Playing with Piety
The Phenomenon of Indonesian Muslim Dolls

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Introduction: Muslim Dolls as Religious Visual Culture

Muslim dolls are a new phenomenon within contemporary popular Islamic culture, particularly in Indonesia. While most contemporary Indonesian Islamist movements like Salafism (neo-Wahabism) are deeply influenced by transnational Islamist ideologies and thus reject any figures of humans,1 moderate Salafists often allow children to play with dolls. This acceptance is based on the *Haddith* that spoke about Aisyah, the youngest wife of the Prophet, playing with a type of doll when she was about nine years old. Despite this acceptance, many conservatives still argue that Aisyah’s doll was not precisely a human-shaped doll.

Muslim dolls emerged in Indonesia in 2005, soon after the reformation era2 when Islamic movements emerged more prominently in public spheres, marking a modern turn in the evolution of Islamic movements. Along with this transition into modernity, members of various Muslim organizations that married and built families began to consider secular toys for their children’s entertainment, particularly dolls. Not only were Muslim parents concerned about whether toys were or were not Islamic in nature—a crucial point considering conflicting opinions among Islamic authorities regarding dolls—but these parents also had pragmatic concerns regarding the safety, educational value, and affordability of toys. Toy makers developed creative strategies in order to take these concerns into account.

Muslim dolls and other popular “Islamic” imagery in popular culture—such as *busana Muslim* (Islamic clothes), Islamic stickers, Islamic music performances, among others—represent a huge material database for “religious visual culture.” Currently, there are various scholars engaged with contemporary Islamic visual culture in Indonesia: Budiyanto (2006) and Lukens-Bull (2005) have written about Islamic stickers, while Carla Jones (2007) and Nuraini Juwiyastuti (2003) have examined Muslim clothing. Most of these scholars have utilized various media and cultural studies theories and methods in their study of Islamic visual culture. In recent decades, as Brent Plate (2002) notes, religious scholars have shifted away from “verbal-textual” doctrines toward the visual and material artifacts constituting religious “practice.”3 David Morgan (2000) similarly observes visual imagery’s significance in religious practices:

[T]he new study of religious visual culture begins with the assumption that visual artifacts should not
be segregated from the experience of ceremony, education, commerce or prayer. Visual practices help fabricate the worlds in which people live and therefore present a promising way of deepening our understanding of how religions work.5

Both Morgan and Plate stress the significance of visual imagery, not only as a component of performances, rituals, and ceremonies, but also for understanding these practices themselves.

Beyond contributing to and serving as a lens through which to analyze rituals, religious visual imagery can serve as a point of departure into discourses relating to broader social issues and contexts. Plate states that visual culture offers:

an attempt to talk about the visual components that are imbedded in everyday life [and] is engaged with the production and the reception of visual objects, the makers and the viewers. And in this mode of analysis, gender, sex, race, nationality, religion, family, and other forces of identification come to play a vital role in the construction of the way we look and are looked at. These components of identity affect the way images are produced and reproduced, and how such images are viewed, and by whom.5

These social concerns provide fruitful ground for research, as the majority of the scholarship about Islamic arts tends to focus on the “fine arts” such as calligraphy and architecture, including Plate’s own books on religious visual culture. This paper will analyze the phenomenon of Indonesian Muslim dolls as an expression of religious visual culture and scrutinize popular Islamic materialist culture by taking into account Plate’s “field of vision,” a comprehensive analytical methodology for examining the visual components in the Indonesian community.6 Additionally, I explore some of the religious and social issues that arise when considering Muslim dolls as visual culture in Indonesia, focusing particularly on the ways religious transnationalism and globalization impact this phenomenon. Specifically, I will examine the varieties of religious transnationalism that have influenced the emergence of the Muslim doll in Indonesia. Through these issues, I will note the waves of globalization—or, flows of religious, social, and economic content through increasingly connected agents from around the world—that are exposed by the Islamic doll phenomenon. Lastly, I will consider Indonesian Muslims’ reception and interpretation of the specifically Indonesian character of these Islamic dolls.

**Barbie: A Story of the Globalized ‘Secular’ Doll**

The birth of the modern doll is represented by the production of a global phenomenon known as Barbie. Barbie was created in 1959 by Ruth Handler, and is, in many ways, an icon of Western consumerism, celebrating Western aristocratic and bourgeois values and lifestyles. To those living in the non-Western world, this ideal of a modern, high-class lifestyle has long been an obsession, but it is also frequently critiqued for eroding traditional cultural values.7 As an emblem of Western modernity, Barbie’s image sparks such ambivalence (see Figure 1).

