try to find expression in socially recognized ways. Thus Freud came to realize that even a part of the Ego was unconscious. Then he introduced the concept of the Id. The Id gave a broader basis to his psychology than the Unconscious in the sense of "repressed." Freud says: "To the oldest of these psychical provinces or agencies we give the name of id. It contains everything that is inherited, that is present at birth, that is laid down in the constitution--above all, therefore, the instincts, which originate from the somatic organisation and which find a first psychical expression here (in the id) in forms unknown to us." A note on this says: "The oldest portion of the psychical apparatus remains the most important throughout life, moreover, the investigations of psycho-analysis started with it." The underlined words suggest a remarkable parallel between the Id and the āsavas of the Buddhist scriptures, the dark affective bases inherited through countless births. According to Freud, "There is nothing in the id that corresponds to the idea of time; there is no recognition of the passage of time, and--a thing that is most remarkable and awaits consideration in philosophical thought--no alteration in its mental processes is produced by the passage of time. Wishful impulses which have never passed beyond the id, but impressions, too, which have been sunk
into the id by repression, are virtually immortal; after the
passage of decades they behave as though they had just
occurred." Freud felt that this offered an approach to
"some profound truths," but that he himself did not make much
progress in that direction. At this point he came up with
the notion of the collective unconscious and of the archaic
heritage of man. But these speculations led to no signif­
icant progress, nor did Jung's enthusiastic preoccupation
with the problem lead to a clarification of the real
psychological issues involved. An attempt to work out the
clinical implications of the concept of rebirth and the basis
of the archaic Unconscious could be really rewarding.

The Id is the obscure, inaccessible part of our person­
ality. The little that has been learned about it is based
on the study of dreams and the formation of neurotic symptoms.
We can come nearer to the Id with the aid of analogies and
call it a "chaos, a cauldron full of seething excitations." It is supposed that it is somewhere in direct contact with
the somatic processes and takes over from them instinctual
needs and gives them mental expression, but it cannot be
discovered in what substratum this contact is made. These
instincts fill it with energy, but it has no organization
and no will; it has only an impulse to obtain satisfaction
for instinctual needs in accordance with the pleasure­
principle. It is irrational. Laws of logic, for instance
that of contradiction, do not hold for processes of the Id,
contradictory impulses exist side by side without neutralizing one another. At most they combine in compromise formations under the overpowering pressure to discharge their energy. In the Id there are no negatives, only contents cathected with greater or lesser strength. There is also no recognition of the passage of time. Conative impulses which have never gotten beyond the Id and even impressions which have been pushed down into the Id by repression are virtually immortal and are preserved for whole decades as though they had only recently occurred. The energy of these instinctual impulses is extremely mobile and fluid and within the Id the organic instincts operate in the form of the pleasure-principle and the death instinct. The one and only endeavor of these instincts is to obtain satisfaction. An immediate satisfaction of instinct would lead to perilous conflict with the external world. But the Id functions in a world of its own. The processes (primary process) which take place in the Id differ largely from those familiar to us by conscious perception. For the Id, which is cut off from the external world, has its own world of perception. As the Ego is governed by the reality-principle, the Id is governed by the pleasure-principle. On the other hand this does not mean that the Id is completely cut off from consciousness. The Id is always alive and dynamic. It has a dominant impact and continuous influence on the secondary processes of the Ego. The Id remains the
"affective base of the personality." This is a very important concept, as the novelty of the Freudian revolt lies in demonstrating the impact of the affective base on the conative and cognitive aspects of personality. Perception, thinking, reasoning, willing and other aspects of cognition and conation are under the influence of this affective base in the personality. This is very clearly brought out in Freud's *Ego and the Id*. In the analysis of his concept of the Unconscious, and specially in what he later called the Id, the tremendous dynamism of the affective processes is evident. Freud has, however, been criticized for adopting a kind of psychic determinism. If the affective bases predominate in the Unconscious and influence the functions of the Ego and Super-ego, does man use his will freely and act rationally?

In the same way that the Id represents the affective processes, the Ego represents what we call reason and sanity in contrast to the Id which contains the passions. To decide whether Freud does justice to conation and will it is necessary to understand Freud's conception of the Ego.

There is a very interesting hypothesis put forward by R. S. Peters in *The Concept of Motivation*. He says that when Freud speaks in the language of cause and effect, he introduces a causal model, the primary process of the Id. When Freud speaks in the language of purpose, he introduces the purposive model, the secondary process of the Ego. This
hypothesis has a basis in Freud's own work, and the distinction between primary and secondary processes is clearly brought out in his "Formulations Regarding the Two Principles in Mental Functioning." 85

In the psychology which is founded on psychoanalysis our starting point was the unconscious mental processes. These seem to be the older primary processes, the residues of a phase of development in which they were the only mental processes. These processes obey the pleasure-pain principle. Satisfaction is at the level of hallucination, phantasy and dreams. But these mental processes have to form a conception of the real circumstance in the outer world. Thus, what is conceived of is no longer pleasant, but that which is real, even if it should be unpleasant. With the introduction of the reality-principle one mode of thought activity was split off; it was kept free from "reality-testing" and remained subordinate to the pleasure-principle alone. This is the act of phantasy-making, which begins even in the games of children and is later continued in daydreaming, where it abandons its independence on real objects. This is not merely limited to the phenomena of dreams as such. These primary processes dominate in our ideational processes. These processes which basically ignore reality are referred to by Freud as "autistic." They are controlled by wishes and desires, not by external reality. "When Freud wants to describe goings-on of which it is appropriate to say that a
man is acting, that he has a reason for what he does, and so on, he talks about the Ego; when on the other hand, he wants to say that a person suffers something, or is made or driven to do something, he speaks of the Id." Freud used the model of the Ego and the Id to show that sometimes we take account of facts, act deliberately, plan means to ends and impose rules of procedure on our conduct, whereas at other times we take no account of facts, act impulsively and are driven, obsessed and possessed.

**Ego, the Seat of Cognition and Conation**

Those who criticize Freud for having introduced a morbid theory of psychic determinism are not quite justified. Freud quite clearly associated with the Ego the function of controlling and organizing the instincts. The Ego has to observe the external world and preserve a true picture of it in the memory traces left by its perceptions and by means of the reality-test. It has to eliminate any element in this picture of the external world which emerges as an internal source of excitation of the Id. The Ego controls the paths of access to motility, but it interpolates between desire and action the procrastinating factor of thought during which it makes use of the residues of experience stored up in the memory. In this way it dethrones the pleasure-principle which exerts undisputed sway over the processes in the Id and substitutes for it the reality-principle.
However, the characteristic which marks the Ego in contradistinction to the Id is a tendency to synthesize its contents, to bring together and unify its mental processes. It is this alone that produces that high degree of organization which the Ego needs for its highest achievements. The Ego advances from the function of perceiving instincts to that of controlling them.

The question of determinism has also been discussed by A. C. MacIntyre. He discusses the problem in a different setting, comparing the neurotic and the successfully analyzed patient. "The sharpest distinction in Freud's clinical practice is presumably that between the suffering neurotic and the successfully analyzed patient. The former goes through compulsive rituals, is harassed by delusive beliefs, cannot understand his own behaviour and cannot control it; the latter is characterized by what Freud calls 'self-knowledge and greater self-control'." Even if Freud's theory of human behavior as it is sounds deterministic, the ideal that he sets before the patient is self-knowledge and self-control. As MacIntyre says, "Freud is so often presented as undermining the rationalist conception of man as a self-sufficient, self-aware, self-controlled being, that we are apt to forget that although he may have abandoned such a conception as an account of what man is, he never retreated from it as an account of what man ought to be." We fail to see this clearly because Freud denies
any moral purpose in his mission. The Freudian message is summarized in the statement: "Where Id was, there Ego shall be."

3. THE NATURE OF EARLY BUDDHIST PSYCHOLOGY IN ITS RELATION TO FREUDIAN PSYCHOLOGY

Freud is so often portrayed as the champion of a materialistic creed and a pan-sexual theory of man that it needs some persuasive argument to prove that this viewpoint is superficial. However, the work done by scholars like Erich Fromm and Philip Rieff gives us a more sympathetic and penetrating analysis of his work. Fromm has pointed out that Freudian psychology is certainly not antagonistic to humanistic religions like early Buddhism. However, inasmuch as the Freudian concept of man was dealt with in Chapter I, it need not be taken up again here, and so we may proceed to discuss some points of similarity between the two systems.

1. Buddhist psychology does not belong to the tradition of pure scientific psychology. It is not a theoretical enterprise without any practical aim in view. On the other hand, it has been often called an ethico-psychology. A very important work on Buddhist psychology, a translation of the Dhamma-saṅgani, uses the term "psychological ethics." The Buddha pursued theoretical questions only insofar as it helped him to diagnose the condition of suffering man and advocate a way out of this tragic dilemma. The Buddha was
interested in the fundamental tragedy of man: the suffering individual. Thus it was an ethico-psychology with a therapeutic basis. Buddhism as a therapeutic system is based on profound psychological principles. But though it is a psychological theory, it has a practical aim. The Buddha makes a psychological analysis of mind and its state with a moral purpose, the purging of the mind of unwholesome states (kilesas). In its attempt to find therapeutic principles for this purpose, the Buddhist scriptures give us an insight into the instinctual and emotional forces that obstruct moral development. This accounts for the ethico-psychological scaffolding of motivational theory in Buddhism. A celebrated work, the Visuddhimagga, has a neatly laid ethico-psychological basis, being divided into three sections: 1. virtue (sīla), 2. concentration (samādhi), and 3. understanding (paññā). The realm of morality, by which one can refrain from actual transgression, is treated under the first of these. But defilements temporarily put away by morality can crop up again and can be potent, at least at the ideational level. Of course, stimuli at the ideational level can impel a man to action when he loses his sense of restraint. The second section, then, dealing with concentration and mental involvement attempts to get at the evil thought processes. However, this process really only pushes the defilements into the background for sometime. The defilements are entirely rooted out by means of understanding (paññā). It is
only at the third level that there is insight into the nature of one's motives. Without such an understanding no release is possible.

Another interesting feature in Buddhist psychology is that the springs of human action are described as wholesome roots (kusala mūla) and unwholesome roots (akusala mūla). The word kusala is sometimes translated as "good, skillful" or "wholesome." The unwholesome states are rooted in greed (lobha), hatred (desa) and delusion (avijjā); the wholesome states are rooted in their opposites, charity (cāga), love (mettā) and knowledge (vijjā). The word kusala, apart from referring to the ethnically good (as against the bad), also implies the idea of skill and also health. This ethico-psychological nature of terms like greed and hatred is an instance of a feature peculiar to all the concepts, words and terms used in Buddhist motivational theory.

Freud apparently tries to use his concepts with a semblance of neutrality, for example by using technical terms like libido without calling it sensual greed. There is a natural tendency to consider motives as character assessments, and the logic of this usage is imbedded in some types of motivational psychology. Even if this is denied regarding Freud, Freudian psychology was cast in a certain therapeutic framework, and this practical aspect is found in Buddhism too.
2. Another aspect of early Buddhism that should attract the Freudian is its interest in dynamic and motivational psychology. What is called "dynamic psychology" is often considered as the psychology of motivation. A recent psychologist defines the term dynamic psychology thus: "Dynamic psychology is concerned with the various psychological and related factors which derive, steer, integrate and sometimes disintegrate the mental life. Dynamic psychology aims to explain mental life causally, to find laws which may be used in controlling mental life." Thus dynamic psychology implies the complex interplay of forces both at the conscious and the unconscious level.

Jayasuriya has made a significant analysis of some aspects of dynamic psychology in Buddhism. Though he bases his analysis mostly on the later tradition as found in the Abhidhamma, the results of his analysis concerning the distinction between structural and dynamic approaches to mental phenomena are true generally of early Buddhist psychology. Introducing a chapter entitled "Dynamic Psychology," he says:

So far the approach to the study of material and mental phenomena has been a static one, in that the taxonomic interest or the interest in the structure of things, was predominant. Yet we have had occasion to consider dynamic questions such as how the body lives, grows and perishes, or how mind acts on the body. Here, we take the dynamic question in greater detail, to describe how the mind works, i.e. thinks, reflects, imagines, dreams, rests, understands others, and laughs, or how the individual gets both the mind and the body to do the
things it wishes; how the continuity of life and mind is maintained from life to life, and how the mind gets tainted or is purified.

Our analysis of motivational theory in early Buddhism seeks to present Buddhism as a dynamic psychology. Freudian psychology was a pioneer in the field of dynamic psychology and its similarity to early Buddhism in this respect cannot be overlooked too easily.

3. Now may be taken up the question as to whether Freudian psychology is abnormal psychology and Buddhist psychology otherwise. Though Freud was primarily interested in the mentally sick his psychology had a broader basis. Rieff points out that Freud's dictum that "we are all somewhat hysterical" and the Freudian claim that the difference between so-called normality and neurosis is only a matter of degree is a key statement. This position resembles the Buddhist axiom: "All worldlings are deranged" (sabbe puthajjanā unmattakā). Regarding the Buddhist concept of mental health, Jayatilleke says: "Now diseases are classified as two-fold, bodily disease (kāyiko rogo) and mental disease (cetasiko rogo). It is said that we suffer from bodily diseases from time to time, but that mental illness is continual until the final state of sainthood is attained." Fromm says that it is only at a superficial level that Freud appears as a creator of a new therapy for mental illness. He says that Freud's own system transcended the traditional concept of illness and cure, and thus he was
concerned "with the salvation of man rather than only with a therapy for mentally sick patients."  

4. What can be said of the personality of the founders of these systems of psychology? In the case of the Buddha it is hardly necessary to emphasize that his preaching and practice harmonized perfectly: "As he spoke, thus he acted" (yathāvādi tathākāri). Freud too, does not belong to that class of philosophers or psychologists who dwell academically on the profundities of life, but leave them severely alone in their private lives. He was deeply involved and immersed in everything he wrote and he himself underwent a vigorous process of self-analysis before he worked out his final psychoanalytic theories. This vigor and inner seriousness are manifest in his relationship with his patients. He was averse to moralizing and preaching to his patients, but he was prepared to analyze a patient for a prolonged period of time. As Fromm says, Freud considered the emancipation, the well-being and the enlightenment of even one individual a matter of concern in the final analysis. He did not measure his results in terms of money and time.  

Commenting on the personality of Freud, Jones says: "An overpowering need to come at the truth at all costs was probably the deepest and strongest motive force in Freud's personality, one to which everything else--ease, success, happiness--must be sacrificed. And, in the profound words
of his beloved Goethe, 'The first and last thing required of his genius is love of truth'. This love of truth implies that Freud considered honesty to be of great value. According to Rieff, "Secrecy is the category of moral illness, for it provides a hiding place for false motives. It is our secrets, hidden from ourselves, that fester and infect action. Thus the entire therapeutic undertaking, based as it is on the promise of 'absolute honesty' becomes a 'lost labour if a single concession is made to secrecy.' For secrecy provides the self with, in Freud's appropriately religious image, a 'right of sanctuary for disreputable citizens of the mental underworld. There are to be no refugees from honesty in Freud's program'.

The role of self-analysis and the rejection of sham and deception regarding one's motives are recognized to be of basic significance by the Buddha. Some very useful material on this question has been systematized by Rerukane Chandavimala Thero in a recent book in Sinhalese. The first part is called "Defilers of the Mind" and the second "Desires in Disguise." The latter part is of great significance and accordingly will be referred to below.

These broad similarities between the two systems of psychology should provide a background for comparing the structure of motivational theory in Buddhism and Freud.
NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. See section on viññāṇa, Chapter II.


8. D. II, 316-357.

9. Dr. K. N. Jayatilleke, Buddhism and Science, Kandy, Ceylon, Wheel Publication, 1958, p. 3.

10. Ibid.

11. Dr. E. R. Sarathchandra, Buddhist Psychology of Perception.

12. D. II, 62, 63; S. II, 6, 8, 12; S. III, 102.


14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., pp. 15-21.


18. O. H. De A Wijesekera, "Vitalism and Becoming."


23. S. II, 12.


29. M. I, 190.

30. Ibid.


32. M. III, 281.


34. M. III, 196.

35. Ibid.


37. S. II, 11.


41. M. I, 301.
43. M. I, XXV.
44. Ibid.
45. Dr. K. N. Jayatilleke, "Some Problems of Translation," Ceylon University Review, volumes 7 and 8.
46. S. III, 60.
50. S. II, 82.
51. Anuruddha, Compendium of Philosophy.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. A. I, III.
55. Anuruddha, Compendium of Philosophy, p. 274.
56. A. I, iii.
58. Mrs. Rhys Davids, editor and translator, Buddhist Psychological Ethics (Dhamma Sangani), London, 1900, p. 34.
59. Ibid., p. 6.
62. M. I, 398 (see translator's notes 3-9).
63. M. I, 303.
64. Nyānatiloka Thera, Buddhist Dictionary; Manual of Terms and Doctrines, p. 94.
65. J. C. Flugel, Studies in Feeling and Desire, p. 61.
68. Mrs. Rhys Davids, editor and translator, Buddhist Psychological Ethics, p. 7, n.2.
70. M. I, 293.
72. Ibid.
73. M. I, 41; 160.
74. S.E., vol. XXIII.
75. J. C. Flugel, Studies in Feeling and Desire.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. S.E. Volume XXII, p. 74.
82. Ibid., p. 73.
83. S.E. Volume XIX.

85. S.E. Volume XII.


90. Mrs. Rhys Davids, editor and translator, *Buddhist Psychological Ethics*.

91. See Chapter III.


CHAPTER III

1. MOTIVATIONAL THEORY IN FREUD

It is the aim of this chapter to examine the structure of motivational theory in early Buddhism against the background of Freudian psychology. The concept of unconscious motivation is the focus around which the Freudian concept of mind has been constructed. It is difficult to grasp the meaning of the phrase "unconscious motivation" without analyzing the meaning of the two words "unconscious" and "motivation" separately and then seeing how the phrase "unconscious motivation" works.

The Freudian concept of unconscious motivation will be taken up first and then the Buddhist theory of unconscious motivation. This is necessary because, before the role of unconscious motivation in Buddhism is examined, the logic of its usage in the Freudian system has to be understood.

