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STUDY OF DAIMYO LEADERSHIP.

University of Hawaii, Ph.D., 1975
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to several persons who have assisted him, and in particular to the late Shunzo Sakamaki, Dean Emeritus of Summer Sessions, University of Hawaii, whose inspiration and friendship encouraged him to undertake this study ten years ago.

Sincere thanks go also to Deborah C. Church, SNJM, for her editorial assistance, and to my wife Adelina de Souza Matsui, M.D. for her constant support throughout the entire, lengthy process.

It is understood, of course, that the writer is solely responsible for any errors or shortcomings remaining.
ABSTRACT

Shimazu Shigehide (1745-1833) of Satsuma was one of the outstanding daimyo of the Tokugawa period. He lived in a time when the traditional agrarian economy on which the ruling forces relied was in crisis. Strong leadership and new approaches were needed to cope with the problems of rising debts and shortage of capital. But the exercise of such leadership was difficult due to samurai morale made lax by a long period of peace. Political factionalism, partially encouraged by the daimyo's half time enforced residence at Edo, was quick to be manifested with the introduction of social, cultural, economic, and political reforms.

This study deals with Shigehide's ideas for reform, the environment in which he operated, and the means by which he seized control and exercised leadership within his own domain. He held the position of daimyo from 1755 to 1787. Although retired in the latter year, he dominated the han government until his death in 1833. He was also the father-in-law of the Shogun Ienari. As a participant in the so-called Tanuma Age (1760-1786), Shigehide reflected the more "liberal" atmosphere of the time at Edo.

Satsuma was a conservative society whose traditional social values had been perpetuated without major
interruption throughout its long history. Abetting this conservatism was an extremely high ratio of samurai to commoners. These samurai, who were supported by the traditional agrarian economy, tended to resist economic reforms of a non-agrarian measure. But it was Shigehide's idea to correct the financial condition, which had been deteriorating since the beginning of the Tokugawa period, by instituting more "commercial" measures.

The success of such a policy against entrenched conservatism required strong daimyo leadership over the han administration, discipline among the samurai, and effective central han authority over local administrative units. Shigehide effected changes in the central han bureaucratic mechanism by expanding the authority of the Office of the Interior (okugakari). This was the instrument by which the daimyo exercised personal administration. Shigehide personally appointed "men of talent" to the vital posts of grand overseer and senior councillor. His personal stewards and attendants were vested with greater inspection power, and the office of sobazume was created to maintain liaison with the senior councillors. Finally, Shigehide placed the senior councillor in the Office of the Interior over the Office of the Exterior (omotegata) and the Office of Finances (katteho).

Shigehide's influence over the han bureaucracy was extended to his political and social control over his
retainers. He enacted reforms to tighten the samurai status system and peacetime military organization called the kumi. In the local scene, he sought to reduce the authority of the local officials by increasing supervision from the castle-town.

With his personal power thus consolidated, Shigehide could push his economic program of increasing the production of special local products, tightening the han monopoly over these products, and encouraging smuggling activities. Conservative officials saw Shigehide's economic measures, which emphasized the utilization of merchant capital, as non-traditional and a threat to their positions and way of life. Their opposition resulted in splitting the han bureaucracy. The ensuing bitter political struggle culminated in the drastic counteraction by Shigehide, called the Kinshiroku purge of 1808.

Shigehide emerged from this last important challenge to his hegemony as undisputed leader of a large and potentially wealthy han. Thereafter he resumed his earlier economic policy of the An'ei-Temmei periods (1772-1789), which served as the basis for the ultimately successful Tempō Financial Reforms.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

While contemporary Western studies of the Tokugawa period continue to revise our understanding of this complex, and frequently maligned, age, there are certain misconceptions still prevailing, one of which concerns the relationship between political and economic institutional development. Although our knowledge of economic development in Tokugawa Japan has been greatly expanded in the last twenty years, at this point we are in need of more regional studies to correct some of the over-generalized statements about the growth of commercialism in general, and the place of rural leadership in that commercialism, in particular. It is important to note that Satsuma's political, social and economic situation differed in several important aspects from other han.

Although contemporary Japanese historians have concentrated their efforts on the social and economic features of Satsuma's history, there has been relatively little research on its political history. It is the purpose of this study to examine the political and economic developments in Satsuma at the time of Shimazu Shigehide, one of the most important figures in Satsuma history. It is an effort at a preliminary synthesis of the political, social and economic factors in one han, while fully recognizing that this
process must be completed for other han before we can arrive at a more accurate synthesis of the whole.

Among the distinctive features of the Satsuma domain which distinguish it from other han are its topography, climate, and geographical location. Satsuma-han was situated in the southern tip of Kyūshū, embracing the provinces of Satsuma, Ōsumi and part of Hyūga, and its territory also included Amami-Ōshima and the Ryukyu kingdom. The island of Tanegashima was the point of first contact with Westerners, Portuguese traders and Jesuit missionaries in the 16th century. Satsuma was also the place of contact with the Chinese, indirectly, through Ryukyu and, directly, through smuggling at its many ports. It was a mountainous and rugged country, easily defensible by land, but vulnerable to coastal attack by a superior navy.

Satsuma, located in a volcanic area, experienced frequent eruptions and suffered from the loss of farmland due to the volcanic ash resulting from those eruptions. Satsuma was also in the path of typhoons which hit the Japanese islands periodically. Monsoon rains caused mudslides which destroyed crops and houses. On the other hand, its warm climate was suitable for products for sale to other part of Japan such as cane sugar in Ōshima and camphor in Satsuma.

Like all the other daikyō, the lord of Satsuma had to reside in Edo on alternate years. Because of the long distance from his home base, it was difficult for the
Shimazu daimyo to keep full control of the situation at home in Satsuma. Understandably, the tendency had been for the daimyo to let the local bureaucracy administer local affairs at Satsuma. Not only was the daimyo's attention divided by his forced attendance at the shogunal capital, his administrative staff was also divided between Edo and Kagoshima. Part of the problems discussed in this study can be attributed to this situation.

The long history of the Satsuma domain is another of its distinguishing characteristics. The Shimazu daimyo was the only surviving shugo daimyo in the Tokugawa period who traced his origin back to the Kamakura period. This great prestige of the Shimazu lineage was important in status conscious Edo, but especially so in Satsuma where the ties between lord and vassals extended over many centuries. The unbroken line of Shimazu authority coupled with the relatively isolated location of the han enabled many institutions to survive the vicissitudes from the Kamakura into the Tokugawa period.

Examples of such institutions were the kadowari seido (land distribution system) and the gōshi seido (rural samurai system). The drastic reduction of the Shimazu domain after Hideyoshi's campaign of 1587 brought about an extremely high ratio of samurai to the rest of the population, amounting to almost one to three. This high ratio of samurai population had a great deal to do with the strengthening of kadowari and gōshi systems as peasant control
systems. In addition, land suitable for rice-growing was limited in Satsuma. From early times, therefore, Satsuma had sought to supplement the han revenues, and had utilized the advantages the geographical location afforded it to engage in trade. Part of the inherent difficulty in changing agricultural procedures is that any reforms designed to increase han revenue through cooperation with merchant commoners were likely to arouse the antagonism of the rural samurai (gōshi), who by their numbers and position in the countryside, exercised a conservative force throughout the period.

The subject of this study, Shimazu Shigehide (1745-1833), was the 25th daimyo of Satsuma, holding that office from 1755 to 1787. He is a significant person to study, not only because he played an important role in Satsuma, but also because Satsuma had a vital role in the phenomenon termed Japanese "modernization." Shigehide laid the foundation for the modern transformation of Satsuma and, indirectly, of Japan. Although he retired as daimyo in 1787, he continued to dominate the government until his death in 1833. During this long period of influence he sought to institute basic reforms in Satsuma.

As present Japanese historians view it, this period of Shigehide's tenure as daimyo, the Hōreki and Temmei periods (1751-1789), was the time of "feudal crisis," a crucial, transitional period in which the commercial features of the agricultural economy, already apparent in 1700, had widened
the gulf between rich and poor among the peasants. Wealthy farmers emerged as de facto landholders as a result of their successful participation in commercial activities. At the same time, the traditional land tax as a source of revenue had reached the point of diminishing returns for the Bakufu and most han. As a consequence, the very economic foundations of the Tokugawa political system, which had been maintained by the securing of the land tax on rice yield, were weakened, and with them, the position of the "feudal" landholding ruling class.

In an attempt to offset this financial "crisis," the Bakufu and han authorities embarked on vigorous financial reforms in the hope of absorbing more wealth from the commercial agricultural sector. Their reform efforts were met by frequent large scale uprisings by the peasants. These uprisings gradually changed in nature from protests against oppressive taxes to attacks against wealthy peasant farmers as well as village officials. Satsuma experienced severe economic difficulties also, but the circumstances were different; in Satsuma there was no emergence of wealthy peasant farmers, and virtually no peasant uprisings.

As we shall see in greater detail in Chapter IV, Shigehide was not entirely successful in counterbalancing the hold of the gōshi over the countryside, but he did reassert daimyo authority by demoting the gōshi in status, and by placing his own agents in charge of projects which were created to increase han revenue. Basically, the central
thesis of this study is that Shimazu Shigehide, contrary to most previous historiography, Japanese and Western, was not an extravagant expansionist whose economic policies brought about excessive han indebtedness. He diversified and strengthened the Satsuma-han economy and established his personal leadership for over fifty years. Shigehide, moreover, was not only a strong han leader, he was also a national figure. His daughter was married to Hitotsubashi Toyochiyo who later became the eleventh Shogun Ienari. As a participant in the so-called Tanuma Age (1760-1786) when the Bakufu government itself carried out progressive policies which attempted to break with political and economic tradition, Shigehide reflected the more "liberal" atmosphere of the time at Edo. He associated with foreign scholars and showed a keen interest in Dutch studies.

In order to firmly establish and maintain his leadership in Satsuma, Shigehide had to struggle with castle-town samurai (jōkashi) for dominance in the han administration. He utilized "men of talent" personally loyal to him, a process repeated in the Shogunate and in other han. As this study will show, the cause of Satsuma's indebtedness was considerably more complex than the traditional histories allow. Since the beginning of the Tokugawa period Satsuma had suffered from financial difficulty. Despite desperate efforts made by successive daimyo of the Shimazu family to increase han revenues and to curtail expenditures, the han debts had continually mounted until it reached the enormous
figure of five million ryo by 1827. Shigehide, in fact, managed to reduce the debts for a time, until circumstances frustrated his efforts.

His enemies employed Confucian rhetoric to discredit his economic policies; commercial exploitation to the detriment of the traditional agrarian values were the stated issues, but the primary source of conflict was in the underlying political struggle for control of the han.

After Shigehide stepped aside as daimyo in favor of his son, Narinobu began organizing his own administration by recruiting and promoting men who shared his views on government policies, while forcing out officials who had served in Shigehide's administration. Most of those newly recruited by Narinobu were disciples of a Confucian scholar, Kitō Takekiyo. He was critical of officials in the han academy, and he attached importance to a Confucian writing called Kinshiroku, from which the name of the group derived. The new group adopted measures which aroused Shigehide's anger and brought about a counterreaction, namely the Kinshiroku purge of 1808. This purge resulted in the followers of Shigehide being restored to their former offices. Moreover, Shigehide reassumed his position of leadership in the han administration.

One of the key factors which enabled Satsuma to play an important role in national politics during the Bakumatsu period (1853-1868) was its ample finances. As Professor Sakai has noted, another significant factor was the wisdom
and leadership qualities of Shimazu Nariakira (daimyo, 1851-1858) who resembled his great grandfather in his "cosmopolitan outlook and enterprising spirit." There seems to be sufficient evidence that Nariakira was influenced by Shigehide when, as a young boy in residence at Edo, he was favored by Shigehide who took him with him everywhere about the city. Certainly, Nariakira continued the vigorous economic policies initiated by Shigehide in the late eighteenth century, policies which led to the Tempō Financial Reforms of 1830.

For over half a century Shigehide exercised power in Satsuma at a time just prior to more direct foreign pressures which were eventually to alter the basic policies and orientation of the nation. Although he consolidated his power within the context of another era, to the extent that Shigehide's ideas and reforms prepared Satsuma for making adjustments to new challenges, he can be called a forerunner of modern Japan.
CHAPTER I


2. I am indebted to Professor Robert K. Sakai for pointing out to me that Satsuma did not fit the description of rural leadership as portrayed in Thomas Smith's important study, *The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan*.


CHAPTER II
THE INFLUENCES THAT SHAPED SHIGEHIDE

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the political, social, and intellectual environment at Edo in which Shigehide lived, and to analyze their impact upon his life style, and his mode of thinking. It is the author's view that the understanding of these environmental circumstances surrounding Shigehide is crucial in properly assessing his programs, which are often termed "forward-looking," pragmatic, and progressive.

Both his appointment as daimyo of a large han and his residence at Edo at an impressionable age had great influence upon Shigehide's life. In 1754 Shigehide (1745-1833) accompanied his father Shigetoshi, the 24th daimyo of Satsuma, to Edo at the age of ten. With his father's death in the following year Shigehide became the 25th daimyo, but because of his age he was until 1760 under the guardianship of his grandfather, Tsugutoyo, the 22nd daimyo. During these years Shigehide could neither exercise power nor assume responsibility as daimyo. In 1761 after staying at Edo for seven years he visited his domain for the first time and, thereafter, on alternate years until his retirement in 1787. Although he retired as daimyo in the latter year, Shigehide continued to dominate then han government until his death in 1833.
The relatively weak political position of the Shimazu house in the Tokugawa feudal hierarchy aroused in Shigehide a strong desire to establish his personal power and social prestige. Being accustomed to the sophisticated Edo life, he felt ashamed of the rustic manners and customs of his people and wished to "enlighten" them by introducing aspects of the refined urban Edo culture into the "backward" society of Satsuma. Also, the intellectual climate of his times stimulated Shigehide's interest in foreign culture, and the familiarity he acquired with this culture added to his prestige.

Political Circumstances

In order to understand the position of the Shimazu house within the Tokugawa political situation, it is necessary to sketch briefly the political circumstances of the time. The status of the daimyo was ranked both by the official productive capacity (omote-daka) of their domains and by their relationship to the Tokugawa house. Satsuma was a large han with an official productive capacity of 729,000 koku, second only to the Maeda of Kaga which had 1,022,700 koku and followed by the Date of Sendai with 625,600 koku as shown in Table I.

Another important system for ranking the daimyo was that based on the relationship of the daimyo to the Tokugawa house. According to this system all daimyo, which numbered around 260, were broadly classified into
TABLE I

THE GREAT HAN OF TOKUGAWA JAPAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Daimyo</th>
<th>Province Name</th>
<th>Official Productivity (in koku)</th>
<th>Status</th>
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<tr>
<td>Maeda</td>
<td>(Kaga)</td>
<td>1,022,700</td>
<td>tozama</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shimazu</td>
<td>(Satsuma)</td>
<td>729,000</td>
<td>tozama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>(Mutsu)</td>
<td>625,600</td>
<td>tozama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokugawa</td>
<td>(Owari)</td>
<td>619,500</td>
<td>shimpan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokugawa</td>
<td>(kii)</td>
<td>555,000</td>
<td>shimpan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hosokawa</td>
<td>(Higo)</td>
<td>540,000</td>
<td>tozama</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kuroda</td>
<td>(Chikuzen)</td>
<td>520,000</td>
<td>tozama</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asano</td>
<td>(Aki)</td>
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<td>Mōri</td>
<td>(Choshu)</td>
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<td>(Hizen)</td>
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<td>Tokugawa</td>
<td>(Hitachi)</td>
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<td>shimpan</td>
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<td>Ii</td>
<td>(Omi)</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>fudai</td>
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<td>tozama</td>
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<td>(Ise)</td>
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<td>Ikeda</td>
<td>(Bizen)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
three categories: the related daimyo (shimpan), the house daimyo (fudai) and the outside daimyo (tozama). The closest to the Shogun in this elaborate hierarchy of loyalties was a group of collateral families, or related daimyo, headed by the so-called Three Houses (sanke) established by the sons of Tokugawa Ieyasu. Next in the scale of importance to the Tokugawa were the house daimyo who had sided with Ieyasu from an early date and had become his direct vassals. Finally, there were the outside daimyo who submitted to the Tokugawa at the time of or after the decisive battle of Sekigahara in 1600.

A method of indicating the position of a han in the Tokugawa feudal hierarchy was by chamber assignment at the time of the actual "attendance" of the daimyo at the Shogun's court. All daimyo were obliged to attend the Edo castle on the first and twenty-eighth of each month and on all other special occasions. There were seven categories of honorary chambers to which they were assigned a seat according to their daimyo rank as seen in Table II. The seating arrangements varied slightly from year to year, but according to those of 1792, only the Three Houses, two other related daimyo, and the largest outside daimyo, the Maeda of Kaga and the Shimazu, were assigned to the Great Corridor which symbolized the highest honorary status as daimyo.
TABLE II
THE CHAMBER ASSIGNMENT OF THE DAIMYO (1792)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Chamber</th>
<th>Related Daimyo</th>
<th>House Daimyo</th>
<th>Outside Daimyo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Corridor (ōrōka)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Hall (ōbiroma)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antechamber (tamarinoma)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hall of the Emperors (teikannoma)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hall of Geese (gannoma)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willow Hall (yanaginoma)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chrysanthemum Hall (kikunoma)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another method of defining the daimyo's feudal status was through court titles and their accompanying ranks, although they were purely honorary in nature. The Shimazu daimyo was specially privileged to reach Middle Commander of the Guards (chūjō) with Senior or Junior Fourth Ranks (shō or ju shii), along with the Matsudaira of Takamatsu, the Hoshina, the Ii and the Date families. Above the Shimazu family in terms of court titles and ranks were only the Three Houses and the Maeda. The heads of the Three Houses, Owari and Kii, rose to Great Counselor (dainagon) with Junior Second Rank (ju nii), while the head of the Mito house became Middle Counselor (chūnagon) with Junior Third Rank (ju san'i). The Maeda
had the privilege of rising to Counselor (sangi) with Junior Third Rank. Thus the hierarchical feudal status of the Shimazu house was among the highest of all the daimyo.

It is important to note, however, that the Shimazu house had not had actual political power in the Bakufu government nor social prestige among the Bakufu officials and fellow daimyo at Edo. This was due to the balance of power principle of the Tokugawa. The house daimyo (fudai), who were of relatively small income, usually filled the top positions in the Bakufu government, and they also had a voice on matters concerning national affairs. On the other hand, although they could not hope to obtain official positions within the Bakufu government, the related daimyo (shimpan) could give advice to the Shogun. Besides, a daimyo of certain related houses, the Three Houses and the Three Lords (sankyō), might himself be appointed Shogun if the Shogun died without an heir. In contrast with these two categories of daimyo, the outside daimyo (tozama) being former enemies at Sekigahara, were not only excluded from any part in the Bakufu administration but also from participating in the delivery of national issues.

This was the political position at Edo of the Shimazu house, the headship of which Shigehide succeeded to in 1755. The only way, as an outside daimyo, he could
increase his power and enhance his prestige was through the establishment of closer marriage relationships with the Tokugawa house and the Kyoto court. His first wife was the daughter of Hitotsubashi Munetada (1721-1764), one of the Three Lords (sankyō), but she died in 1769 after seven years of marriage. A year later Shigehide married Ayahime, the daughter of an influential court noble Great Counselor Kanroji Chikanaga, but she also died after five years of marriage in 1775. Although both wives died young, connections of the Shimazu house with both the Tokugawa and the court continued. Through his relation with the Hitotsubashi, Shigehide succeeded in arranging his third daughter Shigehime's engagement with Toyochiyo, the first son of Hitotsubashi Harunari (1751-1827), in 1776. Toyochiyo later became the eleventh Shogun Ienari in 1787, thus Shigehide became the father-in-law of the Shogun. Shigehide's connection with the court nobility, undoubtedly helped his promotion to an unusually high court rank for an outside daimyo, Junior Third Rank (ju san'ī) in 1831.

Shigehide not only enjoyed his enormous power and prestige at Edo but also used them skillfully to deal with the Bakufu and to dominate the han administration of Satsuma, as shall be discussed in later chapters. The following episodes illustrate his influence and prestige. It is said that a great number of important people
frequently visited his retirement palace at Takanawa in order to seek his friendship and to pay him homage. As a result, Shigehide was respectfully called the Takanawa geba, literally meaning "people getting off a horse at Takanawa". Even though Bakufu elder Matsudaira Sadanobu tried to carry out a retrenchment policy in the Kansei period (1789-1801), Shigehide took no heed of the numerous sumptuary laws issued by the Bakufu and maintained his reputation for extravagance. He was regarded as one of three self-willed daimyo, besides Ikeda Harumasa (1750-1818), the daimyo of Bizen, and Hitotsubashi Harunari, the father of Shogun Ienari.

Social Situation

Both his growing sense of status as daimyo of a large han and the sophisticated Edo life to which he became accustomed at an early age aroused a strong sense of shame in Shigehide for the coarse speech and simple manners of his people, which he felt detrimental to his prestige. It is said that, when Shigehide became daimyo, he had a strong provincial accent and was often called Satsuma Tōjin (Satsuma Chinese) or imozamurai (sweet potato samurai). Mortified, he strove to correct his local speech habits and unsophisticated manners. This sense of shame motivated him to "enlighten" his people by introducing certain aspects of the urban culture at Edo into the "backward" society of Satsuma. Satsuma's
"backwardness" is attributed to the following factors. Both geographical distance from Edo and Osaka, and Satsuma's own "seclusion" policy helped Satsuma to maintain its traditional social values. This "seclusion" policy was primarily intended to protect Satsuma's smuggling activities, and tightening border guard posts hampered the spying activities of the Bakufu agents. Satsuma's traditional social values were further fostered by educational training through autonomous discussion groups for the youth called gōju. The two major areas in the castle-town were divided into more than thirty districts. There was a discussion group in each district. A gōju was composed of two groups of youth: junior members (chigo) and senior members (nise). Junior members were those between ages of 6 or 7 and 13 or 14, while senior members were those between ages of 14 or 15 and 23 or 24, and their heads were respectively called chigo-gashira and nise-gashira.

Each gōju had its own rules and regulations. They not only encouraged training in the martial arts but also placed importance on the strict observance of Satsuma's old simple ways. They also aimed at heightening the spirit of unity among members of each gōju, while fostering rivalry with members of other discussion groups, as seen in the following gōju provisions. "If a gōju member should visit an outsider on business, he must leave
as soon as the business is over. Overstay must be avoided. The members of a certain goju must consult with each other in all matters. A goju member must avoid discourteous overstatements and strictly observe old simple ways.19 Thus, these various factors helped to perpetuate exclusivism and the maintenance of local speech habits and rural manners and customs among the people in Satsuma.

Shigehide's wish to "enlighten" his people was first revealed in a notice issued in the first month of 1772. He ordered that the Satsuma dialect and rude appearance were to be improved, for they were detrimental to the han's reputation and also concerned the han's honor. However, since it was not an easy task to make his people sophisticated in a short time, they were to be improved at first to the standard of other domains in Kyushu.20 Then, the following measures were taken. On his way back to Kagoshima in the fourth month of 1773, Shigehide admonished the rural samurai (goshi) and the peasants of Izumi district for the ugly appearance of their sidelocks.21 After his arrival at the Kagoshima castle, he issued a notice which was intended (1) to correct the local dialect of his people and to improve their country behavior and unsightly hair style, (2) to allow the people from other domains to visit the hot springs in Satsuma, (3) to admit into the country both men and women from other domains
for various vocational instructions, (4) to approve a request for the exhibition of a Buddhist image to the public, and (5) to lift the ban on fireworks and boating. Thus, Shigehide attempted to carry out his "enlightenment" policy by relaxing the so-called seclusion policy of Satsuma and opening the country to freer traffic with other domains. He hoped this would provide opportunities for his people to be in contact with people from other domains, especially from the Kyoto-Osaka area. This contact in turn might help to improve their countrified speech habits and manners.

To supplement these efforts, Shigehide attempted to introduce the more luxurious life of the townsmen at Edo, which was expressed in terms of clothing and other articles of daily use, as well as other forms of cultural entertainment. In the sixth month of 1773 he instructed his people to wear the Japanese coat (haori) throughout the year, and stipulated the hair style of women both in the Kagoshima castle-town and rural areas, and the width of their sash (obi). Shigehide permitted the performance of Japanese traditional drama (shibai) and even brought sophisticated geisha girls from the Kyoto-Osaka area. Besides these beginning efforts at improving the external appearance and physical advantages for his han, Shigehide also turned his attention to more serious matters.
Intellectual Atmosphere

The intellectual atmosphere at Edo greatly contributed to Shigehide's enthusiasm for foreign culture. His interest in and encouragement of Dutch Studies and the Chinese language not only added to his social prestige but also would forward his economic efforts.

Dutch Studies

Shigehide lived at a time of growing interest among scholars in Dutch Studies. This interest was fostered by the Bakufu elder Tanuma Okitsugu (1719-1788). The period from 1760 to 1786, when he dominated the Bakufu government, is commonly called the Tanuma Age. The Tanuma Age was characterized by the prevalence of a free spirit which was accompanied by a great progress made in all cultural spheres and an apparent break with cultural traditionalism. This age was also characterized by a subtle change in Japan's national seclusion policy. Tanuma attempted to ease the restriction placed on Japan's relations with Holland, and his efforts resulted in increased contacts between the Dutch and the Japanese.

Keeping up with the times, Shigehide showed a great interest in things Western and became acquainted with the Dutch. His first contact with them took place in 1771. Shigehide visited Nagasaki with the Bakufu's permission on his way back to Satsuma and stayed there for over twenty days. On 7/16 he arrived at Nagasaki and visited
the Chinese Factory (Tōjinkan) on the 22nd. Three days later Shigehide called at the Dutch Factory (Rankan) and inspected a Dutch ship with the Dutch interpreter, Imamura Akishige.\(^{26}\) The following account of his visit if found in the Rankan nisshì (Diary of the Dutch Factory). "A little after noon on 7/25 the lord of Satsuma came to Deshima. Mr. Feith and I went out to the gate to greet him and invited him into our room. At his request we entertained him with a Dutch luncheon, which he enjoyed, and then he rested for a while. We boarded a ship for inspection, and then we followed him to the gate to see him off."\(^{27}\) Then, four days later, on the 29th, Shigehide's chief attendant also made an inspection tour of Deshima and the ship. Shigehide left for Akune on Satsuma on 8/9. The ostensible reason given to the Bakufu for his visit to Nagasaki was that Shigehide wished to see the actual state of Nagasaki since the city was near the border of his domain, and since there had been frequent problems in recent years.\(^{28}\) Thenceforth, Shigehide continued his contacts with the Dutch. Besides Isaac Titsingh\(^ {29}\) and Philipp Franz von Siebold,\(^ {30}\) of whom further mention will be made, Shigehide had associated with a few other Dutchmen as demonstrated in the following episodes.

Around 1787 or 1788, it is said, Hendrik Casper Romberg or John Fredrik Baron van Reede tot de Parkkeler,
heads of the Dutch Factory, were asked by Shigehide for help in obtaining small rare birds. He also had them judge minerals. On 1798/6/8, Factory Head Gijsbert Hemmij suddenly died at Kakegawa on the way to Edo. It was rumored that his death was a suicide caused by the Bakufu's detection of his plot to engage in smuggling with the Satsuma daimyo through the Dutch interpreter Namura Keisuke. Hendrik Doeff, who stayed in Japan for nineteen years from 1799 to 1817, compiled a famous Dutch-Japanese dictionary which was published in 1833. It is said that the paper for its finished copy was presented by Shigehide. Factory member F. von Overmeer Fisscher, who followed Jan Cock Blomhoff to Edo in 1822, also gave an account of their close association with Shigehide in his diary of his visit to Edo.

It should be mentioned that Shigehide's meetings with the successive heads of the Dutch Factory were the occasion for the exchange of numerous gifts of foreign goods. The list of fixtures in the Satsuma residence at Edo, the Takanawa palace, included such items as paintings, ornaments for the alcove (okimono), writing materials (bungu) and musical instruments, the greater part of which were Western goods. Later, in 1827 Shigehide built a treasure house called the Shūchin Hōko in the Ōzan'en garden of his retirement palace where several thousands of curious rare articles and foreign goods were stored.
Shigehide not only collected foreign goods but also showed a keen interest in learning Dutch. According to Isaac Titsingh, "the prince of Satsuma (Shimazu Shigehide), the father-in-law of the present Shogun (Ienari), used our alphabet in his letters to express what he wished a third person not to understand." 36 Philipp Franz von Siebold also mentioned that "he (Shigehide) used Dutch occasionally during our conversation and asked the names of the things which came in his sight." 37 These statements attest to Shigehide's great interest in Dutch. Thus, his interest in novel foreign goods and his use of Dutch in conversation or correspondence may be considered as manifestations of the so-called Rampeki (to have a taste for things Dutch). However, Shigehide's interest was more than simple curiosity. His enthusiasm was for the acquisition of knowledge of Western science and its practical application.

Siebold wrote of his conversation with Shigehide on 1826/4/10 at Edo. He was impressed by Shigehide's enthusiasm for gaining knowledge of Western science.

When talk with the envoy was over, he (Shigehide) called my name and said that he was a great friend of animals and natural products and that he was anxious to learn taxidermy of four-footed animals and birds. He also told me his wish to learn the preservation method of insects. I acceded to his request.
About his conversation of 4/15 Siebold recorded:

The Old Prince (Shigehide) wished to become my student of natural history and medical science. He also asked me to compile a small book on medical treatment of incurable disease in Japan. Then, he brought a bird with him. I stuffed it immediately according to his request. He was greatly pleased. 39

In addition to his interest in taxidermy and medicine, Shigehide initiated the study of woolen fabrics in 1773. Around 1818 he began raising sheep and started wool spinning and weaving in Kagoshima. However, the undertaking did not develop because sheep did not breed well enough to provide an adequate supply of wool. 40 He is said to have established even a glass factory. 41

What is most significant was Shigehide's encouragement of the study of astronomical and calendrical science and of herbal studies for the increase of agricultural production. Because of the vital importance of astronomy and the calendar to agriculture, Satsuma had paid attention to this area for a long time and had been in contact with the office in charge of astronomical observatory (temmon-kata) of the Bakufu. When the Bakufu published the Hōreki calendar in 1747, Satsuma participated in its reform. Then, in 1765 when the Bakufu reestablished its astronomical observatory (temmondai) at Edo, Shigehide sent Mizuma Ryōjitsu to Edo for its assistance. After he returned to Satsuma in 1772, Mizuma engaged in astronomical observation. Shigehide's promotion of the study of
astronomy resulted in the establishment of an astronomical observatory called Meijikan in Kagoshima in the tenth month of 1779, which was placed under the supervision of Mizuma. This institution produced an agricultural calendar called Satsuma Koyomi. Shigehide's encouragement also led to the publication of the Temmonzu ryakusetzu (Brief Explanation of an Astronomical Chart) edited by Isonaga Magoshirō who studied at the Meijikan.

Herbal studies (honzōgaku) were another area Shigehide encouraged with a view to promoting agriculture, as stated in the preface of his Seikei zusetsu (Illustrated Explanation of Useful Agricultural Plants). His respectful consideration is to print a book for distribution throughout the country in order to encourage agriculture, to give knowledge of things, and to provide information on the effect of medicines.

The study of herbs, which developed in close relation to medical science, was originally limited to the study of medicinal herbs but, encouraged by the Bakufu policy to increase agricultural production, it came to include the study of agricultural plants after the Kyōho period (1716-1736). Thereafter, the scope of herbal studies gradually expanded into the so-called hakubutsugaku (natural history), which included the study not only of plants but also of animals, birds and minerals.

For the promotion of herbal studies Shigehide took the following measures. In 1773 Shigehide sent his
retainers Kōno Dōjō to Tamura Ransui, and both Murata Jōzaemon and Yamamoto Imosuke to Ono Ranzan for the study of plants as well as the method to refine ginseng. He invited Satō Chūryō (1762-1848), herbalist at Edo, to Satsuma in 1781 to have him gather medicinal plants there and to give lectures on them. Although Chūryō left Satsuma after staying only three years, the medicinal herbs collected by him were used for treatment at the medical school established by Shigehide in 1774. Moreover, Shigehide's promotion of herbal studies resulted in the establishment of the new herb garden at Yoshino near Kagoshima in 1779.

Shigehide's interest in herbal studies also led to the publication of important works. As early as 1771 he compiled the Ryūkyū sambutsushi (Book of Native Products of Ryukyu) with the help of Tamura Ransui (1718-1776), a Bakufu medical officer in charge of cultivating and refining ginseng. Shigehide then ordered Go Keishi of Ryukyu to compile a kind of botanical dictionary. Go Keishi collected several hundred kinds of unusual plants, the names of which were not known, from the Ryukyu islands. Sketching and describing them, he asked forty-five Chinese plant experts about their names and medicinal value through Ryukyuans who visited China from 1781 to 1785. The work was titled the Shitsumon honzō (Questions
and Answers on Botany) and it was presented to the office in charge of herb gardens (yakuen-hō) in 1786. In 1793 Shigehide ordered the compilation of the Seikei zusetsu (Illustrated Explanation of Useful Agricultural Plants). For this task he entrusted Sō Senshun, Shirao Kunihashira, Confucian scholar Mukai Tomoaki and Dutch scholar Hori Monjūrō (Aisei) who was invited from Nagasaki. A few years later the work was completed in one hundred volumes, consisting of ten parts such as agricultural affairs, crops, vegetables, medicinal herbs, trees, fish and animals. This great work was a detailed encyclopedia of agricultural plans and medicinal herbs, collected and described in a scientific manner. Unfortunately, the work was destroyed by two fires in 1806 and 1829, leaving only thirty volumes extant in printed form.

Shigehide's Promotion of the Chinese Language

Shigehide lived also at the time when the art of Chinese prose and poetry writing became gradually emphasized as an essential part of Confucian learning, producing many so-called literary Confucian scholars. This trend was first started by Ogyū Sorai (1666-1728) who rejected Chu Hsi's moralistic interpretations of the classics and established his own school. One of the characteristics of this school was that the doctrines were based on direct reading of the classical texts,
which resulted in the emphasis on the study of Chinese language and on Chinese prose and poetry. Sorai's justification was that the classics were written in Chinese and, therefore, the study of prose and poetry was an effective means to familiarize oneself with the language. This literary tradition of the Sorai school was further spread by Hattori Nankaku (1684-1759) and came to dominate the world of Confucian learning at Edo from the Kyôho period (1716-1736). It is said that even Bakufu Confucian scholars such as Shibano Ritsuzan (1734-1807), Bitô Nishû (1745-1813) and Koga Seiri (1747-1817), all of whom belonged to the Chu Hsi school, excelled in the art of Chinese prose and poetry writing.

Following the spirit of the times, Shigehide himself showed a keen interest in the study of Chinese language. His interest was further stimulated by the visit of a Ryukyu mission in 1764. It had been an important duty for the Shimazu daimyo to escort Ryukyu emissaries to Edo for ceremonial events related to the change of the Shogun or the Ryukyu king. The Ryukyuans purposely wore exotic attire for the procession, to give them the appearance of a foreign tributary mission. The reason was that it helped to impress the people that the Shogun's influence extended beyond the seas. On the other hand, Satsuma made a display of Ryukyu's subordination to Satsuma to the Bakufu and the other han.
The mission, headed by an ōji (prince) as chief envoy and an oyakata (elder) as his deputy, included about twenty lesser officials (inclusively called zuiin) and about eighty guards, attendants and carriers (inclusively called koman). Zuiin were selected from among aristocrats with literary accomplishments. It is said that Confucian scholars at Edo and in the provinces along the route to Edo welcomed them and recited Chinese prose and poetry and had scholarly discussions with them. In the 1714 mission a great Ryukyuan scholar Tei Junsoku (1663-1734), who accompanied the mission as a zuiin, discussed Confucianism with Ogyū Sorai, and he was visited by Arai Hakuseki who later published the Nantōshi (Description of the Southern Islands).

Ryukyuan scholars who accompanied the mission had a high academic standard, for they all had studied in China. China's claim to centrality is a loosely conceived universal empire was based on the assumption of the superior virtue of the emperor and the superiority of the Chinese way of life, which was based on Confucian principles. As one of the measures to maintain the cultural and moral superiority of the Confucian Way, China adopted the system of inviting students from less civilized countries. Responding to China's invitation, the Ryukyu government began sending students called kanshō in 1392. Over a period of more than four and a half centuries a total of
ninety-seven students were dispatched. These government scholarship students studied in the Imperial Academy (kuotzu chien) in Peking in the Ch'ing period usually for three years. Special tutors were appointed by the government for the benefit of the Ryukyuan students, and the education was aimed basically at the cultivation of good character and the development of literary skill. Thus, the kanshō system contributed greatly to the development of Chinese studies in Ryukyu.

As in the case of Dutch Studies Shigehide's enthusiasm was more than simple curiosity. It was also motivated by pragmatic considerations. Chinese prose and poetry as a medium of cultural transmission helped to enhance his social prestige among fellow daimyo and the Bakufu officials. A prominent Satsuma scholar, Akazaki Kaimon (1742-1805), lectured at the Bakufu's Shōheikō school from 1800 to 1802 at the recommendation of the Bakufu Confucian scholar Shibano Ritsuzan (1736-1807). Akazaki, who excelled in Chinese prose and poetry writing, took an active part in Shigehide's social life at Edo. Knowledge of Chinese was also a requisite condition for the expansion of the smuggling activities along the Satsuma coast, of which further mention will be made in Chapter VI.

Shigehide's proficiency in Chinese is shown in the compilation of his famous Nanzan zokugokō (Chinese
Conversation Textbook). Its compilation extended over forty-five years from 1767 to 1812. The work contains examples of colloquial language in the Chang-chou and Fu-chou areas collected by Shigehide through Chinese interpreters in Nagasaki, to which Chinese pronunciation and Japanese translation were added. Shigehide himself compiled the work and his academic advisors Sō Senshun revised the Japanese translation, while Ishizuka Saikō, who was familiar with even the Peking dialect, revised the Chinese pronunciation. The preface of the Nanzan zokugokō indicates that he was versed in Chinese and used it in daily conversation with some of his retainers.