Despite critiques of Barbie, she can be found in countries around the world, just as bourgeois values and lifestyles are not exclusive to Western civilization. Yet, the imagery of wealth, elegance, and fantasy that Barbie embodies can be traced in history: for instance, fantastic affluence characterizes many epic stories of princes and princesses that exist in various civilizations around the world. This affluence is present in the Islamic tale of One Thousand and One Nights, the adventures of Prince Panji of Java, or in any folklore from China, India, Japan, and in other countries and historical civilizations.

Acknowledging her international appeal, makers of Barbie have attempted to fuse, and possibly appropriate non-Western cultures, by creating special edition dolls whose clothing and packaging adhere to stereotyped national images (see Image 1). These questions about Barbie’s international appeal and cultural adaptability are important to consider as popular culture becomes increasingly global. Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of the habitus helps illustrate the complications that arise at sites of cultural intersection. “A set of durable practices, values, and dispositions which is both structured and structuring,” the habitus represents the “context in which we understand the world and acquire beliefs, values and knowledge through practice.”8 We might therefore understand Barbie’s status as an icon of bourgeois culture as an effect of cultural practices of the West. Yet, as a global commodity, Barbie’s popularity threatens to export Western values and sensibilities into global culture. This global culture can be
understood as threatening to an Indonesian Muslim who is characterized by practices that are influenced by his or her own habitus (e.g., Islamic culture). This cultural intersection between West and non-West that global capitalism helps produce—we see this particularly with Mattel’s global marketing strategies—can place differing cultural practices into conflict.

In Barbie Culture, Mary F. Rogers recognizes the Muslim world’s anxiety over the cultural intrusion that Barbie represents, suggesting that Barbie can alienate many around the world, as her image reflects racism, sexism, consumerism, and materialism. For many Muslims, Barbie’s world is perceived as a kind of “fantasy of consumption,” a world that is far from the reality most girls face. Barbie idealizes white skin, light hair, blue eyes, a thin body-shape, Western conceptions of beauty and, above all else, fashionable upper-class appeal. This reflects the existence of social and cultural hierarchies in which “whiteness” is understood stereotypically as clean, good looking, honorable, successful, morally good, healthy and charming. For that reason, Barbie has also become representative of Western popular culture and the associated “American Dream” ideology. In this sense, the world of Barbie appears to be normative in popular culture: these ideologies of wealth and consumption differ significantly from the ideal world of Islamic norms and values.  

**Transnational Islamic Piety for the Modern World**

Markets and politics are two sides of one coin: they are inseparable and infused with cultural values and practices. For instance, the conflicts in the Middle East seem to have no certain solution because of continuous fighting for natural resources, political interests, and religious pride and honor. Each of these conflicts intertwines and overlaps with other conflicts whose origins are not precisely known. Islam has historically been a highly political religion, a source of ideologies deeply rooted in the Middle East, and continuously evolving concomitantly with developments in modern political, economic, and cultural realities. These modern developments, combined with Western-European imperialism, have challenged political Islam’s status within the global community. This ideological conflict illustrates Islam’s status as a global and hegemonic power, and, it should be noted, Islam’s own ideologies have both positive and negative influences upon others in the world.

In The Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington predicts the emergence of Islam (and China) as a counter power toward the West is imminent. Huntington claims that since the fall of the Ottoman Empire there has been an ongoing struggle to regain the previous political, economic and cultural power of Islam. The struggle to create a pan-Islamism in the late nineteenth century seemingly failed to solidify because of the emergence of the modern, Western state. These circumstances set the stage for the emergence of modern Islamic nations, both in the Middle East and the rest of the Islamic world. In the 1990s the Islamic ‘civilization’ movement became a political strategy intending to create an Islamic society characterized by the Islamization of everything, and was initially led by Ismail Raji Al-Faruqi. Budiyanto (2006) notes that throughout the various global Islamic movements in the 1990s, including the one in Indonesia, a common theme was the notion that the umma, or Muslim community, was an important element in Islamic activism. Thus, the Islamization of society, not the state, emerged as the strategy for constructing and building the imagined universal umma. While this contemporary transnational Islamic movement was
initially inspired by the *Ikhwanul Muslimin*, a transnational Islamic movement arising in Egypt in 1939, its new strategy, as Oliver Roy (2004) argues, is focused on Islamizing society rather than Islamizing the State: “The neo-fundamentalists of Islam reject the political struggle as means of establishing such a state. They believe that an Islamic state should result from the re-Islamization of the umma and should not be a tool for this re-Islamization.” Seeing the West’s hegemonic cultural power in the global marketplace as a threat to the fate and faith of the young generation, Muslims countered by creating cultural commodities of their own. One example of this cultural response is the creation of *Arrosa*, the Muslim doll.

