TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY COMPOSITION-RHETORIC: BETWEEN THE INTERSTICES OF POSTMODERNISM, TRADITION, REASON, AND VOICE

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Abstract

This dissertation explores the field of composition and rhetoric on several fronts. First, it discusses the intersections between ethics, rhetoric, and a world in which postmodern sensibilities seem to provide the best alternatives to creating meaningful narratives—for both our students and ourselves. Yet it also discusses the role tradition can play in such narratives—traditions based on local, micropolitical practices. Ethics, rhetoric, postmodernism, tradition—all intersect together, but are also conditioned by some notion of reason—reason not in the traditional Cartesian sense of the term, but reason in a broader sense as a linked set of practices that emanate from local cultural practice. However, all of these forces intersect in the voices of ourselves and our students—and these voices, while not necessarily essential—are real political entities in the world. This dissertation is thus divided into six chapters which develop these topics in turn: notions of tradition-based narrative; the role of reason in public discourse; the fragments of rationality (in Faigley’s words) that can be used to further develop more public notions of writing; a practical chapter in which two actual exercises in the composition classroom are cited; a chapter that explores the potential role of literary studies in the composition classroom; and a closing chapter in which the author offers his own work experiences as a hands-on example of the intersections between narrative, ethics, tradition, and voice.
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Recent educators who explore the relationship between composition and philosophy focus upon several linked questions. Is there a relationship between the matter of composition and the subject of philosophy? If so, what are some of the philosophical methods we could incorporate into pedagogical practice? How should we introduce informal logic into the composition classroom? And most importantly for this dissertation, how should we make ethics integral to the theory and practice of composition? While necessarily touching on many of the questions posed above, in this dissertation I will explore the rationale, the viability, and the possible consequences of introducing a narrative theory of ethics into the teaching of composition, and I will also propose some methods for implementing such a theory into the classroom.

I draw my notion of a narrative theory of ethics from four different areas of study: ethical theories formulated by such philosophers as MacIntyre, Habermas, and Rawls; pedagogical theories proposed by such education theorists as Freire, Gutman, Passmore, and Giroux; theories about language and language communities as developed by postmodern poets like Bernstein, Howe, Retallack, Hamasaki, and Trask; and the work of compositionists and rhetoricians such as Berlin, Faigley, Miller, Emig, Elbow, Friend, Dragga, Porter, Sullivan, Murray, Corbett, Kinneavy, and Burke. I begin with a teaching scenario abstracted from the many sections of business writing I have taught over the years. Scenario 1 does not to lead into the subject of business writing per se so much as to serve as a prelude to a central ethical dilemma for all writers. Nevertheless, it is necessary to briefly look at some basic ideas about the intersections between business
writing, ethics, and rhetoric as discussed in the work of Porter (1996), Dragga (1997), Moeller and McAllister (2002), and Dubinsky (2004) in order to provide a proper foreground for discussing the scenario.

Scenario 1 then leads into Chapter 1, which is organized around Alasdair MacIntyre’s claim in *After Virtue* that because “man in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, [is] essentially a storytelling animal” (216), ethics is therefore a genre of storytelling. Further, he argues that man is “not essentially, but becomes through his history, a teller of stories that aspire to truth” (216). This chapter works at several levels to develop the implications of this claim for rhetoric and composition studies. On the most basic level, it continues the theoretical dilemma with which the opening scenario concluded by allowing me to incorporate my strands of my own personal narrative into the discussion—my work, my struggles to balance financial and academic goals—over the years. This section eventually leads to a long theoretical discussion in which I engage MacIntyre’s claims about narrative in terms of his notions of tradition, with an extended look at MacIntyre’s somewhat controversial interpretation of Kierkegaard’s *Either/Or*. To engage MacIntyre’s arguments about tradition and against postmodern notions more fully, I then turn to some postmodernist thinkers themselves—Deleuze and Guattari, the Foucault of *The Order of Things*, and the Jameson of *The Political Unconscious*—in order to better engage MacIntyre’s notions of narrative and to build to my own ideas about how these notions might be used in the composition classroom. To conclude the chapter, I explore the implications of blending MacIntyre’s theory of narrative with Freire’s notions of a potential pedagogy of liberation and with Giarelli’s notions of educating for public life. I then suggest how these notions of narrative, of a pedagogy of
liberation, and of educating for public life might be blended in the composition and rhetoric classroom.

Scenario 2 prepares for a theoretical discussion of the intersections between the public sphere and the writing classroom by posing a brutally practical question: How should a writing teacher structure a class in time of war? What the second scenario presents are the journal entries that I assigned to two classes—English 100: Composition I and English 256: Poetry and Drama—during the spring of 2003. This was the semester during which the Bush II Administration decided to launch its final attack on the regime of Saddam Hussein, and the journal entries I assigned during this semester reflect the current events of those weeks as they occurred in the news.

Chapter 2 itself centers around a discussion of the theories of Jürgen Habermas because he provides a strategy for describing narrative social procedures that in turn provide guidelines for making moral decisions. Habermas asserts that any form of discourse—public or private—can be recognized by a community if the discourse implies universal statements (U)s acceptable to everyone entering into that discourse community. Habermas thus defines a (U) as being valid when “the consequences and side effects of its general observance for the satisfaction of each person’s particular interests must be acceptable to all” (Habermas 1990, 97). Crucial for my purposes, however, is Habermas’s insistence that a (U) is not the ontological equivalent of a transcendental foundationalist statement, but a function of how human beings interact and communicate in historically and culturally situated groups. Habermas therefore provides the terms for describing how people form language communities by producing and consuming each other’s stories—stories which as stories are infused with the (U) underlying narrative. I
then close Chapter 2 by discussing a concrete example of the power of (U)s in a national community by turning to the work of Martin Luther King, Jr., as just an example of how (U)s can be appealed to by a great rhetorician.

Chapter 3 constructs a scenario in which the (U) for a socially constitutive theory of language would be guided by the specific ethical narrative that emerges from John Rawls’s definition of justice as fairness. Rawls is something of an apologist for the most familiar narrative of the ideal American status quo. By suggesting that ethics is organized around two cluster of assumptions—equal rights on the one hand, and acknowledgement of difference among groups and individuals on the other—Rawls replicates the dynamics any serious engagement with the first and fourteenth amendments of the US Constitution will produce. Two of his major contentions, however, suggest some highly productive directions for composition studies. First, Rawls claims that any change in social relationships within a just society should benefit its “least advantaged members”: “[T]he intuitive idea is that social order is not to establish and secure the more attractive prospects of those better off unless doing so is to the advantage of those less fortunate” (75). But second, while in A Theory of Justice the least advantaged members’ problems are economic, in such later work Political Liberalism, Rawls foregrounds the need for a “reasonable pluralism” in discourse between dominant and marginal groups or individuals. A just society’s capacity for recognizing and valuing standards for reason that enable people to work with other citizens and groups holding a wide variety of racial, social, gender, political, economic, and cultural opinions—the capacity, in short, for turning rationality itself into a negotiated dynamics process—may in fact be Rawls’s own rationale for defining justice as fairness.
I continue Chapter 3 by examining how these two claims provide a framework for understanding how people create and come to terms with narratives. I argue that the composition classroom should be a place where reasonable pluralism becomes a means for understanding and responding to narratives. As Rawls defines it, reasonable pluralism is not foundationalist, because it does not prescribe specific values or beliefs, but it is also not morally relativistic, because it insists on the situatedness of how we as a group define what is fair in society—benefiting the least advantaged first, for instance. Rawls in short provides a metanarrative which composition studies can employ to help students develop their own reflective habits of thought—habits which are necessary to make any degree of reasonable pluralism possible. Each student is thus invited to participate in what Rawls calls reflective equilibrium, the large-scale social consequences of citizens accepting reasonable pluralism as a key social good. Reflective equilibrium is achieved when all citizens consent to a specific social organization even though individuals do not know what their position in that society would be. Rawls calls this uncertainty the veil of ignorance, and in a just society, citizens organize themselves from behind this veil. The rest of this thesis could therefore be described as an attempt to answer the following questions: How can we identify and teach the narrative skills necessary for students to set criteria which not only make a reasonable pluralism—reflective equilibrium—possible, but also the constructing of a metanarrative out of these criteria that can provide an ethical ground—a moral (U) of sorts—for conducting the classroom? And second, how can we do this in a way that acknowledges the power vested in the composition teacher—a power that, as postmodernist thinkers such as Faigley argue, holds even in the most “decentered” teacherless classroom—while
acknowledging, as Donald Murray points out in a famous essay, that students often learn better if teachers get out of the way?

In Scenario 3, I discuss some of my own rituals in preparing to teach English 100: the books I surround myself with—Elbow’s works, Corbett’s Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, The St. Martin’s Handbook, and so forth—and the Peter Elbow video I watch. I then discuss how I have come to think of English 100 over the years—as a sort of Janus-figured topic that on one hand allows us to teach students about the writing process, but on the other hand also requires us to teach students about rhetoric and argumentative writing. This scenario serves as a transition from the theoretical discussions of the first three chapters to the greater emphasis on nuts-and-bolts to come in the remainder of the dissertation.

Chapter 4 begins by discussing the distinction Christy Friend draws between teaching ethics as nondistributive as opposed to distributive in its approach by emphasizing the role of student writers as doers as opposed to havers. I then move on to discuss ethical theories developed by two other recent compositionists—Jonathan Mauk and J. Blake Scott—to incorporate two other ethical concepts into the discussion: drawing upon students’ lived spaces (Mauk) and engaging students in rhetorical analyses which have a recognizable ethical telos (Scott). How do I do this? By discussing two examples of how I deploy these concepts in the composition classroom. The first is an exercise in collaborative writing I used in my English 100 classroom in 2002 and 2003 called “the dialogue on civilization.” This dialogue on civilization explores many of the concepts discussed in Friend, Mauk and Scott, while also drawing on notions of definition developed in a recent essay by Jeffrey Carroll. I situate this example by noting
that one of the early ways in which George W. Bush defined his war on terror was as a war to defend civilization; Bush claimed that the 9/11 terrorists had in fact launched a war against not just American civilization, but civilization in general. Hence, I used this dialogue to give students a space in which to explore George W. Bush’s claims and to define civilization for themselves. On one hand, I encourage students to look for the various things George W. Bush has said about civilization; on the other hand, I ask students to situate themselves in the dialogue by discussing civilization as they may be studying it in the University of Hawai‘i vis-à-vis their own classes: History 151 (World Civilizations), Hawaiian Studies 107, and so forth. What this exercise forces them to do is to: 1) work collaboratively with other writers to create writing with some ethical significance; 2) think rhetorically about how god-terms like civilization are defined and used by communicators like George W. Bush; and 3) weigh in on a topic of political and ethical importance, namely, the war on terror.

The second assignment revolves around a discussion of how to teach stasis analysis in the composition classroom. I move from a relatively uncomplicated stasis analysis of a news article to a much more detailed analysis of the relationship between stasis analysis, ethics, and listening. For listening becomes a central part of the dissertation: learning to listen to the world (as Helen Fox phrases it), rather than always speaking to the world. After discussing the example of stasis analysis in a news article, I move on to the more general theoretical question of how to teach stasis in the classroom. I do this by turning to Hawisher and Hawhee’s third edition of Ancient Rhetoric for Modern Students, specifically their chapter on stasis in which they explore the extended example of the abortion debate in the United States. While Hawisher and Hawhee
contend that the abortion debate in the United States is an example of an argumentative situation not in stasis, I challenge this claim by turning to the work of Kenneth Burke and Nola Heidlebaugh. I use Burke’s and Heidlebaugh’s work to try to make a case for seeing stasis as a richer tool for analysis and invention than do Hawisher and Hawhee; the process I introduce a new element for thought: the role of Rogerian rhetoric in analyzing and dealing with rhetorical situations like the abortion debate. I conclude the chapter by turning to the work of Elbow and Ratcliffe to treat listening more extensively as a rhetorical trope—as well as an ethical necessity. I do this by pointing out that on one hand, Rogerian rhetoric gives us a powerful tool for engaging in and analyzing rhetorical situations, especially those situations that require audiences to hear each other out; but on the other hand, we need to complicate this tool theoretically so as to make it flexible in a postmodern world, and this is where Ratcliffe’s notion of ‘strategic listening’—listening to truly engage the discourses that surround us, to understand these discourses in the sense of realizing we stand ‘under’ such discourses—comes into play.

Scenario 4 offers the context for a piece of creative writing—a poem—I wrote while working on this dissertation. What I try to do in this scenario is to create a simple transition to Chapter 5—a chapter about literature and its potential role in the composition classroom—while at the same time trying to continue some of the ethical and rhetorical themes developed in earlier chapters.

In Chapter 5, I draw upon examples from local literature and some theory from postmodern poetry and poetics as a cluster of critically conscious practices which explore the ethics of language use. Why link local literature with postmodern poetry and poetics? Primarily because my attempts to evaluate the linguistic dimensions underlying how
language communities play out their ethical narratives can only benefit from close
analysis of a language community that not only constantly examines and challenges its
own readers’ existing linguistic practices and narratives, but also works to assemble
narrative structures that frustrate readers’ existing linguistic expectations. (Charles
Bernstein calls such narrative structures “antiabsorptive literature.”) I agree with the
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poets that one of the best ways to learn the conventions
sustaining any narrative style or genre is to frustrate those conventions. Or put another
way, as with a mechanical device, the best way to learn how a discourse works is to take
it apart, even break it, and see what happens. Such examples of the use of discourse are
especially exemplified locally in the work of Lee Tonouchi, although in pursuing their
work, Charles Bernstein, Susan Howe, Joan Retallack, and many other postmodern poets
and poetic theorists provide countless other examples of how to frustrate our socio-
historically mediated expectations of what should constitute such narratives—but without,
I argue, valorizing incoherence, or rendering ethics an alien concept. For all these writers
interact in ways that support David Bleich’s claims that compositionists need to
acknowledge the “materiality of language” (23-52), while at the same time turning this
notion on its head. Bleich advocates a confessional approach as the true path to the
“materiality of language,” whereas the L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poets see language itself a
cultural artifact, more akin to a piece of pottery than to a representation of self.

I then spend the rest of Chapter 5 discussing these intersections between voice
and orthography by turning briefly to the works of Gloria Anzaldúa and Lee Tonouchi. I
go on to connect this discussion on orthography with Foucauldian ideas on institutional
discipline on one hand, and the work of compositionists like Helen Fox and Susan Miller
on the other. By so doing, I raise the point of how literature reminds writing teachers of the necessary freedoms we must allow all writers—students or not—but also as a reminder to ourselves of how our roles as teachers impose many unpleasant institutional constraints on our own classroom practices.

I begin chapter 6 with Joan Retallack’s call for a “poethics,” which implicitly erases the distinctions traditionally drawn between poetics, aesthetics, and ethics. By adding the “accursed Aitch,” Retallack forces us to recognize “all of the arts as, rather than about, forms of engaging living in medias mess” (293). I use this quotation from Retallack as a platform from which to spring into my own narrative of my experiments with literate practices outside the academy: namely, my experiences working in a hotel for several years in the nineties. What I draw particular attention to about my years in the hotel is the role I had played in helping to implement a program that was designed to reintroduce Hawaiian culture into the practice of hotel management. My role was to serve as a sort of presenter (the hotels gave us the Hawaiian designation Alaka‘i—leaders) of the program to my particular department in the hotel. The spiritual father of this enterprise was the late George Kanahele—a Native Hawaiian who was a scholar, a businessman, a civic leader, and the author of influential books on how Hawaiian cultural practices could be integrated into hotel management practices. In this final chapter, I turn again to the work of J. Blake Scott—this time his extended rhetorical cultural analysis entitled Risky Rhetoric: AIDS and the Cultural Practice of HIV Testing—as a roadmap on how to analyze this complex rhetorical situation in which I participated for a few years in the nineties. What I try to do is to ‘transpose’ Scott’s analysis of technoscience over to a rhetorical cultural analysis of a business-cultural phenomenon. In the process, I turn to
the works of Burke, Bakhtin, and Foucault to help me complete the rhetorical analysis of
the practices as I saw them in the hotel.

However, I felt it was also necessary to turn to the work of some Native Hawaiian
scholars—Trask and Kame‘eleihiwa—to help me complete my own rhetorical cultural
analysis of the work of the George Kanahele—himself a Native Hawaiian. In the process,
I try to loosely integrate some ethnographic strategies into my narrative so as to allow me
to draw on various experiences I had over the years in the hotel in helping to implement
this process. What I conclude—drawing on Scott’s own call for an ‘interventionist’
model of rhetorical cultural practice—is that sometimes intervention can in a positive
sense consist of doing nothing. Namely, I question the rightness and the ethical
correctness of attempting to implement a program like that of Kanahele’s in the practice
of hotel management—by drawing on the works of other Native scholars. As an aside, it
was a program I once truly believed in—but my research and analysis of the overall
practice makes me draw the conclusion I do at the end of that chapter: namely, that while
I still have many sympathies with the rhetorical scope of Kanahele’s project, I also feel
that the discussion must move on to raise points about more liberatory practices.
Scenario 1: Truth-telling in Business Writing and the Problems of Ethics and Writing

Willie is sitting on one of the benches outside Kuykendall, smoking. As I approach, he asks me, “Eh, Wes. Whatchyou teaching this semester?”

“Business Writing...”

“Ho... Teach 'em how fo' lie, eh?”

“Hopefully not...”

But it’s hard, this question of lying in business communication. After all, there has been so much deception from corporate America in recent years: Enron, World.Com, Arthur Anderson... And it is a question that hits at my own dis-ease at teaching many aspects of the subject. This dis-ease comes from inherent contradictions in my own personal beliefs on both macro- and micropolitical levels. With regards to macropolitics, on one hand, I hold am MBA from the College of Business Administration of the University of Hawai’i at Mānoa and enjoy many aspects of business—the analysis, the challenge, the interaction with people, and yes—the opportunity to make money. Nevertheless, on the other hand, I am aware of the very real problems that plague the history of business and corporations in this country from the time of slavery to today. Some businesses, especially corporations, have often played a hand in helping to create oppression and to marginalize different peoples throughout the history of the United States. Indeed, I will return to this statement again, but at the outset I state my concurrence with the position Derrick Bell takes in *Ethical Ambition: Living a Life of Meaning and Worth* when he writes, “It is essential that the ethical person acknowledge
society's injustices and, whether or not called to ease them, recognize the disadvantaged, those who have been squeezed out unfairly despite the nation's boast that all here have an equal chance to gain a share of the nation's riches" (21).

On the micropolitical level, business writing also creates ethical dilemmas for writers, dilemmas which are not easily, nor necessarily fully, resolved in the correspondence of business writers. For on one hand, every individual has an inviolable sense of what is right. Yet each day, we must balance our sense of what is right with our need to survive in contemporary American society. For example, we must, on the one hand hold jobs, often with large corporations whose interests we must represent to protect our own basic livelihoods; yet we must also try to maintain our integrity in the face of pressure from these corporations to represent their interests fully. This brief prelude explores just such an issue, an issue that hypothetically places the student business writer in a position of balancing what is intuitively right with the interests of the organization that writer represents. Exploring such issues can provide fertile ground for discussions of the intersections between rhetoric and ethics.

In fact, much research exists in the field of technical writing in the intersections between rhetoric and ethics. For example, Porter (1996) has argued that a wide-sweeping critique of the stakeholders and contexts in an ethical situation (cultural differences, ethical standards, professional and disciplinary standards, corporate vs. public and/or consumer interests) should be weighed in any such situation that requires an ethical decision by a writer. Indeed, one might argue—as I will tentatively do in this scenario—that such analysis requires considering the needs and interests of all potential audiences of any piece of business communication. Further, Dragga (1997) has argued that
educators in business and technical writing must provide narrative examples to clarify the issue of ethics in the business writing classroom. Such narratives would answer questions such as: What values does the organization for which I am writing uphold? How do these values intersect with my own personal values? Part of this process may be offering our own personal testimony. As Dragga puts it:

I believe that I have failed as a teacher if my students think that I am morally indifferent or that my class has no relevance to their moral lives. Without proselytizing or stifling discussion, I ought to be willing to tell pertinent stories of my moral choices and offer students my opinions of right and wrong. (158)

In fact as I work through the scenario I am about to discuss, I try to create just such pertinent narratives and establish a richer context for the assignment I describe.

Yet another view of the subject of business and technical writing comes from Moeller and McAllister (2002), who argue that teachers of business and technical writing should introduce the rhetorical notion of techne into the practice of teaching business writing by emphasizing cunning, trickery and unpredictability into such feats of communication, so encouraging students to think of the task of technical and business writing as a sort of artistry. This return to the roots of classical rhetorical to reinvigorate the field of business and technical writing is particularly pronounced in James M. Dubinsky’s “Introduction” to Teaching Technical Communication: Critical Issues for the Classroom (2004) in which he invokes Aristotelian rhetoric through the use of such notions as techne, praxis, telos, and theorein to make key points about how the field has attempted in recent years to ground itself more rigorously in rhetorical practice.
In terms of my own teaching practice in the business writing classroom, I have uncovered a simple, yet fruitful, ethical dilemma in one of the first exercises I use in teaching my business writing classes. The dilemma occurs when I ask students to revise the following memo Locker and Kaczmak’s *Business Communication: Building Critical Skills* 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition:

7.13 Revising a Memo to Improve Positive Emphasis

Revise the following memo to improve you-attitude and positive emphasis.

Subject: Status of Building Renovations

The renovation of the lobby is not behind schedule. By Monday October 9, we hope to be ready to open the west end of the lobby to limited traffic.

The final phase of the renovation will be placing a new marble floor in front of the elevators. This work will not be finished until the end of the month.

Insofar as is possible, the crew will attempt to schedule most of the work during the evenings so that normal business is not disrupted.

Please exercise caution when moving through the construction area. The floor will be uneven and steps will be at unusual heights. Watch your step to avoid accidental tripping or falling. (130)

The ethical dilemma occurs in the last paragraph of the memo. The question is: If some aspect of your business presents potential danger to other people both inside and outside of your business, why not just state the danger upfront? Be honest. Yet “danger”—and its correlative phrases such as “please exercise caution,” “watch your step”—is one of the “negative” words writers probably want to avoid in business communication. It’s a word
that is not only negative—it can also imply liability on the part of a corporation.\footnote{Patel and Reinsch discuss in fuller detail this problem of when and how businesses can apologize in their correspondence without admitting legal liabilities in their recent article “Companies Can Apologize: Corporate Apologies and Legal Liability” (2003). What Patel and Reinsch in fact find is that some apologies can actually reduce legal litigations—however, such apologies must be written with care and with a full understanding of the business environment in which such apologies are drafted.} It’s the ethical implications of just such business communication that I want to discuss in this prelude. I won’t reach any hard and fast conclusions in this prelude—but I do want to set the stage for some of the theoretical discussions that follow in the next three chapters.

Caution and danger: these are words that teachers of business writing at the college level in the nineties have to alert students to for two reasons. First, business writing teachers often teach students to revise such language in terms of basic concepts such as positive emphasis, goodwill, and you-attitude. These concepts are especially central to the business writing texts assembled by Kitty O. Locker of Ohio State University for McGraw-Hill/Irwin, both under and her sole authorship and now co-authored with Stephen Kyo Kaczmarek of Columbus State Community College. The second reason is that writers must consider all of the potential audiences for any piece of business correspondence. These include both the primary audiences—the people for whom the message is intended—and secondary watchdog audiences—people who may read the correspondence, sometimes much later in time, for other implications. Secondary audiences can include government regulators, the press, and attorneys. Hence, students must compose every piece of business correspondence with the idea of protecting the organization from any legal liability—and this may include deciding how to revise words like danger.

Let me first turn back to the problem of teaching you-attitude before attacking this dilemma directly. One of the especially vexing problems I have found teaching business
writing comes in teaching you-attitude, which Locker and Kaczmarek describe as a writing style that:

- Looks at things from the reader’s point of view.
- Respects the reader’s intelligence.
- Protects the reader’s ego.
- Emphasizes what the reader wants to know. (106)

Locker and Kaczmarek further add the following qualifying definition: “You-attitude is a concrete way to show sympathy and the foundation of persuasion” (106). Admittedly, there is a lot of meat in these qualities of you-attitude for the rhetorician’s theoretical teeth—and I will return to tackle some of these questions later. But for the moment, I want to concentrate on the nuts-and-bolts pragmatics of teaching you-attitude. What does you-attitude entail practically in terms of writing? And how can we effectively teach it?

Teaching you-attitude in a business writing course is an attempt to help students master a style to help them see things from the reader’s perspective. Mary Carbone in her 1994 article “The history and development of business communication principles: 1776-1916” traces the development of you-attitude from the eighteenth century rhetorics of Campbell, Blair, and Whatley through to the contemporary period. She specifically cites George Hotchkiss (1916) as the ‘father’ of you-attitude. Hence, this concept is not new with Locker and Kaczmarek; in fact, you-attitude could probably be the study of several genealogical essays like Carbone’s. According to Locker and Kaczmarek, you-attitude is a style of writing that sees things from the reader’s perspective by: 1) talking about the reader, not the writer; 2) avoiding talk about feelings except to congratulate or to offer sympathy; 3) using “you” more often than “I” in positive situations; 4) using “we” only when it includes the reader and the writer; and 5) avoiding “you” in negative
situations (107). I have often found that you-attitude is difficult to teach to students; so much so, in fact, that I have found it useful to divide my business writing courses into two parts. In the first part of the semester, we study the nuances of you-attitude in a variety of situations: positive and negative scenarios, as well as situations in which the writer must present him or herself in as positive a light as possible—resumes, letters of introduction, and such. This first half of the course usually comprises 60% of the student’s course grade. The second half of the course is then devoted to report writing and presentations—usually employing PowerPoint—while still trying to retain some of the flavor of you-attitude mastered in the first part of the course.

In so emphasizing you-attitude, I have come to acknowledge something other business writing teachers have discovered: that getting students to master a reader-centered language like you-attitude is extremely difficult for the teacher. The central problem seems to be that students bring to the classroom all of the varieties of business jargon they have heard over the years and have uncritically accepted as standard practice in business writing: jargon such as “as per your request,” “please be advised,” as well as more apparently reader-friendly euphemisms such as “we are pleased to inform you” or “you will be happy to hear.” I have found over the years that it is crucial to raise language-awareness in students in order to help them overcome such cliché phrases, but in order to do so, I have had to resort to lecturing, cajoling, and allowing numerous revisions to assignments to help them learn you-attitude. I have also found that it is initially difficult to make them practice both invention and revision in mastering such language practices. As such, early in the semester I have them revise the exercise earlier quoted from Locker and Kaczmarek’s text. What I want to do at this point is to take you
through how I create a context for helping students to revise this memo, then end this brief prelude with a return to consideration of primary and secondary audiences, and agency—issues that set up very real ethical dilemmas I find I must discuss with students in so revising this memo.

But let me first give some background on my experience with this exercise—so like Sam Dragga in the article cited above, I want to share my narrative on this assignment. I have assigned this exercise since using the first edition of Locker and Kaczmarek's text in the summer of 2000. When I first assigned this exercise, I gave no contextual background; instead I asked the students simply to revise this memo almost solely for language changes to improve you-attitude and positive emphasis. For example, the first sentence, "[t]he renovation of the lobby is not behind schedule," can be revised to improve you-attitude by first offering a greeting such as "Good news!". It can then be followed by revisions to improve you-attitude that change the passive construction to an active voice sentence, and to include "you" or some form of the second person pronoun in the first full sentence, e.g., "Your lobby renovations are on schedule." At this point, students would ask several questions, such as: "Why include a greeting such as good news?" or "Why use your lobby?" I could explain to students that the "good news" phrase was a sort of ice breaker, but I began to realize that explaining the "your" required a greater discussion of context. After all, to use the second person pronoun implies that the writer is deliberately trying to communicate with an audience, and so has some understanding of the contexts around which this piece of communication is being delivered to this audience, as well as an understanding of the particular needs and interests of this audience. So as I worked through this exercises over half an hour or so at
the end of a class period, I realized that I could most effectively teach the exercise by creating some sort of context for the students that included an understanding of some of what might be going on inside the audience’s head.

I then spent a couple of hours after class brainstorming some ways to approach this exercise. I began by conducting a new critical-type of close reading of the text itself. The first thing I did in this reading was to latch on to the word “lobby.” Hotels, theaters, shopping malls, business plazas usually have lobbies. Next, I latched on to the date—“October 9.” Timing is everything in business, and it immediately came to me that if this were an audience of retail merchant lessees, this date may be full of significance. Why? Because October is a crucial month for almost all sectors of the retail industry—it’s the transition month from the after-summer hump of September into the busiest time of the year, the holidays. And as lessees, such an audience would care very much about the status and timing of renovations to their lobby. No retail lessee wants major work in the public areas fronting their businesses at anytime, but especially during the holidays, which for many retail establishments really begin immediately after Halloween on October 31. With these two pieces of information, I decided to create a context for the students in which:

- The student works for Wesley, owner and operator of Wesley Plaza, as Wesley’s administrative assistant
- The student must write this memo for the tenants of Wesley Plaza
- The student can consult with Wesley while writing the memo

In addition to these points, I also discussed some other contextual points with the students.
The first of these points I threw in was from my own experience during my business education. One of the most important things I learned to do was to think of every business as a marketing organization, so I advise students to always think of marketing the company they represent, and as such, to see the tenants, as well as their customers, as their primary audiences. As a representative of Wesley Plaza writing to its tenants, the writer should always try to sell the very real benefits of the ongoing renovations. As such, concrete details are important, such as brief descriptions of the type of marble that was to be installed (Italian preferred!) and the very real ways in which the marble would improve the appearance of the lobby. These would be very real reader benefits.

Second, I discussed the social context of the memo. On one hand, this meant discussing the economic situation of shopping malls into today's economic environment. For example, I decided that Wesley Plaza was a shopping plaza located in Hawai'i, and that in the shopping mall market in Hawai'i, competition for tenants is stiff due to the hard economic times. I then told the students about shopping malls in Hawai'i that were advertising space available. In addition to the economic context, I also began to discuss secondary audiences and the fact that in business writing, we must always be aware of the fact that we live in litigious times. As such, writers must scrutinize every word for both explicit and implicit readings, and every word should minimize as best we can—given that we are not lawyers—our organization's liabilities, while at the same time always striving to be truthful to our audiences. Further, I pointed out that words and phrases that might increase our organization's liability were loaded into the final paragraph of the
assignment as presented in the text. This is where revising the very tricky language of the last paragraph comes into play.

The last paragraph in essence says that the construction area is dangerous and that readers should use caution when moving through this area. The paragraph is replete with examples of what Locker and Kaczmarek describe as 'negative words to avoid' (189): un-words ("uneven," "unusual"), in addition to words with negative connotations such as "avoid," "tripping," "falling," etc. The purpose of such language use is to help teach students to revise for you-attitude and positive emphasis by first trying to sensitize them to a series of clichés and negative language. And when I first taught this exercise, my main points of emphases were to make students aware of the clichés and negative language, the potential liability the language of the last paragraph exposed their organization to, as well as to help them to realize that this paragraph was inappropriate as a closing paragraph for any piece of business correspondence. I therefore advised students to think of deleting the entire paragraph or to try to choose the least negative terms that would convey the same meaning. However, some students wisely felt uneasy about deleting the paragraph: they felt that the information was important enough to include so that the paragraph was worth revising.

For these students, I would discuss several options. For example, in place of the dead phrase “please exercise caution,” I would suggest students might try a phrase such as “please use care.” In place of words such as “uneven” and “unusual,” I would suggest that students use a less negative word or even a more positive word—the word I often would suggest was “different.” I would then give my 2-minute mini-lecture on how American culture and society celebrate “difference” today. Strangely enough, my focus
at this point in the course remained—and still largely remains—on helping students to master the nuances of you-attitude and positive emphasis, and part of that mastery involves sensitizing students to potentially negative language and helping them to develop strategies to revise such language when appropriate to make it more positive.

However, in the past few sessions I’ve taught business writing, students have brought up a crucial point about this paragraph, especially when I have suggested deleting it altogether: Wouldn’t deleting the information in such a paragraph be in some way dishonest? After all, if there is potential danger in the lobby, shouldn’t building management inform its tenants of such danger? I was actually delighted to hear these suggestions, because they demonstrated that in fact students were in tune to the ethical changes in the business environment: they were showing greater sensitivity to their future responsibilities as business communicators. Further, such suggestions demonstrated that students were increasingly coming around to a point Derrick Bell raises in Ethical Ambition: Living a Life of Meaning and Worth: that “the ethical path can prove the more effective and fulfilling route to success” (11).

At this point, I had two options: I could either admit that their objections were valid but that the main point of the exercise was to work with the language, or I could try to enrich my scenario by discussing how an actual business might handle their questions. However, by the time students started raising this crucial question, I was in the final stages of completing my own MBA at the University of Hawai‘i College of Business Administration and as business students, we were all becoming more attuned to ethical issues in business. We had all—undergraduates and graduates—been studying the demise of giant corporations like Enron and World.Com, and we all had in the back of
our minds the disappearance of one of accounting's big five firms, Arthur Anderson. Ethical issues were foremost in the minds of many business students. I therefore decided that it was time to discuss how ethical communication can occur in business situations.

Up to this point in the course, I had only mentioned ethical issues in passing. I would advise students not to lie or to distort information in their business communication. I would also discuss the ethics of certain language choices, such as choosing bias-free, nonracist and nonagist language, what Locker and Kaczmarek call 'people-first language' (61). However, I had never actually discussed possible scenarios for making ethical decisions about business communication in a business setting. In other words, I had never given students a potential context for how businesses can create ethical business communication.

At this point, then, I had to help students to think like managers, which meant thinking in terms of the ethical issues of how to shape information, of deciding what to share and with whom, and of actually shaping the discourse. But the good news for students was that they often do not need to make these decisions on their own, which is why collaboration is so important, even on individual projects, in a business writing class. For one of the things I tell students is that if they are employed in companies, especially large companies, they should always talk with other people—other managers, co-workers, superiors—about their business correspondence before sending it out. And given this point, I told the students that the best way to handle this scenario was to actually talk with Wesley (as owner of the plaza) about how to handle this piece of correspondence that was to be sent out by Wesley's Plaza. Further, this discussion may very well include
discussing whether or not we want to allow access to a construction area that could expose customers or tenants and their employees to such dangers.

We could then discuss scenarios in which we might need to grant tenants access to certain areas that while still under construction, areas which were nevertheless necessary for tenants to be able to function as retail merchants. For example, I discussed a scenario in which the part of the mall in question might lead to a key storage area for tenants. I then suggested that as the operators of the shopping mall, we may want to restrict access to this area to the actual tenants and designated employees. But perhaps one of the most important points about helping students revise this final paragraph was the emphasis on businesses actually needing to make sure that there was a truthful correspondence (as best as they could determine it) between what the scenario was and the language that went into the revised final paragraph. In other words, in functioning as a communicator for Wesley's Plaza, they did not compromise their own personal integrity by not telling the truth simply to make the revision process easier or to make the business that they represented look good to its clients.
Chapter 1: Public Lives, Private Selves

"Unfortunately, no society has ever been quite so mystified in quite so many ways as our own, saturated as it is with messages and information, the very vehicles of mystification (language, as Talleyrand put it, having been given us in order to conceal our thoughts). If everything were transparent, then no ideology would be possible, and no domination either: evidently, that is not our case" (Jameson 1981, 60-61)

As we saw in the opening scenario, I drew upon my various work experiences to try to create a context for my business writing students to try to come to grips with revising a letter to improve you-attitude and positive emphasis. However, creating this context led to some dilemmas—especially in dealing with how to communicate the vexing, even somewhat damning (from a business point of view), information in that final paragraph. However, these dilemmas were valuable insofar as they allowed students to experience some of the ethical ambiguity—some of the dis-ease as I like to call it—involving in crafting a piece of business communication.