The Freudian Concept of Unconscious

There are six features of the Freudian Unconscious which clearly define its place and function:

1. "The Unconscious is formally distinguished from the Conscious and the Pre-Conscious. The Pre-Conscious is what, not being in consciousness, can be brought to consciousness by ordinary introspective methods. The Unconscious is the realm of that which cannot thus be brought into consciousness." This is the most important point about the
Unconscious and it clearly delimits its function. A Pre-Conscious idea or memory can become conscious without much difficulty. A little effort may be necessary to recall something that is in one's memory, but no special technique is necessary to unravel it. But an unconscious idea or memory is hard to recall, because the resistance is great. Though there can be varying degrees of unconsciousness, a special technique is necessary to uncover the deeper levels of the unconscious processes. Freud used first the technique of hypnotism and then of free association to unravel the Unconscious. The psychical experiences which cannot be brought to the surface due to some kind of resistance belong to the Unconscious or can be described as "unconscious." A passage from the works of Freud would illustrate this point better.

It is by no means impossible for the product of unconscious activity to pierce into consciousness, but a certain amount of exertion is needed for this task. When we try to do it in ourselves, we become aware of a distinct feeling of repulsion which must be overcome, and when we produce it in a patient we get the most unquestionable signs of what we call resistance to it. So we learn that the unconscious idea is excluded from consciousness by living forces which oppose themselves to its reception, while they do not object to other ideas, the preconscious ones. Psycho-analysis leaves no room for doubt that the repulsion from unconscious ideas is only provoked by the tendencies embodied in their contents. This explains why the Unconscious can be considered as that which cannot be brought into consciousness.

2. The Unconscious can also be considered as the area of the primary processes. This is a very important aspect
of the Unconscious, and some psychologists like Jones and R. S. Peters consider this Freud's greatest discovery. Peters says "I have argued in my monograph (1958) adopting Ernest Jones' interpretation, that Freud's great discovery was not of the Unconscious but of the fact that what he calls the 'primary processes of thought' in terms of which the Unconscious works, are of a quite different type from those of thinking proper." 4

Freud says that there are two fundamentally different kinds of mental processes--the primary and secondary. The secondary processes are governed by reason and follow the pattern of logical thinking and recognize temporal and spatial relationships. The secondary processes represent the functioning of the Ego. Laws of logic do not hold for primary processes. As was mentioned in our analysis of the Id, contradictory impulses, negation and oppositions exist in the Id; but really there are no negatives. The infantile mind, the primitive mind, and the existence of dreams, are all aspects of primary processes. These are also referred to as autistic emphasizing the omnipotence of the wish element that is not modified by rational or realistic processes.

3. The Unconscious is also considered as that which is "repressed" by Freud. Though Freud later admitted that the repressed and the Unconscious do not coincide, he accepted the repressed as a very significant aspect of the Unconscious.
In fact, his initial concept of the Unconscious as the area of the repressed was never totally abandoned, but modified. The concept of the repressed wish takes a significant place in Freud's psychology.

4. Freud also considers the Unconscious as the "background link between infancy and adult life." Due to the failure to cure mental disorders by purely physical methods, Freud's psychology took a very significant turn. He came across many mental disorders for which there was no corresponding physiological cause and then he discovered that hysterical paralysis is rooted in purely psychological factors. He also emphasized the significance of the early life of the patient, especially the infancy. Freud unravelled the fact that many personality disorders could be traced to traumatic experiences buried in the past. So he held that childhood wishes persist and influence adult behavior.

5. The Unconscious is an omnipresent background to conscious and overt mental life and to behavior. It exerts a continual causal influence upon conscious thought and behavior.

6. The Unconscious is a "place," a "realm." This concept of the Unconscious as an entity raises the question of whether Freud was merely using spatial imagery or was claiming anything more than that.

Having outlined the basic features of the Unconscious let us briefly touch upon the type of material that he
brought to bear on this concept, mostly drawn from the clinical study of case histories. There are a number of directions from which he arrived at the concept of the Unconscious: the failure to cure mental disorders by the physical methods of neurosurgery, self-analysis, work on dreams, the psychopathology of every day life, study of myths, anthropology, art, etc. On the one hand, the Unconscious is analyzed in terms of the neurotic, yet on the other, is a very interesting analysis in terms of the normal personality.

The Abnormal and the Unconscious

Long before the advent of psychoanalysis experiments in posthypnotic suggestion demonstrated the operation of the Unconscious. A posthypnotic experience is a laboratory production, an artificial fact. But if we adopt the theory of hysterical phenomena first put forward by Pierre Janet, elaborated by Breuer and Freud, the psychological character of posthypnotic suggestion is even more distinctly seen. The mind of the hysterical patient is full of active yet unconscious ideas; all his symptoms proceed from such ideas. It is in fact the most striking character of the hysterical mind that it is ruled by these unconscious ideas. If the hysterical woman vomits, she may do so because of the idea of being pregnant. She has no knowledge of this idea, although it is easily detected in her mind and made conscious to her by the technical procedure of psychoanalysis. If she is
executing the jerks and movements constituting her fit, she does not consciously represent to herself the intended actions. Nevertheless, she is acting her part in the dramatic reproduction of some incident in her life, the memory of which is unconsciously active during the attack.

The preponderance of active unconscious ideas is revealed by analysis as the essential fact in all other forms of neurosis. Furthermore, an analysis of neurotic phenomena shows that a latent or unconscious idea is not necessarily a weak one. There are some latent ideas which do not penetrate into consciousness, however strong they become. The term Unconscious properly is reserved for these, while the term Pre-conscious is used to describe the latent ideas which are accessible to consciousness under ordinary conditions. The term Unconscious designates not only latent ideas in general, but especially ideas which keep apart from consciousness in spite of their intensity and activity. Freud discovered this fact by the methods of hypnosis and free association. In obsessional neurosis the patient's mind is occupied with thoughts that do not really interest him, he feels impulses that seem alien to him and he is impelled to perform certain actions, which not only afford him no pleasure, but which he is powerless to resist. What he does commit are certain very harmless trivial acts, repetitions and ceremonial elaborations of everyday performances, like going to bed, washing, dressing, etc.
The patient is, of course, aware of his condition, but the meaning of the symptom is unknown to him. Analysis invariably shows that these symptoms are derived from unconscious mental processes which can, however, under various favorable conditions become conscious. Freud says that the fact that it is possible to find meaning in neurotic symptoms by means of analytic interpretation is an irrefutable proof of the existence of the Unconscious. The unconscious process contains the meaning of neurotic symptoms. Breuer's discovery still remains the foundation of psychoanalytical therapy, viz. that symptoms vanish when their unconscious antecedents have been made conscious.

The Normal and the Unconscious

If someone should maintain that these are conclusions drawn chiefly from the study of pathological conditions, it could be said that Freud supplemented them by a study of the everyday life of the normal man. Certain difficulties of function of frequent occurrence among healthy people, slips in speech, errors in memory, false actions, etc., were shown to depend on the action of strong unconscious ideas in the same way as neurotic symptoms. This work is significant, as the supposedly impossible gap between the normal and the abnormal person was shown to be false. As MacIntyre says, "Freud's is not an explanation simply of the abnormal and the exceptional but also of the normal."
The scope in principle of Freudian explanation is all human behaviour; had it been less than this Freud would have been unable to draw the famous comparison between the effect of his own work and that of Copernicus. It is not surprising therefore that happenings as normal as dreams, slips of the tongue and jokes should receive attention along with melancholia, obsessive habits, and excessive anxiety.\(^5\)

In the case of forgetting, for example, the motive is an unwillingness to recall something which may evoke painful memories. The same conflict governs the phenomenon of erroneously carried-out actions. Motor expressions serve as the expression of numerous unconscious or restrained feelings. For the most part they represent symbolically wishes and fantasies. Most of these faults in speech, memory and action are the expression of repressed emotions of the psychic life. Even in healthy persons, egotistic, jealous and hostile feelings and impulses, burdened by the pressure of moral education, often utilize the path of faulty action to express themselves in some way. A thought does not seek expression in its complete form, but in a parasitic form, as a disturbance and modification of another thought. That is how the Unconscious and the repressed seek a relationship with the Conscious. Unwelcome, repressed, psychic material which, though pushed away from consciousness, is nevertheless not robbed of all capacity to express itself.
There is one more mental product to be met in normal persons which yet presents a striking analogy to the wildest production of insanity, namely dreams. A dream is itself a neurotic symptom, but which possesses for us the advantage of occurring in all healthy people. A dream is the life of the mind during sleep. Dreams are the reaction of the mind to stimuli acting upon it during sleep. Dreams in general appear confused, unintelligible and often senseless, and their contents may contradict all that we know of reality. Freud on the other hand insisted that they have a very significant meaning and made an attempt to understand them. He maintained that we can interpret dreams, if we assume that what we recollect as a dream after we have awakened is not the true dream-process, but only a facade behind which the true dream-process lies concealed. Here we make a distinction between manifest dream material and latent dream thoughts. The process which produces the former out of the latter is the dream work. The study of dream work affords us a very good example of the way in which unconscious materials from the Id force themselves upon the Ego, become pre-conscious and, owing to the efforts of the Ego, undergo the modification we call distortion.

The formation of dreams can be provoked in different ways. On the one hand, an instinctual impulse which is as a rule suppressed (i.e., an unconscious wish) finds enough strength during sleep to make an impression upon the Ego.
On the other hand, a desire left over from waking life, a preconscious train of thought with all the conflicting impulses belonging to it, obtains reinforcement during sleep from an unconscious element. The unconscious Id plays a dominant role in the formation of dreams. Memory is far more comprehensive in dreams than in waking life. Dreams make an unlimited use of linguistic symbols. Memory very often reproduces in dreams impressions from the dreamer's early childhood. Beyond this dreams bring into light material which could not originate either from the dreamer's adult life or from his forgotten childhood. Freud considers that this aspect of dreams has to be understood in terms of the child's "archaic heritage." This reference to the "archaic heritage" brings us to a rather complex question that has to be analyzed separately. 6

The Unconscious and the Id

Now let us briefly sum up the relationship between the Unconscious and the Id. Though Freud presented a very systematic and comprehensive picture of the Unconscious in his essay "The Unconscious,"7 he modified his position in the Ego and the Id8 and this is of very great significance for a comparative study of Buddhism and Freud.

Freud's conception of the Unconscious up to 1915 was basically "rooted in pathology, with an emphasis on repression."9 Thus it was restricted to repressed impulses. With the publication of the Ego and the Id "Freud took
account of the total personality, of normal as well as pathological functionings and the repressed is explicitly described as only part of the id. The primary system is no longer only the repressed but includes normal impulses as well. It contains the passions.\textsuperscript{10}

The conception of the Id was more productive and comprehensive than the concept of the Unconscious as the repressed. When a patient exhibits signs of resistance, generally he is aware of his repugnance. But it appeared to Freud that sometimes he is quite unaware of it. Thus there must be some kind of unconscious resistance and this unconscious resistance comes from the Ego. The unavoidable conclusion follows that the ego is not limited to what the subject consciously calls his self, but is continued below the threshold of consciousness; part of the ego is conscious, part unconscious. And the latter part is not merely preconscious; it is unconscious in the fullest sense, since much work is needed to make it conscious.\textsuperscript{11} This recognition of the "greater depth of the Ego" is a significant point in the development of Freudian psychology and one which is interesting in the light of Buddhist psychology. Early Buddhism upholds the operation of ego drives at subliminal and unconscious levels.

\textbf{The Freudian Concept of Motivation}

The "study of motivation has to do with the analysis of the various factors which incite and direct an individual's
However, to get involved in a theoretical and abstract controversy as to whether we can get at some all encompassing definition regarding the terms motivation and motive is not a very rewarding venture in a study of this sort. Hence, the Freudian concept of motivation in general will be examined along with the logic of unconscious motives in particular. Whatever clarification of terms like "motivation" and "motives" is attempted, must be limited by the problems under discussion and investigation here. For instance, where relevant analogies and points of contrast between ordinary usages and Freudian theory will be shown.

A recent analysis of the complexities of the word "motivation" sums up the situation thus:

The term has no fixed technical meaning in contemporary psychology. It is often used in reference to the conscious feeling of desire and the whole complex of ideas and feelings which together seem to constitute the conscious antecedents of behaviour according to traditional wisdom. Just as often, 'motivation' is used to refer to the unconscious determinants of behaviour which Freud emphasized, to the purposive character of overt behaviour which Tolman identified as an empirical problem in its own right, to a coherent theoretical account of the contemporaneous determinants of action like the Lewinian scheme or Hull's principle of performance, or to some particular variable in a particular theoretical conception of the contemporaneous determinants of the impulse to action--for example, as a synonym for drive in S-R behaviour theory.

John Atkinson who makes the above statement offers a key to accommodate these theories by saying that there are "different languages" of motivation or "several levels of
discourse": 1. the experiential language, which refers to the conscious experience of desire, emotion, feelings of determination, and the inclination to act; 2. the neurophysiological language, which describes motivation in the technical language of the neural and organic processes; 3. the behavioral language, which considers motivation in terms of the direction, vigor, and persistence of observable behavior in relation to observable environmental conditions; and 4. the mathematical language, which describes motivation in terms of abstract mathematical concepts.

This is a useful way of looking at the problem. But the question really crops up when one of these languages, for example, the neuropsychological, is used to explain all motivational phenomena. Peters describes the situation well when he says that some misguided attempts have been made by psychologists to present "over-all theories of human behaviour." "There are many different sorts of questions which can be asked about human behaviour and the difference, as I shall hope to show, are such that an all-embracing theory is inappropriate. These different sorts of questions are especially confused in theories of motivation," says Peters. In this context Peters pays a compliment to Freud by saying that Freud was perhaps a great exception in this respect. For Freud was genuinely puzzled about concrete phenomena, and developed some very fertile assumptions to explain them."
The basic structure of Freudian motivation is essentially based on his theory of instincts which is worked out clearly in his paper "The Instincts and Their Vicissitudes."\textsuperscript{16}

**Theory of Instincts**

At a very early stage Freud discovered that the symptoms of certain neurotic patients disappeared through the process of abreaction, when painful ideas are brought to the awareness of the patient. It was also assumed that there were memories of some traumatic experiences buried in the past. Then Freud discerned that these ideas which were usually fantasies were rooted in wishes. His discovery that wishes underlie the apparently meaningless content of one's dreams had very significant consequences for the theoretical development of psychoanalysis. In the words of David Rapaport, "It was to explain the origin of these fantasies and dream wishes that Freud introduced the concept of instinctual drives."\textsuperscript{17} He adds that "This step was the beginning of the end of that phase of Freud's theory-making in which he considered the crucial factors determining behaviour as predominantly environmental. It ushered in a new phase in which intrapsychic determiners--of the type I am defining as motivations--became the crucial causes of behaviour postulated by the theory."\textsuperscript{18}

In his Three Essays on the *Theory of Sexuality*\textsuperscript{19} Freud
finally introduced his concept of instinct. But since the
concept of the Libido was given great importance in this
book, the problems of the nature of instinct receded into
the background. It was in his *Instincts and Their
Vicissitudes*\textsuperscript{20} that Freud finally gave a systematic presenta-
tion of instinct. This theory took complete form in his
papers entitled *Repression* and *The Unconscious*.\textsuperscript{21} In a
further enlargement of the theory he emphasized the signifi-
cance of Ego instincts (as contrasted with sex instincts)
in a paper called *Narcissim*, and then the significance of
aggression in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*\textsuperscript{23} where he
postulated the death instinct as one of the dominating in-
stincts. Thus in his final concept of the theory of
instinct he upheld the existence of three basic instincts.
1. the Libido or instinctual desire for sense-gratification;
2. the Ego instinct and its allied manifestations—self-
preservation, self-love, self-assertion, self-continuity,
etc.; 3. the death instinct and the roots of aggression. A
detailed analysis of these three instincts is presented in
*An Analysis of Some Psychological Concepts in Freud and
Early Buddhism*,\textsuperscript{24} where the Freudian instincts are compared
to the threefold manifestations of craving in early Buddhism,
kāma-taṃhā, bhava-taṃhā and vibhava-taṃhā. Hence, an ex-
haustive treatment of them need not be given here.

The term "Trieb" which is translated "instinct" by
Strachey, is rendered "desire" by some scholars and by
Rapaport as "instinctual drive." Freud himself describes the concept of an instinct as something that falls between the frontiers of the mental and the physical. Whether we call the term Trieb an instinct or an instinctual desire, we cannot lose sight of the psychological nature of the concept. As Rapaport says, "Hunger, thirst or other metabolic needs are poor paradigms for instinctual drives, they are usually treated as somatic conditions rather than as mental representations of somatic conditions, and partly because they cannot be delayed for any significant length of time nor are they flexible in their object choice and consummatory pattern."25

No insight into the dynamic psychology of Freud is possible without an understanding of the vicissitudes of instincts, their conflict and their fusion. Freud has a clear insight into the ambivalent structure of instincts which continually prepare the ground for further conflicts, a remarkable echo of the early Buddhist psychology of craving (tanha). But what gives depth to the Freudian theory of instincts is the notion of unconscious motivation, the analysis of which is our primary concern.

The Subconscious and the Unconscious

Often the words "unconscious," "subconscious" and "subliminal conscious" are used indiscriminately to describe one and the same phenomenon. This type of loose usage is often found in popular expositions of psychology. The
Dictionary of Psychological and Psychoanalytical Terms states that in "popular psychoanalysis the unconscious and subconscious are thoroughly confused." In his analysis of the bhavaṅga theory, Sarathchandra seems to use both "unconscious" and "subconscious" to describe the concept of bhavaṅga without implying any shift of meaning. This is a significant point because the logical status of the concept of bhavaṅga is partly determined by the usage of words like "unconscious" and "subconscious," especially when they are used to translate certain Pāli terms in Buddhist works.

Under the entry "subconscious," the Dictionary cites the following: 1. not clearly conscious, but capable of being made so; 2. the pre-conscious of psychoanalysis; 3. subliminal; 4. pertaining to what is in the margin of attention. The psychoanalytic meaning of pre-conscious has already been discussed. The term "subliminal" is not very much used by psychologists now. Historically F. W. H. Myers is associated with the conception of the subliminal. The psychologist's concept of the subconscious (whether we call it what is dimly conscious or at the margin of attention) is historically associated with the work of psychologists like P. Janet, Morton Prince and B. Sidis.

