THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF MARUYAMA MASAO: COSMOPOLITANISM FROM THE FAR EAST

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Introductory Notes

The original titles and publishing years are shown for all of Maruyama’s texts that are quoted in this study. For some works, the abbreviations and volume numbers of the three primary collected series are also indicated for further clarification, particularly when I feel they make the material easier to locate than if I included dates alone. The following abbreviations are applied:

CW:  Maruyama Masao Shū [Collected Works of Masao Maruyama], 17 vols.
Lect.:  Maruyama Masao Kōgirokū [Collected Transcripts of the Lectures of Masao Maruyama], 7 vols.
Conv.:  Maruyama Masao Zadan [Conversations with Masao Maruyama], 9 vols.

References are listed at the end. With respect to secondary literature, I have listed only those previous studies whose interpretation of Maruyama’s texts I have accepted and employed for my analysis. Otherwise, literature was omitted from the references list even when it is mentioned in the body of the study.

In footnotes and endnotes, I have provided the reader with supplementary explanations and background information about Maruyama and Japanese studies.

All English translations are my own, except for quotations from Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics (Maruyama 1969).

Personal names are generally notated in accordance with the Western style: the given name first, followed by family name. The Japanese style of personal titles, when used in the original texts, remains in my translations. Although these Japanese titles can be integrated and translated into either Mr. or Ms. in English, each Japanese expression carries additional nuance, as explained below:

-san: a general way. (e.g., Nakano-san [Mr. Nakano])
-kun: a casual way. (e.g., Tsurumi-kun [Mr. Tsurumi])
-shi: a formal way. (e.g., Maruyama-shi [Mr. Maruyama])
-sensei: an honorific title from student to teacher. (e.g., Nanbara-sensei [Prof. Nanara, Dr. Nanbara, Mr. Nanbara, etc.]).
Abstract

This study aims to draw more attention from Western audiences to the political insight and philosophy of Masao Maruyama (1914–1996), the most prominent political thinker in twentieth-century Japan. My study concentrates on introducing Western readers to his style of universalism and his unique cosmopolitan ideas. In this study, I present some of the most interesting aspects of his political thought, such as the thesis of the vicious cycle between false universalism and ethnocentrism, cosmopolitanism as the sense of neighbors, and democracy as a permanent revolution.

Some recent important studies have successfully reconstructed Maruyama’s theory of modern subjectivity from the side of his theory of others. These previous studies, however, might misguide the reader about the development of Maruyama’s political thought; it appears that some think that, over time, Maruyama gradually shifted his focus from the theory of modern subjectivity to that of otherness. This study reveals that Maruyama was, in fact, presenting his cosmopolitan ideas in preliminary sketches even in his early works. Using his well-known essay “Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism” (Maruyama 1946 [1969]), this study demonstrates the early emergence of his universalist and cosmopolitan ideas. Concurrently, it attempts to prove that Maruyama was consistent in his primary concern with the nurture of the active and self-standing human agent of the Japanese and the establishment of modern individualism in Japan.

My work also provides an introduction to Maruyama’s epistemology on universality and particularity, the “universalist standpoint on ideals,” which has the theoretical potential to encourage political scientists to reconsider the self-evident use of the concept of indigeneity.

This study concludes that Maruyama’s cosmopolitanism appeared from within a psychologically introverted society and through his long-term dissension with the Japanese social trend of compulsory homogenization. His cosmopolitanism looks similar to the cosmopolitan multiculturalism of Western political theory. However, his theory has a different background from its counterpart of Western cosmopolitanism, which has developed in more culturally diverse societies. The dominance of collectivism and valuing of homogeneity in Japanese society overwhelmingly pressures the Japanese to comply with authority and conform to the social majority. In this regard, it is presumed that the emergence of the cosmopolitan thinker is an exceptional case in Japan.

The following study offers a good preparation for the East-West comparison in political theory, including, but not limited to, the topics of otherness, cosmopolitanism, and the political uses of culture.
Introduction: Preliminary Research

1. Invitation to Maruyama’s Political Thought

The primary objective of this study is to introduce Western readers to the basic components and structure of the political philosophy of Masao Maruyama (1914–1996), the foremost political thinker in twentieth-century Japan (see Endnote 1). Since around the early 2000s, the completion of publishing projects of his extensive works, as well as the publication of some prominent studies by Japanese scholars, have gradually revealed the whole picture of Maruyama’s political thought (for more information on the latest developments in studies of Maruyama’s works, see Endnote 2). In order to continue to the dialogue created by the consequences of recent research, this study particularly concentrates on examining the universalist and cosmopolitan ideas of his political thought.

Combining biographical research and theoretical analysis, this dissertation investigates reasons for the emergence of Maruyama’s unique cosmopolitanism. My study attempts to explain that the interplay between his innate personality, his life experiences, and the particular socio-cultural conditions of his country resulted in the birth of a cosmopolitan thinker from within the homogeneous society of Japan—in light of that homogenous society, as an exceptional case. Behind the birth of Maruyama as a cosmopolitan thinker, there was his strong resistance to the nature of Japanese collectivism.

In my work, I also attempt to clarify that his unique theory of otherness, his philosophy of dialogue, his cosmopolitanism, and his takes on the epistemology of universality and particularity were generated because of a combination of the following two conditions: a) his acceptance of Western knowledge and insight into the social sciences, and b) his efforts to
investigate the remaining feudal characteristics of the mentality and behavior of the Japanese. Skillfully applying that knowledge, he attempted to visualize the pathology of the feudal thinking, which is widely observable as a common feature throughout the Japanese population regardless of social class and strata. Examining many Japanese cases, he attempted to prove empirically that this factor of Japanese social-psychological pathology became the primary cause of inefficiency in Japanese politics in the real world. For example, after the Second World War, he became famous for analyzing the relationship between the political structure of the Japanese imperial state and the decision-making processes employed by the militarist leaders in wartime Japan. He brilliantly illustrated that familistic, introverted thought patterns were brought into their organizational management and were joined by the malady of the sectionalism found in modern Japanese bureaucracy. Each administrative section relied on its own authority and struggled to secure its organization’s power. Consequently, insufficient communication between political agencies of the then-militarist regime paradoxically turned into a joint conspiracy for carrying out an aggressive war. At that time, the militarist leaders of Japan also lacked rational thinking and willpower in their political management to confront the reality of the worsening war situation. In Maruyama’s view, the government was constantly overwhelmed by the events that had already taken place, and their opportunistic decision-making caused enormous losses of human lives and national wealth both for Japan and its neighboring countries.

Throughout Maruyama’s academic life, he continued to seek a way of overcoming the social-psychological pathology of the Japanese. Two pillars of his studies, Japanese intellectual history and political science, are connected by his interest in the problems of the immature political consciousness of the Japanese. He investigated the historical and geographical causes of
the deeply rooted premodern characteristics of their thought patterns and their influence to Japanese politics.

He took over the theme of overcoming the negative heritage of *jukon* (儒魂; the Confucian spirit; the Confucian thought pattern and value system) of the Japanese, which Yukichi Fukuzawa (the leading Enlightenment thinker and critic of civilization in the Meiji period, 1834–1901) had previously tackled. Maruyama observed that the Confucian spirit adhered to the Japanese ways of thinking and behavior even after the Japanese lifestyle was modernized. After the Second World War, the country had undergone a drastic regime change from the absolute-monarchic state of the wartime emperor system to a democratic one based on American democratic values and systems. However, Maruyama assessed that the irrationality of thought and behavior patterns based on the Confucian spirit, which had been popularized and translated into social norms and thought patterns within the isolated Japanese society of the Edo period (1603–1868), continued to bind the people even in the late twentieth century.

In the political sphere of the country, feudalistic thought allows the political elite to make political decisions while disregarding public sentiment. This feudal thinking also causes a closed-door style of politics with the politicians and bureaucrats, resulting in alienating the public from the processes of Japanese national politics. Conversely, the same mode of thinking also functions to allow the public to accept psychological dependency on the elite. Their dependence causes their subservience to the elite and resignation to a lack of political participation. On individual levels, the public comes to have a pessimistic sense about their political role. The Japanese public tends to be deluded into believing that they are incapable of participating in the processes of national politics in an effective way.
As I discuss in greater detail below, Maruyama analyzed this vicious cycle formed between a) the increasing political apathy and political withdrawal of the public and b) the promotion of an authoritarian attitude of the political elite. Overall, political scientists observe that in Japanese national politics, the passive mentality of the public causes authoritarianism by the central elite even beyond the structure or type of the political regime; Maruyama’s work is uniquely useful in tackling this problem.

Maruyama’s Concern about Japanese Mass Politics

This study focuses on Maruyama’s theory of the politics of mass society. His political theory has many facets, and therefore the manifold aspects of his theory can interest scholars from various fields. Underlying his broad studies of politics and the history of ideas, however, was his consistent concern about the newly emerging postwar mass society in Japan.

Between the 1950s and the 1960s, Maruyama observed a paradoxical phenomenon of Japanese politics, in which depoliticization corrupted the majority of the mass public on the one hand and the hyper-politicization of the entire Japanese society developed on the other. At the same time, he substantiated that in twentieth-century Japanese society, its remaining feudal culture and customs still defined the thought and behavior of the Japanese. He argued that their feudal thought patterns caused immature political thinking and decisions in both the political elites and the masses. He concluded that feudal thought patterns in the Japanese population had interfered with activating the true potential of democracy in their country. He tackled this socio-political problem throughout his work. What should be noted is that Maruyama’s theory of mass politics taking Japan as a case study suggests both the universal validity of the general theory of mass society to any country and the limits of applicability of the theory owing to cultural
differences. In Japan, even today, the public monitoring system over national politics is not effective enough due to closed-door politics. The public still tends to fall in line despite opportunistic political decision-makings by the elite. From the viewpoint of the politics of mass society, Maruyama thought that in the case of Japan, this problem ultimately resulted from the psychological passiveness—or, in his words, the “fragile political consciousness”—of the public.

The Spiritual Revolution

As explained in Maruyama Masao Serekushon [The Selected Works of Masao Maruyama], Atsushi Sugita understands that Maruyama’s historical study of Japanese feudal thinking was not spurred on merely by his academic interest. Sugita argues that Maruyama’s political theory had a practical goal of promoting a “spiritual revolution” of the Japanese to free them from the bondage of the pre-modernity of their thought patterns and to overcome the myriad social-psychological pathologies of them based on their premodern thinking (Sugita 2010, 444–445).

In this study, I would like to show that deliberate textual criticism underscores the early emergence of Maruyama’s ideas of the Japanese spiritual revolution—overcoming the Confucian spirit and the narrow-mindedness of the Japanese toward “the other,” and learning of “cosmopolitanism as the sense of neighbors.” His unique idea of cosmopolitanism, preaching to his people the acquisition of open-mindedness toward other nations and the global community, can best be understood and phrased as the “universal consciousness.” My study has discovered that Maruyama’s cosmopolitan-related ideas can be observed even in his early texts in the 1940s, including his most famous work, “Chō-kokkashugi no Ronri to Shinri” (1946; trans. “Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism” 1969). In his theory, it was the primary and final goal of the
spiritual revolution that the psychologically passive and introverted people of Japan would gain what he termed “modern subjectivity.” In this study, I attempt to demonstrate that his political thought did not experience a drastic philosophical conversion; through his academic life, he weighed the importance of both principles: a) the strengthening of the mental toughness of the subject and b) the cultivation of the sense of otherness in the subject. His political thought aimed to find complementary aspects between both ideas in order to establish modern individualism in Japan. It is false that we construe that he had changed his focus from the promotion of the independence of the subject to the acquisition of the sense of otherness since around the early 1960s. Rather, he saw that the acquisition of the sense of otherness is necessary for securing the establishment of modern subjectivity. It is true that in the 1960s, he began more consciously speaking of the importance of nurturing the sense of otherness. Yet, on the other hand, he continued to encourage the Japanese to make more concerted efforts to cultivate modern subjectivity in order that they might be able to promote more political activeness to stop the simultaneous occurrence of the overarching politicization of their society and the depoliticization of the Japanese public. Further on in this study, we will examine his theory of this phenomenon in more detail.

**Groupthink and Conformism**

It is also important to consider the significance of the thinking style of Maruyama as a universalist thinker from a practical angle. One of my goals in this study is to clarify in what way we can evaluate him as a universalist political thinker. Observing his life experiences of confronting collective violence, I examine from his perspective the advantage of the thinking style of the universalist political thinker over social conformism and the movement of
compulsory homogenization in totalitarian societies. His sense as a universalist was cultivated under politically critical circumstances. I want to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that his universalist sense was developed through his struggles against the threat of conformism under various types of totalitarian movements in his country and also other countries. His universalist ideas are related to his historical experiences of political collective violence and social turmoil.

In modern Japanese history, the totalitarian movements and the phenomena of conformity recurrently break out in various forms. After the 2011 Tōhoku Great Earthquake, the Japanese movement of *jishuku* (voluntary self-restraint) has acquired attention again in the global media.\(^1\) Certainly, the latest case is not related to problems of the Japanese emperor system. However, a continuity of the problematic Japanese mentality Maruyama criticized can still be observed. Furthermore, the threat of the invisible collective pressure in the society is not limited to the level of Japanese national politics. It is also a cultural problem that is more widely observed in the everyday lives of people in the country.

In the late 1950s, Maruyama pointed out that in Western political science, theoretical analyses of fascism were absorbed in the study of totalitarianism (Maruyama “Nashonarizumu, Gunkoku-shugi, Fashizumu” [Nationalism, Militarism, and Fascism] 1957: CW, vol. 6; see also Tsuzuki 1995, 138). The approach tended to dismiss the fascist movements in the liberal camp. He suggested that social scientists should design the general indexes to identify things particular to the phenomena of fascism, and should set the standards for measuring how much a certain society becomes fascistic. He asked for scholars in the West and the East to exchange views more actively concerning the theme. In thinking of the common barometer, he focused on the

phenomena of compulsory homogenization and conformism of social members, which were observed in the many types of fascist movements.

What should be remembered is that Maruyama’s personal experiences of Japanese totalitarian movements motivated him to engage in his specialized study of Japanese intellectual history. He investigated the source of the feudal thought that postwar generations still possessed, and found that the feudal thinking—in other words, the lack of modern subjectivity in the individuals—was intimately related to the occurrence of the Japanese approach of groupthink and conformism. He tackled the problems of mass society and the totalitarian political system from the viewpoints of political culture and political psychology.

Andrew Barshay describes exactly why Maruyama explored a spiritual renewal in order to find a way to overcome the problems of mass society:

Tellingly, Maruyama, apart from a scattering of instances in his early writings and later notes, appears to have deliberately avoided the term “civil society,” . . . Why then not speak of the Japan he envisioned as one in which civil society had “matured” and become able to support the “permanent revolution” of democracy? One reason appears to be Maruyama’s sense that in the twentieth-century West, civil society had become a “mass society” capable of producing fascism. . . . Even the United States had seen McCarthyism—“fascism in the name of democracy.” Given these historical—and contemporary—realities, civil society smacked too much of an idealized West (and was too lacking in social and national specialty) to be accorded the position of jewel in his political lexicon. For Maruyama, civil society could not be the answer to mass society—including its postwar Japanese avatar. The road to overcoming the contradictions of mass society—social atomization, hyper- or total politicization—lay rather in the self-conscious combination of “radical democracy with radical spiritual aristocracy.” This was what had enabled a politically awakened Thomas Mann to turn in the depths of his being against the Germany that had produced Nazism. (Barshay 2007, 195)

“Spiritual aristocracy” by Maruyama does not mean elitism in the customary sense. The concept implies the spiritual qualification of those who gain one’s footing in mass society and do not comply with mass movement. His idea has some similarities to José Ortega y Gasset’s
concept of a “true nobleman,” defined as “synonymous with a life of effort, ever set on excelling oneself, in passing beyond what one is to what one sets up as a duty and an obligation.”

2. Three Dimensions of Maruyama’s Political Theory

Initially, I would like to provide some foundational knowledge so that the reader may better examine Maruyama’s universalism and cosmopolitanism in the following chapters. I will therefore introduce the following: 1) the three main facets of his work, 2) the primary theme in his academic life, and 3) three perspectives to see the universalist side of his political thought. A preview of these points will help the reader to evaluate my interpretation of the meaning and significance of Maruyama’s cosmopolitan thought.

Maruyama as Historian

First, I will introduce and describe the relationships between the three basic aspects of Maruyama’s work. The purpose of this task is to deconstruct previous, imbalanced evaluations of his achievement; some Western scholars still highlight merely the social role Maruyama took as the democratic opinion-leader in postwar Japan. I want the reader to direct more attention to the consequence of his political thought and philosophy themselves.

In the early postwar era, from 1946 through the 1950s, Maruyama needed to lecture on political science simply because of academic circumstances, including the shortage of personnel who could teach the subject and the underdevelopment of the political science discipline in Japan. In later years, he honestly expressed his complicated feeling toward those days:

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I had a strong vocation to change the slow pace of the development of political science in Japan. Yet, in the meantime, my study of the history of political ideas was delayed. As I explained that story in “Politics as Science,” I had a strong feeling that I should tackle the problems of real society more than my own expertise. Today, I still feel regret of the loss. Until the 1950s I had always hoped to return to my own field as soon as possible. Then, in the late 1950s I went back to the *Kojiki* [Record of Ancient Matters] and the *Nihonshoki* [Chronicles of Japan]. I lectured not from the Edo period but from ancient times. (Matsuzawa and Uete 2006, vol. 2, 208)

Practicality also enters into what of Maruyama’s work is most read in the West. *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics* (Maruyama 1969), out of two English translations of his books, is discussed most frequently because the book, which gathered his political essays, is more readable than the other without an advanced knowledge of Japanese history and classical literature. As the result of this publishing condition, the image of Maruyama primarily as a political scientist has been popularized in the Western world.

Nevertheless, Maruyama, first and foremost, saw himself not as a political scientist and thinker but as an historian dealing with the history of ideas. His expertise was historical research in political thought. This is to say, his study mobilizes knowledge from three disciplines: history, political theory, and philosophy. His primary task was to engage in research into the transition of the mode of political thinking. In particular, he investigated the emergence of modern political thinking in some Japanese Confucian scholars of the Edo period and political thinkers from the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries.

He identifies himself as an historian also by explaining the variance between the philosopher and the historian concerning academic interests and approaches. Comparing himself to his friend Arimasa Mori (1911–1976) as a philosopher, or his teacher Shigeru Nanbara (1889–1974) as a political philosopher, he explains an essential difference between historian and philosopher in studying political thought (Maruyama “Mori Arimasa-shi no Omoide” [In
Reminiscence of Mr. Arimasa Mori] 1979: CW, vol. 11). Maruyama gives this example: If studying Immanuel Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, and Karl Marx in the history of modern German philosophy, Maruyama understands that philosophers focus more on the essence of each philosophy. He explains that contemporary philosophers study the important points of each historic philosopher as an independent subject; the order for studying the above three philosophers does not become important.

On the other hand, as an historian, Maruyama is interested in the genealogical relationship of these philosophers. He considers why Hegel came after Kant and how Hegel prepared for Marx to be important historical questions. As an historian, his concern turns to the extent to which there is historical necessity to the order from Kant through Hegel to Marx and the extent to which there were alternative courses at the “historical original point” (in this case, Kant). Maruyama understands the difference of perspectives between historian and philosopher in this manner. It is therefore important to note that this perspective difference also leads to divergent approaches to the same research material.

In brief, in order to fully understand Maruyama’s academic achievement, I would like Western readers to reconsider the existing popular images of him, such as “Maruyama the political scientist” and “Maruyama the opinion-leader of Japan’s postwar democratization.” Certainly, it is true that he took on some important roles in Japanese politics during the early postwar era. For example, during the first Anpo opposition movement (1959–1960), Maruyama contacted Takeo Miki (the 60th Prime Minister of Japan, 1907–1988), who was an anti-mainstreamer of the Liberal Democratic Party at that time, and advised Miki on how to overthrow the authoritarian cabinet of Kishi Nobusuke (the 56th/57th Prime Minister, 1896–
It is also true that Maruyama’s public speech on “Sentaku no Toki,” or “Time to Choose,” (Maruyama 1960: CW, vol. 8), which called for direct action by the Japanese masses against the cabinet, was reported by the newspapers and stirred up political sentiments in both the Japanese intellectuals and the general public of Japan.

However, Maruyama regarded himself as the seclusionist type; he was far from being the activist type. Longing for that lifestyle, Maruyama confesses that he prefers a secluded life playing the piano (Maruyama and Tsurumi 1967: Conv., vol. 7, 106).

With regards to mass media and its commercialism, which approached him because of his reputation, Maruyama did not freely give his comments on the topics of real politics; indeed, he sometimes refused altogether to contribute to journalism (for example, see Maruyama 1964: CW, vol. 16, 67). Nevertheless, the postwar Japanese press and academic magazines did not allow him to simply hide in the ivory tower and concentrate on his research. It is worth noting that he liked exchanging views, and, once asked, often contributed thoughtful comments on the pressing issues of real politics. Consequently, his political essays also remain important, and the reader can learn the essence of Maruyama’s perspective on Japanese politics from his prominent political analyses.

What needs to be reconfirmed at this juncture is that Maruyama, as an historian, primarily explored the transition of the Japanese thinking through investigating the Japanese classics. Holding a bias viewing Maruyama simply as a political scientist or terming him “the leading public intellectual of postwar Japan” makes us unable to comprehend the whole picture of his achievements. Currently, many contemporary Japanese scholars have concluded that viewing Maruyama merely as a political thinker on the left-right axis of the political spectrum is not

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sufficient to understand the multifaceted aspects of his work; I want Western readers to be reminded of this important point.

In “Nihon no Shisō” [Japanese Thought] (Maruyama 1957: CW, vol. 7), Maruyama explains the distinctiveness of his historical study. In general, historians focus on analyzing political, social, or cultural events. Maruyama also studies these events themselves. Yet his philological research moves forward to investigating the particular thought patterns of intellectuals. His study of intellectual history approaches the mode of thinking of historic thinkers, political leaders, and common people. He investigates how one age bequeaths its *Zeitgeist* (the spirit of the time) and thought pattern to the next. Moreover, he attempts to capture Japanese intellectual history as dynamism of the transition of the particular mode of thinking from generation to generation. He shows a unique perspective, seeing even the intellectual stagnation in the Edo period as an intellectual “change as no change.” In these senses, his historical study is exceptional. The mode of thinking as a psychological phenomenon is a difficult subject to study by the scientific methodology; historians cannot apply the method of psychology to people who lived in the past. Consequently, Maruyama conducted the orthodox philological research and textual critique on historical documents. In fact, “Rekishi-ishiki to Bunka no Patān” [Historical Consciousness and Cultural Patterns] (Maruyama and Katō 1972: Conv., vol. 7) informs us that he was quite knowledgeable about the methodology of the scientific studies of history.

As mentioned earlier, one of Maruyama’s objectives in studying the Japanese mode of thinking in this way was to demonstrate the historical continuity of its feudal characteristics to contemporary thought patterns and to determine the internal and external geographical reasons by comparing the Japanese case to those in other regions of the world. From the 1950s to the
1960s, the Japanese lifestyle and value system drastically changed as the result of the general settlement of Japan’s postwar reconstruction, economic boom, technological development and dissemination of new industrial products, and popularization of American lifestyle, as well as the change of international political circumstances surrounding Japan. However, observing newly forming Japanese mass society, Maruyama analyzed the mentality of the Japanese population and pointed out the continuity of their feudal thought and behavior patterns from prewar through wartime to postwar eras (“Shisō no Arikata ni tsuite” [On the Nature of Thought] 1957: CW, vol. 7). He attempted to ascertain the identity and the source of, to use his metaphor, the “basso ostinato” (obstinate bass or ground bass; a repeating musical motif) of the introverted thought. He examined the Japanese classics, from the Edo period through the Middle Ages to ancient times, for information about the Japanese mode of thinking.

He presents a hypothesis that the unique geographical conditions of the Japanese archipelago—having the appropriate distance (neither too far nor too close) from the Eurasian continent and surrounded by ocean—have formed a distinctive way of importing foreign thought and culture into Japan. He argues that the particular way of Japanizing foreign thought and culture correlates with the retention of the introverted character of the Japanese thinking. For example, in a comparison between two cases, a) England and the European continent, and b) Japan and the Eurasian continent, he attempts to clarify the Japanese unique ways of importing foreign culture. Although both regions appear to have similar geographical conditions at first sight, the two countries show contrastive styles of how to accept foreign ideas (Lect., vol. 6, 9).

He concludes that, indeed, the particular geographical conditions of Japan allow the people to preserve the same pattern throughout time, to modify incoming foreign ideas and to pile them up in an unintegrated form, and that the pattern has been relentlessly re-embedded in
the Japanese way of thinking across generations. This must be seen as the full picture of his historical research on Japanese thought.

**Maruyama as Psychologist**

Maruyama’s political theory carries many aspects of psychological study. The titles of his works represent his consistent interest in the human mind. The list of his works with psychological terms shown below is taken from *Maruyama Masao Shū* [Collected Works of Masao Maruyama]. The original Japanese titles have been omitted here. These works comprise his academic essays, book reviews, glossaries, and records of dialogues. In order to demonstrate the Maruyama’s interest in the human mind in these works, I have emphasized terms implying human psychology in boldface.

“Nature and **Invention** in Tokugawa Political **Thought**: Contrasting Institutional **Views**” (1941: CW, vol. 2)
“Political **Views** in *Jinnō Shōtōki* [Succession of Imperial Rulers in Japan]” (1942: CW, vol. 2)
“The Premodern Formation of **Nationalism**” (1944: CW, vol. 2)
“Modern **Thinking**” (1946: CW, vol. 3)
**Theory** and **Psychology** of Ultra-Nationalism” (1946: CW, vol. 3)
“The Development of ‘Practical Science’ in Fukuzawa: Introduction to the **Philosophy** of Yukichi Fukuzawa” (1947: CW, vol. 3)
“The Formation and Characteristics of **Consciousness** of Freedom in Japan” (1947: CW, vol. 3)
**Philosophy** of Yukichi Fukuzawa: In Particular, its Relation to his **Critiques** of Current Affairs” (1947: CW, vol. 3)
“The **Ideology** and Dynamics of Japanese Fascism” (1948: CW, vol. 3; Maruyama 1969)
“Political **Consciousness** of the Japanese People” (1948: CW, vol. 3)
“**Ideology** of the Meiji State” (1949: CW, vol. 4)
“**Thought** and Behavior Patterns of Japan’s Wartime Leaders” (1949: CW, vol. 4; Maruyama 1969)
“Power and **Morality**: The **Intellectual** Historical Premise of the Modern State” (1950: CW, vol. 4)
“The Age of Terror” (1950: CW, vol. 5)
“Domination and Subordination” (1950: CW, vol. 5)
“Self-Serving Analogy” (1951: CW, vol. 5)
“Kanzō Uchimura and Logic of Pacifism” (1953: CW, vol. 5)
“Thought of the Meiji Period” (1953: CW, vol. 6)
“Political Sense of ‘Progressives’” (1953: CW, vol. 6)
“Patriotism” (1954: CW, vol. 6)
“Ideology” (1954: CW, vol. 6)
“Opportunism” (1954: CW, vol. 6)
“Cynicism” (1954: CW, vol. 6)
“Political Apathy” (1954: CW, vol. 6)
“Thought and Politics” (1957: CW, vol. 7)
“On the Way of Thought” (1957: CW, vol. 7)
“Japanese Thought” (1957: CW, vol. 7)
“Political Recognition” (1958: CW, vol. 7)
“Political Judgment” (1958: CW, vol. 7)
“Thought and Literature in Modern Japan: A Case Study” (1959: CW, vol. 8)
“Attitude Formation in our Day” (1960: CW, vol. 8; Maruyama 1969)
“Time to Choose” (1960: CW, vol. 8)
“Japanese Thought Lacking Universal Consciousness: Conversation with Mr. Masao Maruyama” (This title was given by the editor of a magazine that carried the essay.) (1964: CW, vol. 16)
“Perspective Change in the Late Tokugawa: In the Case of Shōzan Sakuma” (1965: CW, vol. 9)
“Recommendation of Hypocrisy” (1965: CW, vol. 9)
“The ‘Ancient’ Strata of Historical Consciousness” (1972: CW, vol. 10)

Judging from these titles, the reader will understand that Maruyama was primarily interested in analyzing human psychology in order to approach political problems. Of course, the contents of these essays are filled with his rich analyses and descriptions on the interplay between politics and human psychology. Furthermore, even in his works without psychological terms in the titles,
his concern with the human mind comes to the center of his studies of intellectual history, his analyses of current affairs of Japanese politics, and even his examinations of theater.

His focus on the mode of thinking used by thinkers has become common in the academic sphere. In the 1940s however, his methodologies of focusing on the mode of thinking to approach political problems were fresh and unique. Sugita explains the academic contribution and significance of Maruyama’s theory of thinking modes: “By focusing on the mode of thinking, Maruyama produced many creative works on humans and politics. His political theory is neither reduced merely to economic analysis, study of history, nor philosophy. It should be evaluated that the field of historical studies of political thought has been established by him in Japan” (Sugita 2010, 447). Referencing Sugita’s study, we will examine the advantages and problems of Maruyama’s theory of the mode of thinking in further detail later in this study. But in short, Maruyama’s constant concern with the Japanese way of thinking is a common thread connecting his wide range of chosen themes.

**Maruyama as Political Thinker**

There are two general understandings of the task of contemporary political philosophy. One idea regards it as a philosophical study of the nature and meanings of politics in human life. The other sees the discipline as a study of basic political ideas, such as liberty, equality, fairness, and justice, which are applied in modern democratic countries. The latter type of political philosophy also considers the means for mediating conflicts between plural political ideas. For example, when applied singularly, liberty and equality are both considered as supreme principles. However, democratic countries inevitably face a conflict between the principles when they are simultaneously applied.
Certainly, Maruyama did not explain his own political philosophy in an explicit way. Nevertheless, I evaluate that an original political philosophy about the nature of politics, the relationship between politics and human beings, and the meaning of politics in human life was created through his achievements in both intellectual history and political studies. He contributed to both types of political philosophy discussed above. For instance, his contribution as a political thinker consists of 1) his attempt to secure the independence of the political science discipline by focusing on the concept of political power; 2) his quest for the uniqueness of political activity in contrast with economic, cultural, and artistic activities; 3) the formation of his original theory of the politics of mass society; 4) the presentation of his cynical view of politics; and 5) the presentation of his unique theory of democracy emphasizing its process and movement. Beyond mere borrowing of Western knowledge, only a few Japanese political thinkers have successfully offered original political thought and philosophy in Japan. Therefore, Maruyama’s work deserves to be viewed as a world classic of political thought, and his works should be presented to the academic community more widely.

Practically, it is still difficult for Western scholars to grasp the totality of Maruyama’s achievements because of the strict limitations imposed by the relatively few texts available in Western languages. Despite his self-understanding as an historian and his dedication to academics, he left prominent works of political theory and philosophy that surpass the social role he played in postwar Japanese society. In order to fully understand Maruyama’s thought, this study goes beyond his commonly read works. In this way, the whole picture of his political thought and philosophy will be explored in detail. This work examines the propositions, the concepts and ideas, and the models and theories of his political thought.
**Maruyama’s Lifetime Theme**

Through his academic life, Maruyama composed a comprehensive system of his political theory by mastering not only Western political thought and East-Asian political thought, but also by skillfully applying his broad knowledge taken from various fields, including the studies of history and the philosophy of history, the philology of ancient Japanese documents, the nineteenth-century German study of *Staatswissenschaften* (the study of public policy/law and the state government, which has developed in Germany since the 19th century), American political science, British political studies, legal theory, sociology, social systems theory, the theory of mass society, psychology and political psychology, economic theory and thought, philosophy, religious theory, cultural anthropology, the theory of climate, the theory of Japanese culture and aesthetics, musicology and Western classical music theory, literary theory, film theory, theory of theater, and journalism. Although he called Max Weber the “last universal man,” Maruyama was also referred to as the Japanese version of the last universal man. However, Maruyama is consummately concerned with academic professionalism and determined to stay in his own field. He never wrote academic papers off the topics of his expertise of Japanese intellectual history. When he needed to refer to some off-topic thought in round-table discussion or public lecture, before he began to speak, he always explained that the topic was not his specialty.

At the same time, scholar Taizō Iida notes Maruyama’s experimental attempts to communicate with the general reader. Iida explains that Maruyama was not a figure who took pride in being erudite or boasted about his academic credibility. On the contrary, he endeavored to make his political theory understandable for the common people. Iida points out Maruyama’s

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4 According to Takeshi Nakano (1999; 2010), Maruyama was preparing to publish his achievements on studies of Western classical music. Yet his plan did not come to fruition. Nakano explains that Maruyama had highly advanced knowledge on the theme, which made him able to teach the college-level courses.
frequent use of the dialogical style for his writing as evidence of his effort to share his ideas with the lay reader (NHK Software 1997).

This duality illuminates two aspects of Maruyama’s work. In theory, Maruyama’s central concern was to demonstrate the relatively feudal characteristics of contemporary thought patterns in the present Japanese generation. In practice, it was to generate a spiritual revolution of the Japanese. He aimed to demonstrate that the Japanese psychological traits are pathological by comparison with Western intellectual culture. His work aimed to make the Japanese aware of their social-psychological pathologies (“Seiji no Sekai” [The World of Politics] 1952: CW, vol. 5; “On the Nature of Thought” 1957: CW, vol. 7).

Maruyama sought to discover a method by which the mentally introverted Japanese people could become more open-minded, and how their country could develop to be a more open society for other nations and international society (“Kaikoku” [Opening of the Country] 1959: CW, vol. 8). He came to more consciously emphasize his own theory of others and philosophy of dialogue since around the 1960s, continuing to do so until his later years. On November 18 and 19, 1996, three months after his death, NHK Television aired the two-night special documentary film *Masao Maruyama and Postwar Japan*, to introduce his life and achievements (Subtitles: *The Discovery of Democracy* for the first night; *Democracy as a Permanent Revolution* for the second night). We can listen to his last message through his actual voice, recorded on December 3, 1995, in Shinjuku, Tokyo, telling the Japanese people to overcome the tenacious remnants of the feudal system in various sectors of society, shown through the tendencies toward shutting themselves in their own groups, communicating only within their family circles, and not associating with outsiders. In the film, he is shown passionately urging the Japanese to create a

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5 NHK (Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai: Japan Broadcasting Corporation) is Japan’s national public broadcasting organization.
horizontal-networking society in his country (NHK Software 1997). He urged the Japanese to struggle for open-mindedness. He called it “cosmopolitanism as the sense of neighbors” (e.g., Maruyama and Hagiwara 1976: Conv., vol. 7). It was also rephrased as “universal consciousness” (Maruyama 1964: CW, vol. 16).

**Crystallization of the Prototype Theory**

Maruyama’s prototype theory of Japanese thought (the prototype theory, for short, as used below) must be studied in detail to understand his universalist ideas and cosmopolitanism. The primary texts of his prototype theory have not been translated into Western languages. Yet it is possible for Western readers to know the outline and some important points of the theory (see also Endnote 3) through, for example, Victor Koschmann’s book review of Haruo Miyamura’s *Maruyama Masao, Nihon no Shisō Seidoku [An Explication of Japanese Thought by Masao Maruyama]* (Miyamura 2001; Koschmann 2002).⁶ Because Koschmann also mentions Miyamura’s comments on the misreading of Maruyama’s texts in the Japanese critical circle, the book review is also helpful for Western readers to anticipate improvement in the study of Maruyama’s thought in Japan. Evaluating the validity of Maruyama’s hypothesis of the Japanese prototype is not the purpose of this study, as it must be examined by the latest research methods in cultural anthropology. For our purposes, I will quickly introduce the reader to the outline of the theory.

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⁶ Koschmann, J. Victor. 2002. “Book Reviews: Maruyama Masao, Nihon no Shisō Seidoku by Miyamura Haruo.” Social Science Japan Journal, vol. 2: 267–326. Prof. Koschmann is the former chairperson of the Department of History at Cornell University. He is one of the leading scholars who contributed to introducing American audiences to Maruyama’s work, alongside Prof. Andrew Barshay (UC Berkeley) and Prof. Mikiso Hane (Knox College in Galesburg). At the University of California, Berkeley, the Maruyama lecture and seminar is periodically offered, sponsored by the Center for Japanese Studies. Occasional papers and presented reports are available for purchase (http://ieas.berkeley.edu/cjs/maruyama_lectures.html).
From the 1960s, Maruyama’s historical and psychological study of Japanese political thought eventually extended to a general study of Japanese intellectual history. He problematized the narrow-minded viewpoint of the Japanese in terms of cross-cultural exchange. He theorized the pattern of interference between the Japanese mode of thinking and incoming foreign ideas over Japanese intellectual history.

In his study, Maruyama theorizes a modification pattern of foreign ideas by the Japanese since ancient times. He finds that the Japanization of foreign ideas has been repeated in the same pattern throughout Japanese history. In the terms of Maruyama’s musicological analogy, incoming foreign ideas play the “main melody,” and the Japanese way of thinking as “obstinate bass” modifies the foreign ideas. However, the Japanese people only accept a part of foreign ideas so long as they can preserve their conventional customs and value system. There is no occurrence of critical dialogue between the new foreign ideas and Japanese indigenous thought. Consequently, fragmented foreign ideas have been stocked, or piled up, in the unintegrated form in the country, yet original Japanese thought has never been reorganized in the autonomous form. Maruyama calls this Japanese intellectual state the “state of no thought in Japan.” He illustrates the situation as simply the “scattering of foreign ideas” in his country.

In order to combat this repeating pattern, Maruyama had sought out a way to create an authentic hybrid idea between Japanese indigenous ideas and foreign universal ideas (Maruyama “Ansai Gaku to Ansai Gakuha” [Ansai Learning and the Ansai School] 1980: CW, vol. 11; Tanaka 2009, 220–221). As mentioned above, his hypothesis on this pattern of the modification of foreign ideas in Japan has become accepted as the “prototype theory” by the Japanese academic community. It is considered as the culmination of his study of Japanese intellectual history. Through trial and error, he had gradually elaborated on his theory in his university
courses over a thirty-year period. Since 1998, it has been possible to assess the details of his discussions through the seven-volume series of *Maruyama Masao Kōgiroku* [Collected Transcripts of the Lectures of Masao Maruyama]. The publication of the series has enormously contributed to reconstructing his achievements.

Because the term prototype might possibly remind his reader of cultural determinism, Maruyama replaces it with the geological term “old layer” (or “ancient strata”). Then, he further rephrases the concept into the musicological term “basso ostinato” because the expression of old layer reminds his reader of the Marxist ideas of superstructure and substructure. He explains that basically, the three terms mean the same thing, and contemporary Japanese scholars generally accept this explanation. In a more advanced study of Maruyama’s political thought, the three concepts of “prototype,” “old layer,” and “ground bass” are distinguished more strictly; each has its own emphasis. But contemporary Japanese scholars have reached a consensus that they can discuss the essential points of Maruyama’s prototype theory by ignoring the small difference between the three terms, and we will do the same.

Here, let us delve into his prototype theory. He argues: “Ideological tradition as the philosophical center or core axis has not been finally formed, which irresistibly interlinks the ideas and thought of all ages and which makes all ideologies possible to place themselves in history by referring to the central philosophy—even through negation” (“Japanese Thought” 1957).

He names the feature of the Western mentality “the bamboo-whisk type,” because Western thinkers share a long common cultural tradition and intellectual heritage from Ancient Greece through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance to modern times. The handle of the bamboo whisk represents this shared Western character. With this sharing of the mutual
intellectual background, the division of labor of knowledge in Western societies has broadly developed today. The brush on the other side of the whisk represents this characteristic.

In contrast, the mentality and knowledge of Japanese thinkers do not have a common intellectual root because of their failure to produce original Japanese thought. In Japan, individual thought and knowledge of the times were imported in pieces to form merely isolated disciplines with little relationship to one another. Because of this coexistence of isolated, individual disciplines, Maruyama names the distinctive psychological feature of Japanese intellectuals and their thought patterns “the octopus-trap type.” Individual octopus pots for catching octopuses are separated by hard thresholds and exist independently from one another, despite being used in combination (“On the Nature of Thought” 1957). He later replaces the octopus-trap metaphor with the “beehive-type” because his friend pointed out that only one octopus would go in one pot, and the beehive would more appropriately explain the state and characteristic of the Japanese style of sectionalism (Maruyama and Hagiwara “Tasha to no Deai” [Encounter with the Other] 1976: Conv., vol. 7, 265–266).

Sugita (2010) gives us a further explanation for Maruyama’s serious concern about the absence of Japan’s original indigenous thought. Before the modernization in the Meiji era, the notion of Dao from Chinese philosophy provided a steady principle of the Japanese ways of thinking and behavior. However, after the end of the Edo period, the concept Dao was dismissed because of its lack of ability to adapt to modern society. Maruyama argues that an alternative
idea has never appeared in Japan. He applies this argument to his analyses of the pathology of political thinking of Japanese politicians and intellectuals, the compliant behavior of political elites, the avoidance of rational thinking and judgment, and political decision-making based on metaphysical spiritualism. Below, Sugita describes Maruyama’s frustration owing to the absence of the core of Japanese people’s thoughts, even in the late twentieth century:

Because there is no central axis, an individual idea is shattered and does not link to each other. Moreover, ironically, counter-ideologies to the dominant ideology cannot be established because there is no target to revolt to; I see such irritation in Maruyama’s texts. . . . Do the Japanese people act by no principles because of the absence of a central ideology? Besides, is the core idea not formed because the Japanese people think without principles? In any case, Maruyama thought that a lack of the ideological axis of the Japanese was commensurate with no principles in thought and action. (Sugita, 452)

In this intellectual soil of Japan, what negative effect of the absence of the central idea is brought to Japanese politics? Sugita introduces Maruyama’s historical illustration. While the civil rights movement of the Meiji era began with the criticism of the government, in Maruyama’s view, the political movement became conciliatory to the government, and the Liberal Party (one of the first modern political parties in Japan, founded in the Meiji era) fell into hands of Hirobumi Itō (a politician of the Meiji era; first Prime Minister in the Japanese modern cabinet system, 1841–1909). Maruyama describes the series of movements in the political game as a process of setbacks for the Meiji civil rights movement. He concludes that both the natural rights theory, seeking the welfare of the individuals, and the expansionist theory of state sovereignty, aiming to expand the Japanese state’s power to foreign territories, had been coexisting in a form of inconsistent understandings of the Meiji civil rights activists about those new political ideas. In his analysis, such vague cohabitation of the two political ideas in the mind of the Meiji political activists led to the failure of the political movement in the end. The historical case explains that
the absence of the central philosophy and the mixture of insufficiently understood ideas caused inconsistent decision-making in the political processes of Japan (and continues to do so).

As introduced above, the reason why Maruyama thought it important to extract the Japanese pattern of modifying incoming foreign ideas was not only for his academic interest, but also for his strong intention to generate the social practice of a so-called spiritual revolution of the Japanese people. However, while acknowledging the social function and the meaning of religious activities, he continued to be a secular thinker. He kept his post-metaphysical position. The reader must therefore note that he speaks of the spiritual revolution or the “spiritual leap” through encountering the transcendent universal existence in a limited secular meaning.

Through reading Maruyama’s texts in a reverse-chronological order, I have discovered that key concepts for his universalist ideas, his cosmopolitanism, and his idea of the Japanese spiritual revolution—such as cultural contact and its dynamics, opening the country, and the sense of otherness—which fully developed after the 1960s and the 1970s, already appear as preliminary sketches in his early works, at least in the 1940s. I will demonstrate this point throughout this study.

3. Maruyama’s Universalist Sides: Three Views

This study refers to Maruyama as a universalist thinker in a very particular sense. Before embarking upon this work’s main subject, I would like to provide Western readers with the following three perspectives to see the universalist aspect of Maruyama’s political thought.
Angle 1: Pluralist Universalism in Late Maruyama

The first reason to identify the universalist side of Maruyama’s political thought owes its realization to Masaya Kobayashi’s study of the development of pluralist universalism in the late works of Maruyama. Kobayashi views this idea as the final position of Maruyama as a thinker of civilization (Kobayashi 2003).

Kobayashi first explains that there are several ways of breaking Maruyama’s political thought into thought periods according to focal points. He considers both the advantage and the difficulty of dividing Maruyama’s political thought into stages. From the viewpoint of the study of what he calls “public philosophy,” he divides the development of Maruyama’s ideas and primary themes from the 1930s to 1990s into three periods:

1) The Early Maruyama: The period of modernism; Japanese fascism vs. subjective invention.

2) The Middle Period Maruyama: The period of the paradoxical public philosophy; post-war fascisms vs. the civil society.

3) The Late Maruyama: The period of pluralist universalism; the old layer vs. the spiritual revolution.

In 1958, Maruyama fell into a mental depression. He lost his motivation to study because he felt his two main research targets, Marxism as a methodological rival and the psychological structure of the Japanese emperor system as his research subject, together drastically decreased in influence due to the rapid social change of postwar Japan. In light of current politics, he felt that the two topics were no longer challenging areas of study (Conv., vol. 2, 234–235).

In 1968, Maruyama resigned his university position after becoming ill, and began to concentrate on his study of Japanese intellectual history. He published “Rekishi-ishiki no ‘Kosō’”
Kobayashi thinks that the development of the old layer theory points to Maruyama’s acquisition of a new perspective on the development of history and culture. Maruyama recovered his motivation, and his work during the period became the apex of his theoretical development. The transition to the old layer theory marked his departure from the Marxian perspective of history. In “Shisōshi no Hōhō o Mosakushi: Hitotsu no Kaisō” [Seeking out the Methodology of Intellectual History: In my Remembrance] (Maruyama 1978: CW, vol. 10), he writes: “In other words, introducing the perspectives of cultural contact and acculturation (including the problems of ‘how to translate’) into the study of intellectual history required me to deny my conventional application of the universal theory of historical stages of development” (CW, vol. 10, 343). The problems of cultural contact specifically developed as encounter between the world religions as foreign universalism and Japanese indigenous thought. Although foreign thought always took the role of the “main melody” through Japanese intellectual history, as already mentioned, Maruyama discovers the same pattern of modifying them in the particular Japanese way throughout its history. He exemplifies his argument with the cases of Taika Reform (645 CE) and the establishment of the Japanese Ritsuryō system (the centralized governance of ancient East-Asian countries; 7th to 10th centuries in Japan) led by Japan’s contact with the Sui Dynasty (589–618) and the Tang Dynasty (618–907), or the Meiji Restoration (1867) and the Post World War II Reform caused by Japan’s cultural contact with Western powers and civilization (“Japanese Thought” 1957; “Opening of the Country” 1959; “Nihon-shisōshi ni okeru ‘Kosō’ no Mondai” [The Question of the Old Layer in Japanese Intellectual History] 1979: CW, vol. 11).
Maruyama divides the content of the old layer into historical consciousness, political consciousness, and ethical consciousness (Maruyama 1984: CW, vol. 12, 155). According to him, the old layer of historical consciousness means optimism for the settlement of troubles by the “natural occurrence” of events, which has momentum, the repetitive characteristic of things happening one after another beyond human intentions. The old layer of ethical consciousness means “sentimental purism” and “collective utilitarianism” based on the Japanese belief in moral purification. Meanwhile, based on his reading of the Japanese ancient documents, he decides that the old layer of political consciousness implies the phenomenon of serving upwardly in a one-sided way, as in carrying a portable shrine in Maruyama’s favorite metaphor, since matsurigoto (政事) originally derives from “tribute” and “service.” The old layer of political consciousness practically serves to transfer the power from the superior to the subordinate. In other words, the locus of legitimacy and that of decision-making are separated; this separating form is continuously reproduced at lower levels. On the individual level, these three old layers function to hinder the Japanese people from taking spontaneous action and make responsibility for their passive action ambiguous. Maruyama’s old layer theory explains the characteristics of Japanese culture and defines its problems. In addition, Kobayashi evaluates that the old layer theory succeeds not to the theme on postwar Japanese fascism in the midterm period of Maruyama but to wartime Japanese fascism in the early Maruyama. This is to say,  

7 The metaphor of a portable shrine (see the above picture), which is shouldered in the festivals of Shintoism, is used by Maruyama several times in order to express the irresponsibility of the militarist leaders of wartime Japan. The appearance of the portable shrine expresses that the one political leader (represented by the god in the shrine) is shouldered by the anonymous followers. Yet, when the shrine falls down, the responsibility for the collapse becomes unclear. Maruyama used this metaphor to criticize the decision-making system of the wartime government.
based on the ideas of “invention” and “responsibility” in his early works, Maruyama also reformulated the Japanese cultural problems into his old layer theory.

Next, from the viewpoint of the theory of civilization, in his old layer theory Maruyama considers the question of acculturation of Japanese thought, which is prompted by cultural contact (“Seeking out the Methodology of Intellectual History”). The mid-to-late Maruyama’s work shifted its emphasis from the significance of the historical vertical line of the cultural transformation of Japan to the horizontal impact of cultural contact to its thought and culture. As a result of this change of perspective, he decided to reject his early perspective of “the modernization,” viewing Western modernity as superior and as the ideal model.

Instead, he applied a new idea of “plural modernizations,” and he came to take the position of the pluralist theory of modernization (Maruyama 1964: CW, vol. 16, 54). According to Kobayashi’s interpretation, Maruyama’s idea of plural modernizations is close to the Weberian idea of the release from the magic garden. The modernity here is not necessarily limited to Protestant modernity, much less the modernization of rationalism of the Enlightenment.

Nevertheless, Maruyama still emphasized the idea of overcoming particularism by what he called “the universal,” or deconstructing the particularistic old layer by the universal. From the viewpoint of a theory of civilization, the universal, which is invisible to human beings, means the universal spirit of humanity to aim to break through the narrow-mindedness and cultural particularism of a certain small civilization. This mentality becomes a spiritual driving force to allow the local civilization to transform in relation to the world’s universal civilization. For example, seeing world religions as universal ideas (i.e., Confucianism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam) overcomes the limitation of local religion colluding with the local custom of a particular region. Instead, the world religions contain universal ideas, which are applicable to all
people regardless of geographic location. Kobayashi points out that in Maruyama’s 1960s lecture notes, the set of terms “particularism and universalism” frequently appears in his analysis of the conflict between the world religions and Japanese localism. Kobayashi concludes that the late Maruyama departed from the single-track view of modernism and the Euro-centric view of history. However, Maruyama still adhered to his universalist position despite the development of his new idea of modernity. From all this, we can understand that he departed from Euro-centric universalism to pluralist universalism starting in the 1960s, continuing through the 1970s and 1980s until the late period.

According to Kobayashi, no text has been discovered in which Maruyama himself explains his idea of the theory of civilization. However, Kobayashi argues that Maruyama apparently discusses the question of modernization from the viewpoint of the theory of civilization, and the position of the late Maruyama can correspond to the pluralist theory of civilization. However, his shift from the Euro-centric view to the pluralist view of civilization does not indicate the abandonment of his search for the universal. In fact, his change of perspective reflects his departure from Euro-centric universalism to a new approach to “universality” from the global perspective. In other words, the late Maruyama sought for a pluralistic universalism; at this later stage, he stood not as a Euro-centric modernist but as a pluralistic universalist thinker.

The above is Kobayashi’s description of the development and meaning of pluralist universalism in the late Maruyama. I support his interpretation of Maruyama’s final philosophical position as a theorist of civilization. I also argue that the position of pluralist universalism can be the primary reason to find the universalist aspect of Maruyama’s political thought.
The philosophical turn of thinkers is sometimes discussed in the fields of political thought and philosophy. Kobayashi discusses in more detail the transformation of Maruyama’s thought, and in the case of Maruyama I see gradual development and refinement of his ideas. However, focusing on the universalist aspect of his thought, in my view his thought does not demonstrate a drastic philosophical turn. Comprehensive textual critique of his writings proves that his ideas of “the opening of Japan to the world,” “cultural contact,” and “otherness,” which were developed in the middle and late periods, already appeared as preliminary sketches in the 1940s. In Chapter 8, Part III, I will demonstrate this with his most famous essay, “Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism” (1946 [1969]). In contrast to previous interpretations, this study explains that it is not true that he suddenly presented his universalist-related ideas, such as the theory of others, the philosophy of dialogue, and the idea of the transcendent universal existence, after his methodological turn. Instead, I argue that his universalist and cosmopolitan political ideas were already embedded in his thinking at the very early stages of his writing. I also argue that instead of developing them anew, his cosmopolitan ideas in the primitive form became enriched through his life experiences confronting the pathology of the Japanese thinking and totalitarian movements and through his specialized study of the prototype of Japanese thought.

**Angle 2: Maruyama’s Cautioning against Particularism**

The second reason for identifying the universalist aspect of Maruyama’s political thought is to understand his criticism of Japanese cultural particularism and political ethnocentrism. His understanding of Japanese particularism led him to observe the global intellectual trend toward forming universal consciousness and proposing Japan’s participation in the movement. His final
position of pluralist universalism is related to his criticism of the distorted form of cultural particularism and the political misuse of cultural particularity. It is important to note that Maruyama’s concern about Japanese ethnocentrism motivated him to engage in his study of Japanese intellectual history. He warned of the risk of intellectual movements emphasizing in excess Japanese cultural and aesthetic particularities. He analyzed nationalist intellectual movements, which had recurrently broken out in Japanese intellectual history, in order to demonstrate cases of the political misuse of Japanese cultural particularities. For example, he often took up the wartime argument of “overcoming modernity” made by some Japanese nationalist writers and the second generation of the Kyoto School philosophers. During the war, those intellectuals insisted on the supremacy of Japanese spiritual culture over Western materialist culture.\(^8\)

In the 1960s, Maruyama frequently uses the terms *dochaku-sei* (土着性; indigeneity, nativeness, or autochthony) and *dochaku-shugi* (土着主義; localism, nativism, or ethnocentrism) in order to express the exclusive nature of Japanese cultural particularism and political chauvinism (e.g., Umemoto, Satō and Maruyama 1966: Conv., vol. 6; “Kindai Nihon no Chishikijin” [Intellectuals in Modern Japan] 1977: CW, vol. 10; “Kangei-pāti de Iwanakatta Aisatsu” [The Speech I didn’t Deliver at the Welcome Party] 1982: CW, vol. 12; 1984: CW, vol. 12). He also puts forth the thesis of the vicious cycle that is generated between quasi-universalism and Japanese localism. He posits that when uncritically espousing universal thought from the outside of Japan (e.g., Confucianism, Buddhism, Christianity, Marxism as “quasi-religion,” and the ideas of democracy and universal human rights) without having dialectic intellectual interplay, the Japanese come to worship it as pseudo-universalism. Reactionary

localism is caused by their attempt to defend Japanese traditional thought and culture and their combat against foreign universal thought. Seen from the conservative viewpoint, fighting against the pseudo-universalism trying to colonize Japanese thought and culture, localism eventually yields to superiority theories of Japanese spiritual culture and han-nihon-shugi (汎日本主義; Pan-Japanism or Japanese Pan-Asianism). As conflict between both sides rises to an extreme level, Japanese localism escalates into Japanese ethno-nationalism. The Japanese ideologies of kokutai no goji (国体の護持; the preservation of national polity) and messhi-hōkō (滅私奉公; selfless devotion) to the state during World War II is an example of the rise of reactionary nationalism in its naked form. Even today, the superiority theories of Japanese spiritual culture are observable in the comments of conservative politicians and intellectuals of Japan. The philosophical conflict between Western civilization and Japanese supremacy is of frequent occurrence in Japanese intellectual history. Japanese conservatives notice a universal character of incoming foreign ideas. The traditionalists are afraid that the propagation of foreign ideas will expel Japanese traditional culture and paralyze the traditional value system of Japan. Their devotion for Japanese cultural particularism and political ethnocentrism in turn lead to the logic of mobilizing the indigenousness of Japan as a weapon to counter foreign universal ideas.

Analyzing his thesis of the vicious cycle, we will examine main points of Maruyama’s criticism of the closed types of Japanese cultural and political particularism, which attempt to overcome Western modernity by emphasizing the Japanese indigeneity. While he studied the topic, Maruyama aimed to foster three conditions of the modern agent: its autonomy, intentionality with creativity, and open-mindedness. This contrasted with what he saw in the Japanese: passivity, opportunism, and introversion. In summary, his pluralist universalism suggests that in the global community, various cultures can demonstrate their own cultural
individuality and at the same time can share in the universal consciousness. His pluralist universalism suggests the importance of appropriately balancing both sides, valuing both the universal ideas of humanity and the uniqueness of indigenous ideas.

**Angle 3: Maruyama’s Epistemology of the Universal**

The third reason for finding the universalist aspect of Maruyama’s political thought is for his persistent emphasis on the importance of each human’s commitment to *chōetsu-teki-fuhen-shugisha* (超越的普遍主義者; the transcendent universal existence). In relation with this idea, Maruyama developed his own epistemology on universality and particularity. Yet, in his theory, the universal existence is not clearly defined. For example, the absolute God of the world religions, universal political principles, and natural law can be included in the transcendent universal existence. However, Maruyama implies that anything, such as gods, the emperor system, and boyfriends and girlfriends, can play that role, as long as it has a function to relativize the self and reality surrounding the self. In his discourse, the universal existence is frequently rephrased into the German term *Idee*.

His epistemological position is formulated as the “universalist standpoint on ideals” (Maruyama and Tsurumi 1967: Conv., vol. 7, 111–120). This position has not been analyzed in detail by previous studies. But it is important to note for this study that Maruyama’s arguments on universality and particularity are related to his criticism of Japanese ethnocentrism. His position derives from two of his personal psychological preferences: first, feeling vigilance and repulsion against people and groups that uncritically attach themselves to the thoughts of others (in colloquial terms, those who jump on the bandwagon), and second, having a consistent discourse and behaving without being influenced by the intellectual trend of the times. His
epistemology on the issue is also related to his criticism of the phenomenon of the vicious cycle between false universalism and Japanese ethnocentrism. Maruyama’s epistemology of universality and particularity was developed in close relation to his criticism of cultural particularism as an arbitrary explosion of inner personal emotions and the political uses of culture and art.

Maruyama abhorred the collective way of decision-making, including political decision-making, based on dogmatism and opportunism. He repeatedly criticized these mentalities as Japanese social-psychological pathologies, which sometimes caused serious, negative political results. He strove to establish alternative ways of thinking and behavior such that the individuals act by living up to their own principles, evoking their own subjectivity, and overcoming pressure from the collective conscious that foments conformism. Here we come to the primary reason why Maruyama fashioned his universalist sense and sense of tolerance. Atsushi Tōyama (2010) investigates the source of Maruyama’s universalist idea. He argues that it can be traced back to Maruyama’s childhood. By analyzing the first volume of *Maruyama Masao Kaikodan* [Memoirs of Masao Maruyama] (Matsuzawa and Uete 2006), he summarizes that Maruyama’s universalist idea and theory of otherness were gradually materialized throughout his personal experiences of confronting various types of exclusivism against “the other,” which he observed in everything from the everyday life level of human relationships to the nationwide xenophobic political campaigns. In his life Maruyama faced moments of intolerance many times as Tōyama argues:

[The pre-academic period]

1) In his childhood, Maruyama was influenced by Nyozekan Hasegawa (journalist, critic and editor; a colleague of Maruyama’s father, 1875–1969). Hasegawa’s detached but self-critical attitude enabled him to act based on his political belief even if it went against
the tide. His intellectual attitude gave Maruyama a model of how to take the distance from political turbulence and keep one’s conscience.