I now want to turn in more detail to my own work experiences and to discuss some of these ethical issues more theoretically. One of the key premises for this part of my project will be the point I cited from Derrick Bell in the prelude and that I repeat here, namely that "[i]t is essential that the ethical person acknowledge society's injustices and, whether or not called to ease them, recognize the disadvantaged, those who have been
squeezed out unfairly despite the nation’s boast that all here have an equal chance to gain a share of the nation’s riches” (21).

This point is especially poignant for me as I currently work in a hotel in Waikīkī and commute from Kalihi to Waikīkī at night via TheBus. I used to drive, but decided at the beginning of 2003 to try to save on gas money, as well as wear-and-tear on my car, by taking the bus. And what I have seen of Honolulu at night during the last year is frightening: dozens and dozens of people sleeping in the corridors and doorways of downtown businesses at night, often huddled together for warmth during the cooler winter months. What my last year of riding TheBus has showed me unambiguously is that the social safety net of Hawai‘i, that was once one of our state’s proudest boasting rights, has disintegrated. Twenty years of Reagan-Bush I-Clinton-Bush II have made Derrick Bell’s observation all the more pertinent to living an ethical life in today’s United States.

_I have worked in the hotel industry for over twelve years now. I never thought I would stay that long when I started. I have seen the industry move from the final boom years of the late eighties to the bust of the early nineties; I have seen the optimism of ’95 and ’96 dashed with the falling occupancies resulting from the Asian currency crisis in ’97; I have seen the remarkable recovery of ’98-’00 snap after the September 11 attacks; and as I write, I again have witnessed the resilience of this industry in its post-9/11 recovery. I have heard the leaders of the visitor industry call for change, while they themselves have been relatively unwilling to change: I can see that the incessant greed of those who run the visitor industry in Hawai‘i will probably be its eventual undoing. But I have also been constantly amazed year after year by the first-time visitors to Hawai‘i_
who are ecstatic to be here, their personal visions of paradise as yet unmarred by any
real-life experience; more amazing still, I have seen those same visitors leave two or so
weeks later with the same feelings as when they arrived. I one time had a return guest of
many a year tell me, “It’s the romance of the place.”

These guests leave without realizing that most Native Hawaiians find little
romance in Waikīkī, whether it be the Waikīkī of the twenties and thirties—the “Hawai‘i
Calls” Waikīkī—or the Waikīkī of the boom years of the visitor industry boom from 1960-
1990. While the visitor industry will remain the state’s largest industry by far—even with
the increased military expenditures coming from Washington to escalate the war on
terror—all educators must face a disturbing ethical question. Why are we educating
students? For service jobs in either the visitor industry or some other sector of the
service industry? For indoctrination into a political outlook that will perpetuate the
status quo of maintaining an overall American-type level of prosperity in the community?
Or for an overturning of the status quo by creating a technological base, or perhaps
more engagingly, for an independent nation for Native Hawaiians? I raise these
questions at the outset because such questions I feel loom over any discussion of what
publics, education, and work mean and will mean in Hawai‘i both now and in the future.

I begin this chapter by discussing Alasdair MacIntyre’s critique of contemporary
ethics as he developed it in After Virtue. MacIntyre’s critique in large part depends on a
reading of Kierkegaard’s Enten-Eller (Either/Or) that interprets that work as signaling the
turn to an emotivist culture in the middle of the nineteenth century. Although I will not
develop this point in this dissertation, I would suggest that this turn to an emotivist
culture coincides with the rise of both high capitalism and the zenith of colonial
imperialism in Western societies, and I feel that this is not accident. However, the point of MacIntyre's critique of emotivist culture is to put forth in his later works—Whose Justice? Whose Rationality? and Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry—his Thomistic Aristotelian notion of a tradition-based ethics. While I will not endorse his so-called first-order theory of Thomistic Aristotelianism itself, I nevertheless feel that his notion of tradition in ethics is fruitful, especially given the situation of the writing teacher in Hawai‘i. I then situate MacIntyre's critique in a postmodern setting, drawing especially on some of the work of Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, and especially Fredric Jameson, in trying to blend MacIntyre's notions of tradition with a need for a critique of macrostructures that takes into account some of the basic inequalities and injustices in the current status quo.

The second part of this chapter is devoted to outlining the relevance of these theories to composition and rhetoric. For example, MacIntyre's theories about narrative have not been as fully explored in composition and rhetoric as have his notions of virtue ethics and Aristotelianism. For example, Carolyn R. Miller (1989) linked together MacIntyre, Aristotle, business writing and the notion of practices as goods in themselves in her essay “What's Practical about Technical Writing?”, but made no mention of MacIntyre's notions of narrative. Similarly, James Crosswhite (1996) mentions MacIntyre's notions of and opposition to emotivism as developed in After Virtue in the broader context of discussing Perelman and Obrechts-Tyteca's notion of a universal audience. James Porter (1997) discusses MacIntyre's work in terms of Aristotelian notions of rhetoric and practice with no discussion of MacIntyre's broader theory of a narrative theory of ethics. Barbara Couture (2002) in "Writing and Truth" briefly
explores the strength MacIntyre’s relating truth and truth-telling to socially-based practices, rather than to any objective rationalist standards. Finally, McDrury and Alterio (2002) make passing mention of MacIntyre’s theory of narrative in Learning through Storytelling in Higher Education before moving on to develop their own cognitive theories of the role narrative can play in higher education. What I do that is different from these authors is to engage MacIntyre with several postmodernist thinkers, then explore the implications of MacIntyre’s theory of narrative by blending this theory with Freire’s notions of a potential pedagogy of liberation and with Giarelli’s notions of educating for public life and suggest how these notions of narrative, a pedagogy of liberation, and a notion of educating for public life might be blended in the composition and rhetoric classroom.

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In the first decades of the Western invasion of Hawai’i, European moral philosophy was in the midst of changing into what Alasdair MacIntyre in After Virtue identifies as an ‘emotivist’ culture. This emotivist culture’s central doctrine was one in which “all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments [were] nothing but expressions of preference, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character” (Macintyre 1981, 12). This emotivist culture was in MacIntyre’s opinion radically different from the enlightenment culture that preceded it. For the enlightenment culture, the crucial unifying factor that united Hume’s attempts to ground morality in the sentiments and Kant’s attempts to locate the fount of morality in reason was the search for a way to explain morality by the construction of valid arguments, arguments which as MacIntyre describes it “would move from premises concerning human nature as they...
[understood]... it to be to conclusions about the authority of moral rules and precepts.”

(52). According to MacIntyre, the decisive historical break between this enlightenment project to ground morality in some form of rational argument and the emotivist contention that such a foundation was impossible to establish occurs in 1843 with the publication of Kierkegaard’s Enten-Eller.

But before I discuss what MacIntyre says about Kierkegaard, we must first understand a little more about how MacIntyre viewed the history of the enlightenment. According to MacIntyre, the culture of the enlightenment was one in which the philosophical enterprise was perceived as an integral part of the general social enterprise. It was only in the decades after the French Revolution that the philosophical enterprise seemed to splinter off from the more general social enterprise. MacIntyre argues that the claim is that both our general culture and our academic philosophy are in central part the offspring of a culture in which philosophy did constitute a central social activity, in which its role and function are very unlike that which it has with us. It was, so I shall argue, the failure of that culture to solve its problems at once practical and philosophical, which was a and perhaps the key factor in determining the form both of our academic philosophical problems and our practical social problems. (MacIntyre 1984, 36)

MacIntyre then argues that this historical break between the philosophical and social enterprises crystallizes with the publication of Enten-Eller. MacIntyre cites three reasons for identifying this break with Kierkegaard’s work.
First, MacIntyre reads Enten-Eller as a narrative which forces the reader to 'choose' between either an 'aesthetic' or an 'ethical' way of living. The aesthetic way is represented by the notes and letter of 'A,' and represents the life of the rich aesthete who pursues an existence revolving around establishing and maintaining satisfying relationships and aesthetic pleasures. The classic type of this sort of character would be the type of life the main characters in a novel like Henry James's Portrait of a Lady lead. Second, MacIntyre reads Enten-Eller as positing an ethical stance diametrically opposed to the aesthetic one. But whereas the aesthetic stance espouses temporal pleasures—relationships, artistic enjoyment—the ethical stance insistently adheres to the certainties of Kantian ethics: the categorical imperative, the autonomy of the individual, and above all rationality still reign supreme in the ethical universe of Enten-Eller. But third and most important according to MacIntyre's reading of Enten-Eller, neither the aesthetic nor the ethical stances can have any ultimate grounding in reason: both are equally valid ways of living. The only thing that matters according to this reading of Enten-Eller is the concept of 'radical choice': we each have a choice to pursue one way or the other, and then must live with the consequences of this choice. And it is this concept of radical choice which MacIntyre sees as so disruptive of the enlightenment enterprise, for it renders any attempt to base morality in reason unattainable. So in MacIntyre's reading, Enten-Eller is like a Janus-figured sculpture, facing backwards and forwards simultaneously: on one hand looking back to the eighteenth century for Kantian certainty, on the other hand facing future and looking ahead to the emotivism of the twentieth century, an emotivism largely presaged by the writings of Kierkegaard. And in so doing,
as MacIntyre argues, Kierkegaard’s account of choice in *Enten-Eller* renders the enlightenment’s account of morality incoherent.

If we accept MacIntyre’s reading of Kierkegaard, it becomes clear why Kierkegaard’s writings also represent for MacIntyre the historical break between the enlightenment’s culture in which the philosophical and social enterprises were viewed as intimately interwoven together, and the postenlightenment’s dilemma of a philosophical enterprise divorced and alienated from general social discourse. A good example of this alienation is the persona of Johannes de silentio in *Fear and Trembling*:

> The present author is no philosopher, he is *poetice et eleganter* (to put it in poetic and well-chosen terms), a free lancer who neither writes the System nor makes any promises about it, who pledges neither anything about the System nor himself to it. He writes because for him doing so is a luxury, the more agreeable and conspicuous the fewer who buy and read what he writes. (Kierkegaard 1985, 43)

Is it perhaps not unreasonable to see a relationship between the persona of Johannes de silentio and Kierkegaard himself? Kierkegaard was the son of a wealthy Danish merchant who was able to spend almost ten years taking college courses until he finally settled upon the notions he develops in his dissertation, *The Concept of Irony*. But perhaps Kierkegaard in *Enten-Eller* juxtaposes an aesthetic stance like that of Johannes de silentio’s in *Fear and Trembling* with an ethical one like Kant’s because Kierkegaard during the *Enten-Eller* period assumes that the only possible workable ethical stance is one that attends strictly to the Kantian notion of the categorical imperative. And in this respect MacIntyre—when discussing the pre-enlightenment’s tripartite moral scheme of
The first alternative of interpreting the enlightenment enterprise as one not necessarily doomed to failure revolves around locating the failure in the thought of one of the greatest thinkers of the enlightenment, Kant. MacIntyre is correct in arguing that part of the failure of the enlightenment project was due to the inability of the enlightenment thinkers to articulate an adequate statement of the man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-telos position. However, this failure can be adapted by sidestepping Kant’s own insistence that morality be based firmly in reason through the categorical imperative: Kant in essence failed (though not through any fault of his own) to realize that morality should be based as much on the hypothetical as on the categorical imperative. This is the argument which Philippa Foot makes in her essay, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives.” As her prime example, Foot looks at the case of what motivates a person to want to help another person who is in need. What motivates the person wishing to help is
not a categorical imperative ("I ought to help that person because this is the right thing to do"), but rather a desire to achieve the outcome such aid can produce: an outcome that hopefully benefits both the person helped while satisfying the helper's need to help. But as so many assistance programs from the past demonstrate, a pure categorical imperative (wanting to help because it is right) without carefully understanding what help should accomplish (a hypothetical imperative that considers what the person we want to help needs and practical considerations of how to achieve that end) receives no credit: such action can in fact lead to outcomes that put the question to the 'good' intention of the person offering such help. Vietnam and the ongoing "no child left behind" initiative of the Bush II administration come to mind as two possible historical examples of categorical imperatives gone awry as a result of the failure to consider carefully the intended outcomes of rendering such aid. A third example of the moral failure to attend to the categorical imperative without careful consideration of hypothetical imperatives was Captain Cook's intention to try to shelter the Natives he encountered from the western diseases that had so decimated other post-contact cultures.  

The second alternative brings us to a closer consideration of Kierkegaard's points in Fear and Trembling. One of the issues Kierkegaard raises poignantly in Fear and Trembling is the importance of storytelling in moral philosophy. He does this by meditating on the biblical story of Abraham and Isaac, and by so doing he raises one of the most vexing problems of modern philosophy: the problem of how, and if, we are able

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2 David A. Stannard makes this point about Captain Cook's voyages in Before the Horror: that even though Captain Cook's intent (i.e., categorical imperative) was to not infect the peoples he visited, the practical result (the hypothetical imperative) was such that Western diseases were indeed unleashed on Native peoples. As such, we should hold Cook culpable in committing genocide on these peoples, as within a century or so after his visit, many of these populations had been reduced by well over 95% of their pre-contact populations.
to render ourselves intelligible to others. To this end, Kierkegaard in *Fear and Trembling* uses a circling, essayistic form less typical of the systematizing philosophy of say, a Hegel, and more typical of an essayist in the truest sense of that genre, i.e., Montaigne. Kierkegaard frames his meditation around the persona of Johannes de Silentio, an outsider who, as Kierkegaard himself puts it, seems to be trying desperately to work his way into the nature of experience.

Yet this working its way into the nature of experience also seems to be a way of working the experience into the person studying the experience: “Even though one were capable of converting the whole content of faith into the form of a concept, it does not follow that one has adequately conceived faith and understands how one got into it, or how it got into one” (19-20). In a sense, then Kierkegaard, by positing faith as the highest good human beings can achieve, and thus raising faith to the position *eudaimonia* served in ancient Greek ethics—and as MacIntyre points out in his earlier *A Short History of Ethics, eudaimonia “includes both the notion of behaving well and the notion of faring well”*(59)—argues for a way of viewing life in which a given life can be called good only when it is viewed *retrospectively* in terms of a completed action. In short, life must have a *telos* and we can judge the success of a person’s life projects in terms of fulfilling or failing to fulfill this *telos* only when that individual’s life is viewed in its complete entirety. Hence the appropriateness of the panegyric form from which Kierkegaard-as-de-Silentio launches into his meditation: “[F]or the poet is as it were the hero’s better nature, powerless it may be as a memory is, but also transfigured as a memory is”(21).
But despite positing the story of Abraham as the supreme example of faith, we have still the problem that the experience of faith itself is *incommunicable*. As Kierkegaard puts it: “The one knight of faith can render no aid to the other. Either the individual becomes a knight of faith by assuming the burden of the paradox, or he never becomes one” (61). So what we are stuck with is the story of Abraham and Isaac, which looks like it might serve as a communicative bridge to some notion of faith for the hearer of the story; yet this bridge is illusory: the story stands without supports. We can achieve nothing by meditating on this story, yet, if we are to understand faith we *must* meditate on it. But how can the story, then, be rendered intelligible and meaningful to others?

This is the key ethical paradox in Kierkegaard’s philosophy. For on one hand we must fully embrace the notion of the ethical (in the Kantian sense of ethics), while at the same time holding desperately to a radicalized individuality. But this notion of individuality cannot be communicated; all we can do is demarcate the stories in which faith appears to have occurred, the supreme example of which is the story of Abraham and Isaac: “The true knight of faith is a witness, never a teacher, and therein lies his deep humanity, which is worth a good deal more than this silly participation in others’ weal and woe which is honored by the name of sympathy, whereas in fact it is nothing but vanity” (62). But we are witnesses, then, who are only capable of commenting on the experiences of others as mediated to us though story and myth. And this mediation itself seems to embrace a paradox since nothing and everything is communicated through the medium of language. It seems that Kierkegaard’s method, then, recalls the famous quip from Montaigne: “It is more of a job to interpret the interpretations than to interpret the things, and there are more books written about books than about any other subject; we do
nothing but write glosses on one another,” which is where the reader of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling is left: commenting on the commentaries on a story from the Bible. For the ultimate paradox of Kierkegaard’s thought is that we must get *inside* an experience, get the nature of that experience *into* ourselves, and do this *without* any mediation between the way things *should* be and the way things are.

At this point, we might ask: Whither narrative and interpretation? MacIntyre in *After Virtue* leads us down the labyrinth of reading Kierkegaard vis-à-vis the post-Enlightenment history of ethics so that MacIntyre can ultimately demolish the pretenses of contemporary emotivism, and its concurrent stance, moral relativism. But in the years following the publication of *After Virtue*, MacIntyre has argued for a return to a tradition-based notion of ethics that he argues avoids both emotivism and relativism. In MacIntyre’s particular case, this return to tradition has constituted a return on his part to the tradition of Thomistic Aristotelianism—in particular, to a reconsideration of this tradition as it existed prior to the early modern period, especially the Reformation. And although this return to tradition sounds very restrictive, even claustrophobic, for a philosopher who in the early fifties was a member of the British Communist Party, it perhaps is not as retrograde as it seems. The case has been made that MacIntyre’s vision of tradition is one very much rooted in the *local*—local in this case have many of the similarities with the local micropolitics of dissent that Best and Kellner (1991) identify with postmodern thinkers like Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, Baudrillard, and Lyotard. I will return shortly to discuss MacIntyre’s politics, but for the moment I want to explore just a little more this binarism between macro- and micropolitics.
To continue this useful binarism between macro and micropolitics developed by Best and Kellner in *Postmodern Theory*, the Kierkegaard aesthete to whom MacIntyre addresses much of his critique of the post-Enlightenment implications of Enten-Eller is but one option in the postmodern world. Still another option is Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of desiring machines developed in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Anti-Oedipus* (1983). In many ways, Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of desiring machines is still another radicalized form of the Kierkegaardian aesthete, albeit one that works to deconstruct society with the full awareness that “politics is simultaneously a macropolitics and a micropolitics” (213). Still a third is the position MacIntyre himself takes—a position Kelvin Knight has called “Revolutionary Aristotelianism” (as qtd. in Knight 235).³

My own critique of MacIntyre’s reading of Kierkegaardian narrative begins with my essential agreement with an observation MacIntyre himself made more than ten years after the publication of *After Virtue* (1981) in an essay entitled “Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues, and Goods” (1992). In this essay, MacIntyre posits the

³ One of the points about MacIntyre’s return to a Thomistic Aristotelian tradition that initially disturbs readers, including the writer of this dissertation, is how MacIntyre seems to be so willing to focus attention on this Western tradition without reference to other non-Western traditions. However, Kelvin Knight goes to great pains in his “Guide to Further Reading” chapter of *The MacIntyre Reader* (1999) to point out that MacIntyre is in fact a support of tradition *qua* tradition on a most fundamental level. As Knight points out:

MacIntyre gives a transcultural rendering of his metatheory in “Incommensurability, Truth, and the Conversation between Confucians and Aristotelians about the Virtues” (in E. Deutsch, ed., *Culture and Modernity*, University of Hawai‘i Press, 1991; for a complementary comparison see Lee H. Yearley’s *Mencius and Aquinas*, SUNY, 1990) and has taken a number of small opportunities to criticize philosophical imperialism (in numerous reviews, starting with that of Mehta’s *Beyond Marxism* in *Political Theory*, 11, 1983, and in encyclopedia entries), hoping to establish debate with non-Thomistics forms of Aristotelianism and with other philosophical traditions that similarly articulate practical reasoning and pursue truth within other cultures. Even within the West, MacIntyre sides with cultural and other minorities who are excluded, or exclude themselves, from the dominant culture. As the first language of his grandparents was Gaelic, it is likely that part of his motivation for doing so issues from his own background of cultural oppression. (285-86)
“plain person” as one who is schooled in contemporary notions of liberalism and accepts the notion that moral decisions are largely the result of arbitrary choices. Yet it is also important to note that this person’s moral stance is itself largely a socially-constructed persona—a “philosophical artifact” as MacIntyre styles it (MacIntyre 1998b, 137)—that results from this person having been schooled in Western educational systems. In many ways, this person resembles the Kierkegaardian aesthete—the character of “A” in Enten-Eller. As teachers of composition in Hawai‘i, we may recognize this character in our classrooms: the student with SAT scores over 1400, the student who writes fluently and can move from citing Albert Goldman’s biography of John Lennon in one sentence to Ezra Pound’s Guide to Kulchur in the next sentence. In the traditional way of employing a Freirian banking model of education, this is the student who comes to class with a big bank account behind him or her.

Nevertheless, for a teacher situated in Hawai‘i, that teacher may have to invert that standard reading of the state of things—especially in light of MacIntyre’s espousal of tradition-based ethics. For in Hawai‘i, most of our students who enter our writing classrooms are not so well-endowed in this sense—most probably wouldn’t even know who John Lennon, let alone Ezra Pound, was. But they are often very well grounded in another—and I would argue, richer—sense. For the personae they bring to the classroom are forged out of familial and social relationships that may have exposed students to traditions that come closer to the type of tradition MacIntyre discusses when he discusses his brand of Thomistic-Aristotelianism in “Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues, and Goods.” I am thinking of students raised in cultures still rich in Native and Pacific Island heritages, or in East Asian heritages. And while these students may not
write with the grade and aplomb of the young writer moving from Bob Dylan to Jack Kerouac citations, these writers have a wealth that MacIntyre—and I would argue the situation into which writing teachers find themselves imbricated in any post-colonial situation such as that in Hawai‘i as well Freiristas—should acknowledge and respect.

For such students, it is often difficult to come to terms with what Foucault in The Order of Things calls the Classical episteme—a system that “introduced into knowledge probability, analysis, and combination, and the justified arbitrariness of the system” (63). According to Foucault, this episteme is articulated through a world of binarisms that split language into signifier and signified and that arises in European culture with the beginning of the seventeenth century. In contrast, the sixteenth century represented the more traditional form of organizing the world around resemblances—convenientia ("resemblance connected with space in the form of a graduated scale of proximity," (18)), aemulatio ("a sort of 'covenience' that has been freed from the law of place and is able to function, without motion, from a distance" (19)), analogy, and sympathies (Foucault 1970, 17-24). And although Foucault does not make this point, I would add that while this world was strongly marked by Erasmus, it was a world which in tum had even deeper roots in the rhetorical culture of its predecessor culture—Medieval Europe and the culture of Aquinas. 4 What I would postulate we would find were we to examine the language of these students more closely is actually a wealth of being in the world of homo rhetoricus—albeit a wealth we have still to find a way to help these students acknowledge they possess.

4 A good discussion of these topics with regard to writing instruction can be found in Woods’s “The Teaching of Poetic Composition in the Later Middle Ages” and in Abbott’s essay “Rhetoric and Writing in the Renaissance.” Both are collected in A Short History of Writing Instruction, 2nd ed., 2001.
The irony here is that what we must do in large in a college-level writing class is to in fact indoctrinate these students in the ways of Foucault's Classical *episteme*. And in so many ways, this Classical *episteme* is in fact the language of the Enlightenment, the Enlightenment whose moral incoherence MacIntyre derides as being reflected in Kierkegaard's *Enten-Eller*, so that in fact what we do in composition classrooms is to help students come to terms with a sort of schizophrenic existence which on one hand acknowledges the materiality of language and its seductive power—much as Kierkegaard's "A" acknowledges and reveres the seductive power of Mozart's *Don Giovanni*—while at the same time trying to help students maintain the moral certitude reflected in the character of Kierkegaard's "B." In my reading of *Either/Or*, then, we need to see in the disjunction of "A" or "B" the sort of deconstruction of dichotomies in western thought that Deleuze and Guattari have tried to carry out in positing their notions of 'schizophrenia' and 'rhizomatics'; in short, we need to see the possibility of a conjunction of "A" and "B" existing within the same individual, and that it is this conjunction which empowers the individual to be able to deterritorialize the molar with so-called molecular lines of flight. I would thus argue that in many ways Kierkegaard is the first to explore the Deleuzean possibility of a 'body-without-organs' which Deleuze and Guattari discuss in *Anti-Oedipus*.

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5 Later in *The Order of Things*, Foucault eloquently makes the point that this classical episteme came to an end at the beginning of the nineteenth century in terms of a theory of language held by most western philosophers. Nevertheless, to deploy the language of Raymond Williams, I would contend that the classical episteme remains in many ways the *dominant ideology* of the power elite today, while the Foucauldian notion of the reemergence of the world of language at the beginning of the nineteenth-century continues to remain an *emergent ideology*—hence the reason why peoples living in postmodern societies continue to turn to Kierkegaard, as well as earlier Romantic thinkers, to try to come to terms with notions of modernity and postmodernity.
All of this, of course, depends on whether or not the student’s family and social backgrounds have not already indoctrinated the student in such a way as to be quite skeptical of the positions of moral certitude taken by “B,” like the hypothetical 1400-SAT student I mentioned earlier. For in the end, to truly understand Kierkegaard’s “A,” we must take seriously his discussions of the seductive, the sensual, and the material, and to do so would bring us back to the foundations of rhetoric vis-à-vis Gorgias’s *Encomium of Helen*. Indeed, as MacIntyre argues, the ‘plain person’ is to some extent a product of the English composition classroom—a product of a discipline that on one hand embraces its pre-Socratic roots in the sensuousness of language, while on the other hand tries to come to terms with moral certitude somehow—whether through appeals to Bakhtinian ethics (Juzwik 2004, Halasek 1999), Habermas on democracy (Williams 2002, Faigley 1992), Gadamer (Schildgen 1993) or Lyotard on gaming (Faigley 1992), to name a very few.

Nevertheless, to return to MacIntyre’s argument about plain persons and morality, the key point MacIntyre makes in this essay is that when this hypothetical ‘plain person’ does in fact turn to morality, what will this person find? As MacIntyre puts it:

> When from time to time, the plain person retrospectively examines what her or his life amounts to as a whole, often enough with a view to choice between alternative futures, characteristically what she or he is in effect asking is, ‘To what conception of my overall good have I so far committed myself? And, do I now have reason to put it in question?’ The unity of her or his life about which each human being thus enquires is the unity of dramatic narrative, or a story whose outcome can be success or failure for each protagonist. ... The conception of a *telos* of human life is generally
first comprehended in terms of the outcomes of particular narratives about
particular lives. (MacIntyre 1998b, 141)

What MacIntyre of course does here and throughout “Plain Persons and Moral
Philosophy” is to reassert and refine his claim in After Virtue that “man in his actions and
practice, as well as in his fictions, [is] essentially a story-telling animal” and that man “is
not essentially, but becomes through his history, a teller of stories that aspire to truth”
(216). The twist that MacIntyre is able to add in his later essay that he was not fully able
to articulate in After Virtue is that he is able now to articulate this narrative turn in terms
of placing this moral narrative of the plain person against “the truth of some particular
theoretical standpoint and that, when confronted by rival claims to her or his moral
allegiance, the plain person’s reflective practical choices will implicitly at least be a
choice between theoretical standpoints” (149). For himself, MacIntyre ultimately
chooses a standpoint for his own narrative grounded in Thomistic Aristotelianism, and
develops this standpoint in the works between After Virtue and “Plain Persons”—works
such as Whose Justice? Which Rationality (1988) and Three Rival Versions of Moral

And while I on one hand embrace the notions of narrative and tradition MacIntyre
discusses in terms of second-order theories of how we can approach teaching students in
the composition classroom—vis-à-vis honoring and validating the narratives and
traditions with which students enter our classrooms—I do not necessarily endorse all
aspects of MacIntyre’s Thomistic Aristotelianism per se as a first-order theory. Why? On
one hand, what MacIntyre offers is a way to begin to re-evaluate tradition-based modes
of enquiry—in other words, what he describes in Whose Justice? Which Rationality as a
good theory on what makes a good theory.’ On the other hand, MacIntyre’s politics leads not surprisingly to a valorization of the local at the expense of larger political structures—in short, MacIntyre embraces the micropolitical over the macropolitical in helping individuals to lead an ethical life. He makes this point in “Politics, Philosophy and the Common Good” when he writes:

I have asserted not only that the kind of small-scale political community that deserves our rational allegiance will characteristically have a high degree of shared cultural inheritance, but also that its life will have to be informed by a large measure of agreement not only on its common good, but on human goods in general… It will therefore be crucial not only to tolerate dissent, but to enter into rational conversation with it and to cultivate as a political virtue not merely a passive tolerance, but an active and enquiring attitude towards radically dissenting views, a virtue notably absent from the dominant politics of the present. (MacIntyre 1998c, 251)

What is clear from this brief quote is that MacIntyre cherishes small communities as the site of ethical living, but only small communities that have embraced a notion of the virtues that allows them to be tolerant of dissenting and opposing views. Hence, MacIntyre’s defensiveness on this position of dissent in small communities is a position that may remind some readers versed in the liberal tradition of Madison’s own defense of the extended republic in Federalist #10, in which Madison claimed that the only way to guard the right to dissent was to have an extended republic that would allow a larger community to judge or oversee local communities to ensure that the right to dissent was respected. Although I am still not persuaded by MacIntyre’s argument that a community
versed in the virtues will be enough to protect the right to dissent, I am more disturbed by how MacIntyre sees his local virtue-based community responding to larger political structures.

How will MacIntyre’s small community deal with the larger political structures with which it will inevitably have to negotiate its existence? MacIntyre provides the following brief answer near the end of “Politics, Philosophy and the Common Good” when he writes

... it will always also have to be wary and antagonistic in all its dealings with the politics of the state and the market economy, wherever possible challenging their protagonists to provide the kind of justification for their authority that they cannot in fact supply. For the state and the market economy are so structured as to subvert and undermine the politics of local community. Between the one politics and the other there can only be continuing conflict. (MacIntyre 1998c, 252)

On the one hand, I like the antagonism MacIntyre posits as needing to exist between the local, the micropolitical, and the larger forces that surround it—the macropolitical (which includes both nation states and the larger market forces). One could argue that this is a feature built into liberal political theory with regard to the notion of federal governments articulated in some of The Federalist Papers. However, what disturbs me is the failure on MacIntyre’s part to interpret these macrostructures adequately in the context of his own project—the reestablishing of a Thomistic Aristotelian tradition-based ethics.

I would contend that it becomes necessary to keep two separate notions of narrative in mind in order to function in the postmodern world. In one breath, we must
endorse maximum freedom, almost random factionalism—the full power of the local must be embraced. This local can manifest itself in two ways: one way is as a return to tradition-based notions of community, a model of which MacIntyre’s Thomistic-Aristotelian community, but not the only possible model of such tradition-based communities. I have in mind the notions of other tradition-based practices that are found in the cultures of various indigenous peoples, as well as in many immigrant populations to the United States. The other way this local can manifest itself is as a celebration of the postmodern aesthetic, which can take a variety of political or even quasi-apolitical stances ranging from the schizoanalysis of Deleuze and Guattari to the sort of aestheticism of Kierkegaard’s “A” or even a Baudrillard. In fact, I will argue, drawing on the literary criticism of Rob Wilson a little later in this dissertation, that there is a fruitful way of blending both of these visions of the local in the teaching of local literature in Hawai‘i, and that in fact such a blending must perforce become integrated into any theory of rhetorical practice and the teaching of writing in Hawai‘i.

However, in the other breath, we must never lose sight of the macropolitical kairos in which these local postmodern narratives are embedded. If I were to re-read Aristotle against MacIntyre, I would argue that it is only by understanding Aristotle as a Janus-like figure for the modern project—a figure who on one hand fully embraces the traditions of the premodern culture and articulates these traditions as fully as possibly anyone has done, while on the other hand standing at the same time as a precursor to all modern totalizing thought—that we could possibly accept MacIntyre’s setting on Thomistic Aristotelian thought as a possible end-all to moral philosophy. Although MacIntyre would have us to embrace such a reading of Aristotle in its self-contradictory

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totality, I would contend that it is Aristotle’s role as the framer and precursor of the entire
pre-modern ethos—as in short, the speaker for an acceptable good life in a premodern,
local, micropolitical sphere—that we should take from MacIntyre. And in this sense,
MacIntyre becomes in some ways the most fully realized of postmodern theorists.
Nevertheless, Aristotle and Aquinas are not enough to come to terms with the
macropolitical factors that are at play in the modern world, and I would contend that the
only way to come to terms with such factors remains to encounter and come to terms with
Marxian notions of History, Freedom, and Necessity.

At this point, I want to turn from MacIntyre—the former Marxist-(re)turned-
Christian vis-à-vis Thomist theology—to a practicing Marxist—Fredric Jameson—to
round out this preliminary discussion of narrative. I will return later in this dissertation to
discuss some of MacIntyre’s other points on narrative, but I just want to point out here
that MacIntyre ultimately became unhappy with the Marxist vision of history which he
had espoused earlier in his career, as well as with the entire micropolitical stance of
postmodernism, a stance that could in many ways be traced back to this break with the
Enlightenment MacIntyre identifies with Kierkegaard. Later in this dissertation, I will
return to continue arguing that MacIntyre’s neo-Aristotle-lean-Thomist position leads to a
somewhat acceptable theory of how the narratives embedded within micropolitical
struggles of resistance might be crafted, but for now I want to switch gears by
contending—against MacIntyre’s own position—that arguments such as the one
MacIntyre makes about Kierkegaard must continue to be shaped within a macropolitical
context which takes as its starting point a serious encounter with the Marxist critique of
the need for macropolitical theory. And in this sense, I concur with the Deleuzean position that politics is both micropolitical and macropolitical.

For this turn, I find it useful to return to the work of Fredric Jameson in The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (1981). One could posit that Jameson’s entire point in this work is an answer to the questions on narrative MacIntyre has attributed to Kierkegaard: Is there indeed a horizon as to where a proliferation of interpretations comes to its end? Whence interpretation? Jameson in this work offers just one such possible answer—a sort of “absolute horizon of all reading and all interpretation.” Early in the first chapter of his work, a chapter entitled “On Interpretation,” Jameson cites the Marx of Capital, Vol. III, when he argues that for Marxism, the central struggle is “to wrest a realm of Freedom from a world of Necessity” (19). How are we to wrest a realm of Freedom from a world of Necessity in a postmodern world, even if we embrace the notion of a local community I earlier discussed MacIntyre endorsing, given the almost overwhelming macropolitical forces contemporary markets exert on each and every community?

A large part of the answer, according to Jameson a little later in The Political Unconscious, at least in the United States today, is that such communities, along with other marginalized or disenfranchised groups must form alliances. As Jameson puts it, “[t]he privileged form in which the American left can develop today must therefore necessarily be that of an alliance politics; and such a politics is the strict equivalent of the concept of totalization on the theoretical level” (54). In the next chapter, I will turn to a discussion of how such alliances can be formed by deploying Habermas’s concept of the
public sphere; then in the following chapter, I will engage John Rawls's notion of overlapping consensus to further enrich this notion of a politics of alliances.