There have been various attempts to analyze the different shades of meaning of the word "subconscious" as used by psychologists. Six definitions are given below from a symposium on subconscious phenomena:
1. It describes that portion of our field of consciousness which, at any given moment, is outside the focus of our attention; a region, therefore, of diminished attention. It can refer to the fringe of consciousness. The prefix sub- denotes "diminished" or "partial."

2. In abnormal psychology "Subconscious ideas are dissociated or split off ideas, split off from the main personal consciousness, from the focus of attention--if that term be preferred--in such fashion that the subject is entirely unaware of them, though they are not inert but active." This split off or secondary consciousness can under exceptional circumstances be the dominant consciousness.

3. Subconscious states may become personified and are then spoken of as the "subconscious self," "subliminal self," "secondary self," "hidden self," etc.

What is of interest in these definitions is first of all the idea of marginal or partial awareness, then a dissociated state tending toward a personified self.

4. Dissociated states which are "active" and those which are "inactive." The inactive refers to the forgotten and may be recalled as memories.

5. This is the theory of "subliminal consciousness" held by Myers. "The subconscious ideas, instead of being mental states dissociated from the main personality, now become the main reservoir of consciousness and the personal consciousness becomes a subordinate stream flowing out of
this great storage basis of 'subliminal' ideas as they are called."

As Northbridge points out, there are two distinct aspects to this concept of the subliminal self, and Myers himself did not make this clear: "It consists of those mental elements that are too weak to attract our attention. It refers to the intuitions of a 'profound faculty,' which are submerged by the constitution of man's personality."

6. Lastly there is the hypothesis of the physiological psychologist that the subconscious refers to neural processes unaccompanied by any mental processes.

These shifts of meaning in the word as used by psychologists (not laymen) show how inadequate the concept was in classifying certain types of psychological phenomena. The shift went from pure pre-conscious phenomena (in the Freudian sense), such as those that lie at the margin of consciousness, to dissociated states and forgotten and inactive memories. It is because of this that Freud suggested his own terminology instead of the term "subconscious." Though he himself used the term in his Studies on Hysteria, he rejects it later. In the Introductory Lectures he says: "I should also like to hear you admit that our designations unconscious, pre-conscious, and conscious, are less prejudicial and more easily defensible than some others which have been suggested or have come into use, e.g. sub-conscious, inter-conscious, co-conscious, etc."
To facilitate the analysis of the concepts subconscious, subliminal and unconscious 16 different shades of meaning of the word "Unconscious" are given below based on the treatment by J. G. Miller.31

1. **Inanimate.** This refers to what does not discriminate or behave.

2. **Absent-minded.** Daydreaming or anaesthetized.

3. **Not-mental.** A concept rejected by Freud as a popular but a wrong view. Mind and consciousness cannot be equated. The mental or the psychical is a wider realm than the conscious.

4. **Undiscriminating.** Though in the case of the inanimate discrimination between stimuli is not logically possible, here it is possible, but there is a lack of it. E. G. Boring, who has made a clear statement on this position, says: "Discrimination is the psychical function of the organism. It is the criterion of mind, of consciousness, of knowing. Animals, children and irresponsible adults are recognised as conscious only as and in as far as they discriminate, that is to say as they react differentially (discriminatorily) to a differentiated situation."32 This is essentially a behavioral criterion of consciousness and does not depend on any "private awareness."

5. **Conditioned.** This refers to those who act on the basis of conditioning or conditioned response.
6. **Unsensed.** Under this heading are various aspects of unsensing, such as stimuli not reaching the organism, inadequate stimuli affecting the organism, subliminal stimuli affecting the organism, etc.

7. **Unnoticed or Unattended.** When unconscious is used in the sense of unattended, one's actions, ideas, emotions, needs, drives, etc., are unconscious merely because he is thinking of something else.

8. **Insightless.** Miller says that this is essentially a "Gestalt concept" and refers to doing a task without awareness of what is being learned or intent to learn it.

9. **Unremembered.** Miller cites seven types of forgetting which can be brought under this heading: extinction, simple forgetting, incorrect remembering, new material preventing the reproduction of older memories, dissociation, suppression and repression. This is a very important sense of the word unconscious connected with the psychoanalytic usage.

10. **Instinctive or Inherited.** Miller says that this instinctive aspect is the most important characteristic of the Unconscious in psychoanalytic theory. L. E. Emerson stated this well when he said that to a great extent the Unconscious refers to cravings, instincts, impulses and reflexes or psychochemical reactions. The relationship between the instinctive and the Unconscious is something that has to be analyzed again in the light of early Buddhist philosophy.
11. **Unrecognized.** Sometimes this implies that the existence of the process is not known and at other times that the existence is recognized, but the character of the process is not understood.

12. **Involuntary.** According to A. A. Brill Freud believed that what is unconscious cannot be voluntarily recalled. Academic psychologists have never been certain what voluntary means, and have come to neglect studying the will almost entirely. The value of this strand of meaning in the word unconscious depends on unravelling a lot of ambiguity found in the usage of the word voluntary.

13. **Incommunicable.** Miller says that this does not refer to what is not verbalized, but rather to what is incapable of verbalization or of communication of any sort.

14. **Ignoring.** Describing the usage of this word Broad says: "A method which we very commonly use is to put a ring-fence around a certain region, to label it as dangerous, and to avert our attention from the whole of it."33

15. **Psychoanalytic Meaning.** Miller mentions three elements which he considers to be the meaning of unconscious in its psychoanalytic use. 1. They are dynamically repressed away from consciousness--the organs of perception; 2. They can be made available to consciousness only by special techniques such as hypnosis and psychoanalysis; 3. They are not under voluntary control. Freud used a special abbreviation Ucs, to emphasize and mark the special way in which he used the word.
16. **Unavailable to Awareness.** Definition number 4 (undiscriminating) refers to the basic sense of unconscious for those who accept only behavioral evidence, but this meaning is accepted by those who admit the validity of introspective testimony.

**The Logic of Unconscious Motives**

There appears to be some kind of contradiction in juxtaposing the words "motive" and "unconscious" and thus speaking of "unconscious motives." If motives are reasons for actions, "unconscious motives" seems like an unhappy hybrid. It is necessary, therefore, to explain the significance of this concept as a working hypothesis for understanding human behavior. The preceding examination of the meanings of the word "unconscious" should facilitate the attempt made here to explain the "Unconscious" in terms of dispositions. Both Else Frenkel-Brunswik and Arthur Pap refer to the possibility of explaining the Unconscious in terms of dispositions. 34 "From the standpoint of the logic of science, unconscious tendencies are a special case of latent or dispositional characteristics. They are comparable to such physical characteristics as magnetism--provided that we do not insist on assigning them to the mind in a metaphysical sense. Such composite terms as 'unconscious hostility' or 'dependency' describe a disposition to display aggression or dependency under specified conditions for example, in therapy," says Frenkel-Brunswik. 35 Regarding
the meaning of the word "unconscious" Pap says that though it has several meanings, "Its characteristically psychoanalytic meaning, however seems to be dispositional, or more accurately, this is the meaning that remains after it is divested of misleading metaphorical connotations." Even MacIntyre in his analysis of the concept of the Unconscious makes a good attempt to absorb the concept of disposition to his interpretation of unconscious motivation. The best way to make a philosophical analysis of the concept of unconscious motivation is to make our way through some of these studies, especially MacIntyre's monograph on the Unconscious. These illuminating insights will help to clarify a concept that claims to grasp the dark and inner depths of human motivation. Freud himself accepts the fact that the poet, the novelist, and the philosopher had before him discovered the Unconscious, but that he discovered the scientific methods which gives it objectivity and the stamp of a scientific hypothesis. As MacIntyre says, "One of the central failures of the novel is the depicting of how much of human action and passion is not the fruit of conscious intention. This uncovering of our own ignorance of ourselves Freud did not fail to see that he shared with the imaginative writer." Thus must be emphasized the fact that Freud was not a magician, but rather that he dealt with grim human realities. An attempt must be made to show that the best of Freud's findings do not violate the scientific and anti-metaphysical temper upheld by empiricism.
Pre-Freudian and Freudian Senses of Unconscious Motivation
--MacIntyre's Analysis

MacIntyre says that to claim that Freud's theory of unconscious mental activity is at fault because wishes, motives, fears and the like must be conscious is not a correct claim. The terms "wish" and "fear" do not in ordinary usage describe and refer only to private moments of consciousness, but are in part descriptive of patterns of behavior which are publicly observable. These patterns go unrecognized and they may be denominated "unconscious." Freud shows that some types of neurotic behavior are the result of unconscious motivation. The neurotic has purposes and intentions of which he is unaware. Since he is unaware of them, he cannot avow them. By "intention" here Freud means apparently a pattern of behavior. A neurotic patient's intention or purpose is betrayed in his behavior and, if he were not prevented by his disorder, he would avow it. Thus the meaning of intention is elucidated by a categorical reference to behavior supplemented by a hypothetical reference to avowals. MacIntyre says that this is how the concept of intention and kindred concepts should be understood in the pre-Freudian sense. If we follow this line of thought, to ascribe a motive to some one is not merely to say that he has a tendency to behave in a particular way or merely to say that there is a pattern in his actions. To find what else there is in intention we must distinguish between casual
properties in things and the disposition of human beings. The evidence that proves the solubility of salt in water is simply that it dissolves. But if you want to prove that Smith is ambitious more evidence is needed than that he behaves in such and such a fashion. The difference between things and people is that people can talk about their behavior. It makes sense to say that Smith seems to be ambitious because he behaves in certain ways, but the fact is he may not be ambitious. If I tell Smith that he is ambitious and illustrate my point in various ways, it is possible that Smith will ultimately accept the fact of his being ambitious. If so we should have a case of "unconscious" in the ordinary pre-Freudian sense. But if on pointing out in suitable ways to Smith that he is ambitious we discovered an inability in Smith to recognize his own ambition, we should have a case of unconscious ambition in the Freudian sense.

The Ignored and the Inaccessible

It is possible that there are certain intermediary stages between the two senses of "Unconscious" discussed above, certain gradations that fall between the two usages. MacIntyre does not discuss this problem in detail, but it is important. The value of MacIntyre's analysis certainly lies in working out the connecting links between the pre-Freudian use of "unconscious" and the Freudian use
of the word. While he does a good job in dispelling the atmosphere of mystery that surrounds it, yet he ought to have discussed the problem of gradations and degrees of unconsciousness. In the case of Smith's inability to recognize his ambition, it is possible that he is dimly aware of it, but does not really grasp its nature. In our daily activities our actions often proceed from a minimum of thought and reflection. We make decisions and pursue goals without being clear about the reasons for our actions. We sometimes decide on the spur of the moment and have only a vague awareness of the motives that enter into our decisions. Freud emphasizes the fact that in many people there is an aversion to recognize honestly their attitude, especially if there is something uncomplimentary involved. When this tendency to ignore certain aspects of one's personality is repeated, it may be said that he systematically biases his opinion about himself. The question arises whether this systematic bias can be analyzed by the person himself simply by trying to examine himself honestly or whether one of the Freudian techniques like free association is necessary. According to Broad this aspect of unconscious motivation can be described as "ignored, misdescribed or dislocated desires and emotions." He adds that "Desires and emotions are the experiences par excellence about which we pass judgements of praise or blame on ourselves and others. If we find that we have certain desires and emotions we are
obliged to think badly of ourselves; and if we confess such
desires and emotions to others, they will think badly of us.
We thus have a strong tendency not to discriminate these
desires and emotions; or if we discriminate them to ourselves,
or if we discriminate and describe them rightly to ourselves,
to refuse to acknowledge them to others."

Now in what sense are these desires and emotions to be
described as "unconscious"? Regarding these desires and
emotions Broad says that these states are quite literally
conscious. They are really ordinary desires and emotions
about whose existence, nature and objects we need make no
mistake if we introspect honestly and carefully enough. But,
of course, we do not do this. He adds: "If there be any­
thing literally unconscious in the whole business, it is
not the desire or emotion itself, but the process of ignoring,
dislocating or misdescribing it." This aversion to
introspective attention, which begins by being deliberate,
quickly becomes habitual. What is interesting in this
analysis is that there can be gradations of personalities,
some in whom the ignored and the misdescribed become one
with the "inaccessible" in the Freudian sense, and some in
whom the process has just begun and not taken root in the
personality. With the latter group an ordinary effort to
look at themselves honestly should help them get at the
self-knowledge required to transform their personalities.
Though there is a close connection between ignored and
inaccessible experiences, many experiences which have
become inaccessible were not ignored when they happened, and some which were ignored when they happened have not become inaccessible. Broad thinks that there is a close connection between the "ignored" and the "inaccessible." But the accessible and the inaccessible are two limits within which gradations of awareness, discrimination, sophistication and insight are possible. The distinction between the "accessible" and the "ignored" has been treated at length because of its great significance for an analysis of the Buddhist concept of the Unconscious.

Conscious and Unconscious Motives

A good deal of light has been thrown on the subject of conscious and unconscious motivation by L. W. Beck in an article entitled "Conscious and Unconscious Motives." It is particularly important, furthermore, as it is of help in understanding the Buddhist concept of conscious and unconscious motivation. The following case study was used by him to explain his viewpoint.

An educated man walking down a street notices a bookstore on the other side, which he has not visited for many years. He suddenly starts to dart across the street when an automobile, with screeching brakes almost runs over him. He succeeds in jumping back to the sidewalk and avoids injury or death. But he becomes extremely nervous and agitated.

The man is so agitated after his narrow escape from injury or death that he consults a psychiatrist. Eventually the following explanation of his action and his anxiety is formulated. Many years previously he had frequented the store because he had been fascinated by a clerk there. To
escape the temptations thus presented, he finally avoided going into that neighbourhood for many years, and finally he forgot the very existence of the store and of the clerk. On this day, however, when he saw the bookstore, he was seized by his old desire, which he now mistook for the desire to browse in a bookstore. He acted on this desire only to be immediately threatened with punishment in the form of the automobile bearing down upon him. When he escaped this physical retribution, however, his old unappeased feelings of guilt about the clerk revived, and he became distraught and over-anxious long after the danger, which would have momentarily excited any one, was passed. But when the man saw the true cause of his precipitate actions--the desire for the girl and his anxiety, the anxiety diminished and he came to terms with his old hankering after forbidden fruit.

Against the background of this story if we ask the man "why did you try to cross the road?" various types of answers can be given. Beck cites seven possible answers, each answer being subdivided into two, an "agent" answer, or a "spectator answer." The types of answers would roughly fall into the following groups:

1. Motive answers by agent.
   1a. Motive answers by spectator.

2. Intention answers by agent.
   2a. Intention answers by spectator.

3. Situational answers by agent.
   3a. Situational answers by spectator.

4. Mental cause answer by agent.
   4a. Mental cause answers by spectator.

5. Physical cause answers by agent.
   5a. Physical cause answers by spectator.
6. Obstacle answers by agent.

6a. Obstacle answer by spectator.

7. Compulsion answer by agent.

7a. Compulsion answer by spectator.

To the question why did he try to cross the street, we could thus expect various types of answers: 1. "I love books and like to browse in bookstores"; 2. "I wanted to browse in this bookstore"; 3. "I went to the bookstore as I promised to pay a bill there." To the question why did he jump, he could give a simple causal answer: "The on-rushing automobile made me jump." Of course, this could be explained in terms of a motive answer: "I love life"; or an intention: "I did not want to be injured"; or a situational answer: "It was the only thing to do." But most of these answers are reasons that come to one's mind after jumping. In answer to the question why did he jump, the physiologist would say: "The stimulus of the retina in such and such a way caused the contraction of such and such muscles."

Now at this point Beck makes a hypothetical addition to the story and introduces two more types of questions. "Suppose in our story, a sudden rain had come up, and the man sought shelter in another store. We or he could say that the rain caused him to seek shelter, or even that rain made him do it and kept him from going to the store, or suppose that he had gone not to the book store but into the
bar, and when asked he might say that he was driven to do this—'I tried not to go in, but I couldn't help it.' The first he refers to as an "obstacle answer" the other a "compulsion answer."

Beck says that 1 and 2 form a natural pair and 4 and 5 another. Answers of the third type belong to 1 and 2. Obstacle answers and compulsion answers are hybrids between the two groups mentioned above. With this scheme in mind let us try to analyze the structure of unconscious motives. Firstly, there is intentional action, viz. to see the clerk, but he did not really understand its nature, for he said he wanted to browse among the books, though he really wanted to see the clerk. Peters would say that the first is "his reason" and the second is "the reason." Secondly it was a compulsive action, as there was a lack of deliberate self-control.

These two elements form the crux of the unconscious motive. Some one could say that we should add to this C. The unconscious intention functioned like a cause of his action, and D. The cause of the action was a mental cause, though one not known to the agent but only to the spectator.

Beck maintains that the first reason is false, but both are compatible. The first can be accepted because upon the completion of the therapy it is acknowledged by the agent that he had a wish to see the clerk, though he did not recognize it at the moment he crossed the street. Apart
from the agent, the spectator too, could, by suspecting an
unconscious desire connected with the clerk, pick out certain
strands of the agent's history that would strengthen his
hypothesis. The spectator's evidence of unconscious motives
and intentions, then, is the same as his evidence for
conscious motives and intentions, though it is somewhat
obscure. According to Beck "The situation which invites
inquiry into conscious motives is formally the same as that
which occasions explicit inquiry into the unconscious
motives, viz. disparity between intentional acts and
accredited motives and normal situational requirements."
This observation is based on three significant points: 1.
motives are dispositional; they must explain more than the
present intention and act; 2. the action itself may not be
appropriate to the expressed intention, so we suspect another
intention and thus another motive correlated with it; 3. the
effect can be inappropriate to the success or failure of the
action seen in the light of its expressed intentions, e.g.,
the lasting anxiety of the agent after jumping to evade the
oncoming automobile.

