COMPREHENDING UTTERANCES IN JAPANESE AS
A FIRST AND A SECOND LANGUAGE:
LITERALITY AND CONVENTIONALITY

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By

Akiko Hagiwara

Dissertation committee:

Haruko Cook, Chairperson
David Ashworth
Kyoko Hijirida
Gabriele Kasper
Shuqiang Zhang
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ABSTRACT

Literality in interpersonal communication has been discussed in language philosophy as well as in psycholinguistics, in which the relationship between what is actually uttered and what is intended has been an issue. The gap between them can be explained in two different ways: one is the conventionality of language use and the other is through inference based on the literal meaning. These two explanations contrast in such a way that the former does not assume that the literal meaning of the utterance necessarily contributes to the generation of its intended meaning, whereas the latter treats the literal meaning as the basis of the inference. Theoretically speaking, it may be possible to categorize non-literal utterances into roughly two types: conventional utterances and non-conventional utterances. For the latter type, if the gap between what is uttered and what is communicated is perceived as small, it can be considered that the utterance is more literal.

The present study examined how both native Japanese speakers and learners of Japanese, who are native speakers of American English, perceive three types of utterances, literal utterances (e.g., Kyoo wa shokuyi o gochisooshite-itadaite, doomo arigatoo gozaimashita.), non-literal non-conventional utterances (e.g., Kondo baito-dai haittara, watashi ga gochisoo shimasu ne.), and non-literal conventional utterances (e.g., Gochisoo sama deshita.), using a set of multiple-choice questionnaires asking the participants to choose the most likely interpretation of the utterance. Two groups of university students, 60 native speakers of Japanese and 60 native speakers of American
English, who had completed two-years of formal Japanese instruction, participated in the study.

The effect of the language groups, L1 and L2, was statistically significant (p<.0001) and the interaction between the utterance types and language groups was also significant (p=.0052), while the effect of utterance types was not significant (p=.2911). The most obvious difference between native and non-native speakers of Japanese was found when they interpreted non-literal conventional utterances, while the difference was the smallest for literal utterances. These findings suggest that non-native speakers of Japanese are more likely to fail to comprehend conventionally used indirect utterances that native speakers use frequently in daily communication.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Overview

Generally speaking, understanding spoken language is one of the goals of learning a second language. To be able to comprehend someone else’s speech requires various types of knowledge and skills: the ability to perceive auditory input, profound knowledge of grammar, semantics, and pragmatics to understand the propositional content of the utterance, extensive cultural, conventional and pragmatic knowledge in order to be able to infer the intended meaning of the utterance, and the ability to do all these types of processing in the brain in a short period of time. It is obviously a very complex process, but native speakers verbally communicate with each other with ease. When it comes to a second language user, it is a different story, and difficulties may reside in any of the above factors.

As a nonnative speaker of English, I have experienced conversational breakdowns on numerous occasions. Many of which seem to be related to pragmatic miscommunication stemming from not being able to correctly infer the intentions of the speakers. For example, when I first came to Hawai‘i a long time ago, during a party people often invited me to come over to their houses sometime. I sometimes asked them when it would be good to come, and the people who invited me often had a perplexed look on their faces and left. As a native speaker of Japanese, I knew Japanese people would say “doozo asobi ni kite kudasai” (please come over for fun) in a similar
situation, which is a pragmatic equivalent of “please, drop by” used to show politeness to a new acquaintance rather than seriously inviting her. I understood the literal meaning of the utterance perfectly, and I probably understood the speech act of the utterance, but I failed to understand the real intention of it.

As an English learner, I was taught at school that the Americans were very straightforward and direct unlike the Japanese. Also, in American culture, as we learned, inviting people over is much more common than in Japan. Stereotypical knowledge may be helpful in some cases, but, obviously, relying on it in communication may not be a good idea in many cases. However, since many Japanese learners of English do not have enough opportunities to communicate with people in English, items related to the pragmatics of English are not easily learned. In fact, it took me a while to be able to reply more appropriately.

When I was teaching Japanese using Japanese as a Spoken Language, I was allowed to spend some time introducing some features of Japanese culture encoded in the language rather overtly. For example in order to explain a coffee break conversation, the textbook explains as follows:

The office visitor is being served something to drink (usually tea or coffee in such cases), a regular procedure in Japan. The polite itadakimasu ‘I will eat / drink / accept’ is said at the time of acceptance of the offer and / or just before beginning to eat / drink. Silence while enjoying the break and the refreshment
is not uncommon: patterns of talking and the social rules for silence are very
different in Japan and America." (Jorden, 1987, p. 125)

This type of cultural behavior seems to be idiosyncratic, but it may be a good idea to,
at least, notice how people perceive silence in Japan when learners of Japanese face such
situations. By explaining about it rather explicitly, Jorden intends the learners of
Japanese will be able to do that, which might become a consciousness-raising task when
the learner actually has a chance to experience such occasions later on. While it is still
an empirical question that such overtly explained knowledge about culture may or may
not contribute to the socio-pragmatic competence of a learner, it is nevertheless important
to spend some time teaching socio-pragmatic features of the target language, at least, to
raise the learners' attention to them.

There may be various types of 'social rules' in a language, and as Jorden described
above, they are sometimes different according to the culture where the language is
spoken. The list of those social rules seems to be endless. Here several questions arise.
Are those social rules encoded in all conventionally determined linguistic behavior that
one just has to learn in an arbitrary fashion? Are there types of cognitive factors that
underlie language- / culture- specific conventions that we can use probably through
analogy in order to communicate in a foreign language? Communication can be
achieved if the interlocutors can perceive each other's intentions, so finally, a more
specific question arises: "do average nonnative speakers of Japanese perceive
conversational intentions the way the Japanese people usually do?"
If conversation is maintained purely based on universal logic or common sense shared by all the people in the world, learning a foreign language would mean to acquire the system of lexicon and the structures of the target language and the rest would be taken care of through analogy based on their first language. In reality, however, ample studies in inter-language pragmatics (Kasper and Rose, 2002) suggest that pragmatic and psychological factors influence the acquisition of a second or a foreign language. If such factors intervene in the comprehension process, a foreign language learner may not be able to comprehend utterances the way the speaker intended.

According to the studies in cognitive psychology, understanding utterances in one’s own language seems to be complicated as a cognitive process, and doing it in a second language could lead to even more complicated problems. In fact, utterance comprehension can be examined in philosophy, cognitive psychology, social psychology, pragmatics and sociolinguistics.

The scope of this study is to explore whether nonnative speakers of Japanese perceive the intention of an utterance in Japanese from a pragmatic point of view. This study attempts to provide some basic criteria for utterance types that may influence the patterns of comprehension.

In order to communicate verbally, it is necessary to decode auditory input first into one’s cognitive system. It might be impossible to totally separate the ability to hear and the ability to comprehend in theory, but in this study, how individual sounds are processed into the forms to be decoded linguistically will not be dealt with. Also,
grammar and semantic levels of comprehension will be out of scope. Rather, the focus will be how the hearer of linguistic input comprehends the intention of the input.

1.2. Theoretical motivations

Linguistic communication is often looked at as information exchange, focusing on the intentionality of the speech, and, in fact, studies focusing on the intentional nature of communication consist of an important part of pragmatic studies. In studies of linguistic production, how the information is encoded in the utterance is the focus, and in studies of linguistic perception, how the information is perceived is concerned. In the history of linguistic studies, many philosophers, such as those of ordinary language philosophers, and linguists, especially those in pragmatics and psycholinguistics, have looked at the process of perceiving utterances in communication.

Where utterances in communication are concerned, various levels and modes of indirectness are used in communication. As linguists and philosophers have argued, people do not utter every single piece of information in order to convey a specific meaning, but they use indirect expressions almost routinely in conversation (Grice 1975; Searle, 1965). Those utterances include various types of indirectness such as hints, indirect speech acts, irony, hyperbole, and so on. Also, speakers often use ellipses in their speech, which require certain types of inferences, and those ellipses could be treated as indirect utterances.

There is no single theory that can explain how a hearer perceives utterances, and researchers in different fields have studied utterance comprehension from different points
of view. Ordinary language philosophers such as Grice (1975) have examined how indirect speech is used in everyday language modifying the method used in formal logic. Searle (1965) examined conventional uses of indirect language as part of his theory of speech acts. Cognitive linguists such as Clark (1979) and Gibbs (1979) have looked into the process in which conventionally used indirect language is processed in one’s brain by observing the responses of the participants.

The studies of cognitive linguistics suggest that the hearer of an indirect utterance does not necessarily go through the inference process from its literal meaning to the inferred meaning. While for novel utterances, an inference process, such as the one that Grice (1975) suggested, seems to be obligatory, for conventional utterances it is still arguable whether the literal meaning is accessed or not. The findings from psychological studies suggest it is probably the case that utterances are processed differently based on the conventionality of their usage, at least, for native speakers.

A very few studies (e.g., Bouton, 1989) have been conducted to examine how non-native speakers comprehend non-literal utterances in conversation, and it is still unknown whether nonnative speakers comprehend non-literal utterances in the same way as native speakers, especially in a language other than English. The present study examines whether learners of Japanese can comprehend three types of utterances in Japanese, literal utterances, non-literal conventional utterances and non-literal non-conventional utterances, in a way similar to the native speakers. Three types of utterances were empirically generated, and a set of multiple-choice questionnaires asking for the
interpretation of each utterance was created in order to find which interpretation the participants of the study choose. The results were statistically analyzed.

This thesis consists of seven chapters: Chapter 1 introduces the topic, Chapter 2 discusses previous findings from past studies, Chapter 3 presents the overall research design, Chapter 4 describes the preliminary studies that were needed for the main study, Chapter 5 presents the main study, Chapter 6 discusses the findings from the main study, and Chapter 7 summarizes the research and provides further discussions on the theme.
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND

In order to correctly infer the intention of an utterance that somebody else utters in everyday interactions, a hearer may use, at least, the following three types of information. One is the grammatical and semantic meaning of the utterance itself, another is the specific context in which the utterance is made, and the other is general knowledge that could be referred to as world knowledge that is related to the content of the utterance and its context. Whether people access them consciously or unconsciously is arguable (e.g., Recanati, 2004), but anyone who lacks any one of them, or anyone who lacks the ability to conduct the cognitive process of accessing them, may not be able to perceive the intended meaning of the utterance, at least, the way the speaker may have hoped. One part of learning a foreign language is learning how to utilize these types of information in interaction, because without comprehending somebody else's speech, responding to it is undoubtedly a very difficult task, and the conversation may break down.

The present study attempts to find whether intermediate learners of Japanese as a foreign language (JFL), who are native speakers of American English, are able to infer the intention of an utterance the way most native speakers of Japanese would in the same situation. Compared to JSL learners, JFL learners are in a disadvantageous situation, because their exposure to the authentic uses of the target language is presumably limited unlike those who study the target language in the target culture. While it may be possible to acquire grammatical and semantic features of the language to a certain degree
in a JFL situation, students may not be able to acquire sufficient pragmatic or cultura­specific features of the target language. These different types of information are considered to be interrelated, and comprehending an utterance in conversation may be influenced by them.

Based on findings from philosophy, cognitive psychology and pragmatic studies, this study focuses on how the difference of the grammatical and semantic content of an utterance is perceived in a particular context. In order to convey a specific meaning, a speaker chooses one particular utterance from several different choices of utterances that have different grammatical and semantic structures with different speech styles. Although the primary intention that the hearer wants to mean is the same, each of those possible utterances may convey slightly different meanings. The choice of utterance is thought to be based on those additional meanings that can be referred to as pragmatic meanings. The hearer, on the other hand, needs to be able to infer the intention of the utterance the speaker chose to use.

Studies on utterance comprehension suggest several factors influence the comprehension process. The factors include the conventionality of the utterance, familiarity of the use, literality of the utterance within the context, and so on. JFL learners may be able to comprehend the basic grammatical and semantic meaning of an utterance, but if the utterance exploits specific conventional usage that is not familiar to them, they may not be able to comprehend the utterance the way the speaker intended. Conventionality is collective in nature, familiarity is an individual business, and the
literality of an utterance is situation-specific. By comparing how well these types of utterances are comprehended by native speakers of Japanese and JFL learners, these three factors can be examined.

In the present study, three types of utterances were used; they are literal utterances, non-literal conventional utterances, and non-literal non-conventional utterances. The distinction of these three types was made primarily based on theoretical studies together with findings from some of empirical studies conducted by cognitive psychologists. There are various ways of distinguishing utterance types such as to classify them based on grammatical structures or politeness levels, but in this study only literality and conventionality were treated as factors. The following section provides a brief description of previous studies that are related to literality and conventionality of utterances.

2.1. Various types of meanings

There have been basically two types of studies regarding the comprehension process of everyday utterances. One explains how novel utterances are comprehended, and the other attempts to explain how hearers comprehend formulaic utterances. In everyday conversations, people use various types of devices to convey the intended meaning through a limited amount of output. Therefore, for either type of utterance the communicated meaning is fundamentally different from the grammatical and semantic meaning that the utterance itself inherently possesses. The communicated meaning here can be referred to as the pragmatic meaning to contrast with the grammatical semantic
meaning of the utterance. The pragmatic meaning is conveyed through linguistic and non-linguistic means.

While nonverbal communication plays an important role, it is indisputable to say that people communicate with each other mainly through language. Linguistic communication is not just the exchange of conventional meaning of words and sentences, but the exchange of ideas and intentions. However, those ideas and intentions are communicated through the use of conventional linguistic devises such as words and phrases. How the meaning of linguistic forms is comprehended in the interlocutors' mind has been argued through the history of linguistic studies. Several terms have been used to describe the basic and extended definitions of meaning.

In philosophy the definition of meaning in spoken language has been studied for a long time, and the definition of "what is said" as Grice provided has been somewhat controversial (Chapman, 2001). There are various types of meaning involved in conversation. Grice's seemingly rudimentary distinction between "what is said" and "what is implicated" cannot be fully understood without clarification of these forms. In fact, the definition of "what is said" has become an issue in language philosophy and cognitive science (e.g., Ariel, 2002). A major cause of dispute comes from the different ways in which meaning is defined and described.

Looking back at the history of implicature studies, many different terms have been used to refer to "meaning" or related concepts. They include: literal meaning, semantic meaning/content, coded meaning, linguistic meaning, sentence meaning, propositional
meaning, textual meaning, minimal meaning, direct meaning, utterance meaning, truth-conditional meaning, compositional meaning, logical form (LF), explicature, impliciture, inferred meaning, non-literal meaning, pragmatic meaning, implicated meaning, implicature, metaphorical meaning, indirect meaning, and illocutionary meaning, among others.

The "literal meaning" is one of the most frequently used terms. Gricean theory has been applied to the studies on non-literal language, in which the primary distinction of meaning is between literal meaning and non-literal meaning. Many researchers have used the word "literal" in their studies, but the meaning of it differs depending on the context of its use. Gibbs (1994) studied various examples of literality that had been discussed in the literature. They are: conventional literality, subject-matter literality, non-metaphorical literality, truth-conditional literality and context-free literality (p. 75). He argues that some types of meaning sometimes overlap and sometimes do not, and that the term "literal meaning" itself is polysemous in nature and therefore problematic. He even conducted an empirical study on the definition of "literality" using college students as participants (Gibbs, Buchalter, Moise, & Farrar, 1993). He surmised that there is not a unified account of literality among researchers or native speakers of English.

In terms of processing in theoretical terms, Grice states that the hearer's first step for comprehension is to seek "the conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity of any references that may be involved" (1975, p.50). If we assume that implicature is generated from "what is said" after the application of CP and Maxims, it is
important to know exactly what "what is said" is. Grice did not provide a clear
description of "what is said" except that he mentioned "what is said" is "closely related to
the conventional meaning of the words" (1975, p. 25). It is not clear that the meaning
under discussion is a sentence meaning or just the combination of the lexical meanings of
all the words used.

Many studies discuss what "what is said" means (Ariel, 2002; Berg, 2002;
Bezuidenhout & Cutting, 2001; Clark & Lucy, 1975; Gibbs, 1987, 2002; Recanati, 1991,
2004; Thomas, 1983)\(^1\) in different frameworks. The standard approach is that "what is
said" has a complete proposition, and that the hearer processes the meaning of "what is
said" first. Conversational implicature arises based on the propositional content of the
utterance. In studies of cognitive psychology, whether the hearer accesses the "literal
meaning" first or not has been an issue, and researchers still dispute whether the hearers
actually access the literal grammatical meaning or just the lexical meanings of individual
words (Gibbs, 2002).

The word literality may be a confusing term, but it is still useful when non-literality
is taken into consideration. In the present study, the term "literal utterance" is used to
generally mean an utterance that has the intended meaning equal to the conventional
meaning of the utterance generated from grammatical and semantic decoding rather than
the socio-pragmatic meaning generated in the specific context or assigned by a diachronic

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\(^1\) Actually, the question about "what is said" in philosophy dates back to Greek philosophy, and the
studies cited here are the ones studied mostly from psycholinguistic viewpoints.
process of social interaction. Non-literal utterances, on the other hands, are those utterances that are different in meaning from their original literal meanings in given contexts or those utterances in which a different meaning has been diachronically assigned in the given society or speech community.

2.2. Non-conventional, non-literal utterances: Grice's conversational implicature

Scholars in philosophy and semantics have examined and attempted to account for the differences between what is expressed, i.e., form, and the implied message. Among them, Grice's (1975, 1989) theory is one of the most influential pragmatic theories, and it explains the gap between "what is said" and "what is implicated." Grice departed from formal logic and started a new approach, which he calls "conversational logic," based on a belief that communication between interlocutors is a cooperative and goal-directed behavior governed by it. Grice's theory not only accounts for verbal interaction but also any cooperative activity that people are engaged in, and also it claims to be universally applicable, because it is based on rationality rather than culture-specific conventions.

There are two notions that are central to Gricean theory: the Cooperative Principle (CP) and four Conversational Maxims. In his article, "Logic and conversation," Grice (1975) introduces CP as a general principle. Grice states that the CP is to "make your conversational contribution such as is required at the state at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" (Grice, 1989, p. 26). Given that CP is observed, the speaker assumes the hearer will be able to make sense out of an utterance that often seems illogical in a strict logical sense, and also
that the speaker can exploit the hearer's ability to do so. At the same time, the hearer thinks the speaker is trying to mean something logical by making a seemingly illogical utterance in the particular interaction. The speaker's meaning generated in such an instance is called 'conversational implicature.'

Grice proposes four maxims that motivate conversational implicatures. They are Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner, and these are often called as Conversational Maxims. These maxims are:

Maxim of Quantity:

Make your contribution as informative as required (for the current purposes of the exchange).

Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

Maxim of Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true.

Do not say what you believe to be false.

Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

Maxim of Relation: Be relevant.

Maxim of Manner: Be perspicuous.

Avoid obscurity of expression.

Avoid ambiguity.

Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).

Be orderly.

(Adapted from Grice, 1989, pp. 26-27).
One is not required to follow these maxims, because maxims are not rules nor regulations that one must obey. Also abiding by CP does not necessarily mean abiding by these maxims. Rather, maxims are thought to be the guidelines that enable interlocutors to have the most effective and the most efficient exchange of ideas. Relying on these maxims interlocutors do not express every single piece of information that is necessary to be transmitted, given that it can be easily inferred based on the maxims and the content of the utterance within the given context.

The implicatures generated by following the maxims are sometimes called "standard implicatures."² A standard implicature typically occurs when the information a speaker provides as the content of an utterance, at least on the surface, seems unsatisfactory to the hearer, but by assuming that the speaker is fulfilling the maxims, the satisfactory information is perceived by the hearer. The speaker assumes the hearer gains a satisfactory understanding of the intended information through calculation based on the utterance’s meaning, and contextual and other types of information. Through this process communication can be achieved. Grice’s often cited example of this type of implicature is:

A: I’m out of petrol.

B: There is a garage round the corner.  (Grice, 1989, p. 32)

² Levinson’s terminology (Levinson, 1983). Grice categorized them as Group A examples (Grice, 1989, p. 32).
Because the linguistic forms and lexical items used by B are not directly related to A’s utterance, the second utterance seems to be violating the maxim of relation on the surface. Through working out the linguistic and non-linguistic data including the assumption that both are following CP, A can generate enough data that can fulfill the relation maxim. In this case, A assumes that B is actually abiding by the relation maxim, so A can add additional information that will satisfy all the maxims. This working out process can make her believe that the garage being mentioned in fact sells gasoline and also is open on that particular day so that she can go there and buy some. Grice’s contention is that the hearer’s belief described above does not belong to the utterance itself but rather it is generated from the working out process. This is also applicable to the A’s utterance. A not only tells B that the fact that there is no gas in her car, but she covertly asks B for a possible solution, or at least a suggestion, to her problem. B perceives A’s statement as a request for information, and therefore the reply was made in such a way as to provide the information requested.

Examples such as this are directly translatable into Japanese generating the same implicature, given that a similar situation is possible in Japanese culture.

A’: Gasorin ga naku-natta yo. (I am out of petrol.)

B’: Gasorin-sutando ga ano-magari kado no hoo ni aru yo. (There is a garage round the corner)

In human interaction, there are a number of reasons to sacrifice efficiency such as to show politeness, to follow social or conventional rules, or to achieve some sort of speech
effects. In the Gricean framework, these instances can be explained in relation to the above maxims. Grice describes the situations when maxims are not fulfilled:

1. Violate a maxim quietly and unostentatiously.
2. Opt out from the operation both of the maxims and of the CP.
3. Fail to fulfill a maxim because of a clash.
4. Flout a maxim.

(Adapted from Grice, 1989, p. 30)

The first case is liable to miscommunication, and the second case lets the speaker withdraw from the cooperative conversational exchange. The third case is quite possible and also unavoidable in actual communication, because it is not always the case that a participant has the most appropriate information that can fulfill all the maxims for the communicative purpose; Grice categorized such cases as Group B examples.

A Group B example:

A: Where does C live?

B: Somewhere in the south of France. (Grice, 1989, p. 32)

In this example, the maxim of quantity is infringed, but since B does not have the exact information A has requested, B provides unsatisfactory information instead of giving false information which would be a violation of quality maxim. This example can also be directly translatable in Japanese, carrying the same implicature.

According to Grice, in the fourth case above, conversational implicature characteristically arises. In such a situation, he explains, the maxim is being
“exploited,” examples of which Grice categorized as Group C.

A Group C example:

A: Mrs. X is an old bag.

B: The weather has been quite delightful this summer. (Grice, 1989, p. 35)

In this particular case, B does not want to talk about Mrs. X with A, so instead of providing a relevant reply, B is giving a totally irrelevant answer to shift the topic. By flouting the maxim of relation, A is implying that quite clearly. In this particular example that Grice introduced, an idiomatic phrase “an old bag” is used, and therefore literal translation into Japanese does not make sense, but the point Grice makes is still applicable to Japanese. For example, an interaction between the mother and a child may be quite possible as a dinner conversation.

Mother: *Shukudai owatta no?* (Did you finish your homework?)

Child: *Otoosan osoi ne.* (Dad is late, isn’t he?)

The child is trying to shift the topic from her homework to her father by not replying to her mother’s question but by telling her about her father who has not come home yet.

So far as the examples that Grice provided are concerned, the Gricean paradigm is applicable to Japanese language, and, in fact, Grice’s work is introduced in most textbooks on pragmatics in Japan with numerous examples in Japanese (e.g., Koizumi, 1990). It is because Grice bases his theory on the rational thinking process, which is supposedly universal.
Grice described the process of comprehending implicature as follows. The speaker supposes that the hearer is able to infer the meaning through working out a process based on the following five types of information.

1. the conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity of any references that may be involved;
2. the CP and its maxims;
3. the context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance;
4. other items of background knowledge;
5. the fact (or supposed fact) that all relevant items falling under the previous heading are available to both participants and both participants know or assume this to be the case. (1975, p. 50)

(1) refers to the meaning of “what is said,” and, in a strict sense, it is not just a grammatically and semantically encoded meaning but rather a pragmatically enriched meaning, as Grice specifically described as “together with the identity of any references.” In later studies, the meaning of “what is said” in relation to “what is implicated” has become an issue. This issue will be discussed in the next section.

2.3. The characteristics of conversational implicature

There are several known characteristics in conversational implicature. One of them is that the implicating process must be able to be worked out even when the implicature is interpreted intuitively. This is usually referred to as ‘calculability.’ Grice (1975) describes the general calculation process as follows:
"He has said that $p$; there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle; he could not be doing this unless he thought that $q$; he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that $q$ is required; he has done nothing to stop me thinking that $q$; he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that $q$; and so he has implicated that $q$.” (p. 50)

Other characteristics include cancellability, non-detachability, and non-conventionality. The perceived meaning of an utterance that has been transmitted could be cancelled later in the conversation by other utterances (cancellability). Therefore, the meaning of an utterance is not attached to the utterance itself (non-conventionality), and even if other grammatical and semantic forms are used to mean the same intention, the implicature still remains (non-detachability). Because of these characteristics, Grice (1989) explains that implicature is “not carried by what is said, but only by saying what is said” (p. 39) and also that the content of implicature (implicatum) seems to have indeterminacy, because there is no fixed list of explanations for the calculation of implicatures. This is one of the most important aspects of Gricean theory, and he proposes that there should not be a direct conventional relationship between the content of the utterance and the implicature the utterance invites.