2) In the days of First Higher School, he came to hate his own cowardice in his involvement in a disturbance.

3) In his college days, he listened to political philosopher Shigeru Nanbara’s public lecture criticizing the Nazis, an ally of Imperial Japan in the midst of the upsurge of nationalistic intellectual movement.

[The academic period]

4) In the 1930s, before deciding to stay in the academic world, he became strongly averted to the arguments of the superiority of Japanese spiritual culture trumpeted by fanatic nationalists. During the wartime period, even though he became fed up with mystical arguments of Japanese intellectual history made by fanatic scholars in those days, following his teacher Nanbara’s request, he began scientific research on Japanese political thought.

5) Under the circumstance of total mobilization of wartime Japan, he witnessed thought control of the nation by authority, fanaticism by some nationalist intellectuals jumping on the bandwagon, and the formation of the national polity of Japanese ultra-nationalism as an extreme expression of Japanese social-psychological pathology; in contrast, after the war, he was notified of one of the cases of anti-fascist movement by his senior colleagues, who kept their strong belief in justice against the then-totalitarian social condition.

6) He observed the rise of a new type of Japanese mass society and the politicization of Japanese society in the mid-twentieth century. He warned of new forms of totalitarian socio-political movement, including Red Purge in Japan, McCarthyism in United States, the 1960s radical student movements, and the totalitarianism of “voluntary self-restraint” when Emperor Shōwa became seriously ill in 1988.

What should be kept in mind is that Maruyama had already acquired his universalist sense and his mind of tolerance toward others before he learned about Western political thought during his time at university. As articulated above, Tōyama points out that Maruyama earned his universalist sensibility through witnessing historical events of totalitarian social movements and his personal relationships with some intellectuals who were people of conscience. For example, as a little boy he straightforwardly felt resentment toward a group of vigilantes, organized by Japanese citizens, who lynched Koreans in Japan during the devastation of Tokyo by the Great
Kantō Earthquake (1923) (Misuzu Shobō Henshūbu 1997). In high school, he was the central figure of a group that caused a tumult in school. Teachers mistakenly punished unrelated students. Although he was the ringleader of the event, the young Maruyama did not come forward and honestly confess his involvement. He later confessed that he hated his own cowardice and at that time vaguely thought of the mental weakness of the individuals under authority (Matsuzawa and Uete 2006, vol. 2; Tōyama 2010). In the development of Japan’s militarization and its national mobilization during the 1930s, the young Maruyama was impressed by journalist Hasegawa’s way of life, “detaching” him from the circumstances in which he was involved and refusing to follow the nationalistic social conditions (“Nyozekan-san to Chichi to Watashi: Maruyama Masao-sensei o Kakomukai” [Mr. Nyozekan, Father, and Me: Conversation with Prof. Masao Maruyama] 1985: CW, vol. 16, 213–216). Maruyama also witnessed his mentor, Kantian political philosopher Nanbara, and his way of life. Based on his knowledge of Western political philosophy, Nanbara openly criticized the Nazis and predicted the regime’s collapse in the very time when the Japanese fascist movement was becoming uncontrolled. It is reasonable to believe that these vivid personal experiences contributed to forming Maruyama’s universalist point of view.

It is obvious that the combination of two factors, his armament with Western knowledge and his research subject of the feudal mentality of the Japanese, influenced the gradual formation of his universalist ideas. Nevertheless, through careful textual critique, we will verify that he already acquired a universalist sense as a “bias” (in his own terms) before he became a scholar. His rise as a Japanese universalist thinker was primed by his personal revulsion for the opportunistic and collectivist styles of thinking and his yearning for behavior to be based on
one’s belief and principle. I consider him as a universalist thinker in this particular meaning that he is a man of principle. This type of universalist thinker is able to pursue the universal ideas that teach humanity about right and wrong beyond the trend of the times. Even after becoming a scholar, Maruyama’s primordial sense of universalism sense in this respect significantly influenced his intellectual course going onward.

In summary, Maruyama’s final position is that of a theorist of pluralist universalism. This, combined with his criticism of cultural particularism in the form of emotional explosion and his epistemological interest in the universal, indicates the universalist side of his political thought. Yet, throughout my research, I have not found any texts in which Maruyama explicitly names himself a universalist. Moreover, although he criticized localism as the arbitrary explosion of inner emotions, on the other hand he was consistently tolerant to minorities and sought the way to liberate the true “indigenous power and energy.” We will examine these nuances further later in this study.
Part I   The Structure of Maruyama’s Political Thought

In the Western world, many previous studies about Masao Maruyama have focused more on discussing how significant was his role as one of the leading public intellectuals for democratization in postwar Japan. Because of this single-minded attention, it does not appear that the thorough structural analysis of his political thought and philosophy has been conducted in earnest. Part I of this work takes Western readers into several important philosophical components of Maruyama’s political thought. Comprehension of his basic philosophical ideas in advance will help us to explore the theoretical richness of his political thought and to grasp from his perspective the essence of politics, although the availability of his texts is very limited in Western languages.

Broadly looking back into the history of philosophy, great thinkers’ ideas have been misperceived for several reasons; Maruyama’s case is no exception (see Endnote 2). After knowing the basic elements of his political thought, first, I expect that we will be able to avoid producing distorted interpretations of his discourse by our careless misreading of his texts. Second, and more importantly, I expect that the reader will become able to understand aspects of Maruyama’s texts he or she might not be able to previously. To confirm this point, I will demonstrate later that the early emergence of his cosmopolitan ideas can be identified even in his writings of *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics* (Maruyama 1969), which have previously been read simply as political essays dealing with the topics of political power, nationalism, militarism, fascism, the Constitution and so on.
Chapter 1  Seven Aspects of Maruyama’s Political Thought

The following sections enumerate seven distinctive philosophical aspects of Maruyama’s political thought: 1) the focus on the mode of thinking, 2) the critical view of Japanese social-psychological pathologies, 3) the philosophy of fluidity, 4) the cynical view of politics, 5) the non-ideological characteristic, 6) the emphasis of dialectical self-reflection, and 7) the need for the transcendent existence. It is also possible to extract other philosophical ideas from his political theory, such as the emphasis of form (see Sasakura 2003, 350–365). To understand his political theory more comprehensively, it is also preferable to study his philosophy of history and his theory of aesthetics. But for the purposes of this study, I have omitted other philosophical components in order to keep focus.

1.1 Focus on the Mode of Thinking

As a historian, Maruyama was interested in tracking the historical development of the human mind. He constantly called attention to the “mode of thinking” of human beings. In his essays and discourses, this term is variously phrased as the “way of thinking,” the “pattern of thinking,” and the “style of thinking.” His focus on the mode of thinking was inspired by Karl Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge (see his “Author’s Introduction to English Edition for Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan” 1974).

Maruyama explains that behind his theory of modes of thinking, there is his strong belief in the independence of the human subject from the environment. Maruyama stresses that a human being can secure its autonomy from the outside world and is able to objectify the separation between the self and the environment. On the other hand, he understands that human beings are also determined by economic and social structures in some degree. As mentioned in
the introduction, Sugita (2010) points out that beyond his academic interest in analyzing the thought patterns of the Japanese, Maruyama had a practical goal to overcome the introverted mode of thinking of the Japanese by analyzing its problems.

Maruyama attempts to draw his reader’s attention to the importance of analyzing the mode of thinking in the study of political thought. In most of his works, he raises the question of the mode of thinking mode in the early part of his writings or speeches. We can observe that despite the variety of topics he takes on, he leads the discussion to examine the mode of thinking of figures like thinkers, politicians, and the citizenry.

Maruyama refers to these problems even in his analysis of real politics. For example, he wrote a political pamphlet, “‘Mitabi Heiwa ni tsuite’ Dai 1 Shō, Dai 2 Shō” [‘On Peace for the Third Time’, Chapter 1 and Chapter 2] (Maruyama 1950: CW, vol. 5). At the time of its writing, Japan was involved in international political conflict in the early period of the Cold War. Domestically, conservatives and progressives developed an intensive political debate about which political course Japan should take, the overall peace treaty or the one-sided peace treaty. Under such political circumstances, leading Japanese social scientists issued a few statements in their joint names in order to send a clear message of Japan’s pacifist position to the international society. The above manuscript was the third statement, and Maruyama wrote the first and second chapters for it.

In the document, he appeals to readers to know that the appearance of the atomic bomb leads humankind to the crisis of the possible self extermination, and the act of warfare has already lost its function as a practical means to resolve international conflicts. The idea of abandoning wars of course sounds ideal at first glance, yet he argues that, in fact, the idea has a realistic basis. He wrote the political pamphlet to interest people in renouncing war forever
because he thought that the military alliance became inefficient. He preached the demilitarization of Japan, which would in return secure its own safety and security in global politics. He proposed the four principles for peace by adding the principle of neutrality, based on the idea of the overall peace treaty. He also objected to the idea that Japan would offer military bases to foreign troops.

Chikanobu Michiba explains the impact of Maruyama’s manuscript on real politics in Japan at that time: “Such arguments developed in ‘On Peace for the Third Time’ were accepted by the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan and (the left wing) Japan’s Socialist Party, and, importantly, it triggered an ideological left turn of those groups. The principles became the theoretical basis of pacifism of the bloc of the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan and the Japanese Socialist Party until the late 1980s” (Michiba and Yonehara 2006).

Now, even in the above political pamphlet on real politics, Maruyama nevertheless approaches the political problem from his unique perspective:

... the way of thinking significantly influences the problem of peace. Then, before entering the issue of “The Two Worlds” practically, I want to direct our attention to the question of the way of thinking when dealing with actual international problems. At first sight, the problem seems irrelevant to that of peace, but it actually has an important meaning. For example, nowadays, those who calmly examine various criticisms and slanders to the advocates for the overall peace treaty should easily read a similar logic and tone of intellectual atmosphere of the wartime, from the Manchurian Incident through the military alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan and Japan’s secession from the League to the beginning of the Pacific War. As unnecessary to detail specific cases, all present are the threatening verbalism by applying a taboo, judgment by loyalty/disloyalty, and the setting of “enemy country.” (1950: CW, vol. 5, 11)
For our purposes, the point is not the content itself of the above statement but rather Maruyama’s consistent concern with the mode of thinking in his political analysis. We can hardly find such a political thinker in all ages and countries who stressed the mode of thinking in the studies of politics so regularly. His examination of the mode of thinking constantly appears in various discussions, including his psychological analysis of the extreme nationalism of the wartime Japanese emperor system, his empirical study of mass politics of 1950s Japanese society, and even his musicological study of the life and thought of Wilhelm Furtwängler (German conductor, 1886–1954). Through his study of Japanese intellectual history, he developed his own methodology of analyzing thought patterns of classic and modern thinkers.

Maruyama analyzes various types of thinking styles. For example, in his “Nature and Invention in Tokugawa Political Thought: Contrasting Institutional Views” (1941 [1974]), he investigates the Japanese original emergence of modern thinking in Sorai Ogyū (Japanese Neo-Confucian in the mid-Edo period, 1666–1728). Maruyama focuses on Ogyū’s idea that norms were not given by nature but were created intentionally by the saints of ancient China. Ogyū intended not to modernize the Tokugawa system, but rather to maintain the feudal order. Nevertheless, apart from the content of his argument itself, his change of perspective from a natural order to a human-made one had some notable impact on the intellectual system of Neo-Confucianism. Ogyū himself did not expect the significant influence of his thought on Japanese Neo-Confucianism. In this way, Maruyama’s approach is of great use in finding the paradox between cause and effect in that Ogyū’s ideas intended to maintain the feudal order resulted in the dismantlement of that very order.
In his “Seiji-teki Handan” [Political Judgment] (Maruyama 1958: CW, vol.7), Maruyama also analyzes the problem of the thought patterns of wartime political leaders, arguing that they lacked political realism and were not capable of taking responsibility for the consequences of their political management. Referring to Weber’s theory of political responsibility and ethical responsibility of politicians, he analyzes the immature political thinking of wartime Japanese militarist leaders. During the war, the leaders did not distinguish between the two types of responsibility. The leaders defended themselves by appealing to the people that they were concerned about the fate of Japan and claiming that their diplomatic policies were carried out due to their morality. However, Maruyama accuses them of irresponsibility for the political results. He criticizes the leaders for their neglect of objective data analyses on the worsening war situation; instead they relied on metaphysical spiritualism, which was represented by the idea of kamikaze (神風; the blind faith that the blowing of a divine wind reverses a situation at a critical moment). Based on such illogical thinking, they continued giving orders for suicidal missions to the front line.

The Effect of the Thinking Mode Analysis

Maruyama demonstrates the significance of analyzing the mode of thinking in his “Fukuzawa Yukichi no Tetsugaku: Tokuni sono Jijihandan tono Kanren” [Philosophy of Yukichi Fukuzawa: In Particular, its Relation to his Critiques of Current Affairs] (Maruyama 1947: CW, vol. 3). He explains the advantage of thinking mode analysis in his examination of the duality of the thought patterns of Fukuzawa. Maruyama argues that Fukuzawa’s essays on real politics were misunderstood before the 1940s. Fukuzawa’s political discourses were criticized by political ideologues on both sides; his comments were misperceived as expansionist nationalism
on the one hand and as pacifism on the other. However, analyzing Fukuzawa’s thought patterns, Maruyama clarifies the basic philosophy that underlies Fukuzawa’s political discourses. Based on this foundational thought pattern, Maruyama regards Fukuzawa’s consistent political position as that of “relativist pragmatism.”

Through his analysis of Fukuzawa’s philosophy, Maruyama explains the effect of analyzing the mode of thinking beyond the content of thought as follows:

First, this paper is intended to dig out Fukuzawa’s way of thinking and his fundamental value flowing consistently through the base of his multifaceted works and discourses. I aim to analyze how his way of thinking determines the direction of his attitude and criticism toward the specific issues of each area such as politics, economy, and society. For that purpose, consequently, we will focus more on the logic between the lines of his discourse than the content apparent on the surface. In the case of thinkers such as Fukuzawa especially, for whom it is extremely rare to present their own methodology and epistemology in the abstract manner, we should not only analyze their conscious claims, but also often step up to the world of their unconsciousness in order to light their fundamental value system. In particular, Fukuzawa hardly presented his own methodology and epistemology in an abstract manner. Therefore, I needed to deconstruct his works into pieces once and reconfigure them. Evaluating whether my work has provided a dogmatic research consequence is solely left to the reader’s criticism. Simply, my goal is attained if this paper can clarify the intellectual “trails” of Fukuzawa’s exceedingly various and unrestrained criticisms of current events through his life.

Second, therefore, this paper is interested in Fukuzawa’s way of thinking consistent throughout his life. This paper does not discuss the change and transition of his ideas of each era. His ideas and positions were changed as time went by. In some cases the change was made in spite of his basic idea; in other cases the transition was made due to his basic idea. (Emphasis in original.)

Some Problems of the Thinking Mode Analysis

Sugita (2010) points out that Maruyama’s method has its own difficulties. Primarily, he questions to what extent it is possible to discuss the mode of thinking independently from the content of thought. He also asks if we overlook some substantial points of thought owing to our focus on the formal aspect of thought.
For example, Sugita suggests that it is certainly meaningful to find a similar style of thinking in the far-left ideology and the far-right one and to find out the common problem of extreme ideologies. However, this methodological advantage cannot deny the importance of analyzing the conflicting ideological axis between left and right. Even if we discover the same thought patterns between ideological rivals, the finding cannot devalue the importance of political debate between the right and the left. Sugita evaluates the methodological effectiveness of Maruyama’s theory of the mode of thinking and his skillful application of the theory. However, he also points out that the insufficient use of the method possibly invites ideological nihilism because of its methodological formalism.

1.2 The Critical View on Japanese Social-Psychological Pathologies

From the perspective of Western scholars, the reader or audience to whom Maruyama addresses his works is basically limited to the Japanese people. Among Japanese scholars, this point is too obvious to discuss. However, I think that his perspective on the domestic issues of Japan influenced how his ideas and theory formed, and is therefore worthy of note.

For example, Maruyama’s prototype theory takes the logical steps of, first, thinking that foreign ideas flow into Japan and, second, thinking how the foreign ideas are altered by the Japanese and their way of thinking. However, in the other direction, his argument does not take into account the cases in which the Japanese way of thinking flows out of Japan and how it will be modified outside Japan. Rather, a multifaceted analysis of the identity of the Japanese style of thinking would be made possible, for instance, by conducting research into the transition of how the Japanese styles of thinking and behavior transfer, change, and are maintained within
Japanese-American immigrant families over generations. Researchers can compare these cases with the Japanese domestic cases.

Next, we need to reconsider that in his observation of the political thinking and the daily communication of the Japanese, obviously Maruyama has a tendency to see a certain Japanese style of thinking as the “feudal” style. Moreover, he tends to characterize the feudal style as a “pathology” of the Japanese by referring to Western political ideas and culture. Here, we notice his subjective judgment in creating a dual meaning: a) viewing a certain cultural phenomenon as feudalistic and b) judging it as pathological. In his “Author’s Preface to the English Edition of Thought and Behavior of Modern Japanese Politics,” Maruyama explains the reasons for such aspects of his works to Western readers:

In the first place, the reader may well wonder, particularly in those essays dealing specifically with modern Japan, at the tones of denunciation in which my criticism of Japanese politics and society—even of the Japanese academic and literary worlds—is couched. It may seem that I have an obsessive concern exclusively with the pathological aspects of my own society. Some may see in this a typical expression of the despairing self-denigration supposedly traditional to Japanese intellectuals.

I certainly would not deny that in these essays my analysis of Japanese society leans towards the pathological rather than the physiological approach. But in view of the post-war situation, this was not unnatural. Social scientists were animated in their inquiries by one big question: what were the internal factors which drove Japan into her disastrous war? How was it that Japanese intellectuals, who for decades past had been absorbing Western scholarship and techniques and ways of life, who were more familiar—or at least believed themselves more familiar—with Western than with Japanese or Asian traditions, proved in the end so willing to accept, or at least so impotent to halt, the onrush of a blindly nationalistic militarism inspired by the crudest beliefs in the mythology of a uniquely Japanese “Imperial Way?” This, the academic point of departure for workers in all fields of the social sciences after the war, was also their practical response to their sense of social responsibility as citizens. It will be apparent that, however unsuccessful the performance, my conscious intention, at least, in these essays was to expose myself and the body politic of my own society to a probing X-ray analysis and to wield a merciless scalpel on every sign of disease there discovered. (Maruyama 1969, xi–xii. Emphasis in original.)
This is why his political psychology stresses the negative aspects of the feudal mentality and groupthink of the Japanese.

He repeatedly points out various phenomena of Japanese groupthink and collectivism and their problems. For example:

1) To lack *shutaisei* (主体性; subjectivity; the individual’s competence or characteristic for acting independently, autonomously, spontaneously, and creatively) in thinking and behavior, and to wait passively and dependently until directions or orders are sent down from the higher authority for their decision-making and actions.

2) To the contrary, to behave arrogantly and oppressively to the subordinate people or groups.

3) To “cozy up” to one another by forming a group.

4) To sympathize easily with coercive opinions by arrogant and authoritative members of the group they belong to.

5) To be emotional, irrational, and lazy or poor at thinking rationally and realistically based on scientific, objective data.

6) To make a decision based on a metaphysical belief that human’s spiritual stamina might overcome unfavorable political situations in the real world.

7) To take action not based on the worst-case scenario but based on the best-case scenario.

8) To make a collective decision by opportunistic and unprincipled speculation about the future political circumstances.

Although many case studies of each topic are published in the field of Japanese studies, there is no space to introduce them in this paper. If you have some knowledge of them, however, it becomes easier to visualize Maruyama’s theory in my description below.

First, Maruyama does not criticize the Japanese spiritual and metaphysical culture itself. He just empirically points out that the psychological factor of feudalism and groupthink of the Japanese caused catastrophic disasters in modern Japanese history. If the irrational, opportunistic,
metaphysical, and collective decision-making brings positive political results, the Japanese style of groupthink and collectivism is not questioned. However, in unsuccessful cases, the Japanese corrective ways of thinking and decision-making instantly become threatening to their lives and property, in Maruyama’s view. The Japanese political culture of collusion becomes a hotbed, allowing the locus of political responsibility among political elites or among political agencies to become clouded. The Japanese realize that the country of Japan turns to a huge, irresponsible system as an entire nation when they experience the devastating losses on national and international scales by war or natural disaster.

Second, what should be noticed is that Maruyama does not argue that some particular phenomenon is absolutely feudal or pathological; he merely points out that something is “more” feudal or “more” pathological in comparison. Moreover, he does not argue that the feudal modes of thinking and traditional customs are necessarily vicious.

Third, another important point is that as listed above, Maruyama observes the pathological modes of thinking of the Japanese, yet he never argues that these pathological modes are observed only in the Japanese. He understands that if looking around the world, social scientists observe the same mode of thinking in different cultures. If this is the case, how can we define the particularity of the Japanese thinking mode and Japanese thought? As for this, we have already confirmed that Maruyama defines the uniqueness of Japanese thought as the modification pattern of inflowing foreign ideas. He argues that the Japanese have failed in forming their original thought since ancient times. He understands Japanese thought as the same repeating pattern of altering foreign ideas.

Fourth, evaluating the meaning of the same phenomenon as feudal and pathological depends in part on the thinker’s subjective interpretation. Furthermore, as the cultural
background changes, the interpretation of the same behavior would likely also change. For example, the phenomenon of subordinates, pretending to guffaw at boring jokes told by their bosses, is commonly observed in the business scene of any society. If Japanese business people behave as such, the meaning of their behavior is usually interpreted negatively, as “servile flattery.” But in contrast, if American business people take the same action, it might be positively interpreted as “strategic.” Maruyama himself knows that some ways of thinking and the behavioral patterns that he evaluates as particular to Japan are observed in other cultures. However, his criticism of the negative effects of the feudal modes of thinking and behavior based on the remaining Confucian value system—which has affected modern Japanese politicians and their immature political thinking—tends to come to the fore in his thinking.

Maruyama also acknowledges that there are some cases in which human relationships based on the feudal way of thinking work efficiently in Japan, or political decision-making based on the Japanese Confucian values brings about positive results accidentally. Eventually, some successful cases, however, did not lead up to his renunciation of criticizing the negative side of the feudal thinking. Yet, notwithstanding his harsh words to the Japanese, as mentioned earlier, Maruyama presented his idea of pluralistic universalism, and he was not a Euro-centric thinker or simple modernist in the conventional meaning (Iida 1996: CW, vol. 15, 372; Sasakura 2003, 362 and 406–407; Kobayashi 2003, 239–240; Mamiya 2008, 168–173).

In addition, since Maruyama also conducts comparative studies between Korean cases or Chinese cases and Japanese cases to figure out the problems with the Japanese mentality, Western readers can also find the perspective of East-East comparison in his theory.
1.3 The Philosophy of Fluidity

As a distinctive characteristic of Maruyama’s political thought, I would like Western readers to pay attention to the “philosophy of fluidity” that is embedded in the depth of his thought. This philosophy addresses the idea that we should always remember that things taking place in the outside world are normally vicissitudinary, naturally changing. Maruyama’s political philosophy of fluidity encourages the Japanese to face the transitional character of politics and the world.

The Nuance of Fluidity in Japanese Literary Classics

The term fluidity is the English translation of the Japanese concept ryūdōsei (流動性; mobility), which Maruyama uses occasionally. For instance, in explaining Fukuzawa’s flexible view of politics and day-to-day events, he uses the terms ryūdōsei and ryūdōka-suru (流動化する; being mobile). Through context, we can variously translate ryūdōsei into “mobility,” “liquidity,” or “flux” in English. The concept of “social mobility” is frequently used in sociology, and economics has the terminology “market liquidity.” These are both translated into ryūdōsei in Japanese. There is a case in which Maruyama also uses the term ryūdōsei in the sense of social mobility. But here, I focus on his philosophical or aesthetic use of the concept ryūdōsei, applied to see things and the world. I thus use the term fluidity in order to distinguish it from the terminologies of the social sciences and to better express the nuance of his philosophical use of the term.

In the context of Japanese studies, the term fluidity may remind Western readers of The Tale of the Heike in thirteenth-century Japan and the concepts of the impermanence of worldly things, the sense of transitoriness, and the sense of mortality. In The Tale of the Heike, the idea
that the world changes and nothing lasts forever implies that any influential political powers in a particular time will end in ruin someday and that this world is ephemeral. The impermanence of worldliness is usually interpreted with sorrow. Maruyama also compares what he calls the “historical consciousness of becoming” in the Japanese medieval war chronicles and the “historical consciousness of invention” in Western classical literature (Maruyama and Katō “Historical Consciousness and Cultural Patterns” 1972: Conv., vol. 7). Again, this particular Japanese sense, which is observed in Japanese classical literature and aesthetics, usually expresses negative feelings such as evanescence, pessimism, and sorrow.

However, Maruyama’s view of seeing the constant transitional character of things does not result in the idea of mortality. Unlike the philosophy of vicissitude in The Tale of the Heike, he expects that analyzing things from the relativist and pragmatist perspective allows the Japanese to have mature political thinking. He believes that only after acquiring the ability to face up to the instable character of things, can the Japanese overcome their unscientific and irrational thinking style that he sees intervening in the decision-making processes of Japanese politics.

**Politics and the Philosophy of Fluidity**

Here, I would like to focus on Maruyama’s realist sense of facing the transforming character of things and the world. His philosophy of fluidity requires the individuals to have three traits: a strong will to proactively deal with the fluctuant character of things in the world, including political events; a cool-headed perspective on political circumstances, including critical situations; and the ability to rationally think and make a decision reasonably in political reality. His philosophy is based on his strong trust in human reason, will, and ability for action.
Maruyama explains that he learned such a political sense from Fukuzawa’s realistic and flexible view on politics. He calls Fukuzawa’s unique political view the “spirit of contrariness.” Some of Fukuzawa’s political discourses seem to be contradictory with each other at first glance, yet Maruyama extracts Fukuzawa’s consistent philosophy throughout his every discourse. Fukuzawa’s philosophy gave Maruyama a model of how to behave as an intellectual; he interprets Fukuzawa’s thinking style as a sort of pragmatism that attempts to deal with rapidly changing circumstances of domestic and international politics in the late nineteenth century.9

The primary reason for Maruyama’s presentation of the philosophy of fluidity was to criticize the immature political thinking of Japanese politicians and intellectuals. Osamu Nakayama (2001) develops Maruyama’s view and argues that compared to other countries’ politicians, Japanese politicians are relatively poor at having “strategic thinking” in international politics.10 As discussed earlier, Maruyama demonstrated that the immature political thinking of Japanese political leaders caused the misgovernment of wartime Imperial Japan, since they could not strategically cope with the quickly changing nature of international politics. On the

9 Although Maruyama positively evaluates Fukuzawa’s political viewpoint, different interpretations are possible about how much Maruyama himself practiced what he learned from Fukuzawa’s philosophy. A further textual critique will be required in order to fully understand the phenomenon. In addition, in his comment for vol. 3 of *Collected Works of Masao Maruyama*, Uete points out some problems with Maruyama’s interpretation of Fukuzawa’s political view as pragmatism (CW, vol. 3, 374). According to Uete, Maruyama’s breadth of vision makes his research and remarks interesting, yet the aspect sometimes complicates his argument. Maruyama evaluated Fukuzawa’s thought in comparison with pragmatism, by understanding that Fukuzawa took the position of the principle of natural science but did not fall into the evils of scientism, which had been present in the West since the second half of the nineteenth century. However, Maruyama’s argument calls into question why a pragmatist tendency, which appeared in the United States after the end of the nineteenth century, came out in Fukuzawa. Uete also questions to what degree Fukuzawa’s values and historical views are aligned with pragmatism. In Western philosophy, the variations of pragmatism have also been debated, and it is difficult to extract the unified characteristics necessary to establish pragmatism as an independent philosophy.

organizational level, each department became incapable of making an integrated national strategy for Japan. Although this psychological character can be observed in politicians of other countries as well, Maruyama assesses that the characteristic is particularly remarkable in Japanese political leaders. He anticipates that the ability to recognize the fluid character of politics as a normal thing will allow Japanese politicians to respond more flexibly to foreign affairs, which change rapidly. By changing their thinking style in this way, he expects that Japanese politicians can also prepare plural diplomatic policies in advance and avoid making the same error of falling behind in international politics and taking on a simply reactionary role.

In brief, Maruyama argues that preparation for the fluid character of politics depends on securing a realistic sense of politics. His philosophy of fluidity aims to overcome the immaturity of political sense in the Japanese. He problematizes both their easy submission to “reality” and uncritical acceptance of “completed facts” as the two major pathologies in the thinking style of Japanese politicians.

**Strong Subjectivity and the Philosophy of Fluidity**

According to Maruyama, the opposite type of person who overcomes the social-psychological pathology of rapid collective conversion by complying with authority or by following the trend of the times is the person who can think, decide, and act autonomously and proactively. In his analysis of Fukuzawa’s political sense, Maruyama explains the relationship between the ability of the subject with creativity and the fluid character of things as follows:

Thus, in the case of Fukuzawa, an emphasis on the relativeness of value judgments makes a corollary with respect for the autonomous activeness of the subject of the human mind. In other words, our strong and independent mind makes it possible to see a value as constantly transforming and to relativize the value by corresponding to situational change, instead of treating the value as stable from the beginning. Some assess individual
situations one by one, and accordingly establish a certain proposition or standard of action. Moreover, they are always trapped in a particular perspective and absolutize the standard of value in an abstract manner, which is constrained to the “place.” Even if the original condition changes, or even after their assumption of practical criteria has lost the meaning, they adhere to it as golden rule. Fukuzawa saw that the phenomenon wakudeki [“infatuation”] is formed here. It means the laziness of the human mind. This is, it is an attitude to cling onto the criteria, given in advance, so to speak, as a panacea. It is an attitude to avoid the trouble of analyzing the concrete situation at each time of the value judgment. And such abstract criteria are incapable of penetrating independent activities. In that case, one’s daily practice appears often simply as a passive acceptance of the environment around him. Hence, although formalism and opportunism seem to conflict with each other at first glance, in fact they are merely different styles of the presentation of the same wakudeki. (Maruyama 1947: CW, vol. 3)

Maruyama also thinks about a reason why the Japanese tendency to obey authority or the majority opinion uncritically results in developing the Japanese style of conformism. In his view, the Japanese are not aware that the changeability of politics is, in his words, “normal,” as opposed to the equilibrium of politics being considered natural. He points out that the Japanese have a national character of being slow to initiate action in the international political arena. In general, the Japanese react, simply coping with the “situation” after major events broke out.

In his prototype theory, Maruyama also argues for another reason supporting the optimistic attitude of the Japanese toward international upheaval. In his view, their optimism ultimately derives from the geographical condition of Japan—the Japanese archipelago is separated from the Eurasian continent and protected by ocean on all sides. Because of this geographical condition, the Japanese can take advantage of the temporal delay between foreign upheaval and the arrival of its impact to the Japanese archipelago; Japan can mitigate the impact on itself for its geopolitical advantage.

Maruyama’s philosophy of fluidity does not invite a philosophy of resignation and indulgence in the face of recognizing the powerlessness of human beings in the fluid, furiously changing character of international politics. Instead, he believes the philosophy will allow the
Japanese to prevent political opportunism. His philosophy of fluidity is supported by the following ideas: 1) society and social values transform constantly, and the established political ideas and a system functioning tentatively in a limited time and region become dysfunctional as social conditions change; 2) the political elite, which is trusted to use political power, unavoidably abuses that power unless monitored by the public; and 3) thus, although it sounds contradictory, the public who delegates the power to the political elite must constantly monitor and direct the elite in order to protect democracy from being nominal. Put simply, the ruled must rule the ruler. As examined in the following sections, these ideas also bring up Maruyama’s cynical view of politics and induce his ideas of reluctant political participation of political amateurs and the permanent revolution of democracy as the second best.

**The Philosophy of Fluidity and the Philosophy of the Transcendent**

As will be discussed in greater detail below, to avoid the uncritical conformity to the intellectual fashion of the times and to avoid sudden changes of their political position, Maruyama also argued that it is necessary for the Japanese to sense and face the universal existence, consisting of such things as political ideals, the transcendent God, and the universal values of humanity; universal beings have the potential to overcome the fluid character of things, including political events and the political system. Maruyama suggests that constantly sensing the fluid character of things and feeling the universal things will help the Japanese to nurture their independence and autonomy. It is fundamental in interpreting Maruyama that the reader understands that his two premises, the philosophy of fluidity (to confront the constant transformation of things in the world) and the philosophy of universal ideals (to seek for universal things beyond time and space) do not contradict each other. The philosophy of fluidity,
used to perceive things and the world, offers a basis for his idea of the democracy as a permanent revolution. He argues that the idea and institution of democracy will be able to exist only in the form of movement.

In summary, on the one hand, the philosophy of fluidity provides the Japanese with a methodological advantage to prevent the coagulation of perspective in thought and thinking. On the other hand, in politics, the philosophy enables them to have the autonomous and proactive types of political thinking that can compete with the immature types of political thinking such as opportunism and formalism.

1.4 The Cynical View on Politics

We have confirmed that Maruyama’s thought has a basic philosophy that values the dynamics of things. The philosophy of fluidity also contributed to forming his unique perspective on politics. In his political view, we can find various philosophical components, such as relativism, pragmatism, and realism. At this juncture, I would like to consider his cynicism toward politics.

As a political scientist, he was knowledgeable about politics and democracy. He considered how political science could be independent from the neighboring disciplines of sociology, economics, and science of law. In presenting his unique theory of democracy, he also contributed to the modernization of Japanese political science by combining the mid twentieth-century American political science with his knowledge of the late nineteenth-century German science of the state. As an influential opinion leader, he also played an important role in early postwar Japanese politics.
Nevertheless, his contribution to the political science discipline does not guarantee the reader’s anticipation that he must be a scholar who preached the importance of political activity and participation for the public. His career as political scientist does not guarantee that he was an exemplary believer in democracy. In fact, he was a strong skeptic about the value and role of politics in the life of human beings.

Indeed, Maruyama had a quite cynical view on the role of politics in human life. For example, in “Political Judgment” (1958: CW, vol.7), he lays out his skeptical, dry perspective on politics. In this essay, he points out that the hyper-politicization of Japanese society was in progress in the 1950s, and he cautions that the Japanese should not excessively arouse expectations of politics. The essay shows that he is not a blind advocate of democracy. In fact, the text proves that he is wary of politics altogether. After showing his cynical perspective of politics in the essay, however, he also extends the discussion to how residents in a non-political arena can engage in politics. Although there is not space in this study to explain his theory in detail, Maruyama also develops his social systems theory in the context.

The essay is based on the stenographic record of his 1958 public lecture, but it was retouched by him in 1995, only one year before his death. Therefore, his cold attitude towards democracy and politics can arguably be understood as his final views on these political ideas. The essay proves that there is no basis at all for Tadashi Karube’s speculation that Maruyama was a worshiper of “liberalism” and, by relying on his firm belief in this particular political idea, he struggled as the opinion leader in postwar Japanese society. In Section 2 Chapter 4, we will see that such a narrative is a fiction. In considering what Maruyama essentially learned from his teacher Shigeru Nanbara, I will use a few texts to rebut Karube’s thesis which places Maruyama

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in the genealogy of Japanese liberal thinkers. We will see in what respects Maruyama was critical of Japanese liberals and how he alienated himself from Japanese liberal thinkers.

In the above essay, Maruyama argues that the Japanese should be vigilant in politics. Based on his negative evaluation of politics in everyday life, he proceeds to discuss what the political role of the citizenry should be. Maruyama repeatedly argues that there is no inherent value in political activity itself. He frequently mentions that in the whole of human life, the presence of political activity is lower than that of economic activity or artistic activity. He also thinks that the best political form of all is no politics (see also Maruyama 2005, 169-174). Yet, for Maruyama, this does not equate with anarchism; it means that politics as the means for social control becomes unnecessary when each social member can be sufficiently autonomous.

Maruyama and Jürgen Habermas (German philosopher and sociologist) both mention that they were inspired by the political thought of Hannah Arendt (political thinker, 1906–1975). However, Maruyama’s idea on the role of politics sharply contrasts with the radical democrat’s idea, which finds positive meaning in the political participation of the citizenry. Radical democrats argue that human beings can cultivate human nature through participating in political activities.

On the contrary, although Maruyama argues for the necessity of political participation by residents in a non-political area, he argues that it becomes “involuntary participation” in politics; he encourages the reluctant political participation of the public. This is because he empirically understands that democracy becomes titular if the public does not control the elite. He argues that it is important to always keep in mind that any political system and political elite become corrupt inevitably.

For the above reasons, Western readers need to be freed from the existing academic myth that Maruyama was an important figure mostly because of his leading role in postwar Japanese
democratization. He was neither a liberal thinker in the conventional sense nor a closet agitator of national mobilization during the Second World War. Although these interpretations paint contradictory portraits of Maruyama, both show a similar mistake in terms of trying to characterize him as an orthodox political scientist who studies politics because he positively believes in the inherent importance of politics. Instead, it is important to note (so important that it bears repeating) that Maruyama was not at all positive about the role of politics and the efficacy of democratic systems.

1.5 Non-Ideological Basis

Mamiya (2008, 246–252) explains that throughout his work, Maruyama never supports any particular political ideas dogmatically; he does not become a political ideologue in any respect. In theory, he does not apply any political ideologies and ideas in advance as a fixed principle upon which to build his political theory. He attempts several ways to objectively examine his own ideas. This non-ideological character of his political theory also corresponds with his cynical perspective on the role of politics in human lives. In “Minshushugi no Rekishi-teki-haikei” [The Historical Background of Democracy] (Maruyama 1959: CW, vol. 8, 87–95), he explains the non-ideological characteristic of his political theory by exemplifying the uncritical worship of democracy:

In other words, the basic philosophy of democracy inherently includes a paradox to political reality. We must warn of fetishism in the politics of “democracy” that people are practicing in the real world. If we become ignorant about the paradox, the fetishism becomes dominant. However, even if the “rule by the people” includes such a contradiction theoretically, and even if we cannot realize the principle as it is, democracy does not become meaningless. Rather, we get to an idea that we must attempt to democratize constantly because of the gap between the idea and our practice. To the end, it is important to train ourselves to change our idea from viewing democracy not as an existent institution or as a fixed rule but as the constant process of democratization. By
this training, it is important to constantly avoid having fetishism of institutions, and it is important to have realistic and cool-headed views on the evilness that political power essentially holds. If seeing real politics just as the embodiment of ideals, any sort of real politics reaches the excessive beautification and idealization of particular realities; our critical spirit becomes poor and we lose our passion for more democratization. Enthusiasm for a certain ideology, including democracy, eventually transforms into disappointment and disillusionment. Although political enthusiasm and political apathy look to be opposite, they are in a reversible relationship. Churchill said, “Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” Fukuzawa said, “Politics is a choice of the degree of evilness.” While these paradoxical sayings support democracy as a result, the cool-headed political recognitions are something like these. This attitude is also needed for seeing the politics of democracy.

All things considered, assuming oligarchy and power relations as unavoidable things of politics, there is a critical moment for the democratic thing to emerge in our constant attempt to control power under the assumption.

This non-ideological character can be called “political neutralism.” Of course, this philosophy is different from “no thought” and “no thinking,” which provide the basis for the political apathy of the masses. Maruyama himself criticizes no thought, but his realistic, passionless, and cynical views on politics are supported by his political neutralism.

**Political Neutralism and a Person of Principle**

In “On Peace for the Third Time” (1950: CW, vol. 5, 35–36), Maruyama explains that political neutralism plays an important role in real politics. In analyzing the intensification of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, he observes the risk of having fixed ideological thinking in those international political circumstances. In this context, he mentions the true meaning of political neutralism:

I believe that the basis for the principle of the previous statement, claiming that giving full support to one side of the two opposing camps is undesirable for the well-being of the Japanese people, as well as for securing world peace, becomes almost apparent now. The claim of “being neutral” from the two worlds is our basic political stance inevitably
coming from the general principle of politics; policy is not a matter of convenience, and it is influenced by the objective circumstances of the times. Once again, I will summarize the implications of it: 1) it means the opposite of a rigid understanding of the ideological confrontation. In particular, it is risky to see the ideological conflict as an absolute scheme. It is also a fallacy to ignore the complication of various ideologies; 2) it also means recognizing the existing gap between the problem of ideology and that of the confrontation between the organized armed states and their power. I find a leap in logic in deriving the assertion immediately, saying that one should stand for either side in the world struggle for power, from the seeming axiom that there can be no neutrality between good and evil. Such an idea jeopardizes the securing of peace; 3) being neutral does not mean isolation. It means to oppose taking provocative measures and actions against any side of the state. Therefore, it means a protest against the intellectual tendency to pour the thought of the nations into a fixed mold such that a pro-U.S. nation must be anti-Soviet, or a pro-Soviet man must be anti-U.S. Such a view of equating this position with the infamous appeasement policy is a proof that the Japanese people have not yet dispelled the past illusion of Japan as a superpower, which could freely make a choice of whether to take the hardline policy or the so-called appeasement policy; 4) the idea leads to justifying Japan’s aggressive intervention as absolute right in any international conflicts.

Maruyama sometimes uses similar expressions to “pouring the thought of the people into a fixed mold”. For example, in his “Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism,” we find a similar concept: “It is not merely the external system of coercion that determined the low level of political consciousness we find today in Japan. Rather, the key factor is the all-pervasive psychological coercion, which has forced the behavior of our people into a particular channel” (Maruyama 1969, 2). These expressions imply his confirmation of the existence of the particular social psychological system and structure of the Japanese style of conformism.

To revolt against the conformism, Maruyama suggests that each of the Japanese should be a “person of principle.” In this respect, I see clearly the universalist element of Maruyama’s political thought in a different context from Western universalism, which seeks for the universal applicability of democracy, universal human rights, and an international justice system beyond cultural differences. I evaluate him as a universalist thinker in the particular sense that he values thinking, deciding, and acting in a consistent manner based on one’s own genri (原理: close to
“philosophy” or “principle” in English). Focusing on this aspect, Tōyama (2010) calls Maruyama himself a “man of principle.” Maruyama uses some Japanese thinkers as examples of people of principle, including Fukuzawa, Katsunan Kuga (journalist of the Meiji era, 1857–1907), Shigeru Nanbara (political philosopher; Maruyama’s teacher, 1889–1974), and Yoshio Nakano (Anglicist, 1903–1985). Judging from his actions during the war, German philosopher Karl Jaspers (1883–1969) can be added to this type of thinker from Western cases.

**A Person of Principle in the Era of Upside-Down**

I observe an interesting phenomenon that occurred in a somewhat parallel fashion to these universalist thinkers, or the thinkers of principle: In spite of their consistent remarks, as the political value of society changed, these thinkers were accused of being liberal in the era of totalitarianism and nationalist in the era of mass democracy. In his “Gendai ni okeru Seiji to Ningen” (1961: trans. “Politics and Man in the Contemporary World” 1969), Maruyama refers to this phenomenon of contemporary postwar mass society as “the era of upside-down.” He analyzes some problems of a new type of conformism of postwar Japanese mass society. He argued that the mechanism of conformism. He explains that the society itself becomes distorted before thinkers of conscience, who are confident with the idea of the right thing to do and can take consistent action based on their own sense of justice.

In Maruyama’s view, having a primary philosophy is different from absolutizing a particular political idea in a fixed manner. Having philosophical training in politics, his type of universalist thinkers can acquire the principle of self-instruction to guide their behavior under politically critical circumstances. At the same time, they can also have the intellectual flexibility to prevent them from being dogmatic about their ideas.
Democracy as a Permanent Revolution: Maruyama’s Own Ideology

We now understand Maruyama’s idea of political neutralism and its effects for one’s political thinking. However, the documentary film *Maruyama Masao to Sengo nihon* [Masao Maruyama and Postwar Japan] (NHK Software 1997) tells us that he informally mentioned his own political ideology. It is his idea of democracy as a permanent revolution. In the film, Zinbei Andō (Maruyama’s friend and the former chief editor of *Contemporary Ethics*, 1927–1998) testifies as follows:

> Because I am his pupil, I asked Maruyama-sensei a little bit of impolite questions. Well, I asked him once, “Sensei, what is your political position anyway?” Sensei replied to me, “Uh, that’s too difficult! Even if it’s about one’s political idea. It’s not a good thing to express that as a certain ‘ism’ in a word, you know,” or sensei said to me, “It’s impossible!” But I asked him insistently, “For example! Tell me, please!” [Laughs.] Then, he answered me, “Let me see, if I try, let’s say, mine is probably... the theory of democracy as a permanent revolution, isn’t it?”

Maruyama is describing the difficulty and risk at which we determine our own ideology. His discourse above seems to tell us the truth, as it is consistent with his writings, although it is hearsay expressed only through Andō’s testimony. We can see that Maruyama mentions the same idea of seeing democracy as a perpetual movement, or emphasizing the process of democracy, in some writings around the early 1960s, for example “The Historical Background of Democracy” (Maruyama 1959: CW, vol. 8).

In his later years, Maruyama mentions the same idea in “Sengo Minshushugi no ‘Genten’” [“The Origin” of Postwar Democracy] (Maruyama 1989: CW, vol. 15). He explained the characteristic of the idea by applying the concept of permanent revolution. The distinctive character of the idea is emphasizing democracy as dynamism:
As I mentioned earlier, democracy consists of the trinity of its idea, movement and institution; the institutional aspect is just one of them. Although I hesitate to tell you repeatedly what I said decades ago, democracy as an idea and a movement becomes a “permanent revolution.” Capitalism or socialism is not a permanent revolution. They have ideas, but they are still historical institutions. By contrast, only democracy has been surviving since Ancient Greece, and democracy will never end, in spite of its institutional transformation. Democracy can exist only in the form of constant democratization. We understand this by seeing the current situation of the communist bloc. It is about the sovereignty of the people. The clause in the Constitution doesn’t make popular sovereignty self-evident. That simply states the idea that the people are required to work constantly on the sovereignty of the people. It does not end by institutionalization. I think that it will be increasingly important to emphasize the aspects of idea and movement.

Maruyama’s hesitation to repeat his idea of democracy implies that he had kept the same idea confidently until the later years of his academic life. More importantly, his description above makes clear that it was because he was ideologically free that he reached the perspective of seeing democracy as a permanent revolution. Again, I must emphasize that it is untrue that he had a strong belief in liberalism and democracy beforehand and that, based on that belief, he fought against postwar fascism and tried to defend democratic values. His political theory simply does not take these logical steps.

**Democracy as a Permanent Revolution: A Compromise**

Maruyama understands democracy as the trinity of its idea, institution, and movement. Some Japanese scholars interpret his idea of democracy as a permanent revolution favorably; the idea is usually explained as the final achievement of Maruyama’s political thought. For example, Iida explains the philosophical meaning of the idea for the reader in his final remark for the bibliography of *Collected Works of Masao Maruyama*, vol. 15.

However, if we take his cynical perspective of politics into account, the meaning of Maruyama’s democratic theory can be understood from a more penetrating or insightful
viewpoint. Note that he also attempted to relativize the role and meaning of political activity in human life. I would like to draw attention to his negative evaluation for the meaning of political activity, compared with his positive evaluation for the meaningfulness of artistic activity and economic activity. In “Political Judgment” (1958), he argues that, if possible, it is preferable that politics does not exist. Consider that the concept of politics is broader than that of democracy; therefore, his view of politics can be taken as more fundamental than his theory of democracy.

In the case of overthrowing dictatorship and building a democratic country, the country can begin its democratization with institutional reconstruction, including the enactment of the new democratic Constitution. Maruyama was also knowledgeable about the many historical cases of building democracy, including the case of his own country. Nevertheless, the distinctive feature of his democratic theory is his emphasis on the democratization at the psychological level of the members of the society under the processes of democratization, reaching far beyond the mere external, institutional reconstruction. His concern advances to considering the inner democratization of the mentality of the individual. His idea of democracy as a permanent revolution also values this psychological aspect. The practice of the idea requires the Japanese to overcome their traditional value system concerning the relation between politics and the public. There are popular sayings about politics in Japan such as “Leave politics to the authorities,” “The commoner should stay out of politics,” and “You can’t fight the establishment.” These aphorisms express the passiveness of the Japanese political consciousness and attitude. Maruyama’s democratic idea requires the Japanese to achieve a spiritual reconstruction in respect to the political role of the public in the democratic system.
No Politics as Best

The reason why Maruyama encouraged the armature’s participation in political processes was not that he believed in the educational effectiveness of political participation for cultivating humanity.

Maruyama sets the levels of the politicization of society from no politics to excessive politics. He regards the stage of no politics as the best social state (1958). Yet the individuals at the state of no politics do not wallow in political apathy. Rather, the degree of political maturity of the social members reaches the highest level. The individuals can discipline themselves. No longer necessary are any political institutions and activities as a means of conflict resolution or of the distribution of social values. However, Maruyama was a realist political thinker. He knew that this state is ideal. In his rebuttal to Shigeru Nanbara’s idea of seeing political value as part of cultural value, he remarks:

I think that it is fundamentally different. I don’t think that politics has a unique value of its own. I still think that anarchism is the ideal state. Yet, because it cannot be realized, politics exists reluctantly. I think economy, education, art and so on will exist permanently, and I think they should. These are existing not because they cannot be helped. . . . Although I think that politics is something we should reduce gradually, unfortunately it will not go away. (Maruyama 2005, 173)

Therefore, it is conceivable to me that he presented the idea of democracy as a permanent revolution as the second-best option available in the real world.

The Participation of Ordinary People

Maruyama positively evaluated the sects of New Kamakura Buddhism because of their transcendent philosophy. He was inspired by the idea of “lay believers,” about which Shinran (Buddhist monk in the Kamakura period; the founder of the Jōdo Shinshū sect, 1173–1262)
preached. Based on this idea, Maruyama proposes democracy run by political amateurs. This idea is connected with his idea of democracy as a permanent revolution, which can be regarded as an everlasting movement. However, the reason for his encouragement of the amateurs’ participation in political processes is that he accepts the empirical law of politics; the political elite corrupt necessarily unless being monitored by the public. His logic is in contrast to radical democracy, which trusts the political educational effect of cultivating human nature through political participation. In contrast, Maruyama argued the importance of “reluctant political participation” of the public.

The Idea of Permanent Movement

In the last passage of “Fashizumu no Shomondai: Sono Seiji- teki Dōgaku ni tsuite no Kōsatsu” (1952; trans. “Fascism: Some Problems: A Consideration of its Political Dynamics” 1969), we can identify a similar concept to democracy as a permanent revolution:

[Peter Ferdinand] Drucker claims to have heard a Nazi agitator who was addressing a wildly cheering crowd of peasants declaim in all seriousness: “We don’t want lower bread prices, we don’t want higher bread prices, we don’t want unchanged bread prices—we want National-Socialist bread prices.”

Nonsense this may be, but it does serve, in an almost cartoon form, to bring into relief the deepest essence of fascism. In abstract and “theoretical” terms, the process of total organization of the counter-revolution can be completed only when, by the compulsory cementing of society, all heterogeneous elements—all actual and potential opponents of the established order—are swept away. But the appearance of these elements opposed to the established order is a consequence of the underlying revolutionary situation, not its cause, and unless there is a halt in the world-wide onward march of social revolution itself, this kind of homogenization can never in reality be completed. In this sense the work of fascism is eternally “unfinished”; it can exist only as perpetuum mobile towards the goal of total organization of the counter-revolution.

And this is the ultimate fate of “activist nihilism” in modern society. (Maruyama 1969, 176. Emphasis Maruyama’s)
Ronald Dore, the translator of the essay, seems to apply the same musicological term, *perpetuum mobile* in Latin, as Maruyama used in “Genjitsu-shugi no Kansei: Aru Hensansha e” [The Trap of Real-ism: To an Editor] (Maruyama 1952: CW, vol. 5). Maruyama describes the part of *perpetuum mobile* above as *mugen undō* (無限運動; endless motion) in the Japanese original text. It can be translated into “endless motion” or “infinite movement.” Judging from the context, the concept *mugen undō* is quite close to the concept “permanent movement.” Of course, Maruyama critically examined fascism. He did not intend to argue that democracy as a permanent revolution and fascism shared a commonality as movements. However, at least, we can identify his philosophy that highlights the importance of the mobility and dynamism of political systems. The important point is that if we were to read the above passage simply as part of his political essay on fascism, we might overlook his philosophy of emphasizing the kinetics of things and phenomena.

Maruyama’s focus on the dynamic aspects of politics was inspired by the Hegelian dialectic and Carl Schmitt’s idea of politics (“Fascism: Some Problems: A Consideration of its Political Dynamics” 1969). Maruyama’s use of the concept dates back to his idea of “dialectical totalitarianism” in his essay “Seijigaku ni okeru Kokka no Gainen” [The Concept of the State in Political Science] (Maruyama 1936: CW, vol. 1)

In summary, so far we have confirmed some philosophical characteristics of Maruyama’s political thought: 1) an emphasis on the mobility of things, 2) a cynical viewpoint of politics, based on his historical relativism and political realism, and 3) a non-ideological stance. These

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12 This essay was misused by some Japanese post-modernist thinkers in the 1990s in order to concoct a historically untrue story that Maruyama was a closet nationalist and conspirator of the wartime national mobilization movement. Those thinkers did not take account of Maruyama’s long-term use of the idea of emphasizing the movement of politics and its development into the idea of democracy as a permanent revolution.
ideas indicate that it is not fitting, nor is it helpful, to place his political thought on the political spectrum from liberal to conservative. His political thought can be located outside of the traditional debate of political ideology on a horizontal axis. When he was pressed about his own political ideology, he answered that it was the idea of the permanent revolution of democracy. Although the idea can be interpreted in many ways, the most important point is that his thought has the principle of examining its own dogma and ideology. In order to better understand this point, next we will examine the philosophy of self-reflection in Maruyama’s political thought.

1.6 The Philosophy of Self-Reflection

Relativizing the Subject

The principle of self-reflection as a spiritual exercise is an important philosophical aspect of Maruyama’s political thought. Before he became a scholar, he already held this philosophy, acquired through reading Fyodor M. Dostoyevsky (1821–1881) and other novelists. As an example, a famous episode of his detention in his youth proves his early practice of the principle. He was once detained by the Tokkō (The Special Higher Police 1911–1945; police unit controlling anti-governmental thought and expression) because of being misunderstood as the leading Marxist student activist. An investigator of the police impounded Maruyama’s diary and found a note remarking, “Dostoevsky remarks that everything has to be thrown into the crucible of skepticism. Should the national polity be also put into it once?” Misunderstanding the note as Maruyama’s denial of the Japanese monarchy, the investigator scolded and slapped Maruyama. We can see from this note that self-reflection was a principle of Maruyama’s thinking that he practiced since his time at school. As examined further on in this study, the principle would later be developed into his idea of inner-self dialogue.
In “Maruyama Masao-shi o Kakonde: Chosha to Kataru” [With Mr. Masao Maruyama: Conversation with the Author] (Maruyama 1966: Conv., vol. 5), Maruyama remarks: “What we think of our own values are actually often followed zuruzuru-bettari-to [ズルズル, ベッタリ, と; trailingly and sloppily] by the general atmosphere of the era and the idea valid within peer groups without reasonable explanation. Autonomy does not come out if we do not cut off the relationship between ourselves and the environment in the order of our spirit.” He often uses the phrases “cutting off” or “stepping away” from the environment.

Sasakura (2003, 166) explains that through nurturing the mental toughness of the Japanese, Maruyama expected that the Japanese individuals would be able to keep an appropriate distance from the propaganda by the government, reject following the majority trend of society, and truly have their own views and opinions. He thought that the qualifications to objectify socially approved values and ideas, common sense, and traditions, which are regarded as self-evident, would enable the Japanese to avoid being swallowed by conformism.

Maruyama presents two methods to relativize the things restricting the mentality of the Japanese: first, having dialogues with others, and second, approaching the transcendent existence. First, we will discuss the former idea. It is possible to formulate his theory as follows: We repeat the process to deepen our self-reflection through relativizing our own thought and thinking style by meeting with different ideas and thinking styles of others. We will become aware that our presence is essentially different from the presence of others. We let different others come into the interior of ourselves by being aware of “inherently” heterogeneous others. Through this process, the self can gradually relativize itself. In brief, the awareness of the individuality of the self will be truly individualized through the awareness of the characteristic of the self that confronts others and in relation with others.
At the same time, in his “Gendai no Seiji-teki Jōkyō to Geijutsu” [Contemporary Political Conditions and Art], Maruyama points out that one of the principles of Western thought, “tolerance,” can hardly take root in Japan:

. . . For a long time, the Japanese are not good at facing others by assuming that others—in any cases of people or culture—are completely different beings from themselves. The idea of tolerance that developed in Europe was born through something like conviction or desperation telling them that you and I are absolutely other beings from each other. The principle is based on the idea that the human experience of each person is quite unique, one by one, and the principle does not allow us to make an unspoken, cozy relationship so easily. (Maruyama 1959: Conv., vol. 3)

In cross-cultural contact, the Japanese generally prefer to accept foreign religions, ideas, and values peacefully rather than have a tense philosophical confrontation. This is not a bad tradition necessarily, as long as the Japanese people accept incoming foreign thought in a friendly manner. However, the problem is that when the Japanese configure the heterogeneous character of foreign thought as threat to the internal value system and social order, the people suddenly strike out against foreigners or strangers. Maruyama felt that their intolerance and discrimination against heterogeneous beings tends to be much more extreme than any other ethnic groups. Therefore, he philosophically explains that forming the solidarity between the being-in-itself and the being-for-itself in mutual reflection becomes more important than keeping the innocent integrity of the being-in-itself. In this manner, Maruyama expected that the Japanese would be able to sufficiently understand the differences between other ethnic groups and themselves and they and their opponents would be able to cooperate in the processes of cross-cultural contact.
The Dialectical Tension of the Self

Sasakura expertly explains Maruyama’s idea of the “immanent dialectic of internal contradiction” of the subject. The internal contradiction of the subject raises inherent spiritual motion, and the drive provokes the self-reflection of the subject itself. The subject can then be elevated to a higher existence. Maruyama’s theory employs what he calls the “dialectic of tensions of the self.” In brief, first, the cognition of the self constantly shuttles back and forth between its internal contradicting elements. The consciousness of the self will be sharpened. At the same time, the tension of the self tries to resolve the contradiction between the factors by being active. The self-awareness of the self is activated to be a composite, and the self evolves to the higher existence. However, even on this new level, the unification of the self will never be achieved; it stays conscious of the conflict, and the mentality will continue to function as the driving force to increase further awareness and practice of the self. This process is repeated endlessly.