Early in her philosophical work The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt raises the question: Is man a social animal or a political animal? The question points right to the heart of her contention that in the ancient world, the separation between public and private was rigorously maintained. The question as to whether man is a social or political animal has been one of the underlying socio-political issues to dominate western political thought for twenty-four hundred years, from Plato to Marx. As Hannah Arendt describes it, the thoughts of the ancient Greeks on what we today call the public sphere can also easily be translated into the Marxian notion Jameson cites from Volume III of Capital as the conflict between Necessity and Freedom: "What all Greek philosophers, no matter how opposed to polis life, took for granted is that freedom is exclusively located in the political realm, that necessity is primarily a prepolitical phenomenon, characteristic of the private household organization, and that force and violence are justified in this sphere because they are the only means to master necessity—for instance, by ruling over slaves—to become free. Because all humans are subject to necessity, they are entitled to violence toward others; violence is the prepolitical act of liberating oneself from the necessity of life for the freedom of the world" (31). In contrast, Arendt goes on to argue, our modern world is one in which the realm of private Necessity has completely permeated the world of the public so that in a sense in the modern world Freedom is impossible exactly in the realm where it was considered to exist among the ancients: in the political world of the public.
I have carried Arendt’s thought with me for many years now largely because I feel that on a personal level my own Freedom has often been compromised to Necessity. As I ponder how I am to finish my dissertation, I am confronted with the desire for a public life of Freedom as represented in my idealized notion of life in academia, versus the Necessity of needing to ponder things like: How am I to pay my debts? How can I reduce the finance charges on my credit cards? How can I consolidate all of my revolving credit debt? How can I avoid bankruptcy if there is another economic downturn in Hawaii?

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Yet these problems are certainly not unique to me; many if not most of the people who would comprise even the most idealized public in this country face similar questions with regard to how to reduce debt and get by. It dawns on me that many of the students I have encountered and will continue to encounter in composition classes face, or will face similar prospects for the future, if they are not already so engaged in the “debt” system of the modern capitalist state vis-à-vis student loans, credit cards, bank loans, etc. What many of them are doing is, like myself, taking one form of debt or another in exchange for what James Berlin calls “cultural capital.” In one way or another, this cultural capital is supposed to balance out the temporary debts made to acquire it; for those who continue to invest in this system of capital acquisition, the desire to acquire cultural capital may actually exceed the desire to acquire “hard” or real capital. These are the people who comprise much of the graduate student and professorial positions in many departments of a university. In some ways, such intellectual capital may in some way
compensate those who are unwilling—or unable—to acquire real capital and so enter the ranks of the bourgeoisie.

One of the key metaphors Paulo Freire has advanced in his education theories is that of the banking model, which I have already alluded to in my discussion of MacIntyre above. What this model illustrates is that our education system has up to now been very much run like a bank: there are students who enter classrooms with sufficient funds and students who enter with insufficient or deficit funds—that is, those who are low on cultural capital. Those low on cultural capital make up what Freire calls “the oppressed.” The job of teachers in such a system is to make huge “loans” to these students so that they can “catch up” in some way with the students with more sufficient levels of cultural capital. What Freire objects to in such a model of our educational system—and as I said above, my own personal experience has been that this model is still very much in force in the United States more than thirty years after the publication of Pedagogy of the Oppressed—is that it merely tries to reproduce the status quo in a society without turning to the oppressed and asking them what they want, what their hopes and dreams are. Rather, they are to be spoon-fed like sick patients with the proper medicine until they are brought up to par, restored to “health,” through the acquisition of the proper skills and knowledge. As Freire puts it:

The central problem is this: how can the oppressed, as divided, unauthentic beings, participate in developing the pedagogy of their liberation? As long as they live in the duality in which to be is to be like, and to be like is to be like the oppressor, the contribution is impossible.

(Freire 1970, 33)
Hence the crucial problem, in Freire's opinion, is to create education strategies that turn to the material conditions of all people, regardless of what their current state of "knowledge" or "ability" is; and as such, all such educational programs must be established locally, without trying to impose some national, culturally/politically mandated model on the masses.\textsuperscript{6} It seems to me that even today, we still have so much to learn from Freire as our nation tries to mandate some sort of "national education standards" for students.

But although Freire believes all true educational processes take place locally, he has not ruled out the place of theories which, I feel, could be interpreted as universalistic in the Jamesonian or Habermasian sense of the word. For although Freire has said in Learning to Question that the "starting point for a political-pedagogical project must be precisely at the level of the people's aspirations and dreams, their understanding of reality and their forms of action and struggle" (27), he also encourages the continuance of intellectual endeavors such as his own—the creation of a flexible, yet general, theory of education—as when he writes:

> To the critical understanding of reality must be added sensitivity to reality, and to attain this sensitivity or develop it they [i.e., intellectuals] need communion with the masses. Intellectuals need to discover that their critical capacity is of neither greater nor less worth than the sensitivity of the people. Both are required for an understanding of reality. (Freire 1989, 29)

\textsuperscript{6} The Bush II Administration's "No Child Left Behind" comes to mind here—\textit{left behind what}??? Needless to say, in many cases the answer is: the oppressor of the child and his or her community. In short, I see the "No Child Left Behind" initiative as a regressive attempt to make the oppressed in this country like their oppressors.
It is this need for insisting on both the need to think critically and to feel that we must bring back into the academy. For too often we are forced to think of our education as something our parents or we must sacrifice for in order to obtain it, as though we are saving to buy a house or a car. And this is precisely because knowledge has become commodified. While we cannot turn the system around all of a sudden, nor can we repress our own feelings of guilt and anger at having to pinch pennies in order to through our schooling, we can begin to provide a place where students can combine feeling and thinking critically as two of their major life skills, skills necessary both to the creation of and participation in public spheres, as well as to the critical reflection and expression of private, personal insights, feelings and thoughts. And at the moment in the world of academia there are preciously few fields in which students can find these activities fruitfully and beneficially combined, in my opinion.  

One of the big problems, however, in selling such a model of the composition classroom to the public at large is that few people outside of composition and education theory have heard of the world of a thinker like Freire. For in a subject like composition, many people have fixed ideas about what should be taught: the ability to write clearly and concisely, to develop arguments, to construct grammatical sentences. In short, many in the academy expect those in the English department to treat writing as the sort of transparent linguistic medium articulated in the Foucaultian notion of the classical episteme discussed earlier. And granted, these things have some importance. Part of the

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7 Ideally all fields in the university would recognize the need to educate human beings as thinking and feeling subjects, rather than remediating or treating them to either bring them up to certain levels of "expertise" or to certify them as being "experts" in certain fields. Freire elsewhere in Learning to Question says that "true science begins from the concrete world and, with concepts as mediations, returns to the concrete world. It is a constantly recurring cycle. However, science, as at present understood by intellectuals and taught in the universities, consists instead of beginning from concepts, progressing to the concrete world, and then returning to concepts" (52).
problem is that most people are still working under the influence of the banking model of education, and consequently want to beg the most "bang for the buck," to use a crude cliché. For if there is still a dominant paradigm of what the public thinks students at all levels of language education should receive from a writing course, it is this notion of the acquisition of certain skills that should ideally last for life, be they skills for constructing arguments, skills for clear, concise writing, or skills for participating in professional or academic discourse.

The problem with designing composition classes for the instilling of such skills as their primary purpose is, as James M. Giarelli points out in his essay "Educating for Public Life," that such skills serve primarily private ends: the preparing of students for the workplace, the preparing of the students so that they can have marketable skills, and such. Thus the big winners in such a system are the employers who hire this skilled labor, and, to a much lesser extent, the laborers themselves who have the skills to sell. And there is nothing wrong with this per se, but as I will discuss in the next chapter, such a selling of skills without considerations of public discourse is one form of buying into what I will discuss as moral relativism—or as MacIntyre would describe, the culture of emotivism. For what a composition class which chooses to emphasize skills over the formation of communities through the integration of rational thought and feeling does, then, is to choose the development of the private almost to the pure exclusion of the public. In a small way, then, the business writing exercise I used as a prelude to this chapter is designed in part to make students think about the public implications of something as apparently private as a memo written to a limited audience of vendors. And one of the reasons why I emphasize secondary and watchdog audiences in teaching
business writing is that while on one hand, these audiences serve the negative function of making students think about the consequences of the need to be truthful in business writing, on the other hand such audience consideration also invokes in students a consciousness of the broader publics for whom their letters and other writings may have consequences. In teaching-composition-as-business-writing, then, it is important to teach more than language skills.

In short, any composition classroom designed under the premise of concentrating on teaching language skills to students in fact runs counter to the moral claims any public use of language can and should make on all of its participants. For to understand the usage of such prose properly conceived is to understand the usage of such prose in the context of public spaces. Personal themes are good, excellent teaching tools in a composition class, but only in a composition class which understands that the personal is truly political, ad that not only our ambitions and dreams begin by analyzing our current material circumstances, but our very real critiques of those circumstances also begin with close scrutiny of the personal. Classrooms in which personal themes are toss-aways, dummy-runs, for students to practice their writing skills on, then, are no longer acceptable in such a model. In a model such as Paulo Freire's, the personal is much too important and precious to be tossed out for the trite pedagogical aims of teaching students writing skills.
In the beginning of 2003, the military forces of the United States, under the command of President George W. Bush, were preparing to strike a decisive blow at the regime of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. The Bush II Administration went before the United Nations and argued that Saddam Hussein's Iraq was a threat to the security of the world because it harbored weapons of mass destruction and was a major base for training international terrorists. The Administration further claimed that Saddam Hussein's regime had aided and abetted terrorists, specifically terrorists with links to Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda, and by doing so had helped to participate in the September 11th attacks on the United States. The United Nations refused to give its consent to a U.S. attack on Iraq; therefore, George W. Bush proceeded with his attack anyway.

At the time of my writing these words (summer 2004), no significant evidence has been uncovered to demonstrate that Saddam Hussein's regime had in its possession or had been in the process of developing weapons of mass destruction immediately prior to or during the United States' attack on Iraq in the spring of 2003. Further, the 9/11 congressional commission found no credible evidence that Saddam Hussein's Iraq had been a significant ally of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda. In fact, the 9/11 Commission confirmed the public perception at the time of Bush's cry for war against Iraq: there was no evidence that there had been collusion between Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein to commit acts of terror; in fact, bin Laden and Saddam were enemies, and there were few direct contacts between Saddam Hussein's regime and al Qaeda.
As the Bush II Administration was preparing for its final showdown with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in the opening weeks of 2003, I was preparing to teach one section of English 100: Composition I and one section of English 256: Poetry and Drama at the University of Hawai’i at Mānoa. Although I did not know at that time whether or not the United States would finally chose to go to war with Iraq, current events would play a pivotal role in the journal assignment prompts I would assign students that semester. As I reflect back on that semester, one of the ways I made use of those journal assignments was to in fact insert a sort of anti-war political agenda into the classroom—but not one that would be extremely overt. Rather, I attempted to use what Karen Kopelson has called in a recent CCC article a rhetoric “on the edge of cunning.” What this entails is a performance of neutrality that can help teachers to better negotiate student resistance. What this neutrality allowed me to do was to gradually insert my own opposition to the invasion of Iraq without making students feel coerced or uncomfortable—they could continue to voice their support for the Bush Administration—although some students, like myself, were definitely opposed to the invasion.

One of the major tools—properly used—that can help a teacher in deploying a rhetoric on the edge of cunning in the face of probable student resistance is the judicious use of journal entries as a kairotic response to current events.

English 100 January 14, 2003

First journal entry: Talk about 1 or 2 good/bad experiences you have had writing.

English 100 January 16, 2003
For your journal on Thursday, January 21, 2003, write a brief response to the following question from Lunsford, Ruszkiewicz, and Walters on Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech: “Is King’s argument primarily forensic, epideictic, or deliberative (Chapter 1)? Give evidence to support your choice” (670).

For your journal on January 21, 2003, tell me if the following is an argument:

In a Station at the Metro

The apparition of these faces in the crowd;

Petals on a wet, black bough.

For Friday’s journal, discuss the following: What does local literature mean to you? How is Eric Chock’s poetry an example of local literature in Hawai‘i? Is it a successful example of local literature? Why or why not?

For your journal entry on Tuesday, February 18, 2003, respond to #1 on p. 453 of Lunsford, Ruszkiewicz, and Walters, which reads:

Even while Perry denigrates the “No Fear” stickers, he includes himself in the question, “What sort of vacuous buffoonery allows us to adopt such slogans?” What might Perry’s pronoun choice reveal about his attitude toward his audience? Toward People who have “No Fear” stickers on their vehicles? Toward himself?
For your journal on Tuesday, February 25, write about your experiences working with your group on your group dialogue.

Assignment 4: Group Dialogue

Your mission in the fourth assignment is to create a dialogue in which your group discusses some of the issues raised on civilization on technology by Kevin Kelly and Kirkpatrick Sales (KK & KS) on p. 53. Each group member should use his or her own name and contribute to the dialogue at least a page of text.

There are many reasons why I have selected this assignment. First, the issue of civilization and technology has come into the forefront since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. One of the ways George W. Bush has labeled the attacks as attacks on our civilization and on civilization in general. And now GWB is maneuvering the country to wage war with the people who live in the very birthplace of western civilization: Mesopotamia (a.k.a, present day Iraq). It therefore seems fitting that we should have some discussion on what civilization is, viz., what it is we are trying to defend in the war on terrorism. But I think you would get more out of thinking about such issues if you are able to discuss them with other students, hence the collaborative structure of this assignment.

How should you approach civilization? One way is to look at documents such as the U.S. Declaration of Independence, especially the second paragraph, in which Jefferson appeals to social contract theory as a way of understanding how governments are
instituted among people. Although government and civilization are two different entities (or are they?), thinkers often see a link seen as existing between the two. For example, here is Freud in Civilization and Its Discontents on how civilization is instituted by people:

_Human life in common is only made possible when a majority comes together which is stronger than any separate individual and which remains united against all separate individuals. The power of this community is then set up as 'right' in opposition to the power of the individual, which is condemned as 'brute force'. This replacement of the power of the individual by the power of a community constitutes the decisive step of civilization. The essence of it lies in the fact that the members of the community restrict themselves in their possibilities of satisfaction, whereas the individual knew no such restrictions. The first requisite of civilization, therefore, is that of justice—that is, the assurance that a law once made will not be broken in favour of an individual._ (42)

As an aside, consider the following question: Are governments necessary in a civilization? Has there ever been a civilization that did _not_ have some form of government?

Another thing you can do is to consult your History 151 textbooks and reading. How do historians define civilization? How has civilization been implicitly defined in literary texts such as _The Epic of Gilgamesh?_ Finally, don’t forget to look civilization up in a
good dictionary, preferably the *Oxford English Dictionary*. Civilization has as its root the Latin word for city (civita). Are cities necessarily a mark of civilization?

How so?

For one take on civilization, we’ll spend the rest of the period today watching a video about our ancestors from the series *Prehistoric Creatures*.

For Thursday, February 20:

- For your journal entry, respond to the video selection from *Prehistoric Creatures*. Also, discuss how technology seems to be intimately linked to notions of civilization. Please reread “The Accountability Matrix,” pp. 473-77.
- Write a two-page draft of your group dialogue for Thursday, February 20. On Thursday, be prepared to read this draft out loud to the class.

Due date of first ‘final’ draft of assignment: Tuesday, February 25.

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English 100 February 28, 2003

*For your journal on March 6, briefly discuss: 1) the power of a catalog as argument and particular recurring themes; and 2) what happens and what is the relationship between these two events and the catalog, which is enclosed in parentheses? In Sherman Alexie’s “The Exaggeration of Despair.”*
Briefly write about the last movie you saw. Recommend that your friends either see or don’t see that movie.

For your journal on Tuesday, March 18, write a response to #6 on p. 576 which reads:

The three overly opinion pieces—by Curtis, Goodman, and Burnett—approach the controversy as a conflict between the King estate and the public interest, with little consideration of CBS, the other party in the lawsuit. Goodman briefly mentions CBS once in her column in paragraph 11 while neither Curtis nor Burnett makes any reference to CBS at all. Why did these writers not discuss CBS? How, if at all, is the public interest involved in this case? Should “public interest” be used to resolve the controversy? Why or why not?

For your journal on Thursday, March 20, answer #2 on p. 722 which reads

What does Webb mean when she argues that medical advances have both increased life expectancy for Americans and “made the dying process harder” (paragraph 17)? Do you agree? Why or why not? What sorts of evidence do you find yourself offering to support your position? What do you thing Webb means by the final sentence of the introduction?
For your journal entry on Thursday, April 3, talk about your reaction to the war in the Gulf. Do you approve of the war? If so, how do you think it’s going?

English 100 April 3

For your journal on Tuesday, April 8, write a brief response to #3 on p. 400 which reads:

If your knowledge of America were based solely on Seinfeld, Melrose Place, E.R., Xena, Warrior Princess, and Beverly Hills 90210, what would your image of American women (or men) be? (After all, such images of America are the only ones many people around the globe have.) If you are not familiar with these particular television programs, choose two or three other programs that you watch regularly as the basis for your argument.

English 100 April 10, 2003

For your journal on Tuesday, April 15, 2003, talk about what your reaction was to the toppling of Saddam’s statue in Baghdad yesterday. What do you think the U.S. should do next to help bring peace and stability to the Middle East?

English 100 April 17, 2003

For your journal on Tuesday, April 22, discuss what, if anything, the looting of the Iraqi National Museum means to you.

English 100 April 29, 2003

For your journal entry on Thursday, May 1: Freshman composition—English 100—should be an elective, rather than a mandatory course. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? Why?
I remember that for the journal assignment of April 22—the one asking students what, if anything, the looting of the Iraqi National Museum meant to them—I brought my copy of Time-Life Books’ Cradle of Civilization to pass around to the class so that they could see some of the artifacts that might have been taken—perhaps even destroyed. A few students were moved, others seemed relatively indifferent, but the vast majority probably didn’t know what to think. I then compared the looting to what would happen to Hawaiian civilization if the Bishop Museum in Honolulu were to be looted: What would be lost to Hawaiian civilization?
Chapter 2: The Public Sphere as a Confluence of Catastrophe and Progress

Often when we think of the personal in composition, other terms begin to follow: voice, expression, self. In short, we begin to enter the Bartholomae-Elbow debate that led to the labeling of many first generation compositionists, like Elbow, as expressivists.

I'm not interested in rehashing that old debate here, but rather I want to shift the plain of discussion so that we can take everything that is useful in composition's past with us into the undiscovered country of its future. And I believe that part of that future will be bridging discussions of public sphere writing, such as those of Christian Weisser (2002), with more traditional notions of writing and voice as discussed by Elbow.

Weisser draws heavily on the work of Jürgen Habermas, as do I in this chapter. However, the work Weisser draws mostly on is Habermas's early studies of the public sphere (1962) and on the debates that took place with the publication in the U.S. of The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere in the late eighties and early nineties. A volume that was especially pertinent to this discussion with regard to composition studies was Craig Calhoun's Habermas and the Public Sphere (1992), which many scholars have turned to, along with Negt and Kluge's Public Sphere and Experience (1993), as starting places for discussing Habermas's notion of the public sphere. Compositionists who have drawn on Habermas's notions of the public sphere to inform their work include John Trimbur (1993), S. Michael Halloran (1993), Irene Ward (1997), and most extensively, Christian Weisser.

As intermediaries between these two apparent poles of the public and private, I draw on other later theoretical works of Jürgen Habermas and on the practical examples
offered by Martin Luther King, Jr. in the practice of public discourse. From the later works of Habermas, the most influential has perhaps been Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Several compositionists have turned to this work at some point when discussing the intersections between rhetoric, composition, and ethics, including Lester Faigley (1992), George Dillon (1993), James Crosswhite (1996), and most fully and significantly, James E. Porter (1998) in his influential study of the complex relationship between technology, rhetoric and ethics, Rhetorical Ethics and Internetworked Writing. The use of theory, especially in the case of Faigley and Porter, is extensive and deep. Nevertheless, I believe that theory, no matter how abstract, must be useful and must serve the practical topic and situation—the kairos—at hand. And in this particular instance, even a theory as often abstract as Habermas’s can, I believe, serve fruitfully in discussions in composition studies of the intersections between public and personal writing.

If we were to eliminate the personal essay as it is sometimes—although less so than twenty years ago—taught in the composition classroom, and we were also to eliminate the teaching of “hard skills” such as grammar, development, and research methods, what then is left? Perhaps it is an integration of these skills that we must strive for, an integration that will be neither strictly academic in the traditional sense (i.e., academia as it has developed during the past century), nor strictly subjectivist. The skills carefully integrated may, indeed, be greater than the parts: for it seems to me that strong writing must draw both on the materials within, whether one believes those materials to be god-given or socially constructed, and the external circumstances of one’s existence. But perhaps we do not need to stray as far from home as we may think to envision such
an integration of language practice. Perhaps we are already in possession of it through a study of the rhetorical tradition. For as James Crosswhite has written: “[A] rhetorical view of things would also see that there is no writing without human action. Unless someone writes and reads, there is no writing. Unless someone makes a claim on someone, there is no claiming” (26). And later Crosswhite says: “[L]anguage has the same being that human beings have—its disclosive power depends completely on the fact that human beings exist as a disclosure of the world” (26). Perhaps conceived most broadly, as Crosswhite seems to imply, the teaching of composition is nothing less than a plunge into language as being-in-the-world, i.e., Heidegger’s notion of Dasein. And it is having to deal with being-in-the-world in all its linguistic, personal, and public messiness, in all its apparent self-contradictoriness, that we have the most to offer students who study expository writing. For, to paraphrase Georg Cantor who was speaking of mathematics, the essence of writing is Freedom. But that freedom rests in developing an intuition into the ways in which we are free, and the ways in which we are not, but that this intuition can be cultivated is the credo that continues to fire research in composition studies.

As we saw in the previous chapter, I am trying to argue for a way of viewing the composition classroom that allows us to do three things: 1) embrace and valorize the strength of traditional narrative forms with which our students may be well-versed and with which they may enter our classrooms; 2) acknowledge the schizophrenic nature of the composition classroom as an educational site, but to turn that schizophrenic position to advantage in a Deleuzian sense; and 3) empower students with a critique of system that
follows along Marxist lines, drawing initially upon the work of Jameson for theory and Freire for pedagogy. It is to this third point I want to turn more fully in this chapter. However, I will move from Jameson and Freire to a consideration of the work of Jurgen Habermas and the role of reason in the forming of alliances and in the critique of macrostructures of political economy.

One of the most difficult problems in forming any type of public is in reaching some form of agreement. The temptation to give in to moral relativism seems to be the most common way to deal with moral problems today. It is easy to understand why moral relativism is the most common stance of moderates on both the right and the left: it is a position that apparently allows for any viewpoint and does not insist on the need to read any final agreement among parties. Moral relativism apparently allows for a position in which competing notions of the good life can exist without the individuals who believe these notions having to talk to each other; in fact, it is predicated in part on the notion that the holders of these various viewpoints of the good life could in all probability not talk to each other and reach any kind of substantive agreements on notions like freedom, justice, and goodness. And so groups in our society become more isolated with respect to these notions precisely because they refuse to discuss them in any open and rational way: the presumption of moral relativity leads most to believe that any such discussion would be fruitless. The problem is that a society which espouses such a notion of moral relativism cannot embrace common notions on the highest of ethical issues; nor could such a society be considered to have the requisite command of critical thinking abilities which would enable its citizenry to make it a just society, for critical thinking implies the ability to use reason and feel a sense of justice and fairness. Further, groups
in such a society will be unable to form the alliances with other groups and individuals that could help to empower such groups to resist a system that may indeed be unjust.

In the next chapter of this dissertation, I will turn to Rawlsian theories of justice as fairness to discuss the reason why societies should cultivate a positive form of cultural capital which develops in citizens a sense of the virtues of political cooperation and compromise—in short, a society in which the majority of citizens in the society possess a sense of reasonableness and fairness that prevents the society from being inundated with a proliferation of excessive procedures to maintain the balance of power between majority and minority opinions on major ethical issues. In this chapter, I will discuss how a society can begin to cultivate a sense of reasonableness and fairness in its citizenry that allows society to envision and enact forms of justice that transcend neutral, non-normative gestures.

To begin, Harvey Siegel points out in Relativism Refuted that relativism itself implies a metatheory of how reality is constructed: for example, to posit a statement such as $A$ which would argue for the relativism of all value statements is itself to give in to an obvious contradiction, since statement $A$ would imply its own universal significance while at the same time offering a universal statement that all value statements are relative and hence possess no universal significance. In other words, it’s the problem of how to interpret the statement: “I am a liar.” For relativism to hold true, then, one would have to accept the statement All moral decisions are relative (our statement $A$), while at the same time universally rejecting the truth of this statement (in the language of logic, $\sim A$) since in order to uphold relativism as a morality of general import, it would be necessary to either explicitly posit such a universal norm, or act as though such a universal norm were
posited. In short, to be a relativist is to be as logically committed to a foundationalist position as the most rigorous conservative, the only difference being that the conservative accepts the premises from which she argues while the relativist denies these premises, viz., arguing for \( A \) while at the same time denying the validity of any such statement \( A \). Further, it is to work under a foundationalist notion of reality which is riddled with contradiction from its very first premise.\(^8\) Although we should always be careful when invoking the laws of strict logic in moral reasoning—it would indeed seem foolish today to try to erect a system such as Spinoza’s which would proceed *more geometrico* from moral premise to proof and so forth\(^9\) and so on—we must not forget to consider some of the more fundamental laws of western thought such as the law of contradiction, which in informal language states that the moral relativist who posits a position like \( A \) cannot have his cake and eat it too.

So if moral relativism is excluded as a possible route for society to follow in terms of its notion of a pursuit of justice, what then is left? If one follows the arguments of Siegel in *Rationality Redeemed?*, we are left with the old techniques that have held since the enlightenment, the techniques upon which Locke, Rousseau, and Kant based their own notions of public life, what Siegel calls “That old-time enlightenment metanarrative.” However, other thinkers have tried to redefine rationality in a way that deflects enlightenment metanarrative.

\(^8\) Of course the argument is not as simple as this. It is possible for one both to argue that he maintains the relativist position while at the same time *not* upholding any such universal premise as \( A \). However, the crux of Siegel’s argument is to show that any such person is in fact working *as though* \( A \) were in place in his moral thinking, regardless of the position of any such individuals denial of the existence of \( A \) in their thought.

\(^9\) Of course *seems* is the operative word here—although I do not intend to contradict this position on Spinoza in this dissertation.
For example, MacIntyre has devoted a major part of his writings to refuting moral relativism by referring to a form of rationality that is not based on the Enlightenment. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this form of rationality refers to the predecessor culture of the enlightenment, namely the Thomistic Aristotelianism of the scholastic tradition. In "Moral Relativism, Truth, and Justification", MacIntyre makes the point that even if a variety of ethical traditions exist, each tradition must rationally believe in its own claims to truth if it is to be intelligible to members of different traditions. The passage from MacIntyre is worth quoting at length:

So there is from the standpoint of every major moral tradition a need to resist any relativist characterization of that standpoint as no more than a local standpoint. What the claim to truth denies is, as Nietzsche understood, any version of perspectivism. Conversely, the abandonment of claims to truth, even if in the guise of a revision of our conception of truth, so that truth is to be understood as no more than an idealization of rationally acceptability or justification, makes it difficult and perhaps impossible to resist perspectivist conclusions, and obviously so in the type of case in which fundamental moral standpoints are in contention. For how any particular moral issue or situation is to be characterized, understood and rationally evaluated—indeed whether any particular situation is to be regarded as positing significant moral issues—will depend, it must seem, upon which particular conceptual scheme it is in terms of which our own moral idiom is framed. Yet if the claims made from the rival and contending standpoints of view are not claims to truth,
the adherents of the different standpoints in contention will not be able to understand the central claims of their own particular standpoint as logically incompatible with the claims of those rivals. (MacIntyre 1998a, 208-09)

This passage is worth discussing because it makes clear a number of things. First, it links MacIntyre with critics, like Habermas, who insist on critiquing Nietzschean perspectivism, and although I will not discuss this point in great detail, it is important to see MacIntyre as attacking contemporary morality on two fronts: on one front are those who continue to hold to some form of post-enlightenment rationality, like Siegel; on the other hand are those who embrace Nietzschean perspectivism as the end all to philosophical epistemology and ethics. The entire enlightenment rationality, which in MacIntyre’s view as developed in After Virtue and Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, is what leads to ‘emotivism’ and ‘relativism,’ and what bothers MacIntyre about this standpoint is that it is a position in which holders of such positions refuse to or cannot see themselves as implicated in an ethical tradition which grows out of the failure of enlightenment rationality. This position MacIntyre has labeled ‘encyclopedist’ because of its desire to be all-encompassing in the sense of a Lyotardian metanarrative.

Second, like many postmodern critics, MacIntyre has written elsewhere that enlightenment rationality per se must be condemned as part of the disease of Western capitalism and imperialism. This goes along with his critique of the encyclopedist tradition. However, unlike most postmodern thinkers, MacIntyre has also insisted that it is humanly impossible to give in to Nietzschean perspectivism because to articulate any ethical position is to do so from a particular standpoint. In the case of Nietzsche, he has
labeled this tradition the tradition of ‘genealogy.’ It is a position that draws on Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals to contend that all ethical positions are but the masks of power. MacIntyre contends that just such a position refuses to acknowledge traditions such as Thomistic Aristotelianism, Confucianism, and other ethical traditions which truly are claims to truth because they are articulated within and from traditions of rational ethical enquiry. And in critiquing perspectivism thus, MacIntyre does share something in common with a thinker like Jurgen Habermas, despite the latter’s appeal to so much that he claims is good in the Enlightenment project.

Jürgen Habermas has attempted to secure a more certain starting point which, while invoking reason, does not necessarily accept the transcendental foundationalist notions posited in the more crass readings of the Enlightenment thinkers, such as in my opinion is presented by Siegel. This starting point does not aim at reaching definitive conclusions to the rightness or wrongness of certain moral statements (e.g., a definitive judgment as to the correctness of a statement such as “Abortion should remain legalized and access to such services open to all women regardless of socio-economic status.”) per se; that is, it does not try to provide a moral formula that would tend to support Kant’s notion of the categorical imperative: “I should never act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law” (14). Rather, Habermas’s notion of universalization as he describes it in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1990) is predicated on: 1) universal access being available to all citizens—Habermas puts it this thus: “Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse” (89); 2) all citizens being allowed to question any assertion as well as “introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse,” as well as
express their “attitudes, desires and needs” (89); and 3) no “internal or external coercion” being used to prevent speakers from exercising their rights as outlined above. Thus Habermas replaces Kant’s categorical imperative with a universal statement (U) that would ideally be accepted by anyone who would enter into a discourse community (i.e., public sphere discussions) with each other:

(U) For a norm to be valid, the consequences and side effects of its general observance for the satisfaction of each person’s particular interests must be acceptable to all. (Habermas 1990, 197)

With this universal statement in place, Habermas puts forth his principle for “a procedure of moral argumentation”:

Only those norms may claim to be valid that could meet with the consent of all affected in their role as participants in a practical discourse.

(Habermas 1990, 197)

Now at this point, we might ask ourselves, “How does Habermas’s statement (U) contribute to the notion of a universal statement that could be acceptable to all?” As Habermas himself states, one of his primary concerns in positing these statements was to try to formulate principles that would avoid “the ethnocentric fallacy” (197). Habermas believes he has done so by combining the principles of access listed above, his universal principle (U), his discourse principles, and finally an appeal to his own previous work in *A Communicative Theory of Action*.

I want to leave aside further arguments as to the validity or invalidity of Habermas’s principles for this dissertation, and state up front that I accept his principles
as the best valid starting point for a democratic ethics not based on a relativist position. 10

It is true that invoking Habermas's notions will not provide an absolute answer to a question such as the rightness or wrongness of legalized abortion; Habermas's postulates only create the theoretical model from which such issues can be discussed rationally without resort to violence or dogma. But I think that Habermas's notions can be used to:

1) provide a sounder basis for social contract theories of democracy which emphasize the role played by a citizenry in actively creating a public sphere11; and 2) provide a sounder basis for what Rawls describes as the two principles of justice—an issue to which I will return in the next chapter. I believe that with Habermas's notions of discourse ethics, we begin to get a glimmering of what society that rejects moral relativism without rejecting the pluralism inherent in multiple visions of the good life in the modern United States can begin to look like. In such a society, different groups with different ideas can and will exist; the difference is that in a society so conceived, they will be able to talk to each other to generate public spheres—however restricted temporally and spatially those sphere may be—so as to carry out society's business in such a way as to allow for options that create opportunity for all, rather than reducing society to a polarity of ruler and ruled, or expert and non-expert, as would be the case in a meritocracy.

10 For example, I believe Habermas has worked out a more rigorous starting point for an ethics of democratic society than Rawls was able to formulate back in 1971 when he published A Theory of Justice. Although I will used much of Rawls's theory in the next chapter to develop my theories of democratic education, other notions that Rawls invoked in his Theory—the veil of ignorance, the original position—were postulated because of a lack of sufficient theory of how people communicate with each other and form discourse communities. Habermas in his Theory of Communicative Action and his notions of "Discourse Ethics" has helped to bridge this vague theoretical lacuna in Rawls's work with something more substantial.

11 In a sense such work brings closure to Habermas's own work of thirty years earlier, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, in which he argued, "the public sphere of a civil society stood or fell with the principle of universal access. A public sphere from which specific groups would be eo ipso excluded was less that merely incomplete; it was not a public sphere at all. Accordingly, the public that might be considered the subject of the bourgeois constitutional state viewed its sphere as a public one in this strict sense; in its deliberations it anticipated in principle that all human beings belong to it" (85).
But perhaps more importantly, Habermas's principles allow us a theory of communication and ethics that will enable these different groups to begin to communicate so as to form alliances that can empower these groups to resist the hegemonic formations with which such groups must inevitably contend. For example, despite much of the talk of public spheres that has gone on in composition in recent years, I hear little discussion of why such public spheres are desirable. In *Moving Beyond Academic Discourse: Composition Studies and the Public Sphere* by Christian Weisser (2002), for instance, sound arguments are offered as to what the public sphere is and how it may be critiqued. Drawing on the work of Negt and Kluge, Fraser, and others Weisser develops a rich and complex notion of what the public sphere can be by appealing to notions such as ‘proletarian counterpublic spheres’ and ‘subaltern counterpublics’ to counter the vision of a hegemonic bourgeois public sphere that Habermas focused on in his early study, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*. Weisser also deploys the usual language of a ‘rhetoric of citizenship’ and considerations of what does and does not constitute public writing in the composition classroom.

Nevertheless, I often hear little discussion amongst compositionists of why public sphere writing is important. My answer is relatively straightforward: it is only by forming publics that individuals can form groups that can empower such groups to establish their standpoint in a society; it is only through establishing a particular public sphere that one group can ally itself with other groups that share similar interests to defend their shared visions and notions of society; and it is only through group activity writ large—whether through unionism or social activism—that society has been and can be changed. As Negt and Kluge put it, a public sphere is "a genuine articulation of a
fundamental social need. It is the only form of expression that links the members of society to one another by integrating their developing societal characteristics” (2).

Further, as Habermas has gone on to show in his later works, such as *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action* (1990) and *Justification and Application* (1993), it is only through individuals and groups working in and through such public spheres that some sort of *solidarity* can be established. As Ciaran Cronin has put it in his introduction to his translation of Habermas’s *Justification and Application*:

> Since personal identity can be achieved only through socialization, the moral concern with autonomy and equal respect is inextricably bound up with an interest in the preservation and promotion of intersubjective relationships of mutual recognition, and hence of forms of communal life in which they can be realized. Thus *morality* must be supplemented by a political *ethics* whose goal is to mediate between abstract principles of justice and collective identities via positive law and public policy. (Cronin 1993, xxxvii)

What Cronin succinctly points out here is that Habermas does hold to an idea of individual agency while at the same time not endorsing the monadic bourgeois individualism Habermas’s postmodern critics often accuse him of holding. Further, Habermas, like many postmodernists and like MacIntyre, believes that the individual is largely a product of social formations. Hence, Habermas, like MacIntyre, appeals to notions of community in his discourse ethics and in his vision of the public sphere. Finally, Habermas sees discourse ethics as largely a political ethics which can mediate between abstract principles of justice—such as the Rawlsian notions of justice as fairness
I will explore in the next chapter—and these collective identities we might see as being embraced by a plurality of public spheres. It is finally important to note here that pluralism does not by definition imply relativism.