The question why often dispositional motives are better
known to observers and acquaintances than the agent is
important. This, as pointed out by Beck, is a question about
the etiology of self-alienation, self-deception, rationali-
izations and neurosis. With the help of the psychoanalyst the
agent can come to see himself as others see him. This concept
of the enlargement of the personal horizon and the role of self-knowledge is one of those factors that make a comparison of Buddhist and Freudian psychology meaningful. Beck says, "As the agent comes to see his unconscious desires and wishes, he is not just learning a fact about his past; he is experiencing an enlargement of his sense of self through taking something into his personal make-up whose existence he did not know or whose existence he regarded as something alien and external to himself." Thus, it is only when the unconscious intentions become as well-known as the conscious ones that the agent can overcome his self-alienation. Though morbid self-analysis that paralyzes action has to be condemned, rational behavior is made possible by enlarging the area of self-control and self-knowledge.

This theme has been worked out by others like Stuart Hampshire and Konstantin Kolenda. Kolenda insists that our interest in unconscious motives is not only theoretical but practical and moral. He says that "Freud was a moralist and a believer in the desirability of extending the range of rational self-control."

Now let us sum up this discussion. Beck attempts to show how we can make sense of the notion of unconscious motives. He gives a very illuminating answer to the question of how we could rationally understand the irrational or the apparently irrational behavior. This point is now accepted by many who have attempted a philosophical analysis
of the logic of unconscious motives; one of them says: "The neurotic acts irrationally, but his conduct is not something of which it does not make sense to say either that it was or was not done for a reason."\textsuperscript{46}

But Beck's attempt to reject completely the idea of causal explanations in these contexts is something that deserves more consideration. His conception of cause is limited to the mental causes and physical causes of the mechanical kind. But we can have a broader concept of causes of various types. There is, for instance, in Buddhist psychology an analysis of causation under twenty-four types of conditions. These causes do not belong to any para-mechanical kind, but even disposition concepts could be accounted for under this scheme.

However Beck's analysis of unconscious motives is a very useful scheme that we hope to use in analyzing the structure of unconscious motives in Buddhist psychology.

2. MOTIVATIONAL THEORY IN EARLY BUDDHISM

Early Buddhist Concept of the Unconscious

Now we come to our basic thesis that there is a concept of the Unconscious in early Buddhism. This notion seems hardly to have engaged the attention of scholars. Sarathchandra's exposition of the bhavaṅga theory is the closest thing to any systematic examination of the Unconscious in Buddhist thought. However, our study of this
problem differs from his views in a number of ways:

1. The bhavanga theory is not a central doctrine of the Nikayas. This idea was not taught by the Buddha at all. It is hardly even mentioned until the Milinda Panha and was developed by later expositors of the Abhidhamma, like Anuruddha and Buddhaghosa. There is a single occurrence of the word in the Anguttara Nikaya which Sarathchandra himself says "is evidently a wrong reading, for the commentary reads and explains as bhavagga." 47

2. His main concern is with the psychology of perception, whereas we are concerned with the psychology of motivation. A concept of the Unconscious cannot be understood purely by discussing its function within the realm of theories of perception. A concept of the Unconscious is basically related to motivation. Strictly speaking, however, Sarathchandra was limiting himself to perception, his major theme having been the Buddhist psychology of perception.

3. He uses the terms "unconscious" and "subconscious" somewhat indiscriminately. Obviously this can be misleading, and a little care ought to have been observed regarding the usage of these words. Thus, in introducing the bhavanga theory he says: "In the course of our description of the Abhidhamma philosophy of mind we found the occurrence of a new term, bhavanga which we have translated as the unconscious." 48 But later he says: "The series of mental states from subconsciousness to active cognition would be,
in order, bhavaṅga, mano, indriya and manoviśaya.

Similarly in commenting on the yogācāra theory he says: "From the subconscious ālaya there evolved the object-discriminating mind, and from the mind the five kinds of sense-perception." It is difficult to discover any reason for these shifts from one term to the other.

4. One of his basic contentions is that viśīna is considered a sort of anoetic sentience in the earlier texts, which he thinks is a view consistent with the usage of the word in later Abhidhamma theory. Opposing this view Jayatilleke has shown that viśīna in the context of the process of perception is a general term for cognitive consciousness. Further, Sarathchandra states that: "The belief in viśīna as a transmigrating factor appears to be a later view." That this thesis cannot be accepted has been made clear in Chapter II.

In fairness to Sarathchandra, however, it must be said that the bhavaṅga concept is certainly of importance in Buddhist psychology, though the Buddha himself apparently did not mention it. It is used by many expositors and teachers of the Abhidhamma in Ceylon today, and this makes it all the more important to learn to what extent it is found in the early stages in the development of Buddhism. But Sarathchandra errs in considering the usage of viśīna in the sense of a survival factor to be a later intrusion into Buddhist thought. It is on this assumption that he
employs the bhavaṅga theory to solve so many problematical issues. The bhavaṅga concept may be used to explain certain points in the Abhidhamma, but it should be applied with full awareness of its nature and limits.

Apart from the concept of bhavaṅga there are a number of interesting concepts in early Buddhism, like anusaya, āsava, saṅkhāra, saṁvattanika viññāṇa, bhavasota and even viññāṇasota, which make a close study of the Nikāyas of early Buddhism rewarding.

**The Approach to the Problem of Unconscious Motivation**

There are various guidelines to follow in working out the concepts of mind, matter or causation in early Buddhism. The discourses of the Buddha shed a great deal of light on such matters, as has been shown in Chapter II, where a critical analysis of the nāma-rūpa concept was given. Details are often problematical, but one who wants to work out the concept of mind or matter in Buddhism can find his way about. But the problem of the Unconscious presents a more difficult problem. Before a clear picture can be gained, a large amount of critical study of many different texts must be undertaken and many little facts pieced together from here and there and interpreted.

**Concept of Motivation in Buddhism**

A brief review of the structure of motivation in early Buddhism will be of help in understanding the nature of the
Unconscious in early Buddhism. In the early Buddhist psychology the springs of human action are traced to six roots, which fall into two classes, immoral and moral, thus:

**Immoral roots**
1. Greed (lobha)
2. Hatred (desa)
3. Delusion (moha)

**Moral roots**
1. Liberality or charity (alobha or caña)
2. Kindness or goodwill (adosa or methā)
3. Knowledge (amoha or paññā)

Greed (lobha) has two manifestations, viz. in the form of kāma-taṅhā (craving for sensuous gratification) and bhava-taṅhā (craving for self-preservation). Hatred (dosa) manifests itself in varied types of aggressions and ultimately issues forth as vibhava-taṅhā (desire for annihilation). Delusion (moha) is the primary root of evil that prevents man from seeing the true nature of things. As a result of this root he does not grasp the three signs, viz. anicca (impermanence and transience), dukkha (suffering) and anattā (non-self or unsubstantiality). As mentioned in Chapter II, there are two patterns of causal analysis in the Buddhist texts according to which motivational phenomena are treated: 1. the law of dependent origination (paticca-samuppāda) and 2. the method given in the manual called Paṭṭhāna which contains an analysis of 24 relations.
(paccaya). Now according to the law of dependent origination, for example, feeling is conditioned by contact (phassa-paccaya vedana) and craving is conditioned by feeling (vedanā-paccaya taṇhā), and so on, everything being dependent on something else for its particular state. Thus, due to the stimulation of the five sense-organs and the mind-organ there result six kinds of feelings based on eye-impressions, ear-impressions, nose-impressions, tongue-impressions, body-impressions and mind-impressions. These feelings have a certain hedonic tone according to which they are pleasant (sukha), painful (dukkha) and indifferent (adukkha, asukha). Pleasant feelings can induce a desire for pleasure-giving objects and then emerge the craving for sensuous enjoyment. If pleasant feelings also cause a yearning for prolonged existence and for continuity, then there arises desire for self-preservation. Painful feelings, on the other hand, can arouse our hatred and aggressive nature and finally issue forth as the craving for annihilation. There is a potency in pleasant feelings to arouse latent sensuous greed (rāgānusaya) and for painful feelings to arouse latent anger and hatred (patighānusaya). Pleasant feelings can induce an attachment or clinging (upādāna) to objects through the emergence of craving. Thus, the next sequence in the law of dependent origination is: attachment is conditioned by craving. There are four kinds of attachment: 1. attachment to sensuous pleasures; 2. attachment to erroneous opinions
The concept of upādāna is a very interesting psychological phenomenon. Jayatilleke has suggested translating it by "entanglement" rather than "clinging" which is the translation commonly given. He says: "Upādāna literally means 'grasping' or 'clinging'... but since these words express a pro-attitude in that we grasp what we like or desire but not what we hate or are averse to, it would be better to translate the word as 'entanglement' or act of 'involvement.' For it is obviously intended to include the object that we like as well as dislike." This is a very illuminating insight into the psychology of the word upādāna and helps us to understand concepts like the oedipus complex where we discover the subtle ambivalent display of love and hate together.

Having illustrated how the theory of dependent origination helps to understand motivational phenomena, let us tabulate all the links in it in order to make the picture complete and also since this will prove helpful in studying the 24 relations in the Patṭhāna.

1. **Avijjā-paccayā saṅkhārā.** By ignorance karma formations (dispositions or rebirth-producing volitions) are conditioned.
2. **Saṅkhārā-paccayā viññānām.** By the karma formations or dispositions (in past life) consciousness (in present life) is conditioned.
3. **Vīññāna-paccayā nāma-rūpaṁ.** By consciousness the psychophysical complex (nāma-rūpa) is conditioned.

4. **Nāma-rūpa paccayā salāyatanām.** By the psychophysical complex the six bases (viz. the five sense organs and the mind) are conditioned.

5. **Salāyatana-paccayā phasso.** By the six bases contact is conditioned.

6. **Phassa-paccayā vedanā.** By contact feeling is conditioned.

7. **Vedanā-paccayā tanhā.** By feeling craving is conditioned.

8. **Tanhā-paccayā upādanaṁ.** By craving attachment is conditioned.

9. **Upādana-paccayā bhavo.** By attachment the process of

10. **Bhava-paccayā jāti.** By the process of becoming rebirth is conditioned.

11. **Jāti-paccayā jarāmaranām.** By birth [as well as rebirth] old age and death (sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair) are conditioned.

The Method of **Patthāna**

The Patthāna generally concentrates on the plurality of causes rather than a single cause that brings about an effect. For instance, take the case of a seed growing into a plant. The seed must be good, it must be planted well, there must be earth and water, if not, the plant will not grow. Now these conditions can have different relations to the effect and the Patthāna works out 24 such relations as follows:
1. Root condition (hetu-paccaya)
2. Object condition (ārammana-paccaya)
3. Predominance condition (adhipati-paccaya)
4. Proximity (anantara-paccaya)
5. Contiguity condition (samanatara-paccaya)
6. Co-nascence condition (sahajāta-paccaya)
7. Mutuality condition (aññamaññā-paccaya)
8. Support (nissaya-paccaya)
9. Decisive-support condition (upanissaya-paccaya)
10. Pre-nascence condition (Purejāta-paccaya)
11. Post-nascence condition (pacchajāta-paccaya)
12. Frequency condition (āsevana-paccaya)
13. Karma condition (kamma-paccaya)
14. Karma-result condition (vipāka-paccaya)
15. Nutriment condition (āhāra-paccaya)
16. Faculty condition (indriya-paccaya)
17. Jhāna condition (jhāna-paccaya)
18. Path condition (magga-paccaya)
19. Association condition (sampayutta-paccaya)
20. Dissociation condition (vippayutta-paccaya)
21. Presence condition (atthi-paccaya)
22. Absence condition (natthi-paccaya)
23. Disappearance condition (vigata-paccaya)

The term hetu, though often used to mean "cause" means in this case "root" (mūla). "Just as a tree rests on its
roots and cannot exist without them, so also is the existence of all wholesome and unwholesome phenomena entirely dependent on the simultaneity, and presence of their respective roots, and cannot exist in their absence. The metaphor of the "root" is very suggestive, pointing out as it does the fact that our action- and thought-processes have a certain stability as they emerge on certain foundations. It is stated in the Nikāyas that, if a tree is cut down and the tree-stump left firm on its roots, it can sprout again, but if the tree is completely rooted out, it cannot grow again.

Greed, hatred and delusion should thus be considered as basic motives of unwholesome motivation. All other unwholesome states, like jealousy, pride and envy, can be understood in relation to lobha, dosa and moha (greed, hatred and delusion). As was stated in Chapter II, in addition to the dependent origination doctrine and these 24 relations, there is another analysis in the Abhidhamma based on the 89 forms of thought and 52 mental factors. Since a good discussion of this is found in the Abhidhamma-saṅgaha, there is no need to repeat it here. Some aspects of motivation, however, can be understood on the basis of this scheme.

The significance of the threefold basic motives can be seen in the light of this scheme.
The Bhavaṅga Theory

Sarathchandra says that certain problems were raised regarding the metaphysics of the mind by later Buddhist thinkers for which the early Buddhism of the Nikāyas does not provide an answer, and in this way the bhavaṅga theory was introduced. These are some of the questions that were grappled with by the later Buddhist thinkers: 1. What is the relationship between the higher consciousness (jhāna) and the ordinary empirical consciousness? 2. What is the source of the intuitional faculty? 3. Did it lie hidden within the individual in a potential and unmanifest condition? 4. What is the difference between a trance state, deep sleep and dream consciousness? 5. Can we account for the concept of human survival after death without introducing the notion of a soul?

These were the questions that needed an answer. Sarathchandra sums up the position thus: "How could states like deep sleep, trance and dream be explained without the assumption of a permanent, residing consciousness within the human body, manifesting itself at one time in mental activity, and lying potential and dormant at another? To say that there was nothing else besides empirical consciousness would be to expose Buddhism to the charge of materialism."55 Thus Sarathchandra's basic contention is that the concept of bhavaṅga was used later to explain the states of deep sleep, dream and trance and give a
satisfactory theory of survival.

According to Sarathchandra, bhavaṅga originally meant a link in the causal chain. The 12 factors beginning with avidyā, saṃskāra and vijnāna were called the "factors of becoming" (bhavaṅgāni). After some time bhavaṅga in the sense of factor of becoming or existence came to be used in the sense of "cause of existence." Thus there came into being a tradition which explained bhavaṅga as the cause of the individual in various existences.

When bhavaṅga is applied to the process thought, it refers to the fact that at the end of every thought process the mind changes into its original state. When the mind is entirely vacant, as in dreamless sleep, it is viṭṭhimutta (thought-free). It is often described as a state below the threshold of consciousness. S. Z. Aung says it corresponds to Myers' "subliminal consciousness."56

Aung compares the term bhavaṅga-sota or the "stream of existence" to the current of a river when it flows calmly on, unhindered by any obstacle. When the current is opposed by an obstacle of thought from the world within, then thoughts arise. "But it must not be supposed that the stream of being is a subplane from which thoughts arise to the surface,"57 he says, adding that there is only a juxtaposition of momentary states of consciousness, subliminal and supraliminal, throughout a lifetime, from one existence to another. But there is no superposition of
such states. Now this process can be described by the term subconscious or subliminal. By that we mean that which is outside the threshold of awareness or below the threshold of normal sensory excitation.

On the other hand, if we use the term "unconscious," it can be confusing. For instance in the Freudian use of the dynamic Unconscious there are definitely unconscious processes that attempt to emerge to the surface through various circuitious and devious ways. That connotation is rejected by Aung when he says that it cannot be regarded as a subplane from which thoughts arise to the surface. This shows that it is not wise to use terms like unconscious and subconscious indiscriminately to translate the word bhavaṅga.

There are works on Buddhism where the bhavaṅga concept has been likened to a kind of dynamic unconscious in the Freudian sense. Ñyānatiloka Thero says: "Herein, since time immemorial, all impressions and experiences are, as it were, stored up, or better said, are functioning but concealed as such to full consciousness from where however they occasionally emerge as subconscious phenomena and approach the threshold of full consciousness. . . ."58 Ñyanatiloka concludes by saying: "This so-called 'subconscious life stream' or under current of life is that by which might be explained the faculty of memory, paranormal psychic phenomena, mental and physical growth, Karma and rebirth, etc."59 It is interesting to compare this statement
with that of Aung mentioned above. Aung says that the bhavaṅga-sota is not a subplane from which thoughts rise to the surface; according to ṝāratanatīloka stored up impressions, concealed to the consciousness emerge as subconscious phenomena and approach consciousness. They do appear contradictory and also the second statement definitely assumes some kind of dynamic unconscious not found in the first.

Thus in spite of Sarathchandra's claim that the bhavaṅga theory is a useful concept to deal with certain problems unanswered by early Buddhism, the concept of bhavaṅga involves a great element of interpretation and sometimes contradictory interpretations. This danger has been perhaps averted by Ṛnānamoli Thero in his translation of bhavaṅga in Visuddhimagga 458 by "life continuum," whereas Sarathchandra has "unconscious continuum." In fact throughout his translation Ṛnānamoli uses this phrase consistently.

Viññāṇa-sota and the Unconscious

According to Sarathchandra the term viññāṇa-sota found in the Dīgha Nikāya is a later interpolation: "One isolated expression viññāṇasota appears in the Nikāyas used, evidently, in connection with continuance of the individual in a series of births and since this conception of mind is alien to the ideology of early Buddhism, we might well surmise that as a later interpolation." It has already been noted
that in certain contexts viññāṇa is used in the sense of the "factor of survival" and that Sarathchandra is wrong in considering this alien to the Buddhist concept of mind. On the other hand, this passage which he regards as a later interpolation is very significant and contains notions that are found elsewhere in the Nikāyas. It reads as follows:

"... purisassa ca viññāṇa-sotam pajānāti ubhayato abbocchinnam idha-loke patiṭṭhitaṁ ca para-loke patiṭṭhitaṁ ca" (D. N. III, 105). Rhys Davids translates this passage thus: "... he goes on after that to discuss the unbroken flux of human consciousness established both in this world and in another world."62 The context refers to certain degrees of discernment (dassana-samāpatti) attained by the recluse who practices meditation. First he meditates introspectively on the bodily organism "from the sole of the feet to the crown of the head." In this way he discerns the nature of the body. In the second stage he discerns the nature of the human skeleton. In the third degree of discernment, with which the passage quoted is concerned, the recluse discerns the consciousness of the living person (purisassa) as related both to this world and to the world beyond. The fourth state refers to the absence of such a consciousness in the Arahat who will not be born again.