The phenomenon of the Indonesian Muslim doll was motivated by ideas of transnational Islam, suggests its creators. Uuming Dwi Kusminarti (Atiek), the Director of PT Haula Sejahtera, one of the creators of the Arrosa Islamic doll, notes that a Muslim doll was already being manufactured in the Middle East and that it was similar to a Barbie doll. This inspired the creation of a new doll, one with Muslim clothes. She wanted the female doll to wear the *jilbab* (the head-scarf) and the male dolls to wear the *songkok* (a rimless cap). “This Muslim doll is heavily laden with Islamic faith and values,” said Atiek, a mother of four daughters.”

Atiek, who created Arrosa with her friend Asrul Iman, recalled that their inspiration to create a Muslim doll first came when they realized there were no dolls dressed in Islamic clothing available for her daughter. Although a doll named Razzane existed in Malaysia, these dolls were difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. Atiek decided then to make the Muslim dolls herself. Atiek markets the Arrosa doll primarily through the Internet to surrounding cities in Java and neighboring countries. She notes that currently there are many orders from Bandung, Balikpapan, Duri, Surabaya, Bahkan, and even Abu Dhabi and Singapore, but Atiek also admits a desire to expand distribution into foreign markets; for instance, Malaysia where there appears to be a similar interest in dolls with Islamic clothing.

It can be said that Muslim dolls, as a subculture of the Islamic world, represent a counter to the cultural hegemony that Barbie symbolizes. However, Arrosa is not a purely Muslim creation. Her main material components are products of the global market: she is originally made in China. Rather than manufacture her own doll, Atiek instead purchased a plastic molded doll from China and dressed it up. However, dolls from China generally have western faces, although most consumers want an Asian or Middle-Eastern looking doll. If the demand for the doll continues to grow, Atiek will manufacture her own doll, including additional clothing, such as wedding dresses, traditional Indonesian clothes and other accessories, such as a prayer carpet, rosary, and *musholla.*

Unlike what was suggested by George Ritzer that, “it is much easier to export things in a form of ‘nothing’ throughout the whole world, rather than to export things in a form of ‘something.’” Muslim dolls, which are full of Islamic attributes and values, sell well globally, similar to Barbie, thereby complicating Ritzer’s theorization of the circulation of commodities. Muslim dolls are infused with unique attributes that give them value as *something*. They are conceptually bound with Islamic culture (as simultaneously a local and global religious and cultural movement), with temporal specificity (modernity), with humanism, and enchantment.

This complexity in the depiction of a Muslim is emblematic of the segmented sentiment of the Muslim community, which has traditionally had a vast global presence since the early part of thirteenth century. Considering this background, the Muslim doll serves as an effective media and consumer tool for shaping the Muslim consciousness in the context of global and universal Islamic world values. As a material object in circulation, the Muslim dolls—with all of their accessories and products—facilitates the spread of local Islamic values to influence transnational religious culture.

**Muslim Doll: The Birth of Visual Mimicry**

The Muslim doll is a phenomenon of the early 21st century, first appearing in the Middle East in 2004 with the launching of the *Fulla* doll by NewBoy International in Syria. The doll, Fulla, named for a genus of jasmine flower that grows in the Middle East, quickly became a bestselling item. In contrast to Barbie’s blond hair and blue eyes, Fulla has black hair and brown eyes, and she is dressed in long dresses and skirts that cover her knees. (See Figure 2).

In 2005, two new Muslim dolls came to the market: *Razzane*, created by Ammar Saadeh and Sherrie Saadeh, and Arrossa. The Saadehs say that they created the Razzane doll as an alternative doll for Muslim girls...
and boys. In contrast to Barbie’s sexual appearance and pronounced bust, Razanne appears modest, with clothes that cover her body, including the jilbab.