The characteristics described above make it difficult to apply Gricean theory to actual linguistic data, because Grice does not assume any particular form functions as an implicatum. Also, he does not assume a particular implicature arises by the given
utterance in a particular context. Implicatures can be cancelled later in the conversation, can be retained with completely different grammatical forms as long as the propositional content remains the same, are not to be attached to specific cultural or linguistic norms, are not necessarily true, and are indeterminate in meaning. A formal analysis that relies on a form-function mapping will not be successful in analyzing novel utterances that are intended to generate implicatures, at least, within Grice's original framework.3

Culture is also a factor in the application of Gricean theory. Grice clearly states that both the speaker and the hearer must share some knowledge such as vocabulary, context, background knowledge and so forth. In this respect, therefore, although he claims the universality of CP and the Maxims, he seems to assume that cultural conventions and conventional linguistic knowledge should play an important role. There were some classic pragmatic studies (e.g., Keenan, 1976), whose findings imply that some modification is required to apply Grice's theory to different speech communities. In these studies, the linguists discovered some utterances that would be violations of Gricean maxims in Western culture but do not necessarily violate maxims in a non-Western culture, therefore in those cases a particular implicature would not be made. Later theorists (e.g., Green, 1989) claim that the examples found in Keenan's study (1976) were not caused by the difference of maxims per se but the difference of the way in which particular contexts are perceived in the given culture based on cultural

3 Searle uses Grice's theory in his analysis of indirect speech acts. Please look at the later section of this paper. Also, see the discussion in Vanderveken (1994) for formal analysis of implicatures.
conventions. In this view Gricean theory is still intact even in different speech communities.

The conventional speech act is also related to the Gricean approach, but it is different in such a way that it assumes certain conventional relationship between the utterance and the inferred intention. Although many speech acts are conducted exploiting conversational implicatures, conventional speech acts do not necessarily retain the characteristics of conversational implicature, especially non-conventionality, non-detachability, and probably cancellability, although calculability may still be retained. Conventional speech acts will be discussed in detail in the following section.

2.4. Conventional factors

A number of questions have been raised in relation to Gricean theory. Some are from philosophy concerning the concepts of “what is said” and “what is implicated.” Others are from cognitive psychology concerning processing, and others are from social psychology and cross-cultural pragmatics concerning cultural applicability. It seems however, these issues are not directed toward the fundamental part of Gricean approach but rather they concern the conventionality of utterances. The following section discusses issues on conventions and examines how they affect the comprehension of utterances.

2.4.1. Searle’s Speech Acts theory: conventionalized indirectness

Speech Acts Theory (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1965) is an influential theory concerning indirectness of speech. Searle (1965, 1991) attempted to analyze indirect speech acts,
taken from Austin (1962), using two distinctive types of meanings, namely, locutionary meaning and illocutionary meaning. If illocutionary meaning is expressed indirectly, it is called an ‘indirect speech act.’ In his analysis, shared knowledge, rationality and the ability to make inferences are crucial. Searle (1965, 1991) states:

In indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, together with the general powers of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer. (Searle, 1991, p.266)

Searle (1965, 1991) has incorporated Gricean theory into his analysis of indirect speech acts. He proposes that when an indirect speech act (Can you pass the salt?) is performed, the hearer takes the following steps (X is the speaker):

STEP 1: Y\(^4\) has asked me a question as to whether I have the ability to pass the salt (fact about the conversation).

STEP 2: I assume that he is cooperating in the conversation and that therefore his utterance has some aim or point (principles of conversational cooperation).

STEP 3: The conversational setting is not such as to indicate a theoretical interest in my salt-passing ability (factual background information).

\(^4\) This is probably “X.” This may be a typographical error.
STEP 4: Furthermore, he probably already knows that the answer to the question is yes (factual background information). (This step facilitates the move to Step 5, but is not essential).

STEP 5: Therefore, his utterance is probably not just a question. It probably has some ulterior illocutionary point (inference from Steps 1, 2, 3, and 4). What can it be?

STEP 6: A preparatory condition for any directive illocutionary act is the ability of H to perform the act predicated in the propositional content condition (theory of speech acts).

STEP 7: Therefore, X has asked me a question the affirmative answer to which would entail that the preparatory condition for requesting me to pass the salt is satisfied (inference from Steps 1 and 6)

STEP 8: We are now at dinner and people normally use salt at dinner; they pass it back and forth, try to get others to pass it back and forth, etc. (background information).

STEP 9: He has therefore alluded to the satisfaction of a preparatory condition for a request whose obedience conditions it is quite likely he wants me to bring about (inference from 7 and 8).
STEP 10: Therefore, in the absence of any other plausible illocutionary point, he is probably requesting me to pass him the salt (inference form Steps 5 and 9).


From the hearer’s perspective, what determines whether the sentence “Can you pass the salt?” is direct or indirect is the context in which the utterance is made. Why ‘asking about the ability’ is understood as a request is explained by the Gricean theory as the above steps 1 through 5 clearly indicate.

The question Searle had was why some particular forms of indirectness are used more often and understood more easily than others. When we perceive an indirect speech act, there is always a possibility that there are multiple illocutionary meanings, but many indirect speech acts are not necessarily perceived as ambiguous. Searle compared idioms and those speech acts that are used often, and he surmised that those conventional indirect speech acts and idioms perform similarly. He further proposed to add one more maxim to Grice’s original work as: “Speak idiomatically unless there is some special reason not to” (Searle, 1991 p. 274).

While Grice was focusing on novel types of indirect expressions, Searle was trying to connect forms and functions in conventional speech acts. In the later development of studies of pragmatics, the issues they have raised have become very important, because the speakers in conversation rely on conventional ways of speech on one hand; on the
other, they also assume that the hearer would be able to generate the intention of speech by calculation.

The utterances that Grice and Searle examined are thus similar and often overlap, but there is a fundamental difference between them. Some of the characteristics that Grice listed, namely cancellability and non-conventionality are not necessarily present when conventional speech acts are concerned in actual communication.

For example, the conventional Speech Act of request “can you pass the salt?” is hardly understood as a question about one’s ability to pass the salt in most situations in ordinary life. The primary meaning of this expression is the conventional meaning rather than its literal meaning. Therefore, although, theoretically speaking, it may be possible to cancel the illocution, it is virtually impossible to cancel it in ordinary conversation. In this particular case, “can you pass the salt” is not likely to be perceived anything but a conventional request in the given context.

It may be possible to say that for conventionally used expressions like this, even though the characteristics of implicatures may still retain, the degree of cancellability and non-conventionality are low if not nonexistent. If the intended meaning and the utterance itself have a straightforward one-to-one relationship just as an idiom has one meaning, then the cancellability and non-conventionality do not exist at all in terms of the idiomatic meaning. Also, if the intended meaning of the utterance is perceived routinely without the working-out process, the calculability assumption may also be impinged.
From these theoretical studies, it is possible to assume that there are, at least, two types of non-literal utterances: the utterances that require an obligatory working-out process and the utterances that have fixed conventional meanings. These two types of utterances are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but rather there are different degrees of non-conventionality, calculability and cancellability in those utterances. When the degrees of them are higher, the degree of non-detachability is also thought to be higher.

2.4.2. Plausible psychological processing models from philosophical viewpoints

What philosophers have contended regarding comprehension of indirect utterances may or may not explain what is actually processed in the interlocutor's mind. In order to verify the findings from philosophical theories, several processing models have been proposed.

According to Grice's approach, the hearer may go through the following process.

Grice's approach:

Step 1: Accessing "what is said"

Step 2: Comprehending "what is implicated."

Since Grice did not clearly state the exact content of either "what is said" or "what is implicated," it is difficult to apply actual linguistic data in analysis. Several theorists have proposed modified models.

Recanati (1991) examined possible approaches to processing such utterances. First, he proposed a three-level approach: level 1. sentence meaning with contextual ingredients, level 2. "what is said" and implicatures, and level 3. "what is communicated." In this
view, "what is said" subsumes pragmatic constituents, and the difference between implicatures and the pragmatic constituents of "what is said" can be determined by the "pre-theoretic intuitions" of the hearer. "What is communicated" consists of both "what is said" and the generated implicature. This model assumes obligatory access to sentence meaning. After discussing the role of "what is communicated," Recanati then proposed "what is communicated" is actually a level that consists of "what is said" and implicatures.