Shigehide's promotional measures for the study of Chinese are demonstrated in his training of Chinese interpreters. All Chinese interpreters living in the Kagoshima castle-town and other parts of Satsuma were assigned to the Zoshikan domain school by turns. Moreover, twice a year, in spring and autumn, they were called together at the school for a meeting called "conversation in Chinese." This was to create interest and improve facility in the Chinese language. Though scheduled twice a year as a rule, such meetings were convened at every opportunity. Shigehide sent students even to Nagasaki to study the language. Although it is not certain when this practice started, Shigehide mentioned in his request of 1770 asking the Bakufu permission to visit Nagasaki
that he had been sending two or three students there each year to train them as Chinese interpreters. 63

Thus, environmental circumstances at Edo had great influence upon Shigehide's life style and his mode of thinking, which could be termed "pragmatic" and "progressive." These forward-looking elements made Shigehide a "reformer" in the sense that he moved with the wave of the times, although his social and political values were still within the framework of the Tokugawa feudal society. These personal factors were also to play a crucial role in determining the nature of his economic programs which were the most important task in his life work.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER II

1. The following biographical sketch of Shigehide was taken from Sō Senshun, "Geibō setsuroku" ("Biography of Shimazu Shigehide"), MS., (1832), 1-3.

2. Craig, Choshu in the Meiji Restoration, p. 11. The official productive capacity of Satsuma was taken from Kagoshima-ken, ed., Kagoshima-ken shi (History of Kagoshima Prefecture) (Kagoshima, 1940), II, 4. Hereafter cited as Kenshi.


7. See ibid., p. 34.


12. Loc. cit.

13. Ichiki Shīrō, "Satsuma no kuni fūzoku enkaku oyobi kokusei suii no raireki" (Manners and Customs of Satsuma and Its Political History"), Shidankai sokkiroku (Stenographic Records of the Shidankai), #34 (1896), 53.

15. Ichiki, op. cit., p. 48


19. Nise banashi kakushiki jōmoku (Rules Governing the Conduct of the Youth), as quoted by Nakamura in "Kagoshima gōjū seido no kenkyū," p. 28, and also in Kagoshima-ken kyoikushi: Meiji izen, p. 73.


23. Ibid., 850.


25. The following brief description of the Tanuma Age is based on the books cited below unless otherwise stated: Tsuji Zennosuke, Tanuma jidai (Tanuma Age) (Tokyo, 1936). Hall, Tanuma Okitsugu. Numata Jirō, Nihon zenshi (Complete History of Japan) (Tokyo, 1962), VII.

27. **Imamura Akitsune, Rangaku no so Imamura Hideshige** (Forerunner of the Dutch Studies, Imamura Hideshige) (Tokyo, 1942), p. 93.

28. **Kenshi, II, 924.**

29. **Isaac Titsingh** was four times the head of the Dutch Factory: 1779/11/29-1780/11/5; 1781/11/24-1782/10/30; 1782/11/1-1783/10/26; 1784/8/18-1784/11/25.

30. Siebold came to Japan as the physician attached to the Dutch Factory in the eighth month of 1823. He remained there for six years until the twelfth month of 1829 when he was expelled from Japan because the Bakufu discovered his connection with goods and written materials which were forbidden to be carried out of the country. During his stay in Japan Siebold devoted himself to various researches and studies which gave him a prominent place in the history of Japanology. During Siebold's visit to Edo in 1826 he was frequently visited by Shigehide and his son Okudaira Masataka, the daimyo of Nakatsu-han. Shigehide and Masataka welcomed Siebold at Ōmori (3/4; Masataka visited Siebold (3/5 and 3/6); Shigehide and Masataka paid a formal visit to Siebold (3/9); Siebold made a sick call on Shigehide's favorite concubine (3/19); Masataka visited Siebold (3/21); Shigehide visited Siebold (3/29); Masataka visited Siebold (4/1); Shigehide sent Siebold off to Ōmori (4/12). Kure Shūzō, tr., Siebold Edo sampū kikō (Diary of Siebold's Attendance at the Shogun's Court) (Tokyo, 1928), pp. 448, 458, 463, 467, 480, 523, 524, 527.

31. **Kenshi, II, 922-923,** does not specify if it was Romberg or Parkkeler. The former visited Edo to have an audience with the Shogun and stayed there from 1787/4/14 to 6/2, while the latter arrived there on 1788/4/3, and left on the 26th of the same month. Romberg became the Factory head five times: 1783/10/27-1784/8/18; 1784/11/26-1785/11/21; 1786/11/21-1787/11/30; 1788/12/1-1789/11/23; 1789/11/24-1790/11/13, while Parkkeler served as the head twice: 1785/11/22-1786/11/20; 1787/12/1-1788/11/30.

33. Kenshi, II, 923. Doeff stayed in Japan successively for fourteen years as the head of the Factory from 1803/11/14 to 1817/12/6.

34. Saitō Agu, tr., Doeff Nihon kaisō roku, Fisscher sampu kikō (Doeff's Reminiscences of Japan, Diary of Fisscher's Attendance at the Shogun's Court) (Tokyo, 1928), p. 60 (2nd group).


38. Ibid., p. 449.


44. Sō, "Geibō setsuroku," pp. 35-36.

45. Numata Jirō, Yōgaku denrai no rekishi (History of the Introduction of Western Learning) (Tokyo, 1966), p. 48. Honzōgaku in Japan had the tendency to expand into hakubutsugaku from the time when Li Shih-chên's Pên-ts'ao kang-mu (Honzō Kōmoku in Japanese) was brought to Japan from China in 1607. It described exhaustively about 1,000 plants and 1,000 animals as well as many minerals in 52 volumes, thus devoting the greater part of its chapters to natural history. Consequently, the introduction of this book into Japan aroused much interest among physicians and naturalists and encouraged them to study plants.
and animals not only for their medicinal value but also for their natural history. Nihon Gakushiin, comp., *Meiji-zen Nihon seibutsugaku shi* (History of Biology in Japan in the Pre-Meiji Period) (Tokyo, 1960), I, 118-120.

46. Sappan no bunka, p. 141.

47. *Kenshi*, II, 926. Noda Shōhei, "Sappan no bunkyō to hāngaku" ("Culture and Han-sponsored Education in Satsuma"), in *Hagaku shidān* (Historical Essays on the Han Education) (Tokyo, 1943), p. 315. The medical school was established in the second month of 1774 after the model of the Bakufu's medical school.


51. For a detailed account of the characteristics of the Ogyū Sorai school, see *Kinsei Nihon ni okeru Jukyō undo no keifu* (History of Confucian Learning in Japan in the Early Modern Period) (Tokyo, 1965), pp. 185-199.

52. See *ibid.*, pp. 205-208.


II, 669-670. In Shigehide's lifetime six such missions were sent to Edo: in 1752, 1764, 1790, 1796, 1806 and 1832.


57. In the Ch'ing period only one group of kanshō was dispatched during the reign of one king, who were allowed to accompany each Chinese investiture mission on its way back from Ryukyu.


60. Sō, "Geibō setsuroku," p. 4.

61. Chinese interpreters were classified into four ranks following the system for Nagasaki interpreters, hontsuji (interpreters), hontsuji-suke (associate interpreters), keiko tsuji (assistant interpreters) and tsuji keiko (apprentice interpreters), and they received stipends of 6 to 8 koku rince, 5 koku, 3.6 to 5 koku and 1.8 to 2.5 koku respectively. Mutō, op. cit., p. 56. Bōnotsu-chō Kyōdoshi Hensan Iinkai, Bōnotsu-chō kyōdoshi (History of Bōnotsu-cho) (Kagoshima, 1969), I, 385, claims that the rank hontsuji-suke was not found in Satsuma documents. However, those with the rank of keiko tsuji, who had many years of experience and were assigned the same duties as hontsuji before their promotion, were probably considered as hontsuji-suke.


63. See ibid., I, 381.
CHAPTER III
SHIGEHIDE AND THE CENTRAL HAN ADMINISTRATION

Now that we have some inkling of the circumstances influencing Shigehide's ambition for prestige and power at Edo, we must turn our attention to the political and social situation in Satsuma. The establishment of Shigehide's leadership in the han administration and his control over his samurai retainers in Satsuma were necessary conditions for the successful execution of his planned economic policies. To understand why it was necessary for the Shimazu daimyo to reassert his authority over his han, we first must note the unique social and political situation prevailing in Satsuma when Shigehide assumed the title of daimyo in 1755. In this chapter we shall deal with the social system and the political situation in the central han government which was located in the Kagoshima castle-town. An analysis will be made of the various changes instituted in the administrative system of the central government. These show how Shigehide placed the han bureaucracy in the castle-town under his direct control.

The Shimazu family, who traced their origins back to 1196, invaded and had conquered nearly the entire island of Kyushu by 1584 except for the province of Bungo. Three years later in the Kyushu campaign the Satsuma army
was pushed back by Toyotomi Hideyoshi to its original base of Satsuma, Ōsumi and part of Hyūga. In 1600 the Satsuma forces opposed and were defeated by Tokugawa Ieyasu at the battle of Sekigahara. However, due to skillful diplomatic negotiations on both sides, the Shimazu family was allowed to retain their southern provinces virtually intact and to maintain their large number of samurai. As of 1826 the total samurai population of Satsuma was 172,631, which was more than twelve times as many as the number allowed by the Bakufu for other han. According to the Bakufu stipulation which determined the number of samurai to be retained in proportion to the size of the han, Satsuma should have had about 14,000 samurai instead of the 170,000 they did have.² Less than 10 percent of this large number of samurai resided in the Kagoshima castle-town and the rest lived in rural areas as seen in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Entire Satsuma Samurai (A)</th>
<th>Kagoshima Samurai (B)</th>
<th>B/A x 100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1800</td>
<td>168,899</td>
<td>15,728</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1826</td>
<td>172,631</td>
<td>16,794</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The political position of the Shimazu daimyo at the time of Shigehide's appointment as head of the house in 1755 was not strong. The death of his two predecessors
at early ages was largely responsible for the daimyo's weak position. When the 23rd daimyo Munenobu died at the age of 22 in 1749 after being the daimyo for only three years, his younger brother, Shigetoshi, succeeded to the head of the Shimazu main family. Shigetoshi, the father of Shigehide, also died young at the age of 27 in the sixth month of 1755 after ruling Satsuma for only six years. With his father's death Shigehide became the 25th daimyo, but because of his age he was placed under the guardianship of his grandfather, Tsugutoyo, as mentioned in the previous chapter.

Under the circumstances, Tsugutoyo appointed his fourth son Hisasuke, the lord of Miyakonojo, to the post of senior councillor (karō) in the ninth month of 1755 and invested his third son Hisamine, the lord of Chiran, with responsibility to discuss with the senior councillors Tsugutoyo's wishes concerning all matters of han administration. Thus, Tsugutoyo and his sons formed a sort of family council through which han affairs were conducted. After the death of Tsugutoyo in 1760 this family council now headed by Hisamine continued to function as the pivot of the han administration, all of which contributed to the continued diffusion of the daimyo's power. It was not until his uncle Hisamine's death in the sixth month of 1772 that Shigehide, who was 27 years old, was finally able to begin carrying out his desired policies. That
the following measures were all initiated around the time of Hisamine's death attests to the family constraints on daimyo Shigehide's power.

Shigehide began his administrative changes in order to be in a position to initiate measures for the promotion of agriculture and to tighten the han monopoly of local products, but this aspect shall be discussed in greater detail in Chapter VI. Shigehide started his reforms with the reorganization and manipulation of the samurai status system, and the peacetime military organization called the kumi, and the central han bureaucratic offices. The institutionalization of these administrative and social systems in Satsuma had been completed in the first quarter of the 18th century during the rule of his great grandfather, Yoshitaka (daimyo, 1704-1721).

Samurai Status System

The samurai status system was an elaborate hierarchy of loyalties expressed in ranks which, viewed from the political aspect, could be used by the daimyo to strengthen his control over his retainers. Traditionally, this system enabled the daimyo to assign samurai families the power and prestige appropriate to their family rank. It also provided him with a powerful means of rewarding and punishing his retainers. Thus, standing at the apex of the feudal status hierarchy, the daimyo could manipulate the social system to enhance his own power and maintain
social order among the samurai. In this chapter we will limit our description of the samurai status system to the samurai in the castle-town.

One important category of samurai residing in the Kagoshima castle-town consisted of the so-called jōkashi, or the "castle-town samurai," who were hierarchically grouped into nine ranks with their accompanying privileges. Below the jōkashi there was another category of samurai called yoriki who were attached to various central government offices, as seen in Tables V and VI.

The highest rank in the samurai status hierarchy was the ichimon rank, which was granted to the most important Shimazu branch families established by second sons of the daimyo. They served much the same functions as the Tokugawa Houses (sanke) performed for the Shogun. Next in importance to the ichimon rank was the isshomochi ("holder of one rural district") and the isshomochi-kaku ("having the rank of one who holds one rural district") whose holdings were scattered and did not embrace one whole district. It should be noted that there was no distinction between these two family ranks in terms of whether one was above the other. These families were established by descendants of the main Shimazu line or they were families with good lineage, and senior council-lors (karō) were usually appointed from among them. Yoriai ("gathering together") and yoriai-nami (yoriai rank
### TABLE IV
SAMURAI STATUS ORGANIZATION (1826)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family rank</th>
<th>Family income</th>
<th>Number of families or persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ichimon (related families)</td>
<td>over 10,000 koku</td>
<td>4 families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isshomochi (&quot;holder of one rural district&quot;)</td>
<td>over 500 koku</td>
<td>14 families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isshomochi-kaku (isshomochi equivalent)</td>
<td>over 200 koku</td>
<td>41 families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoriai (&quot;gathering together&quot;)</td>
<td>over 500 koku</td>
<td>54 families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoriai-nami (yoriai equivalent)</td>
<td>over 100 koku</td>
<td>10 families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukaku (&quot;without rank&quot;)</td>
<td>over 100 koku</td>
<td>2 families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koban (&quot;small guards&quot;)</td>
<td>over 200 koku</td>
<td>760 families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shimban (&quot;new guards&quot;)</td>
<td>over 100 koku</td>
<td>24 families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koshogumi (&quot;small name guards&quot;)</td>
<td>over 30 koku</td>
<td>3,904 families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goshi</strong> (&quot;rural samurai&quot;)</td>
<td>usually less than 50 koku</td>
<td>103,139 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shiryoshi</strong> (subretainers of powerful vassals of the han lord)</td>
<td>varies depending on their lords' family rank</td>
<td>47,214 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yoriki</strong> (samurai attached to various central han bureaus and offices)</td>
<td>less than 30 koku</td>
<td>figures not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ashigaru</strong> (footmen or foot-soldiers)</td>
<td>approximately 10 koku</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Those with these nine ranks were called the jokashi or the "castle-town samurai." As of 1826, they numbered 17,278 including their families and those stationed at Edo, Kyoto and Osaka.)

(Those with these ranks may be classified as "quasi-samurai")
TABLE V
STATUS ORGANIZATION OF SAMURAI IN THE
KAGOSHIMA CASTLE-TOWN (1826)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family rank</th>
<th>Ichimon</th>
<th>Isshonomochi-kaku</th>
<th>Yorai</th>
<th>Yorai-nami</th>
<th>Koban</th>
<th>Shimban</th>
<th>Koshōgumi</th>
<th>Yoriki</th>
<th>Ashigaru</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jōkashi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jōkashi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(&quot;Castle-town samurai&quot;)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(&quot;Castle-town samurai&quot;)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;quasi-samurai&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Daishimbin (&quot;upper-class samurai&quot;)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shoshi (&quot;lower-class samurai&quot;)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
equivalent) families were established by second or third sons of the ichimon or the isshomochi, and captains of the guard units (kimi gashira) and captains of the castle guards (bangashira) were usually appointed from among these families. It is interesting to note the origin of the family rank of yoriai. The families of yoriai was so called, because they could not be called families of great status and yet were too high in their status to be included in various guard (ban) ranks. The koban ("small guards") were those who were authorized to commute on horseback. The shimban ("new guards") rank had been established in 1713 by daimyo Yoshitaka between the ranks of koban and ōban ("large guards"), promoting seventeen ōban families to this rank. The ōban, called later koshōgumi, literally meaning "small name" guards, was the largest in number and the lowest in the scale of the "castle-town samurai" (jōkashi).

Although they lived in the Kagoshima castle-town, there were so-called quasi-samurai who were attached to various han bureaus and offices but were not called "castle-town samurai" (jōkashi). These were the yoriki. They were called "enlisted samurai" (shamenshi) or zatsukishi, literally meaning the samurai attached to various offices, but this designation was changed to yoriki, or "group power" in 1780, eliminating the word shi (samurai) although they were still considered
"samurai." The change in name of this category of samurai was Shigehide's way of strengthening the status hierarchy as shall be demonstrated later in this section.

The hierarchical importance of each family rank was indicated by the privileges which accompanied the rank. The greatest privilege, dokurei, was granted to the four families of ichimon rank and to five families selected from the rank of isshomochi. This privilege was the prerogative of individual audience with the daimyo during two important ceremonies, one at the beginning of the year and the other on the first day of the eighth month.

Chakuza, the second greatest privilege, was allotted to the remaining "families of great status" (daishimbun): isshomochi, isshomochi-kaku, yoriai, and yoriai-nami. Chakuza was the privilege of having an assigned seat in the chamber when the daimyo was greeted on those two ceremonial days. The preeminence attached to all "castle-town samurai" (jōkashi) was demonstrated in their relationship to the daimyo, emphasized by the fact that they had to report to him their plans for marriage or adoption, while the yoriki were not required to report such events to the daimyo.

Although some distinctions between jōkashi and yoriki were made before Shigehide's tenure as daimyo, Shigehide increased the distinctions between them by differentiating certain ranks within the jōkashi.
On 1785/7/16, he ordered that those with the rank of yoriai-nami and higher should not indiscriminately associate with those with the rank of yoriki and lower in order to maintain the former's prestige.21 A year later, on 1786/7/25, the families above the rank of yoriai-nami were exclusively designated as the "families of great status" (daishimbun) or upper class samurai, although their family ranks remained as before.22 This stipulation resulted in the clear division of the "castle-town samurai" (jōkashi) into two broad classes: the upper and the lower. The latter was called the "various samurai" (shoshi) or "ordinary samurai (hirazamurai), which included the families of guard (ban) rank: koban, shimban, and koshōgumi, formerly called ōban.

It may be suggested that Shigehide's efforts to further stratify the status system by assigning greater prestige to those with higher family ranks was politically motivated, for administrative and consequently political support for the daimyo came mainly from the so-called upper-class samurai, yoriai-nami and above, who were customarily appointed to important han posts. The issshomochi and the issshomochi-kaku started their administrative careers from the post of captain of the koshōgumi guards (koshōgumi bangashira), and could become senior councillor (karō).23 Those with the yoriai and the
yorai-nami ranks were usually appointed to various posts between the commander of the "large guards" (ōban gashira) and the personal attendant of the daimyo (sobayaku), but they could hope to be promoted to senior councillor.24

Although family ranks and their accompanying privileges closely conformed to the hereditary principle, the granting or withholding of these privileges were within the power of the daimyo. Occasionally, samurai with lower family positions would be elevated to higher ranks by virtue of their appointment to higher han posts. On the other hand, those with higher ranks could be demoted by incurring the daimyo's displeasure. Viewed in this light, the samurai status system was a convenient instrument of political control for the daimyo.

Shigehide utilized the status system for this purpose, elevating in rank men who were personally loyal to him. He justified the promotion of men to higher rank by a regulation issued by his great grandfather Yoshitaka (daimyo, 1704-1721) on 1713/3/15. This regulation stipulated that, when a lower class samurai served the office of the captain of the koshōgumi guards (koshōgumi bangashira) or higher, he would be elevated to the rank of yoriai for his lifetime. If he were appointed to the post of grand overseer (ōmetsuke) and higher, his family rank would be changed to permanent yoriai.25 On the basis of this stipulation Shigehide raised both Akamatsu Norimasa
and Nikaido Ikutatsu to the rank of yoriai, when he appointed them to grand overseers (ōmetsuke) in 1770/7. Miyanohara Michinao and Machida Hisatsura were also elevated to yoriai in 1770/11 and 1772/6 respectively. Ichida Kageyu, who became senior councillor in 1786/12, was elevated to the unusually high rank of isshomochi in 1789/11. There was a case of demotion in family rank caused by Shigehide's anger. Senior councillor Chichibu Sueyasu was demoted from the rank of yoriai to the koban rank on 1808/5/12 in the incident called Kinshiroku purge, which will be discussed in Chapter VII.

Kumi System

Another means of consolidating Shigehide's power was through the utilization of the kumi system. Though originally military in nature, due to the long-lasting peace, the kumi (units) mainly functioned as a means of samurai control throughout the Tokugawa period. It was through the kumi units that orders and instructions concerning the maintenance of samurai discipline were transmitted.

The role of the kumi as a means of samurai control and discipline is revealed in the following notice issued to captains of units (kumigashira) on 1642/12/13.

If there are in the kumi those who are subversive or disloyal, who feign illness or neglect their duties, and who believe in Christianity or the Ikkō Sect of Buddhism,
they shall be immediately reported to the authorities. When a dispute or quarrel occurs among the kumi members, it shall be quickly brought to a peaceful settlement after consultation. The kumi gashira shall instruct the kumi members about their attitude and other matters concerning their service to the daimyo. If the samurai morale of the kumi members becomes lax, the kumi gashira shall be held responsible. A suit or grievance shall not be appealed directly to the authorities without first consulting with the kumi gashira.

Such notices were reissued from time to time. The most important of all these notices was the exhortation called Maisaku jōgaki, which was first issued by daimyo Yoshitaka in 1706 and issued anew with each change of daimyo. This exhortation was read to all kumi members by their captains. It included instructions to be observed by all samurai, such as the observance of the Bakufu as well as Shimazu laws, cultivation of a sense of loyalty and filial piety and admonition against corrupt morals.

Since 1708 all samurai residing in the castle-town were grouped into seven kumi units. The first, or karō (senior councillor), unit was composed of the so-called upper class samurai, the yoriai-nami rank and higher, with a senior councillor as its commander. The other six regular units consisted of the lower-class samurai with ranks of koban ("small guards"), shimban ("new guards"), koshōgumi ("small name guards") and a certain number of yoriki (samurai attached to various offices). These six regular units were placed under the command of
captains of the units (kumi gashira), who were usually appointed from among those with the rank of yoriai, one of the upper-class samurai. Each unit was further divided into ten or eleven smaller units.

The kumi, as a samurai "disciplinary" system, was reorganized by Shigehide with a view to fixing a hierarchy within the system. In the eleventh month of 1786 the koban and the shimban were removed from the regular six units, and they were placed under the command of a junior elder (waka toshiyori) and under a newly created post, the captain of the "large guards" (ōban gashira), respectively. In the following year the yoriki were also excluded from the regular six units and placed under the control of the heads of various offices to which they were attached. Thus, the regular six kumi now came to consist of only those with the koshōgumi rank, the lowest rank of the "castle-town samurai" (jōkashi), and they remained under the command of captains of the units (kumi gashira) which had been changed in name to koshōgumi bangashira (captains of the koshōgumi guards) in 1786/7, as seen in Table VI.

The hierarchy thus fixed by Shigehide in the kumi system corresponded more closely to the distinctions he was making in the samurai status. It may be suggested, therefore, that the deepening of the divisions within samurai especially at middle levels was intended to
reinforce the status hierarchy. More importantly, the institutionalizing of the hierarchy in the kumi system meant that Shigehide's disciplinary orders were not only transmitted to individual samurai but also came to bind each family group within a particular rank. Thus, the stratification of the kumi system enabled Shigehide to exercise more effective control over each retainer.

Administrative System

In former times, when a strong-willed daimyo attempted to carry out his planned policies, he first would try to place the han bureaucratic administration under his direct control. As seen in Table VII, in Satsuma there were three main administrative offices in the central han bureaucracy headed by a senior councillor or a group of senior councillors. These were the Office of the Exterior (omotegata), the Office of the Interior (okugakari) and the Office of Finances (katteho). The Office of the Exterior dealt with general official business of the han, while the Office of the Interior managed the administrative and personal matters of the daimyo. The Office of Finances was charged with all aspects of financial matters. These three offices were clearly divided in terms of their authority and jurisdiction. 35

Around the time of the death of his uncle Hisamine in 1772, Shigehide started consolidating his control over
TABLE VI
REORGANIZATION OF THE KUMI SYSTEM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commanders</th>
<th>Number of units</th>
<th>Constituent members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karō (senior councillor)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>upper-class samurai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-60 attendants (tsumoti)*</td>
<td></td>
<td>(yoriai-nami rank and higher)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 koku office salary</td>
<td></td>
<td>(96 persons**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waka toshiyori (junior councillor)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Koban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-35 attendants (tsumoti)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(670 persons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(tsumoti), 300 koku office salary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ōban gashira (captain of the &quot;Targe guards&quot;)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Shimban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 attendants (tsumori)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(221 persons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180 koku office salary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koshōgumi bangashira (cap-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tains of the koshōgumi guards)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Koshōgumi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 attendants (tsumori)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(3,177 persons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180 koku office salary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashiranin (heads of various han offices)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yoriki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(tsumori and office salary vary)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monogashira (commissioners of arms)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ashigaru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 attendants (tsumori)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(foot-soldiers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73 hyo office salary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Tsumori is the number of attendants based on travelling allowance, indicating the importance of the post.
** Figures are those in the Bunsei period (1818-1830).

Note: Han, 秀吉, and samurai, 信長, are the names for the periods and the individuals, respectively, who are involved in the reorganization of the kumi system.
the vital han offices of grand overseer (ōmetsuke) and senior councillor (karō) as seen in Table VIII. Grand overseers, who had been about four in number, were increased to six by 1774, and they all were appointed by Shigehide from 1769 to 1774. On the other hand, five senior councillors were recruited by him from 1769 to 1776. By the latter date there remained only two karō who had been appointed by Shigehide's uncle Hisamine: Shimazu Hisakane (1761/8/4-1793/5/19) and Shimazu Hisatomo (1765/7-1788/5). What is more significant was that the two senior councillors promoted by Shigehide were assigned to important offices: Yamaoka Hisazumi to the "Office of Prosperity" (han'eiho) in the fifth month of 1773, which directed and supervised the "enlightenment" policy, and Akamatsu Norimasa to the Office of Finances (kattehō) in the seventh month of 1775.

It is important to note that Shigehide appointed to these posts "men of talent" with lower family rank. Akamatsu, Nikaidō, Machida and Miyanohara were elevated to yorioi in rank upon their appointment to the grand overseer equivalent (ōmetsuke-kaku), as discussed earlier in the section on the status system. Shigehide's desire to utilize "men of talent" is also evidenced in the following notice. The official notice, which was issued to magistrates and heads of various units on 1772/9/8, stated that they had to carefully select "men of talent"
TABLE VII
MAJOR GOVERNMENT OFFICES

OFFICE OF THE EXTERIOR (OMOTEGATA)

- Grand overseers (Ometsuke)
- Commander of the "large guards" (Eban gashira)
- Magistrates of temples and shrines (Jisha bugyo)
- Captains of the koshogumi guard units (Koshogumi bangashira)
- Stewards (yonin)
- City magistrates (Machi bugyo)
- Commissioners of arms (Monogashira)
- Superintendents of roads (Michi bugyo)
- Inspectors (Metsuke)
- Investigators (Saikyo gakari)

OFFICE OF THE INTERIOR (OKUGAKARI)

- Personal steward of the daimyo (Soba yonin)
- Personal attendants of the daimyo (Sobayaku)
- Superintendents of culinary affairs (Nando bugyo)
- Stewards of the Great Interior (Hiroshiki yonin)
- Professor (Kyju)
- Superintendents of documents (Kiroku bugyo)
- Superintendents of herb gardens (Yakuen bugyo)

OFFICE OF FINANCES (KATHEHO)

- Magistrates of accounting (Kanjo bugyo)
- Maritime magistrates (Funa bugyo)
- Superintendents of construction (Sakushi bugyo)
- Superintendents of rice revenue (Taka bugyo)
- Superintendents of han property (Mono bugyo)
- Superintendents of forests (Yama bugyo)
- Agricultural magistrates (Kori bugyo)
- Superintendents of gold mines (Kinzan bugyo)
TABLE VIII. PERSONNEL APPOINTMENTS BY SHIGEHIDE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Senior Councillors (karō)</th>
<th>(Dates)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Komatsu Seika</td>
<td>(1769/12/31-1781/5/18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiire Hisatomi</td>
<td>(1769/12/31-1789/8/29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamaoka Hisazumi</td>
<td>(1771/8/28-1780/1/29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akamatsu Norimasa</td>
<td>(1775/7/28-1779/8/15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikaidō Ikukatsu</td>
<td>(1776/10/11-1790/9/15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grand Overseers (ōmetsuke)</th>
<th>(Dates)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shimazu Hisakazu</td>
<td>(1769/12/18-1777)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niiro Hisatomo</td>
<td>(1771/2/25-1782/3/31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akamatsu Norimasa</td>
<td>(1773/5/15-1775/7/27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikaidō Ikukatsu</td>
<td>(1773/5/15-1776/10/10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ise Sadatomo</td>
<td>(1773/5/28-1780/10/10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machida Hisatsura</td>
<td>(1774/9-1787/2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miyanohara Michinao</td>
<td>(1778/1-1782/1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

for more responsible tasks. By "men of talent" was actually meant those who would faithfully carry out the daimyo's plans, as indicated in the aims of the Ōshikan domain school which was established in the eighth month of 1773. Shigehide's appointment of the "men of talent" with lower rank to important han posts helped to arouse a strong sense of personal loyalty to him, because they were thus indebted to Shigehide. Gradually the offices of grand overseer and finances came under his direct control through such shifts of personnel.

In the second phase, from 1778 to 1786, Shigehide expanded the authority invested in the Office of the Interior (okugakari), thereby establishing its dominant position over both the Office of Exterior (omotegata) and the Office of Finances (kattehō). The first step towards
this goal was to vest greater inspection power in personal stewards of the daimyo (soba yōnin) and with personal attendants of the daimyo (sobayaku). According to the two notices issued in the seventh and the eighth months of 1778, these officials were assigned the duty to visit various government offices as the mokudai, literally meaning the substitute for the daimyo's eyes. The daimyo's political control was increased further by the creation of the full-time mokudai post called soba metsuke (personal inspector of the daimyo) in the tenth month of 1786. He closely watched activities not only in the Office of the Interior but also in other offices.

The most important step taken to increase the authority of the Office of the Interior (okugakari), however, was the establishment of the sobazume, or the liaison official of the daimyo, in the first month of 1785. This position ranked between the senior councillor (karō) and the junior elder (waka toshiyori), and it carried a large office salary of 500 koku. The importance attached to this post is evident when it is compared with the salaries of the so-called three highest government posts: the senior councillor, the junior elder, and the grand overseer. The salaries of these posts were: 1,000, 300, and 200 koku respectively.

Grand overseer (ōmetsuke), Kawakami Tanomo, was appointed to the post in the second month of 1785. In
addition to his duty as an intermediary between the daimyo and senior councillors, Kawakami was ordered to work in the Office of the Exterior (omotegata) when the daimyo was away at Edo in his alternate attendance (sankin kōtai) duty. While the daimyo stayed in Kagoshima in alternate years, Kawakami was stationed in the Office of Finances (kattehō). Thus, the creation of this post reveals Shigehide's intention to reflect his wishes directly on the han administration. However, upon Kawakami's promotion to senior councillor for Finances in the fifth month of 1786, this sobazume post was abolished. Instead, a senior councillor in charge of the Office of the Interior was empowered with absolute authority over the han administration as seen in the following discussion on the third and final stage, from 1786 to 1788, of Shigehide's administrative reform.

When Shigehide retired as daimyo on 1787/1/29, inspectors accompanying the daimyo procession (tomo metsuke) were concurrently assigned the additional post of inkyo-zuki soba metsuke, or personal inspector of the retired daimyo. It may be suggested that Shigehide wished to use tomo metsuke as his "eyes," when he no longer was obliged to spend alternative years in Satsuma. What is most significant in this last stage of administrative reform was the appointment of Ichida Kageyu to senior councillor on 1786/12/13. He was the brother-in-law of
Shigehide's favorite concubine, Tose, who was the real mother of the Shogun's wife Shigehime. Ichida served in this capacity from 1786 to 1789 and again from 1792 to 1808; meanwhile, he was elevated to the unusually high rank of *isshomochi* in 1789 as mentioned earlier, thus revealing Shigehide's absolute confidence in Ichida. Upon Shigehide's retirement in the first month of 1787, Ichida was put in charge of the Office of the Interior (*okugakari*) and given considerable authority. In addition to his duties in the daimyo's personal administration, he dealt with affairs concerning the Office of the Exterior (*omotegata*). He was also granted the great privilege of seeing Shigehide personally without the intermediation of the *sobayaku*. In the ninth month of 1788 Ichida was even sent to Osaka by the retired daimyo Shigehide to arrange for a loan of money, thus in actuality Ichida came to control all three main offices under the direction of Shigehide. It should be noted that when Shigehide retired as daimyo he and Ichida stayed at Edo from where they conducted the affairs of Satsuma, a circumstance which partially explains later opposition to their rule from officials who lived in Satsuma. On this split in the *han* bureaucracy leading to the bitter political struggle, further mention will be made in Chapter VII.

As demonstrated in this chapter, Shigehide effected changes in the *han* bureaucratic mechanism in order to
establish his leadership in the han administration. The administrative reform was supplemented by his efforts to tighten his political as well as social control over his retainers through the political use of the samurai status system and the kumi. Shigehide's power thus consolidated in the Kagoshima castle-town was one of the prerequisites needed to deal with the financial crisis in Satsuma. Another aspect of his maintaining control concerned local administration in the Satsuma countryside, the subject of the following chapter.
CHAPTER III

The following brief account of Satsuma history is mainly based on Kenshi, I-II.


Kagoshima-shi Shi Hensan Iinkai, Kagoshima-shi Shi (History of Kagoshima City) (Kagoshima, 1969), I, 337.


See ibid., p. 56.

In the fifth month of 1738 the title of ichimon was established as a family status, granting the Kajiki and Tarumi families the ichimon family rank. Then, in the ninth month of the same year the Echizen family was included in this status, and in the fifth month of 1748 the Imaizumi was given ichimon rank. Hampton Kenkyūkai, ed., Hampton: Kagoshima-han (Collected Institutes of the Han: Kagoshima-han) (Tokyo, 1969), I, 880-881. Hereafter cited as Hampton Kagoshima.

Ichimon families constituted the family council for the daimyo to deliberate matters of succession, marriage, or other important domestic issues, and they could provide candidates to assume the leadership of the han.


For the definition of these two family ranks, see Sakai, "Consolidation of Power in Satsuma-han," p. 134.

Kenshi, II, 21.
11. See ibid., II, 22.


13. They had been originally called the jōbashū (samurai on horseback) or hira kiba, but in 1704 their designation was changed to uma mawari (lit., making rounds on horse back). Later, those who were stationed at Edo were called the uma mawari, while those in Satsuma had come to be called the koban. However, they were inclusively designated as koban in the third month of 1706. *Ibid.*, I, 889-890. *Kenshi*, II, 23.


16. *Kenshi*, II, 26-27. In the castle-town there was another group of "quasi-samurai", the ashigaru (foot-soldier). The ashigaru, who ranked below the yoriki in their status, performed various menial services for the han and for samurai of higher status.

17. Four families with dokurei status from the isshomochi were established by third sons of the main Shimazu line, while the fifth, the lord of Tanegashima, was closely allied to the daimyo by marriage. *Kenshi*, II, 19-22.


26. Ibid., I, 857.


28. In time of war the samurai in the castle-town were expected to fight under the command of the captain of the unit to which they belonged. According to the Sappan kyūdenshū (Collection of Traditions in Satsuma-han), Shimazu Mitsuhis (daimyo, 1638-1687) is credited with initiating the kumi, or unit, system in the Kagoshima castle-town. "Mitsuhis stayed overnight in Izumi district on his way back to Kagoshima and expressed his wish to see the samurai dance on the following day. Next morning a large number of samurai gathered and danced before him. The estate manager (jito) of Izumi district told Mitsuhis that not only samurai in the administrative seat but also all samurai in the district came together. He also explained that this quick gathering was made possible by the kumi system. All samurai in the district were grouped into six units (kumi). Each kumi head was responsible for quickly transmitting words to his unit members in case of emergency. Thereupon, Mitsuhis adopted this system in the Kagoshima castle-town." Quoted in Kagoshima-shi shi, I, 357.

29. Kenshi, II, 29. The Kagoshima castle-town was divided into two major areas: the upper and the lower. These were further subdivided into four and two districts respectively. Members of each of the six regular units were composed of those who resided in the same district.

30. Hamposhū Kagoshima, II, 725. The notice issued to kumi members on the same day stressed obedience to their captains. Loc. cit.

31. For the Maisaku jōgaki issued on 1755/8/15, see Hamposhū Kagoshima, I, 8-9.


33. Hamposhū Kagoshima, II, 710, 719.

34. Kenshi, II, 29.


37. This table was compiled from data in the Hampōshū Kagoshima, II, 698-776. Kenshi, II, 98-135.


40. Sappan seiyōroku, pp. 56, 68.

41. Hampōshū Kagoshima, II, 564.

42. Ibid., II, 331.

43. Ibid., II, 729-730.

44. Ibid., II, 762.

45. Ibid., II, 707-708.


47. Ibid., II, 119.

48. Sappan seiyōroku, p. 56.

49. Hampōshū Kagoshima, I, 857.

50. Ibid., II, 704.

51. Ibid., I, 90.
Because the greater part of the han income came from agricultural produce, the productivity of the rural districts was extremely important. As was mentioned in Chapter III, Satsuma society had certain characteristics which differentiated it from other han. In particular, the gōshi seido (rural samurai system) and the kaowari seido (land distribution system) exercised certain traditional constraints upon the Satsuma daimyo. An analysis of these two systems is imperative if we are to understand the extent of peasant control in Satsuma, and the nature of the difficulties Shigehide faced in attempting agricultural reform.