According to the Saadehs, Razzane portrays the ideal character traits for young Muslim women, such as an unpretentious appearance, kindness, good manners, and piety (taqwa and sholehat). At the time they created Razanne, the Saadehs felt there were not any models of Barbie that were positive for Muslim girls. Razanne was created as a tool for Muslim girls to learn the values of education and religiosity, not as an object of admiration that encourages girls to obsess over their own bodies. Razanne is available in three versions: white skin with blonde hair, light brown skin with black hair, and dark skin with black hair. Representing an image of an idealized modern Muslim woman, Razzane is popular in Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and in Southeast Asian countries, and is also sold in America, Canada, and Germany.

From this short history it is clear that the birth of the Muslim doll is representative of “mass-popular-art” that emerges as an effect of the recent revitalization of Islamic consciousness throughout global Islamic communities. This Islamic consciousness has developed in the face of the perceived dominance of Western culture and values, and is intended to stimulate discourses that will lead to a return to the day of “glorious Islam”. This counter-hegemonic consciousness can be traced back to the latter part of nineteenth century. The Muslim doll illustrates the discursive shift in Islamic movements’ gaze from state to society, with its argot doctrines asserting that Islam is revealed to all of mankind as the way of al-akhlaqul al-akram (Islamic moral kindness) and al-rahmatan til al-alamin (Islamic universal values). These discourses are also likely a response to the paranoia of Islam in the Western world after the tragedy of 9/11. Recognizing the cultural hegemony and paranoia of the West, the Islamic consciousness is able to focus its anxieties towards countering imperialist images, such as those that Barbie represents.

The Barbie doll is not just a representation of certain cultural values, but is believed by many in the Islamic world, including many Indonesians, to be representative of Western culture as jahilliyah, or ignorant and led by “American-Zionist Jews.”
Muslim dolls serve to strengthen the religious identity of children and develop a Muslim imaginary that is closer to reality. Nevertheless, the problematic imagery of the perfect Barbie body does not disappear for the modern Muslim doll, especially with Muslim dolls made in Indonesia. This is an example of what Rene Girard describes as a “mechanism of mimetic/mimesis desire.” The Indonesian doll is representative of the Muslim desire to be a part of the advancement and modernization that is associated with Western civilization, while simultaneously being different. Although the Muslim doll makers prefer to create an “indigenous brown-looking doll,” the very fact that this doll must imitate Barbie indicates Barbie’s power as a market icon. The Muslim doll in Indonesia does not appear in the market on its own terms; it must reference and respond to Barbie. Every aspect of the doll, from its inception to its aesthetic values, is labeled as explicitly “Islamic,” yet almost all of the materials and processes are identical to Barbie’s, including the bright pink color of the packaging.

Still, this mimicry can be a form of cultural contestation. Sara Ahmed argues (in Prabasmoro, 2003, pp. 94-95) that through mimicry the Muslim doll hybridizes Barbie to challenge the doll’s claim to originality and authenticity. At the same time, next to Barbie, the Muslim dolls disclose the dialectical interaction of a multitude of dualisms (e.g. master/slave, West/non-West, other/self, global/local, etc.). The global/local dialectic is notable, in the context of globalization and transnational Islam. As the Muslim doll mimics Western Barbie, Muslims articulate local (Islamic) values via a global language of dolls and markets.

Furthermore, an ironic and paradoxical consciousness among Muslims has seemingly emerged, as can be seen by the racial claims of Muslim-ness by the Razzane and Fullas dolls. The creators of Razzane and Fullas regard dolls that physically resemble Muslims as somehow inappropriate for a bate, or westerner, to own. Yet, many Muslims in Europe, the Middle East, and even in America have diverse types of bodies, hair, and eyes, and also speak “bate” languages. This demonizing of Westerners as ‘others’ accentuates the paradox of transnational Islam in Indonesia, where at once it presumes a universalistic stance that goes beyond racial and geographical claims, but simultaneously shows insularity.