But in critiquing Weisser’s recent work, I feel that Weisser should also have looked more closely at Habermas’s later works—for example, Weisser cites no work of Habermas’s written after the second volume of *A Theory of Communicative Action* (Trans. 1987)—as these later works continue to explore solutions to the problems Habermas first articulated in *Structural Transformation* (written 1962; translated into English 1989). Nevertheless, I am drawn to Weisser nuanced discussions of the public sphere vis-à-vis the work of Negt and Kluge, as well as Fraser. The reason is that Weisser draws on Negt and Kluge to point out that the bourgeois public sphere was in large part a mechanism of power employed by the bourgeoisie to gain the upperhand in developing their markets, and later their colonial empires. As Weisser elegantly sums it up, “[t]he bourgeois public sphere was, then a subterfuge through which private individuals of rank and status increased their domination of others and monopolized the means and ends of capitalism” (76). The point I am making here is that even if we hold the public sphere, *eo ipso*, as a good worth trying to attain, and so gear our writing classes to promote writing that will be useful in some sort of public sphere, it is still necessary to read the public sphere as two-edged sword, and to see public spheres as a possible confluence of “progress and catastrophe” that Fredric Jameson argues postmodern culture-as-late-capitalism has become. Jameson’s point is that the serious thinker must keep in mind the “and” in this notion of progress and catastrophe simultaneously as she critiques postmodern culture.
Nevertheless, the public sphere, whether in the form of proletarian counterpublic sphere, or in the form of a subaltern counterpublic, is probably also the most likely nexus in which the alliances which Jameson talks about in *The Political Unconscious* as the ‘privileged form’ in which politics for the American left can develop (54). As Jameson put it in *The Political Unconscious*

such a politics is the strict practical equivalent of the concept of totalization on the theoretical level. In practice, then, the attack on the concept of “totality” in the American framework means the undermining and the repudiation of the only realistic perspective in which a genuine Left could come into being in this country. (Jameson 1981, 54)

In other words, according to Jameson, there has to be some sort of concept of totality—and not merely the totality of narrative-embedded-in-rational-traditions-of-enquiry as offered by MacIntyre, although such totalities can at the micropolitical level bring about real change and even contribute to the nascent formation of certain publics.

In addition to this concept of totality, I might add that the individual must also reemerge—the individual who Marx himself saw as only being able to remerge in community with others near the end of *The German Ideology*: “Only in community with others has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; only in the community, therefore, is personal freedom possible... In the real community the individuals obtain their freedom in and through their association” (193). In a similar vein, Habermas in *Justification and Application* says that “[t]he individual attains reflective distance from his own life history only within the horizon of forms of life that he shares with others and that themselves constitute the context for different individual life
projects" (11). In terms of composition studies, such a turn again begins to allow us to validate the role of personal writing in the composition classroom and to see the possible intersections between personal writing and the public sphere.

For example, one of the things it is important for compositionists to recall is that expressive rhetoric as we understand it today was born during the political ferment of the 1960s. Christopher Burnham recalls this ferment in his essay “Expressive Pedagogy: Practice/Theory, Theory/Practice” when he writes

In 1968, Elbow offers a pedagogical commentary, “A Method for Teaching Writing,” that reflects the flavor and intensity of the early expressivists. He argues that voice empowers individuals to act in the world. He recounts his experience counseling applicants for conscientious objector (CO) draft status during the Vietnam conflict. Elbow, a CO himself, sees writing as a means of political action. He teaches those he counsels that they must do more than just make sense when writing applications for CO status; they must communicate intense belief through voice. Writing thus becomes a form of political or social activism.

(Burnham 2001, 23-24)

Perhaps one reason why a truly effective public sphere has not yet fully articulated itself in the United States against the illegal aggressions by the current Bush II Administration is that the academy has in part forgotten this initial starting point in the individual as the key point of resistance. Perhaps we in the academy, in our postmodern desire to push academic discourse and difference and to minimize this notion of “voice,” have also forgotten the true power a politics of voice can have in generating and
sustaining public sphere discussions. Voice as resistance, voice as generator of public spheres—perhaps with the current political climate, it is exactly the time to resurrect such notions from their shallow grave.

But perhaps there is another way we can have a go at this notion of public sphere writing in the composition classroom. In the “Scenario” which I have placed between the previous chapter and this one, I have included many of my “journal” assignments for a freshman writing class (designated English 100 in the University of Hawai‘i system), as well as some of the journal entries for a sophomore American literature class (English 250 in the University of Hawai‘i system) that I taught during the spring of 2003. Spring of 2003—the spring in which George W. Bush recommenced his father’s war against Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi people. Although I would not initially dare to posit journal entries by student writers as training for public sphere writing, what I would insist on during a semester like the one that spring is that for the responsible writing teacher, there is no way to avoid the fact that the public sphere to large degree will invade the classroom. I don’t think it would be taken as too extreme a political position to say that it might be irresponsible for a writing teacher not to discuss with students world events when such things are happening outside the classroom—in fact, it might be in my opinion a possible dereliction of duty not to do so.

So like many college composition teachers, I structure much of my classroom discussion—especially student journal entries—around three elements: 1) the text we use in the classroom, which in the case of my Spring 2003 section of English 100 happened to be Lunsford, Ruszkiewicz, and Walters’ Everything’s an Argument, Second Edition; 2) current events, especially national, international, as well as local, political events; and
3) student reactions to either the class text or to current events. The second journal entry—assigned during the second week of class—reads thus:

For your journal on Thursday, January 21, 2003, write a brief response to the following question from Lunsford, Ruszkiewicz, and Walters on Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech: “Is King’s argument primarily forensic, epideictic, or deliberative (Chapter 1)? Give evidence to support your choice” (Lunsford et al. 2001, 670).

Perhaps one of the most important points in attempting to answer this question is to understand how Lunsford and Ruszkiewicz define the differences between forensic, epideictic, and deliberative arguments. In so defining these differences, they of course draw on the key distinctions Aristotle discussed in his *On Rhetoric* (1358a-1359b) by defining forensic, epideictic, and deliberative arguments as arguments about the past, present, and future respectively. Typical examples of arguments about the past are trials or the 9/11 commission, which attempt to ascertain what happened so as to assign blame and right past injustices or wrongs; examples of epideictic arguments include ceremonial arguments, such as a presidential state of the Union address; examples of arguments about the future include legislative deliberations on bills. However, it is important to note that Ruszkiewicz and Lunsford point out that all three types of argument may appear in one given piece of discourse; the question is which one of the three dominates. In thus reading King’s speech as text, it is important for students to understand the background: that the speech was delivered on 28 August 1963 on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial during the March on Washington, a march in which more than 250,000 people participated. It is also important for students to understand some of the historical
background of this march: how discrimination manifested itself during this time, the
move to undo discrimination (e.g., Brown v. Board of Education), and perhaps even a
brief glimpse backward to the Civil War, Reconstruction, and the decisive Plessy v.
Fergusson decision. During that semester, I did what I usually do: have the students read
the text, answer the prompt in their journal, then come to class to discuss their thoughts.
But before the discussion begins, I always play a videotape of King’s speech.

What is usually fascinating about student responses to this exercise is that the
students are almost always nearly equally divided between hearing King’s “I Have a
Dream” speech as an example of either epideictic or deliberative rhetoric. I look forward
to this split in how King’s speech is heard because whenever I watch the video and hear
him speak, I myself am unsure as to how to hear King’s speech. Certainly the context
and the occasion would point to hearing it as an epideictic piece of rhetoric; yet the fact
that so much of his dream remained unrealized at that point in time (1963), draw me
toward reading King’s speech as a piece of deliberative rhetoric. I don’t think it is
unreasonable to hear King’s speech as a deliberative piece of rhetoric that opens the door
to argument by stating: Here is one Black man’s position on the issue of discrimination in
this country at this point in time. Here is where we as a society should want to be—and
here are the values we embrace to get from where we are now to where we want to be.

But as James Crosswhite describes it in *The Rhetoric of Reason*, epideictic
rhetoric is ceremonial rhetoric that in fact helps secure a greater sense of solidarity in any
political struggle. In so citing this notion of solidarity, Crosswhite cites Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s discussion of the universal audience in *The New Rhetoric*. Epideictic
rhetoric is often rhetoric addressed to an audience that might be conceived of as universal,
and gaining agreement on values is not a matter of gaining agreement on facts per se, but on what is right. As Perelman and Olbrects-Tyteca put it, "[t]he agreement of a universal audience is thus a matter, not of fact, but of right" (NR 31, italics in original). In this sense, is King’s “I Have a Dream” a piece of epideictic rhetoric? In 2003 and in my prior composition classes in which I have used this exercise, I would answer yes. I can honestly say that I have yet to meet a student in the University of Hawai‘i who does not endorse with varying degrees of enthusiasm King’s values. But would this have been true in 1963? King certainly articulated a dream of universal emancipation for those lined along the Washington Mall that day. We of course know that Bull Connor or the George Wallace of 1963 would not have listened and would have had little or no sympathy with what King was saying. Could we then say King’s audience was universal?

My answer is yes and no. Almost resoundingly yes in 2003; a more reserved yes, with a lot of unfortunate nos, in 1963. The point is that rhetoric and the concept of universality, as discussed rhetorically in works like Crosswhite’s, and Perelman’s and Olbrects-Tyteca’s is a concept of an existing universality of the here and now. It is a necessary solidarity of the present. In contrast, understanding the need for Habermas’s (U) concept in contemporary rhetorical theory is that Habermas’s (U) is future-oriented. We don’t know what these final (U)’s will look like in advance—just as an audience of 1963 may not have been able to see with certainty that the vision of universality King was articulating that day on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial would become a vision of universality the vast majority of U.S. citizens would embrace. And in so embracing these values, these (U)s, commemorate Dr. King’s memory with a national holiday.
In short, understanding the difference between the epideictic vision of universality and the Habermasian (U) becomes a matter of distinguishing a synchronic vision of universality from a diachronic vision of what can become universal. Or better still, Habermas’s (U) is—to again invoke Raymond Williams’s distinctions of the emergent, dominant, and residual—an emergent value we may still not be able to articulate or that a truly universal audience may not yet think itself capable of embracing, whereas the rhetorical vision of universality is dominant in any given synchronic analysis of the rhetorical situation. For me, this ignorance of the final (U)’s is what is appealing in Habermas’s theory. However, we can get a glimpse of how a rhetor and audience might function together to create such (U)’s and form alliances of solidarity by looking back at instances which appear to fulfill the *New Rhetoric*’s criteria for universality.

The way then to understand Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech is to see it as historically articulating an emergent vision of universal values in its time, whereas for an audience such as a contemporary composition classroom King’s speech articulates contemporary dominant values. This reading in no way means King’s dream has been fully realized—far from it—but only that the values of equal rights for all are probably in theory embraced by a universal audience of Americans. However, values that are still struggling to gain this recognition, even despite legal recognition of their status, are not hard to call to mind. Think for example of two—the right of women to full control over their bodies vis-à-vis reproductive freedom and the right of all couples regardless of gender to gain legal recognition for their unions. Despite their legal statuses—abortion has been recognized as legal for over thirty years since Roe v. Wade, and same-gender unions having just gained their legal recognition in one state—both
rights rest on the most tenuous of social agreements. With one shift of judges in the Supreme Court, either or both could tumble in a given moment. So agreement on the justness of these two rights is still far from universal in contemporary American society. In this respect, they remain emergent universals, Habermasian (U)s, and so still subject to debate and a need for vigorous defense by those of us who embrace these emergent visions of universality.

But to return to Martin Luther King for a moment, King's texts like "I Have a Dream" and "Letter From Birmingham Jail" remain central to articulating not only the still-emergent values of equal rights for all, but also the rhetorical means and strategies of effecting a Kuhnian paradigm shift in values that could lead to the sort of construction of Habermasian (U)s. In this light, gaining the assent to the rightness of King's vision in a composition classroom from the outset of a semester is a way of establishing a current sounding of what is the rhetorical universality in society as well as building a foundation for thinking that can help students to engage in the debates over future visions of universality, the Habermasian (U)'s. In this reading of the importance of King's texts—both as written works and as recorded spoken works—King becomes a sort of Virgil to our ephebeistic Dantesque society—or better still, he becomes a Cicero articulating the values of Republic and democracy in an age of emergent colonialism, empire, and repression. He does so through the power of his voice, his personal vision, but also through everything to which he was committed as an African-American man growing up in the middle of the twentieth century. In this respect, what we may call the apparent dormancy of the public sphere may lead to a more active and fully articulated public
sphere in the near future. We cannot deny that there may be a certain virtue in recalling that the readiness is all.
Chapter 3: Salvaging the Fragments of Enlightenment

Liberalism and Rationalism

My office mate and I discuss a particularly difficult student of his who insists on seeing all theories of literature and culture 'objectively'; as my office mate says, and I concur, this student is truly in the grips of a liberal paradigm, a way of viewing the world that is in many ways an outgrowth of Enlightenment rationalism and egalitarianism. Liberals, despite their avowed tolerance of a plurality of viewpoints, often have trouble taking in a pedagogy of liberation, and a pedagogy that endorses a politics of liberation, such as Queer theory does. Nevertheless, I too am in so many ways vested in that very liberal tradition, having grown up in a Hawai‘i that since 1954 has been controlled by and large by the Democratic Party of John Burns, Dan Inouye, George Ariyoshi, et al. I want on the one hand to defend this liberal tradition; but on the other hand I want so much to push beyond its boundaries, to accept its egalitarianism as a given and push onward.

As I begin this third chapter, I cannot thus help but recall Foucault's main premises in *Discipline and Punish*: Foucault describes the emergence of the modern worldview at the beginning of the nineteenth century in terms of the various institutional locales of power and knowledge that created the disciplinary techniques that shape modern individuality. In the most extreme form, these institutional loci of power take the form of the prison, but Foucault traces how the techniques developed and perfected for managing and 'reforming' prisoners gradually permeated schools, hospitals, work places, and of course the modern academy—the institution in which and under whose aegis this
dissertation itself is inscribed. As such, Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* is not only a critique of modern social institutions; it is a warning that the very liberal impulses that helped give rise to these institutions also prescribe a conformity for individuals, a uniformitarian outlook in studying humanity and culture, that is in its own insidious way as terrible as any torture contrived prior to the revolution of 1789. Indeed, the cries for more humane treatment of prisoners and all people during the Enlightenment that were finally and slowly enacted in the European states after 1789 are the inevitable soulmate of the final and most vicious chapters of European colonialism in the nineteenth century. As Foucault memorably puts it in *Discipline and Punish*: "The 'Enlightenment', which discovered the liberties, also invented the disciplines" (222).

Maclntyre, whose work I turned to in Chapter 1, would have had little trouble concurring with many of Foucault's conclusions, even if his diagnosis of the causes and his recommended cures depart radically from those Foucault prescribes. Habermas, who I turned to in Chapter 2, is something of an apologist for Enlightenment rationalism, even as he acknowledges the problems essentialism and rationality have historically brought to society. Habermas complicates his debt to Enlightenment rationalism by further appealing to the New Hegelians and Marx in his analysis; but as many critics have pointed out, especially Foucault in *The Order of Things*, even Marx is in many ways ultimately a child of Enlightenment rationalism. To complicate matters for this dissertation, the compositionists who have turned to the works of Foucault and Habermas are legion.

The reason I begin with this brief digression is that the central philosopher to whom I turn in this chapter—John Rawls—is far less apologetic about tracing his lineage
to the Enlightenment. Indeed, like Chomsky, who openly traces his lineage back to Cartesian rationalism, Rawls traces the ancestry of his ethical/political project back to the heritage of social contract theorists that runs from Hobbes to Locke, Hume, Rousseau, and Kant. As such, I feel that some sort of apology is needed on my part to introduce Rawlsian notions of a just society into this discussion, and I will continue to debate just how much of Rawls we should incorporate into the composition classroom as I continue in the following chapter with an opening discussion of Christy Friend’s notion of distributive vs. nondistributive justice. What Friend will come to champion is a notion of nondistributive justice that treats students as ‘doers’ instead of ‘havers’; and in my mind, Rawls clearly shows a preference for treating citizens as havers instead of doers. But more on these points in the next chapter.

One of the most recent compositionists to have seriously engaged the work of Rawls is Patricia Roberts-Miller in Deliberate Conflict: Argument, Political Theory, and Composition Classes (2004). One of the most appealing contemporary metaphors for the liberal ‘objectivist’ position I mentioned a little earlier comes from the Rawlsian notion of the ‘veil of ignorance.’ This veil of ignorance can be a way of sliding objectivity into our discussions of politics and ethics—the sort of liberal objectivity the student I mentioned above was seeking in my office mate’s discussions. As such, I’m wary of such metaphors; and yet, as I mentioned earlier, such a stance can be pedagogically useful, as Karen Kopelson has pointed out. Pedagogically useful—and perhaps still socially usable.

In the previous chapter, we saw that one of the essential claims I would make about the writing classroom is that it should be a site in which students begin to develop the skills that enable them to use writing—personal and otherwise—to create publics and
to have discussions about public matters. I then drew upon the work of Habermas to contend that rhetoric always involves evoking some sort of universal audience and turned to Perelman's notions of epideictic rhetoric as a way of invoking a form of nonfoundationalist universality in theorizing the writing classroom as a site of public writing. I then concluded by giving some examples from my own practice in the writing classroom in which I contended that Martin Luther King serves the role of modeling public communication *par excellence* and that his works should be used in the writing classroom not as models of how to write—because it would be an almost impossible expectation to ask students to write like King—but rather as models of how to think about universality and communication in the classroom. In short, I saw King's works as serving in the modern classroom the role Cicero's works served in the classical and medieval classroom. In this chapter, I now want to turn to creating a more rigorous model of rhetorical ethics for the democratic classroom by beginning with a discussion between the distinctions between academic and other types of writing, then move into an extended discussion of the theory of justice of fairness as articulated by John Rawls in his writings.

In *Embracing Contraries*, Peter Elbow argues that the nature of composition often requires English teachers to "embrace" concepts that are contrary and opposed to each other. For example, Elbow argues that writing requires on one hand a copious creative ability and on the other hand a tough-minded critical ability and that his works should be used in the writing classroom not as models of how to write—because it would be an almost impossible expectation to ask students to write like King—but rather as models of how to think about universality and communication in the classroom. In short, I saw King's works as serving in the modern classroom the role Cicero's works served in the classical and medieval classroom. In this chapter, I now want to turn to creating a more rigorous model of rhetorical ethics for the democratic classroom by beginning with a discussion between the distinctions between academic and other types of writing, then move into an extended discussion of the theory of justice of fairness as articulated by John Rawls in his writings.

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"Being a Writer vs. Being an Academic," Elbow argues that because writers primarily create texts while academics primarily read texts, there is a natural competition over who is to control the text: ideally, writers should be able to decide intention, readers what is heard (75-76). The problem in the academic environment is that reading is privileged over writing so that, as Elbow puts it, "input is central, and output serves input" (75). Further, Elbow observes that in the classroom:

The academic is reader and grader and always gets to decide what the student text means. No wonder students withdraw ownership and commitment. (76)

The problem with such an environment, if Elbow's analysis is correct, is that withdrawing ownership and commitment is exactly what we don't want students to do if, as Amy Gutman argues, we are to produce citizens who "have the capacity to deliberate among alternative ways of personal and political life" (40). In fact, the possibility that our academies may be fostering in our students any withdrawal of ownership and commitment means that our academies are potentially failing at their task of "conscious social reproduction" (Gutman 41) necessary to perpetuate the individual critical skills necessary to perpetuate a democratic social tradition.

What I will do in this chapter is to offer a solution to this problem framed in contemporary ethical theory that will be based on a philosophical adherence to two contrary principles, principles which are in all ways co-equal and necessary to the education endeavor. These two principles I call: 1) the principle of unity; and 2) the
principle of difference. Unlike the principles that John Rawls develops in his influential
*A Theory of Justice*, the two principles I propose are in no way lexically arranged, which
is to say that principle (1), by its virtue of being (1), is in almost no way prior to, or
superior to (2) in the theory I am going to set forth. 13 In this chapter, I will first discuss
the political, ethical and rhetorical considerations that have led me to set forth these two
principles. I will then carefully examine each of the principles, how they clarify certain
issues that arise in education theory and practice, and what they contribute to our
understanding of these issues. Finally, I will examine some ways in which these
principles may be employed in understanding classical and contemporary theories of
rhetoric that can aid our understanding of pedagogical practice. The following outline
covers what I intend to discuss in this chapter:

I. Political, ethical and rhetorical considerations

II. The two principles
   A. Unity
   B. Difference

III. The role of rhetoric in the principles.

**Political, Ethical and Rhetorical Considerations**

I would like first to set forth: (1) the historical and intellectual antecedents to this
project; and (2) the tentative definitions of the two principles. I approach the initial

13 In practice (1) may be given priority to (2) in certain abnormal and emergency circumstances. For
example, as I write this chapter the United States is continuing to come to terms with potential major social
adjustments between these two principles in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon. However, as principles of education in a democratic society, I feel that
both of these principles must be tenaciously adhered to if the education practices of that society are to
remain democratic. Of course the environmental condition of moderate scarcity must also be assumed (i.e.,
no major environmental or economic crises that could shift the balance); but moderate scarcity is also an
assumption behind Rawls's own principles.
problem in this order because the two principles only make sense in the light of current debates about politics, education and language. At the outset, let me name three progenitors of this stage of my project: John Rawls, Amy Gutman and John Passmore. From each of these scholars I have tried to integrate notions to construct a tentative suggestion as to what education in a democratic society should try to accomplish. From Rawls, I accept the following: the definition of justice as synonymous with fairness; the soundness of his two principles of justice; and the notion of reflective equilibrium. To review the two principles as Rawls describes them:

First, each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.

Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all. (Rawls 1971, 69)

I accept these two principles as a sound starting point in any discussion of what the goals of a just democratic society should be. Further, I believe they should at the outset figure into any theory of education insofar as education provides the primary means of achieving the two principles in practice.

Rawls's first principle provides a general plan for the purpose of education in a democratic society. For in order to both comprehend one's rights and respect those of others, it is necessary to recognize what Rawls in Political Liberalism calls reasonable pluralism. In Political Liberalism, Rawls observes that reasonable pluralism means three things in a modern society: 1) that a diversity of doctrines is a "permanent feature of the public culture of democracy" (36); 2) that this diversity is not "simply the upshot of self
and class interests, or of peoples' understandable tendency to view the political world from a limited standpoint" (37), but is rather the result of people exercising free practical reason; and 3) no reasonable religious, philosophical or moral doctrine will be affirmed by all citizens, so social discussions must be limited to the political (38). What all this implies for education theory is that education in a democratic society cannot possibly teach a single notion of the good life. To do so would require achieving consensus through oppression. But to recognize Rawls's notion of reasonable pluralism as the one we wish to perpetuate (and which will perpetuate itself anyway, regardless of our interventions to the contrary), it is necessary that certain restraints or parameters be placed upon what notions of the good life our educational practices will entertain. It will limit conceptions of the good life because the education process so conceived will stress tolerance and reasonableness and fairness as virtues. As such, options for the good life that would be excluded in such a society would include Spartan general or Nazi stormtrooper. Such options could not be included in our list because by their very nature they would exclude all other options of the good life: Spartan generals and Nazi stormtroopers take positions that compel one to be either part of the dominant group (i.e., you are worth something), or totally exclude the individual (in which case you are deemed worthless). Such options lead to considerations of societies in which the spectrum of possibilities is reduced to rulers and ruled, a spectrum incompatible with the very nature of reasonable pluralism.

But more important for education theory perhaps is that Rawls's first principle leads to the two restrictions on the power the state can exercise in educational practice as outlined by Amy Gutman in *Democratic Education*: nonrepression and nondiscrimination.
The nonrepression restriction prevents the state or any group within it "from using 
education to restrict rational deliberation of competing conceptions of the good life and 
the good society" (44); the nondiscrimination restriction states, "all educable children 
must be educated" (45). Only when these two conditions are met can education be used 
as a deciding factor to establish Rawls's second principle of justice, the difference 
principle. For most of the more highly differentiated positions in our society—educator, 
scientist, legalist, medical care specialist—require varying degrees of education. And 
these different gradations of education can only be judged fair if all citizens in the state 
have the same opportunities to access the necessary forms of education. Only in this way 
can Rawls's condition that inequalities be arranged so that they are "attached to positions 
and offices open to all" be met. But even if we accept these two principles from Rawls, 
as well as Gutman's two restrictions on the state's role in education, we must still define 
a process which allows a democratic regime to perpetuate itself into posterity. As Rawls 
puts it in Political Liberalism:

The virtues of political cooperation that make a constitutional 
regime possible are, then very great virtues. I mean, for example, the 
virtues of tolerance and being ready to meet others halfway, and the virtue 
of reasonableness and the sense of fairness. When these virtues are 
widespread in society, and sustain its political conception of justice, they 
constitute a very great public good, part of society's capital. (Rawls 1993, 
157)

How then can we frame a theory of education that will transmit and refine these virtues to 
future generations?
I believe John Passmore develops a theory that begins to solve this problem: Passmore argues that there are "closed" and "open" capacities. Closed capacities are those that lead to the solution of some problem and are subject to the criteria of closure. Auto mechanics fix cars; lawyers try cases; engineers design mechanical or electrical devices. Closed capacities involve the master and use of established techniques designed to enable the user to achieve some more or less well-defined end. Most professions function on various levels by employing closed capacities. However, professions may also require the use of open capacities—capacities that do not have clearly established ends, or perhaps have ends that are subject to renegotiation with the passage of time and of generations. Research scientists, social scientists, students of the humanities are examples of workers who are required to exercise open capacities. However, I would contend that every citizen has an obligation to maintain and contribute to a socially shared conception of justice in the Rawlsian sense of the phrase. Each and every citizen in a just society thus has a moral obligation to discipline themselves in such a way as to perpetuate the social obligations incumbent to citizenship in a democratic society; and due to the flux such a society inevitably encounters due both to the constitution of its polity and the passage of time, said discipline will inevitably require all citizens to achieve some mastery over open capacities.

At this point I offer my two principles as the most broad-based way of enabling students to achieve mastery over the open capacities required of individuals in a democratic decision-making process. I envision these principles emanating from the
intellectual genealogy\textsuperscript{14} I have outlined during the last two paragraphs (see Figure 1). To return again to Elbow’s essay, “Being a Writer vs. Being an Academic,” Elbow concludes by arguing that the biggest problem the freshman writer faces is overcoming her own naïveté, a naïveté that Elbow explains leads inexperienced writers to fall into one of two traps: either “[e]veryone is just like me,” or “[n]o one else in the universe has ever thought my thoughts or felt my feelings” (80-81). Although these are contrary positions that we should try to warn student writers against falling into, by embracing these positions simultaneously, we can begin to develop a sense of what my two principles offer. Briefly, my two principles:

1. the principle of \textit{unity} states that there is a unifying substance that underlies all varieties of human thought both at the group and individual levels which defines our species of \textit{homo sapiens}; and

2. the principle of \textit{difference} states that each society, each subset of society, and each individual functioning in her various subsets of groups possesses qualities which are unique to herself and that define what she is in relation to the group.

On the surface, these two principles, like Elbow’s little epithets above, seem so mutually exclusive as to be completely incompatible, and therefore naïve. Or they may seem to establish classical binarisms that seem to validate foundationalist notions of human nature and the universe that have been held by thinkers from Plato to Hegel.

\textsuperscript{14} Genealogy here is used in its conventional sense of a recorded history of a family of ideas or notions over time. Earlier in this dissertation, the word genealogy was used in the sense that Nietzsche and postmodern thinkers like Foucault have used it.
Rawls:

Two principles of justice:

(1) equal rights

(2) difference principle (social and economic inequalities tolerated insofar as they benefit the entire society)

Gutman:

Two restrictions on the power of the state

(1) nonrepression

(2) nonexclusion

Passmore

Closed capacities

Open capacities

Includes ability to develop a conception of just through:

(i) principle of unity

(ii) principle of difference

Figure 1: Genealogy of ideas presented in this paper. My additions are to Passmore's conception of open capacities.

Against both charges I would argue that what mediates between the two principles is what we call history. One might want to think of history in the Nietzschean sense of being the intersection of power and time that defines morality and difference along each separate mode of social existence. Or, as I argued earlier, one might want to consider the notion of tradition that MacIntyre offers in Which Justice? Which Rationality? as a
refutation of Nietzsche’s interpretation of history. What I claim is that a society in each
historical episode finds a way to translate into language the mediation of these two
principles in practice: this translation becomes what we might call the story of the tribe.
In classical Greece, this enunciation of history found its expression in the Homeric epics;
in Western civilization during the past two thousand years, these principles have found
their articulation in what we call *rhetoric*. Kenneth Burke has defined rhetoric as “an
essential function of language itself, a function that is wholly realistic, and is continually
born new: the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that
by nature respond to symbols” (Burke 1952, 43).15 Such a definition, I would argue,
integrates the moral and linguistic elements of a plurality of minds to forge a sense of
community. I’ll return again to Burkean notions of rhetoric near the end of this
dissertation. For some philosophers are perhaps right when they claim that morality and
language share many features in common16: on one hand, both are subject to a constant
state of change over temporal and geographic space, yet both also display a remarkable
stability over both types of distance (30).17 One of the things I will argue throughout this
chapter is that morality and language do indeed share similar structures in the Chomskian

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15 Kenneth Burke defines two key terms in recognizing any rhetorical practice: identification and division.
Identification is the key-term, the symbol that represents unity of a group or people or objects; division is
the term that marks the separation, apartness or uniqueness of either a group of people, a person, or an
object. I’ll return to these Burkean concepts in the final chapter of this dissertation.
16 In our century R.M. Hare was the first to rigorously argue the thesis that language and morality bear
striking resemblances with regards to methods and theory. However, Aristotle believed that there was a
clear connection between rhetoric, logic and ethics when he claimed that the rhetorical art was derived from
logic and ethics: “It thus appears rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectic and also of ethical studies”(154).
17 In *Thought and Language*, Vygotsky argues that thought and language develop independently of each
other in the developing infant, but at around eighteen months, the two merge so as to be virtually
indistinguishable on the surface. As modern psychologists dating back to Piaget tell us, this age (eighteen
months) also marks the end of the child’s so-called solipsistic bliss, when it fails to distinguish clearly
between itself and the world. The implication for ethics is that morality is born only at that time in the
infant’s life when thought and language merge. Perhaps one could speculate that thought gives birth to the
content of morality, whereas language shapes its form; but this is only speculation.

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sense of the phrase: both exhibit fundamental deep structures, transformative rules, and a variety of surface structures that account for the general feeling that on the one hand, there is a general unifying factor—a deep structure, or a common moral competence—that gives human beings a common morality; and on the other hand, that there is such a bewildering array of difference in moralities that the only to understand moral practice is through a study of the material history of any said practice. I will argue that both views are necessary and correct in the proper contexts: that they are merely different aspects of the same problem.

As an example of this theory in action, one can turn to Rawls's notion of reflective equilibrium as it is developed in Norman Daniels's essay, "Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics." In this essay, Daniels outlines a notion of morality based "on an ordered triple of a set of beliefs held by a particular person, namely, (a) a set of considered moral judgments, (b) a set of moral principles, and (c) a set of relevant background theories" (258). Despite this set of ordered triples, what Daniels lays out is a scheme in which considered moral judgments can lead to a set of moral principles through the application of a set of relevant background principles. A diagram of Daniels's notion would look like this:

```
Considered moral judgments ←→ Relevant background principles
    ↑
    ↓
Moral principles
```
Daniels's scheme already appears something akin to the Chomskian scheme of deep and surface structures mediated by the rules of transformational grammar. However, whether Daniels is discussing moral principles as generated by a group or by an individual is never clear. At one point, it appears a single agent is attempting to achieve reflective equilibrium, at another, "we" enters into the discussion. Daniels would probably claim that the difference is insignificant. However, in the light of pluralistic democratic theory, I feel that it is quite significant.

What I would argue is that reflective equilibrium may take place at both the group and individual levels. These levels I would call "group reflective equilibrium" and "self reflective equilibrium." Further, insofar as individuals usually align themselves with a variety of groups, individual reflective equilibrium is almost always embedded in a plurality of group reflective equilibria. Finally, these different groups may make varying and conflicting claims on their members: one group, for example, commanding an individual to make a complete disclosure of truth, another demanding partial or nondisclosure of truth. What is needed, even in a theory that espouses a notion of reflective equilibrium as the one that leads most naturally to the adoption of the Rawlsian principles of justice, is a taxonomy that acknowledges the unities and differences of various claims resulting from a plurality of equilibria. What is needed is a rhetorical casuistry or a hermeneutic method for ordering such equilibria. And what I want to argue is that such a taxonomy may begin to develop by applying the principles of unity and difference.
Unity

If we accept my assertion that there is a unifying substance underlying all manifestations of human thought, this substance would be analogous to the deep structures Chomsky has identified as playing a key role in the theory of linguistics. Further pursuing the Chomskian analogy, humans would have to possess a native moral capacity analogous to Chomsky's notion of linguistic competence in order for these deep structures of morality to manifest themselves in considered moral opinions. Now Hume located the source of morality in the sentiments; Kant located it in reason. Pursuing the Chomskian analogy, the source of my unifying substance would have to lie in reason. However, if Vygotsky's assertion that thought and language have their origins in two different human capacities which do not merge until an infant is 1 to 1-1/2 years old, where then do we locate this substance? In cognitive ability? In linguistic competence? Further, the child does not begin to distinguish herself as a moral agent until about eighteen months of age, the time prior to that being spent in what Vygotsky describes as a sort of solipsistic state. It thus appears that morality is born at about the time thought and language merge. Is morality not then a manifestation of the socio-historical reality into which a child is reared via the language practices she internalized during child rearing?

My answer here is no. Hume was right: there is something in the make-up of human beings called sentiment that gives impetus to the birth of the substance which underlies morality. However, Kant too was right insofar as morality comes into existence at around the time language and thought merge. For the sentiment, the substance, which underlies morality only finds its expression through the expression of sentiments via thought-as-language. When in Utilitarianism Mill argues:
[c]apacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant, easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance; and in the majority of young persons it speedily dies away if the occupations to which their position in life has devoted them, and the society into which it has thrown them, are not favourable to keeping that higher capacity in exercise (148)

we must bear in mind that sentiments, too, are subject to Mill’s stipulation: the logic of what I am arguing is that if we expect people to become “good,” they must be provided a nurturing environment that allows them to develop the ability to internalize and master society’s cognitive and linguistic conceptions of the good. For as Amy Gutman puts it: “To cultivate the character that feels the force of right reason is an essential purpose of education in any society” (43).

Yet Kant’s most general notion of the categorical imperative can still play a role in my conception of unity. Insofar as certain manifestations of the categorical imperative (e.g., “Thou shalt not lie”) are no longer tenable in their universality as such, the notion of a unifying idea underlying morality and having its seat in Cartesian reason may still be tenable. For just as the moral self asserts itself almost simultaneously with the Vygotskian fusion of thought and language, the moral self, too, emerges with the fusion of thought, language, and feeling. Feeling—or as Hume would have it, sentiment—is the starting point of morality; but without the articulation of feeling through its merging with thought and language, morality would assert itself through intuitionist likings and dislikings. But once the three strands are fused, there is no disentangling them: morality exists simultaneously as thought, feeling, and language. When the three strands merge,
then, they compel the moral agent to act, think, and speak in ways consistent with his feelings as well as with his inherited social and linguistic practices. All three strands—feeling, thought, language—must be aligned so as to generate maxims that will have the appearance of universability within the given social and linguistic practices the moral agent employs. It then only takes a small leap for a thinker like Kant to assume that all human varieties of thought and language must share similar characteristics so that the maxims thus generated would be universalizable, and this small assumption is what undoes Kant's vision of morality: for as stated earlier, what mediates between unity and difference is history. And thought and language, although they may be born as a result of certain human capacities shared by all, are so shaped by history and culture that one cannot ignore historical material forces in the shaping of morality.