**Description and Functions of the Gōshi System**

As noted in the previous chapter, 155,837 samurai, over 90 percent of the total samurai population, lived in tojō supporting themselves in peace time by engaging in part-time farming and participating in the local administration. The term tojō which literally means "outer castles" actually refers to rural districts, and in 1784 Shigehide designated the tojō as gō (rural districts). The gō were classified into two types of districts,
jitōsho and shiryō. The former numbered 92, while the latter were 21 in number. The jitōsho were the districts directly administered by the daimyo through so-called jitō (estate managers). Shiryō were private domains granted by the daimyo to influential Shimazu retainers with ichimon and isshomochi ranks. Private lords (shiryōshu) were almost autonomous in that they exercised virtually independent control over their lands, assessing taxes and supporting their own retainers. Thus, the income from their salary lands (kyūchi taka) were spent for their personal and administrative expenses and did not augment the daimyo's income. These private lords (shiryōshu) were required to reside in the Kagoshima castle-town away from their territories in the same manner as the Bakufu controlled the daimyo. It should be noted, however, that they posed no threat to the Shimazu daimyo by the time of Shigehide. The power of powerful private lords had been gradually diminished by Shimazu Iehisa (daimyo, 1602-1638) through a series of assassinations and the confiscation of their lands. Private domains thus confiscated by the daimyo were awarded to his relatives and loyal retainers. It is recorded that, by the 18th century, twelve of the twenty shiryōshu had the Shimazu surname and most of the remainder were related to the daimyo by marriage.
In 1826 there were 573,828 people residing in the 113 rural districts, both jitōsho and shiryō. These people lived in four main types of communities: the samurai community called fumoto, agrarian villages (mura), rural merchant towns (nomachi), and fishing villages (ura-hama). In addition, there were other small settlements of teramonzen commoners, Korean descendants (kika Chōsenjin) and outcastes (hinin or eta). The teramonzen commoners cultivated land owned by temples and sold goods during fairs and religious festivities. The Korean descendants were engaged in the production of prized Satsuma pottery, and the eta performed certain mean tasks such as butchery and leather work. The functions of the people of these small settlements, however, lie outside the scope of the present study.

The tojō (outer castles) or gōshi (rural samurai) system functioned in three important ways. Its first function was military, and in order to fulfill this role the majority of samurai, both gōshi and retainers of private lords were made to reside in samurai communities, fumoto, usually located by the site of former castles or forts, around which agrarian villages, rural merchant towns and fishing villages lay scattered. These strategically located fumoto commanded every avenue of approach into Satsuma, thus rendering the han virtually impenetrable. That military defense was an essential
role of this elaborate system was also obvious in the original name, outer castles (tojō).  

Secondly, the tojō or gōshi system functioned as a means of controlling trade, investigating travelers and watching for spies and subversives by establishing numerous border guard posts and port inspection stations in the outer castles bordering on other domains or facing the sea. In actuality this system also served to enforce Satsuma's own "seclusion" policy. The effect of this policy was to help Satsuma maintain its conservative social values virtually unaffected as well as to facilitate its smuggling activities.

The third function of the tojō or gōshi system was that it was used for local control. In this system samurai from the fumoto directly controlled the commoners. This local administrative function was of great significance in terms of the han economy, for it would hamper Shigehide's early economic efforts, as shall be discussed in the next chapter. It is this third function of the gōshi seido (rural samura system), the control of local administration, which will be the focus of this chapter.

Description of Gō (Rural Districts) and Mura (Agrarian Villages) Administrative Officials

Our description of the rural administrative system will be limited to the jitōsho under the direct control
of the daimyo, for the han income mainly derived from the jitōsho and Shigehide's agricultural reforms were carried out in these districts. The highest official in a rural district was the jitō (estate manager), who was appointed by the central han government and who resided in Kagoshima. Most of the Jitō posts were held concurrently by commander of the "large guards" (ōban gashira), captains of the koshōgumi guard units (koshōgumi bangashira), or steward (yōnin). However, those of strategically located go (rural districts) bordering on other domains were concurrently senior councillors (karō). The jitō made inspection tours of their district only once every few years, thus leaving overall local administration almost entirely to the local officials who were all appointed from among the gōshi. He distributed his responsibilities among the so-called "three offices of the district" (tokoro san'yaku), namely the gōshi elders (gōshi toshiyori), group captains (kumi gashira), and censors (yokome). The gōshi toshiyori (elders) formed a council and were charged with the overall administration of a district. The group captains (kumi gashira) each governed one of several military units (kumi) into which all the rural samurai in a district were grouped, while the censors (yokome) carried out police and prosecution functions. These local officials periodically visited Kagoshima to consult with and report to the jitō.
Within the different types of communities located in a ご (district), there was no such thing as self-government for the commoners of Satsuma. In other han, the village and rural town officials were selected from among the common people, since, with a few exceptions, all the samurai resided in the one main castle-town of each han and they were much less in number. In Satsuma, on the other hand, heads of communities were appointed from among the rural samurai (黒日) as seen in Table IX.

In agrarian communities (村) resided 319,432 persons, well over half of the total population in rural Satsuma. These were the communities which most directly affected the well-being of the han which relied to a large extent on agricultural produce. Consequently, our study of the administrative system of rural districts will be limited to the agrarian communities. Under the 黒日 elders there were local officials who were in charge of specific aspects of agricultural affairs. They included agricultural promoters (垂革新), promoters for wax trees and paper mulberry (毛竹模范) and promoters for reclaimed rice fields and irrigation ditches (水道模范). Local officials for agricultural administration in a ご (rural district) are diagrammed below. This direct supervision of peasants by the 黒日 (rural samurai) was further reinforced by inspection tours by the central han government officials.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of communities according to functional classifications</th>
<th>Administrative offices</th>
<th>Status and function of residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fumoto</strong> (samurai community)</td>
<td>Head Kumi-gashira</td>
<td>Gōshī (rural samurai)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assistant Head Kogumi-gashira (captains of sub-units)</td>
<td>(1) Administration and farming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>samurai</td>
<td>(2) Military duty. Relatively light rice tax for those who engage in farming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mura</strong> (agrarian village)</td>
<td>Head Shōya</td>
<td>Hyakushō (peasants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assistant Head Nanushi</td>
<td>(1) Farming. (2) Rice tax. Agricultural corvée. Corvée for porterage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>samurai</td>
<td>commoner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ura-hama</strong> (Fishing village)</td>
<td>Head Urayaku</td>
<td>Ura-nin (Fishermen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assistant Head Benzashi or Bettō</td>
<td>(1) Fishing. (2) Maritime corvée. Special tax on commerce for some fishermen. Tax for ships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>samurai</td>
<td>commoner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nomachi</strong> (rural town)</td>
<td>Head Bettō or Machiyaku</td>
<td>Nomachinin (rural townsmen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assistant Head Toshigōji or ko bettō</td>
<td>(1) Commerce (2) Porterage corvée. Special tax on commerce (for some rural townsmen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>samurai</td>
<td>commoner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Seventeen or eighteen agricultural magistrates (kōri bugyō) each made occasional rounds of several districts to inspect all aspects of agricultural affairs. Under their direction about thirty agricultural inspectors (jikata kensha) were periodically sent out to supervise specific aspects of farming process. The agricultural inspectors called uchiokoshi kensha, who set out for inspection tours before the setting-in of spring, supervised the process of plowing and soaking seed rice in water, while the shitsuke kusatori inspectors closely watched sowing and rice-transplantation. The toriosame kiwame inspectors left the Kagoshima castle-town in early autumn to direct harvesting and hulling of rice and to supervise the payment of rice tax. On the other hand, the mishin kiwame inspectors made the rounds to demand unpaid rice tax.
Description of a Kado and the Kadowari Seido

(Land Distribution System)

Now that we have some idea of the official administrative structure operating upon the agricultural village (mura), we must examine the structure of the mura itself. Peasants in a village (mura) were grouped into several units called hōgiri, which in turn was subdivided into several groups called kado. A kado, in turn, consisted of several kabu or peasant family units as seen in Table X. It is important to note that a kado was the basic unit for local administration and rice and labor taxes in Satsuma; whereas in other han, the basic unit for administrative and tax purposes was the village (mura). This local administrative system in Satsuma enabled the han government to exercise much stricter control over peasants.

In order to demonstrate just how restrictive Satsuma's samurai control over the peasantry was, we now turn our attention to the kado and the kadowari seido (land distribution system). The kado was the basic unit for rice tax collection and labor services. Generally, a kado was composed of 4 or 5 kabu, or peasant family units, although the number of kabu ranged from 1 to 22 per kado. One kabu (peasant family unit) was designated as the head, or myōzu, and the rest were termed nago. The myōzu, as head of the kado, received a larger portion...
**Kōri bugyō**
(agricultural magistrates)

- Uchiokoshi kensha (inspectors for plowing)
- Shitsuke kusatori kensha (inspectors for sowing and rice-transplantation)
- Toriosame kiwame kensha (inspectors for harvesting and hulling of rice)
- Mishin kiwame kensha (inspectors for unpaid rice tax)

**TABLE X**
ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM OF AN AGRARIAN VILLAGE

---

[Shōya]

- Mura (village)
- Mura
- Mura

Headed by samurai

Headed by peasants

[Myōzu]

- Kado
- Kado
- Kado

[kabu]

[nago]

[ ] indicates the head
of land and was required a lesser amount of corvée labor than the nago. According to the notice issued at the time of the Kyōho neiken (domestic land survey) of 1772-1726, the myōzu was allotted one-fifth more land than the nago.

There were two types of kado (rice tax and corvée collection units): kurairi kado and kyūchi kado. The kurairi kado was responsible for the cultivation of land which directly belonged to the daimyo, the yield from which went directly into the han granaries. On the other hand, the kyūchi kado was assigned the cultivation of salary land granted to the samurai and to temples and shrines. Such land was called kyūchi or chigyōchi and its yield went directly to the holder of the kyūchi (salary land). It should be noted, however, that the kyūchi grantee did not become a landholder. The land still belonged to the han. Thus, the kyūchi holder had only the rights to the rice crop from the land, and the kado peasants had only the rights to cultivate it.

The kyūchi (salary land) was granted not only to the castle-town samurai but also to the rural samurai. Only a limited number of upper class gōshi owned a whole kado, several of them usually sharing one kado. The former type of landholding was called the mochikiri kado, while the latter sharing type was designated as mochiai kado. In the case of the mochiai kado (shared kado), one of the
gōshi was designated as ryōshu ("lord of the fief"), and the corvée labor as well as seasonal presents were all given to him alone, although of course the rice yield was divided among the jointsamurai owners.27 Thus we can see that both jōkashi and gōshi (castle-town and rural samurai) were dependent on the prosperity of the kado.

As noted above, peasants were organized into kado, to which the "official land" (kōden) was distributed. The land thus allotted to the kado was called kadodaka, which was measured not in terms of the land area but according to yield. The kadodaka was periodically surveyed and redistributed in order to adjust inequalities caused by various factors such as population changes, soil depletion, and the opening up of new arable and taxable land. As a rule, the redistribution of land was carried out at the time of the land survey (kenchi).28

Because the kado was the basic unit for rice and labor taxes, the members of the kado were collectively responsible for their payment. Rice tax was levied according to the kadodaka (yield) which was divided among the kabu (peasant family units), and the tax rate was as much as 80 percent.29 On the other hand, corvée labor was imposed on all healthy men in the kado between the ages of 15 and 60, who were called ibu. In other words, all peasants, except for the servants of the gōshi, belonged to the kado and were assessed labor services.30
Theoretically, such labor services were for public works or to enable the rural samurai to devote his attention to his local administrative duties. In practice, however, the ryōshu ("lord of the fief") took advantage of peasant labor obligations to increase his own wealth, as shall be discussed in the next chapter.

The situation of the kado in the countryside when Shigehide attempted his economic reforms had undergone certain changes. Before the Kyōho land survey of 1722-1726, the myōzu and nago were originally a kinship group, composed of independent families, who worshipped a common spirit called kadogami. The nago gathered under the roof of the myōzu on festive occasions to exchange felicitations and to demonstrate their solidarity. However, the kyōho land survey changed the patriarchal nature of the kado system, in which the myōzu was considered the main family and the nago as branch families. As a result of the 1722-1726 land survey, impoverished myōzu were compulsorily combined with prosperous nago, or prosperous myōzu were combined with impoverished nago.

The creation of a kado composed of peasants, who were not related to each other by blood, was facilitated by the measure called nimbe or hitoutsushi (forced relocation of the peasants), which was compulsorily carried out by the han government at the time of a domestic land survey or when the han considered it
necessary. This measure aimed at adjusting the imbalance of arable land and labor power, as seen in the case of the large scale relocation of the peasants from the densely-populated areas of southern Satsuma to thinly-populated areas of Hyūga and Ōsumi. The peasants were also transplanted from overpopulated kado to the impoverished kado in order to maintain its labor power. Thus, the forced relocation of the peasants was, in turn, responsible for the disintegration of kinship relations between the myōzu and nago, causing a change in the nature of the kado. Although the kado had gradually lost its patriarchal nature by the nimbe measures of the 17th and 18th centuries, a sense of kinship between the myōzu and nago, who were actually unrelated to each other by blood, was maintained through their worship of the common spirit of the kado. This fictive kinship relationship still facilitated the fulfillment of the kado's function as the basic unit for tax collection and corvée labor. In fact, as we shall see later, the kadowari system, reinforced by periodic forced relocations of peasants (nimbe), was fundamental to the prosperity of the han, but there were limits to its exploitation. When conditions became intolerable peasants resorted to abortion and to running away (tosan). If Shigehide were to increase han revenue, then he had to limit some of the gōshi control over the kado, and divert more profits to his agents.
Local Administrative Changes by Shigehide and Their Significance

Since the jitō (estate manager) was living in the Kagoshima castle-town, all administrative responsibilities of a gō (rural district) had been virtually left to the "local three officials" (tokoro san'yaku) appointed from among the gōshi: gōshi elders (gōshi toshiyori), group captains (kumi gashira) and censors (yokome), as discussed earlier. Thus, in actuality these local officials had been managing all matters pertaining to the administration in the Satsuma countryside, although central han officials had been periodically sent out to inspect specific aspects of local administration.

Shigehide's efforts to place the local administration more under his control are illustrated in the great increase in the number of "inspectors attached to various han offices" (za yokome), from six in 1720 to over one hundred by the beginning of the Temmei period (1781-1789). At the same time he also considerably expanded their authority. In addition to their original duty to watch over the activities in various central han government offices, za yokome were now sent out to rural districts in shifts for a period of three months to supervise local administrative affairs. Itō Katarō (1763-1845), the gōshi elder of Taka-yama district, described the process of this local administrative change
in his *Kanshō zakki* (Miscellany on Deplorable Events). He stated that even inspection tours to rural districts by the magistrate and the head of central han offices were closely watched by *za yokome* in recent years. 39

It is important to note that *za yokome* were under the supervision of grand overseers (*ōmetsuke*), all of whom were appointed by Shigehide by 1774 and whose number was increased from four to six, as discussed in the previous chapter. Viewed in this light, the reform of the central han bureaucracy was an essential step to effect changes in the local administration.

This strengthening of direct supervision by the central han government officials resulted in the reduction of autonomous authority of the local officials. Ito described this shift in power in the local administration in the following manner.

The old practice in (rural districts) has greatly changed in recent years, and everything has come under the direct control of the central han government in Kagoshima. The local officials have become mere assistants to a number of officials sent by the central government, flattering and entertaining them as if the central government officials were their guests. 40

While we can demonstrate later that, in fact, Shigehide was not entirely successful in reducing *gōshi* control in rural areas, partly because of the unfamiliarity of *jōkashi* ("castle-town samurai") with the conditions of
the countryside, it appears that he did succeed in weakening the gōshi position somewhat. One means of accomplishing this was by making changes in gōshi status and family rank.

Traditionally, the gōshi were called tojō shūjū ("samurai in outer castles"). The shūjū being a term for samurai, all samurai except those of the upper class in the castle-town had been called shūjū with designation of the place of their residence such as Kagoshima shūjū, Kokubu shūjū or Kajiki shūjū. Thus, there had been no distinction in status between the lower-class samurai in the castle-town and those living in rural districts. On 1780/7/27 Shigehide changed the term tojō shūjū to gōshi (rural samurai), while naming the lower-class samurai in the castle-town as jōkashi ("castle-town samurai"), thus distinguishing them from rural samurai in status. He also discriminated between jōkashi and gōshi in their family ranks. In the sixth month of 1784 Shigehide changed in name the ōban ("large guards"), the lowest social rank of the "castle-town samurai," or jōkashi, to koshōgumi ("small name guards"), while ranking the rural samurai (gōshi) as the ōban-kaku ("large guards equivalent") in the seventh month of 1786. This demotion of the gōshi in their status and social rank on the one hand was the manifestation of their reduced authority in local administration. On the other hand, these
institutional changes increased the power and prestige of the "castle-town samurai." By elevating certain castle-town samurai and giving them a large administrative role in the rural areas, Shigehide hoped to lay the foundation for his planned agricultural reform.

However, Shigehide did not make any attempt to change the gōshi (rural samurai) and the kadowari (land distribution) systems. It must be said that such an institutional reform would have involved a complete change of the basic social-economic structure of Satsuma. For reasons which will be more apparent in the following chapters, such a change was not feasible. Therefore, Shigehide could only manipulate these systems by enforcing stricter supervision by the central government officials, as we saw in the foregoing discussion. The gōshi system, on the one hand, and the kadowari system, on the other, made it possible for Shigehide to impose an extremely high rice tax on the peasants and to exact excessive labor services from them. The rice tax was as high as 80 percent and corvée, according to popular saying, was as much as "thirty-five days a month." However, compulsory cultivation of kado land and compulsory labor services enforced by these systems tended to reduce peasants to extreme poverty. Poverty caused depopulation of agrarian villages, as peasants were forced to resort to the practice of abortion and flight from the land (tōsan). This decrease
of farm population was, in turn, largely responsible for the mounting financial difficulties of the han. Shigehide's manipulation of the gōshi and the kadowari systems to cope with the financial crisis and their economic constraints will be analyzed in Chapter VI.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER IV

1. Distinct from the "outer castle" was the main castle in Kagoshima, which was known as the inner castle (naijō). The latter was of modest size for a daimyo with a fief of 729,000 koku. Kenshi, II, 139.


3. Satsuma was one of very few han which retained the land fief system throughout the Tokugawa period. By 1688, 204 han, or 84 percent of the total han, already changed from the land fief system to the stipend system. Ito, Bakuhan taisei, pp. 70-71.


5. Ibid., p. 368.


7. Sakai, ibid., p. 139.


13. Jitō posts of the districts bordering on other domains such as Izumi district were held concurrently by senior councillors. Shigeno and Komaki, Sappan shidanshū, p. 552.


22. Ono Takeo, "Kyū-Kagoshima-han no kadowari seido" ("The Land Distribution System in Old Kagoshima"), in Tochi keizaishi kōshō (Research on Land Economic History) (Tokyo, 1931), p. 58. The number of kabu (peasant family units) in a kado usually consisted of from 1 to 3 or 4. Sakai, "Landholding in Satsuma, 1868-1877," Studies on Asia, (1963), 63. Iwakata Isoo and Yamada Tatsuo, "Kagoshima-ken nōgyōshi" ("Agricultural History of Kagoshima"), in Nihon nōgyō hattatsushi (History of the Agricultural Development in Japan), comp. by Tōbata Seiichi (Tokyo, 1954), II, 483. According to Haraguchi Torao, "Kadowari seido" ("Land Distribution System"), in Sekai rekishi dai-jiten (Historical World Encyclopedia) (Tokyo, 1955), XX, 260, the number of kabu in a kado varied in different localities. Some kado included as many as 22 kabu, while some were composed of only one or two kabu.


28. In addition to the land survey carried out by Toyotomi Hideyoshi in 1594-1595, the Shimazu conducted their own land surveys in 1611-1614; 1632-1633; 1657-1659; and 1722-1726. The latter surveys were called naiken (domestic land survey) as opposed to Bakufu supervised surveys known as kōken (public survey). For a detailed description of land surveys in Satsuma and their significance, see Sakai, "The Consolidation of Power in Satsuma-han," pp. 136-137. Land surveys were also carried out locally throughout the period and after the han survey of 1722-1726. Kenshi, II, 307.

29. The average kadodaka ranged between 20 to 40 koku. Sakai, "Landholding in Satsuma," p. 64. Haraguchi, "Kadowari seido," p. 260. It is pointed out, however, that the size of a kado in terms of yield became smaller in the course of time. In the beginning of the Tokugawa period the average size of a kado was over 40 koku. It became around 25 koku at the turn of the 18th century and ranged between 10 to 30 koku after the An'ei period (1772-1781). Kagoshima-shi shi, I, 428.


31. Sakai, "Landholding in Satsuma...," p. 64.


35. According to a deed dated 1723/8/18, 281 peasant families were relocated, while the Ōgoshihai shidaichō (Record of the Land Survey of Satsuma) states that the number of peasant families transplanted during the Kyōho land survey (1722-1726) totalled 372. Kenshi, II, 39.


38. Loc. cit.

39. Itō Katarō, "Kanshō zakki" ("Miscellany on Deplorable Events"), MS., II, 57.

40. Ibid., II, 79.

41. Hampōshū Kagoshima, I, 895.

42. Loc. cit.
CHAPTER V
MOUNTING HAN DEBTS

Description of the Situation

Since the beginning of the Tokugawa period Satsuma suffered from financial difficulty. The main causes for this were the drastic reduction of the Shimazu domain after Hideyoshi's campaign of 1587, the large expenditures entailed by the two Korean campaigns of 1592 and 1597, and the han's support of the losing side of Sekigahara of 1600.¹

It is said that as early as 1603 the han finances were so tight that Shimazu Iehisa (daimyo, 1602-1638) had to borrow two hundred kan silver from Fukushima Masanori on the way to Edo.² By 1616 the han debts amounted to over 1,000 kan silver (about 20,000 ryo). Thereafter, the han debts would continually increase and mount to the enormous figure of 320,000 kan (about 5,000,000 ryo at the rate of .06 kan silver per one ryo gold) by 1827, as shown in Table XI.³
### TABLE XI

**HAN DEBTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Debt (in kan silver)</th>
<th>Debt (in ryo gold)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1616</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1632</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>340-350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>560,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>660,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1801</td>
<td>72,600</td>
<td>1,170,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1807</td>
<td>76,168</td>
<td>1,260,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1827</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE XII

**ANNUAL INCREASE OF HAN DEBTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of years</th>
<th>Total increase (in kan)</th>
<th>Annual increase (in kan)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1616</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1632</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1634</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1667</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1710</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>13,300</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>16,600</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1801</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3,528</td>
<td>588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1807</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>243,872</td>
<td>12,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1827</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Han Revenue

Before we discuss the causes of these mounting han debts, it is necessary to describe the daimyo's actual income and expenditures. His officially listed revenues consisted of the money from the sale of rice (shinobose-mai) and the proceeds from the sale of local products (sambutsuryō) at the Osaka market. Although Satsuma's (including Ryukyu) official rice productive capacity (omotedaka) was fixed as 729,576 koku in 1634, its actual productivity (naidaka) varied as follows.4

TABLE XIII
OFFICIAL PRODUCTIVITY (OMOTEDAKA) AND ACTUAL PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY (NAIDAKA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Omotedaka</th>
<th>Naidaka</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1634</td>
<td>729,576 koku (including Ryukyu, 123,713 koku)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1612 or 1614</td>
<td>619,055 koku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1633 and 1652</td>
<td>572,608 koku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1659</td>
<td>609,371 koku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1667</td>
<td>747,193 koku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1725</td>
<td>867,027 koku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1736</td>
<td>872,886 koku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1783</td>
<td>867,628 koku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1826</td>
<td>899,671 koku</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These naidaka productivities were divided into two types of rice revenues (taka): kurairi taka or the yield from the land directly administered by the daimyo and kyūchi taka (retainers' income from their salary lands), as referred to in the previous chapter.

**TABLE XIV**

**KURAIRI-TAKA AND KYŪCHI-TAKA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Kurairi-taka (excluding Ryukyu)</th>
<th>Kyūchi-taka (including Ryukyu)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1612</td>
<td>325,547 koku</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1632</td>
<td>393,181 koku</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1635</td>
<td>202,237 koku</td>
<td>490,009 koku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1639</td>
<td>195,671 koku</td>
<td>483,871 koku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1648</td>
<td>199,170 koku</td>
<td>503,673 koku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1676</td>
<td>504,158 koku</td>
<td>514,000 koku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1722</td>
<td>334,164 koku</td>
<td>526,839 koku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1736</td>
<td>348,921 koku</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741</td>
<td>561,912 koku</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1771</td>
<td>550,967 koku</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1787</td>
<td>348,333 koku</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1795</td>
<td>327,286 koku</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1826</td>
<td>340,000 koku</td>
<td>568,160 koku</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The kyūchi taka, the income of samurai retainers which derived from their land fiefs, was further divided into
the Kagoshima *taka* (castle-town samurai income) and the *tojō taka* (outer-castle samurai income). The amount and change in their respective yield (*taka*) is shown in Table XV. What must be noted, however, is that we are talking about rice income; supplementary income, which, as we shall see later, actually surpassed the amount of rice income, is not included in these figures.

**TABLE XV**

**KAGOSHIMA-TAKA AND TOJŌ TAKA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Kagoshima</th>
<th>Tojō</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1632</td>
<td>306,528 koku</td>
<td>86,654 koku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1639</td>
<td>310,440 koku</td>
<td>88,601 koku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1676</td>
<td>331,540 koku</td>
<td>81,250 koku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1726</td>
<td>317,476 koku</td>
<td>95,839 koku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1771</td>
<td>340,127 koku</td>
<td>112,197 koku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1826</td>
<td>341,607 koku</td>
<td>116,912 koku</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the *kurairi-taka* or the yield from the land under the daimyo's direct administration, about 120,000-130,000 koku went into the han treasury after 1730 as land tax (0.398 koku rice tax per 1 koku yield). After deducting all expenses needed for the maintenance of the daimyo's household and for general han administration, an annual average of 17,200 koku was sold at the Osaka market, providing a cash income of about 900 kan silver (about 14,000 ryo) during the Bunsei period (1818-1830). This
amount was small compared with other han, for example, Kaga-han (1,022,700 koku) in 1767 shipped 88,000 koku to Osaka for sale, and Shōnai-han (140,000 koku) sold 26,000 koku rice on an annual average during the Kan'ei period (1624-1644). This relatively small amount of cash income of Satsuma from the sale of rice may be attributed to the following reasons: (1) relatively small area of paddy fields to dry fields, the former being 31,823 chō or 77,942 acres and the latter 26,445 chō or 64,780 acres, (2) a large portion of land was granted to a great number of samurai retainers as salary land (kyūchi), and (3) the computation of the han gross rice income in terms of unhulled rice (1 koku of unhulled rice, 0.5 koku of hulled rice).

The second important source of officially listed han revenues was the sambutsuryō (proceeds from the sale of local products) such as sugar, crude wax, paper, rapeseeds and camphor. Cultivation of these raw materials, which flourished in the warm climate of Satsuma, had been encouraged by the han government from the early part of the Tokugawa period to augment its cash income, and their products were monopolies of the han as shall be discussed at length later. Revenues from the sale of local products (sambutsuryō) were as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1801</td>
<td>6,000 kan</td>
<td>100,000 ryo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1815</td>
<td>8,400 kan</td>
<td>140,000 ryo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1829</td>
<td>10,200 kan</td>
<td>170,000 ryo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thus, the income from the sambutsuryō was much larger than the income from the sale of rice which remained almost stationary after around 1730.

Besides these two han revenues, there were other sources of revenue which were not officially listed as han incomes. The first of these unofficial han revenues were forced loans from samurai retainers. Shimazu Iehisa (daimyo, 1602-1638) is said to have initiated this practice. He took the measure called jōchi (return of land) through which all retainers were ordered to return part of their salary lands (kyūchi or chigyōchi) in 1614, and degin (forced loans of money) of 1 mon 3 bu (.0013 kan silver) per 1 koku of rice was assessed for the first time in 1616. Since the degin of 1616 did not improve the han financial situation, the daimyo was forced in 1619 to order all samurai of various ranks as well as temples and shrines to return to the han from one-fourth to two-thirds of their land allotments. Forced loans of money (degin) and forced loans of rice (demai) were ordered practically every year after 1633. In 1746 the degin became fixed at 8.1 sho, and additional forced loans of rice (kasami demai) were periodically assessed depending on the financial needs of the government, as shown in Table XVI. Although complete data on the kasami demai is not available, it may be reasonably surmised that the forced loans were continually imposed judging from the aggravated
## TABLE XVI
### FORCED LOANS FROM SAMURAI RETAINERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Types of loans</th>
<th>Amount of forced loans per one koku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1616</td>
<td>degin</td>
<td>1.3 mon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1619</td>
<td>100-10,000 koku (samurai)</td>
<td>jōchi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>less than 100 koku temples and shrines</td>
<td>jōchi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>over 10 koku (petty samurai)</td>
<td>jōchi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>less than 10 koku (petty samurai)</td>
<td>jōchi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1633</td>
<td>degin</td>
<td>1.5 mon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1634</td>
<td>degin</td>
<td>1.0 mon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1635</td>
<td>degin</td>
<td>3.5 mon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1636</td>
<td>degin</td>
<td>2.8 mon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1637</td>
<td>degin</td>
<td>2.8 mon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1638</td>
<td>degin</td>
<td>2.1 mon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1639</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>6.2 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1640</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>8.0 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1641</td>
<td>degin</td>
<td>1.0 mon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1642</td>
<td>degin</td>
<td>1.05 mon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1643</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>3.3 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1644</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>6.3 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>degin</td>
<td>0.2 mon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1645</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>10.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1646-1687</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>6.0-9.0 sho (except for 11.0 sho in 1649)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1688-1700</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>8.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Types of loans</td>
<td>Amount of forced loans per one koku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1701</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>6.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1702</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>8.6 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1703</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>7.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1704</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>8.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1705-1707</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>7.6 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1708-1709</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>8.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1710</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>10.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1711-1718</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>8.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1719</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>10.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1720</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>8.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1722</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>8.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1727-1728</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>7.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1729</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>8.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1730</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>10.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1731-1745</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>8.9-6.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>13.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747-1748</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>8.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749-1753</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>8.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754-1757</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>8.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758-1760</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>8.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1761-</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>8.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(kasami demai)</td>
<td>1.5 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(kasami demai)</td>
<td>1.8 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(kasami demai)</td>
<td>2.0 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Types of loans</td>
<td>Amount of forced loans per one koku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1768-1772</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>8.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(kasami demai)</td>
<td>1.5 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1773-1795</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>8.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1796-1799</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>8.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(kasami demai)</td>
<td>2.0 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1807</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>8.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(kasami demai)</td>
<td>5.0 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1808-1813</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>8.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(kasami demai)</td>
<td>3.0 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1814-1816</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>8.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1817-1821</td>
<td>demai</td>
<td>8.1 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(kasami demai)</td>
<td>1.5 sho for castle-town samurai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.2 sho for rural samurai</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
conditions of the han after 1754. Actual han income through these forced loans from the samurai was considerable. As of 1826 it equaled 62,322 koku of rice a year.\textsuperscript{16}

Special taxes levied on each person (nimbetsu), cows and horses, and ships were other important sources of han revenue. Although complete data is not available, it seems—as shown in Table XVII—that these special taxes were imposed each year as attested by the following. The official notice issued in the eleventh month of 1805 stated that from 1801 to 1805 the han government made serious, though unsuccessful, efforts to repay all debts by strict retrenchment and by forced loans from the samurai and special taxes on commoners. Thereupon, the decision was made in 1805 to continue the practice for the next five years.\textsuperscript{17} In the first month of 1808 the Kinshiroku faction which dominated the han administration from 1807 to 1808 decided to discontinue the special taxes on each person with 1 mon, and on cows and horses, and on ships.\textsuperscript{18} There were, in addition, various special taxes assessed on commoners such as the merchant tax for monopoly right (itte shōbai tokkyo reigin), the forced loans from merchants called reigin and the special tax on each household (kamadogin).\textsuperscript{19} According to Fujiya's estimate, these special taxes annually amounted to about 1,500 kan silver (25,000 ryo) from around 1730.\textsuperscript{20}
### TABLE XVII

**SPECIAL TAXES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>On each person</th>
<th>On each cow and horse</th>
<th>On each ship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1644</td>
<td>1 bu*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1651</td>
<td>1 bu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746</td>
<td>1 mon</td>
<td>2 mon</td>
<td>1 mon per 1 tan**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754</td>
<td>1 mon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1761</td>
<td>5 bu</td>
<td>1 mon</td>
<td>5 bu for 1 tan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1765-1769</td>
<td>5 bu</td>
<td>5 bu</td>
<td>4 mon per 1 tan for ships with the sail size of 8-23 tan. 2.5 mon for those with 5-7 tan sail size. 1 mon for those with 4 tan sail size and smaller.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1790-1791</td>
<td>amount not specified</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1808-1813</td>
<td>1 mon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 1,000 mon = 1 kan silver. 1 bu = 1 mon

**Tan** is a basic counting unit of the size of the sail.

Perhaps the most notorious source of secret income for Satsuma came from smuggling. Although it is not known how much this illicit trade contributed to the han finances, it must have brought a great amount of profit to Satsuma, as evidenced by the han's continued efforts to expand smuggling, despite Bakufu attempts to prevent it.

With the enforcement of a series of Bakufu national seclusion regulations in the 1630's, Satsuma's free trade with China through Ryukyu was inevitably suspended. Yet,
Satsuma's illicit trade with so-called "drifting" Chinese ships off the Satsuma coast continued. In 1718, the Bakufu warned Satsuma that smuggling of Chinese goods had not ceased and that efforts to control it should not be relaxed. In the same year the Bakufu complained that "the only smugglers arrested were those arrested by the Tokugawa officials and not by the officials of the daimyo on their own initiative." 22

Meanwhile, a number of watch posts or lookouts called ikokusen tōmi bansho and hitate bansho had been established on the Satsuma coast in compliance with the Bakufu order to watch for smuggling activities, while Satsuma itself established port inspection stations (tsuguchi bansho) at its major ports and places where Chinese ships might "drift" ashore, such as Akune, Kaseda, Bōnotsu, Yamagawa, and Ōshima and Tanegashima islands. 23 Port inspection stations and watch posts along the coast and barriers on the boundaries were gradually strengthened and tightened. In a sense, it had the effect of enforcing Satsuma's own seclusion policy, because it kept out strangers while hampering the activities of the Bakufu agents, and hence served to provide the necessary security for the smuggling activities along the coast. 24

According to a survey made by Mutō Chōhei, Chinese interpreters were stationed at the ports and places mentioned above. 25 The importance of their language
training was emphasized especially by Shigehide as discussed in Chapter II. The question is legitimately raised as to why Chinese interpreters were needed in Satsuma since, according to the Bakufu order, all "drifting" ships (hyōchakusen) were to be towed to Nagasaki. For this towing, conversation through writing alone would have been sufficient as was the practice in other han. Obviously, Satsuma was engaged in more than a towing service because Chinese "drifting" ships, which reached the shores of Satsuma, took too many days to be towed to Nagasaki and they were loaded with too little cargo when they entered into Nagasaki port. "In 1801 the arrest by Tokugawa officials of a merchant of Kyoto, Ōmiya Shinbē, charged with smuggling Chinese goods imported through Ryukyu, revealed that in Satsuma there was practically no inspection or control of smuggling at port inspection stations (tsuguchi bansho)."

Han Expenditures

Now that we have examined the various sources of han revenues, it is necessary to describe han expenditures. The annual han expenditures can be divided into three categories: expenses entailed outside of Satsuma, those within the han, and the interest payment for han debts. In 1719 more than half of the total expenditures of Satsuma, 52 percent, were expenses incurred outside of Satsuma: 4,400 kan silver (73,300 ryo) spent at Edo and
the Kyoto-Osaka area (kamigata) compared to 4,000 kan (66,700 ryo) expended in Satsuma.29

This large expenditure outside of Satsuma was largely attributed to the Bakufu measures of daimyo control such as the requirement of the alternate attendance (sankin kōtai) and the periodic levies for money or labor service, as shall be described in detail in the next section. These measures were aimed at keeping daimyo in a state of financial embarrassment and preventing them from challenging the Tokugawa hegemony. Through the alternate attendance system all daimyo were obliged to travel with their retinues to Edo and remain for a year, spending the alternate year in their own domains. Since their families were required to live permanently at Edo, the daimyo had to build and maintain residences there. During the daimyo's absences from Edo their wives and children became hostages to guarantee their loyalty to the Shogun.

According to Tsukahira, roughly 70 to 80 percent of the expenditures in other han were spent on the sankin kōtai.30 As mentioned in the sumptuary law issued in 1719, however, Satsuma, in comparison, spent only 52 percent.31 One of the reasons for this is probably because as an outside daimyo (tozama), who did not participate in Bakufu administration, Satsuma had fewer retainers at Edo than daimyo such as Ii or Sakai.
Another measure taken to weaken the daimyo economically, especially the outside daimyo (tozama), was the forced contributions of money and assistance in public projects such as the building of castles, roads, bridges and palaces. Since the daimyo had no legal right to mint species, all these expenditures had to be paid in money made at Osaka.

The annual deficit was 3,800 kan (63,300 ryo) in 1764. It increased to 7,650 kan (127,500 ryo) by 1801, and the han was operating at a deficit of over 50 percent: expenses (14,650 kan) and income (7,000 kan). However, from 1754 to 1807 there are some discrepancies, as evidenced by the surprisingly slow rate of indebtedness recorded for those years as noted in Table XII. For 44 years (1710-1754) the annual average increase of han debts was 802 kan (13,366 ryo), while the rate increased to the great amount of 12,193 kan (203,216 ryo) from 1807 to 1827. In the 53-year period (1754-1807), with which this chapter is concerned, the han debts annually increased by only 380 kan (6,366 ryo).

Why was the annual growth rate of han debts much slower between the period from 1754 to 1807, compared with the periods before and after it? One possible answer is that unlisted revenues, such as forced loans of money and rice or profits from the illicit trade, were responsible for this slow growth of han debts. It is my assumption,
based on these statistics, that the early stage of Shigehide's economic policy from around 1770 to 1807 was successful, contributing to the slowing down of the growth rate of han debts. In the following sections we will analyze factors, external and internal, which produced the steadily mounting han debts. This analysis is imperative to determine how Shigehide dealt with these factors in his economic efforts which will be described in the next chapter.

**External Causes of Han Debts**

As we have seen from the data presented earlier in this chapter, despite han efforts between 1640 and 1749 to reduce the rate of increase of Satsuma indebtedness, when Shigehide assumed the role of daimyo in 1755, he inherited han debts of over 50,000 kan (833,000 ryo). Moreover, during Shigehide's tenure as daimyo, despite his efforts at economic expansion, the han debts increased.

In this section we will focus out attention on the period of Shigehide's actual rule from 1755 up to 1807. After this period the opposition faction, the Kinshiroku group, cam to dominate temporarily the han administration and to disrupt Shigehide's policies. Perhaps the most obvious external cause for han expenditures in this period was the sankin kōtai. As noted earlier, the expenses incurred outside of Satsuma, mainly at Edo, amounted to about on-half of the annual han expenditures. The
following descriptions explain why the Edo expenses were so high. On a trip to Edo from Kagoshima the Shimazu daimyo spent 850 kan (14,200 ryo) in 1801 due to the geographical distance to Edo (411 ri or 1,005 miles), and it took him fifty days. It should be noted, however, that this expense for the sankin trip was proportionally less than that of some other han. The daimyo of Kii (555,000 koku) spent 519 kan (8,650 ryo) to make his 146 ri (365 miles) trip to Edo. If the Kii daimyo had traveled 411 ri, which was the distance from Kagoshima to Edo, he would have spent 1,349 kan (22,490 ryo). Nabeshima Narinao (1780-1830), the daimyo of Saga (357,000 koku) in Kyushu, reportedly spent as much as 1,750 kan (29,167 ryo) for a single journey. 