Jayatilleke renders this passage somewhat differently from Rhys Davids.63 He thinks that the "stream of consciousness" (i.e., the "flux of human consciousness in Rhys David's
(translation) is not "unbroken" but actually "divided into two parts." This interpretation requires the Pāli word "abbocchinnam" to be read as "abbhocchinnam." According to the Critical Pāli Dictionary (presumably following the view given in the Pali Text Society's Pāli-English Dictionary) "abbhocchinnam" is a wrong spelling for "abbocchinnam." This form without the -h- would have to correspond to Sanskrit avyavacchinnā which has a negative meaning, i.e., "not divided" and this is the version adopted by Rhys Davids, as we have seen. But it is difficult to see why "abbhocchinnam" must be regarded as a misspelling, though admittedly the traditional interpretation culminating in Rhys David's translation supports the negative view. The context, however, seems more naturally to favor the original reading with -h-. For if the reading "abbhocchinnam" be kept, then the sense of the passage, consonant with Jayatilleke's translation, would be: "... he discerns the stream of consciousness of the living person as [being] divided into two [parts], [viz.] as established in this world and established in the world beyond." Now this passage would seem to suggest a twofold nature of the "stream of consciousness" in the individual or living person, the one part of which he is not ordinarily aware of. To attain an awareness of it requires passing into the third stage of meditation which the passage refers to. This part of the stream of consciousness of which the
individual is not aware may well be the dynamic unconscious comprised of the dispositions (saṅkhāra) that determine the particular character of the next birth.

This interpretation can be strengthened by citing another significant passage (D. III, 104). In fact this passage precedes the one quoted above (D. III, 105) and is also found in the Aṅguttara Nikāya I, 171. It refers to four methods of revealing the mind of another person. Firstly, a person can, by means of a sign (nimitta), infer the thought of another person, however much that person may deny it. Secondly, he can infer the thought of another by means of a sound made by a human or a non-human being. Thirdly, the thought of another can be known "through hearing a rational sound made intelligently and deliberately." Lastly, it is said that, when the person attains a state of concentration which is void of conception and discursive thinking (avitakka avicāra), then he is able to discern the thought of another. This also gives him an insight into the mental dispositions of the other person. According to the mental dispositions of the other person he is able to predict that he will at a later time think "such and such a thought." Since the person is not conscious of the mental dispositions (mano-saṅkhārā) which subsequently influence his process of thought, they are perhaps not present in his consciousness when they are discerned by the other with telepathetic powers.
Jayatilleke commenting on this passage says that this is perhaps the earliest historical mention of unconscious mental processes. 64

Asampajāna Mano-saṅkhāra

In Chapter II a detailed analysis of saṅkhāra was made and in this chapter those dynamic saṅkhāras have been discussed which persist in the Unconscious and influence the subsequent behavior of an individual. In addition to these dynamic saṅkhāras there are two subdivisions called "sampajāna mano-saṅkhāra" and "asampajāna mano-saṅkhāra." In the passages where they are mentioned it is said that there are mano-saṅkhāras (mental dispositions or trains of thought) which are self-instigated or instigated by others, while we are aware of them (sampajāno) or while we are unaware of them (asampajāno). 65 The same analysis is made of vaci-saṅkhāra (verbal dispositions) and kāya-saṅkhāra (bodily dispositions). But the analysis of mano-saṅkhāra is more interesting to our theme as it implies the presence of unconscious motives. The concept of asampajāna mano-saṅkhāra clearly implies the existence of unconscious tendencies. It does not imply the existence of a substrate called the "Unconscious," but rather the presence of certain dispositions which can be described by the adjective unconscious. The Buddha rejected substance theories of mind and body whether they have reference to one's conscious
experience or unconscious propensities. That is why we wish to understand the nature of unconscious motivation in terms of dispositions rather than substrates.

**Anusaya**

The term "anusaya" has been variously translated by Pāli scholars, e.g. proclivity, underlying tendency, inherent tendency, lurking tendency, inclination. It must be made clear, however, that the anusayas are distinct from the saṅkhāras; the latter function both at conscious and unconscious levels, whereas the former lie dormant at the unconscious level. What is the metapsychological status of this concept? Using Freudian terminology are we to say that the anusaya functions at a pre-conscious level or at the unconscious level?

The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary defines anusaya thus: "Bent, bias, proclivity, the persistence of a dormant or latent disposition, predisposition, tendency." The characterization of the anusayas as "dormant" is psychologically interesting. The term "dormant" as used in ordinary language gives a good idea of the nature of the anusayas, as they are persistent, latent dispositions. They have been aptly described as "lurking tendencies." In consequence of their pertinacity they tend to provide the foundation for every new sensuous greed, anger, pride, etc. Their pertinacity is well illustrated in a passage from the Saṃyutta Nikāya. "Suppose, friends, there is a dirty soiled
cloth, and the owners give it to a washerman, and he rubs it smooth with salt earth, or lye or cowdung, and rinses it in pure clean water. Now though that cloth be clean, utterly cleansed, yet there hangs about it, still unremoved, the smell of the salt earth . . . "67 This is especially true of the bias of conceit (mānānusaya), which will not be removed till one attains arahatship. This continuous upsurge of such proclivities is made possible by their very nature. . . Thus, the anusayas differ from passing mental states. They have eaten into one's nature and settled there and found a habitat there. The most striking fact regarding the anusayas is their irrational and impulsive character. The majority of people are not aware of the strength of these biases, though they are subject to them.

The Yāmaka (Book of Pairs) has a comprehensive breakdown of the anusayas.68 It mentions seven anusayas, and this is also referred to in the Dīgha Nikāya.69 They are:

1. The anusaya of sensuous craving (kāmarāga)
2. The anusaya of anger (patigha)
3. The anusaya of conceit (māna)
4. The anusaya of erroneous opinion (diṭṭhi)
5. The anusaya of scepticism (vicikiccha)
6. The anusaya of craving for existence (bhavarāga)
7. The anusaya of ignorance (āvijjā)

The question is raised as to where the anusaya originate, and the following answers are given:
1. Where does the anusaya of sensuous craving adhere? To the two feelings (pleasant and indifferent) of the sensuous sphere.

2. Where anger? To painful (bodily or mental) feeling.

3. Where conceit? To the two feelings of the sensuous sphere (see 1.) and of the fine material and immaterial sphere.

4. Where erroneous opinion? To all phenomena included in the existence group (sakkāya).

5. Where scepticism? (same as answer 4).

6. Where craving for existence? To the fine material and immaterial sphere.

7. Where ignorance? (same as answer 4).

The strength and the power of different anusayās are known, some of them being eliminated at an early state of development, while others remain till the attainment of the holy state (arahat). The "stream winner" (sotāpanna) and the "once-returner" (sakadāgāmi) have still five anusayās, viz. nos. 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7. The "never-returner" (anāgāmi) is subject to three anusayās, viz. 3, 6, and 7. This shows that nos. 3, 6, and 7 are more powerful and remain persistent till the attainment of holiness. Conceit and the craving for existence, then, are more difficult to eradicate than the drive for sensual pleasures, a significant point that should be kept in mind with reference to the psychology of Freud. Though Freud later emphasized the
power of the ego instinct and the destructive urge as different from the sexual drives, some people have been influenced by the libido theory to such an extent that they feel the spell of sensuous desires can never be mastered.

There are one or two other points that are worthy of note here. It is said that everyone to whom the anusaya of rāga adheres so does the anusaya of patigha and vice versa. These two often go together. Pleasant feelings induce an attachment (upādāna) to pleasant objects and there is a potency in pleasant feelings to arouse latent sensuous greed (rāgānusaya). Painful feelings, on the other hand, arouse latent anger and hatred (patighānusaya). It is said that "A tendency to attachment lies in pleasant feeling, a tendency to repugnance lies latent in painful feeling, and a tendency to ignorance lies latent in neutral feeling." Clinging (upādāna) emerges always with craving as a condition. Craving is like aspiring to an object that one has not reached, like a thief stretching out his hand in the dark; clinging is the grasping of an object that one has reached like the thief grasping his object. But clinging is very deeply rooted, and once a person clings to pleasure-giving objects, some latent tendencies or anusayas are excited and stimulated. Fixation on pleasure-giving objects is always fed by the undercurrent of the anusayas. An interesting passage occurs in the Majjhima Nikāya where it is said of a baby boy that "a leaning to attachment to sense-pleasures
(kāmarāgānusaya) indeed lies latent in him."71 Four other anusayas latent in the "innocent baby boy lying on his back" are referred to here, viz. byāpādānusaya (a leaning to malevolence), silabbataparāmāsānusaya (a leaning to clinging to rites and customs), vicikicchānusaya (a leaning to perplexity) and sakkāyadiṭṭānusaya (a leaning to the view of one's own body). The Freudians are at a loss to explain the origin of these traits and sometimes they resort to biology and physiology. There are others like Otto Rank who have introduced the hypothesis of the birth trauma. Early Buddhist psychology, however, considers these tendencies or traits to be the heritage of innumerable previous lives.

We have already seen how the polarity of attachment to pleasure, and repugnance from pain dominate the mind. Now let us consider the anusaya of conceit (mānasaya). This annusaya together with bhavarāga and diṭṭhi function within a common framework, since they are all directly or indirectly connected to the ego-concept. But while the diṭṭhānusaya is eliminated by the "non-returner" (anāgāmi), the other two exist till the attainment of the holy state of arahat. Conceit (māna) has to be differentiated from ego-belief (sakkāyadiṭṭhi) which is connected with the diṭṭhānusaya and implies a definite view regarding the assumption of an ego. Māna can vary from a crude feeling of pride to a subtle feeling of one's distinctiveness which prevails till the attainment of arahatship. Conceit is such a deeply ingrained
trait of man that it remains dormant till one becomes an arahat. It is said that to realize arahatship a monk has to give up six things: pride (māna), self-debasement (omāna), vainglory (atimāna), excessive self-esteem (adhimāna), stupefaction (thamba) and excessive self-debasement (atinipāta). All these facets of egoism emphasize the fact that the ideal monk should not harbor any sort of pride. Conceit is manifested in three ways: first, the superiority feeling (seyya-māna); second, a feeling of equality with another (sadisa-māna); third, the inferiority feeling (hīna-māna). These three manifestations of māna can arise in connection with wealth, learning, personal charm and beauty, social standing, physical vigor, etc. This concept of māna offers an interesting analogy to the Freudian concept of "narcissism" and the Adlerian inferiority complex. Māna can be rendered as "pride," but it really implies the illusion or conceit connected with pride. So long as the lurking tendency to conceit (mānānusaya) prevails, man is the slave of an arbitrary valuation of his own making. The ditṭhānusaya is essentially connected with 20 types of personality beliefs and is eliminated at an early stage, i.e., by the sotāpanna. When there is merely a complex consisting of body, feeling, perception, dispositions and consciousness, the individual being subject to the ego illusions assumes the existence of an ego. The 20 types of personality beliefs can be summed up thus:
1-5. Ego as identical with corporeality, feeling, perception, dispositions and consciousness.

6-10. Ego as contained in them.

11-15. Ego as independent of them.

16-20. Ego as the owner of them.

The anusaya concept is helpful in explaining certain patterns of personality. The kāmarāga anusaya can be related to the Libido theory, the patigha anusaya with the death instinct and māna dittha and bhavarāga anusaya with the ego instincts of Freud.

Having described the nature of the anusayas, we shall now try to determine their metapsychological status. In the Visuddhimagga it is stated that the defilements (kilesa) pass through three periods or stages, the first of which is that of the anusayas.72 A detailed analysis of this has been made by Ledi Sayadaw.73 It runs as follows:

1. Anusaya-bhūmi or the period of latency. Sayadaw says that this is the period during which the defilements lie latent surrounding the life-continuum.

2. Pariyutthāna-bhūmi or the period when defilements become manifest as thought processes. When these thought processes take place at the mind-door, any stimuli outside can arouse them.

3. Vītikkamma-bhūmi or the period when the defilements become so fierce and ungovernable that they produce sinful actions in word and deed. Transgression by word and deed
can be abandoned by substitution of its opposites, that is by virtue (sīla). Evil thought processes have to be suppressed by concentration (samādhi). This kind of suppression called "Vikkhambana" can put the defilements into the background. "Jhāna can dispose of the defilements for a considerable time so that they do not arise soon again, for meditation is more powerful in combating the defilements than morality." But yet, since they have not been completely rooted out, pañña (understanding) is needed to eliminate them. Thus the Visudhimagga says "the abandoning of defilements by substitution of opposites is shown by virtue; that by suppression is shown by concentration; and that by cutting off is shown by understanding." At the first level we deal with transgressions, at the second with obsessions and at the third with inherent tendencies (anusayas).

In determining the metapsychological status of the anusayas, we are confronted by a problem of terminology. They are often called "subconscious," "subliminal" and "unconscious"; the term "latent" can be used in a neutral way. Jayasuriya refers to the anusaya stage as a hidden or a potential state and concludes that this latent level of activity "may be regarded as the level of the unconscious mind of the psychologists." "Unconscious" is probably a better term to describe the anusayas than "subconscious," whereas bhavaṅga can be better termed "subconscious" in the
sense of a state of semi-awareness or the lowest degree of consciousness. For as Conze says regarding bhavaṅga, "It is, however, never completely 'unconscious' but always accompanied by some degree of awareness." 77 Another very significant aspect of the anusayas is that they have to be penetrated by a special kind of knowledge and can be rooted out completely only by the development of higher spiritual powers. The anusayās lie latent in the deeper levels of our personality and continue to influence our behavior without our knowledge and thus they constitute an aspect of unconscious motivation.

Āsava

The āsava concept closely resembles that of the Id in Freud. The Dīgha Nikāya mentions four asavas: sensuality, lust for life, speculation and ignorance. It has been translated by a number of works, like "canker, influx, intoxicant, bias, taint," etc. It is derived from a root corresponding to Sanskrit वरु "flow" combined with the adverbial prefix ā- which, with verbs of motion, suggests movement "toward." Literally, then, āsava seems to mean "flowing toward." Horner suggests "influx." 78 "Canker" implies that which frets, corrodes, corrupts or consumes slowly and secretly. Horner also says that if the prefix ā- be taken in the sense of "around" or "from all sides," the translation "canker" is quite apt. Āsava is often rendered by "intoxicant," a usage
that has an important implication. As Mrs. Rhys Davids says, "The āsavas, moreover, are like liquors (āsavā), such as spirits, etc., in the sense of that which may be kept for a long time. For, in the world, spirits, etc., which have been laid down for a long period are called āsavas." This point is taken up in the Atthasālinī where we read: "... as the juices of the madira fruits, etc. become intoxicants by fermentation for a long length of time, so certain states which are like these intoxicants are termed āsavas." All these facets of the concept of āsava bring us closer to the archaic bases of man symbolized by the Freudian concept of the Id.

**Desires in Disguise (vaṭṭchaka dhamma)**

Now we come to a very interesting phenomenon that definitely illustrates how some of the theories of Freud can be used beneficially to get an honest picture of oneself through introspection. We may translate the Pāli term for this phenomenon by "desires in disguise." It is used by Chandavimala Thero who has made a systematic study of them in a Sinhalese work entitled Vaṭṭchaka Dhamma Prakāsaya." All these "desires in disguise" generally refer to certain aspects of self-deception and can be better termed "dislocated" or "misdescribed desires," to borrow from the terminology of Broad. We "dislocate" them when we ascribe to them a different object from that which they have and we "misderease" them by putting them into a certain class
of mental attitudes when we ought to put them into a certain other class.

This phenomenon by which a person can succumb to lustful thought under the guise of compassion or where kilesas (defilements) can creep in under cover of kusala dhamma is of great significance. It has been very clearly described in the Atthasālinī, where it is treated with reference to the four sublime states, viz. loving kindness (mettā), compassion (karuṇā), altruistic joy (mudiṭṭa) and equanimity (upekkhā). Loving kindness and vengeful conduct cannot co-exist by nature. But where love and its object are, they can be threatened by lust, for like love, lust is a positive attitude toward an object. Hence, lust is referred to as the "near enemy" of love, since it lurks close to love. But ill will is considered as a "distant enemy." Regarding compassion it is said that the distant enemy is cruelty, but it has a more insidious near enemy; this near enemy is a kind of self-pity filled with worldly sorrow. Sympathy and equanimity are also analyzed in a similar manner in the Atthasālinī. The near enemy of sympathy is joy regarding worldly and material prosperity. Indifference is referred to as the near enemy of equanimity.

In Chapter II the statement "secrecy is the category of moral illness, for it provides a resting place for false motives" was referred to. Freud claimed that sham and deception have to be rejected to obtain mental health. The
vañchaka dhammas form an interesting parallel to this view. Chandavimala Thero speaks of two groups of vañchaka dhammas. One group is mostly applicable to monks and yogins and to a small extent also to ordinary people. The other group contains 12 types of vañchaka dhammas based on the discussions found in the Abhidhamma. This group is applicable to ordinary people and throws a good deal of light on the nature of unconscious processes. All these vañchaka dhammas are described within a certain framework, as is true of most ethico-psychological inquiries in Buddhist works. There is a tension between kusala and akusala or wholesome and unwholesome states. Since we are dealing with the person who is actively and sincerely practicing the Dhamma or with the monk and the Yogin, the defilements and passions take an outward appearance of wholesome states and thus flatters the person that is good. As people do illegal things under cover of legality, so immoral dispositions under cover of moral dispositions take shelter in the abode of a person's mind. That is why these are called "desires in disguise." They are in the final analysis a subtle form of self-deception.

It is not necessary to review in detail all these desires in disguise. A few may be selected for the purpose of illustration. Let us take greed (lobha) first. Giving to others what belongs to you is a fine manifestation of self-sacrifice and consideration for others. This can take
the form of giving wealth, goods, food or even your time for
the sake of others. Now a person who practices this after a
while may feel that, if he helps a person, he gets something
in return or that he can give little to a person and expect
something more in return. When this aim becomes dominant,
his mind is defiled and he becomes dishonest. Of course, it
is often very subtle, and the person concerned may not be
aware of the change in his aim.