Nevertheless, Sasakura also explains that we do not need to consider this repetition of the dialectical process as a fatalistic resignation that human beings are not able to unify the contradiction. This is because Maruyama prioritizes having the constant movement of making better relationships more than aiming for possible temporary unification.

The dialectic of the tension of the self is important in terms of both recognition and practice. There is no integration in the form of the stable state. The awareness of the internal tension of the self for the settlement of the internal contradictions is constantly provoked, and the practice based on the tensions is also continuously developed. Continuing this process is itself vital for the development of the self.
Sasakura deliberates on the locus of Maruyama’s thought in global intellectual history. Maruyama’s idea places value on the internal contradiction of the consciousness of the subject. Sasakura finds similar ideas of the dialectic of recognition in the philosophy of Kiyoshi Miki (Kyoto School philosopher, 1897–1945), Søren Aabye Kierkegaard (1813–1855), Karl Jaspers (1883–1969), and Dostoyevsky. These philosophers presented similar ideas that human existence takes the intermediary position between things conflicting (e.g., infinity and nothingness). These philosophers thought that human beings are the existence that is constantly aware of their own split. Therefore, human beings enter into the continuing movement toward their equilibrium.

However, in general, these existentialists interpreted the tense relationship negatively, and they usually connected it with the anxiety of human life. For example, Miki explored the presence of human beings in rejecting the easy and stable unification. However, he approached God as the only existence that can resolve the major contradiction of the duality of human greatness and misery.

Here, Sasakura reconsiders whether we need to completely resolve the contradiction of human beings. For Maruyama, there was a positive meaning in keeping aware of the contradiction and having the constant mental exercise for improving the self. The idea that the conflict must be sublated and unified by one element is related to the dialectic of recognition of the existentialists. But in Maruyama’s idea of the dialectical tension of the subject, the sublation and the unification mean the state of movement itself, which becomes aware of the tension and takes constant action. For Maruyama, human beings in such a state are not miserable, trembling with instability, but are the active and productive subjects that can transform the split into powerful spiritual energy based on the split itself. This is also the subject that Maruyama described in his prototype theory of Japanese thought, which he believed could be the factor to
ameliorate the random adoption of foreign ideas into the creation of original Japanese thought as truly hybrid (see the epilogue of “Japanese Thought” 1957). This ideal type of the subject has a strong ability for self-control. The subject has the strong spirit that can actively use the antinomy of human existence. From the Weberian point of view, Maruyama argues that the quality of the activeness of the subject gives us the mental toughness to accept the fundamental incompatibility of things and prevent the split of the self. The spiritual quality allows us to utilize the antinomy positively and flexibly.

Sasakura posits that Maruyama’s direction, which regards human beings as inconsistent existence in tension between the two extreme poles and exposes the positive meaning of the character, is seen in similar forms in other thinkers with whom Maruyama was familiar, such as Weber, Mannheim, Georg Simmel (German sociologist, 1858–1918), and Gustav Radbruch (German legal scholar and politician, 1878–1949). Sasakura also points out that similar ideas can been seen in some German-speaking thinkers in the Weimar period, such as A. F. Vierkandt (phenomenological sociologist, 1867–1953), Martin Buber (Austrian-born Jewish philosopher, 1878–1965), Hermann Heller (German legal scholar and philosopher, 1891–1933), and Karl Barth (Swiss Reformed theologian, 1886–1968) (Sasakura 2003, 253).

1.7 The Need for the Transcendent Pole of Existence

Maruyama also presents an alternative way that the individuals can be self-reflective and avoid being dogmatic in their ideas: It is to recognize the transcendent pole of existence. In interpreting all of Maruyama’s political thought, this point can be the most difficult to understand. In fact, two of the editors of Collected Works of Masao Maruyama, Matsuzawa and
Iida, present different interpretations on the function of the transcendent existence\(^\text{13}\) in

According to Sasakura’s study, Maruyama thinks that it is crucial that the subject has its
secured “principle” as its own spiritual axis for thinking and acting. The thought and actions of
the subject are normatively bound by the principle of being responsible for its own action and for
keeping the internal independence from the environment. This is the meaning of the commitment
of the subject to the transcendent thing (Sasakura 2003, 170). Maruyama attempted to maintain
his scientific mind, and he maintained his post-metaphysical position. He occasionally explained
that he did not ask the basis of his thought for religious ideas. Therefore, although he frequently
mentions the importance of the transcendent pole for the subject, he does not step into religious
argument.

For Maruyama, it is not the true independence of the subject if it merely rests on its
individuality. It is simply a passive form of independence from the environment, society, or
situation. This state is simply a passive self-reliance without modern subjectivity. In this state,
the subject is still confined to its own world. Maruyama argues that the Japanese should reach
socially creative and proactive independence. The subject needs to commit to the “principle” (i.e.,
universal values beyond time and space) and needs to cultivate subjectivity based on its
commitment. Maruyama expects that the principle will nurture the willingness of the subject to
face the transforming character of things and will cultivate the sense of responsibility for tackling
the difficulties of the world.

\(^{13}\) In Maruyama’s theory, the universal existence (i.e., the immanent universal existence) and
the transcendent existence (i.e., the transcendent universal existence) are technically
distinguished (see Maruyama and Katō “Historical Consciousness and Cultural Patterns”1972:
Conv., vol. 7, 250–251). Although Iida also explains the point, we omit the details of the
difference between both concepts for simplicity (see his commentary on Lect., vol. 4 and CW,
vol. 10).
At the same time, as seen in his criticism of the Japanese ultra-nationalism later, the principle is built based on the universal values that have exceeded the state, any other political and social groups, and history itself. The transcendent existence of the universal ideal is directly connected to the inner side of each individual. Otherwise, the individuals are to be absorbed by the state or the outside environment. The universal values of truth, goodness, and beauty are able to speak directly to each person beyond time and space. The universal values are also beyond the state and society, which are limited historically and geographically. Since they cannot be forced by anyone else and anything else, the individuals need to find the universal values independently. The self needs to rely on its inner conviction, determination, and the commitment of each person. In this way, the individuals gain their independence through the social relationship and value systems that they enter. Maruyama remarks:

From the world events as major issues to the everyday human relationships as smaller matters, if the visible world of empirical reality becomes everything, and if we lose the sense of restraint by invisible authority—they might be God, reason, or the ideal beyond realities, we will obey eventually to visible authority—they might be political power, the public opinion, or the reputation. This is my irrational conviction. (Maruyama 1964: CW, vol. 16)

If the invisible authority does not exert its influence on the formation of the code of conduct of the Japanese, it also influences Japanese politics negatively. Maruyama illustrates this point as follows:

The Japanese people rarely have the intellectual habit of judging reality by ideas. For example, the Japanese are not good at evaluating the reality of parliamentary politics and directing it by the idea of parliamentary politics. They rarely have the idea of changing the reality of democracy by referring to its philosophy. (Maruyama 1979)

He argues that the Japanese must experience their “conversion” or take a “leap” of ideals through encountering the transcendent existence in order to gain universal consciousness.
However, the question of who or what plays the role of the transcendent existence remains as the last aporia. Maruyama remarks that the transcendent existence can be filled by anything, such as God, reason, the principle, the emperor system, or even one’s boyfriend and girlfriend. It depends on the awareness of the self. Maruyama carefully avoids identifying what the transcendent being is. The specific content about the subject’s commitment to the transcendent existence remains an open question, although the question is at the heart of his universalist thought. Further analyses are required from various perspectives; therefore, in Part III of this study, I will analyze the point again from a different perspective.

The identity of the transcendent existence of Maruyama’s thought becomes important to discuss. This is because during the Second World War, the Japanese were taught to embrace the emperor as the “living god.” Japan formed the national polity by mixing modern political institutions and the mythology of the imperial family. Maruyama also analyzed the mental structure of the Japanese under the wartime emperor system. As will be seen in Chapter 8, immediately after the war, Maruyama also psychologically struggled to escape from the ideological system of the national polity and the national mobilization. In my view, at least after the war, Maruyama understood the Emperor of Japan as an object of visible authority. However, before and during the war, Maruyama was also part of the ideological system of ultranationalism. He was therefore surprised by the thoroughness of postwar democratization by the United States, including its treatment of the Japanese emperor system.
Chapter 2  Indicators of the Modern Subject:

The Foundations for Universal Consciousness

In general, Maruyama is called a modernist thinker. The reason why he strongly wished Japanese individuals to stand on their own feet is that, quite simply, he thought they were prone to lack in self-reliance under the pressure of authority or the majority opinion. To understand the essence of his political thought, Western readers need to understand that it was formed in quite different spiritual soil from Western societies where modern individualism has already been established.

As already confirmed, methodologically, Maruyama conducted his study of Japanese intellectual history and politics by focusing on human thought patterns. From this unique perspective, he analyzes the premodern property that stays in the thought patterns of the Japanese even after the country was institutionally modernized. His political theory explains how the premodernity of their thought patterns influences their political management.

In Maruyama’s discourse, there are two occasions for his use of the terms such as “feudalistic,” “pre-modern,” or “Confucian.” One is used as an academic term in the field of the history of economy; the other is as a popular understanding of the word. This study is focusing on the latter usage, for instance the cases in which Maruyama loosely speaks of “feudal Japanese business customs” or “the Confucian rules of Japanese human relationships” in the vulgar sense.

Some explain that the premodern mode of thinking mostly derives from the Japanese Confucian ideas and value system. Maruyama also illustrates that the Confucian thought patterns were popularized in the Edo period. In his view, the Edo society was relatively static; in the society, the same lifestyle was repeated and routinized. The idea and practice of refining the “forms” was valued in various fields in Edo society.
Japanese society has been modernized since the Meiji era, and after the Second World War, American individualism and capitalist culture flowed into the society, resulting in the drastic change of the people’s lifestyle and value system. However, until his later years, Maruyama continued to criticize the survival of the feudal mentality of the Japanese, controlling their thought patterns, decision-making, organizational management, and human relationships.\(^\text{14}\)

Maruyama introduces four indexes to measure the presence and absence of *kindai-teki-shutaisei* (近代的主体性; modern subjectivity) in the Japanese individuals. Here, our task is to grasp how he illustrates these indicators and how he visualizes the ideal form of modern subjectivity.

The first thing to note is that in the structure of Maruyama’s political thought, the theory of modern subjectivity and that of others are interwoven in order to compose his cosmopolitan political thought. His ultimate goal was to evoke a spiritual revolution in Japan by cultivating the universal consciousness or the cosmopolitan sense of the people. In doing so, he expected that the Japanese would be able to overcome the intellectual state of random acceptance of foreign ideas and to produce original Japanese thought as a true hybrid between Japanese indigenous ideas and foreign ideas. To reach this goal, he strongly believed that, first and foremost, the Japanese would need to establish modern subjectivity at the individual level.

The following are the four indexes Maruyama establishes for modern subjectivity: 1) subjectivity, 2) modernity, 3) decision, and 4) responsibility. He utilizes these indicators to extract Japanese social-psychological pathologies in his studies. Appropriately understanding his

\(^{14}\) However, Maruyama emphasizes that Neo-Confucianism failed to form the comprehensive intellectual system of the Edo period. His argument in detail is omitted here for practical reasons of time and length.
theory of modern subjectivity becomes an important basis for understanding the meaning of his unique universalism and cosmopolitanism.

2.1 Subjectivity

The study of “national character” still explains a great deal today. The reason why Maruyama put an emphasis on the cultivation of modern subjectivity of the Japanese was because of their underdevelopment of individualism in the Western sense. Western readers need to understand this social background of his argument. In Western countries, the primary issue becomes how to mediate conflicts between strong individualities; this is not the case in Japan.

In the introduction of this study, we briefly discussed that Maruyama is not the Euro-centric type of modernist. Here, I would like to examine his theory of the modern subject in more detail. Although he is called a modernist thinker, curiously, I found in my research that he wrote no independent essay on the theme of modern subjectivity. I also noticed that there is not a specific text which gives us a clear definition of the concept, although there are several records of his participation in the roundtable discussions on the theme. Therefore, I have attempted to reorganize the main points of the type of modern subjectivity Maruyama discussed separately in several texts. I would like the reader to grasp what conditions he thought necessary in order to establish the subjectivity of the Japanese.

For example, in “Shōwa Tennō o Meguru Kiregire no Kaisō” [Scattered Recollections concerning Emperor Shōwa] (Maruyama 1989: CW, vol. 15), he indirectly defines the conditions for one’s possession of subjectivity. In the essay, he is talking about what proactive action means. In the conclusion of the essay, he reconsiders the meaning of his ultra-nationalism essay of 1946 in his academic life. He describes his major psychological challenge to escape from the “magic”
of the modern Japanese emperor system immediately after the war. In this context, his image of proactive behavior is expressed as follows:

After considering the issue for half a year, I had finally reached a conclusion that the emperor system had been the fatal obstacle against forming the freedom of personality—the formation of the human type which is able to determine and act according to their own conscience, take their own responsibilities for the result, and, this is to say and in other words, take the opposite behavioral style from amae—of the Japanese people. (CW, vol. 15, 35. Emphasis mine)

It was not the primary purpose of the above essay to deliver Maruyama’s idea of modern subjectivity, yet the conditions are listed here, fulfilling the “subjectivity of the individual” that Maruyama worked toward (instead, he is expressing it “free personality” here).

The conditions of free personality can be divided into smaller elements; the individual with subjectivity (i.e., autonomy and independence) needs to take three actions:

1) To determine according to one’s own conscience.

2) To take action practically according to one’s own conscience.

3) To take responsibility for one’s own decision-making and action.

Here, Maruyama emphasizes the importance of taking practical action and taking responsibility for the consequence of that action together with the ability of the subject to assess the situation by reason. In November 1989, Maruyama still problematized the psychology and behavior of amae, which he had analyzed in his ultra-nationalism essay (1946 [1969]). In his theory, Maruyama illustrated amae as the behavioral style opposite autonomous and independent

\[\text{Amae (甘え)}\] is the strategic psychological overreliance on the superior. It is a Japanese particular way of strategic reliance, in which the subordinate or the weak operates in relation with the superior, the strong, or those in authority; it is similar to passive-aggressiveness in American culture. See Doi, Takeo. 2002. The Anatomy of Dependence. USA: Kōdansha.
action. During the Asia-Pacific War, the psychology *amae* provided the soil of uncritical compliance to the national mobilization system. Importantly, Maruyama identified the same sign of *amae* in many of the Japanese of 1989. The naïve compliance with authority and adherence to the social mainstream allowed the Japanese to avoid taking responsibility for their thinking, decisions, and actions on the individual level. In brief, Maruyama recognized the survival of the same social psychological structure of Japanese society. Up until the 1980s, historical studies revealed many aspects of fascism and totalitarianism. Maruyama also knew the latest research consequences in this area. Nevertheless, his focus was basically the same as when he wrote the ultra-nationalism essay decades before. In his later years, he still primarily problematized the underdevelopment of the modern subjectivity of the Japanese.

**Three Types of the Subject**

In “Japanese Thought” (1957), Maruyama divided the subject of the individual into the following elements:

a) The subject of person.

b) The subject of ethical responsibility.

c) The subject as a creator of order.

The subject of person means the free subject recognizing the world. Making full use of human reason, the individuals need to face the world without relying on metaphysical existence, animism, or authority. The subject of ethical responsibility relates to Maruyama’s theory of war responsibility, which will be examined later in this work. The subject as a creator of order is related to his research-findings of the outset of modernity in early-modern Japan. From the time
of his study of Ogyū’s political thought, he genealogically studied the transformation of the concept of order in comparison to the notions of “naturally becoming” and “artificially creating.” Since that work, he sometimes applied this comparison to his argument of the subjectivity of the Japanese.

The Subject as a Sequence of Action

In his “Ten no Kiseki: ‘Okinawa’ Kangeki Shokan” [The Track of Points: My Comment upon the Play “Okinawa”] (Maruyama 1963: CW, vol. 9), he argues that the subject can be described as the connection of the track of one’s acts:

Therefore, the subject does not exist sensuously. Because it is a point, it appears only through one’s act. The subject is something that exists behind you who acted yesterday and you who act today. When you speak of the subject, a human as I is not the subject. Therefore, the explosion of emotion is not the case. That is nikutai-shugi [Maruyama’s coinage, meaning “carnal-ism”]. Some think that working hard with one’s physical body might produce his or her subjectivity. Yet it has nothing to do with the subjectivity. The subject does not exist except as an act of trying to influence the situation. The subject comes into existence through an act itself or an act of trying to influence. The subject as a real body does not exist in the end. According to this idea, there is only the carnal existence. It does not mean anything to our spirit. In attempting to influence the situation that changes constantly, the subject would appear when we connect the track of points of acts. This is also the question of responsibility. Thinking that yesterday is yesterday and today is today: This is not the same as saying “forget about what happened yesterday.” What I want to say is that we act today by holding the sin of yesterday. Consider that the cell of the body changes all in a few years. What we can say is that a certain universal thing is only an act I did. [The track of] acts would be left. It cannot be erased even if we try.

Maruyama distinguishes one’s subjectivity between the “subjectivity as a point of act” and the “subjectivity as the track of acts.” The latter type of subjectivity is formed as the connection of more than one act. This idea implies that he interprets subjectivity as a dynamic concept. Importantly, as will be examined in Chapter 4, his idea of the subject as the track of action
provides a theoretical basis for his spirit of a so-called stubborn man, who revolts against the Japanese style of mobocracy through which the elite and the masses approach each other in the various forms of totalitarian social movements. In Part II, we will see his analysis of the correlation between the easy conversion of the ideological position of the elite and the formation of passive political attitudes of the public. The coalescence of both sides produces the Japanese style of ochlocracy, and sometimes it is joined by Japanese collectivism and xenophobia.

Maruyama’s idea of subjectivity emphasizes the creativeness and activeness of the subject to work on the situation. However, he criticizes the fact that many Japanese people misunderstand an autonomous activity as the instant and arbitrary explosion of inner emotion. The “subjectivity as a point” addresses this misunderstood form of subjectivity. He called this distorted style of subjectivity “quasi-subjectivity”; subjectivity as the temporary explosion of inner emotion lacks the ability to take responsibility for the consequences of action. He pointed out that subjectivity as a point caused the opportunistic style of thinking leading to following the status quo of a situation without a critical spirit.

The subjectivity that satisfies the above conditions is set as the ideal type that the Japanese should form at the individual level. Without nurturing a high degree of independence of the individuals, as will be examined in the next chapter, it is impossible to recognize others as different beings. As a result, the inner-self dialogue, which aims to take others into the self psychologically and to have dialectic self-reflection of the self, becomes impossible. Maruyama suggested that through this process, the subject should reexamine its own value from the perspective of others. This is because without strong subjectivity, the individual would be subsumed by the environmental factors such as authority, the mainstream public opinion, and peer group pressure. The lack of strong subjectivity provides the basis of conformism.
Remember, as studies of political culture suggest, the passiveness of the Japanese national character originally caused the above problems. Thus, it might be difficult for the residents in a society based on the principles of individualism and free competition—such as the United States—to understand what essentially the Japanese problem is. However, using the example of McCarthyism, Maruyama warned that the phenomenon of compulsory homogenization might happen to any country and region.

2.2 Modernity

In addition to Kobayashi (2003), Iida (1996: CW, vol. 10, 374–375) also analyzes the true meaning of Maruyama’s idea of modernity. In his “Modern Thinking” (Maruyama 1946: CW, vol. 3), immediately after the war, Maruyama came back to his academic work by declaring: “My primary academic concern for the past was to investigate the process of the development of the modern spirit in Japan. I now would like to tackle this theme more decisively.”

Iida reorganizes Maruyama’s ideas for measuring modernity and modern thinking into three indexes:

1) The presence of the separation between the public and the private, or the presence of the independence of the public sphere and the release of the private sphere.

2) The formation of the idea of invention (i.e., human-made).

3) The existence of the different forms of freedom in civil society. (Emphasis mine)

In his analysis of “modern thinking” or “the modern thing,” the early Maruyama focused on examining the separation between the public and the private; i.e., the independence of the public realm and the opening of the private realm (Maruyama 1940 [1974]). He also focused on the
emergence of the notion of *sakui* (作為; invention) that views social order and culture as a product of humans’ free personality (Maruyama 1941 [1974]).

In the midst of the era of Japanese fascism, the voices denigrating Western modernity became claimed vociferously by nationalists. Meanwhile, liberal thinkers desperately attempted to defend the value of modernity (Maruyama 1983 [1974]). After the collapse of the militarist government, forming the independence and autonomy of the Japanese people became an urgent issue for the success of Japan’s postwar democratization. Maruyama remarked: “Producing the subject *is* the task of our ‘revolution’” (“Japanese Thought” 1957). In his view, Japan lacked the subject itself to establish a democratic society. He assessed that the major factor hindering the Japanese from overcoming this challenge was the remnant of the psychological structure and behavioral patterns of the wartime emperor system (Maruyama 1946 [1969]; Maruyama 1949 [1969]).

The third index of modernity that Maruyama analyzed through his studies of Fukuzawa’s thought is the presence of plural types of freedom in civil society. Maruyama formulated the idea in “Fukuzawa Yukichi no Tetsugaku” [The Philosophy of Yukichi Fukuzawa] (Maruyama 1947: CW, vol. 3). If the power is distributed in an imbalanced form in society, people are taken over by the psychological state of *wakudeki* (惑溺; the obsessed mind). When plural forms of freedom coexist in society, the people can finally produce the independent spirit. This is because the spirit of freedom grows only through having discussions among various views and opinions. Liberalism based on the relativist and pluralist perspective protects a healthy democracy from the trap of falling down to a totalitarian democracy.

However, for Maruyama, the simple eruption of plural groups in the postwar society was not the same as Fukuzawa’s pluralism; rather, as expressed in “Nationalism in Japan: Its
Theoretical Background and Prospects” (Maruyama 1951 [1969]), Maruyama understood the phenomenon as the social dispersion of the remaining nationalist sense of the emperor system. In “Kojin Sekishutsu ni okeru Samazama na Patān: Kindai Hihon o Kēsu toshite” [The Various Patterns of Extraction of the Individual: In the Case of Modern Japan] (Maruyama 1968: CW, vol. 9), Maruyama pointed out that the extraction of the individual under the postwar demobilization revealed a new trend of the privatization of the lifestyle of the Japanese. As Japanese mass society reemerged due to high growth in the early postwar era, he analyzed the trend of atomization of the Japanese and their return toward the charismatic authority. Meanwhile, he also sought an alternative way of switching the privatization of the Japanese to a driving force for democratization. He expected that the maturation of civil society would possibly bring pluralism of freedom to his country. His view of modernity makes his political thought consistent beyond the wartime and the postwar periods.

Nevertheless, Sasakura (2003, 411–412) points out the further development of Maruyama’s index for the evaluation of modernity. The early Maruyama understood that Ogyū’s emphasis on the public thing and the political thing accidentally devalued the vital role of Neo-Confucian norms for teaching human nature. In the ideological system of Neo-Confucianism, the norms were the rules for governing the political world as the public sphere; on the other hand, the inwardness of human beings as the private sphere was satisfied by one’s everyday but sometimes irrational sense, which was separated from any normative restrictions. In his two essays on Ogyū’s political thought, Maruyama once evaluated positively this separation as the factor of cultivating the internal independence of the individuals. He evaluated it as a sign of maturation of the modern element in the Edo period.
However, after the war, for example, in “Nihon ni okeru Jiyū-ishiki no Keisei to Tokushitsu” [The Formation and Characteristics of the Consciousness of Freedom in Japan] (1947: CW, vol. 3), Maruyama reconsidered his own idea and reevaluated the same condition negatively. He began to think that the same condition would also cause decomposition between politics and the individual: Politics becomes the external and collective means for human beings. Meanwhile, the individuals become private and self-oriented, tending to withdraw from politics. According to Sasakura’s study, by observing the drastic political change in postwar Japan, Maruyama revised his own idea on the separation between the public thing and the private thing in early-modern Japanese political thought. While there is no change of his goal of forming independence in the Japanese, Maruyama needed to revise his strategy for attaining the final goal because of the postwar political change. During the prewar era, standing on the liberal position, he highlighted the internal independence of the individuals from the established social norms. In this limited sense, he was a liberal: He valued the independence of the inner side of the individual in order to relativize politics. Yet, at the same time, he argued for the importance of the idea that the individuals should be bound to transcendent values.

After the war, Maruyama moved his philosophical focus to the democratic position. He criticized culture when the Japanese began emphasizing the inner side in a different context. The Japanese shifted their priority to pursue one’s greed and to secure comfortable private life. They began desiring to release themselves from any external restraints. Maruyama disapproved: The selfish opposition to norms as the external restraint and the effortless hiding behind freedom as the release of arbitrariness do not lead one’s spirit to the establishment of new norms. Likewise, Maruyama stopped naively thinking that the establishment of the democratic norm and encouraging the Japanese to engage in political life would become the way of forming a new
political subject. Observing the postwar transformation in the Japanese value system, Maruyama revised his strategy for establishing the autonomous subject of the Japanese.

Sasakura explains that Maruyama considered politics to be the tension between the two principles of liberalism and democracy. In his wartime studies, Maruyama critically referred to Neo-Confucianism as the traditional philosophical system to be deconstructed. Maruyama argued that the mainstream faction of Neo-Confucianism provided a stagnant view of history, which confused the natural order and the established political system. In contrast, he positively evaluated Ogyū’s political thought as the opportunity for breaking through the traditional thought patterns of Neo-Confucianism.

However, after the war, Maruyama shifted his focus and problematized the absence of the spiritual axis in the Japanese. He was concerned about the worsening intellectual condition of the rootless spiritual state of the Japanese in his observation of the reemergence of Japanese mass society. In order to obtain the independence of the Japanese against the mass-social condition, Maruyama reevaluated the Confucian norms. For example, he encouraged the people to reassess the importance of making the forms of discipline of everyday life. Therefore, it is also not true that he criticized all Confucian norms. The Japanese tradition of emphasizing orthodoxy was precisely the culture of “form” in the Edo period. The more technical argument of this qualitative development of Maruyama’s thought can be confirmed in “Ansahi Gaku to Ansai Gakuha” [The Science of Ansai and the Ansai School] (Maruyama 1980). In a dialogue with Shunsuke Tsurumi, Maruyama also explained the change of his strategy for the same goal of cultivating the strong individuality of the Japanese: “I am now reviewing the Edo period from the 180-degrees-turned perspective from the time when I wrote Studies in History of Political Thought in Japan during the war” (Maruyama and Tsurumi 1967: Conv., vol. 7, 120).
Sugita (2010) summarizes the modern subject of Maruyama’s theory. First, in his prototype theory, Maruyama proposed the thesis of “the historical failure in forming a central philosophy of Japanese thought.” The lack of the primary philosophical rule of the Japanese caused the unprincipled state of their thinking and behavior. This philosophical character caused opportunistic decision-making by the political elite and their irresponsibility for their political mismanagement.

The above discussion brought another important theme about how to form the strong independence of the subject, which is able to think autonomously without conforming to the mainstream. Under such a Japanese intellectual condition, Sugita explains that Maruyama’s political thought has been developed in the entanglement between the three themes: 1) to change the character of the subject of the Japanese through establishing the concept of “sovereign”; 2) to find the possibility for making the pluralistic self that once existed in Japan; and 3) to encourage the people to obtain the relativist perspective which would correspond to the fluid world. Sugita explains that these three themes are consistent in Maruyama’s writings, yet the themes are not always interwoven in the system of Maruyama’s political thought.

2.3 Decision

We now move to examining the concepts of decision and action that Maruyama presented as the second condition of modern subjectivity. He anticipated that the individual with free personality should be able to detach himself from the situation, examine information and data objectively, think rationally, and assess the circumstances as realistically as possible. These abilities become important particularly in the political arena.
However, in Maruyama’s view, it is not enough to fulfill the condition of modern subjectivity even if the individual is able to assess the situation in his mind. The ideal form of modern subjectivity further requests that the individual takes practical action in accordance with inner conscience. As examined in the following section, lastly, the individual is then required to be responsible for the consequence of his or her decision and action.

Maruyama looks back to the social atmosphere of wartime Japan. He vividly remembered that silence was itself presumed to be an act of rebellion against the emperor system. Such invisible psychological pressure functioned over the Japanese in each local residential area. Accordingly, Maruyama observes the formation of three types of action.

First, some people spontaneously cooperated with the military government. In his “‘Nihon Roman-ha Josetsu’ Izen no Koto” [Before “An Introduction to Japanese Romanticism”] (1986: CW, vol. 12), Maruyama ridicules this type for their miserable obedience, calling them the “mistress” of authority or the “henchman” of power. He portrays some writers of Japanese romanticism as this type.

Next, under the threat of the secret police, the majority of the public reluctantly joined the exercise of war policy enforced by the military government. They were mobilized to participate in community activities to support the war. The mutual monitoring system was formed at the community level, in which uncooperative people were criticized by the community members.

The third type was the group that carried out the anti-government movement by preparing to die or suffer imprisonment and torture. In the case of wartime Japan, a few unconverted members of the Japanese Communist Party belonged to this group.  

16 During the war, the Communist Party had been outlawed. Maruyama sums up that among the converts of the party, some party members suddenly jumped over from the Old Liberals to join the militarist movement and nationalist movement of exclusivists. Other members aimed to
In addition, some literati remained silent and uncomplaining, albeit their much antipathy toward the situation. Maruyama classifies a few proletarian novelists, such as Shigeharu Nakano (novelist, critic and poet, 1902–1979) who is discussed below, into this group. Including opponents against NAPF (Nippona Artista Proleta Federacio), they were forbidden their creative activities through their experiences of imprisonment, torture, and release (Maruyama 1986).

Maruyama approaches the problem of the lack of independence in the human agent, by comparing the well-principled action of a few intellectuals and the easy philosophical conversion of opportunist intellectuals. For example, he discusses the conditions of the individual’s decision and action by juxtaposing the two forms of one’s situational awareness and behavior. He sees a sharp contrast between Schmitt’s decisionism and Bunsō Hashikawa’s‘17 “suspension-ism” or “indecision-ism.”

Hashikawa confessed to Maruyama that because most coworkers around him were members of the Japanese Communist Party, he felt pressured to apply for membership in order to work comfortably without being afraid of his ostracism from the publisher. Maruyama criticized him, arguing that he should not have joined the party for such an ambiguous, passive reason. In later years, after his apostasy, Hashikawa again talked to Maruyama and said that he had noncommittally joined the party and then indecisively left the party again. Suggesting the paradoxical relationship between Hashikawa’s apolitical stance and Schmitt’s concept of political romanticism, Maruyama analyzes the risk of the indecisive attitude held by some Japanese intellectuals. He remarks:

establish socialism by one country in the form of placing the Emperor at the apex. Left-wing movement in prewar Japan branched into several types of nationalist intellectual movements.

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17 Hashikawa (political thinker and critic, 1922–1983) was the former editor who published Maruyama’s famous essay “Psychological Patterns of Japanese Militarist Leaders” (1949 [1969]) and other works.
I think that Hashikawa-kun showed the blind spot of Nonpoli [non-political; apolitical] of a kind of poet. So, although he wrote various things about political ideas, he does not have any sense and interest of real politics at all. . . . I don’t mean it is good or bad. But, at least he has scarcely studied political science as empirical science.

In the first place, Hashikawa-kun started writing about the Japanese romantic school because he borrowed Schmitt’s Political Romanticism from me. He felt it would work. He thought he could analyze the school by the concept. He had a good sense at this point.

However, Schmitt’s book is quite interesting. . . . Contrary to our expectations, he is not so much enthusiastic about political romanticism, like Adam Muller [German political thinker, 1779–1829]. Rather, he is criticizing the idea dryly. Famously, he defined the concept Occasionalism [occasionalism]. How would I translate this concept? It is not so-called opportunism. It means taking something for the occasion; one experiences emotional burning. Although it actually becomes like opportunism in most cases, so why doesn’t he call it opportunism? Because he is a scholar of Staatsrecht [constitutional law] and a political scientist, I think there is a good reason why he expressly used the term occasionalism, distinguishing it from opportunism. The expression of taking something for the occasion implies confrontation between taking something for cause and taking something for norm. Cause and norm are something to bind things. It means alienating the self from something binding it once and simply using something as the bounds. Russian Revolution, the emperor system, and sweetheart, anything is fine. It is for using something as trigger to burn one’s romantic feelings. It has nothing to do with the objective recognition of reality. It becomes so-called romantic irony. Schmitt sufficiently analyzed the romantic irony, and Hashikawa-kun also frequently applied the idea for analyzing the Japanese romantic school. Yet he does not make practical decisions and does not commit himself all the time.

Hashikawa-kun has a certain good sense. I am sure his sentences are also attractive to read, while not my style. However, he has nearly no sense toward social reality, and therefore he becomes very abstract at the point. Moreover, they are all borrowed concepts. They are not concepts that he invents by himself. Likewise, he also quotes many ideas of political thought from someone else. I am always frustrated by that aspect whenever I read his essays. His writings are composed of many quotes, like someone said so or Carl Schmitt said so. But in his works he tends to assume a dubious attitude toward his own value judgment. (Maruyama 1986)

The questioner defends Hashikawa, mentioning that he knew his weakness very well: “In the conflict over the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960, Mr. Takaaki Yoshimoto [literary critic and poet, 1924–2012] and others sat down at the Shinagawa Station, and someone visited them to persuade them to stop their activity. However, Hashikawa-san could not join the sit-in
movement, and could not join the persuader side. He told me that he just ran about in confusion on the spot.” Maruyama politely but emphatically rebuts:

If so, however, he is not qualified to speak about politics. We need both a strong mind to be decisive and a good eye to be objective to see our own decision as much as possible. Being decisive does not necessarily mean taking practical action such as demonstrations. It means to define one’s own standpoint spiritually. Sitting down and getting drunk about the action is out of the question. However, to the contrary, being indecisive and being a spectator is not qualified to talk about politics either. It is okay that one does not have the qualification. That is a question of human types. It does not mean that unqualified people are an inferior type of human beings. However, at least, I suspect that they can talk about politics and political ideas. (Maruyama 1986)

On the one hand, he argues that some Japanese intellectuals are not qualified to speak on politics unless they are being decisive and active. To be so, he suggests that they can avoid being involved in the situation by keeping some distance from reality. On the other hand, he argues that showing the inner feelings in an explosive manner is different from the exercise of subjectivity. In his arguments, the concepts of reality, distance, objectification, decision, responsibility, subjectivity, practical action, and the qualification to speak of politics are arranged in the above-articulated relationship.

**The Concept of Bystander**

In his “Nakano Yoshio-shi o Kataru” [Talking about Yoshio Nakano] (Maruyama 1985: CW, vol. 12), Maruyama analyzes the idea of “standing by,” which is closely related to the issue of decision and action. This becomes an important concept for understanding Maruyama’s idea of the wartime responsibility of Japanese intellectuals. He evaluated the consistent statements and acts of Yoshio Nakano (Anglist; critique, 1903–1985) through wartime until postwar periods, while at the same time he points out a few problems with Nakano’s thought.
In the essay, Maruyama argues that it is rare in Japan that a discussion at a meeting develops through the dialectical process. Instead, most debaters already rigidly hold their opinion before a discussion starts, then just try to push that preconceived opinion onto other members at the meeting. He uses discussions at Heiwa Mondai Danwakai (Peace Study Group) as a typical example of the Japanese style of discussion, and analyzes the remarkable features of Nakano’s thought patterns (Nakano was one of the participants). From the Kyoto section, progressive and left wing scholars participated in the meeting. From Tokyo, the group—led by Yoshishige Abe (educator and philosopher, 1883–1966) and Tetsurō Watsuji (moral philosopher and cultural historian, 1889–1960)—was made up of so-called Old Liberals. The discussion was largely bogged down by clashes between debaters from different ideological positions, especially when their debate touched on real political issues. But Maruyama observes that Nakano was an exceptional debater who dialectically developed his own views and ideas on the issue at the meeting, through the dialogical and self-reflective processes. In Maruyama’s memory, Nakano was the only participant who expressed openly in front of the other members that his original idea on the topic gradually changed through the discussion. Maruyama remarks, “. . . in Japan, very few debaters can gradually change and consolidate one’s thought internally through receiving various ideas, and very few can express his or her change.” But Maruyama recognizes that Nakano, as a thinker, had established his own belief system on which he based his consistent discourse, which was unwavering even in the face of changing times. Maruyama remarks on the topic, “When I read his works of the early postwar period, I can see his consistent attitude. Namely, he always takes a new action based on the rumination and reflection of his past behavior. He is never influenced by how the world trend goes or what the public prefers” (CW, vol. 12, 166).
From the viewpoint of the consistency of one’s remarks, Maruyama categorizes the three basic types of Japanese social elites from prewar, wartime, and postwar cases:

Type 1: Those who were unconverted from the beginning and were imprisoned in opposition to war policy and militarism; they belong to a minority group of respectable people, who kept their beliefs even under harsh torture.

Type 2: Those who quickly changed their attitude after the war to unconditionally support the liberal camp, while they had screamed to overthrow Britain and the United States during the war and enjoyed a new world order by the Axis; the majority of the elders of politics, business people, and the bureaucracy were included in this category.

Type 3: Those who began to express no remorse for their nationalistic opinions, as the majority were gradually forgetting their war experiences; they pretended to show remorse immediately after the war; this type appeared not only for reactionary movements but also for the increase in Japan’s prestige based on its new economic prosperity.

Maruyama also criticizes the posture of some scholars who withdraw to their specialty, leaving politics to the so-called experts. He considers their passive attitude to be one of the causes for leading the country to the catastrophe of the Asia-Pacific war. The political role of intellectuals had been discussed nationally immediately after the war. Nevertheless, Maruyama inveighed against Japanese intellectuals who forgot easily about transient bitter remorse for political responsibility. Even forty years after the war, he was anxious about what the Japanese had learned from their experiences of the implementation of the aggressive, destructive war and the formation of militarist society from the 1930s to 1940s, first as a group historical lesson, and second as a personal lesson for each individual. He remarks:

People frequently talk about who converted and who did not. . . . Of course, there seems to be no problem about criticism based on such criteria. But, more important is, I think, what and how much the Japanese have learned from our war experiences. A famous proverb of history says something like, “History never repeats itself if man learns from it.” If I turn this saying around, I can say, “If we don’t learn from history, then history might repeat.” . . . Seeing the situation in these days, I can’t help but ask, how much has Japan learned from the recent history? What is the latest in the country is just self-complacently
drunk off its economic prosperity. I mean, I cannot help but think what forgetful people they are.

The rebirth of the country as an economic superpower resulted in a sort of amnesia of the Japanese about the war. Maruyama appraises Nakano’s thinking style of continuing his self-examination repeatedly, in contrast with the irresponsible attitude of some intellectuals concerning Japan’s war experiences: “...limiting our discussion to the prewar and wartime intellectuals, among them, only a few intellectuals became aware of the change of their ideas, and moreover, kept asking the meaning of their change. Nakano-san was one of them.”

Immediately after the war, Nakano replied to the question “Who do you think are war criminals?” by ironically responding “That’s Yoshio Nakano.” Maruyama considers the meaning of Nakano’s seemingly cynical answer:

It seems that he took a “so-what” attitude. Actually, I remember a certain magazine editor took up the topic of Nakano-san’s attitude and remarked, “If you wish, you can take such a defiant attitude.” It was certainly possible to behave as such by rebutting, “Oh yeah, I did cooperate with the war anyway. But, then, what kind of resistance did you put up? Don’t be so bossy, and don’t pretend to be a democratic man.” Certainly, his attitude can be understood as a so-what attitude. Yet we cannot make any comments about his words exactly at that time. First of all, such an attitude belonged to a minority, and of course, his biting response to the questionnaire, “the war criminal Yoshio Nakano,” was directed toward more blatant opportunists during the war. On the other hand, after the war, except the prisoners, people who did not get their hands dirty for various reasons—for example, they were too incompetent to participate, or otherwise just too young to take initiative—started the impeachment of intellectuals indiscriminately, like the Japanese version of the Pharisees. Because he felt a backlash against that kind of people in the intellectual atmosphere in those days, I can understand psychologically why he took a so-what attitude. I am sure that probably Nakano-san also wanted to oppose such Pharisees. However, I don’t know if his expression was just for self-justification at that time.

To be sure that Japan would never repeat the mistake of war again, Maruyama alternatively thinks that, by using one’s prewar and wartime experiences as materials for thinking, having self-reflection constantly is much more productive than criticizing which wartime intellectuals
converted and which did not. Moreover, he puts an emphasis on the importance of constantly examining how the personal belief and idea gradually change through this self-reflection. He argues that this permanent self-examination of the individuals will be the barometer to measure the authenticity of one’s way of life (CW, vol.12, 172–174).

**Being the Bystander Strategically**

Maruyama analyzed the meaning of Nakano’s idea of “loud laughter” in comparison to the shallow tone of Japanese magazines and media critics in the 1980s, which were trying to increase sales by mocking people who tried to face things seriously. He assesses that in doing so, the latter are actually erasing truly serious problems surrounding us from our everyday consciousness. He observes that such troubling mentalities have been common in Japanese society. In contrast, he also sees Nakano’s two-front strategy in his remark about the “loud laughter of liberals,” which serves both to laugh at those who are serious and to show concern at the gravity of the situation.

Maruyama pointed out that as of 1985, talking about politics and culture through play or humor had become prevalent. However, he warned that this intellectual fashion was quite dangerous in the spiritual soil of contemporary Japan. These antics become meaningful only when one sincerely confronts “tensions” with serious issues. He thinks that if everyone becomes a clown, the clowning loses its meaning. He contrasted clowning as a new expression of the Japanese opportunistic mind in the 1980s with the concept of the spectator in Nakano’s thought:

Such ideas do not play an important role even in the place where there is something solemn that you cannot move anyway—the emperor system, Catholicism and so on: Anything is fine. If we say clownery or games under such a circumstance, the acts do not cause friction with anything. At most, such ideas are just adapting to the sentiment of the “middle-class” Japanese people and their comfortable everyday lives. The intellectual
activities do not become a true “criticism of the era” at all. The problem behind this is linked with Nakano-san’s idea of alternative. I mean, so to speak, the medium factor is missing between confronting a serious problem “by risking life” and loudly laughing “on a daily basis.” This point most frequently comes out in our attitude to war. [Nakano-san] writes about his own attitude to war like, “I did not even think and write that the war was a sacred one. I did not think that Japan would win, either. However, it is not true that I was just standing by and hoping that Japan would lose the war. After December 8, I did my best to fulfill my duty as one nation and cooperated with the war. I wasn’t deceived. Gladly and willingly, I did cooperate with the war.” (Emphasis Maruyama’s)

Maruyama also points out a problem of Nakano’s attitude as an intellectual, which he evaluated in some degree. While he analyzed Nakano’s act of “loudly laughing” as an expression of his honesty, referring to Shūichi Katō’s analysis, he discovers the trap in Nakano’s idea. He poses this question to Nakano: “Were all the spectators of the war really smirking?”

. . . as far as I know, Katō-kun was a person who most respected Nakano-san. Despite that, . . . he is questioning whether playing a spectator really was equal to just smirking in that era. The atmosphere of the era was far from allowing people to grin. If the course to be a bystander was deleted, was spontaneous cooperation with the national war policy the right course? Things become different if operating an anti-war movement at the risk of imprisonment and massacre. However, it is impossible for a normal “petit bourgeois,” which Nakano-san likes, and realistically, it is doubtful if the task is effective or not. . . .

There is no choice but to “sit back” if we do not choose the course of imprisonment. This is to say, under certain circumstances, it is possible to take a so-called “expectant attitude” desperately. Then it is still a better attitude than “actively” cooperating with wrong national policy. It is also my own painful memory. When I once spoke of my experience of military life, I was asked by a young political scientist, “Sensei, were you a man with a double character?” I can’t excuse you for that. But, even so, is it appropriate to cooperate with national policy and justify the “new world order” for “unifying” one’s personality? Here, absolutely, we must seriously consider the question of whether we have to commit to the value that transcends the state. Nakano-san expressed cooperation with war policy as “grinningly looking on.” I see his honesty in that he added the adjective grinningly. Yet, at the same time, I must say that even Nakano-san had been poisoned by the terrible toxic militarist education that the prewar generation received.
In developing Nakano’s idea, Maruyama points out the evil of a Japanese idea of *gojuppo hyappo* (meaning there is little difference between the fifty-step escape and the hundred-step escape from the enemy). He remarks:

[As suggested by Shigeharu Nakano; proletarian novelist, 1902–1979] however, we need to have an idea that the forty-nine-step withdrawal is still better than the fifty-one-step withdrawal because of the two-step difference. Of course, this is about the argument of conversion; the point is, the Shigeharu Nakano like the personification of ethics of conviction was talking about his own experience during the war. This is, it is six of one and half a dozen of the other—you and I converted anyway. We are all part of the same gang. If we say so, it actually leads to canceling responsibility of the worst converts, who betrayed his friends; we shouldn’t add those who worked hard in the last minute to the same category of the worst type. I think that Mr. Yoshio Nakano’s idea is essentially same as Shigeharu Nakano’s. It means, he makes political decisions by choosing better one or, say less wrong one. There is the volume titled in “My Passive Philosophy.” The term “passivity” well expresses the characteristic of his idea.

In his later years, Maruyama diverged from Yoshio Nakano’s thought on political issues. However, he thought that even Nakano never believed that the coalition between Japan’s Socialist Party and the Japanese Communist Party was the best choice, for example. He inferred that Nakano had just chosen the lesser evil, by his own evaluation, for the current politics under the political circumstances. Although the difference of their assessment of political reality is remarkable, Maruyama held that this basic idea was shared between them. In addition, however, Maruyama remarks as follows:

But when it comes to the issue of war or something, we are driven into the alternative choice, standing by with smirking or cooperating with the war. Under some situations, playing a spectator desperately becomes quite different from smirking to be it. If one hundred million of the people had been “sideliners” decisively, the spiritual mobilization [of the nation] would have not been possible, even if the militarist leaders gave a command. It corresponds to sabotage tactics in strike.
He admonishes himself that he is not strictly eligible to critique Nakano’s remark. However, in reexamining the term “loudly laughing” that Nakano used offhand, Maruyama finds a certain blind spot in older intellectuals than his generation, who grew up in the era of the Taishō Democracy and received the liberal educations of the Meiji era since their elementary school days. The elders did not have the childhood experience of oppression by the state power. Maruyama understands Nakano’s masochistic remarks such as “liberals’ loud laugh” or “I’m a coward opportunist anyway” as a trap fallen into by too serious people, as it exists behind their defiant attitude. He concludes that this attitude can be understood very well when we examine the roots of the whole personality in the Japanese spiritual soil (CW, vol. 12, 180–184).

We have seen above the concepts of subjectivity, modernity, and decision and action, which Maruyama refers to when visualizing the ideal type of Japanese person with modern subjectivity. In the following section, we will take on another important element of the modern subjectivity presented by Maruyama, the responsibility for the result of one’s action.

2.4 Responsibility

War Responsibility of Politicians

The concept sekinin (責任; responsibility, accountability) is one of the primary indexes that Maruyama uses to measure the feudal characteristics of thinking and behavior in the Japanese. His usage of the idea is best known for its appearance in his metaphor of “portable shrine” or his theory of “irresponsible system” of Japanese fascism. Applying the concept, he measures if the individual demonstrates his or her subjectivity, or if he or she takes the opposite behavioral pattern of playing the behavior of amaе (strategic reliance) by uncritically performing according to accepted fact or relying on the senior authority based on self-interest. In the 1980s
dialogues with the SURE group (Shunsuke Tsurumi, Yoshinori Shiozawa, Tsunehiko Kitazawa and others), Maruyama mentioned that he used the concept strategically: “Before I answer your question, first of all, why I nag about responsibility—every time I mention it, it is for tactical reasons. In other words, I am always thinking of suggesting the antithesis of the thought patterns of the Japanese and their assessment of the situation. Then, it becomes radical unintentionally (laughs)” (Maruyama 2005, 118).

In “Sensō Sekinirō no Mōten” [The Blind Side of War Responsibility Theory] (Maruyama 1956: CW, vol. 6), through applying Weber’s idea, Maruyama critically reexamined the “responsibility for result,” which was to be imposed on both the emperor and the Japanese Communist Party as a political actor (see also Maruyama 2005, 118). His theory of the war responsibility of politicians received emotional backlash from the Communist Party, although his theory was basically a purely academic argument that uniquely applies Karl Jaspers’s theory of war responsibility in Germany and the categorization of responsibility in order to take into account the difference between the legal and philosophical aspects of the idea.

Originally, he meant to discuss mainly the emperor’s war responsibility, but his analysis had become extended to attacking the war responsibility of the Communist Party. His thesis (contrary to the social trend that did not accuse the party of complicity) was that the logic of the Communist Party appeals to ethical responsibility, and the party also should take responsibility for the result that it could not stop militarism. In the essay, he critically examines the muddled debate of war responsibility carried out by Japanese intellectuals at that time:

The question is not clarifying if guilty or not guilty, but distinguishing the nature and extent of each person’s errors, negligence, and mistake, which the individual made in each hierarchy, group, profession of wartime Japan, from the viewpoint how actively and inactively each person has helped the progress of Japan’s road from 1931 to 1945. For instance, it is not wrong to distinguish the ruler and the people. Nevertheless, it does not
make sense to deny any war responsibility of the ruled or “the public.” At least, 
concerning the disastrous destruction of life, property, and culture in China like that, our 
people cannot escape shared responsibility. As for domestic politics, for the time being, 
unlike the case of Germany, because Japanese fascism certainly did not come into power 
on the ground of political democracy, war responsibility of the citizens as the “general 
nation” might be lightened politically in that degree. However, I am skeptical about 
whether our moral responsibility for silent obedience to the rule of fascism is resolved. 
“Tomorrow’s” active consciousness of resistance against evil domination is not expected 
so easily from the people who briefly disclaim their “yesterday’s” invitation of the evil 
ru ler.

However, especially, in the political sense, war responsibility is, needless to say, 
attributed to the power holders and the various political elites in the system. Compared to 
this, war responsibility of the intellectuals—in the meaning of not as politician and 
bureaucrat but as intellectuals—becomes less problematic in [terms of] practical roles 
[they took]. (Maruyama 1956. Emphasis Maruyama’s)

**War Responsibility of Political Thinkers**

In the above dialogue with Tsurumi and others, Maruyama argues for tentatively 
distinguishing the war responsibility of politicians and that of intellectuals, including political 
thinkers. He also notes that “responsibility of politics” and “responsibility of political thought” 
are fundamentally different, and he argues that thinkers cannot take responsibility for their 
political thought. He thinks that although there is a particular responsibility of political thinkers, 
their responsibility cannot be required of them in the same meaning of the responsibility of 
politicians for the following reason. He remarks:

> You know, there is [Elijah Parish] Lovejoy’s book *The Great Chain of Being*. All ideas 
> are probably related to each other in a chain reaction. It doesn’t matter if you’re 
> progressive or reactionary. The right and the left are all related. If so, how can we take 
> responsibility of political thought?

For instance, [Benito] Mussolini was a disciple of Georges Sorel of France. Sorel is an 
anarchist. Mussolini was an anarchist at the first time. He read earnestly Sorel’s books 
and learned from the books, though he became fascist. So, Sorel is a teacher of Mussolini. 
Who is Sorel’s teacher; it is Lenin. Lenin’s teacher is Marx. Then, is Marx responsible 
for fascism (laughs)? Thought is something like this. (Maruyama 2005, 125–126)
Maruyama mentions that the study of the history of political thought is filled with paradoxes. Due to the occurrence of the dialectic effect, he points out that in the field, reality is, a certain political idea sometimes produces something even the quite antithetical to the original. For this reason, he concludes that we ought to distinguish the responsibility of political thinkers from that of politicians.

The responsibility of political thinkers partly overlaps that of thinkers in other fields. However, when compared to, for example, the “thought of physics,” Maruyama notes that the thought of political thinkers inevitably becomes related to real politics much more intimately. He mentions the close relationship between political thinker and politics by referring to an episode of his teacher Shigeru Nanbara’s involvement in real politics in the early postwar period; Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida (1878–1967) criticized the president of Tokyo University, Nanbara, of “literary sycophancy” for his proposition of the overall peace treaty.

We have explored some points regarding the “behavior of taking responsibility for the result of act,” which is one of the three conditions for free personality in Maruyama’s theory. We have also clarified his argument of distinguishing the war responsibility of politicians and that of political thinkers. Including universalist political thinkers, how much political thinkers and political reality interplay depends on unpredictable situations. Maruyama puts forth that even political thinkers must take responsibility for politics from the short-term point of view; however, he argues that this type of responsibility should be distinguished from the long-term responsibility of political thought (he frames this as the difference between “ten-year” and “hundred-year” responsibility).
As will be further discussed in Part II, universalist political thinkers (in the sense that they can have consistent views and assess situations based on their own principle) have a short-term responsibility to lead the revolt of citizens against totalitarian government and society. Thinking based on their self-principle, they can avoid the pitfalls of conformism while living inside a totalitarian society; they can be psychologically disobedient against the groupthink, which encourages people to uncritically attach themselves to the socio-political movements of the mainstream.

Nevertheless, as was introduced in the discussion of the bystander and the three types of action intellectuals could take in the progress of national mobilization and totalitarianization, psychological resistance of universalist thinkers, such as Maruyama and Nanbara (who are able to assess the ongoing situation based on their political philosophy), against the situation is a different matter from whether they can exert a practical force to collapse a totalitarian political system. Even though they can identify the outbreak of conformism, refuse to jump on the bandwagon, and keep retain spiritual independence, this psychological state does not guarantee that the universalist thinker or the man of principle can necessarily dissolve the totalitarian political regime. Besides, the public must be mobilized to organize political campaigns and armed to struggle for the purpose of revolting against the regime. What should be noted here is that even living inside conformism without obtaining information from the outside, which relativizes the totalitarian society into which they are incorporated, universalist thinkers can detect the oppressive mechanism of an homogenous society. At the very least, this mentality can be the point of departure for creating a spiritual and practical resistance of the individual to the various types of socio-political phenomena of totalitarianism, from the formation of a fascist regime to the popular trend in a hyper-consumption society.
In review, Maruyama argued that opportunism and the automatic adherence to accepted fact are the two major pathologies of the political thinking of Japanese people. The human being with modern subjectivity is portrayed as a counter-model to the pathological modes of political thinking. The four indicators discussed in this chapter define this human type.

However, as is suggested by Mannheim and Fukuzawa, Maruyama saw historical, political, and social phenomena from the relativist perspective. Therefore, it is also true that he understood that any indexes or analytical tools should be merely convenient indicators, since they also had significant temporal and spatial constraints. So while he, for the purpose of exposing the feudal characteristics of a particular society at an optional time and region, set up these indicators, he also noticed that the idea of modernity or the distinction between feudality and modernity cannot be given fixed definitions. What should be noted is he clearly understood that as times change, a society necessarily changes as well; the factors contributing to modernity are therefore also fluid. Based on this philosophy, he diagnosed the mode of thinking in the Japanese people of the late twentieth century as still relatively feudalistic.

Mamiya (2008) attempts to identify philosophical meaning in Maruyama’s theory of modern subjectivity by analyzing the mechanism of how the four indicators—subjectivity, modernity, decisions and actions, and responsibility—interplay. Moreover, he draws attention to the crucial relationship between Maruyama’s theory of modern subjectivity and his theory of others. The coexistence of the internal and the external aspects of the individual in a close partnership is tightly linked with the overlapping relation of the private sphere and the public sphere in society: The issues are two sides of the same coin. This is at the heart of the political thought of Maruyama. Therefore, when discussing the modernization of society, Maruyama also thought it necessary to discuss the modernization of the individual (in other words, the issues of
the modern subject and the modern spirit). In his view, the modern subject does not simply mean an autonomous entity in the sense that the subject is self-contained. For Maruyama, the modern spirit cannot be equated to the rationalism of the Enlightenment in the sense of the so-called civilized mind. In his theories of modernization and modern subjectivity, a more important element is rather represented by the key terms of “other beings,” “others,” and “the sense of otherness.” Thus, in a sense, the sense of otherness is the modern spirit itself, and society that is created by people with the sense would be called modern society.

Mamiya interprets Maruyama’s theory of the modern subject in this way. He explains that for Maruyama, the modern subject comes into existence in the form of a “dialectical integration” between the subject and the object. Both the theory of subject and that of object tend to recognize the subject and the object, respectively, as existent a priori, while each regards the other as dependent on the theoretical focus. For example, the Neo-Kantian theory of subject suspects the objective (external) reality of the object, and Marxist’s naïve realism regards the object as a closed, completed entity. Those theories tend to cause unrealistic optimism, believing that the object can be recognized in the form of simplified law. From here Maruyama derives a thesis that practice is the dialectical integration of theory (the subject) and reality (the object). What exists is neither the subject nor the object: It is rather practice (activity). The subject and the object can be recognized by practice or activity, rather than in the form of knowing the self and knowing others.

In Maruyama’s view, neither the mind nor matter exists by itself. Activity is the dialectical integration of mind and matter, and thought and art are the products of the activity. Consequently, modern subjectivity with the sense of otherness appears to be the subject which is active. Yet it does not mean activism in the sense of practice over theory; it means activism in
the sense that activity is unifying the internal and outside worlds. The subject of such activism is the modern subject in Maruyama’s theory.

Mamiya notes that it sounds pleonastic to modify the subject with the adjective “modern,” if the subject of a human being is inherently formed by the dialectical integration of the internal and external worlds. A modern subject is not specific to the subject in modern times; rather, it is supposedly supra-historical. Nevertheless, the reason why Maruyama sticks to the vocabulary of the modern subject and the modern spirit, and sticks to modernization in theory and practice, is that tension between the subject and the object is relaxed in some cases, and the internal world and the outside world—in other words, the private and the public—fall into a state of coexistence have in irrelevance. Mamiya insists that if so-called modernism is autism toward human reason, postmodernism as reaction against modernism is autism toward human emotion. Mamiya pays attention to the following dialogue of Maruyama in 1988:

Maruyama: . . . so, what is risky for postmodernism is the recently popular criticism of [René] Descartes, saying, “It is outrageous that [modernists] have separated the subject and the object.” Such a criticism has been the current intellectual fashion. A good example is structuralism, which is popular in the West and in Japan in these days, saying, “Dualism is [simply] wrong.” So, everyone has been critical of Descartes—[Claude] Lévi-Strauss and others, everyone.

Questioner: Are you also critical of that point?