**Figure 1. Recanati's approach**

```
"what is communicated"  "what is said" & Conversational implicatures
(consciously accessible)                      
sub-doxastic level           sentence meaning                contextual ingredients of "what is said"
(adapted from Recanati, 1991, p. 107)
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This model also assumes obligatory access to grammatical sentence meaning.

Relevance theorists (Sperber and Wilson, 1986) examined the comprehension process of utterances and proposed their account of three levels of meaning.

The relevance theory:

1. Level 1. logical form (coded meaning, a skeleton\(^5\) of what is conveyed)
2. Level 2. explicature (what is said; a proposition is expressed)
3. Level 3. implicature (what is implicated).

Relevance theory clearly argues that explicature is generated in pragmatics, which is

context dependent, rather than in semantics, which is context independent. In this approach, processing the implicature depends on how much relevance the utterance has in the given context, and the processing is a simple two-step model.

Relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure:

1. Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: Test interpretive hypotheses (disambiguation, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in order of accessibility.

2. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied. (Wilson, 2002, p.4)

Wilson (2002) claims that the strength of the relevant theory is that it employs both linguistic decoding and pragmatic inference at the same time.

As a contrasting view, Giora’s graded salience hypothesis assumes the extended semantic meanings of utterances. It argues that some non-literal utterances have intended meanings encoded in the expressions themselves so that the hearer just has to access the intended meaning without recourse to the possible semantic meaning of the utterance. Her argument is based on the claim that figurative and nonfigurative utterances are governed by a “general principle of salience” (Giora, 1997). For example, in the comprehension process of conventional metaphors, the metaphorical interpretation is first accessed, because it is more salient than its literal meaning. For novel metaphors, the hearer seeks more salient meanings until a contextually appropriate interpretation is
reached. Some earlier studies on idiom comprehension by Gibbs\textsuperscript{6} also suggest strong semantic influence on comprehension.

2.5. Factors related to comprehension of utterances

In contrast to Recanati and other traditional theorists' view, the relevance theorists and Giora do not assume obligatory access to the grammatical semantic meaning of the utterance. It is still not yet clear whether it is processed so quickly that it does not show in the experiments or it is not processed at all, however, it is reasonable to assume that the grammatical and semantic meaning of the utterance does not contribute to the intended meaning of the utterance as much if conventionality of form is involved, and the grammatical and semantic meaning becomes the basis for inference if conventionality is not involved. Thus, conventionality seems to be a factor here.

In the cases when conventionally used expressions are not used and yet the grammatical and semantic meaning, in Gricean terms "what is said," is different from the intended meaning, "what is implicated," inference must be made. In such cases, the difference between the two meanings might become a factor. If the difference between the two meanings is minimum, the utterance can be referred to as literal, and if it is very different, it can be referred to as non-literal.

Based on philosophical literature, there are several other terms used as the factors related to comprehending utterances in conversation. Also, in later studies of

\textsuperscript{6} Please refer to the conventional-meaning model in later section of this paper.
philosophy they have distinguished different types of speech acts such as literal, non-
literal, and indirect uses of sentences (Back and Harnish, 1979).

Several other factors have been proposed from the studies of cognitive psychologists. Those factors are important in order to predict how L2 speakers of Japanese would comprehend utterances. Among the factors, one major factor that distinguishes utterance types is the literality, and the other is conventionality.

2.5.1. Factors in a theoretical framework: literality factor

Table 1 shows some of the terms often used in the literature about the comprehension of utterances. All these terms, familiarity, conventionality, cognitive effects, and saliency are deeply related to the concept of context. Without consideration of contextual effects, it is impossible to determine if the utterances are easier or harder to comprehend.

Table 1. Key terms related to the difficulty of utterance comprehension for L1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumed difficulty</th>
<th>Familiarity</th>
<th>Conventionality</th>
<th>Cognitive effort</th>
<th>Saliency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>easier</td>
<td>more familiar</td>
<td>more conventional</td>
<td>less cognitive effort</td>
<td>more salient</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>harder</td>
<td>less familiar</td>
<td>less conventional</td>
<td>more cognitive effort</td>
<td>less salient</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a theoretical framework, scholars have argued whether the complete proposition is generated at the level of “what is said” or not. To date there is no conclusive
evidence that can support either point. In actual interaction, psychologically speaking, it
is also arguable whether the hearer processes the meaning of “what is said,” or whether
the hearer consciously accesses the literal meaning of the utterance.

2.5.2. Formulaic expressions: conventional utterances

Philosophical literature has suggested some processing patterns of utterance
comprehension, however, these studies did not actually use linguistic data to test their
hypotheses. Therefore, it is an open question whether philosophical theories can predict
the actual behavior of linguistic comprehension. On the other hand, psychological
studies attempt to examine processing patterns through experiments.

In cognitive psychology, various types of meanings discussed in philosophical
literature have not been precisely defined.\(^7\) In this field, most studies in utterances
comprehension were conducted using the terms “literal meaning” and “non-literal /
intended meaning” of the utterance. These two terms roughly\(^8\) correspond to “what is
said” and “what is communicated (implicated)” in philosophy. Empirical testing is the
method of research, and several models have been proposed and tested. Those studies
have been developed from different theoretical frameworks, but the area they cover
largely overlaps Grice’s theory. However, studies on novel types of non-literal
utterances were rather rare, and most studies focus on conventionally used formulaic
expressions or the variations of them.

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\(^7\) See Gibbs (1982) and Katz (1998) for discussions on literal meaning.
\(^8\) Actually, there are several other terms that are used to further distinguish different meanings.
Some studies in this field test the comprehension of non-literal utterances by measuring how fast the hearer can comprehend the intended meaning of the utterances. Many of them so far have used idioms and conventional speech acts. There have been three processing models: the literal-meaning-first model (Clark and Lucy, 1975; Bobrow and Bell, 1973), the multiple-meaning model (Clark, 1979; Clark and Schunk, 1980; Swinney and Cutler, 1979; Takahashi and Roitblat, 1994), and the conventional-meaning or the direct access model (Gibbs, 1979, 1982).

The multiple-meaning model proposes that literal and intended (non-literal) meanings are understood simultaneously. The conventional-meaning model assumes that the hearer tends to interpret the conventional meaning of utterances without or before accessing the literal meaning of it, and this model has normally been applied to comprehension of idioms, metaphors and conventional speech acts. The researchers whose experiments support either the multiple-meaning model or the conventional-meaning model have rejected experimentally the literal-meaning-first model, which assumes the obligatory access to the utterance's literal meaning.

2.5.3. The literal-meaning-first model

The literal-meaning-first model assumes the hearer always accesses the literal meaning of the utterance before making any inference. Clark and Lucy (1975) first

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9 These are sometimes referred to as generalized conversational implicatures (Holtgraves, 2002).
10 This is sometimes referred to as the standard pragmatic view in comparison to the direct access view described below.
proposed this model, and their motivation for the study is from pragmatic theories on indirectness. They hypothesized the following processes for the comprehension of indirect speech acts. This is roughly the same as the standard pragmatic view that Grice proposed.

The listener:

1. derives the literal meaning.
2. tests against the context.
   a. accepts the interpretation, if it is appropriate.
   b. rejects the interpretation, if it is not appropriate,
3. applies the rules of conversation, and then derives the appropriate intended meaning through deduction.

If this process is, in fact, a plausible one, the following should be achieved. 1. Characteristics of literal comprehension should be shown (e.g., a negative sentence takes a longer time to be comprehended); 2. if the intended meaning is different from the literal meaning, then it should take longer to process; 3. the intended meaning should be the final representation of the utterance (Clark and Lucy, 1975). The design was experimental one. They used pictures of colored circles as stimuli followed by either direct or indirect questions, or positive or negative questions. The participants were asked to respond whether the question was true or false based on the pictures shown to

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11Such as Gricean theory (Grice, 1975), and conversational postulates proposed by Lakoff (1973).
them. The researchers collected reaction time and the true/false responses. Their data correspond to their prediction.

The literal-meaning-first model was supported by the study of comprehension of idioms (Bobrow and Bell, 1973). However, some researchers contested that Clark and Lucy's study had several major problems (Gibbs, 1982, Takahashi, 1990, Takahashi and Roitblat, 1994). The most crucial problem is a procedural one in that the design of their experiment did not have authentic conversational context. Without context, their processing model (see the step 2 of their model above) cannot be properly verified. Also, Takahashi and Roitblat (1994) have criticized the experiment for not controlling the length of the target sentences; therefore the latencies tested might have been attributed to the decoding speed of the sentences shown.

2.5.4. The multiple-meaning model

Clark (1979) further conducted a series of experiments, and his main focus this time was the response to indirect speech acts. In his study, he proposes that literal and intended (non-literal) meanings are understood simultaneously. He used a method that would simulate daily conversations with contextual information, using naturalistic telephone conversations. Telephone calls were made to local merchants listed on Yellow Pages, asking a piece of information such as asking the time when the merchant closes. He collected the responses and classified them according to the different requesting strategies.
Clark found that the listeners responded to the various types of request systematically, providing all three types of responses. He claims that his data suggest that the listener has access to both literal and intended meanings depending on the information they obtained from the speakers. He surmises that the listeners rely on the following six sources of information in order to determine the seriousness of each meaning of a request: conventionality of meanings; conventionality of form; special markers; transparency of the indirect meaning, implausibility of the literal meaning; the speaker's imputed plans and goals. If these six sources of information are used to determine the meaning, it is impossible to decide that one meaning is understood first and then the other. It is more plausible to say that both are simultaneously understood.

Clark and Schunk (1980) studied politeness in this framework. The hearer understands the polite speech act's intended meaning and also literal meaning in order to respond politely. This is only possible if both are processed simultaneously.

A model practically the same as the multiple-meaning model was proposed by the study of idiom comprehension. Swinney and Cutler (1979) proposed a lexical representation model, or the simultaneous processing hypothesis. In their framework, idioms are stored in the mental lexicon just like words, and the idiom is retrieved from there when the hearer perceives the first word. The interpretation process for both meanings starts as soon as the retrieval begins. This model seems compatible to Giora's graded salience hypothesis.
Gibbs (1982) questions the above studies. He thinks it is not necessarily for the hearer to access the literal meaning in order to determine the utterance's politeness level. It may be due to the fact that people know different politeness formulae by convention. Therefore, computation of politeness from the literal meaning is not necessary.

For the Clark study, Gibbs (1982) explains that the reason why the hearer responds with an answer for both the literal and intended meanings of the utterance may be attributed to other reasons such conventions and politeness. For example, an indirect request "Can you tell me when you will close today?" can elicit response such as "Yes. We'll close at five today." This "yes" was articulated for the sake of politeness, and it was done conventionally. Therefore, the fact that the literal response was used does not necessarily support the model that assumes the processing of literal meaning.

Gibbs (1982) argues that even though their way of treating idioms as lexical items seems plausible, Swinney and Cutler's (1979) study does not clearly explain how idioms are stored, because of the different frozenness levels of the idioms. Also, how idioms are lexicalized can be questionable in their framework. Gibbs proposes a different model, in which all the counterarguments he made are incorporated. The new model is called the conventional-meaning model (See 2.5.5).

Cronk and Schweigert's (1992) study supports the multiple-meaning model, but it does not support the conventional-meaning model. They studied the effects of familiarity, literalness and usage for idiom comprehension. They used eight types of sentences with three variables: familiarity, literalness and usage. Idioms that are either
familiar, literal or used in figurative contexts are the fastest to be understood, and idioms that are either less familiar, non-literal or used in literal contexts were understood most slowly. Their study confirms the multiple-meaning model, because the retrieval of the meaning of an idiom depends on the contextual factors. For idiom comprehension, the lexical representation model, which asserts that idioms are lexicalized just like individual words, seems to be the probable explanation.

Cronk and Schweigert's study, however, failed to support the conventional-meaning model. Their study had usage, literal use and figurative use, as variables, and they claim that when familiar idioms are used figuratively, they were processed faster. This seems to support the conventional-meaning model, but they also found that when less familiar idioms were used figuratively, the processing speed was not necessarily faster. Also, they did not find the interference effect that was supposed to be found when familiar idioms are used for literal interpretation.

Cronk and Schweigert's study provided a more salient view of how each variable interacts for the comprehension of idioms. However, it also posits a problem. In order to control variables, they reduced the amount of contextual information to a minimum. The sentences they used contain very little contextual information. e.g., Laura finally went to the doctor because she had a pain in the neck (Cronk and Schweigert, 1992, p.144). The only information that the participants of the study could get was the first part of the sentence. Gibbs' (1985) explanation for the conventional-meaning model presupposes that the participants are given sufficient contextual information. In order to
clarify the issues regarding both models, it is required to conduct a study that examines
the effects of context, familiarity, literalness and usage.

McGlone, Glucksberg and Cacciari (1994) proposed the sequential-multi-step model
as an alternative approach to explain why figurative meanings of familiar idioms are
processed faster. Explanations were given that idioms are stored in the mental lexicon
(Swinney and Cutler, 1979; Mueller and Gibbs, 1987). They took some examples of
idioms that are often used productively in conversation, which means idioms are
paraphrased to some extent but that the original meanings are still retained. In order to
comprehend these variants of idioms, McGlone, Glucksberg, & Cacciari (1994)
suggested that the following six operations should be processed.

1. Recognize the utterance as an intentional variant of the original idiom, not simply
   a speaker error;
2. Retrieve meaning of the original idiom;
3. Activate word meanings of both variant and original idioms;
4. Compare the word meanings of the two idiom forms;
5. Identify the relation(s) between those word meanings; and
6. Take this relation(s) between the word meanings to infer, by analogy, the
   relation(s) between the meanings of the original and variant idioms.

(McGlone, Glucksberg, & Cacciari, 1994)

According to this model, the latency for comprehension of various types of idioms
should be understood in the following order: conventional idioms; literal expressions;
then variants of idioms. Their experiment, however, could not find support for this model. Conventional idioms were processed faster, but literal expressions and variants of idioms were processed equally quickly. After examining different types of variations, they conclude that literal meanings of idioms constrain the use of conventional idioms and the construction of their variations.

Forrester (1995) studied how familiar idioms and their semantic equivalents are processed. His experiment consists of four types of idiomatic expressions: familiar idioms, the semantic equivalents of familiar idioms, unfamiliar idioms and the semantic equivalents of unfamiliar idioms based on three variables: language form, convention and context. These idioms were tested with figurative and literal contexts. Familiar idioms and their semantic equivalents were processed faster than unfamiliar pairs. Forrester's study shows that phrases that are semantic equivalents of familiar idioms are processed idiomatically; familiarity plays an important role for the comprehension of idiomatic phrases; contextual effects were not found.

The most important finding of Forrester's (1995) research was that idiomatic expressions do not need to be syntactically frozen in order to be comprehended (i.e., using exactly the same wording with the same grammatical structure), and that implicative force of idioms was employed during the comprehension when semantically equivalent phrases were used instead of the idioms themselves. However, as Forrester himself asserts, his findings may be attributed to the difference of literalness. The familiar idioms that he used could be more literal on a literalness scale (Cronk and
Schweigert, 1992) than the unfamiliar idioms. Forrester states that if this were the case, this study would support the multiple-meaning model.

Forrester's study brings a new issue of syntactic frozenness of idioms. The semantic equivalents of familiar idioms are, strictly speaking, not familiar to the participants, but because of the existence of the familiar idioms, they were processed as if they were familiar to the hearers.

2.5.5. The conventional-meaning model

The conventional-meaning model assumes that the hearer tends to interpret the conventional meaning of utterances without or before accessing the literal meaning. This model has normally been applied to the comprehension of idioms, metaphors and conventional speech acts. Gibbs (1979) conducted a study using rating tasks to verify the literal-meaning-first model, providing context for each utterance. The data from his study showed that the response time for understanding indirect requests was not necessarily longer than that of direct request if sufficient contextual information is given. This result disproves the literal-meaning-first model.

Gibbs (1982) argues that the multiple-meaning model does not seem plausible, either, because people tend to interpret just the conventional meaning of an utterance not its literal meaning. Gibbs conducted a study of the indirect requests using a judgment task. Participants were given a short story context, which ends with either a literal or indirect request sentence. Then, one of the following four types of sentences: literal, conventional, unrelated or false, was presented to the participants. The participants’
task was to judge whether the sentence was a grammatically meaningful sentence or not. The time taken to judge the sentence was measured. The assumption of the study was that the literal meaning of a conventionally used utterance is not necessarily processed; therefore if the sentence’s literal meaning is always processed when its figurative meaning is accessed, the reading time would be longer.

The result of Gibbs' (1982) study shows no evidence for the literal interpretation of indirect requests. Conventional sentences were read faster when the story context corresponded to the sentence, but even when the context did not correspond to the sentences, conventional sentences were still processed faster. Since all the indirect requests used in his study were conventionally used indirect requests, Gibbs explains that the conventional meaning of an indirect request is processed faster than a literal sentence.

The above result rejects the multiple-meaning model, which assumes simultaneous processing of literal and non-literal meanings. Gibbs (1982) suggests that literal meanings of conventionally used non-literal utterances are not necessarily processed, and many times, they are not processed at all. This model can be used to explain the result of the previous study of Clark's (1979). One of Clark's findings in his study that many participants responded with "Yes, ..." for a "Would you mind ...?" question suggests that the "Would you mind ...?" question was not literally understood but conventionally understood as a request, so the participants supplied an affirmative answer where a negative form should have been used.
This conventional-meaning model has been supported by some studies on idioms such as Gibbs (1985, 1986), who conducted a study using the same method as the one for comprehension of non-literal utterances (Gibbs, 1984). The result supported the conventional-meaning model that idioms are not necessarily understood literally during comprehension processes.

The conventional-meaning model can only explain the utterances that are syntactically frozen like idioms, and the conventionality being discussed here only means conventionality of forms. There are different types of conventionality discussed in literature, and other types of conventional sentences have not been tested by means of psychological experiments. Issues on conventionality will be discussed in the subsequent section. In this regard, Forrester’s (1995) study confirms that variants of idioms are comprehended fast, and this result suggests another type of convention contributes to the comprehension process.

2.5.6. Processing models and conventional language use

Among the three models discussed above, the literal-meaning-first model has been rejected. It is not surprising from theoretical points of view, because when the degree of conventionality is high, the link between the literal meaning of an utterance and the intended meaning is weak just as many idioms have lost their literal meaning through a diachronic process. The multiple-meaning model and the conventional-meaning model have been supported by various studies. The main difference between them is whether a complete literal meaning is necessarily processed during comprehension or not. Gibbs
(1982) makes a strong argument that many conventionally used utterances are not 
literally processed. That could mean familiar expressions such as conventional speech 
acts, idioms and so forth bypass literal meaning processing especially, but not necessarily, 
when enough contextual information is given, so the hearer can utilize processing 
capacity for a higher level of processing.

The problem of the conventional-meaning model is that it can only explain the 
processing of idiomatic expressions. There are various types of non-literal utterances, 
and, in this regard, the multiple-meaning model can be more generally applicable. 
However, there is a theoretical question whether it is reasonable to treat all types of non- 
literal utterances in the same way or not. There are different degrees and types of 
conventionality involved, and it is not surprising if people process those utterances 
differently.

2.5.7. More on conventionality issues

The reason why the literal-meaning-first model has been rejected was because it did 
not consider the various types of conventions used in spoken language. Morgan (1991) 
discusses the diachronic process of linguistic conventions. He explains that there are 
two types of conventions: convention of language, and convention of usage. 
Convention of language refers to the arbitrary relation between linguistic form and its 
meaning. Convention of usage refers to the language in connection with the three 
elements he proposes: occasion, purpose, and means. The three elements can be 
referred to as ‘context’ and their relationships determine language use. Morgan
proposes that conventions of usage can become conventions of language, if occasion directly links with means through diachronic change. Morgan also explains that a similar transformation may occur with the types of conventions that require Gricean theory. This means that the meaning of, for example, an indirect request can be obtained without recourse to the original propositional content of the utterance, and the conventional meaning of the utterance can even be referred to as its 'literal meaning.'

Clark (1979), whose background is cognitive psychology, also mentions two types of linguistic conventions: conventions of means and conventions of forms. The former refers to the use of a particular semantic device in order to perform an indirect speech act. The latter refers to the use of a specific linguistic form in order to perform an indirect speech act. The difference between convention of means and convention of form is a matter of degree that reflects the history of usage.

Grice's theory assumes no form-attached conventionality, but he assumes diachronic changes of implicatures. It can be argued that some of the examples Grice cited such as hyperbole and irony, or the so-called 'Pope questions' discussed by Green (1989) typically use convention of means. On the other hand, Gibbs (1994) analyzed idioms as dead metaphors, which exploit convention of forms. He explains:

Because contemporary speakers have little understanding of the original metaphorical roots of phrases like spill the beans and kick the bucket,

\[\text{Grice uses the word 'intuitively' to describe such situations. See the discussion on non-conventionality of implicatures (Grice, 1989).}\]
people are thought to comprehend idioms in the same way as they know
the meanings of individual words: as a matter of convention. (p. 274)

According to this view, idioms are examples of conventions of forms, and their
literal meanings have already disappeared. English speakers learn the meaning of such
expressions mostly through repetitive use unless they learn the etymology of such
expressions. Nonnative speakers of English often lack enough exposure to idiomatic
expressions so many have a hard time learning them.

Gibbs further discusses another example of convention such as the convention of
greeting others by asking about their health situations in English. This greeting
convention is also arbitrary, and the present day English speakers know little about the
reason behind it. Although the forms for greeting are not necessarily conventionalized,
the means has been conventionalized through a diachronic change (Gibbs, 1994). This
particular type of convention can be said to be culture-specific, but the original reason
behind it seems to be more universal.

On the other hand, the logic behind ‘Pope questions’¹³ that can also be explained by
convention of means seems to be less universally shared. If the speaker’s native
language did not have the convention of answering questions by asking a question that
has an obvious answer, he/she would not be able to comprehend the utterance unless the
hearer goes through an inference process using analogy. A series of Bouton’s studies

¹³ Pope Q is a type of a question used to reply to a question indicating that the respondent is providing an
obvious affirmative answer. e.g., Does your husband come back late? Is Pope Catholic?
(1988, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1994) examined various types of utterances, and he found that the Pope questions were harder for nonnative speakers, especially for those from Asian countries, to comprehend.

Although the factors described so far seem to influence the comprehension of utterances, it is still difficult to determine exactly what kinds of utterances are easily comprehensible for JFL learners and what are not. One reason is because those factors are all interrelated, and each utterance in conversation may have different features in terms of these factors.

There seems to be no unified account that supports either the multiple-meaning model or the conventional-meaning model. It has not been clarified how familiar idioms are comprehended. There have been suggestions that they are stored in mental lexicon just like words, but because some idioms allow internal modification (Gibbs, 1985) and that the semantic equivalents of idioms are also processed in the same way as idioms are processed (Forrester, 1995), this explanation is questionable. More studies should be conducted to further advance this area. At present, how utterances are comprehended pragmatically is still unclear.

2.5.8. Psychological studies and L2 learners

Through studies on utterance processing, it has been suggested two factors are strongly related to the processing of speech, namely conventionality and familiarity. These two are related concepts, but there is a fundamental difference between them. Conventionality is determined in the society where the language is spoken, and
familiarity is the user's individual business. For many adult L1 speakers conventional utterances can be familiar ones, but for L2 speakers conventional utterances may not be familiar just because they are not exposed to them in authentic situations.

The studies included in Table 2 show that factors such as various types of conventionality (including syntactic frozenness), familiarity, and context are closely related to the comprehension of utterances.

The results of these studies listed on Table 2 suggest the following:

1. The conventional meaning of a non-literal utterance may be accessed faster.

2. The literal meaning of a non-literal utterance may not be processed when the context strongly supports the conventional meaning.

3. A familiar non-literal conventional utterance may be processed faster than unfamiliar ones.

Cognitive psychologists so far have not studied how a nonnative speaker processes various types of non-literal utterances in great detail yet. Unlike literal utterances, conventional utterances needed to be learned in context, and familiarity is only gained when enough exposure is made. Nonnative speakers, especially those who study in a foreign language situation, seem to have a disadvantage of not being able to get sufficient input of non-literal utterances in context as they learn the language.

Very few studies have been conducted so far in L2 utterance comprehension from the perspective of cognitive psychology (Takahashi & Roitblat, 1994). One of the reasons why there are so few studies in this field seems to be that other types of study
such as cross-cultural pragmatic studies are more predominant in this regard. The next section discusses some cross-cultural studies.

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2.6. Issues on conventionality and cross-cultural studies

As demonstrated in previous section, it seems that knowledge of conventional uses of language, whether implicit or explicit, plays a crucial role in everyday spoken language. This is further related to cultural factors. As studies in cognitive psychology examined, some conventionalized expressions have lost the historical and
original logical connections between the forms and their semantic meanings. The meanings of these expressions cannot be easily obtained through analogy. Several researchers have studied comprehension of non-literal utterances in cross-linguistic situations in an anthropological framework. Keenan's (1976) study has often been quoted as a counterexample of Gricean theory.

2.6.1. A classic counter-argument against Gricean theory

Keenan (1976) conducted an ethnographical study of the Malagasy culture. Her findings questioned the application of the maxim of Quantity in Malagasy. She examined a normative behavior in that culture, in which the maxim of quantity is obviously violated without giving a specific conversational implicature. For example, to a question "where is your mother?" a Malagasy would say "She is either in the house or at the market" (Keenan, 1976). If we were to apply Grice's explanation, we would think that the speaker implies she does not have sufficient information of the location of her mother. In Malagasy society, however, this implicature is not made. Keenan provides two reasons: one is that in that society, new information is treated as a commodity, therefore, people do not give it away so easily; a second is that giving information requires some kind of responsibility, and that people generally do not want to take that kind of responsibility resulted from revealing information. Keenan explains that, in Malagasy society, the maxim of quantity becomes irrelevant.

Green (1990) explains that even in such a society, conversational maxims are intact, giving two reasons. One is that in Malagasy society, the maxim of Quality is regarded
as being higher than the maxim of Quantity, because if one gave wrong information, she would have to take the responsibility. The second comes from the fact that in Malagasy society, making explicit statements about beliefs and activities is a taboo. Finding if the application of Gricean theory has to be adjusted all the time in Malagasy society may be difficult, but it is possible to say that there are conventions in Malagasy that are different from those in English, and that those conventions were developed on the basis of cultural constraints.

2.6.2. From social psychology