**Difference**

Historical material forces which shape social cognitive and linguistic practices are then the origin of the principle of difference. Nor can these forces be "leveled" by appealing to cognitive or linguistic capacities shared by all communities or by individual agents. The observed variations in morality are too great, and the power of history such, that to try to ignore these practices would be to reduce all human beings to the level of the lowest beasts.¹⁸ Human beings are exactly what Aristotle called them—political animals—because of their inherited historical differences as manifested in cognitive and linguistic practice. Difference must be acknowledged. And it is difference which also

¹⁸ We must not forget here that many contemporary scientists are finding that many higher mammals—great apes, cetaceans, elephants—may demonstrate cultural practices which are learned rather than genetically inherited. As such, even these creatures may possess a claim to the rights cultural history confers on such creatures. The importance of such claims—and of the animality of human ethics—are touched upon in Alasdair MacIntyre's *Dependent Rational Animals*.
makes human beings the story telling animals MacIntyre describes in After Virtue: it is
the need of each tribe to tell its own story and acknowledge its history, the need of each
family to tell its own story and acknowledge its history, the need of each individual to tell
her own story and acknowledge her history, that drives humans in all cultures to
perpetuate, while at the same time critically examining, their socially mediated visions of
morality. Under the principle of difference, morality is story telling.

* * * * *

The color newspaper photo depicts three Caucasian males huddled together,
beaten and bloodied. They were not beaten to the point that they looked like they would
in an ICU, but they did look like they needed some medical attention; perhaps one did die
later—I can’t remember. I felt pity for them; I felt ashamed of living in so violence a
world. Then I read the captions beneath the photo: the three were Afrikaaners who had
had the audacity to try to lead a pro-apartheid demonstration into a Black neighborhood
in South Africa. Suddenly the wounds did not appear bad at all; the pity vanished like
helium escaping from a balloon. In fact I became convinced that they could easily
survive a few more solid blows to the head and perhaps enduring said blows, come out
better people for them. I experienced the almost universal feeling most people have at
one time or another that morality is something that can sometimes be best conveyed
through corporeal means.

* * * * *

If the categorical imperative still has a role in the principle of unity, the
hypothetical imperative reigns supreme under the principle of difference. We judge
stories by their endings, their total impact, not their intent. For example, Captain Cook’s
intent in his voyages through the Pacific was not to spread syphilis and other diseases to the Natives he encountered; the outcome of his voyages was, however, that he and the westerners who followed him, did indeed knowingly spread genocidal diseases despite this initial good intent. And the result, as David Stannard has argued in After the Horror, was genocide on an almost inconceivable scale. The rightness of Cook's intent must be briefly acknowledged in any tale of Native Pacific Islanders during the last two centuries; but the outcome of Cook's journeys must always be underscored in the darkest red ink. I have sought a way to make the principle of difference clearer through logical argument the way I attempted to do through the principle of unity, but I have failed: perhaps this is the nature of difference—to resist taxonomies to the end. Instead I have hand waved at some general notions and told two stories—one personal, one historical. Perhaps it is time to move on to what I see as the central reason for embracing unity and difference: the ability these two principles give us to create and analyze rhetoric.
Scenario 3: Preparing to Teach English 100

..think of writing as an organic, developmental process in which you start writing at the very beginning—before you know your meaning at all—and encourage your words gradually to change and evolve. Only at the end will you know what you want to say or the words you want to say it with. You should expect yourself to end up somewhere different from where you started. Meaning is not what you start out with but what you end up with. Control, coherence, and knowing your mind are not what you start out with but what you end up with. Think of writing then not as a way to transmit a message but as a way to grow and cook a message. Writing is a way to end up thinking something you couldn't have started out thinking. (Elbow 1973, 15)

Over the years, my vision of English 100 has crystallized into a sort of Janus-figured monster. On one hand, English 100 should teach the writing process as that process has been articulated by compositionists like Elbow, Emig, Graves, Macrorie, Murray, Newkirk, Perl, Sommers, and Tobin. On the other hand, English 100 is about rhetoric and argument; it deals with discourses and all their situated messiness in the real world (ITRW as abbreviated for netiquette). As such, it draws on classical rhetoric as articulated by compositionists like Bizzell, Corbett, Herzberg and a host of rhetorical theorists and literary critics, as well as Cultural Studies, community-service pedagogies, writing across the curriculum studies, feminist pedagogies, and many other disciplines, such as cognitive psychology and educational psychology.
This view of the dual nature of English 100 is reflected in my own course description which I have used for the past three years:

English 100 is a class with at least two purposes. First, it is designed to help you master the writing process. What do I mean by the writing process? Let me explain.

This class is conducted as a workshop, which means that you will break into small groups—the number of groups depends on the class size—and as a writer, you will share your writing with your group. As an audience, you will each need to take the responsibility to respond thoughtfully and thoroughly to the work of your fellow writers. I will provide you with instruction and handouts on how we will do this from class to class.

In early drafts, you will share your writing by reading aloud to your group. Each member of the group will then respond to what you read. In later drafts, you will need to bring enough photocopies of your papers for all of your group's members. Your group members will then help you to revise, edit, and proof your paper. You will write, revise, then revise some more, then revise still again all papers written for this class. If you turn in a paper without doing the preliminary work of drafting that paper or without participating in the group work, I will not read your paper.

The second purpose of English 100 is to introduce you to the notion of argument. Most of the prose writing you do in college will be argumentative: you will have to make a statement, then offer proof that
supports your statement. **Statement. Proof.** These are the most
fundamental parts of writing for college, as well as for most of the non-
personal and non-creative writing you will do ITRW.

In addition to the Janus-like nature of composition studies, and specifically the
composition classroom vis-à-vis English 100, I usually follow my own rituals when
preparing to teach the class. A re-reading of Elbow’s *Writing Without Teachers* and
*Power in Writing* will almost always come early in the semester, along with a glance of
one of the more recent editions of Elbow and Belanoff’s *A Community of Writers*. I’ll
usually watch Elbow’s video *Peter Elbow on Writing* somewhere in the first third of the
course just to keep Peter’s calm voice and demeanor in my own ear as I assign and
prepare to respond to my students’ writing. But along with this emphasis on process, I’ll
also keep the final edition of Corbett and Connors’s *Classical Rhetoric for the Modern
Student*; an edition of Rottenberg’s *The Structure of Argument*; a copy of Lindemann’s *A
Rhetoric for Writing Teachers*; Belanoff et al.’s *The Right Handbook*; and recent editions
of *The Bedford Handbook* and *The St. Martin’s Handbook*—all within arm’s length
throughout the semester. Hence, another early semester ritual is to gather these books in
one place before I teach English 100 and put them into a neat stack somewhere near my
bed.

And then there is always the question: Should I take on the daunting task of trying
to teach stasis theory during this particular semester. I have no doubt that I’ll mention
it—especially if I’m using *Everything’s an Argument*, which briefly discusses stasis
theory in the first chapter. However, as I’ll discuss in the following chapter, stasis can
be a difficult subject to teach—difficult, yet potentially rewarding. In fact, I’ll go out on a
limb here and say upfront that I think that if there is any real way to integrate fully
process theories and rhetorical-cultural theories, it will lie in somehow deploying this
beautiful notion of stasis as a starting point for all rhetorical analyses. Were I to one day
write a textbook, I would, unlike Lunsford and Ruszkiewicz, structure the entire book
around stasis theory. It's true that there are more fully developed discussions of stasis
theory in other textbooks (I think especially of Crowley and Hawhee's superb Ancient
Rhetorics for Modern Students, which I discuss in the following chapter), but I'm still not
fully happy thus far with what I've seen in terms of using stasis as an all-embracing, yet
non-transcendent and flexible postmodern tool for rhetorical and cultural analysis, as
well as for the invention of texts.
In this chapter, I look at two exercises I have used in my writing classes over the past three years. The first is a collaborative writing piece I call a 'dialogue on civilization'. The second is a stasis analysis of a newspaper article I used in fall of 2002 to teach stasis to an English 100 classroom. However, I expand on this second example with an extended analysis of how stasis analysis is used in Crowley and Hawhee’s fine text Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students. The reason I spend time on this extended example is that one of the most important issues many of the young adults who enter our classrooms have faced or will have to face—and my experience has shown that this goes for both male and female students—is the issue of abortion. My own class assignments do not bring up the topic of abortion specifically; however, I have received essays-written-as-letters from students that do address this important issue.

In 2002, for example, I received two such papers from two different students; one a male, the other a female. These essays were in response to a writing prompt from the second edition of Everything’s an Argument that asked students to “[w]rite a letter in which you explain to someone—a friend, your parents, a teacher, for example—why you have been moved to take a stance on some issue with which they disagree” (653). This argument is in turn framed around a reading of Ed Madden’s “An Open Letter to My Christian Friends” in which Madden argues for greater acceptance of homosexuals in Christian society based on his own personal experiences as a committed Christian and a homosexual, and on the discussion Lunsford et al. have of this letter in which they identify the letter as “an apology in the original sense of the term—that is, a genre that
aims to explain or justify a strongly held idea or position about a matter of importance” (653). The two letters I received argued intelligently and sensitively for the positions they presented. The first, from a male student who assumed the stance of someone writing to his mother, explained why he and his girlfriend chose to have an abortion despite both of their Catholic upbringings and their attendance in parochial schools. This letter was especially memorable insofar as this student was and remains in a committed relationship to his high school sweetheart, and he intends to become a secondary education teacher himself. The second was from a girl who told her mother why she was choosing to keep her child, despite her mother's opposition. I do not pry into my student's lives, so I did not ask her whether she wrote the letter assuming a persona (always permissible in my writing assignments) or she wrote it as a woman actually going through the experience. However, a short time ago, I did see this student caring for an infant as I was driving by a mall in Kalihi...

I frame these two concrete examples of pedagogical exercises—the dialogue on civilization and the stasis exercise and discussion—around a discussion of the ethical theories of Christy Friend, Jonathan Mauk, and J. Blake Scott, three of the younger generation of compositionists-rhetoricians to emerge since the mid-nineties. I then conclude by drawing on notions of classical rhetoric as developed in Crowley and Hawhee’s Ancient Rhetoric for Modern Students to discuss notions of stasis, and conclude with a discussion of how process theory may also provide a key to other forms of rhetorical analysis vis-à-vis the work of Carl Rogers. Between the works of Crowley and Hawhee's superb arguments for the validity of classical rhetoric in the modern composition classroom and Rogerian rhetoric, I turn to notions of rhetoric explored by
Kenneth Burke, the work of philosopher Nola J. Heidlebaugh in a chapter she devotes to stasis theory in *Judgment, Rhetoric, and the Problem of Incommensurability* (2001), and the work of two compositionists: Peter Elbow and Krista Ratcliffe.

If we are to create and analyze rhetoric in the composition classroom, we must come to terms with the claims that Christy Friend makes in “Ethics in the Writing Classroom: A Nondistributive Approach” (1994) and “From the Contact Zone to the City: Iris Marion Young and Composition Theory” (1999). Friend draws on the work of Iris Marion Young in both these articles to develop some key points about ethics and composition by deploying Young’s notion of “distributive” vs. “nondistributive” ethical models. The distributive model is one in which justice is defined in terms of the “distribution of societal benefits in equal proportions to individuals” (Friend 1994, 550). The big problem with this model, as Friend summarizes it, is that it “conflates the distinction between having and doing “(550). What this in turn leads to is ethical theories that primarily determine who gets how much of what, with the “whos” and the “whats” often remaining vaguely defined in the ethical theories.

What Friend finds appealing in Young is an alternative to distributive models that will treat people as “doers” instead of “havers” (551). According to Friend and Young, an ethical theory that treats people as doers should begin by analyzing the historical, social, and structural features of the two constraints of domination and oppression.

Friend cites Young by concurring with the idea that “justice [should] refer primarily to [these] two forms of disabling constraints… these constraints cannot easily be assimilated to the logic of distribution: decisionmaking, procedures, division of labor, and culture” (39)” (Young as qtd. in Friend 551). Friend further develops and blends these arguments...
in her 1999 article “From the Contact Zone to the City: Iris Marion Young and Composition Theory” by joining together Mary Louise Pratt’s often-used notion of the contact zone together with Iris Marion Young’s ethical theories, especially those which view the city as a confluence of strangers. Friend then draws on her own experiences to develop the notion of the city as an ideal contact zone for the enactment of Young’s ethical theories.19

The question I want to answer, then, in light of Friend’s claims in these articles and in terms of my own arguments, is this: How can we create the vision of ethics for the composition classroom which fits Friend’s claim for the need for a nondistributive ethical paradigm to take hold in the composition classroom? How do we create in the composition classroom the spatial equivalent of an urban contact zone that treats students as doers, rather than as havers?

One way to approach this notion might be to treat the classroom as a “space.” We all inhabit various spaces, and these spaces exist at the intersections of various historical, material, social, political, gender, racial, and technological threads that run throughout our society. For example, Jonathan Mauk in a 2003 College English article entitled “Location, Location, Location: The ‘Real’ (E)states of Being, Writing, and Thinking in Composition” has argued that composition teachers must engage their students in their own lived spaces. Mauk draws upon the work of Edward Soja and Henri Lefebvre to argue that what we need to create is a “pedagogy and theoretical lens that accounts for and engages the spatial and material conditions that constitute the everyday lives of

19 One could fruitfully compare Young’s ethical notions with the Freirian banking model I discussed earlier in this dissertation. Ethical theories based on the distributive model would be akin to Freire’s notion of the banking model of education, while nondistributive ethical models would be akin to Freire’s notion of liberatory practices.
students" (370). In order to do this, Mauk argues for the creation of a 'third space' (drawing on Lefebvre's triad in *The Production of Space*—space as it is perceived, conceived, and lived) that is "born of the juncture between academic space and student ontology, the region where academic space is dispersed throughout students' daily lives, a dimension emergent from the generative collision of academic, domestic, and work spatialities" (380). As Mauk puts it, "students are increasingly steeped in the activity systems of nonacademic life" (384) so that the composition classroom and academia in general "come to be seen as places in a continuum of signifiers for intellectual space (386).

Why do we want to do this? Because in treating students as doers instead of havers (again, Friend's notion), the composition classroom must draw on students' lived, conceived, and imagined spaces as actually lived so as to help lift the veil of "transparency," the realistic illusion about language that says that the purpose of language is to be an unproblematic medium through which information and ideas are conveyed. One of the biggest problems composition instructors face is to help students overcome this notion that language is a medium, like an electrical wire, conveying information. This notion is, to use Raymond Williams's terminology, a residual element of the classical past that Foucault in *The Order of Things* describes as part of the Classical heritage. 20 In the early nineteenth century, the transition period between the

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20 One of the reasons I turn to the early Foucault here is that the composition scholars I discuss in this chapter—Friend, Mauk, Scott—usually turn to the later Foucault of the genealogical studies. Foucault in his genealogical studies often deconstructs the notion of 'man' by appealing to analyses of power and oppression. While I agree with these analyses and with the scholars who undertake them, I also feel that it is important to return to Foucault's earlier archaeological studies to have the proper historical grounding in situating such projects. I believe this is necessary because we so often attribute the difficulties we have teaching language as an object of material-cultural study to the Aristotelian heritage—which in part is true. However, I feel Foucault in his archaeologies really puts this problem in the proper perspective by realizing
Classical and Modern eras, the rebirth of language in all its enigmatic density led to the birth of man—and this in turn led to the notion of justice as one of treating people as havers, rather than doers. But now in a postmodern era, the struggle is in a very real sense to make man “disappear” so that we can again deal with the real situatedness, the real *kairos* of our lived lives. And this means returning to an interrogation of our lived spaces in exactly the way composition scholars like Mauk try to do.

Now let me back up here for a minute to return to this Foucauldian notion of making man disappear. Why is this important for composition studies? Because as J. Blake Scott describes it in “Extending Rhetorical-Cultural Analysis: Transformations of Home HIV Testing” (2001), it was this appearance of man that led to the culturally embedded notion in the west that science was an objective, a ‘neutral’ activity. Or at least this is how I interpret Scott when he draws on the work of Bruno Latour in arguing that we need to challenge the idea of “technoscience as a coherent, discrete, and ready-made entity” (254). What Scott wants to do in a more radical way than was achieved by the earlier studies of scholars like Kuhn is to rhetoricize science. Scott wants to do this by first drawing on the work of Donna Harraway who he says was “redefining science as a heterogeneous, dynamic web of cultural practices”; and second by mapping “the connections and power relations among science’s heterogeneous actors” (355). Why does Scott want to do this? So that rhetorician critics can “assess the effects of power as beneficial or harmful, desirable or undesirable, ethical or unethical” (356). The specific practice Scott chooses to interrogate is home HIV testing and he does this through a close...
rhetorical reading of the history of this debate in the mid-nineties. But one of the key
caveats Scott makes in critiquing these activities is that he argues the rhetorician-critic
should “also be involved in these practices” (363) so that a recognizable telos will be
achieved. As Scott puts it: “The ultimate goal of my study was not a more sophisticated
understanding or academic critique of the home-testing controversy, but the creation of
more widely beneficial testing rhetorics and practices” (363).

What I want to do in the rest of this chapter is look at two assignments I gave to
students back in 2003 to see how I: 1) deploy Friend’s notion of employing a
nondistributive paradigm of treating students as doers; 2) draw on Mauk’s notions of
engaging students in their lived spaces; and 3) provide a context in which to engage
students in cultural-rhetorical analyses that will enable students to analyze cultural
practices in terms of power and oppression and to hopefully reach a recognizable telos in
the practice: to begin to try to undo injustice in society.

Like many college composition teachers, I structure much of my classroom
discussion—especially student journal entries—around three elements: 1) the text we use
in the classroom, which in the case of my spring 2003 section of English 100 happened to
be Lunsford, Ruszkiewicz, and Walters’ Everything’s an Argument, Second Edition; 2)
current events, especially national, international, as well as local, political events; and 3)
student reactions to either the class text or to current events. Beginning in the spring of
2002, the collaborative exercise I chose to add to my syllabus was what I called a
“dialogue on civilization.” It is the final revision of this exercise that I assigned in the
spring of 2003 that I discuss in the following example.
George W. Bush and Civilization: A Dialogue Between Students

The first concrete example is an assignment I call a ‘dialogue on civilization’. It is a collaborative writing assignment that requires students to discuss the notion of civilization in terms of: 1) an excerpt of a dialogue presented in the second edition of Lunsford et al.’s second edition of *Everything’s an Argument*; 2) discussions of civilization since 9/11, especially in the context of how the term has been used as a sort of ‘god-term’ (to invoke Burkean terminology) by George W. Bush early in his war on terror; and 3) civilization in the context of a university class taking place in the University of Hawai‘i, with particular emphasis on notions of civilization and Native Hawaiian Civilization.

First, let me present the dialogue excerpt as it appears in the second edition of *Everything’s an Argument*. The dialogue takes place between Kevin Kelly (KK) and Kirkpatrick Sale (KS) and is presented as written by Kevin Kelly with the title “Interview with the Luddite”:

*KK:* Do you see civilization as a catastrophe?

*KS:* Yes.

*KK:* All civilizations?

*KS:* Yes. There are some presumed benefits, but civilizations as such are catastrophic, which is why they all end by destroying themselves and the natural environment around them.

*KK:* You are quick to talk about the downsides of technological civilizations and the upsides of tribal life. But you pay zero
attention to the downsides of tribal life or the upsides of civilizations. For instance, the downsides of tribal life are infanticide, tribal warfare, intertribal rape, slavery, sexism. Not to mention a very short lifespan, perpetual head lice, and diseases that are easily cured by five cents’ worth of medicine now. This is what you get when you have tribal life with no civilization. This is what you want? (52-53)

When I first began teaching with Lunsford et al.’s text in the spring of 2001, I paid no attention to this little dialogue; after all, who would take a dialogue with a luddite seriously? However, when re-reading this text to teach in the fall of 2002 in order to teach English 100, I found this passage resonant with various meanings, given the post-9/11 atmosphere of a war on terror and Bush’s own insistence in many key statements that the 9/11 attacks were an attack on ‘our’ civilization—or, in Bush’s own mind, an attack on ‘civilization’ tout court.

The assignment, in brief, was to continue—albeit on the student’s own levels as participants—a dialogue on the theme of civilization as KS and KK begin it in this brief citation. I felt that this assignment was important first because it engaged students in something that was really happening in the world at the time. George W. Bush had in large part defined the war against terror as a war to defend our civilization. But this exercise also had the potential to introduce students to the subtle notion of irony: Irony in that the war on terror ended up turning back to one of the key historic starting points of civilization itself. It also allowed students to engage in projects together collaboratively, so encouraging them to develop a “dialogue” that was in a sense a public document on a
One fruitful way to begin this dialogue on civilization was to have students do a web search for George W. Bush's remarks on civilization. A simple yet effective way to do this was to simply sign on to the White House's website at www.whitehouse.gov and enter the word "civilization" into the search field. Unsurprisingly, the White House maintains fecund records of George W. Bush's comments on everything—even the smallest statements, so that this search yields well over 260 results as of October 1, 2004. Students could then peruse these individual documents using the "Find" option under the "Edit" dropdown menu in Internet Explorer, then enter the "find" term civilization to locate those points in the document where George W. Bush discussed civilization. In so recommending this technique to students, however, it was important to remind students to read the documents in their entirety—even if the reading was cursory—so that it was clear to the student what the context of the discussion was.

The next step in discussing civilization might then be to assemble a collage of these quotations from George W. Bush, much like the collage I assemble in Appendix A. This collage can then be used as one of the launching points for the student dialogues on civilization. However, it was also important to relate the god-term "civilization" to the context of the student's own lives—to, as Mauk puts it, understand how this term relates to the space that students actually occupy in relation to the academy. For a teacher at the University of Hawai‘i, working with a term like civilization has been relatively easy during the past three years because one of the core requirements (until recently) for each and every undergraduate student has been two semesters of a history course designated
"History 151 and 152: World Civilizations." And one the earliest starting points student encounter on their journey through world civilizations is of course the civilizations of Mesopotamia—in other words, the civilizations of modern day Iraq. What this context allows for is a discussion of civilization in terms of how students have encountered the term defined in their world civilization classes, either at the university or at the high school level.

The next thing students have to do is to define the key term civilization. In a recent *Rhetoric Review* article, Jeffrey Carroll has pointed out different ways that composition teachers can help students come to terms with key terms. One of the key points Carroll makes in this article is that while on the one hand we want students to try grappling with creating 'essential' or Aristotelian definitions of key terms, on the other hand such an approach is inadequate in a "zeitgeist of a kind of multicultural, free expression that explains the lack of interest in dictionaries and underscores the rhetorical motive as a prime motive and source of contingent meanings in writing" (Carroll 159). I like Carroll’s point here because it is especially important in dealing with a word like civilization: as teachers, we must pose the “mischievous questions” (Carroll’s phrase) to students to really get them to work out the various contingent definitions that will make the word “civilization” mean something within the context of their own discussions and their own lived lives.

This also brings up the importance of introducing to students exploring comparison and contrast in rhetorical constructions. In this case, students are invited first to compare one of the earliest—if not the earliest—civilizations vis-à-vis the case of Mesopotamia, then to compare this to the modern United States. What this also leads to
is a comparison and contrast between civilization-as-it-was-created-in-Mesopotamia and civilization-as-it-now-exists-in-the-United-States, and this is a key contrast because it leads students to consider the notion of irony—intended or not—in interpreting rhetorical statements such as those of George W. Bush on civilization. Is the United States a worthy successor to the key term ‘civilization’ as the term has been applied to historians in describing the historical epochs of ancient Mesopotamia? What are the characteristics of a civilization (e.g., technology, literacy, economy, etc.)?

In addition to this rhetorical irony, we can also invite students to ponder historical irony in its real material sense. And this, to me, is where this assignment gets exciting. There are many historical ironies here, of course. The first and most obvious is that George W. Bush chose to wage war against Iraq, and that Iraq-as-modern-day-Mesopotamia is in fact the birthplace of western civilization. I try to make this irony clear in my description of the assignment when I write to students:

There are many reasons why I have selected this assignment. First, the issue of civilization and technology has come into the forefront since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. One of the ways George W. Bush has labeled the attacks is as attacks on our civilization and on civilization in general. It therefore seems fitting that we should have some discussion on what civilization is, viz., what it is we are trying to defend in the war on terrorism. But I think you would get more out of thinking about such issues if you are able to discuss them with other students, hence the collaborative structure of this assignment.
But in addition to this irony, there is a less subtle irony, an irony I did not discuss in the
handout: the fact that George W. Bush is in fact trying to continue and complete the war
begun over a decade ago by his own father, George H. Bush. In this case, we encounter
the full replay of history described by Marx in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis
Bonaparte*, and further elaborated by Said in “On Repetition” in *The World, the Text, and
the Critic*: “Everywhere Marx insists on the formula for which the work has become
famous: all world historical events recur twice, first as tragedy, then as farce” (Said 122).
As Said reminds us, a replay such as the one we see of George H. Bush’s Gulf War as
performed by his son is indeed a categorical ‘farce’: we see the relationship between what
the predecessor attempted to do and what the successor attempts to re-do, and we
recognize the cognitive dissonance.

It is further possible to establish other contexts for this dialogue to enrich these
historic ironies by drawing even more deeply from the students’ lived space: we can try
to draw parallels between the United States-as-a-self-proclaimed-beacon-of-civilization
and the history and culture of Native Hawaii. By using various definitions of civilization,
we can pose a thorny question such as: Is the United States a civilization, whereas the pre-
contact traditional Native Hawaiian society was not? This really begins to complicate the
god term of civilization because civilization of course stands in a rigid binary of civilized
person vs. barbarian (or uncivilized person)—person of culture vs. person-implicitly-
without-culture. And this is where understanding a dictionary definition—especially the
etymology of the word (civilization>civitas>city in Latin) can become crucial. How do
we define cities? If we mean densely populated peoples existing in areas in which
extensive and intensive agriculture must take place to feed the population, and along with
this the social, technical, and cultural complexities that accompany such cultures, how
can we deny precontact Native Hawaii society the designation of civilization? At this
point, it is also important to introduce the arguments of David Stannard in Before the
Horror that the precontact population of Hawaii was probably more in the neighborhood
of one million inhabitants, rather than the traditional figure given by scholars since
Kuykendall of 250,000. Such a large population living a subsistence existence seems
unthinkable; only with highly advanced technological and social apparati could such a
society survive: in short, a civilization.

Further, what Bush seems to imply by civilization—and what both KS and KK in
the original dialogue seem to have trouble distinguishing—is civilization as something
we 'have' as opposed to something we actively create and recreate over space and time.
This stands in contrast to a notion of civilization as an active principle that requires that
its actors be doers in Christy Friend's sense of the word, as opposed to havers. What
Bush and KS seem to both emphasize is what we as passive participants in civilizations
'have'—technology, health benefits, lack of head lice, etc.—over what civilization
requires of its participants as actual makers and doers in such a society. Bush, by
invoking the god-term 'civilization,' plays exactly on a fear of what we all may 'lose' if
we lose the war to protect our civilization. In contrast, the Native Hawaiians perhaps
concentrated less on what their civilization had then on what it 'did' and what its people
had to 'do' to maintain a remarkable society. As Kameʻelehiwa points out in Native
Lands and Foreign Desires, what Hawaiian civilization required of Natives—both rulers
and subjects—was that they maintain a society that was *pono*, or righteous. As an
organizing principle of Native Hawaiian civilization, *pono* was an active principle of
justice, a principle requiring “doers” rather than “havers”.

However, there is also further division (in the rhetorical Burkean sense) to be
located here. For on one hand, the Native Hawaiians are recognized as possessing
(having) an advanced civilization; yet on the other hand, this key term of civilization also
becomes vexed in the fact that we have to account for what sort of ‘civilization’ the
United States has attempted to impose on its colonies. This pain becomes acute as one
reads over John Osorio’s *Dismembering Lāhui* (2002). On one hand, Osorio writes
proudly of the Native peoples:

> The labor-intensive subsistence economy and extensive cultivation of the
mauka (upland) areas had been the basis for, and also a sign or, a healthy
and prosperous civilization. This system was especially vulnerable to
rapid depopulation, which inexorably led to the abandonment of thriving
lo’i (taro patches) and homesteads as the labor needed to maintain them
continued to diminish. (47)

In contrast to the positive tone he adopts with regard to his own Native civilization,
Osorio at many points in his book contrasts the desires of the American colonizers to
“civilize” the Native Hawaiians, especially in the rapid push missionaries made to
privatize the landownership system and establish a form of “representative” government
for the Natives insofar as a system designed to represent the *Maka‘āinana* (the
commoners) was in fact subverted and used to dispossess them of their land and to
separate them from their beloved *Ali‘i* (42). Such readings point out how vexed a term
like civilization can be: on one hand, recognizing that one's culture is indeed a high
civilization worthy of respect, honor, and study; while on the other hand, having to deal
with the violence and dispossession that can take place when one 'civilization' violently
invades and overthrows the space of another civilization.

In terms of actually working through this dialogue as an English 100 class
assignment, however, could students be expected to be able to work with these complex
issues—especially drawing on the work of contemporary Native scholars like
Kame`eleihiwa or Osorio? My general experience with this assignment indicates the
answer is "yes" for University of Hawai`i students. First, many local students, especially
Native students, show an awareness and a political acuity to such issues that was lacking
in many students only a little over a decade ago. Second, the popularity of both Hawaiian
Studies classes and Hawaiian Language classes has further sensitized students to such
issues and made many of the students aware of the importance of scholars like Trask,
Kame`eleihiwa, Osorio, and many others. I have had students eloquently recount—and
sometimes with pain of having to relive the horrors of the past—their experiences in
these classes. One student described both her excitement and her realization of the hard
work and organization it took to work in a Native lo`i, a requirement in her Hawaiian
Studies 107 class. Although with some groups working on the dialogue, I have had to try
to introduce them to some of the Native Hawaiian scholarship that is available to them, I
have found that in most groups, there were at least one or two students who had some
knowledge of contemporary theories on Hawaiian Studies.
Teaching Stasis Analysis: Finding Examples that Students Will Care About

As Mauk points out, it is important to engage students in the space in which they live. One of the things I do in the first week of class is to talk about the particular space the students will inhabit during the course of the semester. At the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, this means several things. First, it means getting students to simply appreciate the beauty of the campus. I have spent my entire academic career in this university: undergraduate and graduate. I remember when I was an undergraduate being told by one English teacher how ugly he thought the campus was, especially compared to other campuses. Granted, the section of the campus the English department inhabits—the area around Kuykendall Hall—has until recently been one of the most unattractive spaces of the campus. However, when Evan Dobelle came on board as president of the university, a beautification project was begun that did add some attractiveness to this part of campus. Nevertheless, there was even twenty years ago other facets of the university that were beautiful: the Japanese Garden at the East-West Center, some of the architecture (some of the buildings at the East-West Center were designed by the famous Chinese-American architect I.M. Pei who designed the pyramid now fronting the Louvre in Paris) is quite engaging, and the trees on campus—some of which are close to a century in age—make the campus itself a veritable arboretum. Much to be proud of in the living space that makes up this commuter campus we call the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa.

In addition to talking about the real-world space students inhabit, I also talk with them about some of the key virtual spaces they will inhabit as University of Hawai‘i
students—especially the registration web page called the MYUH banner system. University faculty can use MYUH to email each student in their classes, as well as posting files, messages, links, and assignment reminders. However, as MYUH is still relatively new and is undergoing constant revision, it can be frustrating—even infuriating—to use at times. As a composition teacher, I feel that this is grist for writing and an important topic to talk about—the advantages and disadvantages of the MYUH banner system. These two topics—the real lived space of students, as well their virtual space at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa—are just two examples of how we should approach implementing Mauk’s call for engaging students in ‘third’ space in the classroom.

In the fall of 2002, I engaged students in still another way: I used a simple news article to try to help students in teaching them stasis analysis. This simple article was about an injury to a star University of Hawai‘i football player by columnist Stephen Tsai entitled “UH coaches irate over ‘cheap shot’ to lineman” that I read one morning while on duty at the hotel. The article discussed a season-ending injury to University of Hawai‘i defensive lineman Lui Fuga—it discussed what happened according to various witnesses (argument of fact—did something happen?); how the action should be defined, e.g., whether it was a cheap shot (argument of definition—what is the nature of the thing?); how serious the violation was (argument of evaluation—what is the quality of the thing); and what sorts of remedies Lui Fuga and the University of Hawai‘i football team might have in light of their claims (proposal arguments—what actions should be taken?). What dawned on me as I read this article was that in its structure and in the way it approached the issues, it could be used to teach stasis analysis to students.
Often when teaching stasis analysis, textbooks take one of two approaches. The first approach—exemplified by the second edition of *Everything’s an Argument* I alluded to earlier—was to give stasis analysis short shrift and move on to other aspects of argumentation. The second approach—one that I have only recently discovered in the textbook *Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students* by Sharon Crowley and Deborah Hawhee—is to take students through stasis analysis step-by-step. I like this second approach, and will refer to the Crowley and Hawhee text a little later. But what I needed in the fall of 2002 was a simple, yet effective way to take students through stasis. As soon as I got off work—with a photocopy of the Tsai news article in hand—I went home and wrote up the following handout for my students:

*Analysis of Article on Lui Fuga*

*This article offers a good example of stasis theory in action. Lunsford et al. discuss stasis theory in pp. 13-19 of *Everything’s an Argument*. Your text lays out stasis in terms of the following topics and questions:*

1. *Arguments of fact:* Did something happen?
2. *Arguments of definition:* What is the nature of the thing?
3. *Arguments of evaluation:* What is the quality of the thing?
4. *Proposal arguments:* What actions should be taken?

*Let’s now analyze the article on Lui Fuga’s injury with these questions in mind.*
1. Arguments of fact: Did something happen?

Yes. Lui Fuga suffered a possible season-ending fracture of his left tibia in Saturday's game against Eastern Illinois after he was hit by Eastern Illinois right tackle Frank Castognelli.

2. Arguments of definition: What is the nature of the thing?

The question is whether Fuga's injury was a result of normal play during a collision sport like football or if it was the result of an illegal block by Castognelli.

Important definitions: Chop block: A block in which a defender is struck low while engage in a block or tackle (paragraph 9). Such blocks are illegal when intentionally used by players.

- Cheap shot: Any illegal technique used by an opponent that could intentionally inflict injury upon another player.

- Intentionality: An action undertaken willfully by a player, as opposed to something that happens during normal play and is beyond the player's control. Definition by example: If a player lunges in making a chop block, that is evidence of intentionality; however, if the block is a result of normal play during the game (e.g., the player is unintentionally pushed or falls into the opponent, as happened when Lawrence Taylor broke Joe Theisman's leg several years ago), the block may not be ruled a personal foul by referees.
3. Arguments of evaluation: What is the quality of the thing?

- Evidence of intentionality: cheap and flagrant (paragraphs 3-5); evidence of lunging as opposed to being "pushed" into Fuga (paragraph 3); a recurring behavior displayed by other Eastern Illinois players (paragraphs 9-10).