Maruyama: Indeed, Lévi-Strauss sent me a letter saying, “The separation of public and private, as you say, is exactly one of the pathologies of modernity.” He studies primitive societies, and he found an answer there. I understand his point. That is a self-criticism of Europe. But it is disproportionate to import the self-criticism of Europe to Japan and apply it to Japan, whose culture and tradition is completely different. I don’t think that his idea is acceptable unconditionally [here in Japan]. I don’t accept it without any doubts. Yet that is a thorough analysis of the separation about Western modernity. Because of the separation, the natural sciences have fully developed. Thus, the attitude of seeing things objectively is born for the first time when the subject becomes independent, and the objectivity is born from there.
In the case of Marxism, the importance of the object has gradually increased since the primitive stage of separation, saying, “Actually, the subject is merely an illusion, and it is a reflection of things.” (“Kenryoku no Henchō’ o Megutte” [On the “Unbalance of Power”] 1988: *Maruyama Masao Wabunshū* vol. 4, 2009, 184–185)

Mamiya thinks that it is possible to glimpse Maruyama’s thought from the above text. In Maruyama’s view on the subject and modernity, Modernism and postmodernism are considered merely different types within the same category.

Mamiya notes that in Maruyama’s theory, various pairs of antonyms are treated as pairs of synonyms, for example, hypersensitivity and insensitivity to the object (others), faith in feeling and faith in theory, faith in passion and faith in reason, formalism and opportunism, modernism and postmodernism, subjectivism and objectivism, closed-mindedness and open-mindedness, non-politics and hyper-politics, political avoidance and political enthusiasm, politicization of art and political romanticism (turning politics into artistic activity) and so on. Mamiya suggests that the Japanese aesthetic concept of *mono no aware* (the complex feelings of elegant beauty, or grief about nature and life) becomes a key word here, and the closed-mindedness of the Japanese is the commensurable factor of the above sets of antonymic synonyms. From an almost nihilist perspective, Maruyama observed that narrow-mindedness had been spreading through the postwar society both vertically and horizontally. However, Mamiya’s careful analysis shows that it was not so simple as assessing what Japan lacks by the Western standard, and thinks that through his studying of intellectual history and real politics, what Maruyama came to question was why the Japanese mentality becomes unchangeably introverted. A tentative answer for this question has been given in “Rekishi-ishiki no ‘Kosō’” [The “Ancient Strata” of Historical Consciousness] (Maruyama 1972: CW, vol. 10) as his theory of consciousness of time of the Japanese. The above is Mamiya’s study about the main points of
Maruyama’s theory of modern subjectivity. It is clear now that in Maruyama’s theory, the argument of modern subjectivity and that of others significantly support each other.
Chapter 3  Maruyama’s Philosophy of Dialogue: Three Key Concepts

In Japanese academic society, Sasakura (2003) and Mamiya (2008) have published the seminal works that successfully approach Maruyama’s political thought and philosophy from comprehensive perspectives. Kobayashi and others (2003) have also contributed to analyzing many of the philosophical points of Maruyama’s political thought. These recent studies similarly draw attention to Maruyama’s theory of others. Takeshi Ishida (2005), Tanaka (2009), and Tōyama (2010) have also successfully reconstructed Maruyama’s theory of modernity by analyzing his philosophy of dialogue from each individual’s perspective. These previous studies have demonstrated how Maruyama’s theory of modern subjectivity and his theory of others are complementary.

These newer studies have extracted the three key concepts of Maruyama’s philosophy of dialogue: 1) *tasha-kankaku* or *tasha-sei-kankaku* (他者感覚 or 他者性感覚; the sense of otherness), 2) *jiko-nai-taiwa* (自己内対話; the introspective dialogue of the self; the inner-self dialogue), and 3) *rinjin-kankaku no kosumoporitanizumu* (隣人感覚のコスモポリタニズム; cosmopolitanism as the sense of neighbors). These concepts were not systematically theorized by Maruyama in the form of written essays. However, starting in the 1960s, in correspondence with the introduction of a new perspective of cross-cultural contact into his study of Japanese intellectual history, he began to mention more often his idea of otherness, his philosophy of dialogue, and his unique cosmopolitanism, in his public lectures, interviews with him, and roundtable discussions he attended. His philosophy of dialogue has been a particularly crucial element in approaching his political thought.
3.1 The Sense of Otherness

Others as Other Beings

Maruyama, Shōzō Fujita (historian; political scientist, 1927–2003), and Ishida undertook a joint study on the theme of “orthodoxy and heterodoxy” spanning more than thirty years. Fujita quit participation in the study group later (see Ishida 2005, Chapter 2, “Why was Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy Unfinished?”). Looking back to his forty-year intellectual interaction with Maruyama, Ishida attempts to reconstruct Maruyama’s idea of the sense of otherness from both practical and philosophical angles. He evaluates that Maruyama’s personal military experiences became one of three primary sources for his critical view on the Japanese feudal thinking, along with his experiences of detention as a suspected Marxist student activist in 1933 and his periodic hospitalization after the war. These experiences provided him, as a member of the intellectual elite, with opportunities to observe the public life and world from the inside.

According to Ishida’s study, the sense of otherness means that we accept the heterogeneity of others as it is rather than comply with the views of others. Yet it is not equal to stopping our attempts to understand others. Maruyama distinguishes between what he calls “civilized-mindedness” and “open-mindedness.” The former is one’s closed mentality toward others, which results from taking for granted that his or her state is already civilized. By contrast, the latter means to engage in opening the hearts of both the self and others. Therefore, the sense of otherness refers to one’s continual attempts to open one’s heart toward others; in turn, this sense provokes the constant growth of the self.
An Example of Early Emergence of the Concept

Ishida discovers Maruyama’s early use of the concept of the sense of otherness. Whereas he was not using exactly the same term, in the last passage of his “Politics and Man in the Contemporary World” (1961 [1969]), we can find the same concept: “It is the only way that the function of intelligence is namely to allow others to be just as they are, and moreover, to understand others as other beings.” In his *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics* (1969), the same passage has been translated more freely to read “And the function of intelligence consists in any age in understanding others—to use Hegel’s terminology—as others (in ihrem Anderssein)” (1969, 348. Emphasis in original). In the record of a seminar discussion between Maruyama and university students, “The Question of the Old Layer in the Japanese Intellectual History” (1979: CW, vol. 11), we find another remark of his. “[Quoting Mannheim:] The premise of academic freedom is a fundamental curiosity to try to understand any other groups and/or any other human beings as “the other.” What Nazism critically lacked was such an intellectual curiosity.” This passage is followed by his criticism of the lack of the sense of otherness in the Japanese. In these texts above, his idea of the sense of otherness has appeared as a matter of intellectual attitude. In the seminar above, he argues, “The sense of human rights is difficult to cultivate in the place where the sense of otherness is absent” (CW, vol. 11, 175). He also remarks, “Our fatal misunderstanding of China was caused by the lack of our sense of otherness. The Japanese have embraced the illusion of using the same Chinese characters [i.e., the Chinese and the Japanese can easily understand each other, because both people seemingly use the same Chinese characters]. The Japanese were [innocently] saying, ‘the same race, the same script’” (CW, vol. 11, 176–177). Thus we can see that in the student seminar, Maruyama is
using the concept of the sense of otherness in a broader sense than his usage in particularly discussing politics.

**A Person with the Sense of Otherness**

In the text above, Maruyama deals with the negative consequences of lacking the sense of otherness. When combined with the principle of tolerance, the idea can extend its conceptual utility even further. In “Hao-san to no Tsukiai” [Hanging out with Hao-san], Maruyama also explains the case of a person with the sense of otherness:

[Takeuchi’s] holding the principle of tolerance; when someone made a decision based on his or her own principle, and even if he would not agree with the decision, Takeuchi respected the way of life of the person. . . . [He had] eyes able to understand others as others and look at others from the eyes of others. This is a difficult sense to nurture in a society like Japan, where the people fantasize that everyone is Japanese. (Maruyama 1978: CW, vol. 10)

Ishida (2005, 21–22) explains that Maruyama respected Takeuchi’s sense of tolerance. In Maruyama’s view, Yoshimi Takeuchi (Hao-san in his nickname) (expert in Chinese literature; Maruyama’s neighbor, 1910–1977) believes that everyone in this world should be a different existence from one another. On the one hand, he sets the difference of the individuals as the point of departure of his argument. At the same time, he has the sense of respecting ordinary neighbors by thinking that the same humans are living everywhere. Maruyama evaluates Takeuchi’s cosmopolitan sense, as well as a similar sense of Kanzō Uchimura (Japanese Christian thinker; critic, 1861–1930), that the human race is made up of John Doe and Jane Doe next door. In the text above, Maruyama thinks that Takeuchi’s cosmopolitan sense indicates his sufficient acquisition of the sense of otherness.
This cosmopolitan sense is the opposite mentality of claiming that all residents of Japan should be Japanese. Maruyama explains that the lack of open-mindedness for others evokes the mindset of dividing insiders from outsiders. Japanese people with this mindset see the world as existing outside of Japan. He explains that the dichotomous mentality of dividing in-group members and out-group members causes what he calls “false universalism” in Japanese intellectual soil. People with the provincial mentality refer to the incoming foreign ideas as the model of universalism. Yet, the “nationalism of affiliation” (Maruyama’s coinage: nationalism emphasizing people’s subordination to their group) arises as a reactionary intellectual movement. Thereupon, the vicious cycle is generated between foreign thought and indigenous thought; the arrival of foreign ideology stimulates the conservative intellectual movement of Japanese indigenous thought; the foreign thought exercises fecundity as a universalist idea; the action amplifies the reactionary movement of the indigenous thought. This vicious circle lasts endlessly. The problem is that neither side enters the dialectic stage in order to evoke sublation between both intellectual sides and reach the synthesis.

Ishida mentions that Maruyama also regarded his family doctor, Takeshirō Matsumoto, as a model of a person with the sense of otherness. Ishida understands that Maruyama’s personal experience of struggling with illness was important for the development of his theory of others. Matsumoto had been Maruyama’s friend since junior high school, then later was his doctor and managed his health problems. In his essay “Watashi no Chūmon-chō: Oisha-san e” [Dear Doctor: A Few of my Requests], Maruyama sends a message to Matsumoto:

I would like to dedicate the words of [Johann Wolfgang von] Goethe to you: “Since medical care is intended to cover all aspects of human beings, [doctors] must devote all of themselves to taking care of their patients.” I especially want caregivers always to know that patients need a lot of care in the psychological aspect and thus I want caregivers to have delicacy in words and behavior. (Maruyama 1956: CW, vol. 16, 300)
In his response to Maruyama, Matsumoto also shared his concern about the risks of medical practice. He notices that a conflict happens in a medical institute that is constituted by the experts and their patients as human beings. As medical science and technology progress and the specialization and fragmentation of the field is expanded in the medical world, intensified is the competition between the experts over medical consumers. Matsumoto comments that from the technical side, doctors should know the importance of giving their maximum care to their patients, with full use of their own expertise. At the same time, doctors should remember that they treat the patient as an entity of human beings. He suggests that it is important for doctors, as an expert, to have both senses: the sense of professionalism and that of humanity. Ishida notes that Matsumoto’s idea of what healthcare providers should give their patients corresponds with his sense of otherness.

As Ishida points out, the history of Maruyama’s struggle with illness becomes important when reading the context of his political thought. In the text above, we can identify that from the viewpoint of a patient, Maruyama talks about those who are socially vulnerable and those who need to receive the sense of otherness. Inpatients at hospital are the most defenseless type of people.

Through his experiences of long-term hospitalization, Maruyama pondered over the question of the sense of otherness for those who were under more difficult conditions. His life as a patient in a sanatorium became an important experience for him, living under the same roof with common people, just as when he was detained in jail under suspicion of being the leading Marxist student activist and he served in the military in his thirties as a general soldier. For him, any of these events became an exceptional situation; in a sense, he was forced to comply with the
specific disciplines of those internal societies in the separated and isolated spaces, in which his social status became unimportant.

Ishida evaluates the significance of Maruyama’s long-term hospitalization for understanding his theory of others, also because in the sanatorium he was also involved in the problem of abolishing nursing attendants in the hospital. The incident was a political movement run by ordinary people within a small social group. In his “Dansō” [My Fragmented Thoughts], Maruyama remarks on the political movement of National Sanatoria: “Facing the issue of abolishing attendant nurses, I realized once again, in reality, how hard it is to understand others from the position of themselves. I impudently speak to ‘outside’ people of the sanatorium from the insider position. Yet, when I stand in front of long-term inpatients or critically ill patients, I must admit that there are the spaces of these people’s lives where I will never be able to enter, with my half-baked ‘sympathy’” (Maruyama 1956: CW, vol. 6, 152).

What should be noticed here is that Maruyama recognizes the need for having the sense of otherness for someone who is facing a more difficult situation other than our own. At the same time, he is also aware of the difficulty of practicing this. Understanding disparate others is inherently difficult, yet that is why he believes that it is necessary to constantly strive to understand others. There is no guarantee of being able to understand feelings of others through this effort; but importantly, one’s psychological struggle to win the sense inevitably becomes a permanent spiritual movement that is held between the self and others. Here, in his theory, the idea of the sense of otherness will necessarily be connected to another important concept of the “inner-self dialogue,” which is discussed in the following section.
Politics and the Sense of Otherness

In the case of hospital life, the idea that patients must trust their doctors and stay in bed silently sometimes leads to the assimilation of the weak to systems set by higher authority. Maruyama moves forward from analyzing the common difficulty of understanding others to discussing some problems of the act in the political world. In his view, personal experiences of each individual are, after all, his or her own; they cannot be represented by someone else and cannot be assimilated easily. This is why the challenge of democracy becomes truly meaningful, because it advocates that everyone has the right and eligibility to speak about his or her own unique experience in a democratic society. On the contrary, easy assimilation to the experience of others causes the social atmosphere of intolerance on the one hand and bureaucratic paternalism on the other (CW, vol. 6, 152–153).

Ishida explains that everyone has the right to insist on ideas based on one’s own experiences, instead of being represented by someone else, and this principle suggests that one’s everyday efforts to acquire the sense of otherness becomes the permanent mental exercise for understanding the existence of others. As we notice here, this philosophy provides the basis for the idea of democracy as a permanent revolution. Suggested by Walter Lipmann’s theory of the formation of public opinion, Maruyama argues that the awareness of the difficulty to understand others helps direct our attention to one’s occasional misunderstanding between an “image” of others and the “reality” of the others. If we know in advance the inevitability of having a prejudice against and misunderstandings of others due to the psychological effects of forming the image of the others, rather, we will be cautious of the socio-political pressure for assimilation. Finally, it is important for us to together admit that each individual can make an appeal for its
own uniqueness in society. This is the logical consequence of the efforts for the self to gain the sense of otherness. The efforts become a permanent and ongoing mental exercise.

**Maruyama’s Idea of Proceduralism**

Ishida points out that Maruyama put an emphasis on the idea of proceduralism for setting up an intermediary between the two ideas of a) the sense of otherness and b) democracy as a permanent revolution. Maruyama argues that we need to exercise “rights” not by one’s emotional outbursts but by one’s sense of “rule” and “democratic procedure” in order to effectively claim that everyone should have rights for requesting his or her particular desires.

On the other hand, Maruyama points out that from the management of the national parliament to that of small social groups, the fetishism of the rule is caused by the institutionalization of democracy, despite the fact that the institutions are originally devised as a convenient means for a great purpose. When they instead become an end unto themselves, in his view, the system becomes dysfunctional and hollow. As the fetishism of democracy as an institution is brought about, the idea of democracy, which is the driving force for the establishment of the institution, will become routinely mentioned in order to sustain the institution itself; the driving force will be weakened. Therefore, he repeatedly stresses that having the permanent revolution (regular exercise) must be required on both sides of the idea and the movement of democracy in order that democracy can function as a system. Otherwise, the representative system does not play a critical role for securing rights of the public, who claims individual requirements which ought not to be spoken by others.

In summary, the idea of the sense of otherness in everyday life, which thinks of the position of others from the perspectives of the others, will probably depart from a matter of
feelings and attitudes at the individual level. However, in Maruyama’s theory, the argument of
the sense of otherness and the lack of the sense at the individual level are also applied to
arguments in a broader social context. His idea on the relationship between the self and others
provides the basis for discussing human relationships and organizational relations in
contemporary society, in which the diversification of values has become increasingly promoted.
His theory of others and otherness has a wide scope in order to analyze both levels of the
individuals and the social conditions of contemporary mass society, which hinders the
development of the sense from the Japanese.

3.2 The Inner-Self Dialogue

Tension and Tolerance for Heterogeneous Beings

The introspective dialogue of the self or the inner-self dialogue is a dialogue that is
formed by combining two ideas: dialectic introspection and the sense of otherness. Tanaka
(2009) analyzes the conceptual relationship between both ideas. In Maruyama’s lecture
“Bakumatsu ni okeru Shiza no Henkaku: Sakuma Shōzan no Baa’ai” [Perspective Change in the
Late Tokugawa: In the Case of Shōzan Sakuma], to understand different cultures and others,
Maruyama argues for the importance of objectifying and relativizing the conventional norms that
the subject has been wearing like a pair of biased glasses (Maruyama 1965: CW, vol. 9). Due to
the task, he speaks on the necessity that the self incorporates a view of others, which is based on
the completely different standard of value. The self should attempt to have a dialogue between its
own view and the view of others. He calls this activity the “inner-self dialogue.” He describes:

Have more domestic exchange rather than international exchange! Have more [spiritual]
interchanges of the personality rather than have superficial human relations! I don’t trust
some people’s faith in progress through human communication, unless those people have a conversation within the self.

When someone just asserts, “I like coffee,” and the other claims, “I like tea,” there is no room for having a [productive] debate on the excellence of coffee and tea. The controversy often becomes fruitless and meaningless because the disputants merely throw plausible rhetoric toward the opponent each other. (Maruyama *Jiko-nai-taiwa* [Dialogue with Myself] 1998, 252)

Here, he defines the inner-self dialogue as seeing things from the standpoint of others by setting our dislike in our own spirit, but pretending to ourselves as if we like it, and proceeding to have a dialogue with ourselves.

Tanaka notices that, of course, simply putting heterogeneous things inside the self will bring about the dissociation of personality. Thus, a constant dialogue between the self and others must be attempted in order to form a new self. Tanaka interprets the meaning of the open-mindedness in Maruyama’s argument as follows. For example, Shōzan Sakuma (thinker in the late Edo period; a military specialist, 1811–1864) attempted to combine the essences of newly arrived knowledge of Western natural science and Neo-Confucianism without abandoning the Japanese traditional thought. The act of “self-dialogue of the subject” is not only the philosophical interaction between new and old ideas but also one’s psychological stance which is used to form the new self (or to increase the independence of the subject) from the act of taking on a perspective of alien others whom we encounter in everyday life.

Plato applies the dialogue as the means of finding the truth and exposing how the things we believe are either true or untrue. By contrast, in Nakae’s work, the absolute truth is neither presupposed nor sought after. Tanaka explains that in Maruyama’s view, Nakae’s application of dialogue is different from the conventional styles of Japanese literary works. However, Maruyama does not regard Nakae as a simple relativist. In Nakae’s Three Drunkards on Government (1887), the hierarchical relationship is not set as to personal values and social positions between the three leading characters: Nankai-sensei (Dr. Nankai), Gōkai-kun (Mr. Magnificent), and Shinshi-kun (Mr. Gentleman).

Maruyama interprets that the three characters do not represent a particular political ideology. (Tanaka also mentions an alternative interpretation that each character represents three different political ideologies.) A variety of views are exchanged through their dialogues from multiple angles. In Maruyama’s view, in some parts Mr. Magnificent is telling what Mr. Gentleman is supposed to say. Mr. Gentleman and Mr. Magnificent reach a consensus on several issues. For example, both are basically agree with the progressive course “from barbarism to civilization.” Categorizing people into conservatives and progressives, they also agree that the former is the culprit of the underdevelopment of Japan. However, both characters espouse different ideas from each other concerning the way of removing the culprit. Although they have the same goal of civilizing Japan, their ideas of practical means to attain the goal are dissimilar from each other. They debate what the key element is for catching up with Western powers between two ideas: having logical thinking or holding a full of passion.

In Maruyama’s view, Nakae’s Three Drunkards on Government suggests that observing things from different perspectives at the different levels is important for having a good political sense. In doing so, the many sides of a particular issue are made clear, and the main problem to
tackle becomes clear. Yet, in political activities, the problems cannot be resolved all at once. Tanaka explains that Nakae was philosophically a materialist unlike Fukuzawa. In that sense, Nakae can be regarded not as a relativist but as an absolutist. Nakae was also a representative democrat in the Meiji period. Maruyama takes the following idea out from his reading of Nakae’s *Three Drunkards on Government*: As our sense becomes sharper about the difficulty and the multiphasic character of problems, our awareness becomes deeper about the uselessness of deducing a principle of finding a solution. Hence, we cannot understand the essence of Nakae’s idea unless we see both the consistent commitment to the fundamental principle, on the one hand, and the multifaceted perspective, on the other.

According to Tanaka’s understanding, Maruyama evaluates that unlike the radical positions of the other two characters, the seemingly moderate stance of Dr. Nankai is in fact close to the nihilist position with the “sense of abandonment.” As mentioned earlier, Maruyama also finds such nihilistic political insight in Fukuzawa’s political thought. Tanaka summarizes the essence of Maruyama’s theory of otherness as follows:

Traditionally, about *Three Drunkards on Government*, scholars have debated about which character of the three stood for Nakae’s political position. However, Maruyama interprets the same writing from an alternative perspective. He argues that all of the views by the three characters together compose Nakae’s self-dialogue. Yet, his finding does not simply mean that politics requires multifaceted perspectives. Supposing that we all have a different standpoint from someone else, taking the different viewpoints of others into ourselves, and having dialogues permanently between the self and others: these acts must be at the basis of all intellectual activities. This idea expresses Maruyama’s final philosophical position. (Tanaka 2009, 247–248)

Tanaka concludes that through his academic journey, Maruyama confirmed that the strong subjectivity of an individual could be nurtured through having the inner-self dialogue between the self and others constantly.
The Inner-Self Dialogue in Politics and in Everyday Life

Ishida (2005) mentions that in his “On Peace for the Third Time’, Chapter 1 and Chapter 2” (Maruyama 1950: CW, vol. 5), Maruyama problematized the phenomenon that Japanese society was approaching the “prison-garrison-state,” which was discussed by Harold Lasswell (American political scientist, 1902–1978) in the intensification of the Cold War. In this type of society, observed are the following phenomena: 1) the increase of military secrets, 2) the development of a larger spy network and domestic security systems, and 3) the spread of witch-hunting hysteria and suspicious eyes toward those who question and criticize the government.

According to Ishida’s observation, immediately after the terrorist attacks in New York in 2001, while worrying about the outbreak of the same type of social hysteria, Ishida points out the significance of Maruyama’s theory of others. After the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, repressive circumstances in US society led to the establishment of a series of laws and regulations related to the Patriot Act. In Japan, the emergency laws had been established in rapid succession by uncritically following the international policy of the United States and taking advantage of the social disturbance. Ishida observes that the social trend of eliminating the sense of otherness from people became prevalent in both countries. For instance, American national sentiment was highly provoked in those days. The public spaces were flooded with the Stars and Stripes, and it became difficult to inherently understand ordinary Muslim neighbors. In Japan, the virtue of tolerance for others and the sense of otherness of citizens were seriously damaged as well. In public schools, flying the national flag and singing the anthem were enforced not only by the authorities concerned but also by the nationalistic “atmosphere.” The nationalist movement drowned out anti-Japanese statements and behavior.
In “Encounter with the Other,” Maruyama describes the meaning of cultural contact between the subject and others, in which our recognition of others bounces back to ourselves. He focuses on the interplay between recognition of others by the subject and self-recognition of the subject. He remarks: “In deepening our recognition of others as equal and as independent, we become able to relativize ourselves or the cultural group that we belong to; we will be able to sharpen the eye of self-criticism” (Maruyama and Hagiwara 1976: Conv., vol. 7). Dialogue based on the sense of otherness can be formed when the self as an independent entity understands others as an equal and independent partner. He criticizes those who do not have an attachment to unnamed people and those who do not have the sense of otherness for appreciating more vulnerable people as the equal and independent existence. These types of people would be easily mobilized in a heteronomous form because they lose the autonomy of the self before the stronger or the superior.

In “Zōhoban Gendaiseiji no Shisō to Kōdō Tsuiki, Hoki” [Excursus and Postscript for Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics], Maruyama remarks, “We are facing a difficult task of learning both the ‘value-free’ observation and the activeness for choosing values” (1964: CW, vol. 9. Emphasis Maruyama’s). We can understand that the subject can objectify itself from the perspective of others because the subject chooses its own value decisively. Because we respect the sense of valuing others and attempt to understand others inherently, the subject will be able to recognize things without having a bias. Not only from the theoretical perspective, but also the practical one, Maruyama suggests that it is important for the Japanese to change their introverted mentality by maintaining the small, everyday practice of having inner-self dialogue.

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3.3 Cosmopolitanism as the Sense of Neighbors: Universality behind Particularity

For the purpose of having the sense of otherness and starting an inner-self dialogue based on the sense, Maruyama also suggests that the subject should have an experience to face the “authoritative thing” or the “absolute being.” The following manuscript left in his personal notebooks is an important source for analyzing his idea:

i) The approval of authority is a phenomenon unique to human beings. The animals do not know about being obedient to authority. They just know the physical power relationship (“law of the jungle”). ii) In human society, similarly, if the internal restriction of invisible authority—the authority of God, truth, justice, reason, and heaven—weakens, the restriction of virtually visible authority increases—the authority easily perceptible. (“We must obey God rather than men” . . .). The independence not only from political power but also from economic profits, the public opinion, “the global movement,” and the collective conscious cannot be secured without approving the absolute authority. A simple denial of any authority is indistinguishable from the self-assertion of animals. In the acknowledgement of the authority of “reason,” reason can finally be distinguished from simple self-assertion, when reason is viewed as the universal beyond the relationship between the self and others. By contrast, we are not eligible to talk about “reason” unless we know how to relativize our own group before the absolute authority. What distinguishes the self of animals from “right” is again the approval of the universality of rights, and thus the recognition of others. (Dialogue with Myself 1998, 229. Emphasis Maruyama’s)

In the 1960s, the development of Maruyama’s prototype theory corresponded with his attempt to expose the ideologies of Japanese parochialism, which periodically broke out on a national scale in modern Japanese history. Moreover, he criticized in theory that theorists of national polity arbitrarily used Japanese mythology. His epistemology of universality and particularity is related to this criticism of the exclusive types of nationalism. In his “Nihon no Kindaika to Dochaku” [The Modernization of Japan and Localism], he remarks:

When someone says, “Get to the universal thing through the particular thing,” I want to oppose the idea in an instant, by saying, “Wait a minute, it doesn’t work so easy.” If you study the world intellectual history even just a little, you should realize that when the breakthrough from particularity to universality is achieved, a dramatic qualitative leap—
the “conversion,” in a religious sense—has been accomplished out there in both cases of the individuals and ethnic groups. Obviously, it is different from a protracted development [of Japanese indigenous thought] at a slow pace. (Maruyama 1968: CW, vol. 9, 369–370)

Maruyama criticizes the naïve idea of a continuum—some Japanese traditionalists expect that Japanese indigenous thought naturally turns to universal thought if we simply emphasize Japan’s indigeneity. By contrast, in Maruyama’s view, an idea has its birthplace; if an idea wants to prove its universal value for all humankind, the idea needs to be disconnected once from the local characteristic of its birthplace. In order to prove its universal value, the idea needs to pass the test of removing its indigenous character.

Of course, there is some risk that the absolute authority is used selfishly for the purpose of claiming the legitimacy of the self or the collective self of a particular group for dominating over others. However, according to Maruyama’s description, the absolute authority means something which is able to relativize the self or the collective self of a group. He expects that the absolute authority has a power to dissolve the egocentrism of the self and to eliminate the dichotomous mentality of dividing insiders and outsiders. The absolute authority provides an opportunity for the Japanese to have equal dialogues with “other beings.”

Maruyama calls this awakening consciousness “cosmopolitanism as the sense of neighbors.” He seeks a way for the Japanese to have the sense and to get over Japanese localism, introverted thought patterns, and narcissism that understands the world order by placing Japan at the center. His cosmopolitan idea exhorts the Japanese to reconsider the idea that “cosmopolitan people” are someone who live in far places outside Japan. Rather, Maruyama argues that ordinary neighbors, whom the Japanese meet in their daily lives, are themselves cosmopolitans.
Hence, he suggests that each of Japanese people should be a cosmopolitan person and play a role of the world citizen in everyday life.

In Maruyama’s discourses, the concept of cosmopolitanism as the sense of neighbors is also restated as “universal consciousness.” In his “Fuhen’ishiki Kaku Nihon no Shisō: Maruyama Masao-shi o Kakonde” [Japanese Thought Lacking Universal Consciousness: Conversation with Mr. Masao Maruyama], he describes it as follows:

The idea of [universal] human rights derived not from Greek philosophy but from Christianity, and it was enacted in the bourgeois constitutions. Yet it does not come out without the above image of universal human nature or human beings, right? It does not come out without ideas that universality exits behind particularity, or universality is the basis of particularity. It does not come out unless it gets through the idea of cosmopolitanism. For us [the Japanese people], there is no more confusing idea than that of cosmopolitanism. This is, for us, the world exists outside our society. For instance, although the Shirakaba School named themselves cosmopolitans, for me, there is no other group whose ideas are so infected by Japanese ideas. Rather, each of us can be a member of the cosmopolitan or the human race in the duality of being the world citizens and being the Japanese people simultaneously. We should see ourselves in a new light. It is not true that the universal thing exists outside the particular thing, and the pursuit of particularity produces universality. Besides, universality and particularity always overlap with each other in order to emerge. (Maruyama 1964: CW, vol. 16, 59)

In 1967, in a conversation with Shunsuke Tsurumi, Maruyama reiterates that he does not prefer the dichotomous notions of the West versus the East, or, Japan versus foreign countries. Considering the reason for the formation of the dichotomous mindset, he looks to the geographical condition of Japan: neither too far from nor too near to Eurasia. Because of the condition, in cultural contact, the Japanese have extended time in which to make a choice of what elements they should accept and add to Japanese indigenous thought and their way of life. In this context of their dialogue, Maruyama shows his idea of cosmopolitanism as follows:

Some apply the ideas like “Japan versus USA,” or “Japan versus Indonesia.” As symbolized by the expression of “Japan versus foreign countries,” however, the non-
Japanese world is all mixed up in the name of “foreign countries.” In the old days, the world was represented by China. Since the Meiji period, the world has become “the West,” instead. Besides, it means the Western powers, or the Western countries, rather than mean civilization. Therefore, then as now, there is no more unpopular word than cosmopolitanism in Japan. It is ridiculous that some refer the Shirakaba School as a group of cosmopolitans. Yet, their idea is, rather, a good example that the worship of foreign modes and Japanese tastes are combined in a peculiar manner. By contrast, I can see a cosmopolitan idea in the religious thought of Dōgen [Japanese monk of Zen Buddhism, 1200-1253] or Shinran. Again, because these [Kamakura Buddhism] are universal religions, the individuals directly face the absolute truth. Their doctrines become like a sort of the principle of world citizens. They never think of Buddhism as the idea of [particular] “country.” Thus, [unlike the Japanese in contemporary society] they do not have an idea of bringing something from somewhere else and improving it inside of their home [country].

It can be also called internationalism [in his nuance, meaning the same as “cosmopolitanism” here]. When all is said and done, the idea was what came out after nationalism. Therefore, I think that unless cosmopolitanism, like “Home is wherever one lays one’s hat” or “You can make your living anywhere in this world,” comes out, [healthy] nationalism will never take root in Japan, instead of [the domination of] “introverted” nationalism. (Maruyama and Tsurumi, 1967: Conv., vol. 7, 113. Emphasis Maruyama’s)

In the late 1960s, while seeing the gradual development of cultural globalization in Japanese society on the one hand, Maruyama foresaw the difficulty of the spiritual innovation that would have occurred in the Japanese in the future, on the other:

Tsurumi: So, [the Japanese style of] cocooning becomes the prototype of the thought pattern of insider versus outsider that you mentioned earlier, right?

Maruyama: Yes, it does. The thought pattern can be subdivided infinitely. In the case of company, it becomes the division of our company and your company. Inside the company, it becomes our section and your section. They are like similar triangles, and the smallest one is the notion of my home and your home. Therefore, although some speak of the conflict between the principle of self-annihilation for the sake of one’s country and that of cocooning, actually, these two are coexisting from the very beginning.

Maruyama: . . . Yet the idea of insider/outside will not be able to sustain itself owing to the rapid change [of cultural globalization in Japanese society]. In that sense, I’m repeatedly telling people about the importance of the opening of the country. But I am not speaking of just the geographical opening, such as international exchange. What is really difficult is the spiritual opening of this country: bringing a heterogeneous principle to
ourselves, and having constant conversations with it [in the mind’s eye]. While Tsurumi-san has a fanatic side (laughs), I am impressed because you also have that sense. Some persistently advocate having a dialogue; yet, generally speaking, only a few people are capable of having inner-self dialogues. Instead, dogmatic ideas are just clashing with each other. (Maruyama and Tsurumi 1967: Conv., vol. 7, 114)

As confirmed earlier, Maruyama’s arguments were specifically developed for the Japanese audience. Behind the development of his cosmopolitan idea, there was a particular social background. He felt he needed to tackle the malady of the Japanese style of parochialism and the introverted mentality of the people. He also argued that the Japanese should have moments to face the absolute authority having the function of objectifying external environmental factors such as political power and authority, the economic principle of profit seeking, the public opinion, and the spiritual climate of the times. Yet he did not specify the identity of the absolute authority, the transcendent existence, or Idee in other words. We will discuss this point again in Chapter 6.

**Summary of Part I**

We have extracted the seven basic philosophical ideas of Maruyama’s political thought.

First, his political thought has the following characteristics: 1) in his study of intellectual history and politics, he focuses on the mode of thinking of thinkers and politicians; 2) his works basically limit the reader to the Japanese, except a few speech transcripts written for his presentation in Anglo-American countries; 3) he views things and the world as fluid. His philosophy of fluidity leads him to his political thought emphasizing the mobility, processes, and dynamism of politics. His idea of “democracy as a permanent revolution” is an example of the application of this philosophy. The philosophy also influences his analyses of real politics.
Next, he analyzes the pathologies of immature political thinking and passive political consciousness of the Japanese by using the concepts of subjectivity, modernity, responsibility for the result, and decision.

Lastly, through his philosophy of dialogue, Maruyama encourages the Japanese to attempt the active interaction between the self and others, the constant introspection of the self, and the occasional encounter between the self and the transcendent existence for the purpose of overcoming the passiveness and narrow-mindedness of the Japanese national character.

Importantly, these philosophical ideas of his political thought are also presented in the writings of the two English editions, *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics* (1969) and *Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan* (1974). There was his constant concern about the premodern characteristic of mentality of the Japanese people behind his writings and discourses on a variety of topics. The serious concern provided his arguments with consistency through different areas of his studies.

In addition, his scholarly productivity (see Endnote 4) also helps us to analyze his thought patterns. It becomes possible for us to indicate his favorite logic, reasoning patterns, and historical episodes, which are repeatedly employed in his works. If Maruyama were an unprolific scholar, even if he used some important logic a few times, such as a “vicious cycle,” a “paradox,” an “eternal incompleteness,” an “accumulation at random,” the “vertical-horizontal dichotomy,” and the “internal-external dichotomy,” researchers would not be able to ascertain the importance of the logical patterns of his thought. In this study, I have omitted an introduction of Maruyama’s favorite logic and rhetoric and their meanings to the reader. Although Western readers can tentatively gain the basic knowledge of Maruyama’s political philosophy based on my study, I would like to encourage the reader to explore peer reviews of other already-translated texts of the
above two English editions in order to confirm the accuracy of my structural analysis of his political philosophy.
Part II  Japanese Ethnocentrism and the Awakening of a Cosmopolitan Thinker

In Part II, I conduct biographical research on Maruyama for the purpose of understanding the social background that prompted him to be a cosmopolitan political thinker from inside Japan.

Maruyama was an innately tolerant person and had the sense of justice from the time of his youth. Yet I advance the thesis that his personal experiences confronting the social phenomena of “compulsory homogenization,” which periodically broke out at the national scale in Japanese modern history and gave birth to his unique cosmopolitan idea in a more conscious form. His experience of the “dark age” and “ultra-nationalism” forced him to face the psychological weakness of the Japanese and its influence on Japanese politics. Yet he realized that the problem was not resolved by Japan’s postwar democratization. We notice that the number of his texts more directly appealing to the Japanese to break their introverted national character increases starting in the late 1970s, as he became more aware of the seriousness of the politico-psychological problem.

In Maruyama’s theory, both problems, a) the occurrence of mobocracy and conformism in Japan (i.e., the political phenomenon) and b) the lack of modern subjectivity of the Japanese and their collectivism (i.e., the psychological and cultural aspects), are tightly related. On the one hand, he criticizes the social elite, including political leaders and intellectuals, who easily convert their political views in order to follow popular trends. On the other hand, he criticizes the immaturity of the political consciousness of the public. He criticizes the Japanese public that has not obtained the spirit of modern subjectivity on the individual level despite the modernization of their country. He thinks that the weak mentality of the Japanese public becomes the initial cause of their inactivity in politics and the psychological aspect affects how their political attitudes become subservient to those of the elite and authority. The goal of maturing the political
consciousness of the Japanese public also becomes the primary reason for his study of Japanese intellectual history, to strike at the root of their psychological weakness before government authority. As a result of the underdevelopment of modern individualism on the psychological level, the authoritarian political climate remains in Japan to this day. From the overall perspective, in the political sphere, the majority of the Japanese public still shows today the sign of their obedient tendency toward authority.

Through his study of intellectual history, including his unfinished study of “orthodoxy and heterodoxy,” Maruyama was also knowledgeable about historical cases of political and religious persecution around the world.

Nevertheless, in this study, I would like to introduce several cases from his real-life experiences confronting the various forms of totalitarian social movements, which cracked down on those who did not adapt to the established system. I take five important cases into consideration, in which his friends, teachers, colleagues, and he himself became involved. His politico-psychological study of the weak mentality of the Japanese individuals is closely related to his experiences of strife in political reality under siege of persecution against people of conscience by the conformism of social members and the totalitarianization of society.
Chapter 4  The Person of Principle under Conformism

4.1 Philosophical Cultivation in Collective Violence

Case 1: The Tsuda Incident (Japanese Fanaticism)

In the summer of 1937, Japan invaded the Republic of China and Japan-U.S. and Japan-U.K. relationship was also worsening. In Japan, nationalistic intellectual movements radicalized, and the crackdown on thought by the government had become more extreme (Matsuzawa and Uete 2006, vol. 1, Chapter 7). Publications that were suspected of desecrating the divinity of the Emperor were slandered in nationalistic magazines. Books that attracted the attention of the authorities were subject to being banned. Some famous cases of the prohibition on academic books were concentrated after the mid-1930s. Some cases of forcible resignation of scholars also occurred due to the pressure exerted by the authorities.

In 1939, a history class of Oriental political thought was newly established at Tokyo Imperial University. The original aim of the government for setting the course was to provide lectures of the history of Japanese and Chinese political thought by revising the conventional lectures of the history of political theory, which mainly taught Western political history. The department chairperson Shigeru Nanbara (political philosopher; Maruyama’s mentor) decided to invite Sōkichi Tsuda (historian, 1873–1961) as the first lecturer from Waseda University as a test case, before Nanbara would entrust the course to Maruyama.

Although Tsuda himself sincerely respected the Emperor, his scientific study of ancient texts such as the *Kojiki* (古事記; literally, records of ancient matters) and the *Nihonshoki* (日本書紀; literally, chronicles of Japan) pointed out the fictitiousness of the genealogy of the imperial family. Nationalists considered Tsuda’s study to be a rejection of the myth of the
genealogical continuity of the Imperial Family. They then aimed to eliminate Tsuda from the academic society.

In *Memoirs of Masao Maruyama* (Matsuzawa and Uete 2006), Maruyama describes the background of why Tokyo Imperial University invited Tsuda:

Yes, the purpose of the establishment [of the new course] was properly written for submitting to the Ministry of Education. . . . It was what scholars such as Sakuzō Yoshino and Kaoru Nakata started when Yoshino-san began [lecturing modern philosophy of] the Meiji period. Nanbara-sensei took over the project for those predecessors. . . . As you may know, Nanbara-sensei had to take on tremendous responsibility for the project. It had a significant potential to open the history course of Eastern political thought at that time. Since the first lecture was very important, the department decided to ask Tsuda-sensei. That was Nanbara-sensei’s decision. I did not give him any suggestions. Because he expected the application would be accepted soon, it seemed that he studied the history of Eastern political thought. He was thinking that Tsuda-san was the only person to ask, so sensei visited him to negotiate. Then he got immediately interested in the scholar. [He had the] typical appearance of a Confucian scholar, buried among books in a small house. Nanbara-sensei was attracted, first of all, by his simple lifestyle. Of course, the content of his study was also another reason he invited him. (Matsuzawa and Uete 2006, vol. 1, 220–221)

The government wanted the faculty of law to open the course to indoctrinate the candidates of the social elite with nationalistic ideas. The beginning of the course with Tsuda instead showed that the course became different from the government’s expectation. Tsuda became involved in an academic persecution by the department’s attempt. Before Tsuda gave his lecture, the department was already watched by right-wing activists for its anti-establishment attitude. Maruyama reviewed the incident and remarked that if Tsuda had not accepted the invitation from the department, the Tsuda incident would not have occurred; Tsuda’s visit to the department gave the right-wing activists a great opportunity to attack the faculty.

Between October 30 and December 4 in 1939, six lectures were given by Tsuda. The content of his lectures covered the history of political thought in the pre-Qin era. Maruyama remembered that the lecture had about sixty to seventy auditors. Immediately after he finished
his last lecture, Tsuda was challenged by nationalists, who were dispatched from a right-wing group and infiltrated the class by hiding behind ordinary students, to answer ideological questions. The aim of the nationalists was to expel Tsuda by recording and reporting his inappropriate remarks about the Emperor. The young Maruyama, who also infiltrated the class as an observer at Nanbara’s instruction, could not restrain his anger toward the rude and intimidating behavior of the nationalists against Tsuda, who was calmly trying to have a conversation with them. Impetuously, he ran up to the podium and quarreled with the nationalists.

According to Maruyama’s explanation, they were some members of the Student Association. The group was a Nazi-like student organization which was created by the right-wing group Genri Nihonsha of Muneki Minoda (wartime fanatic nationalist, 1894–1946) and others. The group was sponsored by members of the House of Lords, the military, and the business community. The organization had its branches in several major public and private universities and issued newspapers. The group usually sent open letters demanding apologies from liberal scholars of the department of law or the department of economics at Tokyo Imperial University, which were being monitored by the authorities in those days. Regardless of their majors and registration statuses, the group sent spies to the departments; the members snuck into classrooms, spied on lectures, reported to the responsible authorities, and asked the authorities to take action against the liberal scholars. For example, the association had played a major role in the incident regarding Professor Eijirō Kawai (social philosopher and economist, 1891–1944), which had happened one year before the Tsuda incident. The Department of Law, caught in the crossfire from Minoda’s group, subjected to a student activist to expulsion, who was the most influential member of the organization, and took a stance to confront the nationalist group openly. Taking every opportunity, the group members attempted to mobilize the forces behind them and
had become obsessed with dealing a fatal wound to the department. It was in the midst of this situation that Tsuda was invited to the department.

In “Aruhi no Tsuda-hakushi to Watashi” [Dr. Tsuda and I at That Day] (Maruyama 1963: CW, vol. 9), Maruyama also vividly described the scene how the nationalists intruded into the last lecture:

Professor finished his last lecture by saying quietly as usual “Now, I’ve finished my lecture. Thank you,” and he bowed slightly. Just then, shouting out “Question! I have a question!” some students raised their hands from here and there in the classroom. I was a little surprised at the quick reaction and the stabbing tone of their voices, but I did not have further skepticism at that right moment. A “student” who was pointed to by the professor stood and started asking his “question.” Although his manner of speaking was polite, it seemed to be prepared in advance indeed, and there was no stagnation. His pitch became gradually faster, and it became closer to the one-sided speech tone. (Maruyama 1963: CW, vol. 9, 123–124. Emphasis Maruyama’s)

Two points of Tsuda’s argument caused the nationalists’ anger of the nationalists: First, Confucianism has not in any way affected the real life of the Japanese people; second, China and Japan have developed under very different philosophical traditions. These ideas resulted in Tsuda’s idea, expressed in his Chinese Thought and Japan, that the belief in producing the ligaments of the coexistence between both countries from Confucian ideas would be complete falsehood (2006, vol. 1,223–224). Although Tsuda basically did not mention the topic in his lectures, in the nationalists’ view, Tsuda’s idea implied that there was no ideological basis for the diplomatic proposal of Imperial Japan for the creation of a new order of East Asia under cooperation between China and Japan. Tsuda’s idea invited emotional objections from the nationalists because they misunderstood that his study was denying the meaning of Second Sino-Japanese War (July 7, 1937–September 2, 1945).

The nationalists also threw the following issues against Tsuda: In his lecture, Chinese Confucianism is regarded as just an aggregate of various ideas that were made up by a particular
intellectual group. They just projected their own philosophy onto history. It was born under the very specific social and political conditions of ancient China. From the very beginning, the thought could hardly become forceful enough to affect politics and society in those days. Tsuda claims that the philosophy had rarely interplayed with real life of the Chinese people, not only at that time, but also through its long history. Consequently, Tsuda sees the value of Chinese Confucianism as low indeed.

The general bent of their criticism was as follows: Tsuda completely denies the connection between Confucianism and Japanese culture and asserts that such “Eastern culture” does not exist together through China and Japan. The nationalists claim that through this holy war, our brethren shed blood every day to strive to create a new order of East Asia; Imperial Japan is struggling to awaken China from the illusions of Western liberalism, democracy, and communism, which have poisoned Asia for many years; Japan aims to restore the culture and traditions of the East in partnership between China and Japan; however, Tsuda’s thesis fundamentally denies the cultural meaning of the holy war.

Listening to such ideological questions, Maruyama immediately realized the truth of the situation. In some bewilderment and tension, he quickly deliberated how to make the interrupters settle down. For a while, he was listening to their “questions” from a back seat. After a few questions and answers were exchanged, several auditors continuously stood up and asked other questions without interruption. Their tone was gradually getting close to cross-examination. Maruyama dashed from his seat to the podium as his patience snapped. Without introducing himself, he started raging at the impolite questioners and refuted them as follows:

I think you all know it by the opening remark of Professor Nanbara: Although Professor Tsuda has never given lectures in other schools, he came all the way here for our selfish request, and he gave us great lectures to celebrate the opening of this course on the
As if they were frightened or threatened, the “students” stopped questioning for a while. In an oppressive atmosphere of the classroom, Maruyama took Tsuda to the waiting room next to the classroom. Breathing a sigh of relief, and sat down in a chair; soon, nearly twenty people entered the room with noisy footsteps, surrounded a round table in the middle, and sat down around Maruyama and Tsuda. Some were dressed in hakama haori (the Japanese formal attire). They did not look like students at all. They then began impeaching Tsuda in the waiting room.

Maruyama vividly remembered the scene:

Their act was well planned in advance. Though we can use a tape recorder today, they opened a notebook, and the chief questioner sat there. They were members of Genri Nihonsha. I knew the name. They continued asking questions endlessly.

I asked sensei in the beginning, “Would you like to answer their questions?” He said to me, “Since I gave a lecture, it is my obligation to answer questions.” Because I couldn’t tell him not to do it, I decided to stay beside him. Their attitudes were increasingly becoming more violent in tone. (2006, vol. 1, 223–224)

The nationalists’ questions went far beyond the content of the lecture, and they criticized the entire spectrum of Tsuda’s study and thought. They rebuked him by insisting that, contrary to the idea of the national polity of Japan, his idea denies the great spirit that Chikafusa Kitabatake (court noble, 1293–1354) described in his Jinnō Shōtōki [Succession of Imperial Rulers in Japan]. In this way, their accusation was well planned so that every discussion ended up with their already-prepared conclusion. From the beginning, they tried to ignore Maruyama, who was beside Tsuda, yet he attempted to break into their dispute and fought back against the nationalists. Later, he explained his feelings of that day:
At that moment, I was almost psychologically assimilating with Dr. Tsuda rather than simply defending the professor. My feeling was closer, like I wanted to deal with my own trouble. There was even a scene in which Dr. Tsuda lightly chided me because I was so excited to rebut the nationalists. I was deeply impressed by Dr. Tsuda, who, without breaking in his posture and facial expression, sincerely repeated, explaining his position to the flood of slander exaggeratingly brandishing taboo and waving the Imperial flag of brocade. Yet I was also irritated by his patience at that time.

Although the lecture finished at five in the evening, it was already after eight o’clock. I took him out by force, telling him “Sensei, let’s go home. It’s useless to discuss with this kind of fanatic people.” I remember the scene well because I used the word fanatic. Then they did not chase us anymore. But we really felt miserable. I thought it had become a very obnoxious age. Mr. Tsuda and I opened an umbrella, went out through the main gate, and walked in the rain. We were almost speechless. There was a restaurant named Morinaga in 1-Chome, Hongô. It was almost the closing time, yet we asked the shop to stay open, so we could eat something. In a while, Tsuda-sensei quietly told me, “That kind of people will deteriorate the imperial family of Japan.” His idea was surprising to me. Moreover, during that dispute, a student had asked him, “Is your idea a materialistic view of history?” He had contemptuously replied, “A materialistic view of history is not academic at all.” These two points were what made me feel uncomfortable. (2006, vol. 1, 224)

About two months after this incident, Tsuda’s four books were banned. Subsequently, in March 1940, Tsuda and Shigeo Iwanami (1881–1946), the editor responsible for their publication, came to be prosecuted on suspicion of violating the wartime press law. Soon held was the “National Assembly for the Eradication of the Law Department of Tokyo University.”

In “Dr. Tsuda and I at That Day”, Maruyama considers the meaning of the particular incident that he witnessed in the entire context of the Tsuda incident (see Endnote 5). He also suggests that we should consider the meaning of the Tsuda incident in the great flow of Japanese intellectual history. The incident was a case that broke out in a series of incidents of suppression of academic freedom, for example the emperor organ theory incident (1935), the Takigawa incident (1933), the Yanaihara incident (1937), and the Eijirō Kawai case (1938–39). Maruyama assessed that the incident on the final day of Tsuda’s lecture was merely one of the fragmentary
episodes in the overall development of the problem of wartime suppression of academic freedom. He revisited the incident reasonably and remarked that even if it had not happened that particular day, the situation surrounding Tsuda would sooner or later be dragged up by fanatic right-wing activists or by other conformists to the militarist government. Maruyama concluded that Tsuda would be trapped eventually in a similar situation either way.

The episode marks the first time that Maruyama, as a young scholar, had confronted fanatic nationalists face-to-face. At the time, he was not an influential figure in the academic community. His act was merely mentioned in a nationalist magazine reporting the incident: “Although a certain assistant was frequently interrupting. . .” (CW, vol. 9, 129).

After the incident, until the end of the war in August 1945, the Department of Law at Tokyo Imperial University was watched by nationalist groups and the government. At the same time, the department was also a body of significant power that did not allow the government to intervene in its decision-making. The institution kept a certain amount of independence and autonomy. As will be examined later, Nanbara and six other scholars of the department attempted a secret mission to end the war by contacting liberal senior politicians and the Navy. However, Maruyama could not be directly involved in the movement because he was drafted in Hiroshima.

Case 2: The Norman Incident (McCarthyism)

When the storm of the Red Purge in Japan (1949–1950) and McCarthyism in the United States culminated, Maruyama lost his friend Herbert Norman (Japanese-born Canadian diplomat, historian, and scholar in Japanese studies, 1909–1957) as a victim of McCarthyism. Norman was forced to commit suicide during his tenure as ambassador to Egypt under suspicion for a Marxist
(Maruyama 1957: CW, vol. 7). In his later years, reflecting on the Red Purge, Maruyama remarked: “I could not predict that the trend of democratization would change into a reactionary political climate in such an early period.” He criticized himself for his optimistic observation in the early postwar period. He had expected the success of social change of Japan by the transition from the totalitarian regime to a new democratic country.

Owing to the disclosure of information in the post-Cold War era, some commentators argue that Norman was in fact a spy for the Soviet Union. Yet it is unclear if he was a member of the Communist Party and worked as a spy for the Soviet Union in the context of real politics, like Richard Sorge (1895–1944) or Hotsumi Ozaki (1901–1944).

As seen below, although Maruyama decisively defended in proof of his friend’s innocence, in our investigation, we do not discuss the authenticity if Norman was actually a spy for the Soviet Union, and if so, how much his activities influenced international politics at that time. He is a social scientist, historian, and scholar of Japanese studies. His personal political ideology and his academic works should be dealt with separately. However, from the trajectory of his recorded remarks, it is possible to infer that he had a philosophical tendency toward leftist thinking in the sense not of real politics, but political thought. He was initiated in Marxism when he studied at Cambridge University in the early 1930s intellectual climate.18 Since he was a sworn friend and follower of John Cornford (1915–1936), who was killed in the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), it might be true that he was a Marxist during a certain period. Cornford was a theorist who struggled to release Marxism from the understanding of the Soviet Communist Party. But we need to examine Marxist influence on Norman in the context of intellectual history.

rather than in the context of Marxist political movement. In this study, we focus on verifying that his friendship with Maruyama and the event of his suicide became an important opportunity for Maruyama to tackle the problem of compulsory homogenization—that the individuals would be obliterated by mass hysteria, pressuring to ideologically assimilate.

In January 1940, Norman visited Japan for the appointment as a language officer of the Canadian delegation in Japan. In 1941, he published his doctoral thesis at Harvard University as *Japanese Emergence as a Modern State* from the Institute of Pacific Relations. The book influenced the United States’s view of Japan right before the outbreak of the Pacific War. In December 1941, due to the outbreak of the war, he was detained and repatriated to Canada in August of the following year. During this period, Norman invited Maruyama and his senior colleague Yasaka Takagi (political scientist, 1889–1984) to his home. They had a friendly conversation, and Maruyama was impressed by Norman’s erudition and humanity. After the war, in September 1945, Norman came to Japan again as the research director of the counterintelligence and analysis section of the office of Supreme Command of the Allied Forces. In this year, he finished writing his third book, *Feudal Background of Japanese Politics*. In 1953, he was appointed as High Commissioner for New Zealand. From May to June 1955, he came to Japan on vacation. During his stay in Japan, Norman visited Maruyama, who was receiving medical treatment at his home. This became the last occasion for the two scholars to see each other.

In September 1956, Norman came to Cairo for the appointment as ambassador to Egypt and a minister for Lebanon. In the wake of the declaration of the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Egypt, Israeli forces invaded the Sinai Peninsula in October and the Suez Crisis broke out. British and French troops occupied the port side area. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser
(1918–1970) and Lester B. Pearson (1897–1972), Foreign Minister of Canada, attempted to take the initiative to relieve tension of the Cold War. Norman, who had been trusted by both politicians, made great efforts for a cease-fire between the two sides. Monitored by the United Nations Emergency Force, their efforts achieved the truce. The expansion of the war stopped.

However, in the meantime, the subcommittee for national security of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, which once had made a relentless attack on Norman on suspicion that he was a member of the Communist Party between 1951 and 1952, brought up the same attack again. March 14, the committee announced the proceedings of the summons, and it broadcast the content on the radio. It reported that it became “apparent” that Canadian Ambassador to Egypt Norman is a member of the Communist Party. Furthermore, at that time, the committee summoned Norman’s old friend, Shigeto Tsuru (Japanese economist; a classmate of Norman at Harvard University, 1912–2006), who was staying in the States at the time. Norman was cornered further. On March 26 and 27, 1952, Tsuru had been invited to the program of the committee of the U.S.-Japan scholarly exchange. He was also a visiting professor at Harvard University. In the U.S. Senate, Norman was again investigated for his suspicion by the FBI, whose investigator questioned Tsuru. On April 4, 1957, Norman committed suicide in Cairo.

“E. Hābāto Nōman o Itamu” [An Appreciation for E. Herbert Norman] (Maruyama 1957: CW, vol. 7) is the memorial essay for Norman written by Maruyama, who was shocked by Norman’s suicide. The essay was originally published on the Mainichi Newspaper over twice, under the titles of “An Affection for the Lesser Names: On Herbert Norman” and “Tolerance Beleaguered by Intolerance: On Herbert Norman.” One of the editors for Collected Works of Masao Maruyama, Hiroaki Matsuzawa, explains that the international circumstances from 1955 to 1956 were illustrated as movements of détente for easing tensions of the Cold War in one
sense (Maruyama 1957: CW, vol. 7). The international condition emerged in the wake of de-Stalinization in Eastern Europe. It was in these years that the race for developing nuclear weapons intensified between the United States and the Soviet Union, but at the same time both countries sought to lower the tension between them.

Matsuzawa explains that the above articles clarify what position Maruyama took in such an international situation and how he saw it. In Maruyama’s view, treating Norman’s suicide as “a case” and prying into the background and cause leads to the meaningless abstraction of the incident. He could not motivate himself to connect the report of the Committee for National Security in the U.S. Senate, much less Tsuru’s testimony, to his friend’s death. In any case, no one can deny that relentless attacks over several years by Joseph McCarthy (American politician, 1908–1957) and his imitators in the United States seriously damaged Norman’s honor and tormented his mind and body. Maruyama remarked that judging from either his temperament or his thought, we can easily understand how ridiculous it is to put the label of communist on Norman, even if the above-mentioned childish report hysterically attacked him.

For Maruyama, the problem is not what a communist means in an objective sense. The problem is what it particularly means when William E. Jenner (member of the U.S. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, 1908–1985) and Robert J. Morris (the subcommittee’s counsel, 1914–1996) condemn someone as a communist. According to them, first, it means those who lack the normal quality of human beings. In their expression, it became synonymous with gangs and rogues. Second, it is same as the spies of the Soviet Union. Maruyama remarked:

For those who know the gentleman’s manner, and for diplomats who represent a country, I must say that calling them out like that is a malicious slander of their personality. In the old days, the quarrel was put to a duel immediately. However, these people in question are, borrowing the words of Canadian Foreign Minister Pearson, exactly the ones who deserved to be treated with the sense of disdain. In other words, they are political gangs
unworthy to duel with. If Norman, who loved the beauty of human nature in that manner and who trusted possibilities of persuasion by the intellect in that manner, had to kill himself and had to reach the end of his short life in the siege of prejudice, intolerance, and fanaticism, what should we do after his death? (Maruyama 1957: CW, vol. 7)

Maruyama showed his anger in this way. Norman’s suicide happened during the intensification of the Cold War on the stage of international politics from the United States to the Middle East.