Expenses for the maintenance of Satsuma's Edo residences (yashiki) and the samurai retainers and their families stationed at Edo can be surmised from the following examples of other han. A daimyo normally had three Edo residences, but most of the large han possessed more than three: the Ikeda of Tottori had ten residences, the Mōri of Chōshū had nine, the Tokugawa of Kii and the Date of Sendai had eight respectively. The Shimazu daimyo owned six Edo residences (yashiki) by 1773, possibly occupying a large area judging from the yashiki holdings of other han. The Date of Uwajima (100,000 koku) had a yashiki area of about 71 acres, while the Matsudaira
of Matsuyama (150,000 koku) possessed 57 acres. The Maeda of Kaga had holdings of 267 acres although the Maeda daimyo had only four residences. 37

**TABLE XVIII**

**HAN POPULATIONS PERMANENTLY STATIONED AT EDO**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Han</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Those With</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kaga</td>
<td>(1688-1704)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1,022,700 koku)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kii Tokugawa</td>
<td>(1852-1868)</td>
<td>6-700</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(555,000 koku)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chōshū</td>
<td>(1744-1748)</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>2,171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(369,000 koku)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hikone</td>
<td>(1688-1704)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(350,000 koku)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tottori</td>
<td>(1772-1781)</td>
<td>110</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(325,000 koku)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takata</td>
<td>(1852-1868)</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(150,000 koku)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsuruga</td>
<td>(1852-1868)</td>
<td>144</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100,000 koku)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinshū Matsumoto</td>
<td>(1716-1736)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(70,000 koku)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bitchū Matsuyama</td>
<td>(1852-1868)</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(50,000 koku)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satsuma</td>
<td>(1788)</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>est. 2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(729,500 koku)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This figure of Satsuma samurai permanently stationed at Edo included both 119 castle-town samurai (jōkashi) and 66 yoriki, the samurai attached to various han offices. 39

Judging from the figures in the above table, the Satsuma's
total permanent population at Edo in 1788 could have been over 2,000 at a conservative estimate, which included the daimyo's family and their attendants, samurai retainers and their families, and a considerable number of functionaries and menials. It should be noted that the total population greatly increased when the daimyo remained there in alternate years. In the case of Kaga-han there were already in the Genroku period (1688-1704) 4,000 permanent population there, and the number increased to 8,000 when another 4,000 retainers accompanied the daimyo on his sankin trip to Edo. 40 While it is likely that Satsuma expenses at Edo were not as large as fudai (house daimyo) who were more actively engaged in Bakufu administration, still the expenses connected with the sankin system were a drain on han finances.

In addition to these ordinary Edo expenses, frequent extraordinary expenditures were required for marriages and funerals within the daimyo's family, and for the rebuilding of Edo residences after fires. The account of Shimazu Tsugutoyo's (daimyo, 1721-1746) marriage with Takehime in 1729, the adopted daughter of Shogun Tsunayoshi, suggests that considerable expenses were involved in the daimyo's marriage. For this marriage about 5.6 acres were added to the Satsuma's Shiba residence at Edo (10.8 acres) to build her a residence. 41 It is said that several scores
of Takehime’s attendants, whom the daimyo had to support, moved with her into the residence. 42

To lessen Satsuma’s financial burden, the Bakufu excused the daimyo from the 7,295 koku-a-year "offered rice" (agemai) obligation for three years from 1729 to 1730. 43 The agemai system, which was initiated by Shogun Yoshimune in 1722 and enforced until 1730, required all daimyo to contribute 100 koku for each 10,000 koku of their revenue. In return, their period of residence at Edo was reduced by half. 44

The rebuilding of han residence (yashiki) after frequent fires also involved additional expenditures to the han treasury.

**TABLE XIX**

FIRES OF SATSUMA HAN RESIDENCES, 1755-1807 45

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year and month</th>
<th>Name of han residences (yashiki)</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1762/2</td>
<td>Shiba</td>
<td>Edo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1772/2</td>
<td>Sakurada</td>
<td>Edo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1775/7</td>
<td>Takanawa</td>
<td>Edo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1781/9</td>
<td>Shiba</td>
<td>Edo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1786/1</td>
<td>Tamachi</td>
<td>Edo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1786/4</td>
<td>Sakurada</td>
<td>Edo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1788/1</td>
<td>Satsuma residence</td>
<td>Kyoto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1806/3</td>
<td>Shiba</td>
<td>Edo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The cost of reconstructing these han residences can be reasonably surmised by the expenses spent by other han. It is said that Sendai had to expend about 7,200 kan (120,000 ryo) for the reconstruction of its main yashiki during the Kyōho period (1716-1736), while Chōshu was forced to spend 3,054 kan (50,900 ryo) to replace its main residence during the An'ei period (1772-1781).

Another external cause which was responsible for the financial difficulties of Satsuma were the special assessments levied by the Bakufu. Being an outside daimyo (tozama), the former enemy of the Tokugawa, Satsuma frequently suffered from heavy levies. As early as 1605 the Shimazu daimyo was ordered by the Bakufu to help reconstruct Edo castle, a task which required 300 large ships to transport the huge stones.

One of the most costly orders from the Bakufu was the Kiso river water conservation work of 1754-1755. This project took thirteen months for its completion and cost well over the 300,000 ryo initially estimated. The han had to borrow over 13,378 kan (220,198 ryo) from Osaka merchants, and it raised the balance through the sale of local products of Satsuma and also by additional forced loans of money and rice from its people. In addition, this Kiso river project caused the death of more than eighty people including the Satsuma senior councillor, Hirata Masasuke, who supervised it. The daimyo Shigetoshi
died of extreme anxiety in the sixth month of 1755, two months after the completion of the project. Thus, it was one of the most costly and most tragic orders of the Bakufu.

In the ninth month of 1788 Satsuma was ordered by the Bakufu to contribute 200,000 ryo (about 12,000 kan silver) over a period of four years to assist in the rebuilding of the Emperor's palace and the Nijō castle at Kyoto. The enormity of this contribution and the total cost of the Kiso river project (about 18,000 kan) will be better appreciated when these figures are compared with the 7,000 kan han income from the sale of local products at Osaka (sambutsuryō) in 1801.

As Table XX indicates, the island communities of Amami-Ōshima with a population of 74,593 in 1800 were the hardest hit. While natural disasters in themselves were not the decisive factors in determining economic prosperity in Satsuma, their frequency contributed to the severity of the external pressures upon the han.

Internal Causes of Han Debts

When considering the internal causes for Satsuma's increasing indebtedness, we must recognize that many of the problems stemmed from previous economic conditions and traditional methods of meeting these problems. Haraguchi Torao, Yamada Tatsuo and Yamamoto Hirobumi attribute the increase of han debts for the period of 1755-1807 to basic
TABLE XX
NATURAL DISASTERS, 1755-1807

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Natural disasters and damages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1755-1756</td>
<td>Tokunoshima</td>
<td>Continued famine causing the death of 3,000 residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758/7</td>
<td>Satsuma*</td>
<td>Typhoons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1767</td>
<td>Tokunoshima</td>
<td>Prevalence of an epidemic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1769/8</td>
<td>Satsuma</td>
<td>Loss of more than 100,000 koku of han rice revenue caused by a typhoon followed by insect damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1771/autumn</td>
<td>Satsuma</td>
<td>Heavy damage from insects to crops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1772/spring-1773</td>
<td>Tokunoshima</td>
<td>Prevalence of an epidemic, causing the death of more than 1,700 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1773/spring</td>
<td>Tokunoshima</td>
<td>Infestation of harmful rice insects, causing even the total loss of seed-rice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1775/4</td>
<td>Satsuma</td>
<td>Poor harvest of wheat due to a long spell of rain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1777/summer-autumn</td>
<td>Tokunoshima</td>
<td>Visit of several typhoons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1778</td>
<td>Oshima</td>
<td>Poor harvest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1778/8</td>
<td>Okierabu</td>
<td>Strike of tidal wave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1778/autumn</td>
<td>Satsuma</td>
<td>Heavy damages to all rural districts caused by the visit of two typhoons, resulting in the assessment of scores of thousands of people to various repair works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1779/10</td>
<td>Satsuma</td>
<td>Eruption of Sakurajima volcano which caused the death of over 150 people, collapse of about 500 houses and loss of 20,000 koku of rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1781/5-8</td>
<td>Ōshima</td>
<td>Five strikes of typhoons, causing the failure of crops, floods causing poor harvest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1782/autumn</td>
<td>Satsuma</td>
<td>Poor harvest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1782-1783</td>
<td>Tokunoshima</td>
<td>Famine in Ryukyu, caused by sustained rain followed by a typhoon. 20,000 koku relief rice sent from Satsuma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1784</td>
<td>Ryukyu</td>
<td>Strikes of storms and floods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1784/6-7</td>
<td>Satsuma</td>
<td>Serious damage to crops caused by flood, typhoon and harmful insects following one another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1786</td>
<td>Satsuma</td>
<td>Famine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1789/5</td>
<td>Ryukyu</td>
<td>Prevalence of an epidemic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1790</td>
<td>Tokunoshima</td>
<td>Heavy damage from insects to crops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1802</td>
<td>Tokunoshima</td>
<td>Drought, resulting in poor harvest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1806/summer</td>
<td>Kikaishima</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Satsuma includes Satsuma, Ōsumi and part of Hyūga.
factors inherent in the local agricultural economy such as the gōshi (rural samurai) and the kadowari (land distribution) systems and, specifically, to Shigehide's agricultural policies represented by the promotion of rice production and the cultivation of local products through tighter samurai supervision. In the view of these traditional historians, the combined effect of these social-economic institutions and Shigehide's agricultural policies caused the depopulation of agrarian villages and a resulting decrease in han revenue.

In order to assess the validity of these criticisms, we must determine what caused the decrease of farm population, its actual economic effect, and whether there was in reality, a decrease in han revenue. It will be obvious, as we examine the data, that Shigehide tried to reduce han debts, not increase them. Yet, critics of Shigehide's policies claim that excessive taxation, excessive corvée labor, and the forced cultivation of local products impoverished the peasants and disturbed the rice economy.

Looking at the issue of taxation, we see that Satsuma had two types of taxes: rice tax and a labor tax (corvée) called kuyaku. According to the traditional interpretation, the rice tax imposed upon the peasants in Satsuma was extremely heavy, and the tax ratio was fixed at 3 to 5 shō per one koku. To this fixed rice tax were added
extra taxes such as kuchimai 7 go, yakumai 2 shō, daimai 1 shō, ten'yakumai 1 shō 1 go. Kuchimai was the added tax to make up for rice lost in the process of transporting the rice tax and to feed peasant porters. Yakumai, daimai and ten'yakumai were, respectively, the commuted rice payments for corvée for construction or repairs, for the presentation of festival and seasonal goods, and for the transport of baggage from one port town to another. It should be noted, however, that actual labor services were not replaced or lightened by these extra taxes of rice payments for corvée obligations. Since the han government demanded 40 percent of the gross figure to be turned over in polished rice, the tax rate was as high as 80 percent, leaving little of the peasants' products for themselves. It is said that the peasants of Satsuma were able to survive such "exploitation" largely owing to the sweet potato (Satsuma-imo). As late as 1860 the staple food for villagers of Yoshitoshi-mura consisted of five parts sweet potato, three parts millet, one part rice and one part of wheat or buckwheat.

It is difficult to assess the severity of the rice tax. This tax had not been increased by the han government after 1700, except for the levy in 1799 of an additional tax called sangōmai, a commuted rice payment for corvée. The proportion of dry fields to paddy fields was relatively high in Satsuma. It was 45 to 55 percent at
Yet, of the total revenue from the land tax the tax from dry fields (hatadaka) was only 17 percent, while that from paddy fields (dendaka) was 83 percent. The study of Hosono village, Kobayashi district, by Matsushita Shirō reveals that in 1845 this proportion was 9.79 percent to 90.21 percent. Although dry fields were presumed to be less productive, and hence not taxed as much, the extent of dry field land which was almost equal to the amount of paddy land should be considered when we discuss the severity of the land tax. Moreover, emphasis on the great amount of rice tax without taking into consideration the ratio of the crop and tax to the peasant population tends to distort the economic effect on the peasantry.

According to Ono Takeo, the assessment of the labor or corvée service (kuyaku) was also "excessive" in Satsuma. "The peasants in Taniyama village worked on their farm land for fifteen days every month and they had to cultivate land owned by village head (shōya) or provide corvée labor service for the remaining fifteen days." Haraguchi Torao also mentions, "it is a common saying everywhere in Kagoshima that the peasants suffered from corvée for 'thirty-five days' a month." The "excessive" assessment of labor services was attributed by Satsuma traditionalists to the increased number of han central government officials who were sent out to rural districts
in Shigehide's time. In his survey of rural districts in 1797, Kubo Heinaizaemon, the agricultural magistrate, related this situation, and he stated that the corvée imposed on the peasants increased in recent years almost ten times more than at the time of the Kyōho land survey (1722-1726).

Writers such as Ono and Kubo suggest that Shigehide's agricultural efforts to increase the production of local products and rice had an adverse effect. In their interpretation, the demand for forced cultivation of local products not only added to the burden of the peasants who were already under pressure of excessive corvée assessment, it also caused the disturbance of the rice farming process such as plowing, planting, weeding and harvesting. According to agricultural magistrate Kubo Heinaizaemon, the change to the more complicated method of picking wax tree berries required the peasants to expend more labor and time; moreover, their picking time coincided with the harvesting season for wheat, a situation which left the already short-handed impoverished peasants in serious difficulty. This situation is also described by Ito Katarō, the gōshi elder of Kōyama district.

Harvesting of wax tree berries lasted from the 9th month to the 11th month and coincided with the harvesting season for various crops, thus causing much trouble for the peasants. A delay of one day in the harvesting of crops meant great loss; unhulled rice was eaten up by the birds, while sweet potatoes were
spoiled by snow and rain, thus causing the loss of the peasants' staple food. Ripe millet was shaken off overnight by the strong west wind, and buckwheat required much more labor unless it was reaped and dried within a month after the first frost of the year. Thus, the loss of one day at especially this time of the year was crucial for the peasants, for it meant their starvation the following year. The peasants were forced to harvest wax tree berries almost every day. If they neglected its harvesting for three days, they were pressed hard by the officials in charge of wax trees. At the same time the peasants also had to harvest rice for the government tax. Consequently, they could only watch helplessly as other crops fell or spoiled, thus losing their provisions for the following year.65

Strictly forced cultivation of paper mulberries also brought an additional burden on the peasants. Formerly, the peasants had cultivated only a fixed number of paper mulberries assessed as tax. Therefore, they could choose for themselves a suitable place for planting them, which did not hamper the cultivation of other crops. In Shigehide's time, however, they were forced to plant as many mulberries as they could in accordance with more detailed procedures. Kubo claimed, besides, that the peasants were forced to plant them under strict supervision of officials even in land unsuitable for their cultivation or in pasture land for cows and horses.66

To Kubo and Itō not only the forced cultivation but also the insufficient knowledge on the part of agricultural officials was a heavy burden on the peasants. The establishment of the post of kannō gakari (promotion of
agricultural production) in 1776 demonstrated to these writers how much insufficient knowledge of agricultural affairs interfered with agricultural production.

The purpose of the establishment of the kannō-gata (office for the promotion of agricultural production) was to consolidate the economic foundation of the country by enriching the peasants. However, the kannō-gata officials had little knowledge of the fact that the planting and harvesting methods for the crops were different according to the climate of a region. Even though experienced farmers told the officials that they were familiar with all aspects of farming such as plowing and planting, the latter did not listen to them. The officials simply believed that only strict supervision would be sufficient to raise a heavy crop, and they forced the peasants to follow their orders. As a result, both fertile land and its cultivators became impoverished.

In addition to the factors discussed above, traditional critics of Shigehide blame his falconry as having adverse effects on agricultural production. Falconry was considered a sophisticated form of hunting enjoyed by the shogun, the daimyo and court nobles. Shigehide had obtained the shogun's permission to hawk even at the Bakufu's hawking ground. His great interest in falconry resulted in the designation of a number of hawking grounds near the Kagoshima castle-town and in various rural districts in Satsuma, consequently leading to the creation of posts of takashō gashira (chief of falconers) and torimi gashira (chief of bird hunting). This setting aside of hawking grounds meant not only the reduction of arable land but also the prevention of commoners from
hunting wild birds and even catching fish in the rivers running through the grounds. Birds and river fish were important supplementary foodstuff for them. However, the peasants suffered most from the fact that the establishment of hawking grounds resulted in a great increase in the number of wild birds. According to the report of agricultural magistrate Kubo Heinaizaemon, wheat, the main staple of the peasants was eaten up by wild birds which had multiplied greatly in number. The peasants in some rural districts, therefore, gave up even the planting of wheat, causing further suffering for themselves. As a result, there were many peasant families which were forced to break up.

Without further evidence on the extent of the acreage disturbed by falconry, Kubo's assertion that this sport caused the breakup of many peasant families will have to wait for a more conclusive study to be verified.

Whatever the multiple causes, it appears irrefutable, however, that the poverty and misery of the peasants was recognized by the han authorities by 1778, as expressed in the official notice issued in the eleventh month of the same year.

Recently, all the peasants have been reduced to extreme poverty because of the continued imposition of corvée and various additional taxes in kind and money. In some areas even the han rice tax is difficult to secure. Unless relief measures are gradually taken, it is certain that living conditions of the peasants will become much worse and various serious problems will arise in the future.
The causal factor for the impoverished state of the peasants was attributed by gōshi elder Itō Katarō to the decrease in rice production. In addition to their fixed corvée obligations, peasants were forced to spend much time on the cultivation of cash crops for the han and for the burdensome duty of welcoming and sending off many government officials. Since these labor services were demanded practically day after day, peasants had very little time left to cultivate rice. Itō added that in the near future one third of arable lands would become desolated due to the impoverishment of the peasantry.72

As the traditional interpretation has it, the poverty and suffering of the peasants led to the depopulation of agrarian villages. According to the government survey, conducted in 1770, of Kammyo village of Aira-gō (district), of the total of 90 kado (rice tax and corvée collection units) there were 17 kado without any peasant workers and 27 kado with peasants who were hired by gōshi (rural samurai) as day laborers. Thus, roughly half of the kado in this village were extremely impoverished and not functioning as the basic unit for tax collection.73

Agricultural magistrate Kubo pointed out that since 1776 the number of peasants in Hyūga and northern Satsuma areas had decreased by 6,000, while the number of gōshi increased by more than 3,600.74 This situation is also
described in the Sappan keiiki (Particulars of Satsuma) by Satō Nobuhiro, the famous agricultural economist. "I visited your country (Satsuma) for the first time in 1786. Later in 1805 when I visited there again, I was told that there were many villages with decreased population but there was no village with increased population during these twenty years." Apparently, this trend held throughout Satsuma. The increase of the number of gōshi (rural samurai) and the sharp decrease of the number of peasants is shown in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Peasants</th>
<th>Gōshi (rural samurai)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1772</td>
<td>1800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants</td>
<td>372,762</td>
<td>316,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gōshi</td>
<td>147,799</td>
<td>150,708</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Base index (1772 = 100)

An examination of the actual process of the depopulation of agrarian villages reveals that the depopulation took three forms: the practice of abortion, peasant flights and the employment of impoverished peasants by gōshi (rural samurai). Of the three forms, the third seems to indicate where the majority of peasants went. Concerning the first form, or the practice of abortion,
from the beginning of the Tokugawa period by regulations issued in 1611, 1633, 1645 and 1684, abortion was prohibited in Satsuma and those who committed abortion were severely punished. 77 According to Haraguchi, however, abortion became more prevalent after the Kyōho period (1716-1736) due to the mounting corvée burden on the peasants and their consequent impoverishment. 78 This situation is related by Satō Nobuhiro who visited Satsuma twice in 1786 and 1805. "The Satsuma authorities were very proud of the fact that there was no evil practice of infanticide such as prevailed in eastern domains, but secret abortions were practiced in Satsuma more than in eastern domains." 79 Since we do not know upon what evidence Satō based this claim, further study is required to assess the effect of abortion on the depopulation of villages.

Peasant flights were supposed to have had direct effects on the population decrease in agrarian villages. In Satsuma, where strict social and economic control systems were maintained, there occurred only few incidents of peasant uprising during the Tokugawa period, but peasant resistance to the oppressive rule of the Shimazu daimyo, instead, took the form of peasant flights. 80 It is said that the mounting tax burden on the peasants together with the strict prohibition of the Ikkōshū, a branch of the Pure Land Sect of Buddhism, forced many of
them to run away mainly to neighboring domains. According to a document written some time during the Hōreki period (1751-1764), "peasant flights never happened in the earlier period of the Shimazu rule. It is a common saying that many peasants in the Hyūga area of Satsuma have often taken flight to other domains in recent years, although the han authorities keep denying it." A sub-retainer of Miyakonojō, Sakamoto Kihei, reported in 1798 on peasant flights to Ohi domain. He revealed the interesting information that there were even two magistrates in charge of runaways (kakeochi bugyō) in Ohi, who ordered runaways to state that they were not from Satsuma but from Hosojima or Nabeoka. Satsuma peasants who fled to Ohi domain numbered as many as 2,804, and the majority of them were not the believers of the Ikkōshū. Even if we accept the 2,804 figure, there were still another 53,771 less peasants in 1800 (see Table XXI) to be accounted for. Some of the decline may be attributed to changes to genin status and some probably was due to abortion.

Besides abortion and peasant flights, the appearance of wage workers and gōshi (rural samurai) servants and their rapid increase in number was greatly responsible for the decline in farm population. This form of peasant depopulation took place in relation to the accumulation of land by gōshi. Before we determine what happened to the village population, we must discuss the economic
plight of the *gōshi* as well as the peasants, and the privileges granted to the *gōshi* to supplement their meager income.

As we saw in Chapter IV, Satsuma maintained a large number of samurai outside of the Kagoshima castle-town. In lieu of salary these rural samurai, or *gōshi*, were allotted small plots of land which they cultivated. The example of the rice income of *gōshi* in Isaku district (*gō*), as shown in the following table, suggests that the majority of them received less than one *koku*, indicating their difficult living conditions.

**TABLE XXII**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taka</th>
<th>Number of Families</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50 - 100 <em>koku</em></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 50 <em>koku</em></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 20 <em>koku</em></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 10 <em>koku</em></td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1 - 1 <em>koku</em></td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>less than 0.1 <em>koku</em></td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>332</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to supplement what otherwise was a meager income, the *gōshi* were granted some privileges. They were allowed to engage in occupations such as carpentry,
cooperage, smithery and stonecutting; or rather, these occupations were permitted only to gōshi. Paper-making and tobacco cultivation were also the monopolies of the gōshi. What is more important was their privilege to cultivate nonofficial or non-kado land such as ukimen and kakechi. Land called ukimen was the fertile land not included in kadodaka (official land); it was reserved for the gōshi. Kakechi was the land reclaimed by the gōshi at their own expenses with government permission. The han rice tax on both types of land was relatively light as shown in the following table.

**TABLE XXIII**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of land</th>
<th>Taxes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kadodaka</td>
<td>3 to 9 shō 8 gō (hulled rice) per 1 koku (unhulled rice)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukimen</td>
<td>9 shō 2 gō</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kakechi</td>
<td>8 shō 2 gō</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisaku</td>
<td>3 to 9 shō 8 gō</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizoshita mikake</td>
<td>token assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ōyamano</td>
<td>token assessments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 1 koku (in Satsuma) = 9 to 6 shō (unhulled rice) = 4 to 8 shō (hulled rice).

Besides kakechi, there were other types of reclaimed land: *eisaku, mizoshita mikake* and *ōyamano*. The right to
open up these lands was granted to both gōshi and peasants. However, eisaku, mizoshita mikake and ōyamano were not so productive as kakechi. From all the reclaimed land taxes were exempted for the first three years after their development. Although ukimen and kakechi holdings, with which we are mainly concerned in this discussion, were described as "self-cultivating and self-harvesting" land, many of these parcels were acquired by the upper class or wealthy gōshi because of their advantageous position to obtain government permission and to gather labor power for cultivation and reclamation of land.

The primary source of gōshi labor force was comprised of so-called genin (servants). They were broadly classified into three types, eitai genin, dekan-mero and himagane no mono, according to the nature of their relationship to their employers as defined below. Eitai genin were the servants who were dependent for their entire life or even for several generations upon their master's house. Since they grew up under the master's roof, they were also called hizaoyashi, literally meaning, bringing up a child on one's lap. Dekan (male) and mero (female) were those under indenture which usually spanned over several years. Himagane no mono were those who worked for several days a month in return for an advance of money. It should be noted, however, that the himagane no mono included not only impoverished peasants but also
some poor ごし, although the latter still maintained their samurai status. 92 In any case these "genin" (servants) were the essential labor power for land cultivation and reclamation.

Now it is necessary to see what effects the appearance of "genin" and their increase in number had on the depopulation of agrarian villages. Before 1779 it had been a privilege granted to only castle-town samurai (jōkashi) to hire such genin, while the ごし (rural samurai) were allowed to employ them only under special circumstances for a certain period of time. Under such circumstances, poverty-stricken peasants went to work for the upper-class ごし under the pretext of じょうひょう, literally meaning, permanent day workers. 93 However, since in 1779 permission to hire them was also granted to all ごし and others in lower social status as a relief measure for sufferers from the eruption of Sakurajima volcano, 94 it became the usual practice to employ peasants impoverished by the mounting burdens described earlier. 95 Agricultural magistrate Kubo Heinaizaemon described the many peasants who still remained in their villages as becoming like vagrants. They left their villages and became wage workers. 96 Yet, one might ask if wage workers can be equated with vagrants. According to Haraguchi Torao, most of the upper class ごし in various rural districts
usually had two to three male servants and one to two female servants. 97

Thus, much of this labor force came from the impoverished peasants who belonged to the kado. As we saw in Chapter IV, the kado was the social-economic unit to which the so-called official land was distributed for cultivation. This practice of labor recruitment from the kado came to loosen the kadowari seido (land distribution system) which was the traditional basis of the han revenue.

In this changing economic situation, then, we see shifts in the kinds of agricultural production and corresponding social changes. Economic and social changes frequently bring dislocation and discontent for some. In the case of the traditional conservatism of Satsuma, it is understandable that some elements in the han would look upon measures which departed from traditional practices with growing apprehension. Shigehide did not create the economic problems of Satsuma but, in the opinion of his critics, he exacerbated them. We turn now to an examination of the economic reforms of Shigehide.
FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER V

1. It may be suggested that Satsuma-han was already in financial difficulty in 1587 due to the large number of its warriors, who were supported by the income from its severely reduced territory. Five years later when the Shimazu daimyo was ordered by Hideyoshi to send troops to Korea, the daimyo had to confiscate one-third of the land owned by temples and shrines in order to raise war funds. It is said that Satsuma-han was financially unable to meet Hideyoshi's order to dispatch 5,000 more warriors, totalling 15,000, in the second Korean campaign of 1597. Thus Satsuma-han had already suffered from financial difficulty at the turn of the century. Tsuchiya Takao, Hōken shakai hōkai katei no kenkyū (Study of the Disintegration Process of the Feudal Society) (Kyoto, 1927), pp. 360-361. Hereafter cited as Hōken shakai hōkai katei. Kagoshima-shi, ed., Kagoshima no oitachi (History of Kagoshima City) (Kagoshima, 1955), p. 238.

2. Sakai, "The Consolidation of Power in Satsuma-han," p. 137. Even a small amount of the debt of 200 kan silver could not be paid back at once, and was repaid over the period of three years. Hōken shakai hōkai katei, p. 361.

3. See ibid., pp. 362, 393-396.


13. See *ibid.*, pp. 364-367. Sakai, "The Consolidation of Power in Satsuma-han," pp. 137-138. It should be noted that the samurai found it more difficult to make a living due to the return of part of their land allotments in 1619. Thus, degin was not ordered for a few years. In 1633 the han returned the land to those whose land allotments had been taken by two-thirds. Hōken shakai hōkai katei, p. 368.


15. Hōken shakai hōkai katei, pp. 362-388. *Kenshi*, II, et passim. The demai and the kasami demai (in hulled rice) were assessed for 1 koku of unhulled rice (0.48 koku when hulled).


19. Hōken shakai hōkai katei, p. 35.


25. Mutō, Seinan bunun shiron, p. 56.


27. Loc. cit.


32. See ibid., I, 451.

33. See ibid., I, 475.

34. Tsukahira, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

35. See ibid., p. 91.


40. Tsukahira, op. cit., p. 95.

41. Kenshi, II, 211-212.

42. Haraguchi, Kagoshima-ken no rekishi, p. 183.

43. Kenshi, II, 211.


46. Tsukahira, *Feudal Control in Tokugawa Japan*, p. 94.


52. Corvée was called kuyaku in the central and southern Satsuma, Ōsumi and Hyūga areas, and ten'yaku in Atara district and Tanegashima, and fuku in the northern part of Satsuma. Haraguchi, "Sappan gōshi seikatsu..." p. 209.


56. Furukawa Koshōken, *Seiyū zakki* (Record of the Travel to the West), in *Kinsei shakai keizai sōsho* (Social Economic Series for the Recent Period), comp. by Honjō Eijirō (Tokyo, 1927), IX, 102.

57. Quoted by Haraguchi in "Sappan gōshi seikatsu..." pp. 231-232 [footnote].


59. See ibid., II, 364-365.


64. See ibid., p. 51.

65. Itō, "kanshō zakki," II, 8a-9.


68. Ichiki, "Satsuma no kuni fūzoku enkaku oyobi...," pp. 53-54.


70. Kubo, op. cit., p. 58

71. Hampōshū Kagoshima, I, 322.

72. Itō, "kanshō zakki," II, 8, 9.

73. Haraguchi, Kagoshima-ken no rekishi, p. 175

74. Kubo, shōgō eirō shirabe, p. 49.

75. Satō Nobuhiro, Sappan Keiiki (Particulars of Satsuma) (1830), in Satō Nobuhiro kagaku zenshū (Complete Works of Sato Nobuhiro), comp. by Takimoto Seiichi (Tokyo, 1926), II, 696.

76. These figures are taken from Kenshi, II, 11-16.

77. See ibid., II, 338-339.


80. Kokushō Iwao, "Hyakushō ikki nempyō" ("Chronological Table of Peasant Uprisings"), in Sekai rekishi jiten (Historical World Encyclopedia), XXII, 460.


82. Quoted by Kawagoe in Kagoshima kenshi gaisetsu, p. 734.


84. Haraguchi, Bakumatsu no Satsuma, p. 16. The following survey by Yamada also indicates the economic plight of the gōshi.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hioki-gun</th>
<th>Kawabe-gun</th>
<th>Satsuma-gun</th>
<th>Satsuma-gun</th>
<th>Kawabe-gun</th>
<th>Aira-gun</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Isaku-gō</td>
<td>Ehi-mura</td>
<td>Takae-gō</td>
<td>Yamasaki-gō</td>
<td>Kawabe-gō</td>
<td>Gamō-gō</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(over 50 koku)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(over 30 koku)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(over 20 koku)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(over 10 koku)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(over 5 koku)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(over 1 koku)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>327</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(over 0.1 koku)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(less than 0.1 koku)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>169</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Year of survey: (1869) (1870) (1869) (1789) (1818) (1774)

Yamada, Meiji zettaishugi..., p. 187.


For a detailed description of the nature and types of
ukimen, see Andō Tamotsu, "Kinsei Satsuma-han no
ukimen ni tsuite" ("On the Land Called Ukimen in
Satsuma-han in the Early Modern Period"), in Satsuma­
han no kiso kōzō (Basic Structure of the Satsuma-han),
ed. by Hidemura Senzō (Tokyo, 1970), pp. 73-122.

88. Taken from Haraguchi, Kagoshima-ken no rekishi,
p. 170.

89. Sakai, op. cit., 66. Haraguchi, "Sappan gōshi
seikatsu...," pp. 224-225.

90. Yamada, Meiji zettaishugi..., p. 198. The survey of
the land holdings of the gōshi in Gamō district in
1863 shows that kakechi land was concentrated in the hands of the upper class gōshi with rice income of
30 koku or more. Andō, "Kinsei Satsuma-han no ukimen
ni tsuite," p. 121.

91. Hidemura Senzō, "Bakumatsu-ki Satsuma-han ni okeru
jōsō gōshi to eitai genin" ("The Upper Class Goshi
and their Permanent Servants in Satsuma-han during
the Bakumatsu Period"), in Satsuma-han no kiso kōzō,
pp. 159-163.

92. Ibid., p. 162. Hidemura Senzō, "Sappan ni okeru ichi
jōsō gōshi no rōdō soshiki" ("Labor Structure of an
Upper Class Gōshi in Satsuma-han"), in Honjō Sensei
koki kinen: kinsei Nihon no keizai to shakai
(Commemoration of Professor Honjo's Seventieth Birth­
day: Economy and Society in Japan in the Early
Modern Period), ed. by Horie Yasuzō (Tokyo, 1958),
p. 348.

93. Haraguchi, Kagoshima-ken no rekishi, p. 175.

94. Hampōshū Kagoshima, I, 333.

95. Haraguchi, "Sappan gōshi seikatsu...," p. 238, states
that in extreme cases they were hired even without
bond.


CHAPTER VI
ECONOMIC REFORMS OF SHIGEhide

Due to the external and internal causes discussed in the previous chapter, the economic basis of the power and prestige of the Shimazu daimyo had been greatly weakened at the time Shigehide became han lord in 1755. Moreover, not until 1772, with the death of his uncle Hisamine, who had dominated the han government through the family council, was Shigehide finally able to proceed with his own economic programs. In order to accomplish his economic goals, Shigehide carried out various changes in both central and local administration with a view to establishing direct control over the han government, as we saw in Chapter III and IV.

"Conservative" Measures

First, to cope with the financial difficulties of the han, Shigehide continued the traditional "conservative" economic measures which had been enforced by previous daimyo, while initiating some other measures which may be characterized as "progressive". We shall deal first with his "conservative" measures. One traditional means of coping with the problem of han indebtedness was the levying of forced loans and special taxes.
Prior to his assumption of power, in 1746 the annual assessment of forced loans of rice (demai) for samurai was fixed at 8.1 sho (0.081 koku) per 1 koku income, as discussed in the previous chapter. Additional forced loans of rice (kasami demai) were levied from time to time depending on the economic needs of the han. Since the total samurai income (kyūchi taka) remained at around 550,000 koku from 1741, it is reasonable to assume that these extra taxes for samurai contributed annually to the han treasury over 50,000 koku (about 50,000 ryo).

Forced loans of money (degin) and special taxes for commoners levied from around 1730 annually amounted to some 1,500 kan (25,000 ryo).

While continuing the levy of these extra taxes on his people, Shigehide frequently issued sumptuary regulations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of issuance</th>
<th>Duration of regulations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1761</td>
<td>1761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1763</td>
<td>1763-1768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1768</td>
<td>1769-1774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1774</td>
<td>1775-1781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1781</td>
<td>1782-1787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1788</td>
<td>1788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1801</td>
<td>1801-1805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1805</td>
<td>1806-1810</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These regulations were supported by measures advocating strict retrenchment. Shigehide himself took the initiative and reduced his daily necessities, thus attempting to show the great importance he placed on this policy. In the fourth month of 1768 Shigehide reduced the number of dishes in ordinary days from one soup and two kinds of entrees to one soup and one entree. He ordered his servants to brew the same green tea twice, and to reduce expenses for other daily necessities such as clothes and candles. In addition to the aforementioned measures, the following measures were taken: the extension of the period of residence for officials stationed at Edo, Kyoto and Osaka to two years except for a senior councillor (karō) and the daimyo's personal steward and attendants; the reduction of office salary for those in the office of Nō drama (nōkata) who received more than five koku for their services; the abolishment of the Satsuma office of accounting (kanjōsho) at Edo (in the ninth month of 1775); and the suspension of the expansion and rebuilding of Satsuma residences and han offices, and the further decrease of the number of government personnel stationed at Edo (in the fifth month of 1788).

One of the more significant aspects of the retrenchment policy was that in the second month of 1786 Shigehide was able to secure Bakufu permission to considerably
reduce presents to the Bakufu elders and other officials while paying back loans of money and rice obtained from the Bakufu in 1784. It should be noted that gift-giving to Bakufu officials upon the daimyo's arrival at Edo, and on numerous other occasions, was compulsory and enforced by Bakufu order. There is little doubt that Shigehide's power and prestige as father-in-law of the shogunal heir-apparent helped him to obtain the Bakufu's permission to reduce presents. This reduction lasted until 1799.

Another material benefit derived from Shigehide's close relationship with the Tokugawa was the large loans of money and rice secured from the Bakufu. The Bakufu, which had considerably reduced financial assistance to all daimyo from the Hōreki period (1751-1764) due to its own economic distress, virtually discontinued the practice of loans in 1771, especially to outside daimyo (tozama). Despite this change in Bakufu policy, Shigehide managed to obtain periodically a large amount of loans, as shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of loans</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Period for payment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1785</td>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>10 years from 1786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1794</td>
<td>20,000 ryo, 10,000 koku</td>
<td>10 years from 1797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1805</td>
<td>10,000 ryo, 10,000 koku</td>
<td>10 years from 1809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1806</td>
<td>10,000 ryo</td>
<td>10 years from 1818</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thus, the payment of these loans each extended over as long as ten years without any interest, considerably benefited Satsuma finances.

Another "conservative" economic measure was the permanent transfer to the han treasury of large portions of Shigehide's retirement allowance (inkyoryō) and his personal funds for household needs (nandogin) in order to supplement the ordinary expenditures at Edo.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of transfer</th>
<th>Amount of transfer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1788</td>
<td>30,000 ryo transferred from the daimyo's nandogin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20,000 koku (1 koku=1 ryo) transferred from Shigehide's 50,000 koku retirement allowance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1790</td>
<td>500 ryo &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1794</td>
<td>10,000 koku &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1805</td>
<td>1,000 ryo &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These contributions amounted to 61,500 ryo (3,690 kan) annually after 1805.