Although cross-linguistic studies between Japanese and American English regarding the perception of utterances were not found, there is one study that focuses on how deeply Koreans and Americans infer the intention of an utterance. Holtgraves (1997), who is a social psychologist, conducted an empirical study using participants from an American university and a Korean university. He first examined individual differences in looking for indirect meanings when indirect utterances are made, using self-reporting data. Also, he used a multiple-choice questionnaire asking the participants to read a short description of context and three choices of intended meanings, and to choose the intended meaning of the utterance. He found that the Koreans tend to look for a deeper meaning of an utterance than the American counterparts do from this study. He argues that even though there are individual differences among participants, collectively speaking, people in collective cultures tend to look for deeper meanings than those in individual cultures.
One methodological question arises regarding Holtgraves' work. He used a set of questionnaires in both English and Korean. The Korean version was the equivalent of the English counterpart, and it was created using translation and back-translation. It is a fundamental question whether it is possible to create the exact equivalents, because language itself is so deeply rooted in its culture, so an exact equivalent for one word may be difficult to find. Also, the context used in the questionnaire may also manifest cultural variables, and the perception of the context may have influenced comprehension rather than the language use in his studies.

In the field of social psychology it may be reasonable to look at a society in general as having some sort of psychological tendency, but in a pragmatic point of view characterizing one society based on a limited number of data taken from even more limited social situations seems problematic. As studies in pragmatics report that contextual factors, such as social distance, status difference, types of speech events and so forth, play an important role in language use, it may require much more extensive research before characterizing a society as a whole.

It seems cross-cultural studies conducted to date have not deeply looked into various types of conventions that might affect the comprehension of utterances. However, conventions in society influence the linguistic and non-linguistic features of communication, because whatever conventional in a society can be perceived as unmarked, and whatever unconventional may be perceived as marked, and those marked events invite the use of Gricean inference. It is important to first examine whether the
speech events used for the study are conventional in both societies or not before judging the characteristics of the society as a whole.

2.6.3. Pragmatic presupposition and intercultural issues

Pragmatic presupposition is also related to conventions of language use. Mey (2001) describes some of intercultural miscommunications resulting from “the presence of a non-acknowledged, and hence not shared, pragmatic presupposition.” His example of an exchange between a Western tourist and a Japanese temple attendant signifies this point by showing how the tourist perceived the temple attendant’s reply to the inquiry about toilet.

Tourist: Is there a toilet around here?

Attendant: You want to use?

Tourist: *(somewhat astonished)*: Sure I do.

Attendant: Go down the steps. *(Mey, 2001, p.264)*

For this particular example, Mey provides two explanations. One is that even the attendant perceived the speech act that the tourist was making, because the pragmatic presupposition in Japan is different, so the attendant made sure that his understanding of it was correct by asking a clarification question. Another explanation he provides is that since there are two types of toilet, Japanese or Western, in Japan, if the tourist himself wanted to use the toilet, then a Western style toilet would be more appropriate for the tourist who was undoubtedly a foreigner, so the attendant asked him the question to make
sure that this foreigner would not be embarrassed. In any case, the tourist did not expect to be asked such a question.

The term pragmatic presupposition here is an extended one from generally discussed pragmatic presupposition in earlier literature (cf. Stalnaker, 1974). For most of the people in the Western culture, the question under the circumstance has a presupposition that the tourist indeed wants to use a toilet, so replying "You want to use?" challenges the presupposition. Mey's explanation is that this same presupposition does not necessarily exist in other cultures, so if there are people who do not share the same pragmatic knowledge, miscommunication may occur. Interestingly, in this particular example, because the presupposition was challenged, the hearer (Mey himself) could use conversational logic and generated explanations provided above.

Pragmatic presupposition, unlike conversational logic, is usually an unmarked part of communication, and it is not usually challenged. When it is being challenged, conversational logic may be implemented in order to provide a reasonable explanation or the conversation may break down.

A semantic notion of presupposition (which includes, despite their name, some of Stalnaker's original 'pragmatic presuppositions') merely links sentences

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14 Since the situation here is between a native speaker and a non-native speaker of English, a cross-linguistic factor should also be taken into consideration. Many native speakers of Japanese may agree that saying the Japanese equivalent of "You want to use?" would also sound awkward in this situation. So, the reason why the temple attendant used the particular expression may be attributed to a second language problem. Therefore, this may not be a good example of cross-cultural difference, while it can still be used to explain the concept of pragmatic presupposition.
together on the basis of what is true or false. A serious theory of pragmatic presuppositions goes beyond this, and inquires metapragmatically into the ways an utterance is understood in the context of the languages users’ ‘common ground’. (Mey, 2001, pp. 186-187).

In his view, conversational inference, which is individually operated, is cooperative with pragmatic presupposition, which has been collectively formulated, in conversation. Sometimes conversational implicatures are generated on the basis of the pragmatic presupposition. Mey explains:

Whereas pragmatic presuppositions (as all presuppositions) are here to stay once they are accepted (and not explicitly cancelled), conversational implicatures share the shifting framework of conversational interaction. We may put presuppositions to work to create an implicature; but we cannot use an implicature to create a presupposition (unless the implicature is ratified by all parties and becomes a new presupposition in its own right). Implicatures are mainly the individual’s own business; presuppositions require a collective, sometimes even metapragmatic justification (p. 189).

In this explanation, it is sometimes the case that the conventionalized use of a conversational implicature brings about a presupposition through diachronic changes. Although pragmatic supposition has not been tested in psycholinguistic studies, it may be the case that non-literal utterances based on pragmatic presupposition are processed differently from the non-literal utterances that exploit conversational maxims. If so,
comprehension of non-literal utterances based on pragmatic presupposition that is only shared by the people in a particular community may be more difficult to comprehend, because it requires the language users’ shared knowledge that is deeply rooted in the culture where the language is spoken.

This is an important factor for the L2 studies, because L2 learners presumably have a very limited chance to be exposed to various types of language use especially when they are in a foreign language situation. If the grammatically decoded meaning of an utterance does not contribute to the intended meaning, the L2 learners may have to use a different strategy from that of the L1 speakers in order to comprehend utterances.

Cognitive psychologists have experimentally examined comprehension processes, but again, most studies use L1 data.

2.6.4. Implicature and conventionalized indirectness

Gricean theory has been accepted as an influential theory that explains how people comprehend the intended meaning of an utterance, but because of its theoretical nature, application of it into actual conversational data has been somewhat problematic. One major reason is that non-literal utterances are not always processed in the same way; some utterances are understood very fast, and others are not.

While Grice’s original classification of implicature types and types of implicature based on which maxim is being exploited does not seem to contribute to the difficulties that an L2 learner might encounter (Bouton, 1988), several factors have been pointed out as possible explanations for the difference. Conventionality, familiarity and context
have been pointed out as some of the factors, and these are further related to cultural
differences and syntactic frozenness of the utterances. A unified explanation such as the
relevance theory has been proposed, but it is a theory of information exchange, and it
does not intend to explain the difficulty that nonnative speakers have because of both the
formal differences between their first language and the target language and the possible
difference between how they perceive the context and how most native speakers do.
The relevance theory also requires further refinement when applied to different
languages.

It seems that none of the proposed pragmatic theories can predict difficulties that the
L2 learners may have in a straightforward manner. Understanding utterances in natural
interactions can only be possible when both interlocutors share knowledge, both
linguistic and conventional, and have the same goal of comprehending each other, which
leads to the use of conversational inferences. When non-native Japanese speakers are in
contact with native speakers, there might be various sources of miscommunication.

2.7. Factors influencing utterance comprehension

In theoretical works, several factors have been pointed out that may influence the
comprehension of utterances. One major factor is conventionality of the forms and
means. Especially conventional non-literal utterances have been studied rather
intensively by cognitive psychologists, while non-conventional types of utterances were
rarely studied except the utterances that are variants of conventionally used formulaic
utterances, and those variants are related to conventionality of means. Conventional
utterances require a certain amount of knowledge for comprehension, and those who lack the knowledge have difficulty comprehending the intention, though it may not be totally impossible to infer the intention through analogy or inference. Formulaic utterances are therefore those utterances that exploit convention of form, and the literal meaning of them always contrast with the intended meaning, and the relation between them sometimes could seem arbitrary and sometimes inferable through analogy.

The factor that is almost opposite of conventionality is literality of the utterance. A literal utterance is the most straightforward utterance that directly expresses the meaning that the speaker wants to convey. The problem with literal utterances is that they are not often used in conversation, because there are many pragmatic reasons to avoid direct communication, so they are not conventional in everyday conversation. Direct communication is preferred in certain occupational situations or most emergency situations, but in social conversation, purely literal utterances are hardly used.

The other type of non-literal utterances different from conventional ones is those utterances that require an inference process. The intention of this type of utterance can be inferred through the working out process just like the one Grice proposed. Since this type of utterance is always a novel utterance, so the hearer must be able to correctly guess the intention of it.

Another important factor for utterance comprehension is the familiarity factor. Especially for conventional expressions, if the hearer is not familiar with the expression, comprehension seems to be very difficult or the hearer might infer the intention
differently. For JFL learners, the level of familiarity with conventional utterances may strongly affect the comprehension, and in fact the difference between L1 speakers and L2 speakers may be found in the familiarity factor.

These factors, namely conventionality, literality, and familiarity, seem to strongly influence the comprehension process together with contextual factors. Since contextual factors are too complicated to categorize, in the present study, it was determined to use exactly the same contextual information for three different utterances to control the contextual variables. Also, familiarity assumes individual differences, so in the present study, conventional utterances are taken from the list of frequently used expressions that should be familiar to JFL learners.

2.8. Research methods for comprehension of utterances

In the field of pragmatics, many studies focusing on the production of either native speakers (L1) or second language learners (L2) have been conducted. On the other hand, studies on pragmatic perception and comprehension are limited in number and variety. It seems that various methods that could be used for comprehension studies have not been exploited in full. It may be the case that those methods having been used in production studies can also be used for comprehension studies possibly with some modifications. In order to find how the conventionality and literality factors affect the comprehension of utterances, several different approaches are possible. Some of the few empirical studies using different elicitation methods will be reviewed in this section.
2.8.1. Data elicited through interaction

According to Kasper and Dahl (1991), data collection methods used in comprehension studies in pragmatics include rating tasks, multiple choice questionnaires, and interviews. However, comprehension studies are not limited to these tasks. Other tasks such as role-plays and structured interviews could be used as the source of data. Three of the studies on comprehension of non-literal utterances, using elicited conversation will be reviewed here.

Clark’s (1979) study used a set of simulated conversational interactions. He studied how the addresses of telephone conversations would respond to indirect requests in authentic situations. His study consists of five experiments. In each experiment, telephone calls were made to local merchants, requesting a particular piece of information that is relevant in the context. The speaker deliberately used different forms of request (e.g., indirect request, direct request, conventional indirect request, etc.). The responses from the merchants were collected and analyzed according to the forms that the speaker used. His respondents replied with “Yes, we close at ...” for a question such as “Do you mind telling me what time you close?” instead of “No,” which is a grammatical reply. Because the respondents provided with both literal and non-literal responses, both meanings were considered to be communicated.
The second study is on the nonnative speakers' responses to native speakers' speech acts. Kasper (1984)\textsuperscript{15} examined pragmatic misunderstandings of German learners of English. Data were elicited using face-to-face conversations between German learners (NNS) and English native speakers (NS). They performed open-ended role-plays in order to obtain some conversational routines and some utterances that are conventionalized. She collected inappropriate expressions that learners made as the responses to native speakers utterances.\textsuperscript{16} The results show that learners tend to misunderstand non-literal utterances. She hypothesized that the learners' misunderstandings are the result of their inadequacy in utilizing top-down processing and their heavy reliance on bottom-up processing.

The third study is the one conducted by Ervin-Tripp et al. (1987).\textsuperscript{17} They report the result of two studies, a pilot study and the main study, of children's (both L1 and L2) comprehension of indirect speech acts. The variables they looked at were contextual information and literalness of the utterances. Two kinds of data elicitation methods were used. Both are based on interviews using different stimuli. The first one, which used narrative discourse and pictures, was the main study. A short story was read and a picture book that corresponds to it was shown to the subject. Then the subject would

\textsuperscript{15}In her study, she also looked at other phenomena such as the learners’ responses to frame shifts, but in this paper, I just use the ones directly related to non-literal utterances.

\textsuperscript{16}Kasper defines it more strictly, using the terms: first pair part and second pair part, taken from Schegloff and Sacks (1973, as cited in Kasper 1984).

\textsuperscript{17}Their first study, which is the main study, is pretty much structured, and it is not very naturalistic as a method. The reason why I put their study here is because their second study is relevant here, and that the first study does not belong to other groups in this paper.
hear an utterance, an indirect request, played by a device, which would invite some changes in the ending of the story. The interviewer asked the subject what would happen at the end of the story, and asked the subject's interpretation.

The second study was done at the same time with the first study. Between the tasks for the first study, the interviewer made some authentic requests (e.g., passing a pen to the interviewer), which is relevant to the given context, to each subject using indirect speech acts. If participants did not comply with the request for the first time, then more explicit strategies were used until the subject complied or until request was made three times.

Ervin-Tripp et al. (1987) report that their study supports the hypothesis that the hearers of requests start their activity of inference with processing contextual information first. They also report that as the older the participants, the less linguistic input is necessary in order to carry out the request unless there is incongruity between the context and the linguistic expressions.

The above three studies used data elicitation methods which simulate a real-life conversation, but these three are different from each other in several ways. The difference is found in the research design of each study. Clark's (1979) and Ervin-Tripp et al.'s (1987) studies are based on a hypothesis-testing design. On the other hand, Kasper's (1984) study is based on a hypothesis-generating design. Another difference is found in the analytical tools. Clark (1979) used quantitative measures with 950 participants altogether, which indicates he had 950 pieces of data. Whereas, Kasper
(1984) used 48 dialogues and analyzed different elements of speech within them, employing qualitative analytical measures. Ervin-Tripp et al. (1987) used quantitative measures with fewer participants than Clark's but more varieties of situations to be looked at.

These methods described above have both strong points and weak points. The major disadvantage of the three data elicitation methods is that what they observed was the production data. The rationale behind that is that since we cannot directly observe how people's minds are operating when they encounter non-literal utterances, so production data were used in order to infer psychological processing patterns. Because of this indirectness, the findings can also be attributed to other extraneous variables.

Clark's study has the advantage that the data are elicited authentically, and that the data can be obtained rather easily. Going through a real conversation, the relationship between the speaker and the hearer can be established. Also, it is possible to collect a large amount of data using the same situation.

The disadvantages of using telephone conversation as in Clark's study is that this method can only be used for limited speech act situations, so using this procedure alone will not effectively test more complex utterances with other variables such as different levels of imposition, status difference, social distance and so on unless the study is designed extremely carefully. Also, this type of research is difficult to conduct for ethical reasons.
The method used in Kasper's (1984) study also has advantages and disadvantages. One major advantage is that it utilizes naturalistic conversational data. It allows the researcher to obtain discourse level output from the participants. As Kasper and Dahl (1991) report, this method also has disadvantages that the inappropriate responses Kasper (1984) looked at may be attributed to a production problem not a comprehension problem. Also, because this method is based on naturalistic role-plays, it is not geared to elicitation of discrete items in discourse.

Ervin-Tripp et al. (1987) used their method in order to test children's linguistic ability. They used participants who were as young as three years old. If it were replicated with participants who are adult native speakers or learners, this method of study may not be as successful as it was with children. The definite strong point of their method is that they combined two elicitation techniques, and that they confirmed their findings in both cases.

Affective concern is another issue related to interview tasks and role-play tasks. It is important to have cooperative participants to carry out a study, therefore, careful preparation for both tasks and affective concerns should be made prior to the study. There may be an ethical problem, also, especially in the case of Clark's study. It seems the participants were not told that their responses would be used as experimental data for a linguistic study prior to the experiment. It would create additional problems if the research were carried out without consent from the participants at all.
2.8.2. Multiple-choice questions and open-ended questions

Multiple-choice questions (MCQ) have been used in pragmatic studies (Rose, 1994; Bouton, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1994). Bouton (1988) reports using MCQs is a more reliable data elicitation method in the study of comprehension of non-literal utterances than open-ended questionnaire. Because Bouton's studies directly address the topic of this paper, a more detailed description will be presented.

Bouton (1988, 1989, 1992, 1994a, 1994b) conducted a series of studies using the notion of Gricean implicatures and their perception by nonnative speakers. At the very beginning of his longitudinal study, Bouton (1988)\(^\text{18}\) conducted a study using a set of MCQs. He had two research questions: how much nonnative speakers from different cultures can understand conversational implicatures used in American setting, and whether MCQs would be a reliable tool to analyze the comprehension of conversational implicature. Bouton (1988) conducted the study using a test with 33 MCQs. A typical question on the test has a short paragraph that explains the context followed by a brief conversational exchange that includes a non-literal utterance. Below that, there are four kinds of interpretations of the utterance. Each subject is supposed to choose the one that is the closest to his interpretation.

\(\text{18There are certain characteristics in Bouton's(1984) studies. One is that his study is pedagogically oriented, and its design is not a hypothesis testing type. In fact, it is more like a hypothesis generating type of study, because before the study, he did not have any idea how learners from different cultures of English would perform in the task specifically designed to test the ability to comprehend conversational implicatures.}\)
In order to generate MCQs, Bouton used an open-ended questionnaire and collected data from both native and nonnative participants. The design of the questionnaire was basically the same except for the way in which answers should be chosen. Instead of choosing one, the participants were supposed to write down their interpretation using their own words. The interpretation that the majority of the native speakers chose to write became the 'expected response' for each question item on the test. Other interpretations generated by nonnative speakers became the distracters. Sixty native speakers of American English (NSs) and 79 nonnative speakers (NNSs) participated in this preliminary study.

In his main study with the MCT, Bouton (1988) used 436 NNSs and 28 NSs as the participants. Participants were from seven different language groups: Germans, Spanish/Portuguese, Taiwan Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, Mainland Chinese and Americans. A positive relationship between the language background and the performance of the MCT was established through a statistical analysis.

Bouton (1989) combined the MCT with a post-test interview and compared it with the result of the open-ended questionnaire. He claims that open-ended questionnaires have inherent flaws that participants often write their interpretation of indirect utterances using indirect expressions that may invite the use of the Gricean theory. He asserts that MCT also has a limitation, because participants sometimes choose the 'expected response' for different reasons from the expected one. Many times contexts provide clues to determine whether a remark is supposed to be a positive or negative remark.
By combining a post-test interview, a kind of retrospective interview, the researcher can get richer sources of information about how conversational implicatures were interpreted by NNSs.

The fact that Bouton (1992, 1994a, 1994b) repeated his studies using MCQs in order to obtain the data in a longitudinal design and also the pre- and post-test design seems to prove that using a questionnaire with MCQs is a reliable means for the study of comprehension of non-literal utterances. The obvious advantage as a data elicitation method is that a MCT makes it possible to obtain a large amount of data, and that replication of the study can be done quite easily. Also, as a procedural practicality, MCQ can limit the number of possible interpretations, because, in theory, there are layers of meanings being communicated, and it is possible that the participants may write any one of those meanings if they can verbalize what is in their mind. As comprehension is a psychological phenomenon, verbalizing ideas in mind may require a lot of effort even for native speakers. For nonnative speakers, it will be even more difficult to write the meanings being communicated in a foreign language. They may be able to do it in their native language, but translation creates additional problems. By limiting the possible interpretations, the participants can choose the one that is the closest in meaning to what appears in their mind, and also possible bilingual translation problems will be avoided.

19 Literal translation is often impossible when two languages do not have common grammatical or semantic devices to mean the same. When the explanation requires use of the conversational logic in the subject's native language, it further complicates the problem.
Psychologists also often use MCQ for their studies. Holtgraves (1997), for example, used a multiple-choice questionnaire to find which of the three interpretations, literal, conventional indirect, or non-conventional indirect, the hearers inferred when an utterance was presented with situational information. His experiment used situations that were generated for the experiment, and the choice of the three interpretations seem to have been generated for the sake of the experiment. Although each and every question item was not described in the report of the study, the conventional indirect and the non-conventional indirect interpretations seem to be problematic. Theoretically speaking, there may be more than one non-conventional indirect meaning. Holtgraves describes one situation as follows:

Person A asks Person B for a loan, and Person B replies, “I don’t get paid until Friday.” The literal interpretation was that Person B is saying she doesn’t get paid until Friday, the conventional indirect interpretation was that Person B is declining to loan Person A the money, and the nonconventional indirect interpretation was that Person B is upset that Person A is again asking to borrow money. (Holtgraves, 1997: p. 628)

Although the interpretations Holtgraves provided seem reasonable, unless empirically supported, the participants may not be able to choose one out of the three. There are other possible interpretations such as that Person B is telling Person A to come back to borrow money after the coming Friday, or Person B feels sorry that he cannot loan money on that particular day. The distinction between conventional and non-
conventional indirect interpretations seems to lack theoretical support. None of the pragmatic theories can determine which interpretation is conventional or non-conventional without empirical data. From two other examples Holtgraves listed, it seems what he means by saying the non-conventional interpretation is that it includes an emotional expression such as that Person B is “upset” in above example. 20 Emotional factors may be an extension of interpretation, but unless empirically tested, choosing one emotional verb instead of another seems problematic.

Holtgraves (1997) was successful in forcing the participants to choose one interpretation among the three. However, because the choice of indirect interpretations was not both empirically and theoretically supported, the final result is questionable. MCQ is a powerful tool in this type of study, because the participants would choose one interpretation either by positive choice or by elimination. However, in order to use MCQ, it is very important to use the theoretically or empirically supported choices of answers.

It seems that in order to control various factors using multiple-choice questionnaires is reasonable. Comparing the two studies cited above, Bouton’s (1989) study used MCQ, but he did not control those factors; on the other hand, Holtgraves (1977) tried to control those factors by assigning different contexts for the same utterance. However, since the contextual information is usually the most difficult to control, using the same

20 Two other examples listed in the Appendix A of Holtgraves (1997) also use verbs with emotions as “wishes” and “envies.”
contextual information and testing different types of utterances seems to avoid the possible misinterpretations of the contextual information.

2.8.3. Comprehension of utterances by L2 learners

Little research has been conducted concerning L2 learners’ comprehension of utterances in Japanese. Unlike production studies in which the process of creating utterances can be inferred from the production itself, it is difficult to examine exactly what information is processed in the learners’ mind when linguistic input is processed because it is not directly observable. Studies in different, but related, fields, including social psychology, pragmatics and psycholinguistic studies, suggest that JFL learners in the US may encounter problems in comprehension of utterances in Japanese, not because they do not know the specific grammar and vocabulary, but because they do not realize that there are the pragmatic constraints and social conventions that are not necessarily overtly expressed. These could be considered to be factors that may influence the JFL learners’ comprehension of utterances in Japanese.

One of those factors is related to the pragmatic transferability of formulaic expressions between the learners’ native language and the target language. Cross-linguistic studies that focus on formulaic expressions are rather rare, probably because they seem to be idiosyncratic. However, pragmatic equivalents of formulaic expressions are potential causes of miscommunication. For example, some routinely used formulaic phrases can have different meanings in different contexts, and pragmatic equivalents in two languages sometimes have contrasting usage. For example, there is a
difference between “A happy New Year!” in English and “Akemashite omedetoo gozaimasu,” which is the equivalent in Japanese. The former can be used after or just before the New Year’s Day, but the latter can only be used on or after the New Year’s Day. This usage is related to the semantic and grammatical meaning of both expressions. The English expression expresses a wish, whereas the Japanese expression congratulates the New Year’s arrival. The Japanese equivalent would sound awkward if it was uttered on the New Year’s Eve because of -te form which indicates the completion of the opening the New Year’s Day, but the English equivalent would be appropriate. Thus, for formulaic expressions, matching form and its function may require extensive knowledge of usage as well as grammatical and semantic decoding skills.

To become a proficient communicator in a foreign / second language, it is important to know different types of conventions used in the target language. In some instances, these conventions influence the understanding of the intention of the utterance, but in some other cases, they may play a little role, and one must interpret the utterance using a higher level of inference such as conversational logic. But even in such occasions, the application of the Gricean maxims may involve some culturally determined biases (Green, 1990).

The cultural interventions are multifaceted. The factors related to possible bilingual problems include: 1. lack of knowledge of conventional speech patterns (c.f. knowing that one asks about the hearer’s health condition as a greeting expression); 2. lack of knowledge of the conventional use of certain linguistic forms (c.f. saying “How
are you?" instead of "Are you fine?"); 3. lack of knowledge about the normative perceptive patterns of culturally defined conversational contexts (c.f. knowing exactly when to answer the question seriously). 21 This study aims to find out whether nonnative speakers of Japanese can comprehend utterances in Japanese despite these possible problems. Because of the idiosyncratic nature of various conversational contexts, this study is intended to focus on the collective behavior of both L1 and L2 speakers as a group in some specific situations rather than to study how an individual comprehends uniquely in those situations.

21 These contextual factors are similar to the concepts of a schema, frame or script in other frameworks.
CHAPTER 3. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM AND METHODOLOGY

The literature reviewed in the previous section suggests that the following two concepts may, to some degree, contribute to the difficulties that JFL learners may encounter when they understand non-literal utterances in Japanese: one is conventional language use, and the other is conversational inference based on the Gricean paradigm. The former may include conventionality of form and conventionality of means, while the latter, Gricean theory, only explains non-conventional utterances, so they seem to be mutually exclusive in theory. However, in reality, it does not seem to be so straightforward, simply because conventionality is the result of diachronic change of language use. In other words, for some people, some non-literal utterances can be perceived as conventional, but for others they could be novel expressions that are to be uniquely interpreted. This is especially obvious when those expressions are regional or generation-specific, and it is possible that the users of those expressions may not be aware of the fact that those expressions are not universally used in the society that they belong to. It is thus both theoretically and empirically difficult to set a clear line between conventional non-literal utterances and non-conventional non-literal utterances. It seems conventionality as well as literality can only be discussed in terms of relativity, in which an utterance can be referred to as it is more conventionally used in a certain situation than others.