In the roundtable discussion “Jōkyō, Soshiki, Ningen: Tsuru Shōgen o Megutte” [Situation, Organization, and Human: Concerning the Testimony of Tsuru] (Maruyama 1957: See also Matsuzawa’s commentary on CW, vol. 7, 395–399), Maruyama criticized the relationship between the subcommittee and Karl August Wittfogel (German-American historian; sinologist, 1896–1988) and his fatally adverse testimony against Norman: “I thought it was an unforgivable betrayal for friends.” In his commentary on Collected Works of Kōji Iizuka, vol. 5, he also showed his rage: “Concerning this issue, I can’t abate my fury at Wittfogel’s betrayal until today” (Maruyama 1976: CW, vol. 10).

In the same roundtable discussion above, regarding the Norman suicide case as an expression of the spreading global repression over freedom of thought and speech, Maruyama considered the meaning of the incident as follows:

I want to see that kind of attitude of the U.S. Senate as one of the world phenomena of the contemporary times. In other words, it’s become another new age of the inquisition in this twentieth century. . . . Needless to say, freedom of speech and thought, or respect for the privacy and the secrecy of correspondence and so on, these were the most precious things that Western democracy was proud of, its own moral superiority above communism until then. Furthermore, the legislature exercised something like the judicial power, but it does not take any responsibility for it. In any case, I think that it is the suicide of Western democracy.

Ishida (2005, 23–24) points out that the Norman incident became a significant impetus for Maruyama to consider the problems of the lack of the sense of otherness and the spirit of
intolerance in contemporary society. From the last sentence in his “Lament for E. Herbert Norman,” Ishida reads Maruyama’s outrage against intolerance of McCarthyism, which suppressed the precious sense of otherness that Norman possessed. Ishida also reads in it Maruyama’s respect for Norman’s sense of otherness that took care of “nameless others.”

**Case 3: The 1960s Japanese Student Protest Movements**

In 1968, as if echoing the social movements of the United States and Western Europe, student protest movements against academic authority heated up in Japan as well. Violent acts by student protesters of Tokyo University reached an extreme level, with fatalities among both students and riot police. Radical student protesters regarded Tokyo University as the very symbol of authority.

Although Maruyama once served as the bodyguard for Tsuda against wartime nationalists, in the riot case on the Tokyo University campus of 1968, this time, Maruyama, who had already earned a good reputation, was targeted as a symbol of Japanese academic authoritarianism. His class was interfered with by student radicals. He was also taken by force on the way to class and pulled into a kangaroo court set up to denounce him. He was taken to the stage of the large auditorium. Hundreds of students sitting in attendance were overlooking him. The condemnation for him was begun by the radical student activists. Although he attempted to have a rational conversation, the student activists labeled him elitist from the beginning, and, in hysteric and coercive manners, they refused to have a constructive dialogue with Maruyama. Forming a crowd, they yelled at and mocked him. Eiji Oguma narrates that Maruyama and the radical student activists could not have a rational conversation at all (Oguma 2006). Maruyama left the following note about a series of turmoil:
In fall of last year [1967], when the executive of [Ichirō] Katō was elected and it accepted most of the seven articles requested by the All-Campus Joint Struggle League, the student group started insisting that what’s matter is not whether accepting the articles or not, but how to accept them. . . . The character of pseudo-religious revolution of the Tokyo University conflict became exposed in those days. Whether the way of acceptance is good or bad is a matter of attitude or conscience, and it cannot be examined by external behavior. Thus it cannot be the issue of social or political struggle, in other words mass movement. . . . the ideological form of completely fruitless exercise, which requests “self-criticism” or the “endless struggle” and which forces to confess so easily in front of the masses about the matter of the inwardness and conscience, was spread in this way. . . . They do not know even what the “freedom of conscience” means; this shows that they have not fully escaped from the prewar type [of mindset]. Yet, why can they name themselves the New Left?” (Dialogue with Myself, 129–130. Emphasis Maruyama’s)

They said, “Reform of the system is not the issue for us. Changing the argument of our ‘revolution’ into the theory of institution is an insult to us.” Their statement that “the seven articles themselves are not important, and what is important is the way of accepting the articles” is related to these arguments. Unfortunately, that kind of argument only indicates the biggest weakness of the lack of their institutional creativity, which they are desperately trying to justify and hide. Even the civil rights activists [in the Meiji period] seriously wrote private drafts for the National Constitution. They should not change the subject by insisting [on being] “anti-university.” (1998, 222. Emphasis Maruyama’s)

Although various evaluations of the 1960s student protest movements in Japan are submitted today, the then student protesters explicitly denied Japan’s “postwar democracy.” Nevertheless, Oguma retraces the history of the movement and remarks that the then twenty-year-old student protesters who were born in 1948 and 1949 hardly understood the variety of Japan’s postwar democracy as an idea and as an activity. In fact, since 1945, Japan’s postwar democracy had gradually formed through many twists and turns. However, the 1968 student protesters loudly shouted and criticized Japan’s postwar democracy, and they specifically targeted the presence of Maruyama. Why was Maruyama chosen as one of their targets? Oguma explains that as of the 1960s, Maruyama’s books had already become a required text for political science. In those days, his books presented a solid formula for Japan’s postwar democracy.

Consequently, students probably assumed that the postwar democracy was equal to Maruyama’s
position. Moreover, the student radicals assumed that he stayed in the ivory tower and concentrated on routine scholastic work. The truth is that he dedicated himself to reconstruct the faculty of law, against the conservative faction of the department. But the student radicals assumed that this champion of postwar democracy loved Tokyo University and was preaching the significance of academism in the classroom. It thus became unavoidable that the student radicals regarded Maruyama as the symbolic representative of academic authoritarianism to overthrow.

On the other hand, Maruyama was unconditionally critical of the student radicals and their violence. Those students intruded into his classroom and mocked him, saying, “Can I punch him now?” and shouting, “Hey, you study listening to Beethoven!” When his office was occupied by those students, it is said that he shouted back to them, “I don’t hate you all, I just scorn you all!” (Oguma 2006). We can also see his anger and disdain for these radial student activists in his posthumously published book, Jiko-nai-taiwa—a compilation 20 (Maruyama 1998)—a compilation

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19 A recent study reveals that a certain professor’s office next to Maruyama’s was occupied, although there used to be an accepted idea that Maruyama’s office itself was occupied by student radicals. Students who occupied the office burned the professor’s research materials for warmth (Oguma 2006).

20 The word jiko-nai-taiwa (自己内対話) was coined by Maruyama and was adopted as the book title by the editor, meaning “dialogue with myself” or “the inner-self dialogue.”
of memos left by him in three notebooks. In those notes, we find his bitter words toward student activists: “If you speak haughtily about ‘self-criticism,’ first and foremost, get a good amount of knowledge worthy to criticize!” and “Wearing a hardhat, being armed with an iron pipe, and covering the face with a towel, what formidable conformity their acting style is, although their goal is to destroy the very existing conformity and liberate themselves from it!” Other notes also tell us his anger: “I barked out at students who violently interrupted my lecture, ‘Why can’t you guys talk to me alone, face-to-face, not by crowding’?” In the winter of 1968, by using violence, the student radicals forcibly closed the office of the Law Department at Tokyo University. To protect historical documents, Maruyama needed to stay at the department archive for several nights, and he became sick. In the end, his physical and mental damage caused by the series of social disturbances was fatal, and it resulted in his early retirement from the university in 1971.

He understood the significance of direct action. In the case of the 1961 protest movement against the automatic extension of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, he and his students together fought against the Kishi Cabinet. They together also participated in a political rally, march, and sit-in, and went home together triumphantly shouting, “We’ve won today!” (Oguma 2006). However, in the case of the 1968 student protest movement, Oguma finds that a negative chain reaction of hatred formed between Maruyama and student radicals. Oguma describes that the relationship between both sides was tragic; it was far from conflict resolution through rational communication, which democratic culture presupposes. At the time, twenty years had passed since American democracy was transplanted to Japan and the new Constitution of Japan was proclaimed (enforced in 1946). The new Japanese Constitution resonated with the creation of a

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21 The official name of the treaty is the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. The treaty was concluded in 1951 between U.S. and Japan, and it provided the initial basis for Japan’s security relations with the U.S. It was signed after Japan gained its full sovereignty at the end of the Allied occupation. This treaty is still active today.
new free and democratic society. But Maruyama was unsatisfied with the degree of political maturity of the Japanese, and observed the continuity of the premodern characteristic of Japanese political culture between the prewar and postwar periods.

**Case 4: Totalitarianism as Jishuku**

I would like to introduce the reader to Maruyama’s analysis of another case of Japanese conformism in the late 1980s. Through this, we can see how he kept his consistent concern about problems of Japanese groupthink and conformism until his later years. In the late 1980s information society of Japan, he analyzed the phenomenon of *jishuku*(自粛: literally, self-restraint). He identified the phenomenon as a new form of conformism in contemporary Japanese information society. He found some similarities in mentality and social structure between prewar and postwar Japanese societies. In the contemporary study, the phenomenon of *jishuku* has gained more attention from scholars of Japanese studies in order to analyze the national character of Japan.

In 1988, when Emperor Shōwa (1901–1989) became seriously ill, Maruyama observed a social phenomenon on the national scale that scheduled public events, such as town festivals and television entertainment programs, were simultaneously postponed or canceled at the discretion of the organizers themselves (see Endnote 6). He named this phenomenon *jishuku to iu na no zentaishugi* (自粛という名の全体主義; totalitarianism in the name of self-restraint). He discerns the unchanged social psychological mechanism of Japan beyond the Asian-Pacific War, which creates a totalitarian atmosphere one day pandemically. The particular social structure persistently influences how Japanese mentality and behavior form. He points out that the mechanism generates the invisible social pressure that forces the people to follow the majority

During the jishuku movement, Maruyama was invited to a discussion circle by his former students. In the circle, he gave them the following comment:

Higaki: By the way, in this situation that the Emperor lies on a bed of illness, the kichōjo [the temporary office to put notebooks in order that the public can write down their prayers for Emperor’s recovery] has been open for the public in the square in front of the Imperial Palace. According to television news, many people are visiting the office to leave their message for the quick recovery of the Emperor’s health. I heard that many young people were also visiting.

Maruyama: Yes, indeed. But I want to ask you a few questions, because this is quite interesting in many senses. Although I call it the totalitarianism of jishuku, my question is how we can understand this phenomenon.

. . . In the case of Emperor Taishō [1879–1926], almost nothing was reported. . . . By contrast, this time, the media announces almost everything. In a sense, this is a new phenomenon. But I’m not telling you this in a good sense. This is the emperor system that is connected with information society. In other words, it expresses well a character of information society. Something unnecessary to know, something that you don’t need to know: Even if they report the latest data about his bloody bowel discharge, [the public] cannot do anything [for him]. Even if someone who worries about [his health condition], there is nothing they can do for him. Moreover, the mass media reports his health condition many times a day. NHK is the worst, though. Reporting [a state of his health] again and again is quite a new phenomenon. Connected with information society, however, it seems to me that it still inherits “that” from the wartime emperor system in the end. Yet it consists of the dual structure. This is not simply the same as the prewar emperor system. Every event becomes news. And everyone’s concern converges on the one issue through an unclear process. I heard that even local festivals were forced to cancel. I feel the totalitarianism of jishuku, linking up with information society, is much more problematic than the prewar type. . . . Well, if the autonomy of local communities were maintained, each community would have made a decision case by case. Nevertheless, precisely because the event is reported by halves as national news, the people come to agree to say, “Let’s call off public events together.” I would like to call it the information-society emperor system and totalitarianism under the system. (Maruyama Masao Wabunshū vol. 3, 413–414)

For example, famous fall festivals were in fact canceled in Tokyo and Kyoto. Observing the simultaneous cancelation of events in various regions, Maruyama raises a question that it is not
clear where the movement broke out at first and through what processes many events have been canceled in sequence. He points out that the location of the responsibility for social decision-making in the information society is indistinct in the mist. He finds that the current Japanese society remains the same social system and structure of wartime Japan in terms of the rapid formation of the totalitarian spiritual climate. He comments on this point as follows,

Eventually, we could not figure out which power holder expanded the war at each stage, and whose instruction worsened the situation of Japan. The outbreak of that event is still wrapped in a veil of mystery of [Japan’s] social conditions. I would say that it became so by an atmosphere. Once I painted the war as the rule of atmosphere. I understood the war [of Japan] as the domination of atmosphere. I evaluate this ongoing event as the same [type of phenomenon]. Even the Asahi Newspaper canceled the [already-scheduled] event. I have received an invitation letter for its founding anniversary from the company. Then, the president, [Tōichirō] Ichiyanagi, phoned and told me, “Due to several reasons, we are sorry, but we will cancel the event.”

Probably, the cancelation has been decided not by the top leader but by consultation among top-level people, including the case of the Asahi Newspaper. And another problem is the jishuku of jishuku. As far as I know, the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet and the Prince said that self-restricted activities seem to reach to an extreme degree. Public opinion of reconsidering the extreme degree of self-restraint did not come out voluntarily. The Chief Secretary remarked that the extreme level of voluntary restraint would oppose the feeling of his Majesty. At least, his comment was reported in the newspapers as his own comment, yet, probably, he was received the idea from someone else.

Imai: His health condition is announced many times a day. I heard that the announcement is entirely instructed by the Cabinet; the Imperial Household Agency is actually opposing the activity. (2008 vol. 3, 415–416)

Maruyama hypothetically examines how the same situation would have been dealt with in prewar Japanese society. Through this analogy, he analyzes the pathology of the mental structure of the Japanese in the late 1980s. During the prewar period, when the Emperor became ill, it was difficult to report the incident in an article. Since the media needed to write in a manner of adding phrases such as “in the very presence of His Gracious Majesty the Emperor,”
in Maruyama’s view, it was impossible to write, “His Gracious Majesty the Emperor had hematochezia.” He also explains that according to ancient ideas, the Emperor’s illness and his death should be distinguished. The Japanese ancient idea suggests that when the Emperor became ill, rather, his subjects and the ruled had a grand festival to try to vibrate the tama (霊; spirit). Maruyama argues that when the Emperor is ill, the Japanese tradition does not have a custom that the public restrains its activities in everyday life. When the Emperor becomes ill, it is quite an ordinary thing that the people hope for his quick recovery by doing something fun and vivacious. He critically points out the moral decadence of contemporary Japanese people:

So, it is a very strange phenomenon. While the Emperor is still struggling with a disease, they are already processing things by anticipating the day of his death. Because they keep the day in mind, they come to the idea of self-restraint. If the Emperor [as a human being] is ill, a person of heart hopes for his quick recovery, right? From the viewpoint of human nature, what they are doing is quite unnatural. The phenomenon of jishuku is unnatural in every sense. Moreover, there is no such thing in [Japanese] tradition. In old days, it was called mogari. [Even after the Emperor passed away], expecting that he might come back to life, people held a festival to shake the tama for about a week. After doing that, they had the funeral. Even after the death of the Emperor, they behaved so. While he is still alive, people should cheer him by saying “Hang in there!” The activities of jishuku are completely opposite. No matter who started saying it, this is a perverted phenomenon that results from the loss of the Emperor’s prestige. If he still kept the traditional authority, everyone would have been struck with awe and no one would have said things by expecting the coming day of his death.

However, now in the meantime, based on the expectation of the day, whether they are handling things to do in a businesslike manner is not that simple. The English edition of the Minichi Daily News wrongly announced his death, and the company fired the reporter. Why does he have to be fired for what everyone is doing? That is because there is still a certain premised taboo. It is hard to say. I have no word but saying that the moral decadence is finally reaching its extreme level. In other words, the interiority of the Japanese has now been insubstantial. Today, people do not have a feeling to worry about the Emperor as a human being. If people really worry about the Emperor as a human being, there must be another way of dealing with this situation. Well, I am not suggesting, “Let’s have a festival for him,” at least, yet [we shouldn’t be] deciding vaguely that this should be canceled and that should be canceled.

Imai: I wonder if it is better to leave him alone quietly . . . .
Maruyama: Yes. That’s a more natural feeling as a human being. And carrying out festivals as scheduled also shows our normal feelings. Some invisible force is socially functioning. This is decadence. I feel that this is extreme. (2008 vol. 3, 416–418)

Maruyama also criticizes intellectuals who opportunistically began to discuss the problem of how to continue or end the emperor system, as if they were suddenly reminded of the topic after the Emperor became ill. He remarks, “If you look at him as a human being, when someone is seriously ill, discussing the responsibility of the person for the past is against the natural feeling of humans. I think, when someone becomes ill, it is natural to leave the person in peace.”

On the other hand, he insists that regardless of his disease, the question of war responsibility of the Emperor should be discussed forever as an academic question of the history of Shōwa. He argues that Japanese journalism must tackle with the problem. However, he criticizes the lack of persistency of the journalism and intellectuals, who were just chasing timely topics in order to receive the attention from the mass public, and who tended to dismiss the important issues of the imperial system unless a special event like the 1989 case occurred. Maruyama remarks:

We must keep questioning war responsibility of the Emperor forever, and at the same time we must keep questioning the meaning of the emperor system. Why do some people suddenly get eager to debate the issue now? The phenomenon means that after this event is settled, to the contrary, they will stop discussing the subject, like “danger past, god forgotten.” Therefore, I said I opposed it. They are shortsighted in this regard. It’s the same as the topic of the expected day as I mentioned before. After the war, intellectuals who debuted on the critical circles from around the 1970s criticized that what my generation argued became old-fashioned. I really want to know what they are thinking of right now. Actually, we haven’t solved the postwar problems, even one single problem. Some people say radical things as if what I am raising now is old-school to discuss. How are they now exactly thinking about this situation? Probably, I am wondering if they are all surprised in their minds about this totalitarianism of self-restraint—about the fact that the Japanese people have the potential to produce such large invisible force.

Imai: Realistically, there is no solemnity anymore, is there?

Maruyama: No. It has disappeared. The Cabinet of Giichi Tanaka resigned by the present Emperor Hirohito’s one word, regarding the incident of blowing up Zhang Zuolin to
death [the Manchurian Incident] in 1928. I was fourth grade of junior high school. I could get the news immediately, because my father was an editor in chief of his newspaper company.

[My father] said, “The present emperor is great,” meaning that the Emperor could make the [Guichi] Tanaka Cabinet resign by one word. Just by a single remark, “This is different from what you said to me.” The next day, Prime Minister Tanaka dedicated the resignation to the Emperor. Although my father was severely attacking the Tanaka Cabinet, he never expected its resignation (laughs). The swaggering Tanaka Cabinet collapsed by the one word of the Emperor. But, we begin to think that eventually, we may need that kind of thing. In return, this is, however, the biggest problem of the emperor system. Unless we rely on that kind of thing, we cannot overthrow the government by our own hands. Some say that because of having the Emperor, the people can maintain morality. If we lose the Emperor, we lose morality. This idea means the absence of our internal morality on the individual level. We should know that it is pathetic. Although there are one hundred sixty countries around the world, there is no other country that cannot do anything without the emperor, right (laughs)? Is the country Japan so miserable? I really want to say, “Don’t underestimate the Japanese people.” However, as a matter of fact, that is true. Before World War II, the Japanese had the presence of awe. Today, we have only two principles: the majority rule and the control of money. You can do anything if you win a majority. And the other rule is that you cannot do anything if you don’t have money. The dominant values of today would be those two (laughs). This is unbelievable. I was too optimistic. I’ve never expected that things would become like this. I can’t believe this. (2008 vol. 3, 419–421)

Taking the “Recruit Scandal” case that happened in the same period, he points out that the most serious problem is that some people no longer feel corruption as corruption before criticizing the bribery scandal itself. If someone can feel the corruption as corruption, the mindset of the person is still normal. However, when corruption is structured and normalized, people begin to feel that it is a common thing. Everyone gives and takes bribes, and if someone is arrested for bribery, he or she is considered unfortunate or considered as a fool. Such ideas become dominant. Maruyama suggests that Japan has been covered with the paralyzed sense of right and wrong, and that very sense has become the general atmosphere of society. He reports that this peculiar phenomenon has also attracted attention from the global media:
The *Times* in England immediately picked up the problem. The reaction of the Japanese people to political corruption is unbelievably sluggish. The abnormal country Japan does not get angry in the face of corruption. Otherwise, the sensitive country Japan, in which regarding illness of the Emperor, the phenomenon of self-restraint endemically spreads so rapidly in the national scale. (2008 vol. 3, 422)

He points out that on the one hand, the contemporary version of Japanese totalitarianism does not take the concrete form of an authoritarian political regime, and on the other hand, unclear is the original source for the regimentation of public opinion. He calls this new type of Japanese totalitarianism the “totalitarianism of atmosphere,” or the “totalitarianism of mood.”

Maruyama collates the behavior of the people under the late-1980s emperor system with those of the prewar society. In prewar Japan, constitutionally, the Emperor was in the position of head of state. He introduces a historical episode in order to show the mindset and possible behavior of the people in prewar Japanese society. The principal of a high school burned to death by jumping into the school building when a fire broke out in an attempt to rescue the portrait of the Emperor. Meanwhile, in the 1988 case, the legal status of the Emperor was a symbol of the unity of the people. The serious health condition of Emperor Shōwa was reported daily by the mass media. Corresponding to the media reports, the people voluntarily regulated their activities. The Japanese society was covered with the social atmosphere of self-restraint. The mood demanded the people not only to postpone festival-like public events but also to spend everyday lives in a humble manner. However, the point of departure, where the movement began, remained unclear. On the one hand, despite the change of the constitutional status of the Emperor, Maruyama found a psychological continuity between a) those who lived under Japanese militarism during the Asia-Pacific War period and b) those who live in late-twentieth century Japanese society where democratic ideals and liberal culture had been popularized. On the other
hand, he read the aggravation of moral decadence in the people, by extracting the new social phenomena about the emperor system in advanced information society.

As examined later, Maruyama presented his “universalist stance on ideals of democracy and justice,” and he criticized unthinking compliance to the popular intellectual trend of the times, unquestioning obedience to political authority, and inconsistent and unscrupulous remarks by opportunist thinkers. For example, some intellectuals, who fanatically defended the national polity during the war, suddenly turned to supporting American democracy by cunningly predicting the trend of the postwar world. However, Maruyama understood it as another expression of spiritual conformism. Focusing on their thought patterns, in his view, there is no change in the social-psychological pathology of opportunists, following *fait accompli* in a submissive manner.

In a comparison between two different intellectual movements, the wartime nationalist movement of anti-Western culture and the postwar national campaign of advocacy for American democracy, Maruyama revealed the persistent archetype of Japanese thought patterns, which are observed behind seemingly contradicted political movements. From the militarist regime to American democracy, despite the change of the political regime, he pointed out that something has not changed in the mode of thinking of the Japanese. The problem is that the underdevelopment of individual autonomy and independence brings about the social conditions for group-oriented culture and values, originally deriving from the Confucian value system in a distorted manner. The value system used to function to produce social norms in the Edo period.

In summary, Maruyama certainly discussed in theory the risk of the exclusive type of cultural particularism. However, we should notice that before his theory building, there was his emotional aversion against the Japanese intellectuals who behave conveniently to jump on the
bandwagon and change their views and remarks opportunistically. His criticism was also aimed at postwar democrats. In postwar Japanese society, he took an antagonistic stance against New Left ideologues who coercively advocated for democracy. He criticized them as “fascism in the name of democracy” (Conv., vol. 2, 274). Applying concepts of the stereotype, conformism, and compulsory homogenization to his political analysis, he bitterly observed the political movements of postwar Japan from the 1950s until his later years.

4.2 Spiritual Influence from Nanbara (Case 5)

For the fifth case showing the battle of people of conscience against the threat of compulsory homogenization, I would like to take up Maruyama’s mentor Shigeru Nanbara’s struggle against Japanese militarism during the war. Nanbara’s behavior as a morally principled person critically influenced Maruyama’s life and thought. Among various interactions between both political thinkers, I focus on Maruyama’s understanding of the meaning of the anti-war activity by Nanbara and the other six jurists of Tokyo Imperial University at the last stage of the Asian-Pacific War. Because he had been working as a soldier in Hiroshima since March of 1945, Maruyama himself could not join the secret mission of the seven scholars. He learned the particulars of the operation after the war.

I would like to demonstrate that Maruyama’s universalist idea was profoundly influenced by Nanbara’s way of life. I would like the reader to understand the significant impact of Nanbara’s life philosophy over the formation of Maruyama’s universalist thought, which emphasizes one’s consistent remarks and decisive action based on one’s own principles. What should be noticed is that Maruyama showed a great interest in the mental toughness of the “person of principle” to endure the stress by the enclosure of the individuals in a totalitarian
system. Through his decisive action, Nanbara demonstrated the point for
Maruyama. For example, he predicted the collapse of Nazi Germany while
living under the menace of Japanese fascism and the development of a
nationalistic intellectual fashion (Maruyama 2005, 84; Matsuzawa and Uete
2006, 57). These episodes tell us the strength of the person of principle in the
face of compulsory homogenization.

Since the Manchurian Incident in 1931, the hardliners of the Imperial Army controlled
Japanese domestic and international politics. In the country, people were monitored by the secret
police and incorporated into the socio-political systems of national mobilization. In the press, as
well as in the academic community and universities, many opportunists appeared and trumpeted
the nationalistic ideology of selfless devotion of the Japanese to the formation of the totalitarian
state.

In contrast, a social atmosphere was created, in which those who were critical and
uncooperative with the national mobilization movement were derided as hikokumi (非国民;
betrayers of the country; unpatriotic people). Maruyama explains that no expression of one’s
support for the movement in an explicit manner was itself regarded as an antiestablishment
behavior. Moreover, if someone showed disobedience to the national polity, even social elites—
including politicians, military officers, scholars, and journalists—they were sent to jail as anti-
establishment members opposed to the emperor system, or punitively sent to the front lines of the
war.

In the surveillance society of wartime Japanese totalitarian state, the Japanese looked at
others with suspicious eyes. Japanese collectivism further stimulated the social condition. In
general, the Japanese usually behave modestly toward others, and they are passive to authority.
However, as Maruyama pointed out, once they fear someone who threatens the internal order and rules of the closed system of Japanese society, the same people suddenly become merciless in rooting out the social members as “pagans.”

Now, our focus here is to consider what political thinkers are able to do under the totalitarian state and society. As examined earlier, Maruyama argued for the importance of political responsibility for the result of decision-making. Meanwhile, he also distinguished the responsibility of politicians from that of political thinkers. I examine the potential of morally principled political thinkers, who have knowledge of political philosophy (i.e., the study of justice) and who establish principle of thought and action in order to keep their conscience. How does this type of political thinkers think and act in an environment of compulsory homogenization?

The Secret Plan to End the War by Seven Scholars

At the terminal stage of the Asia-Pacific War in Japan, seven scholars of the Department of Law at Tokyo Imperial University, the last line of defense for liberalism, were operating a secret mission to end the destructive war. The central figure of the covert operation was Nanbara, who was the mentor and a senior colleague of Maruyama. He was in the position of chief of the department at that time. Among colleagues, he was nicknamed the “philosopher of the cave” (Matsuzawa and Uete 2006, vol. 2, 63). His colleagues recognized him as a person who hid in the ivory tower and indulged himself in studying Western political philosophy. However, Nanbara decided to take action by risking his life. The secret operation by his group was one of the maneuvers for ending the war.
After graduating from his university, Nanbara joined the Ministry of Home Affairs and worked as a bureaucrat for six years. When he decided to return to Tokyo Imperial University, he hoped to contribute to his country by devoting himself to academic work. He wanted to move on from his administrative job entirely. Later, he comments: “Staying in the ivory tower, I wanted to concentrate on study. . . . Much less, I specialize myself in political philosophy and the history of political ideas, which is a most estranged field from an administrative job. . . . Although I intended to fulfill my minimum duties as a public servant [of Imperial University], I did not want to take any administrative positions of the department” (Maruyama and Fukuda 1989, 266).

After the “Hiraga Purge” incident in 1939, when he was assigned the position of dean of the department, he declined the job once for the above reason. Nevertheless, as the war situation was worsening in Japan, he made an exception and accepted the position. He felt that taking the job was his last duty in serving his country. When he took the position, some scholars were already involved in trouble because of the anti-establishment contents of their publication. The Imperial Army was already cunningly aiming to crush the Department of Law at Tokyo Imperial University.

Although neither Nanbara nor Maruyama remembers the exact day and time, Maruyama had a chance to make an appearance at his department for a short time between his demobilization from his first military service in November 1944 and his second draft on March 6, 1945. On that occasion, Nanbara told Maruyama about his rough plan to end the war, which he was secretly elaborating on at the time. His idea was that in order to suppress the Army’s war-policy of do-or-die resistance, he and his team were to ask some senior statesmen and members of the Imperial Palace to take decisive action. If the Army did not listen to the proposal, they would use the power of the Navy to stop the Army. Although Nanbara only confided his scheme
to Maruyama, he soon began to draw up a more concrete plan with his colleagues after he took the position of dean. Maruyama also mentions that during the same occasion of his short visit, he exchanged views with Yoshitake Oka (political scientist, 1902–1990) about the possibility of establishing the Cabinet by a royal family member.

In response to the interview by Maruyama and others, Nanbara testifies as follows:

While many things happened, the war was getting intense. And it turned March 9; I might say now that I decided to accept the appointment because I felt like “This is a special case. This time, somewhat, I will have to do something to return a favor [for the country].” At that time, what I was thinking was how to stop that war. I questioned myself whether there would be anything that we in the professorship can contribute behind the scenes, at least, as the Department of Law at Tokyo Imperial University. Although I didn’t tell anyone, I made up my mind to take over the position. (Maruyama and Fukuda 1989, 266–267)

The next day, in the morning of March 10, 1945, Tokyo was hit by unprecedented air raids. Most transportation was disrupted, and Yamanote Line was barely running. Nanbara went to Ueno by train to get to his university and came home by walking in Mejiro. From Hongō to Koishikawa, the areas were all burned. The smell of gun smoke did not disappear, and bodies were covered with rags and left on the road. Seeing the destruction of the city by the major air attack became the turning point for him to decide what to do as dean of the Department of Law at Tokyo Imperial University.

Some of his colleagues, such as Oka, were also concerned about the war in the same way, although they did not announce their concern in public. They individually gathered and exchanged information, and they examined the problem in secret. Nanbara began thinking about officially mobilizing those scholars, after he was in charge of the department. At that time, he recalled the “Seven Doctors” of Tokyo Imperial University in the Russo-Japanese War period (1904–1905). In the previous case, the scholars had rather encouraged the Cabinet to go to war.
In turn, Nanbara’s team’s task was to save their country from the mess of war by the military government that had lost control.

The team was made up by trustworthy volunteer members of the department. By chance, at that time, seven professors were gathered again: Yasaka Takagi (political scientist, 1889–1984), Kōtarō Tanaka (jurist, 1890–1974), Sanji Suenobu (jurist, 1899–1989), Sakaе Wagatsuma (jurist, 1897–1973), Yoshitake Oka, Takeo Suzuki (jurist, 1905–1995), and Nanbara. The member agreed to keep their underground activities confidential; the mission required them to prepare carefully and to risk their own lives. They agreed to erase all the traces of their activities from the historical record.

For Nanbara, Takagi was the most confident person among the professors. He was an expert in American studies, and a close friend of Kōichi Kido (politician, 1889–1977), who was Takagi’s classmate and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at the time. Like Nanbara, Takagi was seriously concerned about the progress of the aggressive war, and he became the first comrade of Nanbara’s team. The two conceived the first draft of the mission and developed it gradually while five other professors joined the team. They secretly gathered at the VIP room on the second floor in the Central Library of Tokyo Imperial University and analyzed information there. The team discussed how specifically they reach out to targeted cooperative figures. Nanbara looks back on the tense scene in those days as follows:

I don’t think we met regularly. It would stand out if all the seven got together, so we made a rule to meet three or four people at a time. The first talk was about our basic stance that we would work from the academic position. Differently from politicians and journalists, we discussed that we would limit our task to reporting the result of our data collecting and information analyses to trustworthy people among the ministers or senior statesmen, such as Mr. [Fumimaro] Konoe, or even non-Cabinet members who were influential to some degree. We attempted to gather accurate information and to analyze the international political circumstances properly as much as we could from the academic point of view. By the way, around this period, Shigeru Yoshida [diplomat; the first prime
minister under the postwar new Constitution, 1878–1967] was detained by the military police.

I remember when I was eating at the Yamagami Palace [a cafeteria at Tokyo University], there was a tense scene and my heart fluttered with concern. Professor Kenzo Takayanagi was there with a Diet member. They were also eating and having a conversation. The politician started mentioning, “Recently, I’ve heard that some faculty of the Law Department at Tokyo University are working on peace moves. . .” I got nervous, yet fortunately they did not notice our activity. (Maruyama and Fukuda 1989, 269–270)

Each member of Nanbara’s team individually contacted the senior statespersons. They decided that each member would confidentially contact the selected important figures to give their proposal. Nanbara and Takagi together visited key persons. To the best of his remembrance, Nanbara had a meeting with Fumimaro Konoe (politician, 1891–1945) at least twice. It was the first time that Nanbara and Tanaka visited Konoe’s second house in Odawara. They had an all-day talk there. Nanbara and Tanaka visited also Reijirō Wakatsuki (politician, 1866–1949) in Itō. They visited Wakatsuki a few more times in his house in Komagome. Through one of the seven members, Suzuki, Nanbara contacted also the Minister of Agriculture, Tadaatsu Ishiguro (administrator; politician, 1884–1960). In addition, his group also approached Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō (1882–1950), Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kido, and General Kazushige Ugaki (military officer; politician, 1868–1956).

Nanbara’s group attempted to convince the trusted and politically influential figures to take action by advising five ideas (Maruyama and Fukuda 1989, 270–272).

First, on the timing for ending the war: Nanbara and the other six scholars took action from the end of March until May in 1945. They predicted the collapse of Nazi Germany in May and considered Germany’s surrender as the best chance for Japan to announce a peace proposal. Their consensus was to bring Japan to the end of war at least before the start of U.S. military’s landing operations on Okinawa.
Second, on the way to contact the Allies: They thought that it was the best to contact the U.S. side directly. If that proved impossible, Japan would offer surrender to the U.S. through a third country such as Switzerland. They determined that Japan should avoid the Soviet Union’s involvement. The idea was based on their evaluation that the Soviets’ involvement would complicate the situation. Nanbara and Foreign Minister Tōgō discussed the problem. Tōgō asked Nanbara to invent the specific method for attaining the diplomatic goal. The same episode is also recorded in Tōgō Shigenori Gaikō Nikki [The Diary of Diplomat Shigenori Tōgō] (1989).22

Third, on designing the specific processes to end the war: At the time, the Army stubbornly continued taking its aggressive position against the offensive from the Allied Forces. In the meantime, the Navy was more reasonably seeing the international political circumstances. The Navy was taking a different stance to the Army. Thus, Nanbara and the other six sought to separate the Navy and the Army. They were confident that it was the best move to persuade the Navy to understand that there would be no prospect of winning this war, and therefore the Navy should take the initiative to avoid making the situation worse and bring the war to its end as early as possible. The team contacted General Mitsumasa Yonai (politician, 1880–1948), who was the central figure of the Navy. At the time, the brain of Yonai was Major General Sōkichi Takagi (1893–1979). Nanbara and Yasaka Takagi met Yonai three times or so, and they requested of him that the Navy to take action. However, the Navy was very careful, and did not take action in the end. In his interview, Nanbara later evaluates that unlike other military officers, Sōkichi Takagi was the person who could see the whole picture of the situation and understand thoroughly the importance of the proposals made by Nanbara’s group. Nanbara also remembered that Takagi was a trustworthy person who kept a secret.

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Fourth, regarding conditions for the end of war: The group suggested that an unconditional surrender would be the best decision for the immediate ending of the war. In the case of Japan’s surrender, the team members thought that the most preferable way was to announce it in the form of the Emperor’s decision: in other words, in the form of the promulgation of the decree from the Emperor. The group suggested that in the declaration, the Emperor should clarify his responsibility for foreign countries and his own country. This idea implied that the Emperor should abdicate at an appropriate time after the end of war. Nanbara and the other six scholars basically supported defending and maintaining the emperor system itself. Yet the team members were also thinking that the prerogative of the Emperor in the new Constitution would need to be largely limited. The group reached a consensus on the proposal, although they did not use the term “the upholding of national polity.”

Lastly, on the selection of key Cabinet members: The new Cabinet members were expected to save the complicated situation. Nanbara and the other six decided to contact the above-mentioned General Ugaki of the Army. They considered him as the only elder of the Army whom they could request to cooperate with the Navy. Nanbara alone visited Ugaki in Yotsuya. Although he did not have any specific ideas, Nanbara recalls that Ugaki was very upset about the Army’s aggressive actions based on its unrealistic war-planning. Ugaki listened to Nanbara’s advice seriously, and they reached a consensus on most of the issues. Liberal politicians and military officers, whom Nanbara’s team contacted, understood that Nanbara and his fellow scholars were deeply concerned about the country, had analyzed the global circumstances appropriately, and came from the academic point of view to the conclusion on the best way to save the country. Those politicians and military officers promised to cooperate with them seriously.
Nevertheless, the time passed so quickly, and it turned May and June in 1945. By this time, other groups had also been working in the same course to end the war. Despite all their efforts, on August 15, 1945, the Japanese listened to the radio broadcast announcement of the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration and Japan’s surrender. The announcement was recorded one day earlier by the Emperor himself. But in practice, the war was ended by the dropping of two atomic bombs. In the interview, Nanbara recalls:

Nanbara: After all, what we tried didn’t work effectively. Frankly speaking, our attempt met such an ending. For our group, the only thing left is the fact that we all were desperately concerned about the destiny of our country and together suffered. From the beginning, I think such a record of covert action should be buried as a secret forever. Yet after the war, through the publications of *Diary of Tōgō* and *Diary of Kido Kōichi*, our activity was exposed, as well as other similar cases. Therefore, I told you our story today. (Maruyama and Fukuda 1989, 273)

Fukuda: So, having foresight and a well elaborated plan, your team met various people. If I were you, I’d expect that based on the well-planned mission and action, the first move of the Navy would probably cause a chain reaction to the end of the war. How [accurate] is this point?

Nanbara: At least, it assumed that the Navy would take action toward the success of our plan. However, I was not confident enough about that point. While we could not get any concrete results, we passed through the incident of the German surrender. Japanese troops in Okinawa were completely conquered, too. It was already July. To be honest, because of Germany’s unconditional surrender on May 8, in other words, the end of the war in Europe, I thought the war in Japan would be over. (276)

At this juncture, Maruyama asks Nanbara a slightly provocative question about the opportunistic behavior of Sōkichi Takagi. Nanbara compassionately shows his sympathy to Takagi’s complicated position at that time.

Maruyama: Well, this is a little bit of a delicate question. I’d like to ask you about Sōkichi Takagi-san. That person had people such as Yabe Teiji, Kiyoshi Nagata, and Kazuo Ōkawachi as the brains. At that time, [for example] Yabe-sensei was supporting the idea of do-or-die resistance [against the Allies]. He decisively spoke to young faculty members of the laboratory, saying, “All efforts will be in vain if we accept the surrender,
because we have already made it to this stage.” In brief, after I came back from my military job, I heard that he approved the idea of suicidal missions until the death of the last man. Therefore, critically speaking, he [Takagi] played it both ways. On the one hand, he was beside theorists of the decisive battles on the mainland, and on the other hand, he was in contact with pacifists such as you, Nanbara-sensei. I might say he was complicated, or I might say that he was such a politician.

Nanbara: Well, Rear Admiral Takagi maybe had [real feelings on] both sides. Even so, I would never question his sincerity in a relationship with me. He was also struggling, wasn’t he? Ostensibly, though he kept pace with the Army, he was looking for a way out from the Navy’s position. Since he was a very clever person, I think he was acting from his true heart. The fact is that he got stuck in another move at that time. I must say that it was the destiny of Japan. We were under enormous pressure until the last minute. Battles were continuing. I mean, even after the defeat in the Battle of Okinawa, pointless battles continued. I could not predict anymore how long Japan would continue the war.

Then, the Imperial Army led to prepare for the battles on the mainland, and the people were demanded to get ready for the final stage of a suicidal attack of one hundred million people. Our own plans to end the war terminated around this period, and in the same period the Army directly requested Tokyo University to transfer its facilities to the military. (276–277)

Besides the above episode, various incidents Nanbara was involved in are illustrated in his memoir, including an anecdote of repression by a slip of the pen in the 1930s, his supervision over the evacuation of over 200,000 books of Tokyo University, his negotiation with the Imperial Army coercively aiming to take over the university facilities during the war, and his postwar struggle to protect the autonomy of his university from GHQ’s takeover. These episodes are also good sources of material for our research into Nanbara’s characteristic as the person of principle, but space does not permit me to insert them here.

**Maruyama’s Acceptance of Nanbara’s Life Philosophy**

Along with the ongoing project of publishing *Collected Works of Masao Maruyama* (17 vols., 1995–1997), Matsuzawa and Uete as series editors also conducted interviews with Maruyama seventeen times between April 1988 and November 1994. Maruyama cooperated
with the interview process because he expected that his testimony would serve as historical
documents for future generations. The record of the interviews resulted in the byproduct
publication of Memoirs of Masao Maruyama (Matsuzawa and Uete 2006). In the second volume
of the memoir (55–96), he analyzes the above-mentioned covert mission by Nanbara’s team.
Here, he is evaluating Nanbara’s wartime activity in the context of showing his skepticism of
liberalism as a political idea:

Maruyama: Speaking of the limits of liberalism, as I said before, I am not talking about
liberalism on its various levels. Although I noticed the limits at each level, my criticism
[of liberalism] derived from my background knowledge of Marxism since I entered the
university. I mean, I was seeing liberalism historically from the Marxist perspective. My
teacher Nanbara already wrote his “Consideration of Liberalism as a Political Principle”
in the 1920s. That is a criticism of the philosophical foundations of liberalism. In sensei’s
view, the philosophical foundation of liberalism is the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill.
He claimed that utilitarianism is useless. The political theory of Kant is liberalism.
However, utilitarian liberalism derived from Mill genealogically, and it became the
mainstream. He said that utilitarianism was not good; sensei is quite simple. According to
him, the U.K. and France are not good, because utilitarianism is not good.

Besides, sensei was tragic during the war. Germany, which he relied on as the second
homeland, became the Nazis. Then he was compelled to ask Britain and France [to bring
peace to Europe], which he was previously criticizing as “useless.” During the summer of
1940, it was the stage whether the German army would land on the British mainland or
not. And finally, the summer passed. England endured ferocious bombing. In the end, the
Nazis gave up landing. Accordingly, the event lifted England in his eyes. Sensei was very
pleased and said, “I was very proud of England.”

Matsuzawa: So, that is the way that Nanbara-sensei grasps the [sense of the] U.K. by
utilitarianism.

Maruyama: Utilitarianism and positivism were all treated in the same way. Comte, Mill,
and Spencer, all were treated in the same manner. And German idealism conflicted with
them. Yet, even in German idealism, he could not admit Hegel, because [in Nanbara’s
view] Hegel’s idea went beyond the forbidden boundary. After all, he reached Kant and
Fichte. Basically, his philosophy relied on Kant. Yet he said that Kant was not good at the
foundation of the community. In the case of Fichte, the foundation of the community
would be the ethnicity. A problem of socialism comes out there. Nanbara-sensei is truly a
national socialist, in a different sense from the Nazis. (Matsuzawa and Uete 2006, vol. 2,
55–56)
Maruyama mentioned the same episode several times in which Nanbara warned Maruyama of his devotion to Hegel’s philosophy. For example, in “Dōjinkessei no Koborebanashi” [Episode of the Coterie Group], Maruyama introduces an episode of Nanbara’s criticism of German Hegelians during the war. Nanbara mentioned that Kantians and Hegelians showed contrasting behavior when the Nazis seized control of the government in 1934:

Maruyama: I have two teachers, Nyozekan [Hasegawa], and Nanbara-sensei who believed in German idealism. In my opinion, just a few Japanese scholars read the original texts of *Three Criticisms* of Kant earnestly. Nanbara-san was one of them. In Japan, some emphasize Kant, but they just read secondary books “on” Kant (laughs). *Pure Reason* especially is really dry. I said to Nanbara-sensei, ‘That’s great you really read it.” He confessed to me that he sometimes had to control his frustration not to throw the book on the floor. Even Nanbara-sensei became like that. The book is really boring to read. . . . Yet, since Nanbara-sensei was critical of Hegel and I was engrossed in Hegel, he sometimes told me, “Look, every one of Hegelians stood for the Nazis. Certainly, most German Kantians did not become crazy for the Nazis in those days.”

Questioner: That is a point [to consider].

Maruyama: Yes, this is a very interesting problem. I am sorry to say this, but though in wartime Japan the school of “Philosophy of World History” put an emphasis repeatedly on Kant, Kant, and Kant, I wonder how seriously that kind of people read Kant. If they read it seriously, they could have been much more critical of the [fanatical] trend of those days. (Maruyama 1992: CW, vol. 15. Emphasis Maruyama’s)

Importantly, in Nanbara’s intellectual activity, Maruyama finds the same type of thought process that he sees in Yoshio Nakano’s, described in Chapter 2. Nanbara and Nakano similarly keep their conclusive principles for thinking and behaving in a consistent manner. This aspect allows them to avoid being involved in any totalitarian movements. Yet they also had the flexibility to revise their ideas through a dialogue with others. In the above interview, Maruyama illustrates the character of Nanbara’s thought as follows:

Uete: How long did Nanbara-sensei stay in England?
Maruyama: About a year, I guess. The first time, he visited England and moved to Germany. In the U.K., he did not go to Oxford and Cambridge at all. Staying in London, he had been listening to lectures at the University of London. So, maybe, he listened to the lectures of Graham Wallas [British political scientist, sociologist, 1858-1932], for example. Although he stayed in England, I don’t think he was influenced much by the U.K. Sensei said he reevaluated England. World War II was a process that made him review all things. And, about the Battle of Stalingrad: He told me, “Owing to this incident, the Soviet Union will remain in the history of the world.” His reevaluation was because of Stalingrad, wasn’t it?

Matsuzawa: It seems like he made a realistic judgment based on a clear criterion. (Matsuzawa and Uete 2006, vol. 2, 56)

On December 27, 1940, Nanbara gave the lecture that later became the basis of his essay “The World View of the Nazis and Religion.” Maruyama was also in the hall when Nanbara gave his lecture. In the storm of fanaticism and the national mobilization movement, he was impressed by the strength of remarks by the thinker who was supported by his own principle.

Maruyama: That was amazing. There was a small study circle in the name of political science. It was a small group of students of Onozuka-sensei. I was not his own student. Yet, because he was a teacher of my teacher, Tsuji-kun and I got permission to join the circle. In the midst of the war, Nanbara-sensei gave a lecture which became the basis of his thesis “The World View of the Nazi and Religion.” . . . Recently, I have read the record written by Oka-sensei acting as secretary. That is great. In that record, the next thing is expressed much more clearly than in the paper itself.

[Nanbara argued that] the source of European spirit is the Greek spirit and Christianity. The basis of the Greek spirit is logos and love for the universal truth. However, the Nazis denied the universality of truth. Second, they denied the transcendent being of Christianity. Their idea became the apotheosis of human beings and the apotheosis of Hitler. Therefore, they denied two parts of the primary European ethos, Hellenism and Christianity. Nazism was one that deviated entirely from European traditions. Thus, there were only two choices left for Nazism: to choose to collapse by pursuing its own idea, or otherwise to change its idea by following the tradition of Europe. In this way, he argued convincingly during the war. I am sure that Oka-sensei did not rephrase the original words and did not add his own ideas; I know it because I attended that lecture. (Matsuzawa and Uete 2006, vol. 2, 56–57)
Nanbara’s character as a person of principle, who thinks and makes a decision based on his own belief, was also represented in his attitude when he decided to hire Maruyama for an assistant position of the Department of Law. Maruyama remembered a conversation with Nanbara about whether he would stay at Tokyo Imperial University. Before employing Maruyama as an assistant, Nanbara already decided to ask Maruyama to take over the course of the history of Oriental political thought. With no hesitation, he instructed Maruyama to study Japanese intellectual history. Maruyama declined Nanbara’s offer once and objected to his teacher: “Why would I? I want to study Western intellectual history. I cannot bring myself to studying something like the ‘spirit of Japan’.” Nanbara politely replied to his student as follows:

That is why you have to do it. Certainly, I have been studying the history of Western political thought like Plato or Kant. Yes, we have been studying them, because we believe that we can find out the universal thing in their ideas. However, our study is not influential in these days. From now on, we must develop a scientific study of Japanese thought, and the experts have to come out. It is supposed to be different from what militarists and right-wing thinkers are agitating, such as the exaltation of the Japanese spirit. We need the [scientific] study more and more today. I cannot fight fanatic people on the same court, because my subject of Western political philosophy is regarded as the enemy’s thought. (Matsuzawa and Uete 2006, vol. 2, 68)

For this reason, Nanbara successfully persuaded Maruyama to join the faculty and to be an expert of the scientific study of Japanese intellectual history. Nanbara promised Maruyama that the department was ready to invite him as a staff, provided he wrote an excellent paper. Yet, until that moment, Maruyama had never expected that he would become a scholar. He was confused, and felt that he would need to explain his personal background. He confessed to Nanbara, “I’m not thinking of being a scholar. And although I didn’t tell you this until now, I have to tell you something.” He told Nanbara about his arrest on suspicion of being a thoughtcriminal. Maruyama told Nanbara, “I don’t think I am Marxist, and I’ve never joined the activism. But, in
fact, I’m on the blacklist. So, I don’t want to trouble the department.” Nevertheless, Nanbara just replied to Maruyama, “It doesn’t matter.” He did not mind Maruyama’s background at all.

Maruyama also knew that Nanbara had many faces, as a political philosopher, as an administrator, and even as a poet. On the one hand, Nanbara lived in the ivory tower to engage in his expertise of Western political philosophy. On the other hand, he became a clever politician and practitioner with good tactics in negotiation. After working for six years as a government official, Nanbara returned to the academic society. In Maruyama’s view, Nanbara had a responsible attitude to academic works more than anyone else, and his unique career resulted in that stance. The faculty of law at Tokyo Imperial University had a side of a prestigious training school to produce elite practitioners such as legal experts and state bureaucrats. In this, Nanbara’s class of political philosophy was a non-required course. Maruyama describes Nanbara’s behavior this way: “In his opening remark at the first class, every time, Nanbara-sensei straightforwardly told his students, ‘This class is open for only those who have a strong interest in philosophy’, and after looking around, he always said, ‘It’s still too many’. He half-seriously waited until the number of students decreased” (Matsuzawa and Uete 2006, vol. 2, 61).

Maruyama was most attracted by Nanbara’s mental toughness as an idealist thinker. The ideal side of Nanbara allowed him to think rationally and decide reasonably based on his belief. His idealism, which believes in the power of political ideals, made it possible that he refused to conform to the intellectual mainstream of the times and to refuse to comply with authority, even if he was living in a totalitarian society. Through him, Maruyama confirmed that the person of principle would be able to take decisive action in critical situations. He describes the idealist character of Nanbara in the expression “Seek justice, even if the world is ruined.” On the other
hand, he expresses the realist side of Nanbara by quoting Nanbara’s words: “Set a thief to catch a thief” (Matsuzawa and Uete 2006, vol. 2, 62–63).

**Political Thinking and Real Politics**

We have examined the wartime episode of a team of Japanese political thinkers and jurists of Tokyo Imperial University who attempted to mobilize senior statesmen of the Emperor, liberal politicians, and the Imperial Navy for ending the self-destructive war. In the episode, Maruyama observes the mental toughness of the person of principle, who can resist the repressive atmosphere of totalitarian society, keep rational thinking and maintain conscience, and, if necessary, take decisive action. In the dialogue “Gakumon to Seiji” [Scholarship and Politics] (Maruyama 1964: Conv., vol. 5), both thinkers later look back on the events surrounding the faculty of law at Tokyo Imperial University during the war. They discuss actions that a scholar can take in extreme situations. A political thinker has the following multifaceted sides: 1) the aspect of an intellectual with responsibility to lead the public, 2) the aspect of one of the citizens, and 3) the aspect of a private man. In other words, when thinking of the responsibility for the remarks of a political thinker, we need to clarify what side of the thinker made the remark.

After returning from the Ministry of Home Affairs to Tokyo Imperial University to be a professor of the Law Department, Nanbara had a firm decision to devote himself to academic works and not to comment on real politics as long as he stayed in academic society. Moreover, he attempted not to confuse academic research and private matters more strictly than did Maruyama. In order to record his historical experiences, Maruyama and his colleague attempted to interview Nanbara. In the interview, there was the following interesting interchange. Nanbara witnessed the backstage workings of some important political decisions in postwar Japanese
history, and he told Maruyama about the events in his private life. Nevertheless, Nanbara stubbornly rejected to put the episodes into Nanbara’s memoirs that Maruyama was editing. Maruyama complained about his teacher’s attitude; it is quite interesting to know that even Maruyama, who valued the academic professionalism of not confusing personal story and historical event, showed his frustration at Nanbara’s stubbornness (Matsuzawa and Uete 2006, vol. 2, 81).

In this section, I have attempted to clarify what aspect of Nanbara influenced Maruyama’s insights and intellectual activities. He understood his teacher as a person of principle. I wanted to demonstrate that a careful textual critique clarifies what, primarily, Maruyama learned from his teacher.

According to some of his comments, Maruyama as a political thinker highly evaluates Nanbara’s accomplishments in his studies of Western political philosophy. However, he does not accept Nanbara’s political theory itself. Indeed, both thinkers form a sharp contrast between their political theories and moreover their methodologies of examining history.

Incorrect information about the genealogical relationship between the two political thinkers has been circulating due to the arrival of a brief biographical study of Maruyama to Western academic society. Besides, if a researcher wants to insist in any way that Nanbara was a liberal thinker and Maruyama succeeded to that ideological position, the scholar needs to responsibly define what liberalism means in his textual interpretation. However, I have not found any texts which prove Maruyama’s acceptance of Nanbara’s “liberal” idea. Neither does any literature indicate that Maruyama attempted to develop his teacher’s doctrine. As we observed, he even sometimes ridiculed Nanbara’s simple understanding of British utilitarianism.
In fact, careful textual critique clarifies the following points. First, Maruyama does not regard Nanbara as a liberal thinker in a simple way. Second, in an interview, he openly explains that he was not influenced by Nanbara as a liberal:

I have gotten rather mixed up, but, let’s go back to the previous question. I’ve talked about the question of liberalism, the impact from Yukio Ozaki [liberal Japanese politician, 1858–1954], and before that, what I received from Nanbara-sensei. What I learned from Ozaki is literally a reevaluation of liberalism. Everyone acknowledged him as a liberal thinker. In those days, only a few people identified themselves liberals, because it was the era when liberalism was referred to as a kind of hotbed of communism. Under such a social condition, Kiyoshi Kiyosawa [journalist, 1890–1945] and a few acknowledged themselves as liberals.

Nanbara-sensei never recognized himself as a liberal thinker. “Consideration of Liberalism as a Political Principle” is sensei’s opus, which was contributed to Kokkagakkai-zasshi [journal of Kokkagakkai] vol. 42, no. 10, October 1928. Yet, because I read his paper soon after I reassessed liberalism, I felt a little antipathy to his harsh criticism of liberalism. I wonder if he came back from Europe during the 1920s when the Taisho Democracy was booming. Although it was the era without any sign of fascism, it was sensei’s criticism of liberalism and individualism from the viewpoint of political philosophy. Because I was familiar with his criticism, I’ve never been inspired by him in terms of the reevaluation of liberalism. (Matsuzawa and Uete 2006, vol. 1, 245. Emphasis mine)

In addition to the above evaluation, Maruyama carefully reconsiders what he accepted from his teacher:

I’ve learned various things from Nanbara-sensei. Thus I can’t tell you in a word in what ways I’ve been influenced by him. I was greatly influenced by him, so, it is too difficult to recall from this day how much influence it was. [His idea was] not the Neo-Kantian schools but the original idea of Kant itself; it puts an emphasis on the independence of the personality. It is also probably an element of liberalism. Eijirō Kawai [social philosopher and economist, 1891–1944] and a few others actively preached the point. Meanwhile, Nanbara-sensei stressed the independence of the inner personality more. His idea is different from atomized individualism. It is different from the individualism of enlightenment thinkers, too. His idea is irrelevant to laissez faire, of course. In a sense, his idea can be referred to as the original Protestantism. In other words, it is a matter of individual conscience that is directly connected with God. I, of course, don’t have [religious] faith, yet if I try to conceptualize in what I was greatly influenced by him, it is about the strength of person who has such a thing. The strength means inner
Shown here is first that Maruyama does not regard Nanbara as a liberal thinker. Second, as we saw when we examined the complexity of Maruyama’s political philosophy in Part I, it is too naïve to define his political theory as a school of liberalism. Instead, it is conceivable to me that what Maruyama accepted from his teacher was Nanbara’s life philosophy itself (see Maruyama 2005, 83–84). He took a lesson from his teacher about one of the ways of how to keep an appropriate distance from the situation and how to ensure one’s conscience. Nanbara’s life philosophy and wartime action taught Maruyama about the importance of holding one’s philosophical principle and listening to one’s conscience in order that one should have consistent thinking and take decisive action against the outbreak of conformism or despotism by the authoritarian government. Maruyama learned from Nanbara that the person of principle would be able to see through the trick of totalitarian society from within its system. Alienating himself from Japanese liberal thinkers, Maruyama summarizes the political meaning of the people of principle as follows:

For the first season, those who were regarded as so-called liberals were anguished by the rise of the military and the right wing. Nevertheless, as the social climate had changed in that direction, the liberals also came to cooperate with national policy at the time, since ideas such as individual freedom or human rights for the basis of liberalism had not fundamentally taken root in Japan yet. All of the liberals, leftists, and Marxists were thrown into “the season of conversion.”

In those days, even though I was still young, the more I observed our senior intellectuals of Japan, the more I noticed their fatal weakness. Unlike in [Martin] Luther’s saying, “I am certainly standing at this point rather than any other points,” they didn’t stand on their own steady philosophical ground. They were apt to be carried away by the social trends surrounding them. I was very concerned about such weakness. People like Nanbara-sensei or Yanaihara-sensei were resolute in the face of this adversity. Although they were Christians, there were also a few self-standing people from the non-Christian group. I
was watching such a trend with my own eyes. As the right wing became dominant over society, many people uncritically followed the trend. Besides, because the majority in the world was going to totalitarianism in those days, chanting the slogan “Don’t miss the bus,” everyone followed the trend. Yet people like Nanbara-sensei didn’t behave in that way at all. As long as I saw, they absolutely formed a minority group among the Japanese then. They were able to determine their own attitudes anyway about what is right and wrong, what truth is, and what justice is. (Maruyama Masao Wabunshū 2008, vol. 1, 303)

As mentioned above, sometimes Maruyama asked Nanbara a question in a provocative manner without hesitation. On the flipside, Nanbara might pose Maruyama a challenge: “Maruyama-kun, please write your paper on Japanese intellectual history by using Western publications for more than half of your references.” While Maruyama understood his teacher’s instruction about the importance of writing a paper of Japanese political ideas in a scientific manner, against ideological arguments, later he also jokingly grumbles at his teacher about his sporadic unreasonable requests, “What an unreasonable demand it was!” (Memoirs of Masao Maruyama vol. 2, 2006, 141–142) I understand that Maruyama’s attitude came from his sincere respect for Nanbara and his humanity. One of the reasons for his deep respect for his teacher was not because of Nanbara’s political theory itself, but because of his way of life, which rejected flattering popular trends even under the threat of totalitarian society.