Perhaps the most significant economic countermeasure taken by Shigehide was the lowering of the interest rate on han debts. As we noted earlier, the han debts amounted to 72,600 kan (1,170,000 ryo) as of 1801, and its annual interest was 6,800 kan at the rate of 7 shu (about 8.4 percent). In the eleventh month of 1801 Shigehide decided that this rate was too high. It was his plan to lower the annual interest rate of the total han debts at Edo, Kyoto and Osaka to 2 shu (about 2.4 percent) and the rate for those in Satsuma to 2 percent from the following
The daimyo's personal attendant (sobayaku) Iwashita Sajiemon and investigator (gimmiyaku) Komeyoshi Hikonojō successfully concluded negotiations with moneylenders, and they were able to lower the interest rate to 3 shu (3.6 percent) at Edo and 2 shu (2.4 percent) at Kyoto and Osaka.

The success of these negotiations suggests that up to 1801 Satsuma enjoyed credit with the merchant moneylenders outside of Satsuma, especially with the Osaka merchants. Undoubtedly, one factor in the gaining of both political and economic control by Shigehide was his willingness to bypass traditional personnel and methods to achieve his goals, as described in Chapter IV. This pragmatism has been severely criticized by his opponents as we shall see later, but his utilization of and cooperation with merchants is an integral part of his success in limiting han debts and maintaining Satsuma's credit with merchant moneylenders. In the third month of 1776 he appointed Ikeda Shōzaemon, a Satsuma merchant, as the moneylender for the office of accounting (kanehō goyōgakari ginshu) attached to the daimyo's personal administration.

"Progressive" Measures

Shigehide's "progressive" economic measures centered around the promotion of rice production, the encouragement
of the cultivation of local products and their han monopoly, and the expansion of Satsuma's official Ryukyu-China trade as well as smuggling activities. In this section we will limit our discussion to Shigehide's promotion of agriculture and his various undertakings for the production of finished goods. His efforts to expand both official and illicit trade will be left to Chapter VIII, for visible effects of this trade were felt after 1810.

One of the measures Shigehide took to increase rice production and to secure more tax revenue from rice was the han-sponsored land reclamation. It should be remembered that there was much reclamation by the people themselves as discussed in the previous chapter, but we will limit our discussion to the reclamation carried out by the government. According to Yamada Tatsuo, land reclamation had been actively carried out from around 1658 to about 1726, but it had slowed down in the years previous to Shigehide's rule as shown in Table XXIV. Sometimes land reclamation was associated with other than rice production. In the eleventh month of 1768, then again in 1777, 10,000 koku of rice was transferred from the han treasury to the daimyo's personal fund (nandogin). With this personal fund Shigehide undertook the reclamation of fields and salt farms, and charged agricultural magistrate Hori Jin'emon with the project in the third
month of 1776. However, this reclamation project was discontinued in the eleventh month of 1778 due to the large amount of peasant corvée needed for repairing serious damages throughout Satsuma caused by typhoons in the autumn of that year.  

### TABLE XXIV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total area reclaimed</th>
<th>Number of reclamation projects</th>
<th>Reclaimed area per year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1596-1657</td>
<td>879 chō*</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16 chō</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1658-1715</td>
<td>4,747 chō</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>95 chō</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1716-1780</td>
<td>2,079 chō</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>40 chō</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1781-1829</td>
<td>1,301 chō</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26 chō</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The total areas reclaimed include both reclaimed rice fields and paddy fields improved by irrigation

1 chō = 2.45 acres

Another means of increasing rice production was the further tightening of agricultural supervision as demonstrated in the following measures. In the fifth month of 1768 each agricultural inspector (jikata kensha) periodically sent out from the central han government was ordered to take charge of the particular rural districts (gō) for three years, and he was also held responsible for the results of specific farming processes under his supervision. According to the Kannō ōsedashi-gaki (Instructions for the Promotion of Agriculture), written
in the first month of 1782 by deputy agricultural magistrate (kōri bugyō minarai) Mihara Nakazaemon, around 1776 one or two gōshi elders, unit captains (kumigashira) and agricultural promoters (kōri mimai) were appointed to the newly created local post, the office for the encouragement of agriculture (kannō goyō gakari). On fixed days each month they gathered at the jitō kariya, the headquarters of the local gō administration, and saw to it that official notices on agriculture, including instructions by the agricultural magistrate (kōri bugyō), were successfully carried out. The strengthening of agricultural supervision on the village is demonstrated in an order of the first month of 1782 wherein village heads (shōya) were instructed to awake peasants before daybreak either by blowing a trumpet shell or striking clappers to force them to engage diligently in farming. It should be mentioned that these stricter measures of peasant control were supplemented by the more elaborate instructions for agricultural promotion called Kannō ōsedashi-gaki. The Kannō ōsedashi-gaki gave detailed guidance and instructions concerning various aspects of farming, and it was sent to all major local officials such as gōshi elders, unit captains (kumi gashira) and agricultural promoters (kōri mimai). This Kannō ōsedashi-gaki was mainly based on the Nōgyō-hen (Regulations on Farming) and the Nōgyō-hō (Instructions
on Farming Methods). The Nōgyō-hen was compiled by senior councillor (karō) Nejime Kiyoo in 1683, and the Nōgyō-hō was completed by him some time during the Genroku period (1688-1704).26

To keep peasants in a self-sufficient economy and to secure the full payment of their rice tax, Shigehide further tightened the control of peddling, as demonstrated in the following notice issued by senior councillor Akamatsu Norimasa and grand overseer (ōmetsuke) Miyanohara Michinao in the eleventh month of 1778:

Peddlers from other domains enter into the rural districts of Satsuma to sell kitchen utensils or fancy goods, and some of them do not even have the permit issued by the city magistrate (machi bugyō). Since most of their goods are sold on credit, the peasants buy more than they can afford. In early autumn the peddlers come to collect unhulled rice or minor cereals for the goods they have sold, causing great difficulty for the peasants in paying their rice tax to the han government. Therefore, the peddling of the above goods shall be prohibited.27

There were frequent issuances of official notices after 1656, which either prohibited peddlers from entering agrarian villages or forbade peasants to buy goods from them "before the full payment of the rice tax."28 It should be noted, however, that merchants who sold daily necessities such as salt and oil, and drug merchants were not bound by these prohibitions. In Shigehide's time even a group of traveling drug merchants from Toyama-han, called the "Satsuma-gumi," were ordered to discontinue
their peddling in 1781, 1787 and 1799, although they were later granted permission to resume trade each time in return for a large amount of special taxes. 29

While taking various measures to increase rice production and to secure the rice tax as we observed in the foregoing discussion, Shigehide vigorously carried out measures to promote the production of local products to increase han revenue. The initiation of this policy can be seen in an official notice issued in the fifth month of 1772. It stated that measures which had been strictly adhered to up to the present would be changed depending on the situation. The notice further stipulated that even the measures which had not been permitted heretofore would be allowed and enforced after investigation if they proved financially beneficial to the han. 30

Shigehide further tightened the control over the purchase and sale of local products to secure maximum profits from their transaction. This measure resulted in han monopolies of rapeseed in 1775 and sugar in 1777 as we shall see later. Other local products such as sesami seed, tobacco and indigo ball were exclusively bought and sold by privileged merchants who paid the merchant tax (reigin) to the han government. It should be remembered that, to assist in the successful execution of this monopoly, Shigehide allowed merchants from the Kyoto-Osaka area to settle down or arrange marriages in Satsuma in the
sixth month of 1772, as we described in Chapter II in connection with his "enlightenment" policy. Now, we shall examine various measures Shigehide took to promote the production of local products and to obtain maximum income from their sale.

Local products of Satsuma such as sugar, crude wax, paper and camphor were important sources of han revenue, and their production had been encouraged from the early part of the Tokugawa period. Peasants had been encouraged to cultivate sugar cane, wax trees and paper mulberry trees, and these products were then bought up by the han. Since sugar was the most profitable local product of Satsuma, various measures to increase production had been taken by the han government before Shigehide's time. Soon after the introduction from Ryukyu of the methods of sugar manufacture around the year 1698, the han government began to consider sugar as an important source of han income. Consequently, some time after 1698 the han established various posts such as kibi yokome (sugar cane inspectors), tsuguchi yokome (port station inspectors) and chikuboku yokome (bamboo tree inspectors) in Amami-Ōshima to increase sugar production and sale. The establishment of these offices suggests that the han government began purchasing sugar there some time in the Genroku period (1688-1704).

As its financial situation deteriorated, the han further encouraged production of sugar and tightened its
control over sugar sales by instituting the han purchasing systems called jōshiki kaiire and kaikasami. Through the former system, which was established during the Kyōho and Gembun periods (1716-1741), the government allotted a fixed amount of sugar to be produced by an individual peasant which was compulsorily sold to the han. By the latter system, which was initiated some time before the Hōreki period (1751-1764), the government purchased a fixed amount of surplus sugar. The han gave 0.35 shō (100 shō = 1 koku) of rice for 1 kin (1.323 lb.) of sugar bought through the jōshiki kaiire system, while 0.4 shō of rice was exchanged for 1 kin of sugar in the kaikasami system. The amount of sugar bought annually by the jōshiki kaiire system was fixed as follows: 3,500,000 kin from Ōshima, 580,000 kin from Kikaishima, and 730,000 kin from Tokunoshima.

In 1745 the peasants in Ōshima were ordered to pay their rice tax with sugar at a rate of 0.36 shō rice for 1 kin sugar. This order was very important in the sense that it signified a complete change in the nature of the island economy from a rice basis to the commercial crop basis, a process effected by the establishment of the han sugar monopoly system (satō sō-kaiire-sei) in 1777.

With the initiation by Shigehide of this sugar monopoly system in the so-called "Three Islands" (Ōshima, Tokunoshima and Kikaishima), all business transactions in
the islands were suddenly prohibited, and daily necessities of the islanders were supplied by the han government, according to the Oshima daikan-ki (Record of the Oshima Intendant). For the effective implementation of the measure, Shigehide also eliminated spiritual mediums (noro and yuta) who had hindered han efforts to increase sugar production. The latter used to tell the islanders, for example, not to clear a specific mountain because of its sacredness or not to work on certain days because of ill luck. Haraguchi Torao described the effect this sugar monopoly system had on the island agricultural economy as turning the whole island into a "collective farm" of sugar cane cultivation and sugar manufacture.

This measure was discontinued in 1787 probably because sugar production had reached a point of diminishing return due to the increased impoverishment of the peasants in the islands. They were already in a state of extreme misery by 1777 when the sugar monopoly system was initiated. Their plight was described by Tokunō Michinao who was sent by the han government to the islands in 1777 as an official of agricultural promotion (kannōshi). He lamented that "there was not even a house within which to sit down and wash his feet." There was not enough food for the islanders to eat, and they were subsisting on seaweed, according to him. This situation prompted Tokunō to make the following suggestions to the han
government: to limit the amount of forced sugar cane cultivation; to allow peasants extra time for the cultivation of agricultural products other than sugar cane such as rice and sweet potato in order to alleviate their suffering; and to suspend the practice of rationed rice by the han government. In short, he advocated the discontinuation of the han sugar monopoly system.

In addition to the harsh effects of the sugar monopoly system, there is no doubt that frequent natural disasters especially during the Temmei period (1781-1789), often leading to famines, added more poverty and much suffering to the life of peasants in the "Three Islands." The "Three Islands" (Ōshima, Tokunoshima, Kikaishima) were highly vulnerable to natural disasters due to their geographical location situated in the middle of the ocean, and almost all typhoons which visited the Japan mainland passed through these islands. The severity of the effects of typhoons on the life of the islanders is related by Honda Chikataka who served as Ōshima intendant (daikan) from 1805 to 1806. According to him, one visit of a typhoon in summer or autumn could result in extreme poverty for the peasants. Two strikes could cause a peasant family to break up, while three visits could lead to a famine followed by starvation.

As noted earlier, Satsuma was stricken by a series of natural disasters in the 1780s. Especially devastating
was the flood in the sixth month and the storm in the eighth month of 1786, which caused the loss of 398,000 koku of rice. Tokunoshima also suffered from a series of famines caused by poor harvests in 1782, 1783 and 1786. Judging from these natural disasters in Satsuma and Takunoshima, it may be reasonably suggested that Ōshima and Kikaishima also suffered from some sort of natural disasters, although no records are available to verify this. Presumably, the increasing impoverishment and suffering of the islanders, partially aggravated by the reluctance of the peasants to forego former ways and by a series of natural disasters, worked against the han efforts to increase han revenue through the sugar monopoly system. Consequently, the han government was forced to discontinue the system in 1787.

In the following year the han government resumed the former systems of sugar purchase, namely, the jōshiki kaiire system by which the han allotted a fixed amount of sugar to be produced and purchased, and the kaikasami system through which the government bought a fixed amount of surplus sugar. As seen in Table XXV, the amount of sugar purchased by the han through these systems rapidly increased in the years after 1788.

Raw wax was another of the major local products of Satsuma, and the cultivation of wax trees (haji) also had been encouraged by the han from the beginning of the
TABLE XXV.

SUGAR PURCHASED IN THE "THREE ISLANDS" AND RICE PAYMENT FOR IT (1788-1807)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Oshima</th>
<th>Tokunoshima</th>
<th>Kikaishima</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jōshiki</td>
<td>Jōshiki</td>
<td>Jōshiki</td>
<td>Jōshiki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>kaiire</td>
<td>kaiire</td>
<td>kaiire</td>
<td>kaiire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kaikasami</td>
<td>Kaikasami</td>
<td>Kaikasami</td>
<td>Kaikasami</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1788</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>730,000</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1797</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>730,000</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1799</td>
<td>4,600,000</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>730,000</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1801</td>
<td>4,600,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>730,000</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1804</td>
<td>4,600,000</td>
<td>400,000*</td>
<td>730,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1805</td>
<td>4,600,000</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>730,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1806</td>
<td>4,600,000</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>730,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1807</td>
<td>4,600,000</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
<td>730,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Expressed in kin: 1 kin = 1.323 lb.)

1788 ——— 1799 ——— 1801 ——— 1805 ——— 1807

Jōshiki kaiire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jōshiki kaiire</th>
<th>Kaikasami</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1788</td>
<td>0.3 sho</td>
<td>0.4 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1799</td>
<td>0.324 sho</td>
<td>0.4 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1801</td>
<td>0.324 sho</td>
<td>0.324 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1805</td>
<td>0.324 sho</td>
<td>0.424 sho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1807</td>
<td>0.324 sho</td>
<td>0.4 sho</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(per 1 kin sugar)

* Kenshi states that the kaikasami (additional purchase) sugar was increased to 400,000 kin in 1805. However, it also mentions in other places that the kaikasami sugar was assessed annually 200,000 kin for three years, 1801-1803, and that it was increased to 900,000 kin in the spring of 1805. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the kaikasami sugar was increased in 1804.

** Figures for three years listed in Kenshi are confusing, so that they are not quoted in this table.
Tokugawa period. In 1684 when he was appointed the estate manager (jito) of Ei district, Nejime Kiyoo directed each peasant in the district to cultivate 500 wax trees. He later extended their planting to various places along the coast of Satsuma. 45

The cultivation and treatment of wax trees and the collection of their nuts were strictly supervised by inspectors for wax trees (hajikata kensha) sent out by the han central government and by promoters for wax trees (haji mimai). All wax tree nuts were purchased by the han with 7.25 shō rice for 1 hyō (bale) of nuts since the Kan'ei period (1624-1644). However, the rice payment was later reduced to 7.12 shō for 1 hyō of nuts, thus increasing han income. 46

During the Jōkyō and Genroku periods (1684-1704) the method of wax manufacturing was greatly improved by the efforts of Nejime Kiyoo. Reportedly, the han netted a profit of 400 or 500 kan silver in 1704. The net profit doubled by 1726 to 996 kan. However, raw wax began to be produced in neighboring domains after the Enkyō period (1744-1748), causing a fall in the price of Satsuma raw wax. As a result, even the post of the agricultural magistrate for wax trees (hajikata kōri bugyō) was abolished. 47

With a view to promoting the production of raw wax, Shigehide reestablished the office of agricultural
magistrate for wax trees around 1770. It is said that he also fixed the commuted rice payment for wax tree nuts at 5 shō rice for 1 hyō nuts in the autumn of 1773. Reportedly, the han netted 646.497 kan from the sale of raw wax in one year from the eighth month of 1777.

Rapeseed (natane), which was raw material for lamp oil was another important cash crop in Satsuma. In its major areas of production, the southern part of Satsuma and Ōsumi peninsulas, peasants had been allowed to pay their dry field tax by rapeseed. Shigehide attempted to make this important cash crop a han monopoly, as seen in the notices of the fourth month of 1775 and the second (int.) month of 1792. However, the han rapeseed monopoly was not continually enforced due to the type of fertilizer needed for its cultivation. The cultivation of rapeseed required fertilizer made of powdered animal and fish bone, which was bought from other domains and sold in advance to peasants by local merchants. The merchants collected the price for this fertilizer by taking rapeseed produced in the following year.

Consequently, according to the notice issued in the third month of 1788, peasants were granted permission to sell their surplus rapeseed within Satsuma between the eleventh month and the second month, and the local merchants were permitted to ship the rapeseed to other domains between the third month and the tenth month.
The notice issued in the fifth month of 1806 also stated that shipping of rapeseed to other domains was permitted between the eighth month and the second month. 53

The cultivation of tobacco in Satsuma, which began some time during the Keichō period (1596-1615), had been for the most part the monopoly of the gōshi (rural samurai). 54 However, tobacco trade by gōshi had not been actively carried out mainly due to their disdain of pecuniary matters. 55 It was after 1772, when Shigehide opened Satsuma for freer traffic, that Satsuma tobacco gradually began to be shipped to other domains. 56 Reportedly, the merchants first shipped a large quantity of tobacco to the Osaka market during the Temmei period (1781-1789), making a large profit. 57

As discussed in Chapter II, Shigehide encouraged the cultivation of medicinal herbs, leading to the establishment of the Yoshino herb garden in 1779. To systemize the management of three herb gardens at Yamagawa, Sata and Yoshino in Satsuma for the increased production of medicinal herbs, he instituted the office of herb gardens (yakuensho) around 1781 and created the post of superintendent of herb gardens (yakuen bugyō) in the twelfth month of 1792. 58 According to the official notice issued in the sixth month of 1789, pharmacopoeia produced in Satsuma were monopolized by the han and shipped to Osaka for sale. 59
The han government had paid attention to camphor production from early Tokugawa times. Forest magistrates (yama bugyō) strictly supervised the planting and treatment of camphor trees. According to an official notice issued by the office of the forest magistrate in 1652, those who rooted up and stole camphor saplings were to be fined, while those who reported offenders to the authorities were to be rewarded.

Camphor was bought up by the han, and most of it was exported through Nagasaki. The exportation is said to have started about 1637 and 1638. Its net profit was said to be around 1,000 ryo or 60 kan silver a year in the Shōtoku period (1711-1716). The net profit for one year from the eighth month of 1777 amounted to 151.299 kan (2,521 ryo) while the han netted 88.154 kan (1,470 ryo) in 1826. Although very little data is available on Shigehide's promotional measures of camphor production, the great increase in net profit in 1777 suggests that his measures were successfully carried out at least in the initial stages. Probably his greater concern with the activities of merchants as well as his pressure for increased production explain why the trade brought more revenue to the han treasury than before.

The raw material for paper, paper mulberry (kōzo), had been widely cultivated in Satsuma. In 1684 its planting was ordered by the han: five paper mulberry trees
each per peasant and five on the premises of each merchant, temple and gōshi (rural samurai). The cultivation of paper mulberry trees and their treatment were placed under the strict supervision of inspectors for wax trees (hajikata kensha) and promoters for paper mulberry (kōzo mimai). The bark thus produced was bought up by the han government.

It is important to note that paper making was exclusively a secondary occupation of gōshi (rural samurai). The office of paper manufacturing, called kamiza, distributed mulberry bark to gōshi, who delivered to the kamiza a fixed amount of paper in proportion to the ration of bark allotted to them. The gōshi received wages for their paper making.

Shigehide made an effort to improve the technique for making paper hoping thereby to increase its production. Reportedly, this led to the establishment of an office called the zasshi-kata (office of paper). Shigehide even tried to produce Chinese paper in 1787 with the help of a Ryukyuan called Arakaki Jin'ya whose father learned the paper making technique in Fukien.

Shigehide also attempted to undertake textile industries. His encouragement of the study of textiles is seen in the notice issued in the first month of 1773. Shigehide stated that, if there were those who would wish to learn weaving techniques of textiles of any kind, they
were to be sent to Osaka for training. He established a weaving factory (oriya) in Kagoshima in 1776 which wove habutae-silk with raw silk imported from the Fukushima, Kōrigami and Ōmi areas. However, this undertaking did not develop, mainly due to the lack of demand for silk goods caused by the official Bakufu restrictions against wearing them. Shigehide also initiated the study of woolen fabrics in 1773. His enthusiasm led to his attempt to raise sheep and start wool spinning and weaving around 1818 as mentioned in Chapter II. Even though not all of his economic ventures, such as sheep raising, were successful, it is evident that Shigehide gave great impetus to commercial and technological development by his projects.

Lastly, Shigehide's efforts to increase han revenue are also seen in his attempt to expand smuggling activities, as mentioned earlier in this chapter. Reportedly he requested permission from the Bakufu to expand Satsuma's Ryukyu-China trade, under cover of which Shigehide wished to carry out illicit trade. The Satsuma government persistently asked the Bakufu for permission to increase the number of approved Chinese import goods, purportedly to rescue Ryukyu from its financial difficulties. It submitted ten such requests from 1804 to 1820. In 1810 Satsuma was finally granted the Bakufu's temporary permission to import eight articles which were to be sold
through the Bakufu's Nagasaki Trading Agency (Nagasaki kaisho). The significance of the expansion of Satsuma's Ryukyu-China trade and the illicit trade under its cover will be discussed in detail in Chapter VIII.

Assessment of Shigehide's Economic Reforms

Although Shigehide was not entirely successful in reforming the han economy, by 1807 he had demonstrated his ability to recognize the changing economic times and to direct Satsuma's response to it. By suspending the construction of buildings at Edo, reducing gifts to the Bakufu officials, acquiring interest-free loans of money and rice, successfully reducing the rate of interest on the han debt to Osaka merchants, and by even reducing the amount of his personal expenditures, Shigehide decreased the rate of Satsuma indebtedness. Why then have his critics declared his efforts not only a failure, but also evidence of severe exploitation?

There are several possible explanations. One factor was Shigehide's willingness to bypass regular channels of administration. As one of his critics, the gōshi elder Itō Katarō has noted, Shigehide utilized the naii (daimyo's personal wish) method, and he chose men from outside the workings of the status system. In particular, his promotion of chōnin, or merchants, must have been especially distasteful to the samurai. Samurai bias is evident in the traditional attacks against the encouragement
of local commercial products as opposed to rice production. As we have shown, however, Shigehide apparently did not neglect rice production, but he recognized the limited ability of Satsuma to increase han revenue by concentration primarily on rice.

Secondly, these critics have been selective about the data with which they point to the increased han debts. Traditional interpretations on Shigehide's rule all emphasized the enormous han debts of 5 million ryo, or 320,000 kan by 1827. There are two points of weakness in these interpretations. One is that they failed to divide the time of Shigehide's domination over the han administration into two clearly distinguishable periods in terms of the rate of increase of han debts. As we saw in Table XII, the annual average of debt increase from 1710 to 1754 was 802 kan silver, while that from 1807 to 1827 was 12,193 kan. The period from 1754 to 1807, with which we are concerned in this chapter, witnessed the annual average of only 380 kan in the increase of han debts. Thus, we may conclude that Shigehide was successful in his earlier economic reforms in that he was able to keep the debt increase at a minimum.

The second point of weakness in the traditional interpretation was the undue stress on the impoverishment and suffering of peasants, which in turn led to the depopulation of agrarian villages and the resultant
decrease in rice income. While Shigehide was not so "enlightened" as to embody the liberal attitudes of the late twentieth century strictures against peasant exploitation, he was pragmatic enough to realize that severe peasant suffering was inimical to the han's well-being, and evidently discontinued practices which the peasantry could or would not bear.

Since a set of complete data of the han revenue and expenditure around 1801 is available, we will analyze this data to find reasons why Shigehide was successful in his earlier economic reforms.

**Annual han expenditure around 1801:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6,700 kan</td>
<td>Annual average of the ordinary han expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>850 kan</td>
<td>Sankin kōtai trip to and from Edo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,100 kan</td>
<td>Annual interest payment for the total han debts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 kan</td>
<td>Annual average of the ordinary expenditure at Kyoto and Osaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14,650 kan</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Annual han revenue around 1801:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,000 kan</td>
<td>Annual average of the income from the sale of rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,000 kan</td>
<td>Annual average of the income from the sale of local products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,000 kan</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The annual deficit was 7,650 kan (127,500 ryo). However, there were the following incomes which were not officially listed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3,000 kan</td>
<td>Forced loans of rice from samurai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,500 kan</td>
<td>Various taxes for commoners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,800 kan</td>
<td>Transfer to the han treasury from Shigehide's retirement allowance (3,000 kan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,300 kan</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The total han revenue, both official and unofficial, was 13,300 kan (221,600 ryo), thus creating an annual deficit of 1,350 kan (22,500 ryo). As we noted in the previous chapter, the annual deficit or the increase of debt was only 380 kan (6,300 ryo). What were the sources for payment of the balance of 970 kan (380 kan subtracted from 1,350 kan) and of the extraordinary expenses such as the Bakufu levies, the rebuilding of Satsuma residences after fires, marriages of members of the daimyo's family and gift-giving? It is my assumption that they were covered by Bakufu loans, profits from smuggling, and savings from the lowering of interest rate. Frequent loans of money and rice without interest, which Satsuma was able to obtain from the Bakufu owing to Shigehide's power and prestige among the Bakufu officials, as discussed in Chapter II, no doubt helped the Satsuma economy. Besides the fact that these loans bore no interest, they were carried over ten years. There is also the additional factor of inflation, which was exemplified by the rise in rice price. The price of rice in 1616 rose by eleven times by the middle of the 19th century. Inflation in actuality worked for the decrease of the amount of loans.

Finally, the lowering of the interest rate on han debts was also beneficial to han finances. In 1801 Satsuma paid the interest of 6,100 kan (8.4 percent in
interest rate) for 72,600 kan debts. In the following year it succeeded in lowering the interest rate to 3.6 percent per annum for debts at Edo and to 2.4 percent for those at Kyoto-Osaka as well as in Satsuma as mentioned earlier. It should be noted that the interest rate is crucial in understanding the rapid continued increase of han debts after 1807 when Satsuma failed to obtain loans with lower interests. In 1806 the han was forced to borrow 2,595 kan (43,269 ryo) from Edo merchants, of which 2,472 kan (41,200 ryo) carried 10 percent annual interest.

Shigehide's economic reform measures were not without their opponents. Just how strong the opposition was we shall see by examining the event referred to as the Kinshiroku purge.
1. Kenshi, II, 230-240 et passim. Sumptuary regulations were not issued for 1762 and for the years of 1789 and 1800. The omission in the latter period was due to the natural disasters which occurred frequently during the Temmei period (1781-1789). The typhoon and flood in the summer of 1786 were responsible for the loss of 398,000 koku rice, reducing greatly the han as well as samurai incomes, and causing great suffering for peasants. The resultant financial difficulty of the samurai led to their exemption from additional forced loans of rice (kasami demai) in the fifth month of 1788. It is said that Shigehide, knowing the misery and suffering of the peasants, "reluctantly" decided to assess special taxes on commoners in the eighth month of 1790 for the next two years in order to meet the financial needs of the han. Ibid., II, 436, 239.


3. Ibid., I, 457.


6. Tsukahira, Feudal Control in Tokugawa Japan, p. 68.


12. See ibid., II, 74.


14. See ibid., I, 481.

15. Loc. cit.


19. See ibid., II, 878.


23. Kawagoe, ibid., p. 702.

24. Ibid., pp. 702-703.

25. Ibid., p. 706.


27. Hampōshū Kagoshima, I, 323.


31. The following annual han revenue from the sale of Satsuma's local products at Osaka during the Tempō period (1830-1844) shows the importance of sugar as the source of income: sugar (235,000 ryō on an annual average, 1830-1839), rice (18,400 ryō, 1830-1839), raw wax (15,000 ryō, 1830-1840), rapeseeds (1,500 ryō, 1832-1839). Ebihara Yōsai, Sappan Tempō do igo zaisei kaikaku temmatsusho (Report of the Financial Reform of the Tempo Period in Satsuma) (1884), in Kinsei shakai keizai sōsho, IV, 38-54. Hereafter cited as Temmatsusho.

32. The kibi yokome supervised the cultivation of sugar cane and made sure of sufficient input of manure, thus taking charge of increasing sugar production. The tsuguchi yokome inspected incoming and outgoing ships and maintained strict control against the illicit sale
of sugar. The chikuboku yokome was assigned the supervision of the cultivation of trees which were used to make the barrels for sugar. Hōken shakai hōkai katei, p. 452.


34. Kenshi, loc. cit.


36. Quoted by Haraguchi in "Satsuma no satō," p. 83.

37. Haraguchi, Bakumatsu no Satsuma, p. 115.

38. Haraguchi, Kagoshima-ken no rekishi, p. 196.

39. Haraguchi, Bakumatsu no Satsuma, pp. 103-104.

40. See ibid., pp. 115-116.


43. Ibid., II, 435-436, 439.


45. Ibid., II, 531.

46. Ibid., II, 532-533.

47. Ibid., II, 533.

48. Ibid., II, 533-534.

49. Ibid., II, 369.


51. Ibid., I, 236.

52. Ibid., I, 235.

53. Ibid., I, 239.

55. See ibid., p. 22.


58. Kagoshima-shi, Sappan no bunka, p. 120.

59. Hamposhū Kagoshima, I, 303.

60. Murano Moriji, "Satsuma no shōnō" ("Camphor in Satsuma"), in Nihonsangyōshi taikei, VIII, 139.


64. Sappan seiyōroku, p. 185.


68. Hamposhū Kagoshima, I, 376.

69. Kenshi, II, 518.


72. Sakihara, ibid., p. 194. Kenshi, II, 749. These eight articles included thin paper, colored T'ang paper, nails, woolen textiles, carpets, damask, rouge, and indigo.


75. Hampōshū Kagoshima, I, 475.


77. Hampōshū Kagoshima, I, 480.
CHAPTER VII
COUNTER REFORM MOVEMENT AND THE KINSHIROKU PURGE

When Shigehide retired in 1787 in favor of his son Narinobu, he left the han administration up to the senior councillor Ichida Kageyu, through whom Shigehide continued to dominate the han government. Daimyo Narinobu, who had been isolated from the Shigehide's group, however, began around 1805 to organize his own administration by recruiting and promoting men who shared his views on government policies, while forcing out officials who had served in Shigehide's administration. Most of those newly recruited by Narinobu were disciples of a Confucian scholar, Kitō Takekiyo. Kitō, critical of officials in the han Confucian academy, advocated the promotion of the teachings of certain Sung philosophers whose collection of writings was called the Kinshiroku. Since these disciples of Kitō were utilized by Narinobu in his efforts to dislodge Shigehide's administration, the term Kinshiroku came to be applied to the han faction supporting Narinobu. The Kinshiroku group adopted certain "reform" measures ostensibly based on Neo-Confucian principles, but Shigehide viewed these actions as a threat to his power and angrily set in motion a counterattack in 1808. The counteraction which historians call the Kinshiroku purge resulted in the severe punishment of 115 Kinshiroku members, including Kabayama Chikara and Chichibu Sueyasu, who were the main figures of the group,
and in the appointment and promotion of men who were loyal to the retired daimyo Shigehide. Moreover, Shigehide reassumed his position of leadership in the han administration.

There is practically no detailed study on the nature and significance of the Kinshiroku kuzure (purge), although the purge was extremely important in the sense that it signified the establishment of the retired daimyo Shigehide's absolute political power and leadership in the han administration, one of the factors essential to the success of the so-called Tempō Financial Reforms which began in 1830. At present, most available studies on this subject view the Kinshiroku purge of 1808 merely as a conflict of policies, especially economic, between the Shigehide group and the opposing Kinshiroku group.¹ These studies attribute the rise of the Kinshiroku group to the mounting han debts caused by Shigehide's "loose" economy and "progressive" policies, which in turn were responsible for the extreme poverty and suffering of the peasantry, and the corruption of samurai morale. In this interpretation, accordingly, the Kinshiroku group centering around daimyo Narinobu attempted to cope with the financial difficulties of the han by certain retrenchment measures which they characterized in Confucian terms as "benevolent" rule. The nature of the Kinshiroku reforms threatened the power and position of Shigehide, however, and prompted a swift counteraction.
Despite the Confucian rhetoric of the 19th century Japanese historians, and the economic emphasis of their 20th century colleagues, it is the opinion of this writer that the Kinshiroku purge represented more than a conflict in economic policies or in ideologies. Seen as a political power struggle to control the han administration and direct its policies, the Kinshiroku factional struggle marks a turning point for Satsuma and, by extension, for the future of Japan. We turn, then, to a consideration of Shigehide's retirement, Narinobu's accession as daimyo, and the rise of the opposition, or Kinshiroku group.

Shigehide's Retirement and Rise of his Opposition

Shigehide retired as daimyo on 1787/1/29 at the age of forty-three, and his son, Narinobu, succeeded his father to the head of the Shimazu family at the age of fifteen. Because of the latter's young age, however, Shigehide remained as guardian until 1791. Why did Shigehide retire in the prime of life? To understand the rise of the opposition faction called the Kinshiroku group, it is important to examine the reasons for Shigehide's retirement. There are several explanations.

According to the Tokugawa Jikki (Veritable Record of the Tokugawa Dynasty), Shigehide abdicated the headship of the Shimazu family in favor of his son because of
illness. The official notice issued by the newly appointed daimyo, Narinobu, in the first month of 1787 gave another explanation. It stated that, owing to the Shimazu's marriage relationship with the Tokugawa, it was apparent that the Shimazu family would receive warm treatment from the Shogun in the future. The retired daimyo, Shigehide, did not wish to monopolize this honor but desired to share it with his descendants. Consequently, although he was far from old age, he went into retirement and left the han administration to Narinobu.

Shigeno Yasutsugu, Satsuma historian in the Meiji period, claimed that the Bakufu officials forced Shigehide into retirement because they were jealous of the power of one who was both the daimyo of a large han and the father-in-law of the Shogun.

Another explanation is that the fall of Bakufu elder, Tanuma Okitsugu, upon the death of Shogun Ieharu in the ninth month of 1786 prompted Shigehide's early retirement. Although no records are available to verify the political ties between these two men, the following event suggests their close association. On 1776/7/19 Tanuma arranged the engagement of Shigehide's daughter to Hitotsubashi Toyochiyo, later to become Shogun Ienari, and succeeded in the consummation of the marriage on 1781/9/22 despite strong opposition from the Tokugawa Three Houses (sanke). Reportedly, Shigehide felt so grateful to Tanuma for his
efforts that he presented Tanuma with a large model of a boat made of pure silver. It may be suggested that, because of his close connection with Tanuma, Shigehide voluntarily went into retirement upon Tanuma's fall. Many others close to Tanuma either severed ties with him or were deprived of their Bakufu posts. This theory, however, seems untenable. There was no reason why Shigehide had to retire with the fall of Tanuma, for as the father-in-law of the new Shogun he would have nothing to fear.

It is my assumption that Shigehide retired in 1787 because he had succeeded in consolidating his power by a series of administrative changes. Perhaps, by retiring to Edo, Shigehide was relieved also of the financial burdens of the sankin kōtai and its alternate trips to Kagoshima. Even though Shigehide was in retirement, his domination over the han administration continued. As we observed in Chapter III, a month before his retirement Shigehide appointed his trusted retainer, Ichida Kageyu, to the post of senior councillor (karō) and left the actual han administration up to him. When Shigehide went into retirement in the first month of 1787, Ichida was put in charge of the Office of the Interior (okugakari) with considerable authority over both the Office of the Exterior (omotekata) and the Office of Finances (kattehō).

When Shigehide returned to Satsuma in 1788 he heard the various rumors which had been circulating in Satsuma
about the han administration. Official notices issued repeatedly since 1775 prohibited the spread of unfounded reports. Since he considered these rumors to be extremely disrespectful to him, Shigehide ordered that anyone spreading such rumors was to commit harakiri or be put to death. Such notices demonstrate clearly that Shigehide intended to be in control. A statement by Arima Yoshinari, a member of the Kinshiroku group, also attests to Shigehide's continued control over the han bureaucracy. According to Arima, in 1800 senior councillor Ichida Kageyu, who had been stationed at Edo, decided all matters pertaining to han administration. All his colleagues in Kagoshima, such as senior councillors Yamada Arinori, Akamatsu Ichinokami and Takahashi Nuidono faithfully followed his instructions.

Thus, retired daimyo Shigehide continued to rule through Ichida even after he ceased his guardianship in 1791 and moved into his retirement palace, called Hōzankan, at Takanawa in Edo in the following year. On the other hand, daimyo Narinobu who had been making the trip to and from Edo on alternate years had no control over the han administration. When grand overseer (ōmetsuke) Kabayama Chikara, a leading figure of the Kinshiroku group, was granted an audience with daimyo Narinobu for the first time on 1807/10/24, it was rumored that "it was unusual for Narinobu to receive him in audience, for Narinobu had
not granted an audience to any official above the rank of grand overseer for many years. All Narinobu's messages on han administration had been conveyed through a personal attendant of the daimyo (sobayaku)."8

In light of subsequent events, we can surmise that Narinobu, who was 33 years old in 1805, and who, although he was daimyo, was completely isolated from the han administration, wanted to gain control of the han bureaucracy himself. His 61-year-old father, Shigehide, had been exercising despotic control over the han for several years. Accordingly, in 1805 Narinobu made several moves to establish his leadership in the han administration. In the same year Narinobu wrote the Kikaku mondō (Dialogue between a Crane and a Tortoise), in which he admonished his retainers to be more frugal and benevolent, while he sought outspoken advice from his retainers on how to govern the country.9 It was also during the year of 1805 that Moriyama Sanjū, a Kinshiroku group member, introduced to Narinobu through the chief of the pages (koshō tōdori) the Kinshiroku, a collection of the sayings of the founders of the Sung philosophy. It is said that Narinobu was impressed with the work and ordered his close attendants to read it.10

It was also around this time that Narinobu started rallying around him men whom he could trust. Someone recommended Kabayama Chikara, the lord of Imuta private
domain to him. Kabayama was a close friend of the agricultural magistrate Kubo Heinaizaemon who deplored the miserable state of the peasants, as we saw earlier in Chapter V, and who also advocated restoring the time-honored simple manners and customs of Satsuma. Subsequently, Kabayama was promoted to steward (yōnin), serving concurrently as chief deputy officer (tōban gashira) on 1806/3/13.¹¹

One of Narinobu's attendants informed him of two critics of the han administration, Chichibu Sueyasu and Shimizu Moriyuki, who, it was claimed, had been falsely charged, dismissed from office, and confined at home since 1802 because of their criticism of the leadership of senior councillor Ichida Kageyu. Daimyo Narinobu acquitted Chichibu Sueyasu and Shimizu Moriyuki of these charges and appointed them to the post of investigator (metsuke saikyo gakari) on 1806/7/13.¹² These events demonstrate Narinobu's desire to consolidate his power base for the reforms he would attempt to carry out a year later. His plan was to dismiss Shigehide's men from the han offices, and to promote his own men to important han posts.