**Muslim Dolls: Where Art, Politics, Consumerism and Religion Overlap**

If we agree that the Muslim dolls are a visual art form, or at least stand as images of Islamic popular visual culture, it is important to consider them not only as a commodity, but also within the context of Islamic political culture. As mentioned previously, the doll was created to disseminate the symbolic and aesthetic values of Islam, thereby contributing to the increase of Islam’s political profile in the popular media. The creators understand that their target audience recognizes and appreciates the importance of Islamic cultural values. Not only do the dolls’ creators experience economic gain by producing the dolls, but they also share in cultural and symbolic gains that come with the dissemination of Islamic images of faith and piety. Muslim consumers also share in these symbolic benefits, Atick confirms: “[This doll] is made as media to support education and early educational activity in disseminating Islamic values ... The birth of Arrosa itself is a response to an alternative choice of various dolls in the market. But, because those dolls are generally wearing ordinary clothes, we try to sell dolls with Islamic clothes.” Thus, the Muslim doll becomes a symbol of the artistic doll, an aspect of Islamic art, but also a promising business venture with vast market potential, with the addition of a political identity embedded with the primary values of Islam. Presently Arrosa is exporting its doll-clothes products to America specially designed for Razzane. Also, in a relatively short span of time, Fulla has penetrated the Indonesian market.

The Muslim doll represents the ways religion, politics, art and economics blend in public space and modern markets. The production of both secular and religious material culture in public space is generally aimed to appeal to the interests of their prospective customers. The crucial distinction between secular consumer products and religious ones is the embedded aura of religious value within the latter. Products of religious culture are seen by consumers to have religious and spiritual attributes, while, ironically, also having an economic value that characterizes materiality. The producer of any product, including Muslim dolls, must think about capital, costs, and the efficiency and profitability of production. Conveniently, Muslim dolls are a product that is relatively easy and inexpensive to market, because their consumers have
become a voluntary marketing network through their *pengajian* and *arisan*, and through political activities.\(^{36}\) Moreover, the market for religious materials and products is actually broad and relatively stable.

The producers of the Muslim dolls clearly understand the needs their consumers—Muslim families with children—who wish to be more reflective of religious tenets and guidance. This contrasts with the products created by secular producers, which are assumed by religious consumers to promote modern lifestyles and aesthetics that reflects the interest of the producers only.\(^{37}\) Producers and consumers of religious products speak of a similar “call” for piety that transcends business needs. Does it mean that the producer of religious products tends to prioritize the religious piety rather than business? The producers of religious products often believe that spirituality is more important than economics; still, in Islam, being profit-oriented is not a sin.

Although the Muslim doll is a commodity with an image that circulates through social and media networks, the fact that it has a physical, three-dimensional form should not be overlooked. These dolls are not just ideas, but physical objects that have close contact with consumers’ bodies and minds through play. Thus we see the intersection of religious, political, cultural, and economic forces coming together in the physical act of childrens’ play and pleasure.

Additionally, Muslim consumers can identify with the Muslim doll. This identification makes parents more secure with the Muslim doll than other dolls, because this doll looks like people in their own community and would likely have similar everyday values and practices (*habitus*). Consumers also enjoy repeatedly playing with Muslim dolls including purchasing new dolls, clothes and accessories. In this concern for the doll, children and parents (and nannies) that play with and talk about the characters of their Muslim dolls develop strong psychological ties to their dolls. This engagement in the imaginative world of the Muslim dolls occurs whenever they are played with. Moreover, when imagining their dolls in a certain setting, narrative, or staged, diorama-like scene, children and parents might experience a pleasurable sense of disconnection from the real world; yet, Muslim values remain a central component of this play. Pleasure is also a component of consumption itself, and the commodification of religion, particularly in Islam, is not taboo. Throughout history religious commodities (e.g. religious relics) have been prominently featured.\(^{38}\) In fact, public space in Islam is always seen (ideally or imaginatively) as totally religious space, as evidenced by the notion of public society as *ummah*.\(^{39}\)

Therefore, even as modernity continues to reshape our lives and the world, the public spaces that emerge do not undermine the existence of religious culture and religious public space. This conception of religion and public space runs counter to suggestions by scholars who claim that modernity will fully secularize this space. Indeed, religious commodities have flourished in the market, as religion continues to adapt to evolving expressive modes to communicate its ideas and realities. The Muslim doll represents one such manifestation of this adaptation.