Maruyama explains a sharp contrast between Nanbara’s political theory and his theory as follows: “In 1955, I wrote a book review of sensei’s essay about Fichte. . . . In his view, the independence of individual personality is quite an obvious thing, and starting from the point, his study arrives at the question of social restriction of human beings. In that sense, he took the course from individualism to socialism. In my case, departing from social restriction, I came to gradually think about the independence of personality” (Matsuzawa and Uete 2006, vol. 1, 234–235).
Chapter 5  The Vicious Cycle between False Universalism and Ethnocentrism

Maruyama criticized Japanese jingoism and chauvinism based on Japanese parochialism and condemned the political use of Japanese culture and aesthetics by Japanese nationalists. In this chapter, we will focus on the theoretical explanation for his criticism of cultural particularism. His criticism can be theorized as the thesis of “the vicious cycle between false universalism and ethnocentrism.” Below, I would like Western readers to confirm the theoretical juncture between his warning about Japanese localism, his philosophy of dialogue, and his cosmopolitan ideas.

Maruyama’s Criticism of Localism

In “Sengo Nihon no Seishin Kakumei” [Spiritual Revolution in Postwar Japan] (Maruyama 1964: Conv., vol. 5), Maruyama characterizes the narrow-minded types of Japanese localism as shokubutsu-shugi-teki-dochaku-shugi (植物主義的土着主義; localism as the theory of plants), meaning the ideology of indigeneity based on the emphasis on blood and soil. According to him, Japanese particularists determine Japanese indigeneity by the idea of the birthplace. In “The Modernization of Japan and Localism” (Maruyama 1968: CW, vol. 9), he also criticizes Japanese nationalists who argues for cultural particularism based on the genealogical legitimacy of Japanese ethnicity. They carelessly advertise the cultural particularity of Japan and its excellence. He honestly shows his aversion to the introverted types of Japanese localism:

About indigenousness? The term of indigenous or Japanese causes my allergic reaction. Even if I am called a Western-centric thinker, I should be honest about this, because I have such a feeling. Moreover, in 1960s Japan, feudal people and feudal groups are colluding with the hectic “modernization” right? So, every time I go abroad, at the moment my airplane takes off, I feel good and always want to scream to someone,
“Serves you right!” although I’ve been overseas just a few times. Of course, leaving Japan spatially does not guarantee becoming international. Some self-styled “international” people still have an odious Japanese tail hanging out.

One character from *The Threepenny Opera* by [Bertolt] Brecht says, “Completely different are something shocking and something annoying. Only real art can surprise us.” . . . Recent popular theories of indigenous nationalism belong to the annoying category. (1968: CW, vol. 9, 370. Emphasis Maruyama’s)

Maruyama mentioned that applying the research findings of folklore studies, some critics of social science and humanity were discussing indigeneity and making arguments about the nation and nationalism based on indigeneity. He thought that several theories were well elaborated, yet there were not many significant theories that caught his eye or held his attention.

**The Quasi-Subjectivity**

Maruyama argues that in the Japanese academic circle, the perspective of indigenous versus foreign involves the debaters’ value judgment that something indigenous *is* something autonomous and independent. He points out that some attempt are those that tried to establish the theoretical foundation for the superiority of the Japanese thing, by claiming that Japanese Shintoism is rooted in medieval Shintoism and grew into Taoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism in Japanese intellectual history. These thinkers extend the metaphor in order that these foreign ideas might eventually become the flowers, fruits, leaves, and branches of Shintoism.

He identifies several variations of the theory of soil and points out two common problems in these theories. One is that the theory dismisses the fact that any endogenous culture can be formed and developed through encountering the entirely different culture of others, being influenced by the other culture, and having intense cultural exchange with the other culture. He understands that the theoretical error is given by this omission; the natural-generation theory of
 indigenous culture tends to be confused with the essentialist theory of it. The other problem is observed in their arguments for subjectivity; some confuse the individual independence of the Japanese and the ethnic autonomy of the Japanese nation. Because the Japanese language sometimes does not clearly distinguish the singular and plural forms, the boundary between the individual and the group becomes unclear. He explains that the lack of autonomy of the Japanese people ironically becomes the individual’s dependence on a group in Japan. The theory rather leads to the passiveness of the individuals in the cultural soil of Japanese collectivism.

For instance, he understands that the claim of Japanese Shintoism as Japanese national religion is qualitatively different from the argument of Judaism as the ethnic religion of the Jewish people. From Ubusunagami (tutelary deity of the Japanese) to Amateras (the ancestor god of the imperial family), according to him, the gods of Japan are literally special gods to the Japanese, which are inseparable from the Japanese land. On the other hand, Jehovah is God of the world from the beginning; he is merely linked with the Jews by contract (1968: CW, vol. 9, 371). Maruyama describes Cain, who is abandoned by Jehovah and told that anyone who meets him on the road will kill him; as well as the individuals in the state of nature in Thomas Hobbes’s theory, this absolute loneliness goes beyond the imagination of the Japanese people.

There is an idea that Japan’s religion is the religion of community, yet Maruyama thinks that the community is not a singular entity in Japan. He argues that multiple communities form duplicate relationships in the country. Therefore, even if someone is expelled from a community, the person can avoid social isolation by his or her involvement with another community. There is a Japanese proverb that says “When one god deserts you, another will pick you up.” In the form of containing many communities, the community of kuni (クニ) comes into being. This social mechanism provides the basis for a human relationship of mutual dependence of the Japanese. In
In this respect, Maruyama thinks that Japan is a happy country because the Japanese can avoid facing the absolute loneliness Cain encounters. However, in return, since it becomes quite difficult to psychologically break their reliance on the environment, it becomes also difficult to raise their awareness that each individual is burdened with the fate of the nation on his or her shoulders. It becomes difficult to evoke a sense that each one is the subject to decide the direction of the nation. In this way, Maruyama analyzes the mechanism that Japanese nationalism tends to be insubstantial. He aims to cultivate the authentic patriotism of the Japanese, which can be supported by both the establishment of modern individualism of the people and their acquisition of cosmopolitan spirit. For that purpose, he emphasizes that the individuals should disconnect themselves from the environment and should overcome the relationship of mutual dependency.

Maruyama thinks that Japan is a rare country that left the stage of the “uncivilized people” in the early period, experienced contact with the highest of world cultures, and yet kept relative ethnic homogeneity, in terms of race, language, the mode of production, and religious consciousness, since entering the civilized stage. However, he argues that in everyday life, most Japanese people are unconscious of the rareness of their homogeneity. He mentions that this point has been clarified by Western scholars of Japanese studies. He argues that the Japanese should reexamine their habitual ideas about their country, and should begin to reconsider the preservation of their conventional ideas as a Japanese problem. He asks why the Japanese prefer to apply the perspective of contraposition, such as indigenous versus foreign, endogenous versus extrinsic, and Japanese versus foreign countries. These ideas sometimes intertwine with the argument of subjectivity. He points out that the collusion has appeared repeatedly in Japanese intellectual history. He concludes that in fact, the dichotomous mode of thinking should be
explained as part of the above larger question on the historical and geographical conditions of Japan and the impact on the formation of the Japanese way of thinking.

The Collusion between False Universalism and Localism

Maruyama creates a thesis of the occurrence of the vicious cycle between *giji-fuhenshugi* (擬似普遍主義; false-universalism) and *dochaku-shugi* (土着主義; localism). His word “localism” can be considered comparable to “ethnocentrism” in Western political theory. First, as shown by the characteristic of Japanese gods as particular gods, the Japanese people did not know the concept of universal truth or universal Idee until Confucianism and Buddhism arrived in Japan. In this regard, Edo thinkers such as Sorai Ogyū, Shundai Dazai (Confucian in the middle of Edo period, 1680–1747), and Norinaga Motoori (the most influential scholar of the Kokugaku or Native Studies movement in the Edo period, 1730–1801) agreed with each other, though they offered completely opposite perspectives on the meaning of the introduction of universal truth. Second, from the doctrine of Confucianism and Buddhism to modern ideologies, universal ideas always came from the outside into the country; thus the notion of insider was connected with the notion of the particular, and in response the outsider was connected with the universal. As a result, it became a stereotype that they ascribed the particular thing to the internal thing and the universal thing to the foreign thing. Therefore, those who sought out the universal truth became pro-China or pro-India. Since Buddhism also arrived in Japan as Chinese Buddhism, Chinese civilization especially had represented the universal truth. For example, the way of a Chinese saint represented the ideal of politics, and for the heretical opponent to the saint was supplied the Chinese thought of the “idleness of Taoism” or
“the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove.” Third, Japan did not adopt foreign civilizations whole. The internal thing of Japan altered it, thus Confucianism and Buddhism were modified in the Japanese style. This is the so-called problem of the “Japanization” of foreign thought: Something internal is the key and it has functioned as the driving force of the Japanization, not only in the domain of religion and thought but also in all the cultural fields. Using this “something,” for centuries, some thinkers have attempted to produce the originality of Japanese thought. As represented in the history of Shintoism most typically, it could also be an abstract doctrine. Nevertheless, in “The Modernization of Japan and Localism” (Maruyama 1968: CW, vol. 9), Maruyama argues that it is apparent that this “something” has become the cause for preserving the particular pattern of modifying foreign ideas in Japan.

In the 1970s, Maruyama submitted the above hypothesis on the modification pattern of foreign ideas throughout Japanese history. In the 1950s and 1960s, using the occasions of his university lectures, he by trial-and-error attempted to explore the internal structure of the “something” by giving it a tentative name: the prototype of Japanese thought.

Maruyama argues that the interplay between foreign universal ideas and the Japanese prototype has continuously redeveloped, and after the Meiji Restoration, the interplay was, again, repeated in an alternative form of the ingestion of Western civilization. In this case, the pursuit of universal truth has been pro-America, pro-Europe, and sometimes pro-Russia. In the Edo period, the reactionary movement of Kokugaku (the study of Japanese classical literature) had broken out, attempting to expose the falseness of the universal character of foreign ideas by regarding foreign universality as the Chinese spirit or the Buddhist spirit, and some attempted to recognize the prototype itself as Japanese indigenous thought. Since the Meiji period, in Maruyama’s view, the same types of reactionary movement have reoccurred in the forms of the nationalist
intellectual movement resisting Western civilization. However, after the Westernization of the
country, Confucianism and Buddhism, which used to be considered extrinsic, are now
incorporated into the side of Japanese traditional thought. They have taken the position of
components of Japanese indigenous thought as if they historically were.

Most importantly, Maruyama argues that the problem of localism becomes also that of
quasi-universalism. The Japanese understand the Japanese indigeneity by connecting it to the
civilization of particular foreign groups, from which Japan has imported the universal thing. As
the latest example of the phenomenon, he discusses the case of the modern Japanese acceptance
of Marxism. Japanese Marxist thinkers developed an intellectual movement of pseudo-
universalism until recent years—until the collapse of the communist bloc in the late 1980s—by
treating Marxism as the universal ideal. Those thinkers were enthusiastic in any ideology and
culture of China or the Soviet Union.

He argues that the Japanese should correct the tradition of seeing the model of universal
ideas in imported foreign thought:

I feel it is an honor to be labeled as a so-called Western modernist in one sense, and I also
want to protest it on the other. Moreover, I am not arrogant and I never say that my past
idea has been entirely free from quasi-universalism. The conception of “indigenous” as
pseudo-universalism and a reaction to it—it does not necessarily mean political
backlash—and the vicious cycle that is repeated many times: How do the Japanese
disconnect themselves from these intellectual bad habits? This is the most urgent issue
that we must face in the future. Yet, there is no easy prescription for the task. (1968: CW,
vol. 9, 374)

The Absence of Universal Consciousness and the Occurrence of Ethnocentrism

Immediately after the war, Maruyama explained that the ideological basis of Japanese
ultra-nationalism was vulnerable in comparison to Nazi Germany. However, in “Theory and
Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism” (1946 [1969]), he also describes it this way:
Yet the absence from Japanese ultra-nationalism of this sort of authoritative basis does not mean that it was weak as an ideology. Far from it: ultra-nationalism succeeded in spreading a many-layered, though invisible, net over the Japanese people, and even today they have not really freed themselves from its hold.

It is not merely the external system of coercion that determined the low level of political consciousness we find today in Japan. Rather, the key factor is the all-pervasive psychological coercion, which has forced the behavior of our people into a particular channel. (Maruyama 1969, 1–2. Emphasis mine)

As will be further discussed in Chapter 8, it is reasonable to read his theory of ultra-nationalism in the context of his theory of mass society and, moreover, his theory of the prototype of Japanese thought. For instance, in his university lecture of 1966, he talked about the prototype of the Japanese ideological structure (Lect., vol. 6, 247). In the lecture, he explains that both Japanese ultra-nationalism during the war and the cocooning (family-oriented way of thinking) of 1960s Japanese mass society have the same root cause: the pathology of a narrow-mindedness of the Japanese for seeing the world in contrast between the relatives and the strangers. There is no opportunity to face the universal or transcendent existence that the world religions show human beings, and there is no opportunity to experience a universal idea. Owing to the intellectual condition of lacking a central philosophy, it becomes inevitable that sometimes Japanese particularists submit incoherent ideas. And finally, in the contrastive idea of the psycho-pathological behavior based on the closed mentality of dividing insider and outsider, what is on the other end of the spectrum is the “universal consciousness” (i.e., the cosmopolitan sense of neighbors), which he encouraged the Japanese to cultivate. In his theory of national reform, a higher priority is given to the improvement of the psychological aspect of the nation in order to promote the open-mindedness of the Japanese and further redesign an open society in Japan.
Mamiya (2007; Chapter 3, Section 2) reexamines the historical meaning of the wartime phenomenon of ideological conversion of members of the Japanese Communist Party from supporting communism to supporting the idea of the national polity of the emperor system. He draws attention to Maruyama’s comparison between two similar phenomena of tenkō (転向; conversion) and kaishin (回心; spiritual rebirth). In “Kindai Nihon no Chishikijin” [Intellectuals in Modern Japan] (Maruyama 1977), Maruyama explains that kaishin puts the accent on one’s new devotion toward something. Meanwhile, tenkō puts the accent on one’s withdrawal from something. The concept of kaishin becomes important in his theme of individual’s commitment to the transcendent existence and the acquisition of universal consciousness.

Accepting the conceptual distinction, Mamiya develops the idea and argues that conversion from their belief in communist ideology to their devotion to the ideology of national polity also bears the character of kaishin. He thinks that both tenkō and kaishin are the same: a change from something to something. Nevertheless, based on the kaishin as the leap from A to B—the leap sometimes even mars the integrity of the personality, he argues that we should call a change of a low or small degree of leap tenkō. He points out:

In fact, Maruyama himself thought in the same way. As well as Yoshimi Takeuchi, who called Japanese culture the culture of conversion, Maruyama also considered Japanese culture as that of conversion. The investigation about what had created such culture became his lifelong research subject. If the rapid change of thought and culture is the distinctive feature of Japanese intellectual fashion, there must be “something” that generates the change. His life experience of the era of conversion probably became an opportunity for him to continue thinking about the “something.” (Mamiya 2007, 184)

As mentioned before, Maruyama investigated the idea of the “something” in his university lectures. The idea was developed in his attempt to apply three different concepts: the “prototype,” the “old layer,” and the “basso ostinato” of Japanese thought. Mamiya suggests that Maruyama’s
observation of the wartime conversion of intellectuals triggered him to consider the social-
psychological pathology of the Japanese and its root.

Moreover, Tōyama (2010, 25) also finds another reason why Maruyama became
concerned about the ideological conversion of intellectuals. In his childhood, Maruyama was
impressed by the way of life of Nyozekan Hasegawa, who stubbornly rejected his easy
compliance with the popular intellectual fashion of those days. It appears that Hasegawa’s
influence on Maruyama prepared for his rebellion against intellectuals who easily conformed to
the intellectual mainstream.

Importantly, Maruyama’s universalist and cosmopolitan ideas, such as the sense of
otherness, universal consciousness, and the commitment of the individuals to the transcendent
existence, help to arm ourselves against the threat of conformism. Moreover, the formation of
these ideas is closely related to his real-life experiences fighting back against the various forms
of Japanese collectivism and conformism. What should be noted here is that his universalism is
not a political ideology, but something more akin to his life philosophy. His universalism is
based on his spirit of the stubborn person, who struggles against political dogmatism and
opportunism which selfishly utilizes the Japanese indigeneity or Japanese spiritualism. He
warned that those intellectual attitudes rather intensified conformism in Japanese society. I am
intrigued by his theory of mass politics and political culture, because it suggests that there seems
to be a positive correlation between the misuse of indigeneity and the increase of conformism,
which have been studied separately in the field of political science.
Summary of Part II

In Part II, I have conducted biographical research on Maruyama to clarify the social background of the emergence of his style of universalism and cosmopolitanism. We have confirmed that his ideas were formed throughout his approach to Japanese groupthink and its political impact. In his life history, the most influential event on his thought was, without doubt, his experience of Japanese militarism and the totalitarian society from the 1930s until August of 1945. In the formation of a surveillance society, he criticized nationalist intellectuals who sided with National Spiritual Mobilization Movement by the Konoe Cabinet and trumpeted the virtue of Japanese spiritualism. They complied with the militarist regime and uncritically followed the nationalistic intellectual fashion in those days. On the other hand, after the war, he heard of the struggle of his senior colleagues against the militarist government and its aggressive war policy.

However, he recognized that the totalitarianization of society was a common phenomenon that would come into existence in different forms, not only in the wartime fascist countries but also in both capitalist and communist countries. He addresses some cases of the socio-political phenomenon and the repression of the individuals under the collective conscious of totalitarian societies. In chronological order, they are the societies of Nazi Germany, Japan’s ultra-nationalism, the Red Purge in Japan and McCarthyism in the United States, and Russia under the Stalin regime. He also argues that the radical student protest movements in the 1960s-era have the same psychology as the wartime fascist movement. He also analyzes the 1988–1989 “self-restraint” movement as a new form of totalitarian movement. In his later years, he still observed that the invisible collective conscious forced the Japanese to cancel the already-scheduled public events all over Japan. Involved in the turbulence of Japanese conformism, he studied the problem of the repression of people of conscience by the collective conscious. Five
cases of his life experiences have been examined in this study. It is clear now that while Maruyama experienced many historical incidents of compulsory homogenization, his experiences rather emboldened him to take a cosmopolitan position more consciously. The well-known case of his opposition to the nationalist movement of intellectuals is his criticism of the “theory of overcoming modernity” followed by the second generation of the Kyoto School and other nationalist intellectuals. With his rebellious spirit, after the war he then competed against Japanese intellectuals who uncritically followed the intellectual fashion of the times and quickly changed their political position from pro-militarism to pro-pacifism. In 1967, in a conversation with Shunsuke Tsurumi, Maruyama explains that his rebellious spirit against conformist intellectuals derives from both his innate temperament of “contrariness” and his objection to the inconsistent behavior of opportunists. Behind his encouragement for the Japanese to promote modern subjectivity was his emotional rejection of opportunist intellectuals.

We have also confirmed the theoretical reason why Maruyama was concerned about Japanese cultural particularism. His ideas can be represented as a formula of the vicious cycle between false universalism and closed localism. In theory, he explained the harmfulness of the closed types of Japanese cultural particularism.

It is also clear that before his theoretical explanation of the risk of cultural particularism, his primordial feelings of dislike for conformist intellectuals contributed to forming his antagonistic attitude to the trend of conformism in contemporary Japan. His involvement in the phenomena of thought suppression and mob violence prompted him to theorize about the Japanese style of conformism. He argues that the country Japan consists of the mixture of modern technology and the feudalist culture of spiritualism. This mixture influences the management of politics, organizations, and human relationships. In comparison with Western
societies, he portrays his country as a system of “interdependent collectivism.” In the system of the aggregation of the passive and indecisive individuals, in critical situations, the following problems occur in a chain reaction: a) decision-making is delayed to deal with urgent issues; b) the distribution of powers becomes unclear among the political agencies; and c) responsibility for the result of decision-making becomes unclear. The negative effects of groupthink directly affect Japanese politics, especially under the critical situations such as the outbreak of war or natural disaster.

The dysfunctionality of the Japanese political system has been observed again in the damage control by the government for the nuclear accident in the Tohoku earthquake in March 2011. If Maruyama analyzed the incident, he would have pointed out similarities in the problems of Japanese groupthink under the wartime political system. He would have argued for the remnant of the same psychological structure linking with prewar Japanese society. The incident proves that if it lacks the quality of modern subjectivity on the individual level, in politically critical situations, the Japanese political system repeats the same error: politicians avoid their political responsibilities; they demand a scapegoat to dodge public criticism; and they become silent and simply wait for the natural settlement of the situation. In the meantime, people struggling at the field level are sacrificed by the politicians and their opportunistic political management.

Of course, similar phenomena are observed in different political cultures. And on the flipside, decisive action can be observed in Japanese politics too. Nevertheless, overall, I do not think that it is misjudgment to argue that Japanese politics continues providing sample cases for the conclusion that the problems of political management in the country and society exist because individualism is underdeveloped. Maruyama suggests that within an interdependent
group, individual members do not behave spontaneously because of their fear of punishment by the group, owing to breaking the internal order. In the field of Japanese studies, nowadays the phenomenon has become famous as the theme of kūki (空気; literally, air or atmosphere) or ba no hun’iki (場の雰囲気; the atmosphere of place). On the other hand, he also points out that the passive Japanese suddenly exercise their subjectivity toward members who disrupt the internal order of their group. The obedient members relentlessly attempt to eliminate the heretical members from their group by evoking their subjectivity that is usually hidden in order to maintain the group order (see Lect., vol. 6, 118). His research on Japanese political culture convincingly shows that the political management of the Japanese would reflect their national characters.

Part III  Maruyama’s Epistemology on Universality

Trust in Modern Western Ideas

In 1967, in a dialogue with Shunsuke Tsurumi, Maruyama expressed his trust in the universal value of modern Western ideas: “If someone points out that I idealize and universalize the past of Europe, I must say, ‘Yes indeed’. Of course, I am not saying that other cultures do not have universality. Yet I accept that my thought holds the abstraction of European culture within it. I believe that it is the universal heritage of humankind. I strongly believe so. I would like to learn much more about it” (Maruyama and Tsurumi 1967: Conv., vol. 7, 111–112). What should be noted is that he trusted Western ideas in the “idealized” form. Remember that as a thinker of civilization, he took the position of pluralist universalism endorsing different styles of modernization.

On the other hand, at the epistemological level, he took a universalist stance on political ideals based on two of his psychological preferences: first, his innate temperament of being, in his words, a “stubborn person” against the popular intellectual trend of the times, and, as an extension of that, his rejection of the rapid conversion from one’s philosophical position to another’s. He consistently objected to intellectuals who uncritically followed the intellectual fashion of the times. In Part III, we will examine his epistemology on universality and particularity for the purpose of understanding the basis of his unique universalist and cosmopolitan ideas. Understanding his epistemology helps us to comprehend why he warned against Japanese cultural particularism and the employment of cultural particularity by Japanese nationalists aiming to arouse the nationalist sentiment of the Japanese. I will also argue that his primordial sense of universality is the undercurrent running through his cosmopolitan political thought.
The Layers of Thought

Maruyama categorizes human thought into four layers by what he perceives as their degrees of abstractness:

Layer A: The thought, the theory, and the worldview of thinkers; the most highly systematic and abstract thought.

Layer B: General opinions of society, or public opinion of the times; thought that is conscious in a fair degree, yet less systematic and abstract than that of Layer A.

Layer C: The spirit of the times; thought less conscious than thought on Layer A and public opinion on Layer B.

Layer D: One’s sense of life; a sense and an emotion connected to everyday life; the lowest consciousness of thought that is even sometimes irrational (Maruyama 1964: Lect., vol. 4; Tanaka 2009, 126–128).

Maruyama’s thought itself can be distinguished into two types. The first is his theoretically elaborated ideas that formed through his logical thinking. These ideas are described in his academic writings. His expertise of intellectual history fits into Layer A. By contrast, the second type is expressed in the form of his intuitional and epistemological comments on things. His primary sense of universality and particularity can be added to Layer D. His personal psychological preferences on things are also part of this second type. This type of ideas came into being before his rational thinking and his academic writings. When developing his epistemological arguments on universality, he attempted to distinguish them from his statements based on his academic research; whenever he talked about his intuitional or epistemological ideas, he notified the audience or the reader that his comment was based on merely a rough idea.

Except a few essays about his methodology, he did not explain his own epistemology in a systematic manner. We therefore need to reconstruct his epistemology of universality and particularity by combining his fragmented comments on the theme through multiple texts. In Part III, I examine his cosmopolitan political thought from its epistemological phase.
Chapter 6  The Universalist Standpoint on Ideals

6.1 The Role of Idee

Recognition of Idee

Maruyama’s epistemology on the universality and particularity of things is expressed by the term “universalist standpoint on ideals.” In 1984, Tsurumi and his fellows had an opportunity to converse with Maruyama. After reading all of his writings available at the time, Tsurumi and others formulated seven questions about his political thought and prototype theory. Their first question was “As the distinctive character of Japanese thought, Mr. Maruyama points out that in Japanese intellectual history, no ideas could fully meet the conditions of orthodoxy. If so, were any ideas successful in establishing the position of orthodoxy in European intellectual history and Chinese intellectual history?”

In their dialogue, Maruyama and Tsurumi debated human recognition of the universality and particularity of things. Maruyama was asked an epistemological question: Is recognition of particularity preceded by that of universality? Maruyama answered in the affirmative; his answer to the question probably connects with the depth of his universalist thought. But Tsurumi rebutted Maruyama’s view. The following conversation provides so much insight that it is worth quoting at length; it will be discussed in the subsequent section.

Tsurumi: We can discuss the issue in more detail by examining the case of Muhammadanism or Confucianism, yet I want to skip that now. However, let me ask you one question. Maruyama-san’s methodology begins with scripture. In other words, it seems to me that you think that there are words in the beginning. But I think that there is something before the scripture. So, I think that the methodology will also be a little bit different, if our understanding of the point is different. I am therefore somewhat skeptical about your idea. . . .

Maruyama: Well, if you mean a specific book, like Capital, by the term “scripture,” my answer will be different. But if you ask me whether [our recognition] starts from an abstract Idee [idea] or not, I say yes.
Tsurumi: I think that the Idee has already dwelled on texts. What do you think about this point?

Maruyama: Specifically, it is converted to characters. But, afterwards, for instance Lenin would write something again. Thus, the point also becomes my counterargument to Tsurumi-kun. You always confuse such a specific book and the dimension of the Idee behind the book. I believe in Idee behind it. In that sense, this is my own bias. It is my conviction that a fact cannot be criticized by another fact. I think that we can criticize a fact for the first time by invisible Idee beyond the fact. Those who are not aware of it just fall into self-deception. While they assume some Idee, they are not aware of it.

Tsurumi: If I put my idea in a simple way, I think that the Idee dwells on something. There was custom before the scripture was established, and the custom came out. In other words, we do not know whether action is the Idee or not. Generally speaking, it is impossible that animals’ behavior assumes the Idee.

Maruyama: It all contains the Idee.

Tsurumi: You say animals’ behavior does contain the Idee?

Maruyama: Yes. It all does.

Tsurumi: I think that it [the recognition of Idee] might be formed through a much more multilayered process. There are such things [customs] in advance before the scripture is written. And then, even after the scripture came out, the idea [Idee] is reflected back in their customs, behavior, and action in its various forms. . . .

Maruyama: Yes. In my view, on the contrary, such action that abstracts the Idee is just a physical exercise. It is just a physical movement from one point to another.

Tsurumi: I don’t abstract the Idee.

Maruyama: No, no.

Tsurumi: I don’t abstract the Idee. As it is, as a whole. . . .

Maruyama: No, no: In your argument, [the Idee] has already been abstracted. Otherwise, the Idee is always a prerequisite. In other words, when removing all the Idee, only physical things will be left.

Tsurumi: We don’t remove the Idee: As a whole.

Maruyama: Yet we can’t recognize it as a whole. It’s different.

Tsurumi: As a whole….
Maruyama: Let’s discuss more next time (laughs). Some say that a custom is easy to understand. But they say that ideas are abstract and difficult to understand. This is fundamental prejudice. I do not understand customs at all. Rather, ideas are [much easier]. . . .

Tsurumi: Logically speaking, you can’t say that you don’t understand it at all (laughs). In my impression, logically, I found the customs more confusing.

Maruyama: Well, I don’t think you can say that. As we discussed a little while ago, because thought is confusing, every religion has been debating about the orthodoxy and heresy for thousands of years. Because people cannot figure out what true Marxism is, what true Buddhism is, and what true Islam is, humans have repeated bloody religious wars. How could you ignore this reality? It proves how significantly human beings are provoked by Idee. It has nothing to do with what the customs of the time are like. I would say that thousand-year-old customs have nothing to do with the present day.

Tsurumi: I am quite skeptical about the way of setting a question by asking what the true one [answer] is. This is to say, it is a belief that there is truth only in the direction.

Maruyama: Well, so, what direction do you mean?

Tsurumi: I can present it.

Maruyama: What is it? What direction is it?

Tsurumi: It is the direction by empirical, or by verification.

Maruyama: Well, instead of saying “by,” does the direction imply that something is moving? What is it?

Tsurumi: It would be the ideal of humankind.

Maruyama: If you say so, it is just the same [as what I am saying] (laughs).

Tsurumi: Well, it’s still different (laughs).

Maruyama: That is what I’m saying. In withdrawing from that place, it becomes close to an idea like primitive materialism. It becomes just physical movement. Therefore, ideas are inevitably included in so-called act. The study of intellectual history just extracts them in an abstract form. It is another question whether we socially reconstruct the extracted ideas once again. It becomes a methodological question.

Maruyama: In the meantime, because the universal doctrines are all foreign thought in Japan, the inferiority complex of thought becomes so strong to the Japanese people. I have worked as an editor for The Compendium of Japanese Thought. In the series, there
is a volume of “Thought of Civil Movement.” However, why can’t we just say “Civil Movement”? The thought of civil movement is supposed to be inevitably included in the civil movement. Japanese people cannot feel comfortable unless they add the word “thought,” like “The Thought of the Civil Rights Movement.” Such an expression sounds funny to me. The civil rights movement in the Meiji era already contains thought itself therein. So, that is an inferiority complex about thought. Unless they mention “thought” anyway, they feel uncomfortable.

Tsurumi: If you say something like that. . . . Well, what I am telling you is just as it is (laughs).

Maruyama: After all, because all universal doctrines are foreign ideas, on the contrary, people inevitably have such a weak consciousness. (Maruyama 2005, 32–36)

**Universality Precedes Particularity**

In the dialogue above, epistemologically, Maruyama demonstrates his thought that because we sense something universal of an object in advance, we can recognize the particular characteristics of the object. It seems that their debate about one’s cognitive order for recognizing universality and particularity ended in controversy, because Tsurumi restrained himself, hesitating to rebut Maruyama thoroughly.

When we compare the characteristics of culture X and those of culture Y, we do not make a direct comparison. It seems that we consciously and unconsciously establish the standard reference on the subject for comparison, and from the standard, first, measure the difference of X from the standard and do the same for Y. The attributes of X and Y can be recognized as distances from the standard. Then, we compare the characteristics of X and Y indirectly by referring to the differences X and Y have from the standard. The establishment of this criterion implies our recognition of the universality of the attribute in question. Those that are set close to the reference line become the majority, and those that are away from the line are determined to be minorities. In other words, in human cognition, we cannot directly compare the uniqueness of something and that of other things. Because we have set the standard of measurement in advance
or because we can sense its universality, we can recognize the particularity of the object (as the
distance of the object from the baseline). This cognitive law can be extracted from Maruyama’s
epistemology.

At this point, I can formulate three epistemological rules from Maruyama’s argument in
order to consider universality and particularity in the context of the studies of political culture.
First, by sensing the universality of an object in advance, we can identify the particularities of the
object. Second, epistemologically speaking, we cannot directly compare between a particularity
and another particularity. Lastly, applying the former two cognitive rules (for example, in the
context of minority politics), the following general law of recognition of indigeneity can be
derived. Consider the case that a certain minority group attempts to assert its uniqueness based
on a certain cultural attribute of the group. This group can recognize and begin to claim its
uniqueness, because the majority trend on the concerned attribute already exists in society before
the group’s claim. The particularity of the cultural identity of the group can become recognizable
by recognizing the attribute of the group marking a difference from the majority trend.

Maruyama’s epistemology on the ideal, or Idee, suggests to me that there are the above
epistemological laws behind the identity claim of minority groups. Consider how to recognize
the unique cultural identity of a certain attribute of a certain minority group. If the majority trend
as the standard barometer is entirely lost, the minority group will not be able to recognize its own
cultural attribute as particular. As a result, the group will not be able to exist as a minority group
centered on that attribute. The group then becomes the majority. This law brings about our
expectation that studying minority politics requires simultaneously studying majority politics
(i.e., the politics of mass society). The disciplines are two sides of the same coin.
The Function of Idee

Maruyama’s expression *Idee* in the dialogue above is expressed elsewhere in his texts in ways such as an idea, the universal truth, or the transcendent universal existence. We need to examine his idea of the transcendent existence that is beyond human existence.

Maruyama even expresses his belief in *Idee* as his own “bias,” something beyond his rational thinking. Tōyama (2010) also pays attention to Maruyama’s belief in *Idee*. Maruyama emphasizes the role of *Idee* to the individual because of his premise that we cannot evaluate a fact by another fact; he argues that we can evaluate a fact only by the *Idee* behind the fact. This idea becomes the foundation for his criticism of the nationalistic argument of Japanese cultural particularism. In fact, the portion of the debate between Maruyama and Tsurumi quoted above is examining an epistemology of human recognition of *Idee* by following their previous discussion about some historical cases of academic conflicts over the orthodoxy and heresy of world religions.

In 1960, in another roundtable discussion, Maruyama expresses his philosophy of valuing consistent remarks and actions against the rapid conversion of one’s political or philosophical position. Their dialogue was recorded in an academic magazine, and the editor paired it with the title “Fuhenteki Genri no Tachiba” [普遍的原理の立場; Standing for Universal Principles] (Maruyama and Tsurumi 1967: Conv., vol. 7). This title expresses Maruyama’s warning against compulsory homogenization that attempts to unify the public mind and public opinion. He also explains that his caution against rapid ideological conversion results from the “conservative” aspect of his idea. He suggests that the individual’s devotion to *Idee* enables him or her to take an appropriate distance from the political turbulence of the various types of conformism or totalitarian movements.
The Effect of the Universalist Mode of Thinking

During the Second World War, thought control had been made exercised by the militarist government. Conforming to popular trends, some Japanese intellectuals began preaching the superiority of Japanese spiritual culture of the divine land of Japan over Western material civilization. Based on the idea, those Japanese intellectuals insisted that Japan would lead the world revolution. The government strictly regulated free speech and publications. Tsurumi evaluates that during the war, Maruyama kept a wider philosophical point of view than the then narrow-minded philosophical fashion. Tsurumi also analyzes the trajectory of Maruyama’s thought during the war. Historicism had become the mainstream in wartime Japan. Under these intellectual conditions, Maruyama wrote a book review about a study of the history of philosophy by Yoshiteru Asō (historian of Japanese philosophy; esthetician, 1901–1938). In the book review, Maruyama positively evaluated the view of Hajime Ônishi (philosopher, 1864–1900), which did not dismiss various philosophical schools other than historicism. Tsurumi points out that Maruyama’s stance continued arguing for the importance of remembering other intellectual paths disparate from the wartime ideological mainstream, even if he risked himself by opposing the majority trend.

Moreover, in his “Kokka-shugi no Zenki-teki Keisei” (1944; trans. “The Premodern Formation of Nationalism” 1974), Maruyama introduced an episode of Sir Ernest Mason Satow (British diplomat active in Japan between the late Edo period and the Meiji period, 1843–1929). Immediately after the Anglo-Satsuma War (1863), Japanese men were repairing batteries that were destroyed by the British warships’ bombardment. When Satow and some others passed by there, the Japanese workers came close to Satow’s group and willingly helped their business. In a society in which hostile toward the United States and the United Kingdom were thoroughly
entrenched, Maruyama introduced such an episode on purpose. Even under the severe condition of thought control, he mentioned the episode, anticipating the postwar restoration of an academically open society. Tsurumi understands that Maruyama’s wartime writings meant to restrain the fanatical intellectual atmosphere that had lost its self-control. During wartime, the Japanese were forced to hold a very narrow ideological profile. Tsurumi argues that during the war, in contrast, Maruyama continued to have a wider philosophical view about Japanese thought than the then dominant intellectual trend of anti-Westernism. Evaluating different philosophical lenses other than historicism, such as Ōnishi’s study and the record of Satow, Maruyama accounted for other possible ideas beyond the militarist ideology of national polity. At that time, no other intellectuals reflected on the ideas of Ōnishi or Satow. Tsurumi writes that by his “logic of recall,” Maruyama could take a stance philosophically free from wartime Japanese totalitarianism.

Why, in the fanatical intellectual climate, was Maruyama able to keep his own style of thinking? Maruyama responds to Tsurumi’s evaluation frankly. Although Tsurumi evaluates Maruyama’s wartime attitude in a rational manner, Maruyama explains that it was just his common exercise of the “spirit of stubborn man.” As mentioned before, in Maruyama’s view, Fukuzawa was the best teacher about the spirit. Moreover, he explains that during the war, his attitude was supported not only by the spirit of a stubborn person but also by something else; it was an idea of respecting the “inner continuity” of one’s thinking. He does not decide one day to say something completely different than what he said the day before. He also attributes this as another expression of the conservative aspect of his thought.

Maruyama’s two creeds, the spirit of the stubborn person and the respect for internal continuity of thought, enabled him to take the following action. Immediately after the war, with
the spirit of the stubborn person, he began pushing back against the left wing because of their rapid conversion from Japanese wartime fanaticism to the postwar pacifism. However, in the 1950s, the left wing was struggling to get public support in the political conflict over the peace treaty issue. Thereupon, his stubbornness was invoked, and in turn, he came to support the democratic group including the left wing. As a result, the political conflict over the Treaty of San Francisco became an opportunity for him to commit more actively to real politics and mass movement, although he had looked only obliquely at the postwar society until then. He explains that although he did not mean to touch upon political activism through his participation in the Peace Issue Discussion Committee, the political events of the Red Purge and the peace treaty issue became a turning point in his academic life and his intellectual activity. Looking back on the wrongly propagated image of his, he analyzes his own commitment to political activism as follows. People regarded him as a hermit who was not active or capable of leading the public to political movement, and as the typical type of thinker who controlled academia in postwar Japan. When the issue of the security treaty broke out between 1959 and 1960, he came to touch more actively upon the political movement. People around him were amazed because his name frequently appeared in newspapers. He analyzes that such an attitude was also his conservatism, passively evoked by external conditions. Here, we notice that there is a distinct gap between his self-analysis and his reputation as a powerful democratic opinion leader in early postwar Japanese politics.
6.2 Universality and Everydayness

Recognizing Universality in Everyday Life

In “Standing for Universal Principles” (1967), Maruyama and Tsurumi also discuss the relationship between universality and everydayness. The concept of everydayness becomes crucial to understanding how Maruyama visualizes the universal.

In a group discussion of “Gendai Nihon no Kakushin Shisō” [Progressivism in Contemporary Japan] (Umemoto, Satō and Maruyama 1966: Conv., vol. 6), Maruyama remarks that the recognition of universality will precede that of particularity. As already mentioned, Tsurumi questions Maruyama’s epistemology. But Tsurumi also sees a connection between Maruyama’s epistemology and his evaluation of the wartime emperor system. Tsurumi suspects that Maruyama’s epistemology is also connected with Maruyama’s beautification or idealization of the reality of Europe.

In some degree, Tsurumi understands Maruyama’s epistemology at the early stage of human cognition. Certainly, when recognizing the particularity of the subject, we have already estimated the universal image of the subject in the ambiguous form. We already sense the universality of the subject as foreshadowing.

However, Tsurumi objects to Maruyama’s epistemology because recognition of particularity probably precedes recognition of universality in order to form the universality in a more sophisticated way. Consider the human recognition and judgment present in such simple observations as “here is a dog,” “here is a white teacup,” and “the lady next door is a good person.” We are aware that the animal in question is a dog, not a cat; that it is a white teacup, not a blue one (or a white teacup, not a white coffee mug); the lady is a good person, not a bad person (or the lady is a good person, instead of her husband; or the lady is next door, not in the
next town and so on). In this way, we determine things based on our understanding of certain particularities. Taking up fragments of our experience, Tsurumi points out the possibility that particularity is prior to universality in our recognition and judgment. He argues that in the cognitive process, universality progressively emerges as a more universal judgment and a more universal proposition.

In the debate above, Maruyama emphasized the awareness of universality of things at a more primitive stage of human cognition. Meanwhile, Tsurumi is concerned more with the universality at a more advanced stage in cognition, such as the universality of a religious doctrine. Nevertheless, in response to Tsurumi’s claim, Maruyama maintains that his saying that “recognition of the universal precedes that of the particular” expresses the same thing as what Tsurumi is trying to say.

Maruyama: The process becomes exactly like you say it is. The universal thing cannot come out all of sudden. There is no problem about that point, at least, if you are aware that something universal is included in any particular propositions in terms of logic. If you are aware of that, I have nothing to argue. So, I am not surprised even if Tsurumi-san loudly claims [the Japanese] ethnicity. I don’t need to worry about [your words and actions] (laughs).

Tsurumi: Well, if you say so, I am beaten (laughs).

Maruyama: In other words, you can put the brakes on yourself, because you’re essentially a cosmopolitan person. (Maruyama and Tsurumi 1967: Conv., vol. 7, 117)

Tsurumi appreciates Maruyama’s fair evaluation of him and replies that he has been able to bounce back from his ideological frustration. For example, his issue with the faith of universal American values against his own “foundation of thought” restricts him from making a universal judgment. Moreover, he highlights the aspect of cognitive flow that universal ideas are formed by the accumulation of our everyday-life recognition and judgment, such that the lady next door is a good person. He illustrates that there may be a way of assembling thoughts as such. In this
respect, he argues that through the accumulation of “the Japanese thing” or “Japanese-like experiences,” it will be possible to compose a “Japanese thought” that has a universal function.

Tsurumi is responding within the boundaries of the propositions of no-thinking in Japan or no-orthodoxy in Japan that were submitted by Maruyama. Maruyama responds to Tsurumi’s view as follows:

Maruyama: At that point, if it’s different from your idea right after the war, it seems like I misunderstood you. I don’t call it a particular thing. I just call it an everyday thing. Like, there is a dog; we’re living with a relationship on a daily basis. That’s all. A real philosophy takes care of one’s daily experiences. I’ve learned this exactly from you. However, if you say [this makes for] the Japaneseness [things particular to Japan], I want to say, “Wait a minute” (laughs).

Tsurumi: Well, then, I shouldn’t say “Japaneseness” anymore. What I just want to point out is that there is no particular thing in a pure sense.

Maruyama: Okay, that’s good. That is just the same [as my idea]. On the contrary, regarding the one-sided judgment that Maruyama believes that only something like democracy or a certain ism as universal things: Let me tell you something, such a speculation is completely misunderstanding me. Well, of course, democracy or basic human rights are universal ideas. Yet, when I talk about something universal, I am not just saying [it is] something like those.

Maruyama: For example, when I am taking the subway or walking through crowds, most of the time, in my sense, I rarely think that I am in Japan now or the woman sitting next to me is Japanese. Even when I am taking the subway in England, I just feel that someone sitting next to me is simply a human being. Rather, it suddenly came to me at one point, and I thought consciously, “Oh, I am in England now.” After coming back [to Japan], after a while now, in the hustle and bustle in the city of Ochanomizu, I finally but suddenly have become aware that I am in Japan now. Although I am really bad at speaking English, I don’t think this is a problem of language. This is not just a matter of living in England or in Japan. For example, imagine that an unknown editor or someone from a company is visiting you. If the person presents his or her business card, I think, “Oh, the person is from a certain company.” However, once I start small talk with the person, I don’t care about the personal attribute anymore, the socially attached [labels] like editor, businessman, or university professor. Soon, I just come to feel that a human and a human are having a conversation. The universal thing is living in me as a feeling or sense like that.
Tsurumi: Well, I think that British empiricism is a philosophy that puts its roots down there. It is called common sense. The principle of common sense is not far from universality.

Maruyama: Then I completely agree with your idea. I have learned that point exactly from Mr. Tsurumi and some other people. This is a question of everyday experience. I don’t think that it is the same as the question of universality versus particularity, which often becomes controversial. Don’t you think so? In my view, there are not any ideas more universalist than those of Locke and Hume of British philosophy. They are so transparent and rational. (1967: Conv., vol. 7, 118–119)

It is in this manner that Maruyama envisions the universal thing: It is tightly interwoven with an everyday thing. There is no reason for him to deny democracy and basic human rights. He accepts their universal values. However, the above remark also proves that he does not begin discussing by setting democracy and basic human rights as absolute premises. As already confirmed throughout this study, Maruyama does not follow the procedure of first adopting the absolute value of the ideas of democracy and basic human rights as given presupposition, and, second, moving forward to building a political theory based on those principles. Moreover, it is clear now that we cannot simply regard him as a universalist thinker in the same sense the term takes on in the Western debate, which has developed across the past decades in the theoretical conflict between a) skepticism about the universal values of democracy and basic human rights and new attempts to rebuild them beyond the criticism, and b) the rise of the politics of recognition based on various claims of cultural and political particularism. Accordingly, the popular evaluations of Maruyama, such as those regarding him as a liberal thinker who symbolized the struggle of postwar Japan’s democratization or a universalist thinker who preached the universal value of democracy and basic human rights, are ungrounded and oversimplifying his political thought.

After examining Maruyama’s political thought up to this phase, the true meaning of his seeming adoration of Western thought and modernism finally becomes clear. In contemporary
Japan, many people still do not have a cosmopolitan sense. Maruyama is wary of debate on the universality and particularity in the cultural and political contexts; however, he stridently argues that even if it is misunderstood as Euro-centrism, the emphasis on universality is better than that of particularity, which often turns into ethnocentrism. He remarks that universalism also has many problems. However, he considers it to be better than the emphasis on particularity that he believes will turn into xenophobia that dogmatically praises the excellence of Japan. This idea is his fundamental philosophy.

Maruyama once asks Tsurumi whether universality or particularity will draw more public interest. Tsurumi answers, “I think universality is more likely to gain attention from the public.” In his reply, Maruyama criticizes that Tsurumi’s evaluation for postwar intellectual conditions, saying it is a misjudgment and his assessment is quite snobbish:

[Look at] political and business elites, or executives of large newspaper companies: Why don’t you look at Japanese society overall? [Their thought patterns are] quite far from the idea of universal. They don’t care for abstract notions such as the universal value of humanity. They say that they should leave such a theme to the chatter of scholars. On the way home from their workplaces, visiting [the Japanese style of] nightclubs and drinking along with beautiful women are universal—well, I should say “common”—to them. Nevertheless, in topics such as the Japanese tradition or Japanese pride, they nod with smug looks and say “uh-huh.” That is the majority trend of the public, overwhelmingly. If you don’t know it, you shouldn’t speak about everydayness (laughs).

I trust a lot in your philosophy. But I haven’t trusted your everyday sense for a long time now. Your common sense is far deviated from ordinary ones. Your sense is floating away from very ordinary Japanese. You know, judging from the living environment I grew up in, I’m holding to the chaotic “premodern” thing more than you do (laughs). (1967: Conv., vol. 7, 119–120)

In this way, Maruyama argues that universality in the highly academic and purely sophisticated meaning is not necessarily accepted in Japanese society. Rather, he thinks that everyday senses are important to reach recognition of the universal thing, and something universal naturally emerges through close proximity with the “premodern thing” that takes root in people’s everyday
lives. For Maruyama, the universal thing is not something to spread to the mass public in a top-down manner administered by academics. In the deeper aspects of his thought, he was sensing the universal thing as something that could be distilled from the chaotic everyday lives of the public, in which their desires were swirling and competing. Here, again, we observe complexity in his political thought that is far from the popularized innocent images of him as the simple modernist Maruyama or the naïve democrat Maruyama.

6.3 Maruyama’s Ideas on Particularity

Preference for Studying Particularity

Maruyama’s epistemology concerning particularity suggests that we should reconsider the mechanism of how we recognize and define the indigeneity of minorities on the group and individual levels.

As seen in Part II, Maruyama critically examined problems of Japanese conservative movements of ethnocentrism based on cultural particularism. He characterized Japanese nativism prioritizing the birth place as shokubutsu-shugi (植物主義; Maruyama’s coinage: literally, an ideology of vegetation). As mentioned in Chapter 5, he criticized nationalists who claimed that certain cultural traits were particular to Japan simply because they were originated from the land of Japan. He also criticized Japanese nativism misunderstanding the explosion of inner emotion as the exercise of individuality. He called the misconceived form of subjectivity giji-shutaisei (擬似主体性; quasi-subjectivity).

Maruyama examines several historical cases of Japanese xenophobic movements, such as religious persecution against Christians in sixteenth-century Japan, the reactionary intellectual movement of National Learning of ancient Japanese thought during the Edo period, and the
wartime intellectual movement of “overcoming modernity.” These intellectual movements similarly applied Japanese indigenous thought to confronting incoming foreign ideas and to establishing the superiority of traditional Japanese spiritualism. However, those claims were not supported by satisfying scientific research methods. Moreover, in Japanese intellectual history, nationalists have frequently used theories of Japanese culture and aesthetics to promote nationwide political xenophobia. In this context, Maruyama was critical of cultural particularism, and he even sometimes expressed an emotional aversion to the Japanese indigenous movement.

Nevertheless, on the other hand, Maruyama expressed his personal preference for studying what he called the “uniqueness” of Japanese thought and culture. Thus, his discourse of universality and particularity becomes complicated. In his “Author’s Introduction to the English Edition of Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics” (1969) he provides the reader with an alternative idea about universality and particularity from his criticism of closed types of Japanese cultural particularism:

There is, however, the further reason of personal predilection. By temperament I am less interested, in the analysis of men and institutions, in discerning those characteristics which they share in common with other men and institutions, than in those special characteristics which differentiate them. Immanuel Kant once remarked that all students of nature could be divided into two groups, those who were more concerned with principles of homogeneity, and those who leaned towards specification. One group, according to Kant, seems to be “almost averse to heterogeneousness and always intent on the unity of genera”; others “are constantly striving to divide nature into so much variety that one might lose almost all hope of being able to distribute its phenomena according to general principles.” If the same classification may be applied to social scientists, I must own my memberships of the latter category. But as Kant himself goes on to say, both approaches are necessary. The exponents of neither approach can claim a monopoly on the truth; they should supplement, rather than arrogantly reject, each other.” (Maruyama 1969, xiv)

Therefore, we should notice that he does not criticize cultural particularism in a unilateral manner. In “Genkei, Kosō, Shitsu-yō-tei’on: Nihon-shisōshi Hōhōron ni tsuite no Watākushi no
Ayumi” [Prototype, Old Layer, and Basso Ostinato: My Methodological Footsteps for Japanese Intellectual History], he also describes his interests:

I’m afraid to say my very excuse at the beginning, yet in short I haven’t studied a general theory of political science lately and haven’t analyzed the current events [of real politics]. Meanwhile, in my own expertise, I’ve been always thinking about how to grasp the characteristics and the nature of Japanese thought from the very beginning until today. My idea was not something which came up around my “Old Layer” essay. (Maruyama 1984: CW, vol. 12, 111. Emphasis Maruyama’s)

Maruyama remarks that he prefers to examine particular areas. Since he describes his idea as a “personal predilection” or “temperament,” we can say that his preference for investigating the particular thing is considered as his primordial sense on the pre-academic level. Therefore, we need to analyze carefully his comments on universality and particularity through thoroughly understanding the context surrounding them.

**Individuality: The Introduction of an Intermediate Concept**

As mentioned before, Maruyama assumed Japanese readers for his writings. He applied an East-West comparison to distill the particular problems of Japanese politics, society, culture, and people. However, Tsutomu Tsuzuki criticizes him, arguing that to some extent, Maruyama negatively views some phenomena of Japanese political culture as pathological in a one-sided manner (Tsuzuki 1995, 139). Analyzing Maruyama’s critical theory of Japanese fascism, Tsuzuki argues that the phenomena of succumbing to the accepted facts or escaping to authority, which Maruyama criticized as Japanese problems, are universally observed (that is, present in any culture); in his analysis, Maruyama had a tendency to liken general phenomena, such as the transfer of emotions of frustration and anger from superior to inferior, to the peculiarities of Japanese political culture.
If so, how can we scientifically grasp the Japanese thing in thought and thinking? How is it possible to extract the particular problems of the Japanese way of thinking and Japanese ideas? Here, Maruyama took a methodological strategy of introducing the concept of “individuality” between the concepts of universality and particularity. Individuality means the originality of the manner why a certain group combines the elements of belief they adhere to. Maruyama thinks even if different groups have the same cultural or ideological traits, the ways of combining the same traits will vary. In this way, he distinguishes the term individuality from particularity. Obviously, we should notice that his application of the ideas of particularity, individuality, and universality is inspired by Hegel’s philosophy (Maruyama 1964: CW, vol. 16, 51). In his description of the prototype theory, Maruyama puts it this way:

In brief, if we decompose the individual elements of the myth of Japan, we find that every element is common with some narratives somewhere around the world. We may say that there is nothing particular to Japan. In this respect, we can also say that it is unlikely that there is the “particularity” of Japanese mythology. Nevertheless, when we pay attention to the point that each individual element is connected with each other in a certain way to form the structure of Japanese mythology as a whole, it should be considered as quite unique. (Maruyama 1984, 137. Emphasis Maruyama’s)

Maruyama explains that just as every individual is unique, Japanese culture is unique when viewed as a complete structure. He describes this point by taking the example of a child’s play with building blocks. When separating blocks into individual pieces, each block can be classified into several forms: square ones, rectangular ones, triangle ones and so on. Connecting the base types, we can assemble various kinds of works: doll houses, some animals and so forth. If we have more variations of the form of blocks, we can be able to build richer varieties of structures. However, if we deconstruct the crafted work, which acquired a unique form, into individual building materials, the works return to several types of blocks shared with other structures. The
“individuality” of the crafted work of building blocks has been lost now. Meanwhile, the original blocks that cannot be divided any further have a kind of universal attribute as fixed forms of triangles, parallelograms and the like. This example demonstrates Maruyama’s argument that individuality should be explained only as applying to a whole structure. Connecting this principle to the question of how we can capture the uniqueness of Japanese thought, he remarks as follows:

This becomes an epistemological question. Consider a human being named Maruyama. Some people would have similar forms of nose to mine, and others are as tall as I am. Others would have a similar temperament to mine. Yet, as a total personality, the completely same person as Maruyama never exists. In the same way, we should attempt to grasp the “individuality” of Japanese thought. Even if we seek its particularity, when deconstructing it into conceptual pieces, the attribute that you found will be dissolved into something existing somewhere in the world. First and foremost, the concept of particularity is a subcategory of the concept universality. What I often argue is that not the “particularity” but the “individuality” of the history of Japanese thought should be considered as the overall structure. From this perspective, I am thinking, I would like to capture the history of Japanese thought as a unification of the two contradictory elements pointed out earlier, that is, the overwhelming influence of foreign culture on the one hand and the persistent remains of, so-called, “the Japanese thing” on the other. (1984, 138. Emphasis Maruyama’s)

The methodology that Maruyama invented to identify of the uniqueness of Japanese culture is as follows: If we attempt to identify things particular to Japan, we investigate the origin of the attributes that are considered to be the unique nature of Japanese culture and ideas; if the same types of attribute are found in other regions, we will remove them from the list of the Japanese thing. However, Maruyama does not think that we can catch all things particular to Japan as a simple byproduct of the elimination process. Therefore, he expected that research in cultural anthropology would discover each element of the indigeneity of Japanese thought in other regions around the world. He argues that we can identify the uniqueness of Japanese thought only in the combination of those elements. In the context of political science, the
prototype theory plays a role; for example, mobilizing some anecdotes of Japanese mythology, wartime nationalists insisted on the supremacy of Japanese spiritual culture and the uniqueness of the divine land of Japan. The methodology of “factorization” of Japanese ideologies and the understanding of the uniqueness of Japanese thought by the elimination method reveal the fictitious character of the ideology espoused by the national polity. It reveals that most claims about the uniqueness of Japanese spiritual culture were, in fact, invented by the government and nationalist thinkers after Japan’s modernization in the late nineteenth century.

The idea of deconstructing the research subject into elements and seeing the uniqueness in combining them is also found in Maruyama’s early works. For instance, I find similar logic in his description about how we can find the originality of the works of Fukuzawa (Maruyama 1947). At that time, some critics had already denied Fukuzawa’s originality, judging him a scholar who merely introduced European civilization into Japan. They claimed that his ideas were no more than a translation from Western books. To the contrary, Maruyama questioned the meaning of the term “originality” used by those critics. If the originality means that thinkers configure the system of their thought without any influence by predecessors, then indeed, Fukuzawa is not a creative thinker at all. However, Maruyama asks the reader how many philosophers and thinkers are worthy of being labeled ingenious in this sense. He argues that the question of whether a thinker is an independent thinker or a mere commentator on the theories of others is not determined by the extent of the influence from other ideas and theories; instead, it should be evaluated by the degree of how proactively the thinker incorporates the predecessors’ ideas in his or her own idea. Taken in this sense, Fukuzawa’s thought is his own without any doubt. In fact, Fukuzawa himself was aware that his “Gakumon no Susume” [An Encouragement of Learning] (1872–1876) was written under overwhelming influence by Francis Wayland’s
“Elements of Moral Science” (1856) and Henry Thomas Buckle’s “History of Civilization in England” (1864). François Guizot “Histoire de la Civilization en Europe” (1856) also became primary inspirational sources for building his arguments in “Bunmeiron no Gairyaku” [An Outline of a Theory of Civilization] (1875). Maruyama explains the meaning of the originality of Fukuzawa’s thought this way:

Fukuzawa was not the only person who was strongly influenced by Guizot and Buckle. Works of these historians were the common soil that nurtured the early Meiji Enlightenment thinkers, such as Hiroyuki Katō [an academician and politician of the Meiji era, 1836–1916] and Ukichi Taguchi [a historian and economist of the Meiji era, 1855–1905]. What should be asked here is, even so, why Fukuzawa’s ideas have acquired its own color, which cannot be seen in anyone else. How did he make himself the master of the historical theories of those Western thinkers, while coping with the reality of his country and his era? How did he assimilate those theories sufficiently to establish his own philosophy? You will be fully convinced of these points if you examine his works in more detail. (Maruyama 1947: CW, vol. 3)

His logic in the passage above finds uniqueness in how Fukuzawa took common, shared philosophical ideas and reconstructed them in his own way. This also fits with the logic of his prototype theory; there is a similar aspect to the logic that the uniqueness can be found only in how incoming foreign ideas were arranged in the Japanese style. Of course, the reader should be reminded that in the above passage, Maruyama’s focus is on describing the uniqueness of Fukuzawa’s thought specifically; he is not discussing the topic here as an issue of universality and particularity in the comparative theory of culture.