In this study three types of utterances were compared. These three types of utterances reflect the theoretical explanations on utterance comprehension, and they are characterized by the relationship between “what is said” and “what is communicated.” The first type of utterances to be looked at have a relationship between the two meanings that is inferential, which requires exploitation of conversational logic, in Grice’s (1975) term, flouting the maxim. The second type is the non-literal utterances that are conventionally used, in which the relationship between “what is said” and “what is communicated” is conventional. The last type is literal utterances, in which the relationship between the two meanings is straightforward, and maxims are not intentionally flouted. In real conversation, the distinction of these three types of utterances is not so simple, because there is no fixed list of interpretations for an utterance. The interpretation is always up to the hearer.

A typical situation when utterance requires conversational logic is when the meaning being communicated (what is implied) is different from the literal meaning (what is said) of the original utterance. There have been conflicting views as to what constitutes implicature in literature, but so far none of the theories seem to be able to clearly distinguish the two meanings. Although it is difficult to explain as a theory in general, native speakers usually have little problem comprehending non-literal utterances.

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22 For the relevance theory, the distinction is between explicature and implicature.
The utterances to be looked at in this study in particular have certain characteristics. 1. They are inherently ambiguous in meaning in the given context. 2. The actual intended speaker meaning is, strictly speaking, not theoretically predictable, although it is theoretically explainable in a post-hoc manner. 3. The context strongly influences the use and the interpretation of the utterance. 4. The literal meaning of the utterance may or may not play a role in comprehension. 5. There may be cultural differences, and therefore foreign language learners may find it difficult to comprehend the utterance.

This study intends to find whether JFL learners can actually comprehend utterances the way most native speakers do, and to find out what utterances are comprehended in a way more like native speakers than others. This study also aims at finding out the possible reasons why some utterances were comprehended and some were not. Because there have not been any studies that predict what types of inferences are made during comprehension, this study will not attempt to generate a comprehensive theory of L2 comprehension of non-literal utterances. Rather, it aims at finding specific problems that many L2 learners commonly have when they encounter some non-literal utterances in Japanese.

This study attempted to generate some non-literal utterances in contexts that can be roughly classified into three different types, literal, conventional (conventional, non-literal utterances), and inferential (non-conventional, non-literal utterances), reflecting the findings of theoretical literature. These three types of utterances are operationally defined as follows:
Literal utterances: the utterances for which the grammatical and semantic meaning roughly corresponds to the intended meaning of the utterances in the given context. Because of the nature of literality as documented in literature, a truly literal utterance is more like an imaginary construct. Therefore, it is more accurate to say that these utterances to be used in the study are relatively more literal than other two types utterances, judging from their grammatical and lexical structures. The verification of literality is also unrealistic, and therefore instead of attempting to judge the literality of each utterance, a perceived-directness test was performed to verify the relative directness of the literal utterances.

Non-literal, conventional utterances (conventional utterances): the utterances that are frequently used formulaic phrases that have a somewhat fixed meaning different from their grammatical / semantic meaning, where the conventional meaning roughly corresponds to the intended meaning in the given context.

Non-literal, non-conventional utterances (inferential utterances): the utterances in which grammatical and semantic meaning and the intended meaning contrast, and therefore inference (i.e., application of the Gricean paradigm) is required in order to make sense in the context. These are not formulaic utterances.

These three types are not absolute categories, because literal utterances in an exact sense are not used in conversation. Similarly, conventionality is also a matter of degree as conventions emerge as the result of diachronic changes.
Because of these characteristics, those three types of utterances should be empirically formulated rather than artificially created by a single person, because there are always variations of possible interpretations of utterances among people, and depending on a single person’s intuition is not appropriate for this type of task.

3.1. Research questions and hypotheses

Based on the findings from various studies of philosophy (e.g., Grice, 1975) and psycholinguistics reviewed in the previous section, it is assumed that, even though they are made rather routinely in everyday conversation, non-literal utterances are typically made when:

1. The speaker knows that the hearer knows the language well enough.

2. The speaker knows, or, at least, assumes, that the hearer is able to use inference such as utilization of conversational logic.

3. The speaker has some reason(s), such as to trying to be polite, to use a non-literal utterance.

4. The speaker assumes that the hearer knows if there is any conventional usage of the non-literal utterance.

5. The speaker may want to convey several different meanings and the speaker assumes the hearer can recognize them or at least some of them.

6. The speaker knows that there is a possibility that the hearer does not get the intention the way the speaker makes the utterance.
This above list may not be an exhaustive one, but it shows many key characteristics of non-literal utterances. The first point is that it is likely that a native speaker of a language may not use non-literal expressions with less proficient speakers such as children and non-native speakers of the language as much as they would with more proficient speakers. The second one explains that if it is an emergency situation, non-literal language may be avoided, because adequate time for inference may not be present in such a situation. The third point says that there is a functional motivation for the use of non-literal utterances. The forth point is that the speaker uses conventionalized forms such as formulaic expressions only when the speaker knows that the hearer can recognize them. So, when conventional expressions are used, the speaker does not expect the hearer to go through an inference process as if they were used for the first time.

The fifth point is that by speaking non-literally more information may be transmitted through the working out process of the hearer than the literal meaning of the utterance itself. Because of this the literal version of an utterance tends to be longer than non-literal ones. Also, non-literal utterances can convey more pragmatic meanings without explicitly stating them. For example, saying “it’s cold in here” may mean just the statement of the status of the room, or a request for closing the windows. Or it could be a starter of a conversation or complaints about the building. An utterance has multiple pragmatic meanings which are determined by the context. The final point is that a non-literal utterance can be interpreted in various ways. The illocution and perlocution may differ in this regard.
Given this, in order for a learner to correctly infer the intended meaning of a non-literal utterance, at least the following is required:

A hearer:

1. is able to perceive the context appropriately based on background knowledge (e.g., frame, schema, script, etc.);
2. knows the conventional meaning of the utterance or be able to decode the linguistic meaning of the utterance;
3. knows the conventional use of the utterance;
4. is able to employ a complex cognitive task of reasoning.

As indicated by cross-linguistic studies such as Keenan’s (1976), the perception of contextual variables and specific speech styles may be different depending on the speech community, and therefore, L2 learners may encounter difficulties in interpreting some non-literal utterances in the target language. If the interpretive process happens to correspond to the ones in L2 in certain contexts, the learner can simply apply the knowledge acquired in her native language to comprehension of the utterances in L2 through analogy, although the learner still has to know that her knowledge in her native language is applicable in that particular context but it may not in other contexts. If this process does not correspond to the ones in the target language, the learner may not be able to appropriately process the intention of the utterance when she first encounters the situation, although it is still possible for the learner to guess the intention of the speech correctly using conversational logic.
Although some researchers (Gibbs, 1985, 1986; Forrester, 1995) claim that the literal meaning of an utterance is not always accessed when a figurative meaning of the utterance is the preferred interpretation in some contexts, it does not mean that the grammatical and semantic information is not processed at all. It may be more reasonable to assume that a complete literal interpretation, although it is most likely processed, does not contribute to the interpretation of such utterances for L1 speakers. Also, L1 studies show that when non-literal utterances are made, there are possibilities that the hearer infers layers of intended meanings (Gibbs, 2002).

It appears that inferring the intention of an utterance is a complex psychological process, and it is extremely difficult, or even impossible, to directly measure the process as many psycholinguistic studies have to depend on the indirect observation of data. Since there have not been studies that focused on nonnative speakers’ perception of this type of utterances, this study attempts to investigate whether non-native speakers of Japanese, whose native language is English, and native speakers of Japanese comprehend the intentions of utterances in Japanese equally well or not. Secondly, the study attempts to find whether the L2 participants can comprehend the utterance in a manner more similar to L1 participants depending on the type of the utterance. Based on the information given, the following research questions were generated:

Question 1: Do JFL learners who are native speakers of English comprehend the intended meanings of the three types of utterances in Japanese as well as L1 speakers?
Question 2: Do the three types of utterances (literal, conventional, and inferential) influence the choice of interpretations for both L1 and L2 speakers? If so, how do they differ?

Several hypotheses were formulated in order to find the answers to the research questions described above. Those hypotheses are based on the following assumptions.

Assumption 1: When making a choice on multiple-choice questions, the participants of the present study would choose the one that is closest in meaning to their own interpretation. As open-ended questionnaires often induce the interpretation of an utterance that is exactly the same as the utterance being interpreted, it may not be an easy task for people to verbalize the working out process in their mind. It is hoped that it is possible to understand this process by having the respondent choose an item from several options.

Assumption 2: The L2 participants are able to perform the cognitive task of reasoning by reading entirely in Japanese. Because of the risk of possible cross-linguistic interference, the contextual information, the utterances and the choices of interpretations were presented entirely in Japanese. If English were used to describe the contextual information, fine distinctions in cultural meaning would be lost.

Assumption 3: The four choices of interpretations, if they were constructed carefully, would be sufficient for this study. It is possible that when inference is involved, there are layers of meanings being communicated, and if various meanings are communicated, the primary interpretation of the intention may vary. If the interpretation of an utterance
does not require inference, that is to say that the intention is understood immediately, one interpretation choice will stand out as the right choice. For mainly procedural reasons, it was determined to use MCQ with four choices in this study, and therefore it is very important that the choices used should be possible interpretations unlike the distracters typically used in multiple-choice test items for grammatical judgment.

The following are the hypotheses for the present study.

Hypothesis 1: As an overall tendency, more L1 speakers should choose the most relevant choice of interpretation for each utterance item than L2 speakers because conventionality is considered to be involved.

Hypothesis 2: The effect of utterance types should be present for both L1 and L2 participants.

Hypothesis 3: Everything else being equal, both L1 speakers and L2 learners should comprehend literal utterances more easily than the two other types of utterances.

Hypothesis 4: Everything else being equal, an L1 speakers’ choice of interpretation should be more varied for inferential utterances than conventional utterances.

Hypothesis 5: Everything else being equal, more L2 speakers should be able to choose the most relevant interpretation for inferential utterances than conventional utterances.

Psychological studies reviewed in the previous section (e.g., Gibbs, 1994) suggest that formulaic utterances are processed differently from non-formulaic utterances as exemplified by multiple-meaning or conventional-meaning models. Conventionality and
familiarity are two factors that strongly influence the comprehension of those items. It is assumed that because the amount of exposure to conventional language use is limited for JFL learners, they would not be able to comprehend formulaic utterances as well as non-formulaic utterances. Whereas for the L1 speakers, familiar formulaic utterances are most likely to be comprehended immediately, and as the result, the intended meaning can be retrieved without generating additional inferences. Therefore, for native speakers it should be more likely that they will choose the most relevant choice of interpretation when the utterance was formulaic (conventional utterances) rather than non-conventional (inferential utterances).

It is an empirical question whether there is a difference in comprehension processes between literal and non-literal conventional utterances. At this point since there is no reason to reject the proposition that the most direct or literal utterance is comprehended most easily, it was hypothesized accordingly.

3.2. Methodology

The methodology for the current study is basically a quantitative one, which means that this study aims at finding a general tendency rather than focusing on how learners of Japanese comprehend specific utterances. For this purpose, a research design was formulated, in which it was very important that the materials for this study were empirically based. The design consists of the materials, participants and analyses. The following section describes the methodology.
The materials used for the study were a set of questionnaires. In order to answer the research questions described in the previous section, multiple-choice tests were used. It was assumed that describing the intentions of an utterance using language is not easy even for native speakers (Assumption 1 in the previous section). Describing what comes to mind verbally or in written form may require some training, and also the inference process may not be consciously accessible, and therefore relying on the participants' self reports may not result in reliable results. Multiple-choice questions, on the other hand, can limit the range of possible interpretations, and also make it possible, especially, for the L2 participants of the study to focus on the intended meaning of the utterance itself, not having to think about how to describe the meaning in Japanese.

Because the goal of the study is to find whether JFL learners who are native speakers of English can comprehend utterances in interaction in the way similar to native speakers, it is necessary to develop material that can be used for both groups of participants. The contents of the questionnaire to be used were written entirely in Japanese (Assumption 2 in the previous section). This method was chosen mainly because translating the contextual information, the utterances, and the choices of interpretations into English may involve different types of implicatures that might be influenced by English.

The content of the questionnaire was formulated based on empirical data rather than artificially created for the sake of experiment, because, theoretically speaking, there is an unlimited number of implicatures that can be generated in any speech event. In reality,
however, possible interpretations for one utterance may be limited in number, reflecting various contextual and linguistic factors. Since the goal of this study is to find out exactly what is communicated in interaction, it was necessary to make a list of possible interpretations within the particular speech event empirically.

Five preliminary studies were conducted. In these studies, several sets of question items, with three different types of utterances for each situation, were generated. Five preliminary studies were conducted. The goal of Preliminary Study 1 was to collect the non-literal utterances from naturally occurring data with contextual information. L1 speakers of Japanese supplied the interpretation for each non-literal utterance in Preliminary Study 2, and they also supplied a non-literal equivalent utterance that could be used instead of each of the original non-literal utterances. In the Preliminary Study 3, JFL learners supplied interpretations for the utterances and also equivalent utterances that could replace the original utterances by filling out open-ended questions. The questionnaire used in this study also had questions that tested whether JFL learners could understand the contextual information written in Japanese. Preliminary Study 4 was a pilot study using the first multiple-choice questionnaire version. This study was used to find whether JFL learners who are native speakers of English could actually comprehend the entire questionnaire and provide answers as intended. Retrospective interviews were performed for the same purpose. Preliminary Study 5 was performed to find out whether native speakers of Japanese actually perceived three types of utterances differently in terms of their directness within the context. Although two types of non-
literal utterances were generated empirically, their literal equivalents were created based
on the most relevant interpretation of the original non-literal utterances selected in
Preliminary Study 1. Such being the case, it was necessary to verify that the literal
utterances were in fact perceived by native speakers as more direct than the non-literal
utterances in the same context.

In the main study, the participants were asked to interpret the intention of the
utterance by choosing the most-likely interpretation from the multiple-choice items based
on the context information. In order to balance the data, all three types were evenly
distributed among three versions of questionnaire much like a randomized block design
often used in agricultural studies.

Because the questionnaire was written in Japanese, there was a possibility that the
L2 participants may misinterpret the contextual information on the questionnaire. In
order to avoid this problem, preliminary studies were also used to verify whether the L2
participants could comprehend the contextual information.

The participants of the study were both Japanese native speakers and the students of
Japanese as foreign language. Since this is a cross-sectional study targeting a typical
group of intermediate JFL learners who are studying in university settings, the L1
participants were also chosen among college students in Japan.

Data generated by multiple-choice questionnaires were statistically analyzed. A
two-way analysis of variance with repeated measures was used for the main study.
When there was a statistical significance, follow-up tests were conducted to examine
whether there is difference between L1 and L2 scores for each type of utterances. Also, one-way ANOVA with repeated measures was used to test whether the effect of utterance types was significant for each language group.
CHAPTER 4. PRELIMINARY STUDIES

Five preliminary studies were conducted. The primary purpose of these studies is to generate a set of multiple-choice questionnaires (MCQ) to be used in the main study. Because this is a study of language use, the primary data to be used in the questionnaire were to be taken from naturalistic data. Nevertheless, this is also an experimental study that aims at comparing how L1 and L2 participants interpret three types of utterances, literal, conventional and inferential, so it is necessary to generate utterances that meet the specific criteria for the study.

4.1. Preliminary Study 1: Selection of situations

4.1.1. Purpose

The primary purpose of this study was to collect a set of non-literal utterances from natural conversation in Japanese. The collected data were made into a formatted set of questions to be used in the subsequent studies. Each of the questions consists of a short passage of contextual information and an utterance. Note taking was chosen to be the method for the primary data collection in order to generate the questionnaire as authentically as possible. The only criterion for the data-collection was to collect utterances in which the grammatical and semantic meaning clearly contrasts with the pragmatic or the intended meaning of the utterance within the given context. Since conventionality was not used as a criterion, some of the collected non-literal utterances contained formulaic phrases and some did not.
4.1.2. Method

The researcher collected the data by observing natural discourse in Japan. When an utterance that obviously violates a Gricean Maxim was heard, it was recorded in a notebook with some contextual information. The collected utterances were both conventionally used and non-conventionally used non-literal utterances. The note-taking task continued until a significant number of utterances were collected. Many of the situations were taken from academic settings, because the participants of the present study were intended to be students who are studying in universities, the utterances made in academic settings were determined to be appropriate for the study. After about three months of data collection, when over fifty utterances were collected, a selection procedure was implemented.

There were several matters to be considered in the selection process. Because the questionnaire was going to be in Japanese, it was necessary that the L2 participants would be able to comprehend the contextual information by reading passages in Japanese. Some modifications had to be made in order to avoid unnecessary complication of the data-collection process. For example, complicated situations involving many people were avoided as much as possible. Also, because it was assumed that many nonnative participants would not always be familiar with culture-specific items that the Japanese typically use in specific cultural situations, such as rituals like weddings, funerals, and other ceremonial situations, so the items appearing in the background part had to be the items somewhat familiar to the participants who live in the United States.
4.1.3. Results

After the selection process, twelve situations with an utterance for each were chosen. In order to use them in the questionnaire, the passages were revised several times to fit the level of the nonnative participants. The utterances were all non-literal utterances; some use conventionally used phrases while some are novel.

Those twelve situations are (see Appendix A):

Situation 1: giving a gift in a formal situation
A young person is visiting his father’s friend, who had helped him get a job at a company. He brings a rather expensive gift and thanks the older man.

Situation 2: showing gratitude after dinner in an informal situation
Two cousins are eating dinner. One is a company worker and the other is a college student. The younger one utters a conventional greeting formula after dinner.

Situation 3: buying dinner after receiving help
Two people are eating dinner. One is supposed to pay the bill, but the other person is offering to chip in some because it was quite expensive.

Situation 4: opening a bank account (bank teller asking questions)
A customer is asking the bank teller about a fund. The teller asks the customer how serious the customer is.

Situation 5: receiving comments about one's outfit at workplace
An office worker is wearing an unconventional outfit. Her boss is commenting on the outfit in the office.
Situation 6: replying to suggestion to stop smoking

A smoker has been asked to stop smoking, and he is replying to the suggestion.

Situation 7: replying to a negative question about one’s vacation

An office worker is talking about his trip to Hawai‘i. His colleague is asking him whether he went to a specific place.

Situation 8: commenting about one’s own daughter

A mother is replying to a compliment about her senior’s ability made by her friends.

Situation 9: offering dinner to guests

A couple is receiving guests, and the wife is offering dinner to them.

Situation 10: asking about one’s senior’s not coming to a party

A couple of college students are talking with a senior student about the party they are planning. They are asking the reason why he cannot come to the party.

Situation 11: discussing what to eat for lunch with colleagues

Some office workers are discussing what to eat for lunch.

Situation 12: commenting about food after a party

A wife is asking her husband who went to a party at an expensive hotel about the food being served at the party.

Obviously these situations are not intended to cover all types of everyday conversation, but since the purpose of the study is to test whether nonnative speakers of Japanese can comprehend non-literal utterances in familiar situations, these situations seemed to be familiar and simple enough to be used in the questionnaire.
As the preliminary analysis, each of these twelve utterances was interpreted by the researcher. Based on the interpretation, a literal equivalent for each non-literal utterance was generated, and it was to be verified by the L1 participants in the following preliminary studies. At this point the literal equivalents were tentative because they were created based on one person's interpretation.

4.2. Preliminary Study 2: An open-ended questionnaire

4.2.1. Purpose

This study had three goals: the first one was to collect interpretations of the utterances collected in Preliminary Study 1, the second one was to collect another set of non-literal utterances, and the last one was to verify the literal utterances created in Preliminary Study 1. To fulfill the first goal, an attempt was made to find native speakers' interpretations of each of the twelve utterances.

Since three types of utterances, conventional non-literal utterances, non-conventional non-literal utterances and literal utterances, were needed for the main study, another set of non-literal utterances was added. There were both conventionally used utterances and novel utterances among the original non-literal utterances; for the situation with a conventional utterance, a novel non-literal utterance was to be selected, and for the situation with a novel non-literal utterance, a conventional non-literal utterance was to be selected.

For the literal utterances created in the previous study, it was necessary to verify whether they, in fact, could be perceived as the literal equivalents of the original non-
literal utterances. Native speakers' interpretation of the literal utterance should be the same as that of the non-literal utterance in the same context.

4.2.2. Method

Using the twelve situations with a non-literal utterance and a literal utterance for each, a questionnaire was formulated. The participants were native speakers of Japanese. As it has been suggested (Bouton, 1988), using an open-ended questionnaire can be problematic for a study of implicature, because participants may write down sentences that might invite further implicatures. In order to avoid this problem, the participants were instructed to write the intention of the utterance in longer sentences describing what was in their mind as clearly as possible with details. Because the descriptions that the participants provided would be long, and collecting only a limited number of interpretations for each utterance was the goal, instead of collecting a large number of data, data from a small number of participants sufficed.

4.2.3. Participants

Five undergraduate students, four female and one male, from Tokyo University of Pharmacy and Life Science who are native speakers of Japanese participated in this study. They were between 18 and 21 years old. The task was assigned individually and participation was voluntary. Twenty sets of questionnaires were distributed, but only five students brought them back (25%); therefore the five students who brought back the questionnaire consisted of the participants for this study.
4.2.4. Materials and procedure

An open-ended questionnaire was created using the twelve situations with two utterances, one non-literal and one literal equivalent, for each situation collected in the previous study. There were in all twenty-four items in the questionnaire. The question consists of a short paragraph of background information, an utterance, both literal and non-literal, and two questions asking the interpretation and the equivalent utterance. The entire questionnaire was written in Japanese, including the directions.

The participants were first asked to write down the intention of the target utterance based on the contextual information. Then, they were asked to write down an utterance that could replace the target utterance that conveys the same intention. They were also instructed to note any unnatural expressions found in the entire texts. The participants either completed the questionnaire at home or at school. Each subject brought back the questionnaire and handed it to the researcher on the next day.

4.2.5. Results

After collecting the responses, the intentions of the utterances that the participants described were categorized (See Appendix D). For the original non-literal utterance, the descriptions of intentions and alternative utterances, the pragmatic equivalents, were examined. For the literal utterance, it was noted whether the participants perceived the intentions in the same way as the original or not.

In the interpretation part, most replies were similar in sense except in some cases, the participants supplied interpretations with additional implicatures for literal utterances.
However, for the pragmatic equivalents of the non-literal utterances, it was almost impossible to categorize them based on grammatical and lexical categories, because each participant supplied different types of utterances that could supposedly convey a similar pragmatic intention.

The most basic criterion for the categorization was whether the intention of the alternative utterance would correspond to the most-likely interpretation of the original utterance. Unlike the interpretation part, the pragmatic equivalent has unlimited possible expressions, and even with a small number of participants, it was almost impossible to generalize the patterns both grammatically and functionally. Instead of attempting to choose the most frequently appearing pattern of utterances, additional non-literal utterances were chosen based on their conventionality of form. Since some of the original non-literal utterances used conventional expressions, a novel type of non-literal utterance should be added to each of those situations. When the original non-literal utterance was a novel-type, a non-literal utterance that uses conventional expressions was chosen. For example, for situation 11 (lunch), for a non-literal, non-conventional utterance “kyoo wa sapparishita mono ga tabetai wa (I feel like eating something plain today.),” a more conventional utterance “tempura wa chotto... (Tempura is a bit, you know.)” was selected.

In order to use the utterances collected in Preliminary Study 1 and 2 in the main study, it was necessary to further examine their quality, so the utterances chosen at this point were treated as the tentative ones that would be revised in the following studies.
4.2.6. Discussion

The primary purpose of Preliminary Study 2 was to generate possible interpretations for the non-literal and literal utterances, and also to examine the literal utterances for their appropriateness. In most cases, the participants wrote down similar interpretations for both type of utterances, but in some cases, the literal utterances produced additional implicatures. Because the literal utterances tended to be longer than the non-literal utterances, some of the lengthy expressions might have invited implicatures. When it was obvious, the literal utterance was revised with shorter expressions.

Interesting findings include that the interpretations of conventional utterances still retain their literal meanings, at least, partially. Some situations still appeared to require specific cultural knowledge, so necessary revisions were made in order to solve these problems. Specific explanations for each item are summarized in the table (See Appendix D).

In order to generate the final version of the questionnaire, it was necessary to have three utterances, four choices of interpretations, and contextual information. After this study, three types of utterances were tentatively selected, and several choices of interpretations were collected for each utterance. However, because the participants of this study were all native speakers of Japanese, their interpretations for the non-literal utterances did not produce four different types, so it was necessary to generate more patterns of interpretations. All three utterances and the description of contexts should also be tested to find whether JFL learners could do the task as intended. It was
necessary that the JFL participants should be able to understand the contextual information and also read and decode the utterances.

4.3. Preliminary Study 3: L2 Interpretations

4.3.1. Method