After these initial efforts, Narinobu left Kagoshima for Edo for his sankin obligation in 1806. It was not until he returned to Kagoshima on 1807/10/23 that the reforms were begun.
In the meantime, while Narinobu was away at Edo, senior councillor Ichida Kageyu and the daimyo's personal attendant (sobayaku), Iwashita Sajiemon, transferred Chichibu and Shimizu to the less significant position of magistrate of roads (michi bugyō) on 1807/1/11. Their transfer took place within six months after their appointment as investigator (metsuke saikyo gakari). It is said that when Chichibu and Shimizu held this post, they constantly argued about the reform of laws and regulations and did not get along with their colleagues who insisted upon maintaining the old laws. At this time Chichibu and Shimizu were not yet personally known to Narinobu, unlike Kabayama. This incident indicates that the opposition faction was not yet united into an organized group centering around the daimyo Narinobu and that the Shigehide group still dominated the han administration.

On 1807/10/24, a day after Narinobu's return to Kagoshima, grand overseer (ōmetsuke) Kabayama Chikara was received in audience by daimyo Narinobu through the good offices of Nomura Yotōta, the daimyo's personal attendant. They discussed for hours in secret about the "evil" aspects of the han administration and the corruption among han officials. Kabayama expressed his belief that important han officials were unfit for their duties. Daimyo Narinobu apparently agreed completely with him, presented him with a sword as a token of his confidence.
in him, and entrusted Kabayama with the counter reforms. After that Kabayama met with the daimyo every day.

Before we examine the opposition, or Kinshiroku group's counter reforms, it is necessary to see who comprised the Kinshiroku group, their social position, and what motivated their actions.

The Kinshiroku Reformers

The two leading figures of the Kinshiroku group were Kabayama Chikara and Chichibu Sueyasu, both of whom became senior councillors. Both men have been described as being stern, strong, and uncompromising in the strict fulfillment of their duties and in their enforcement of laws and regulations. As we saw earlier, Kabayama was entrusted with the counter reforms by daimyo Narinobu on 1807/10/24 and was soon promoted from grand overseer (ōmetsuke) to senior councillor (karō) on 11/9. It is said that although he was merciless and ambitious by nature, Kabayama always strove to behave properly and to associate himself with virtuous people. Therefore, his seniors and supervisors did not mind associating with him. Men like Kubo Heinaizemon, the agricultural magistrate (kōri bugyō), whom we referred to in the previous chapter, admired Kabayama's ability and recommended him to the post of steward (yōnin) in the third month of 1806, when he was 29 years old. Through Kabayama's recommendation all the key figures of the Kinshiroku group, including Chichibu Sueyasu, were
promoted to important han posts. Although Kabayama outranked Chichibu Sueyasu and became known to Narinobu first, it was through Chichibu that the reforms were carried out as we shall see.

Chichibu Sueyasu seems to have had an especially dominating character. Several incidents attest to his stubbornness and disregard of status if he believed himself in the right. When Chichibu was inspector (metsuke) in 1801, he was ordered by his supervisor, grand overseer (ōmetsuke) Niiro Kura, to visit various rural districts to observe the living conditions of the peasants. Chichibu refused to obey the order, insisting that there were only the poor in the rural area and that there was no need for him to visit there. Grand overseer Shimazu Noburu, Niiro's colleague, asked Chichibu in anger how he was aware of their living conditions when he was not an agricultural magistrate (kōri bugyō). Chichibu answered defiantly that even a child knew how much they were suffering under the despotic rule. As a result of his disobedience Chichibu was dismissed from office and ordered to be confined in his house in the first month of 1802, when he was 29 years old. This confinement lasted for five years.

During the time of his confinement Chichibu persevered through adverse circumstances, such as extreme poverty, the unhappiness of his wife and sons, and his brothers' bitter feeling toward him. Cultivating a small
field which he owned, Chichibu supported his family with income from the sale of the crops. It is said that many people in the country admired him for his courage to protest and for his strong sense of justice, and they sympathized with him in his adversity. 20

When his first son died on 1808/4/21 at the age of twelve, Chichibu asked the daimyo's attending physician, Morimoto Kōken, to treat his son. Chichibu even sent his retainer Ijichi Shōkurō to the mausoleum of the Shimazu family to pray for his son. A man of learning admonished Chichibu for his contemptible conduct, for an honorable samurai should pray to the ancestors of the Shimazu family for his lord but not for his own son. 21

Yet Kabayama Chikara recommended Chichibu Sueyasu to Narinobu as an unequalled patriot. It was through Kabayama's recommendation that Chichibu and a third member of the opposition group, Shimizu Moriyuki, mentioned previously in section one, were appointed by Narinobu to han offices. 22

Kabayama introduced another opposition member, Kumamoto Gunroku, to Narinobu as a genius. As a consequence of his recommendation, Gunroku was recalled from Nagasaki to be appointed a page attached to the daimyo (kinjūban). Later he was promoted to superintendent of culinary affairs (nando bugyō), finally becoming the daimyo's personal attendant (sobayaku). 23
### TABLE XXVI

**FAMILY RANKS OF THE KINSHIROKU MEMBERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Family Rank</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Upper-class samurai</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabayama Chikara</td>
<td>Isshomonchi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shimazu Takumi</td>
<td>Isshomonchi-kaku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hori Jinzaemon</td>
<td>Yoriai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kōno Yasunouusemon</td>
<td>Yoriai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamada Shizuma</td>
<td>Yoriai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shimazu Hikodayū</td>
<td>Yoriai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shimazu Hueita</td>
<td>Yoriai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lower-class samurai</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chichibu Suesyasu</td>
<td>Koban (elevated to yoriai 1807/12/5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shimizu Moriuki</td>
<td>Koban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomoto Gengouzaemon</td>
<td>Koban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayashi Yasuemon</td>
<td>Koban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ōshiga Gorōzaemon</td>
<td>Koban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsuzaki Zempachirō</td>
<td>Koban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sogi Tōtarō</td>
<td>Koban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aiko Hanzō</td>
<td>Koban</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kamata Shirōzaemon</td>
<td>Koban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onoe Jingozaimon</td>
<td>Koban</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ijūin Zendayū</td>
<td>Koban</td>
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<tr>
<td>Narahara Suskezaemon</td>
<td>Koban</td>
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<tr>
<td>Satake Jirōemon</td>
<td>Koban</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ninomiya Tōtazaemon</td>
<td>Koban</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hongō Hachiemon</td>
<td>Koban</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kuzuhara Shemon</td>
<td>Koban</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kojima Jimbē</td>
<td>Koban</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oka Senemon</td>
<td>Koban</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honda Sukenojō</td>
<td>Koban</td>
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<tr>
<td>Koriyama Gonsuke</td>
<td>Koban</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nishi Kakudayu</td>
<td>Koban</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kiba Kyūemon</td>
<td>Koban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ushuku Jūjirō</td>
<td>Shimban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumamoto Heita</td>
<td>Koshōgumi (elevated to koban 1807/11/24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moriyama Sanjū</td>
<td>Koshōgumi (elevated to koban 1807/11/24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Lower-class samurai</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katsube Gunki</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ōkawahira Kizaemon</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tōgō Chuzō</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kumamoto Gunroku</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Arima Jizaemon</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kitō Takekiyo</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Morimoto Kōken</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yamauchi Genken</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nishi Genka</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tokunaga Riemon</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nishikawa Gempachi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tashiro Seita</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hatta Gennoshin</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nagata Saichirō</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ōsako Hachiji</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Yoshida Kiheiji</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ashiya Rosai</td>
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</table>
Besides the personalities of the men involved in the opposition group, another significant factor in understanding the nature and direction of the Kinshiroku reforms was the social status of the opposition leaders. The family rank of fifty Kinshiroku group members, whose ranks were listed in the Bunka Hōtō jitsuroku (Veritable Record of Factions during the Bunka Period), is shown in Table XXVI. Only Kabayama Chikara held the rank of isshomochi ("holder of one locality"), the second highest in the Satsuma scale of family rank. One person had isshomochi-kaku (ishomochi equivalent) rank, while five members held that of yoriai. They were called "families of great status" (daishimbun) or upper-class samurai (jōkyūshi), and they were usually appointed to the important office of captain of the koshōgumi guards units (koshōgumi bangashira) and above. Next, there were twenty-two members with koban ("small guards") rank, one with shimban ("new guards") rank, and twenty with koshōgumi ("small name guards"). These were the so-called lower-class samurai (kakyūshi) or ordinary samurai (hira-zamurai). There were 130 upper-class samurai with yoriai-nami rank and above in Satsuma, but only seven members of the Kinshiroku group belonged to this class. Moreover, of these seven high-ranking samurai only Kabayama played a significant role in the reforms; the rest of them joined the group much later and did not take an active role.
Since Shigehide's financial measures were most strongly felt by these lower-class samurai because of the consecutive assessment of additional forced loans of rice (kasami demai), it is likely that their financial distress, reinforced by their belief in more traditional economic practices, motivated their participation in the opposition faction, although traditional Japanese historians have stressed their Confucian idealism as the primary motivation for the counter reform movement. In fact, the name Kinshiroku, by which this opposition group led by Kabayama and Chichibu have come to be known, indicates the traditional importance placed on the ideology supposedly motivating the counter reforms. The counter reformer, or opposition group, adhered to Chu Hsi doctrines and devoted themselves only to the study of the Kinshiroku, a collection of sayings of the founders of the Sung philosophy, which was compiled by Chu Hsi and Lü Tsu-ch'ien in 1175, and the Taikyoku zusetsu (Explanation of the Diagrams of the Great Ultimate) written by Chou Tun-i in 1060, who is generally called the pioneer of Neo-Confucianism. All leading members of the Kinshiroku group studied these two works under Kitō Takekiyo, who was promoted from Zōshikan school clerk (kakiyaku) to chief of attendants of the Great Interior (hiroshiki bangashira) on 1808/1/15.

In the following discussion we will see how the key figures of the Kinshiroku group came to study under Kitō,
and we will analyze the nature of Kitō's learning, which is the ideological justification for their counter reforms. Traditional historians have stated that Kumamoto Gunroku, Morioka Magoemon, Arima Jizaemon and Narahara Sukezaemon constantly got together to discuss learning and to comment on people. They had studied the Taikyoku zusetsu (Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate) under Kitō Takekiyo. Chichibu Sueyasu, who had had a great respect for him, met Kitō for the first time when he was acquitted of the "false charges" by daimyo Narinobu on 1806/7/13. After their meeting Chichibu praised Kitō as the "master of moral virtue" and became his disciple. Finally, Chichibu persuaded such like-minded persons as Kabayama Chikara, Shimizu Moriyuki and Moriyama Sanjū to become Kitō's disciples also. 28

It is significant to note that, after Kabayama became Kitō's disciple, he broke off with Kubo Heinaizaemon, whom formerly he had respected as his master in learning, and by whom he was recommended to the post of steward (yōnin) in 1806. 29 As noted earlier, Kubo was well aware of the poverty and suffering of peasants because, as agricultural magistrate (kōri bugyō), he periodically made the rounds of rural districts and had direct contact with the cultivators. His familiarity with the actual conditions of peasant life aroused his sympathy for them and prompted him to submit to the han government the
Shogō eirō shirabe (Report on the Decline of the Various Rural Districts), in which he proposed various measures to alleviate the misery and suffering of the peasants. Although Kubo was critical of Shigehide's agricultural policy, his criticism was not politically motivated. It was not directed against Shigehide and his group personally but against the measures they employed. Therefore Kabayama's breaking off with Kubo and becoming Kitō's disciple suggests that Kabayama joined a political faction centering around daimyo Narinobu, in order to dominate the han administration.

Kitō Takekiyo, the central intellectual figure of the Kinshiroku group, adhered to the Chu Hsi school established by Muro Kyūsō, and rejected the Kogaku school (Ancient School of Learning), particularly that of Ogyū Sorai. He devoted himself to the study of the Kinshiroku (Reflection on Things at Hand) and was versed in the Taikyoku-zu (Daigram of the Great Ultimate). However, Kitō was a self-educated man and too narrow-minded to listen to others. Therefore, no matter how deeply he studied, he was no exception to carelessness and guesswork. Kitō insisted that broad learning was not necessary. Instead, he attached importance to the cultivation of moral virtue. 30

Thus, the learning of the Kinshiroku group was characterized by an emphasis on the cultivation of moral
virtue, which they considered the primary basis for good government. This attitude toward learning is evidenced by the following episode recorded by Arima Yoshinari, a Kinshiroku group member. When Kabayama visited Chichibu for the first or second time, their discussion was mainly about how to govern a state. Chichibu is said to have remarked that the basis of government consisted of the cultivation of one's moral virtue, without which a state could not be governed. Moral virtue or moral principle, an essential element of Confucianism, held the samurai ruling class responsible for exercising rule for the benefit of the people. Related to this concept of "benevolent" rule was their economic thinking, which was characterized by traditional Confucian agrarianism. Thus, the counter reforms by the Kinshiroku group, supported by traditional Neo-Confucian principles, made them necessarily conservative.

The problem which arises when one claims moral justification for one's actions is that these actions then can be scrutinized for their ideological "correctness". An examination of some of the leading Kinshiroku group members reveals some departures from the Confucian norms they claimed. Shimizu Moriyuki was promoted to steward (yonin) on 1807/11/19 at the age of 37. On intimate terms with Chichibu, he was dismissed from office and ordered to confinement in his house on 1802/1/16, at the same time
when Chichibu was punished, on the charge of encouraging the latter's disobedience to the grand overseer's (ōmetsuke) order. Shimizu was considered a competent and resourceful official, although he was carefree and lived an elegant and poetical life. He thought of himself as a resourceful tactician.

Kumamoto Heita, a close friend of Kabayama, was promoted from one position to another and finally to that of daimyo's personal attendant (sobayaku) on 1807/11/23. By contrast to Shimizu, Kumamoto had a reputation for sincerity, selflessness and profound knowledge. Reportedly, he entirely supported his main family, not spending even a penny for his personal use. He remained unmarried for life. People called him the virtuous bachelor.

Moriyama Sanjū is said to have closely associated with Chichibu and Shimizu like brothers. He was appointed page of the Interior (oku kōshō) at the age of fifteen. After many years of service at this post, Moriyama was promoted to chief of the pages (kōshō tōdori) and then to sobayaku on 1807/11/23. Thus, Moriyama had served daimyo Norinobu for almost thirty years, thereby becoming familiar with every movement of his lord. He had a reputation for keen insight into human nature, and he made many suggestions to Norinobu.

Again, by contrast, Katsube Gunki was an unlettered man without personal opinions. Nevertheless, he had
served his superiors with respect and had received favors in return. When Kabayama and Chichibu were appointed to important han posts, Katsube served them with reverence and faithfully performed his assigned duties. Consequently, he was promoted from superintendent of culinary affairs (nando bugyō) to personal steward of the daimyo (soba yōnin) on 1807/12/6.36

Kumamoto Gunroku, son of Kumamoto Heita's cousin, was an intimate friend of both Kabayama and Chichibu. He was promoted to the position of daimyo's personal attendant (sobayaku) on 1808/1/16 at the age of thirty. He had a reputation for courage and freedom from restraint, but Gunroku despised routine work, and he made a fool of petty officials. When he was stationed at Nagasaki, it is said that he frequented the gay quarters, indulging in debauchery, and sometimes even brought a prostitute into his official residence. However, Gunroku was very efficient in performing his duties and rendered great assistance to his superior at Nagasaki.37

Perhaps the most dominant member of the "reformers", Chichibu had his lapses from Confucian morality; even after he was appointed senior councillor (karō), he did not keep a riding horse, but keep six concubines instead.38

Judging from the above description of the leading Kinshiroku group members, some of them did not live up to their professed Confucian principles. Thus, the ideological
reasons they gave might be interpreted as only rationalizations for wanting power. In other words, they used their learning of Confucianism as a means to criticize Shigehide's policies, as shall be discussed later, and to justify their attempts to control the han administration.

Before we turn to the actual reforms themselves, there is another factor which needs to be examined, and that is the role played by Narinobu. Arima Yoshinari, a Kinshiroku group member, suggests that both Kabayama and Norinobu came to be controlled by lower-ranking members. In particular Narinobu is depicted as being indecisive, weak and easily influenced. Once on a pleasure trip, daimyo Narinobu ordered plum blossoms arranged behind a folding screen in order to enjoy the beauty of nature. One morning Kumamoto Gunroku, the daimyo's personal attendant (sobayaku), presented himself to his lord and advised: "The lord who rules the people is not supposed to enjoy refined elegance in a small scale. If you wish to admire plum blossoms, you should go to a mountain by palanquin and admire them in bloom." Responding to Kumamoto's suggestion, daimyo Narinobu immediately ordered the plum blossoms thrown away.39 On a pilgrimage to the Kirishima shrine something interesting caught daimyo Narinobu's eye, and he went there on foot to see it. Thereupon, Kumamoto Gunroku asked him whether his visit to the shrine was for worship or for sight-seeing.
Narinobu promptly replied that he was not sure. If
Narinobu did not know the purpose of his visit, Kumamoto
advised, he had better consider this visit as a sight­
seeing trip. The daimyo, it is said, greatly regretted
having given such a careless answer. 40

As mentioned previously, Kabayama Chikara was the
only leading Kinshiroku group member with high family
rank. He played an important role in the initial stage of
the counter reforms, yet he was also influenced by those
with lower family rank. According to Arima, Kabayama,
Chichibu Sueyasu and other members of the group had been
meeting at Chichibu's house to study the Kinshiroku.
When Kabayama was promoted to grand overseer (ōmetsuke) on
1807/1/11, he told his colleagues that he would not be
able to attend the meeting for a while because of the
change of his office. Chichibu immediately said, "If you
will not attend the meeting just because of the change of
office, you are not a true scholar." Consequently,
Kabayama continued to participate in the meeting. 41

Finally, it is interesting to note that the Kinshiroku
group consisted mainly of lower class samurai who were
financially pressed, with little chance for promotion.
Moreover, most of them had lived in the conservative,
tradition-steeped society of Satsuma and had never been
out of the han. The outlook of the group was narrower
than that of Shigehide. They accused him of not being
truly Confucian and attacked his various economic and governmental policies from their standpoint of Neo-Confucian principle. The charges against Shigehide and his han bureaucrats were that their maladministration had resulted in excessive suffering by the peasants, an increase in han indebtedness, and corruption of samurai discipline and morals.

Counter-Reform Measures

The counter reform measures advanced by the Kinshiroku group centered around three major issues: (1) the change of academic traditions, (2) the curtailment of unnecessary expenses, and (3) the enforcement of strict official discipline among the samurai. Before we discuss the changes they made in academic traditions, it is necessary to see what the academic tradition was before the emergence of the Kinshiroku group.

The Zōshikan domain school was established by Shigehide in 1773 with a view to solidifying the ideological basis of his power. Shigehide established the doctrine of Chu Hsi as the orthodox school of thought in Satsuma, thus banning other systems of thought as heresy. The moral doctrines of the Chu Hsi school focused directly upon man and his closest human relationships, as expressed in the Five Human Relationships and their accompanying obligations. Thus, the emphasis Chu Hsi placed on loyalty and proper personal relationships strengthened the feudal
status system and helped maintain social order, which were essential to the consolidation of Shigehide's power. With the establishment of the Zōshikan domain school academic traditions in Satsuma went through a great change.

Academic traditions before Shigehide's time were best exemplified by a series of moral instructions called iroha waka poems. These waka poems were written by Shimazu Nisshinsai (1492-1567), the father of Takahisa (1514-1571), who, as the 15th daimyo, unified the three provinces of Satsuma, Hyūga and Ōsumi. Through the iroha waka poems, which reflected the spirit of the Age of the Warring States, Nisshinsai emphasized the importance of moral instruction and practice.

This academic tradition began to change gradually with the introduction from around the Kyōho period (1716-1736) of the Muro Kyūsō school. This branch of the Chu Hsi school, which prevailed at Edo, entered into Satsuma. At Edo the emphasis on the art of Chinese prose and poetry writing in the study of Confucianism produced many so-called literary Confucian scholars. The introduction of the Muro Kyūsō school into Satsuma also resulted in a gradual change of academic traditions to an emphasis on mastering the art of Chinese prose, poetry, and writing. This trend was further emphasized by Shigehide, for he used his skill in Chinese literature to enhance his prestige among the Bakufu officials and fellow daimyo.
This shift in emphasis in Satsuma's academic tradition was aptly depicted by Tokuda Yūkō (d. 1804). Tokuda's criticism of Shigehide's "enlightenment" policy resulted in his banishment to Ōshima island for eleven years after 1776. Tokuda wrote:

> During the time from lord Nisshinsai to daimyo Iehisa (1576-1638) learning meant the study of lord Nisshinsai's iroha waka poems and its practice. Students of Confucianism were not even familiar with the words in the Four Books. However, there were many lords and vassals who kept their principles, although they did not study Chinese and Chinese prose and poetry to which people are devoting themselves these days [Shigehide's day].

The Kinshiroku group criticized this new trend in Confucian learning in Satsuma and attempted to counteract Shigehide's emphasis on the study of literary arts as shall be discussed later.

As part of the thorough-going personnel changes, the Kinshiroku group forced the dismissal of the professor (kyōju) and assistant professors (jokyō) of the Zōshikan domain school through the following measures. On 1807/12/24, professor Yamamoto Shūsui was ordered to present to the daimyo Narinobu a work titled the Gakujutsu (Learning). The work, ordered by a group of senior councillors, was originally planned in three separate titles: the Sekihiron (Treatise on the Denunciation of Injustice), instructions to students on their schoolwork called the Kagyo kōron, and the Gakki (School Regulations).
In the Sekihiron Yamamoto discussed in detail right and wrong with regard to learning and how to govern a country. He also bitterly criticized the Kinshiroku group which he branded the Nise Jitsugakutō (Fake Practical Learning Clique).47 When he was still working on his writings, Yamamoto was forced to present to Narinobu all three works with the title Gakujutsu.48 It is rumored that Kitō Takekiyo and Morioka Magoemon, both clerks attached to the Zōshikan and Kinshiroku group members, had secretly informed han officials of Yamamoto's writing of the Sekihiron. The release of this secret information precipitated the daimyo's order for the presentation of the book.49 Consequently, Yamamoto was called before daimyo Narinobu on 12/26 and was ordered by the daimyo's personal attendant (sobayaku), Moriyama Sanjū, to destroy the book by fire. Moreover, he was bitterly accused of interfering with the han administration by publication of his book. He was strictly ordered to concentrate on teaching and not meddle with han administration.50

On the same day the senior councillors Shimazu Shōgen and Chichibu Sueyasu and grand overseer (ōmetsuke) Machida Kemmotsu, sitting with the daimyo, ordered assistant professors Hashiguchi Gonzō and Miyashita Shuzaemon to give a lecture on the Taikyoku-zu (Diagrams of the Great Ultimate). When professor Yamamoto returned to the Zōshikan after finishing his business at the daimyo's
residence, he was informed that Hashiguchi and Miyashita were ordered to give a lecture on the Taikyoku-zu. He immediately sent a messenger to the library for the volume of the Taikyoku-zu in the Seiri taizen (Great Collection of Neo-Confucianism), 51 The book had been checked out by Kitō, who was not at the school on account of illness. Yamamoto finally borrowed the book from Shimazu Tōjirō whose house was in front of the Zōshikan school. However, when Yamamoto arrived at the daimyo's residence, it was too late to participate in the lecture. 52 In the meantime, the assistant professors in professor Yamamoto's absence were being humiliated by the Kinshiroku members. Chichibu repeatedly accused Hashiguchi of carelessness in his lecture and of poor knowledge of the work. When Miyashita was ordered to lecture, he excused himself saying that his interpretation was not different from Hashiguchi's. Then, Chichibu asked Hashiguchi some questions, and a bitter argument ensued. Finally Moriyama Sanjū and Kumamoto Gunroku, the Kinshiroku group members, were summoned to give their opinions of Hashiguchi's answers. They agreed with Chichibu, saying that Hashiguchi's answers did not make any sense. 53

The accusation and humiliation of the Zōshikan instructors by the Kinshiroku group before the daimyo, and the fact that professor Yamamoto was not even informed of the lecture by his teaching staff, were evidence of the
measures employed by the opposition group to force them to resign. Consequently, Hashiguchi did not attend office after 12/27 on the pretext of illness, and Miyashita absented himself the following day. Professor Yamamoto was deprived of his professorship on 1808/1/21.

To assure Kinshiroku dominance of the Zōshikan domain school, senior councillor (karō) Kabayama Chikara was appointed to the important post called Zōshikan gakari (office in charge of the Zoshikan domain school) on 1807/12/29. Senior councillor Yamada Arinori had originally taken charge of the Zōshikan gakari, but upon his death in 1802 this office had been abolished. Reestablishment of this important post was indicative of the desire of the Kinshiroku group for a complete change of Satsuma's academic traditions to furnish them with ideological justification for their counter reforms. On 1808/1/21, assistant professor Kuroda Sainojō was promoted to professor.

The Kinshiroku group strongly opposed Shigehide's emphasis on erudition, the study of prose and poetry writing, and textual criticism. For them, such literary accomplishments were not an essential part of learning, but rather they were useless both for governing of the country and for fulfillment of one's duties. According to the instructions issued to the teaching staff of the Zōshikan by senior councillor Kabayama
on 1808/2/25, "the purpose of the Zōshikan is to cultivate men of talent and moral virtue for the service to the country. Therefore, it cannot be hoped to perform virtuous conduct by studying only the art of prose and poetry."\(^{58}\)

The notice of 1808/4/5 by daimyo Narinobu, directed to retainers with dokurei (individual audience with daimyo) privilege, stated as follows:

> There are few people who truly understand the sense of duty and discharge loyalty and filial duty, because they only play with literary arts...Their devotion to unessential learning is not only useless but also ruinous to themselves. It shall also become an obstacle to the path of virtue and disturb the government of the country.\(^{59}\)

The Kinshiroku group was convinced that the cultivation of moral virtue, the primary objective of their learning, could be attained only through the intensive study of Chu Hsi's works. According to their interpretation, "Since they do not concentrate on reading Chu Hsi's writings, people do not understand moral principles and the primal basis of governing a country."\(^{60}\) This belief led them to bitterly denounce other schools of thought as heterodox, especially Ogyū Sorai's doctrines.

The Sorai school was characterized by its direct reading of the classical texts and by the emphasis on the study of Chinese and the art of prose and poetry. It was also characterized by keen interest in and discussions on economic as well as political affairs of state and by a
respect for individuality. On the other hand, this school did not attach much importance to the cultivation of moral virtue. It is said that many of those who belonged to the Ogyū Sorai school were criticized by the political authorities for causing the corruption of public morality and disturbing the social order.

The Sorai doctrines were in direct conflict with the learning of the Kinshiroku group, and this led to their strict prohibition, as seen in the Kabayama's instruction of 1808/2/25 cited earlier:

It is understood that there is no one who has been studying the writings of Ogyū Sorai. If there should be, however, he shall be banned at once from studying them, for it will cause the corruption of public morals and lead to the rise of heretical doctrines. Therefore, it is essential to devote oneself only to the study of Chu Hsi's works.

The second major objective of the counter reform by the Kinshiroku group was the reestablishment of the han economy by measures based on "benevolent" rule, one of the elements of Neo-Confucianism as interpreted by the Kinshiroku group. On 1808/1/26, a group of senior councillors (karō) issued a written notice to abolish all hawking grounds (takaba) in various rural districts, which we referred to in Chapter V, and to discontinue the extra taxes such as forced loans of money (degin) of 1 mon for each person and taxes on cows, horses, and ships. Reportedly, daimyo Narinobu took these measures out of benevolence and sympathy for the peasants who were in a
state of extreme poverty and suffering. According to Arima Yoshinari, a Kinshiroku group member, "the peasants rejoiced to hear about the abolition of the hawking grounds." Another notice, issued two days later, warned samurai to be extremely careful not to trample fields owned by others in rabbit hunting and in hunting with dogs (inuyama).

It was proclaimed on the 19th of the second month that han officials with the office rank of grand overseer (ōmetsuke) and above could attend their offices either on foot, on horseback, or by palanquin, though heretofore they had been using only palanquin, and that they were to decrease the number of their retinue, except on New Year's day and on the days of festivals. On the following day donation to the sekisai (festival to worship Confucian sages) was discontinued.

As a further means to curtail han expenses, a number of posts were abolished on 1808/2/22. These included positions such as the commander of the outer guards (ōban gashira), the superintendent of roads (michi bugyō), the chief of bird hunting (torimi gashira), the chief of falconers (takashō gashira), the superintendent of gardens (niwa bugyō), the superintendent of bird affairs at Oguro (Oguro bugyō), all of which had been established by Shigehide during the An'ei and Temmei periods (1772-1789), and the office of school inspector (gakkō metsuke) which
was created in 1798. Consequently, those whose positions were abolished were shifted to other offices, and their office salary was decreased to five koku of rice except for *michi bugyō*, *torimi gashira* and *takashō gashira* who had subordinates working under them. According to Arima, the number of staff in the office of *Nō* drama was also reduced. In addition, the number of scribes (*kakiyaku*) and functionaries were decreased in the offices which had less work to perform. It is interesting to note that when these offices were abolished their office buildings were sold by tender. Thus, the "reformers" attempted to curtail unnecessary expenditures through personnel cuts and the reduction of office salaries as well as of maintenance expenses of office buildings.

Moreover, the retrenchment policy was extended to the commercial sector of the Kagoshima castle-town. Some time in the third month of 1808 it was ordered that all woven materials in dry goods stores in Kami-machi and Shimo-machi merchant districts were to be confiscated. Each inspectorial staff (*yokome*) accompanied by footmen (*ashigaru*) rushed to over thirty stores simultaneously and sealed all chests of drawers in which the materials were kept.

In addition to the retrenchment measures described above, the Kinshiroku group is reported to have planned to petition the Bakufu for the following requests: the
relaxation of restrictions placed on Satsuma's Ryukyu-China trade, the exemption of the Satsuma daimyo from the alternate attendance (sankin kōtai) requirement for fifteen years, and for a loan of 150,000 ryo. 74

The third objective of the counter reforms the Kinshiroku group attempted was the rectification of corrupted discipline among han officials, the result of such prevalent practices as gift-giving and private petitions. The practice of gift-giving was a matter of long established custom. Presents went with various petitions, appointments to office or promotions, as tokens of appreciation. However, from the moralistic viewpoint of the Kinshiroku group, petitions outside the regular bureaucratic channels and their accompanying gift-giving meant corruption of official discipline.

On 1808/2/12, senior councillors Chichibu and Kabayama directed to various han offices a notice which strictly prohibited all petitions outside the regular bureaucratic channels. The notice forbade private petitioning to senior councillors in the Office of Finances (kattehō) through the mediation of functionaries such as yōtatsu and uchiyō danomi, and ordered appeals to be made through the steward (yōnin). On the other hand, the stewards were instructed not to give personal advice to petitioners. Investigators (gimmi yaku), magistrates (bugyō) and their clerks were also ordered not to listen
to intended lawsuits outside their offices. According to Arima, the notice of 1808/2/12 stated that although it had been an established rule to present privately petitions on various matters, hereafter they were to be submitted only in an official written form. The notice issued on 3/11 banned gatherings to celebrate appointment to office, promotion, or employment of clerks and other functionaries, for such gatherings were always accompanied by presents.

In addition to this direct prohibition against private petitions and their accompanying present-giving, the Kinshiroku group also attempted to eliminate other causes responsible for the corruption of official discipline, negligence of official duties and moral decay. They reprimanded magistrates (bugyō) and heads of various han offices through the following notice issued on 3/5.

In recent years magistrates and other heads of various han offices had left their duties entirely to scribes and other functionaries, and they were unfamiliar with the situation of their offices and unable to perform their duties efficiently. Negligence of their duties had forced magistrates and heads of offices to consult with their functionaries on official matters. Consequently, people had secretly negotiated with minor officials or bribed them, thus causing laxity in official discipline.

A sophisticated style of living, as the result of Shigehide's "enlightenment" policy, was demonstrated among some of the upper-class samurai with high income, who were customarily appointed to important han posts. For the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Date of dismissal or punishment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Niiro Kura</td>
<td>Senior councillor (karō)</td>
<td>1807/11/20 (dismissed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iwashita Sajiemon</td>
<td>Grand overseer (ōmetsuke-kaku)</td>
<td>1807/11/20 (dismissed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yakumaru Iemon</td>
<td>Chief deputy officer (tōban gashira)</td>
<td>1807/11/20 (dismissed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishiguro Tōgozaemon</td>
<td>Daïmyo's personal attendant (sobayaku)</td>
<td>1807/11/20 (dismissed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takeda Takedayū</td>
<td>Steward (yōnin)</td>
<td>1807/11/20 (dismissed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kokubu Ichirōemon</td>
<td>Steward of the Great Interior (hiroshiki yōnin)</td>
<td>1807/11/20 (dismissed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shimazu Noboru</td>
<td>Senior elder (waka toshiyori)</td>
<td>1807/11/20 (reproached)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takahashi Nuidono</td>
<td>Senior councillor (karō)</td>
<td>1807/11/21 (ordered to retire)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akamatsu Ichinokami</td>
<td>Senior councillor (karō)</td>
<td>1807/11/21 (ordered to retire)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omodaka Gennojō</td>
<td>Superintendent of culinary affairs (nando bugyō)</td>
<td>1807/12/6 (demoted to commissioner of bows, yumi bugyō)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamamoto Uagenta</td>
<td>Superintendent of culinary affairs (nando bugyō)</td>
<td>1807/12/6 (demoted to commissioner of lances, yari bugyō)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hirata Heiemon</td>
<td>Agricultural magistrate (kōri bugyō)</td>
<td>1807/12/17 (dismissed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamaguchi Kōemon</td>
<td>Superintendent of construction (sakuiji bugyō)</td>
<td>1807/12/31 (dismissed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamamoto Shūsui</td>
<td>Professor (kyōju)</td>
<td>1808/1/21 (dismissed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ichida Kageyu</td>
<td>Senior councillor (karō)</td>
<td>1808/2/4 (dismissed)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Kinshiroku group this sophisticated mode of life was labeled as "pleasure-seeking and luxurious" and a cause of moral decay among the samurai and of corruption of official discipline. Moreover in the notice issued on 4/5 they accused the families of great status (daishimbun), or families with the rank of yoriai-nami and above, of their "extravagant" life and urged them to live within their means and to make efforts to recover the fine customs of simplicity and honor of Satsuma.80 The Kinshiroku group directed their reforms against the important han officials who were appointed by Shigehide for, in their view, these officials were largely responsible for the "misgovernment of the country."

As the first step in carrying out these reform measures, the Kinshiroku group concentrated on thorough-going personnel changes, as seen in Table XXVII, which they considered essential to political control. Those who were dismissed from office on 1807/11/20, including the senior councillor for the Office of Finances (kattehō karō), Niiro Kura, were accused of committing blunders, though no evil had resulted yet.81 Junior elder (waka toshiyori) Shimazu Noboru was reproached because his treatment of his subordinates was unreasonable. Apparently this referred to the former dismissal of Chichibu Sueyasu, a leading figure of the Kinshiroku group, in an incident which has already been referred to.82 Assistant
professors (jokyō) Hashiguchi Gonzō and Miyashita Shuzaemon were forced to resign their posts on 1807/12/27 and 28 respectively because of their humiliation by the Kinshiroku group. 83

The following statement demonstrates how extensive were the personnel changes intended by the Kinshiroku group. Since Chichibu Sueyasu was appointed senior councillor (karō) on 1807/12/6, he ordered strict inquiries about the work attitudes of all han officials and even about the friendly relations of their fathers, sons and brothers, which resulted in the dismissal of scores of officials from office. Chichibu's colleagues, such as Shimizu Moriyuki and Kumamoto Heita, repeatedly suggested that only leading "sycophants" were to be discharged from office, while petty officials were to be left as they were. Chichibu replied, however, that not a single such functionary was to be kept in the han government. 84 Chichibu gave strict instructions that all who belonged to the Shigehide group and who were actively carrying out Shigehide's policies must be investigated. As a result, almost all officials who had been favored and promoted by Shigehide were either demoted or dismissed from office.

On the other hand, daimyo Narinobu rapidly appointed or promoted many members of the Kinshiroku group to important han posts. Kabayama Chikara who was entrusted
with enacting the reforms of Narinobu, was promoted from steward attached to the Office of Finances (kattehō yōnin) to grand overseer (ōmetsuke) on 1807/1/11, and to senior councillor (karō) on 1807/11/19. Chichibu Sueyasu, who became Kabayama's right-hand man in the counter reforms, was rapidly promoted from magistrate of roads (michi bugyō) to steward (yōnin), concurrently holding the post of the chief deputy officer (tōban gashira), on 1807/11/19, to grand overseer (ōmetsuke) on the 28th of the same month and to senior councillor on the sixth of the twelfth month. By the end of the third month of 1808, scores of the Kinshiroku group members were appointed to various essential han offices, as shown in Table XXVIII.