In summary, the idea of dividing a crafted work into its elements (or building blocks as described above) is related, for example, to how to grasp the cultural uniqueness of a group. If we adopt an idea of extreme functionalism, the Chinese traditional costume, the Korean one, and the Japanese one can be described as cloth covering the body that has the function of keeping the body warm or protecting the body from the collision with dangerous objects, and is made from
material such as cotton or silk. However, in practice, we can identify cultural characteristics (differences) as three types of clothes, and our attention turns to the visual uniqueness of each, rather than the shared functional side. In human cognition at this stage, the distinctive cultural meanings have been granted for these three and the particular cultural traits of each have been ready to be represented. Carrying out the same task for other cultural items, it becomes finally possible to extract the uniqueness of each of three cultures. Consolidating the extracted uniqueness of each culture, we can conceptualize the cultural individuality of each in a more general form. We will be able to express the cultural uniqueness of each country in a broader concept of Chinese-ness, Korean-ness, and Japanese-ness. In addition, enhancing the level of abstraction of the features of the three cultures, we can make a larger concept of “Eastern culture” in contrast to Western culture.

The True Meaning of the Japanese Thing

In his bibliography for the tenth volume of *Collected Works of Masao Maruyama*, Iida compares Maruyama’s prototype theory and the critical review on the theory by Tadashi Ishimoda (historian, 1912–1986) in order to reconsider Maruyama’s idea of “the Japanese thing.” Ishimoda points out a fallacy of the “theories of the Japanese thing” popular since the 1960s (see CW, vol. 10, 367–379). Those theories compare Japanese traditional culture and advanced civilizations in Europe, Korea and China. Then the theories carelessly jump to the conclusion that “factors” which only Japanese culture holds are the unique things to Japan. Rather, Ishimoda pointed out that anthropologists found that aspects of the Japanese uniqueness as determined by the above theories could be found widely in so-called primitive societies in the South Pacific (the regions of Micronesia and Polynesia), Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Ishimoda
argued that the principle began to be refined and developed by contact with more advanced thought and cultures from the continent. Iida thinks that in this regard, Ishimoda’s theory coincides with Maruyama’s idea that Japanese thought forms its old layers (i.e., the prototype) and functions as an opportunity to accept the universal worldviews of foreign ideas and modify them on a case-by-case basis.

Iida mentions that Maruyama explains the same idea in his 1964 lecture: “We can reconfigure to some extent the Japanese religious consciousness that has been acting continuously since ancient times.” Maruyama also remarks: “In other words, I might say that it is the prototype of Shintoism. Yet I should not think by this that there was an original faith of Japan. The idea shows significant similarities to the myth of the Southern Islands, Korea, South Asia, and northern China.” In his “Prototype, Old Layer, and Bassso Ostinato: My Methodological Footsteps for Japanese Intellectual History”, he writes: “Therefore, it is quite natural that we cannot find almost anything unique to Japan when taking up the individual tales of Japanese mythology.” When it appears as a constant combination of the old layers, he says, “Even if they show the unique ‘individuality’ as a whole structure in the history of the spirit of Japan, it does not mean ‘something unique to Japan as a substantial thing with its individual content’” (Maruyama 1984: CW, vol. 12, 137).

**Evaluation of the Indigenous Energy**

Maruyama is clearly a universalist in several senses, such that 1) he puts an emphasis on the function of *rinen* (理念; universal ideals; he also frequently uses the German term *Idee*), 2) he values the individual’s commitment to the transcendent existence, and 3) he warns of nativism and minority rights claims as the explosion of inner emotion expressed in an egoistic manner. In
the Japanese context, he assessed such political activism as the quasi-exercise of modern subjectivity. In the limited Japanese context, his basic stance toward cultural nationalism and rising cultural and political minority movements is complex; first, he did not support the outburst of natural sentiment of minority groups, and he did not admit such intellectual movements to be the exercise of modern subjectivity. On the other hand, he sought for the potential for a certain kind of “indigenous energy.”

In his works, Maruyama detects that Japanese people, including politicians, intellectuals, and the citizenry, are still mentally susceptible to social taboo or conventionalism. He recommends that the Japanese should banish magical ideas from their consciousness in committing to politics. To this end, he argues that it is important for the Japanese to approach the universal or the transcendent existence in order to critically evaluate the existing political ideas and institutions. He supports the ultimate value of the individuality of humankind—the worth of human beings is determined by being born as human beings, and even if someone is vulgar, no one can replace his or her preciousness because the same, single person never exists twice in the world. This is his explanation of the interactive relationship between his ideas of universal consciousness and “democratization as a permanent revolution” (or “modernization as a permanent revolution”) (Maruyama 1964: CW, vol. 16, 60).

He also opposes the idea of approaching universality through particularity. He argues that the successful breakthrough from the particular to the universal requires that the Japanese have a contact with the transcendent existence and achieve a qualitative leap in a religious sense both on the individual and group levels. He recognizes the limitation of the supremacy theories of Japanese spiritual culture, which simply stretch something native or something national to get to the universal idea. He argues that the emphasis of Japanese indigeneity without having a
dialectic conversation with different cultures will not break through the closed mentality of the Japanese. On the other hand, in a theater play he finds some clues about a better way of expressing native energy, and evaluates the potential of indigenous energy (Maruyama “The Modernization of Japan and Localism” 1968: CW, vol. 9, 369-374).

As seen in Chapter 5 of Part II, Maruyama proposed the thesis of the vicious circle between false universalism and closed types of localism. He repeatedly examined problems of emphasizing cultural particularity and utilizing it for political purpose (Umemoto, Satô and Maruyama 1966; Maruyama 1977; Maruyama 1982). He employed the term of dochakusei (土着性; indigeneity, nativeness, or autochthony) in his argument. Maruyama’s remark on the universalist standpoint on ideals fits closely with his thesis of the vicious cycle between false universalism and closed nativism. His epistemology of universality becomes a basis for his theory of others and philosophy of dialogue.

Here, I see that Maruyama’s thesis becomes also important for revising contemporary theories of minority politics, based on claiming the personal or group particularities in the political negotiations. He explains that the model, uncritically worshipping world religions or any foreign universal ideas from the outside of Japan (e.g., Confucianism, Buddhism, Christianity, Marxism, liberalism, democracy, liberal democracy, and the idea of universal human rights), makes the foreign thought shade into false universalism. Furthermore, when resisting the foreign ideologies to defend Japanese indigenous thought and culture, the reactionary intellectual movement turns into closed nativism. In reacting against pseudo-universalism, which attempts to colonize Japanese culture and ideas, the exclusive type of nativism eventually results in wartime nationalist ideas of Japanese Supremacy or Pan-Japanism. Conflict between both sides becomes critical, and closed-nativism finally turns into Japanese
chauvinism. Although the ideologies of selfless devotion and the national polity, and the movement in wartime Japan appeared as the extreme case of Japanese ethnocentrism, the superiority theories of Japanese spiritual culture are also observable in discourses by Japanese conservative politicians or nationalist political groups even today.

The intellectual conflict between pro-Westernization and Japanese chauvinism during the Second World War and the contemporary conflict between cultural imperialism and indigenous culture cannot be simply compared because both intellectual conflicts have different historical and political backgrounds for their occurrence. Nevertheless, both conflicts share a common logical structure of provoking people’s caution and resistance to cultural compliance because, for better or for worse, people become aware of the universality of foreign ideas and their power of propagation over their native culture. Moreover, beyond time and space, I see that modern Japanese chauvinism and contemporary indigenous politics share a similar style of thinking of confronting foreign thinking. Both attempt to mobilize the indigeneity of their traditional culture. Maruyama’s ideas—requiring simultaneous cultivation of modern subjectivity, taking action based on the principle, being tolerant to others, and having self-reflection—teach us the importance of keeping a good balance between valuing universality and valuing particularity. His view of universality and particularity seeks for a way that each cultural group can pursue its own cultural uniqueness and at the same time can share the universal thing with all others. We will come back to this point in the concluding part of this study, where I introduce the reader to a dialogue between Nanbara and Maruyama about the rising global trend of universal consciousness and Japan’s participation in the flow. We will confirm the meaning of the emergence of a Japanese universalist thinker under siege of an overwhelmingly introverted mental climate.
Chapter 7  Universal Consciousness and Personal Experiences

We have examined the theoretical explanation of Maruyama’s warning of the political uses of cultural particularity by nationalists. In the intellectual soil of Japan, the reactionary movements of cultural particularism occasionally erupt against incoming foreign ideologies. In Japanese modern history, cultural particularism is frequently mobilized to fuel political campaigns of xenophobia. In this respect, Maruyama’s political thought certainly has more affinity with universalism than particularism.

However, as examined in the previous chapter, his universalist tendency does not mean his total denial of the significance of cultural particularity. Indeed, he showed his preference to investigate the particularity of a research object. He also sought for the true release of “indigenous energy,” instead of claiming cultural particularism self-interestedly. In this sense, his political thought also has a particularist side. As a person, he was a very tolerant man before any minorities. In any case, we realize his frequent usage of the concepts of universality and particularity in his texts. We also understand the profound influence of Hegelian philosophy over this thought processes.

Now, Maruyama’s universalist side appears to influence how he dealt with particularity on the individual level. Interestingly, his philosophy of the person of principle was expressed as his hesitation in using his significant personal experience for developing his own thought.

Along with collective particularities, the studies of minority politics deal with the issue of particularity of people at the individual level. In the discipline, political scientists qualitatively analyze a narrative and a personal life story of a targeted figure. In this field, the study of political problems is also tightly bound to cultural problems. Although he did not talk much about the theme, as seen below, we can detect traces in a few texts in which he refers to the
importance of applying one’s personal experiences to political studies. In this chapter, I would therefore like to examine how Maruyama dealt with his personal experiences. Below, I focus on his struggle with his life experience of witnessing the ravages of the dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima in 1945. Examining his hesitation to use his survival experience in Hiroshima for developing his thought, in an alternative way, I would like to approach the identity of Maruyama’s style of universalism.

**Maruyama in Hiroshima on August 6, 1945**

In the summer of 1945, in the Far East, the deadly combat in the Pacific region between the U.S. Forces and Imperial Japanese Forces was going to the final stage, and the defeat of Imperial Japan was imminent. Maruyama was inducted for the second time into military service and was working as a private at the headquarters of the Imperial Amy at Ujina, in Hiroshima city. He was thirty-one years old at the time. His duty was to intercept communications by the U.S. military and to analyze information about the movement of the U.S. task force in the Pacific, which was approaching the mainland of Japan.²⁵ At that time, Japanese military leaders demanded the Japanese to fight to the last man, and the nation prepared for the final battle on the mainland.

²⁵ Some may wonder why Maruyama, who was already an assistant professor of Tokyo Imperial University, was drafted into the military not as an officer but as an enlisted soldier. As mentioned before, there were some cases in which thought criminals were sent punitively to the front line. In the case of Maruyama, despite his placement in the domestic workplace, some researchers still suspect that his conscription had a punitive meaning. In fact, Nanbara sent a petition to the army to ask for Maruyama’s release from his military duty by appealing to Maruyama’s value as a human resource for the faculty of Law at Tokyo Imperial University. Nevertheless, his discharge was not granted. However, historical records to prove that his draft was due to punishment have not yet been discovered. In his later years, Maruyama told that he was endowed to receive the second life, and his postwar life was like an extra given by his accidental survival of the atomic bomb.
On August 6, 1945, the U.S. Forces dropped an atomic bomb at a point five kilometers away from the Ujina headquarters. Maruyama survived the blast and heat of the bomb by the coincidence of a few overlapping conditions, such as the weather condition at that day, the timing of the bomb’s release by the bombardier, and the geographical setting of the building. He witnessed the disastrous scene of refugees who had fled to the base. He and his senior officer were exposed to radiation when they went out to search the destroyed city.

In this way, he had a personal experience that we can agree should be considered historically significant. He left a few testimonials about his atomic bomb experience. We can read his comments about his military life in Hiroshima and atomic bomb experience in the following documents (see Kawaguchi’s editorial comment for Conv., vol. 7, 321):


In addition to these texts, the compiled book of his memoranda, which were written during his military service in Hiroshima, was published as Maruyama Masao Senchū Bibōroku [Wartime Memorandum by Masao Maruyama] (Maruyama 1997). The book includes many photographs
taken by Maruyama himself in his military life. Some pictures show us the disastrous situation of refugees in Hiroshima immediately after the explosion of the bomb. The photos can convey to the reader what Maruyama actually witnessed at the scene of the incident.

The above texts validate the consistency of his testimonies, which were recorded for nearly thirty years, on different occasions, with different interviewers. The lack of discrepancies between the texts proves that his testimony is objective, or at least can be seen as historically valuable documents. In these texts, Maruyama vividly tells the interviewers several dramatic episodes that only people at the scene could witness.

Nevertheless, his real experience and original photos were never used as material for his political thinking. His personal experience of the Hiroshima incident with his notes and photos were not used as primary sources for his creation of theories. After the war, he asked himself why he did not contemplate his atomic bomb experience (see Text 2 above). Importantly, he was aware that his personal experience should be applied for his intellectual activity. Yet, as a political thinker, he did not philosophize his firsthand experience of witnessing the historical catastrophe. He felt remorse about his hesitation.

My question is whether his psychological conflict is related to his universalist side. Below, I would like to examine the meaning of his dissatisfaction with not facing his atomic bomb experience. In so doing, I approach the identity of his unique universalism from another angle.

In Text 2, the dialogue between Maruyama and Tsurumi begins with their conversation of how war-experienced intellectuals transfer wartime and postwar history to new generations. They also discuss the way of recording the wartime and postwar experiences of intellectuals. At that time, using a portable cassette tape recorder was becoming popular among the public, and
with the new device, some politicians began to keep a record of historical events in which they were involved.

In the dialogue, Maruyama and Tsurumi are exchanging opinions about private research groups on postwar democracy, which were newly established after the war. According to their conversation, some groups were successfully keeping records of their activities. In the meantime, other groups were caught in ideological disputes and mudslinging, personal attacks. In this context, the two thinkers discuss in turn the following goals: 1) to make a record of the “fact,” 2) to understand personal atomic bomb experiences, 3) to stop the dichotomous view of foreign versus Japan, 4) to reach the positive meaning of defense, 5) to discuss particularity and everydayness, and 6) to reevaluate the meaning of the “form.”

In the middle of their conversation, Tsurumi asks Maruyama:

The postwar world has faced something like the end of the influence of American values and European values. It seems to me that the universality of American value is now tested, or rather I feel it has exposed the lack of its universality. I am not saying this just from the global viewpoint. I think it is also a problem that is related to the domestic problems of Japan. Did you see anything like the illusion to American and European values?

After this question, they moves to discussing the issues of universalism, for example, the issue of whether Western culture has universality, the difference between European culture and American culture, and the closed nature of Japanese culture. Maruyama’s comment about his belief in the universality of Western civilization at the beginning of Part III is given in the above context of their conversation.
The Spirit of Stubbornness and Personal Experiences

As examined in Part II, the formation of Maruyama’s study was largely determined by his critical views on the rapid ideological conversion of the opportunist type of Japanese intellectuals and their uncritical compliance with authority. After the defeat of Imperial Japan, some opportunists who had preached the superiority of Japanese spiritual culture and championed “overcoming Western modernity” during the war had converted their political ideology overnight. They appealed to the public that they had been deceived by the evil militarist government, and they quickly turned to supporting the postwar democratic reform of Japan and the establishment of the new Japanese Constitution. Maruyama explicitly showed his hatred and contempt for these intellectual opportunists:

Maruyama: I was not critical of the new Constitution itself. Nevertheless, I didn’t want to participate in the “Promotion Meeting of the Constitution” at all. Then, along with the establishment of the Constitution, also practiced were a massive abolishment, reorganization, and enactment of relevant laws and acts. In those days, although I was not a legal expert, because all help was needed, because of the hectic situation, and because of the propagation of a general idea of democratization that amateurs should also join the creation of law, I was asked to participate in the committee that would revise the law. But I declined all invitations. Of course, since the demobilization, I was fully enjoying the sense of liberation. Along with Tatsuji Kibe-kun and others, as a lecturer I helped the activity of the Citizen’s University of Mishima. I was spontaneously working on so-called enlightenment activity. I still don’t know well why I declined the offers. Well, I don’t want to say this now because it looks like I follow the latest trend of [Japanese] intellectuals. But I had strong discomfort with the leftists in those days.

Tsurumi: Oh, really? I didn’t notice that kind of aspect of Maruyama-san.

Maruyama: I still have the notebook on which I took down my thoughts at that time. I can show you the evidence. More than feeling uncomfortable, at the time I rather had a hatred and contempt for the intellectuals who had behaved arrogantly during the war. My hatred was intense enough. I can’t feel in the same way today anymore. I think, I also had the sense of being a victim. (Maruyama and Tsurumi 1967: Conv., vol. 7, 104–105)
The notebook he mentions is included in *Dialogue with Myself* (Maruyama 1998). Maruyama’s hatred for opportunists becomes vital in forming his universalist philosophy of valuing the internal continuity of one’s thought. He continually emphasized the importance of efforts to maintain the internal consistency of thought, although he of course admitted to the gradual development of thought over time.

His emotional rejection of rapid ideological conversion prepares the way for his political theory of mass society. His philosophy values the internal continuity of thought processes more than the content itself. A good illustration of this aspect is his criticism of a series of mass movements in the postwar Japanese democratization process. Calling it the “totalitarianism in the name of democracy,” he criticized the social conditions of postwar Japan that allowed all the population—of one hundred million—to uniformly support the new ideology and culture of American democracy. He regarded the postwar Japanese democratization as another exhibition of the Japanese pathology of weak individuality, the absence of primary philosophy, and the conformist tendency toward the social mainstream. For him, the risk of the totalitarian society is the same in both wartime and postwar Japanese society; unless the Japanese overcome their aspect, the exclusion of ideological minorities happens at any time. Therefore, even after the collapse of the Japanese militarist regime, he still warned against intellectuals who easily converted their ideas by following the academic trend of the times and who promoted the national mobilization of the Japanese population in alternative forms.

As mentioned earlier, Maruyama explained his personality as being affected by the spirit of the stubborn person. The stubborn person does not change his or her opinion easily and rather prefers to say something opposite to the social mainstream. Scholars with this stubbornness
intend to remark and act against the intellectual trend of the times. Maruyama explains his own character as the stubborn man as follows:

... simply speaking, I think it was like my stubbornness. If you ask me who is the teacher of my spirit of obstinacy, I say Yukichi Fukuzawa... And, another innate characteristic of mine is my feeling to rejection to say something different from what I said yesterday in an inconsistent manner. I might say that it is something like the internal continuity, or a kind of conservativeness. Even if I change my remark, I don’t want to change it all of sudden. (Maruyama and Tsurumi 1967: Conv., vol. 7, 103)

As examined before, this stubbornness has an effect of detaching the self from the environment (i.e., the political situation of a particular time).

Maruyama explains that the tone of representing his two creeds, a) the spirit of obstinacy and b) the emphasis of internal continuity of one’s thought and remark, did change through his academic life. The characteristics were expressed more explicitly in his works for the first two years of the postwar period. “Modern Thinking” (Maruyama 1946: CW, vol. 3) and the “Ultra-Nationalism” essay (Maruyama 1946 [1969]) were written in this period.

Maruyama was cynically observing that the Japanese who shouted “Hurray Emperor” during the war turned to saying “Hurray General MacArthur” merely a few years after the war (Maruyama 1964, 66–67). There are many reasons for the occurrence of one’s ideological conversion. Among the phenomena of conversion, Maruyama mostly criticizes the Japanese intellectuals who change their remarks for preserving their social statuses. This type of intellectuals thinks and acts first and foremost to protect their vested interest. As a result, they continue to be passive to postwar intellectual movements. Instead of producing new movements, they simply wait for things to happen. Maruyama points out that only two choices remain for those intellectuals: if they are thrown in extreme situations, a) they obey the circumstances, or b) they withdraw into their shell to wait patiently until that storm leaves. Despite the postwar
democratization, Maruyama evaluated negatively that the psychological condition of most Japanese intellectuals had not improved.

After he commented on his psychological objection to the postwar intellectual trend, in the same conversation with Tsurumi, Maruyama moves to talking about his failure to look directly at his survival experience from the dropping of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima. He remarks, “This may be a little off-topic. Yet looking back on these days, the biggest thing is I didn’t try enough to use my own atomic bomb experience for my thinking, in spite of my experience of going through that extreme situation.” He bitterly regrets that although his personal atomic bomb experience had a potential to be applied to his thinking and writing activities, in the end, he could not handle it, unlike his other personal experiences. (Maruyama and Tsurumi 1967: Conv., vol. 7, 106–109).

Maruyama asks himself why he could not carry out the task. Some tips for answering his own question are found in the dialogue between Maruyama and Tsurumi. In “Standing for Universal Principles” (Text 2 above), he reconsiders his own analysis of the impact of the appearance of atomic and hydrogen bombs on postwar global politics. Soon after the outbreak of the Korean War, as already mentioned, Maruyama wrote a draft of the introductory part of the report “On Peace for the Third Time” for the Peace Issue Talk. In the manuscript, he set a theoretical basis for the peaceful coexistence between the capitalist and communist states. He appealed to the reader that with the appearance of the atomic bomb, the existing form of modern warfare had changed significantly. He suggested that along with the arrival of nuclear weapons, the means of modern war had developed rapidly; even if the war claims a just cause, the possibility that the means would act contrary to the purpose of war had increased.
However, Maruyama revises his earlier analysis from an alternative viewpoint of applying personal experiences to political studies. His previous analysis of the appearance of nuclear bombs was merely an abstract observation of a phenomenon in world politics. He compares his past intellectual activities and novelists’ activities such as those of Masuji Ibuse (novelist, 1898–1993), who wrote *Black Rain* (Ibuse 1966), or Kenzaburo Ōe (novelist; Japan’s second Nobel Prize winner in Literature, 1994), author of *Hiroshima Notes* (Ōe 1965). These writers attempted to crystallize the severely traumatic experiences of Hiroshima into literary works. Maruyama, however confesses that unlike those writers, he avoided dealing with the theme:

Maruyama: In that sense, when I am asked if I used my atomic bomb experience as materials to elaborate my thought, [I must say] I did not. I think this point is what I have been missing most from my intellectual activity.

Tsurumi: What made you hesitate to face your own atomic bomb experience?

Maruyama: I don’t know why [I did]. Immediately after the explosion, citizens escaped onto the premises of the headquarters like an avalanche. The square in front of the tower was quickly filled with survivors. There was no place to even set down a foot. There were many people whose back skin came off horribly. A woman was half-naked, hiding her body with a blanket or something. She was dazed and did not talk of anything. Because it was midsummer, the sunlight was intense. The military did not have much medicine for burns. We never thought that so many people would be burned at one time. Later, an airplane from the Navy base of Kure came and dropped medicines. But the refugees were neglected until then. I have witnessed such unforgettable, horrifying scenes more than enough. However, I didn’t think enough of the meaning of the atomic bomb, [not as much as I] think of it now. In those days, since the war ended, I first and foremost felt that the awful era was finally over. The feeling of relief was much stronger than thinking of the meaning of the atomic bomb. (Maruyama and Tsurumi 1967: Conv., 106–107)

Moreover, Maruyama explains another reason for his hesitation. Because he belonged to the intelligence section at the military base, he had the chance to obtain information about the latest situations and world events. Although general soldiers were not permitted to browse the
information, when no one was at the room, he read it frequently. In addition, one day, a lieutenant section leader assigned him to write weekly reviews about international affairs, although it was not an official component of his job. Unlike a General Staff Headquarters position in Tokyo, it was just general information through Associated Press and other companies, and there was no confidential information. Even so, he still had the opportunities to learn about the world affairs in a timely way, and as a result, in his military life he felt he could keep an objective view based on those conditions. He remarks:

For instance, the so-called carpet bombing such as the Hamburg and Dresden cases is extremely cruel, isn’t it? I do not remember the exact number, but it is hundreds of thousands [included in] the death toll. Hundreds of thousands were also killed in the Tokyo air raid of May. I did not think that atomic bombs were the only cruel things anymore. . . . Perhaps, for me, the problem of the atomic bomb seemed to have resolved to a general issue of the brutality of war. War is such a thing. War necessarily entails brutality. . . . It sounds a bit misleading, yet I would say I think I had understood the thing [of war] by that kind of feeling at that time. (Maruyama and Tsurumi 1967: Conv., vol. 7, 108)

In this way, he finds a few possible reasons for his failure to apply his survival experience in Hiroshima as a source to his thinking: 1) his psychological trauma, 2) the occupation of his thinking with another kind of feeling, such as the sense of relief at the end of the war, and 3) his generalization and abstraction of the specialty of the Hiroshima incident in the notion of the scourge of war. However, he says that he does not know the real reason, in the end:

Nevertheless, anyway, I still don’t know why. Of course, in an abstract way, I thought that the nuclear war would become the war of mutual destruction. . . .

Yet I don’t think that it is underpinned by my real experience. Democracy or basic human rights, which are usually referred to as abstract notions, live in me. I feel them like my body itself. Yet I didn’t feel an atomic bomb in that way. At least, until the Daigo Fukuryū Maru case of 1954 occurred, I did not think about the issue profoundly. Well, this is my penitence. Because I have this sense of guilt, I feel it is too late to claim that I

In another dialogue, Maruyama also narrates:

Maruyama: Back to my health issue, actually, sometimes I get in trouble. I look healthy, but because I have only one lung, I might be treated as handicapped. Since I was exposed to radiation when the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, I can receive the special notebook for the patient. But I haven’t got it yet. Actually, it’s useful if I have it. For example, if I show the notebook, the conductor secures a seat for me in a crowded train.

Tsurumi: Why don’t you just receive it?

Maruyama: I think [I should] . . . But, finally, I have been to Hiroshima a few years ago [1977]. Because of my A-bomb experience, I’ve hesitated to visit there. I think that Hiroshima is a place where those who are not exposed go to carry out the peace movement. People who were actually exposed to radiation and saw the brutality are not willing to go at all. Nevertheless, I finally decided to go to the city. A study group in Hiroshima asked me to talk about the process of the foundation of *Heiwa Mondai Danwakai* [Peace Issue Talk Group in 1949]. In a sense, I am conflicted; I have both feelings—I want to go and I do not want to go. And then, I went there for the first time since my survival of the atomic bomb. (Maruyama 2005, 11-12)

I find a few reasons for Maruyama’s carefulness about applying one’s personal experiences to political thinking. Certainly, deeply traumatizing was his experience of witnessing the disastrous scenes in Hiroshima. However, beyond that, it seems to me that his hesitation comes from his style of “modesty” that prevented him from painting himself as a victim. He commented that he does not like to behave like a victim because of his personal reasons. It appears to me that his attitude is also another expression of his spirit of a stubborn man.

Moreover, his hesitation seems to relate to his basic stance of being a man of science, who always attempts to objectify even one’s personal experience into an historical record. It seems that he needed to depersonalize his own story in order to face his Hiroshima experience.
I can see proof of his psychological conflict owing to his obligation to take plural social roles as a historian, a representative political thinker, a leading public intellectual, a private man, and a human being. On the one hand, he may have attempted to play the ideal model of intellectuals who can confront totalitarian society and social conformism. He was aware of his social role as a public intellectual. He tried to see his historical experience objectively and attempted to figure out how his personal experiences influenced the formation of his own thought from a third-party perspective. In the conflict between those plural roles, however, there remained the task of crystallizing his own atomic bomb experience into his political thought. Reexamining the conversation with Maruyama, Tsurumi later excellently describes the complexity of Maruyama’s position as a modernist thinker and also a universalist thinker or a man of principle:

For me, [the act of] criticism has been like a self-defeating machine. My criticism of Maruyama-san was always as such. Yet I am still wondering one thing about his methodology: It seemed difficult for him to find the meaning of his own experience with the atomic bomb. Maruyama’s methodology preserves the Western model of thought, and it does not pay attention to things existing beyond the collapse of Western thought. His self-reproach that does not confuse humans and animals derives from this side. In spite of being one of the A-bomb victims, throughout his postwar activity, Maruyama finally could not obtain the vision that going to the Brute Dimension, someday mankind may end up in annihilation between the same species. It sounds like I am self-destructive, but this is my methodology rooted deeply in my unconsciousness. To understand better Masao Maruyama’s methodology, does it make more sense to admit his assumption of the God [of Christianity]? For me, the drop of atomic bombs seems to be the suicide of God. (Maruyama 2005, 263)

Maruyama’s hesitation in facing his atomic bomb experience does not mean that he did not apply any of his personal experiences to his thinking. In the above dialogue, he also explains three cases in which his real life experience directly and indirectly influenced the formation of his thought:
1) Social disruption by the aftermath of the Great Kanto Earthquake.

2) Repression of academic freedom during World War II.

3) The conversion phenomenon of intellectuals in the early postwar era.

He attempted to face these historical events each time. He said that his experiences surrounding these events were crystallized into his thought in various degrees:

Maruyama: Or, if I go back [further in time], my experience of the [Great Kanto] Earthquake: Because I was nine years old, I got a strong impression from the incident itself, rather than the war. At that time, I wrote a report by myself.

Tsurumi: At the age of nine?

Maruyama: Yes, I wrote a piece of reportage. Of course, that was just reporting written by a nine-year-old kid. I still have it. It means that my experience of the earthquake was so shocking. And, [regarding] my experience of the military: I have tried to sublimate these experiences in my study. However, reflecting on my thought processes, among my experiences, what I’ve missed is to apply my atomic bomb experience to my thinking. (Maruyama and Tsurumi 1967: Conv., vol. 7, 106–107)

The above-mentioned report is recorded in Maruyama Masao no Shisō Sekai [The World of the Thought of Masao Maruyama] (Misuzu Shobō Henshūbu 1997). His original notebook was also introduced in the television documentary ETV Special, Masao Maruyama and Postwar Japan (NHK Software 1997). In the disorder after the Great Kanto Earthquake, vigilantes among the Japanese citizens massacred Korean residents of Japan. Nine-year old Maruyama who had heard the news noted his anger and criticism of the incident. He showed his anger against the brutality, writing, “Such vigilantes should be disbanded.” Here, an expression of his innate tolerance toward minorities can be seen in his criticism. From his comments above, we can expect that his primordial sense of sympathy for social minorities later developed into his theory of otherness.
The Identity of Maruyama’s Universalism

All things considered, if we extract a universalist aspect from Maruyama’s thought, it should not be regarded as an ideology but as an alternative mode of thinking and the way of life that he practiced in order to counter the Japanese style of groupthink and conformism. His universalism values thought processes as endless motion; his thought has a distinctive feature of refusing to accept any particular ideas in advance as fixed doctrines. Accordingly, there is no case in which he ideologically supported a particular political idea, such as liberalism, beforehand, and based then on the idea began to develop his political argument. Logically speaking, his political thought never follows this order in his writings. In this respect, his universalism has a different meaning from the European debate on universalism versus particularism, which has developed for decades over the reconstruction of Western ideas of democracy and basic human rights.

In this way, his political thought bears a characteristic of fluidity, and his flexible thinking was supported by his innate temperament as a stubborn person. This stubbornness stimulated him to revolt against the mainstream of his era. He despised intellectuals who easily converted their philosophical positions and political opinions by bowing to the mainstream. His philosophical character is what caused him to warn of conformism in the Japanese intellectuals and the Japanese public.

The world religions flowing into Japan, such as Confucianism, Buddhism, Christianity, Marxism, and the ideas of democracy and basic human rights, claim the universal truth of their doctrines beyond cultural differences. In that context, Maruyama dealt with modern ideologies, especially Marxism, as secular religion. However, he was also quite familiar with the world history that these foreign universal ideas had caused countless religious wars. He put an
emphasis on the role and the function of the transcendent universal existence of world religions. However, it is not because of his acceptance of the universal truth of particular religious doctrines, but rather because of his idea of relativizing human beings through having constant conversations with the transcendent existence. He retained his non-religious position. In principle, whereas his political thought required the transcendent, he did not use religious arguments to tackle themes of the cultivation of modern subjectivity and a cosmopolitan sense of the Japanese. His scientific mind hampered him from including religious ideas in finding an answer for his questions. What should be noted here is that based on the reason Maruyama failed to apply his atomic bomb experience to his intellectual activities, Tsurumi realized that, with much difficulty, Maruyama was standing on the boundary between his modernist position and his religious sensibility.
Chapter 8  Reinterpreting the Ultra-Nationalism Essay

The goal of this final chapter is to demonstrate my thesis that Maruyama’s cosmopolitan-related ideas are already expressed in his early writings. For the task, I use his most famous essay, “Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism” (1946 [1969]) as a sample text.

8.1 Preparatory Notes

A series of studies of Japanese fascism by Maruyama continues to provide good research materials for the studies of fascism. For example, it is helpful to compare the timid-mentality model of Japanese militarist leaders by him and the model of the banality of evil by Hannah Arendt (political thinker, 1906–1975) in order to extract a general theory of how public servants are instrumentally used as cogs and turn into components of the totalitarian system. Maruyama’s study provides further evidence that the irresponsible mentality of state bureaucrats is more widely observed under the totalitarian regime.

Maruyama presented fascinating angles from which to approach fascism. In his “Nihon Fashizumu no Shisō to Undō” (1948; trans. “The Ideology and Dynamics of Japanese Fascism” 1969), he tentatively classifies the phenomena of fascism into three aspects: institution, idea, and movement. He analyzes in detail how these three aspects mutually operate. In “Fascism: Some Problems: A Consideration of its Political Dynamics” (Maruyama 1952 [1969]), he also understands fascism as an ideological reaction and backlash movement. From this perspective, he compares several case studies of fascist movements in order to categorize the types of fascism. Furthermore, in “Nationalism, Militarism and Fascism” (Maruyama 1957: CW, vol. 6), he pays attention to the compulsory homogenization of social members as a particular phenomenon to distinguish fascism from other similar political movements.
Examples of Criticism

It is not difficult to point out the inadequacy of Maruyama’s study of fascism in terms of empirical research. Contrary to his negative evaluation, of course, there were many situations in which Japanese militarist leaders made reasonable and resolute decisions during the war. As Yasushi Yamaguchi (Kobayashi 2003) suggests, it is not true that all Nazi leaders necessarily behaved as Hermann Goering (1893–1946) did, and yet this is the case Maruyama used as an example of the boldness and strong individuality of wartime German officers. Goering’s arrogance had already been criticized by both other Nazi leaders and the leaders of the Allied Forces during the war. Maruyama’s simplification of the characters of the Japanese militarist leaders in comparison with Nazi leaders perhaps misguides the reader.

Another thing is that it is easy to label failed military operations as reckless in hindsight, as Maruyama did. Yet, at least in most cases, each mission is built before the battlefield from the professional viewpoints; tactics are planned and carried out by the military professionals. The outcome of battles is always uncertain because of unforeseeable factors. Well-prepared missions sometimes fail, and reckless tactics sometimes have great success. Maruyama did not have experience leading the troops, taking an operational command, and even participating in actual combat. As a researcher, he was not an expert of military studies; apparently, he was not knowledgeable about the theory of military operations. In his analysis, he does not pay attention to the linkage between individual battles, the fact that the outcome of one fight creates the need for another operation. His descriptions give us impression that he tends to underestimate the reality of decision-making on the battlefield from the field-based perspective. A major history of win and loss of the war between nations is made by the accumulation of small dramas at the battlefield, and each event would occur along with numerous small decisions. Maruyama’s
criticism of the Japanese Imperial Army generalizes the individuality of each combat situation and simplifies the character of decision-making of the Army as irrational and irresponsible. However, from the beginning, it is impossible to explain all the military decision-making of the Army by the theory of systematic irresponsibility and the theory of transferring repression. Therefore, although his argument is still useful in that it is suggestive when studying the national character of the Japanese, but his theory of Japanese fascism needs to be reconstructed based on scientific research.

An Example of Misreading

Since the war, the study of fascism has grown dramatically. Based on the new research findings, some have insisted that Maruyama’s study of Japanese fascism became retrospective. For example, Kei Ushimura (2003) points out a few trivial fallacies of Maruyama’s citation system from historical documents. He scrutinizes the record of the accused plea of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal), and finds contradictory statements by former militarist leaders, which can be evaluated as responsible enough for their decision-making during the war. Thereby, Ushimura criticizes Maruyama’s description of the Japanese militarist leaders as relatively indecisive, saying Maruyama’s premise is a one-sided assessment and a manipulation of historical documents. Certainly, Ushimura’s finding is important from the viewpoint of the scientific research of history.

Nevertheless, Ushimura seems to misunderstand the essence of Maruyama’s theory of Japanese fascism, because he does not consider the locus of Maruyama’s argument on Japanese fascism in the larger context of his study of Japanese intellectual history. In other words,

although Ushimura regards Maruyama as political scientist, he seems to forget Maruyama’s real research field. If we read the essay in the flow of his study of Japanese intellectual history, Maruyama’s errors on detailed points from the science of history are not fatal to supporting his argument. Analyzing his political thought inclusively, I will argue that Ushimura’s claim does not take account of the connection between Maruyama’s theory of fascism and his works on the intellectual history.

Moreover, Ushimura does not have any intention to further develop Maruyama’s findings about the essence of Japanese political culture. In this regard, Ushimura’s criticism is superficial, and his partial textual critique is not productive in developing important points on Japanese political culture and political psychology. Beyond criticism for criticism’s sake, we need to reconstruct productively Maruyama’s findings on Japanese political culture and psychology by introducing the scientific data.

8.2 Basic Components of the Ultra-Nationalism Essay

Before reinterpreting the essay from the viewpoint of his cosmopolitan theory, I would like to review concisely a few basic points of his theory of ultra-nationalism for the reader who has not read the essay. In the beginning of the essay, he mentions the goal and focus of his research as follows:

What was the main ideological factor that kept the Japanese people in slavery for so long and that finally drove them to embark on a war against the rest of the world? Writers in the West have vaguely described it as “ultra-nationalism” or “extreme nationalism”; but until now no one has examined what it really is.

Scholars have been mainly concerned with the social and economic background of ultra-nationalism. Neither in Japan nor in the West have they attempted any fundamental analysis of its intellectual structure or of its psychological basis. There are two reasons for this. . . . (Maruyama 1969, 1. Emphasis mine)
During the war, American administrators in charge of the future occupation of Japan had already begun working to create the platform for reform projects to democratize the socio-economic conditions that had promoted Japanese militarism. For example, the reform plan aimed to dissolve the collusion between the Japanese Imperial Army and Japanese conglomerates. The proposal also problematized the dual structure of residual feudalism in rural areas and modernized lifestyle in urban areas. The Allied Forces prioritized legal and institutional reforms, and the U.S. planners focused on the democratization of the socio-economic aspects of Japan.

On the other hand, in the opening remark above, Maruyama announces that his study leaves the analyses of the institutional foundation of Japanese militarism to other studies. Instead, he declares his intention to focus on analyzing the psychological basis of Japanese militarism. Based on this focus, he attempts to demonstrate the “extreme” character of wartime Japanese nationalism. Consider the inclusion of the following important points in reading the passage above:

1) Maruyama implies that his study intends to analyze Japanese militarism as a matter of nationalism; he explains the phenomena neither as ultra-militarism nor ultra-totalitarianism, but as ultra-nationalism.

2) Ultra-nationalism is not a concept coined by Maruyama; Western intellectuals began to use it first.

3) In addition to ultra-nationalism, there is an alternative name: “extreme nationalism.”

4) According to the original Japanese text for the same part, nationalism is used as the meaning of Kokka-shugi (国家主義; nationalism focusing on the state institution), not as Kokumin-shugi (国民主義; nationalism focusing on the people).

5) Maruyama’s comparison of Japan with the world (or foreign countries) can be identified.
6) He is interested in analyzing the psychological foundation, rather than socio-economic conditions.

Two of these important points will be discussed below.

**The Index of “Extremeness”**

What should be asked is how Maruyama can determine wartime Japanese nationalism as “extreme.” Such a value judgment can be done by assuming that there is a standard or normal nationalism and by assuming that a comparison is possible between the plural types of nationalism. The comparison between the different degrees of nationalism becomes possible by measuring the distance of the individual cases from the standard nationalism. We can set various criteria to define the standard nationalism. Based on the measurement, our value judgment becomes possible; some cases are relatively close to the standard, while others are far from it.

For the standard of measurement, Maruyama applies the degree of psychological penetration of the ideology of the national polity to the individuals. Applying the Western cases to the standard model of nationalism, he finds that the Japanese case shows a high degree of ideological penetration. In this way, he determines that Japanese nationalism is extreme. (In another essay, he compares Japanese nationalism with non-Western cases such as China or Korea.)

Key concepts of classical masterpieces are sometimes popularized in insufficient understanding, and this is also true for Maruyama’s works. Some secondary literature has claimed that Maruyama coined the concept of ultra-nationalism. Yet, according to Maruyama’s own description, the Allied Forces in fact began to use the concept first. That is, American officers and politicians already had the image of standard nationalism or “normal nationalism,”
and in comparison with that standard, they assessed that wartime Japanese nationalism as “extreme” in several aspects. During the war, officers and general soldiers of the Allied Forces were already discussing the behavioral patterns of Japanese soldiers, such as extreme loyalty to the Emperor, suicide attacks by Japanese pilots, and other behavior perpetrated at the expense of the individuals.

On the other hand, Maruyama also attempts to explain the extreme nature of Japanese nationalism from a social psychological perspective. He asks the reason for the extreme degree in the deep indoctrination of the ideology of the national polity into the Japanese population. He demonstrates that the wartime national (spiritual) mobilization movement became an uncontrolled, automatic movement that even the militarist leaders themselves could not handle.

The point is that Maruyama does not grasp the extreme character of Japanese nationalism simply from his own perspective. In “Scattered Recollections concerning Emperor Shōwa” (Maruyama 1989: CW, vol. 15), he confesses that he had a hard time, indeed went through withdrawal, trying to free himself from the magical illusion of the emperor system. The ideology had been imprinted in his thought patterns beyond all his expectations. In other words, at the exact moment when he was writing the ultra-nationalism essay, he was still a resident of the ideological world of the national polity. Precisely because he began to notice the social-psychological pathology, he struggled to escape from the thought pattern in the early postwar era (Matsuzawa and Uete, 2006, vol. 1, 203–204).

In addition, the term ultra-nationalism has certainly become famous because it is also used in the title of his representative essay. But we should not dismiss as an alternative expression “extreme nationalism.” In my view, the latter explains more effectively what Maruyama intends to express.
The Psychological Aspect

As mentioned above, the goal of Maruyama’s study of Japanese fascism in the early postwar period was to elucidate the psychological structure of the Japanese under the wartime militarist regime. In the ultra-nationalism essay, he aims to analyze the interplay between the social structure of the emperor state and the psychology of the Japanese in those days.

As discussed in Chapter 1, Maruyama’s study focuses on the mode of thinking. He understands that studies of totalitarianism have a variety of viewpoints, and, accordingly, the methodology is diverse as well. He uses the logic of the East-West comparison in order to diagnose pathological aspects of the Japanese style of thinking and human relationships. And he defines the Japanese style as relatively feudalistic. He points out, for example, the formation of a closed organization and underdevelopment of the horizontal-network society. He then makes a value judgment to characterize the society as feudalistic. Consider his remark in the middle of the ultra-nationalism essay below:

Here we find a sharp difference between the Eastern and Western attitudes. The German people, as Thomas Mann has pointed out, have a latent sense that politics is essentially an immoral and brutal thing; but it is impossible for the Japanese to recognize this with any real conviction. Accordingly, two types of politician are rarely to be found in our country: the genuinely idealistic politician who remains steadfastly faithful to truth and justice, and the Cesare Borgia [Italian politician, 1475–1507] type of politician who is prepared fearlessly to trample underfoot all accepted standards of morality. In Japan we find neither the humble, inward-looking approach nor the naked lust for power. Everything is noisy, yet at the same time it is all most scrupulous. It is precisely in this sense that Tōjō Hideki [a general of the Imperial Army and the 40th Prime Minister of Japan during WWII, 1884–1948] can be regarded as representative of the Japanese politician. (1969, 11)

However, he carefully applies the perspective of the East-West comparison. In the prologue for “Japanese Thought” (Maruyama 1957: CW, vol. 7), his representative essay in the midterm, he criticizes both attempts of the compromising theory and the confrontation theory of
Eastern thought and Western philosophy. He argues that in Japanese intellectual history, both types of theory have not achieved a great success. In the essay, he proposes an alternative idea of enhancing Japanese thought from the random accumulation of foreign ideas to the formation of a true hybrid idea between imported foreign thought and Japanese indigenous thought. In this context, he analyzes again how the ideology of ultra-nationalism functioned:

Here once again, let us take a look back at the starting point of this essay. Japanese traditional religion could not play a role for regenerating the tradition consciously by philosophically confronting the ideology that has flowed into in new eras, and as a result the character of the spiritual randomness of the modern Japanese people has become more noticeable. The modern Japanese emperor system attempted to deal with this condition by using all at once the heart of its power as the very spiritual “axis.” Nevertheless, because the national polity regarded the mixed characteristic of “tradition” itself as its own entity, the intellectual tradition worked negatively as a powerful principle to promote homogenization (i.e., elimination of heresy), rather than as a principle of arranging our ideas practically. The regime was encapsulated from the beginning and destined to become the fatal fetters against the establishment of the subject of personality—in the meanings of the free subject of recognition, the subject of moral responsibility, and the subject as a creator of order.

Hence, if we review Maruyama’s ultra-nationalism essay from the perspective of his research theme of Japanese intellectual history, the wartime national polity of Japan can be drawn out as one of the failed attempts to produce the Japanese original thought or the axis of Japanese thought.

Maruyama negatively assesses the ideology of the emperor system, which was practiced by applying the genealogical myth of the imperial family. He also describes its failure to stop the archetypal mode of thinking that is regularly at work in Japanese intellectual history. In the end, the ideological experience of Japan gives us one lesson: The ideology of the national polity of the emperor system did not exhibit any function to organize the interminglement of ideas in Japanese thought before and during the war. The ideology, rather, eliminated extraneous ideas
contrary to the ideology of national polity, generated an exclusively nationalistic idea against Western thought, increased the mythical Japanese spiritualism as a reaction to Western thought, and ended up promoting the spiritual climate to reinforce the homogenization of the Japanese. When Maruyama judges a particular phenomenon as a Japanese pathology, his assessment is made by comparing the object with something else. He usually refers to the European history and culture as model cases. In the ultra-nationalism essay, we can reaffirm the application of the indicators of subjectivity and modernity to his assessment of the characteristic of “extremeness” of Japanese nationalism during World War II. Throughout his academic life, he continued questioning why the Japanese public was not able to promote the independence of the subject, why they tended to patiently obey the authoritarian political system, and why they were caught up in the tide of homogenous society without meeting any resistance whatsoever. His awareness about the issue is recognizable in every discourse of his, from his expertise on Japanese intellectual history, through his political essays, to his prototype theory of Japanese thought. Ultra-nationalism during the Asia-Pacific War can be understood as one of the extreme forms of the expression of the Japanese social-psychological pathology. As seen below, for Maruyama, the pathology has not been dispelled by Japan’s defeat and the second chance of democratization of the country under U.S. occupation. In postwar Japanese society, he faced another expression of the pathology as the simultaneous development of the political apathy of the masses and the politicization of the entire society.

**Wartime Fascist Society and Postwar Mass Society**

The ultra-nationalism paper has been read as a political essay to understand the peculiarities of wartime Japanese nationalism in terms of interference between the social system
and the human psyche. Let us regard this orthodox way of reading as the first interpretation of the essay.

At the same time, it is also possible to interpret his argument of ultra-nationalism from his study of the politics of mass society. I want to regard this way as the second interpretation of the essay. Since around the 1950s, he became especially interested in a new development of politicization, which was commonly observed in Western European countries and the United States. The rapid development of productive forces, transportation systems, mass media networks, and mass communication devices in the mid-twentieth century prepared the formation of a new type of mass society. He observed a paradox that while political influence expands to every corner of the society, including the private sphere of citizens, political apathy of the public and its passive attitude before the political elite increase conversely. In his “The World of Politics”, Maruyama describes this paradox as follows:

... the more the “politicization” of society develops, the more the depoliticization of the masses develops. We should not shut our sight. We need to face the contradiction that the “depoliticization” of the masses getting more prominent is largely rooted in the essence of modern civilization; we need to consider this problem seriously. We must continue to think seriously about our future direction by facing the issue. (Maruyama 1952: CW, vol. 5, 185)

This concept of politicization derives from Carl Schmitt’s political theory (see Conv., vol. 2, 301). Applying the concept to 1960s Japanese society, Maruyama observed a) the growing influence of politics over most sectors, including the private realm of the public, i.e., politicization; b) the development of political apathy of the masses; and c) both phenomena stimulating each other to form a vicious cycle.

Maruyama analyzes the thought patterns and psychological traits of the Japanese in the new development of politicization. In his “Politics and Man in the Contmporary World (1961
(1969), he illustrates the character of politicized society using various expressions, for example, the “society of the age of upside-down.” Under the social psychological conditions, the public becomes uninterested in politics but is placed under the enormous influence of politics. This social condition provides a hotbed for the rise of a new type of totalitarian society, in which the public voluntarily complies with authority, even without the direct exercise of political power including propaganda. In recent years, from this point of view, several Japanese political scientists or sociologists have studied mobocracy in the Jun’ichirō Koizumi Cabinet.

Maruyama began to discuss politicization more intensively since the mid-1950s. He analyzes the issues of politicization of postwar Japan by reorganizing key concepts from classic studies such as Walter Lippmann (American journalist; critic, 1888–1974) and studying the latest theory of mass politics from thinkers such as Harold. D. Lasswell (American political scientist; the founder of behaviorist study of politics, 1902–1978) and David Riesman (American sociologist; Maruyama’s friend, 1909–2002). Yet his reference to the concept of politicization itself can be found in his early works. For the earliest case, I verify his usage of the concept in his “1936–37 Nen no Eibeiyōbi Doitsu Seijigakkai” [Political Science in the UK, the US and Germany in 1936–37]:

It is said that this is the era of politicization. The system of cultures has lost its autonomy of the past. The emblem of “science for science” has faded, and science is now connected to the masses below and is subservient to authority above. From Idee to ideology: This trend is most pronounced in none other than the studies of politics. While Anglo-American associations for political science reflect diverse ideological competition more reasonably, the ideology of Germany has been painted only in one color. For this, at least we have sought for an academic explanation for that by deeply considering its philosophical basis. Yet even in the attempt, the political color is so intense. In this era, survival of the scientific spirit is not a problem merely for scholars anymore. Once it was buried in the midst of political frenzy, it will be left to the judgment of the masses. (Maruyama 1938: CW, vol. 1, 82)
However, Maruyama’s focus shifted between the 1930s and the 1950s due to the change of social conditions. At the year of 1938, internationally, Japan had already entered the Fifteen Years’ War (1931–1945) and the relationship with Britain and the United States was becoming worse over the national interest in China; domestically, the militarization of society was in progress.

Philologically speaking, it is reasonable that scholars have read the ultra-nationalism essay as a study of wartime Japanese nationalism and militarism. However, from a wider perspective, it is also possible to incorporate the essay into the sequence of Maruyama’s works on the psychology of mass politics and society. As seen above, he was interested in the problems with mass politics and politicization since the 1930s. Then he faced the totalitarianization of his country and experienced living in the surveillance society in the era of “dark valley” from the 1930s to August of 1945.

On the one hand, in the ultra-nationalism essay, Maruyama analyzed the mechanism of the ideological invasion of the emperor system into the psychology of the people. The process from the indoctrination to the completion of the compulsory homogenization of society follow the next steps: a) the induction of belligerent and chauvinistic public opinion by the militarist government’s propaganda, b) the evocation of invisible psychological pressure, c) the enclosure of the individuals in the collective pressure, and d) the formation of a voluntary, mutual-monitoring system of society.

On the other hand, from the 1950s to the 1960s, for example, in his “The World of Politics” (1952: CW, vol. 5) or his university lectures during the 1960s (Lect., vol. 3), he discusses synchronization between the increase of political apathy of the masses and the simultaneous progress of politicization of the entire Japanese society (in his term, the “Japanese
paradox”). He addresses the topics of the Japanese style of groupthink, the siege of people by the collective conscious to join in compulsory homogenization, the struggle of people of conscience against groupthink, and the promotion of the independence and autonomy of the individuals who do not succumb to the pressure.

Here, ultra-nationalism and postwar politicization are similarly analyzed as the threatening phenomena of a totalitarian society against the individuals. In this regard, we realize that there is certain continuity between the two themes. It is reasonable to suppose that Maruyama understood Japanese ultra-nationalism in the Asia-Pacific War period as the extreme form of problems of politicization.

8.3 Cosmopolitan Ideas in the Ultra-Nationalism Essay

The Third Interpretation

Now below I would like to attempt to read Maruyama’s ultra-nationalism essay from the third perspective, which reinterprets the essay from his cosmopolitan side. I want to confirm that several ideas related to his theory of others, horizontal network, spiritual revolution, and the like have already appeared in the ultra-nationalism essay. Traditionally, the essay has been read as his political essay about Japanese nationalism, yet we can reinterpret the same essay from the stance of his theory of others and cosmopolitan ideas.

Of course, at the year of 1946, a more urgent issue for him was to analyze the ideology of the emperor state system that had been restraining the Japanese until the end of the war and to consider the immediate obtainment of modern subjectivity for the passive Japanese. At that time, he was not yet conscious about preaching on the importance of owing the sense of otherness, having more intercultural contact, and acquiring the cosmopolitan sense.
Below, I exemplify specific texts indicating the early expressions of his cosmopolitan ideas. Except the first citation from *Collected Works of Masao Maruyama* vol. 3, all texts cited below come from *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics* (Maruyama 1969).

**Idea 1: The Old Layer of Thought**

There are the following passages in the ultra-nationalism essay.

*Sample Text 1:*

それはなまじ明白な理論構成を持たず、思想的系譜も種々雑多であるだけにその全貌の把握はなかなか困難である [Since this has never had any clear theoretical form or any single intellectual pedigree, it is very hard to grasp in its entirety]. (CW, vol. 3, 18; *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics*, 2. Emphasis mine)

*Sample Text 2:*

[Quoted by Maruyama] If we cut across the time axis, the events that occurred 2,600 years ago continue the central layer…. The happenings in the Emperor Jimmu’s reign are therefore no ancient tales but facts that exist at this very moment. (21)

In *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics*, Text 1 has been translated freely. However, the translation above does not seem to inform accurately the original nuance of his expression. The literal translation should be: “Because it rarely has its clear theoretical structure and its ideological genealogy dates back to various roots, it is quite difficult to grasp the whole picture of it.” Indeed, the part “its ideological genealogy dates back to various roots” can be translated more literally as “the ideological genealogy is miscellaneous.” It can also be expressed in noun form as “the mixture of ideas of different lineages.” Here, I recognize a concept similar to the proposition of the lack of axis of Japanese thought, which was raised in his prototype theory. Although Text 2 is not his own passage but his quotation, it is also possible to find a
related concept to his prototype theory, which dates back to the past and finds the prototype of
Japanese thought by the elimination of attached foreign ideological elements in each age.

As Sasakura (2003) and Kobayashi (2003) suggest, a series of Maruyama’s study of
Japanese fascism should be relocated in the larger context of his historical research on the source
of the feudal mindset of the Japanese, rather than as a solo study of nationalism and fascism. I
accept their idea of reinterpreting the ultra-nationalism essay in the larger context of his study of
intellectual history.

Idea 2: Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy

As mentioned before, Maruyama, Fujita, and Ishida had started in the 1950s their joint
research on orthodoxy and heterodoxy in global intellectual history. Although I have omitted
details of Maruyama’s unfinished research on this theme, we can notice that some related ideas
are already introduced into the ultra-nationalism essay. Consider the following passages from the
essay.

Sample Text 3:

A comparison with European nationalism will lead us to the crux of the matter. As Carl
Schmidt [sic] has pointed out, an outstanding characteristic of the modern European State
lies in its being ein neutraler Staat. That is to say, the State adopts a neutral position on
internal values, such as the problem of what truth and justice are; it leaves the choice and
judgment of all values of this sort to special social groups (for instance, to the Church) or
to the conscience of the individual. The real basis of national sovereignty is a purely
“formal” legal structure, divorced from all questions of internal value. (3. Emphasis
Maruyama’s)

This resulted from the particular way in which the modern State developed out of the
post-Reformation wars of religion that dragged on through the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. The interminable struggle, which revolved about matters of faith and theology,
eventually had two converse effects. On the one hand, it obliged the religious sects to
give up the idea that they could realize their principles on the political plane. On the other,
it confronted the absolute sovereigns of the time with a severe challenge. Until then the
monarchs of Europe had brandished the slogan of the Divine Right of Kings, thus providing their own internal justification for ruling. Confronted now with severe opposition, they were obliged to find a new basis for their rule, namely, in the \textit{external} function of preserving public order. (3. Emphasis Maruyama’s)

Thus a compromise was effected between the rulers and the ruled—a compromise based on distinguishing between form and content, between external matters and internal matters, between the public and the private domains. Questions of thought, belief, and morality were deemed to be private matters and, as such, were guaranteed their subjective, “internal” quality; meanwhile, state power was steadily absorbed into an “external” legal system, which was of a technical nature. (3)

During the prewar period, had Maruyama already addressed the theme of orthodoxy and heterodoxy itself. For instance, Sorai Ogyū’s thought in his first academic papers includes the heretical opposition to the mainstream of Neo-Confucianism. In his 1942 essay “\textit{Jinnō Shōtōki ni Arawaretaru Seijikan}” [Political View in \textit{Succession of Imperial Rulers in Japan}], he deals with the problem that even the orthodox faction of Emperor’s family lost political power because it lost support from the public (CW, vol. 2). Along with his collaborating research project on the theme, he constantly tackled the theme of orthodoxy and heterodoxy in some of his writings. And as seen the passages above, the related ideas can be identified in his ultra-nationalism essay too.