In order to generate interpretations for the questions that are used for the main study, interpretations were collected from L2 speakers. Those interpretations were used as the choices of interpretations of the multiple-choice questions in the main study. In addition to this, since it was necessary to examine if JFL learners could perform the main study, this study was used to verify the reading comprehension of JFL learners. First, in order to test whether the contextual information was comprehensible or not, simple comprehension questions were prepared. Then, the participants were asked to write down their interpretation of each utterance in English, and they were then asked to write what they would say in Japanese instead of the utterance in question. Three versions of open-ended questionnaire were used, and the data were collected and analyzed. The question items, the utterances, non-literal and literal, and the contextual information, were those generated in Preliminary Study 1 and 2.

4.3.2. Participants

Seventeen L2 learners of Japanese ranging in age from 18 to 32 years old, six female and eleven male, participated in the study. Eleven of them were native English speakers, and the others were Chinese, Korean or Vietnamese speakers. Four participants completed version 1, six completed version 2 and seven completed version 3.
They were taking a third-year Japanese language course at the University of Hawai'i at Manoa. The questionnaire was assigned as homework, and submission was voluntary, therefore the number of the participants for each questionnaire type was not balanced.

4.3.3. Materials and procedure

The participants were asked to write interpretations for the items generated in Preliminary Study 1 and 2. Three versions of open-ended questionnaires were used, each having eight question items, asking for the interpretation of the key utterance. For this study, two utterances, non-literal and literal, were tested for each situation. Each question consists of a short passage of contextual information, an utterance, one comprehension question, one question asking the intention of the utterance, one question asking for the participants' interpretation of the utterance, and one asking the participants what they would say if they were in the same situation. Except for the last question, the participants were asked to write the answers in English, though the contextual information and the utterances were written in Japanese. These are all open-ended questions that normally require significant time and effort of the L2 participants of the study, so it was not realistic to ask all twenty-four questions to them. Therefore, the 24 questions were evenly divided into three versions. Each version consists of eight situation types each with either non-literal or literal utterances.

4.3.4. Results

All of the participants who submitted responses filled out the questionnaire (See Appendix F), although some participants left some blank spaces instead of supplying
answers. For the comprehension part, which asked the participants to answer questions about who is making the utterance to whom for what purposes and so forth, the participants replied with expected answers. However, when pragmatic equivalents were to be made, it appears that some participants misunderstood the contextual information or created a new story, which reflects that they did not quite understand the contextual information. However, irrelevant answers were also noted.

4.3.5. Discussion

A task that asks for the interpretation of utterances like this study has several known problems. One problem to be concerned with was that the participants write down the utterance itself as the intended meaning of the utterance; there were several such cases in this study. The study of L1 in the previous section also had the responses that stated that the intended meaning of the utterance was the same as the utterance, but those were all for the interpretation of literal utterances. In this L2 study, some subjects wrote exactly the same sentences as the interpretation.

While many participants supplied meaningful replies, some questions had more irrelevant responses, i.e., responses that are a very different form from the interpretations that L1 speakers produced in Preliminary Study 2. For example, in situation 8, the literal utterance produced mostly irrelevant answers even though the original non-literal utterance mostly produced responses that were closer in meaning to the ones L1 speakers had produced.
Overall the participants provided useful information. The interpretations were collected and categorized based on the contents of the responses, and four types of interpretations were selected as the choices for the multiple-choice items. Because this questionnaire was going to be completed by intermediate level students, and there was a concern that their reading abilities are limited, and also that the choices given in Japanese might further invite the use of conversational logic if the choices contained complicated contents, the language used was kept as grammatically and semantically simple as possible. Also, all the kanji, Chinese characters, appeared in the text had furigana, phonetic alphabet superscripts. Even though both L1 and L2 speakers in preliminary studies gave various types of meaningful responses, the choices were reduced to the simplest forms.

4.4. Preliminary Study 4: A pilot study and retrospective interviews

4.4.1. Purpose

There were basically two purposes for Preliminary Study 4. The main purpose of preliminary study 4 was to test the first version of the complete multiple-choice questionnaire. The second purpose was to perform retrospective interviews with JFL learners who are native speakers of English.

The primary purpose of this study was to find whether both L1 and L2 participants could choose the relevant interpretation of the given utterance in the given contextual information (12 situations). Both contextual information and the four choices of interpretation had to be reviewed carefully in order to avoid unnecessary errors such as
the wrong interpretation of the contextual information. Since it would be difficult to collect qualitative data from the main study, which would require a larger number of participants, retrospective interviews were conducted at this stage in order to find out whether the participants could comprehend the contextual information well enough to choose the interpretation reasonably as well as to find out more precisely why the participants chose specific choices of items on the questionnaire.

4.4.2. Participants

A group of eight JFL learners who are native speakers of English, 2 female and 6 male students, from the University of Wisconsin at Madison and a group of 18 Japanese L1 participants, 9 female and 9 male students from the Tokyo University of Pharmacy and Life Science participated in this study. The JFL learners were taking a third-year Japanese language course. The participants were between 20 and 31 years old. Among them, three L2 participants, two male and one female, took part in the interview sessions. Four L2 participants answered version 1 of the questionnaire, and four answered version 2. Nine L1 students filled out version 1 of the questionnaire, and nine filled out version 2. The number of L2 participants for the study was rather small, because the number of qualified Japanese learners whose native language is English is quite limited in many universities in the US.

4.4.3. Materials and procedure

Two versions of the questionnaire based on the data from the previous preliminary studies were prepared for the study. Because of the constraints of time and the number
of participants, two out of three utterance types were used for each of the 12 situations. Two types of utterances (i.e., literal, conventional, and inferential) were evenly distributed between the two versions. Thus, two versions of the questionnaire are exactly the same except the utterance parts. For each situation, there was a passage of contextual information, a key utterance, and a question asking the interpretation of the key utterance. Participants were asked to choose the most relevant interpretation out of four different choices. The participants were also requested to write down comments about unclear items on the test if necessary. The task was administered as a take-home assignment for L2 participants.

Three L2 participants volunteered to sit for an interview. Interviews were conducted individually, and they were recorded using an MD recorder. The purpose of the interviews was to verify the questionnaire in terms of its linguistic difficulty, but much information about comprehension of the utterances was collected as a result. The interviews last about 30 to 50 minutes for each participant.

4.4.4. Results and discussion

The participants seemed to have been able to comprehend the contextual information and the utterances in Japanese. None of the L2 participants reported difficulties reading the questionnaire, and also all the participants seemed to understand the procedure. Because the number of participants was small, statistical analysis was not performed. Some comments were collected and necessary modification in wording was made to the questionnaire on the basis of this pilot study. The basic structure of the
questionnaire seems to be acceptable, and the interview sessions revealed that the L2
participants seem to have comprehended the contextual information part without much
trouble, and also that they reported the glossary that was attached to the questionnaire
was helpful. The content of the retrospective interview was used in the analyses of the
main study in Chapter 6.

4.5. Preliminary Study 5: Perceived directness judgment by Japanese L1 speakers

4.5.1. Purpose

Theories, both philosophical and linguistic, predict that the hearer's comprehension
is affected by the degree of inference the hearer makes when the utterance's usual
meaning “what is said” is not the intended meaning “what is implicated” in the particular
context. The degree of deviation from the conventional meaning of the utterance can be
determined empirically by asking the people how direct the utterance is. The question
items to be used in the main study were examined in this study in terms of their
directness.

There are 12 situations, three utterance types for each situation, and four choices of
interpretations in the main study. The three utterance types are: literal utterances,
conventional utterances, and inferential utterances, and these utterance types were
generated based on one particular intended meaning. Therefore, all these three types of
utterances were constructed, theoretically speaking, to convey roughly the same intention
within the given context, but their directness is designed to be different within the context
in theory.
Unlike non-literal utterances the literal utterances were created from the primary interpretation of the non-literal utterances, but those categorized as literal utterances were not empirically verified. In order to test whether the literal utterances are perceived as more straightforward than the other two types of utterances, a perceived directness test was performed. There are two reasons why a directness test was performed instead of performing a literality judgment task.

The first reason comes from a procedural difficulty, because it is not realistic to test the literality of an utterance empirically. Since literality is an abstract concept and, asking people to judge the literality of an utterance does not seem to yield meaningful data as documented in literature (e.g., Gibbs, 1994). Directness, on the other hand, can be judged more easily, because it is used in everyday language. Thus, by asking the directness of each of the three utterance types, it is possible to verify that the literal utterances used in the main study are perceived as more direct than other types of utterances, particularly the utterances categorized as inferential utterances.

The second reason is that though literality and directness are related concepts, they are not equal. It is possible that some frequently used non-literal conventional expressions may be perceived as direct while most non-conventional non-literal ones may be perceived as indirect. In theoretical terms, indirectness may be defined as the degree of deviation from the most direct, or straightforward, meaning. If the conventional meaning of a non-literal utterance happens to be the most straightforward meaning in the context, it is probably perceived as direct. For this reason, the results of this study
should indicate a difference between conventional utterances and inferential utterances.

The goal of this study is thus two-fold:

1. to verify that the prepared three types of utterances are perceived differently in terms of directness.

2. to verify that the three types of utterances show the following characteristics that are theoretically predictable.
   a. Literal utterances are to be generally perceived as more direct than inferential utterances.
   b. Conventional utterances may sometimes be perceived as more direct than other utterances.

4.5.2. Participants

A group of 30 native Japanese students, 15 male and 15 female, participated in this study. They were all university students between 18 and 24 years old, studying at the Tokyo University of Pharmacy and Life Science. None of the students participated in the previous studies. The questionnaire was distributed in the classroom, and the participants took about 10 minutes to complete it.

4.5.3. Materials and procedure

A questionnaire was prepared for this study based on the results from Preliminary Studies 1 through 4. The questionnaire consists of the 12 situations, and each situation has the same brief passage of contextual information used in other preliminary studies, all three, literal, conventional and inferential utterances, and the expected interpretation for
each situation. A 9-point scale was placed under each utterance, and the participants were asked to judge the directness level from 1 (sutoreeto=very straightforward) to 9 (enkyoku=very indirect) based on the contextual information and the expected interpretation. The entire questionnaire was written in Japanese except the consent form. The questions for each situation look like the following, and the participants of the study were instructed to circle the number based on their directness judgment for each of the three utterances.

Situation 1. (Originally in Japanese)

Mr. Yamamoto was able to get a job at a certain company through a reference by Mr. Sato, a good old friend of his father's. Two weeks after starting his new job, Mr. Yamamoto visited Mr. Sato. He took along a nicely wrapped, rather expensive, dish, which he had purchased at a department store, together with a box of sweets. At Sato's, Mr. Yamamoto thanked Mr. Sato for referring him to the company. As he presented the gifts to Mr. Sato, Mr. Yamamoto said:

(The intention of the utterances: He was being humble despite the dish's true value.)

A. Kore wa tsumaranai mono desu kedo...

(These are very trivial things, but...)

more straightforward ( 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 ) more indirect

B. Kore wa osara na n desu ga, tsukatte kudasai

(This is a plate. I would like you to use it.)

more straightforward ( 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 ) more indirect
C. Kore, ki ni itte itadakeru ka wakara-nai n desu kedo
(I am not sure if you like this.)
more straightforward (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9) more indirect

The result of the questionnaire was statistically analyzed using an ANOVA with repeated measures for utterance types as a whole. Then Friedman test was implemented to verify the degree of indirectness of each utterance, which is a nonparametric test for repeated measures, because the rating task was done in such a way that the participants chose the rating based on relative directness of the utterance assigning numbers between 1 and 9.

4.5.4. Results

The collected data were analyzed using an ANOVA with repeated measures with utterance type as the independent variable and rating as the dependent variable. The results from the ANOVA reveal that there is a statistical significance for the types of utterances, F (2)=67.155, P<.0001. As Table 3 shows that the literal utterances were rated the most direct, the conventional utterances were rated less direct, and the inferential utterances were rated as the least direct.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literal</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2.950</td>
<td>.825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4.544</td>
<td>1.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inferential</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6.022</td>
<td>1.164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. ANOVA results for three types of utterances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F-Value</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35.896</td>
<td>1.238</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question Types</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>141.657</td>
<td>70.828</td>
<td>67.155</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QT x Participants</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>61.172</td>
<td>1.055</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data were further analyzed using a Friedman test for each situation to serve the verification purpose. Except Situation 8, the effect of utterance type was statistically significant for all situations (Table 5). A post-hoc test, the Nemenyi test, was applied for each situation except Situation 8. As predicted, conventional utterances were perceived as more direct than inferential utterances in general, and in two out of 12 situations, conventional utterances were rated more straightforward than literal utterances.
Table 5. The mean rank based on the 9-point scale of the perceived relative directness of utterances used in the main study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literal</td>
<td>1.083</td>
<td>1.533</td>
<td>1.417</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.083</td>
<td>1.083</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>2.033</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>1.333</td>
<td>1.417</td>
<td>2.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conv.</td>
<td>2.617</td>
<td>1.967</td>
<td>1.783</td>
<td>1.483</td>
<td>2.117</td>
<td>2.233</td>
<td>2.533</td>
<td>2.033</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infer.</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.717</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.683</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>1.933</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>2.617</td>
<td>2.533</td>
<td>2.517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χ²</td>
<td>39.41*</td>
<td>13.81*</td>
<td>30.40*</td>
<td>25.63*</td>
<td>46.49*</td>
<td>42.13*</td>
<td>26.97*</td>
<td>0.528</td>
<td>14.26*</td>
<td>25.03*</td>
<td>18.22*</td>
<td>26.43*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*alpha=.05

Table 6. The relative perceived directness of the utterance in each version of MCQ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>MORE DIRECT</th>
<th>MORE INDIRECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Literal</td>
<td>Inferential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Literal</td>
<td>Conventional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Literal</td>
<td>Conventional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Conventional</td>
<td>Inferential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Literal</td>
<td>Conventional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Literal</td>
<td>Conventional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Literal</td>
<td>Inferential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Inferential</td>
<td>Literal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Literal</td>
<td>Inferential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Literal</td>
<td>Conventional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Literal</td>
<td>Conventional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Conventional</td>
<td>Literal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.5.5. Discussion

The results suggest that the effect of utterance type was statistically significant for the directness judgment task. As predicted, literal utterances were rated as the most direct, and inferential utterances were rated as the most indirect. This corresponds to the assumption based on psychological theories; therefore the classification of three types of utterances chosen for the main study tuned out to be meaningful in terms of perceived directness, and the literal utterances were verified as having the characteristics of literal utterances except for Situation 8.

It was expected that conventional utterances could be perceived as more straightforward than non-conventional ones, because their conventional meanings can be accessed very quickly as cognitive linguists such as Gibbs claim. It is not surprising if native speakers of Japanese would immediately comprehend the conventional meanings of those frequently used phrases without inference. However, even though frequently used conventional utterances could be processed quickly, they are nevertheless non-literal. If the task was to judge their directness, the participants of the study may rate them as indirect from that point of view. It may be the case that indirect expressions are often used conventionally to express pragmatic meanings such as to show politeness, and in those cases, the intention of utterances are quite easily accessible thought they are perceived as indirect. The rather inconsistent results for conventional utterances were thus explainable.
The inferential utterances were consistently rated as indirect as expected in this study. Therefore it was further verified that the inferential utterances were appropriate to be used for the main study.
CHAPTER 5. THE STUDY

5.1. Method

The main study was conducted using the three versions of multiple-choice questionnaires (MCQ) from the previous studies, each consisting of twelve question items. Two groups of participants, Japanese L1 speakers and JFL students whose native language is English, participated in the study. The results were analyzed using Analysis of Variance with repeated measures. In order to balance the task, the types of questions were systematically randomized, so that each participant could interpret all three types of utterances.

5.2. Participants

Two groups of students, L1 and L2 speakers of Japanese, participated in the study. In order to balance the age and other social factors between the L1 and L2 groups, the participants were university students taking undergraduate language courses. The major reason was that the learners of intermediate to advanced level Japanese in the US are most likely university students, so this was an appropriate environment to find participants.

Sixty native Japanese speakers, 35 female and 25 male, between 18 to 25 years old studying at the Tokyo University of Pharmacy and Life Science participated in the study. They were taking undergraduate English as a foreign language course. None of the participants were returnees from overseas, and none of the participants participated in the preliminary studies.
Sixty Japanese L2 learners, 31 female and 29 male, participated in the main study. They were all native speakers of English between 18 and 30 years old enrolled in college-level, high-intermediate Japanese language courses in major universities in the U.S., who had completed approximately two years of college-level Japanese courses. Because the number of qualified participants was very limited in each university, the participants were from three different universities in the US, namely the University of Washington, the University of Hawai‘i at Manoa, and Michigan State University. None of the participants had spent an extended period of time (longer than 6 months) in Japan.

5.3. Materials and procedures

Three versions of the questionnaire constructed in the preliminary studies were used. There were two copies of a consent form, a background information sheet, twelve questions, and a page of glossary information in each version of the questionnaire (Appendix F). Each question item consists of a short paragraph of contextual information, one of the three types of target utterances, and four choices of interpretation. In order to avoid a possible interference effect, one of three utterances were systematically randomized and assigned to each question in each version of the MCQ (Table 7). Therefore, there were four items of non-literal utterances (inferential), four items of non-literal conventional utterances, and four items of literal utterances in each version of the questionnaire.

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23 A consent form was prepared on accordance with the Committee on Human Studies of the University of Hawai‘i.
Except the utterance parts, all the items are exactly the same for all three versions. Table 8 describes the distribution of question items in each version of questionnaire.

Table 7. The distribution of three types of question items in each version of MCQ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MCQ</th>
<th>Literal</th>
<th>Conventional</th>
<th>Inferential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V. 1 (situations)</td>
<td>2, 5, 8, 11</td>
<td>1, 4, 7, 10</td>
<td>3, 6, 9, 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. 2 (situations)</td>
<td>1, 4, 7, 10</td>
<td>3, 6, 9, 12</td>
<td>2, 5, 8, 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. 3 (situations)</td>
<td>3, 6, 9, 12</td>
<td>2, 5, 8, 11</td>
<td>1, 4, 7, 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the kanji, Chinese characters, which appeared in the questionnaire, had furigana, phonetic alphabet superscripts. A short glossary of the words that might be unfamiliar to the participants was attached to the questionnaire to help students with unknown vocabulary.

The items on the questionnaire were similar to the ones used for Preliminary Study 5, except that there were four choices of interpretations instead of the rating task. The participants were asked to choose the most relevant choice of interpretation among the four choices. The following is an example of the item used in the main study.

Situation 1. (The entire questionnaire was written in Japanese.)

Mr. Yamamoto was able to get a job at a certain company through a reference by Mr. Sato, a good old friend of his father's. Two weeks after starting his new job, Mr. Yamamoto visited Mr. Sato. He took along a nicely wrapped, rather expensive, dish, which he had purchased at a department store, together with a box of sweets. At Sato's, Mr. Yamamoto thanked Mr. Sato for referring him to the company. As he presented the
gifts to Mr. Sato, Mr. Yamamoto said:

Yamamoto: *Kore wa tsumaranai mono desu kedo...*

(These are very trivial things, but...)

a. He said so because the dish indeed seemed worthless compared to what Mr. Sato had done for him.

b. He was being humble despite the dish’s true value.

c. Although he had wanted to give something better, he could not find anything else.

d. Mr. Yamamoto’s gifts were truly worthless.

After filling out the consent form, the participants were instructed to complete the questionnaire either at home or in class. Because the questionnaire was quite long with a lot of reading in Japanese, a time restriction was not set, considering that the speed of reading varies student by student. Unlike response-time studies, it is important that the participants spend enough time to comprehend the background information, the utterances, and the four choices of interpretations. L2 students were told that they could consult dictionaries when necessary, but they were not supposed to discuss interpretations with other students or teachers. 

The submission of the questionnaire was voluntary,24 although in some cases the instructors of the Japanese language classes assigned the questionnaire as homework for the class.

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24 In some L2 cases, it was impossible for the instructors of the Japanese language courses to distinguish the participants based on their first language. Therefore, more than 100 copies of questionnaires were distributed, about eighty L2 participants including both native speakers of English and native speakers of other languages such as Korean and Chinese completed the questionnaire, but the responses from 60 participants whose native language is English were used for the analyses.
5.4. Data analyses

Collected data were categorized based on the type of utterances and the participant groups, and then each question type (literal, conventional and inferential) was separately analyzed for the comparison of L1 and L2 language groups. The expected choice of interpretation was counted as the score. After the scoring the number of choices, the scores for each type of utterance were calculated using spreadsheet software.

A two-way analysis of variance with repeated measures was used as the main analysis with the scores for each utterance type as the dependent variable and participant groups, L1 and L2, and utterance types as independent variables. As the follow-up analyses, multiple comparison tests (Toothaker, 1991) were conducted to compare the performance of L1 and L2 participants for each type of utterance. A one-way analysis of variance with repeated measures was performed to find the effect of utterance types for each group of participants.

A software package, StatView 5.0 for Macintosh, was used for the entire analysis.

5.5. Results

First, the results of each version of MCQ by L1 and L2 participants are listed. Then, the descriptive statistics based on utterance types and the participant groups are shown. Then, the results of two-way ANOVA with repeated measures are described.

The data from the three sets of questionnaires were first tallied for each version of questionnaire before each type of utterance was separately compared. In all three versions of MCQ, L1 participants scored consistently higher than the L2 participants. Table 8 shows the descriptive statistics for each group.
Table 8. Summary of overall results by MCQ versions and participant groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group (MCQ)</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Mean (n=12)</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Overall %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L1 (v1)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8.60</td>
<td>1.429</td>
<td>71.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L1 (v2)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9.30</td>
<td>1.301</td>
<td>77.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L1 (v3)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8.55</td>
<td>0.998</td>
<td>71.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L2 (v1)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6.65</td>
<td>1.663</td>
<td>55.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L2 (v2)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>2.513</td>
<td>58.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L2 (v3)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>2.406</td>
<td>58.33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since utterance types were randomized in each questionnaire, question items were grouped into three utterance types. Table 9 describes the results based on the types of utterances.

Table 9. Results by utterance types for L1 and L2 participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Utterance types</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Mean (n=4)</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Overall %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L1 (Conventional)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3.250</td>
<td>.628</td>
<td>81.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L1 (Inferential)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2.900</td>
<td>.858</td>
<td>72.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L1 (Literal)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2.667</td>
<td>.951</td>
<td>66.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L2 (Conventional)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2.167</td>
<td>1.122</td>
<td>54.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L2 (Inferential)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2.350</td>
<td>1.039</td>
<td>58.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L2 (Literal)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2.367</td>
<td>1.164</td>
<td>59.17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These three types of utterances were compared between language groups, using two-way analysis of variance with repeated measures with the language groups and utterance types as independent variables, and the score as the dependent variable. An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests. The two-way analysis of variance with repeated measures brought the following results. While the effect of utterance type was not statistically significant, $F(2, 236)=1.241$, $P=.291$, the effect of participant groups between L1 and L2 was statistically significant, $F(1, 118)=34.714$, $P<.0001$. The interaction between the effect of utterance types and participant groups was statistically significant, $F(2,1)=5.376$, $P=.0052$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F-value</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37.378</td>
<td>37.378</td>
<td>34.714</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>127.056</td>
<td>1.077</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Utterance Types      | 2  | 2.217    | 1.108    | 1.241   | .2911(NS)
| U Types * Groups     | 2  | 9.606    | 4.803    | 5.376   | .0052   |
| Types * Participants | 236| 210.844  | .893     |         |         |
Figure 2. Interaction plot for utterance types and participants groups

![Interaction plot for utterance types and participants groups](image)

Figure 2 shows the interaction between L1 and L2 groups for three types of utterances. It seems while there is a wider gap between L1 and L2 groups for conventional utterances, and the difference is rather small for literal utterances. In order to verify the difference between L1 and L2 groups a multiple-comparison test (Toothaker, 1991) was performed for each type of utterance.

**Table 11. MCP results for three types of utterances between L1 and L2 groups**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Utterance type</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Mean Difference</th>
<th>t-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literal</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>.300</td>
<td>1.682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>1.083</td>
<td>6.071*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inferential</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>.550</td>
<td>3.083</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*P<.05
The MCP results confirmed that the difference between L1 and L2 participants for the interpretation for conventional utterances was statistically significant, and it was not statistically significant for inferential and literal utterances.

The interaction between participant groups and utterance types was statistically significant; the L1 group shows a difference depending on the types of utterances. In order to find the effect of utterance types on L1 and L2 groups separately, one-way ANOVA with repeated measure was applied. As expected, the effect of utterance types was statistically significant for L1 group, F(2)=6.963, P=.0041, but not for L2 group, F(2)=.708, P=.4948.