- By using the definitions above and the evaluation of the overall play of Eastern Illinois (a pattern of cheap shots), we can tentatively conclude that the shot to Lui Fuga was indeed cheap and illegal.

4. Proposal arguments: What actions should be taken?

- Two types of proposals: 1) What action(s) should be taken with regard to achieving justice for Lui Fuga (e.g., punishing the perpetrator)? 2) What must UH do as a team to compensate for the loss of a key player?

- When Rich Miano compares what would happen in similar circumstances under NFL rules, we can infer that:
  - There should be a review process under NCAA rules for such flagrant penalties.
  - Players found guilty of such penalties should be suspended for at least one game.

- What must UH do as a team to compensate for the loss?
  - Employ Plan B: Sopoaga replaces Fuga in the line-up
  - Abu Ma'afala, who was scheduled to redshirt his freshman year, becomes top backup.
One of the reasons why I found this example and this exercise so attractive and useful was that for this particular class, football was a topic that constantly cropped up in class discussion. In other sections of English 100 I have taught, I wouldn’t think of using such an example because the *kairos* of the class wouldn’t make it relevant. However, I knew there were several football fans in this class, there was a cheerleader who sometimes wore her uniform to class because practice was right after my class, and this was the first semester that quarterback star Timmy Change began playing for the university. This exercise I felt would work for this particular class—and I have never used this exercise again in a section of English 100—again for reasons of *kairos*.

How did I know this exercise worked? First, because I gave an extended essay quiz—it was almost a period long—testing students on their knowledge of stasis, and they were able to apply some of the concepts beautifully. Almost every student passed with flying colors. And second—and more rewardingly—students would bring up ‘that stasis thing’ in class discussions throughout the semester without prompting. The reward of having a concept stick with a group of students. Nevertheless, this example, combined with other examples I used to teach stasis—some drawing on famous American state documents (the Gettysburg Address, Declaration of Independence), some drawing on Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech—made this class the most extensive exploration of stasis I have ever attempted with any English 100 class. In fact, I probably spent two-and-a-half weeks on the topic of stasis with this particular class. I have in subsequent classes only touched on the topic of stasis—in part because I found the
experience with that class in 2002 so exhausting—because the teacher has to argue through and work with students on every point and concept. And the teacher must do so without being dogmatic in his or her stances. Nevertheless, several memorable essays—including a very fine group dialogue that discussed the relevance and superiority of the civilization of Native Hawai‘i over those of the west and an eloquent plea for HCE (Hawai‘i Creole English) to be used much more extensively in public schools (I’ll briefly discuss this essay in the next chapter)—were the fruits of such attention to the nuances of stasis in rhetoric and argument.

In terms of other ways of teaching stasis theory, the most fully developed explanation I have found in writing textbooks on stasis theory to date are to be found in Crowley and Hawhee’s third edition of Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students. Crowley and Hawhee devote their entire third chapter, “Stasis Theory: Asking the Right Questions” to developing the student’s understanding of stasis theory. As they explain the term

*Stasis* (Latin *status* or *constitutio*) is derived from the Greek word meaning “a stand.” Thus a stasis can refer to the place where one rhetor takes a stand. Seen from the point of view of two disputants, however, the stasis marks the place where two opposing forces come together, where they rest or stand in agreement on what is at issue. (Hence the appropriateness of the Latin term for stasis, *constitutio*, which can be translated as a “costanding” or a “standing together). An agreement to disagree must occur in every rhetorical situation, as Quintilian put it, “Every question is based on assertion by one party and denial by another”
But this resting place is only temporary, suspended as it is between conflicting movements, until a skilled writer or speaker comes along to move the argument away from stasis. The most satisfactory modern equivalent for stasis seems to be the term issue, which we define as the point about which all parties to an argument can agree to disagree: this is what is at issue. (53-54)

When I have taught stasis, I have always emphasized the first definition that Crowley and Hawhee deploy, the one derived from the Greek that emphasized the place in which a rhetor can situate her or his argument. Further, while the second definition derived from the Latin constitutio is interesting and somewhat useful—especially when used in the context of Ciceronian-Quintillian heritage of Latin rhetoric—I think it is too restrictive in our postmodern world to use this definition as Crowley and Hawhee do to argue that in fact stasis (in terms of thesis and antithesis) is achieved on some issues while on other issues stasis is not achieved. The example Crowley and Hawhee of an issue in which stasis is not achieved is abortion.

In their analysis of abortion (Ancient Rhetorics, pp. 62-67), Crowley and Hawhee argue that stasis has not been achieved in the abortion debate because on the pro-life side of the issue a rhetor who wishes to find stasis with someone who believes that abortion is murder should argue (a) that abortion is not murder; or (b) that abortion is legal so therefore it cannot be murder, because murder is illegal in America; or (c) that abortion is not murder, because a fetus is not a human...
being; or some other proposition that defines abortion in such a way that it can be excluded from the category “murder.”

**Stasis Achieved Rhetors Can Now Agree to Disagree**

A. Abortion is murder.

B. Abortion is not murder. (64-65)

However, on the pro-choice, Crowley and Hawhee argue that

[a] rhetor who wishes to find stasis with someone who believes that women have a right to decide what happens to their bodies, on the other hand, must argue that (a) women do not have the right, at least when they are pregnant; or (b) that the right to life of a fetus outweighs a woman’s right to choose what happens to her body; or (c) that the right to life extends to fetuses and takes primacy over any other human right; or some other similar proposition about the priority ordering of human rights.

**Stasis Achieved: Rhetors Can Now Agree to Disagree**

A. Women have the right to decide what happens to their bodies, including terminating a pregnancy.

B. Women do not have the right to decide what happens to their bodies when they are pregnant because a potential life is at stake.

(65)

On one hand, I like the way Crowley and Hawhee lay out these arguments about why stasis is not achieved because they do clarify key reasons for students as to why there is
and will continue to remain so much disagreement on this issue. I like their diagrammatic use of stasis—as could be expected from someone who laid out the questions as I did in my own analysis of the much simpler issuer presented by the injury to University of Hawai’i football player Lui Fuga. And I even like the way Crowley and Hawhee deploy their second definition of stasis based on the Latin *constitutio* (standing together) to try to make the point that the abortion debate is a public debate that is not in stasis. On the other hand I must disagree with Crowley and Hawhee that this is an example of a public debate that is not in stasis. I feel that Crowley and Hawhee are deploying their classical rhetorical analysis in too limited a way as to not take full advantage of both the full classical tools available; also, their decision to label this example as one of a public argument that is not in stasis fails to take into account the fact that the disagreements about abortion are exactly the types of disagreements we might realistically expect to encounter in our postmodern world. Perhaps this is a limitation implicit in the fact that Crowley and Hawhee are dealing with *ancient rhetorics*; nevertheless, I feel that even readings of the ancient rhetorical treatises would reveal that stasis was a far more flexible theoretical tool than Crowley and Hawhee indicate in their analysis of the abortion debate.

My disagreement is based first on their definition of stasis. For myself, I have always seen stasis as one of the magical words in rhetorical analysis, and I prefer the Greek over the Latin term, as well as the Greek definition. My own stance is based in large part on my reading of the beginning of the second chapter of Kenneth Burke’s *A Grammar of Motives*. At the very beginning of that chapter, Burke writes

> There is a set of words comprising what we might call the Stance family, for they all derive from a concept of place, or placement. In the Indo-
Germanic languages, the root for this family is *stā*, to stand (Sanskrit, *sthā*). And out of it there has developed this essential family, comprising such members as: consist, constancy, constitution, contrast, destiny, ecstasy, existence, hypostatize, obstacle, stage, state, status, statute, stead, subsist, and system.

Surely, one could build a whole philosophic universe by tracking down the ramifications of this one root. (Burke 1945 & 1962, 21)

Indeed, much of my respect for the very notion of stasis as I understand it derives from this passage in Burke’s *A Grammar of Motives*. For to me stasis is one of the more wonderful galaxies in the philosophic universe of the Stance family Burke is suggesting would be worthwhile tracking.

Second, Crowley and Hawhee fail to fully historicize the nature of the abortion debate in terms of the stasis issues as they present them. The analysis they present in terms of the vocabulary in which they present it could only have emerged *after* an extended collision of sides coming from morally incommensurate positions. This point is made clear by Heidlebaugh in a chapter she devotes to stasis theory in *Judgment, Rhetoric, and the Problem of Incommensurability* (2001) in which Heidlebaugh herself extensively analyzes the abortion debate—much as Crowley and Hawhee do—using stasis analysis and drawing deeply from the rhetorical treatises of Cicero—*De Natura Doerum, De Inventione, De Oratore*. In defining her own notion of stasis, Heidlebaugh draws on the work of Otto Loeb Dieter (1950) to create a richer interpretation based on the Latin translation of stasis as *constitutio*.
The Latin use of the word *constitutio* for *stasis* signifies a unique synthesis that emerges only during the contact of contraries or opposites; for example, "the bringing together and the resultant 'standing together' of contrary informations of a homogeneous nature, or an instrumental organ of the body, as for example a femur and a tibia are articulate to form a leg" (Dieter, 359-60).

In this type of synthesis, the contraries are brought into contact, but although they touch, they do not merge; the subject matter created at the joint of their contact does more to create further material for talk than to bring the positions together into the sort of hierarchical relationship we usually expect of a system. There is no attempt to bring the two sides together in some way that would make the positions compatible or to discover some transcendent principle or hierarchical term to subsume them both. (118-119)

What Heidlebaugh has done in this passage is to make the point that the Latin notion of *constitutio* is far richer than the over-simplified notion of stasis Crowley and Hawhee present in their text. And for this reason, although I admire Crowley and Hawhee's effort in *Ancient Rhetoric* to present students with a clear and accessible approach to stasis theory, I would still be somewhat reluctant to use their text in my writing class without carefully working through some of the issues I raise in this dissertation.

To return to the abortion debate, Heidlebaugh argues that the pro-life and pro-choice stances "demonstrate that the incommensurate vocabularies do not exist fully
formed before debate, as though each is isomorphic with some natural state. They evolve in response to fundamental challenges: each side develops, in part, by casting itself in fundamental opposition to the other” (129). Heidlebaugh also cites Faye D. Ginsburg’s Contested Lives: The Abortion Debate in an American Community (1989) to point out that the pro-Choice and pro-Life positions do not develop “naturally” or “correctly,” but “[i]nstead, at some points the conceptual structures develop “dialectically” in opposition, or at least in response to, the other side” (131). What in fact the difference is between the two sides, Heidlebaugh goes on to argue, is a debate over the first question in stasis, the question of fact. As Heidlebaugh sees it: “left alone to be debated as an issue of fact, the argument over abortion would be intractable” (133). What needs to be done, according to Heidlebaugh, is that each side needs to make a genuine good faith attempt to establish issues and subjects that can be discussed (133), and one example of such a project is the Public Conversation Project developed in 1989 by family therapists led by Celeste Michelle Condit. Condit recounts her experiences in establishing this project in Decoding Abortion Rhetoric: Communicating Social Change (1990).

The methods that Condit brings to fore in this account, according to Heidlebaugh, are clearly not within the province of the Ciceronian rhetoric Heidlebaugh discusses through most of her chapter on stasis. Heidlebaugh concedes these points herself; instead, these techniques include safe zones, an emphasis on interpersonal relationships, and finding ways to promote and maintain an atmosphere of trust. Rather, they are the product of contemporary discourse—and this is where I expand on Heidlebaugh—a discourse that has come to the fore since the latter half of the twentieth century, a discourse often associated with Carl Rogers in what has come to be called Rogerian
methods of analysis and argument, or Rogerian rhetoric, in many composition studies circles. As Doug Brent points out in an article in the 1998 collection *Theorizing Composition*, Rogerian rhetoric was first introduced into the conversation of composition studies through Young, Becker and Pike's 1970 textbook *Rhetoric: Discovery and Change*. As Young, Becker, and Pike put it, Rogerian rhetoric can be utilized in the following stages:

1. An introduction to the problem and a demonstration that the opponent's position is understood.
2. A statement of the contexts in which the opponent's position may be valid.
3. A statement of the writer's position, including contexts in which it is valid.
4. A statement of how the opponent's position would benefit if he were to adopt elements of the writer's position. If the writer can show that the positions complement each other, that each supplies what the other lacks, so much the better. (Young et al. 283 as qtd. in Brent 264).

Brent goes on to say that "It is vital that when the rhetor imagines and restates the audience's perspective, she or he does so, not to find holes in it or even to make partial concessions as in traditional debate, but genuinely to search for areas of validity" (264). Rogerian rhetoric has been little studied as a technique of rhetorical analysis in composition studies; indeed, Brent goes on to point out that many compositionists (Lunsford, Ede, Pounds, Lassner, and Brent himself) have found many problems with
Rogerian rhetoric, including gender bias that generally favors males over females in the process of implementing such rhetorical strategies (Lassner), and what Brent himself identifies as a grounding "in a wish, tracable to General Semantics, to transcend language in order to obtain an objective, value-neutral stance, which we now believe to be impossible" (Brent 264). Brent goes on to argue that Rogerian rhetoric may best be viewed not as a strategy of persuasion, but rather as "an invention heuristic that encourages writers to begin by imagining the world as others see it" (265).

To a large extent, I agree with this interpretation. Indeed, one of the most powerful influences Rogerian thought has had on composition studies is not only to create an invention heuristic that allows writers to see the world as others see it, but also as an indispensable tool to building trust in interpersonal relationships. This trust comes to the fore in the process pedagogies that were developed early in composition studies' history in the late sixties and the seventies. For example, Peter Elbow points out in the "Introduction" to the second edition of Writing Without Teachers that the work of Carl Rogers had a profound influence on his thinking in terms of how he approached response groups to writing (1998: xxix-xxx):

People like to look back on him as a soft Mr. Rogers kind of Rogers. They don't pay enough attention to his emphasis on methodology. I felt how the force of his method for restoring communication when it had broken down derived somewhat from its carefully ritualized methodology: Smith may not tell his or her own thoughts in response to Jones until after restating what Jones said—and to Jones' satisfaction. Perhaps some of the rituals I tried to build into the teacherless class are an echo. Rogers
emphasized how this interpersonal process requires a kind of double loyalty. On the one hand, Smith must move *toward* Jones enough to enter his idea with sympathetic understanding; on the other hand, Smith needs to stay true to him- or herself so as not to be fake or condescending (Rogers called it being "transparent"). (Elbow 1998, xxix)

What Elbow makes clear in this passage is that he seconds Brent’s assessment of the effectiveness of Rogerian rhetoric as an invention heuristic in terms of writing classroom pedagogy.

But what Elbow goes onto observe is how truly powerful this pedagogy can be as an education tool. As Elbow puts it a few sentences later:

> Rogers helped me trust my sense that humans, when given safety and support, will naturally come to notice contradictions themselves, even to their favorite ideas. But *not* if they are under attack and have to defend those ideas (or have to spend all their energy at survival tasks [Maslow]). We can trust students; we don’t have to do everything for them. (Elbow 1998: xxx)

What I think Elbow does in this passage is to bring us full circle back not only to the early Rogerian theories that influenced him, but also indirectly to the rhetorical ethical theories of a compositionist like Christy Friend. For what Elbow tried to do in his early composition pedagogy was to change the classroom from a space in which students were viewed as passive recipients of knowledge, “havers” needing to build up their bank account of knowledge—to blend Freirian and Friendian metaphors. Elbow instead turned
the discipline to one in which we could begin to view the classroom as space that treated students as “doers” that we can trust to learn, think, and participate in classroom effectively and intelligently—with what they already to a large extent bring to the classroom (as contact zone) from their own diverse cultures and lived spaces.

What these references to Carl Rogers indicate is that the field of composition and rhetoric may indeed have added ‘something’ to overall classical rhetoric not merely in its discovery of process pedagogies, but in the content and structure of rhetoric. Further, such pedagogies can make a difference in how rhetoric works in the real world so as to do some of things J. Blake Scott argues rhetoric should do in the world: rhetoric and practice can be blended together to achieve the recognizable and desirable telos of achieving some form of justice in the world: in this particular case, trying to help communities and individuals come to terms with the issue of abortion. As teachers of composition, all we can really do is listen to the arguments students may present—justifying decisions to have abortions, or arguing for why they should keep their children. However, the way in which we listen to these arguments can have a real impact on these students’ lives.

What I am advocating here is a method of rhetorical analysis that might blend these Rogerian concepts that entered composition studies through the works of process theorists like Elbow with more recent rhetorical efforts to theorize rhetorical listening, such as Krista Ratcliffe’s notion of “strategic idealism when listening with the intent to understand” (205) that she develops in her essay 1999 “Rhetorical Listening: A Trope for Interpretive Invention and a “Code of Cross-Cultural Conduct.”” Ratcliffe foregrounds her call for strategic idealism in listening by first observing that while listening had been
part of rhetorical pedagogical practice for centuries, even in classical rhetoric listening had been slighted. As Ratcliffe puts it, "[c]lassical theories foreground the rhetor's speaking and writing as means of persuading audiences; these theories are only secondarily concerned with how audiences should listen and hardly at all concerned with what Michelle Ballif calls the desire of particular audience members" (199). Ratcliffe goes on to develop this concept of strategic listening by arguing that "we might best invert the term and define understanding as standing under—consciously standing under discourses that surround us and others while acknowledging all our particular and fluid standpoints" (205). What I might add in conclusion to this chapter is that this standing under can be viewed as a blending of Burkean concepts of the stance family of terms I discussed a little earlier in this chapter; of ethical stances like those of the contact zone and of treating students as doers rather than havers, as Friend does; and of the notions of listening to truly understand the position of the other, as outlined in the works of Carl Rogers and Peter Elbow.

In the next chapters, I hope to develop these points more fully to demonstrate how we as composition teachers can become better listeners, as well as how we can help our students to become better listeners, by discussing how we can better integrate literature back into the composition classroom. These skills are crucial if the project of integrating narrative ethics into the composition classroom that I called for in the first three chapters of this dissertation are to have any chance of being truly implemented in the composition classroom. The reason is that to create narratives—like those of the abortion debate I discussed previously—we need to realize that such calls as Ratcliffe's for strategic idealism in listening help to condition the social contexts in which we can create, read,
listen to, and respond to texts. In the final chapter of this dissertation, I'll turn to another instance—my experience as an *Alaka`i* for Vista Hotels—as a case where I began as one anxious to speak, but found increasingly as time went on that I needed to still my mouth and listen—so as to be able to in a Rogerian sense begin to see the world in a different, and I feel juster—perspective.
Scenario 4: The Writing Teacher as Creative Writer

It turns out that there is a completely different approach, and that is to ignore almost entirely the whole question of what to write about. Assume simply (and correctly) that you have plenty to write poems about and that your job is to keep from mucking it up by paying too much attention to it. (Not that you ignore what’s in the poem, only what the poem’s about.)... Consider the writing of a poem as the playing of a game, getting the ball through a hoop, a technical problem to be solved. (Elbow 1981, 101-102)

I’ve never taken a class from Oliver Lee, yet his presence, like that of Haunani-Kay Trask, has loomed over this university over the twenty or so years I have been affiliated with it—either as an undergraduate, a graduate student, or an instructor—providing a sort of guidance as to right and wrong. I graduated from high school in the very early 80s, so the memories of the Vietnam War and the campus resistance to that war—a resistance that made national and international news—were already becoming hazy to later generations of University of Hawai‘i students. Nevertheless, when there was something happening in the world, in the state, or on campus that was truly important, truly urgent, you could count on Oliver Lee or Haunani-Kay Trask to be there in some way—often as speakers, sometimes as participants—to lend their considerable authority to the side of right.

I remember one particular incident in 1995 when the then-new Cayetano Administration was pushing for severe budget cuts at the university. Then-President of
Kenneth Mortimer's solution was simple: raise tuitions to unheard of rates. The students showed an unusual amount of unity in trying to oppose such tuition raises by organizing a Halloween march that was dubbed "The Death of Education March." Students and faculty marched from the university to the State Capitol to confront a belligerent Cayetano, and one of the faculty who helped direct this non-violent show of unity from the campus to the Capitol was Oliver Lee—who simply helped to make sure everyone was safe and keeping in step.

Years later, as I was working on my dissertation and taking a dinner break, I saw Dr. Lee at McCully McDonald's reading and wrote the following brief poem:

At McCully
McDonald's

the seniors play Monopoly
in the makai corner

while Suerte
the manager

tries to get a cheeseburger
made—no pickles, no onions
and

Oliver Lee
reads

Zinn? Chomsky? Arundhati Roy?

he underlines a
phrase

and one senior rolls his dice
"you
have to use the money
build
something
when you have loads of"
and Oliver Lee turns to the back of the book to check the index, read a note while the seniors laugh playing Monopoly in McCully McDonald's

While I have not explored the topic of creative writing in this dissertation fully—it is, after all, a dissertation in composition-rhetoric—I feel that it is important for all of us who teach writing to at least explore creative writing and to flex our creative writing muscles at times—no matter how meager the effort, as the above demonstrates. Elbow felt that creative writing was important enough to discuss in a chapter of his 1981 book Writing with Power; and truth be told, almost all of us in composition-rhetoric have migrated from some initial interest in either literary studies or creative writing.
Chapter 5: “I Miss Literature”

Those of us who can remember how literature was often treated in writing classes are not surprised that it did not survive as a major pedagogical force. Its virtual disappearance, however, was not, I think, the result of all those theoretical reasons given in some recent articles on the topic. In large part, literature disappeared from composition classes in this country because it was badly misused by teachers desperate to teach literature... (Tate 1993, 317)

In the previous chapter, I concluded by discussing how we as composition teachers should cultivate our own ethical sensibilities to become better listeners to our students and to their writing. In this chapter, I turn to the problem of how to continue to cultivate listening skills both in our selves and in our students. I turn first to a discussion of HCE and local literature—how can we incorporate recent works of local literature into the composition classroom? I contextualize the discussion by first turning to the work of Rob Wilson and Susan Schultz, then draw on some notions from the theory Caribbean Literature as developed by Edouard Glissant. I then turn to an extended discussion on how the work of Lee Tonouchi—who has recently had an essay written in pidgin accepted for publication by College English—exemplifies and complicates some of the binarisms between voice and postmodernism that Schultz and Wilson see at work in local literature. I then conclude with a discussion of the relevance of Tonouchi’s work—and the relevance of allowing students to write in their own languages—and how it validates much of the theoretical discussions that have gone on both in postmodern
poetics (vis-a-vis Charles Bernstein) and contemporary composition theory (e.g., the work of Helen Fox in *Listening to the World*, but also compositionists who turn to the writings of artists like Theresa Hak Kyung Cha and Gloria Anzaldúa). I then conclude by sharing my own experiences and narratives on the ethical intersections between our 'narratives' and the narratives of literature.

Early in his essay “The Cultures of Literature and Composition: What Could Each Learn from the Other?”, Peter Elbow feels the need to preface the statement that is the title of this chapter with the remark: “I start with a sentence that makes me nervous (though I enjoy how it links the personal and professional): “I miss literature”” (149). This prefatory remark says worlds about the divisions between composition and rhetoric that exist to this day in many university English departments. As Tokarczyk and Papoulis observe in the “Introduction” to their collection *Teaching Composition/Teaching Literature*, “as recent articles in publications such as *The Chronicle of Higher Education* indicate, the gap between the two divisions actually seems to have widened in recent years” (1). As a graduate student specializing primarily in composition and rhetoric, I remember one of my favorite undergraduate literature professors once confiding to me while I was in the midst of the composition program that “student writing can be o.k. sometimes, but Shakespeare is still a much more interesting writer” in a way that there was almost guilt—if not a tinge of sarcasm—over his apparent dis-ease with student writing and his overt preference for reading Shakespeare. I will go on to add that while I had fond memories of his literature class—even the fact that he would smoke in class as he read from Chaucer’s *Troilus and Criseyde*—he was usually the literature professor most undergraduates hoped that they would not get.
While my own experiences at the University of Hawai‘i therefore seem to support the claim that there is indeed still a rift between composition and literature, what I want to do here is argue for a situated-negotiated peace between composition and literature at least in Hawai‘i. The reasons are many: first, like Elbow, I miss and love literature and try not to let an opportunity in a composition class go by in which I can insert some sort of literature. If I can make a point in a writing class using literature, all the better. Second, many of my students are from Hawai‘i and so are deeply attached to oral cultures, whether those cultures be Native Hawaiian, Pacific Islander, or Asian, or more often a blend of all three of these. These students often respond with enthusiasm when first encountering the works of Lois-Ann Yamanaka, Lee Tonouchi, Haunani-Kay Trask, Lisa Linn Kanae, and other local writers. The fact that usually at least a quarter or more of my students have had some experience with Hawai‘i Creole English makes their first encounters with the literature of these islands all the more revelatory and enjoyable. In many ways this celebration of the ‘local’ voice has been the result of a renaissance in local literature in part spurred on by the over-quarter century publication of the journal Bamboo Ridge.

However, as Rob Wilson points out in Pacific Postmodern: From the Sublime to the Devious, local literature is not simply a pure expression of voice. Wilson cites Susan Schultz as arguing that there are in fact two postmodernisms at work in the local literary scene: one that seems to celebrate the reified voice, but another more experimental postmodernism that attempts to theorize local valorizations of voice and identity (Wilson 2000, 1). I would posit that one could extend Wilson’s and Schultz’s argument into one of literate practices by seeing that one of the most vexing problems for developing
poetics in Hawai‘i has been the attempt to blend a postmodern poetic sensibility with a multicultural linguistic practice that has a long tradition of searching for “voice,” that is, the oral tradition, of many of the peoples of these islands. Blending the oral and the written is not a problem, however, unique to these islands: Edouard Glissant discusses similar issues of combining oral and literate traditions in Caribbean Discourse: Selected Essays when he discusses notions of a forced poetics as opposed to a natural poetics. Forced poetics arose out the Martinican need to communicate in the master’s language—French—which was the “official” language of the islands, as opposed to being able to communicate in their “natural” language—Creole.

In the first half of the twentieth century Martinican Creole was gradually displaced in written literature because of the attempt to convey “Creole” experience into non-Creole French. This distinction is important because French as Native Martinicans experienced it was the written language, while their own language, Creole, was “oral.” In defining the written as opposed to the oral, Glissant emphasizes that the written requires “nonmovement” of the body, while the oral requires “movement”, and that in the Caribbean, the “word is first and foremost sound” (123). From this organizing principle, Glissant works to a description of the Creole language as one that “organizes speech as a blast of sound” (124). And it is exactly this blast of sound that the master language of French attempted to silence for so long in Martinique by degrading and denigrating the Creole tongue. It is in fact what different colonizers in a different land continue to do to Gloria Anzaldúa when she writes:

So, if you really want to hurt me, talk badly about my language. Ethnic identity is twin skin to language identity—I am my language. Until I can

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take pride in my language, I cannot take pride in myself. Until I can accept as legitimate Chicano, Texas Spanish, Tex-Mex, and all the other languages that I speak, I cannot accept the legitimacy of myself. Until I am free to write bilingually and to switch codes without having always to translate, while I still have to speak English or Spanish when I would write when I would rather speak Spanglish, and as long as I have to accommodate the English speakers rather than having them accommodate me, my tongue will be illegitimate. (295)

What Anzaldúa’s passage forces us to do is to consider notions of textuality and orality deliberately placed side-by-side, a deliberate juxtaposition that problematizes Glissant's binary of (text=nonmovement of body) vs. (orality=movement of the body) in a way that accentuates the point Wilson and Schultz make about the problematic relationship between the two postmodernisms in Hawai‘i.

On one side of this divide in Hawai‘i is HCE—pidgin—which is a linguistic example of what Mary Louise Pratt calls the contact zone. As Pratt defines this term, contact zones are “social spaces where cultures meet, clash and grapple with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power, such as colonialism, slavery, or their aftersmaths as they are lived out in many parts of the world today” (139). Hawai‘i is a contact zone in exactly the post-colonial sense: every inch of what is today called the “State” of Hawai‘i was formerly inhabited and ruled by the indigenous government of a Native Hawaiian civilization, a rule that was forcefully displaced by exactly the asymmetrical power relation of colonialism. The memories of this enforced displacement live on in higher cultural “metamemories” that re-enact various acts of displacement: the
British Union Jack contained within the Hawaiian National flat itself, and strange-sounding names like “Beretania” that recall a mixture of British-Hawaiian not dissimilar to Anzaldúa’s notion of Spanglish. To greatly oversimplify, HCE developed in at least three stages: 1) a mixture of Hawaiian and English from the early days of contact, a true ‘pidgin’ that allowed for communication between traders/explorers/exploiters and Natives; 2) the incorporation into this ‘pidgin’ other non-Native linguistic systems and vocabularies with the creation of the plantation system from the second quarter of the nineteenth century onward; and 3) the standardization of this pidgin into a more permanent Creole form that has achieved an enduring permanence—and is even a source of pride—amongst working class members of this colonial community. This insistence by the local people in retaining their Creole, their HCE, is not an historical fluke; rather, it is an act of political resistance, just as the attempt by Martinicans like Glissant to insert their form of Creole into written literature is a form of resistance.

It is also a particular act of resistance against small-minded educators from outside the colony who have come to teach “proper” English: rather than give completely in to the petty demands of such colonial instructors, locals have adhered all the more closely to HCE. As Haunani-Kay Trask puts it: “The use of pidgin by locals is often a political statement, especially in the presence of haole” (Trask 1994, 22). To extend on this notion, pidgin when used by locals in the presence of foreign haole functions as apparent non-semiotic noise: that is, as a sign that by virtue of its otherness from the discourse of standard English (i.e., haole English), both plays on the dominant discourse (it is English), while at the same time denying its place in the hierarchy of that discourse—it is our English, not haole English. It is both inside and outside
simultaneously. One thing to note, also, about Trask’s note on pidgin is that its is often relational: in order for “pidgin” to exist in a political sense, the presence of an haole observer (either real or imagined) seems almost obligatory. The reason for this is that pidgin is the linguistic contact zone locally: from the historical perspective, the Native language is Hawaiian, and pidgin is then by definition the dialect of English spoken in these islands. For most growing up local in Hawai‘i, then, HCE is English.

One apparent weakness, then, of representing HCE textually is that it has not developed a standardized orthography. Or so argues Suzanne Romaine, who in her essay “Hawai‘i Creole English as a Literary Language,” argues that the problem with Creoles in general is that they can be used for dialogue, drama, and poetry, but are “more subjective” because they are defined in “opposition to mainstream values” (37). The apparent result, according to Romaine, is that pidgin is always reflected through either the recording of someone else speaking it—think, for example of Lois-Ann Yamanaka’s poems as dramatic monologues in the Brownian sense of that term—or through the mediation of an omniscient narrator in standard English—the most obvious example being Milton Murayama’s All I asking for is my body. However, one can also view the more recent works of Rodney Morales—his collection of stories The Speed of Darkness (1988) and his novel When the Shark Bites (2002) as more advanced experiments in third person pidgin patois not dissimilar to what Twain accomplished for lower class white and Black dialects in the South in Huckleberry Finn over a hundred years. Nevertheless, such a view as Romaine’s may be partially correct insofar as it is true that the political force of pidgin is derived from its opposition to mainstream (read: colonial haole) values; but such a view may fail to account for the fact that HCE is truly English to its speakers.
The problem then is one of dealing with the language in an unmediated form; except that we depend on our ears and eyes to regularize so much of what we hear and read, that everything seemingly becomes subject to translation, to mediation, in order to get back to the original. This paradox is borne out by the example June Jordan describes in her essay, "Nobody Mean More to Me Than You and the Future Life of Willie Jordan." Jordan describes how African-American students studying Black English often go through the practice of translating Black English into standard English before Black English can be accepted by these students as an acceptable and correct form of English. She demonstrates this paradox by her example of a class reading the opening lines of The Color Purple: in order to appreciate the "rightness," the correctness if you will of Walker's prose, the class must translate the opening lines into standard English. This translation allows the class to see the relationships between Black English (which is English to Celie) and standard English. I do not want to argue here against the art of translation; when intelligently and sensitively practiced, as in Jordan's case, it is a valid and necessary art form. It would be against the coarse translators of the world, those who want contact zones to be leveled into homogeneity, with whom I would take issue.

But what has emerged in Hawai'i in recent years is a more radical form of textuality—the second postmodernism to which Wilson and Schultz refer—that recognizes cultural and personal idiosyncrasies in writing from the earliest stages, rather than trying to pound regularity and standardization into students, so challenging the colonial metaphor of requiring students to master a 'necessary' standard English repertoire which is the prerequisite to their own experiments with their Native tongues. This challenge is heralded by Native and non-Native local writers like Joe Balaz, Lisa
Linn Kanae, Richard Hamasaki, Lee Tonouchi, Rodney Morales, Haunani-Kay Trask, and several other writers. In terms of pedagogical approaches to teaching language, the difference between the colonial and post-colonial ways of teaching language is like the difference between “commonsense” and “uncommonsense” that John S. Maher discusses in *Uncommon Sense*. Commonsense requires that correctness, clarity, and fluency be taught in that order; uncommonsense allows for the possibility that the commonsense approach is not inevitable and natural, and that it is possible to teach fluency, clarity, and correctness instead. Further, in the world of commonsense, fluency is something one is born with—it is a talent that flows naturally when correctness—“conformity to convention”—and clarity—“making one’s meaning as transparent as possible”—is mastered. The uncommonsense approach to fluency is that it is the “feeling of comfort, confidence and control of the writing process, not built on an absolute assurance that one will always succeed, or that the effort will not involve struggle, but rather on a sense that the process itself is worth it for the learning it brings and the potential rewards of meaning making and communication” (229). Interestingly, however, while Maher defines the uncommonsense notion of clarity as the struggle of making meaning more accessible to readers, he pretty much equates both the commonsense and uncommonsense interpretations of the notion of correctness.

It is this apparent equating of the uncommonsense and commonsense views of correctness that I want to question in Maher’s reading. For as my previous discussion of HCE seems to indicate, we cannot accept “conformity to convention” as a natural definition of correctness, or else we will be right back to arguing with Romaine that HCE requires a standardized orthography. The conventions by which HCE writers articulate
themselves are unstable, and a great deal of flux and latitude should be exercised in judging what is to pass for “correct.” Correctness in this view is subject to negotiations at every step of the writing process. Rules should probably not be deployed in a “traditional”—that is, a haole—sense: much as irregularity was the rule in writing English prior to the eighteenth-century\(^{21}\), irregularity must not only be allowed but positively encouraged in the way English is spelled in Hawai‘i. Hence the excitement that we can introduce into the composition classroom by introducing students to texts such as the stories found in Lee Tonouchi’s *da word*, especially in the last story of that collection, “pijin warz,” in which Tonouchi deploys Odo orthography to depict the nuances of HCE. Although students initially have trouble with this story—especially if it is assigned for reading before class—it can be very effective in helping students to understand the whole notion of ‘convention’ in spelling and writing if taught in class with the explanation of Odo orthography as a writing system developed by linguist Franklin Odo to better capture the oral nuances of HCE—indeed, a system much better fitted to those nuances than traditional standard English writing systems.