The subtle working of passion (rāga) is especially in-
teresting in the light of a comparison with Freud. A
hypothetical illustration will serve to explain it. A married
man of deeply religious nature, devoted to the Dhamma, is
attracted by a woman who is beautiful, but stricken with
dire poverty. He has compassion for the poverty stricken
woman, but in reality, though he is unaware of it, his com-
passion is due more to his love for her than to her poverty
stricken state. It is possible for passion to take an
acceptable form by the outward appearance of compassion.
This is a very subtle mechanism and a great deal of honest
introspection and self-criticism is necessary to safeguard
one from it. Hatred and anger (dosa) also take certain
subtle disguised and counterfeit forms. Chandavimala Thero
says anger can take four forms: ferocity, fear, disgust
and sorrow. Even these forms can manifest themselves through
various disguised and counterfeit desires. Hatred can
manifest itself as "patience." Thus, if a child is punished
by his parents, the child may say, "I don't mind what my parents do to me. I will bear it all patiently." Though he calls it "patience," within him there is a great amount of anger and hatred, not revealed, however, in any other form. Again certain demonstrations of nonviolence to show one's disapproval of an employer may be born of great anger and hatred.

Chandavimala Thero works out in detail 12 types of desire in disguise: greed, hatred, jealousy, stinginess, pride, sloth and torpor, remorse, shamelessness, non-dread of evil, wrong view, delusion and doubt. All these unwholesome states can emerge through the guise of wholesome states.

Ālayavijñāna (Store-consciousness)

This concept is sometimes compared to the "collective unconsciousness" of Jung. Ninian Smart says that "the store-consciousness, which underlies the individual, and is not part of what constitutes the individual, cannot be considered as the name for an entity peculiar to any individual. Thus it corresponds (very roughly) more to Jung's collective unconscious than to Freud's concept." The attempt of Jung to develop the notion of the collective unconscious against the background of eastern religions is interesting. He specifically says that karma is essential to the understanding of the nature of an archetype. In a sense the theory of karma and the law of dependent origination provide us with such general patterns in human behavior. But there
are an element of obscurity and a speculative vein in his writings that often make it difficult to understand what he is attempting to say. Thus, Jung's development of the Freudian notion of the archaic heritage is somewhat mystifying, and a clear analysis of the psychological implications involved in the concept of the archaic heritage might prove very rewarding. The clinical implications in the light of the early Buddhist hypothesis of rebirth ought also to be studied. Jung, however, reached out into so many fields (anthropology, sociology, archeology and art) that his results are obscure and complex, and, on the whole, do not answer the Freudian query about the archaic heritage. Though Jung's ideas are by no means crystal clear it would seem that his notion of the "collective unconscious," shrouded as it is in speculative theories, bears some kinship to the ālayavijñāna concept of later Buddhism, whereas the Freudian Unconscious, rooted in a scientific and empirical framework, resembles the concept of the Unconscious in early Buddhism.

Ālayavijñāna and Early Buddhist Psychology

Is the concept of ālayavijñāna a natural and logical development of the viññāna of early Buddhism, or is it something diametrically opposed to it? Conze feels that it is opposed to the spirit of early Buddhism. He says: "All these theoretical constructions are attempts to combine
the doctrine of 'not-self' with the almost instinctive belief in a 'self,' empirical or true. The climax of this combination of the uncombinable is reached in such conceptual monstrosities as the 'store conscious' of Asaṅga: "...")88

The ālayavijñāna concept performs all the functions of a "self" in a theory which almost vociferously proclaims the non-existence of such a "self." While Conze considers the ālayavijñāna as an unhappy hybrid of two philosophical positions diametrically opposed to each other (viz. the self and the non-self), others, like the Venerable Walpola Rahula, think otherwise. Venerable Rahula says: "One may see that, although not developed as in the Mahāyāna, the original idea of ālayavijñāna was already there in the Pāli canon of the Theravāda."89 His contention is based on a reference to passages in the Nikāyas where words like ālaya and bija (seed) have been used and these occurrences suffice to convince him that the elements that make the concept of ālaya vijñāna are found in the Pāli canon. He analyzes the three layers of the mind (citta, manas and vijñāna) as presented by Asaṅga which he says are synonymous in the Pāli canon, in the Lankāvatārasūtra and Asaṅga. Asaṅga also considers them as different aspects of the aggregates of consciousness. "Thus we can see that Vijnāna represents the simple reaction or response of the sense organs when they come in contact with the external objects. This is the uppermost or superficial aspect or layer of the Vijnānaskanda.
Manas represents the aspect of its mental functioning, thinking, reasoning, conceiving ideas, etc. Citta which is here called Ālayavijñāna, represents the deepest, finest and subtlest aspect or layer of the Aggregate of consciousness. It contains all the traces or impressions of the past actions and all good and bad future potentialities.  

Venerable Rahula also points to certain significant phrases in the Theravāda texts, like ālayasamugghāta ("up-rooting of ālaya") used as a synonym for nibbāna, and anālaya also a synonym for nibbāna. In ālayarāma, ālayā-bhirata the word ālaya- is explained in the Pāli commentaries as "attachment to five-sense pleasures." Thus, ālaya and vijñāna being used in various passages in the Nikāyas, the concept of ālayavijñāna is not a creation of the Mahāyāna. But the fact that ālaya and vijñāna do occur separately in early Buddhist texts does not imply that the later compound ālayavijñāna is actually a development of any notion in that early tradition. Further, if we follow the logic of the history of ideas that underlie the emergence of the Yogācāra School, we can discern certain trends of thought that made possible the postulation of concepts like that of ālayavijñāna. The central criticism of the ālayavijñāna by the Theravādins is that this theory has been responsible for the infiltration of substance theories into Mahāyāna. In any case, whether or not the seeds of the ālayavijñāna concept existed in early Buddhism, no evidence is needed from this
quarter to prove that there was a concept of unconscious motivation in early Buddhism.

It was pointed out in Chapter II that the word viññāṇa has four strands of meaning. It is reasonable to suppose that these same strands of meaning are found also in the compound ālayavijñāna.

1. A basic use of viññāṇa is in the sense of cognition. The five forms of sense-consciousness mentioned in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, i.e. visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactual, appear to be the only parallel to the cognitive import of viññāṇa found in the Theravāda. But in the case of ālayavijñāna, it does not have any intellectual function. "It simply accumulates all the impressions, all the memory seeds (bīja) that are produced and left behind by the activities of the vijñānas." 92

2. Viññāṇa in the sense of anoetic sentience. This, as we have seen, is not a central usage of early Buddhism. But it is one of the strands of meaning found in the ālayavijñāna concept. As Sarathchandra notes, the idealist regards the functioning consciousness as a manifestation of the ālaya. "Ālaya seems to remain as a sub-plane all the while, even during the activity of its manifestations. This is the implication of the simile of the sea and the waves on it." 93

3. Viññāṇa as the medium in which progress in meditation takes place. This sense is of help in understanding the Yogācāra preoccupation with the concept of consciousness.
While the Mādhyamika School for instance laid emphasis on the dialectic of reason, the Yogācāra School emphasized the contemplative process. That perhaps explains why the Yogācāra conceived the absolute in terms of consciousness. In early Buddhism the stages of spiritual development are considered as the footholds of viññāṇa. However, viññāṇa ceases to manifest itself in the final state of the cessation of all conceptual and empirical experience. Thus, in the final stage of spiritual development early Buddhism goes beyond the Yogācāra School.

4. Viññāṇa as the factor of survival. Obviously this has a parallel in the concept of ālaya as the "depository of karma seeds, good as well as bad." Though there is a parallelism to the ālaya, the Yogācāra metaphysics seems to consider the ālaya as some kind of substrate, thus perhaps inviting the comment that it is a "soul in disguise." In spite of Suzuki's attempt to dispel this criticism, he admits: "There is no doubt that this idea of ālaya viññāṇa ... caused confusion in the minds of some Mahāyāna Buddhists who have been brought up in the teaching of anātman (non-ego)." What the critics of Suzuki like Conze say is not that there is a fully fledged substance theory of soul in the Yogācāra system, but rather that it is an "unhappy hybrid" of the soul and the non-soul theories.
Normal Consciousness and Spiritual Awakening

Fromm says that when we speak of consciousness and unconsciousness in psychoanalytic contexts, there is the implication that consciousness is of a higher value than unconsciousness, but "yet it is quite obvious that consciousness as such has no particular value, in fact most of what people have in their conscious minds is fiction and delusion. . . ". If we accept the fact that most of our consciousness is delusion, then to achieve something valuable the hidden unconscious has to be revealed. Thus we arrive at a new concept of conscious-unconscious according to which the average person, though he thinks that he is awake, is actually half asleep. Fromm says: "By 'half asleep' I mean that his contact with reality is a very partial one; most of what he believes to be reality (outside or inside of himself) is a set of fictions which his mind constructs." Fromm's underlying idea is the fictional and unreal character of our normal consciousness. And he compares this with the awakening or enlightenment advocated by Zen Buddhism. "To enlarge consciousness means to wake up, to lift a veil, to leave the cave, to bring light into the darkness."

This brings us to the concept of awareness in early Buddhism. With regard to the Buddha's message we can speak of those who are conscious of it and follow a method of self-discipline; of others who know of the Buddha's message, but fail to manifest it in their behavior; of others who are
completely uninformed and insensitive to it, and so on. In this connection are we going to say, as Fromm does, that what most people have in their conscious minds is fiction and delusion? If we compare those who are perfect and have attained the holy state (arahat) with the "stream-winner" (sotāpanna), the "once-returner" (sakadāgāmi), the "never-returner" (anāgāmi), those who are ardently following the path of the Buddha but have not attained any such stage, those who call themselves the followers of the Buddha, either as monks or laymen, but fail to carry this out, then we should discover various stages of imperfection. In the context of the norms of Buddhism the arahat can be regarded as the awakened one, who is fully aware and mindful to the utmost. If so, there is a wide gap between the arahat and the puthujjana (the worldling) who is still possessed of all the ten fetters binding him to the round of rebirths. If we proceed in this way, we come to that profound axiom "Sabbe puthujjana unmattaka" (All worldlings are deranged). This parallels Freud's assertion of the world as a patient and civilization as essentially pathological. In the context of Buddhism the normal personality can be defined to the degree to which one is dominated by craving and the delusion of self-hood.

The levels of spiritual development referred to above are important because they bear upon the Buddhist concept of the "conscious" and "unconscious." Let us examine some
of the key words for awareness, like sati and sampajāna. The Buddhist therapeutic system has four significant elements of which sati (mindfulness) is one. They are faith (saddhā), mindfulness (sati), concentration (samādhi) and wisdom (paññā). In varying contexts sati has been translated by "memory, recognition, wakefulness of mind, mindfulness, alertness, lucidity of mind, self-possession," etc. The word sampajāna is often used similarly to mean "thoughtful, aware and attentive." There are other phrases with a similar meaning, like yoniso manasikāra (wise attention) or paccavakkhati (to reflect or look at oneself.) Of course mindfulness in Buddhism refers to concentration and wisdom to which it provides a footing. All these together imply a very high state of "wakefulness" according to which ordinary consciousness seems fictional and confused. Against this background a number of polarities can be projected which illuminate the concept of consciousness in Buddhism: 1. calm and quiet as contrasted to turmoil and agitation; 2. clarity and lucidity as contrasted to confusion and obscurity; 3. mastery and control of desires as contrasted to domination by involuntary impulses; 4. insight and knowledge as contrasted to delusion and ignorance. Some of these are paralleled in the Freudian system, but there is no mystical and spiritual development in Freud.
The Nature of Dreams

There is no systematic theory of dreams in the early Buddhist scriptures. However, the problem of the moral responsibility of the dreamer is discussed in the Vinaya where the question of whether a person who sins in his dreams is to be condemned, is taken up. From this can be inferred an attitude to dreams. There is some interesting material in the Milinda Pañha as well as in some works on the Abhidhamma. This material has been examined by Sarathchandra and Aung. Since our aim is to describe the nature of unconscious processes according to the early Buddhism of the Nikāyas, references connected with the Abhidhamma are excluded. A brief reference to the Milinda Pañha is made only so far as it is relevant. In the latter work the question is raised whether a man dreams when he sleeps or when he is awake. The answer given is that dreams do not belong to sleep or to waking experience, but to an intermediate stage comparable to a monkey’s sleep. Dreams do not occur in deep sleep, for the mind has to be active in some way for the occurrence of dreams. How does the mind become active during sleep, and what are the causes of dreams? Dreams are classified thus:

1. Dreams due to organic and muscular disturbances.
2. Dreams due to the impact of previous experience.
3. Dreams due to the influence of supernatural agencies.
4. Prophetic dreams.
Regarding the problem of mental responsibility the reference to previous experiences is significant. It is natural for a mind that is preoccupied with evil thoughts to extend this disposition to dreaming. Freud says that dreaming is a way of satisfying unfulfilled wishes. It is stated in the Vinaya that a monk who commits an offence in a dream is not morally responsible for his dream acts. This suggests that there is no volitional control over dream thoughts. According to another view dream thoughts are not ethically neutral, but from the point of ecclesiastical offences they are of a negligible nature. If we accept this view that there is an element of volition, though negligible, it suggests a certain similarity with the Freudian hypothesis that dreams are wish fulfillments. The fact that the arahat does not dream also shows that dreams are the product of imperfection. Freud, of course, believed that dreams gave an insight to the real nature of a person and this thesis is not inconsistent with early Buddhism, though the discussion in the Vinaya does not shed much light on this point.


The Metapsychological Status of the Concept of the Unconscious

We have already referred to the statement of Pap that the characteristically psychoanalytic meaning of the word
unconscious is dispositional, and that is the meaning that remains after it is divested of metaphors and analogies that are misleading. Though Freud has used a number of spatial images to describe the unconscious, to Freud unconscious tendencies are a special case of latent tendencies and dispositions. If we accept this view, maintained by people like Pap and Brunswik, we can see some very interesting points of contact between Freud and Buddhism.

In our analysis of the early Buddhist Unconscious we have referred to the anusayas (latent tendencies) and asampajāna mano-saṅkhāras (dispositions of the mind or trains of thought of which we are not aware). It was noted that a person who has telepathic powers can discern the mental saṅkhāras of another and predict what he will think at a later time. In the passage containing viññāna-sota was pointed out that a part of the stream of consciousness consisted of certain saṅkhāras which persisted in a state of flux in the Unconscious influencing his later behavior. Now most of these references indicate that the early Buddhist concept of the Unconscious can be explained as a disposition concept similar to Freud's. One significant difference is that the saṅkhāras have a wider dimension extending from innumerable births. The hypothesis of rebirth is certainly something that the clinical psychologist and the psychiatrist should seriously examine.
Method of Unraveling the Unconscious

According to Freud an important difference between the Pre-conscious and the Unconscious is that the Unconscious is not accessible to ordinary introspection as is the Pre-conscious. A special technique like the hypnotic method or that of free association is necessary to get at unconscious processes. A little effort may be necessary to recall a pre-conscious memory, but no special technique is necessary to unravel it. According to early Buddhism too, whether it be one's own or another's recognition of unconscious processes, a special kind of cognition, like telepathic power or extrasensory cognition, is necessary to unravel the Unconscious. Both systems, then, require a special procedure to unravel the Unconscious. However, Freud would not claim any powers of extrasensory cognition, but would merely say that it is a development of the usual powers of reason and sensory experience at a mature level that helps us to unravel the Unconscious.

Meaning of Unconscious Motives

A number of meanings of "unconscious" were outlined with the help of the list suggested by Miller. Most of these can be brought under two heads: 1. motives that go unrecognized, the nature of which is not correctly understood by the person, 2. those which lack any "control" by the agent and often appear almost compulsive. Beck's analysis of unconscious motives recognizes these two aspects
of unconscious motives. Both are certainly found in Freud as well as in early Buddhism. Lack of insight into one's motives was well illustrated by the "desires in disguise." Insight, whether it is transcendental or well developed introspection of the ordinary level, can illuminate the sources of one's deeds, speech and thought according to the Buddha. Lack of Control is equally discussed in the Buddhist texts. There is an emphasis on the unguarded and uncontrolled senses, for when there is no control over them, evil states flow in. When the senses are unguarded, delightful and pleasant stimuli or disagreeable and painful stimuli can excite certain dormant traits. The person who is undergoing training is expected to analyze his own mental states carefully, for if one dwells with the organ of sight uncontrolled, evil states will creep in, or if he is obsessed with thoughts about sense-pleasure (kāmavitakka) evil tendencies emerge.

Contents of Unconscious Motives

It is on this point that popular opinion rejects any comparison of Buddhist and Freudian psychology. It is true that Freud somewhat overemphasized the role of sexuality. But one who follows the development of Freudian thought will notice that later Freud admitted the existence of both ego instincts and aggression. The points of similarity between the threefold desires of early Buddhism (kāmā, bhavā and vibhava-tañhā) and the Libido, Ego and the Death instinct
have been shown. There are also similarities regarding the content of the Unconscious in the two systems, especially the role of sensuality, self-love and aggression. There is also the problem of whether the Unconscious consists of only the evil aspect of man. On this Jung has criticized Freud, saying that there is a profound and good aspect to man's personality buried in his Unconscious. Buddhism certainly admits that man has dispositions which are both good and bad. Often it is possible that certain wholesome dispositions in some men can recede into the background and the evil traits dominate due to a bad environment, frustrations, upbringing, etc. The dynamic saṅkhāras that determine the nature of one's next life consist of both good and bad dispositions.

The defilers (kilesas), the cankers (āsavas), the latent tendencies (anusayās), the hindrances (nīvaranas) and allied concepts are aspects of personality that darkens the mind. The moral aspect is rather defined in terms of powers (bala), like confidence, mindfulness, concentration, effort and wisdom. It is difficult to describe these as "unconscious," because as the individual gets trained in morality, concentration and wisdom, the wholesome aspects of personality emerge with mindfulness. Hence, when the Buddhist focuses his attention on the Unconscious, he is interested in the latent traits that distort, and darken one's consciousness without his awareness. However, in a man's life
through successive births, the wholesome aspect can recede to the background and remain mute and find expression in the most unexpected circumstances. The classic case of the spiritual transformation of the criminal An̄gulimāla may be a case in point.