**Table 12. The result of one-way ANOVA with repeated measures for L1 group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F-value</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>32.328</td>
<td>.548</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utterance types</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.344</td>
<td>5.172</td>
<td>6.963</td>
<td>.0014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types*Participants</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>87.656</td>
<td>.743</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 13. The result of one-way ANOVA with repeated measures for L2 group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F-value</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>94.728</td>
<td>1.606</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utterance types</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.478</td>
<td>.739</td>
<td>.708</td>
<td>.4948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types*Participants</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>123.189</td>
<td>1.044</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION

Five hypotheses were formulated for the present study. First two hypotheses were examined by the results of the main study. A parametric analysis, a two-way analysis of variance with repeated measure, was used as the primary analysis. The rest of the hypotheses were further analyzed by follow-up tests. Firstly, brief descriptions of the results that are relevant to each hypothesis are described, and then more detailed discussions based on the factors follow.

6.1. Discussions based on hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: As an overall tendency, more L1 speakers should choose the most relevant choice of interpretation for each utterance item than L2 speakers because conventionality is considered to be involved.

The results of ANOVA showed that the L2 learners did not choose the expected choice as often as the L1 learners for all three types of utterances. Also, the average scores of L2 groups for each version of MCQ test were lower than that of L1 speakers. Several different explanations can be made. One is that although L2 participants could read and comprehend the contextual information, but they did not perceive the contextual information the way the L1 counterparts did. Or, they comprehended the contextual information well, and they chose the interpretation that best fits in the context regardless of the utterance type, reflecting their lack of linguistic decoding skills of the utterances.

Another explanation could be that L2 participants interpreted each of the utterances differently from L1 participants. Since the average scores the L2 groups for the three
types of utterances did not result in statistical significance, the second
explanation may be more plausible, but the results from the main analysis do not provide
further evidence.

As the preliminary conclusion, the L2 learners did not perform the task as well as
the L1 speakers, but more than 50% of the time on average they could still choose the
expected choice of interpretation.

Hypothesis 2: The effect of utterance types should be present for both L1 and L2
participants.

The results of a two-way ANOVA with repeated measures reveals that the
interaction between utterance types and L1 / L2 groups were statistically significant.
Therefore, one-way ANOVA was implemented to find how the utterance type affects
comprehension for each of the language groups. The effect of utterance type was
statistically significant for L1, but it was not for L2. This suggests that for L1
participants, the three types of utterances were perceived differently, and for L2 learners,
the literal meaning or the conventional meaning of the utterances did not affect the
patterns of comprehension. While L1 participants processed each type of utterance
differently, L2 participants processed primarily the contextual information, but that they
did not comprehend the utterance to the level where subtle differences were seen.

Hypothesis 3: Everything else being equal, both L1 speakers and L2 learners should
comprehend literal utterances more easily than the other two other types of
utterances.

This hypothesis was not supported by the results of the study. The results show
that L1 speakers scored the lowest for the literal utterances among the three types of utterances, whereas L2 speakers scored the highest but not as high as to be statistically significant. Because the directness test in the preliminary study found that literal utterances were the most direct, it was expected that L1 participants would choose the most straightforward interpretation for that utterance. A possible and theoretically explainable reason why L1 participants did not choose the expected interpretation on these utterances could be that they sought a deeper meaning for each item when they were making choices during the task. The assumption that speakers choose the most direct one because it is easy should be questioned. In social interactions, the speakers are more concerned with social factors such as politeness rather than the meaning that is directly communicated, so they are not conditioned to think in terms of directness.

Hypothesis 4: Everything else being equal, an L1 speakers' choice of interpretation should be more varied for inferential utterances than conventional utterances.

This hypothesis was supported by the results of the study. For L1 participants, conventional utterances were perceived without generating other inferences, just as documented in the psycholinguistic studies that support conventional-meaning models or the multiple-meaning model (e.g., Gibbs, 1994). When L1 participants processed the inferential utterances, the choice of interpretations varied for this type was as expected, and therefore the score for this type of utterances was lower than that of conventional utterances.

Hypothesis 5: Everything else being equal, L2 speakers' score is higher on inferential utterances than conventional utterances.
For the L2 group the hypothesis was not supported, simply because there was no difference found among the three types of utterances. This hypothesis was based on the assumption that conventional utterances require more pragmalinguistic knowledge than inferential ones, which would make them more difficult for the JFL learners to comprehend. The results of the study do not support this assumption, but they also do not support the possible counter-argument that inference based on conversational logic in a foreign language would be more difficult for the L2 learners.

6.2. The difference between L1 and L2 participants

There were two basic differences between L1 and L2 participants found in the results of MCQ. One was the difference of overall results of the questionnaire, and the other was the pattern of the perception of three different utterance types. Based on the results of the two-way ANOVA, the effect of participant groups was statistically significant, which means the performance of the L2 participants was significantly lower than that of the L1 participants (Hypothesis 1). Intermediate-level JFL learners who are native speakers of English do not process the three types of utterances differently, while native speakers of Japanese had different response patterns for each of the three different types of utterances. For L1, the effect of utterance type was statistically significant, but for the L2 participants, it was not statistically significant (Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 5). These two were the most notable results from the obtained data.

The MCQ study reveals that the L1 participants scored consistently higher than the L2 groups, but when each type of utterance was concerned, among the three types of utterances, the effect of participants groups was not statistically significant for literal
utterances. Also, the difference of the mean scores that L1 and L2 groups made for literal utterances was the smallest among the three types of utterances. This means that both the L1 and L2 groups performed similarly for literal utterances. However, it was not because L2 participants scored significantly higher for the literal utterances, but rather that the group of L1 participants scored significantly lower for literal utterances than the other two types of utterances.

It was predicted that non-native speakers of Japanese would be able to comprehend literal utterances more easily than the other two types of utterances (Hypothesis 3). The result of the main study did not support this hypothesis, either. It was assumed that JFL learners could comprehend grammatical and semantic meaning of both contextual information and the utterances, so the difference between the L1 and L2 groups should be the difference of processing the pragmatic meanings. In fact, only a few participants in Preliminary Study 3 replied with answers that reflect a lack of grammatical decoding, and also the interviewees from Preliminary Study 4 did not express difficulties in the comprehension of grammatical meanings, though they said that they had to check the meanings of some words in the dictionary.

For each of the three types of utterances, more detailed discussion will be provided in the following sections to show how JFL learners performed for each and how the results differed from those for native speakers.

6.3. Literal utterances

The results from preliminary study 5 demonstrate that the literal utterances were rated as the most direct among the three types of utterances. Therefore, it was expected
that the participants of the study would agree with the expected interpretation in
the MCQ study for the literal utterances. However, while the average score of L2
participants for the literal utterances was the highest, the L1 participants scored the
lowest for the literal utterances.

Since literal utterances used in this study were designed to be the most
straightforward utterances within the given contextual information, they were expected to
be the easiest for the L2 group, but statistically speaking, it was not as easy for L2
participants to choose the expected interpretations as expected. Since literal utterances
do not assume the factors related to non-literal utterance comprehension, it was predicted
that the difference between L1 and L2 groups would be minimal. The post-hoc result
supports this prediction, however, the reason behind this result may not be as expected.
In order to prove this point, both L1 and L2 groups should score higher for literal
utterances than for other utterance types, because the relation between the intended
meaning and the utterance meaning is supposed be direct.

One possible explanation is a procedural one. Since the L1 group’s average score
for the literal utterances was the lowest, it was assumed that because of the nature of the
MCQ the L1 participants might have made a deeper inference than expected and chose
interpretations that were different from the original literal interpretation. The
participants might have thought that they were expected to make an inference in order to
choose the interpretation, because at least one third of the questions on the questionnaire,
regardless of the version, require the use of inference to make sense. Choosing the
expected choice might have been too simple a task for the L1 respondents.
The second explanation is more related to pragmatics. As Searle asserts as the additional maxim “Speak idiomatically unless there is some special reason not to,” (Searle, 1991, p. 274) native speakers may not utter literally unless there is a reason for it. In fact, unlike other utterances, literal utterances for this study were rather artificially created despite being empirically verified, and also literal utterances did not appear in the discourse completion tasks that L1 participants supplied in Preliminary Study 2. It could be the case that the L1 participants sought non-literal meanings for the literal utterances when they performed the task because it was more natural to seek non-literal meaning in actual conversation, reflecting that conversation is more based on conventional expressions than literal communication.

For JFL learners who are native speakers of American English, literal utterances could have been the easiest to comprehend, because the task was to find the interpretation that was the closest in meaning to the grammatical and semantic meaning of the utterance, but the results did not fully support the prediction. From the results of this study it is not possible to find out the reason why less than the expected number of participants chose the expected choice of interpretation. The only possible explanation was that the participants chose the most relevant choice of interpretation for the given context regardless of the literal and conventional meaning of the utterances to be interpreted.

6.4. Conventional utterances

Conventional utterances classified here are non-literal, conventional utterances using fixed formulaic expressions or the variations of them often used in communication. The utterances used for the present study were chosen from textbook examples of formulaic
expressions quite often used in everyday conversation. Because of procedural
difficulties, the degree of familiarity and conventionality was not empirically verified, but
the basic usage of the items in the MCQ should have been familiar enough for the L2
participants to recognize based on the responses received in the preliminary studies.

Based on the studies of psycholinguistics that assume direct access to the
conventional meaning of a formulaic utterance, it was predicted that L2 participants
would not be able to comprehend them better than the literal counterparts. It was also
predicted that the L1 participants' choice of interpretation would be concentrated on the
expected interpretation for these conventional utterances, therefore the average scores for
conventional utterances would be higher. The results confirmed this tendency. The
results revealed that L1 speakers scored the highest for conventional utterances among
the three types of utterances (Hypothesis 4). Moreover, the difference between L1 and
L2 was the largest for this type of utterance. However, the difference resulted from the
high score that the L1 participants made rather than the drop of the score of L2
participants.

If the comprehension patterns were exactly the same between JFL learners and
native speakers of Japanese, the L2 participants could have scored higher on this group of
items just as the L1 counterpart, given that the forms of conventional utterances were
supposedly familiar items even for the non-native speakers. In fact, none of the
participants in preliminary studies reported that the expressions themselves were
incomprehensible.
By examining the collected data, in each of the conventional type of utterances, the L2 group scored lower than the L1 group except in one case in which the number of participants who chose the expected choice of interpretation was the same between two language groups. However in some specific cases the number of the L2 participants who chose different interpretations was quite large compared to the other types of utterances. One such example is the utterance used for Situation 2. In order to compare, another example is also examined.

1. (Situation 1-Conventional) *Kore wa tsumaranai mono desu ga...*
   (These are very boring / trivial things, but...)

2. (Situation 2- Conventional) *Gochisoo sama deshita.*
   (Thank you for the dinner.)

These are typical examples of formulaic phrases ordinarily used in specific situations with specific speech acts. (1) is used when giving gifts, and (2) is used after meal to express gratitude for the food. As Table 14 shows that the number of L2 participants who chose the expected interpretation for the conventional utterances were smaller than those of L1 participants’ for both cases. However, for Situation 1, more L2 participants chose the expected choice of interpretation when the utterance was literal, and when it was inferential, there was no difference between L1 and L2 groups. For Situation 2, while the differences between L1 and L2 groups for the literal and the inferential utterances were smaller, the difference for the conventional utterance was comparatively larger.
Table 14. The percentages of expected choices that L1 and L2 participants chose for three types of utterances in Situation 1 and 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(Situation 1)</th>
<th>(Situation 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L1</td>
<td>L2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literal</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inferential</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Situation 2 can possibly have two interpretations: a conventional interpretation, declaring the end of the meal, and a more indirect interpretation, expressing the gratitude for the other person's paying for the dinner. While 11 out of 20 L1 subjects chose the latter interpretation, and eight L1 subjects chose the former interpretation, a much smaller number of L2 subjects, six out of 20, chose the latter interpretation, and 12 chose the former interpretation, and two chose a completely different interpretation that none of L1 subjects chose. Even though the number of L1 participants who chose the expected choice was smaller than the other types of utterances, the drop of number was more obvious for L2 participants for the conventional utterance used for Situation 2.

The most plausible reason is that this conventional utterance was ambiguous in meaning in this particular context. From the contextual information given in the passage, it was unclear if the hearer of the utterance had previously promised that she would pay, and the only clue that could let the participants of the study reach the expected interpretation was that it was mentioned that the utterance was addressed to the hearer. *Gochisoo sama deshita* is a fixed phrase said after the meal, expressing thanks to either to the meal itself or the person who is paying for the meal for the speaker.
This type of interpretation of formulaic phrases exemplified by the above case can also be treated as a conventional meaning for the utterance as well as the regular conventional meaning. It could be explained as an inferred meaning based on the regular conventional meaning through Gricean logic, and the relationship becomes conventional with a diachronic process. It is a question whether it is more reasonable to assume there are two conventional meanings or there are both the conventional meaning and the inferred meaning based on the conventional meaning for this type of expression. If the former was the case, it is necessary to take the multiple meanings of conventional expressions into consideration for the analyses of comprehension of utterances in the studies like the present study. If the latter was the case, then it is necessary to consider that the conventional meaning of a formulaic phrase can be treated just like the literal meaning of “what is said” rather than the pragmatic meaning of “what is implicated.”

Cultural factors seem to be operating, too. It is quite possible that an older person pays for the meal in Japan, and in this particular context, the addressee of the utterance works and the addresser of the utterance is a student, and therefore it is more likely that the addressee pays. As a JFL learner who is a native speaker of American English, one participant of Preliminary Study 4 reports in the retrospective interview as follows:

I thought this was a set phrase, because there wasn’t any indication that Hanako-san had paid. If it would have said *Gochisoo ni narimashita*, then I would have said (a). I didn’t realize that anyone who’s paying anything, so it’s hard to understand why anyone makes someone pay it. The reason it might not be a set phrase is because, then I think, that Hanako-san would have also said. (...)

I just didn’t see any mention of money, and I didn’t know that it would be normal for Hanako-san to pay.

This L2 participant thinks that since it was a set phrase, it only conveys the fixed conventional meaning. If a more general expression were used such as gochisoo ni narimashita, then she claims that she could have chosen the expected choice. She also mentions that she did not know that in Japan, it is often the case that the older, working person pays for the dinner, and the younger person thanks the person who pays the bill on the table or outside the restaurant by uttering gochisoo sama deshita.

In theory, the extended interpretation of the conventional utterance could probably be achieved if the context is carefully examined, but for the MCQ used in the current study, it would have been difficult for the L2 subjects to infer the intention from the context alone. It is still unknown whether it is a problem of conventionality, a problem of inference, or a problem of inference based on conventionality. At least it is reasonable to assume in order to derive the implicature that is generated from fixed phrases requires either the knowledge about the extended use, that could have been conventionalized, or the skills of inference together with the cultural knowledge in which the utterance is made.

Based on the results a large gap was observed between the performances of L1 and L2 participants, even though the utterances used in the study were familiar items even for JFL learners who study Japanese in the US. One theoretical reason could be that conventional utterances may have different conventional meanings, and the other could be that the conventional meaning of a conventional utterance can be treated as "what is
said" and the hearer can generate the implicature based on it. There are situations when the intended meaning is ambiguous, which makes comprehending the utterance more difficult.

6.5. Inferential utterances

For inferential utterances, there are at least two factors that might strongly influence the perception. One is inference based on universal conversational logic, and the other is contextual variables that might be related to social conventions. These two factors should be realized in different ways. If only the former was operative, the scores for this type of utterance in both L1 and L2 groups should be smaller than for the conventional type of utterances. If conventional factors are operative, the difference between L1 and L2 groups should be large.

The results show that the difference between the L1 group and the L2 group was not as large as for the conventional utterances, and it was slightly larger than for the literal utterances, but it was not large enough to show statistical significance.

Because inferential utterances require inference based on contextual information and conventional knowledge of the world including culture-specific knowledge in order to reach the intended meaning, which is indeterminate and also cancelable in theory, the choice that the participants make could be more varied than for the conventional utterances.

When individual items were examined, there weren't any situations that could be used as evidence to prove that an inferential utterance influenced comprehension in a particular way. It seems contextual factors are more influential than the utterances
themselves. The number of L2 participants who chose the expected choice of interpretation for inferential utterances was consistently smaller than L1 participants in nine out of 12 situations. It was exactly the same twice, and in one situation more L2 participants chose the expected choice of interpretation. When the gap between L1 and L2 was large, the difference was also observed for the other two types of utterances used in the same situation (e.g., Situation 4, Situation 9), and when a significantly smaller number of L2 participants chose the expected interpretation, the L1 group also had a similar tendency (Situation 12). Because inferential utterances are more indirect ones, various interpretations are possible based on the contextual information, and in these cases, the relation between the context and the utterance was probably not as straightforward as other utterances used in the study.

The former case above suggests that the L2 participants in all three groups did not seem to perceive the contextual information the way L1 participants did for these two situations, and for the latter case, the process of inference might not have been different between the two language groups. The statistical difference between the two groups most likely resulted from how the participants perceived the contexts, although the results of this study do not indicate exactly how the contextual factors can affect the comprehension process of these utterances.

6.6. Conventional factors

Theoretically speaking, there are, at least, four factors that might affect the comprehension of certain types of indirect utterances namely, familiarity, conventionality, cognitive effort, and saliency, and it is assumed that L2 speakers are not as proficient at
perceiving non-literal utterances because of these factors. These four factors are related to each other. If these factors affect the comprehension of utterances, non-literal utterances should be harder to comprehend than literal utterances for the non-native speakers, because familiarity and conventionality factors are related to the exposure to non-literal utterances, and also because of their limited decoding skills their perception of utterance may not be as fluent as the native speakers, so they may require more cognitive effort. As the result, they may not be able to perceive the utterance as being salient as native speakers would. However, for literal utterances, comprehension should be easier than for non-native speakers.

The results of the study suggest that those factors did not seem to affect the comprehension of utterances for L2 participants. Their comprehension of three types of utterances did not show much difference. Furthermore, their choice of interpretation did not seem to be random either, because they chose the expected choice of interpretation about half of the time, and the expected interpretations were their preferred interpretations when overall scores were examined. One possible explanation is that they chose the interpretation mostly from the contextual information not from the literal and conventional meanings of the utterances. L2 participants chose the interpretations that make more sense within the given contextual information.

If this explanation is in fact a plausible one, then it is necessary to conclude that for L2 learners, the processing of utterance relies more on how they perceive the contextual information rather than how they exploit their decoding skills. From the results of the present study, it is possible to conclude that the perception of contextual information
affects more than the utterance itself. "What is said" in this case did not have more effect on "what is implicated" than contextual factors. For L1 participants, the difference of utterance types affected the comprehension of utterances, but further evidence is required to verify this.
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION

7.1. Summary of the findings

This study attempted to find how the interpretation of an utterance could be affected when different utterance types are used. Both native speakers and intermediate JFL learners who are native speakers of American English participated in the study to examine several factors supposedly related to the comprehension processes.

The present study produced the following four findings:

1. The performance of L2 learners was significantly lower than that of the L1 speakers.

2. The effect of utterance type was statistically significant for L1 participants but not for L2 learners.

3. L2 and L1 speakers performed differently when both types of non-literal utterances were interpreted. The difference was obvious when conventionally used formulaic phrases were interpreted.

4. Statistical significance was not found between L1 and L2 participants for literal utterances.

7.2. Significance of the study

This study examined how L1 and L2 participants perceived non-literal utterances controlling contextual factors by using the same paragraph for three types of utterances. Where the participants chose a different interpretation for a particular utterance, it reflects the difference in the utterance itself. This study revealed that the comprehension of
conventional utterances is the easiest for the L1 speakers, and that the difference between L1 and L2 is the largest for this type of utterance.

It was expected some differences would be found for inferential utterances that require Gricean inference, however, the difference was not observed. Two explanations may be plausible. One is that both L1 and L2 participants performed the process of inference in the same way based on a similar conversational logic. Because Grice assumes the universality of his theory, the present study might have supported his theory. However, since the average scores for L2 participants were significantly lower than that of L1 participants, the results of this study do not fully support it.

The other explanation is that the L2 participants relied on contextual factors when they interpreted the inferential utterances. In this case, the grammatical and semantic meaning of the utterance did not affect the comprehension process, in which linguistic meaning played a minimal role. A further study is necessary to verify this.

The contribution of the present study concerned the perception of conventional utterances. Since formulaic utterances are frequently used in everyday conversation, it is necessary that teachers of Japanese should focus on frequently used formulaic phrases in JFL classes. In the present study, the formulaic utterances were familiar ones even for the L2 learners, but their comprehension pattern was significantly different from that of the L1 speakers. One reason could be because formulaic phrases often have more than one conventional meaning, but L2 learners often learn only one meaning in class but not others.
7.3. Limitations of the study

The current study aimed at finding factors related to the comprehension of utterances in interaction. It was done in such a way that the participants were instructed to spend enough time to choose the most likely interpretation of an utterance with contextual information on a piece of paper. This study does not simulate the actual interaction in a way, because even with some contextual information written in the form of a paragraph, it is still very different from actual interaction. It would have been possible to use a different type of research method such as to use video-recordings, written passages with some pictures, or even role-playing. The current design was implemented for the following two reasons. One is that this is an exploratory study that looks into a prototypical behavior of participants rather than individual variations or spontaneous decision-making at a specific event, and the other is that since L2 speakers were involved, it was necessary to avoid the influences from other variables such as the listening skills that include the recognition of grammatical features as well as prosody, and how prosody should be interpreted etc. It is a challenging task to find a more naturalistic but still plausible research design for a study with L2 learners.

The methodological limitations include, besides the ones already discussed, the design of the questionnaire itself. A certain level of JFL learners who are native speakers of American English were the participants in this study, and the questionnaire was carefully formulated, using furigana for all the kanji, the numbers of people involved in the context was limited to a few, triad, or quadruple interactions were minimized or nonexistent, and culture-specific matters if there is no equivalent in the US were
minimized except for things related to fundamental human relations. However, there is no way of knowing if the participants were actually able to comprehend the context as well as expected. To make sure that they did, oral interviews were conducted, and those who participated in the interview sessions seemed to have completely understood the contextual information.

Theoretically speaking, comprehending contextual information and comprehending the utterance meaning are closely interrelated, and the separation of them may not be possible. This way, testing the L2 participants’ comprehension of an utterance is fundamentally different from that of L1 participants’, simply because L2 participants are not familiar with social situations as well as pragmatic presuppositions in the culture where the language is spoken. In order to conduct a study such as the present study, what sort of situations to be used continues to be difficult, because there is no fixed list of situations in daily conversation.

Theoretical limitations of this study are mainly from the problem of Grice’s work that is a theoretical in nature and not intended to be empirically tested. Grice’s suggestions of characteristics of conversational implicatures do not assume form-attached conventionality, but it appears that language, which exists external to our cognitive system, is fundamentally conventional in nature, while the human mind is not. Studying inference is studying how the human mind processes linguistic and other input, and the input mentioned here can be shaped by collectively determined social rules, or thoughts deeply rooted individual experiences in society, or conventionally used language. As a logical consequence, the study of inference requires the study of, at least, seemingly
unlimited lists of arbitrarily arranged social and linguistic factors. In this general viewpoint, the current study merely touched a little piece of a huge problem. The findings from speech acts studies, functional grammar, and politeness studies should all contribute to provide a better picture of comprehension of utterance, the linguistic facet of cognitive input.

Instead of verifying Gricean theory, the present study further supported the importance of conventional language use that Searle proposed decades ago. In language teaching, especially, factors related to conventional language use are extremely important. The results from this study further assure that conventionality is not a simple form-function matching of phrases, but it has a more complex function. Conventional expressions also require inference, and the studies focusing on what types of inference are related to the comprehension of conventional utterances are needed.

Communication can be achieved with a short exchange of words and phrases, but it is usually the case that the interlocutors continuously infer the intentions of each other's utterances, and inference can be modified through further interactions. This study examined only a little part of a conversation; in real life, it is not very realistic. A study such as this focuses on a specific aspect of conversational exchange, but it does not examine the development of conversation. It is necessary to study how conversation develops focusing on the inferences that interlocutors make.

7.4. Pedagogical Implications

Other than the findings previously described, this particular study is most relevant for the application to teaching Japanese as a second/foreign language. The primary
purpose of studying foreign language is to be able to communicate in the target language. If the communicator knows grammar and vocabulary alone, even with beautiful pronunciation, communication in a language does not take place. The interlocutors who commit to communicate in a language consciously and unconsciously try to find the intended meanings of utterances. Otherwise, it will be impossible to respond, because the response is influenced by the context and the preceding utterance.