**Muslim Dolls and Indonesian-ness: A Remark**

Due to the combination of Islam’s extensive history in Indonesia and the quantity of Muslims living within its borders today, Islam is clearly influential in the formation of Indonesian identity.\(^{40}\) As I have argued, the Muslim doll stands at the intersection of the local and global, the national and transnational: it is a hybrid cultural product of modern Indonesia and global Islam. It is also worth noting that the appearances of these Muslim dolls, especially Arrosa, resemble the urban elite class of Muslims. Atiek admits that she follows fashion trends, since not all Muslims wear the *jilbab* or the *songkok*. She notes that she wanted the dolls to be more fashionable, including having the dolls wear skirts and pants.\(^{41}\) The clothing of these Muslim dolls therefore resembles what Carla Jones observes as *baju Muslim*, which represents the historical discourse and interpretation of state understandings of Indonesian-ness, modernity, and Islamic tradition in the practices of piety and modernity.\(^{42}\)

On the other hand, Islamic fashion does not garner significant resistance from traditional Islam such as *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) or modernist groups such as *Muhammadiyah*. This does not mean there is no resistance to the dolls at all, as other Islamic transnationalist movements oppose and reject this modern hybridization, which they consider to be a Western representation dressed in modern Islamic fashions. Transnational Islam, particularly the neo-salafism (such as Majelis Mujahaddin of Indonesia-MMI and
Front Pembela Islam-FPI, and Hisbut Tahir Indonesia-HTI), intensely reject and refuse all items that exhibit Western influences, which they see as heresy, including these fashionable and modern *busana Muslim* clothes for modern Muslims and Islamic dolls.  

Most of the Salafist Islamic groups assert Islam as the ideology of the state to suit their political interest by prescribing Arabic style clothing as the only dress code for genuine Islamic identity. Regardless of the identity politics that the dolls stir, Muslim dolls are obvious examples of material culture that has been influenced by the processes of globalization and localization. To conclude, I would like to return to what Dr. Shahid Athar said regarding the Muslim community concerning this phenomenon of Muslim dolls. His statement has gained popularity among an Indonesian Muslim mailing list that poses an imagined conversation between Barbie and a Muslim Doll:

Barbie Doll: “Welcome to United State of America, land of freedom and bravery. Welcome and have a great fun!”

Muslim Doll: “What do you mean by freedom, bravery, and fun?”

Barbie Doll: “For us, freedom is the ability of all people to choose clothing and god. We are free to choose our lifestyle, friends, both male and females. The definition of bravery is the bravery to try drugs, alcohol, and sex! Fun is dating, dancing, and drinking until drunk, anything that makes you happy!”

Muslim Doll: “For us, freedom is freedom of thought, freedom of speech, and freedom to worship God. For us, bravery is person who is brave enough to fight temptation, ‘syahwat’ desire, and hate. Are you brave? For us, fun is enjoying life with friends, family, and nature, not with Bobby or George (Barbie males).

Barbie Doll: “All of those are good lifestyle values, but you will soon forget it as fast as you forget your life, you will dissolved with your life, you will become as one of amongst us and you will have a boy friend like Bobby!”

Muslim Doll: “We will not worship what you are worshiping and you also will not worship of what we are worshiping. For you there is your way, for us this is our way”.
Bibliography


End Notes


2 Reformation era is the era after the authoritarian New Order Regime, which began after 1998. From then on, the power of Islamic movements emerged stronger than before in public, particularly in challenging the nationalist political movements. For more on this topic see Riddel (2002).


5 Plate (2002); see also Rampley (2005), Walker (1997), and Zolberg (1990).

6 This “field of vision” is Plate’s methodological approach for critiquing visual culture, and it is elaborated by Rose (2007). That which is included in the field of visions is: 1) The image itself - what it looks like, its execution, physical materials, etc; 2) The relationship between the medium and the message, or form and content, of the image; 3) The creator of the image, including his or her ethnic, gender, sexual, racial, religious identity; 4) The nature of the language that surrounds the image in terms of explaining it, arguing against it, or for it; 5) The responses, on all sides, to the image – physical responses, verbal responses in newspapers and journals, the response of the museum goers, legalistic responses; 6) The historical context of the image - in this case, among thousands of other images; 7) The identity of those who view the image; 8) The particular cultural crossings that are constantly taking place—in the image itself or in the creator itself; and 9) The role of social, political, and cultural institutions in the creation and reception of “art” (Plate 2002, p. 5).

7 Religious transnationalism is a term for a new wave of religious movements that organize their networks across national borders, sometimes in conflict to movements within the nation-state. In the case of Indonesian Muslims, the term is usually attributed to the new movements other than Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, the two major Islamic institutions within Indonesia.