Needless to say, the counter reforms of the Kinshiroku members angered the retired daimyo Shigehide at Edo. Although after their appointment to important han posts Kabayama and Chichibu from time to time reported to Shigehide the reasons for their counter reforms, they received no reply from him.85

Shigehide's Reaction, the Kinshiroku Purge

The counter reform efforts by the Kinshiroku group ended in a decisive purge. Senior councillors (karō) Kabayama Chikara and Chichibu Sueyasu were about to leave for Edo in late spring of 1808 in obedience to daimyo Narinobu's order at the same time that the senior councillor Ei Shinano was ordered by the retired daimyo
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Promotion</th>
<th>Posts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kabayama Chikara</td>
<td>1807/11/19</td>
<td>Senior Councillor (karō)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chichibu Sueyasu</td>
<td>1807/11/19</td>
<td>Steward (yōnin), concurrently chief deputy officer (tōban gashira)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1807/11/28</td>
<td>Grand overseer (ōmetsuke)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1807/12/6</td>
<td>Senior councillor (karō)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumamoto Heita</td>
<td>1807/11/3</td>
<td>Chief of the attendants (konando tōdori)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1807/11/23</td>
<td>Daīmyo's personal attendant (sobayaku)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shimizu Moriyuki</td>
<td>1807/11/19</td>
<td>Steward (yōnin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wakamatsu Heihachi</td>
<td>1807/11/19</td>
<td>Commissioner of guns (teppō bugyō)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moriyama Sanjū</td>
<td>1807/11/23</td>
<td>Daīmyo's personal attendant (sobayaku)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomoto Gengozaemon</td>
<td>1807/12/4</td>
<td>Page of the Interior (oku koshō)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katsube Gunki</td>
<td>1807/12/6</td>
<td>Personal steward of the daimyo (soba yōnin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hori Jinzaemon</td>
<td>1807/12/6</td>
<td>Superintendent of Culinary Affairs (nando bugyō)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kōno Yasunouemon</td>
<td>1807/12/6</td>
<td>Commissioner of guns (teppō bugyō)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayashi Yasuuemon</td>
<td>1807/12/19</td>
<td>Chief of the attendants (nando bugyō)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saisho Shinsuke</td>
<td>1807/12/19</td>
<td>Superintendent of government property (mono bugyō)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ōshige Gorōzaemon</td>
<td>1807/12/19</td>
<td>Attendant (konando)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsuzaki Žempachi</td>
<td>1807/12/19</td>
<td>Attendant (konando)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sogi Tōtarō</td>
<td>1807/12/19</td>
<td>Inspector (metsuke)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aikō Hanzō</td>
<td>1807/12/19</td>
<td>Deputy investigator (saikyo gakari minarai)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamata Shirōzaemon</td>
<td>1807/12/21</td>
<td>Investigator (saikyo gakari)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumamoto Gunroku</td>
<td>1807/12/23</td>
<td>Page of the daimyo (kinjūban)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1808/1/16</td>
<td>Daīmyo's personal attendant (sobayaku)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Shigehide to come up to Edo. \(^86\) The purpose of the visit of Kabayama and Chichibu to Edo was to negotiate with the Bakufu about financial assistance to Satsuma. They also intended to discuss with Shigehide the resignation of his favorite retainers at Edo. \(^88\) Ei left Kagoshima on 1808/5/3, and Kabayama went on the following day. Chichibu's departure was delayed due to the death of his son. \(^89\)

On 1808/5/8 an unexpected incident took place. Both Kabayama and Chichibu were suddenly dismissed from office and forced into retirement by retired daimyo Shigehide. Kabayama was ordered to return to his private domain, while Chichibu was confined to his home. \(^90\) At first, Narinobu reacted against his father's order and considerably relaxed the latter's decisions. Narinobu's order to Kabayama and Chichibu on 5/9 stated that since both were his favorite retainers, they were not to be dismissed from office but would merely be confined to their homes. Whenever Narinobu had something to discuss with him, however, Chichibu was to be allowed to attend the palace of the daimyo. As for Kabayama, it was not necessary for him to return to his private domain. \(^91\) Three days later on 5/12, however, Narinobu suddenly changed his mind and went along with Shigehide's decision, dismissing them from office and forcing them into retirement. \(^92\) On the same day most members of the Kinshiroku group were deprived of their positions.
This was the beginning of Shigehide's reaction, and eventually one hundred fifteen people who took part in the counter reforms were severely punished. Leaders of the Kinshiroku group, Kabayama and Chichibu, were ordered to commit harakiri, while Kitō Takekiyo, the central intellectual figure of the group, was banished to Tokunoshima island. Twenty-five were ordered banished to distant islands, 42 to take the tonsure, 23 were confined to their homes, 12 received other punishments. In this manner all of the Kinshiroku group members were completely removed from power. Then, on 1809/6/7 daimyo Narinobu was forced into retirement at the age of 37, and his son Narioki was appointed to the head of the Shimazu family at the age of 19. This purge is called the Kinshiroku kuzure (purge) or the Bunka Hōtō Jiken (Factional Incident in the Bunka Period).

When the purge was carried out in 1808, Shigehide was 64 years old and in retirement at Edo while Narinobu was the daimyo of Satsuma-han. Yet, Shigehide interfered with the han administration by dismissing important han officials and even forcing the daimyo into retirement. How had he been able to accomplish this? Obviously, as the extent of the subsequent purge demonstrates, Shigehide had never relinquished his actual control over the affairs of Satsuma. Although he justified his actions in terms of Confucian ethics, loyalty and filial piety, the language
which had been used by his critics, Shigehide was able to exercise autocratic political power boldly because he had consolidated his position some years before. He thus succeeded in snuffing out effective opposition.

Upon his arrival at Edo on 5/28, Ei Shinano was received in audience by Shigehide. The former daimyo declared with anger that "what the Kinshiroku group had done was extremely disrespectful to the wife of the Shogun and insolent toward himself. They were indisputably rebellious retainers who encouraged disloyalty and impiety. Therefore, Chichibu and Kabayama and the rest of the group must be full investigated."

According to Haraguchi Torao, Shigehide possibly planned his counteraction in consultation with his daughter Shigehime, the wife of Shogun Ienari. Ienari was known for his extravagant and luxurious living style, and if the counter reforms attempted by the Kinshiroku group were carried out, she knew that she had to feel small before her husband and the people in the Great Interior (ōoku) due to lack of donations from Satsuma. Therefore, Haraguchi suggests, concern for herself and her love for her father Shigehide made her unhappy with what was taking place in Satsuma.

Shigehide resumed an active role in the han administration. An official notice on 1808/6/27 announced that he was assuming the direction of state affairs "because of
the deplorable incident." Shigehide also restored to the former state most of what was changed or abolished by the Kinshiroku group. On 1808/9/17 the following persons were absolved from domiciliary confinement: 97

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Former Post</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1808/9/17</td>
<td>Niiro Kura</td>
<td>Senior councillor (karō)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1808/9/17</td>
<td>Takahashi Nuidono</td>
<td>Senior councillor (karō)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1808/9/17</td>
<td>Akamatsu Ichinokami</td>
<td>Senior councillor (karō)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1808/9/17</td>
<td>Iwashita Sajiemon</td>
<td>Grand overseer equivalent attached to the Office of Finances (ōmetsuke-kaku kattehō zutome)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1808/10/11</td>
<td>Yakumaru lemon</td>
<td>Chief deputy officer (tōban gashira)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1808/10/11</td>
<td>Ishiguro Togozaemon</td>
<td>Daïmyō's personal attendant (sobayaku)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1808/10/11</td>
<td>Takeda Takedayū</td>
<td>Steward (yōnin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1808/10/11</td>
<td>Kokubu Ichirōemon</td>
<td>Steward (yōnin)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ichida Kageyu, the former senior councillor and Shigehide's most trusted retainer, was appointed magistrate of accounting (kanjō bugyō) on 1808/9/29, and transferred to captain of the koshōgumi guard units (bangashira) in the second month of 1809, while former senior councillor Niiro Kura was appointed to grand overseer (ōmetsuke) on 1808/9/29 and reappointed senior councillor on 1814/3/27. 98

It is important to scrutinize the active senior councillors (karō) after the Kinshiroku purge. As we see in Table XXIX, four out of seven senior councillors were sons of former important han officials who had been
appointed to their posts by Shigehide. Although the posts occupied by the father of Ei Shinano and Kamata Tenzen cannot be identified, Ei and Kamata themselves had been recommended to the post of grand overseer (ōmetsuke) by the Shigehide group on 1792/8/13 and 1805/5/28 respectively.99 Thus, it may be suggested that these senior councillors were all retainers who enjoyed the confidence of Shigehide.

TABLE XXIX

ACTIVE SENIOR COUNCILLORS AFTER THE KINSHIROKU PURGE100

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Tenure of office</th>
<th>Father's name, position and tenure of office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ei Shinano (Hisataka)</td>
<td>1803/2/1-1813/12/27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shimazu Shōgen (Hisayoshi)</td>
<td>1806/8/6-1814/8/12</td>
<td>Hisakane, senior councillor, 1761/8/4-1793/5/19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamata Tenzen (Masayoshi)</td>
<td>1807/9/13-1819/2/25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shimazu Awa (Hisayoshi)</td>
<td>1808/6/3-1824/7/2</td>
<td>Hisanaga, senior councillor, 1789/11/1-1796/4/28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shimazu Noboru (Hisakane)</td>
<td>1808/6/28-1810/12/19</td>
<td>Hisatsura, senior councillor, 1788/9/3-1790/6/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawakami Ukon (Hisayoshi)</td>
<td>1810/8/27-</td>
<td>Hisaoki, senior councillor, 1793/7/28-1801/10/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niiro Kura</td>
<td>1814/3/27-1826/11/28</td>
<td>Hisatomo, grand overseer, 1771/2/25-1782/3/1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another important feature to note about this group of senior councillors is that, except for Niiro Kura, none of
the former senior councillors were reappointed to their former posts. The Kinshiroku purge was in actuality a complete shift of personnel by Shigehide, who took advantage of the Kinshiroku incident. Presumably, Shigehide was disappointed by the former senior councillors for their inability to prevent the rise of the Kinshiroku group. It may be suggested also that he wished to direct the han administration with new senior councillors who were undoubtedly grateful to Shigehide for their promotion, and who were thereby loyal to him. The third reason might be that by this change of senior councillors, Shigehide hoped to come up with more effective measures to cope with the financial difficulties of the han which began to become aggravated from 1806, as shall be discussed in the next chapter.

Besides the reinstatement of some retainers and the promotion of others, from 1808 to 1809 Shigehide reestablished all offices such as the office of the commander of the outer guards (ōban gashira), which had been abolished by the Kinshiroku group. He restored the hawking grounds (takaba) in various rural districts on 1808/9/14 and 24. The resumption of the assessment of forced loans of money (degin) for the next five years, 1 mon for commoners, was announced on 1808/9/27. However, degin for cows and horses were exempted.
What is most significant in Shigehide's counteraction was the consolidation of his power which had been temporarily eroded by the rise of the Kinshiroku group. Their domination of the han administration was short. In addition, he took elaborate measures to guard against future challenges to his power. First, Shigehide warned against the formation of political factions and attempted to eliminate their causes. On 1808/6/27, one day after the resumption of his leadership in the han administration, Shigehide issued the following notice.

Despite frequent issuance of prohibition orders, people in the Kagoshima castle-town still band together into groups and treat those who do not belong to their own group like strangers. Loitering at night (yakō) and standing on street corners (tsujitachi) by the younger generation are still prevalent, causing quarrels and fights. Because of such bad behavior people are discordant with each other, consequently forming factions and causing disturbances in the han administration.

In the third month of 1810 another notice was issued strictly prohibiting the formation of political factions.

In the past, two different factions were formed. They ended in purges some time in the Enkyō period (1744-1748) and in 1773. Again, recently the late Kabayama and the late Chichibu and like-minded men formed a faction which frequently met together at night, disturbing the han administration. Consequently, the country (Satsuma) was thrown into confusion and disorder... In order to avoid such a regrettable incident, young people shall get together for the study of literary as well as martial arts and devote themselves to the cultivation of a sense of loyalty and filial piety. Thus, as they grow
older, they can serve the country. For this purpose the Zōshikan (School for the Study of Literary Arts) and the Embukan (School for the Training in Martial Arts) were established. 106

Judging from the notices quoted above, it is clear that the Kinshiroku purge was motivated by political considerations. The purge was a means of ridding himself of his opposition and to reinforce his earlier social policy. Shigehide was concerned about "bad customs," among them, the sectionalism and rustic manners of his people, which geographical and institutional factors had maintained virtually unaffected. Those who grew up in the tradition-bound secluded society tended to oppose any attempts to change their traditional social values. As discussed in previous chapters, Shigehide had lived in Edo from the age of ten. Autocratic in personality and progressive in views, he took various measures to "enlighten" his people during the An'ei and Temmei periods (1772-1789) seeking to reform these "bad customs." He regarded the provincial customs of his people as one of the causes for the formation of political factions. These factions threatened to erode his political power and disturb the han administration. In order to eliminate this cause, Shigehide took advantage of the Kinshiroku purge and reasserted the objectives of his earlier social policy.

Secondly, Shigehide used the purge to place the ichimon (four most important Shimazu branch families) more directly
under his control. On 1808/6/30 he issued the following statement in his own handwriting, reprimanding the ichimon and demanding a stronger sense of loyalty to himself.

You are of specially privileged families. Although you do not have to participate in the routine business of the han administration, it is a matter of course to inform me secretly of any affairs of vital importance to the state (Satsuma). Recently, many han officials were dismissed or appointed and a number of offices were abolished, creating a commotion in the state... It was a national crisis, but, disappointingly, none of you informed me of it. You are not worth the name of ichimon, and you have proved to be of little reliability. 107

The ichimon families constituted a family council for the daimyo to deliberate matters of succession and marriage, and to deal with other important domestic issues. They were granted the highest status in the Satsuma feudal hierarchy, accompanied by the greatest privilege of dokurei (individual audience with daimyo). In return, their loyalty was most expected by the daimyo. Thus, the ichimon played an important role in the conduct of state affairs, although they did not directly participate in it. This was a strong reprimand of the ichimon for their lack of loyalty to the retired Shigehide.

Shigehide made known his intention to maintain his direct control over the han administration. Just before the newly appointed daimyo, Narioki, left for Kagoshima for the first time in the fourth month of 1810, Shigehide advised him to concentrate on the management of state
affairs but not to decide any matters by himself. Since Narioki was still young, he said, the affairs of the state must be carefully dealt with by important officials such as senior councillors (karō), junior elders (waka toshiyori) and grand overseers (ōmetsuke), namely the people appointed by himself. Moreover, stipulated laws and regulations must be strictly enforced by them.

With leadership of the han administration once more in his hands, Shigehide was ready to enforce again the various economic measures to cope with the mounting financial difficulties of the han, which is the topic of the next chapter.

Assessment of Kinshiroku Reforms and Shigehide's Purge

In any assessment of political change, or attempted political change, as in the case of the Kinshiroku reforms, the reader must be aware of the discrepancies between what was said, and what was done, or, in other words, he must separate the rhetoric from the reality. As has been indicated in the preceding pages, despite the Confucian rationalizations on both sides, the Kinshiroku counter reform movement and the purge initiated by Shigehide to restore his own reform policies were basically political power struggles for the control of the Satsuma han government. Differences over the state of the han economy, and related bureaucratic administrative methods provided the
more obvious issues of the struggle, but the events of 1807-1808 had more far-reaching causes and consequences.

The result of the Kinshiroku purge was that Shigehide emerged from what was to be the last important challenge to his hegemony as the undisputed leader of a large and potentially wealthy han. As has been suggested, Shigehide's financial reforms in the An'ei and Temmei periods (1772-1789) led directly to the ultimate success of the Tempo Financial Reforms and, indirectly, to the important role the Satsum-han played as a consequence of early unification of leadership in the Meiji Restoration. Seen in that light, then, the significance of the Kinshiroku purge heightens. How, then, do we evaluate what the Kinshiroku counter reforms accomplished?

It is difficult to assess the success of the counter reforms, for they lasted only half a year from 1807/11 to 1808/5. It may be suggested, however, that the major objective of the reforms, the reestablishment of a more traditional han economy, could not have been accomplished even if the reforms had lasted for a much longer period. In the first place, a money economy had already spread throughout Japan and Satsuma was no exception. It was a time when the successful operation of han finances depended on the utilization of the merchant economy. As we discussed in detail in the previous chapter, Shigehide was aware of this trend toward commercialism and attempted to
cope with the financial difficulties of the han through such "progressive" measures as the utilization of merchant talent and their capital, the further encouragement of production of local products and the tightening of their han monopoly, and the encouragement of smuggling with China. On the contrary, the Kinshiroku group attempted to return to more traditional economic practices based on an agrarian economy, possibly because of their attachment to certain Confucian principles, but also because they felt threatened both economically and politically by the newer measures based on commercialism.

Secondly, the Kinshiroku group planned to submit to the Bakufu various petitions in the hope of obtaining aid for the fulfillment of their economic efforts. It was necessary, however, to have a strong power base and great prestige to deal with the Bakufu officials. Even Shigehide, whose daughter was the wife of the Shogun, had repeatedly appealed to the Bakufu since 1804 to relax the restrictions placed on the Satsuma's Ryukyu-China trade but with limited success.

Possibly the third reason for the failure of their counter reforms was that most of the leading Kinshiroku group members, like Chichibu Sueyasu, were upstarts in Satsuma's administrative hierarchy. Yet, the nature of their reforms, or possibly the inflexibility of their characters, led to their outright denunciation of the "families of great status" (daishimbun) for their playing
with literary arts and for their "extravagant" life styles. There is no doubt that the Kinshiroku group aroused the resentment of such families. The Shimazu branch families, especially those with the dokurei (individual audience with the daimyo) privilege, were keenly sensitive to any decline in Shimazu fortunes and in their own prestige. These families were on the top of the samurai status hierarchy on which the daimyo's power was based. Without their support, daimyo Narinobu's political position became inevitably weakened. Thus, the Kinshiroku group who depended on Narinobu alone could not hope to bring their counter reforms to success.

The Kinshiroku Reforms were a counter to Shigehide's policies. Ostensibly they dealt, among other things, with the discontent caused by Shigehide's economic reforms. Were the Kinshiroku charges that Shigehide increased the misery of the peasants and the financial distress of the han well-founded? Since the members of the Kinshiroku group were jōkashi (castle-town samurai) their knowledge of rural conditions and of peasant distress may have been limited. Thus, it is difficult to assess the basis for their accusations.

The question of increasing han debts has been treated in Chapter V. Shigehide cannot be faulted for his commercial policy, in relation to the debts, for it was
precisely because Shigehide had commercial connections that the interest on the han debts was as low as it was, at least until 1801.

As for the matter of "corrupt" officials, here again the reader must be wary of Confucian rhetoric. In an age of semi-feudal absolutism, we must not expect to find twentieth century distinctions about governmental ethics. There is no question that Shigehide wielded and sought to maintain an arbitrary, ruthless power and brooked no challenge to his authority. In this age, personal loyalty was more important than Confucian principles. Officials were not appointed or promoted because of their moral rectitude, but for their loyalty to Shigehide.

Moreover, it was possible for a man of talent to be retained in office so long as he did not involve himself in political power struggles against those in authority. In this regard, it is significant to note that Kuroda Sainojō, who succeeded Yamamoto Shūsui to the professorship of the Zōshikan domain school, was not dismissed from office by Shigehide in the Kinshiroku purge. He remained in this post until 1820. Kuroda was not necessarily the choice of the Kinshiroku group nor identified closely as a member of the Shigehide group. This fact enabled him to remain as professor of the Zōshikan even after the purge. Another possible reason why Kuroda was not dismissed from office was that Shigehide found use for Confucian learning as a political tool.
Shigehide's educational objectives had been not so much to promote the learning itself but to use it as a means to consolidate the ideological foundation of his political power. After Shigehide attained absolute political power through the Kinshiroku purge, he did not need to encourage "learning" as much as he used to. After the purge the people in Satsuma became not only disen­chanted with learning but also were afraid that reading books led to harakiri. According to some critics of Shigehide, this consequent fear of reading was responsible for the "stagnation" of Confucian learning in Satsuma. In this view, no outstanding Confucian scholars were produced after Yamamoto Shūsui (1734-1808) and Akazaki Kaimon (1742-1805), nor were any significant Confucian works written. What is more likely, however, is that the dangers inherent in too narrow an application of Confucian "principles" was recognized, and thoughtful men turned their attention to other matters.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER VII


8. Ibid., 5b.

9. Ibid., 3b. "Hōtō jitsuroku," 9a. Haraguchi, Bakumatsu no Satsuma, p. 44, states that the kikaku mondō was widely read among the samurai.


15. Ibid., 4b-5a. "Hōtō jitsuroku," 12b, states that Kabayama was received in audience on 10/24 through the good offices of Ishiguro Togozaemon, the daïmyo's personal attendant.

17. Kubo Heinaizaemon was fond of learning and excelled in scholarly discussion. He was a samurai without assigned duties, but he was soon appointed to intendant (daikan) in charge of Tokunoshima island and later promoted to agricultural magistrate (kōri bugyō). Kubo wrote such works as the Shōgō eirō shirabe (Report on the Decline of the Various Rural Districts) and the Sappan shifūden (Manners of the Samurai Class in Satsuma-han), in which he expressed his lamentation for the suffering of peasants and the decline of samurai morale.


19. Ibid., 2b-3a.

20. Ibid., 9a.

21. Ibid., 74a-74b.

22. Ibid., 14b-15a.

23. Ibid., 31a.

24. These data are taken from "Hōtō jitsuroku."


26. With this work and another short work called the T'ung-shu (Penetrating the Book of Changes), Chou Tun-i laid the pattern of metaphysics and ethics for later Neo-Confucianism. Chan, loc. cit.


28. Ibid., 34b-35a.


33. Loc. cit.
35. Ibid., 16a.
36. Ibid., 23a-23b.
37. Ibid., 31a.
38. Ibid., 76b.
39. Ibid., 17b-18a.
40. Ibid., 18a-18b.
41. Ibid., 14b.

42. Kagoshima-ken kyōikushi: Meiji izen, p. 55. The chaotic conditions in the world of Confucian learning prompted Shigehide's decision to promote the Chu Hsi school. Around that time various schools, including several so-called schools of Eclecticism (setchū gakuha), were competing and criticizing each other, hence impairing the general prestige of the Confucian teachings. This was a time of great confusion and complexity in the world of Confucian learning throughout Japan, and the need for uniformity of the Confucian teachings was keenly felt by the political authorities as well as scholars. Sagara, Kinsei Nihon ni okeru Jukyō undō no keifu, pp. 221-230. Kasaï Sukeharu, Kinsei hankō ni okeru gakutō gakuha no kenkyū (Study of Various Schools and their Academic Traditions in Domain Schools in the Early Modern Period) (Tokyo, 1970), I, 59-66.


47. Around the period of Enkyō (1744-1748) Kawakami Chikamasu advocated the policy of promoting jitsugaku (practical learning) and rejected broad learning as idle show. Kawakami and his followers got together and criticized the han administration and han officials. After his death his followers met frequently and engaged in secret discussions. In the twelfth month of 1750 all the group members were banished to a distant island by Shigetoshi, the twenty-fourth daimyo of Satsuma. Muto, op. cit., p. 80. Kenshi, II, 889-899. It can be assumed that Yamamoto called the Kinshiroku group the Nise Jitsugakutō in the sense that they were imitators of the Kawakami group and their doctrines.


49. Loc. cit.


51. The Seiri taizen (Hsing li ta chüan in Chinese) was compiled by Hu Kuang et al. in 1415.


53. Ibid., 33a-33b.

54. Ibid., 36b.

55. Loc. cit.

56. "Hōtō jitsuroku," 37a-37b

57. Ibid., 47b.

59. Ibid., 69a-70b.
60. Loc. cit.
61. Sagara, Kinsei Nihon ni okeru Jukyō undō no keifu, pp. 185-221.
64. "Arima Sensei," 7b.
66. Ibid., 58b.
67. Ibid., 59a.
68. Ibid., 59a-59b.
69. Ibid., 60a.
71. Loc. Cit.
72. For example, it was ordered on 3/7 that an office building of the superintendent of roads was to be sold by tender. "Hōtō jitsuroku," 66a.
73. Ibid., 68a.
74. Ibid., 58a-58b.
75. Ibid., 55b-56a.
78. Ibid., 65b-66a.
79. These data are taken from "Hōtō jitsuroku."
81. Ibid., 15a.
82. Ibid., 15b.
83. Ibid., 36b.
85. Ibid., 10b.
86. These data are taken from "Hōtō jitsuroku."
88. Shigeno and Komaki, Sappan shidanshū, p. 507.
89. "Hōtō jitsuroku," 75a-76b.
90. Shigehide's order for their dismissal from office was issued a month before, on 4/9, at Edo. Their relatives stationed at Edo were ordered to immediately resign their offices, and they were sent back to Kagoshima to convey Shigehide's order to Chichibu and Kabayama. They arrived in Kagoshima on 5/7. "Hōtō jitsuroku," 79a.
91. Ibid., 82a-82b.
92. Ibid., 83a.
95. Ibid., 24a.
96. Haraguchi, Bakumatsu no Satsuma, p. 54.
98. Ibid., 132a. Ichida Kageyu's son, Nagato, served as senior councillor from 1819/1/15 to 1822/4/14.
99. Sappan seiyōroku, pp. 69.
100. Ibid., pp. 57-69.

105. Upon the completion of the Zōshikan domain school in 1773, Yamamoto Shusui, a Chu Hsi scholar, was appointed its first professor. Contrary to their expectations none of the Ancient Learning (kogaku) school, including men like Kawakami Kazen, Takahashi Buemon, Aikō Shin'emon, were appointed to any offices of the domain school. Reportedly, Kawakami himself and others were confident that he would be given the head position. Their disappointment and dissatisfaction was shared also by men like Koriyama Sonshi, who was replaced by Yamamoto as the attendant Confucian scholar of Shigehide at Edo, and senior councillor Shimazu Hisaoki who lost Shigehide's favor and was in despair. Consequently, they started voicing their criticism of Shigehide's "enlightenment" policy. Their opposition soon aroused Shigehide's anger, leading to the tragic purge by which most of them were exiled or ordered to do penance and barred permanently from appointment to han offices. Noda, "Sappan no bunkyo to hangaku," pp. 312-314. Kasai, Kinsei hankō ni okeru gakuto gakuha no kenkyū, II, 1934.

106. Quoted by Tokutomi in Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi: yūhan-hen, p. 89.


108. Quoted by Tokutomi in op. cit., p. 90.


110. When professor Yamamoto Shusui was deprived of his post on 1808/1/21, it was rumored that Hioki Gorōta, the official for religious inspection (shūmon aratame-kata), and Kito Takekiyo, the central intellectual figure of the Kinshiroku group, were informally notified of their appointment to professor and assistant professor respectively. However, due to a commotion in the school caused by their informal appointments, Kuroda was promoted to professor. Kenshi, II, 897. Hioki was promoted, instead, to commissioner of arms (monogashira) on 1808/2/22. "Hōtō jitsuroku," 59a.

111. Ichiki, "Satsuma no kuni fūzoku enkaku oyobi...," p. 58.
CHAPTER VIII
SHIGEHIDE'S ECONOMIC REFORMS 1808-1830

With the resumption of his leadership in the han administration in 1808, Shigehide devoted himself to the recovery of han finances which had been rapidly deteriorating from around 1806. In the third month of 1806 the Satsuma residence at Shiba in Edo burned down and had to be rebuilt quickly to receive a Ryukyuan appreciatory mission (onshashi) which was due the following year. Expenses for rebuilding the Satsuma residence necessitated a new loan of 2,595 kan (43,269 ryo) at Edo in 1806. Two thousand four hundred and seventy-two kan (41,200 ryo) of this new loan carried an annual interest as high as 10 percent. As noted in Chapter V, in 1802 Shigehide previously had succeeded in lowering the annual interest rate on the han debts to 3.6 percent at Edo and to 2.4 percent at Kyoto-Osaka. Yet, the han debts, which increased to 76,168 kan (1,260,000 ryo) in 1807, reached an astronomical figure of 320,000 kan or 5 million ryo by 1827.

In this chapter the author will analyze the real causes for the sudden increase in han indebtedness and will examine the various economic measures Shigehide employed to cope with these mounting debts.
Background Information on Shigehide's Economic Policy (1808-1830)

Again, it is necessary to look at the political moves Shigehide made in reorganizing the han administration in order to enforce his economic policies. As noted in the previous chapter, he reassumed his personal direction of state affairs both at Edo and Satsuma on 1808/6/27. On 1808/6/5, Shigehide put senior councillor Ei Shinano in charge of the Office of Finances (kattehō). Ei was assigned to deal concurrently with matters concerning the Office of the Exterior (omotegata) as well.

Right after the purge, reportedly, Shigehide had ordered various officials including magistrates of accounting (taka bugyō), maritime magistrates (fune bugyō), commissioners of arms (mono bugyō) and intendants (daikan), to inquire into possible financial reform measures. They submitted their reform plans to the senior councillor for the Office of Finances who, in turn, gave instructions concerning various financial reform measures in the seventh month of 1809. Reportedly, since no specially effective plans had occurred to them, Shigehide in the tenth month of 1809 established an advisory council on han finances (shuhōhō), which was independent of the Office of Finances. The advisory council was composed of the daimyo's personal steward (soba yōnin), a personal attendant of the daimyo
(sobayaku) and a superintendent of culinary affairs (nando bugyō). Several assistants called shirabe gakari (lit., investigators) were attached to this advisory council also. These men were competent and experienced officials supposedly selected from various han offices, but the majority of them seemed to come from the Office of the Interior. The shuhōō adopted measures pertaining to financial matters and reported them to Ei Shinano, the senior councillor for the Office of Finances (kattehō). It should be noted that this advisory council on han finances (shuhōō) gradually would be greatly enlarged in scale and authority, and changed in name to naiyōkata (lit., office which carried out the daimyo's secret orders) when the so-called Tempō Financial Reforms started in 1830. The naiyōkata would become the driving force of the successful Tempō Financial Reforms.

Perhaps of more immediate significance, however, among the administrative changes carried out by Shigehide after the purge was the greater authority, especially in financial matters vested in the Office of the Interior (okugakari), the daimyo's personal administration. As described in Chapter III, when Shigehide retired in 1787, he appointed his trusted retainer, Ichida Kageyu, the senior councillor for the Office of the Interior and entrusted Ichida with all aspects of the han administration. In addition, Shigehide directly managed financial affairs
of the han without the intermediation of the senior councillor of the Office of Finances, as demonstrated in the following episodes. Shigehide returned to Kagoshima in 1813 to give personal directions to the ichimon (Shimazu branch) families as well as to important han officials with regard to the han administration. On his way there he personally negotiated with Osaka merchants about a loan of money. As has been stressed before, Shigehide had been exercising more personal leadership over han finances since 1787, and had continued to place various economic measures under his direct control. A more detailed explanation of the various devices Shigehide utilized to maintain his control, as well as an examination into the reasons why he had to resort to these measures, will be reserved for the conclusion of this chapter. We turn now to look at the specific economic measures pursued by Shigehide from 1808 to 1830.

Economic Measures

Although Shigehide continued his earlier "progressive" economic policy, which as discussed in Chapter VI, his economic policy from 1808 to 1830 was characterized by even more emphasis on commercialism, as we shall see. In the meantime he did not neglect more traditional means of economizing. He reenforced sumptuary regulations and stricter retrenchment measures.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of issuance</th>
<th>Duration of regulations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1805</td>
<td>Originally 1806-1810 but extended to 1813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1813</td>
<td>1813-1820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1820</td>
<td>1820-1825</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Previously the han had allowed hiring horses for travel from Edo along the Tōkaidō and San'yōdō routes, but as an economy measure, travel by horse along the Tōkaidō only was permitted by an order of the tenth month of 1808.8

The following notice issued in the eleventh month of 1808 demonstrates the extent to which Shigehide carried out these retrenchment measures. It was ordered that decorations for New Year's day and other festival occasions were to be discontinued, and that even flowers were not to be specially arranged except in the case of the visit of important guests.9 Gratuity had been given to the han officials and their accompanying "foot-soldiers" (ashigaru) who were dispatched to Ryukyu and Amami-Oshima, but this practice was discontinued in the third month of 1809.10 Shigehide managed to obtain the Bakufu's permission to reduce the retinue accompanying the sankin kōtai trip in the tenth month of 1814.11 In the ninth month of 1816 he decreased the number of officials stationed at Edo: one envoy (tsukaiban) and one chief of the attendants of the Great Interior (hiroshiki bangashira). In addition, a personal steward of the daimyo (soba yōnin)
was ordered to serve concurrently as the daimyo's personal attendant (sobayaku).\textsuperscript{12}

Although previously Shigehide had obtained loans from the Bakufu, as mentioned in Chapter V, these loans were not available after 1806. The only monetary favor given to Satsuma at this time was an extension of the period of payment. Two loans, 10,000 ryo and 10,000 koku in 1805 and 10,000 ryo in 1806, were both due to be paid from 1809 to 1818. However, Shigehide managed to obtain the Bakufu's permission to postpone the date of payment for the second loan of 1806 from 1818 to 1828 because of the tight financial situation in Satsuma.\textsuperscript{13} The reason no loans were extended to Satsuma after 1806 is probably because the Bakufu finances were also in deficit by some 74,415 ryo and 7,644 koku annually on the average for the ten years from 1812 to 1821.\textsuperscript{14}

One of the important "unofficial" sources of han income was the permanent transfer to the han treasury of portions of Shigehide's retirement allowance and the daimyo's personal funds for his household needs, as we saw in Chapter V, which amounted to 61,500 ryo (3,690 kan) annually after 1805. Right after the Kinshiroku purge in 1808, Shigehide announced an annual contribution to the han finances of 2,000 ryo from his retirement allowance for the next five years.\textsuperscript{15} Then, both retired daimyo, Shigehide and Narinobu, decided to contribute 500 koku
(500 ryo) each in 1817 for the next two years, and their contributions were continued another two years until 1821. In the seventh month of 1809 Narinobu had been allocated 20,000 koku (approximately 20,000 ryo) as his retirement allowance. However, this amount was reduced to 8,668 ryo in the seventh month of the following year.

As we discussed in Chapter V, additional forced loans of rice (kasami demai) from the samurai and forced loans of money (degin) from commoners were almost continually assessed. In addition to the regular assessment of forced loans of rice (demai) 8.1 sho per 1 koku of rice income, kasami demai were imposed in the following years: 1808-1813 (3 sho) and 1817-1821 (1.5 sho for the castle-town samurai and 2.2 sho for the gōshi or rural samurai). As to forced loans of money (degin) from commoners, 1 mon was assessed on each person in 1808 for the next five years. Due to smaller shipments of local products to Osaka for sale around 1820, the han government's financial stress forced the levy of additional forced loans of rice as well as forced loans of money. Thus degin was assessed presumably more than once after 1818. To secure their full payment, the following measure was taken by Shigehide. On 1809/4/18, maritime magistrates (fune bugyō) ordered that, since arrears had recently amounted to a large sum, local officials in charge from time to
time must summon before them those delinquent in their payment and collect all the arrears without fail.  

Importantly, in addition to the "regular" degin on each person (nimbetsu), cows and horses, and ships, it appears that Shigehide attempted to squeeze more wealth from non-agrarian sectors after 1808. This tactic of Shigehide was described by Ebihara Kiyohiro, also known as Yōsai, one of the main figures in the Tempō Financial Reforms. According to Ebihara, a special tax called kasami gin was assessed on temples and shrines, while artisans were forced to pay a special tax, katadori. Even a tax on geisha girls called shakin was imposed. On special occasions such as the alternate attendance (sankin kōtai) trip, forced donations were ordered from well-to-do commoners not only in the Kagoshima castle-town but also in rural districts.

Ebihara's statement can be substantiated by the famous Confucian scholar Rai San'yō who visited Satsuma in 1818. San'yō described the Kagoshima castle-town in his letter to Kan Sazan, who referred to San'yō's letter in the Fude no susabi (Writing for Amusement Sake).

San'yō had thought Satsuma was an unsophisticated rural country, but to his surprise he found constant performances of shibai (Japanese traditional drama), five or six wholesale stores called Kamigata ton'ya, and some one hundred geisha girls from the Kyoto-Osaka area who were living in small groups and entertaining day and night, sometimes visiting samurai's houses.
Presumably, the owners of the shibai theaters, shibai actors, and wholesalers were assessed special taxes also, as were the geisha girls.

Concerning Shigehide's efforts to increase agricultural production, there are very few records available from 1789, the first year of Kansei, to 1830 when the Tempō Financial Reforms started. This scarcity of documents suggests that the economic measures initiated during the An'ai and Temmei periods (1772-1789) were for the most part continued with little change. In the following study we will mainly base our discussion on the available statistical data for the amount of local products sold at Osaka market for the ten year periods before and after 1830, as shown in Table XXX, in order to analyze the direction and nature of Shigehide's agricultural policy after 1808.

TABLE XXX
AMOUNTS OF MAJOR LOCAL PRODUCTS SHIPPED TO OSACA FOR SALE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of products</th>
<th>Period of years</th>
<th>Annual average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>1818-1829 (12 years)</td>
<td>17,211.25 koku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1830-1839 (10 years)</td>
<td>12,524.132 koku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>1820-1829 (10 years)</td>
<td>12,000,000 kin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1830-1839 (10 years)</td>
<td>12,000,000 kin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude wax</td>
<td>1819-1829 (11 years)</td>
<td>305.334 kin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1830-1840 (11 years)</td>
<td>239.711 kin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapeseed</td>
<td>1820-1829 (10 years)</td>
<td>3,275.624 koku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1832-1839 (8 years)</td>
<td>4,002.760 koku</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The proceeds from the sale of these products were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>1818-1829</td>
<td>900 kan (14,000 ryo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1830-1839</td>
<td>1,150 kan (18,000 ryo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All local products other than rice</td>
<td>1801</td>
<td>6,000 kan (100,000 ryo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1815</td>
<td>8,400 kan (140,000 ryo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1829</td>
<td>10,200 kan (170,000 ryo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1843</td>
<td>15,600 kan (260,000 ryo)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An examination of the figures in Table XXX reveals that, in the first place, the annual average amount of local products sold at the Osaka market during the Bunsei period (1818-1830) was greater than that in the Tempo period (1830-1844), except for rapeseed. Yet, the han obtained less proceeds from their sale (sambutsuryo), as shown above, during the Bunsei period than the Tempō period. Greater profits realized in the Tempō period were mainly attributed to the improvement in processing as well as selling methods of the local products and not to their increased production. Significantly, these improvements were not initiated until the Tempo Financial Reforms which started in 1830. In the second place, then, the steady increase in the sambutsuryō from 1801 to 1829 can be only explained by the increase in production of local products, which was achieved through the continued application of various promotional measures initiated by Shigehide during the An'ei and Temmei periods (1772-1789). One example of this was the sugar production in Ōshima island. According
to the Ōshima daikanki (Record of the Oshima Intendant),
the annual sugar production was 6,000,000 kin about
1781. The annual average increased to 6,704,000 kin in
the Bunka period (1804-1818) and to 6,913,000 kin in the
Bunsei period (1818-1830), and then decreased to
5,768,000 kin during the Tempō period (1830-1844). In
addition, a notice issued in the twelfth month of 1810
restricted the amount of sugar allowed to be purchased by
intendants (daikan) and other officials in the "Three
Islands," and it also strictly prohibited private sugar
trade by boatmen. In the second month of 1814 Shigehide
ordered merchants in the Kagoshima castle-town to lower
their shipping charges for local products to be sent to
Osaka.