Along with this explanation as preface, the teacher should make sure to take the students through Tonouchi’s wonderful story, especially highlighting the speech the Pidgin Guerrilla (and here Tonouchi’s insistence on using standard English orthography for his own self-styled *nom de plume* and in the Guerrilla’s own speech is worth comment in itself) makes at one point in the middle of the story:

\(^{21}\) As Susan Miller reminds us in *Textual Carnivals*, Shakespeare was *not* the earliest student of composition, so “he could not be excused for spelling his own name six different ways”\(^{55}\). Miller’s entire discussion of standardization and the role it is has played in composition pedagogy is quite relevant here. See Miller, 54-66.
"Standard english is one oxymoron, english by nature isn't standard. If you travel to different parts of da country, eh-rybody's english going be li'l bit different. And if you compare english thru time, go compare Beowulf, Shakespeare, and John Grisham III, all da englishes wuz supposedly da standard of da time, but dey all so different. Dis standard ting is jus one artificial construck invented by man. Pidgin acknowledges da reality of language. In Pidgin we can look beyond correck-incorreck in terms of grammar, spelling, pronunciation, and focus on da content. Pidgin breaks down da hierarchies and instead of dismissing based on superficialities, you take da time to undahstan and get to know wea da person is coming from. We like standardize ehryting cuz it makes tings mo' easy fo' process, but wot would happen if we did 'em da hod way?"

(Tonouchi 2001, 134-35).

It is exactly with a passage like this that the teacher should take a moment—whether teaching "pijin wawrz" in a composition classroom or a literature classroom—to ask students to freewrite for five minutes, and to then have some group discussion. For as Marilyn Rye points out in a recent article "Using Composition Strategies in the Literature Classroom to Develop 'Critical' Readers and 'Critical Relativism'" (2003), both composition and literature courses define as central objectives teaching students to construct and validate knowledge through textual interpretations. Both suggest that reading, writing, and construction of meaning are interrelated processes. (14)
At this point in the discussion, the teacher should also point out that Lee Tonouchi himself writes in HCE all the time—even as a teacher at Kapiʻolani Community College (KCC). Tonouchi is insistent on writing HCE whether the assignment be a résumé (Tonouchi’s own letter of application to KCC was written in HCE) or a formal written assignment; and he encourages and permits his students to write in HCE as well. Tonouchi raises all these points in his own recent monograph essay Living Pidgin: Contemplations on Pidgin Culture.

Further, it may be incumbent on the composition teacher who would go so far in the Hawai‘i classroom as to introduce these concepts into class to encourage and permit students to write their own essays—even formal argumentative essays—in HCE. In fact, I had a student ask to write her final paper in HCE for an English 100 class in the spring of 2003. She had done this after I had assigned two or three of Tonouchi’s stories from da word as an assignment in the last weeks of the class. The class discussion on these stories was one of the most exciting of the semester, as more than half of the class members were in one way or another HCE users. For this particular student, she experienced what Lisa Linn Kanae describes at the end of her extended collage essay Sista Tongue when such students discover HCE truly validated as an acceptable way of writing in all genres—whether creative writing or academic writing. As Kanae writes, “When local Hawaiʻi students hear the rhythms of their own literature, they are pleasantly shocked. It is as if they had never imagined their world was significant enough to be in the pages of a book.” This student’s first language was HCE, and as with many students whose first language is HCE, her standard English composition had shown signs of original and insightful thinking throughout the semester; however, she seemed to keep on
getting ‘stuck’ in expressing herself. However, when freed of the bonds of having to write in this second language of standard English, her final essay was an eloquent testimony to the power and empowering ability writing in HCE can convey to some local students.

Nevertheless, one can push the interpretations of Tonouchi’s work still deeper. To return to the binarism that Wilson and Schultz set up of the two postmodernisms—one valorizing voice, the other a local engagement in experimental writing—one can pose the question to students: To which of these two postmodernisms does Tonouchi’s work give greater allegiance? While this may be a difficult question to approach strictly in the composition classroom, it should nonetheless be attempted. For if Tonouchi on one hand creates a persona like the Pidgin Guerrilla apparently soaked in voice and a sort of local HCE essentialism, he also challenges the very essentialism of such writing by choosing to write in non-standard HCE styles of writing like Odo orthography. After all, he chose to write the final story of da word in Odo orthography, yet reverted to a more ‘traditional’ orthography (a là Darrell Lum) in his extended essay Living Pidgin: Contemplation on Pidgin Culture. And as he makes the case in Living Pidgin, HCE should be acceptable in all linguistic discourses—whether creative writing, non-fiction, academic, or business writing. Tonouchi will not compromise with the current status quo: unlike one successful first-generation Bamboo Ridge writer, who once told me that he tells his class to write in HCE but to know all the rules of standard English and be able to write in standard English, Tonouchi sees no reason for compromise with the standard English system in Hawai‘i—this system, after all and parenthetically, is the legacy of colonialism in these islands. Tonouchi is thus not even half-joking when he writes near the end of Living
Pidgin "Should we raise awareness in da work place about Pidgin civil rights and Pidgin discrimination?" (46). So if Tonouchi represents a sort of ‘essentialist voice’ in Pidgin (which I do not believe he does), he nevertheless creates a persona willing to challenge and stand up to the system in a full critique of the right of teachers to insist students master standard English when the first language of many of these students is HCE.

Does this mean that these students of HCE will be placed in a sort of academic jeopardy in the sense that their relation to their Native tongue, HCE, will be undertheorized? In the case of Tonouchi’s writings, I would assert that the answer is no. In many of the techniques Tonouchi employs in his writing—the collage style of Living Pidgin, the Odo orthography of “pijin wawrz”, the use of footnotes in true academic fashion throughout Living Pidgin, I would argue that in fact Tonouchi is also firmly insistent on the full theoretical complexity of HCE as both a dialect of voice and a fully engaged textual practice. In this respect, Tonouchi’s textual practices are akin to those of the L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poet Charles Bernstein, who in Artifice of Absorption creates a distinction between writing that is absorptive and antiabsorptive.

For Bernstein, antiabsorptive writing prevents the reading process from becoming "absorbing," i.e., like the reading of a detective novel or a mystery. Such absorptive reading creates an illusion of texts that are not historically situated so that the reading of absorptive texts can in no way lead to what we might call in Freirian terms an awakening to critical consciousness, or to a “sociohistorical reading” of such texts. As Bernstein puts it:

In order for a sociohistorical reading to be possible, absorption
of the poem's own ideological imaginary must be
blocked; the refusal if absorption is a
prerequisite to understanding (in the literal sense
of standing under rather than inside). (Bernstein 1992, 21)

Creating an antiabsorptive text is thus a way of situating readers and text in history by
refusing to allow readers an easy way "into" the text; rather, readers must work their way
around, or "under", the text. Such obstructed readings will ideally bring about a more
heightened critical consciousness about language in readers, so that such moves are as
much political as they are aesthetic.

But here I must introduce a complication, a complication that seems to run
counter to the post-colonial argument I have presented so far: namely, that while all
writing is political, writing is not all political. For it seems to me that all too often in the
teaching of literature, particularly literary theory, the fine line between all writing being
political and writing being all political is crossed. It is against the latter that I argue.
What is the difference? It is the difference between recognizing that writing is an
extension of the human body, just as other tools that humanity has created throughout the
ages are extensions of the body, as opposed to asserting that writing is what is done to the
body rather than something that the body does. There is little doubt that there are
elements of truth to the notion that we write only in response to having encountered the
writing of others, so that we are in a real sense always written on before writing; writing,
then is our response, our answering back, to what has been written on us. We might do
well at this point to recall Susan Miller's comments on composition's obsession with
mechanical errors (one form standardization can take) in Textual Carnivals:
Writing makes an object of a student's language, and usually without at all objectifying a composition teacher's judgment of its writer. Consequently, the practice of attending to mechanical errors allowed written texts to become instruments for examining the "body" of a student, not just the student body. This attention allows a teacher (an "auditor" in both aural and accounting senses) to examine the student's language with the same attitude that controls a clinical medical examination. (57)

What Miller is pointing out here is how our positions as teachers of composition fulfill a truly Foucauldian institutional function, like that of a doctor or the regulators of a prison. The consequences for reading and responding to student texts are profound here.

The reason is that my text, like my voice, is also my body: so that the distinctions I quoted Glissant as drawing earlier in this chapter become problematized—writing does engage the body, and is as much a reflection of the body politic as of the political body. So like my body, social forces may control its context: perhaps you would like me to tuck in this piece of fat here, or to develop strength in certain muscles, or wear my hair just so, or to develop certain hand-eye coordination skills. Almost certainly, as Foucault points out throughout Discipline and Punish, just such a desire of society to impose its wishes on individuals has been the driving force of most social institutions from the early nineteenth century, from prisons to government agencies ranging from the military to education. Often in composition, the desire to have students learn the rules so that they can then break them is often a disguised pedagogical impulse that allows teachers to maintain their social institutional status (in the Foucauldian sense), while at the same time allowing them to ease their consciences as to the fulfillment of their own pedagogical
liberatory practices. Teachers like Tonouchi, then, are to be praised and admired, for refusing to give into this Foucauldian institutional sense of imposing standardization and regularity on their students, and instead insisting that students be allowed to write in their own languages.

Let me insert my own story here as an example. Often teachers of composition will criticize students’ writing and try to reason with students about the criticism. Teachers will often tell students that the criticism is not of the students as people, but rather is a comment on the writing alone. How can we arbitrarily separate students from the texts they produce? As I look back on my own academic career, I realize that we cannot. And nothing makes this clearer than a paraphrase of comments I myself received many years ago in response to a paper I submitted in a composition class:

You cannot write. This is not your fault. I know that you grew up in a public school system which probably gave you few opportunities to write; or, which when it did provide such opportunities, did not give you the proper direction or guidance. Much of what we teach nowadays in English 100, or even English 315, is remedial writing. You own writing shows the peculiar habit of circling around itself, “beating around the bush,” one might say, without ever going anywhere: it’s all heat, no light.

As I look back on such comments, I realize now that they did express some truth about the piece of writing I had turned in for that class—and I worked hard throughout that semester to learn to generate more light in my writing. But as I also look back and reflect on such comments, I also hear a teacher fulfilling his or her institutional obligations just as Foucault describes them in *Discipline and Punish*. If all writing is political—and I
accept this statement as a working premise for writing—then the comments we make in response to student writing are political as well. They are statements about class, education, institutional authority, power, domination, and oppression. And as all of these things, and more, they are the stuff that revolutions may be fought over. For revolutions, from the macropolitical view, may have their origins in political-economic systems; but every revolution is fed by the festering wounds inflicted on the bodies and souls of individuals.

This intimacy between writing and individuals has been observed by composition scholars for some time. Further, it seems to run across the gamut cultures, and is not simply the product of western capitalism. For example, Helen Fox has noted the intimacy with which students who come from outside the United States to study regard their writing:

Although many who live and work in other countries are changed by the experience and feel some “reverse culture shock” upon returning home, it is learning to write within the new culture, students tell me, that produces the most profound change in a person. And it is because writing is so tied to thinking—the inner expression of a person’s being—and to communicative style—its outer expression—thus touching the core of the writer’s identity. (71)

Even allowing for the ways in which individuals are molded by the societies in which they are reared, we may have to admit that the self in a capitalist society functions in a way that it has the appearance of a core identity congealed around it, otherwise the identity of the individual in question may be subjected to questioning and even
institutionalization. It is these tools of order—a social insistence on apparent core individuality that can be held accountable for ethical decisions—that have created the institutions of power that hold sway in capitalist societies, according to Foucault. Schizophrenia—the failure of such a core identity to congeal—is only then defined in societies that have such institutions. This is the material reality of such societies, and it has to a large extent become the material reality of societies invaded by western culture. One way to challenge such societies is to challenge notions of “correctness” as a criteria for grading writing. When grading writing, then, we must perhaps learn to silence our own churning minds, our own every prolific voices, and submit ourselves to the experience of the text/author: the first impulse must be to see uncritically, to absorb, and even enjoy, these extensions of the author’s body, rather than trying to make them conform to our own taught conceptions of what writing should be. We need to play what Elbow so many years ago in Writing Without Teachers called “the believing game.” However, the catch is that institutions expect us to “teach,” not just to absorb.

Fox explores this dilemma throughout her book: perhaps at times she seems to flip-flop between trying to teach her students and trying to listen to them. As she puts the dilemma herself: “I realized we must do both—change the students and change the university—even if it seems contradictory, even if doing so seems to support ethnocentrism at the same time we try to dismantle it” (108). As Fox elaborates on this contradiction, we must help students “cope” with the system as it exists even as we try to change the system. But the caveat here is that it is the teachers who want to change the system who often buy more into the system: they surrender much of their independence in graduate schools by accepting assistantships; they continue to buy in by looking for
tenure track jobs after completing their studies; they regularize the texts they submit for publication to make sure they conform to the latest MLA guidelines. And in the struggle to move from peon to professor, they become enmeshed in departmental politics while trying to cling tenaciously to what few surviving ideals may still be intact after these various social processes to which they voluntarily submit themselves. No wonder they often end up talking to the world more than listening to it; no wonder that even someone like Fox, who has some fine ideas, mixes the pedantic urge to help students with the emerging ethos of trying to listen to them more often.

Years ago, when I was in my early twenties and taking first year Hawaiian at KCC, I remember an older woman of Hawaiian ancestry go off in anger about the way she was brought up as a child. She said that she was expected to be silent and watch and listen to adults as she went about her daily chores. She complained that whenever she tried to ask questions, she would be silenced, and she complained that adults would never explain things to her. She once said that she wished she had had a more “American” style of upbringing: more talk, more questions, and I might add parenthetically: more complaining. So as she would tell me these things about her childhood, something began to dawn on me, something I didn’t have the courage to share with her: it seemed to be me that even from her negative comments on such practices, what came across was an apparently simple notion that Native Hawaiians must have held—that children naturally pickup on what’s happening, and that the best way to do that was to not interfere with the process by making comments—comments from either parent or child. For the flip side of what she was telling me was that her parents rarely corrected her on any mistakes she made: her parents did not scold her, physically abuse her, or talk at her about her own
errors. The feeling I got was that her parents expected that she would figure out her own mistakes and so learn from them. It is also important to recall that in Native Hawaiian society, corporal punishment of children had no place; further, condescending language to anyone, including children, was unacceptable. And it was interesting that even in first year Hawaiian, our kumu seemed to stress similar values in her own pedagogy. Such notions seem to me to indicate a profound respect for the human capacity to learn on its own, without pedantically drilling models of correctness into the learner’s head: people naturally want to learn, and to push them, cajole them, even bully them into doing so will probably cause a reaction in the people so brutalized that it will have the opposite effect.

I am astonished as I read through the journal assignments for this semester. Amongst them, a College Opportunities Program (COP) student who writes approximately half of her journal responses in English and half in Hawaiian. I feel like I’ve wandered into a undiscovered country. I probably shouldn’t be all that surprised: she constantly uses Hawaiian in her emails and in her essays—all with my approval. But to see her working out her thoughts in both languages—and me trying to make out some phrases using what little I can recall of my first year Hawaiian. I recall my Anzldúa, my readings of Theresa Hak Kyung Cha’s Dictee, and of course the example Mary Louise Pratt discusses in her famous article “Arts of the Contact Zone”: Poma’s New Chronicle and Good Government. And I will be meeting with this student tomorrow. I must tell her that it is o.k. to write in both languages—that she must keep on writing how she feels most comfortable. I must share with her works that validate her right to write between however many languages she must in order to be able to write her story. Like Gary Tate wrote a few years ago in “A Place for Literature in Freshman Composition,” I feel like
telling this student, “Pssst. Hey, kid. Want to read a good poem?” (176)—a good poem that will validate her decision to write how she wants in the languages she chooses to write in. I’ll share with her a copy of Anzaldúa’s and Cha’s work—no wait, the joy of discovering for yourself, wandering through the library and the books and seeing them for yourself. I’ll give her references to them and leave the decision to her if she wants to pursue looking these works up. I’ll ask her about HCE and if she says she also uses HCE, I’ll recommend something by Tonouchi. And I’ll remind her again that it’s o.k. to use Hawaiian—and not just words and phrases, but passages—but she should remember that while I have a revised edition of Pukui and Elbert’s Hawaiian Dictionary, she will probably have to teach the teacher in some of her essays. And like Anzaldúa, if she chooses to share with her reader in both languages, fine; but if she wants it only in one language or the other, fine again. But I must warn her, too: Warn her that there probably are English teachers who would not let her do what I am doing; but that there are other teachers in our department who not only would probably encourage it, but might be better able to guide such a student. Teachers who struggle to work between the languages—Hawaiian and English and HCE—and are far better versed than me in many of the nuances of all of them. But most of all, I want her to leave the meeting with hope.
Chapter 6: In Medias Mess; or, Writing and Communication ITRW (in the Real World)—an Example from My Own Work Experience

Quinta Slef: Well, how shall we begin? You’ve been talking and writing for the last few years about “poethics.” Why? Why complicate further an already complex term by adding an accursed Aitch? (laughter)

Joan Retallack: Quinta, my dear friend, it’s because I think a poetics can only take you so far without an “h.” When complex life on earth begins for you, then you need a poethics which foregrounds all of the arts as, rather than about, forms of engaged living in medias mess. (Joan Retallack 1996, 293)

Throughout this dissertation, I have periodically alluded to my experiences working in a hotel for over 12 years of my life. As I write this dissertation, I am still currently employed full time in the same hotel. Why? Largely for the benefits—especially health insurance—which keep my diabetes and other medications somewhat affordable. In this final chapter, I want to blend a little bit of ethnography with what J. Blake Scott in his recent work Risky Rhetoric: AIDS and the Cultural Practices of HIV Testing (2003) has called “rhetorical-cultural” analysis. Although in that study Scott addresses the problems of technoscience, rhetoric, and culture posed by the history and implementation of home HIV testing, he does also create a sort of new paradigm for blending together rhetorical analysis and cultural studies. Drawing on Richard Johnson’s influential 1987 article “What Is Cultural Studies Anyway?”, Scott describes
rhetorical-cultural analysis as an account of the entire cultural circuit by “accounting for science’s broader conditions of possibility, mapping the shifting intertext of science in action, evaluating science according to its effects, and targeting opportunities to intervene in harmful effects” (21). Scott goes on to cite the work of Colin Gordon as offering a paradigm for using this entire cultural circuit to create a genealogy that “analyzes a multiplicity of political, social, technical and theoretical conditions of possibility, re-constructing a heterogeneous system of relations and effects” (Gordon 243 as qtd. in Scott 21-22).

Although by looking at one cultural aspect of the hotel—its attempt to implement a program in the mid-nineties to ‘reintroduce’ Hawaiian culture into the practice of hotel management—I am deviating from Scott’s initial blend of rhetorical-cultural analysis and technoscience vis-à-vis HIV home testing; I hope to capture the spirit, but on a much more modest scale, of what Scott attempts to do in his own study. Further, I draw loosely on some of the techniques of ethnography in this final chapter. Ethnography has a time-honored tradition in composition studies, from Emig’s influential The Composing Processes of Twelfth Graders (1971) to Shirley Brice Heath’s Ways with Words (1983) to Scott’s own study. Although Scott does not choose to classify his own work as ethnography, one might argue that in some sense it does come out of this tradition of ethnography—albeit with a much stronger political/interventionist dimension added.

What I do in this chapter is to look at a real rhetorical process I had a personal hand in back in the early nineties: I helped to implement this process of reintroducing Hawaiian cultural practices into hotel management. The hotel for which I worked at the time I call ‘Vista Hotels’ (not the real name of the chain)—a large family-owned chain of
hotels based in Waikīkī and extending to other islands in the Pacific. In this instance I am trying to describe in ethnographic terms of sorts a language community in which I actually participated, much as Beverly J. Moss describes her own attempts to do ethnographic research in her own community in her 1993 essay "Ethnography and Composition: Studying Language at Home." As Moss observes in that essay, 

[a]t the root of most ethnographic research is the native’s perspective (the emic perspective), usually accessible to ethnographers through fieldwork. Ethnographers allow the participants (along with artifacts from the community) to define the community for them (Moss 1993, 157) 

My unusual problem in doing this research was that while on one hand, I was a participant and member of this community, much as Moss was in her own research, I was not a ‘Native’ participant in the sense of being a Native Hawaiian. This difficulty became especially vexing to me over my years in the hotel as I continued to read on one hand the works of George Kanahele, who was the spiritual father of the program that Vista Hotels adopted and implemented, and to have on the other hand more contact with the work of Native scholars such as Haunani-Kay Trask, Lilikalā Kameʻeleihiwa, and John Osorio. 

In the early nineties, the large hotel chain Vista Hotels attempted to implement a series of ongoing workshops to modify the organizational culture of the company in order to reintroduce Hawaiian values into the company operations. The program was inspired and guided by the work of Dr. George Kanahele, who throughout the nineties worked with a variety of local companies to “re-Hawaiianize” our local business environment.
George Kanahele passed away in 1999, but not before having a big impact on Vista Hotels and on Waikīkī in general. In a series of papers and pamphlets—“Can Waikīkī be Re-Hawaiianized?”, Critical Reflections on Cultural Values and Hotel Management in Hawai‘i—Kanahele argued that Waikīkī had lost its ‘sense of place,’ and so was in need of a Hawaiian Renaissance similar to the one Kanahele himself had identified with the achievements of Native Hawaiian voyagers on Hokule‘a in his 1982 monograph Hawaiian Renaissance (1982). Kanahele’s works had a profound influence on business leaders and executives during the nineties. In fact, his writings were in many ways like a poetic touchstone for some hotel executives—a touchstone that, in the words of Retallack quoted at the beginning of this chapter, attempted to foreground all of the arts as about engaging life in medias mess. Further, I would argue that he used what might be identified as Bakhtinian notions of speech genres to create utterances that would most fully create a rhetorical sense of identification with business leaders and executives with his enterprise. I’ll return to these notions a little later in the discussion—for now, let me move on to how Vista Hotels attempted to implement the ideas of Kanahele in its business.

When Vista Hotels chose to implement their program—with George Kanahele as consultant—they chose to give the project a Hawaiian name. Using Pukui and Elbert’s Hawaiian Dictionary, they opted to translate “Vista” into the Hawaiian word “Nānaina,” which Pukui and Elbert define as “[g]eneral appearance, view, aspect, panorama, sight, scenery, scene” (261). Next, the hotel executives wanted to give the overall project a designation, so again they chose to append a Hawaiian phrase crafted in-house to the project: “Project Ho`okipa Nānaina”—Project Vista Hospitality. The working premise
behind this program, and behind the entire hotel chain, was an argument that Jimbo Gilligan always used—an argument that Gilligan's mother, Hoku (a non-Native with a Hawaiian name), had always stamped on business documents when the company was first formed in the late '40s: "In Hawai'i, tourism is everyone’s business." Jimbo Gilligan, the second generation owner of the chain, would often use this saying in both his speeches and in his writings. This saying—"In Hawai'i, tourism is everyone’s business"—combined with the attempt to reintroduce Hawaiian values into the hotel business provides an example of what Scott identifies as a "knowledge enthymeme."

In his own study of HIV testing, Scott defines a knowledge enthymeme as "a disciplinary body of persuasion that exaggerates the power and beneficial effects of testing and the knowledge it produces" (43). In transposing Scott's work to my own study of Vista Hotels, I would contend that the saying "In Hawai'i, tourism is everyone’s business" provides an example of an enthymeme in the Aristotelian sense: such a saying does exaggerate the power and beneficial effects of the visitor industry to the actual working people—the maka 'āinana, to employ my own use of Hawaiian vocabulary—of Hawai'i. The chain of reasoning behind the saying that tourism is everyone’s business runs something like this: the money brought into this state by the visitor industry provides for the continued health of its economy; and this in turn benefits everyone in the state. Such thinking in turn implies that all groups in Hawai'i, regardless of national origin or belief, benefit from this influx of visitor money. People who grew up in Hawai'i in the seventies, for example, may recall the commercial put out by the Hawai'i Visitors Bureau entitled "The Story of a One-Dollar Bill": the commercial shows a one-dollar note circulating through the local economy from the visitor’s gratuity to a bellperson, to the
various items purchased by its different possessors. What such reasoning also indicates is what Kenneth Burke calls identification.

I want now to turn to Kenneth Burke’s terminology—identification and division—for a moment here to further enrich Scott’s notion of the enthymeme. For it turns out that this knowledge can in fact be ‘questioned’ by people who claim to possess different ‘knowledges’ on a key issue—such as the supposed universal benefits of the visitor industry to all of the residents of Hawai‘i. Burke defines identification and division in opposition to each other: division represents what separates peoples as groups, what keeps them apart. As Burke puts it:

Identification is affirmed with earnestness precisely because there is division. Identification is compensatory to division. If men were not apart, from another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity. If men were wholly and truly of one substance, absolute communication would be of man’s very essence. (Burke 1952, 22)

This dialectical notion of identification and division perhaps gives us a compass by which to begin tracing the outlines of language practices within and between different communities: it may give us a pattern by which we can begin to define a possible “north” and “south” in such practices. However, Burke’s use of these terms is also usefully cagey: he defines them dialectically without recourse to over-simplistic binary oppositions. Had Burke defined these terms as binary oppositions, we would be left with lumping language practices into one category or another: either identification or division. Such a binarism would further imply that the middle ground—the possibility of categorizing a substance as simultaneously an example of identification and division—
might be excluded by the logical rule of the excluded middle. However, Burke’s system avoids these extremes, and thus provides an excellent use of terministic screens by which to analyze a variety of language practices.

To return to the discussion of the visitor industry, if the claim that the visitor industry is everyone’s business represents a trope of identification, an enthymeme that tries to encompass all of the residents of Hawai‘i, this knowledge can also be turned on its head through division. This can be done by claiming that yes, the visitor industry is indeed everyone’s business in Hawai‘i, but for exactly the opposite reason: because the industry does not benefit everyone equally, especially Hawai‘i’s Native people. Many would claim that the benefits of the visitor industry are grossly exaggerated to most Native Hawaiians.

For on the other side of this enthymeme about the benefits of the visitor industry are the claims of Native scholars who argue that the same one-dollar bill perpetuates the presence of a foreign government in these islands. Such scholars will also claim—for exactly opposite reasons—that in Hawai‘i, tourism is everyone’s business. Their twist on this interpretation is best exemplified by Haunani-Kay Trask when she writes:

If you are thinking of visiting my homeland, please don’t. We don’t want or need any more tourists, and we certainly don’t like them. If you want to help our cause, please pass this message on to your friends. (Trask 1993, 195-96)

This counterexample provided by a Native scholar is an example of Burkean division because it argues that the visitor industry does not include everyone in its benefits—that the benefits not only do not extend to all the Native people, but in fact that the industry as
it is currently managed is positively harmful to Native Hawaiians. Like the owners of Vista Hotels, Hauanani-Kay Trask will concur: In Hawai‘i, tourism is everyone’s business. But for Trask, the reasons are exactly the opposite. The benefits of the visitor industry accrue to a few powerful alien businessmen, while helping to perpetuate the presence of a colonizing power in Trask’s homeland. And when tourism turned down in the early nineties after the Gulf War, it looked as if Trask’s pleas not to visit were indeed being heeded.

When the executives of Vista Hotels turned to George Kanahele in the early nineties, business was not as good as it had once been. These business people were looking for answers—knowledge—that would answer their questions as to why this was so and, more importantly, show them how to fix it. It was at this time that George Kanahele’s arguments began to gain a serious hearing. The solution the executives sought was to blend their well-worn enthymeme about tourism being everyone’s business with a reintroduction of Hawaiian values. In the process, Vista Hotels was creating a true ‘knowledge enthymeme’ in the sense that Scott uses the phrase. As Scott puts it, “[t]he knowledge enthymeme’s main chain of premises, combined with its wider web of appeals and assumptions, creates a casual argument about the need for and effects of testing or another intervention” (44). In transposing Scott’s argument to my own example, what the visitor industry received was a stamp of authority on cultural intervention into their business in the form of Dr. George Kanahele, a respected scholar of both western and Native traditions. In the process, they were empowering their discourse in a way that had not been seen in the industry before—they were attempting to create a pool of knowledge that would allow them to make knowledge enthymemes that
would be hybrids “between a general enthymeme, common across a range of discourses, and a special one, particular to a certain type or types of discourses” (Scott 45). In the case of the visitor industry, this new blend would allow the visitor industry to tap into its traditional discursive strongholds—business, government, the TIM school of the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa—and add new dimensions: cultural critics, Native scholars, historians, and experts.

In short, the visitor industry was for the first time invading the space traditionally occupied by Native scholars like Haunani-Kay Trask. At this point, the visitor industry and Native scholars fighting to defend their traditional space were thus caught up in a rhetorical war. I want now to turn to how Kenneth Burke defines rhetoric in his *A Rhetoric of Motives* so as to draw more fully on some of his concepts for the rest of this chapter. Kenneth Burke defines rhetoric as “an essential function of language itself, a function that is wholly realistic, and is continually born anew: the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols” (Burke 1952, 43). Whereas the key-term (or as Burke might have it, the god-term) in classical rhetoric is “persuasion,” the key-term in Burkean rhetoric is “identification.” And what these two sides who fight over the meaning of what the enthymeme “In Hawai‘i, tourism is everyone’s business” are fighting over is the rhetorical equivalent of identification.

What I want to look at now is how these Burkean notions of rhetoric—identification and division—played themselves out rhetorically and ethically during the nineties in the business practices of Vista Hotels. I also want to draw on Bakhtinian notions of what constitute coherent utterances and Foucauldian notions of “fields of use”
by which to analyze these practices and to account for my own participation in such practices.

A Word on Materials and Methods

In order to achieve the sort of ‘triangulation’ that ethnographers draw on in performing their research, I drew on several sources. First and foremost were the written works of George Kanahele himself—especially his finest work in my opinion, *Kī Kānaka: A Search for Hawaiian Values* (1986)—but also his publications on his dream of re-Hawaiianizing Waikīkī. Second, I drew on a paraphrased version of the “Sense of Place” script George Kanahele prepared for the Vista Hotel *Alaka‘i* (leaders) who were to present the various Project Ho‘okipa workshops to their fellow employees. This paraphrased version of the script is presented in Appendix B of this dissertation. Third, some of the responses I received while serving as an *Alak‘i*—formal or informal feedback from fellow employees—are recalled through the technique of recalled dialogues. All I can do in this regard is to attest to the truth of the gist of each instance in which I have lapsed into recalled dialogue, and I beg my readers’ forgiveness for any possible lapses. However, I felt that using recalled dialogues in this way did represent one way of introducing alternative discourses into the otherwise traditional academic project of producing research which aspires to Blake’s call for rhetorical-cultural analyses that are drawn from fields in which we as rhetoricians find ourselves socially and politically enmeshed. Nevertheless, I have always tried to keep in mind as I review my work and notes from the past that I am listening to voices from a few years earlier in my life—and
so I try to listen with the ‘strategic idealism’ I cited Krista Ratcliffe as calling for at the end of the fourth chapter of this dissertation.

In terms of the specifics of the implementation of Project Ho‘okipa Nānaima, the process was designed to be implemented in three stages: 1) sense of place, or wahi, which includes the script of the slideshow mentioned above; 2) the role of the host, or mea ho‘okipa, which would discuss how we as hotel employees (or, hospitalitarians, to employ nomenclature Kanahele himself used early in the process) could best fulfill our function in the hotel; and 3) the role of the guest, or malihini, which would discuss some of the obligations and roles Vista guests were to assume. But before we as Alaka‘i actually went to our own departments to present these programs, we first had an opportunity to hear presentations given by George Kanahele himself at the Vista Hotels’ Diamond Head Conference Room—an experience which I will recount shortly.

George Kanahele: Speaker, Utterance, Field of Use

As I have already recounted, the executives of Vista Hotels approached George Kanahele back in the early nineties and asked him about instituting a program to reintroduce Hawaiian concepts such as ho‘okipa into the operation of the hotel. At that time, there was much talk about how to bolster a flagging visitor industry in Hawai‘i. In the past, such talk had usually centered around two subjects: increasing the budget to the then-Hawai‘i Visitor Bureau (HVB) so as to increase the marketing of Hawai‘i as a visitor destination; and the legalization of gambling to improve the lure of Hawai‘i to Asian visitors. Corollary to both of these major issues had been the underlying push since the early eighties to build a major convention center in or near Waikīkī.
However, George Kanahele and the Waiaha Foundation, a private foundation of which he was a sort of spiritual and intellectual father, had analyzed the problem from a different point of view. Kanahele argued that for Hawai‘i to maintain its competitiveness as a major visitor destination, it was necessary to maintain and restore the Hawaiian sense of place, or as Kanahele phrased it, the “Hawaiianess,” of Hawai‘i, and especially of Waikīkī. As recounted in an article in Hospitality, “Can Waikīkī Be Re-Hawaiianized?” (1995), Kanahele shared how he had taken his program to outer island hotels in the eighties because Waikīkī hotel chains were not interested; however, after the Gulf War and the ensuing recession, many executives reconsidered their stance on Kanahele’s ideas. By the early nineties, Kanahele and the Waiaha Foundation had coined a phrase for this endeavor to re-Hawaiianize Hawai‘i’s hotels: “Project Tourism: Keeper of the Culture.” Kanahele also argued his case in a short monograph on the subject entitled Critical Reflections on Cultural Values & Hotel Management in Hawai‘i (1991). In this monograph, Kanahele claimed that the visitor industry in Hawai‘i might serve its own best interests by using some of its enormous economic power to perpetuate and to preserve the Hawaiian culture by promoting Hawaiian cultural activities in the hotels, upholding basic Hawaiian values in management practice, and promoting the Hawaiian culture outside of the hotels through such activities as supporting crafters, hula hālau, and exhibitions and research designed to discover and to disseminate information on the Hawaiian culture.

Even with this brief description of Kanahele’s endeavors, it is possible to see in Kanahele’s project a rhetorical attempt to establish Burkean identification tropes that would include everyone in Hawai‘i: businesses, employees, government agencies,
concerned citizens and scholars (like Kanahele himself), and kūpuna (elders) are only some of the groups that might be tapped for such an enterprise. Or to rephrase the enthymeme mentioned earlier in this paper, Kanahele was extending on the notion that “In Hawai‘i, tourism is everyone’s business” by adding a knowledge/power component to it: “In Hawai‘i, the Hawaiian culture is everyone’s business.” Further, when we turn to the workshops Vista Hotels created to institute the process, we find a deliberate effort to use examples from across cultures to further enhance this Burkean identification: the workshops identified the Hawaiian word for spiritual force or energy, Mana, by comparing it to similar terms from across other cultures: Ki in Japanese; Chi in Chinese; Prana in Indian; Plenum in Greek. Similarly, the Hawaiian term for hospitality, ho‘okipa, was explained by referring to analogous terms from other cultures: Panang Sangaili in Ilocano, or Philoxenia in Greek. So what George Kanahele attempted to accomplish by such comparisons was to emphasize the rhetoric of Burkean identification: all of the cultures who now inhabited Hawai‘i, not only the Native culture, had precedents for the concepts that seemed unique to Hawaiian culture.

However, if Kanahele was really going to make his argument effective, he also needed to underscore rhetorically what made Hawai‘i culturally different; in short, he had to come up with the rhetorical equivalent of Burkean division. But he had to do so without alienating his largely non-Native audience so that they could still identify with his project. How did Kanahele do this? One trope he used would be to use the words of nineteenth-century haole to describe the uniqueness of Hawaiian ho‘okipa. For example, in Kū Kanaka (1986), he cited William Ellis, a nineteenth-century visitor to Hawai‘i, as observing:
“Even the poorest would generally share their scanty dish of potatoes with a stranger. Not to entertain a guest with what they have, is among themselves, considered reproachful; and there are many, who, if they had but one pig or fowl in the yard, or one root of potatoes in the garden, would cheerfully take them to furnish a repast for a friend.” (as qtd. in Kanahele 1986, 372).