The MCQ used in this study can let the participants focus on the intention of the utterance; how it is usually perceived by the native speakers, why a particular interpretation is preferred, how the learner would perceive it in his native language, how the contextual information influences the interpretation and so on. People may not be aware of these types of information consciously when they are engaged in conversation in their native language. However, when they are learning a new language, they need to focus on these factors, because presumably there are differences and similarities between their first and second languages.

The interviews performed in this study show that the interviewees, who are L2 learners, are very analytical about their decision about the choices they made on this MCQ. From the interviews, it was made clear that the participants, college students, who have been taught Japanese focusing on pragmatics are especially attentive to the pragmatic features of Japanese. The students reported to me that they were taught Japanese in such a way that the teachers teach them explicitly the culturally marked differences between Japanese and English. Their knowledge about human relationships in Japanese society, such as the senpai-koohai (senior-junior) relationship, was proven to
be useful to choose the intention of the utterance when they were engaged in the MCQ.

Activities such as the MCQ used in the present study can generate classroom discussions, and they can also be used as consciousness-raising tasks. The indirectness task may also be used in class to test the directness level of multiple utterances against one interpretation. The results of the present study show even when the literal meaning of an utterance seems relevant to the contextual information, people may go through a process of inference to fulfill a different conversational goal such as to be polite. Therefore, by doing both types of exercises, students can experience that the most straightforward utterance may also invite additional implicatures.

As to the teaching implications from the findings, this study revealed that if we believe that human beings are equipped with the ability to process the intention of others’ thought as the relevant theorists claim, we can assume that the learners of a second / foreign languages have already developed the function. If this really is the case, what a teacher can teach is obviously not the development of innate ability, but rather matters shaped in a specific society, or the features resulting from linguistic differences. Cultural differences are manifested in linguistic forms in different ways, and linguistic and other conventions are probably more important than we used to think.
Appendix A: The Situations used for the study (with English Translation)

Situation 1: giving a gift in a formal situation

Mr. Yamamoto was able to get a job at a certain company through a reference by Mr. Sato, a good old friend of his father's. Two weeks after starting his new job, Mr. Yamamoto visited Mr. Sato. He took along a nicely wrapped, rather expensive, dish, which he had purchased at a department store, together with a box of sweets. At Sato's, Mr. Yamamoto thanked Mr. Sato for referring him to the company. As he presented the gifts to Mr. Sato, Mr. Yamamoto said:

[Utterance]

Situation 2: showing gratitude after dinner in an informal situation

Masako is a third year university student. She went out for dinner with her cousin, Hanako. It had been a long time since the two had gone out together. Hanako has been working at a big company since she graduated from the university three years ago. The two of them discussed various matters about the job and the university. After the dinner, Masako said to Hanako:

[Utterance]
Situation 3: buying dinner after receiving help

Mr. Sato went out with Ms. Tanaka for a dinner one Friday evening. Prior to that, Mr. Sato had asked Ms. Tanaka to assist him with his job by performing a simple task, with a promise that he would take her out for a dinner in return. The restaurant the two went turned out to be rather expensive. Therefore, when it was time to pay, Ms. Tanaka also tried to pay some amount. Mr. Tanaka then said:

[Utterance]

Situation 4: opening a bank account (bank teller asking questions)

Ms. Sugimoto went to a bank with a will to set up a new trust fund (a mutual fund). In order to start the fund, one needs at least ten thousand (note: later change to) three hundred thousand yen. After a detailed explanation, the bank teller asked Ms. Sugimoto:

[Utterance]

杉本さんは、新しく投資信託を始めたくて銀行にいきました。投資信託を始めるためには最低30万円が必要です。いろいろ細かいことを説明したあと、銀行員は、杉本さん
に

[Utterance]

と言いました。
Situation 5: receiving comments about one's outfit at workplace

Ms. Honda works for a big company in Tokyo. She graduated from the university in Hawai‘i and found a job in Tokyo. Her firm has no dress code. However, similar to any other companies in Japan, male employees usually wear suits while female counterparts dress themselves with plain colored suits. Today, her manager saw her and said:

[Utterance]

Situation 6: replying to suggestion to stop smoking

Mr. Yamamoto, who has been smoking over ten years, smokes about twenty cigarettes a day. Lately, his friends often tell Yamamoto to quit smoking. He is fully aware that smoking is bad for health and has considered quitting but with little success. Today, when his friends nagged him again about the hazard of smoking to health and what kind of cancer it causes, Mr. Yamamoto said:

[Utterance]
Situation 7: replying to a negative question about one’s vacation

Last week, Sakai went to Hawai’i for vacation. She is now talking about the place with Suzuki who has been there before. Sakai said that since the ocean was so beautiful, she spent most of her time at the beach. When Suzuki asked, "Oh, then you did not go to Tantalus?" Sakai answered:

[Utterance]

Situation 8: commenting about one’s own daughter

Mrs. Sato has three daughters, all of whom went to the United States to study and have lived there since. One summer, Mrs. Sato took a trip to the US with two of her friends to visit her three daughters. Satoko, the youngest daughter who lives in L.A, traveled with them around the US as an interpreter. Mrs. Sato's friend said to Mrs. Sato, "Satoko speaks good English and drives well. It's wonderful." Mrs. Sato replied:

[Utterance]
Situation 9: offering dinner to guests

Suzuki invited her friends for a dinner today. It has been a long time since Suzuki saw Mr. and Mrs. Yamamoto, who were the next-door neighbors when Suzuki was living in Osaka. Since the Yamamotos had some business to attend to in Tokyo, Suzuki invited them over to her place. Suzuki does not usually have guests, but today, she cleaned the rooms with special care and put some flowers to decorate the place. Suzuki takes cooking lessons and is indeed a very good cook. Today, she selected particularly good ingredients to prepare the food. Eventually, the Yamamotos arrived and they began the dinner.

Carrying the dishes out, Suzuki said:

[Utterance]

鈴木さんは今日久しぶりに友人を夕食に招きました。以前大阪に住んでいたとき、隣に住んでいた山本さんです。山本さん夫婦が東京に来る用があるというので、自宅に招いたのです。普段あまりお客様を迎えることがないので、今日は特別きれいに部屋を掃除して、花を飾りました。料理教室に通っているので料理も得意なのでですが、特に今日は材料もいいものをつかって準備しました。山本さん夫婦が来て、食事の時間になりました。鈴木さんは料理を運びながら

[Utterance]

と言いました。

Situation 10: asking about one’s senior’s not coming to a party

The members of a seminar at the university are going to a casual drinking party (c.f. konpa) tomorrow. Yamashita intends to go with Saito. While the two are talking about the party Tanaka shows up. He is a senior member of the same seminar. When they ask whether Tanaka is going to the party, he replies that he is not going. The two of them then say:

[Utterance]

明日は大学のゼミのコンパがあります。山下さんは斎藤さんと一緒に行くつもりです。2人がコンパのことを話しているところに同じゼミの先輩の田中さんが来ました。田中さんに明日のコンパに来るかきくと、来ないというので、2人は田中さんに

[Utterance]

と言いました。
Situation 11: discussing what to eat for lunch with colleagues

A company employee, Sakuma, decides to have lunch with Nakamura and Saito, who are her colleagues and good friends. The three of them are talking about which restaurant to go to out of several that are close by. Nakamura says, "How about tempura?" Sakuma replies:

[Utterance]

Situation 12: commenting about food after a party

Suzuki went to the 50-year anniversary party held for his client’s company last night, which took place at a hotel in Shinjuku. The hotel is well known for its high quality and standards. Suzuki’s wife stayed home, so she asked Suzuki what the food was like. He said:

[Utterance]
Appendix B: Choices for the Main Study (with English Translation)

Situation 1.

a. 佐藤さんのしてくれることにくらべれば、お皿は価値のないものなので、そのように言った。

b. 本当はいいものなのに謙遜していった。

c. もっとよいものを差し上げたかったが、ほかによいものが思いつかなかった。

d. 山本さんの贈り物ものは本当にあまり価値がないから。

a. He said so because the dish indeed seemed worthless compared to what Mr. Sato had done for him.

b. He was being humble despite the dish’s true value.

c. Although he had wanted to give something better, he could not find anything else.

d. Mr. Yamamoto’s gifts were truly worthless.

Situation 2.

a. 花子さんが食事の代金を支払ってくれたことに対するお礼。

b. 花子さんが話を作ってくれたことに対するお礼。

c. 食事が終わった挨拶。

d. 花子さんに食事の代金を払ってもらうことを依頼している。

a. It’s an expression of gratitude for Hanako’s paying the bill for the dinner.

b. It’s an expression of gratitude for Hanako’s listening to Masako’s stories.

c. It’s a ritual expression after dinner.

d. It’s an expression of request for Hanako to pay the bill for the dinner.
Situation 3.

a. He said so to show his gratitude to Ms. Tanaka’s saying that she would share the bill.

b. He did not want her to worry about the cost since he was ready to pay as promised.

c. Given the promise, it would be embarrassing not to pay everything by himself.

d. Despite the promise, he did want some help since he was short of cash this time.

Situation 4.

a. 「30万円出してください」という意味で言った。

b. 30万円というのは高額なので、本当に投資信託を始めたいのかきいた。

c. 今日は投資信託はやめることにしたのかきいた。

d. 投資信託に使える30万円以上のお金を持っているかきいた。

a. The teller meant, ‘Please hand me the amount now.’

b. It was a question to confirm Ms. Sugimoto’s will to set up a trust fund because three hundred thousand yen is a big amount.

c. It was a question asking whether Ms. Sugimoto decided after all to quit the idea of starting a fund, at least for the day.

d. The teller asked whether Ms. Sugimoto possessed the minimum of three hundred thousand yen.
Situation 5.

a. The Hawaiian dresses suit Honda, so she should stay the way she is.

b. The manager wants Ms. Honda to wear something flashier.

c. The manager is troubled by the fact that Ms. Honda does not know the Japanese common sense.

d. The manager wants Ms. Honda to wear plain suits.

Situation 6.

a. S/he finds it annoying and wants her/his friend(s) to quit giving him/her advice.

b. S/he feel grateful for his/her friend’s thinking about his/her health

c. It’s a message expressing that Yamamoto has no intention of quit smoking

d. After listening to the advice, she decided to quit smoking.
Situation 7.

a. S/he did not go to Tantalus
b. S/he went to Tantalus
c. Sakai is not answering the question
d. S/he did not want to go to Tantalus

Situation 8.

a. Sato regrets that her daughter is becoming American-like
b. Her daughter is not such a good driver or a proficient speaker of English as her friend thinks
c. Her daughter changed her nationality to an American
d. She is in fact happy that her daughter lives like an American, but she is being humble not to boast about it.
Situation 9.

a. 自分がおいしいと思うものを山本さんに食べてもらいたいと思ってつくった。

b. 上手につくったつもりだが、外のレストランでプロが作ったものを食べるのにくらべ十分でないの。

c. 相手が気を遣わないように準備が大変ではなかったという印象を与えるため。

d. 心を込めて作ったということを伝えている。

a. Suzuki made the dinner because she wanted Yamada’s to enjoy what she likes to eat.

b. Suzuki thinks her dishes are good, but her food may not be as good as eating out at a restaurant where food is prepared professionally.

c. Suzuki wants to give the impression that the preparation was not so labor intensive and her guests should not worry about it.

d. She tells Yamamoto’s that she tried her best.

Situation 10.

a. 田中さんがコンパに来ない理由をきいている。

b. 田中さんがコンパに来ないことを責めている。

a. 田中さんが来ないのは残念である。

d. 田中さんが忙しくて来られないことに同情している。

a. They are asking for the reason as to why Tanaka is not coming.

b. They are criticizing Tanaka for not coming to the ‘compa’.

c. They are disappointed that Tanaka is not coming.

d. They sympathize with Tanaka for not being able to come because he is too busy.
Situation 11.

a. てんぷらじゃなくてほかのものが食べたい。

b. てんぷらが食べたい。

c. てんぷらのようなさっぱりしたものが食べたい。

d. さっぱりしたてんぷらが食べたい。

a. She wants to eat something other than tempura.

b. She wants to eat tempura.

c. She wants to eat something light like tempura.

d. She wants to eat lightly fried tempura.

Situation 12.

a. 料理はとても良かった。

b. 料理は普通だった。

c. 料理の味はそれほどよくなかった。

d. 料理はよくなかった。

a. The food was very good.

b. The food was ordinary.

c. The food was not so good.

d. The food was bad.
Appendix C: Utterances (with English Translation)

Situation 1: giving a gift in a formal situation

Non-literal, Conventional: *Kore wa tsumaranai mono desu kedo...*
(These are very boring / trivial things, but...)

Literal: *Kore wa osara na n desu ga, tsukatte kudasai.*
(This is a plate. I would like you to use it.)

Non-literal, Inferential: *Kore, ki ni itte itadakeru ka wakara-nai n desu kedo...*
(I am not sure if you like this...)

Situation 2: showing gratitude after dinner in an informal situation

Non-literal, Conventional: *Gochisoo sama deshita.*
(Thank you for the dinner.)

Literal: *Kyoowa shokuji o gochisooshite itadaite, doomo arigatoo gozaimashita.*
(I appreciate that you treated me to dinner tonight.)

Non-literal, Inferential: *Kondo bai-to-dai haittara, watashi ga gochisoo shimasu ne.*
(When I get paid from the part-time job next time, I will invite you for dinner.)

Situation 3: buying dinner after receiving help

Non-literal, Conventional: *Yakusoku wa yakusoku dakara...*
(A promise is a promise, so...)

Literal: *Ie, yakusokudoori watashi ga haraimasu kara, daijoobu desu.*
(No, I am fine. I will pay everything as I promised.)

Non-literal, Inferential: *Iyaa, omotto yori wa yasukatta kara...*
(No, it was less expensive than I thought...)

Situation 4: opening a bank account (bank teller asking questions)

Non-literal, Conventional: *Sanjuu-man-yen, omochi desu ka?*
(Do you have ten thousand yen?)
Literal: *Teikyokin wa sanjuu-man-yen kara dekimasu ga, kyoo wa sanjuu-man-yen omochi desu ka?*  
(This fund requires the minimum of three hundred thousand yens to set up. Do you have the amount ready?)

Non-literal, Inferential: *Jikai ni nasai masu ka?*  
(Would you like to do it next time?)

Situation 5: receiving comments about one’s outfit at workplace

Non-literal, Inferential: *Kyoo no fuku wa tottemo hawai desu ne.*  
(Hawai‘i an attire today!)

Literal: *Moosukoshi jimina fuku o kitekite kudasai?*  
(Could you choose clothing with a slightly plain look?)

Non-literal, Conventional: *Kyoo no fuku wa chotto...*  
(Today’s clothing is …)

Situation 6: replying to suggestion to stop smoking

Non-literal, Inferential: *Adobaisu doomo arigatoo gozaimashita.*  
(Thank you for your advice.)

Literal: *Yameyoo to doryoku shiteiru n dakara, urusaku iwanaide kuretara arigatii n dake do...*  
(I AM trying to quit, you know, so I would appreciate it if you stop nagging me about.)

Non-literal, Conventional: *hai, hai...*  
(Yes, yes…)

Situation 7: replying to a negative question about one’s vacation

Non-literal, Conventional: *Ee, maa.*

(*A positive reply.*)
Literal: Zannen nagara ikenakatta n desu.
(I am afraid I could not go.)

Non-literal, Inferential: San-paku shika nakatta kara…
(There were only three nights, so…)

Situation 8: commenting about one’s own daughter
Non-literal, Inferential: Sukkari amerika-jin ni natte shimatte...
(She is completely like an American now.)

Literal: Amerika ga nagakute, amerika dewa benrina n desu kedo, nihon-jinrashisa
ga dandan nakunatte shimatte, komaru n desuyo.
(She has lived in the States for a long time. It’s convenient in the States, maybe, but they are gradually losing her Japaneseness. I am troubled by it, you know…) (note: All of three were deleted later.)

Non-literal, Conventional: Ie, ie, sorehodo demo nai n desu yo.
(No, no, not really so…)

Situation 9: offering dinner to guests
Non-literal, Conventional: Hontoo ni nani mo gozaimasen ga...
(I don’t have anything special to offer.)

Literal: Senshuu, ryoorikyoushitsu de naratta ryouri na n desu kedo, oishikatta no de,
tsukutte mita n desu yo.
(This is a dish that I learned at the cooking class. It was good, and so I tried making it.)

Non-literal, Inferential: Hontoo wa soto de tte omotta n desu ga...
(I thought about eating out, but…)

Situation 10: asking about one’s senior’s not coming to a party
Non-literal, Inferential: Tanaka senpai, ashita baito na n desu ka?
(Do you have a part-time job tomorrow?)
Literal: Tanaka senpai, dooshite konpa ni konai n desu ka?
(Why are you not coming to the party?)

Non-literal, Conventional: Ee? Nande?
(How come?)

Situation 11: discussing what to eat for lunch with colleagues

Non-literal, Inferential: Kyoo wa sapparishita mono ga tabetai wa!
(I would like to eat something plain, today.)

Literal: Soo nee. Demo tenpura wa chotto aburappoi kara, kyoo wa betsu no mono ga ii wa!
(Let’s see. Tempura is a bit greasy. I would rather have something else today.)

Non-literal, Conventional: Tenpura wa chotto...
(Tenpura is a bit...)

Situation 12: commenting about food after a party

Literal: Moritsuke ga tottemo kireidatta yo.
(That was Japanese food, and it was very nicely decorated.)

Non-literal, Conventional: Anna monda to omou yo.
(That was Japanese food, and there was a lot of food!)

Non-literal, Inferential: yokatta yo.
(It was good.)
Appendix D: Summary of Responses from the Questionnaire used in Preliminary Study 2

**Situation / Type** | **description of intention (# of participants)**
---|---
1 | **Non-literal** She was not sure if Sato likes the present, so she said *tsumaranai mono*. (4) **Literal** Same as the meaning of the sentence. (2) Yamamoto thinks the item she chose was good, but because she wants to be polite, she uses the polite expression. (2) To tell Sato that the present is intended to show how grateful she is. (1)
2 | **Non-literal** It was assumed, or predetermined, that Hanako paid the bill (was going to pay the bill), so Masako thanked her. (3) Asking Hanako to pay the bill. (1) Thanking Hanako for the time and telling her it was nice to see her (1) **Literal** Same as the meaning of the sentence. (4) Masako makes sure that Hanako will take care of the bill. (1)
3 | **Non-literal** Because it was a promise, and that Tanaka helped Sato in great deal, Tanaka said, "I will pay as I promised you." (3) To tell Tanaka that Sato will pay the bill, although Sato thinks it would be nice if Tanaka chipped in some (although he would never let that happen...) (2) **Literal** Sato thinks it is a little more expensive than he originally intended, but by saying that, he is acknowledging that he is obliged to pay the bill. (3) Sato tells Tanaka not to worry about paying. (1) Same as the meaning of the sentence. (1)
4 | **Non-literal** Although the teller knows Sugimoto brought the money with her, saying "please, submit the money here" sounds too strong, so she said. (2) The teller is not sure whether Sugimoto brought the money today, so she asked her if she has the money. (2) It seems Sugimoto does not know anything about the fund, so the teller told her some money is needed to open an account. (1) **Literal** Same as the meaning of the sentence. (4) In order to avoid the customer to lose face in case she does not have the amount, the teller added "today". (1)
5 | **Non-literal** The manager wants to tell Honda sarcastically that her outfit is problematic. (2) Honda's outfit is not suitable for the company, but it is hard to directly tell her about that so the manager implied. (1) Just told her to wear something more conservative. (2) **Literal** The manager assumes that Honda does not realize that her outfit is not suitable in the office, and so he told her indirectly about it. (4) Honda's outfit (which is not a suit) was far too much, and telling her to wear a plain-colored suit would be impossible. So, the manager asks her to wear something more conservative if not a suit. (1)
6 | **Non-literal** Yamamoto wants to shut Sato up. (3) An advice is an advice, but I cannot stop smoking... (1) Yamamoto thanks Sato for caring him, but he has no intention of quitting. (1) **Literal** Yamamoto knows the harm of smoking and tries to quit, and so he is a little upset because Sato is nagging. (5)
| 7 | Non-literal | Sakai just told that he did not go. (3) 
Sakai told that he did not even want to go. (1) 
Sakai wanted to say that even he did not go to Tantalus, he was satisfied with his trip. (1) |
| Literal | Sakai is regretting a little that he could not go. (4) 
To be polite to Suzuki, he said it was regrettable. (1) |
| 8 | Non-literal | Sato does not disagree with her friends' comment, but she is sad that all her daughters now live in a place so far away from her own. (3) 
Baldly agreeing with her friends' comment is like boasting her own daughters, and so she expresses a negative feeling toward her daughters. (1) 
Sato just wants to tell her friends objectively how her daughters have been Americanized. (1) |
| Literal | Baldly agreeing with her friends' comment is like boasting her own daughters, and so she expresses a negative feeling toward her daughters. (3) 
She is worried about her daughters, because they are losing Japaneseness. (1) 
Sato is complaining about her daughters' not behaving like Japanese. (1) |
| 9 | Non-literal | Although Suzuki did put a lot of efforts for preparation, she does not want her friends to feel bad, so she said so. (3) 
Suzuki is not sure if they like the food she prepared so she said so. (1) 
It is just a formal way of saying when food is offered at home. (1) |
| Literal | She is not sure if her cooking was ok or not, so she told her friends so. (3) 
She wants to please her guests, so she told them so. (1) 
She wants to ask the guests how they like the new dish. (1) |
| 10 | Non-literal | They are asking indirectly why Tanaka is not coming to the party. (4) 
That was the most probable reason for Tanaka's not coming. (1) |
| Literal | They just want to know the reason why Tanaka is not coming. (4) 
They wanted Tanaka to come, so they are wondering what important business Tanaka has on that day. (1) |
| 11 | Non-literal | Assuming that everybody agrees that tempura is heavy, Sakuma is indirectly rejecting the suggestion. (4) 
Sakuma does not want to eat tempura at all. (1) |
| Literal | Sakuma just does not want to eat tempura. (3) 
Simply telling that she does not like tempura seems too direct, so she provides a reason for it. (1) 
Sakuma likes tempura in general, but she just does not want to eat tempura on that particular day. (1) |
| 12 | Non-literal | The food not only tastes good, but the presentation was outstanding. So he wanted his wife to know it. (2) 
Suzuki did not really think the food tasted good, but he also does not want to betray his wife's expectation, so he said so. (1) 
Because Suzuki told his wife that he would be eating very good food on that day, so he did not admit that the food was, in fact, not very good. (1) 
Same as the meaning of the sentence. (1) |
| Literal | Usually Japanese food does not have much quantity, so it was good because there were varieties of food at the party. (2) 
The taste of the food was not good. (2) 
The taste was ok but not outstanding. (1) |
Appendix E: The summary of perceived intentions for each utterance types by JFL learners (Preliminary Study 3)

*# of subjects assigned
**Number of subjects answered

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Utterance*</th>
<th>Description of intention (# of subjects answered)**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Non-literal(4)</td>
<td>This is a fixed phrase when someone offers something. (3) Although it is not much, this is a gift. (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Literal(6)</td>
<td>Polite give a dish. (3) Sato wanted Yamamoto to feel free to use the expensive plates. (1) Unintelligible answer (1) No answer (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Non-literal(6)</td>
<td>To conclude eating. (4) Thank Hanako for the meal. (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Literal(4)</td>
<td>Sato wants to keep his promise and buy Tanaka a meal. (2) Just let me pay because I don’t want to owe you anything. You helped me so I’ll pay for this. (1) Unintelligible answer (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Non-literal(4)</td>
<td>Sato wants to do you have the amount with you? (4) To let him know the minimum. (1) Unintelligible answer (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Literal(4)</td>
<td>The teller thinks Sugimoto did not bring the amount today. (1) The teller just asks Sugimoto if he has the amount. (1) Unintelligible answers (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Non-literal(4)</td>
<td>The manager wants her to wear something more appropriate. (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Literal(7)</td>
<td>The manager wants her to wear something more appropriate. (6) The manager does not like her clothes. (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Non-literal(7)</td>
<td>Yamamoto wants to thank Sato for the advice and concern. (4) Yamamoto does not want to hear any more. (2) Yamamoto thanks Sato for the concern but does not attend to quit. (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Literal(4)</td>
<td>Stop nagging. (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Non-literal(4)</td>
<td>Sakai agrees with Sugimoto. (3) Sakai did not even want to go. It’s none of your business. (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Literal(7)</td>
<td>Sakai is telling that it was regrettable he did not get to go. (4) Sakai does not regret that he did not go. (2) Sakai wanted to go, but because he was busy with other things, so he did not go. (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Non-literal(7)</td>
<td>Sato is proud of daughters’ abilities does not want to brag about it. (3) Sato is describing objectively how Americanized her daughters are. (3) It was inevitable that the daughters have become like Americans. (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Literal(4)</td>
<td>Sato just wants to objectively state that it is convenient to have daughters who can drive well and speak English well. (1) Unintelligible answers (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Non-literal(6)</td>
<td>Just present the food humbly. (3) Suzuki is apologizing for the food. (1) Suzuki wants the Yamamoto family to take whatever they want to eat. (1) Unintelligible answer (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literal (7)</td>
<td>To indicate that the cooking might not be good. (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same as the sentence meaning. (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>She is bragging about going to cooking class, learning how to make this dish and all the hard work she’s put into this dinner is insinuated. (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>That the food is special, she hopes that Yamamoto couple would enjoy the meal. (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 10 Non-literal (7) | The two girls like Mr. Tanaka and want to know if he is really not going. (1)  |
|                   | They want to know why Tanaka can’t come. (2)  |
|                   | They want to know whether Tanaka is so busy working. (1)  |
|                   | Unintelligible answer (2)                         |

| Literal (6) | Asking Tanaka to come to the party (why don’t you come to the party?) (5)  |
|            | Asking why Tanaka is not coming. (1)  |

| 11 Non-literal (6) | Tell them how strongly she doesn’t want tempura. (2)  |
|                   | Sakuma wants to eat tempura. (2)  |
|                   | Unintelligible answer (2)  |

| Literal (7) | Express that she wants to eat something else. (6)  |
|            | No answer (1)                                       |

| 12 Non-literal (6) | The food was beautifully served, and it was good. (5)  |
|                   | Just to tell that it was Japanese food. (1)  |

| Literal (7) | The food was very good. (3)  |
|            | There was good quantity of food, but not enough for him. (1) |
|            | There were a lot of different varieties of Japanese food there. (1)  |
|            | Unintelligible answer (1)  |
|            | No answer (1)  |
Appendix F: A sample questionnaire used in the main study

AGREEMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN
English Speakers' Comprehension of Indirect Speech in Japanese

Akiko Hagiwara 1432-1 Horinouchi, Hachioji, Tokyo 192-0392 Japan.

This study attempts to examine whether nonnative speakers of Japanese would infer the intention of indirect speech in the same way as the native speakers normally do, and this questionnaire will be used as the primary data for the study. At the beginning part, there are several questions about your linguistic and cultural background, and then a set of reading tasks follows. Each task contains a short reading and an utterance in Japanese. You will be asked to choose the interpretation of the given utterance from several possible interpretations. It will probably take about 15 to 20 minutes to complete the whole questionnaire. This can be done in class or as homework. Although the format of the questionnaire looks like an exam, this task is not intended to test specific linguistic skills nor general Japanese proficiency, and there is no absolutely "incorrect" answer to any of the questions. The result of this study will potentially be used both in intermediate- and advanced-level classes of Japanese, in which the students are facing rather challenging tasks of Japanese such as to understand how Japanese people communicate without explicit expressions in conversation. It is important for the instructors to know what types of expressions are understood more easily and what types are not. This study not only clarifies some characteristics that English native speakers commonly have when they are exposed to Japanese but also to let the teachers know what to be done in class. Participation in this study is voluntary, and your identity will remain confidential.

I certify that I have read and that I understand the foregoing, that I have been given satisfactory answers to my inquiries concerning project procedures and other matters and that I have been advised that I am free to withdraw my consent and to discontinue participation in the project or activity at any time without prejudice.

I herewith give my consent to participate in this project with the understanding that such consent does not waive any of my legal rights, nor does it release the principal investigator or the institution or any employee or agent thereof from liability for negligence.

Signature of individual participant

Date

(If you cannot obtain satisfactory answers to your questions or have comments or complaints about your treatment in this study, contact: Committee on Human Studies, University of Hawaii, 2540 Maile Way, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822. Phone: (808) 956-5007.)

c: Signed copy to subject
Direction:
This questionnaire looks like a test, and the way it should be answered is also similar to that of a test. There are 12 questions. What you should do is to circle the most appropriate interpretation of the underlined utterance based on the contextual information. As you do, if you find new words, you can check the glossary in the back. Most words have furigana on them, so you can also check your dictionary when needed. However, I would like you not to consult with other students nor teachers! I hope this task is not too difficult for you.

[Direction for the task] Read the following passage and the underlined utterance, and choose the item that best describes the intention or the meaning of the underlined utterance.

下の文章と下線のついた発話を読んで、発話の意図にもっとも近いものを選択肢の中から選んでください。

[Example]

すどう きとう sanは大学生です。今日は授業のあとすぐ家に帰って家庭教師のアルバイトに行くことになっています。授業が終わった時、隣に座っていた木村さんと一緒に食事に行かないか、誘われました。すどう sanは

すどう「今日は、ごめん。」

と言いました。

a. すどう sanは木村さんと食事に行く。
b. すどう sanは木村さんと食事に行けない。
c. すどう sanは木村さんが食事に誘ってくれたので嬉しい。
d. すどう sanはべつの人と食事に行く。

How to Answer: Because Kudo san is apologizing, you can guess it is because he cannot go to eat out with Kimura san, although Kudo san is not clearly saying so. Therefore, (b) seems to be the closest choice.

Please go on to the next page and start the tasks.
1. 山本さんは、お父さんの古くからの知り合いである佐藤さんの紹介で、ある会社に就職することができました。働き初めて2週間目に佐藤さんの自宅を訪問しました。そのとき、ちょっと高級なお皿をデパートで買って、きれいに包装をしてもらい、お菓子1箱ともにもらったことが感謝しました。そして、お料理を手渡しながら、

山本：「これは、つまらないものですけど。」

言いました。

a. 佐藤さんのしてくれたことにくらべれば、お皿は価値のないものなので、そのように言った。
b. 本当はいいものなのに謙退していた。
c. もっとよいものを差し上げたかったが、ほかによいものが思いつかなかった。
d. 山本さんの贈り物は本当にあまり価値がないから。

2. 正子さんは大学の3年生です。いとこの花子さんと久しぶりに一緒に食事にいきました。花子さんは3年前に大学を卒業してから大きな会社でOLをしています。2人、いろいろ仕事や大学のことなど話しました。食事のあとは、正子さんは花子さんに

正子：「今日は食事をご親しみしていただいて、どうもありがとうございました。」

言いました。

a. 花子さんが食事の代金を支払ってくれたことに対するお礼。
b. 花子さんが話をきいてくれたことに対するお礼。
c. 食事が終わった挨拶。
d. 花子さんに食事の代金を払ってもらうことを依頼している。
3. 佐藤さんは、田中さんと金曜日の夜に食事に行きました。仕事の手伝いを
してもらうかわりに食事をご馳走するという約束で、佐藤さんは田中さん
に簡単な手伝いをしていたのです。2人がいったレストランは、ちょっと
と高かったので、お金を払うときに、田中さんも少し払おうとしたら、佐
藤さんは、

佐藤：「いやあ、思ったよりは安かったから。。。」

と言いました。

a. 田中さんが少しお金を出すと言ったことに対する感謝を示すため。
b. 約束したとおり自分が払うから、気にしないで欲しい。
c. 約束したのに払わないのは、恥だから自分が支払う。
d. 約束はしたけど、今回はお金が足りないので少し出してもらいたい。

4. 杉本さんは、新しく投資信託を始めたくて銀行にいきました。投資信託を
始めることは最低30万円が必要です。いろいろ細かいことを説明したあ
と、銀行員は、杉本さんに

銀行員：「30万円おもちですか？」

とたずねました。

a. 「30万円出してください」という意味で言った。
b. 30万円というのは高額なので、本当に投資信託を始めたいのかきいた。
c. 今日は投資信託はやめることにしたのかきいた。
d. 投資信託に使える30万円以上のお金を持っているかきいた。
5. 本田さんは、東京にある大きな会社のOLです。ハワイの大学を出て東京で就職しました。会社には、特定のドレスコードはありませんが、ほかの日本の会社と同じように、男の人は背広を着ていて、女の人たいてい地方色のスーツを着ています。今日、主任が本田さんをみて

主任：「もう少し地味な服を着てきて下さい。」

と言いました。

a. 本田さんはハワイの服が似合うから、そのままでよい。
b. もっと派手な服を着てきて欲しい。
c. 本田さんは日本人の常識を知らないで困る。
d. 地味なスーツを着てもらいたい。

6. 山本さんはもう10年以上前にたばこを吸っています。毎日200本ぐらい吸うのですが、最近、友達からたばこをやめるようによくいわれます。山本さんも体に悪いことは十分知っていて、やめようとは思っているのですか、なかなかやめられません。今日も仲の良い友人の佐藤さんにたばこがどんなに体に悪いか、どんなガンの原因になるのかいろいろ教わって、山本さんは、

山本：「アドバイス、どうもありがとうございました。」

と言いました。

a. うるさいと思ってアドバイスをやめさせようと思っている。
b. 体のことを気遣ってもらって感謝している。
c. やめるつもりはないことを伝えている。
d. アドバイスをきいてたばこをやめるつもりだ。
7. 先週、坂井さんは、休暇でハワイ旅行に行ってきました。ハワイ行ったことがある鈴木さんが、坂井さんとハワイについて話をしています。あまり海がきれいなので、坂井さんは、ほとんどの間、ビーチにいたといいました。鈴木さんが、「じゃあ、タンタルスには行かなかったんですか？」と聞くと、坂井さんは、

坂井:「ええ、まあ。」

と答えてました。

a. タンタルスには行かなかった。
b. タンタルスに行った。
c. はっきり行ったか行かなかったか言っていない。
d. タンタルスには行きたいとも思わなかった。

8. 佐藤さんは娘が3人いるのですが、皆アメリカに留学して、そのままアメリカに住んでいます。夏の間に3人の娘を訪れに友達2人とアメリカ旅行にいきました。ロスアンジェルスにすんでいる下の娘、さと子が通訳として一緒にアメリカを回りました。佐藤さんの友達は佐藤さんに「さと子さんは英語も上手で車の運転も上手で、本当にいいですね。」といいました。

佐藤さんは、

佐藤:「アメリカが長くて、アメリカでは便利なんですけど、日本人らしさがだんだんなくなってしまって、困るんですよ。」

と言いました。

a. 娘がアメリカ人ぽくなってしまってさびしく残念だ。
b. 娘は他人が思うほど車の運転も上手ではないし、英語もうまくない。
c. 娘がアメリカの国籍をとった。
d. 娘がアメリカ人のような生活していて嬉しいが、自慢にならないよう謙遜している。
9. 鈴木さんは今日久しぶりに友人を夕食に招きました。以前大阪に住んでいたとき、隣に住んでいた山本さんは、山本さん夫婦が東京に来る用があるというので、自宅に招いたのです。普段あまりお客様を迎えることがないので、今日は特別に部屋を掃除して、花を飾りました。料理教室に通っているので料理も得意なので、特に今日は材料も良いものをつかって準備しました。山本さん夫婦が来て、食事の時間になりました。鈴木さんは料理料理を運びながら

鈴木：「本当は外でて思っとったんですけれど。」

言いました。

a. 自分がおいしいと思うものを山本さんにも食べてもらいたいと思ってつくった。
b. 上手につくったつもりだが、外のレストランでプロが作ったものを食べると、それにくらいまででないのです。
c. 相手が気を遣わないように準備が大変ではなかったという印象を与えるため。
d. 心を込めて作ったということを伝えている。

10. 明日は大学のゼミのコンパがあります。山下さんは斎藤さんと一緒に行くつもりです。2人がコンパのことを話しているところに同じゼミの先輩の田中さんが来ました。田中さんに明日のコンパに来るかきくと、来ないというので、2人は田中さんに

山下・斎藤：「えっ？なんで？」

言いました。

a. 田中さんがコンパに来ない理由をきいている。
b. 田中さんがコンパに来ないことを責めている。
c. 田中さんが来ないのは残念である。
d. 田中さんが忙しくて来られないことに同情している。
11. 会社員の佐久間さんは同僚で仲のいい中村さんと斎藤さんと3人でお昼を食べに行くことにしました。3人は近くにあるいくつかの店のなかからどの店に行こうか、話し合っています。中村さんが、「てんぷらなんだろう？」というので、佐久間さんは

佐久間：「そうねえ。でも、てんぷらはちょっと油っぽいから、今日は別のものがいいわ。」

と言いました。

a. てんぷらじゃなくてほかのものが食べたい。  
b. てんぷらが食べたい。  
c. てんぷらのようなさっぱりしたものが食べたい。  
d. さっぱりしたてんぷらが食べたい。

12. 鈴木さんは昨日の夜、新宿にあるホテルで取引先の会社の創立50周年的パーティーがあるということで、行ってきました。そのホテルは高級ホテルでとても有名です。家で留守番をしていた奥さんは、料理がどんなものだったか、鈴木さんに聞いてきました。鈴木さんは、

鈴木：「盛りつけがとってもきれいだったよ。」

と言いました。

a. 料理はとても良かった。  
b. 料理は普通だった。  
c. 料理の味はそれほどよくなかった。  
d. 料理はよくなかった。