**Mastery of the Unconscious**

This is certainly the point at which the early Buddhist system of therapy is superior to that advocated by Freud. Rieff concludes his classic work on Freud with the sentence "Aware at last that he is chronically ill, psychological man may nevertheless end the ancient quest of his predecessors for a healing doctrine. His experience with the latest one, Freud's, may finally teach him that every cure must expose him to new illness."¹⁰⁶ This is the Freudian dilemma: the sense of despair of man who sought a cure for the ills of man.

Freudian therapy is essentially a process of bringing into consciousness that which has been unconscious. But the mere unraveling of the unconscious sources of a personality disorder does not completely eliminate the re-emergence of similar or substitute formations. Though Freud preferred the method of obtaining insight into oneself to the technique of releasing one's pent up emotions (catharsis), he could not find a radical solution such as advocated by the Buddha.

There are two significant aspects to the mastery of the Unconscious advocated in Buddhism in keeping with two basic
senses of the term unconscious motive already referred to: 1. the cognitive level at which insight and awakening break through the Unconscious, 2. a conative level at which man achieves perfect self-control over his unruly desires and also stabilizes the growth of wholesome tendencies within himself. In a very general way it can be said that the disciplines of sīla (morality) and samādhi (concentration and tranquility) function at the conative level and panna (wisdom) at the cognitive level. Freud himself shifted from a position which emphasized emotional relief and tranquility in catharsis to a system that emphasized insight and understanding of the sources of mental sickness. In spite of this similarity it is said the Buddhist therapy is more radical than the Freudian, since the Freudian goal was limited to an attainable ideal of happiness and the translation of hysterical misery into everyday unhappiness. Others say that his goals were far-reaching, that he aimed at ideal psychic normality, but that his techniques were not far-reaching. Freud himself admitted that "there is a bit of unconquerable nature in each of us."
NOTES TO CHAPTER III


2. Ibid., p. 29.


6. Chapter III, Part II, see, references to Jung's Collective Unconscious and the Alayavijñana.

7. S.E. Vol. XIV.

8. S.E. Vol. XIX.


10. Ibid.

11. See S.E. Vol. XIX, for a development of this theme.


13. Ibid.


15. Ibid., p. 3.

16. S.E. Vol. XIV.


18. Ibid.
19. S.E. Vol. VII.
20. S.E. Vol. XIV.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. S.E. Vol. XVIII.
27. Ibid.
29. S.E. Vol. II, n.69, n.45.
33. Ibid., p. 41.


43. *Ibid*.

44. *Ibid*.


47. A. II. 79.


64. *Ibid.*

65. A. II, 158; S. II, 36-41.


67. S. II, 130.


70. M. I, 303.

71. M. I, 433.


83. R. Chanda Vimala Thera, *Cittopaklesa Dipani*, p. 163.


89. Dr. Walpola Rahula, "Ālayavijñāna" (store consciousness), *Middle Way*, London, August 1964, p. 57.


100. Dr. E. R. Sarathchandra, *The Buddhist Psychology of Perception; Anuruddha, Compendium of Philosophy*.
103. Chapter III, Part I.
104. M III 2.
108. *S.E. Vol. XXIII*.
Roots of Morality and Religion

Early Buddhist psychology grew up within the dimensions of an ethico-psychological system. Its basic inspiration is religious. But if early Buddhism is termed "religious," some qualifications are needed. As we know, Buddhism does not uphold the belief in an all-powerful god or an unchanging soul. As a result some consider early Buddhism rather as a system of practical psychology with a therapeutic basis. On the other hand, there is a very strong spiritual and mystical core in early Buddhism because of which we can say that it has an ethico-religious basis. Freud's criticism of current religions that they display an un-psychological attitude cannot be made against early Buddhism. The Buddha himself condemned current religions that perpetuated "rite and ritual clinging." This criticism is quite similar to the Freudian critique of religious fetishes. This is perhaps what made Rhys Davids remark that "compared with the ascetic excesses as well with the imaginative and speculative obsessions of the age the Buddhist standpoint was markedly hygienic." But in spite of its criticism of the religious practices of the age, Buddhism did uphold the reality of mystical and spiritual experience and in this attitude it
differs from Freud, although, according to Fromm, Freud was not unsympathetic to a humanistic religion like Buddhism as compared to an authoritarian creed. 2

Now it may be asked: What was Freud's specific aim in applying the findings of psychoanalysis to ethics and religion? Flugel maintains that it was to reveal a certain clumsiness and crudity in the operation of man's powers of moral control. It was to show that conscience was a factor in the mind that was capable of doing harm as well as good. 3

Rite and Ritual Clinging (sīlabbatūpādāna)

The Buddha's reference to some of the contemporaneous religious cults and rituals echoes Freud's severe indictment of traditional morality in his Future of an Illusion. The Buddha came across a variety of religious cults that perpetuated misguided and pointless rituals. The Buddha described their adherents as subject to "rite and ritual clinging" (sīlabbata-parāmāsa). This is described as one of the four clingings (upādānas): 1. sense desire clinging, 2. false view clinging, 3. rite and ritual clinging and 4. self-doctrine clinging. Rite and ritual clinging was condemned by the Buddha on various grounds.

The term parāmāsa suggests that one clings to these rituals more with a feeling of compulsion than by a judicious understanding of their function, as it literally means "being attached to, being under the influence of, contagion," etc. Thus in the phrase "sīlabbata parāmāsa" it came to mean that
one is excessively attached to the outer ceremonial aspect of morality or the contagion or mere rule and ritual.

It was earlier suggested that upādāna might be rendered by "entanglement," which unlike "clinging," suggests involvement in objects whether we like or dislike them. Some of the religious fetishes—like hand washing mentioned by Freud are primarily the expressions of such entanglements or obsessions. The Buddha exposed the vacuity of many superficial forms of self-purification practiced in his time. On the one hand, there were those who used severe forms of penance to destroy sins, like fasting and starving. The Buddha described this ideal of self mortification as painful, unworthy and unprofitable. There were also other practices such as washing away impurity by bathing. The Buddha declared that no amount of washing can cleanse the hostile and guilty man. Some of the practices he condemned are enumerated in the following passage:

Such ways as fastings, crouching on the ground, Bathing at dawn, reciting of the Three, Wearing rough hides, and mattered hair and filth, Chantings and empty rites and penances, Hypocrisy and cheating and the rod, Washings, ablutions, rinsings of the mouth. 4

Unless there is a basic transformation of character, a person who tries to purify himself by external ceremonies will miss the mark. "As an unclean cloth when dyed will not be pure in colour," so is the man who tries to wash away the evil deed in the river. 5 The method of purification that the Buddha advocated is not external, but internal. It implies
a basic transformation of character. The person who follows this method is said to have washed with an "inner washing." The Buddha was of the opinion that ethical sacrifices were more worthy than physical sacrifices or rituals. The intense spiritual fire that burns within one puts to the shade even a thousand fires produced by burning wood.

I lay no wood, brahmin, for fires on altars. Only within burneth the fire I kindle. Ever my fire burns; ever tense and ardent, I, Arahant, work out the life that is holy. 6

Asceticism and Self-mortification

There was a group of religious teachers who believed that the mortification of the body would bring about the purification of the soul. This path of self-mortification was one of these methods tried by Gotama for eight long years and ultimately rejected. He rejected it when he discovered the true path of nibbāna. Actually the Buddha rejected two extremes: the way of self-mortification and addiction to sensual pleasures. His own way, the "noble eightfold" path is referred to as the "middle path" (majjhima­patipadā).

Thus the Buddhist attitude regarding anguish (dukkha) offers a striking contrast to the methods of self-mortification practiced, for example, by the Jainas. The deliberate attempt to live through painful experiences and the technique of purging and burning up the effects of karma is condemned by the Buddha. He declared that some of these
methods were the manifestations of craving itself. For example, the immortality penance, self-tormenting exercises performed to attain immortality, were the product of the craving for self-preservation (bhava-tanha). Certain types of penance and self-torture excited latent hatred (patigha anusaya) and issued forth in the craving for annihilation (vibhava-tanha). The Buddha showed that there is no short cut to end suffering; self-torture will not take a person to nibbana. People often confuse the desire for nibbana and the craving for self-annihilation. All violent attempts to deal with problems of suffering lack insight and are subject to the delusion of the ego in a subtle form. The individual exhibits a tremendous preoccupation with the ego in spite of his attempt to "destroy the essential being." It is a vicious circle, and the Buddha analogically says it is like a dog running and circling round a post to which it is tied. Many forms of self-torture and suicide display this psychological pattern. A comparison of the concept of self-annihilation (vibhava-tanha) in early Buddhism with the death instinct in Freud is significant as Freud says that the Super-ego is rooted in a tremendous amount of aggression.

The Jainas believed that "vocal sins are destroyed through silence, mental sins through respiratory restraint, bodily sins through starvation and lust crushed through mortification." The doctrine of the expiation and purge of former misdeed upheld by the Jainas is treated in the
Majjima Nikāya. The Buddha says that the Jainas maintain the doctrine that "whatever this individual experiences, whether pleasant or painful or neither painful nor pleasant, all is due to what was previously done. Thus by burning up, by making an end of ancient deeds by the non-doing of new deeds there is no over flowing into the future." This doctrine is definitely rejected by the Buddha. His own position is explained by an analogy. A man is pierced by an arrow smeared with poison. Then his friends procure a physician and surgeon. They cut open the wound, dress it with medicated powder and heal it. And when the skin is healed the patient is cured and his well being restored. In the process of treatment the painful feelings are incidental and have to be borne by the patient. In the same way, whatever bodily and mental hardships are incidental to the path of morality (sīla) and concentration (samādhi) have to be patiently borne by the monk. But the Buddha does not make the bearing of these painful experiences an end in itself. Though we strive with great effort to get rid of suffering, we must be indifferent to the source of anguish through equanimity. Anguish cannot be mastered by anguish, anguish has to be mastered by equanimity. Mrs. Rhys Davids has rightly pointed out that the Buddha's objection to asceticism rests on the fact that excess is dukkha and tapas is excess. The question is raised whether happiness is to be won through suffering, and the Buddha shows that the
method he advocates is not through suffering. The Buddha refers to four types of people: 1. those who torment themselves and not others, 2. those who do not torment themselves but others, 3. those who torment both themselves and others, and 4. those who do not torment themselves or others. The true Buddhist belongs to the fourth group.

The Moral Sense According to the Buddha

In the light of the Freudian criticism of the Super-ego and the Buddha's own rejection of misguided religious rites it is legitimate to ask whether Buddhism offers any positive notion of a moral sense or conscience. This is certainly found in the concepts of hiri (shame of evil) and ottappa (dread of evil). There is also great emphasis on the development of the inner self and the value of self-analysis.

Hiri-ottappa

Early Buddhism certainly rejects an original sin or any concept of sin in the Christian sense. The Buddha only exhorts people to understand the nature of human motives and act wisely. The two terms "kusala" and "akusala" referring to the good and evil or moral and immoral actions are often rendered by the two English terms "wholesome" and "unwholesome." It is also sometimes rendered "skilful" and "unskilful," reminding us of Aristotle's definition of virtue. Among the wholesome factors are shame of evil (hiri) and dread of evil (ottappa). But this should not be
confused with remorse or guilt. Kukucca, which can be rendered as uneasiness of "conscience, guilt, remorse and worry," is considered unwholesome. It is associated with hateful and discontented consciousness (dosa) in the way that the Super-ego consists of certain aggressive elements. Kukucca is regarded as one of the five hindrances (nivarana) when combined with restlessness. Uddhacca-kukucca (restlessness and worry) is an obstacle to the development of the mind. Restlessness and worry are described by a simile in the Nikāyas. If a pot of water were shaken with the wind so that the water trembles, eddies and ripples, and a man were to look there for his own reflection, he would not see it. Thus restlessness and worry blind one's vision of oneself. The other four hindrances are also explained by similes: lust and passion (kāmacchanda) are compared to water mixed with variegated colors; ill-will (vyāpāda) is compared to a pot of water boiling and bubbling over; sloth and torpor (hīna middha) to a pot of water covered with moss and water plants; doubt (vicikicca) to muddy and turbid water.  

According to the Atthasālinī hiri has a subjective origin within oneself, and ottappa an external origin, i.e. in the impact of society. Hiri is based on shame and ottappa on dread. Rhys Davids says that "taken together they give us the emotional and conative aspect of the modern notion of conscience, just as "sati" represents it on its intellectual side." Hiri and ottappa are to be cultivated as positive
moral emotions. They are described as powers. He who lacks these positive emotions lacks a conscience.

Deception and Guilt

There are two types of extremes both of which are unhealthy, one is deception, the other guilt. Many people try to deceive others consciously by pretenses. Some deceive themselves by unconscious rationalizations. Deception, disguises and secrecy have been condemned by the Buddha as well as by Freud. Guilt, the other extreme, causes one to brood over the wrongs that he has done. Now this can vary from short lived states of repentence (which may not be damaging) to uneasiness, restlessness, dejection and even pathological guilt. While conscious deception is positively evil, guilt is damaging, unwholesome and unproductive. This aspect is often emphasized by the Buddha. Freud's basic attack is against current religions and moral behavior because they rest on some neurotic guilt complex.

Deception and disguise of one's real nature is condemned. Careful and earnest scrutiny of oneself is necessary. Throughout all the discourses of the Buddha there is an emphasis on the axiom "to one's own self must one be true." There is no way of covering up one's faults from oneself. Even if some one tries to mask one's desires it is said that the "Tathāgatas and Devas see the fool who in the world walks crookedly." The Buddha advocates honest and
diligent self-analysis as a basis for healthy moral development. The only path open to an immoral man is to understand himself and bring about a transformation in his character. No amount of penance and ritual can cleanse him. Unless the immoral base of the personality of the immoral man is cleansed and rooted out, superficial religions are of no avail. Once a man becomes immoral, not even remorse can help him.

In admonishing both the layman and the recluse to develop a healthy moral sense, the Buddha has described the bad effects of burdening oneself with an unhealthy guilty conscience. He says that "one who is a fool experiences threefold anguish and dejection here and now." 1. If the fool is sitting in a place like an assembly room or at a crossroads where people meet and if the people start talking about him, then he thinks that he has done certain immoral acts and the people talk about it. This created anguish and dejection in him. 2. When he sees others being punished by the king for evil deeds, he fears he will have to suffer in the same way. This makes him uneasy and creates anguish. 3. When a fool is resting on a chair or a bed, the evil deeds done by him come to his mind. "Monks, as at eventide the shadows of the great mountain peaks rest, lie and settle on the earth, so monks, do these evil deeds that the fool has formerly done . . . lie and settle on him . . . ." The fool thinks that what is good has not been done and that he will
be born in a bad place. He grieves, mourns, laments and falls into disillusionment. This sort of guilt and uneasiness is certainly the kind of restlessness that has been condemned by the Buddha. It is different from a healthy and productive sense of shame and fear (hiri-ottappa). Thus both these extremes, deception and guilt, are condemned by the Buddha.

The Super-ego and the Origins of Guilt According to Freud

Against this background of the early Buddhist conception of the roots of morality and religion let us now view the Freudian analysis of the Super-ego. The grounds on which Freud rejected pathological religious and moral behavior are mentioned in many of his works. Freud has often been condemned for rejecting morality and religion as a whole. The fact is that Freud had to play a historical mission in exposing the pathological aspects of the "conscience of a civilization."

Freud says that the long period during which the growing human being lives in dependence upon his parents leaves behind it a precipitate, that forms within his Ego a special agent in which his parental influence is prolonged. It has been given the name "Super-ego." Insofar as the Super-ego is differentiated from the Ego or opposed to it, it constitutes a third force which the Ego must take into account. Thus an action by the Ego is as it should be, if it satisfied simultaneously the demands of the Id, of the
Super-ego and of reality. The details of the relation between the Ego and the Super-ego becomes completely intelligible if they are carried back to the child's attitude towards his parents. The parents' influence naturally includes not merely the personalities of his parents, but also the racial, national and family traditions handed on through them as well as the immediate social circles they represent. In spite of their fundamental difference, the Id and the Super-ego have one thing in common, they both represent the influence of the past. The Id is to a great extent the influence of heredity, the Super-ego is essentially the influence of what is taken over from other people, whereas the Ego is from the individual's own experience.

It is a remarkable thing that the Super-ego often develops a severity for which no example has been provided by the real parents, and further it takes the Ego to task not only for its deeds, but equally for its thoughts and unexecuted intentions, of which it seems to have knowledge.

The hero of the Oedipus legend too, felt guilty for his actions and punished himself, although the compulsion of the oracle should have made him innocent in our judgement and his own. In the melancholic patient the Super-ego becomes severe, abuses, humiliates and ill-treats his unfortunate Ego. It threatens with the severest punishments. This aggressive aspect is well demonstrated in masochism.
Freud, commenting on Kant's view regarding the greatness of moral conscience within, says that where conscience is concerned God has been guilty of a careless piece of work and though it has no doubt been within us, it has not been there from the beginning (unlike sexuality); children are, therefore, essentially amoral. They have no internal inhibitions against their pleasure-seeking impulses. The role which the Super-ego undertakes later in life is at first played by an external power, viz. by parental authority. The influence of the parents dominates the child by granting proofs of affection and by threats of punishment, which to the child means less of love. This objective anxiety is the forerunner of later moral anxiety. The Super-ego seems to be influenced only by the harshness and severity of the parents, their preventive and punitive functions, while their loving care is not taken up by it. Apart from the activities of self-obedience and conscience the Super-ego also has the function of holding up ideals: the striving to attain perfection, win fame and honor, which is sometimes referred to as the ego-ideal.