If we simply read the ultra-nationalism essay as one of his political essays, our textual critique would end by reading the above section as an explanation for the modern characteristics of the nation-state in an East-West comparison. Of course, there is no problem with this way of reading. However, the traditional interpretation misses the most significant implications of Text 3. Besides, from the larger perspective, if we review Maruyama’s thesis of ultra-nationalism as part of his research of Japanese intellectual history, rather than an essay about a political current event, we can recognize that behind his argument is an epistemology that was inspired by his thinking about the academic conflict between orthodoxy and heterodoxy.
Although this study does not cover his unfinished study of orthodoxy and heterodoxy, Maruyama basically deploys the following arguments. With respect to the dynamism between the orthodox school and the heretical one, he submits the proposition that the heterodoxy is established at first, before the orthodoxy is. When the heretical faction of a certain doctrine appears, the academic debate eventually breaks out over the loci of the orthodoxy of the doctrine. Each school begins asserting its orthodoxy. The mainstream school, which has been content with the conventional status until being challenged by the heretical school, now faces an urgent issue for systematizing the doctrine in a clearer and more official form. Maruyama discovers that this phenomenon is found in the same patterns throughout different religions (for example, see Maruyama 2005, 13–21). Although he is not discussing the theme itself, from the epistemological viewpoint, we can identify a related idea to the theme in the ultra-nationalism essay.

**Idea 3: Critical View of Buddhism during the Edo Period**

Sample Text 4:

In post-Restoration Japan, however, when the country was being rebuilt as a modern State, there was never any effort to recognize these technical and neutral aspects of national sovereignty. In consequence Japanese nationalism strove consistently to base its control on internal values rather than on authority deriving from external laws.

Foreign visitors to Japan during the first half of the nineteenth century almost invariably noted that the country was under the dual rule of the Mikado (Tennō) [the Emperor], who was the spiritual sovereign, and the Tycoon (Shōgun), who held actual political power. After the [Meiji] Restoration, unity was achieved by removing all authority from the latter, and from other representatives of feudal control, and by concentrating it in the person of the former. In this process, which is variously described as the “unification of administration and law” and the “unification of the sources of dispensation and deprivation,” prestige and power were brought together in the institution of the Emperor. And in Japan there was no ecclesiastical force to assert the supremacy of any “internal” world over this new combined, unitary power. (3–4. Emphasis Maruyama’s)
In the Edo period, Christians were expelled from Japan. On the other hand, Japanese Buddhism was subordinate to the control of the secular power. In his 1960s lecture, Maruyama argues that in Japanese history, religious forces had been incorporated under the rule of the secular power by the early seventeenth century, and this power relation has brought a significant consequence to Japanese intellectual history and the social role of religion in Japan. Unlike Western societies, in Japan, the people missed the chance to directly face the invisible transcendent existence. As already discussed, this spiritual condition resulted in their blind obedience to visible authority and political reality. We can notice that related ideas to this argument are also already present in the ultra-nationalism essay.

Idea 4: The Sense of Otherness and the Horizontal Networks

Sample Text 5:

The identification of morality with power and the constant stress on proximity to the Emperor have an important effect on people’s attitudes to their duties. Pride in carrying out one’s duties was based not so much on any sense of horizontal specialization (that is, division of labour) as on a consciousness of vertical dependence on the ultimate value. The various pathological phenomena that arose from this state of affairs are perfectly exemplified by the Japanese armed forces. (14)

Sample Text 6:

Such an approach was the basis of the appalling reputation for self-righteousness and sectionalism that the armed forces acquired during the war. (15)

This sectionalism was rampant not only in the Army and Navy but throughout the entire structure of the Japanese government. It has often been described as “feudalistic,” but that is an oversimplification. The feudalistic impulse to defend one’s own particular sphere of interests had its origins in the efforts of each unit to entrench itself in a closed, self-sufficient world. Japanese sectionalism, however, derived from a system according to which every element in society was judged according to its respective connexion, in a
direct vertical line, with the ultimate entity. This involved a constant impulse to unite oneself with that entity, and the resultant sectionalism was of a far more active and “aggressive” type than that associated with feudalism. Here again the military provide a perfect example: while they relied at each point on the fortress provided by their prerogative of supreme command, they tried (in the name of total warfare) to interfere in every single aspect of national life. (15–16)

In Maruyama’s argument in the text above, I see a related concept to the idea of the lack of the sense of otherness of the Japanese, which he problematized more explicitly in his later years. For him, in Japanese society, it is conspicuous that each specialized field builds a wall to protect its own vested rights and interests. The closed groups do not exchange information with other sections and work apart. As seen in the concluding part of this study, Maruyama sent his last message to his former students who were working as social elites in various fields, encouraging them to try to break down the sectionalism; he preached that beyond sectionalism, talented people should form a horizontal network between different fields. In the passage above, I can identify an idea that leads throughout his work all the way to his last message.

Idea 5: Evaluating the State from the Transcendent Viewpoint

Sample Text 7:

In Japan, then, we are faced with a situation in which national sovereignty involves both spiritual authority and political power. The standard according to which the nation’s actions are judged as right or wrong lies within itself (that is, in the “national polity”), and what the nation does, whether within its own borders or beyond them, is not subject to any moral code that supersedes the nation. (8)

This formulation will immediately bring to mind the Hobbesian type of absolutism. But there is a clear difference. The authority to which Hobbes refers when he writes: “It is not the truth that makes laws, but authority” is a purely pragmatic decision and does not connote any value that can be regarded as normative. In his *Leviathan* there are no such things as right and wrong, good and bad, until they are enacted by a decision of the sovereign. The sovereign himself creates the norm; he does not bring into force a system of truth and justice that has already existed. What makes the law valid in the Hobbesian
State is exclusively the *formal* fact that they derive from the orders of the sovereign; and this stress on formal validity, far from involving any fusion of form and content (such as we find in Japanese thinking on the subject), leads to the modern theory of legal positivism. Even in Frederick the Great’s Prussia, in which legitimacy (*Legitimität*) ultimately resolved itself into legality (*Legalität*), we can recognize a direct line of descent from the Hobbesian type of absolutism. (8. Emphasis Maruyama’s)

Sample Text 8:

Japanese nationalism, on the other hand, was never prepared to accept a merely formal basis of validity. The reason that the actions of the nation cannot be judged by any moral standard that supersedes the nation is not that the Emperor creates norms from scratch (like the sovereign in Hobbes’s *Leviathan*) but that absolute values are embodied in the person of the Emperor himself, who is regarded as “the eternal culmination of the True, the Good, and the Beautiful throughout all ages and in all places.” (8. Emphasis mine)

According to this point of view, virtue arises only when this “eternal culmination,” which is in fact the essence of the “national polity,” starts to spread out in waves from its central entity, the Emperor, to the rest of the world. In the patriotic slogan “spreading the just cause throughout the world,” the just cause (that is, virtue) is not regarded as something that could exist before the Japanese nation acted, nor is it something that developed afterwards. The just cause and national conduct invariably coexist. In order to spread the just cause it is necessary to act; conversely, when the nation acts, it is *ipso facto* in the just cause. (8–9. Emphasis Maruyama’s)

Thus it is characteristic of nationalist logic in Japan that the down-to-earth precept, “It’s always best to be on the winning side,” should be subtly blended with the ideology, “The righteous cause triumphs.” The Empire of Japan came to be regarded *per se* as “the culmination of the True, the Good, and the Beautiful,” and was by its very nature unable to do wrong; accordingly the most atrocious behavior, the most treacherous acts, could all be condoned. (9)

Here, I would like the reader to pay attention to Maruyama’s remarks “any moral code that supersedes the nation” in Text 7 and “the nation cannot be judged by any moral standard that supersedes the nation” of Text 8. These refer to the same idea at the core of his universal thought, which argues that we can evaluate an institution or the state in accordance with the principle that
transcends it. We have already examined his idea of valuing the transcendent existence for two main reasons. The idea already appears in the ultra-nationalism essay.

**Idea 6: Spiritual Revolution**

Sample Text 9:

As Ferdinand Lasalle puts it, “The opening of a new era finds itself in the acquisition of the **consciousness** of what has been the reality of existence.” This task may well be an essential condition for any true national reform. Indeed may we not say that a revolution is worthy of its name only if it involves **an inner or spiritual revolution**? (2. Emphasis mine)

Sample Text 10:

Now for the first time the Japanese people, who until then had been mere objects, became **free subjects** and the destiny of this “national polity” was committed to their own hands. (21. Emphasis mine)

Text 10 is Maruyama’s final remark in the essay. The passage corresponds with Text 9. Strictly speaking, Text 10 is an irrelevant or superfluous sentence that breaks the logical flow of the essay. Yet, it seems that Maruyama could not help himself from adding the sentence in order to express his enthusiasm and joy of the dawn of a new era.

When we attempt to reinterpret the ultra-nationalism essay from the viewpoint of an indication of ideas associated with his cosmopolitan thought, we realize his idea of achieving a spiritual revolution of the Japanese is also present in the essay. Certainly, at the time of writing the essay, Maruyama had not deepened yet his academic question of the impact of the “opening of the country” over Japanese intellectual history and his perspective on cultural contact between
different civilizations. He had not yet submitted his idea of cosmopolitanism as the sense of neighbors (i.e., universal consciousness). His ideas were gradually organized.

The goal of overcoming the feudal mentality poses two challenges to the Japanese: First, the individuals should acquire modern subjectivity; and second, toward the world, the Japanese should gain the cosmopolitan sense as a neighboring sense. The sense teaches them that they are themselves members of the world, and that they should overcome the pathological aspects of their national character, such as the dichotomous mentality of dividing in-group members from out-group ones, parochialism, familism, xenophobia, discrimination against heterodoxy, the psychological tendency to comply with group norms over personal independence, and the vulnerable mentality to socio-political movements of compulsory homogenization. In the ultranationalism essay, I can read his philosophical preparation for the development of his thought in the cosmopolitan direction.

The Meaning of Early Emergence of Cosmopolitan Ideas

As confirmed in Part II, in his academic life of over half a century, Maruyama describes the years from the 1930s to 1940s (the period of his twenties and thirties) as “the era of the dark valley” or “the dark ages.” It is obvious that his experiences during the era significantly influenced the formation of his thought. During this season, the militarization and totalitarianization of his country had become much stronger. Japan’s territorial expansionism and military aggression against other Asian countries accelerated. Domestically, the collective conscious of “selfless devotion” for celebrating the national polity of the emperor system had spread rapidly. Corresponding with the establishment of the totalitarian militarist regime, radical activists and opportunist intellectuals appeared. They fanatically agitated for Japanese supremacy
based on its spiritualism. In the late 1930s, just before he became a professional scholar, Maruyama felt antipathy toward the theory of Japan’s mission to become the Asian leader and the fanatic faith that the Japanese civilization and its spiritualism must overcome the traps of Western modernism as economic materialism.

On the eve of the outbreak of the Asia-Pacific War, Maruyama wrote three academic papers on Japanese intellectual history: “The Sorai School: Its Role in the Disintegration of Tokugawa Confucianism and its Impact on National Learning” (Maruyama 1940 [1974]), “Nature and Invention in Tokugawa Political Thought: Contrasting Institutional Views” (Maruyama 1941 [1974]), and “The Premodern Formation of Nationalism” (Maruyama 1944 [1974]). He hurriedly wrote the third essay as if he meant to draw up his will just before the departure for his second-time military service. His hidden motivation of writing these academic papers was to attempt to refute what the nationalists were claiming in those days. After the war, Maruyama himself explains that his confrontational attitude went beyond just writing academic papers.

Certainly, I agree with other scholars that Maruyama’s war experience urged him to sharpen the focus of his studies of Japanese politics and intellectual history. However, through this study, I have verified a certain consistency in his academic interest throughout the entire flow of his intellectual activities, from the 1930s until his later years in the 1990s. In other words, his political thought certainly took a methodological turn on his study of intellectual history (e.g., his introduction of a new perspective of cross-cultural contact by departing from the Marxist view of history). However, in my view, his political thought itself did not have a major philosophical turn; he maintained his primary concern of establishing the modern subjectivity of the Japanese and achieving a spiritual revolution by overcoming their feudal mentality. The
consistency of his goals is frankly expressed in the declaration of his fresh postwar start in his “Modern Thinking” (1946: CW, vol. 3). He there proclaims, “Despite the major social change, I just continue to engage in tackling my unchanged academic interest in searching for the foundation of modern thinking.” This short essay was written immediately after his demobilization and before his writing of the ultra-nationalism essay.

Maruyama submitted the model of ultra-nationalism through his own war experiences. Certainly, the theory explains the psychological effect of the ideology of the national polity over the Japanese. We can read the essay as his political writing. However, we should confirm that it is also possible to relocate the theory in the larger context of his historical study of Japanese thought, which aims to elucidate the origin of the feudalistic national character of the Japanese and seek a way to overcome the problem. The early expression of his cosmopolitan-related ideas can be used as evidence for the consistency of his academic interest.

In summary, we have examined the following two points by using his ultra-nationalism essay as a sample text.

First, in the essay we have reconfirmed his methodology of focusing on the human mind. I also referred to his use of the indexes of subjectivity and modernity to identify the characteristic of “ultra” as a particular trait of wartime Japanese nationalism.

Second, I have demonstrated that his cosmopolitan-related ideas, such as his theory of otherness, which are developed along with the formation of his prototype theory, already appears in the essay written in 1946. The essay has been read as a political essay on Japanese nationalism and the Japanese emperor system. However, if we persist in this conventional way of textual critique, we would overlook that his universalist and cosmopolitan ideas are already embedded in
We have also confirmed that the following ideas are already presented in the ultra-nationalism essay:

1) Orthodoxy and heterodoxy.
2) The old layers of the Japanese style of thinking.
3) Criticism of the Buddhist force in the Edo period.
4) The idea of evaluating the state institution by the transcendent principle beyond the state.
5) The construction of horizontal networks across the different sectors.
6) Spiritual revolution.

Therefore, I would like the reader to know that the same essay can be read in terms of his universalist and cosmopolitan political thought. My attempt to reinterpret his ultra-nationalism essay is proof that most of his cosmopolitan ideas, which he consciously deployed later, were already all presented in the first period of the 1940s (in his thirties). I argue that in the very early stage, he already had cosmopolitan ideas; it is not true that after he introduced his new perspective of cross-cultural contact, he suddenly turned into a cosmopolitan thinker. For another piece of evidence, the early emergence of his cosmopolitan ideas can be also identified in his Dialogue with Myself (1998), which collects fragmentary notes of his thinking from his early to later life stages. Although I selected his ultra-nationalism essay as an example text in this study, I would like the reader to know that his universalist and cosmopolitan ideas can be identified in other early works that were also read merely before as political essays.

The ideas of modern subjectivity, otherness, and universalism (i.e., his emphasis on the transcendent universal existence in order to relativize the self and its surrounding political reality) establish the three principles of the system of his political thought. My finding is that
these ideas already appeared all together in the 1930s and the 1940s, and he kept them equally in
his mind throughout his academic life. Yet his stress between the three principles changed by his
academic periods.

It is possible to relocate the ultra-nationalism essay in his larger project of investigating
the history of evolution of the human spirit. The late Maruyama inquired of us about the
possibility of developing a cosmopolitan sense and leading all humanity to dialogue beyond
cultural conflicts. He called the sense “universal consciousness.” His discourse on a variety of
topics, delivered in his response to each era, are all integrated by his grand vision of finding the
way to achieve a spiritual revolution of the Japanese, which aims to overcome their feudal
mentality and gain the cosmopolitan sense. His writings and discourses, which cover broad
topics of politics, the theory of humanity, and art and culture, are all related in this respect.
Therefore, although each piece keeps its own moderate independence, we ought to read each
work in the entire context of his grand vision in order to fully understand the richness and the
potential of Maruyama’s thought.
Conclusion: The Rising Global Trend of Universal Consciousness

1. The Subject, the Transcendent Existence, and Political Reality

   In this study, I have introduced Western readers to important philosophical components of the political thought of Masao Maruyama. A structural analysis of his political philosophy helps us to understand the meaning of his unique universalism and cosmopolitanism. I hope that now the reader can visualize the whole picture and the basic structure of Maruyama’s political thought. Although his prolific academic writings contain further knowledge, my study has dealt with the most important ideas, concepts, propositions, arguments, theories, and models of his political thought.

   I would like to conclude by considering in what sense we can evaluate him as a universalist thinker and reflecting on the meaning of his cosmopolitan ideas which emerged from within a society with a strong tendency toward compulsory homogenization.

The Structure of Maruyama’s Political Thought: Summary

   We have extracted the following philosophical features of Maruyama’s political thought throughout this study:

1) Maruyama’s study focuses on the mode of thinking of political thinkers and actors.

2) The philosophy of fluidity forms his unique perspective on politics. This philosophy characterizes his political thought as realistic, pragmatic, and relativistic. The philosophy leads him to a cynical view of politics and democracy.

3) His unique cosmopolitanism was composed by the interplay between his philosophy of self-reflection and his philosophy of dialogue.

4) He believes that the human subject is necessary to face the transcendent existence.
In the structure of Maruyama’s political thought, we can distill two philosophical ideas, a) a human’s commitment to the universal ideals or transcendent existence (i.e., strictness to the principle), and b) the philosophy of fluidity (i.e., flexibility from the principle); far from being contradictory, the principles collaborate with each other.

Maruyama certainly implies his sympathy toward the universal value of democracy, universal human rights, and the international system of justice. However, as this study has confirmed, he takes a relativist position on all specific political ideas. Therefore, it is not sufficient to refer to him as a universalist thinker in the same context of the Western political debate of universalism versus particularism.

I conclude that we should regard him as a universalist thinker in a particular sense. His political thought has aspects of the universalist side, as demonstrated by his emphasis on thinking and behavior based on principles, which serve to prevent one from falling into political opportunism and revolt against the menace of conformism. His political philosophy also recognizes the important role of the transcendent existence in order to relativize the human experience and the environment surrounding humans. In Maruyama’s philosophy, the commitment to the transcendent has the effect of allowing the Japanese people to evaluate reality by ideals. In the context of real politics, this simple thesis can be interpreted as follows: Even if he or she lives within a totalitarian political system, the person of principle can act based on his or her own conscience. In the context of these particular elements, Maruyama can be considered as a universalist political thinker.

In his public lecture “With Mr. Masao Maruyama: Conversation with the Author,” Maruyama describes the relationship between three entities: a) the human subject, b) the transcendent existence, and c) political reality: “If we lose a sense that we are bound by certain
invisible authority (i.e., a universal idea that supports the subject), my thought draws an irrational conviction that . . . after all . . . we will be dragged down by visible authority” (Maruyama 1966: Conv., vol. 5, 315).

We have also demonstrated that, over time, Maruyama gradually embodied his primordial sense of cosmopolitan through his real-life experiences of confronting historical events and everyday incidents related to conformism in Japan and other countries. He also responded to the Japanese style of ethnocentrism, which appealed to the superiority of Japanese spiritual culture and attempted the political use of the cultural particularity. He was confronted with Japanese chauvinism and jingoism both on academic and personal levels. His life experiences in political reality prompted him to be more aware of his innate characteristic as a cosmopolitan thinker. Using his ultra-nationalism essay as a sample text, we have confirmed the early emergence of his cosmopolitan ideas.

2. The Last Message from Maruyama on December 3, 1995

Maruyama had been suffering from liver cancer since 1993. His condition became worse, and he was constantly in and out of the hospital. In those days, he participated in a declaration calling upon the government to implement rapid payment of postwar reparations. In this period, we can read his remarks as his last message to the Japanese people. As a political thinker, what was he thinking of in his later years? At about the same time, another intellectual giant who represented postwar Japan, Hisao Ōtsuka (historian, Maruyama’s senior colleague, 1907–1996) passed away in July of 1996. At the funeral, Maruyama’s message of condolence to Ōtsuka was delivered by his agent. And, as if following his senior colleague’s death, Maruyama passed away
on the symbolic day of August 15 that same year—the day that is generally considered to mark Japan’s loss of the war in 1945. He was 82 years old.

The final goal of his studies of politics and Japanese intellectual history was, as we examined, to show the way to achieve a spiritual revolution of the Japanese people. The following remark has literally become his final message on the theme. The tape, recorded by his students six months prior to his death, is the last message by Maruyama. The sticker on the cassette records the date and place: The Volunteer Board of Maruyama Seminar, 12/3/1995, the Mitsui Club, Shinjuku.

It seems there is something wrong with Japan. Again, what was most disturbing to us is *Aum*. It is *Aum Shinrikyō* [an anti-social religious group; in 1995 *Aum* members released deadly sarin gas on a Tokyo subway train]. But . . . it seems most of you are thinking that the incident is something very unusual, or it has nothing to do with ordinary people. Many people seem to wonder why that kind of group was born. However, I don’t think that the incident is irrelevant to you all. In a nutshell, well, looking back to my youth, I am wondering if the whole of Japan was the *Aum Shinrikyo* cult. You know, I am quite sure about this: Very unreasonable things outside Japan go unmentioned internally in Japan. [Most Japanese] do not listen to others’ ideas at all. So, well, at the end, let me tell you one reasonable thing: [What I want to draw attention to is that] lacking the sense of otherness is the problem. Well, “others” are absent. Since we are having a conversation with the same fellows all the time, simply speaking, a serious problem is the deficiency of the sense of otherness. We lack it. I think it is a big problem here; [we should be aware of] the fear of that.

Therefore, the last thing that I would like to tell you is, looking around you, [you see that] really excellent people are working in completely different fields, aren’t they? I am wondering why these people don’t use more opportunities to contact each other and talk with each other horizontally, without [the commonality of being the former students of] Maruyama. I would like you all to connect with people in different workplaces horizontally. You are wasting a great chance! (NHK Software 1997)

We can notice here that Maruyama’s critical views on the narrow-mindedness of the Japanese, the vertical structure and the octopus-trap form of Japanese society, and the absence of horizontal communication between people, themes which appeared in the early Maruyama (e.g.,
He frequently used the logic of the transfer of something (e.g., political power, repression, information and so on) to contrast between vertical and horizontal flows. Since Chie Nakane’s sociological study of human relationships in Japanese “vertical society” was translated into English, in Western societies the concept of vertical society has been a popular way to express this characteristic of Japanese society and human relationships. Yet Maruyama had already applied the same concept in his early works. In his case, the logic of verticality was inspired originally by Max Weber (his theory of bureaucracy and iron cage, for example). Later in life, Maruyama also referred to Nakane’s study\(^{27}\) (Maruyama Masao Wabunshū, vol. 3, 402).

**Moments of Intolerance**

As seen in the introduction to this text, Kobayashi (2003) defines pluralist universalism by the late Maruyama in connection with the study of the wartime emperor system by the early Maruyama, rather than the theory of postwar fascism by the midterm Maruyama. The last message above addresses two things worth noting: first, the problems of the totalitarianization of Japanese society and the assimilation of its social members to the majority trend (due to the underdevelopment of modern individualism), which were the primary concerns of his study in the early postwar period (see his “Modern Thinking,” 1946: CW, vol. 3), and second, the

\(^{27}\) Nakane, Chie. 1972. *Japanese Society*. California: University of California Press. Nakane compares, for example, the cases of Japan and India and does not argue that Japanese society is absolutely vertical. What should be noted is that she clarifies that both the vertical structure and the horizontal structure can be observed in any society, and she merely argues that in the case of Japan, the use of the vertical structure becomes more effective in making human relationships and organizational management smooth. It is obvious that in the passages above, Maruyama understood Nakane’s theory when applying the network concept in comparison between vertical and horizontal relationships.
Japanese problem of lacking the sense of otherness (e.g., Maruyama and Hagiwara “Encounter with the Other” 1976: Conv., 7). These two topics are correlated in his political theory. It is through this line of thought, that we have been able to examine Maruyama’s later argument of totalitarianism as voluntary restraint (Maruyama “In the Midst of Totalitarianism of Self-Restraint” 1988: Maruyama Masao Wabunshū, vol. 3).

Despite the wide range of his study, Maruyama’s primary concern was always with thinking about why the Japanese could not obtain kindai-teki-shutaisei (近代的主体性; modern subjectivity, roughly equivalent to the autonomy and independence of the individuals). Throughout his academic life, he investigated the cause of the Japanese people’s inability to achieve modern subjectivity. In relation to this consistent concern, he tackled important themes such as the immaturity of the political consciousness of the Japanese, the three prototypes of Japanese thought (the prototypes of ethical consciousness, historical consciousness, and political consciousness), and the simultaneous occurrence of hyper-politicization and depoliticization. He developed his own philosophy of dialogue aiming to dissolve the introverted national character of the Japanese. His searching on these topics comprised most of his academic journey. Maruyama constantly problematized the absence of the modern subjectivity of the Japanese because the condition encouraged them to indulge in opportunistic thinking and behavior. This, in turn, made the Japanese vulnerable to movements of conformism. He attempted to demonstrate that this psychological character had a significant impact on Japanese national politics and diplomacy.

In another notable aspect of his work, Maruyama also rephrased “the other” as ishitsusha (異質者; a different being: the alien). He emphasized how important it was that the Japanese
would encounter different cultures and people in order for their psychologically closed society to transform into an open society.

In his life, Maruyama had witnessed moments of intolerance many times, the collective violence of which struck people of conscience:

1) When Maruyama was nine, the events of the massacre of Korean residents in Japan following the Great Kanto Earthquake (1923).

2) The repression of the Japanese communists by the government (1920s).

3) His activities on the student council at the First Higher School during the prewar era (1930s).

4) The nationalist movement in Japan carried out by fanatic intellectuals (1940s).

5) The phenomena of conversions of Japanese intellectuals during and after the Second World War (1940s–1950s).

6) The calamity of the Red Purge in Japan and McCarthyism in the United States, as well as his friend’s suicide during the incident (1950s).

7) The popularization and hollowing of postwar democracy in Japan (1960s onward).


He was also knowledgeable about historical events relating to the oppression of Christianity, for example, as well as other cases.

For Maruyama, totalitarianism was not limited to the case of Japanese militarism during World War II. It is a group of social psychological phenomena that are widely observed in many times and can take place in any region. His investigation of the problem was further developed when he addressed the issues of the rise of a new type of fascism (postwar fascism), which corresponded to the re-emergence of mass society in postwar Japan.
3. Dialogue between Nanbara and Maruyama on April 3, 1973

The Phantom of “Overcoming Modernity”

Maruyama assessed Japanese homogeneity as quite a rare case in world history. It has been maintained ethnically, linguistically, and culturally for nearly two thousand years (at least since the sixth century), resulting largely from the geographical condition of the country, since the Japanese archipelago is isolated by the waters on all sides. Except two historical cases, this particular condition did not allow other countries to attempt to physically invade or occupy Japan. But this condition also has formed a psychologically closed society. According to Maruyama, life in the closed system and insufficient amounts of contact with other cultures made the Japanese unaware of their feudal national character from inside the system. Many sociological studies show that the relative narrow-mindedness of the Japanese has not changed up until today.

Maruyama predicted that the birth of new global-transportation technology and systems would have a tremendous impact on the global exchanges of human resources, and he expected that the Japanese would also become involved in the global interchange (Maruyama and Hagiwara 1976: Conv., vol. 7).

We can expect that Japan will be fulfilled with multiethnic and multicultural conditions on an extensive scale in the future, if major cities around the world become connected and reachable within thirty minutes by further development of aviation technology and if the visa system and borders are abolished all over the world (Maruyama Masao Wabunshū, vol. 3, 302). As a result of the social changes, the problem of poor communication by the Japanese in foreign languages and the narrow-mindedness of the Japanese people may be finally eliminated in the future. However, this vision is far in the future of Japanese society; for the time being, the
Japanese need to look for an alternative way to cope with the evils of their introverted national character, which Maruyama referred to as the psychological pathologies of the Japanese.

**Getting over the Pitfalls of Nativism and Releasing Indigenous Energy**

In their 1973 dialogue “Kikigaki Nanbara Shigeru ‘Seiji-rironshi’: Nanbara Shigeru Chosaku Shū Dai 4 Kan ‘Kaisetsu’ no tameni” [Interview Record: Shigeru Nanbara “History of Political Theory”: For ‘Commentary’ on Collected Works of Shigeru Nanbara, vol. 4.], Nanbara and Maruyama discussed their thoughts about the trend of universality possibly emerging in the future global community, and how the Japanese people would participate in that trend. Here, they are discussing that the Japanese tend to misunderstand Western rationalism; they are also talking about a current revival of the intellectual movement of “overcoming modernity,” propagated by wartime nationalists who were proud of the Japanese spiritual culture:

Maruyama: Nowadays, new risks have emerged, like environmental pollution and other problems; the harm of modern science, technology and civilization has become apparent. Yet such concerns also turn to a general denial of the West. What Japan primarily received from the West is modern science, technology, and civilization. And European rationalism has resulted in the problems I mentioned. This kind of idea seems fashionable today.

Nanbara: That’s wrong. As you know, as we discussed, the philosophy of the Meiji Restoration also dismissed the truly valuable things from [the philosophy of] Mill or Spencer. Such an understanding of civilization: This is not a problem only for Japan. The [contemporary] world consists of such an understanding of civilization. Ignoring the truly important thing, human beings pursue science and technology, the empty development. Once again, the human race should return to the point of departure.

Maruyama: Yes. The West is still better. Japan is risky. It becomes the general denial of the West.

Nanbara: It is, again, the same thing during the war. That’s bad.

Maruyama: It becomes the denial of Western rationalism. There is a variety of rationalism. Rationalism of science and technology is not the only sort of rationalism.
However, the total denial of Western rationalism is considered fashionable these days. In a sense, it has been similar to wartime. Shouting “overcoming modernity”; it becomes very similar to that.

Nanbara: Going back to the old days again.

Maruyama: Yes. Then, one idea is being primitive, such as living in the forest, like hippies. Literally, going back to the primitive nature. And another is nativism. This is also similar [to the wartime]. So it becomes anti-Europe, the ideology of anti-Europe.

Nanbara: That is no good. Likewise, we shouldn’t ignore the universal course of humanity. I must say: “Join the universal flow while maintaining the individuality.” [Japan] Must contribute to form the global flow. The Japanese have not understood the flow yet, except a few people. Much more so are [Japanese] politicians and adults in recent years.

Maruyama: I often say, “It hasn’t been long since Japan’s opening to the world. Japan is just one hundred years old since the opening of the country to Europe.”

Nanbara: She is still young.

Maruyama: Yes, so it is funny to see that some Japanese believe that they know Europe enough.

Nanbara: I put this in the concluding part of my book. How will Japan contribute to the world? Again, entering the inside of the flow of universality, and then how does Japan act in it? And Japan takes advantage of the Oriental spirit out there. She can do it.

Maruyama: However, the modernization of Europe itself has become imperialism (laughs). So, denying that point becomes denying everything of Europe.

Nanbara: But, Japan also took the course of imperialism. That’s the same crime (laughs). Don’t blame European people due to the common sin.

Maruyama: But, rather, Japan has been engaged in learning the worst part.

Nanbara: It is a turning point of the world’s civilization. From the twentieth century to the twenty-first century, toward another Renaissance and Reformation. . . . (Maruyama Masao Wabunshū, vol. 4, 421–423)

In the passage above, Nanbara and Maruyama are convinced of the feasibility of the simultaneous achievement of the activation of Japanese individuality and Japan’s participation in the global trend of universalism. Their idea can be used as a blueprint for the global movement.
of genuine universalism, under which every culture can share the universal ideas, and at the same time, every culture can seek the uniqueness of its identity. Remember that Maruyama never denied cultural particularism itself. Rather, he sought an appropriate way for the activation of the true “indigenous energy,” instead of egoistic, emotional expressions of nativism.

4. Beyond the Prototype toward Global Consciousness

Nowadays, reexamining the Western principles of democracy and basic human rights, Western universalist thinkers seek to reconstruct Western universalism. For example, Immanuel Wallerstein has presented his idea of “genuine universalism.” In the final remarks of his public lecture, he illustrated his future vision of European universalism:

We are at the end of a long era, which can go by many names. One appropriate name could be the era of European universalism. We are moving into the era after that. One possible alternative is a multiplicity of universalisms that would resemble a network of universal universalisms. . . . There is no guarantee that we shall arrive there. This is the struggle of the coming twenty to fifty years. The only serious alternative is a new hierarchical, inegalitarian world that will claim to be based on universal values, but in which racism and sexism will continue to dominate our practices, quite possibly more viciously than in our existing world-system. So we must all simply persist in trying to analyze a world-system in its age of transition, in clarifying the alternatives available and thereby the moral choices we have to make, and finally, in illuminating the possible political paths we wish to choose.28

The crux of Wallerstein’s idea is arguing for the importance of relativizing the traditional claim of European universalism, which had one-sidedly propagated the universal value of democracy and basic human rights to non-Western countries. Although it is not so much clear what Wallerstein means by his term of “genuine universalism,” he at least aims for the coexistence of

plural universalisms separated from different cultural regions. This idea is quite similar to Maruyama’s idea of pluralist universalism.

In the text above, although Wallerstein is speaking to Western audiences, it is also understood that he is giving his lecture to a global population. Of course, his argument is based on his world-systems theory. He is attempting to relativize European universalism within the unified, global, capitalist world system. Therefore, every resident of every region of the global society would be involved in his project of genuine universalism. “We,” in the above statement, includes all the global residents, even though we differ in our cultural traits. It is important to understand that Wallerstein’s narrative can be linked to the dialogue between Nanbara and Maruyama; what should be noticed is that contemporary universalist thinkers such as Nanbara, Maruyama, and Wallerstein do not deny cultural and political particularism itself. Instead, these political thinkers suggest that universalism and particularism are not incompatible political ideas.

Findings

The research consequence and findings of this study are as follows:

1) Philosophically, Maruyama does not apply a particular political ideology a priori in order to develop his political theory. His political thinking does not take such a procedure. By the preference of researchers who do not see its whole picture, different ideological aspects, from a wartime closet agitator for national mobilization (Nakano 2001) to a loyal believer in liberalism (Karube 2006 [2008]), can merely be extracted from Maruyama’s multi-faceted political thought. Rather, the reader needs to understand his basic philosophical ideas supporting his political theory and discourse.

2) Maruyama’s cosmopolitan ideas were developed through his lifelong struggle against Japanese feudalism, collectivism, and conformism.

3) Maruyama’s cosmopolitan-related ideas are already presented in his early works.
This study concentrated on calling Western readers’ attention to Maruyama’s political thought and philosophy. I reorganized important research surrounding his political thought carried out by Japanese scholars in order to paint a more complete picture of its basic structure. From there, my study focused on Maruyama’s unique universalism and cosmopolitanism. I considered the reason why he became a cosmopolitan thinker in Japan and analyzed his criticism of the political use of cultural particularity in distorted manners. This study also examined his epistemology on universality and particularity; applying Hegelian concepts, Maruyama developed a unique method to extract the Japanese thing from the way of thinking and the behavior of the Japanese (Maruyama 1964: CW, vol. 16, 51).

My research can be expanded upon in the future by asking several questions. First, how can I characterize Maruyama’s theory of others in comparison to Western theories? Second, how can the idea of the rising “universal consciousness” suggested by Maruyama and Nanbara correspond to reconstructing Western universalism? Based on the findings of this study, my next research theme will be to advance to conduct an East-West comparative study of cosmopolitan political theories. For example, Andrew Heywood has presented three models of multiculturalism: the liberal model, the pluralist model, and the cosmopolitan model. According to Heywood’s guidelines, I can preliminarily say that the third model, cosmopolitan multiculturalism, has many similarities to Maruyama’s cosmopolitan political thought. Heywood describes it thus:

Cosmopolitan multiculturalism endorses cultural diversity and identity politics, but views them more as transitional states in a larger reconstruction of political sensibilities and priorities. This form of multiculturalism celebrates diversity on the grounds of what each culture can learn from other cultures, and because of the prospects for personal self-development offered by a world of wider cultural opportunities and lifestyle choices.

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Culture is, in this view, fluid and responsive to changing political and social circumstances; it is not fixed and historically embedded, as pluralist and particularist multiculturalists would argue. This can lead to a kind of pick-and-mix multiculturalism, which portrays society as “melting pot,” as opposed to a “cultural mosaic” of separate ethnic or religious groups. From the individual’s perspective, the exploration of different cultural options and ways of life is positively endorsed, if not encouraged. In some senses, this model stands clearly apart from pluralist and even, to some extent, liberal multiculturalism, in that it positively embraces the ideas of multiple identity and hybridity. Hybridity is embraced because people, regardless of their cultural origins, share the same planet and are confronted by very similar challenges and experiences. This form of multiculturalism is thus rooted in cosmopolitanism and global consciousness. It is the kind of multiculturalism that is usually supported by many in the anti-globalization movement. (Heywood 2007, 217. Emphasis in original.)

Even in this brief look at Heywood’s work, we can notice the overlap of several key concepts between Maruyama’s cosmopolitanism and the cosmopolitan multiculturalism described above, such as the emphasis on the importance of cultural contact to develop the open-mindedness of the individuals, hybridity, and global consciousness. Regardless of these conceptual similarities, however, we should remember that Maruyama’s cosmopolitanism emerged through his struggle with the introversion of the national character of the Japanese and Japanese homogeneous society; once again, I wish to emphasize that Maruyama’s cosmopolitanism differs in its origin from Western cosmopolitanisms that have developed in culturally diverse societies. In Western political theory, particularism is usually understood as reactionary cultural and political movements against universalism. In the context of political theory in the twenty-first century, we can rephrase the term universalism as the “globalization” of particular political ideas and systems. In Western academic society, in progress are a fierce debate between the propagation of the universal truth of modern Western political ideas, represented by a claim of the universal value of liberal democracy, and traditional wisdoms, such as those of indigenous ideas for social order and conflict resolution.
In contrast, Maruyama’s cosmopolitanism developed through his criticism of narrow-minded types of Japanese particularism. Although I did not in my research find any specific texts in which he gives a title of a cosmopolitan man to himself, it is obvious that Maruyama struggled with himself to be a cosmopolitan thinker. On the other hand, when we regard him as a universalist thinker, it does not mean that he supported the universal truth of particular political ideas, including democracy and universal human rights. In a sense, he took a relativist position on any political ideas, and he adhered to the philosophy of fluidity about all things in nature. Only because he valued the ideal, Idee, or the transcendent universal existence, can we consider him to be a universalist thinker. The reason for his emphasis on the Idee was a) to relativize the self, and b) to detach the self from the environment (i.e., one’s psychological blindness, surrounding situation, political reality and so forth).

Throughout this study, we have examined Maruyama’s analyses of Japanese political-psychological pathology. He critiqued the irresponsible system of wartime ultra-nationalism as the most extreme case of many outbreaks of the pathology. To combat this pathology, he put an emphasis on the modernization of the political consciousness of the individuals beyond that of political institution and he promoted a spiritual revolution of the Japanese. Maruyama regarded the narrow-mindedness of the Japanese as pathology largely due to his interest in the role and influence of the human mind in political phenomena. His empirical studies of Japanese politics attempted to demonstrate that Japanese groupthink, collective behavior, and feudalistic human relationships negatively influenced how Japanese politics formed. Maruyama was aware of his tendency to criticize the Japanese Confucian value system and culture as the Japanese specific problem, although he also understood that the phenomena that he critically sketched were not necessarily particular to Japan.
Finally, regardless of his efforts to criticize the disadvantages of Japanese feudalism, Japanese collectivism, and the introversion of the Japanese national character, we should not dismiss that the conservative stream of thought, attempting to preserve the feudal customs of mindset, behavior patterns, and human relationship style that are represented by sexism, familism, and the *senpai-kōhai* (senior-junior) system ruling the Japanese people, is still dominant in the country. Japanese conservatives persistently appeal to the public to gain their approvable for a positive interpretation of the same pathological phenomena that Maruyama criticized. Moreover, from the viewpoint of cost-benefit performance, some argue that in Japanese society, preserving Japanese feudal customs is a preferable method and will help to achieve efficient human relationships and organizational management, rather than abolishing them. This is seen in the rise of new conservative movements by new generations, who do not have memories of the war and postwar periods; they aim to reconstruct the Japanese feudal culture in a contemporary way. When studying Maruyama in context, we need to keep in mind that reactionary movements against his style of cosmopolitanism are also quite powerful in Japan. Indeed, the development of a cosmopolitan thinker like him is rather an exceptional case in the intellectual climate of Japan.

I must also say that the emergence of universalist political thinkers such as Maruyama and Nanbara are rather rare cases in the introverted spiritual soil of Japan. Even today, many contemporary sociological studies of Japanese people, organizations, and lifestyles show the stagnation of feudalism and the rise of reactionary movements against the liberation from *jukon* (儒魂; the Confucian spirit) in various fields throughout Japan. Personally, I am skeptical as to whether the majority of Japanese people will take the course that Nanbara and Maruyama suggested; I cannot be optimistic about the possibility of the Japanese public breaking through
the feudal style of thought patterns and human relationships. Maruyama once described the character of mass society in contemporary Japan as the collusion between hyper-modernity and pre-modernity without modernity. In his view, the key to genuine modernization of Japan was to modernize the psychological aspect of the people beyond mere institutional modernization. But a bigger question still remains unanswered; despite the development of modernization in material and institutional phases, why are the feudal mentality and human relationships still very much alive in Japan? As Maruyama pointed out, if the continuation of a closed-door style of politics and political withdrawal of the mass public in Japan are primarily due to the survival of feudal mentality of the Japanese, this socio-political problem will continue to be an important research question in Japanese studies and comparative politics. Based on recent research and statistical data, further investigation is required in order to update Maruyama’s theory of political culture and psychology and more thoroughly understand its potential for analyzing contemporary issues of Japanese people and society.
Endnotes

1. Maruyama Masao (丸山 眞男 or 丸山 真男, 1914–1996) is a former professor of the Department of Law at the University of Tokyo, Japan. He is one of the best-known Japanese political thinkers of the twentieth century. He has many faces as an historian, a political scientist and thinker, a theorist of mass society, and a critic of civilization, but he regarded himself as an historian of Japanese political thought. He was also a student of Western classical music. He is globally famous for his study of the extreme-nationalism or ultra-nationalism of wartime Japan, which was conducted shortly after the end of World War II (Maruyama 1946 [1969]). Analyzing stenographic records of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, which he borrowed from his colleague, Maruyama analyzed the relation between the polity of the wartime emperor system and the psychology of the nation. He analyzed the mechanism of how the fanatic ideology of the Japanese emperor system eroded the nation psychologically and how they were mobilized. During the largest mass movement, the Anpo opposition movement (1959–1960), Maruyama, as one of the leading intellectuals of the time, led the political campaign, and his public speech “Sentaku no Toki” [Time to Choose] (Maruyama 1960: CW, vol. 8) invigorated Japanese citizens that revolted against the high-handed politics of the then Kishi Cabinet. In the 1960s, being satisfied with the fruit of academically training younger scholars in the political science discipline, Maruyama decided to withdraw from the study of political science and concentrate on his expertise of Japanese intellectual history. On occasion of his lectures at Tokyo University, he developed the theory of the prototype of Japanese thought. After retiring from Tokyo University in 1971, while continuing the study of Japanese intellectual history, he presented his own theory of others and philosophy of dialogue at roundtable discussions and public lectures, and he continually expounded on the importance that the Japanese people should break away from their narrow-mindedness, establish the principle of modern individualism, and obtain the sense of cosmopolitan or “universal consciousness.”

2. During the 1990s and 2000s, various Japanese intellectuals offered external criticisms on Maruyama’s works. Their careless criticisms were poisoned by commercialism or resulted from insufficient research. Those works were counterproductive in deepening our understandings of Maruyama’s political thought. Those critics neglected to conduct comprehensive readings of Maruyama’s texts. For example, in his own way Toshio Nakano deconstructed Maruyama’s wartime academic essays on Neo-Confucian thinkers and claimed that between the lines, he discovered Maruyama’s hidden intention to encourage the Japanese to cooperate with the war efforts (Nakano, Toshio. 2001. Ōtsuka Hisao to Maruyama Masao: Dōin, Shutai, and Sensō-sekinin [Hisao Ōtsuka and Masao Maruyama: Mobilization, the Subject, and War Responsibility]. Tokyo: Seidosha). Meanwhile, Tadashi Karube wrote a story as if Maruyama was a devout believer of liberalism:

Instead, modern thought should be understood in terms of universal human ideals and norms whose early stirrings we can also find in Japan in the Tokugawa period (1600–1868). In fact, Maruyama’s selection of the origins and significance of modern nationalism as a research topic was initially spurred during his time as an academic assistant, when, at his father Kanji’s suggestion, he read an article entitled “Jiyūshugi ikan” (What is liberalism?, 1890) by the Meiji-period columnist and editor of the
newspaper, *Nihon*, Kuga Katsunan. The thought of Japanese writers such as Kuga and Fukuzawa, even if it was a legacy of the early Meiji period and already influenced by Western ideas, was providing Maruyama with the raw material he would meticulously reassemble into a reevaluation of modern thought focused on the concept of liberty. (Karube 2008, 73–74)

Maruyama liked to quote definitions of freedom by Voltaire: “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it”; and by Rosa Luxembourg: “Freedom is always the freedom to think differently from others.” For him, to be a liberal—and especially to be a Japanese liberal—meant believing in the value of freedom, no matter what the circumstances. August 15, 1945, with its tragedy and hope, became the point of departure for his efforts in pursuit of this ideal. (Karube 2008, 93)

The history of arbitrary reading and distorted interpretation of Maruyama’s works by these Japanese intellectuals has been largely dispelled in Japanese academic circles, thanks to the appearance of several prominent works on Maruyama’s thought by Sasakura (2003), Mamiya (2008), and Kobayashi and others (2003), and elaborate commentaries for the complete works by the editors Sawamatsu, Uete, Matsuzawa, and Iida. By exploring Maruyama’s works, Sasakura’s and Mamiya’s studies both have encouraged us to grasp the entire structure and more accurately distill the philosophical essence of Maruyama’s political thought. Without a doubt, both studies are located at the apex of the study of Maruyama’s thought. On some points taken up by my study, their writings in fact provide more informative commentaries and deeper analyses than my descriptions, as the goal of my work is to introduce Western readers to the outline and basic structure of Maruyama’s political thought and philosophy. Unfortunately, their studies have not yet been translated into Western languages.

In Western academic society, which has generally given Maruyama a fixed ideological position such as a liberal, nationalist, or democratic advocate, academic discussions on Maruyama have relatively concentrated on his historical role as the leading public intellectual in the processes of postwar Japanese democratization. In my view, recent research by Western scholars is still bound to that trajectory. Contrary to that convention, I would like to encourage Western scholars to explore the contents of Maruyama’s political thought and philosophy themselves. For this purpose, English translations of Mamiya’s and Sasakura’s works should be published as early as possible. It is expected that the introduction of both studies into Western academic society would initiate a new tack in Western studies of Maruyama.

**The Latest Academic Trend of Study of Maruyama’s Thought in Japan**

The academic projects of arranging Maruyama’s works into several series have come to their completion. The completion of the projects has made it possible for scholars to see the whole picture of Maruyama’s achievement. It has also enabled experts to analyze his studies of Japanese intellectual history in more detail. Qualified and comprehensive studies on the area of Maruyama’s expertise have begun to appear such as Tanaka (2009) and Tōyama (2010). They both closely analyze a series of *Collected Transcripts of the Lectures of Masao Maruyama* published in 1998, and attempt to seek for the theoretical potential of Maruyama’s prototype theory. Their studies also attempt to draw readers’ attention to Maruyama’s theory of others. In other words, Tanaka and Tōyama both successfully reinterpreted Maruyama’s theory of modern subjectivity from the side of his theory of others. In-depth studies on the relevance of the two
fields of Maruyama’s studies, political science and studies of Japanese intellectual history, have also been elucidated by other experts.

After Maruyama’s death in 1996, approximately 30,000 materials have been left in his house, including books, writing manuscripts, fragmentary notes and memos, letters, and scores of Western classical music with Maruyama’s notes. Most of the materials have been donated by his family to Tokyo Women’s Christian University and the Maruyama Masao Center for the History of Ideas was established in 2002 (http://office.twcu.ac.jp/facilities/maruyama/bunko/index.html). The institute stores approximately 18,000 books and 5,400 drafts, including Maruyama’s own manuscripts and notes. The stored materials make it possible to configure the whole picture of Maruyama’s learning and thought process. These materials are available to the researchers and students by application.

For an analysis of the whole picture of Maruyama’s thought, there are two unexplored parts. One is his studies of the theme “Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy,” which remains unfinished in spite of 40-year collaborative research with Tsuguharu Fujita and Takeshi Ishida. The other is his studies of Western classical music. For the former, there remains the primary source such as cassette tapes which recorded their discussions on the orthodoxy and heterodoxy workshops. As of today, researchers can partly study Maruyama’s theories on the theme through a few works such as “Chūsei to Hangyaku” [Loyalty and Rebellion] (1960: CW, vol. 8) or “Ansai Gaku to Ansahi Gakuha” [The Science of Ansai and the Ansai School] (1980: CW, vol. 11). The other unstudied area is his study of the Western classical music. Numerous numbers of scores with Maruyama’s analytical notes are preserved. It is expected that these two areas will be explored by experts through arranging and publishing the above remaining materials.

The Current State of English Translation of Maruyama’s Works

Meanwhile, as of 2013, two of Maruyama’s books are available in English. However, English translations of the mid- and late Maruyama (the 1970s to the 1990s) are necessary for Western scholars to study his prototype theory and his theory of civilization. I sincerely hope that a better literature condition will be in place in the near future to aid Western academics. Moreover, Maruyama’s text is supported by extensive knowledge and is also highly compressed (to narrow the issues, he sometimes boldly omits explanations of necessary background knowledge for his argument). Accordingly, each single sentence becomes rich in connotation. Since sometimes all lines of each paragraph become important, Maruyama’s work does not allow researchers to summarize easily. Eventually, it is much preferable that Western readers have direct access to his original text.

Western scholars also need to reread Maruyama’s Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan (1974) to understand the eventual turn of his evaluation of the modernity of Japan, which spontaneously emerged from within. In the early works, he evaluated Sorai Ogyū’s idea of separating the public sphere and the private sphere as an indicator of modern thinking. These ambitious works on Neo-Confucian thinkers of early Maruyama challenges the Japanese original occurrence of modern thinking from within. Famously, the works inspired Michel Foucault (French philosopher, 1926–1984).

Since the 1950s, Maruyama, however, changed his previous positive evaluation on the emergence of modern thinking in Ogyū’s works. His reconsideration was due to the rapid change of the political situation surrounding postwar Japan. The three essays in the above book are works written before Maruyama applied a new perspective of cross-cultural contact in earnest (from the 1950s to the 1960s). Therefore, the English translations of works of the midterm of
Maruyama and the late Maruyama, including “Nihon no Shisō” [Japanese Thought] (Maruyama 1957: CW, vol. 7), should be anticipated by Western readers in order that they may study the development of Maruyama’s ideas of modernity, whereas his early works still continue to provide material for our consideration on the universal conditions of modernization beyond cultural differences.

3. The “prototype” of Japanese thought is the hypothetical mode of thinking of the Japanese people, which has been used to modify and Japanize foreign universal ideas or the world religions, such as Confucianism, Buddhism, Christianity, Marxism (as quasi-religion), liberalism, democracy, socialism and others. Maruyama hypothesizes that the Japanese have transferred the particular thought pattern, sense of value, worldview, or view of life from generation to generation since ancient times. Since the prototype is simply a hypothesized one, its content cannot be embodied and formulized as doctrine. In his “Genkei, Kosō, Shitsuyō-tei’on: Nihon-shisōshi Hōhōron ni tsuite no Watakushi no Ayumi” [Prototype, Old Layer, and Basso Ostinato: My Methodological Footsteps for Japanese Intellectual History] (1984: CW, vol. 12), Maruyama explains the way of extracting the prototype. His method is to subtract the element of foreign influences in Japanese ancient documents such as the Kojiki (古事記; Records of Ancient Matters) and the Nihonshoki (日本書紀; Chronicles of Japan)—already influenced by foreign thought such as Confucianism and Buddhism—and to extract the “something” eventually left. As for Maruyama’s method of elimination, Chikatsugu Iwasaki analyzes in detail its epistemological and methodological problems (Iwasaki, Chikatsugu. 1989. Nihon-bunkaron to Shinsō-shirī [Cultural Theory of Japan and Depth Psychology]. Tokyo: Shin'nhon Shuppansha). Several suggestive studies on Maruyama’s prototype theory have also been published gradually since the 1970s and 1980s, including historian Shō Ihsimoda’s papers (Ishimoda 1977; Iida 1998: CW, vol. 10, 371–374), and, in younger generations of Japanese intellectual history, Tanaka and Tōyama. Maruyama argues that the prototype of Japanese thought consists of the prototypes of the ethical consciousness, historical consciousness, and political consciousness. Before the publication of Maruyama Masao Kōgiroku [Collected Transcripts of the Lectures of Masao Maruyama] in seven volumes, the reader could partly know his theory of the prototype of historical consciousness in his “Rekishi-ishiki no ‘Kosō’” [The “Ancient Strata” of Historical Consciousness] (1972: CW, vol. 10) and the prototype of political consciousness in his “Matsurigoto no Közō: Seiji-ishiki no Shitsuyō-tei’on” [The Structure of Matsurigoto: The Basso Ostinato of Political Consciousness] (1985: CW, vol. 12). Now, it has become possible to study his prototype theory, including the aspect of ethical consciousness, more systematically thanks to the publication of The Lectures of Masao Maruyama.

4. For instance, according to my count, 339 independent manuscripts are recorded in the seventeen volumes of the complete works in a chronological order. I counted short pieces such as his 2-page essay “Kindai-tekishii” [Modern Thinking] (1946: CW, vol. 3) as one. Meanwhile, I also counted the record of his lectures on “[Fukuzawa’s] ‘Bunmeiron no Gairyaku’ o Yomu” [Reading An Outline of a Theory of Civilization] (1986) as one essay, though it occupies the whole volumes 13 and 14. As a few of “postscripts” in the book form were recorded as independent texts in the complete works, I counted them as independent works. The complete works include some personal letters and condolences, which should be recorded all together in Maruyama Masao Shokan Shū [Collected Letters of Masao Maruyama], vols. 5 (2003–2004), yet I counted them independently. When counted this way, the total number reaches 339. Therefore,
substantially we have roughly 200 to 250 academic essays. In terms of content, they include pure academic essays on Japanese intellectual history, such as “The Sorai School: Its Role in the Disintegration of Tokugawa Confucianism and its Impact on National Learning” and “Chûsei to Hangyaku” [Loyalty and Rebellion] (1960); semi-academic essays such as “Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism” and “‘Dearu’ Koto to ‘Suru’ Koto’” [“Being” and “Doing”] (Maruyama 1959: CW, vol. 8); book reviews; newsletters; speech manuscripts from conferences; and responses to surveys.

As for the reasons for Maruyama’s productivity, Uete points out that first, Maruyama was not reluctant to write, and second, he liked to promote thinking and discussions among the public through publishing his writings (Uete “Bibliographical Introduction for Collected Works, vol. 2”). Uete points out that a) writing many book reviews in the earlier stage of Maruyama’s academic life trained him, and b) being the son of news reporter contributed to Maruyama’s innate journalistic character (CW, vol. 2, 274). In fact, Maruyama himself was thinking of becoming a journalist until noticing in passing a recruitment flyer for assistants in the Department of Law at his university. His decision to stay in academics was made right before his graduation.

5. In 1939, Tsuda demonstrated the falsehood of the substantiality of Prince Shōtoku (574–622) in the Nihonshoki [Chronicles of Japan]. In the same year, Minoda and others attacked Tsuda as guilty of lese-majesty. They criticized his study as an annihilating theory of the unified spiritual culture that could connect the East and Japan, resulting in a satanic and nihilistic idea. On February 10, 1940, the authorities prohibited the sale of Tsuda’s four publications, including A Study of Kojiki and Nihonshoki (1919), A Study on History of the Times of Gods (1924), A Study of Ancient History of Japan (1930), and Society and Spirit in Ancient Japan (1933). In the same year, he was finally forced to resign from his professorship at Waseda University by order of the Ministry of Education. Tsuda and Shigeo Iwanami (1881–1946), the publisher, were prosecuted for violating the press law, and in May 1942 the authorities sentenced them to three months of imprisonment for Tsuda and two months for Iwanami, and a two-year probation for both. Although Tsuda appealed, his case was dismissed by prescription in 1944.

After the war, because of his prewar experience of oppression, he was enthusiastically welcomed by the Japanese academia. “Tsuda’s view of history,” which denies the imperial view of history based on mythology, had become the mainstream of studies of history after the Second World War. He became the representative historian, embodying the postwar transformation of values. However, in 1946, in his essays “Circumstances of the National Founding” and “The Thought of an Unbroken Imperial Line,” he insisted on the survival of the emperor system by arguing that the imperial system changes as time goes by, and therefor need not conflict with democracy. Abolitionists of the emperor system critically regarded Tsuda’s remarks as turgid from his prewar idea. However, his idea of the development of the emperor system into a constitutional monarchy was consistent between the prewar and postwar periods.

6. The eleventh note on “‘Jishuku no Zentaishugi’ no Sanakani: Maruyama Masao-sensei o Kakomukai” [In the Midst of “Totalitarianism of Jishuku”: With Masao Maruyama-sensei] (Maruyama 1988) reads as follows:

Totalitarianism of Jishuku: Broadcasts in Japan voluntarily regulated the content of variety shows and TV commercials, and in popular song shows, “inappropriate” casts
were replaced and “inappropriate” lyrics of songs were omitted on the screen. Canceled were the Nagasaki Kunchi Festival, Jidai Matsuri [Festival of the Ages] in Kyoto, Tokyo Festival, Japan Music Awards (by eight commercial broadcasters), and the concert at Tokyo Station of East Japan Railways. Wedding receptions of famous actors or singers were postponed. Sea bream and red rice [in Japanese food culture, eaten in occasions for celebration] were disappeared from store shelves in grocery stores. In private companies, clothing and activities of *settai* [接待; providing entertainment for business clients] were voluntarily restrained by *shamei* [社命; instruction of company]. A spate of voluntary restraint movements was observed nationally; for example, there were cancellations of autumn festivals, sports festivals, group travel, year-end parties, *Kadomatsu* [門松; gate pines: a Japanese traditional decoration of the New Year, which is made of pine and bamboo and placed in front of homes to welcome ancestral spirits], and new-year greeting cards. As a result, related industries were hit hard economically. In 1989, although January 8, the following day of Emperor Shōwa’s death on January 7, was the first day of the third semester, the scheduled opening ceremony was postponed in many elementary schools, junior high schools, and high schools. (*Maruyama Masao Wabunshū*, vol. 3, 456–457)
References