And to further bolster the correctness of these haole observations, Kanahele goes on to emphasize that even chiefs were expected to share in a similar manner and not to be niggardly in their ho`okipa, for to do so would mean they could incur the worst epithet an Ali`i could earn for him or herself: to be labeled pīpine, or stingy (Kanahele 1986, 416-21). Kanahele thus tried to emphasize the uniqueness of Hawaiian ho`okipa through a sort of triangulation: the audience (in the present) identifies with a haole observer of ho`okipa (in the past); this haole observer attests to what makes ho`okipa in Hawai`i unique, in other words what divides or separates ho`okipa from say philoxenia. This haole observer’s testimony is then corroborated through the current scholarship of a Native (Kanahele) as he reads the works of other nineteenth-century Native Hawaiian scholars (Malo and Kamakau, for example). Kanahele thus fulfills the Burkean rhetor’s dual mission of emphasizing division through a medium of identification.

In addition to the Burkean elements of identification and division, we can also find in Kanahele’s works two other elements to which I wish to draw attention: the Bakhtinian notion of the utterance and the Foucauldian notion of the field of use. For the texts that Kanahele helped to create for the Project Ho`okipa Nānaina project are also examples of utterances: in the end, the employees of Vista Hotels were subjected to these
utterances, and they were then expected to respond according to patterns which Bakhtin outlines in his essay “The Problem of Speech Genres.”

I want now to draw on Bakhtinian notions of what constitute coherent utterances to analyze these language practices. The utterance in Bakhtin is not an artifact that can be looked at in isolation from speaker and listener; rather, the Bakhtinian notion of utterance always involves a speaker and a “comprehending” listener. Bakhtin explains these notions when he writes:

"The fact is that when the listener perceives and understands the meaning (the language meaning) of speech, he simultaneously takes an active, responsive attitude toward it. He either agrees or disagrees with it (completely or partially), augments it, applies it, prepares for its execution, and so on. And the listener adopts that responsive attitude for the entire duration of the process of listening and understanding, from the very beginning—sometimes literally from the speaker’s first word. Any understanding of live speech, a live utterance, is inherently responsive, although the degree of this activity varies extremely. Any understanding is imbued with response and necessarily elicits it in one from or another: the listener becomes the speaker. A passive understanding of the meaning of perceived speech is only an abstract aspect of the actual whole of actively responsive understanding, which is then actualized in a subsequent response that is actually articulated. (Bakhtin 1986, 68)"

This active listening on the part of the audience will not merely be understood, however; it will influence the speech and behavior of its audience. As Bakhtin goes on to observe:
Sooner or later what is heard and actively understood will find its response in the subsequent speech or behavior of the listener. In most cases, genres of complex cultural communication are intended precisely for this kind of actively responsive understanding with delayed action. Everything we have said here also pertains to written and read speech, with the appropriate adjustments and additions. (Bakhtin 1986, 68-69)

I would contend that Kanahele’s work next attempts to carry on a dialogue with a variety of sources: businesspeople in Hawai‘i, nineteenth-century haole observers of Hawai‘i, and nineteenth-century Native Hawaiian scholars are all drawn into the conversation to corroborate Kanahele’s interpretation of such topics as ho‘okipa.

This dialogic aspect of Bakhtin’s work is of course what he is largely famous for in contemporary criticism. What I would argue here is that Kanahele’s work, as expressed through his articles, his books, and his work on the Project Ho‘okipa Nānaina program are examples of the Bakhtinian notion of the utterance in which units of speech are marked by “changes of speaking subjects” (Bakhtin 71). Bakhtin contends that

[a]ny utterance—from a short (single-word) rejoinder in everyday dialogue to the large novel of scientific treatise—has, so to speak, an absolute beginning and an absolute end: its beginning is preceded by the utterances of others, and its end is followed by the utterances of others (or, although it may be silent, others’ active responsive understanding, or, finally, a responsive action based on this understanding). The speaker ends his utterance in order to relinquish the floor to the other or to make room for the other’s active responsive understanding. (Bakhtin 1986, 71)
One of the things I want to do through the rest of this chapter is look at what other Vista employees say when Kanahele or the employees of Vista Hotels designated as speakers for the Project Ho‘okipa Nānaina program “relinquish the floor.” For in the final analysis, it is their “active responsive understanding” that determines the success of failure of the program.

A second terministic screen (to again employ Burkean terminology) I want to employ here is the Foucauldian notion of the “field of use” Foucault discusses in The Archaeology of Knowledge. The field of use defines a rule of materiality for how statements how are socially inscribed: “The rule of materiality that statements necessarily obey is therefore of the order of the institution rather than of the spatio-temporal localization; it defines possibilities of reinscription and transcription (but also thresholds and limits), rather than limited and perishable individualities” (103). What are the institutional forces at work that allow for the possibilities of inscription and reinscription in the case of Project Ho‘okipa Nānaina? First, there is an agent: George Kanahele, who blended his socially inscribed powers as businessman, scholar, teacher, and civic leader as the holder of a Ph.D. in Government and Southeast Asian Affairs from Cornell. This agent attempted to reinscribe in a scene (Waikīkī, the ancient capital of O‘ahu and Kamehameha’s second capital of a united Hawai‘i) a ritualized past (the purpose, viz., restoring Hawaiian ho‘okipa to a place). He further attempted to do this within the current backdrop of a dominant visitor industry that had completely transformed Waikīkī-as-scene. Kanahele’s agency further derived from the fact that he was on one hand a recognized Native Hawaiian scholar who had written recognized books such as Kū Kanaka and the Encyclopedia of Hawaiian Music and Musicians, and on the other hand
he was also a Native Hawaiian who had cracked the white man’s so-called doorway to success: higher education. Further, he had worked over a series of year (in conjunction with the Waiaha Foundation) to develop a scripted definition of hospitality (ho’okipa) that he could now deploy at Vista Hotels so that the institution of the hotel could in turn disseminate these concepts to its workers.

We can further combine Aristotelian notions of rhetoric with this Foucauldian reading of the field of use at play in Project Ho’okipa Nānaina by interpreting George Kanahele’s actions as an exercise in ethos, pathos, and logos. Kanahele exercised ethos through his unique combination of scholarship and compassion for his cultural roots; pathos in the way he carefully articulated his position so that his audience could both identify with what he was saying, while at the same time acknowledging the difference, the uniqueness, that set Hawaiian culture apart; and logos insofar as he made a rational appeal to the business community of Hawai‘i that it needed to take responsibility in helping to preserve and perpetuate the Hawaiian culture. And this entire Aristotelian triad was in turn inscribed and reinscribed based on the responses of Vista employees to Kanahele’s scripted utterances. 22

What Does George Kanahele Make?

We are all sitting in a dark room at the Vista Hotel’s Diamond Head Conference Room. We are about to watch a slideshow prepared by George Kanahele entitled

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22 For an example of such a scripted utterance, please see a paraphrased version of the script I and other Vista employees would use as a guide to preparing the Project Ho’okipa Nānaina Sense of Place Workshops in Appendix B of this dissertation.
“Waikīkī: 2000 Years of History,” and the Vista security officer sitting next to me leans over and whispers, “How much do you think he’s getting paid to do this?”

“Who?” I respond feigning ignorance of to whom the officer is referring.

“Kanahele. They must be paying him a lot.”

“Yeah, they must. An awful lot if he’s going to be making up slideshows to show to the executives,” I respond.

A year later, one of the security captains and I discuss the merits of Project Ho’okipa Nānaina: to sum up, I support the program, while the captain presents some strong objections. The security captain is a Native Hawaiian.

“You know, my kupuna, they perpetuate the Hawaiian culture and don’t do it for money, like they’re trying to do with this Project Ho’okipa Nānaina. It’s selling the Hawaiian culture out for a buck.”

“No, I think you’re wrong. Look, even the original keepers of the Hawaiian culture, like the Kāhuna, sold their skills to the Ali‘i in exchange for greater economic benefits and prestige in the old culture,” I respond.

Money—a sensitive subject. And the more of it one makes, the more sensitive it becomes. If anything can create a sense of division in an audience, money can: who has it, who doesn’t, whether it is distributed fairly or not. But money can also create a sense of identification in an audience: in modern capitalist society, everyone needs to make and spend money in one form or another. Kanahele put forth an argument in Kū Kanaka for interpreting the Native Hawaiian culture as one that blended political, economic, cultural, and spiritual aspects of society in such a way that the boundaries between these fields were not distinct, as they are in capitalist society. For unlike western culture, which has
created the conditions for interpreting aesthetic, religious, economic, and political realities as separate phenomena, Native Hawaiian culture according to Kanahele had embraced all of these spheres in a unified cultural identity.

Kanahele, writing of this unity, a unity today's society would have trouble comprehending, describes how the making of a canoe was a sacred, as well as an economic, undertaking in pp. 112-13 of Kū Kanaka. As Kanahele puts it in that work, “all ritual brings some benefit, directly or indirectly, to material well-being” (112).

Kanahele then cites David Malo’s claim that “the building of a canoe was an affair of religion” by observing that the making of the canoe might employ any where from eight to one hundred men in a cycle that moves from procuring the supplies for the canoe maker, employing men for several weeks to haul the log from the mountains to the work areas, then the actual carving and production of the canoe. But accompanying all of these activities were the proper rites and prayers to assure that every stage of the process was done properly, in accordance with what was spiritually proper. Kanahele again cites Malo as saying that canoe makers were “very much like preachers. They do what is correct and proper and do not commit sins” (Malo as qtd. in Kanahele, 112). Kanahele then concludes

[t]he entire purpose of ritual was to ensure that every stage of this "laborious and dangerous undertaking" would be successful. In short, for Hawaiians ritual was the handmaiden to economics. (Kanahele 1986, 113)

What Kanahele tries to do in such passages is to create in his audience a sense of identification between current economic practices and original Native practices. Further, he tries to undermine potential arguments against his enterprise that might be forth,
arguments like those of the security captain I mentioned earlier. Kanahele might further have attempted to refute the security captain’s comments by arguing that they represented notions of a separation between various fields, a separation that could only be recognized after the arrival of western culture in Hawai‘i: for example, an “art for art’s sake” notion of knowledge, a notion of art not tied to economics or politics.

*Kū or Lono?

Alasdair MacIntyre, who I cited earlier in this dissertation, begins *After Virtue* with a hypothetical situation: suppose modern civilization suffers a catastrophe in which a series of environmental disasters are blamed on the scientists of the world. Suppose further that the world’s populations then launch a movement to eradicate all science and scientists: the burning of scientific texts, the execution of scientists, the end of science teaching would all in turn become policies of state. Then suppose generations later that the few surviving fragments of this catastrophe are at last picked up and that later generations attempt to re-establish science. What would we have? The generations engaged in such an enterprise would have bits and pieces, and so would need to begin rebuilding a system of theory around these fragments, but would they be in possession of the system in its entirety? MacIntyre goes on to suggest that this is exactly the situation with regards to discussion of morality and ethics in contemporary western civilization: that the traditional (and as we saw earlier in this dissertation, this word ‘traditional’ is key here) moral system of medieval Europe was largely destroyed by seventeenth and eighteenth-century philosophers and that contemporary philosophy must try to pick up the pieces of a system of moral thought that had been developed from a blend of the
classical/heroic cultures of Greece and Rome, and the Christian moral thought developed from Augustine to Aquinas. However, in the works he has written since *After Virtue—Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* and *Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry*, MacIntyre does go on to assert that enough is known about the predecessor cultures to provide a solid basis upon which a renewed Thomistic-Aristotelian morality based in tradition may again be founded.

It is not my place as non-Native to argue how Hawaiian Civilization should proceed in its current resurgence, I do sense that in many ways Hawaiian Civilization is more or less exactly at an analogous point in its own Renaissance. Enough of the traditions of Native culture survive so that Hawaiian Civilization, despite the genocidal ravages of the past two centuries, can again survive and prosper under some form of Sovereignty. However, one of the things I realize is that I am strictly *haumana*, a student, of this civilization; it is not my *kuleana*, my place, to offer up any suggestions, public or private, on how this Renaissance is to proceed. On one hand I enjoyed studying in the classes prepared for Vista Hotels under the auspices of George Kanahele: these classes helped to open my eyes to ways of looking at Hawai‘i, and at Waikīkī in particular, that have been exciting and rewarding. For like many non-Native locals, I grew up hearing the oral legends perpetuated by many haole on O‘ahu: legends about how Waikīkī was a swamp (and that word evoking an image of a wasteland, or swamp creatures, in my

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23 It was during the seventies that George Kanahele coined the phrase “Hawaiian Renaissance” to describe the renewal of interest in nā mea Hawai‘i, things Hawaiian, that was then taking place among peoples of both Hawaiian and non-Hawaiian ancestry. In the speech in which he coined the phrase (1977), Kanahele noted several events that marked this Renaissance: the voyage of Hōkūle‘a to and from Tahiti which reaffirmed the validity of Polynesian navigation techniques and refuted the ‘drift’ theories of thinkers like Thor Heyerdahl; the renewed interest in Hawaiian music, which Kanahele himself helped to promote with the publication of his encyclopedia on Hawaiian music; the renewed interest in the hula, both modern and kahiko; the resurgence of interest in Hawaiian crafts such as wood working and lei making; and a renewed concern for the sanctity of the ʻĀina, as manifested by the activities of the Protect Kahoʻolawe ʻOhana.
mind) that was drained and “reclaimed” for modern development. I knew that the
beaches had always been famous, and that the Ali‘i of old had used that as their personal
“getaway” spots during the nineteenth-century, but I had always had visions of them tip-toeing through the swamps to reach their favorite surfing haunts. How na`aupō, how
hūpō, I was and remain.

So I take very seriously Kame‘elehiwa’s injunction at the end of Native Lands
and Foreign Desires that Hawaiian Sovereignty is none of my business, none of my
kuleana. George Kanahele, as far as I know, remained relatively mute with respect to
sovereignty throughout the remainder of his life. Further, leaders of the workshops at
Vista Hotels were advised to veer away from any discussion of sovereignty, and to
instead steer class attendees toward the “cultural” and “historical” facts, rather than to
discussions of what can and should be done. And in retrospect, I know that I really felt in
tune with what that security captain was telling me that night: I felt that we should take a
stand on the issue, that Kanahele should have told us how he felt about the issue, and the
owners and executives of Vista Hotels should have told us where they stood on the issue.
It seems in retrospect that Kanahele perhaps went too far in emphasizing the ways in
which Hawaiian culture could be identified with the other cultures of the world. He
emphasized Lono, the God of agriculture and of peace, the God of Aloha and Ho`okipa,
who perhaps led Hawaiians for two centuries to accept with too great a tolerance the
haole invading their shores. But as Kenneth Burke reminds us, identification cannot exist
without division, for pure identification could only be achieved if all humans were of one
substance. And we are not.
So I sense that if the Hawaiian Renaissance George Kanahele described in the
seventies is to continue, it will not be through programs like those he tried to set up in the
hotels of Waikīkī in the nineties. For as Kame‘eleihiwa argues in Native Lands and
Foreign Desires, there must also be a place for Kū, the Hawaiian War God,
Kamehameha’s primary deity in the form of Kūkā‘ilimoku, the deity under whom
Kamehameha himself unified the Hawaiian Islands. Kame‘eleihiwa goes on to point out
that both Lono and Kū were necessary in the path to Pono, to righteousness. As
Kame‘eleihiwa sees it, the problem for modern Native Hawaiians is that two centuries of
Christianity have taught Hawaiians to remember Lono but to forget Kū. As
Kame‘eleihiwa puts it:

It is Kū whom we have forgotten; the Akua of war, confrontation,
political power, and debate; the Akua whose nature was erect, sharp, and
thrusting. He was the Akua of our fearless Ali‘i Nui, of Kamehameha and
Kahekili. It was the Calvinists who taught us to reject Kū and all that he
symbolized. It was the American missionaries who taught us to live in a
perpetual state of ha‘aha‘a (humility), that we must always be humble and
on our knees to serve Jehova and obey his priests. That is my objection to
Christianity. In fact, our Ali‘i Nui were ha‘aheo, “proud and majestic”;
they were not made ha‘aha‘a until the overthrow of 1893. (324)

What especially draws me to this passage is the way in which it seems to respond
sharply to what George Kanahele puts forth in Kū Kanaka: namely, that one of the major
attributes of the Ali‘i Nui was a capacity for ha‘aha‘a. Here is how Kanahele puts forth
his notion of ha‘aha‘a among the Ali‘i Nui:

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A leader was told “Kū‘ia ka hele a ka na‘au ha‘aha‘a,” “A humble person walks carefully so he will not hurt those about him” (Pukui). Or, to put it in the negative imperative, “Don’t walk over people!” The leader is the one who “walks carefully,” who inspires the respect and allegiance of the people. Conversely, the leader who throws his rank and power around is bound to hurt someone and, when enough people are hurt, inevitably the situation comes to not good end for the leader.

Ha‘aha‘a is a leader’s best defense against excesses growing out of his own pride and egotism, which feed on power real or imagined. Without humility, “power doth corrupt,” and leadership will always prove to be difficult, if not impossible, over the long run. (Kanahele 1986, 409-410)

It is important to observe how in this brief argument for the importance of ha‘aha‘a amongst the Ali‘i, Kanahele cannot but help at one point but slide into the use of Biblical language to drive his point home (“power doth corrupt”). By so doing, Kanahele almost confirms in my own mind the correct of Kame‘eleihiwa’s observations on the relationship between Christianity, colonialism, and the missionary zeal to have Native Hawaiians embrace Lono over Kū. Ha‘aheo or Ha‘aha‘a? Kū or Lono?

It is not my place to say—but from reading Scott’s work in Risky Rhetoric, I’ve relearned a lesson that I learned several years ago while watching Spike Lee’s Malcolm X. Namely, that there are times when doing nothing can be a positive virtue. In that scene from Spike Lee’s movie, a white female college student approaches Malcolm X to tell him of her admiration for his work, and to ask if there is anything she can do to help
advance his cause. Malcolm X responds, “Nothing,” and marches on, eyes forward, offering the plaintive student no consolation for having deflated her optimism, her hope, her admiration. Spike Lee depicts the scene touchingly, for at that moment when the young girl’s hopes are dashed, the attentive viewer to Lee’s movie should realize that what Malcolm X does not mean is doing nothing in a sarcastic, divisive sense (i.e., “What can a white woman do for a Black man? Haven’t whites already caused enough damage?”), but in a positive inclusive sense (i.e., “Blacks must determine their own course without white interference, even well-intended intervention. And if a white person cares for the Black cause, that person will realize this and do nothing.”) Doing nothing as a positive virtue. It’s a hard concept to accept. But it’s a concept that non-Native residents of Hawai‘i must accept to demonstrate their love, their Aloha, for Hawai‘i’s Native peoples. And in this sense, they are both excluded from, or divided from, but at the same time included, insofar as their doing nothing, their silence, is indeed an affirmation of the Native principles of Sovereignty. Indeed, when Haunani-Kay Trask asks potential visitors to Hawai‘i to do “nothing” by not visiting the Islands, her so doing conveys an invitation to participate in her cause, or, in Burkean terms, to identify with it. And in a real sense, all people, regardless of their origins, can participate in such a plea for action.

However, such a conclusion also leaves me with the question: Whither Kanahele’s project of re-Hawaiianizing the hotels of Waikīkī? It has been almost five years now since George Kanahele passed away, and little has been done to advance Project Ho‘okipa Nānaina since his death. Why? One explanation might be that once again tourism turned down after the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington. Without
Kanahele to prod the executives into maintaining their vigilance in continuing the
program, the leaders of the visitor industry perhaps began to think in their olds ways—
not that they had every truly stopped thinking in these ways—namely, keeping a close
eye on the bottom line. Perhaps another reason is that the executives themselves are
coming to realize what the security captain had said to me so many years ago—that the
commoditization of the Hawaiian culture was really what was at the heart of Project
Hoʻokipa Nānaina, despite the apparent blend of idealism and business sense of a leader
like Kanahele. Although I felt one of the key executives who helped to implement the
program had made a genuine good faith effort to believe in Kanahele’s vision, perhaps he
too in the end began to backpedal a little away from the program as time moved on. The
crafter displays, the hula shows, the lei making sessions, are all far fewer at Vista Hotels
today than they were five or six years ago.

In its heyday in the nineties, no less than four or five full-time Vista employees
and a number of business college interns were devoted to implementing Project Hoʻokipa
Nānaina—today all of those employees, while still retaining some vestigial
responsibilities of those original functions, are for the most part working in the hotel
chain’s human resource department in one way or another. Despite all of this, however, I
still feel drawn to some points in Kanahele’s vision. For example, although I juxtapose
Kanahele’s claim about haʻahaʻa against Kameʻeleihiwa’s claim for haʻaheo above, I
still return every few years to Kanahele’s Kū Kanaka. And I will doubtless return to it
again—and not only to find passages in it with which to compare the ideas of other
Native Hawaiian scholars. But as I return to it, it sounds each time more like that
conversation about liberalism I recount having with my officemate at the beginning of the
third chapter of this dissertation. Kanahele's rhetoric rings more of the Hawai'i of the Democratic revolution of 1954, and less and less of the Hawai'i I would ardently wish to see arise in the future: a Hawai'i in which the ideals for which that first generation of Democratic leaders are a given, so that we can push the discussions of social discourse well beyond those boundaries—and perhaps achieve a more just society.
Conclusion

In a sense, this dissertation has ended where it began: with my working experiences in writing and my working experiences in a hotel. Whereas the first scenario began with a discussion of my experiences teaching business writing, the final chapter concluded with my efforts almost a decade earlier to become a communicator for business. In both the opening scenario and the closing chapter, my writing experiences have been framed around discussions of real world experiences and real world ethical decisions. If the opening scenario could be described as somewhat optimistically—with due caution—an argument for intervention, the closing chapter was an argument for when intervention was ethically inappropriate. It has taken me almost a decade to articulate the experience in the hotel in a way that I felt was somewhat satisfactory rhetorically and ethically—but I doubt I have said the last word on the subject.

But in another sense, the last three chapters of this dissertation have been my own narratives—framed around the ethical discussions of narrative in the first three chapters—my own attempts to explore my various voices and how I have tried to use these voices to help students come to grips with their own writing. If Chapter 4 presented my theoretical-technical classroom experiments, Chapter 5 tried to deconstruct culturally and rhetorically these experiments so as to make them more fluid by appealing to the potential role literature—specifically local literature—can play in the composition classroom in Hawai‘i. This is not a universal role, but rather a situated, local, micropolitical role—like the ones I argued for in the earlier chapters when I discussed the works of Alasdair MacIntyre and some of the major postmodern thinkers. However,
despite this emphasis on the local in the later chapters, it is necessary in this conclusion to recall the larger picture—the greater ‘vista’—we must all take in so as to be able to function effectively in terms of our rhetorical, social, cultural, gendered, political beings. And perhaps this is something that I’ve lost sight of in my romp through my own micropolitical corridors in the last three chapters. So please let me return to this theme for a moment.

I write this conclusion near the end of 2004, after a presidential election in which George W. Bush was re-elected to a second term. As I write this conclusion, a marine division is fighting street battles in Fallujah, Iraq, with the official reason of trying to eliminate terrorists insurgents in that city; and the Congress has voted to raise the U.S. debt ceiling by almost $800 billion to help finance the continuing war on terror. So as I review the last three chapters of my dissertation, I must ask myself: How will what I say here help in some small way at least to change these ongoing large-scale macropolitical injustices?

I almost immediately want to backpedal away from the question—it seems loaded, perhaps even unfair to pose of a relatively simple dissertation. Yet I can’t help but ask it because the question reverberates through all of the scenarios of the last three chapters. Whether it’s the question of American colonial policy in Hawai‘i that rears its head in the final chapter of the dissertation; or the questions of educational language use and standardization that the discussion of literature raises in the fifth chapter; or the questions about abortion raised in my discussion of stasis analysis in the fourth chapter; or even, perhaps, long-term questions of the survivability of civilization that I raise in the first part of the fourth chapter in the teaching scenario I discuss on the dialogue on civilization.
All of these questions are directly impacted by the re-election of George W. Bush as president: the almost inevitable increase in military spending that will come in Hawai‘i as a result of the stationing of a Stryker Brigade in these islands; the increased tying of education to federal funding through George W. Bush’s “No Child Left Behind” initiative; and the question of what sorts of candidates George W. Bush will offer as Supreme Court nominees to the U.S. Senate—a Senate more deeply Republican than at anytime during the past half century. This last point is especially frightening to me, for while I do discuss abortion in the fourth chapter, I must clearly state upfront that I firmly support Roe v. Wade and a woman’s right to control her own body. Let me digress here a moment to again share one of my own narratives—although these narratives have at times threatened to almost inundate this dissertation with my various voices. As a youngster in my teens, I grew up by making myself almost staunchly conservative (this was definitely not my family’s doing!), and so did not support Roe v. Wade in—a youth spent in the seventies; but since my late teens, I have come to consider Roe v. Wade as not only essential to the freedoms of women to have a right to decide what happens to their bodies, but to all of us—male and female—to decide so. This point became especially clear to me during my writing of this dissertation as I read works like J. Blake Scott’s Risky Rhetoric: we must all have an inviolable right to decide when intervention is right for own bodies and when it is not. I will not deny that abortion is a moral and ethical decision—it most definitely is—but it is solely an individual decision, and a complex one at that, although as anyone tries to make such a decision, they must be aware of all the ethical discourses under which he and/or she stand as Krista Ratcliffe might phrase it.
So, in brief, this dissertation will not have an impact on these issues—George W. Bush will have his four more years with a Republican Congress—but perhaps with some of the points I raise in this dissertation, there might be the hope that we can at least begin to do several things. The first thing will be that we may begin to share our narratives, and feel comfortable sharing those narratives speaking and writing in our own voices. This is the first step—as Ngũgĩ points out in the early chapters of *Decolonizing the Mind*—toward at least establishing local micropolitical solidarity with others. But second, we must also begin to attune ourselves to listening to a variety of discourses—and as I conclude in the fourth chapter, this may mean in some ways resurrecting Rogerian rhetoric into our discussions not only as a way of facilitating discussion, but as a way of promoting discussion—both in terms of invention and analysis.

However, what all of this discussion and listening brings up is the problem of how we are to communicate with each other, across cultures, classes, countries, genders, religions. Ratcliffe’s essay was an eloquent attempt to answer this question in terms of listening—and her notion of strategic idealism in listening is an invaluable contribution here. We need to both share and listen to each other’s narratives—and from these sharing experiences, we can then begin to forge link by link the sorts of alliances I discuss as essential to resisting the hegemony of U.S. political policy in the early chapters of this dissertation. These narratives will come from many voices: voices that validate the strength and validity of tradition-based communal forms of knowledge, like those Alasdair MacIntyre valorizes, and which I discuss throughout the first three chapters. The examples of these types of voices I offer in this dissertation are found especially in the fourth chapter. But we must also foster an environment that will encourage
postmodern experimentation with just these voices—and increasingly, as this year’s 2004
Fall Festival of Writers reminded me—postmodern experimentation is not simply the
province of the Kierkegaardian aesthete I discuss in the first chapter.

Postmodern experimentation has for a long time also become a valid realm of
expression for tradition-based writers who must draw on many traditions—writers like
Anzldúa, who is already recognized—but also local writers like Lee Tonouchi, Lisa
Kanae, Joe Balaz; but also writers who identify a multi-traditional facet in their writings,
Caribbean writers like Michelle Cliff, and Nalo Hopkinson. These writers will not only
mix the various voices their multi-traditional backgrounds have bequeathed to them—
they will also mix genres, so that the distinctions between poetry, different forms of the
novel (from epistolary to Bildungsroman to science fiction), and various forms that mix
the personal and academic will all be brought together to create a variety of narrative
voices. Even the example I cited earlier in the fourth chapter—Lee Tonouchi’s “pijin
wawrz”—is in a real, if humorous Woody Allen Sleeper-type way, a hybrid of HCE
writing, autobiography, and science fiction. These voices may range through all the
voice registers allowed by English grammar (first, second, third), and even try to capture
more complex notions of grammatical voice that have all but atrophied in standard
English language usage.

Given all of these traditions giving rise to all of these voices and
postmodernisms—and the “s” at the end of postmodern is deliberate here—what sorts of
standards of reason will be used? Reason was a major theme in the first three chapters of
this dissertation—especially the second and third chapters—but it was a theme that
became increasingly muted through the last three chapters. Not that I feel that these last
three chapters are ‘unreasonable’ in any egregious way—I hope that they are not. These standards, as I tried to discuss in Chapters 2 & 3, will be situationally negotiated at the local, micropolitical level—and although it will be necessary, in order to discuss the possibility of alliances that I raise by citing the work of Fredric Jameson in Chapters 1-3 to establish some sorts of ground rules for rationality on a situation-by-situation basis, I am in the end still wary of some of the points I draw on in those chapters—especially in Chapter 3 where I draw on the work of John Rawls.

And yet... Perhaps the reason why I have been somewhat insistent on including the word ‘reason’ in the title of this dissertation is that as I have mentioned at different points in this dissertation—the beginning of Chapter 3, the end of Chapter 6—I still in many ways cling to elements of my ‘liberal’ heritage. It was a heritage I had tried to deny in my teens—like Alex in the old sitcom Family Ties—but by my late teens and early twenties, I had made peace with my liberal heritage. And perhaps I still cling to these ‘fragments of rationality’ (as Faigley phrases it) in the liberal tradition too tenaciously—even as I have at points in this dissertation tried to break that tradition’s hold on me by appealing on one hand to alternative non-Englightenment endorsed renditions of the validity of tradition, like those of Alasdair MacIntyre, and on the other hand endorsing an almost linguistically sensual postmodernism derived both from French theory (Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari) and from more exciting vistas in literary studies. So I must add that in addition to still taking guilt-ridden occasional re-reads of works like George Kanahele’s Kū Kanaka, I will also return again to texts I have grown to love over the years—Kant (who at least has the postmodern endorsement of Lyotard and the later Foucault), Wittgenstein, language philosophers like Searle and Austin, and even one of
my favorite textbooks as an undergraduate (do I dare say it?): Copi's *Introduction to Logic*. And there is still Rawls's book on an internationalized form of his theory of justice, *The Law of Peoples*, to read. I cannot deny that there is something 'intuitively' (again a word to raise a red flag) appealing about a theory based on the apparently simple notion of interpreting justice as fairness.

But as I continue to return to these old sources of light—perhaps to find those crannies and crooks in these works which not only no longer give illumination, but are positively mystifying (in the Jamesonian sense), but also to take in whatever heat they may still have to offer—I will also continue to inhale deeply those tradition-based narratives that we find in Native scholars like Trask, Kame'eleihiwa, and Osorio that blend academic rationality with an awareness of the injustices of domination and oppression that have been inflicted on Native and non-Native peoples throughout history. And I will always try to weigh when I should add my voice to the conversation (put my oar to the till, as Kenneth Burke might say), and when it is my place to stand back from the conversation and start exercising my own strategic idealism in listening. Such narratives allow the voices of the past to speak to us so that we may again stand under their wisdom, and learn from past mistakes, so that we can perhaps right some of these injustices while continuing to open spaces—third, fourth, fifth, and so on—for the voices that may come.
Appendix A: A Collage of Quotations on Civilization from the Public Statements of George W. Bush

President Bush: "No Nation Can Be Neutral in This Conflict"
Remarks by the President To the Warsaw Conference on Combatting Terrorism


November 6, 2001

Al Qaeda operates in more than 60 nations, including some in Central and Eastern Europe. These terrorist groups seek to destabilize entire nations and regions. They are seeking chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Given the means, our enemies would be a threat to every nation and, eventually, to civilization itself.

So we're determined to fight this evil, and fight until we're rid of it. We will not wait for the authors of mass murder to gain the weapons of mass destruction. We act now, because we must lift this dark threat from our age and save generations to come.

BACKGROUNDER: THE PRESIDENT’S QUOTES ON ISLAM

http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/ramadan/islam.html

• Presidential Message Eid al-Fitr
December 5, 2002

• "Islam brings hope and comfort to millions of people in my country, and to more than a billion people worldwide. Ramadan is also an occasion to remember that Islam gave birth to a rich civilization of learning that has benefited mankind."

• President George W. Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership
The Rose Garden, Washington, D.C.
June 24, 2002

• "When it comes to the common rights and needs of men and women, there is no clash of civilizations. The requirements of freedom apply fully to Africa and Latin America and the entire Islamic world. The peoples of the Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms and opportunities as people in every nation. And their governments should listen to their hopes."
• Remarks by the President in Honor of Eid Al-Fitr
  The Diplomatic Reception Room
  December 17, 2001

  "The teachings of many faiths share much in common. And people of many faiths are united in our commitments to love our families, to protect our children, and to build a more peaceful world. In the coming year, let us resolve to seize opportunities to work together in a spirit of friendship and cooperation. Through our combined efforts, we can end terrorism and rid our civilization of the damaging effects of hatred and intolerance, ultimately achieving a brighter future for all."

Global Message

From remarks by NSA Rice on FOX Special Report with Brit Hume, 9/15/03


We are engaged in a worldwide effort to destroy the evil force that is terrorism. The reason terrorists are coming to Iraq is that they understand that a stable and prosperous Iraq in the center of the Middle East will be a serious blow to their efforts to bring down civilization.

If the terrorists weren't fighting in Iraq, they would be fighting someplace else. They are a hardened group of people who hate what America stands for and who intend to bring down civilization.

Introduction to National Security Council Website by George W. Bush

http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssintro.html

Freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human dignity; the birthright of every person—in every civilization.

George W. Bush
THE WHITE HOUSE,
September 17, 2002
Appendix B: A sample script from the sense of place workshop

What business are we in?
“The hospitality business.”

What is the dictionary definition of hospitality?
“To welcome and entertain guests and strangers with warmth and generosity.”

What are the three elements in any hospitality situation?
“Place, Guest, and Host.”

And what integrates these three elements?
“Aloha.”

Slow down here. Take time to develop the ideas here and invite some discussion amongst workshop participants. One way to do this might be to have a group brainstorming session in which we try to develop the “logic” of identifying place as the most important element of the three introduced so far.

Of the three, which is most important?
“Place.”

Why?

Can you have a host without a guest?
“No.”

Can you have a guest without a host?
“No.”

Can you have a host without a place?
“No.”
Can you have a guest without a place?

"No."

But can you have a place without a host?

"Yes."

And can you have a place without a guest?

"Yes."

So we see that place is important. Yet how often is place mentioned in the hotel where you work? We talk about keeping the place clean, keeping its sense of specialness, but we direct all of our efforts towards the guest. What is the guest’s first impression? How would a guest respond to this lobby? What we have to do, then, is to separate out place by asking ourselves two questions: What does place do for you? And what can you do for the place? By answering these questions, we can develop a fuller appreciation of sense of place, and even arrive at a definition of place. We know that place is a located space, but have you ever been some place special, some place that gives you “chicken skin?”

We would now like you to close your eyes and to imagine yourself in such a place. Imagine how it feels, what it looks like, the sights, the scents, the sounds you year. Hold that thought in your mind. Where are you? Is it some place special, some place that gives you that sense of “chicken skin?” Well, that special sense of place was something that the ancient Hawaiians also experienced. They attributed it to the place (the power of place), to living creatures, and to the entire universe. They called this feeling or sense Mana, and it was the single most important concept in Polynesian, as well as in Hawaiian, culture.
And do you know something else? Where you are right now, in the heart of Waikīkī, was also a special place. For Waikīkī was one of the most sacred places in ancient Hawai‘i: it served as a religious, agricultural, political and cultural center for hundreds of years. When Kamehameha the First completed his conquest of the major islands (except, of course, Kaua‘i), he established his first capital at Waikīkī. Now let’s take a look at a video prepared by our Project Ho‘okipa Nānaina team under the auspices of George Kanahele. This video is entitled: “Waikīkī: 2,000 Years of History,” and it will help to imagine the Mana that Waikīkī held for our ancient kūpuna.
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