When it is asked how a sense of guilt arises in anyone, the answer is given that people feel guilty (pious people call it "sinful") when they have done something they know to be "bad." But how little this answer tells us! Perhaps a person who has not actually committed a bad act, but merely become aware of the intention to do so, may also regard
himself guilty. In both cases, however, it is presupposed that wickedness has already been recognized as reprehensible, as something that ought not to be done. Freud feels that the suggestion of an original capacity for discriminating between good and evil can be rejected. An extraneous influence is evidently at work which decides what is to be called "good" and "bad." Since their own feelings would not lead men along the same path, they must have a motive for obeying that extraneous influence. It can best be designated "the dread of losing love." In a sense the sense of guilt is obviously only the dread of losing love, i.e., "social anxiety." "Consequently such people habitually permit themselves to do any bad deed, that procures them something they want, if only they are sure that no authority will discover it or make them suffer for it; their anxiety relates only to the possibility of detection." The authority is internalized by the development of a Super-ego. At this point the dread of discovery ceases to operate and also once for all any distinction between doing evil and wishing to do it, since nothing is hidden from the Super-ego, not even thoughts.

"But the influence of the genetic derivation of these things, which causes what has been outlived and surmounted to be relived, manifests itself so that on the whole things remain as they were at the beginning." The Super-ego torments the sinful Ego with the same feelings of dread and
watches for opportunity whereby the outer world can be made to punish it. External deprivation and adversity too, strengthen the conscience, and when some calamity befalls, he holds an inquisition within, discerns his sin, heightens the standards of his conscience, imposes abstinences on himself and punishes himself with penances. Thus Freud explains the increased sensitivity to morals in the face of ill luck. Now fate is felt to be a substitute for the agency of parents, for adversity means that one is no longer the highest power of all. Thus destiny is looked upon in the strictly religious sense as the expression of God's will. Thus Freud says that God functions as a magnified father. With the dread of authority, there is only the renouncing of instinctual gratification, but with the dread of the Super-ego there is punishment.

Thus Freud's conception of guilt is central to his analysis of morals and religion. It is in this light that he sees a close analogy between the religious rituals and the obsessions of the neurotic. Freud also sees religion as something that issues out of man's helplessness. In the way that a helpless child clings to the parents, man isolated in a threatening world clings to his image of God which is a magnified father-figure. The derivation of a need for religion from the child's feeling of helplessness and the longing it evokes for a father seems to him incontroversible, especially since this feeling is not simply
carried on from childhood days, but is kept alive perpetually by the fear of what the superior power of fate will bring.

**Buddhist Meditation and Psychotherapy**

Conze says that there is very little contact or similarity between Buddhist meditation and modern psychotherapy. "Mental health is the goal both of the practitioner of meditation and of the modern psychologists. Apart from that there is little contact or similarity between them. They differ profoundly in their definitions of mental health, in their theoretical assumptions about the structure of the mind and the purpose of human existence and in the methods which they describe for the attainment of mental health." He goes on to say that in recent years a few psychologists have shown interest in the therapeutic value of these meditations, but that little has come of it.

We hope to limit ourselves to the theoretical structure of Freudian psychotherapy and focus our discussion so that it would illuminate the concept of unconscious motivation. Psychotherapy is basically the creation of Freud and it is so often associated with a pan-sexual theory of man that very few will even think of comparing psychotherapy with a spiritual system like Buddhism. There are many factors in a "humanistic religion" like early Buddhism (as differentiated from an "authoritarian religion") that Freud probably would have heartily endorsed.
Regarding Conze's claim about the disparity in the two therapeutic systems, a very stimulating answer had been given by Fromm in *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis*. Fromm's analysis is, of course, limited to Zen Buddhism. But his discussion can be applied to the therapeutic aspects of early Buddhism too. He says that "Psychoanalysis is a characteristic expression of western man's spiritual crisis, and an attempt to find a solution. This is explicitly so in the more recent developments of psychoanalysis in 'humanist' or 'existentialist' analysis." This aim is implicitly found in Freud. Fromm adds that contrary to a widely held assumption, Freud's own system transcended the concept of "illness" and "cure" and was concerned with the "salvation" of man, rather than only with a therapy for mentally sick patients. If this is so, there are points of contact between psychotherapy and Buddhism regarding the purpose of human existence.

This fact is also seen in a remarkable change that took place within the psychoanalytic system of therapy due to a change in the kind of patients who came for treatment. "Psychoanalysis shifted its emphasis more and more from therapy of the neurotic symptoms to therapy of difficulties in living rooted in the neurotic character." The patients who first came for treatment suffered from certain symptoms like a paralyzed arm, obsessional symptoms or a washing compulsion. The difference between these patients and those
who went to the regular physician for treatment was that the cause of their symptoms was mental and not organic. But there was a common pattern of cure: once the symptom was removed the patient was cured. The new kind of patient that came for treatment was not sick in the traditional sense and had no overt symptoms. These patients were not insane or considered sick by their relatives. Yet they complained about being depressed, having insomnia, not enjoying their work, etc. Though these people thought they suffered from this or that symptom, their complaints were only the conscious and socially recognized ways of expressing a deeper dissatisfaction. Putting his finger at the source of the malady Fromm says: "The common suffering is the alienation from oneself, from one's fellow man, and from nature; the awareness that life runs out of one's hand like sand, and that one will die without having lived; that one lives in the midst of plenty and is yet joyless."20 This concept of "alienation" can be illustrated by a typical example cited by Fromm. A business man, intelligent, aggressive, successful, has come to drink more and more heavily. He turns to a psychoanalyst to be cured of his drinking. His life is completely devoted to competition and money making. Nothing else interests him. His personal relationships all serve the same goal. He is expert in making friends and gaining influence, but deep down he hates everyone he comes into contact with, his competitors, his
customers, his employees. He also hates the commodity he sells. He has no particular interest in it, except as a means to make money. He is not conscious of this hate, but slowly one can recognize from his dreams and free associations that he feels like a slave to his business, his commodity, and every one connected with it. He has no respect for himself and dulls the pain of feeling inferior and worthless by resorting to drinking. He has never been in love with anyone and satisfies his sexual desires in cheap and meaningless affairs. 21

Now is his problem drinking? Or is his drinking only a symptom of his real problem: his failure to lead a meaningful life. Actually his problem is not his drinking, but his moral failure and this cannot be analyzed in terms of the manifest symptoms. These changing visions of psychoanalysis bring psychoanalysis closer to a religion like Buddhism. The psychoanalyst becomes dissatisfied with the therapy of a mere social adjustment and searches for a radical therapy that can illuminate the meaning and purpose of human existence.

This brings us logically to Conze's claim about the divergence regarding the definition of mental health. A clear insight into the Freudian position is found in a statement quoted in the book Normality by Daniel Offer and Melvin Sabshim: "From an analytic point of view, there is no such animal as the 'normal' person except as an ideal--we
are all relatively neurotic. The basic tenets of psychoanalysis affirms that conflict is the essence of life and that instinctual renunciation is the price of being a civilized human being. Paraphrasing Alexander Pope's phrase 'to err is human,' we would say 'to be neurotic is human'." The underlying premise in this Freudian position is that all men are at least partially neurotic. And this fits in with the Buddhist axiom "sabbe puthajjanā ummattakā" (all worldlings are deranged). F. C. Redlich voices a similar sentiment regarding Freud: "Freud also felt that absolute normality, like complete happiness, is impossible and that conflict is always present in human beings." Now this position maintained by Freud brings him quite close to early Buddhism. But there is a difference. Freud implies that complete perfection is an ideal that man can never reach. In keeping with this position Offer and Sabshim present three basic trends regarding the definition of normality and health: 1. normality as an ideal fiction; 2. normality as optimal integration; 3. normality as adaptation within context. The tendency to regard normality as an ideal fiction started with Freud. Buddhism agrees with Freud regarding the universality of neurosis and the universality of unconscious conflicts, but Buddhism does not regard normality as a fiction. This ideal is hard to achieve, but it can be achieved, and it was achieved by the Buddha and some of his disciples who attained the state of
arahat (the holy state). Freud often advocates an attainable ideal of happiness, as perfect happiness cannot be attained. But the Buddha says that ultimate perfection and happiness is possible. The Buddha classifies disease into two kinds, bodily disease (kāyiko rogo) and mental disease (cetasiko rogo). We suffer from bodily diseases from time to time, but mental illness is continual till the state of arahat is attained. Thus, according to the Buddha in a healthy mind all the selfish desires and passions are extinguished, and the mind positively enjoys bliss and peace.

This brings us to the next point mentioned by Conze: the methods advocated for the attainment of mental health. In this instance there are certainly differences, but the two systems are not so completely different that the Freudian system cannot gain anything from absorbing some of the techniques of Buddhist therapy. The practical and educational value of comparative studies is to stimulate such extensions of Freudian therapy. The Freudian therapy for neurosis was not so thoroughgoing as that advocated by Buddhism. Freud's despair in his inability to find a permanent solution to prevent a recurrence of the neurotic condition has great significance in the light of the radical system of therapy advocated by the Buddha.

Finally regarding the structure of mind in the two systems, Conze thinks that there is great difference. But
as has been demonstrated in our comparative study of the theory of mind and unconscious motivation, there are certain significant similarities. The similarity between the three-fold desires of Buddhism (kāma-, bhava and vibhava-taṭhā) and the Freudian concepts of the Libido, Ego and the Death Instinct are indeed remarkable. All these show that Conze's observation regarding the two therapeutic systems is not quite correct.

Buddhist Meditation

The early Buddhist system of therapy involves a very large field that can be described from various standpoints. Since we are interested in unconscious motivation, we will survey the Buddhist system of therapy briefly so far as it has a bearing on this there. A detailed exposition of the system of Buddhist meditation is found in the recent works of P. Vajiranāna Thero and Conze.

It is a significant fact that the Four Noble Truths which form the essential core of early Buddhism correspond to the basic structure of traditional Indian medicine:
1. the malady ~ suffering; 2. the cause of suffering according to the diagnosis ~ craving and ignorance; 3. treatment ~ the Eightfold Path; 4. the goal of treatment (health) ~ nibbāna. This basic structure brings out the therapeutic attitude that underlies the Buddha's teachings. There is both a cognitive and an emotional aspect to the cause of
suffering so that it can be discussed under "craving" and "ignorance." Craving (tañhā) is derived from the root causes called "rāga" (passion) and "dosa" (hatred). Ignorance or lack of knowledge (avijjā) is basically related to another root cause, viz. moha (delusion). It is said in the Samyutta Nikāya that beings are "cloaked in ignorance and tied to craving." Thus we get two character types in whom these aspects dominate: 1. the craving temperament (tañhācarita) and 2. the view temperament (diṭṭhicarita) or the theorizer. Therapeutically, "quiet" is advocated for the man who is excessively tied to craving and "insight" is advocated for the man who is cloaked by ignorance. Both aspects are generally found in everyone in varying degrees. But there are character types in whom these aspects dominate and color the whole personality. This concept of character types is given prominence in the Visuddhimagga. There are many possible classifications of character types, and Buddhaghosa offers six basic types: greedy temperament, hating temperament, deluded temperament, faithful temperament, intelligent temperament and speculative temperament. He works out various combinations of these types and relates them to various meditations which can serve as a corrective for a particular character type. Buddhist meditation (bhāvanā) may be one of two kinds, viz. 1. development of tranquility (samatha), also described as the development of concentration (samādhi), and 2. development of insight
(vipassanā) which culminates in wisdom (pāññā). Śīla (morality), samādhi (concentration) and pāññā (wisdom) provide the threefold structure on which the whole therapeutic structure of Buddhism stands. This threefold structure can also be presented as aspects of the Eightfold Path:

1. Right understanding, 2. Right thought, 3. Right speech, 4. Right bodily action, 5. Right livelihood, 6. Right effort, 7. Right mindfulness and 8. Right concentration. The first two come under wisdom, 3-5 under morality and 6-8 under concentration. As Francis Story remarks, "Techniques of meditation (bhāvanā) in Buddhism are designed for specific ends, according to the personality of the meditator and the traits it is necessary to eliminate. They are prescribed by the teacher just as treatment is given by a psychiatrist; the mode of treatment is selected with the individual requirements of the patient in view. The forty subjects of meditation, known as Kammatthanā (bases of action), cover every type of psychological need and every possible combination of type."²⁸ This observation is quite in keeping with the spirit of this inquiry. It is said that, since the Buddha had the telepathic powers to discern the minds of others and their unconscious desires, he would always recommend a certain type of meditation as a corrective to a particular personality. Not merely could the Buddha discern the mind of another, but he could get a glimpse of the recurring patterns in one's personality through innumerable
births. However, ultimately the Buddha lets each man be his own psychiatrist and then evades problematic phenomena like that of "transference" that emerge due to excessive dependence on the analyst.

**Freudian Psychotherapy**

At a very early stage Freud employed what was called the "cathartic method." Under hypnosis certain emotionally charged memories appear in various dramatic forms. This release of pent up emotions is referred to as "abreaction." It is due to the recalling of memories which would not have been recalled under ordinary conditions. The inability to recall certain memories under ordinary conditions is linked up with certain traumatic events buried in the past. This theory is also connected with one of the stages in the development of the concept of the Unconscious where the Unconscious is considered as the realm of repressed memories and emotions.

Freud found that abreaction by itself had no permanent use. As Franz Alexander has pointed out, during this stage Freud accepted the fact that the "Ego must face and learn to handle the repressed emotions. Thus the emphasis was on insight." Gradually the method of free association replaced the method of hypnotism. Now Freud directed his therapy not merely to reconstructing the past, but to making patients remember and above all understand it. The past had
to be understood and accepted by the patients.

The phenomenon called "transference" was discovered in a certain type of emotional relationship that arose between the analyst and the patient. "In the transference the original pathogenic conflicts of the early family relationships are repeated with lesser intensity. This is what is called the 'transference neurosis'." The emotional reenactment gradually increases the Ego's capacity to face these conflicts. However, this can lead to too much dependence on the analyst and thus leads to an interminable analysis. The question regarding the limits of analysis is directly connected with the goals of analysis. Freud first posits an ambitious definition of analysis and shows how such an ambitious concept turns out to be illusory. The ambitious goal is the attainment of absolute psychic normality. But there are three factors which make the attainment of such normality impossible: 1. the intensity of the instincts or the constitutional factor; 2. the traumatic factor; 3. the rigidity of the Ego based on defense mechanism. Freud remarks that his "aim will not be to rub off every peculiarity of human character for the sake of a 'schematic normality,' nor yet to demand that a person who has been 'thoroughly analysed' shall feel no passions and develop no internal conflicts."³⁰ Thus he rejects a goal that cannot be achieved. Commenting on his own ideal, Freud says that analysis should secure the best possible
psychological conditions for the functioning of the Ego. If this is the goal of analysis, then it can be achieved. He also says that whatever one's theoretical attitude is, the termination of analysis is a practical matter. Within this modest and limited ideal Freud remains an optimist, but when speaking of ultimate normality Freud remains a pessimist.

Both Freudian psychotherapy and the Buddhist system of therapy aim at breaking through the conscious layer of one's personality to the depths of the Unconscious. However, Buddhism uses a spiritual and mystical dimension of experience which is not found in Freud. Though there are strong analogies between the two systems and the emphasis is on introspection, self-analysis, development of insight, etc., Buddhism advocates integration of personality at a higher level. By merely unraveling the origin of a personality disorder, a patient is not fully cured. The treatment has to be lasting. Freud grappled with this question, but he could not discover a lasting solution. He said that his system was not a panacea, but that it was superior to any of the therapeutic systems so far presented. Thus the Buddhist system of therapy is more deep rooted and advocated a more positive form of personality integration. Within the Freudian system there is a tension between descriptive clinical diagnosis and prescriptive normative therapies. On the other hand, Buddhist ethico-psychology cuts through
the problem by asserting boldly that the measure of immoral behavior is simply the degree to which it is dominated by craving and the delusion of selfhood. This at once gives an absolute standard and an unchanging point of reference. The advocacy of a deep rooted therapy resting on the development of jhānic experience gives Buddhism a standard of absolute normality. The acceptance of the hypothesis of rebirth gives Buddhism a larger framework of reference.

These are the differences, but there are similarities which give meaning and purpose to our study. The shift from symptomatic changes to characterological changes gives a sense of depth and permanence to psychotherapy. It often happens that the therapy goes beyond the patient's expectations; he not merely recovers from the illness, but he has become an enlarged and improved person. Freud hopes that the stimuli received during the patient's own analysis will not cease to act when the analysis is over, that the "processes of ego transformation will go on of their own accord and that all further experience will be made use of in a newly acquired way. This does indeed happen and, insofar as it happens, it qualifies the learner who has been analyzed to become an analyst." If the patient who has recovered ultimately can qualify as an analyst himself, this echoes the Buddhist theory that one becomes fully perfect when one follows and achieves the path of an arahat, the same path that the Buddha trod. Freud also requests
that every analyst should be analyzed at least every five years. While this differs from the Buddhist conception of the perfected one, it is clear to what extent even the analyst has to be conscious of his own projections and prejudices.

Freud displays elements of both optimism and pessimism. As a clinician working with a practical problem, he advocates an attainable ideal of happiness and is optimistic. As a theoretician and philosopher he often betrays a pessimistic attitude. According to the Buddha the unattainable ideal of Freud is something that can be achieved. He and his disciples after him did achieve ultimate happiness and normality. In short, the Buddha claims that the "complete mastery" of the Unconscious is possible.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. E.R.E., Vol. II.


4. S IV, 118.

5. M I, 36.


9. E.R.E. Vol. II.


13. A I, 149.


16. Ibid., p. 108.


30. S.E. Vol. XXIII.

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4. The Interpretation of Dreams (Part I).

5. The Interpretation of Dreams (Part II).

6. The Psychopathology of Every Day Life.


9. Jensen's "Grandiva" and other works.

10. Two Case Histories (Little Hans and "The Hat Man").


12. The Case of Schrober: papers on technique and other works.

13. Totem and Taboo and other works.


15. Introductory lectures on Psycho-Analysis. I.

16. Introductory lectures on Psycho-Analysis. II.
Vol. 17. An Infantile neurosis and other works.

18. Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Group psychology and other works.

19. The Ego and the Id and other works.


21. The future of an illusion, civilization and its discontents and other works.

22. New introductory lectures and other works.

23. Moses and Monotheism. An outline of psychoanalysis and other works.

II. SECONDARY SOURCES

A. Works on Buddhism


B. Works on Freud