8 The images of modern, progress, and ‘civilization’ in Indonesia, not just Muslim community, generally refer to achievements of the ‘Western civilization’ (Mrzéek 2006), but at the same time it seem as the actual source of the threat to ‘local civilization’ (i.e. norm, culture, and values) (Laffan 2003). In relation to the Muslim and modernity issue, Bellah (2000) clearly state that the problem of Muslim with modernity is actually a matter of the question whether modernity is able to fulfilled the various needs of modern Muslim religiosity effectively; not about the modernization of politics, family, and individuality. Therefore, the creation of these Muslim dolls offers one of the answers on how Muslim religiosity copes with modernity.


10 Siregar (2007).

11 Based on research from the Freedom Institute and PPIM-UIN Jakarta, the notion of imperialist prominent in contemporary Indonesian Muslim discourse, particularly the transnational Islam. It is actually a mixed feeling of belief and understanding that the Western world, generally represented by America, is still obsessed with the old agenda of colonialism and imperialism of the 19th century that is threatening to Islam. Indeed, imperialism is mixed up with a variety of terms: globalization, (neo) capitalism, (neo) liberalism, (neo) imperialism of western world that makes a powerful cultural, political, and an economical homogenization impact on the Muslim world. See Mujani (2005) and the Freedom Institute – PPIM UIN Jakarta. Nalar-Jakarta.


13 For further discussion on the formation of nationalism of Indonesia and the role of Islam see Laffan (2003).


16 Ikhwanul Muslimin or Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Hassan Al Bana and his colleagues such as Sayyid Qutub and others in Egypt 1939. This movement initially started from education-based at mosques and madrasah, which is why it is popularly known as tarbiyah movements. For further issues on the influences of Ikhwanul Muslimin’ ideas (not to say ideology) in Indonesian Muslim movements please see Rahmat (2008).


19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.


23 Siregar (2007): 123-26. What is ‘nothing’ for Ritzer is a globalized product that is generic, lacking local-ties—it is timeless, dehumanized, and disenchanted. Here, Siregar gave the notion of the ‘mall’ as an example, however debatable the example, in which as McDonalds, Coca-cola, or Barbie is also treated as global-product (which is ‘nothing’).

24 Even though, the Muslim world is not homogenous in its politics and ideology, today they share a monolithic discourse that is the ‘sharitization’ issue.


27 Ibid.

28 For the details of the impact and the Indonesian’s umma hope on Pan-Islamic see Laffan (2003).

29 See this Muslim assumption at Budiayto (2006).


Therefore, as Prabasmoro argues through a reading of Hall (1998), local capital (the producer) should develop its certain “globality values” in its local product to be easily recognized by its consumer, while not entirely losing its centrality. In fact, one may see that actually it is really a matter of global Islam vis-à-vis global capitalism, which is usually perceived as Western. Indeed, historically and culturally, Islam has been made out by Indonesian Muslims as being “local”, making Muslim Barbie dolls more powerful and marketable than their ‘traditional and indigenous’ counterparts. The discussion on mimicry and hybridization in postcolonial era of Indonesian can be seen at Prabosmoro (2003): 94-95 and Ahmed (1999).

35 Pengajian is a regular meeting of mostly women reciting the Quran, whilst Arisan is mostly womens groups conducting regular social gatherings whose members contribute to and take turns at winning an aggregate sum of money.
36 Siregar (2007): 94
38 Islamic society; in which individuals and groups within it should be subject to Islamic norms and morality.
40 Nova 13 March 2006.
41 For modern clothing most of the Salafist ulama reject any un-Islamic representation, although debatable enough, dolls are strictly avoided in most of salafist theology. See the debates at http://muttaqun.com/clotheswithpictures.html (retrieved December 11, 2007).
43 Once in 2008, at the Islamic Book Fair event, I saw how differently they displayed the Arrosa dolls with the “Aa Gym” dolls (the doll made in Bandung inspired by Aa Gym community); the Arrosa was placed on the floor and scattered around with used books, meanwhile the ‘Aa Gym’ dolls were beautifully arranged (See Image 4). About the Aa Gym movement see Solahudin (2008).
44 For modern clothing most of the Salafist ulama reject any un-Islamic representation, although debatable enough, dolls are strictly avoided in most of salafist theology. See the debates at http://muttaqun.com/clotheswithpictures.html (retrieved December 11, 2007).
46 Translation by author. See the debate about Barbie vs. Muslim doll by Dr. Shahid Athar See at http://qitori.wordpress.com/2007/03/08/boneka-Barbie-boneka-muslim/ (retrieved December 11, 2007).