Another significant "progressive" economic measure
was Shigehide's serious efforts to further expand Satsuma's
illicit trade. Outright smuggling had been carried out by
the successive daimyo, and Shigehide made efforts to
further expand it during the tenure of his office as
daityo (1755-1787), as was discussed in Chapter VI. There
were two types of illicit trade both of which were
conducted secretly. One type of smuggling was with so-
called "drifting" Chinese ships off the shores of Satsuma,
and the other type was the illicit trade carried on under
cover of Satsuma's Ryukyu-China trade. Although there are
no available records on smuggling from 1808 to 1830,
Satsuma was continually engaged in it after 1808, judging from the Bakufu's accusations of the extensive engagement in smuggling during the Tempō period (1830-1844). In a confidential document dated 1835/3/28, Bakufu elder Ōkubo Kaganokami noted that, within the borders of Satsuma, a great amount of smuggling with China was going on, and that two Chinese ships which had reached the Nagasaki port the last autumn were way behind schedule and loaded with too little cargo. The Bakufu's directive issued to daimyo Narioki also referred to the increased smuggling activity with Chinese "drifting" ships and warned the daimyo to tighten its control.

The second type of illicit trade, which Satsuma managed during the Satsuma's Ryukyu missions, involved selling contraband Chinese goods at Nagasaki and in other areas of Japan. The Satsuma government first petitioned the Bakufu to increase the number of approved Chinese imports in 1804 and, thereafter, repeated these requests ten times until 1820. In 1810 Satsuma obtained the permission to import eight articles, which were to be sold through the Bakufu's Nagasaki Trading Agency. The following report by the Bakufu magistrate of accounting illustrates Satsuma's active engagement in this type of illicit trade.

In 1810 Satsuma was granted temporary permission to import eight articles, purportedly to rescue Ryukyu from its financial difficulties. When a
famine in Ryukyu killed a great number of people in 1816, Satsuma seized this opportunity to stress, in a petition in 1817, the need for permitting more trade to rescue Ryukyu. The Nagasaki Trading Agency strongly opposed these moves by Satsuma. Its officials submitted several lengthy counter petitions to the Bakufu authorities and insisted that any increase in Satsuma's import trade would seriously jeopardize the business of the Nagasaki Trading Agency, resulting in decreased revenue for the Bakufu. However, the Bakufu feared that Satsuma would give the Bakufu more trouble if the Shimazu daimyo's petition were refused. Furthermore, daimyo Narioki pledged that he would maintain strict control of the illicit trade in Satsuma, if his petition were approved. As a result, the Bakufu finally granted Satsuma permission to import four more articles in 1818 for the period of three years. Since then, Satsuma filed one petition after another requesting increases in the number of import articles. In 1825, in addition to the previously permitted eight articles, sixteen new articles were permitted for import.35

Around 1810 the office in charge of expenditures of the two retired daimyo, Shigehide and Narinobu, called inkyo tsuzukeryō gakari was created, which was later changed in name to the Ryukyu sambutsu-hō (lit., office for Ryukyu local products). However, this office was commonly called the Tobutsu-hō, meaning the office for Chinese imports.36 As indicated by the various names of its offices, the expenditures of the two retired daimyo were to be met by the profits gained through the Ryukyu-China trade, which had a trade ceiling of 2,700 kan silver (45,000 ryo) a year after 1820. Sakihara estimates that 2,700 kan, Satsuma's trade ceiling at Nagasaki, brought a net income of 1,035 kan (17,250 ryo).
On 1824/11/1 Zusho Shōzaemon (1776-1848), the central figure in the Tempō Financial Reforms, was promoted to daimyo's personal steward equivalent (soba yōnin-kaku) and appointed to the office of inkyo tsuzukeryō gakari. In the fourth month of 1827 Zusho was commended by Shigehide and awarded two pieces of taiheifu cloth for his efforts to obtain "considerable profits" through his skillful management of the Ryukyu-China trade. Judging from the evidence mentioned above, Satsuma's repeated petitions to the Bakufu for the increase of the number of Chinese imports, purportedly to rescue Ryukyu from its financial distress, were in actuality intended to expand the cover for her illicit trade. After 1830 2,700 kan actually consisted of only 35 percent of the total imports. The remaining 65 percent, 5,014 kan (83,567 ryo), was sold illegally and produced the net profit of 3,166 kan (52,767 ryo). Therefore, through the Ryukyu-China trade, Satsuma annually obtained the total gross income of 7,714 kan (128,567 ryo), and a net profit of 4,201 kan (70,017 ryo).

Assessment of Shigehide's Economic Measures

As we observed in the foregoing section, it appears that Shigehide's economic measures after 1808 were successful in terms of money brought to the han finances. Then, why did the han debts suddenly increase from
76,168 kan (1,260,000 ryo) in 1807 to the enormous figure of 320,000 kan (5,000,000 ryo) in about twenty years? Before we can answer this question, we must look at the financial situation of the han in its various stages, and examine official reaction within the han to those stages. Through this analysis we hope to determine the real causes for this large han indebtedness and to evaluate the significance of the economic course which Shigehide pursued from 1808 to 1830.

According to the sumptuary regulation issued in the eighth month of 1801, the total han expenditures in 1801 were 14,650 kan (243,400 ryo). Both the interest for all the han debts, which amounted to 6,100 kan, and the expenses incurred at Kyoto and Osaka which equalled 1,000 kan, were met mostly by the proceeds from the sale of local products including rice (sambutsuryō) which totaled 7,000 kan. The remainder of the total han expenditures, some 7,550 kan, was covered by the following "revenue." The largest portion of this balance was met by "unlisted" income such as forced loans of rice from samurai which yielded 3,000 kan, various special taxes from commoners amounting to 1,500 kan, funds permanently transferred to the han treasury from Shigehide's retirement allowances which brought 1,800 kan, and an undetermined amount of profits from smuggling. Thus, in addition to the sambutsuryō and the "unlisted" income,
a loan of only 380 kan may have been needed to meet the total han expenditures in 1801, if we apply the annual average increase rate of han debts for the 53 years from 1754 to 1807.

Turning now to an examination of the possible increase in expenditures at both Edo and Kagoshima, we see that in 1801, 6,700 kan (111,500 ryo) was needed to meet all the expenses there. In 1809 the ordinary expenditure at Edo became fixed at 3,000 kan (50,000 ryo). Then, it was declared in 1815 that, hereafter, all expenses at Edo were to be met with 4,200 kan (70,000 ryo): 3,000 kan for ordinary expenditure and 1,200 kan for extraordinary expenditure. According to the regulation of 1719, 52 percent (4,400 kan) of the han expenses were allotted for Edo, and 48 percent (4,000 kan) for Satsuma domain expenses. Although the costs connected with the sankin kōtai for Satsuma were great, these were not as extensive as most other han which spent 70 to 80 percent of their han's revenues for their entourage. If we assume this percentage was still applicable in the year 1815, the Satsuma domain expenses would have been about 3,780 kan (63,000 ryo). Using these figures, the total amount of money expended at both Edo and Satsuma in 1815 comes to 7,980 kan (133,000 ryo). Thus the expenditure in 1815 increased by 1,280 kan (21,333 ryo) as compared with those in 1801, showing an annual average increase of only about
91 kan (1,500 ryo). Since we know that Shigehide had cut his personal expenses, it seems safe to assume that this relatively slight increase was not the crucial factor responsible for the rising han debts.

If the ordinary and extraordinary expenses of Edo, Kyoto, Osaka and Satsuma had not increased at an unusual rate, what then was responsible for the accumulation of 5 million ryo debts by 1827? As we saw earlier, income from the sale of local products, including rice, (sambutsuryō) were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1801</td>
<td>7,000 kan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1815</td>
<td>9,400 kan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1829</td>
<td>11,200 kan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(116,700, 156,700, 186,700 ryo). Its annual average increase was 171 kan (2,850 ryo) for the 14 years, 1801-1815, and 129 kan (2,150 ryo) for the 14 years, 1815-1829. In 1801, 7,000 kan sambutsuryō was almost enough to cover both the payment of the interest for all han debts of 6,100 kan and the expenditure at Kyoto and Osaka of 1,000 kan. Yet, it seems that the balance of payment was broken around 1807. On 1806/3/4, three Satsuma residences had to be quickly rebuilt because of the visit of a Ryukyu mission to Edo which was due on 11/23. To meet expenses needed for their reconstruction the han raised 2,595 kan (43,269 ryo) through loans at Edo alone. Two thousand four hundred seventy-two kan of this amount carried 10 percent interest per annum.
According to the notice issued in the tenth month of 1808, due to the sudden increase of han debts, the income from the sale of local products (sambutsuryō) would not be enough to cover their interest payment and the Osaka expenditures. An estimated sambutsuryō in that year was about 8,200 kan (136,700 ryo). In 1815, reportedly, 9,400 kan (156,700 ryo) revenue from the sale of local products was not enough to pay even the interest for the han debts.

Ordinarily, when arranging loans from merchants, Satsuma's local products were given as security. The loan of 2,472 kan which Satsuma obtained in 1806 at Edo with the high annual interest rate of 10 percent indicated that Satsuma was in arrears on her interest payments, and consequently had lost credit with the merchants. This loss of credit becomes more obvious when compared with previous successes in lowering the interest rate in 1802.

Satsuma's inability to regularly pay interest perhaps prompted the retired daimyo, Shigehide, to personally negotiate with Osaka merchants in 1813 on financial matters. Again, in the ninth month of 1816 Shigehide himself wished to visit Osaka "because of the failure of Satsuma's plan," presumably referring to the failure to obtain new loans to meet the Bakufu levy mentioned below. Although Shigehide was dissuaded by his retainers from doing so because of his old age, he sent senior councillor
(karō) Kawakami Hisayoshi on his behalf. In the fourth month of 1816 Satsuma was ordered by the Bakufu to contribute 77,664 ryo or about 4,660 kan for water conservation works along the Tōkaidō highway. The han government managed to meet this forced levy by loans raised at Edo, Kyoto and Osaka. Significantly, these loans were planned to be paid by additional forced loans of rice (kasami demai) from samurai, and contributions of 500 koku each from the two retired daimyo's allowances for four years from 1817 to 1821.

In 1819 all Osaka merchants refused new loans of money to Satsuma. Reportedly, this refusal by the Osaka merchants, coupled with the poor harvest of local products in that year, left the daimyo Narioki in serious difficulty to raise even traveling expenses back to Kagoshima for his sankin obligation. The following episodes illustrate how grave the financial situation in Satsuma became. That same year (1819) Shigehide petitioned the Bakufu in vain for permission to return to Kagoshima and remain there in order to cut down the large expenses at Edo. Failing that, he petitioned the Bakufu to allow his son, retired daimyo Narinobu to return and stay at Kagoshima, but this request was also denied. In 1821 daimyo Narioki was scheduled to go back to his domain for his sankin duty. To save on expenses involved in the trip, Narioki requested the Bakufu to allow him to remain
at Edo. His request was granted, and Narioki stayed there until 1823 when he left for Kagoshima. The alternate attendance (sankin kōtai) was still in this period, one of the most important obligations which the Bakufu imposed on daimyo to maintain the Tokugawa hegemony. A daimyo was not supposed to be exempted from this obligation in any circumstances unless the Bakufu itself voluntarily decided to relax the sankin kōtai system as was temporarily done from 1722 to 1731 by Shogun Yoshimune. Therefore, the petition of the Satsuma daimyo to be exempt from his sankin obligation to save traveling expenses, some 850 kan (14,200 ryō), attests to the extreme financial difficulty of the han. Eventually by 1827 the han debts amounted to the large sum of 320,000 kan or 5 million ryō. Reportedly, due to frequent breaches of contract, all moneylenders at Edo, Kyoto and Osaka came to refuse loans of money to Satsuma.

This financial crisis toward the end of the Bunsei period (1818-1830) was vividly depicted by Ebihara Kiyo-hiro, Zusho's chief assistant in the Tempo Financial Reforms. According to Ebihara, not only could the expenses involved in the official business with the Bakufu not be met, but also those needed to visit Edo and to return to Kagoshima for the alternate attendance requirement could not be raised. Also, the salary for han officials stationed at Edo could not be paid for as long
as thirteen months. He also mentioned that even casual workers could not be hired to clean the yards of Satsuma residences which were overrun with grass.

Judging from the foregoing description of various stages of the financial situation of Satsuma, it may be presumed that the accumulation of interest was primarily responsible for the enormous 320,000 kan (5 million ryo) debts by 1827. We shall look at how the accumulation of interest contributed to this large sum. As we saw earlier, in 1807 the total han debts were 76,128 kan (1,268,808 ryo), which included new loans of 2,595 kan (43,269 ryo) obtained at Edo in the previous year. Of these new loans, at least 2,472 kan carried 10 percent annual interest. Seventy-three thousand five hundred and thirty-three kan were old loans with the following interest rates: 3.6 percent for those at Edo and 2.4 percent for those at Kyoto-Osaka as well as in Satsuma. Since the han government continued to operate on a deficit budget, it can be reasonably assumed that both the principal and interest for the old loans were not paid back at all. If we figure that these old loans at 74,000 kan carried an average annual interest rate of 3 percent, the principal and cumulated interest together came to roughly 135,000 kan or 2,250,000 ryo, which was nearly a half of the 5 million ryo debts total.

All new loans which were obtained after 1806 perhaps carried 10 percent annual interest or higher. According
to Ebihara Kiyohiro, referred to by Haraguchi Torao, the actual interest rate toward the end of the Bunsei period (1818-1830) was as high as 12 percent, thereby the 5 million ryo amount in 1827 bore 600,000 ryo in annual interest. 

There were two instances in which the han expended large extraordinary expenses: the rebuilding of three Satsuma residences at Edo which were destroyed by fire in 1806, and the Bakufu levy in 1816, as we referred to earlier. The former case forced Satsuma to borrow 2,595 kan (43,269 ryo) from merchants at Edo and the latter case forced her to raise 4,660 kan (77,664 ryo) at Edo, Kyoto and Osaka. Prior to 1815 it seems that Satsuma had still maintained credit with merchant moneylenders and managed to obtain new loans to meet these extraordinary expenses and the annual deficit in the balance of revenue and expenditure (as in 1815 when 3,000 kan was needed). However, the flat refusal of additional loans to Satsuma in 1819 by Osaka merchants, the largest group of creditors, suggests that the han was no longer able to keep up with even the interest payment for the new loans. Therefore, the interest on han debts at Osaka continued to mount. Because of the loss of credit at Osaka, all new loans Satsuma managed to obtain at Edo and Kyoto carried an annual interest of 10 percent or higher. It appears that Satsuma failed to pay the interest for these new loans
obtained at Edo and Kyoto, thus leading to the complete loss of Satsuma's credit with moneylenders at Edo and Kyoto toward the end of the Bunsei period (1818-1830).

Viewed in this light, the accumulation of interest on the "old loans" and on the "new loans" which Satsuma was forced to obtain after 1806 was the crucial factor which drove Satsuma to near bankruptcy. The accumulation of 5 million ryo debts simply cannot be attributed to Shigehide's "extravagant" mode of living nor to his "oppressive" rule and "exploitation of the peasantry which resulted in their extreme poverty and consequent decrease of han revenue, as claimed by traditional Japanese historians. Shigehide was greatly concerned about the financial conditions of his han as demonstrated in his desperate efforts to sharply reduce even his own retirement allowances. Realizing the limitations inherent in Satsuma's agricultural productivity, Shigehide placed more emphasis on commercial measures after the resumption of his leadership in the han administration in 1808. As a result, the sambutsuryō markedly increased and illicit trade possibly brought a large profit, while keeping han expenditures at the minimum. Thus, it may be concluded that Shigehide was successful in his economic efforts during the period from 1808 to 1830, but that he became a victim of the spreading money economy, exemplified by the necessity of taking loans of money repeatedly with higher
interest rates, which was inevitable so long as the sankin kōtai system was maintained. However, in the Tempō Financial Reforms which were initiated by Shigehide in 1830, he managed to utilize this money economy, that is, the merchant's capital and talent, to bring financial success to Satsuma, but this aspect is beyond the scope of this study.

Conclusion

It is this writer's view that the ultimate success of the so-called Tempō Financial Reforms which began in 1830 was the result of Shigehide's continued economic efforts initiated during the An'ei and Temmei periods (1772-1789). The factor directly responsible for this economic success was the gradual consolidation of Shigehide's leadership in the han administration. Until recently there has been little attention focused on the aspect of the prevailing tension existing between the daimyo and his retainers within each han of Tokugawa Japan not to mention the tension between the collective han and the Shogunate.55

As Professor Sakai has noted, the Shimazu daimyo who traces his hegemony to Kamakura times, was in one of the strongest position vis-à-vis his retainers as compared with some other han. On the other hand, the proportion of samurai in Satsuma was also greater than in other han.56 Add to this the strength of the gōshi (rural
samurai) and the kadowari (land distribution) systems explained above in Chapters III and IV, and it is highly significant that Shigehide was able to consolidate his personal power and exercise it over so long a period at the very time when the Shogunate, for example, was experiencing the slow erosion of its influence.

Related to the political power struggle, and entailing ideological and economic factors as well, was the question of what Professor Hall termed "traditionalism" versus "realism." Obviously, political control was linked with economic well-being, and Shigehide's emphasis on the non-agricultural sectors of the Satsuma economy undoubtedly contributed to the eventual emergence of Satsuma in the Bakumatsu period as one of the most prosperous han. Yet it was his emphasis on commercialism, as opposed to the supremacy of the traditional agricultural economic orientation which won for Shigehide the severest criticism which is reflected in most works even today.

As a conclusion to this study, we will analyze the political and developmental process utilized by Shigehide, and attempt to place its significance not only for Satsuma, but also for Japan, in a broader context.

One of the ways Shigehide won dominance in the han administration at the expense of the jōkyūshi (upper class castle-town samurai) and the ichimon (Shimazu branch families) was (a) by his use of men of lower rank, even
commoners, to make personnel changes in the han bureaucracy, (b) his stratification of the samurai status system, (c) the reorganization of the kumi (guard unit) system, and (d) by his creation of an intermediary body somewhat outside the regular official channels, a device reminiscent of the Tokugawa Shogun's use of the chamberlains to offset the influence of the elders and the sanke (Three Houses). Since we have already described the promotion of certain key men and the resulting bureaucratic changes, we will turn our attention to the intermediary body which in the beginning functioned as a special finance office.

The origin of the naiyōgata, or office which carried out the daimyo's secret orders on financial matters, which was the nerve center for the Tempo Financial Reforms of 1830, had its origins in 1776. Both in 1771 and 1777 10,000 koku rice was transferred from the han treasury to the daimyo's personal fund (nandogin). This personal fund of the daimyo was used for the reclamation of fields and salt farms, and the profits derived from these projects were to be used to meet unforeseen han expenses. Then, on 1776/3/21, Shigehide appointed Ikeda Shōzaemon, a Kagoshima castle-town merchant, to be the purveyor for monetary affairs in the Office of the Interior (sobagata kanekata goyō gakari). Previously, Ikeda had contributed to the han economy by negotiating with shipowners in other
domains to lower shipping charges in transporting to Osaka rice produced in the Hyūga area. Ikeda's assignment was to manage the daimyo's personal fund (nandogin) for various economic undertakings and this, in effect, signaled the creation of a special finance office under the daimyo's direct control, outside of the Office of Finances (kattehō).

This special finance office or sobagata kanekata goyō gakari was expanded into an advisory council on han finances called shuhōhō in 1809, a year after the Kinshiroku purge. As we discussed earlier, the office of shuhōhō was staffed with the daimyo's personal steward (soba yōnin), personal attendants (sobayaku) and various officials from the Office of the Interior (okugakari). This office adopted economic measures and reported them to the senior councillor for the Office of Finances (kattehō). Thus, it is clear that all financial measures planned reflected Shigehide's wishes or, in other words, he could carry out his economic policy without going through the regular bureaucratic channels.

This advisory council on han finances (shuhōhō), which became the so-called naiyōgata ("office to execute the daimyo's secret orders") during the Tempō Financial Reforms, was greatly enlarged in its function as well as in its organization. Although the exact organizational structure of the "naiyōgata" is not clear in the Sappan
Tempo-do igo zaisei kaikaku temmatsusho (Report of the Financial Reforms after the Tempo Period in Satsuma-han) by Ebihara Kiyohiro, it can be conjectured that a group of offices essential for the execution of the Reforms were collectively called the "naiyōgata" or "naiyō gakari" as hinted by Haraguchi Torao. This "naiyōgata," the driving force in the Reforms, was directly under the control of Zusho Shōzaemon with whom the Reforms were entrusted by the retired daimyō Shigehide and daimyō Narioki, independently of the Office of Finances (kattehō). Ebihara related that Mihara Tōgorō, a shuhōhō official, was delegated authority to supervise all financial matters in Satsuma which normally fell under the jurisdiction of the senior councillor for the Office of Finances.

The "naiyōgata" thus defined included "men of talent" regardless of their family rank or social status. Besides Mihara's assignment to supervise all financial matters in Satsuma, a number of shohōhō officials were charged with the following duties in the office of "naiyōgata:" Arikawa Tōzaemon with forest affairs, Hayakawa Tamaki and Niiro Shirōemon, later Hirata Naonoshin, with financial affairs at Edo, Shigeta Gozaemon, later Nakamura Gensuke, with coinage (kanehō).
The following merchants were also appointed to the office of "naiyōgata." According to Ebihara's report on the Reforms, an Osaka merchant named Hiranoya Yasusuke was appointed a "naiyōgata" official to improve the method of rice shipment to Osaka. Kagoshima merchant Kirino Magotarō was ordered to take charge of the manufacturing of refined wax. Kuroiwa Tōemon, the maritime merchant of Ibusuki, was given the office of koppun-kata which distributed powdered animal and fish bone needed for the cultivation of rapeseed. The supervision of silk-weaving was assigned to Kawabata Kiyoemon, while Shigehisa Sajiemon was put in charge of the cotton-weaving factory. Kirino Magotarō, who supervised refined wax manufacturing, was concurrently appointed the superintendent of sugar manufacturing in Satsuma and Ōsumi areas. In addition, five Kagoshima merchants, Yakushi Jimbē, Katō Heihachi, Kuwabara Shōzaemon, Kuwabara Jirōzaemon and Nakamura Buhē were appointed officials of the "naiyōgata." These merchants took turns in visiting Osaka to assist an Osaka merchant, Izumoya Magobē, in sugar transactions.
As a result of these developments, the Office of the Interior (okugakari), or perhaps selected officials from the okugakari who represented Shigehide's personal administration, came to supercede in authority the Office of the Exterior (omotekata) and the Office of Finances (kattehō) (see Table VII in Chapter III). As Shimazu Nariakira (1809-1858) noted, there had been a clear division of authority between the three offices of Interior, Exterior and Finances before Shigehide. By the nineteenth century, however, the Office of the Interior (okugakari) so dominated the administration that if the okugakari indicated that a measure was by secret order of the daimyo, the Office of the Exterior (omotekata) immediately acquiesced.

Shigehide's recognition of the role of a strong economy in effective political leadership, and his decision to emphasize commercial means to achieve his goal has been given little attention. Recently, however, historians are re-examining commercial activity and the new kinds of commercial institutions which developed in the Tokugawa period. As more regional studies of the changes in Tokugawa economic institutions appear, it will be possible to revise some of
the current misconceptions. This study, based on the groundwork laid by Professor Sakai, is at present the only Western work of its kind on Satsuma-han, one of the most important domains in the emergence of what historians term the "modernization" of Japan.

We have already demonstrated that the traditional interpretation of Shigehide as an extravagant expansionist who plunged his han into an enormous debt is wide of the mark, in fact, we have asserted that his economic reforms laid the framework for the successful Tempō Financial Reforms. The means by which Shigehide reformed the Satsuma economy include an emphasis on (a) the increased production of local products, (b) the regulation of han monopolies, which involved a limitation of rural markets, (c) the extensive use of merchant capital and talent, as well as more effective use of merchant taxes, and (d) the expansion of the illegal China and Ryukyu trade. Although these procedures had been in practice in Satsuma long before Shigehide's time, it was his aggressive use of merchant capital which made the difference.
Shigehide had helped promote the merchant class in the Kagoshima castle-town. In the fifth month of 1772 Shigehide issued a notice which stated that measures prohibited heretofore would be allowed and enforced if economically beneficial to the han. In the following month Shigehide allowed merchants from other domains to settle down or arrange marriages in Satsuma. Then, in the fifth month of 1773 the "office for prosperity" (han'eihō) was established and it was placed under the direction of two senior councillors, Shimazu Hisakane and Yamaoka Hisakata.

By these measures and with the help of merchant capital and talent, he improved the financial conditions of Satsuma by tightening the system of han monopolies set up to secure a generous proportion of the profits from the proceeds of the sale of local products. As we discussed in Chapter VI, camphor and raw wax had been the monopoly of the han long before Shigehide's time. In addition to these two local products, Shigehide further encouraged the cultivation of medicinal herbs and the manufacturing of paper and silk goods which he also placed under a han monopoly. The success of these efforts led to his establishment of the weaving factory (oriya) in 1776, the office of herb gardens (yakuen-sho) in 1781, and the office of paper manufacturing (zasshi-kata) some time during his tenure as daimyo (1755-1787). Shigehide also
intermittently bought up all rapeseed after 1775, and instituted the monopoly system on sugar from 1777 to 1787. It should be noted that, although this sugar monopoly was discontinued in the latter year, the amount of sugar annually purchased by the han through the jōshiki kaiire and kaikasami systems greatly increased.

Merchants were also directly involved in the tobacco trade. During the Temmei period (1781-1789), reportedly, the merchants bought up tobacco and shipped to the Osaka market, making a large profit. Their extensive involvement is also seen in the case of rapeseed which needed the fertilizer of powdered animal and fish bone for its cultivation. This fertilizer was handled by the merchants, who sold it in advance to peasants and collected in return the rapeseed produced in the following year.

These local products, monopolized by the han directly or through selected merchants, were shipped to the Osaka market and sold by privileged Satsuma merchants, as seen in the notice issued in the second month of 1814 in which the han government ordered them to lower the shipping charges. 77 Hamazaki Taheiji V of Ibusuki, the wealthiest merchant in Satsuma during the Kansei period (1789-1801), was engaged in this shipment and also was believed to have aided the han in its smuggling activity. 78
It seems obvious that the encouragement by Shigehide from the An'ei and Temmei period (1772-1789) of the active participation of the privileged merchants in the han economic undertakings resulted in the operation of five or six Kamigata ton'ya ("Kyoto-Osaka wholesale stores") in the Kagoshima castle-town as described by Rai San'yo in 1818. Upon these wealthy merchants was not only levied a merchant tax for their monopoly rights, but they were also forced to contribute large sums of money on other special occasions.

Although the full effect of the improvement of new processing methods, the rationalization of shipping charges, and updating in sales methods at Osaka would not be seen until the Tempō Financial Reforms, the ground work was completed before Shigehide's death in 1833. Without going into complete details, the example of sugar will demonstrate how the han managed to secure large profits from local products.

By 1830 the han had learned to process and distribute sugar, and the previously unsuccessful sugar monopoly was reestablished as described in Chapter VI. With these new methods the han made greater profits during the ten-year period (1830-1839), than in the previous ten-year period (1820-1829), although the annual amount of sugar sold at the Osaka market was the same as seen below.
Total amount of sugar sold at Osaka

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Amount (kin)</th>
<th>Proceeds (kan)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1820-1829</td>
<td>120,000,000</td>
<td>81,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830-1839</td>
<td>120,000,000</td>
<td>141,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The monopoly on sugar was carried out from 1830, with the establishment of the Santō-hō ("Office in charge of the Three Islands") responsible for the strict enforcement of the monopoly system. In Ōshima, for example, the annual average of sugar production was 5,768,000 kin (1 kin = 1.323 lb.) during the Tempō period (1830-1844), of which 4,600,000 kin was collected by the government as sugar tax. All remaining sugar was bought up by the han and exchanged for daily necessities at a fixed exchange rate. It is significant to note that the han made a considerable profit in this exchange. For example, 1 sho rice was exchanged for 5.07 kin sugar, while the same amount of sugar could be exchanged for 6.2 sho rice at the Osaka market price. Furthermore, in order to facilitate the enforcement of this exchange measure, the government completely discontinued money circulation in the islands, prohibited all transactions among the islanders, and cancelled all existing debts among them.

The greater profit from 1830 to 1839 was due to a steep rise of the selling price of sugar at Osaka, to which the following measures were attributable. The han constantly inquired about the reputation of Satsuma sugar at Osaka and Sakai and kept officials in Anami-Ōshima...
informed, and instructed them in detail concerning the making of sugar barrels and sugar refining. 86

The han government also rationalized shipping expenses by subsidizing the building of ships which transported sugar exclusively. Reportedly, ships which had been used to carry sugar decreased in number due to shipwrecks, but shipowners could not afford to build new ones. Thereupon, the han accommodated them with money for shipbuilding from the reform funds. These ships, numbering some dozen, plied between Anami-Ōshima and Kagoshima. 87 On the other hand, han-owned large ships which were built mainly for transporting rice to Osaka were used to carry sugar to Osaka. 88

In addition, the government also improved the sales methods of sugar at Osaka. In 1835 it decided to sell all sugar by tender, thereby eliminating intermediary profits made by wholesale merchants. Detailed procedures for bidding and other sales methods were carefully planned by Izumoya Magobē, an Osaka merchant who was granted the surname Hamamura and Satsuma samurai status in 1830, assisted by Satsuma merchant-officials of the naiyōgata. 89

We have discussed the two kinds of illegal trade in which Satsuma was engaged, the trade with the so-called Chinese "drifting" ships, and the trade conducted during the Satsuma-Ryukyu transactions. Shigehide had increased the number of Chinese interpreters who were
stationed at posts and lookout stations along the Satsuma coast. He expanded the second type of trade in 1810, when he first obtained Bakufu permission to import eight Chinese articles and to sell them through the Nagasaki Trading Agency. By 1825 a total of twenty-four Chinese articles were allowed for import through repeated petitions by Satsuma.

In this trade Satsuma either shipped large quantities of illegal Chinese imports to northern Japan and Echigo for sale, or inserted them among the Chinese goods which were officially allowed to be sold at Nagasaki. The proceeds were then used for the purchase of dried sea products (tawaramono) in northern Japan, especially at Matsumae (presently Hokkaido). Dried sea products thus acquired were, in turn, exported to China through Ryukyu to purchase illegal Chinese goods.

Bakufu documents reveal the extent of this operation. The Bakufu elder Ōkubo states, there were so many Chinese goods available in Satsuma that, as a result, even merchants from other domains, came to Satsuma to purchase them. Since they were contraband articles, smugglers in the Kagoshima castle-town disguised themselves as ordinary merchants and sold them secretly. They preferred, however, large scale transactions. In a report dated the fourth month of 1835, Hijikata Izumonokami, the Bakufu's magistrate of accounting (kanjō bugyō), referred to
Satsuma's illicit purchase of dried sea products:

Nagasaki's main exports, marine products of beche-de-mer, abalone, shark fins, and laminaria, are mostly purchased from Matsumae. But the best of these products, according to merchants, were smuggled to Satsuma, who would dispatch its ships disguised as foreign ships to receive the illicit marine products. These are confirmed reports. Because Satsuma first secures the best grade products, the Nagasaki Trading Agency gets only inferior products, and its business has suffered considerably in recent years.91

After 1830 Satsuma's Ryukyu-China trade alone brought the annual net profit of 3,166 kan (52,767 ryo) to the han treasury.

One of the results of the expanded commercial policy of Satsuma was increased han control over the rural economy. Shigehide attempted to secure the maximum amount from the cultivation of local products. By instituting han monopolies whereby the local products were purchased by the han at a fixed amount, and the surplus was bought and sold exclusively by privileged merchants who paid a merchant tax to the han government for the monopoly right (itte shōbai tokkyo reigin), there was little room left for independent economic development.

While more research is needed to determine the amount of rural control in Satsuma as compared with other han, Professor Sakai suggests that the greater number of gōshi (rural samurai) may have limited the ability of commoners to develop the rural market economy as described by Professor Smith.92 In Satsuma throughout the Tokugawa
period, markets (teikiichi) which opened at regular intervals, and fairs which opened during the temple and shrine festivals, met the minimum daily necessities of the commoners. In the Kagoshima castle-town the teikiichi was held on the third, sixth and ninth day of each month, while the fair was opened during the festivals mentioned. In rural districts, however, the market day was less frequent. The limitation of the number of markets and the volume of business among smaller merchants suggests that the han attempted to keep the commoners in a self-sufficient economy. In 1808 only 151 or 10.5 percent of the merchant houses in Shimo-machi, the largest of three merchant districts, were wealthy enough for the merchant tax (reigin) to be levied. The rest of the houses, 89.5 percent, were too small as retailers to be assessed. It is also reported that the number of shōchū wine house in the castle-town decreased from 1,200 in the Temmei period (1781-1789) to 960 in 1807. These instances suggest that most commoners had a minimum standard of living due to Shigehide's policy to tighten han monopolies. The monopolies left little room for most merchants to accumulate wealth.

While we have yet to assess the long-term social and political results of Shigehide's economic reforms, we can see the immediate economic benefits they brought to Satsuma. The financial wealth thus accumulated through
the Reforms, which were still within the framework of the feudal tradition in their purpose and means, was to enable Satsuma to modernize its military system under the direction and leadership of another forward-looking Shimazu daimyo, Nariakira (1809-1858), who took an active role in the national political arena during the last days of the Tokugawa government.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER VIII


5. *Kenshi*, II, 250. For the financial measures proposed by magistrates of accounting, see *Hampōshū Kagoshima*, I, 469-471. Perhaps this is because these officials were well entrenched and conservative.


20. Ibid., II, 253.


22. Zusho shōzaemon rireki gairyaku (Brief Personal History of Zusho Shōzaemon) quoted in Hōken shakai hōkai katei, p. 396.


24. Kaikaku temmatsusho, pp. 34-54.


27. The manure of powdered animal and fish bone, which was essential for the cultivation of rapeseed, had been sold in advance by local merchants and paid by the rapeseed which was produced in the following year. During the Tempō Financial Reforms Zusho Shōzaemon established an office of powdered bone called koppunkata which was placed under the control of Satsuma maritime merchant Kuroiwa Tōemon. Kuroiwa purchased and collected animal and fish bone from all over Japan and distributed powdered bone abundantly among the peasants almost without profit, thereby greatly increasing rapeseed production. Kaikaku temmatsusho, p. 112.


30. Calculated from the table in Kenshi, II, 407-408. In the case where there were two different figures given in the same year, the first figure was used in this calculation.


32. Ibid., I, 543-544.

34. Ibid., I, 185-186.
35. Ibid., I, 166.
36. Haraguchi, Bakumatsu no Satsuma, pp. 61-62. Kenshi, II, 757, states that the office of inkyō tsuzukeryō gakari was later changed in name to the Tōbutsu-hō and again to the Ryūkyū sambutsu seisanhō (lit., office for the production of Ryukyu local products).
38. Ibid., p. 3.
40. Hampōshū Kagoshima, I, 475.
41. Kenshi, II, 249.
42. Ibid., II, 251-252.
45. Hampōshū Kagoshima, I, 480.
46. Ibid., I, 472.
47. Kenshi, II, 251.
48. Ibid., II, 252.
49. Loc. cit.
53. Kaikaku temmatsusho, pp. 10, 125.
54. Haraguchi, Bakumatsu no Satsuma, p. 66.
57. Hall, Tanuma Okitsugu, p. 57.
58. Ibid., p. 44.
60. Ibid., II, 878.
61. Ibid., I, 477.
62. Ibid., I, 348.
63. Ibid., I, 522.
64. Haraguchi, Bakumatsu no Satsuma, pp. 94-95.
66. Loc. cit. According to Haraguchi Torao, the "office of coinage" (kanehō), which actually minted counterfeit money, was originally built as a daimyo's detached residence on a mountainside in Kekura village around 1833 or 1834. The Satsuma story has it, when daimyo Narioki stayed there overnight, a "spectral phenomena" happened. Reportedly, Narioki got frightened and built another villa in Tamazato and moved in. The Kekura detached residence was immediately converted into the "office of coinage." Since the minting of counterfeit money was against the Bakufu law, there are no extant records on its operation. However, Haraguchi suggests that the "spectral phenomena" was a fabricated story and the Kekura detached residence was intended for the "office of coinage" from the beginning, where reportedly about 200 workmen were engaged in the minting of counterfeit money. Haraguchi, Kagoshima-ken no rekishi, pp. 189-190. Haraguchi, Bakumatsu no Satsuma, pp. 91-92.
67. Kaikaku temmatsusho, p. 71
70. Kaikaku temmatsusho, p. 91.


75. Hall, Tanuma Okitsugu, pp. 92-93.


77. Hapōshū Kagoshima, I, 543-544.


80. Ibid., p. 32. Kensi, II, 400.

81. Kensi, II, 408.

82. Höken shakai hōkai katei, p. 454.

83. Loc. cit.

84. Haraguchi, Bakumatsu no Satsuma, p. 126. For the exchange rate of various goods to sugar, see Kensi, II, 404-407 and Höken shakai hōkai katei, pp. 455-459.

85. Höken shakai hōkai katei, 460.


87. Kaikaku temmatsusho, p. 73.

88. Ibid., p. 72.

89. Höken shakai hōkai katei, pp. 472-474. Izumoya Magobē was responsible for the actual start of the Reforms by organizing the Shingumi Ginshu (New Guild of Moneylenders at Osaka). He also planned Satsuma's unique "repayment plan" of its debts, which was tantamount to their cancellation. In recognition of these efforts Izumoya was granted the samurai status of koshōgumi-kaku ("small name guard" equivalent) in 1830. Then, he was successively elevated in family rank to shimban-kaku ("new guard" equivalent) in 1833 and to koban-kaku ("small guard" equivalent) in 1836. Kaikaku temmatsusho, pp. 11-12, 58. Höken shakai hōkai katei, pp. 407-408. Haraguchi, Bakumatsu no Satsuma, pp. 85-86.

91. Ibid., I, 164-169, summarized and translated in Sakihara, "The Significance of Ryukyu in Satsuma Finances...," p. 181.

92. See Sakai, "Landholding in Satsuma 1868-1877," p. 62. Although his remarks refer to gōshi in relation to land-holding, further research on the number of samurai who were involved in commercial activities may lead to a revision of Smith's thesis, at least as it applies to Satsuma. See also Thomas C. Smith, *The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan* (Stanford, 1959).


94. Kagoshima no oitachi, pp. 344-345. For example, a big festival of the Inari Shrine (God of Harvests) was opened during the festival of the Shrine from November 3 to 23.

95. Ibid., pp. 313, 342-343.
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